Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6071

1 Monday, 26 April 2004

2 [Open session]

3 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

4 [The accused entered court]

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar, will you

6 please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-01-47-T, the Prosecutor versus

8 Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10 Can we have the appearances for the Prosecution, please.

11 MR. WITHOPF: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your

12 Honours. Good afternoon, Counsel. For the Prosecution, Tecla Benjamin,

13 Ekkehard Withopf, and Ruth Karper, the case manager.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Withopf.

15 Can we have the appearances for the Defence.

16 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. President.

17 Good afternoon, Your Honours. On behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina

18 Residovic, lead counsel; Stephane Bourgon, co-counsel; and Mirna

19 Milanovic, legal assistant. Thank you.

20 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

21 On behalf of Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and

22 Mr. Mulalic, legal assistant.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. After the weekend,

24 the Chamber bids good afternoon to all those present, representatives of

25 the Prosecution, the representatives of the accused, the accused, and the

Page 6072

1 staff of this courtroom, and most particularly Madam Registrar, who's

2 going to assist us this week.

3 I also wish to greet the interpreters and the court reporter, as

4 well as the security officers.

5 Today we shall be continuing the hearing of a witness who

6 testified on Friday, and his testimony will be continued by his

7 cross-examination. I have learnt from the legal officer that the Defence

8 has a statement to make, and I therefore give him the floor.

9 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Madam Judge. Good

10 afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon, Mr. President.

11 Good afternoon. Before beginning the cross-examination of the

12 witness who is before the Chamber, Lieutenant Colonel Chambers, we would

13 like to have certain clarifications regarding the ruling of the Chamber

14 regarding the duration of the cross-examination. Mr. President, our

15 understanding of the decision of the Chamber was that the Defence should

16 not take more than one and a half times the time used by the Prosecution

17 for the cross-examination. This time is to be shared by representatives

18 of both the Defence teams.

19 Mr. President, this is a problem for us and for the following

20 reasons: The witnesses that are before the Chamber that have appeared

21 during the last two weeks and during next week are international

22 witnesses, and these witnesses -- for these witnesses we will need more

23 time than the Prosecution. The Prosecution had the advantage of having

24 met the witness. They are their witnesses. And this particular witness

25 has already told the Prosecution what he has to say in this Chamber, so

Page 6073

1 there's -- so that is quite clear.

2 The Defence has a number of documents to deal with, many of which

3 have to do with international witnesses, and when an international witness

4 appears, if the Prosecution uses only a single document prepared by that

5 particular witness, it is a document that is -- that will be used in

6 support of their case, as is normal, it is understandable that we on the

7 Defence need to produce several documents which will require more time.

8 You have certainly understood, Mr. President, that the questions

9 discussed in this Chamber during the past few weeks and the week to come

10 are at the very heart of the case, and therefore it is very important for

11 us, for the Defence, to have adequate time to be able to properly use the

12 witness of the opposing side to support their case and their submissions.

13 Mr. President, I would like to indicate some statistics regarding

14 the time used by the Defence up to now. We have made these calculations

15 with the assistance of the registrar as well as our own records.

16 According to those statistics, Mr. President, the total time used by the

17 Prosecution up to now would be about 84 hours and 55 minutes; the total

18 used by the Defence would be 57 hours and 6 minutes; therefore, we account

19 for about 67 per cent of the time used by the Prosecution, and witness

20 Garrod has not been included because he still hasn't been cross-examined,

21 and also witness Chambers has not been included.

22 As regard the number of witnesses that have been cross-examined

23 by the Defence, we took less time than the Prosecution in 57 per cent of

24 the cases, among whom three were international witnesses, and in 78

25 per cent of the cases we were shorter than the Prosecution, counting all

Page 6074

1 the witnesses. And on 16 occasions, or in 22 per cent of the witnesses,

2 we took more time than the Prosecution. Therefore, one out of two

3 witnesses, or in 48 per cent of the cases, the Defence took less than half

4 of the time used by the Prosecution.

5 Finally, Mr. President, in order to be able to properly represent

6 the interests of the accused and our case, without wishing to waste any

7 time, we fully understand that if the Chamber believes that our arguments

8 were not relevant or were presented in a way that causes a waste of time,

9 then of course we can be interrupted and that would be quite normal. But

10 we respectfully request to be allowed to have sufficient time to properly

11 carry out our cross-examination. And we would like the decision of the

12 Chamber to apply to the duration of the case as a whole, the Prosecution

13 case. That is, once all the witnesses have been heard, we certainly will

14 not have exceeded one and a half times the time used by the Prosecution.

15 Otherwise, this could be prejudicial for us.

16 As for today's witness, when the Chamber told us that we would be

17 limited to 1 hour, 43 minutes for the cross-examination, we believe,

18 Mr. President, that we need 2 hours, 30 minutes. That is for both

19 accused. And as I explained a little earlier, the principal reason for

20 the duration of the cross-examination is linked to the presentation and

21 discussion of documents, which will be more numerous than those presented

22 by the Prosecution during the examination-in-chief.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Bourgon.

24 Does the other Defence team wish to say anything on this point?

25 Mr. Dixon.

Page 6075

1 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours.

2 Your Honours, as a practical matter, I understand, and the

3 Prosecution will in all likelihood inform Your Honours of this, the second

4 witness for today is no longer going to testify, and hence we may have

5 enough time in any event to complete the cross-examination of Mr. Chambers

6 and not have it affect the schedule. Other than that, Your Honours, we

7 can say that on behalf of Mr. Kubura that we have considered our questions

8 and will be able to complete our questions in the time allotted. Thank

9 you, Your Honours.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Dixon.

11 Mr. Withopf, regarding this problem of substance, what are the

12 observations of the Prosecution?

13 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, the Prosecution is a

14 bit concerned that it becomes a pattern that Defence wishes to

15 cross-examine the future Prosecution witnesses to an extent that is an

16 obvious contradiction to the recent ruling of the Trial Chamber. The

17 Prosecution is also a bit concerned that in the event this pattern

18 continues, it may have a negative -- a very negative impact on the

19 Prosecution's witness schedule, which has been communicated to both the

20 Defence and the Chamber recently.

21 For clarification, I wish to add one particular issue: It's not

22 only the Prosecution in respect to the international witnesses which meets

23 such witnesses in many instances; the Defence counsel also meet the

24 Prosecution international witnesses prior to their testimony.

25 Having said this, Mr. President, Your Honours, however, the

Page 6076

1 Prosecution does not object - does not object - a Defence application to

2 exceed the time limit, provided that certain conditions are met. Number

3 one: The Defence should provide the Prosecution and Trial Chamber in

4 detail reasons for extension of time to cross-examine Prosecution

5 witnesses, reasons for which on their face appear to be reasonable; the

6 Defence is allowed to only ask questions which appear to be relevant; and

7 number three - and the Prosecution wishes to emphasise this last point -

8 that the Prosecution at a later point during these proceedings - namely,

9 once the Defence presents their witnesses - that the Prosecution is also

10 at a case-by-case basis given more time to cross-examine the Defence

11 witnesses.

12 In respect to the today's cross-examination of the witness

13 Chambers, Mr. President, Your Honours, the Prosecution does not object to

14 the Defence application. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you,

16 Mr. Withopf.

17 The Chamber will withdraw for a couple of minutes to deliberate.

18 Nevertheless, I wish to recall that we decided by a previous oral decision

19 to limit the duration of the cross-examination to 50 per cent more than

20 the time allotted to the Prosecution, which means that if the Prosecution

21 takes one hour, the Defence will have an hour and a half; if the

22 Prosecution takes two hours, the Defence will have three hours; that is,

23 50 per cent in addition to the time used by the Prosecution. That means

24 the time should be multiplied by 1.5.

25 The Defence attorneys, who have studied the time used up to now,

Page 6077

1 tell us that in general terms the Defence has used less time than the

2 Prosecution and that on 16 occasions, which is in 22 per cent of the

3 cases, the Defence exceeded the time taken by the Prosecution. Concerning

4 more specifically the international observers, the Defence tells us that

5 in view of the fact that these witnesses are important, and as noted by

6 the Defence we are at the core of the issue, the Defence would need to

7 produce certain documents during the cross-examination, and this could

8 take a little more time than the duration of the examination-in-chief.

9 By way of a compromise, the Defence commits itself that should the

10 time be exceeded for certain witnesses, the Defence promises that globally

11 it will not take more than 50 per cent in addition to the time of the

12 Prosecution regarding the totality of the witnesses. And in this

13 particular case, we have 1 hour, 43 minutes for the Prosecution, the

14 Defence tells us that they would need two and a half hours for the

15 cross-examination.

16 The Prosecution in reply tell us that they're aware of the

17 problem, but that the Defence should not be used in a way that could

18 prejudice the proper conduct of the proceedings. That is why we will

19 withdraw for a few minutes and we will come back and render our ruling.

20 --- Break taken at 2.34 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 2.38 p.m.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber has deliberated

23 this matter, having heard the observations of the Defence, as well as of

24 the Prosecution. At this stage it is the opinion of the Chamber that

25 there's no need to reverse its previous decision, which means that the

Page 6078

1 Defence is allowed to have 50 per cent more time than the Prosecution.

2 On the other hand, due to exceptional circumstances linked to

3 certain witnesses known as international witnesses, the Defence by a

4 special submission may be authorised to exceed the time allotted it.

5 During the cross-examination the questions put to the witness

6 have to be relevant questions and must go to the heart of the matter,

7 rather than being questions that have no effectiveness, because in that

8 case everyone is wasting time and then one exceeds by far the time

9 allotted. That is the first observation.

10 The second is that as you have noted, in view of the highly

11 technical and military nature of the questions put, the Chamber itself

12 sometimes is prompted to ask questions, increasingly so, and following the

13 questions put by the Chamber the Defence also has time to come back to

14 certain matters. That time for the present is not being calculated, but

15 this is time that is at your disposal. And, therefore, we believe when

16 Judges ask questions at the end of the testimony, the Judges will again

17 give you the floor to ask questions.

18 The jurisprudence in this area indicates in general terms that

19 after the Judges, in theory the parties should not ask any questions,

20 except in two precise cases: If there are material errors made in the

21 replies of the witness to the questions of the Judges; or because the

22 witness is contributing new elements which have not been covered by the

23 Defence and could be prejudicial to the accused. And that is the very

24 specific jurisprudence in the area.

25 However, up to the present the Chamber has quite liberally

Page 6079

1 interpreted these Rules, allowing you to ask questions. So if the Judges

2 take ten minutes for their questions - take ten minutes, not half an hour,

3 because otherwise we will never be able to complete the proceedings as

4 planned. Having said that, we maintain our decision to give you 50

5 per cent more time than the Prosecution. We feel that if the questions

6 are properly focussed, that time is quite sufficient. However, should any

7 exceptional circumstances arise, ask permission from us to extend the

8 time, and in the cross-examination that is coming now you will have

9 several documents and then we will understand that the time it takes to

10 produce the document, to hear the opinion of the Prosecution, et cetera,

11 this might justify some extension.

12 For this particular witness, you asked an extra 45 minutes. Let

13 us say that if you put your questions properly, then there will be no need

14 to exceed the time limit. But we will see, depending on the documents

15 that you will be producing, that such an extension may be justified. But

16 we will watch the time with vigilance.

17 To avoid any further wasting of time, we will have the witness

18 brought in immediately.

19 Mr. Usher, would you be kind enough to bring in the witness.

20 It would also be a good idea if you have, five, six, seven

21 documents, before beginning the cross-examination to tell us that you plan

22 to tender five, six, seven documents. That is an indication, and that may

23 not be necessary, but as you have already prepared the cross-examination,

24 you know whether you're going to tender documents or not and you could

25 tell us that.

Page 6080

1 [The witness entered court]

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Good day, sir.

3 THE WITNESS: Good morning -- good afternoon.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You spent have the weekend here

5 so that we can continue with your cross-examination. I hope you had a

6 good weekend.

7 I will now let the Defence take the floor. They will commence

8 with the cross-examination.

9 Mrs. Residovic, you may proceed.

10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.


12 Cross-examined by Ms. Residovic:

13 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Chambers. My name is Edina

14 Residovic, and together with my colleague Stephane Bourgon I represent

15 General Hadzihasanovic.

16 We met last week and spoke about the information you had; is that

17 correct?

18 A. Quite right, yes.

19 Q. And similarly, prior to that, you also met Mr. Bourgon on one

20 occasion in London; is that correct?

21 A. I did, yes.

22 Q. And according to your testimony in the course of the

23 examination-in-chief, you were in Bosnia and Herzegovina from September

24 1993 until April 1994. That was when you were performing your duty in

25 Bosnia. Is that correct?

Page 6081

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. And during that period of time, if I have understood this

3 correctly, you were in the Department for Military Information, which was

4 part of the UNPROFOR headquarters for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was in

5 Kiseljak. Isn't that correct?

6 A. Yes, it is.

7 Q. Your main duties when holding that post consisted of collating

8 military information which you would obtain from various sources. You

9 have also had to assess the information obtained in this manner and

10 forward the information. Was that on the whole your main task?

11 A. That is correct. To assess the information from a variety of

12 sources and information points, to assess it so as to try and predict the

13 future fighting, future warfare and conflict, to allow for the

14 humanitarian aid to pass by the safest route. And I passed those

15 assessments and future assessments to a number of sources, both within and

16 outside Bosnia.

17 Q. And as you have said, it was your -- your personal responsibility

18 had to do with the area of the Canadian Battalion, the French Battalion,

19 and the battalion at the airport in Sarajevo; is that correct?

20 A. Yes. The -- the British Battalion in the area of Vitez; the

21 Canadian Battalion in the area of Visoko; and French 3rd Battalion in the

22 area of Sarajevo. Yes, that is correct.

23 Q. If I have understood this well, the sources you had were the

24 officers, the military information, from these three battalions, liaison

25 officers from the United Kingdom, the European Community Monitoring

Page 6082

1 Mission, and other non-governmental organisations and other organisations;

2 is that correct?

3 A. Yes, it is.

4 Q. You would compile a summary of the main information on a weekly

5 basis and send them to the units in the field, to UNPROFOR headquarters in

6 Zagreb, to the UNHCR, and to national intelligence services. This was for

7 the purposes of their government. Isn't that correct?

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 Q. Sometimes, as you have testified in the examination-in-chief --

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Residovic, I will

11 interrupt you now. The question has already been put, but that wasn't why

12 I was intervening.

13 In line 6, on page 12 you said that the witness passed on his

14 information to the intelligence services, to national intelligence

15 services. That doesn't appear to be what he said in response to the

16 questions put to him by the Prosecution.

17 So I will put the question to you, Witness: The Defence claims

18 that you would compile your reports, which would be forwarded to the UN,

19 the UNHCR, and to intelligence services. This means that you had a direct

20 link with the intelligence services of the various countries that were in

21 the field. Is that the meaning of the question and the meaning of your

22 answer? Because it doesn't appear clear. It didn't appear clear last

23 Friday. What could you tell us about this?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Each major contributing nation to the

25 United Nations sent back the military information summary and the

Page 6083

1 pictorial information summary that -- those documents that I compiled

2 every Sunday, they would send them back along their national communication

3 chains to their national Ministries of Defence, where the intelligence

4 communities, I would imagine, or assume, the intelligence communities of

5 each national government would then read those summaries.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You assume. The

7 question wasn't really in that sense. The question was: Did you have a

8 direct link with the intelligence services? You said it went through the

9 chain of command, it went to the Ministry of Defence

10 Please continue, Mrs. Residovic. The answer wasn't exactly the

11 one that you were thinking of when you put the question to the witness.

12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. This question was

13 based on the statement that Mr. Chambers gave to the Prosecution in the

14 course of the investigation, but I think that the witness has clarified

15 the situation when responding to your question, Mr. President.

16 Q. Mr. Chambers, as you said, you would sometimes compile subject

17 reports and you spoke about this with the Prosecution on Friday; is that

18 correct?

19 A. I spoke about it with the Prosecution on Friday in the court, but

20 previously on the Thursday of last week, yes.

21 Q. All the information you had, whether these were regular weekly

22 summaries or special subject reports, all -- the main sources for this

23 information were documents that you had previously obtained, either from

24 the battalion -- from battalions in the field or from other organisations;

25 is that correct?

Page 6084












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6085

1 A. Yes, it is. All the weekly summaries were from the battalions,

2 exactly as you've described. Though occasionally I would be asked to

3 compile a special report on a particular matter.

4 Q. So the facts that you presented in the weekly reports and their

5 accuracy depended on the accuracy of the information that you obtained

6 from the field and on the accuracy of the information that you were

7 provided with; isn't that correct?

8 A. Absolutely correct. I was dependent upon those that reported to

9 me and their reports being accurate, yes.

10 Q. So if we assume that in -- if in the reports you had the sum of

11 the facts were imprecise or erroneous, these errors would be duplicated in

12 your weekly reports; isn't that correct?

13 A. Inevitably, yes. There would be occasions where something might

14 be reported in the weekly military information summary that had not been

15 fully substantiated and for which there was no subsequent information, and

16 therefore there may have been inaccuracies within those reports, yes.

17 Q. In fact, you worked to the best of your ability on the basis of

18 the information that you had at your disposal, but it wasn't your task and

19 it wasn't possible for you either to check the accuracy of the information

20 that you received; isn't that correct?

21 A. That is correct. I was not able to verify or substantiate every

22 report, but obviously where possible we tried to connect one, two, or

23 three reports together, and that was as close to substantiation of a

24 report as we could get, correct.

25 Q. Would you agree with me, Mr. Chambers, if I said that if you had

Page 6086

1 had other information and more accurate sources, in such a case the

2 conclusions you reached in your weekly reports might have been different?

3 A. Of course, yes.

4 Q. Sometimes in your analysis you would quite simply take over the

5 conclusions or the comments made by battalions in the field and you

6 believed that on the whole this information was accurate and had been

7 verified. Were there such cases?

8 A. Generally we believed that the information that was given to us

9 by the battalions and most of our sources of information was accurate in

10 that it had been reported to them or they had seen particular activities.

11 This was not so in every case, of course, but generally the information

12 was accurate as it was reported and from a trusted source. There were, of

13 course, occasions where a single line entry might have been made by a

14 battalion or by a individual but then appeared in the weekly report or

15 weekly information summary just as a line that stood by itself, that did

16 not have any -- necessarily any substantiation. Correct.

17 Q. Mr. Chambers, am I interpreting your answer correctly, the one

18 that you gave to us before this hearing? The information on foreign

19 combatants was received on the whole from individuals, and the source

20 about -- of information about the Mujahedin on the whole was the HVO? Is

21 that what you told us?

22 A. No. What I thought that I told you on Friday and at subsequent

23 meetings -- or on previous meetings with you was that the source of most

24 of the information on the Mujahedin came from the British Battalion and

25 from other sources. The British Battalion themselves may well have

Page 6087

1 received some of that information from the HVO or indeed from some of the

2 ABiH commanders themselves.

3 Q. Thank you. I didn't mean that you personally received this

4 information, but military reporters from the battalion on the whole

5 received this information from individuals. That is what you said; isn't

6 that right?

7 A. The battalion received it from individuals, correct, yes. And

8 the battalion then subsequently reported it to me. Yeah. Yeah.

9 Q. You yourself didn't have any official documents that mentioned

10 the existence of the Mujahedin in Central Bosnia; isn't that right?

11 A. If by "official documents" you mean documents belonging to any of

12 the warring factions, no, that is correct. Of course, all the documents

13 that were created by the battalions were official documents, but we had no

14 documents from any of the warring factions, no. That's correct.

15 Q. Mr. Chambers, was it possible for you to obtain information from

16 various sources, the battalions, international organisations, and the

17 monitors, information that concerned the same event but their conclusions

18 and comments relating to the facts concerned were often divergent? Is

19 that correct?

20 A. The UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force, members, United

21 Nations Military Observers, European Community military monitors, and

22 similar organisations, or individuals from those organisations, generally

23 their conclusions to an event were very similar. However, there were

24 divergent views on an event held by each side of the warring factions;

25 that is, HVO and ABiH. But generally those contributing nations for a

Page 6088

1 singular event would hold very similar views as to what had taken place.

2 Q. Mr. Chambers, could you please tell me whether you would agree

3 with what Mr. Williams stated. He testified here last week, and with

4 regard to that problem, he said the following, and I'm quoting; it's

5 page 57, line 8 to 12: "This is an indisputable fact that the

6 information --"

7 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.

9 MR. WITHOPF: May I please interrupt at this point in time. I

10 don't find it the appropriate conduct of a cross-examination to make

11 reference to another witness's testimony before this Court. The witness

12 may, for whatever reason, none of the parties know or the Judges may be

13 aware, have a certain connection to certain witnesses, and this reason may

14 influence his answers to the questions put to him. The Prosecution

15 doesn't find it the correct conduct to confront the witness with the

16 testimony of a different witness before this Court in the very same

17 matter.

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President --

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mrs. Residovic, what do

20 you have to say about this?

21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] In accordance with the Rules of

22 the Tribunal, with the jurisprudence, I think that in the course of the

23 cross-examination a witness can be presented with all the evidence that

24 has been accepted by this Trial Chamber, all the evidence that has been

25 introduced here. Since General Williams has testified before this Trial

Page 6089

1 Chamber, I think that it is quite appropriate and correct to present part

2 of his testimony or refer to part of his testimony when questioning this

3 witness or any other witness.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In order to summarise what you

5 have said, you are asking the witness to comment on someone's testimony.

6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I want to ask the witness whether

7 he would agree with something that the witness Williams stated before this

8 Tribunal. It has to do with the question that I just asked the witness

9 that had to do with contradictory information received from various

10 organisations, the various organisations that were present in the field.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Put your question

12 to the witness, and the Trial Chamber will state its position.

13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation].

14 Q. Mr. Chambers, I'm going to quote what General Williams said. He

15 testified before this Tribunal and said that the fact that there was

16 contradictory information was something that happened. He said that it

17 was indisputable, that the information obtained from various sources

18 reflected the situation -- presented the situation in various ways and

19 there was also the risk that some people might create a problem by turning

20 rumours into something solid and by repeating these rumours on a number of

21 occasions.

22 My question is whether on the basis of your personal experience

23 you would agree with what this witness stated before the Tribunal.

24 A. Indeed. I'm assuming that the Brigadier Williams to whom you

25 refer was at the time Lieutenant Colonel Williams who commanded the

Page 6090

1 Coldstream Guards Battalion in -- British Battalion in Vitez. That being

2 the case, much of the information that I received was from the -- his

3 military information cell, his own staff within his own battalion

4 headquarters. He and his staff were much closer to the warring factions,

5 the HVO, and the ABiH, and consequently they, I am sure, as he has stated,

6 used to hear contradictory versions of events from each side that were

7 engaged in the actual battle.

8 My position, which if you like was one step up in the

9 headquarters, was I would receive more filtered information that had been

10 assessed by his staff and by himself perhaps on occasion and where they

11 would have filtered out some of the excessive claims or each of the

12 warring factions. So the version of events that used to come to me was

13 more filtered and more sanitised, if you like, yes.

14 Q. However, would you nevertheless agree with me if I said that if a

15 rumour was repeated on a number of occasions in a given report, in such

16 cases there was a risk that a certain weight might be attached to such

17 information?

18 A. Yes, I would agree. That -- that was always a risk and is still

19 a risk in any military information or intelligence field. That is

20 correct. I can accept that -- that certain weight might be given to

21 information that had been heard two, three, or four times over a period of

22 time, yes.

23 Q. Your reports on the Mujahedin and the 7th Muslim Brigade that you

24 sent on the 2nd of November, 1993, was a result of the request made by

25 General Chambers dated the 1st of November 1993; is that correct?

Page 6091

1 A. Yes, it is.

2 Q. Given that you received the request by fax on the 1st of November

3 at 11.30 and you replied on the 2nd of November at 15.43, the time you had

4 to compile this report was quite short; isn't that correct?

5 A. Yes, it is.

6 Q. As a result, you based yourself on the report of Captain Whitley

7 [phoen] from the British Army, who was performing his duties in the

8 UNPROFOR command before you arrived; isn't that correct?

9 A. Not quite. I remember very distinctly the evening of the 1st of

10 November. I sat down and wrote that report - I can clearly remember - in

11 about three hours on the evening of the 1st of November. Based on a

12 number of things, a little bit -- or some on the previous information left

13 by Captain Whitley, a considerable amount based on my own knowledge of the

14 Mujahedin, most of which had been passed to me by the British Battalion in

15 Vitez. So it was, if you like -- again, to use the word, a fusion of

16 information, some of which was in my head, that I had inherited from

17 Captain Whitley, some of which was in reports that had been sent to me by

18 the British Battalion.

19 Q. However, you didn't have enough time to check in detail all the

20 information that in the course of 1993 arrived in the command in Kiseljak.

21 A. Oh, sorry, that's a question? I did have time. I think, to put

22 it into perspective, as I said before on Friday, this was a -- a quick

23 RFI, request for information, from General Chambers' staff, and they posed

24 me in the facts a number of questions, and those questions I answered,

25 realising that they in Vincenza, the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, and

Page 6092

1 General Chambers specifically, knew nothing about the Mujahedin and was

2 interested in the background information about who they were, what they

3 were, and what they were doing. Those questions were very specific in

4 the -- in his fax, his staff fax to me, and I answered those questions in

5 the order in which they were presented. And on the pages that you have,

6 the four-page fax in question, you will see underlined the question and

7 then my answer to those specific questions..

8 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be showed

9 document DH8 [as interpreted]. It's a milinfosum, 32, dated the 31st of

10 May, 1993.

11 DH108, not 8, as it appears in the transcript.

12 Q. Could you have a look under the title "Zenica," item 3.

13 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.

15 MR. WITHOPF: A pure technical issue. If the witness would be so

16 polite to put the document on the ELMO, since at the time we don't have

17 the document in front of us.

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Chambers, would it be correct to say that in this paragraph

20 you can see that the liaison officer did meet certain Mujahedin, and at

21 the end of this paragraph, paragraph 3, he states that it is his belief

22 that they were not under the control of the 3rd Corps?

23 A. Excuse me. One moment.

24 Yes, it's a poor photocopy, but I can see it. It does say at the

25 bottom "3rd Corps." Yes, I would accept that his belief at that time was

Page 6093

1 they were not under the control of the 3rd Corps. Yes, that's what his

2 statement says.

3 Q. In item 4 of this milinfosum, you can see that the liaison

4 officer also had a meeting with Commander Jasmin Saric and with another

5 commander. And on page 2 it appears that Commander Saric also gave the

6 impression that the Mujahedin were not under the control of the 3rd Corps.

7 A. Yes, I would accept that that seems to be his assessment at that

8 time. Yes.

9 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

10 Defence Exhibit DH72. It is a milinfosum number 46 dated the 14th of

11 June.

12 Q. This is a milinfosum in which in paragraph 1 it mentions the

13 meeting of a commander from the BritBat with General Hadzihasanovic. And

14 if you have a look at the end of the paragraph - it's the seventh line

15 down - you can see that the deputy commander, Merdan, says that the

16 Mujahedin weren't under the effective control of the 3rd Corps. You can

17 also see that it says that Hadzihasanovic showed a letter he had written

18 and addressed to the Supreme Command in which he requested that the issue,

19 the problem of the Mujahedin, be solved. Is this what this milinfosum

20 states?

21 A. Yes, it appears to state that he's seeking the authority of the

22 higher command to -- to, as it puts it in the report, "To deal with what

23 he considered to be a problem," for he, Hadzihasanovic, to deal with what

24 he considered to be a problem. Yes.

25 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness also be shown

Page 6094

1 Exhibit DH73, please, dated the 13th of June.

2 Q. I think you will agree with me if I say that you hadn't seen this

3 document before.

4 A. That is true. I have not seen this before, no.

5 Q. The assessments made in these milinfosums and the document that

6 you saw, had you studied them in detail when you were asked to respond to

7 a fax -- to the fax from General Chambers would probably have affected the

8 position that you presented in your reply. Would you agree with that?

9 A. This latest document that you have shown me may have had an

10 effect, though I have not read it in detail. The previous milinfosums may

11 not have affected my overall reply to General Chambers in November, which

12 was some five months -- or six months after those milinfosums and some

13 five months after this particular letter, which was the time at which I

14 was writing. But I would accept, again without reading the detail of this

15 yet, that there seems to be -- appears to be a letter to Delic, I think,

16 from Hadzihasanovic. I'm just reading it through now.

17 Yeah. I accept that he at this time appears to be writing to

18 Delic asking for advice as to what to do with the 3rd Corps, yes.

19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could these two documents be

20 returned now and could the witness be shown Prosecution Exhibit P163 --

21 actually, the three documents can be returned, and P163 shown to the

22 witness, please. It is a milinfosum dated the 27th of June.

23 Q. Mr. Chambers, would you please look at this milinfosum of the

24 27th of June, especially the commentary at the end of it.

25 A. Is it this comment here you want --

Page 6095

1 Q. Yes. Is it true that from this comment it is visible that

2 information about foreigners in the 7th Muslim Brigade had come from

3 Commander Nakic from the HVO?

4 A. In this report, it would appear so, yes.

5 Q. Actually, this comment is in a different tone than the earlier

6 documents I showed you because it claims that the Mujahedin are under the

7 control -- are under control; is that right?

8 A. If I can just read for a moment.

9 Yeah, I -- I have to confess I'm slightly confused because I'm

10 not quite sure what he is trying to say here as to whether they are or are

11 not under control. He states: "Should this prove accurate, then all

12 doubts as to whether the Mujahedin are under control or not might be

13 ended." I don't know in which way he means it to be ended. I'm unsure

14 myself. You may be able to enlighten me. Is the confusion "ended"

15 because he considered them to be under control or is the confusion "ended"

16 because he considers them not to be under control?

17 Q. But the last part of the sentence would appear to mean that the

18 author believes that the 7th Muslim Brigade and the Mujahedin are one and

19 the same. The last sentence of this comment.

20 A. Yeah, that appears to be what he is saying, is that the Mujahedin

21 and 7 Muslim Brigade are one and the same, is what he appears to be

22 saying, yes.

23 Q. And the source for such a conclusion is Commander Nakic, who was

24 a commander of the Croatian Defence Council. That also follows from this

25 comment, doesn't it?

Page 6096

1 A. Again, without reading it, I'm sure that that was the probable

2 source, yes.

3 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Withopf.

5 MR. WITHOPF: It's happened repeatedly that the witness made

6 statements introducing with "without having properly read it," or "without

7 reading it." May my learned friend from the Defence please give the

8 witness sufficient time to actually read the documents which are put in

9 front of him in order to enable to -- to enable him to make an informed

10 statement on the issues he's asked about.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Madam Residovic, give the

12 witness time to read, because if you are showing him a document and you

13 want to ask him questions about it, the reply could be amputated from a

14 part of the truth. So will you please rephrase your question, because now

15 he has taken the time to read the document.

16 What you wanted to show was that the source of this information

17 was the HVO; is that right?

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber fully understands

20 that.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do have it. Yes.

22 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation].

23 Q. Would you agree with me that this comment was made repeatedly in

24 certain reports sent by the British Battalion to the UNPROFOR command

25 regarding the Mujahedin and the 7th Muslim Brigade?

Page 6097

1 A. Yes, I think particularly in the early stages - and by that I

2 mean early 1993 - many people used to use -- invitedly use the

3 term "Mujahedin" when referring to the term 7th Muslim Brigade. It was

4 only -- and that was careless by some people and perhaps not sufficiently

5 accurate, because their understanding of the structures at the time were

6 immature. As time went on, I think people began to make the clear

7 distinction between the Mujahedin element and 7 Muslim Brigade and that --

8 there are two entities maybe within the same body. But early on I accept

9 that the -- the two phrases -- or "7 Muslim Brigade" and "Mujahedin" were

10 almost interchangeable when some people were talking or writing, correct.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] This document may be returned

13 now, and could the witness be shown Prosecution Exhibit P376, which is a

14 monitoring daily report dated the 20th of October.

15 Q. Mr. Chambers, could you please read on page 2, paragraph 7.2.

16 A. Yes, I have read that.

17 Q. Do you agree with me in saying that this report raises the

18 question of control over the Mujahedin and says that this question is

19 still quite open?

20 A. Yes, it would appear that the European Community monitor at that

21 time, in this specific instance, felt that they were not under control.

22 That is correct.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown

24 Prosecution Exhibit P176, which is also a monitor team daily report of the

25 27th of October, 1993.

Page 6098












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6099

1 Q. Would you please look at page 2, paragraph 7, "Comment." And the

2 responses given under a, b, and c.

3 Mr. Chambers, is it clear from this report once again that the

4 army is taking steps and endeavouring to place the Mujahedin under control

5 but that they clearly are not under the control of the Bosnian army?

6 A. It would appear clear that elements of the Mujahedin were not

7 under control or were acting in an independent manner at this stage. That

8 I would accept as being true, yes.

9 Q. These reports of the European Monitoring Mission were compiled

10 prior to your report, and had you had access to them, they also could have

11 affected your own report of the 2nd of November; isn't that right?

12 A. It is right in -- in a general sense, but I note this particular

13 report was published only three days before the request for information

14 from General Chambers. I used to read all of these reports from the

15 European Commission Military Monitors that used to get passed to me.

16 Indeed, I may have read this particular report at that time. I can't say.

17 So would it have -- your question was: Would it have possibly affected my

18 answer to General Chambers in my response. I may have had this

19 information already in my head; I may not. I don't believe that it would

20 have -- this particular small piece would have over -- would have changed

21 my overall message that I was giving back to General Chambers, though I

22 accept this is a -- a small piece of a big picture.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

25 Prosecution Exhibit P181. It is a report of the European monitors, the

Page 6100

1 regional centre in Zenica, dated the 3rd of November, 1993.

2 Q. Could you please look at page 2, paragraph 10.

3 A. There's a paragraph 10 on page 8, here. It starts --

4 Q. Yes. Yes.

5 A. "When asked whether he was --" "When asked about the..."

6 Yes, I've read that.

7 Q. Is it true that it would follow from this report that at a

8 meeting held with the deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, the deputy

9 commander made it clear that the Mujahedin were not under control and that

10 there were efforts either to send them back to their own countries or to

11 place them under control and that there were also other groups that called

12 themselves Mujahedin but who are in fact not foreign fighters? Would that

13 briefly be what emerges from this paragraph 10?

14 A. Yes. Though I think we have been using the word "control" for

15 some time, you and myself. I think we perhaps ought to define our

16 understanding -- our mutual understanding of the term "control." Seeing

17 this as a distinct control in a discipline -- in a disciplinary way, as

18 opposed to command. And the two are slightly separate. And you may wish

19 to speak about that or question me on that later, which is fine.

20 In the strict sense of word "control," were they able to be held

21 in check or held in control, I accept that there were individuals who were

22 not able to be controlled and were not held in check because they lacked

23 the discipline or whatever. That, I accept, yes.

24 Q. So you do accept that Enver Hadzihasanovic at this meeting made

25 it quite clear that foreigners were a problem which they were trying to

Page 6101

1 deal with, either by sending them away from Bosnia and Herzegovina or by

2 having them integrated within the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

3 A. Yes. Yes, indeed. But I thought the meeting was between the

4 political advisor, Commander Merdan.

5 Q. Yes. In the first part, it refers to a meeting with Mr. Merdan,

6 but on page 7 you will see that it continues with a conversation with

7 Enver Hadzihasanovic, the commander of the 3rd Corps of the BH army, and

8 this paragraph refers to that meeting.

9 A. I understand.

10 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.

12 MR. WITHOPF: This manner to ask the witness questions about

13 these documents appears to be a bit problematic, since my learned friend

14 from the Hadzihasanovic Defence does nothing else than making the witness

15 paraphrasing what's written in the document. The witness himself was not

16 at any of the meetings in which these things have been said, so how can

17 the witness comment beyond what's actually said in the document and in

18 answering the questions by my learned friend? This appears to be

19 problematic.

20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I respond?

21 On Friday, the witness explained his assignment and role, and he

22 said that he received all the information and that he analysed this

23 document. He confirmed that in answer to a question from me. Therefore,

24 the witness is a person who cannot testify about facts, but he can provide

25 an analysis of the documents which were sent to him. And it is for these

Page 6102

1 reasons I am showing the witness documents which he must have received at

2 the UNPROFOR command in Kiseljak and which he probably commented on in his

3 reports.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. But the question

5 regarding the last document --

6 Witness, the document you have in front of you, have you seen it?

7 Do you remember having seen this particular document?

8 THE WITNESS: I -- with virtually every document, sir, I can't

9 specifically remember this document; however, I almost certainly would

10 have received this document, and that being the case would have almost

11 certainly read that document, now, 11 years ago. I cannot absolutely say

12 that I have read this document before, no.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We take note of

14 your answer.

15 I'm going to interrupt you because it is almost time for us to

16 take the break. We will resume at 4.00.

17 --- Recess taken at 3.39 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We will now resume.

20 The Trial Chamber would like to ask you to forgive us for being a

21 little late.

22 Within the framework of the questions put to the witness, we'd

23 like to ask the Defence to proceed rapidly. And could you try to avoid

24 asking questions that have already been put. We have noticed that the

25 witness has already answered some of the questions put to him.

Page 6103

1 In addition, there is a slight mystery in that we don't know

2 whether the Defence team for Mr. Kubura will also take up a certain amount

3 of time for the cross-examination of the witness.

4 So, Mr. Dixon, do you intend to cross-examine the witness or not?

5 MR. DIXON: Yes, Your Honour, we do. We don't have too many

6 questions. At the maximum, 30 to 40 minutes, at the extreme end of the

7 scale.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mrs. Residovic.

9 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am halfway

10 through my cross-examination. I would like to inform the Trial Chamber

11 that I would like to show the witness four Prosecution exhibits which

12 refer to the same things that he has informed Mr. Chambers of. I would

13 also like to tender five other documents, five new documents. So I would

14 like to ask the Trial Chamber to allow me to continue with my

15 cross-examination.

16 Could the witness now be shown Exhibit 379, Prosecution

17 Exhibit 379. This is a letter from General Williams to the UNPROFOR

18 command dated the 5th of December, 1993, and there are certain attachments

19 too.

20 Q. Mr. Chambers, would you first have a look at the letter from

21 Captain Guinness dated the 26th of November. Have a look at paragraph 2,

22 the last sentence in paragraph 2.

23 A. Yes, I've read it.

24 Q. This seems to show that Captain Guinness claimed on the 26th of

25 November that the Mujahedin were not under control. Is that what this

Page 6104

1 document states?

2 A. It appears to state that some elements are out of control, yes.

3 Q. Could you have a look at the letter that the then-colonel, now a

4 general, Williams sent to Brigadier Ramsay. Have a look at page 1,

5 paragraph 1, the last sentence.

6 A. Yes, understood.

7 Q. This document also shows that it is quite unclear whether the

8 Mujahedin are under the control -- were under the control of the 3rd

9 Corps. Would you agree with me?

10 A. Yes. Again, if I might just mention the issue of control and

11 command. I fully accept that there are elements of the Mujahedin who were

12 out of control, who were operating perhaps outside of the norms of any

13 command structure, yes. But the issue of command is a separate issue

14 perhaps.

15 Q. Thank you for that clarification. If necessary, as you have

16 said, it's an issue we can go back to.

17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could Mr. Chambers now be shown a

18 document from the regional centre of the ECMM dated the 29th of

19 December -- the 18th of December, 1993. We have a sufficient number of

20 copies to distribute to everyone in the courtroom and to our colleagues.

21 Q. Mr. Chambers, would you please have a look at the heading,

22 the "15th of December." It's on page 5, dated the 15th of December. It's

23 paragraph 2 that I'm referring to.

24 A. Is it the -- the one that starts, "The white road convoy..."

25 Q. No. You've been given a weekly report dated the 18th of

Page 6105

1 December; isn't that correct?

2 A. That is correct, yes.

3 Q. On page 5, under the date the 15th of December, item 2 states

4 that, "The liaison officer of the operations group Bosnian Krajina..."

5 A. I now have it. I'm reading it, yes.

6 Q. This report also seems to show that the liaison officer from

7 Bosnian Krajina informed you that the Mujahedin were out of control; is

8 that correct?

9 A. Yes, it appears that this report says that. Yes.

10 MRS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Given that the document is dated

11 the 18th of December and it's a document from the Central Bosnia area, I

12 suggest that this document be admitted into evidence. We received it from

13 the Prosecution on the disk that Mr. Chambers provided the Prosecution

14 with.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.

16 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, it may be a technical

17 issue only, but the question was: This report also seems to show that the

18 liaison officer from Bosnian Krajina informed you - informed you - that

19 the Mujahedin were out of control. That's the understanding of the

20 Prosecution that the witness did not himself talk to the liaison officer

21 of the ops group Bosanska Krajina, at least not at the time when this

22 report was compiled. It may be just an issue of the transcript. And if I

23 may please ask my learned friend from the Hadzihasanovic Defence to

24 clarify this issue.

25 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you. I was only

Page 6106

1 stating that the information that the witness received from the liaison

2 officer from the OG Bosnian Krajina stated that the Mujahedin were out of

3 control and this weekly report dated the 18th of December is a document

4 that the witness provided the OTP with.

5 THE WITNESS: That is correct, yes.

6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

7 exhibit into evidence.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Withopf.

9 MR. WITHOPF: No objections.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar, could we have

11 a number for the document.

12 THE REGISTRAR: The exhibit number is DH130.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Please proceed.

15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown a

16 report dated the 29th of December, 1993. It's from the regional centre in

17 Zenica of the European monitors. We have a sufficient number of copies

18 for everyone here.

19 Q. Mr. Chambers, have a look at page -- the page numbered ZA00772

20 and have a look at item e.

21 A. Yes, I've read that.

22 Q. Would you agree with me if I said that Commander Alagic quite

23 clearly stated here that the Mujahedin were out of control and that they

24 had been asked to respect the laws of the country and to join the BH army;

25 otherwise, they would be treated as paramilitary units? Is this what is

Page 6107

1 stated in the report?

2 A. That appears to be so, and that he had taken certain measures

3 regarding some Mujahedin units who had now left Zenica. That is correct,

4 yes.

5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since this is an

6 ECMM document, we suggest that for the time being the document only be

7 marked for identification and we will try to tender the document into

8 evidence when we have a representative from the ECMM as a witness here.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.

10 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, again, no objection.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could this document be marked

12 for identification, please.

13 THE REGISTRAR: DH131 ID, marked for identification.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation].

16 Q. Mr. Chambers, would it be correct to say that the report that I

17 have shown to you and they preceded the report you forwarded to General

18 Chambers as well as the ones that were forwarded subsequently, these

19 reports show that there was a problem as far as controlling the Mujahedin

20 were concerned and show that they weren't under the control of the 3rd

21 Corps? Will you agree with this conclusion?

22 A. I certainly agree that there was a problem with certain elements

23 of the Mujahedin and that they -- shall we call them rogue elements that

24 may have carried out some independent actions and were beyond the norms of

25 control as we understand it, though the -- again, I come back to the issue

Page 6108

1 of control and command and to make the differentiation between whether or

2 not a grouping - say, some of the Mujahedin - felt they were under command

3 of a higher authority or whether there were some elements, which I believe

4 there were, that believed themselves to be independent of any norms of

5 military command.

6 Q. Mr. Chambers, could you confirm that when performing your duties

7 you received a number of reports from the BritBat but also from other

8 international organisations and these reports stated that conflicts arose

9 between the Mujahedin and members of the BH army?

10 A. That is true, yes.

11 Q. You were also aware of the fact that the Mujahedin carried out an

12 armed attack against the commander of the 7th Muslim Brigade, against Amir

13 Kubura? Were you aware of that fact?

14 A. No, I wasn't. No.

15 Q. Did you know that the Mujahedin also attacked some members of the

16 17th Krajina Brigade?

17 A. I was aware of frictions between the 17th Krajina Brigade and

18 7 Muslim Brigade, and in particular I'm aware of a threat by the commander

19 of 17th Krajina Brigade to lay down mortar fire upon one of the commanders

20 within 7 Muslim Brigade by the name of Abu Haris, who commanded a company

21 of Mujahedin in the area of Mehurici. So yes, I -- I am aware of

22 frictions that in some cases led to threats of hostile acts.

23 Q. Please, could you tell me whether you would agree with me if I

24 said that the commander concerned was Commander Cuskic and he is the one

25 who threatened the Mujahedin in Mehurici? It wasn't the 17th -- it wasn't

Page 6109

1 the 7th Muslim Brigade.

2 A. The commander to whom I'm referring may well have been the name

3 Commander Cuskic, but I believe him to have been the commander of

4 17 Brigade at the time, and his threat was to the commander known as Abu

5 Haris who commanded the majority of the foreign national Mujahedin.

6 Q. You also received information according to which a conflict broke

7 out between the Bosniak population in the territory of the 3rd Corps and

8 the Mujahedin, referred to in the ECMM reports. Were you aware of such

9 information?

10 A. I cannot remember a specific event. I am, however, aware that

11 the Mujahedin were very unpopular with the local population because of

12 their significant fundamentalist views and indeed some of their behaviour.

13 Yes, I'm aware that they -- there was friction between the Mujahedin and

14 the local population.

15 Q. Nevertheless the knowledge you had about conflicts that broke out

16 with the army brigades and the Mujahedin and the knowledge you had about

17 the dissatisfaction of the population with the Mujahedin is not

18 information that you included in the report that you forwarded to General

19 Chambers; isn't that correct?

20 A. In fact, I think in my report I did actually say that the

21 Mujahedin were unpopular with the local population. I think I used those

22 or similar words. I also think I may have made mention in that four-page

23 fax to which we all refer to there being frictions within the Bosnian

24 army.

25 Q. Thank you. I have indirectly checked this. That's what you

Page 6110

1 said; although, you didn't specifically mention the 17th Krajina Brigade.

2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I would now like the witness to

3 be shown Exhibit P223. This is a report dated the 2nd of November

4 forwarded by this witness at the request of General Chambers.

5 Q. You do remember this report, so I'll ask you my question: Would

6 it be correct to say that in item 1 of this reply you say that you have

7 attached a graphic representation of ORBAT and according to the latest

8 information it represents the command structure of the 7th Muslim Brigade?

9 Is that what your report states?

10 A. Yes, it is.

11 Q. I'd now like to talk about the information provided in the

12 attachment, in the graphic representation attached.

13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness also be shown

14 P123.

15 Q. The document I am showing to you is an order concerning the

16 establishment of the 3rd Corps, dated the 19th of November, 1992; isn't

17 that correct?

18 A. It appears so, yes.

19 Q. Mr. Chambers, could you very quickly have a look at items 111,

20 112, et cetera, at the place names that define the zone of responsibility

21 of the 3rd Corps. The last number is 113.

22 A. Yes. I've got a general idea, yes.

23 Q. Is it true that in this order no mention is made anywhere of

24 Maglaj as an area covered by the 3rd Corps?

25 A. I will accept that, yeah, without reading it in detail. Yeah.

Page 6111

1 Q. Is it true that in responding to questions from my learned friend

2 you said that whatever is written within these boxes are verified facts?

3 A. Yes. I said -- I said in response to the Prosecution's question

4 that where information was known and was a known fact, it was written

5 below the boxes or in numbers to the left and right of the box. So yes,

6 where information is not known, it was left as a blank.

7 Q. On your table, it appears that the 7th Muslim Brigade was also

8 deployed in Maglaj, because we see the word "Maglaj" beneath the box. Is

9 that right?

10 A. It is correct, and therefore that would have been a fact. But I

11 also remember on Friday, when responding to your learned friend, the

12 Prosecution, to say that Maglaj at that time was a pocket that was cut off

13 and was not visited by UNPROFOR troops, and therefore information was very

14 scant about the Maglaj pocket, as we called it.

15 Q. So this fact appearing on your table is one that you cannot claim

16 with certainty that it is correct.

17 A. That is correct, yes. I cannot absolutely certainly say that

18 there was a battalion -- the 4th Battalion of the 7th Brigade in Maglaj.

19 Q. In the column when you talk about the command structure, beneath

20 the word "Travnik" there's the name of the commander of the 1st Battalion,

21 Assim Korcic; is that right?

22 A. That's what the chart would say, yes. I cannot actually remember

23 if he was the commander at the time.

24 Q. According to your answer given to the Prosecution, that would

25 have to be a known fact; isn't that right?

Page 6112












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6113

1 A. Correct. Correct, yes.

2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown a

3 list of the officers of the Brigade Staff and officers working in the

4 premises of the school dated the 12th of January, 1993. It's a document

5 of the 7th Muslim Brigade, and we received it from the Prosecution.

6 Q. This is a document dated the 12th of January, 1993, and as you

7 can see, under "1" it is indicated that Koricic Asim was commander of the

8 7th Muslim Brigade.

9 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.

10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Does that follow from this document?

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.

13 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, I object to this line of questioning

14 for two reasons: The name that is mentioned on Prosecution Exhibit P123

15 isn't Assim Korcic. It's certainly not the name which is mentioned on the

16 document which has now been shown to the witness dated the 12th of

17 January, 1993. And even if there would be a difference between the two

18 documents, I wish to emphasise that the one document of 12th of January,

19 1993 reflects the situation of 12th of January, 1993; whereas, the other

20 document reflects the situation certainly later on during the year 1993.

21 For these two obvious reasons, I object that the witness is asked such

22 line of questions.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Can the Defence address

24 the point raised by the Prosecution, who are contesting that document P123

25 bears the name "Koricic."

Page 6114

1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it is one and the

2 same person that the Prosecutor is aware of and who was at the beginning

3 the commander of the 7th Muslim Brigade, before Amir Kubura took over that

4 post. As the witness responding to questions from the Prosecution said

5 that these were known facts and that they applied to the 2nd of November,

6 my next question to the witness is whether he ever received any

7 information or document confirming that Assim Korcic became a battalion

8 commander.

9 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Withopf.

11 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, it's certainly true that the

12 Prosecution is aware that a certain Assim Korcic was the 7th Muslim

13 Brigade commander at a point in time, but the document which my learned

14 friend is referring to, there is a different name. It says, "Assim

15 Korcic," and we are not talking about the commander of the 7th Muslim

16 Brigade but about the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Muslim

17 Brigade, what's obviously a difference.

18 I also wish to draw the attention of the Trial Chamber that the

19 document which the Defence is currently using in showing the witness is a

20 document which stems from the Prosecution and which the Defence has

21 contested. It's on the contested exhibit list, what appears to be quite

22 strange.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, you know that the

24 Defence has contested documents for various reasons, the main reason being

25 that we wish to check the contents of certain documents through witnesses.

Page 6115

1 I do not expect this witness to recognise this document, but the witness

2 said that the facts contained in these boxes were verified facts as of the

3 date of the report, and we wish to indicate that at the time the witness

4 did not have the real facts at his disposal. That is what the Defence

5 would like to show. And I think that the witness himself said at the

6 beginning that had he had different information, then his conclusions

7 would probably have been different as well. That is what the witness

8 himself said.

9 My question to the witness now is:

10 Q. Did you, Mr. Chambers, ever receive a document from which it

11 would follow that the former commander at the 7th Muslim Brigade at some

12 point in time became battalion commander in Travnik?

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Withopf.

14 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, I object against this question,

15 since the name on the document which has been produced by the witness is

16 apparently different from the name which is on the 12th of January, 1993

17 document; and in addition, Defence has objected to the Prosecution

18 tendering the 12th of January, 1993 document into evidence for the reason

19 that it's outside the relevant time frame for the indictment. The Defence

20 appears to contradict themselves at this point in time. Either it can be

21 used or it can't be used. And the main reason, however, is that the two

22 names on the two different documents are obviously different.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. In the document P223,

24 under "Travnik, Commander Assim Korcic" it says. That is the question

25 you're asking, isn't it? And to show that the indication that he was the

Page 6116

1 commander of the 7th Brigade would be in contradiction with the fact that

2 in P223 the name of that -- he is the commander in Travnik. Will you

3 please explain your question, because we are having some difficulty in

4 following you.

5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, according to the

6 indictment itself, the 1st Command of the 7th Muslim Brigade was Assim

7 Korcic, who after that left, and as of April Amir Kubura became the

8 commander, according to the indictment. There is a letter, one "I" is

9 missing, but to say that that same person was in November commander of a

10 battalion is a fact which has been put on the chart because probably the

11 witness had incorrect data about the names of battalion commanders in the

12 7th Muslim Brigade, and that is my question to the witness.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf, I'm going to give

14 you the floor.

15 But the question is a very simple one: Witness, we have a

16 document and a list of officers of the 7th Brigade. This document is

17 dated the 12th of January, 1993, and number 1 is Assim Korcic. And then

18 in the document that you prepared in November, which means several months

19 prior to this one, we have indicated that a battalion commander - that is

20 a level below - Assim Korcic. So there's a big question there.

21 The document that you drafted in November, does it not contain a

22 colossal error, since Mr. Assim Korcic would have been demoted and would

23 be a battalion commander in Travnik; whereas, in the document that you

24 have in front of you he's number 1? What explanation are you giving for

25 that? If it is the same person, of course.

Page 6117

1 The question the Defence is putting to you would mean that in

2 your document you're referring to the same person. According to you, is

3 it the same person or are we talking about two different people? Because

4 if it is the same person, we have a problem. And if they are two

5 different persons, then there's no problem. What are you telling us?

6 THE WITNESS: I don't know, sir, is the answer. All I'm aware of

7 is the new document I have been produced here, showing Assim Korcic as the

8 brigade commander in January of 1993, 11 months later it was Kubura who

9 was the commander. What happened to Koricic I don't know. The chart

10 shows an "Assim Korcic." Whether it is the same man or not, I don't know.

11 I agree with you, though, sir, it would be unlikely for the

12 brigade commander to be demoted down to battalion commander 11 months

13 later, but I don't know if it is the same man or not, sir.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Please continue.

15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation].

16 Q. Mr. Chambers, if I were to tell you or if you had the documents

17 which would indicate that the command of the 2nd Battalion in Zenica was

18 never Hidan Kisanovic [phoen], but Serif Patkovic and that the commander

19 of the 3rd Battalion in Kakanj, Nihad Catic, stopped being the commander

20 of that battalion in June 1993, had you had such documents then what you

21 wrote down would not correspond to the actual state of affairs, would it?

22 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.

24 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, my learned friend from the

25 Hadzihasanovic Defence tries to make the witness speculate, and this can

Page 6118

1 certainly be not the purpose of the testimony of the witness.

2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the Defence is

3 making submissions which it will seek to prove during its case. The

4 witness told us that he drafted reports and charts on the basis of the

5 knowledge he had at the time. Since he made an assessment to the effect

6 that his report could have been different had the information been

7 different, I am asking him if he had known these facts would this chart,

8 then, have been in the same way as it is now. Would it have been

9 different.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll give you the floor,

11 Mr. Withopf.

12 The question is quite a simple one, in fact: Hypothetically, if

13 Assim Korcic is one and the same, in November when you prepared your

14 chart, would you have said the same thing or would you have changed your

15 chart? If, of course, it is the same person. If they are two different

16 people, then it's another matter.

17 So the attorney is telling you if you had this list and if you

18 had seen that Koricic was number 1, would you have indicated on your chart

19 that he was battalion commander?

20 THE WITNESS: Probably not, sir. But if I can clarify, which may

21 help the Court; it may not.

22 The -- the issue that you are asking, it would appear to me, is

23 whether what is printed on the chart was an absolute 100 per cent fact in

24 every case on the day that this was printed. My answer should you have

25 asked me that was the -- where we place names, places, and numbers on

Page 6119

1 these charts means that we have substantiated those facts at some point in

2 time. Obviously these facts change, and often. Units move; commanders

3 change. Therefore, on that specific day, there may have been changes that

4 had happened within the ABiH structure, maybe in some cases one or two

5 months before, which had not yet been relayed -- the information had not

6 come to us, and so therefore the chart -- it was not known to us, and

7 therefore there may be old information that is contained on these charts,

8 yes.

9 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Thank you. Also, Mr. Chambers --

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I think Mr. Withopf had

12 something to say, but he sat down. What was it you wanted to say,

13 Mr. Withopf? I asked you to wait for the answer of the witness before

14 giving you the floor.

15 MR. WITHOPF: Thank you, Mr. President. The witness has actually

16 clarified the issue I wanted to address.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please continue.

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Microphone not activated]

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Chambers, you did not have occasion to see an order on the

22 formation of the 7th Muslim Brigade, did you?

23 A. No, I did not.

24 Q. If I were to put it to you that the 7th Muslim Brigade pursuant

25 to that order had only three battalions, then the chart indicating a

Page 6120

1 fourth battalion under the 7th Muslim Brigade would not be in line with

2 the actual structure of the 7th Muslim Brigade, would it?

3 A. That is correct. Though I think you have probably drawn

4 attention to note 4 about the Maglaj brigade, which says under

5 note 4: "Probably no longer in the Maglaj area."

6 Q. Thank you. However, you would agree with me if I say that the

7 information that the 7th Muslim Brigade had four battalion [as

8 interpreted] would not correspond to the facts?

9 A. Yes, I would accept that.

10 Q. In your report, you say that the 7th Muslim Brigade was the only

11 manoeuvre brigade; is that right?

12 A. No. I'm not -- that is not the case, in that manoeuvre brigades,

13 by my understanding, are brigades that are able to manoeuvre in offence,

14 defence, or whatever military operation you are conducting. Obviously the

15 ABiH had a number of manoeuvre brigades. I did, however, say that they

16 were their predominant manoeuvre brigade who used to be used as the

17 "schwerpunkt," i.e., the point of attack more often than not.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Residovic, the Chamber is

19 wondering whether the Defence counsel for Mr. Kubura, whether Mr. Dixon

20 might not wish to ask the witness a question regarding this point, because

21 in the document the 7th Brigade is under the command of Mr. Kubura in

22 Travnik as head of battalion, Mr. Assim Korcic.

23 Mr. Dixon, would you like to intervene at this point?

24 MR. DIXON: Your Honour, I would prefer to keep all my questions

25 together at the end, after Mrs. Residovic has finished. This is certainly

Page 6121

1 a point that I did wish to ask the witness a few questions on.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I wasn't seeing

3 you, so the Chamber wanted to have a clear view.

4 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Chambers, in this chart, in one of the boxes you said that an

6 8th Muslim Brigade had been formed, and it says, "Zenica Mehurici," but

7 next to the name there's a question mark. That means that you had

8 information that the 8th Brigade had been formed but you didn't know its

9 name. Is that right?

10 A. Yes. At that time, we had heard rumours, discussion of the

11 possibility of a -- an 8th Muslim Brigade. We did not know its name,

12 hence the question mark, and the -- the grid reference, Zenica-Mehurici

13 there was assumed to be where the headquarters would form -- was formed

14 up.

15 I have to confess I do not know -- I cannot remember whether

16 8th Muslim Brigade had formed at this point or whether they were still in

17 formation. I suspect it was the latter; they were still forming at this

18 time.

19 Q. However, in your testimony, in response to questions from the

20 Prosecution, you said that the brigade consisted exclusively of foreign

21 fighters; is that right?

22 A. No., that is not right. I very clearly stated, and I think in

23 testimony, and indeed on this fax, that the brigade consisted of between

24 five and 800 fighters of which approximately 200 or so, two to 300 were

25 Mujahedin and that the other elements of the brigade were either

Page 6122

1 fundamentalist Muslims - national, not -- by that I mean Bosnian, as

2 opposed to foreign - so not in the slightest did I ever infer that

3 7 Muslim Brigade was exclusively foreign fighters, never.

4 Q. I apologise. I must have phrased my question wrongly. So we

5 didn't understand one another. I was asking you about the 8th Muslim

6 Brigade, because it says under number 3 that you believed that the new

7 8th Muslim Brigade consisted exclusively of foreigners. Is that right?

8 A. Yes. I -- I believe that the intention of the Bosnian army was

9 to try and force - and I use the word fairly advisedly - force the

10 Mujahedin into one formed unit under 8th Muslim Brigade and bring all

11 Mujahedin together under -- under that one unit to be known as 8 Brigade,

12 yes.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Residovic, we are making

14 our calculations, and you have already used up two hours. How much more

15 time do you need? Because as Mr. Dixon told us, he would need 30 minutes,

16 we are going to exceed the time limit. What are the exceptional reasons

17 for which you need more time?

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am close to the

19 end, but I think I would need another 15 minutes or so.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you any more documents?

21 You need 15 documents [as interpreted] -- do you have any new documents or

22 not? You need 15 minutes.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I have two documents. And a

24 Prosecution document that has already been admitted.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You will be able to continue,

Page 6123

1 but I'm going to ask the witness for a point of clarification.

2 As we're talking about the 8th Brigade, in the chart where it

3 says, "El Mujahed" with a question mark, there's the

4 square, "Zenica-Mehurici," and below that it says, "YJ 10.205." What does

5 that mean? What does that mean, those numbers?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, that is the grid reference, i.e., the map

7 reference, the point on the map at where their -- where their headquarters

8 was.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

10 Madam Residovic, please continue.

11 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Is my understanding correct, Mr. Chambers, that you just said

13 that there were certain indications that the 8th Muslim Brigade was in

14 formation? Is that right?

15 A. That is correct, yes.

16 Q. Which means that your report -- your reports could have contained

17 certain possible facts and not only the facts that you were quite certain

18 about.

19 A. In the case of 8 Muslim Brigade, that is correct.

20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I would now like the witness to

21 be shown milinfosum number 156, dated the 1st of October, and the report

22 of the 24th of October of the UNPROFOR command in Kiseljak.

23 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Residovic, on the list

25 that you produced, what do you wish to do with this document? Are you

Page 6124

1 going to ask that it be tendered? Are you going to withdraw it?

2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. I withdraw that

3 document. We will be discussing it when we have the discussion about

4 documents.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Withopf.

6 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, I find this procedure a bit unusual.

7 The Defence shows the witness a document, a document which they got from

8 the Prosecution. It's a document Defence has objected to and contested,

9 and the reasons are outlined in their filing on the contested documents.

10 They used this document in order to ask the witness a number of questions,

11 and once they are asked, whether they wish to tender it or to mark it for

12 identification, the answer is, "We will discuss this document once we have

13 the court sessions on the documents." This procedure isn't a fair

14 procedure under any circumstances. Either the Defence contests a

15 document, meaning that they don't use it, or they accept it as a

16 Prosecution exhibit. But to ask the witness to comment on the document

17 and later on to contest it appears to be a bit unusual.

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if my learned

19 colleague has no objections to this document - I thought that he did have

20 an objection - in order not to waste time, the Defence would like to

21 suggest that this exhibit be admitted into evidence, the document about

22 the office structure of the 7th Muslim Brigade.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber will withdraw

25 for a few minutes and we will be back in a few minutes' time.

Page 6125

1 --- Break taken at 5.17 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 5.21 p.m.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] With regard to the document,

4 the list from the 7th Brigade containing the names of officers, the

5 Defence would like to tender the document into evidence. No objections

6 have been raised by the Prosecution, so I would like to ask Madam

7 Registrar to give us an exhibit number.

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Previous translation continues] ... Is DH132,

9 and the English translation, DH132/E.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Having given the document

11 number DH132 for the B/C/S version and for the English version DH132/E,

12 the Trial Chamber has admitted this document into evidence now, but

13 nevertheless the Trial Chamber would like to point out that the Defence

14 has proceeded strangely. You first of all contested the document and then

15 you requested that it be admitted into evidence, so there's something

16 that's not quite coherent here. Nevertheless, we understand the fact that

17 this is a useful document. When you contested the document, perhaps you

18 didn't realise the interest it had.

19 Secondly, as far as the time you have taken up is concerned, you

20 have used up more time allocated to you, we would like you to respect the

21 amount of time allocated to you. We have to control the time that both

22 parties use up, because otherwise the Prosecution could also take up a lot

23 of time when conducting its examination-in-chief. And since the Defence

24 has another 50 per cent of time when cross-examining, well, we might have

25 to spend another day to examine a witness. So we have to restrict the

Page 6126












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6127

1 amount of time used up by the Prosecution, and you should do so as well.

2 When you are putting questions to witnesses, you must bear in mind the

3 fact that the Judges are listening to the questions. There is no jury

4 here; there are professional Judges sitting in the courtroom who can

5 immediately assess the scope of the questions and the value of the answers

6 provided. This is why you have to go to what is essential immediate.

7 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation].

8 Q. Mr. Chambers, could you have a look at the milinfosum dated the

9 21st of October, under b. Is it correct to say it that says the 8th

10 El Mujahed Brigade was established and it consisted of local and foreign

11 combatants? It's milinfosum number 156, dated the 1st of October.

12 A. Yes, I have the same. Yes, it -- it does say that it had formed,

13 and the information is contained, yes.

14 Q. So this is contrary to what you stated in the graphic

15 representation, according to which this brigade was composed of foreigners

16 alone; is that correct?

17 A. Yes. Except that you will note the date of the milinfosum 156 is

18 dated 1st of October. I would have received this report on the morning of

19 the 2nd of October, having written my report, which we discussed, on the

20 evening of the 1st. So actually, this is new information which came

21 immediately subsequent to my fax that went to General Chambers in

22 Vincenza.

23 Q. Thank you. Could you have a look at the report dated the 24th of

24 October, have a look at item -- the item -- or the heading "Warring

25 parties." Have a look at b.

Page 6128

1 A. Yeah, I'm looking at it. Yeah.

2 Q. In the sixth line, doubt is still expressed as to whether the

3 8th Muslim Brigade had been formed; isn't that correct?

4 A. Yes, it appears that way.

5 Q. So this report, dated the 1st of October, and the one dated 24th

6 of October, compiled before your report dated the 2nd of November -- or in

7 fact, dated the 30th of October and the 2nd of November, they contained

8 facts that don't reflect the facts in your graphic representation -- or

9 rather, they represent these facts in a slightly -- or in a different

10 light. Would you agree with me?

11 A. Very slightly, yes. I -- I still believe that the graphic

12 representation of 8 Muslim Brigade was correct at the time of writing on

13 the graph and was then further substantiated by the written reports that

14 you have here, either before or after that fax. What it may not have

15 included was the line that you drew out, that it may contain some national

16 elements, not just foreigners, yes.

17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown P378.

18 Q. This is a report that concerns the organisation of the 3rd and

19 the 6th Corps. Please have a look at item 15.

20 A. Yes, understood.

21 Q. If I remind you of the document dated the 27th of June, a

22 milinfosum which contains a comment on the Mujahedin in the 7th Muslim

23 Brigade, and it's a document compiled on the basis of information from

24 Commander Nakic, an HVO commander, would you agree with me if I said that

25 item 15 adopted the comment contained in the milinfosum dated the 27th of

Page 6129

1 June?

2 A. What, do you mean that the -- there are some members who dress as

3 though they are 7 Muslim Brigade? Is that the point you're making?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. Yes, I accept that that may well have been happening, yes, from

6 these reports.

7 Q. So you agree that some comments were simply copied into other

8 reports and they didn't take into account all the documents and the facts

9 concerning the composition of the 7th Muslim Brigade and the Mujahedin

10 that we have referred to today in this courtroom?

11 A. I fully accept that many comments are copied from one report to

12 another report without any further substantiation by the author at the

13 higher levels of our command, because we are not able, or were not able,

14 to substantiate them -- any of them all [sic]. That is not a problem to

15 me to say, yes, that certain parts, certain reports were copied across

16 into another report, to make the formation of another report.

17 Q. And finally, Mr. Chambers -- and finally, Mr. Chambers, would you

18 agree with me if I said that at the end of your duties in the UNPROFOR

19 command in Kiseljak you were not in a position to have a clear idea of the

20 Mujahedin and you cannot confirm that they were part of the 7th Brigade or

21 under the command of the 3rd Corps?

22 A. The answer to that is potentially very long and which we have

23 discussed before, and I think the -- I think I did have as good a picture

24 as anybody else in UNPROFOR at that time. But as I'm sure you will have

25 heard other witnesses in this Court say, perhaps, that we were observers

Page 6130

1 in somebody else's war; we were not fighting the war ourselves.

2 Consequently our focus and our intensity for divining the information

3 about what the warring factions were doing to one another was perhaps not

4 as intense as if we had been fighting the war ourselves.

5 I did, however, have probably as good an overview of the Mujahedin

6 as anybody else, and I would also state that the business about control

7 and command is still an issue that -- that I think is open in my mind. I

8 believe that there are elements that were no longer under control and were

9 operating as mavericks, but I do believe that -- that there was a command

10 structure and it was our belief, our perception at the time that, 7 Muslim

11 Brigade fell within the operating area of 3rd Corps and consequently

12 3rd Corps had administrative and logistical responsibility for 7 Muslim

13 Brigade, though they may not have had the operational control of them.

14 Q. Thank you. And finally, am I interpreting your very graphic

15 answer when you said that you sometimes felt that you were faced with a

16 sort of curtain that you would attach certain pictures to, you thought

17 they were accurate, but when the curtain was opened, you realised that

18 reality was quite often different? Have I correctly interpreted what you

19 said?

20 A. You have correctly interpreted an analogy I have made before, and

21 it is so of any war: If you are looking at the war through a curtain, or

22 at a curtain, there are certain chinks or small pieces of light and you

23 make up the picture as you see it. Obviously when the curtain is drawn

24 back and, 11 years on, other documents and other history and other

25 testimony comes to light, the picture may not have been exactly as you

Page 6131

1 were seeing it at the time. That is accepted in all wars in any

2 intelligence community. That is without a doubt. So you make the best

3 picture you have at the time. History may well prove you wrong or that

4 the picture was different.

5 Q. Thank you, Colonel Chambers.

6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

7 would just like to ask that the last two documents that I showed the

8 witness be admitted into evidence.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You are requesting

10 that milinfosum 156 be admitted into evidence, dated the 1st of October,

11 1993; as well as the document from the UNPROFOR -- the UNPROFOR document

12 that concerns the implementation of the peace plan in Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina. You are also requesting that this be admitted into evidence;

14 is that correct?

15 Mr. Withopf, these are two official documents that we have.

16 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, no objection.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar.

18 THE REGISTRAR: The milinfosum number 156 dated the 1st of

19 October, 1993, DH133; and the operations order, implementation of peace

20 plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina dated 24 October, 1993, is Exhibit

21 Number DH134.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to

24 thank you for allowing us to conclude our cross-examination of the

25 witness. Thank you.

Page 6132

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 It's 25 to 6.00 now. We have to have our second break. We will

3 resume at 6.00 and we will have one hour exactly.

4 Mr. Dixon has told us that he will take 30 minutes for his

5 cross-examination, perhaps even less. I know how concise Mr. Dixon can

6 be, so it will certainly be less. And then Mr. Withopf, who can also be

7 very concise, will proceed. And if any time is left, the Judges will also

8 ask some questions.

9 We will resume at 6.00.

10 --- Recess taken at 5.36 p.m.

11 --- On resuming at 6.06 p.m.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Dixon, you have the floor.

13 MR. DIXON: Thank you, Your Honours.

14 Cross-examined by Mr. Dixon:

15 Q. Colonel Chambers, would it be correct to say that only on rare

16 occasions did the UN sources gather information from what they had seen,

17 as opposed to what they had heard?

18 A. Yes, that would be entirely true.

19 Q. And that applied to you as well, as a person in the field?

20 A. Even more so to me. I -- I didn't go out an awful lot, so I

21 relied mainly on reports and reported speech, yes.

22 Q. And the information as we've heard was being obtained from

23 hearing from the warring sides and hearing from locals on the ground.

24 A. A lot of that information, yes, was -- was gathered that way,

25 from local people, yes.

Page 6133

1 Q. One of the ways in which the UN gathered information was by

2 driving around in a UN vehicle handing out cigarettes and sljivovica in

3 exchange for information; is that right?

4 A. Yes, particularly with the United Kingdom liaison officers, with

5 the warring faction commanders would sit, have sljivovica, give

6 cigarettes, and, if you like, in part -- in conversation, whilst smoking

7 the cigarettes and the coffee, sljivovica they would receive information,

8 yes.

9 Q. And they were also offered to local persons in villages when

10 travelling around in order to obtain information?

11 A. Possibly less so in that case, but I'm sure that that would have

12 happened, yes.

13 Q. You would agree with me that what you don't see with your own

14 eyes is partially true?

15 A. I would agree with you that you're entirely dependent upon the

16 integrity of the person that is telling you the information, yes.

17 Q. And where that information is inaccurate, then it will end up in

18 a report and remain inaccurate. You've confirmed that already.

19 A. Yes, that did inevitably happen, yes.

20 Q. Your role consisted of hearing, as we've outlined, information

21 from various sources, summarising it, and forming perceptions of what was

22 occurring on the ground.

23 A. Yes, that's -- that's correct. I was to build up an overall

24 picture, a perception of movement, potential attacks, potential pressures,

25 and so on if. It was -- yes, to create an overwash, an overview of what

Page 6134

1 was going on, rather than detailed specifics.

2 Q. And in connection with the specific allegation that appears in

3 your report that approximately 200 foreigners, Mujahedin, were located in

4 the 7th Brigade, that was a perception of yours, as you've described the

5 term now?

6 A. Yes. It would have been from a report, again from British

7 Battalion, from a variety of sources over a period of time that would have

8 led to that figure, and indeed to where they thought they fitted in the

9 command structure of the ABiH, yes.

10 Q. But you have no hard evidence that they were incorporated into

11 the structure of the 7th Brigade, do you?

12 A. I have no paperwork or hard evidence to -- to support that, no.

13 Q. You have said that you were aware that a person by the name of

14 Mr. Abu Haris, a foreigner, commanded the majority of the foreign

15 Mujahedin.

16 A. That is correct. And the name Abu Haris is phonetic. We never

17 had, as far as I'm aware, the -- necessarily the correct spelling of his

18 name. But he did command the majority of the Mujahedin and was based in

19 Mehurici, yes.

20 Q. You've also said that there was a disaffected group of foreigners

21 who came to fight for a holy war, but that they did not find a place in

22 Central Bosnia.

23 A. Rather than specifically a -- a place on the map --

24 Q. At home. I correct myself.

25 A. Indeed. Yes. They -- I think they were disillusioned because

Page 6135

1 they felt that they had come there to fight Jihad, a holy war, and that is

2 not what they found when they arrived, and consequently they were

3 disaffected, yes.

4 Q. And you've said that these elements that we've referred to now

5 could have been a group apart from the 7th Brigade.

6 A. That is very difficult to know. I don't know the -- the absolute

7 answer to that. As to how many Mujahedin were with Abu Haris and whether

8 there were other smaller groupings, say, who were set apart, I -- I don't

9 actually know.

10 Q. Yes, you've said that there was a time when 7th Brigade was

11 synonymous with Mujahedin. That was earlier on. But then understandings

12 crystallised and they were then seen as two entities. Is that right?

13 A. Indeed, what I was trying to -- to impart was that, I think,

14 people commonly confused the term "Mujahedin" with 7 Muslim Brigade.

15 However, those who studied, if you like, like myself in more detail

16 realised there were two separate entities within the same body. The

17 Mujahedin element, predominantly under Abu Haris, and then, if you like,

18 the national Bosnian element within 7 Muslim Brigade, yes.

19 Q. Would it be correct to say that the situation regarding the

20 command structure of the Mujahedin was at best grey?

21 A. Yes, I think that is entirely fair to say.

22 Q. If you had been fighting in the war yourself, it's likely that

23 that information would have been obtained through proper intelligence

24 sources. But as you've said, you were not involved in the war.

25 A. I think that is entirely fair. We would have -- (a), we would

Page 6136

1 have had the resources and would have gone out of our way to define and

2 develop our greater understanding of the Mujahedin, 7 Muslim Brigade, and

3 indeed all warring factions. We didn't have the resources, in terms of

4 physically seeing who was where, and therefore we were reliant

5 predominantly upon third party reports. If it had been our own war, yes,

6 we would have given more resources to that particular problem and would

7 have put in a lot more energy to finding out more, yes.

8 Q. Thank you. On the preparation of your report, you indicated that

9 you prepared it in the course of one evening. There was some urgency

10 about getting it off, wasn't there?

11 A. I really prepared it that evening out of my own convenience, I

12 seem to remember. Most evenings were quiet, where I did most of my

13 analysis. This report had come in, and I answered it there and then over

14 a period of about three hours of typing and a bit of research to get it

15 back the next day just to clear my desk, as much as anything.

16 Q. Yes. You never at that time, when you were preparing your

17 report, you never went out into the field to conduct any further research

18 or any further interviews, did you?

19 A. No.

20 Q. You say that it was based largely on your own information that

21 you had and a little bit from Captain Whitley's report; is that right?

22 A. Yes, and virtually all of it, if you like, was not things that I

23 had seen of my own eyes.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. But reports that were given to me. But predominantly from the

Page 6137

1 British Battalion reports in whose area 7 Muslim Brigade lived.

2 Q. So that would have been things that you had heard after you

3 arrived in September 1993.

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. You were obviously not there in June or July 1993.

6 A. No, I was not.

7 Q. Captain Whitley's report was also a general impression report.

8 You said it was a short report. Was it one which was also in the form of

9 an overview?

10 A. Yes. I think it was a -- on memory, it was a report that had

11 been built up over a period of time since the British had been in theatre

12 and was a fusion of lots of little elements that had come together and

13 gave an overview of what he, at that time, believed was the command

14 structure and the size, scale of the Mujahedin and so on.

15 Q. You didn't go month by month reporting on what the situation was,

16 did you?

17 A. I don't believe Captain Whitley did, no.

18 Q. At the time when you prepared the report, you had not met

19 Mr. Amir Kubura, who was at that time the commander of the 7th Brigade,

20 had you?

21 A. I did not meet him then, and I had not met him until I arrived in

22 this courtroom today.

23 Q. Did you know that he was the acting commander of the 7th Brigade

24 from the 1st of April, 1993?

25 A. I -- I did not, no.

Page 6138

1 Q. That he was standing in for Mr. Assim Korcic who remained as the

2 commander until August 1993?

3 A. I was not aware of that, no.

4 Q. You had never been to the headquarters of the 7th Brigade in

5 Zenica, had you?

6 A. I did not, no.

7 Q. You didn't know where the headquarters were located.

8 A. I think it had been pointed out to me, but I never visited.

9 Q. You didn't have a list of members of the brigade?

10 A. Not a -- an ABiH list.

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. Obviously we had the British Battalion list of what they thought

13 it consisted of and the personalities within it.

14 Q. You didn't have any 7th Brigade documents or orders, did you?

15 A. No.

16 Q. You did say in your report - I don't know if you have it in front

17 of you there; I'm sure you do -- you don't. It's been taken away.

18 A. It doesn't matter. I can -- I know it very well.

19 Q. Perhaps we can try and do it for the purposes of moving through

20 it quickly, without your referring to the report, that the 7th Brigade

21 were grouped under the command of the 3rd Corps and that certainly the

22 3rd Corps command gives operational direction. Do you recall that being

23 in your report?

24 A. I remember that line, yes.

25 Q. And do you recall stating at paragraph 13 that: "Despite the

Page 6139

1 routine claims of the HVO there are no known or suspected atrocities that

2 have been conducted by the Mujahedin."

3 A. Yes, I wrote that line. I remember it well. And that was my

4 perception at the time. Again, having been in the theatre two months.

5 Q. Were you aware at the time of other brigades within the Bosnian

6 army, not within the area of the 3rd Corps, which also were referred to as

7 Muslim brigades?

8 A. Yes, I was.

9 Q. There was one in the 1st Corps in Sarajevo, was there not? Do

10 you remember that?

11 A. I can't, but I would fully accept that there was probably one,

12 yes.

13 Q. And one in the 2nd Corps in Tuzla.

14 A. I think I do remember that one, yes.

15 Q. And other brigades in the 4th Corps in Konjic and Jablanica.

16 A. Could be. I would accept probably so.

17 Q. And one in the 6th Corps.

18 A. Again, I would accept that probably were.

19 Q. And they were manoeuvre units or assault units. Do you remember

20 that?

21 A. I can't as such, no. I can't remember that.

22 Q. But the use of the term "Muslim" with brigades was quite common

23 within the Bosnian army.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Looking at the area of the -- the 3rd Corps. In your report -

Page 6140












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6141

1 you may need to refer to it, but perhaps we can do it without wasting

2 time - there were a number of assault brigades, as you called them that

3 you recorded.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. The 17th Krajina Brigade.

6 A. 305.

7 Q. 305 Brigade.

8 A. Yeah, and 7 Janja.

9 Q. And 27th Banja Luka Brigade?

10 A. Banja Luka, yes.

11 Q. And you said that these brigades were combat indicators.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. That they seldom did defence work but, instead, focussed on

14 assault operations.

15 A. Correct. I think that was most specifically so of 7 and 17.

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. Were generally offensive -- used in the offensive role, yes.

18 Q. So there was more than one brigade that was used in the offensive

19 role that served as a combat indicator for you.

20 A. Yes, 7 and 17 were the two that I followed most carefully, yes.

21 Q. And you've also mentioned the forming of an 8th Brigade, the

22 El Mujahed Brigade.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Moving on to your chart, which is at the back of the report.

25 Once again, perhaps we can take this without --

Page 6142

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- it necessarily being in front of you. You have accepted that

3 the information on here might be inaccurate because it might have changed

4 over time.

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. So it wouldn't surprise you, then, if the commander of the

7 Travnik Battalion - you've said that person is Assim Korcic - there's been

8 some dispute over the spelling - was never the commander of that battalion

9 and in fact there were three other persons who were the commanders during

10 the time of 1993/1994.

11 A. I would fully accept, and it would now not come as a surprise to

12 me, not now nor indeed then, that the "X" of the information was in the

13 box, if you like, or on the chart as at that time as we understood it.

14 Q. This wasn't a chart that you'd prepared -- and it might be

15 difficult for you to answer questions therefore about it, but I'm seeking

16 to clarify the accuracy, as you can understand, of the report. Is that

17 right that, this is a chart prepared by others?

18 A. I understand the question. Correct, it was a spreadsheet chart

19 prepared by the British Battalion of which we had copies and I would amend

20 as new information came in.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. So we each had copies and free-flowed the information between.

23 Correct.

24 Q. Moving on to the 2nd Battalion in Zenica. It wouldn't surprise

25 you if the person named there was in fact only an ordinary foot soldier,

Page 6143

1 Mr. Pasanovic, and not the commander indeed of that battalion?

2 A. That would surprise me, only in the fact that that would seem to

3 be a gross inaccuracy from a report from the ground. But I can accept it

4 might be possible, but it would be surprising.

5 Q. His name might have come from one particular source, though, that

6 might not have been verified; is that right?

7 A. It would be very unusual to place a name of a commander in a box

8 such as that if it was only on one pure unsubstantiated report. Unusual.

9 I would not say impossible, though.

10 Q. So it would be possible?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And in respect of Mr. Catic, then, that he was not the commander

13 after June of 1993 of the 3rd Battalion.

14 A. I could accept that's possible, yes.

15 Q. The 7th Brigade, as you recall it, only had three battalions,

16 those that I've mentioned now, and the others that I mentioned on this

17 chart were in fact never confirmed, is that right?

18 A. Yeah, that is correct, though I think it important to -- to just

19 highlight that the understanding of a clinical hierarchical structure, as

20 in most regular armies, it was not necessarily the case in the Bosnian

21 army structure or the HVO or -- or anyone, but yes, I accept that the

22 Maglaj Battalion, for example, pictorially displayed on the map, may not

23 have been at Maglaj, and I accept that the Sarajevo Battalion, about which

24 little was known, may not have existed in the way that we -- we depicted

25 it.

Page 6144

1 Q. And it might be that these two, the 4th and 5th Battalions, were

2 in fact confused with other Muslim brigades, such as those that I

3 mentioned earlier, operating outside of the area of 3rd Corps?

4 A. That, it would be possible, yes.

5 Q. Moving down under the Travnik Battalion, Mehurici. Mehurici is

6 mentioned twice on this chart; there and under the 8th Brigade.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. There's the name Abu Haris mentioned.

9 A. He is mentioned under the Mehurici company, I recall.

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. But not under the 8th Brigade.

12 Q. Yes. The way you understand this chart is that both were based

13 in Mehurici?

14 A. Yes. Though, again, to clarify, we were very content that Abu

15 Haris and the Mujahedin, that that core grouping of Mujahedin were based

16 in Mehurici. It was only clarified by your learned friend with the

17 document which she showed me that we had had a report that 8th Muslim

18 Brigade were forming up and that their headquarters was at Mehurici. That

19 was -- it was forming in that period October/November of 1993.

20 Q. Would it be fair to say that this chart could be inaccurate

21 regarding the Mehurici company and where it fitted in on account of what

22 you said earlier on about the greyness surrounding the subordination of

23 the Mujahedin within the Bosnian army?

24 A. One of the few things that I feel entirely certain about was that

25 the Mehurici headquarters of those Mujahedin -- the core element of

Page 6145

1 Mujahedin, that it -- their headquarters was at Mehurici. I feel certain

2 about that.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. Though I do accept that we were not able to see necessarily the

5 full picture of who was subordinate to whom within the Bosnian army in all

6 matters, no. That I would accept.

7 Q. Thank you. One final question relates to a document. This is

8 the only document we seek to introduce. And it comes from, Colonel

9 Chambers, your disks which were taken off, I presume, your computer and

10 which were disclosed by the Prosecution to the Defence.

11 A. Yes.

12 MR. DIXON: I have copies of the document for Your Honours and,

13 of course, for the Prosecution and the witness.

14 Q. It's a document dated the 15th of November regarding the Bosnian

15 command reporting requirements. Is this a document that you prepared as

16 part of a briefing session for those collecting information? Can you

17 recall? They were obtained from your disks.

18 A. I am just trying to remember it. I'm working hard at this now.

19 And as to why it would have been done, I have a very, very vague

20 recollection of it, and I can't remember why it was created. It looks as

21 though we were -- we had some form of G2 conference on the 15th of

22 November with our battalion milinfo officers.

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. And this was one of the presentations or something. Yeah.

25 Q. Was that the kind of activity that you engaged in, giving

Page 6146

1 guidelines to those who would be collecting information for your office so

2 that you could prepare your reports as accurately as possible to be passed

3 on to governments?

4 A. Yeah. But indeed, this -- looking at it now, just getting a feel

5 for it, it looks like it's the -- if you like, the introductory brief to a

6 new unit and their milinfo team as part of, say, a whole day of

7 instruction of which this was the -- the introduction or overview of the

8 study day, where we are giving them the idea of what it is that we require

9 of them. That's what it appears to me now to be.

10 Q. Yes. If you could turn to page 2 of the document, under

11 heading "Assessment and presentation," where you are here referring to the

12 assessments to be put into the reports.

13 A. Yes, I'm reading it.

14 Q. Would you confirm that it's written there: "That that is a

15 matter up to you, no standard format, though area by area works well.

16 Don't worry what it looks like. Doesn't matter if it is not a staff

17 school production."

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And that further down another point in the presentation: "Try to

20 make a gut feeling assessment at the end daily."

21 A. Yes. Yes.

22 Q. And below that: "Try to sum up the week, a seven-sentence sound

23 bite," which is in inverted commas.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And the last point: "Don't worry if you are wrong. We often

Page 6147

1 are, and nobody notices."

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Can you confirm that this is a presentation that was given by

4 yourself or those involved in the preparation of milinfosums on

5 15 November 1993?

6 A. I can't.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please make pauses between questions

8 and answers for the benefit of the interpreters. Thank you.

9 THE WITNESS: I can't. Though I accept that it is quite likely

10 that this presentation was given.


12 Q. And would you accept that this was a document retrieved from your

13 computer disks, information kept on your computer?

14 A. Almost certainly, yes.

15 Q. Thank you, Colonel Chambers.

16 MR. DIXON: I have no further questions.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Dixon.

18 MR. DIXON: Your Honour, the most important part was missing,

19 which is for the document to be tendered as an exhibit on the basis that

20 the witness has identified that it was part of the documents that he

21 handed over to the Prosecution, and he has commented on the document

22 today.

23 I'm grateful, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The Trial Chamber

25 would like to thank you for having used only the time allocated to you.

Page 6148

1 Mr. Withopf, as far as the document is concerned, what is the

2 Prosecution's position? This document has been identified -- recognised

3 by the witness.

4 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, no objection.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Madam Registrar,

6 could we have an exhibit number.

7 THE REGISTRAR: The exhibit number is DK10.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 Mr. Withopf, is there any re-examination?

10 MR. WITHOPF: There is a re-examination, Mr. President. It will

11 be very brief. I have four issues to address; two of them are for

12 clarification purposes only.

13 Thank you, Mr. President.

14 Re-examined by Mr. Withopf:

15 Q. Sir, question number one: You already mentioned that your report

16 of the 2nd of November, 1993, was a fusion, to use the word you used, of a

17 report that was put together by Captain Whitley, who was in the area from

18 April to September 1993; it was a fusion of such information and your own

19 information which you could have obtained only after you arrived in

20 September 1993; and you also mentioned in addition, of reports sent to you

21 by the British Battalion. Can you please inform the Trial Chamber as to

22 what point in time the reports of the British Battalion that finally

23 formed part of your report, on what point in time such information was

24 collected.

25 A. Yes. The British Battalion at the time that I was there, who had

Page 6149

1 been there from April through until the October, was the first battalion,

2 the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment, and so they were -- had had six months

3 in which their milinfocell had been able to assess, and at the time that I

4 compiled a report in November, they had just left or were leaving the

5 theatre of Bosnia back to Germany, and so they had six months' worth of

6 collation of that information.

7 Q. For clarification, does it mean that your report was based on

8 information that was collected by the British Battalion between April and

9 September 1993?

10 A. Mainly that is correct, yes.

11 Q. The second issue, sir: When you were shown the ECMM report dated

12 the 27th of October, 1993, which is Prosecution Exhibit P176, on page 27,

13 line 17 you said that: "This is only a small piece of a big picture."

14 What was the big picture about?

15 A. I've only seen that report today, and I do recall making that

16 statement. I can't remember what it was in relation to. I think it was

17 to do with the taking of a hostage of one -- was it not by the Mujahedin?

18 Q. It was the issue about the subordination of the Mujahedin. And

19 you said, "This is a small piece of a big picture." And the question is:

20 What was the big picture about?

21 A. Yes. I understand now. The -- the big picture, if you like, is

22 trying to understand, as we spent considerable time and effort trying to

23 understand, where 7 Muslim Brigade fitted into the Bosnian army picture.

24 It was our opinion at that time that 7 Muslim Brigade were receiving, if

25 you like, operational direction from the highest levels of the Bosnian

Page 6150

1 army to conduct operations, predominantly offensive operations, throughout

2 Central Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3 However, again, as part of the bigger picture, is that they lived

4 mainly in the 3rd -- Bosnian 3rd Corps area and received probably

5 logistical support - fuel, weaponry support, transport, and so on - and

6 came under a loose administrative grouping of Bosnian 3rd Corps, though it

7 is accepted, or we certainly came to understand that they were directed in

8 their operational actions from army-group level.

9 Q. Does it mean that the big picture is actually the one which you

10 included -- or the information which is included in your 2nd of November,

11 1993 report?

12 A. If you mean by that the diagram as being the big picture of

13 7 Muslim Brigade, that diagram is, as we understood, the structure of

14 7 Muslim Brigade at that time being subordinate to Bosnian 3rd Corps for

15 matters, for administration, and all the things I have said; however,

16 fully accepting the fact that they received operational direction from a

17 higher level. So that is the big picture to which I was referring.

18 Q. Earlier on today you were mentioning, sir, that the ORBAT was

19 part of a spreadsheet, the ORBAT which forms part of your 2nd November

20 1993 report. Do you recall, and if so can you inform us, as to when this

21 spreadsheet was put together?

22 A. I certainly know that the British Battalion between April and

23 September had this spreadsheet showing all the Bosnian army corps,

24 brigades, battalions as they knew it, and what you are seeing on that

25 chart, as I explained on Friday to the Court, is the -- the extreme

Page 6151

1 right-hand side just 7 Brigade coming underneath of Bosnian 3rd Corps. To

2 the left of that visible chart that you have would be a number of other

3 brigades and units as part of the spreadsheet.

4 Q. Does this answer imply, sir, that the ORBAT also reflects the

5 situation between April and September 1993?

6 A. It represents a compilation of the situation between April and

7 September 1993, and I will accept and have accepted with your learned

8 Defence counsel that there may have been inherent inaccuracies that

9 were -- or not updated parts of that chart.

10 Q. And the very last issue, sir, which I wish to address with you:

11 The Defence for Hadzihasanovic has shown you quite a number of documents

12 that had included comments made by representatives of the ABiH. The

13 question is, Lieutenant Colonel, at the time in respect to the reliability

14 of information, did you make a difference between information gathered

15 from independent sources, meaning not the warring factions, and the

16 warring factions?

17 A. Yes. The -- we always regarded as -- regarded reports given to

18 us by the warring factions -- any of the warring factions, leaders, or

19 commanders as being -- we used to take the default setting that it was not

20 true unless we were able to prove it to be otherwise true. From reports

21 that we received from other sources, UNPROFOR, non-governmental

22 organisations, and so on, reports that they had seen were taken as true,

23 default setting, unless proved not to be true. However, many of the

24 reports that we received from UNPROFOR and from the non-governmental

25 organisations were from talking to local people. Consequently, we were

Page 6152

1 very sceptical of any information that we received in any report and

2 generally until we had two or three reportings from different sources, we

3 did not accept that to be -- any particular fact to be true.

4 Q. Thank you very much, sir.

5 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, Your Honours, I have no further

6 questions.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Withopf.

8 Witness, there are a few questions I would like to put to you.

9 Questioned by the Court:

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before you were sent to

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, you said that you held a number of positions. It

12 appears that you are an intelligence expert. Is it your previous position

13 that relative to the fact that you were assigned to the headquarters in

14 order to concern yourself with collating information under the authority

15 of a French colonel?

16 A. Yes, sir, I was -- the entire truth of the matter is I was sent

17 to Bosnia with four days' notice to go because we had run out of people to

18 send. I am -- I was at that time an infantry officer, had just returned

19 from the Toronto -- Canadian Staff College. I was not a specific

20 intelligence expert at that time, and I went there to do the job to the

21 best of my ability as a staff officer. But I did work for Colonel

22 Latapie, a full colonel in the French Army, who was -- himself was not an

23 intelligence expert but had seen service with the French Foreign Legion

24 and was a combat soldier.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Today, given your military

Page 6153

1 past, if you had to define "intelligence service," would you say that this

2 should be the matter of specialists or infantry members who are asked to

3 go and gather intelligence and are given four days to be sent on the

4 mission? What could you tell us about this?

5 A. Two things, sir: One is that although I was -- I am not an

6 intelligence -- was not then an intelligence expert or specialist, my

7 background in Northern Ireland and -- which was about three and a half

8 years in Northern Ireland, doing various intelligence-related jobs there,

9 predisposed me to be relatively well-trained for this sort of work.

10 Further, my formal training at Sandhurst and on many other

11 courses also trains you to be able to look at the intelligence cycle, as

12 we term it, and to be able to make assessments and create the mechanisms

13 to make assessments.

14 In that regard, although I was not a specialist, I was confident

15 in the manner in which I did my work. However, I have to say that in an

16 ideal world, intelligence specialists or intelligence is best left to

17 intelligence specialists.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for that answer.

19 Yesterday you said that the purpose of collating information was

20 only to protect humanitarian convoys and to provide your superiors with

21 information. As far as the protection of humanitarian convoys are

22 concerned, within the framework of your intelligence work, were you aware

23 of any humanitarian convoys that had been attacked, looted, or were parts

24 of any convoys robbed? And if that was the case, by whom?

25 A. Yes, sir. It was a relatively common or frequent occurrence,

Page 6154












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6155

1 particularly in the area of Gornji Vakuf, in the southern end of the

2 3rd BiH Corps's area. However, the main protagonists, people that were

3 shooting at the humanitarian aid convoys, were the HVO in the area of

4 Gornji Vakuf.

5 We had a number of other instances where humanitarian aid convoys

6 became embroiled in a conflict, and one in particular I remember was in

7 the centre of the Vitez pocket between Novi Travnik and Vitez, where a --

8 an attack was going on, and mortar fire killed two of the truck drivers

9 in -- in Vitez.

10 Further, in my own headquarters at Kiseljak we lost a Belgian

11 corporal who was killed, shot by a sniper, and a Dutch soldier, who was

12 injured in the same truck whilst coming back into the Kiseljak HVO pocket,

13 and we did not know who fired those shots, and it will never be known.

14 So attacks on convoys were relatively frequent, yes, sir.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll go back to the diagram

16 about which many questions and various types of questions were put to you

17 by the Defence. You said that the reports that were compiled were

18 forwarded to the UN, to the ministries of the countries that had troops

19 present in the field, and to other authorities. In your opinion, did

20 these reports have a capital importance in view of the addressees that

21 they were intended for?

22 A. Yes. The -- obviously our -- the headquarters that commanded us

23 was Headquarters UNPROFOR in Zagreb. They, of course, needed to know what

24 was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And our military information summary

25 and the pictorial information summary on the Sunday was their prime means

Page 6156

1 of receiving intelligence information on the warring factions in Bosnia

2 and Herzegovina. They were our prime customer, if you like.

3 Other customers were all the other battalions and units within

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that they could read our assessments and try and

5 predict where confrontation would happen.

6 Further, each national government or Ministry of Defence were

7 interested in keeping a watching brief, a watching eye, on what was

8 happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it affected their own troops, or indeed

9 may have affected foreign policy decisions by governments and been part of

10 that build-up.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In such conditions, any errors

12 [realtime transcript read in error "area"] were excluded or should be

13 excluded given the importance of such reports. Colonel Latapie in the

14 headquarters and his superior, did you inform them of the fact that it was

15 necessary to compile reports which reflected as accurately as possible the

16 reality and did you inform them that any errors should be excluded, even

17 if this was intelligence that was concerned?

18 Mr. Withopf, is there something that's missing?

19 MR. WITHOPF: Mr. President, it appear that is in line 1 of your

20 question there's something wrong with the transcript. It's written "any

21 areas were excluded," whereas, I understood that you were asking "any

22 errors that were excluded."

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. What I wanted to say is

24 that given the importance of your reports, your superiors in headquarters,

25 did they inform you of the risk of making errors and of the fact that it

Page 6157

1 was necessary that these reports reflect as accurately as possible the

2 reality on the ground and this should exclude interpretation of any kind?

3 Were you made aware of this or not?

4 A. Yes, I -- I was. And it is something that in the whole

5 intelligence world people are acutely aware of. And the reason for that

6 is you have a clear choice: You either say nothing and nobody would then

7 know anything; or you have to make a judgement as to what is probable and

8 therefore what is going -- what is useful. And thus, you have to make a

9 judgement call all the time as to how much to include and how much to

10 exclude from a report based on the probability of what you perceive to be

11 happening on the ground, to make a useful assessment. So everybody in the

12 whole community realises that any report is -- is a fusion, a blend, and

13 an assessment, and will not necessarily be straight and absolute fact.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You said that there were 24

15 liaison officers in the field. Did you have contact with these liaison

16 officers in order to verify the contents of these reports? Did you have

17 discussions concerning the problems with them, or did you quite simply not

18 see them at any time, since these liaison officers were naturally in

19 contact with the local population and with the HVO or BH army units? Did

20 you see them? Were there any working meetings that you had with them

21 concerning your assessment of what was happening, since that was your

22 mission? Your mission was to assess what the reality was.

23 A. Absolutely, sir. Yes, I did meet some of the United Kingdom

24 liaison officers. But to make things completely clear, the three

25 battalion areas that I looked after each had a military information cell.

Page 6158

1 Those cells were receiving information from many sources, and they were

2 the first filter, the first people to collate, assess, and then send to

3 me. So already by the time I am receiving reports from the three

4 battalions, that information has been collated, has been substantiated,

5 where possible, and has been assessed. My job, if you like, was then to

6 take those three reports, or three big elements, and fuse those together

7 to make the picture just that little bit bigger.

8 I did, however, meet some of the liaison officers, and the 24

9 United Kingdom liaison officers, who were all captains, were specific to

10 the British Battalion. No other battalion had these characters, these

11 officers. So when the British Battalion went in, it had a full battalion

12 of manpower, plus 24 captains whose sole job was to gather information.

13 So the information we received from the British Battalion was

14 inevitably much more than anywhere else. However, those United Kingdom

15 liaison officers reporting to the British Battalion in Vitez would of

16 course have spoken to local commanders, HVO, BiH, and local civilians to

17 inject their reports into the British Battalion in Vitez.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And my last question: Given

19 the presence of two or 300 Mujahedin, as you have said, now, you said that

20 they were located in Mehurici, did your superiors address this issue and

21 did they think of having a liaison officer within the 7th Brigade? If

22 that wasn't done, in your opinion why wasn't it done, given the importance

23 of the 7th Brigade in general -- in the general framework? And you have

24 referred to this in your report.

25 A. Indeed, sir, yes. I would agree, sir. I am not aware of a

Page 6159

1 specific liaison officer or liaison officers who dealt with the

2 7th Brigade, and I don't know who did liaise with them -- who did liaise

3 with them routinely. I am unsure.

4 I know that a lot of the discussion about the 7 Muslim Brigade and

5 the Mujahedin was had, as indeed some of the documents that have been

6 presented to me today will prove, was had by the then-Lieutenant Colonel

7 Williams talking to Alagic, Enver Hadzihasanovic, and so on. So much was

8 discussed about 7 Muslim Brigade. I am not aware of a liaison officer,

9 and yes, I would agree with you, sir, a liaison officer would have been

10 ideal. I do not know why there was not one provided, or indeed there may

11 well have been. I'm not aware of one though, sir.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 As the Defence took a lot of time, unfortunately the Judges would

15 like to ask you other questions but we can't go beyond the time we have,

16 unfortunately, given the fact that the Trial Chamber has asked the witness

17 a number of questions, is there -- are there any other issues to be raised

18 by either of the parties?

19 Mr. Withopf, is there any issue you would like to raise? The

20 questions were precise and the answers were precise, too. Is there

21 anything you would like to add?

22 MR. WITHOPF: Nothing from the side of the Prosecution,

23 Mr. President.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Does Defence have any questions for the witness, any brief

Page 6160

1 questions following the answers we have been provided with?

2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] No. Thank you, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. Dixon.

4 MR. DIXON: [Previous translation continues] ...

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Witness, thank you for having spent over two days here, because

7 you spent the weekend in The Hague. You have answered the questions put

8 to you by the Prosecution, by the Defence, and by myself. I would like to

9 thank you for that. And we wish you a good trip home.

10 I will now ask the usher to escort you out of the courtroom.

11 [The witness withdrew]

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will now adjourn. As we

13 have already said, tomorrow we will be dealing with the documents

14 according to the plan that I mentioned on Friday. I hope that the

15 Prosecution is prepared, as well as the Defence. To the extent that this

16 is possible, we will see if the Prosecution will be in a position tomorrow

17 to have a witness here for Thursday; if not, we'll have to cancel this

18 witness if the discussion of the hearing takes more time than planned.

19 I'd like to stress the fact that both parties should be as

20 concise as possible; they should present the problems very clearly, in

21 order to enable us to move ahead rapidly tomorrow and on Wednesday,

22 because as you know, the Trial Chamber has to render a decision concerning

23 the admissibility -- the admissibility into evidence of the documents

24 contested by the Defence. I think that the Defence is equally well

25 prepared for this debate tomorrow.

Page 6161

1 At this point in time, would either of the parties like to make

2 any comments?

3 Mr. Withopf, is there anything you would like to say, or not to

4 say?

5 MR. WITHOPF: Could we please go into private session? This is

6 in respect to one witness.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll go into

8 private session, Madam Registrar.

9 [Private session]

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 6162












12 Page 6162 redacted, private session














Page 6163












12 Page 6163 redacted, private session














Page 6164












12 Page 6164 redacted, private session














Page 6165

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 [Open session]

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are in open session now.

14 It is ten past 7.00. I will close the proceedings for today,

15 inviting all parties to come back tomorrow at 9.00 a.m. Thank you.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.09 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 27th day of

18 April, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.