1 Thursday, 6 May 2004
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call
6 the case number, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The number of the case is
8 IT-01-47-T, the Prosecutor versus Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Could we have the appearances for the Prosecution. I would like
11 to greet Mr. Withopf, who is amongst us yet again.
12 MR. WITHOPF: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Good morning,
13 Mr. President. Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning, Counsel. For
14 the Prosecution, Daryl Mundis, Kyle Wood, Ekkehard Withopf, and Ruth
15 Karper, the case manager.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 And the appearances for the Defence.
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.
19 Good morning, Your Honours. On behalf of General Enver Hadzihasanovic,
20 Edina Residovic, counsel; Stephane Bourgon, co-counsel; and Muriel Cauvin,
21 our legal assistant. Thank you.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. On
24 behalf of Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Nermin
25 Mulalic, our legal assistant.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 The Trial Chamber would like to greet everyone present in the
3 courtroom, members of the Prosecution, Defence counsel, the accused, and
4 everyone else present here.
5 We'll continue with the cross-examination of the witness today.
6 Both Defence teams will conduct this cross-examination. The Trial Chamber
7 would like to point out that as we have already said, it's necessary to
8 conclude the cross-examination today. In theory, Mr. Bourgon has between
9 an hour and a half and two hours for his cross-examination, and this
10 should allow Defence for Mr. Kubura to conduct their examination for the
11 two hours that they have requested, unless Mr. Dixon would like to inform
12 us that he requires less time.
13 MR. DIXON: Yes. Good morning, Your Honours. We do require less
14 time. And we've spoken to Mr. Bourgon about this, and the proposal that
15 we therefore have for the division of time today is to allow Mr. Bourgon
16 to continue for the first session, until 10.30, and then when we usually
17 resume at five to 11.00, if -- if he be permitted to continue from then
18 until 12.00, for a further hour, and at that stage, if we could request
19 that we have our break until twenty-five past 12.00, and then I will
20 commence the cross-examination for Mr. Kubura at that stage, estimating
21 that it will take about an hour or just over an hour. That will allow the
22 cross-examination to be done in one continuous flow and also will allow us
23 to set up a -- a videotape, because we have a small piece of video to show
24 the witness and Your Honours during his testimony. And that could be done
25 in the break. So if that is convenient for Your Honours, we'd propose
1 that as a division of time today and then the Defence cross-examination
2 will be finished at the end of today.
3 Thank you, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. This plan is
5 perfect and fits into the plan we've already established.
6 Without wasting any more time, I would like to ask the usher to
7 call the witness into the courtroom.
8 [The witness entered court]
9 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good morning, General. I'd
11 first like to check that you're receiving interpretation.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I do.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would also like to check that
14 the documents that you were promised yesterday were provided to you in the
15 course of yesterday afternoon.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, they were.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Mr. Bourgon, you may take the floor.
19 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Good morning, Madam Judge. Good
20 morning, Your Honour. Good morning, Mr. President.
21 WITNESS: KLAUS REINHARDT [Resumed]
22 Cross-examined by Mr. Bourgon: [Continued]
23 Q. Good morning, General. Once again, thank you for being here this
24 morning. And I shall proceed with my last segment of the
25 cross-examination today, in reference to and in relation to your expert
1 report as filed previously before this Chamber.
2 What I would like to do to begin with, General, of course you
3 have been given some -- you have been given three different documents
4 yesterday at the end of the afternoon, along with some questions that I
5 would like to put to you a little later today towards the end of my
6 cross-examination. For now I would like to simply come back quickly on
7 the issue of the measures that had been taken by the accused General Enver
8 Hadzihasanovic while he was commanding general of the 3rd Corps of the
9 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10 General, would I be right in saying that as you were drafting
11 this report and as part of the questions which were asked of you by the
12 Prosecution the measures or the lack thereof taken by General
13 Hadzihasanovic was one of the main focuses of what you were asked to look
15 A. This was one of the focuses I was asked to look at, yes, sir.
16 Q. And may I confirm with you, General, this morning that at some
17 point during the cross-examination you mentioned that as you were looking
18 throughout all these documents that were provided to you by the
19 Prosecution you were basically surprised at to what extent the documents
20 displayed a will on the part of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from
21 its president, Mr. Izetbegovic, down to the 3rd Corps and its subordinate
22 units that the operations be conducted in accordance with the law?
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. And that you could see this from the -- from the multiple
25 documents that you reviewed.
1 A. This is correct, sir.
2 Q. And in your report, you also mentioned that General
3 Hadzihasanovic did issue a number of reports -- a number of orders, sorry,
4 with a view to preventing violations from being committed.
5 A. Yes, sir, he did.
6 Q. And it was also your view that General Hadzihasanovic felt
7 responsible for the prevention of such violations.
8 A. Yes. He, I think, went even further; he basically declared that
9 the new Bosnian army should not fight the same way as their opponents
10 would fight. He was claiming for a more human way of fighting according
11 to the international law.
12 Q. And in some cases, at least one of which is reported in your
13 expert report, you mentioned that General Hadzihasanovic did exactly what
14 could be expected of a commanding general being faced with allegations, in
15 terms of doing the right thing from the investigation down until we have
17 A. Yes. And I stated this is unfortunately the only case I found in
18 the document. This is the Kakanj case, where he basically sent the
19 military police, he investigated, and he gave a clear order then to the
20 commander -- the commander of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade to relieve
21 some of the officers he thought that they would be -- they hadn't done the
22 job properly.
23 Q. And yesterday, General, we went through some of the documents
24 when we were discussing measures, and one of the cases we discussed was
25 the investigation which was triggered by General Hadzihasanovic in
1 relation to some events in Susanj, where some 19 people had died. Do you
2 recall us discussing this issue yesterday?
3 A. I do.
4 Q. And can you confirm that what you mentioned yesterday was that
5 the way this situation was handled was exactly what could be expected of a
6 commanding general in a position of General Hadzihasanovic?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. One of the things that you did mention is that although some
9 orders had been issued by General Hadzihasanovic, you pointed out in your
10 report that the orders seemed to have been timely, in terms of close after
11 some events, which would, in your opinion, show that he had a certain
12 knowledge of something bad had taken place; he was willing to try and tell
13 his soldiers not to do it again, if that was the case; but at the same
14 time, that it did not appear to you that he did take actions to punish.
15 A. Well, at least I didn't find anything in the documents which
16 would lead me to that conclusion, and that was the problem.
17 Q. Now, when we talk about taking measures, General, I'd like to
18 confirm with you that of course one of the measures which can be taken is
19 punishment. You would agree with me that this is probably the most
20 typical type of measure?
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. Would you also agree with me, General, that other measures can be
23 taken to ensure that violations are not repeated and to ensure that the
24 troops are under control?
25 A. This is too global. I don't want to answer on this, because I
1 don't know what you're talking about.
2 Q. I will give you maybe some examples. By training your soldiers,
3 you can, on one hand, prevent and ensure that the soldiers and the
4 leadership of your corps is able to stop violations from being committed.
5 A. Right, sir. This is a preventive measure.
6 Q. By -- once you learn of your enemy committing serious violations
7 or acting beyond the law - and we discussed yesterday the impact that this
8 can have on your own army - that protests, I suggest to you, could be a
9 valid way of ensuring that crimes don't happen again.
10 A. The protest to the opposite side.
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Would you say that for a commanding general, especially in the
14 present situation, to propose a meeting with the opponent to discuss such
15 issues would also be a good way for both armies to conduct or to wage
16 warfare in accordance with the law?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. And you understood from your reading of the documents that were
19 provided to you that at least until January of 1993 the HVO and the Army
20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina were meant and for all intents and purposes were
21 supposed to fight together.
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. They were basically on the same side fighting against the Army of
24 Republika Srpska, the VRS.
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. And that it is in the course of 1993 that this situation changed
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. And that a former ally turned its back on General Hadzihasanovic
5 and that that complicated the situation very much.
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And you could understand from the documents that were shown to
8 you that not only he had now two enemies or two front lines, but that in
9 fact one of those enemies was within his own lines.
10 A. In --
11 Q. Can you confirm that?
12 A. Yeah. Yeah.
13 Q. As soon as a general learns of an issue or some type of
14 violation, you would agree with me that investigating or at least seeking
15 information should be the way to go?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. And as we discussed yesterday, the reliability of the information
18 is important and in the absence of any indication to the contrary a
19 commanding general must trust the information he receives.
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. And would you also agree with me that having a proper legal
22 department or at least trying to have a proper legal department would also
23 be a good way to ensure that the law would be respected?
24 A. Yes, sir. The legal department and the security forces, I would
1 Q. So both military police doing their job and the legal department.
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And, of course, both depend on the quality of the people that you
4 will get, not quality in terms of subjective quality but whether these
5 people are trained to do their jobs; would you agree?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Now, if we have international observers in the area and these
8 international observers offer their assistance with a view to allowing
9 investigations of complaints by either side, would you agree with me that
10 cooperation with such a commission would indeed be also a good way to find
11 out what happened -- what happens on the ground and to be able to react to
12 these complaints?
13 A. Absolutely.
14 Q. This would also allow a commanding general in many respects to
15 determine whether such complaints are founded or whether such complaints
16 sometimes are ill-founded.
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. General, in your own experience in Kosovo, it is my understanding
19 that there were such type of commissions. Could you elaborate on your own
20 experience and the use of the commissions in Kosovo.
21 A. In -- during my tenure, we had none of those commissions; but in
22 my tenure, we had a lot of accusations of either side claiming the other
23 side of war criminal activities. So for every Serb, a UCK fighter, by
24 being a guy like this, was a terrorist and a criminal because he fought
25 against his own state. While for the Albanians, every young Serb who has
1 joined the army as a draftee became a war criminal as long as he fought
2 within Kosovo, because these were the guys who committed the crimes.
3 And there was this mutual accusation but not very substantiated,
4 and we tried to find evidence on the individual cases in order to look for
5 that, but it was very difficult, but there was not an official commission
6 looking for that. I think this was the evidence which in the -- in the
7 individual areas of responsibility of the nations, the nations - like the
8 Dutch, like the British, like the Germans - tried to find out with their
9 legal capabilities.
10 Q. Thank you, General. I've -- I've had a look, of course, in the
11 documentation which was provided to you, and correct me if I'm wrong but
12 you received little information on the Busovaca joint commission.
13 A. It doesn't ring a bell, sir.
14 Q. If you had been made aware that there was such a thing as the
15 Busovaca joint commission, which was composed of three people from the
16 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and three representatives from the HVO and
17 at the highest level - for example, I think it is in the documentation in
18 some area that the deputy commander to General Hadzihasanovic was a member
19 of this commission -
20 A. Mr. Merdan?
21 Q. Mr. Merdan. And that Mr. Nakic, if you are familiar with the
22 name, was the deputy commander of Blaskic, who -- on the HVO, and that
23 they were both on this commission and they often travelled together to try
24 and substantiate complaints that the commission had received. Would you
25 say that this type of commission and this type of endeavour by a
1 commanding general by participating fully in such a commission, that he is
2 indeed trying to find out and do the necessary fact-finding to ensure that
3 violations are not committed?
4 A. I think so. Yes, sir.
5 Q. In the information that you were provided, General, correct me if
6 I'm wrong, but you did not get much information, if any, on the efforts of
7 both parties to establish a joint command or a joint headquarters.
8 A. Not that I'm aware of, sir.
9 Q. Would you say, General, that for these two armies who were former
10 allies, who were now fighting each other, the will at the highest level,
11 at the army level, to establish such a joint command would also be a good
12 way to prevent violations but also to ensure that they are stopped?
13 A. It might be a possibility, but I think this somehow surpasses my
14 capability, because the key question you're asking right now is a
15 political and not a military question. As long as the two political
16 parties are not willing to form a joint headquarters, the different armies
17 cannot do this. So it's -- it's one of the key political questions which
18 arose by that time, and I'm not willing to comment on that because I have
19 no capability of doing that.
20 Q. Thank you, General.
21 Are you familiar from the documentation that you have read with
22 the names General Petkovic on behalf of the HVO, and General Halilovic, on
23 behalf of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
24 A. I am familiar with the name of General Halilovic. I think I also
25 read about General Petkovic, but I have no clear information on him.
1 Q. And if I was to tell you, General, that these two generals at the
2 highest level established or signed a joint order to establish a joint
3 command, which then led to Colonel Blaskic, from the HVO, and General
4 Hadzihasanovic to also sign a series of orders in January, to establish
5 not only this joint headquarters but also to take steps to release
6 prisoners, to remove checkpoints, to pick up the bodies, and a couple of
7 other things, and of course to participate in joint fact-finding
8 operations, would that also be a good way for a commanding general to
9 accomplish his duty as the conduct of law -- conduct of waging of war
10 within the parameters of the law?
11 A. Yes, sir. I read about the cooperation of General Hadzihasanovic
12 and Colonel Blaskic, and I think this was a very clever way to do
13 business, to try to overcome some of the problems in which both army were
14 at that time.
15 Q. What I would like to do at this time, General, is to talk a bit
16 about the situation in which both armies were.
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. And the situation in the context in which General Hadzihasanovic
19 operated and exercised his command. We -- you confirmed yesterday the
20 importance of various aspects of the context and of the situation. Am I
21 right in saying that?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. That many factors could have an impact on the ability of General
24 Hadzihasanovic to exercise his command and in some cases to take
25 decisions, depending on the time.
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, at this point in
3 time the Defence would like to do the following: I'd like to use the maps
4 that are behind the witness, and with your leave, Mr. President, I would
5 like to approach the map in order to point to certain locations. I have
6 already discussed this with my colleague from the Prosecution, in order to
7 inform -- I wanted to inform my colleague that I intended to use these
9 As I point to certain locations on the map, I would be in a
10 position to say where the maps come from and what the Defence's intention
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please go ahead.
13 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... go towards the
15 map and simple life highlight some issues for you. And given that I do
16 not need the listening device, then I guess I will be able to show you
17 some of the areas.
18 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I'm not
19 sure whether the microphone is working.
20 Mr. President, I would first of all like to use one of the maps
21 here. I have asked one of the technicians if it would be possible to
22 direct the camera here and to have map number 1 on the screen. Could we
23 have a close-up of map number 1. We've tested this. It was working
24 earlier on.
25 Mr. President, Your Honours, I don't know whether you can see
1 things clearly. The "1" has been reversed, given the time at which this
2 number was written down, but this is map number 1.
3 Mr. President, this is a map which comes from the headquarters of
4 the UNPROFOR command. The date of the map is the 6th of June, 1993.
5 We're dealing with parts of this map, Mr. President, and we will obtain a
6 copy of this map. We have made such a request, which has been addressed
7 to the United Nations, but we haven't received the map yet. Nevertheless,
8 my colleague has agreed to me using this map for the purposes of
9 Mr. Reinhardt's testimony.
10 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... areas, and of
11 course, as we normally do it for intelligence briefing, I will start from
12 the more broader picture, moving down to the more specific. So I will be
13 following from map number 1, to map number 2, to map number 3, which
14 illustrate the same area at various points in time, and then move down to
15 the more specific, which is the larger map which is here, which is map
16 number 4.
17 Map number 4 --
18 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I forgot to mention
19 the fourth map, which is a map used in the headquarters of General
20 Hadzihasanovic. The instructions on the name of the map is here. It's a
21 3rd Corps map. It's divided on the basis of operational groups. And the
22 date is August 1993.
23 We've covered this map with transparent plastic and we have added
24 certain details to make it clearer and more visible. I have informed my
25 colleague from the Prosecution how we can proceed, and at a subsequent
1 date we intend to present the original map, which is the map that General
2 Hadzihasanovic had in his headquarters.
3 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... to go to map
4 number 1 and to basically, first of all, show you the area of the
5 3rd Corps as you have seen it from the documents. And what is important
6 is that you see the area - and I will go slowly so that the camera can
7 follow me - and this here is the area covered by the 3rd Corps. And we
8 recognise Zenica as being where the headquarters of the 3rd Corps was, and
9 we recognise the cities you are probably familiar with from the documents
10 you have seen, which is Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, and then
11 Kakanj. So this is -- and Bugojno is also part, and Gornji Vakuf, in
12 terms of the area of the 3rd Corps.
13 What I would like to bring your attention on is the situation
14 that is taking place here, first of all with Sarajevo, because you have
15 seen the documents illustrating that immediately from the beginning of the
16 war the -- Sarajevo was encircled, there was a siege, and it was very
17 difficult, if at all possible, for anyone to come into Sarajevo.
18 The other thing I would like to mention to you is to show you
19 this place here, which is Gorazde.
20 A. Gorazde, yeah.
21 Q. Gorazde is not in the area of the 3rd Corps; however, what I
22 would like to point out is the area leading to Gorazde, this area here.
23 We see a dotted line. Now, the dotted line refers to - and we can't see
24 it because it is hidden - but the dotted line refers to internal
25 confrontation lines.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.
2 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 My learned colleague in fact did discuss the use of these maps
4 and what use was going to be put to the maps with the Prosecution
5 yesterday. I rise to my feet because our objection at this point is that
6 my learned colleague is not putting questions to the witness but, in our
7 respectful view, has -- has perhaps crossed into the line of -- of
8 testifying himself, with respect to the detail that he is providing to the
9 expert witness.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] At this stage, the Chamber
11 takes note of the observations of the Defence, who is indicating to the
12 witness the area covered by the 3rd Corps, the towns of Travnik, Zenica,
13 and the other towns. He mentioned Sarajevo, in order to present all the
14 elements that would lead up to the question. Is that right, Mr. Bourgon?
15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Absolutely so.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That was the understanding of
17 the Chamber as well.
18 Please continue.
19 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... this area, can
21 you confirm that you recognise the area that you have been -- that you
22 have been reading about as being the area of the 3rd Corps?
23 A. The part which you just described is the area of the 3rd Corps,
24 but I'm a little bit mixed up right now. Is the red -- thick red line the
25 area within the 3rd Corps operated?
1 Q. General, would you -- I would put this, rather, as being a
2 question to you, in terms of this red line here is actually the line of
4 A. That's what I thought. Okay.
5 Q. That being the line of confrontation, General, on this side -
6 inside, of course, we would find - I'm trying not to testify to follow
7 what my colleague is saying, but am I right in saying that the HVO and the
8 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been holding this front line?
9 A. I think so, yes.
10 Q. And that on the other side of the front line would have been the
11 Army of Republika Srpska.
12 A. [No audible response]
13 Q. I would like to draw your attention to the area of Maglaj. Can
14 you explain on the basis of your knowledge and your professional expertise
15 how would you describe this area from Maglaj, Tesanj, and Doboj.
16 A. Well, it's a -- a very mountainous area, a difficult area to
17 operate in, broken terrain.
18 Q. I will -- General, I understand that this is -- my questions are
19 not very precise, because I'm trying not to testify, but what I would like
20 to draw your attention to is, in terms of the confrontation line, if you
21 were a -- the opposing military and if you were the Army of
22 Republika Srpska, what would you attempt to do with this area here?
23 A. Well, you see, the whole area is full of pockets, and -- and you
24 would like to try to consolidate your -- your area of Defence or your
25 defensive lines or your FEBA, whatever you would call it in this case.
1 Q. Now, General, on this particular map, we cannot see the roads,
2 but on a further map we will be able to see the roads. But you can
3 confirm, General, that the issue of roads is indeed a very important issue
4 for the commanding general?
5 A. This is for the commanding general. This was also for the
6 future, I think, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because this is Central Bosnia,
7 and who keeps the roads is the master of the area.
8 Q. Thank you, General.
9 I would like to move now to map number 2. Map number 2 is
10 further in time. And I would like you to describe, General, what you see
11 from the same area of Maglaj, Tesanj, and Doboj, in terms of what has
12 happened here with this dotted line being an internal line of
14 A. I really cannot tell you what happened here. I don't know. I
15 cannot -- I cannot -- it looks with -- if I see 2 Bravo, there were two
16 attempts closing the whole pocket around Srebrenica and Tuzla to the
17 south, because at 2 Charlie you also have an arrow in the south, in order
18 to cut off the whole north-eastern part of that pocket and probably also
19 the area south of Maglaj, but this is just an hypothesis which I deduct
20 from the way this map has been drawn.
21 Q. And, General, would I be right if I asked you to compare the
22 issue of Gorazde and the issue of Gorazde here --
23 MR. BOURGON: May I have a close-up, please.
24 Q. This was Gorazde in June, the 6th of June. And I slowly move up
25 to the next map, also asking for a close-up. And what has happened to the
1 same area in a matter of weeks -- sorry, Gorazde is here.
2 A. Having been to Gorazde, having seen the terrible destruction of
3 the city and the area around, it shows here that by the time of the two
4 time lines we are discussing, Gorazde has been cut off from the Bosnian
5 area; it has been under siege; and it was a very difficult way because
6 there was no additional connection between the -- the forces defending the
7 centre area of Bosnia and the forces in Gorazde. They were cut off.
8 Q. Thank you, General.
9 I would now like to move to the third map and refer to the area
10 of Tesanj, Doboj, and Maglaj that we were referring to. And I note that
11 this map is dated the 18th of July, 1993.
12 May I have a close-up, please, to show what has happened to the
13 area of Doboj, Tesanj, and Maglaj. If I can -- if I ask you, General, to
14 comment on this situation, as compared to map number 1, map number 2, and
15 map number 3.
16 A. Again, it shows that the area of Tesanj in the north has been cut
17 off from the main area of defence. It also shows that the -- the attempt
18 to cut off the north-eastern part, which we have saw here by those arrows,
19 didn't seem to be successful. So additional individual pockets of
20 resistance which made it very difficult for a coherent operation.
21 Q. And if I ask you to comment, General, on the situation, in terms
22 of the lost ground for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which no longer
23 has access to this pocket, how would you comment on the consequences?
24 A. There are two consequences: One consequence is to give up the
25 area, clean it up and consolidate your forces; the other possibility is to
1 try to re-establish contact. By all means, if it's so important for you,
2 I don't know whether this area was very important from the point of view
3 of the operations, but I think these are the basic possibilities which you
4 have under conditions like this.
5 Q. Now, General, before we move on to map number 4, I would like you
6 to comment on, if you look at map number 1, inside the territory that you
7 have identified as being that of the 3rd Corps, and if we move to this
8 second map with the same area, and if I move to the third map with the
9 same area, can you comment on what you see inside the territory.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Would the General -- would the General please
11 speak into the microphone. The interpreters cannot hear.
12 THE WITNESS: You caught me cold here, and I don't -- how does it
14 MR. BOURGON:
15 Q. It's on.
16 A. Okay. I'm sorry. You caught me cold here, because I haven't
17 seen this map before. But the way I read it, it shows that HVO forces are
18 within the corps area, so there is an internal fight in all these areas
19 about probably key terrain for the defence of the 3rd Corps. So it's a
20 fight outside -- or it -- at the outside against an enemy who tries to
21 condense this, and it's a fight against enemy which is inside your area of
23 Q. Thank you, General.
24 We will now move to the larger map, and the larger map being the
25 one I indicated from the 3rd Corps. What I would like to ask you to --
1 whether you recognise this line with the military symbol that is being
2 used, what would this be?
3 A. This is the corps boundary.
4 Q. And would you recognise this area inside as being the area of
5 which corps?
6 A. It seems that this is the area of the 3rd Corps.
7 Q. Now, the colour of the lines which are being used here, just for
8 your information - and I point down to the legend at the bottom of the
9 map - I don't know if it is possible to have a close-up.
10 MR. BOURGON: Can we have a close-up, please, on the legend of
11 the map here down?
12 Q. The legend here indicates that the lines in blue are that of the
13 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that the lines in red are that of the VRS,
14 and that the lines in orange are that of the HVO.
15 What I have added to this map in a different colour than the
16 original is the black lines, which illustrate the roads.
17 MR. BOURGON: May I have a close-up here, and if you can please
18 follow me simply to indicate you the roads.
19 Q. And then I will, General, ask you a question about the road.
20 MR. BOURGON: Could I have a close-up -- yes. I will try to
22 Q. The town that you see here is Zavidovici, and I would simply
23 drive down this road and show you exactly the importance of that road, and
24 the road goes here. This is the road that leads to Zenica and the corps
25 headquarters. Basically it is a road leading up north that was leading
1 before to the area that we saw, the pocket that has been taken over by the
3 Now, from Zenica here -- I understand it appears to be a bit
4 difficult with the camera -- to have access to Sarajevo, it was necessary
5 to drive this road here, and I follow slowly with the pointer, driving
6 through an area called, of course, Kakanj, and then we come to a junction
7 here. The junction is a two-way; you either go left, and you see how
8 difficult it is to go around; and all the way down around the boundary of
9 where the HVO is, in orange, taking the road all the way around to
11 The other road here at this crossroad is the one that leads up
12 north. And if I follow slowly this road going up north, it goes --
13 crosses the corps boundary that you have identified and goes up north,
14 leading all the way down -- up to Tuzla.
15 My question, General, is as follows: If you look at this area
16 here, the road to Sarajevo, how would you describe, because of the orange
17 line here and here, what happens if the general loses this territory
18 between these two -- between these two orange pockets?
19 A. Well, first of all, we see that the corps had to fight, with
20 inverted lines, in two different directions; very, very difficult. And it
21 had to rely on those roads of communications by all means. And it's
22 rather obvious from the disposition of the HVO forces that they tried to
23 cut off this road. I know the road, because I've driven that, and we have
24 reinforced this road later in the southern part. It's a very, very
25 difficult road to negotiate. It goes over high mountainous terrain. It's
1 not a road which we normally would consider a road like a paved road, so
2 this was a very, very difficult line of communications from the 3rd Corps
3 across the mountains into the Sarajevo area, key, I think, for any kind of
5 Q. Thank you, General.
6 One last question with this -- the upper part of the map. If I
7 can have a close-up. We see the town here which is the town of -- and I'm
8 looking for Vares, which is right here. This is Vares. And so would you
9 confirm, General, that Vares here is not in the same corps area as the
10 3rd Corps?
11 A. No. Vares is in the -- as far as I remember, in the 6th Corps
12 area, and -- but for forces of the 3rd Corps were linked to the
13 neighbouring corps in order to reinforce them for operations in Vares.
14 Q. And, General, by looking at the red line, in terms of the line of
15 confrontation, what would be the result if the line of confrontation that
16 is here, close to Vares, and the line of confrontation that is here, this
17 is the pocket that was just been taken, if we close this gap and we lose
18 this terrain in Vares, what happens -- or what is the result for the
19 commanding general?
20 A. He would have been cut off from his neighbouring corps. He would
21 have -- and the neighbouring corps would have lost a key area, as far as a
22 strategic turntable -- traffic turntable is concerned. So it was of
23 utmost importance also for the 3rd Corps, rather than only the
24 neighbouring corps, to keep Vares and to keep this corridor open.
25 Q. And if I indicate to you, General, that this is the only road up
1 north leading to Tuzla, which we do not see on this map, would I be right
2 in saying that be closing the gap between Zepce and Vares it would be no
3 longer -- it would be completely cut off from the road and not able to
4 drive any more to Tuzla?
5 A. That's what I just tried to explain before. Yes, sir.
6 Q. I would simply like to go back on the bigger picture and simply
7 show -- to have three snapshots so that we can see the difference. The
8 first snapshot is this one here. I would like to have a close-up. And we
9 see the pocket here between Maglaj, Tesanj, and Doboj. Now, this is the
10 first snapshot.
11 Now, at the same time we see the difference between Vares and
12 this tip of the confrontation line, and we see that this is a very short
13 distance between the two.
14 In the second -- in the second snapshot, we see that battle is
15 taking place and that there is now a new line of confrontation and that
16 the 3rd Corps is about to lose the pocket of Maglaj, Tesanj, Doboj, and
17 that in the Zepce area.
18 In the third snapshot, we see that by July the pocket, Maglaj,
19 Tesanj, Doboj, has been lost to the 3rd Corps. We now have a new pocket
20 here of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And at the same time, the
21 area between Vares and this tip of the confrontation line is reducing.
22 On the basis of these three snapshots, General, can you confirm
23 that what would be the focus of the general's attention of an operational
24 perspective at that point in time.
25 A. Well, first of all, the third thing which you just described I
1 cannot deduct from the map, because I think the distance from Vares to the
2 north, at least for me, looks identical on all the three maps. And since
3 the arrows are not there any more, which we have on the second map, it --
4 it looks better, at least as far as the map has been constructed here.
5 But notwithstanding these comments, it -- it must be key for the
6 corps commander to keep both shoulders of the Vares corridor open, to
7 reinforce there in order to prevent the -- the forces of the
8 Republika Srpska to cut from Vares north and from north to the south, to
9 cut off his whole northern part of the defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10 So this must have been one of his key terrain and his key objectives, to
11 keep this open at any rate -- at any cost.
12 Q. And one last question - and you referred to it, General, at the
13 beginning - looking at -- given that this map has the complete territory
14 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, can you confirm that at this point in time, in
15 July of 1993, the area of Central Bosnia was key not only to General
16 Hadzihasanovic but was key to the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 A. Well, I think I just had the same expression before. This is the
19 key terrain, the Central Bosnia, because all the main roads go through
20 that. And if this key terrain is lost, the survival of the Republic of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina doesn't make any -- it's very difficult. And it
22 would bring the republic and even more pockets, because you still have the
23 Bihac pocket in the north and the Gorazde pocket now and Srebrenica coming
24 up pretty soon too. So this was a very difficult situation. And the
25 mission for the 3rd Corps to keep this key terrain for the survival of the
1 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a very difficult one.
2 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. [In English] Thank you very much, General, for highlighting these
4 issues for us.
5 Now, I would just like to confirm that from the documents you
6 have read you did understand that both the HVO was an illegal armed force
7 and that the VRS were also an illegal armed force.
8 A. Well, in this regard, the question of legitimacy and legal and
9 non-legal is a thing which has to be discussed on a much higher level.
10 But as far as I see what has happened by that time on those different
11 courts, it was illegal from one side. But I think if you'd ask a Croat
12 officer on the same question, he would see it differently. Therefore, I
13 say I'm not quite sure -- I'm not that expert to call this illegal or
14 non-legal forces.
15 Q. Maybe my question was not precise enough, General. What I was
16 referring to is which of the three armies, whether it was the Army of
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the army of the HVO, or the army of the VRS, which
18 one of the armies is fighting a war defensively on its own territory
19 against two aggressors?
20 A. This is the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. Thank you, General.
22 Now, I wanted to highlight this situation, and now to come back
23 on, despite this operational context, to go back to the documents we were
24 looking at and the measures taken while fighting and while being occupied
25 in this context.
1 I would like you, General, to refer to binder number 1 that you
2 were given yesterday concerning the measures.
3 A. Okay. I have it.
4 Q. If I may ask you to turn to tab number 1.
5 The theme for the others in the courtroom -- unfortunately do not
6 have tabs. The theme is called, "Measures taken by ABiH 3rd Corps and its
7 subordinate units in relation to training."
8 General, we've had the opportunity yesterday to look at the title
9 of each one of these documents; am I correct?
10 A. Yes, sir, we were.
11 Q. And we've had the opportunity to look a bit closer, because not
12 in detail, due to lack of time, at the order of 10 July 1992 with respect
13 to an order to form a training centre and to train recruits.
14 A. Yeah.
15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the Defence would
16 like to tender into evidence all the documents under tab 1, for the moment
17 that they should be marked for identification as documents that the expert
18 has identified as important documents in the light of the decisions taken
19 by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, the Defence would
21 like us to mark for identification all the documents under tab number 1,
22 these documents being military orders, as we can see, with stamps,
23 signatures, et cetera.
24 What is the position of the Prosecution in that regard?
25 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, perhaps I -- if I could ask for some
1 clarification. My learned colleague has referred to tendering them into
2 evidence and also marking them for identification. I'm not sure if he
3 wants them tendered into evidence, in which case they might be admitted,
4 or if he simply wants them marked for identification. It's a bit unclear
5 to me.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You wish them to be marked for
8 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Yes, for the moment, so as not to
9 waste any time, but the Defence certainly does intend to produce these
10 documents later on. We have already had lengthy debates with the
11 Prosecution over these documents. I am not saying that they should be
12 admitted now but for the present only marked for identification.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution has noted the
14 subtleness of the request of the Defence. They only wish the documents to
15 be marked for identification, even though you have tendered almost
16 identical documents which have been contested. So anyway, at this stage
17 they're being marked for identification.
18 What are your observations, Mr. Mundis?
19 MR. MUNDIS: Two brief -- two brief observations, if I might.
20 First, Mr. President, I'm not sure - and it doesn't need to be
21 resolved at this point - I'm not sure about the lengthy debates about
22 these documents that my learned colleague referred to. The Prosecution --
23 we're still evaluating the documents that were provided to us yesterday,
24 but most of these documents the Prosecution has never seen before. But I
25 leave that to another day.
1 Mr. President, in order to save time, I'm not sure if my learned
2 colleague is planning on marking all the documents for identification, but
3 if his point is simply to have the documents marked for identification,
4 the Prosecution has no objection with respect to all the documents
5 provided yesterday in tabs 1 through 10 being marked for identification.
6 Of course, the documents at tab 11 are already in evidence, so I don't
7 mention those at the moment. But if they want to mark all the documents
8 in all ten of the tabs, we have no objection to that.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, will you give us
10 a number for all these documents under tab 1, which should be marked for
12 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] DH154 ID.
13 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon, DH150D covers all
15 the documents under tab 1. So we don't need DH150-1, -2, et cetera.
16 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] No. This is a global document.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] 12 documents together under a
18 single number.
19 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... tab 2 of the
21 binder you have been provided with. And I refer to the documents in this
22 tab as being judgements by the district military court in Zenica. And
23 yesterday we went through some of the documents, General, under this tab,
24 and namely, we did look at the first four documents.
25 A. Would you please tell -- give me the tab again.
1 Q. Sorry, tab number 2, General. Sorry.
2 A. Okay, I'm sorry. I thought binder number 2.
3 Okay, I'm with you.
4 Q. And tab number 2. Can you confirm, General, that we have
5 together yesterday looked at the first four documents under this heading,
6 and that was the request from the 3rd Corps Command for information, and
7 then there were the Military Police Battalion. One was a monthly report;
8 one was for a report over a longer period of time; and one was a report
9 from the district military prosecutor.
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. Can you confirm, General, that these judgements are measures
12 which can be attributed to General Hadzihasanovic, in terms of these
13 referred to events or apparent violations committed by members of the
14 3rd Corps which have led to a final judgement?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to
17 tender these documents and have them marked for identification. It's a
18 series of documents which will be tendered in a bundle.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, Defence is
20 requesting that these documents be marked for identification, all the
21 documents under tab 2. We have documents of two types: Either orders or
22 reports between the 3rd Corps and the military court; and then we have
23 judgements which were delivered against a number of individuals. These
24 judgements, according to the Defence, are illustrated by the documents
25 that are beneath the bundle.
1 MR. MUNDIS: Again, Mr. President, in the event we weren't clear
2 previously, the Prosecution has no objection to any of these materials
3 being marked for identification, including all the documents in all of the
4 first ten tabs of the material provided to us yesterday. We have no
5 problem with any of those documents being marked for identification.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, with regard to
7 all the documents under tab 2 in binder 1, could we have a number, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. President, the number for this bundle of
9 documents will be DH155 ID.
10 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I will
11 move on to the next series of questions. The reason for which I'm dealing
12 with these documents by series is that the comments of the expert witness
13 will be important when determining the admissibility of these documents,
14 and this is why I want to proceed on the basis of the subjects dealt with.
15 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... tab number 3 of
16 the binder, under the theme, "Investigation and inspection."
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Can you read, please, General, the title of the three documents
19 that are in the first page, just the title, and the date, please.
20 A. Well, the first is 11/05/1993. It's, "Order, organisation and
21 realisation of team tours, inspection of and assistance to units of the
22 3rd Corps and planning of team tours and inspection tours -- inspection of
23 units, command, and troops of the 3rd Corps."
24 And then there's another one, almost a month later, 08/06/93 --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Would the witness please slow down when reading
1 for the benefit of the interpreters, please.
2 THE WITNESS: Sure. Excuse me, please, I apologise.
3 The 8th of June, 1993, "A criminal report against unknown
4 perpetrator, destruction of cultural and historical monuments and record
5 on investigation."
6 And the third -- that rings a bell, yeah. And the third is the
7 15th of June, 1993, "A report of the commission for establishing factual
8 situation in the villages of Susanj and Ovnak."
9 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, General.
10 [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to have these
11 documents marked for identification. These are three documents which will
12 be filed as a bundle. Could we have a number, please.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.
14 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, it appears that the second of these
15 three documents already bears the number Defence -- or DH66, based on the
16 markings at the top right of that document. Again, we have no objection,
17 but it appears that one of these three documents is already in evidence.
18 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] That's quite right, Mr. President,
19 but nevertheless I would like to file these documents as a bundle. And
20 when discussing the admissibility of the documents, we could withdraw a
21 document that already has a number. That would enable us to proceed more
22 rapidly, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could we have a
24 number for the documents under tab 3. We have three documents, but it has
25 been pointed out the second one already has a number, DH66, but could we
1 have a number for the bundle.
2 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The number for the bundle of
3 documents will be DH156 ID.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Please continue.
6 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation]
7 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... of the binder,
8 under the heading "Protest letters." I would refer you to in the list of
9 documents which is the first page --
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Mundis.
11 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, in order perhaps to save time here,
12 the Prosecution is prepared to state for the record that we have no
13 objection to any of the documents being admitted into evidence. If it's
14 simply a question of them wanting this witness to identify what's in the
15 bundles based on the titles, that may or may not be the best use of our
16 limited time.
17 With respect to all the documents in the first ten tabs of this
18 material that was provided to us yesterday, the Prosecution has no
19 objection to all of these documents going into evidence, if my learned
20 colleague so wishes to do that, they can be marked and tendered and
21 admitted into evidence, and we have no objection to all these documents
22 being admitted into evidence. I simply raise that as a way perhaps to
23 save some of our limited time. We're not going to be contesting these
24 documents that were provided to us yesterday.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
1 Mr. Bourgon, do continue. In fact, you wanted to ask the witness
2 whether he was familiar with these documents, and if he had known about
3 these documents would this have changed anything in his report. That was
4 your purpose, was it not?
5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.
6 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... I will -- from
7 my colleague from the Prosecution, I will simply move on to quickly go
8 through each of the tabs and have you read the theme; whereas, tab
9 number 4 talks about protest letters, can you confirm that you have
10 answered earlier to the fact that protest letters are indeed something
11 that can be important, in terms of both prevention and suppression of
12 violations of international humanitarian law?
13 A. I have seen protest letters from both sides, and I think they are
14 an important part, but I'm not familiar with those here under tab 4, as
15 far as I see right now.
16 Q. General --
17 A. But basically I concur with your attitude -- or with your
19 Q. Thank you, General.
20 Can you please move to tab number 5, under the heading, "Legal
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. But we need a
24 Mr. Registrar, could we have a number for all the documents under
25 tab 4.
1 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The number for this bundle will
2 be DH157 ID.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Please continue.
5 MR. BOURGON: Tab number 5, "Legal measures." And all these
6 documents come from either the legal sector of either the 3rd Corps or of
7 one of the brigades. And you have confirmed that having a legal
8 department and the endeavour to have a well-functioning legal department
9 is also important in the business of prevention and suppression of
11 A. Yes, sir, I do.
12 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to have
13 a number for all the documents under tab number 5.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We've been requested to give a
15 number to the bundle of documents under tab number 5, some documents of a
16 legal nature that were signed by General Hadzihasanovic. We should also
17 point out that there are documents bearing General Hadzihasanovic's
18 signature and the signature is not the same.
19 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] That's quite right, Mr. President,
20 and that is why we would just like to mark these documents for
21 identification for the moment, in order to state our position with regard
22 to these documents. So the Defence won't adopt a different position from
23 the one adopted with regard to the documents tendered by the Prosecution.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm talking about
25 document 177O. Apparently the signature is not the General's signature.
1 He usually signs in a legible manner. His signature is usually legible.
2 In fact, his signature is his name, and it's easy to read.
3 Having said that, could we have a number for all the documents
4 under tab 5, Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The number for this bundle will
6 be DH158 ID.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Please continue.
9 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Q. [In English] [Previous [Previous translation continues] ...
11 tab 6, under the heading, "Joint command," and ask you to confirm that the
12 establishment of a joint command, especially in the situation in which
13 General Hadzihasanovic operated, namely, having a former ally who has
14 become his enemy, the endeavour to form a joint command to work together
15 again are indeed important measures.
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Thank you, General.
18 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we have a
19 number for the documents. There are seven documents in a bundle.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could we have a
21 number for the bundle of seven documents.
22 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The number for this bundle of
23 documents will be DH159 ID.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Please continue.
1 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
2 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... tab number 7,
3 under the heading, "Other measures taken by ABiH 3rd Corps and its
4 subordinate units." And I would like you to refer to the third document
5 on the first page, to say -- to look at the type of documents. And this
6 one is a request to send an inspection to the Secretariat of National
7 Defence, and this document was sent to the District Secretariat of Defence
8 in Travnik.
9 The -- I would like also to refer you to the document -- the last
10 one -- the before-last document, the document dated 13 September 1993.
11 And this document is entitled "Order, a ban on entering public
13 Are these types of measures and orders that can be effective for
14 the prevention and the topping of violations -- stopping of violations of
15 either discipline, criminal acts, or violations of international
16 humanitarian law?
17 A. I -- I would like to be helpful. But as long as I don't know
18 what the contents is -- just to send an inspection team some place doesn't
19 mean anything to me in this regard. If I see on order imbalance of units,
20 it doesn't tell me something about morale and discipline, and law and
21 order. So it might be that you're right, but I cannot really assure that
22 this is the way it's written down in those documents because I just don't
23 know them, sir. And I had no time to scan or to even read them.
24 Q. I fully appreciate, General. And I really also wish to express
25 my appreciation for your help in these circumstances, being shown that
1 many documents. Maybe we can actually go to the before-last document,
2 dated 13th of September.
3 A. Okay.
4 Q. And this is a document -- so maybe, General, to go more quickly,
5 if I look at the document dated the 3rd of October.
6 A. Which one is it? I don't see it.
7 Q. No. The dates -- there seems to be a date problem.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
9 MR. BOURGON: [Microphone not activated]
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 MR. BOURGON: Can you refer to the first document, General, the
12 one dated the 7th of March. And can you look at this document. I was
13 hoping to get a shorter document, and that's why I was referring to the
14 last one.
15 Can you please have a glance at this document, which is addressed
16 to commands of all brigades, to Municipal Defence Staff, and headquarters
17 support units. And this document deals with the joint application of
18 security measures and to create a joint commission that will define the
19 competencies, tasks, and duties of this commission. And it goes on to
20 talk about the composition of the commission.
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. And lists the duties of the commission, including such things as
23 duration and control of curfew.
24 A. That looks very sensible to me.
25 Q. And if we look at the second page of this document, we look at
1 paragraph number 3, where it talks about the formation of special purpose
2 MUP units - MUP being, as you know from the documents you have read, the
3 civilian police component.
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. Such measures, if the other documents under this heading are
6 similar documents and similar measures, can you confirm that all measures
7 taken by the 3rd Corps headquarters to regulate the way the army conducts
8 its business and the way the soldiers will behave are important for the
9 prevention of violations?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we have a
12 number for the documents under tab 7. There are eight documents under
13 this tab, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could we have a
15 number for these eight documents.
16 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The number for this bundle of
17 documents will be DH160 ID.
18 MR. BOURGON:
19 Q. I would like to go to binder number 2, General, please.
20 A. Yes, sir. I'm with you.
21 Q. Thank you very much. Under tab number 8, we have a theme
22 called, "Preventive measures in relation to alleged incidents." I would
23 like you to turn to the second document, the one dated 18 April 1993.
24 A. I have it.
25 Q. This document, General - I have the document before me - and can
1 you confirm that this is dated 18 April 1993, this is to all units in
2 Zenica, and the document is, at least under the signature block of the
3 chief of security for the 3rd Corps, and that this talks about urgently
4 taking all necessary measures to prevent plunder of facilities in town and
5 regions of combat activities. Can you confirm that such orders and such
6 measures being issued by the chief of security would be measures that are
7 very important to prevent and also to suppress and repress violations?
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. Now, in this particular case, General, I would like you to refer
10 to the date 18th of April, 1993. Does this date remind you of a specific
11 incident in Central Bosnia?
12 A. Well, as far as I remember, that this was shortly before --
13 before the things happened in Miletici, but I don't know exactly what on
14 the 18th of April happened, or maybe the 17th of April happened. Because
15 it must refer to something which happened before the 18th.
16 Q. And if I suggest to you, General, that on the 16th of April, 1993
17 was probably the -- the most -- the biggest massacre committed by the HVO
18 in the town of Ahmici.
19 A. Mm-hm.
20 Q. Are you familiar with this attack that was conducted by the HVO?
21 A. I read about this, but I'm not familiar, because this was not the
22 case I was looking into.
23 Q. And, General, could you confirm that if there was such -- such an
24 attack - and actually, before this Chamber this is a fact that has been
25 admitted, that there was this attack on the 16th of April - but on the
1 basis of our discussions yesterday, that this attack could have had an
2 impact on the soldiers of the 3rd Corps and especially might have been
3 very difficult on them if their close relatives or people from their own
4 ethnic background lived in Ahmici. Would that be fair to say?
5 A. It would have been difficult for them. I admit this, yeah.
6 Q. And an order such as this one at this point in time would be very
7 important in order to keep the soldiers under control and ensure that even
8 though someone is from a Croat background, that we would protect their
9 property and ensure that the soldiers would not commit violations.
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. Thank you, General.
12 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we have a
13 number for the documents under tab 8. It's a series of documents. The
14 bundle consists of a total of 19 documents.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could we have a
16 number for all the documents under tab 8.
17 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The number for this bundle of
18 documents will be DH162 ID.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have another five minutes
21 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. I go on quickly to the "Measures to protect" under tab 9, and I
23 refer you simply to the title of the second document, which would be, "An
24 order to the Operational Group Lasva to organise and take measures to
25 connect forces of manoeuvre and area structure and the MUP with a view to
1 protecting residents and property." Is that the type of order which can
2 be very significant in preventing and suppressing violations?
3 A. I think so, yeah.
4 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we have a
5 number for the documents under tab number 9.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, the previous
7 number was DH162 ID; isn't that correct?
8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] I apologise, Mr. President. The
9 previous number should have been DH161 ID, and the new number should be
10 DH162 ID. I apologise again.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So the three
12 documents, "Measures for protection," DH162 ID will be the number for
13 these documents.
14 Mr. Bourgon, you have another four minutes.
15 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... last category
16 of documents, because given that those under tab 11 are already evidence,
17 these documents deal with fulfilling of obligations in respect to
18 prisoners of war and exchange. Would you say, General, that it is very
19 important for the parties to fulfil their obligations under the law with
20 respect to the exchange of prisoners of war?
21 A. Yes, sir, definitely.
22 Q. And that it would be another very significant sign for the
23 commanding general to cooperate and even to create a commission for the
24 exchange of prisoners and to ensure that the agreements arising from such
25 commissions are applied in good faith?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we have a
3 number for the documents that have to do with respecting obligations when
4 exchanging prisoners of war. These are documents under tab number 10.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could we have a
6 number for the 15 documents under tab 10.
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The number will be DH163 ID.
8 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] We'll go on to tab number 11.
9 These have already been tendered into evidence.
10 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ...
11 cross-examination this morning by going back on the issue of measures as
12 being one of the focuses of your expert report?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. And we moved on to looking at the maps and looking at the
15 operational context to confirm that in this specific case the
16 circumstances under which General Hadzihasanovic was operating were not --
17 not complex but probably the most complex circumstances that a military
18 commander can be placed in.
19 A. Mr. Bourgon, there's no question about it, and I think I also
20 made it very clear in my statement how difficult the situation for the
21 corps commander was to build up his corps, to fight the corps under very
22 adverse conditions, and I think I -- I don't -- I don't envy him for the
23 things he had to do in that time, because as from my professional point of
24 view, it couldn't have been worse for him.
25 Q. And, General, this is a sensitive question, but we have just went
1 through a series of documents which were not provided to you at the time
2 of making -- of preparing your expert report. May I ask you how you feel
3 about having been asked to prepare an expert report on measures without
4 having been provided with such documents.
5 A. Sir, I don't really want to comment on that, because I have been
6 issued additional material again and again and again. And on the one
7 hand, I'm happy that I haven't had another 23 binders; on the other hand,
8 the more material you get, the better it is to -- to base your statement
9 on -- on facts and figures drawn from the documents. So I -- I don't know
10 when the documents came up, and therefore I am -- it's very difficult for
11 me to -- to judge here. I only tell you the better you are prepared, as
12 far as the documents are concerned, to come up with an expert statement,
13 the better it is for you.
14 Q. Thank you very much, General.
15 Can you say, just before we move to the break, to what extent
16 this changes your view on the situation and the exercise of command by
17 General Hadzihasanovic in 1993 in the circumstances in which he was placed
18 and the measures which were taken by him and his subordinate units?
19 A. As I have stated in my statement, I found only one case until
20 now. Now in those binders I found many other cases, and therefore I would
21 revise my opinion that this was a singulary [sic] action. I would say
22 that having seen all this material it shows that he has taken much more of
23 his responsibility in an appropriate way than I thought before.
24 Q. And could you confirm that it is even surprising that an army
25 could do all these measures in this context.
1 A. No. Because I think this is a part of the mission, and there was
2 a very clear legal mission also to the commanding general of the 3rd
3 Corps. And what you have shown me now, it shows that he did his job
4 according to the legal mission. But we discussed it also yesterday,
5 notwithstanding the adverse operational problems, you just cannot put
6 aside the legal question. So it's not astonishing, no. This is the way
7 it should have been done, and I think General Hadzihasanovic has done as
8 far as the problems are concerned where we just discussed the best way
9 possible under the circumstances.
10 Q. Thank you very much, General.
11 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we can have the
12 break now. Thank you.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have our break now, and
14 we will resume at five to 11.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Bourgon, you have the
19 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. [In English] General, we are closing in to the end of my
21 cross-examination on behalf of the accused General Hadzihasanovic. I
22 would like to address two issues at this time, and I would like to begin
23 with the issue of the events which took place in Dusina in the month of
24 January of 1993.
25 From the documents that you were given, I take it that you are
1 familiar with these events.
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. General, in your report, when you referred to Dusina, am I right
4 in saying that you did not provide very much -- or the details of the
5 operation itself?
6 A. No. I was not asked to do that.
7 Q. And one of the questions you were asked to do is whether the
8 general was aware of the -- what had happened in Dusina.
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. And whether measures had been taken.
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. To move quickly with this issue, I would like you to -- to refer
13 you to the map that is behind you, and I would like to point to a few
14 areas on this map and ask you a few questions.
15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I should like to
16 approach the map. Thank you.
17 Mr. President, this is a map that I showed at the beginning of my
18 cross-examination. It is a composition of several smaller maps, mostly
19 being Defence exhibits. Others are new. And the totality now is one
20 exhibit or one document.
21 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... let me -- are
22 you able to tell by looking at this map that this is a 1 to 25.000 map?
23 A. I would say so, yeah. That's what it says.
24 Q. And, General, on this particular map, there are two things that I
25 would like to point out to you: First of all, the headquarters of Zenica.
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. And there's -- there was a -- in the red is indicated - and these
3 are the markings that were made by the Defence on a map that was empty,
4 but I just want to ask you whether the markings in red here identify to
5 you the orders that were issued to --
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.
7 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 For the benefit of the records of these proceedings, I'm
9 wondering if my learned colleague can tell us whether these markings are
10 based on a hypothetical situation or if they are based on materials that
11 in evidence before this Trial Chamber, and what the source, whether it's a
12 trial transcript record or an exhibit, what is the source for the markings
13 which the Defence have made. Or in the alternative, if we're dealing in
14 the realm of hypothetical situations, please.
15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the markings in red
16 on the map come from a document which was submitted by the Defence. It
17 has been marked for identification. It has still not been admitted into
18 evidence, but it refers to an order that was given by the Brigade
19 Commander Jure Francetic, that is, General Totic, who testified in this
20 chamber. And the information comes from a sketch that he himself made
21 before the Chamber and which is being reproduced here.
22 Q. [In English] General, I would like you --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Are the explanations provided
24 satisfactory for the Prosecution?
25 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I don't sitting here recall a sketch
1 drawn by Mr. Totic. Perhaps if we could have the number. My learned
2 friend says it was marked for identification. If we could have the number
3 of that document, that might assist us in retrieving the document from our
5 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] I shall look for the document,
6 Mr. President.
7 Mr. President, the document is DH46 ID and DH44. I left the
8 original in the office because I used it to make the markings.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So I see. It's DH44.
10 Mr. Registrar is going to give it to us.
11 The Chamber will look at the document.
12 So the red markings were made by you on the basis of indications
13 given by General Totic; is that right? The indications to be found on
14 document DH44.
15 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, together with
16 the arrows.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please continue. We're
19 MR. BOURGON:
20 Q. To make things quicker, I would simply ask you one question. And
21 ignore the markings in red. I would simply ask you to take a look,
22 please, at the Lasva junction, which you are familiar with on the basis of
23 the documents that you have read, and to please confirm -- if you can
24 please look at the Lasva junction. To make it easier, I will point this
25 junction to you. And on the basis of this map on the 1 to 25.000, could
1 you please elaborate on the importance of this specific junction for the
2 commanding general of the 3rd Corps.
3 A. [Microphone not activated] Well, it's -- it's important because
4 two -- excuse me, it's important because two major roads are joining
5 there; one along the Lasva Valley, which I think was a major road, and the
6 other one going to Kaonik and from there into the western side for the
7 area of operations. So the Lasva junction for him was important to keep
8 it open for two major roads of supply and, I would also say, of
10 Q. Thank you, General.
11 Would you agree with me, General, that by losing this junction,
12 the Lasva Valley junction, that this would simply cut off the main road
13 which was linking Zenica, here, to Travnik and Vitez, here?
14 A. Yes, I think this is what I just explained.
15 Q. Can you on this map -- do you recall from the documents that you
16 have been -- that you have consulted whether there were events in the same
17 time frame as Dusina which took place in Busovaca?
18 A. No. I concentrated on Dusina, as this was the key issue, and
19 this was also one of the first encounters between the HVO and the Bosnian
20 forces. I did not -- I did not look into the other case you just
21 mentioned. I'm not familiar with that one.
22 Q. Thank you, General.
23 I would ask you, with the permission of the Trial Chamber, if you
24 could come and take a look at the model. And I would like you to comment
25 from a military perspective and an operational perspective the location of
1 the Lasva Valley junction and where -- whether to have -- and I would ask
2 you to come this way, please, General.
3 I will indicate to the Lasva Valley junction. Whereas Zenica is
4 here. And can you point with -- towards the Lasva Valley junction.
5 A. I think it's this one.
6 Q. [Microphone not activated] Yes. Could you please leave the --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could you use the microphone, please.
8 MR. BOURGON:
9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and have a close-up, please.
10 Now, General, just above the Lasva Valley junction, there is a
11 hill indicated with -- over here. Can you confirm that from a military
12 and a tactical perspective this was probably the best area to control this
14 A. It's one of the possibilities. I don't know whether it's the
15 best one because --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness use a microphone, please.
17 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I think the scale of that map here is
18 so large that it's very difficult. And now we're really talking small
19 tactics, very small tactics, company level and below. This hill is always
20 very important to overwatch a road junction, but I don't know whether this
21 was the proper one, this one, or whether he would have done it down in the
22 valley. I don't know. I think this is not to be seen from that kind of
23 sketch here.
24 MR. BOURGON:
25 Q. Thank you, General, I would like to --
1 [Microphone not activated].
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.
3 MR. BOURGON: [Microphone not activated]
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
5 MR. BOURGON:
6 Q. From the documents you have been given, what you can say about
7 the events in January, in terms of what exactly was the event which took
8 place on the 26th of January, 1993, if you know.
9 A. Well, I also referred to the material issued to me yesterday from
10 you, because even so this is called a hypothetical case, I think it's not
11 hypothetical at all. I don't know why we have this term. But at least
12 this was an encounter between -- a military clash between the HVO and the
13 ABiH I think for the very first time, and it's obvious that the commanding
14 general of the 3rd Corps tried everything to prevent it. On the other
15 hand, he knew that if something happens there, he had to fight for that.
16 And there was a clash. This was not a big battle. It was small, a very
17 small battle, where both sides had some very minor casualties. I say that
18 because I think we have to see about the size of the operations going on
19 by that time. And in the battle, some HVO soldiers surrendered and I
20 think which made that case infamous or famous, why we're talking about
21 this right now, is that five of those -- or four of those surrendered --
22 soldiers surrendered from the HVO have been killed afterwards. So it's a
23 small happening, but for the outbreak of the violations between the
24 Bosnian and the Croat forces I think it was very important, and that's
25 probably also the reason why ECMM intervened immediately.
1 Q. Thank you very much, General.
2 Now, I -- it was difficult to try to highlight the material that
3 was given to you and the material that was not given to you in respect of
4 Dusina. We tried to isolate this material. What I would like to do -- to
5 do at this time is to highlight for you some of the principal
6 characteristics of what happened during that period and then ask you to
7 comment. This is based on the information which was provided to you
8 yesterday, so we may call it hypothetical because this was the -- what the
9 Defence was trying to do to save some time and to not show you every
10 single document.
11 Correct me if I am right, General, did you understand from the
12 material given to you that there was a build-up on the part of the HVO
13 leading to the actions taken by General Hadzihasanovic?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Can you confirm that General Hadzihasanovic on the basis of the
16 material provided to you - and I'm talking the Defence material - that he
17 issued orders in the way it would be expected of a commanding general,
18 even though this was a very small operation, but due to the importance of
19 the Lasva Valley junction he issued his orders to place his troops while
20 asking of them restraint? Could you confirm that on the basis of the
21 material given to you?
22 A. Yes, sir, this is true. And he even did a restriction which was
23 very strange for me, that the final goal for the fighting of his forces
24 would be dependent on his agreement. So it was the corps commander
25 himself who basically looked into the battle in -- in all its little
1 aspects in order to prevent an outbreak too early by leaving it to
2 lower-level command.
3 Q. And from this material, can you confirm that not only did he keep
4 the last order to proceed with the use of force to himself but that he
5 also warned his forces and his subordinate units that they were to at any
6 possibility avoid a conflict with the HVO?
7 A. Yeah. He didn't want to be called the one who had started the
8 operation. He wanted to make absolutely sure this was the other side
9 which started the hostilities.
10 Q. And, General, we discussed -- the material provided to you
11 indicates that following that two -- sorry. To conduct this operation,
12 the General deployed the Zenica Municipal Defence Staff. Can you confirm
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. That he deployed with that a company of the 2nd Battalion of the
16 7th Mountain Brigade.
17 A. This is true.
18 Q. And that later on, just before, on the 25th, he also deployed a
19 reinforced company from the 303 Brigade to go towards the line between
20 Merdani and Dusina.
21 A. Well, I think that's a part of the papers -- of the orders I have
22 been given to you. It's -- yeah, that's the -- it's number 20. Right.
23 Q. Now, if the material given to you was true in the sense that on
24 the 25th of January the HVO broke the line and that they were getting
25 closer to this junction and to Dusina and that General Hadzihasanovic
1 reported to the Supreme Command this situation but also that he was going
2 to take the necessary measures to reinforce the Lasva Valley junction,
3 would that be a proper thing to do for a commanding general?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. And for a commanding general to deploy his mortars on -- in
6 Janjici, about five kilometres away or a little less from this junction in
7 support of operations in the Lasva Valley junction, would that also be the
8 proper thing to do?
9 A. Well, I don't know whether this is the proper thing to do for a
10 commanding general of a corps. I come back to what I said before, because
11 the commander really now coordinated a very, very small-scale
12 tactical-level operations. But maybe since this was the first operation
13 breaking out he just wanted to make sure that nothing happens which was
14 not in consonance with his ideas. But this would normally not be the
15 normal way for a commanding general, to move a company and to talk about
16 the employment of the company. This is down to, at the most, at the best
17 a battalion commander and not the corps commander.
18 Q. Now, General, in the material provided to you, it is indicated
19 that there was some kind of a clash on the 26th of January and that a
20 series of reports were then produced --
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. -- following this event.
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. I list the reports that were highlighted in the material given to
25 you, which begins with a report from the 1st Company of the 2nd Battalion
1 of the 7th Muslim Brigade talking about five HVO soldiers captured at
2 10.00 and that this specific subunit had returned to barracks.
3 A. Yep.
4 Q. A further report by the Municipal Defence Staff -- now, the
5 Municipal Defence Staff were the lead unit, can you confirm this on the
6 basis of this information?
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. And they provided a report to the district staff, which is kind
9 of the headquarters of the TO, to which they were still reporting at the
10 time, that they reported that three HVO had been killed, that three had
11 been wounded, and five or six captured.
12 A. This is true.
13 Q. The next report was by the district staff on the basis of the
14 former report reported in the interim to the 3rd Corps that there had been
15 fighting and that they had -- they reported the same information they had
16 received from the Municipal Defence Staff. This was followed by a report
17 by 7 Brigade directly to the 3rd Corps operations centre talking about
18 five HVO who had been killed and -- made prisoners and 25 HVO who had been
19 made prisoner in Lasva.
20 There were two further reports according to this scenario; one at
21 6.00 by the district staff confirming their event on the 26th of January,
22 and then the 3rd Corps reporting this information to the Supreme Command
23 the night of the 26th of January.
24 General, on the basis of this information, if that information is
25 true, would that be the normal way for information to be reported from the
1 subunit all the way up to the 3rd Corps and to army command?
2 A. I would say so. And it also shows that the problem of
3 communications which we discussed before was not existent here. So all
4 levels were in close communication and very fast communication because
5 these were on-spot reports, as we would call them, and it was -- they were
6 capable in the time of highest tension to get all this information through
7 to highest headquarters. So notwithstanding the -- the technicalities, at
8 least the communication worked pretty well.
9 Q. Thank you, General.
10 Now, here from a military perspective there is something that
11 attracted my attention, and that's what I would like to ask you: It
12 appears that the 1st Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Brigade made
13 two reports; one to the Municipal Defence Staff and one to the 3rd Corps.
14 Would that be a proper procedure, to have two reports from the same
15 company in this particular scenario?
16 A. Well, I think this was a very unusual situation. It was the
17 first outbreak. They were under the command of the Municipal Staff, so
18 they reported to them. At the same time, the -- the brigade was still
19 under the direct command of the 3rd Corps, so they also informed the
20 3rd Corps, because they had two ways of command and control, being that
21 detached company under the Municipal Staff. So I think it might be a
22 little bit irregular, but as I know, in times of tension you -- you used
23 to give more information and to give -- to have a much denser message flow
24 than you would normally have. This was not the routine by -- for the
25 forces by that particular time.
1 Q. Thank you, General.
2 Now, we -- based on this information, unless -- because we
3 discussed this issue before. Unless the commanding general receives any
4 specific information to the contrary, was it reasonable for him to believe
5 that operations had been conducted in the way they should have been?
6 A. Yep.
7 Q. If we move on under the same scenario, General, there was a
8 report which was addressed by the commanding general to the supreme
9 headquarters where they reported that the deputy commander of the
10 3rd Corps, who had attended a meeting on the 27th of January, said that
11 the commander of the HVO, Colonel Blaskic, did not want to participate in
12 this meeting any more because of allegations of seven people killed in
13 Lasva. This information, according to this, if it is true, was
14 immediately reported to Supreme Command headquarters. Would that be the
15 proper way to do things for a commanding general who hears about this
17 A. Yep.
18 Q. And further to this report, we see that the next day, on the
19 28th, there was another -- further information which was provided again
20 from the commanding general to the Supreme Command and with a detailed
21 timetable of all the events in Dusina. Would that also be reasonable for
22 the commanding general, having heard of allegations, reporting them to his
23 superior headquarters, and then checking the information and reporting
24 back and saying that this has been a normal engagement?
25 A. Well, the -- the one you're talking about right now is on the
1 28th; right?
2 Q. Yes, the 28th.
3 A. It would not be normal to air this on Croatian radio. If you go
4 to your higher headquarters, this is a very -- a very strange way to
5 connect -- to communicate with higher headquarters, through Croatian
6 radio. But the content of what you're saying I think is appropriate.
7 Q. Now, maybe the example that was given to you was not particularly
8 clear, but on the 28th there were -- or 27th or 28th there were
9 allegations made on Croatian radio that there had been killings.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. So what -- having heard the information on the radio, having
12 heard about the allegations made by Colonel Blaskic, on one hand, but on
13 the other hand, having all these reports internal and having checked the
14 information, would it be reasonable for the commander to weigh the
15 information and to report his conclusions to his superior headquarters?
16 A. Okay. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Now, we see from this scenario that further on there was an
18 identification of the bodies that were picked up on the battlefield and
19 that this was done by the Zenica Security Service and the Ministry of the
20 Interior. And I also note there that there was an official test
21 conducted; they call it a paraffin test. This information was not
22 provided to you, but this is a hypothetical: I simply say for the record
23 that the paraffin test is simply to say if people had gunpowder on their
24 hands and whether they had been firing weapons at that time.
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. And the results of that test were then, along with the identity
2 of the people who died, provided to the district military court in Zenica.
3 If General Hadzihasanovic, if these events are true -- if General
4 Hadzihasanovic had the belief on the basis of the internal reports
5 provided to him through his subordinate chain of command that there had
6 been no offence and these events had taken place by the organisation which
7 was responsible to pick up the bodies, who did identify the body, who did
8 do a test, and who did report it to the district military court, whether
9 there was an offence or not committed, did the general accomplish his duty
10 of ensuring that these events will be followed up upon?
11 A. If he believed that what he has been told by lower headquarters,
12 that they were not included in these alleged crimes, if he believes in
13 that, then -- then you're right.
14 Q. And would you expect, General, that the commanding general would
15 proceed himself to Dusina to check?
16 A. No.
17 Q. And if I add to this scenario the fact that any witnesses to the
18 killing, if there were any, were not available, would that help you to --
19 would that assist the commanding general in believing the information he
20 was provided with?
21 A. If people are being killed, you normally have witnesses. I would
22 at least have sent my own organs, like military police, security forces,
23 to check into that, because I think this was the first real thing in -- in
24 the war, the first outbreak. Therefore, it was not the normality.
25 Normally the size of operations, I think, was a very small one. But since
1 this had such a big bearing for the rest of the operations, as far as a
2 component of the forces was concerned, I would have done at least my
3 own -- not my own personal, but I would have sent my organs available for
4 that to check into that and make absolutely sure that nothing has happened
5 which could be brought on the shoulders of my soldiers.
6 Q. And, General, given all the information that you have in this
7 specific scenario, would you conclude that there was any attempt
8 whatsoever on the commanding general to hide information?
9 A. No. I don't have this intention -- this -- I don't think this is
10 what he has done.
11 Q. And --
12 A. Impression. I did not have this impression.
13 Q. And if the documents and the evidence shows that what was
14 possibly -- what could be done possibly in the circumstances, given, of
15 course, the circumstances even with which we have described, where there
16 is still fighting going on in many areas, would it be normal for the
17 general to, having been -- having convinced himself that there were no
18 offences, to move on to other issues and to continue waging his war and
19 fulfilling all of his other responsibilities which he had to do at the
20 same time?
21 A. Well, sir, it seems that the general was not very happy with the
22 situation of his own forces; otherwise, he wouldn't have given an order
23 almost after this happening where he talks about occurrences of looting
24 and plundering and disbehaviour of his own soldiers and tells them that
25 they should adhere to the provisions of the international law. So it
1 seems that there has -- happened some things he was not very happy with
2 but he thought by that time, by -- at least, this is my interpretation,
3 that by giving these orders - and he gave two in a very short period of
4 time, on the 1st and 3rd of February; at least, these re the ones in my
5 hand - where he shows his discontent with the behaviour of the troops on
6 the ground.
7 Q. And, of course, these orders, General, you've seen these orders,
8 and these orders don't mention the issue of killing but they mention the
9 issue of plunder.
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. And you've noticed, General, by looking at the indictment -- or
12 maybe you don't know. But if I tell you that any allegations of
13 plundering in Dusina have been withdrawn, would you establish, then, a
14 link between these orders and the situation in Dusina or maybe with
15 another situation because he has a whole area to look after?
16 A. Maybe it was another situation because the word "Dusina" doesn't
17 appear in -- in either of the two documents I'm referring to.
18 Q. Now, one last thing on Dusina before moving on quickly to the
19 last issue, and that is dealing -- because in your report you refer to a
20 meeting which took place on 1 February, and you mention in your report
21 that this meeting was initiated by the HVO and that there must have been
22 the issue was placed on the agenda and that it must have been known also
23 by General Morillon.
24 I don't have time, General, to show you and run you through the
25 documents, but if I tell you, General, that this meeting was basically the
1 meeting at which the joint command was created and that this was the
2 meeting which was actually initiated by General Hadzihasanovic - and we
3 didn't have time to go through the protest letters, but in the protest
4 letter he suggested these talks - how would you interpret the actions of
5 General Hadzihasanovic in such a scenario?
6 A. Well, maybe I might quote -- maybe I don't understand English
7 enough, but it says in the paper signed by General Hadzihasanovic on 1st
8 February: "On the request of the HVO Croatian Defence Council," so it
9 doesn't say, "On my request" -- "through the mediations of General
10 Morillon and with the approval of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command a
11 joint meeting was held."
12 So I just refer to what I found in my papers here. And I think
13 that Morillon went there on behalf somehow to mediate between the two
14 warring factions by that time. And it doesn't say very much in detail,
15 just says what the outcome was. At the end, again General Hadzihasanovic
16 tells his brigade commander, "Prohibit all members of the army from
17 stealing, looting, burning property, arrest perpetrators, and so on."
18 So he took, as I said, his first impressions about the first
19 happenings in the war and portrayed his impressions to his brigade
20 commanders, telling them, "I'm not very happy what has happened there."
21 And two days later he even went further to -- to sign a special order to
22 all his brigade commanders where he said, "We'd like to stick with the
23 humanitarian approach of the international law and make sure that your
24 soldiers do this as well."
25 So he has taken his consequences of what he was informed of,
1 either by his commander or by the ECMM in this regard, or by General
2 Morillon - I don't know who in person informed him on that - but again, I
3 don't know how much he basically looked after the -- the killing or the
4 alleged killing of those five HVO soldiers who have surrendered, and I
5 think this -- and I come back to that. I think this would have been a
6 very important thing, because once you kill soldiers of the other side who
7 have surrendered, you start up a spiral of violence against your own
8 soldiers which is very detrimental, and therefore I think it's very
9 important to look into that particular case in order to prevent things
10 like this happening again.
11 Q. And what the -- if I tell you, General, that the -- the actual
12 meeting of the 1 February -- and again, I don't have sufficient time,
13 maybe we can come back to that. But that this meeting was not related to
14 the event in Dusina but that there were meetings earlier on with the
15 commander of BritBat in which this was discussed. Now, I ask you that
16 when you look at all these events, in terms of the way -- the preparation
17 or the build-up towards this attack, the way the attack was conducted by
18 the HVO, the way the ABiH responded by defending the territory, and then
19 all the reports issued by -- or received by General Hadzihasanovic and the
20 way he reported it to the superior headquarters, went out to check and get
21 more information, reported the -- the detailed chronology to his supreme
22 headquarters, and then the issue was handled [sic] over to the district
23 military court. Do you find any, in these course of events, if that was
24 the case, do you find any way to say that General Hadzihasanovic was not
25 a -- did not act as a reasonable commander in the circumstances?
1 A. No, sir. If this is the way you just portrayed it, which I
2 cannot find in the documents, and you said he sent somebody to look into
3 the matter - I don't know that - I only can base my assumptions on the
4 documents issued to me. If this is the case, as you just portrayed it,
5 that's different from the impression I had. And then I agree with your --
6 with your assumption.
7 Q. But even on the documents that you've received and the fact that
8 he did report the matter twice to supreme headquarters, you didn't -- you
9 cannot know there's any -- any possibility or any inference that he was
10 trying to hide something or that he was trying to -- to do away with the
12 A. No, no, I never said this, and I would never implicate that.
13 That's not the case, not at all.
14 Q. Thank you very much, General.
15 I'd like to move on to the last issue in my cross-examination and
16 this is also an issue in your report and that deals with an issue of the
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. Can I confirm, General, that when you took on this assignment to
20 become the -- an expert witness on behalf of the Prosecution, that you had
21 no specific knowledge on -- on the issue of Mujahedin.
22 A. Well, I think I had the same knowledge as every European reader
23 of the papers, that there were Mujahedin, that they have committed
24 atrocities, and that there are probably still some Mujahedin in the
25 country right now. I know from my discussion which I had once with the
1 president of Bosnia and Herzegovina how important for him the support of
2 the Arab countries was; morally and even more so financially. But I -- I
3 was not informed about details as I have seen them now in those papers.
4 Q. And in terms of the links between the religious community in
5 Bosnia and the Mujahedin, you have no information to that effect?
6 A. No, sir. Not so whatsoever.
7 Q. Or in terms of the source of financing or the source of getting
8 weapons of these Mujahedin.
9 A. I haven't had any information on this before, rather than the
10 Mujahedin have been in the country and took part in the fighting.
11 Q. And am I right in saying that on the basis of your report you, of
12 course, mentioned that the material which was provided to you, you
13 mentioned the word it was rather limited in order to form a clear view as
14 to what really happened with those Mujahedin in 1993.
15 A. Well, sir, it's still -- it's still somehow blurred for me.
16 Because on the one hand, they were called soldiers, and there is evidence
17 that they were called soldiers by the commanders of the Bosnian forces.
18 And they themselves said, "We joined to some extent the territorial
19 organisation right at the beginning and worked with them." They were
20 being taken care of in a rather detailed way by the 7th Mountain Brigade
21 for looking for lost persons, and they said, "These are soldiers which we
22 are looking for." They were working within the battalions or cooperating
23 within the battalions. On the other hand, I don't know whether is a part
24 of a real organisational structure under which they worked. But one thing
25 for me is clear: Based on the material given to me that the Mujahedin
1 were operating on the battlefield and in some ways very closely with the
2 forces on the ground, spearheading them, and supporting them, and also
3 creating problems for them, and that it then took a lot of -- a lot of
4 work for the -- for the brass of the Bosnian army to incorporate them into
5 the Bosnian army as an entity, and even so at the end of the year they
6 were not officially under control because people were still concerned
7 about what they -- what they did and how they did it. And this is a clear
8 deduction just from the sources, the documents given to me.
9 Q. Now, General, the -- you mentioned "they," they the Mujahedin.
10 You talk about "they," and you've referred to that earlier on. But I take
11 it that you refer to the issue because in response to questions by my
12 colleague you referred to a video. Am I right in saying that this video
13 was your main source of information on the Mujahedin?
14 A. No, you're not right. You're not right. I have a whole list of
15 documents here which are documents from the 3rd Corps, from the
16 7th Mountain Brigade, from the 306th Brigade, under which heading they
17 were -- amongst whom they were working. So it's not only this one video.
18 I only took this video to show how the Mujahedin themselves saw them and
19 the evolution when they came in country in the summer of 1999 and how from
20 their point of view they tried to hook up with the institutions and
21 organisations working in the country, and I don't know about the purpose
22 of this video, but I thought the way this has been portrayed, it shows, at
23 least not only a one side but also the other side concerning what we are
24 talking about.
25 Q. And, General, this video, you don't know who produced the video.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 You were not informed, at least, as to who produced the video.
2 A. Well, it -- it always talks about the Shura, the war council of
3 the Mujahedin, which were interested to -- to demonstrate what they have
4 done in that time and also somehow to -- to -- how should I say? To
5 memorise the martyrs; i.e., those Mujahedin which have been killed during
6 those battles.
7 Q. Now, the -- you mentioned in your examination-in-chief that you
8 had not seen the video; is that correct?
9 A. I only have the transcript of the text which is underlining the
10 video which I have never seen.
11 Q. And you don't know who wrote this text.
12 A. No, sir.
13 Q. And this -- when I look at the -- you are -- you will agree with
14 me that if we want to determine the true relationship that could have
15 existed or the true motif of the Mujahedin, it would be important to
16 have -- to know and to speak to the Mujahedins themselves.
17 A. Yes. I don't have any document by the Mujahedin, but I thought
18 rather than having it only from one side, i.e., the documents -- the
19 orders by the Bosnian army, this is a supplement, which doesn't bring
20 anything new. It just is a supporting factor of what I had drawn out from
21 the other documents. And I have no reason to believe that this is all
22 wrong, what they -- how they portrayed it themselves. And I think it's --
23 it's the way a very good help because it coincides in some ways very much
24 to what General Hadzihasanovic writes in his reports about the time, about
25 the -- the way of -- of the cooperation which had happened at the very
1 early time. So I think it's rather obvious that if this is a source which
2 I don't feel like being a wrong propaganda, I don't have the -- any reason
3 not to believe that this is true. I have not any reason that this has
4 been alleged afterwards. I think it's a self-portrait of the Mujahedin
5 which I think it's worthwhile to look into.
6 Q. And if I would provide you, General, with another book on the
7 Mujahedin by another expert on Mujahedin which provides you with different
8 information, you could also be tempted to use the book and say, "It's very
9 interested because it can help me in knowing what happened in Bosnia."
10 A. Yes, sir. Being a historian, I know how difficult it is to
11 qualify the sources from which you draw your information. You have to
12 analyse them and you have to look from them. And, therefore, I
13 contradicted when you told me that I based all my information on that
14 video, because this is just not true.
15 I had most of the time worked without the video. I got the video
16 at one of the very last encounters, where I got the video and the Blaskic
17 statements of the two -- the two gentlemen, which was withdrawn then. But
18 before that, for me, based on the documents given to me, the documents
19 prepared or produced by the 7th Mountain Brigade, by the 306th Brigade,
20 and by the 3rd Corps headquarters, for me it was very obvious that there
21 was some kind of close cooperation in the preparation and the conduct of
22 operations. And if you are responsible for an operation, the -- the
23 forces fighting with you, working with you, whether they're official under
24 your supervision or not, you become responsible for what happened in the
25 operation which you planned and executed.
1 Q. Now, that is -- that is if they take part in your operation and
2 that is if they take part with you?
3 A. Sir, that's it.
4 Q. But you could not identify this in terms of the documents and the
5 material that was given to you.
6 A. Well, at least the -- the 306th Brigade was very clear that
7 they -- they -- at least, the brigade commander, I must say, not the
8 brigade, that he was very much against the conduct of the operation in
9 Miletici, where -- where civilians were killed afterwards. And it also
10 shows, at least in -- in two cases, where after a battle has been taken
11 care of a responsible representative of the 7th Mountain Brigade went into
12 the area where the forces were still available, trying to find out what
13 happened, and looting happened, and the looting could not be -- could not
14 be prevented any more and the discipline could not be reinstated because
15 forces which participated in that -- in that operation before were
16 opposing law and order, were even opposing the attempt of the military
17 police to restate law and order. So if that happened, I would assume that
18 the same forces which were there doing their part in the looting business
19 also participated in -- in the operation before. And I also have
20 indications, as I stated in my paper, that at least the Mujahedin proposed
21 clear training for BiH forces -- Bosnian forces.
22 Q. You have reference to this?
23 A. Yes. And I have reference to this. They said, "We offered -- we
24 offered the best guys from that battalion to come with us." And I think
25 even general --
1 Q. And --
2 A. General Hadzihasanovic in his paper to higher headquarters
3 basically lays down that there were Turks and Arabs training soldiers for
4 the guerilla type of warfare. So --
5 Q. Now, General --
6 A. This is not my words.
7 Q. The information you're referring to now about the training also
8 comes from that video; am I correct?
9 A. I said one comes from the video. But also, in -- in that demand
10 for establishing or asking higher headquarters what to do about the --
11 Q. I'd like to show you, General, a few documents just to go over
12 and to finish my cross-examination. And this is a series of documents.
13 MR. BOURGON: I would like to issue to distribute this documents.
14 Q. Just to confirm with you a few issues before closing my
15 cross-examination at 12.00, as promised.
16 A. But, sir, you just cut me off when I was just trying to finish a
18 Q. Please --
19 A. And I think I should --
20 Q. Please go ahead, General. I don't want to cut you off.
21 A. And I should be in a possibility, because I think this is
22 important also for the Court. That this is not only based on the video.
23 It says - and this is a paper signed by General Hadzihasanovic on
24 13 June - that: "There have been volunteers from foreign countries as
25 well as a group of Bosnians trained by them, the so-called guerilla." So
1 they have -- this is not a video. This is General Hadzihasanovic saying
2 that the guerilla have been trained by them.
3 And in the order of the 13th of August, it says: "Replenish the
4 El Mujahed detachment with foreign volunteers --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down when reading, thank you.
6 THE WITNESS: "These people keep the weapons and other equipment
7 which have been issued to them."
8 So it's probably the Bosnian army who issued them the weapons. I
9 just want to make sure that we don't have a one-side look at this
10 particular case. That doesn't mean that they were incorporated all the
11 time in the army, but it shows that even on the side of General
12 Hadzihasanovic there was some kind of cooperation with them.
13 MR. BOURGON:
14 Q. Can we have a look at these documents, General, because this is
15 exactly the same documents you were looking at. And I would simply like
16 you to confirm some of the informations that is found in these documents.
17 And the first document -- and I would like to go one by one very quickly,
18 because unfortunately I'm running out of time -- and the general here
19 mentions in his letter to the supreme headquarters - he is writing to
20 Commander Delic and to the Chief of Staff, Halilovic - and can you confirm
21 that what he says in there in the first line is that since the beginning
22 there have been volunteers from foreign countries?
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. He says that. And he says that there's a group of Bosnians --
25 and he's not talking about soldiers who have been trained by them. Can
1 you confirm that?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. Can you confirm that these guerillas he's referring to is the mix
4 of the Mujahedin and the Bosnians who have not entered the ranks of the
6 A. This is true.
7 Q. And can you confirm that they had been invited to and they
8 refused to do so, according to this letter?
9 A. They have been invited and they have refused to. And we also
10 know, sir, that in those battalions of the 7th Mountain Brigade there were
11 organisations, the guerilla organisations, which were organic parts of the
13 Q. Can I go on, General, with -- when it says that: "These people
14 are still contemplating proposals made to them by the Army Chief of
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. That would indicate that there is something going on --
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. -- between the army and between this guerilla group, who is not
20 in the army.
21 And then it says: "They don't want to make public their
22 decisions regarding whether or not they will join the army," which means
23 that they haven't joined the army at this time. And: "They only want to
24 talk to top officials and not the 3rd Corps commander."
25 A. That's true.
1 Q. Is --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down for the
4 MR. BOURGON:
5 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... that they don't want to talk
6 to them.
7 A. Yes, it's obvious that they didn't want to talk to him.
8 Q. And that in the opinion of these people, according to General
9 Hadzihasanovic, all that is wanted is that they want him to fix a meeting
10 with the top brass.
11 A. This is true.
12 Q. And he confirms in the next paragraph that: "These people were
13 in the territory even before the 3rd Corps was created."
14 A. That's what he says, yes, sir.
15 Q. And that they've been fighting using unlawful or at least methods
16 that are outside lawful methods of combat, and this is the problems you
17 were referring to. These people were fighting and what they were doing
18 was detrimental to the state of BH. Is that what the general is saying?
19 A. Yeah. That's what he says.
20 Q. And is the general also saying that these Muslims also have a
21 link with clergymen and who are behind them? Is that what the general is
22 saying in this letter?
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. And what about the next paragraph, General, where the general
25 says: "Negotiations have started and finding a solution with the highest
1 level of the RBH." Isn't that the general confirming that there are
2 something going on, there is something going on with the army and these
3 people but that is completely foreign to him?
4 A. Well, he doesn't know exactly what's going on, but there is
5 something going on. There's no question about it.
6 Q. There's something going on. But he doesn't know what's going on.
7 You would agree with me, according to this letter.
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. And then what he says is that he does not want to be held
10 accountable --
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. -- for the consequences of these people's actions, which is a bit
13 different from what you mentioned in answer to the Prosecution when you
14 responded that he no longer wants to be held accountable. Is there a
15 difference between he does not want to be held accountable or no longer
16 held accountable? You would agree with me that there is a difference
17 between the two?
18 A. Well, he, I think, he is not accountable. He doesn't feel
19 accountable for what has happened with the Mujahedin in his area of
21 Q. Can we move -- thank you, General. Can we move to the second
22 document. And this is the -- a follow-up to General Hadzihasanovic's
23 letter. And if you look at the date of 16th June, so it is immediately
24 following. Would you confirm, General, that the first paragraph of this
25 letter is a direct reference to General Hadzihasanovic's letter?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. And that this letter, the last line of this beginning: "The
3 order is the aim of their focus, engagement, and our struggle." Now,
4 these are not the words of General Hadzihasanovic. These are added by
5 supreme headquarters, who for the first time say in writing that they have
6 an aim of focussing their engagement into the Bosnian struggle. Do you
7 agree with that?
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. And the order is twofold: The order is to send them to Igman and
10 to merge them with the independent detachment in Zuka's unit."
11 Can you confirm, General that, the SDK independent detachment in
12 Zuka's unit is, based on the information you've been provided, an
13 independent unit attached and subordinated directly to the army and not a
14 unit in the 3rd Corps?
15 A. It's not the unit of the 3rd Corps.
16 Q. And the second part of the order, of course, is he says: "If
17 they don't accept this, if they don't want to go to Mount Igman, then you
18 show them no hospitality and eventually, if you have to, disarm them." Is
19 this what this order is saying?
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. And that the commander, of course, is requesting information as
22 to the measures to implement this order.
23 Now, I'd like to show you the next document. And I'm not sure if
24 you have received this document or not. You do -- have received this
25 document. And this is a phone conversation between General Halilovic and
1 with General Hadzihasanovic. At least, this is what you used this order
2 for in your report.
3 Now, the Defence position on this document, General, is that it
4 is a telephone conversation, and we have not admitted this document
5 because we have some doubt as to the source. But if this document is
6 true, then we look at the second page, and there is a question that comes
7 from -- the information is the following: And it says, line 15 of page 2.
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. Where it says: "Regarding the information that we have received
10 about those foreigners." Now, you agree that this is a person's name with
11 a Delta that speaking.
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. And General Halilovic then says, "Yes.
14 And Hadzihasanovic answers: "It cannot be done that way." Is
15 that what the general is saying?
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. And he's saying, "If I do this, this is going to be my third
18 front line." And he says, "No, no, it's ordered here. The two of them
19 have signed it." Who are -- do you know who the "two of them," he is
20 referring to, who Halilovic is referring to as "the two of them"?
21 A. Well, I think it's -- it's the representative of the Mujahedin,
22 on the one side, and the representative which has been sent to them, on
23 the other side, by Delic.
24 Q. Well, he's talking -- isn't he talking in this paragraph about
25 the letter that -- about the order itself? Isn't he talking about the
1 order? "It is ordered here. Two of them have signed it."
2 A. Well, it might also be the order. I don't know. I only know
3 that there was a special representative sent there because they were not
4 very cooperative at the beginning, and maybe this was a letter which has
5 been signed on other side; maybe it's -- it's the order of the 13th of --
6 of August.
7 Q. And you -- can you see that by this letter General Hadzihasanovic
8 is basically saying, "I cannot take them on. I don't want to open a third
9 front. And please send me another order." Is that the gist of this
11 A. One could interpret this this way.
12 Q. That would be a reasonable interpretation.
13 A. [No audible response]
14 Q. And if we look at the next document, General, this is the one
15 where we have -- called "Authorisation." This is also a document that has
16 been provided to you.
17 A. Yeah, that's just what I just was talking and referring to
19 Q. And this document authorised a Mr. Mahmuljin, who is, according
20 to this document, a member of the 3rd Corps Command, and to carry out on
21 behalf of the army, not on behalf of the 3rd Corps, negotiations and
22 arrangements with the representatives of the Mujahedin. And they say --
23 it appears to be from Zenica. And the two things they want to negotiate
24 upon is the inclusion of the Mujahedin into the army and the use of that
25 unit against a fight against the Chetniks. And, as it says: "The manner
1 of his resubordination." Can you confirm that this letter confirms that
2 as of that date, the 23rd of July, this unit has not been resubordinated
3 to the 3rd Corps Command?
4 A. Obviously.
5 Q. And that, of course, the order is -- is issued with the idea to
6 solve this problem. You would agree that this is a problem?
7 A. This is the problem. This is the reason why the 3rd Corps
8 commander addressed his higher headquarters about this problem.
9 Q. Now, if I put it to you that Mr. Mahmuljin, albeit that it says
10 here that he was a member of the 3rd Corps Command --
11 Sorry, General, I have to go back to my previous question in
12 terms of whether this would be a reasonable interpretation that General
13 Hadzihasanovic was saying, "I cannot take them on and please send me a new
14 order." And your answer was not recorded on the transcript. Can you
15 confirm that what your answer was in terms of whether this interpretation
16 was a reasonable interpretation.
17 A. I said this is a -- this is a possible way to interpret it this
18 way, because there's still a question mark.
19 Q. But I added then, "Was it reasonable?"
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. And your answer was --
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. Now, this authorisation, if I put it to you that Mr. Mahmuljin
24 was not a member of the 3rd Corps, despite what it says here, would that
25 show you again to say that there is something going on again between
1 someone higher than the 3rd Corps but that's something to which General
2 Hadzihasanovic is not privy to?
3 A. This is true.
4 Q. And --
5 A. But how should I know that he is not a member of the 3rd Corps?
6 Q. I just suggest to you.
7 Now, General, can you see on this letter or authorisation, can
8 you see that this authorisation has not been sent or has not been copied
9 to General Hadzihasanovic?
10 A. No, it doesn't show.
11 Q. And would that also indicate that what is going on is beyond the
12 reach of the knowledge of General Hadzihasanovic?
13 A. I wouldn't -- I wouldn't deduct this from what you just said.
14 It's a personal authorisation for that gentleman, which he needs to go to
15 the Mujahedin in order to authorise his capability to negotiate with them;
16 therefore, it doesn't have to be -- it hasn't been issued to General
18 Q. And -- but would you say -- would you agree with me that the fact
19 that this letter was not copied to General Hadzihasanovic, when we are
20 talking about a very important problem that he raised in the first place
21 that, as a minimum, he should be informed about someone being nominated to
22 go and negotiate with these people?
23 A. Well, I -- I understand it this way: If this gentleman was from
24 the 3rd Corps - and I assume he was from the 3rd Corps - there's no
25 question that the corps commander was informed about that, especially
1 since the corps commander raised this issue as a key issue on his behalf.
2 Even if I have not the paper on that, it doesn't say it hasn't happened.
3 So I assume, seeing the cooperation between the higher headquarter and
4 General Hadzihasanovic on a daily basis that he very well knew about that.
5 Q. And if I look at the next document - and I have to move quickly,
6 because we're a bit short on time - there is a proposal dated the 12th of
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. Now, this is dated -- if you look at the last document, was 23rd
10 of July and this document is the 12th of August. This is a proposal that
11 is sent to the supreme headquarters, and the idea is, "Proposal for the
12 formation of a detachment of foreign citizens." Would simply the title
13 indicate to you that this detachment has not yet been created?
14 A. It's true. This is still a proposal.
15 Q. And that at that time -- again, we find in the first paragraph,
16 or the introductory paragraph that: "Given the need to organise and to
17 make use of the foreign volunteers," would that indicate to you, General,
18 that maybe there was an intent to say that, "Yes, we should use them
19 because they're Muslim and maybe we can benefit from their presence but
20 this is not taking place at this time." Would you agree with me with this
22 A. Well, I agree with you that the commanding general of the
23 3rd Corps was very interested to get this matter solved as urgently as
25 Q. And this specific paragraph, General, refers to the
1 authorisation, 129754 of 23 July. Now, what I don't understand is that
2 this proposal here refers to a specific document which was not copied to
3 General Hadzihasanovic. The fact that this order coming back from the
4 corps is -- a proposal coming back from the corps is the proposal that
5 refers to an authorisation on which it is not -- or which was not copied
6 to the general, would that indicate to you that whoever drafted this
7 proposal might not even have shown it to General Hadzihasanovic?
8 A. That might be true. It might not be true. At least, that this
9 proposal here shows that the 3rd Corps was deeply involved in the creation
10 of the El Mujahedin, because they even proposed a name for that. And that
11 they have prepared the steps that in case they get the green light from
12 higher headquarters, they could put it into being immediately.
13 Q. And --
14 A. That's my deduction from that. It shows that the corps is very
15 well involved in the process of getting this problem resolved.
16 Q. So they want -- and you can see from this that General
17 Hadzihasanovic, at least from the time he wrote this letter to this time,
18 that he is actively involved in solving this issue, in solving this issue
19 without having to fight the Mujahedin.
20 A. And it's amazing that it took until now two months already from
21 his initial proposal until the realisation, so it shows it was a very
22 cumbersome and difficult process to achieve.
23 Q. Now, General, recently you did an interview concerning the --
24 what the situation in Iraq, with respect to the United States. And you
25 were referring in that interview that to solve problems such as these with
1 the independent units, that the use of force should not be the way to go
2 but, rather, we should do it by finding a political solution to problems
3 like this and to get those people in Iraq under and to create [sic].
4 Would you say that on the basis of your own opinion that what
5 General Hadzihasanovic was doing and not to take them on and, rather, to
6 find the proper solution with the help of a superior headquarters was the
7 reasonable thing to do for General Hadzihasanovic to focus on his mission?
8 A. He has been talking before about the third front, and maybe this
9 was -- and we know from the documents how difficult it was to deal with
10 the Mujahedin, that they were very trigger happy in their way to do
11 business, and this is maybe the reason why he hasn't done anything
12 beforehand. But by that time, when he initiated, what we were just
13 discussing the last 10 minutes or 14 minutes, I'm absolutely with you.
14 But let me also refer that Delic told them, "If they don't
15 comply, show them the hospitality and disarm them." So Delic was willing
16 to take them on and say, "I'm not willing to continue what they have done
17 until now." And the question for me is not whether he -- what he has done
18 right now is the appropriate way. I think there's absolutely no question
19 about this. The question is whether he should have done a little bit
20 earlier things like this in order not to establish a third front but to
21 disarm the perpetrators.
22 Q. Now, what you say, General, in your opinion, of course, is
23 that -- and that is also in your report, that until the next piece of
24 paper, which is what we have here on the 13th of August -- and this 13th
25 of August we have the formation of a detachment is being created. And we
1 talk about this thing called El Mujahed Detachment in the 3 Corps zone of
2 responsibility. And a number is given.
3 Now, this is, of course -- this task is to be realised
4 immediately, and that is done on the 13th of August.
5 A. Yeah.
6 Q. Now, from the documents that have been shown to you, you have no
7 way of saying when exactly, if ever, this order was activated.
8 A. From my understanding of an order like this, once it's been
9 published, it's activated.
10 Q. And --
11 A. "I hereby order." So why should I activate it any more if I have
12 ordered it, for me as a commanding general or the chief of the army, in
13 this -- of the armed forces by that time, once I order it, it goes out and
14 we will execute it. Why should I do something else on -- on that?
15 Q. And, General, would you agree with me that if General
16 Hadzihasanovic wanted to organise or to accomplish and execute this order,
17 that it would be important for a reasonable commander to try and find
18 where the leadership was, find who the members of that unit are, find out
19 where they are, and to ensure that anything would be done the proper way?
20 A. Sure.
21 Q. And that if there was going to be any unit like this, that its
22 commander, in accordance with the rules of regulation that you have seen,
23 would have to be appointed by Izetbegovic himself and by no one else.
24 A. I don't know whether Izetbegovic appointed every battalion
25 commander; maybe he did. I don't know.
1 Q. Well, that's the law that was -- in the documents, in the
2 material that were given to you, any -- any appointment -- assignment of
3 battalion commanders and up had to be done by --
4 A. Okay.
5 Q. -- had to be done by the -- by the Presidency, upon
6 recommendation of the Minister of National Defence.
7 A. That being the case, he probably -- not probably. Then he had
8 appointed this commander.
9 Q. And this order, of course, if on paper we've created this entity,
10 until we have a commander assigned officially by the Presidency and until
11 we have actually something done physically, then we can't say that this
12 unit exists as of yet?
13 A. This unit existed because we know where they were stationed, we
14 know where they trained, we know -- and if I look again into the video, I
15 would know who was the commander by that time, because they are very clear
16 who was when the commander. But I don't have any document on that. And
17 it doesn't say, since this is the only document which I have, that this
18 commander could not have been appointed the same day.
19 Q. And if we look into the fact that your last answer, the fact that
20 take away the video that you have, you don't know where they trained and
21 you don't know where they are and the leadership is not accessible, as is
22 pointed out in your report; am I correct in saying that?
23 A. No. Because I think also from other sources, sources from the
24 7th Mountain Brigade, we know that Mehurici -- Mehurici was one of the
25 training areas in which they lived. We also know about other places where
1 they were working. So it was not -- it was not a shadow force for the
2 Bosnian army. They knew where they were. They knew where their
3 commanders were. Otherwise, I think the reaction of the commanding
4 general of the 3rd Corps to get them organised -- and also, as we have
5 seen, he asked -- they have asked them before to join the Bosnian army,
6 because it was rejected by the Mujahedin, so there was a connection -- a
7 connection with them. I think your deductions are just not deductions I
8 would like to take.
9 Q. And, General, if I move on with the next document that you have,
10 in terms of an order which has got the signature block of the general, but
11 then there is a mention about the subordination of this apparently
12 independent detachment El Mujahed, and this order is to the -- addressed
13 to the commander of the 306th Brigade, but there is the mention
14 there: "Not carried out." Is there a possibility, simply a possibility
15 that this order was not carried out on the order of General Hadzihasanovic
17 A. Might be. But why -- why do you write an order if you don't
18 carry it out afterwards?
19 Q. And -- but there could be many reasons why this could take place.
20 Did you -- did you, General, have in your whole career, have had to issue
21 orders that then you've had to take back or cancel for various reasons?
22 A. Not that I'm aware of. Maybe I did, but I -- I don't remember.
23 Q. And, General, if we look at the last document that you have in
24 this pile of documents, dating back to 21 of February, 1994. And can you
25 look at this document and read the first paragraph, because this document
1 was not given to you.
2 A. No.
3 Q. And this -- would you agree with me on the basis of the fourth
4 line that this was -- relates to a conversation between a man called
5 Abu Haris, who appears to be a commander of the -- appears to be, at least
6 based on this document, a conversation with the commander of the army, and
7 that is in February of 1994, and this is that people who are on this list
8 no longer want to be working with the Mujahedin and that all the Mujahedin
9 don't want to give their passport and their names to the 3rd Corps, even
10 though they're being requested to do so by the chief of security?
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. Would that also be an indication that even in 1994, the beginning
13 of 1994, the situation with respect to the status of these foreigners was
14 still kind of up in the air?
15 A. I think the status was not quite up -- up in the air, because he
16 is -- he represents the unit of El Mujahedin. So the unit by that time
17 must have been organised. The question is how can you control the guys in
18 that unit, and -- and how can you make them behave as the other soldiers
19 should behave.
20 It seems that it was very difficult to control them, even in 1994.
21 But I think the organisation as such is there, and if you have included
22 them in your organisation and if they misbehave, then you take the
23 responsibility what they have done in -- under your command.
24 Q. And, General, if I look at the -- this specific case that we've
25 just discussed, the creation of this so-called unit, El Mujahed, but even
1 on the basis of the documents that you have had access to, am I right in
2 saying that you are not in a position to confirm that there were no other
3 elements of foreigners also present in that territory which have nothing
4 to do with the people we are referring to here, which is the El Mujahed?
5 A. I -- I know not from the documents but I have read that other
6 people were there, some kind of mercenaries, but individuals only, not as
7 a unit as we see it here with the El Mujahedin.
8 Q. So you are aware of that personally or from the documents that
9 were given to you?
10 A. I said not from the documents.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. Only from what I read in -- in public sources.
13 Q. So there is a possibility that despite all the reasonable steps
14 taken by General Hadzihasanovic to handle the specific problems, it might
15 have been the end solution to the complete problem of these fighters
16 coming from abroad within the 3rd Corps in 1993.
17 A. Might be.
18 [Defence counsel confer]
19 MR. BOURGON:
20 Q. Thank you very much, General. This is the end of my
21 cross-examination. I thank you very much for your patience and for
22 answering all of my questions. And my colleague after the break will have
23 some further questions for you. Thank you very much.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. Bourgon.
25 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I'm aware of the time --
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.
2 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm aware of the time. I
3 have two questions, first relating to the packet of documents and the
4 status -- or the Defence position with respect to these documents. This
5 of course can be dealt with after the break.
6 I also, Mr. President, would suggest for the record of these
7 proceedings that the document entitled, "Hypothetical case Dusina" be
8 somehow marked or attached to these proceedings, because the witness made
9 several references to this document during the cross-examination. I'm not
10 proposing that it be admitted into evidence but perhaps it could be marked
11 or made a court exhibit for purposes of maintaining a copy of this
12 document in the court proceedings.
13 Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
15 Regarding the documents, there are two questions: First of all,
16 you gave us two binders with documents, appear to be official documents,
17 as they are military orders in most cases. These documents were not in
18 the possession of the witness or the Prosecution. Could you tell us where
19 did you get those documents from? We know that the Prosecution seized in
20 Sarajevo a certain number of documents. They seized the originals. Does
21 this mean that you or members of your team went to the Sarajevo archives,
22 looked through the documents, and asked for photocopies of the originals,
23 and you were given copies of those documents? Under what legal format did
24 you obtain them? How did you obtain access to the official archives? So
25 would you explain to us how you managed to get hold of these documents and
1 is there any trace of the fact that the documents were given to you
2 officially? Because there should be a stamp of the Sarajevo archives on a
3 document saying that they were given to so and so.
4 So, Madam Residovic, can you explain the source of the documents
5 in the two binders?
6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Some of the
7 documents have Prosecution numbers on them, and they were disclosed to us
8 under the disclosure procedure. That is clearly indicated on each of the
9 documents that we received in the pre-trial stage.
10 In accordance with the Statute of this Tribunal and the Rules of
11 Procedure and the agreement on cooperation between the government of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Tribunal, at the very beginning
13 of these proceedings, after our client had his Initial Appearance in the
14 Tribunal, the Defence of General Hadzihasanovic, as well as General
15 Kubura's defence, addressed the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on
16 the basis of the equality of arms that we should be allowed access to the
17 archives of the state and other archives. The government of Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina passed conclusions instructing the state authorities to
19 provide the investigators of both teams with access to those archives. On
20 the basis of this, the Defence has managed to gain access to the state
21 archives, first the army archives, then the archives of the Defence
22 Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the archives of the police, the
23 courts, the prosecutor's offices, and all the documents in the binders
24 given to you which do not come from the Prosecution are the result of our
25 own investigations during the pre-trial proceedings.
1 The Defence, again in accordance with the cooperation between the
2 Republic of Croatia and this Tribunal, the Defence addressed the liaison
3 office of Croatia to allow us access to the state archives of Croatia
4 containing the HVO documents. We were given that permission, and we were
5 disclosed a number of reports from the presidential archives of the
6 Republic of Croatia, and through official communication with the UN we
7 were enabled to have access to UNPROFOR archives in Geneva. Through
8 direct contacts with the responsible authorities of Great Britain, we were
9 given access to the documents of the British Battalion; and you're also
10 familiar with the measures taken by the Defence teams to get access to the
11 archives of the European monitors.
12 So those would be the sources of the documents that will be
13 presented to Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. I am grateful for
15 this information indicating the origin and sources of the documents that
16 you have shown the witness.
17 There is a series of documents whose fate hasn't been regulated.
18 First of all, the document that was given to General Reinhardt through the
19 Victims and Witnesses Unit are the documents that he has reviewed; therein
20 the documents on the hypothetical, the Dusina case, questions, and the
21 table. Are you asking for these documents to be tendered?
22 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
23 The only document that I referred to today was the document on
24 Dusina that my learned friend referred to.
25 While preparing the cross-examination, I noticed that
1 unfortunately I don't have time to use the documents in the way I intended
2 to do. I really would have preferred to have been able to have more time
3 for the cross-examination of this witness and to show him each of the
4 documents in turn. But we tried to speed things up, and therefore that
5 was not possible, so I focussed only on one case today; that is, the case
6 of Dusina. Therefore, regarding all the other documents, they should be
7 put aside; whereas, the Dusina document could be marked for identification
8 or even tendered into evidence, if my learned friend has no objection.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, regarding the
10 Dusina document.
11 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Dusina document was the only one
12 I made reference to earlier. We would certainly support it being marked
13 for identification or being attached as some kind of a court exhibit. We
14 would oppose it being admitted into evidence on the ground that we've
15 litigated the issue of these facts, and we would simply ask that it be
16 somehow attached to the record so that in the event of any appellant
17 proceedings and a review of the transcript where the witness is making
18 reference to this document, that it be available to the Appeals Chamber to
19 review this document.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Let us give it an
21 ID number.
22 Mr. Registrar, please.
23 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it will have DH
24 number 164 ID.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
1 Now, we have another document, a set of documents shown to the
2 witness, and within this set, there are documents which are already a part
3 of the court file and then there are also new documents; specifically
4 documents which appear for the first time, specifically the one of the
5 21st of February, 1994. Is the Defence asking us to give one number for
6 all these documents?
7 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] I think an ID number for this set,
8 and then we will consult with the Prosecution to see what the positions of
9 the parties are.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I see.
11 Mr. Mundis agrees.
12 Can we have a number.
13 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] DH165 ID.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Now, we still have outstanding the problem of the maps. What is
16 the Defence going to tell us about this large board with the maps? Are
17 you going to ask that they be tendered?
18 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Mr. President, my idea was to have
19 photographs focussed on by the camera in the courtroom or even to use a
20 digital camera. However, in view of the actual use I made of the map, we
21 will produce the UN map and General Hadzihasanovic's map later on.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
23 It is 12.30. We will resume at five to 1.00, and then it will be
24 the turn of the other Defence team, that is, Mr. Dixon, who will have one
25 hour at his disposal, maybe a few minutes more, to allow him to
1 cross-examine the witness.
2 So we will resume at five to 1.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Bourgon, you
6 have concluded your cross-examination.
7 I will give Mr. Dixon the floor now.
8 MR. DIXON: May it please Your Honours.
9 Cross-examined by Mr. Dixon:
10 Q. General Reinhardt, it may be trite, but it is correct, is it not,
11 that a commander may only be held responsible for the perpetrators of war
12 crimes if those perpetrators are indeed his subordinates within his chain
13 of command?
14 A. Yep.
15 Q. So if the perpetrators are not the subordinates of the commander,
16 then the issue of notice is wholly irrelevant; is that right?
17 A. I don't -- I would not say "wholly irrelevant." Because I think
18 nevertheless you are responsible what happens in the area. And if there
19 are fighters in the area which cooperate and coordinate their activities
20 with you, you take over responsibility of them.
21 Q. But would you agree with me that unless those people are under
22 your command, then you can't be held responsible for their actions. If
23 they are under the command of somebody else, then it's that person who's
25 A. This is the -- basically I'm absolutely with you. And the
1 question is: What does it mean, "under your command"? If I plan an
2 operation, a military operation, and execute this military operation with
3 people who are executing this together with me, for these -- these
4 elements, then, are under my command for the purpose of this particular
6 Q. Yes, because you have effective control over them.
7 A. That's it.
8 Q. And that's why you have responsibility for them.
9 A. Yeah. Even so, they don't belong to your own organic
11 Q. I'm talking in general terms, General Reinhardt, not about the --
12 A. Okay.
13 Q. -- scenario you're outlining. The basic principle is they must
14 be your subordinates before you can be held responsible.
15 A. Right, sir.
16 Q. And if they're not your subordinates, it doesn't matter whether
17 you got information or not about what was going on with those
19 A. Yeah.
20 Q. And also, it doesn't matter if you took no actions in respect of
21 those perpetrators, if they're not your subordinates.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. Can we turn to Vares. That was an area where you in your report
24 at paragraph 9.5.2 were somewhat critical of my client --
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. -- Mr. Kubura.
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. We would all agree that there were units of the 7th Brigade in
4 Vares in November 1993; they were there with a number of other units and
5 brigades conducting an operation. Would you agree with that?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And, in fact, an organisational group had been formed, call the
8 OG Istok.
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. And the 7th Brigade units were part of that, together with a
11 number of other units.
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. In your report, you say that: "On 4 November 1993 the commander
14 of the 306th Brigade reported criminal activities of the 7th Brigade
15 soldiers during the operations against Vares."
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. And you go on to say that you would have expected Mr. Kubura to
18 look further into those reports and not just accept the report of the
19 commander of his second battalion; is that right?
20 A. This is right.
21 Q. Where you said there was a report from the 306th Brigade in the
22 first sentence, there's no footnote there indicating what document you
23 rely upon, is there?
24 A. No. But I think I can -- I can tell you what document it is.
25 Q. Okay. If you could, because what I'm trying to establish is what
1 report was sent and indeed whether Mr. Kubura got that report.
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. Do you know which report we are talking about offhand, or would
4 you need to go through the documents in --
5 A. I think --
6 Q. -- some detail?
7 A. I think I -- maybe you'd give me a chance to go through the
9 Q. Well, perhaps I can assist in the interests of time. Is it not
10 correct - and I can show you these documents, if you wish - that in fact
11 the 306th Brigade was never in Vares; it operated in Travnik? And we are
12 talking here about reports from the OG Istok that I referred to earlier
13 on, two reports; one on the 4th of November, 1993, and second on the 4th
14 of November, 1993. These are documents which you have received. You
15 might not have them with you, I appreciate, because they weren't referred
16 to in your report. They are PT116 and PT827.
17 My point is, General Reinhardt, that -- and you can look at them,
18 if you wish, but it might be quicker if we just go through it with me --
19 A. Yeah.
20 Q. -- leading you -- that both of these reports were sent by the
21 commander of the operational group directly to the 3rd Corps Command and
22 the 6th Corps Command. There was no copy sent to Mr. Kubura. He wasn't
23 even given a cc'd copy for information.
24 A. Okay.
25 Q. You would accept that?
1 A. Yeah, if you say so.
2 MR. DIXON: The document, Your Honours, are two contested
3 exhibits, 46 and 306.
4 Q. Of course, General, these are documents that are not in evidence
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Fortunately this is a matter that doesn't have to concern you,
8 whether or not they are to be admitted. But these are documents which you
9 did have and which you would have been able to review in drawing up your
11 A. Okay.
12 Q. Would you agree, then, that it would not be correct to say that
13 Mr. Kubura should have followed up those reports if he didn't receive
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. He was entitled to rely on the report of the commander of his
17 2nd Battalion.
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. Can we move on to Kakanj, then, which was another incident that
20 you mentioned.
21 For the record - you may or may not know this - but the looting
22 in that area is not in fact charged in the indictment.
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. Did you know that?
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. But it is -- sorry, General.
2 A. I just took that case not because of what happened but how
3 General Hadzihasanovic reacted, saying this was a very good way how to
4 solve and react to a course, which -- to a case which has been presented
5 to him.
6 Q. Yes. And you said also in your -- your evidence-in-chief, and
7 this is while asking you about it, that you weren't sure that action was
8 followed up by the brigade commander further down the chain of command.
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. There is a document which you may have in front of you, another
11 contested exhibit. This is a document that you were given, and it's
12 PT538 -- PTW538. It's a letter from General Hadzihasanovic to the Supreme
13 Command, and it says --
14 MR. DIXON: And perhaps it might be best, Your Honours, if
15 General Reinhardt is given a copy.
16 THE WITNESS: I would appreciate that.
17 MR. DIXON: Of this. Otherwise, we'll spend so much time going
18 through various pages.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
20 MR. DIXON:
21 Q. Is that a document you recall looking at? It was in the bundle
22 that was given to you.
23 A. It might be that I have seen that. I don't -- I don't recall it
24 right now. Maybe I -- it just didn't come to my attention. If you say I
25 have been issued this, it might be true, but I don't remember it.
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. Otherwise, my conclusion would have been different.
3 Q. General, if I could refer you to the second-last paragraph. It's
4 a simple point which I wish you to confirm.
5 A. Yeah.
6 Q. And that is that it reads: "Pursuant to the order of the
7 7th Brigade Command a battalion commander, company commander, and several
8 other 7th Battalion officers were relieved of their duties in Kakanj on
9 23 June 1993 for failing to carry out an order to prevent crime and
10 looting." Would you agree that that order indicates that on its face the
11 matter was followed up and these persons were removed from their duties by
12 the 7th Brigade Command?
13 A. I agree with you.
14 Q. Would you also agree that having looked at a number of additional
15 documents this morning about measures taken, that this might not be the
16 only incident where action was taken and followed up all the way down to
17 the brigade level?
18 A. Having seen these additional documents, I already reversed my --
19 my position this morning, because I haven't had more by the time when I
20 was looking into the case.
21 Q. And this would apply both to the 3rd Corps Command and also
22 further down the chain of command to the brigade commands as well.
23 A. I would not be ad libitum in this regard because I don't know
24 exactly what the brigade commander has done in that case. I haven't seen
25 any reliable actions. But if you say so, I must -- I must assume that you
1 have better evidence than I have.
2 Q. Well, I'm not going to burden you with files of more documents.
3 My point only is that you weren't given all of the material that could be
4 applicable in this case. You were given as much as was necessary, which
5 you've reviewed, but there is additional material which you haven't
7 A. There was, and I see there is additional material I haven't
8 reviewed and which haven't had impact on my statement.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 Turning to Miletici, then. Is it correct that there were no
11 7th Brigade personnel deployed in Miletici in April 1993?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Turning to Maljine. Is it correct that likewise there were no
14 7th Brigade personnel committed to the fighting in Maljine?
15 A. I didn't say that.
16 Q. But is it correct from all the material that you've been --
17 A. As far as I see the material, yes, this is correct.
18 Q. There is a document which was given to you, another one which you
19 probably don't have, because it wasn't one referred to in your report.
20 This is an uncontested exhibit, so it's got an exhibit number already,
21 Exhibit P174. And for you, General, it would be PT108.
22 If you could be given a copy of it, as I don't think you --
23 A. I would appreciate it.
24 Q. -- you have it in front of you.
25 A. Thank you.
1 Q. This is a report dated 21 October 1993 from the deputy commander
2 of the 3rd Corps going to the Supreme Command Staff; is that right?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Do you recall seeing this --
5 A. No.
6 Q. -- document?
7 I can confirm that it was given to you, but it may be amongst all
8 the documents. It's entirely understandable that you cannot remember each
9 individual one.
10 Can you confirm, however, by looking at the document now that in
11 this report the deputy commander is reporting on the incident that
12 occurred in Maljine in October 1993 [sic], and nowhere is it indicated
13 that any members of the 7th Brigade were deployed there?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. There is a translation on the front of it, the English
16 translation you're working from.
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. At the -- the back of it, there's a copy of the original document
19 in B/C/S. I just wish to clarify one point, and that regards -- and
20 that's regarding the translation of the document. As I say, this is
21 not -- this is not a contested document. And that is that in paragraph 2
22 it says: "Where soldiers of the --" and it says: "illegible" and no
23 brigade number is filled in. If you look at the original, from what I can
24 see it's quite clear that it reads: "306th Brigade." Would you agree
25 with me?
1 A. I'll just try to find out, please. Give me ...
3 Q. So it reads: "306 Brigade."
4 A. It could be: "306 Brigade," yeah.
5 Q. And then it goes on to say: "Armed citizens who were not members
6 of the BH army units."
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. DIXON: There's one correction to the transcript, Your Honour,
10 and that is that the date for Maljine that's at line 23 is not October
11 1993 -- it's page 100, line 23 -- but in fact, October 1993 is mentioned
12 there. It should be June 1993. The document is dated October 1993.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
14 MR. DIXON:
15 Q. Thank you, General.
16 If you could move on now to paragraph 4.5 of your report. My
17 learned friend from the Prosecution took you to that paragraph earlier on,
18 where you say that: "Based on the material I have looked through, it is
19 not quite clear to me to which extent and under what kind of command
20 relationship elements of the Mujahedin were fighting within the
21 7th Brigade before they were officially recognised into an independent
22 3rd Corps detachment on 13 August 1993." That your -- that is your
23 conclusion, is it?
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. You also said in your evidence in chief that there was no clear
1 order that says that the Mujahedin or a group of them belonged to the 7th
2 Brigade. You couldn't find any such document.
3 A. No.
4 Q. And that the documents that you reviewed some -- some 400
5 documents - you said this in your evidence in chief; I just wish to
6 confirm it - that they did not give a very clear indication, that you
7 could only make deductions and assumptions.
8 A. Right. I can make deductions and assumptions from documents
9 which I have looked through.
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. But as assumptions and deductions are not a clear 100 per cent
12 evidence, it is only that I can take some logical consequences out of
14 Q. So you are interpreting the documents, a process which you would
15 agree anyone in the courtroom can undertake, making deductions and
16 assumptions from documents which are not very clear.
17 A. This is right.
18 Q. The video was mentioned earlier on. I'm quite clear that this
19 was not the only material that you based your conclusion on. There were
20 documents and the video. But for your benefit and the benefit obviously
21 of Their Honours, I wish to play you the portion of the video which you
22 referred to in your report.
23 A. There are many portions, quite a few portions.
24 Q. Yes. There's one particular portion, if I may indicate which
25 that is, and that is the one referred to in paragraph 4.6, the paragraph
1 just after the one I've referred to.
2 MR. DIXON: Perhaps we should clarify that first, and then we
3 will -- we will show the video.
4 Q. You say in paragraph 4.6: "According to the videotape, somewhere
5 in early 1992 an agreement was made with the commander of the Muslim
6 forces in Travnik to send a group of his best soldiers to join the ranks
7 of the Mujahedin and train them to carry out special operations."
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. And that is a quote from the written transcript --
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. -- which you had.
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. As you've confirmed, you never looked at the video; you simply
14 read the transcript.
15 A. Yeah. But I have to say in the footnote it shows that "1992"
16 must be "1993." I said this correctly in the footnote.
17 Q. Yes. So when you say: "In early 1992" --
18 A. It must be 1993, as it says in the footnote.
19 Q. Yes, so it's 1993 we're talking about.
20 A. It's a typing error.
21 Q. Yes.
22 MR. DIXON: Okay. If we could show, with the leave of Your
23 Honours, the portion of the video. It is a very short portion. And we --
24 we might need to show it twice in order that it can be fully appreciated.
25 [Videotape played]
1 MR. DIXON: Your Honour, I would suggest that we show it one
2 further time, as it is very short.
3 Unfortunately, the sound cannot be increased. The words that are
4 heard spoken in the background are those that appear in the transcript.
5 But the purpose of showing the video was to ask General Reinhardt to
6 comment on what in fact he sees now on the video.
7 So it could be shown again, I would be grateful.
8 [Videotape played]
9 MR. DIXON: Thank you.
10 Q. General Reinhardt, having now seen the video, would you agree
11 with me now that there's nothing in the video material which indicates who
12 the soldiers are?
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. There's nothing in the material which indicates that they are
15 soldiers of the 7th Brigade.
16 A. No.
17 Q. Or that the commander that may have indicated that there should
18 be training was a commander of the 7th Brigade.
19 A. It doesn't say anything about the 7th Brigade in this regard.
20 Q. In fact, would you agree that, having seen the video, that
21 material could have been taken at any time and be of any troops?
22 A. It does not -- it's not necessary that the -- that the text of
23 the video and the -- and the picture which we have seen, the movie which
24 we have seen, are -- are coincidental?
25 Q. Yes. Thank you.
1 And yet, you have said in your report and in your evidence in
2 chief that it says very clearly - we're talking about the video here -
3 that, "They offered training" - this is the Mujahedin - "to the battalion,
4 to one of the battalions of the 7th Mountain Brigade." And I think
5 training is part of cooperation.
6 A. That's true.
7 Q. Leaving your assumptions aside, you would agree that the hard
8 evidence does not show that that is the 7th Brigade there offering the
10 A. I deducted, as you can see from my footnote --
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. -- he's talking about the command of the Muslim forces in
13 Travnik, and this was the 1st Battalion being stationed in Travnik, that
14 him being the commander, one could deduct that this is then the one he was
15 negotiating with.
16 Q. That's footnote 57 that you're referring to.
17 A. Right, sir.
18 Q. That's a deduction that you make on the basis that the
19 7th Brigade had a battalion in Travnik.
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. You are aware that there were many other brigades and units based
22 in Travnik, are you not?
23 A. I know.
24 Q. So would you agree that it's possible that when forces are
25 referred to, it could be referring to other units and not the 7th Brigade?
1 A. It could be also other units. I could not exclude this.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 Based on the video material and the documents that you refer to
4 in your report, your conclusion on this topic is set out in paragraph 4.11
5 of your report, is it not, where you say: "Based on the scarce
6 information --" so you would regard the information as limited; is that
8 A. Absolutely. That's what it says.
9 Q. "From existing documents, one can assume that at least certain
10 elements of the Mujahedin were incorporated in the organisation of the
11 7th Brigade battalions, beginning in early 1993."
12 Would I be correct in saying, as you mentioned earlier on, that a
13 logical extension of this conclusion is that there were elements that were
14 not incorporated in the 7th Brigade?
15 A. Sure.
16 Q. And you cannot say which elements were in and which --
17 A. No, I cannot.
18 Q. -- elements were out?
19 A. I cannot. Therefore, I leave it so dubious, because it remained
20 dubious for me.
21 Q. It remained blurred, as you said.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. You have, in respect of the Mujahedin, indicated that from the
24 evidence that you've looked at they came to fight for a Jihad in 1992.
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. Do you agree with me?
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. They arrived before the BH army was organised into corps and
5 A. Yeah.
6 Q. And you've also said that they were not very happy with their
7 situation. They were disillusioned because the Bosnians did not share the
8 same aims or mission as them.
9 A. And they thought they were professionally not well trained
11 Q. Yes. And that they also, you said in your evidence in chief,
12 wanted to be in a unit in the Bosnian army, under a direct chain of
14 A. They wanted to be as a unit in the direct chain of command, yeah.
15 Q. And you are aware that they had their own independent funding
16 from abroad?
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. And as you've indicated in your evidence so far, these factors
19 led to the development in August 1993 towards the building up of a organic
20 unit of the Mujahedin.
21 A. This is true. And coming back to the last question, they had
22 their organic funding but they were also issued weapons by the Bosnian
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. Even so they had their organic funding.
1 Q. They had funding to buy their own weapons, did they not?
2 A. They had.
3 Q. You said in your evidence in chief that there was no document
4 before August of 1993 from which you could deduct that there were
5 foreigners part of a unit of the Bosnian army.
6 A. This is right.
7 Q. They wanted to become a defined unit.
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. And this is what began occurring, in your view, from August
11 A. From June onwards. Because this is when General Hadzihasanovic
12 sent his request to higher headquarters to have this problem solved, so
13 it's not only the end which we are talking about. We have to see that
14 this was an evolutionary development.
15 Q. You haven't seen any orders from Mr. Kubura in respect of this
16 process, have you?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Would it be correct to say that before this process began they
19 were an independent grouping, they were not within a unit in the Bosnian
20 army, and that the entire process that you've outlined was an effort, a
21 difficult one, but an effort to slowly bring them within the army over
23 A. It was slowly an effort to bring them in the army over time and
24 to regulate the kind of cooperation which have developed in the meantime
25 in the appropriate channels.
1 Q. You cannot say, though, from the documents when this process was
3 A. I think the process was completed by the establishment of the
4 El Mujahedin Detachment, because then they become a unit, an official unit
5 of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian army.
6 Q. What I'm referring to, General, is the process was completed in
7 terms of bringing all these elements fully within the command structures
8 of the Bosnian army. That took some time --
9 A. I think it started by that time. And since this was a rather
10 loose group of people, these El Mujahedin, I don't know when it really
12 Q. Thank you, General.
13 MR. DIXON: I have no further questions on behalf of Mr. Kubura.
14 And, Your Honours, there are no documents to -- to tender, as
15 these documents are either exhibits already or they are contested
16 exhibits, and that will have to be resolved through -- through the
17 arguments that are ongoing before Your Honours.
18 Thank you, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Dixon.
20 The Trial Chamber notes today at 1.30 that the cross-examination
21 of this witness conducted by the Defence has now been concluded. Tomorrow
22 will be used for re-examination on the part of the Prosecution and for the
23 Judges' questions.
24 At this point in time, would it be possible for the Prosecution
25 to inform us of the amount of time they will require for the additional
1 questions they will be putting to the witness in the light of the
2 witness's cross-examination that concerned a number of subjects.
3 Mr. Mundis.
4 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Based on the guidance that we had received from the Trial Chamber
6 earlier, the Prosecution was of the view that the questions from the Trial
7 Chamber would be the next item or the next order of business. Am I
8 mistaken in that respect, Mr. President? I had assumed, in other words,
9 that Your Honours would have questions and then we would return, if
10 there's time remaining, to the parties for any questions, based on
11 questions from Your Honours as well as the cross.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber would prefer
14 the Prosecution to commence with its re-examination now that the
15 cross-examination has been concluded. You could put questions with regard
16 to the report of the witness and the items -- the items that have been
17 contested by the Defence. We could thus dispose of this matter, and the
18 Judges could then ask the witness questions.
19 We will soon have to adjourn, so if you are not prepared to
20 commence now, we can start tomorrow. You could start with your
21 re-examination tomorrow, unless there aren't any questions that you have
22 to put to the witness. That is also a possibility.
23 The Judges will then ask the witness some questions about the
24 report and various other elements that arose in the course of the
1 Mr. Mundis, would you prefer to wait until tomorrow in order to
2 re-examine the witness?
3 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution would indeed prefer
4 to re-examine the witness tomorrow.
5 With respect to timing, the Prosecution will certainly take no
6 more than one hour for re-examination, and there is, of course, a
7 possibility that the Prosecution will have only a few questions in
8 re-examination. There has obviously been a large amount of material
9 that's been covered on cross-examination, and we would like the
10 opportunity for the remainder of today to review that. But certainly we
11 will take no more than one hour, and I would -- I would hazard to guess
12 that it would be substantially less than one hour. We're certainly aware
13 that Your Honours have questions, and obviously those questions -- we
14 don't want to run out of time, take too much time that Your Honours would
15 have questions. But I don't anticipate that we would have much, and
16 certainly no more than one hour.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You plan to re-examine the
18 witness for about an hour. The Judges will then have some questions. And
19 the Defence would like to ask some other questions. The witness might be
20 able to go home earlier than we thought tomorrow. But in any case, the
21 hearing should be concluded by 1.45 tomorrow. Nevertheless, it's possible
22 that you might be able to leave at an earlier time; that depends on the
23 questions that will be put to you by the parties involved.
24 We will now adjourn. And I would like to invite everyone to be
25 present for the hearing that will commence tomorrow at 9.00.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.33 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Friday, the 7th day of
3 May, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.