1 Friday, 10 December 2004
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]
6 THE REGISTRAR: [No interpretation]
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Appearances for the Prosecution,
9 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. For the Prosecution this
10 morning, Mr. President, Matthias Neuner, Tecla Henry-Benjamin, Daryl
11 Mundis, and we are assisted by Mr. Andres Vatter, our case manager.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Appearances for the Defence,
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. On
15 behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina Residovic, counsel; Stephane
16 Bourgon, co-counsel; and Muriel Cauvin, legal assistant, thank you..
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The other Defence
18 team, please.
19 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. On
20 behalf of Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Nermin
21 Mulalic, legal assistant.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber would like to greet
23 everybody on this Friday morning. We would like to greet the Prosecution,
24 the Defence teams, the accused, and everybody else in the courtroom.
25 I'm going to ask Mr. Registrar to go into private session, please.
1 [Private session]
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We resume in open session. We
21 shall continue the testimony of the witness by the examination-in-chief of
22 General Kubura. I would kindly ask the usher to bring the witness into
23 the courtroom.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Mundis.
25 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. While the witness is
1 coming in, in light of the comments that Your Honour just made, it does
2 raise an interesting issue whether this witness is appearing as a joint
3 Defence witness for Mr. Kubura, in which case it would be
4 examination-in-chief, or whether they consider him to be not one of their
5 witnesses, so that they would be cross-examining him. And of course that
6 might make a difference on whether -- the treatment that they're giving
7 the witness in terms of the questioning, and we would simply ask that be
8 put on the record, whether they consider this to be a joint Hadzihasanovic
9 and Kubura Defence witness or whether the Kubura team does not consider
10 him to be one of their witnesses.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, bearing in mind
13 what my learned friend has just said, General Merdan is not a joint
14 witness, so we shall cross-examine him.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, then. That was a
16 question that I have had in mind for several weeks now. This question has
17 not been raised so far, but if the witness is a joint witness, obviously
18 you conduct examination-in-chief. If it is not a joint witness, then you
19 will cross-examine him.
20 General, I hope you had a nice rest, because your testimony will
21 continue today. At the beginning, you will be answering questions put to
22 you by the Defence team of General Kubura. They have indicated to us that
23 they will need about two hours. After that, it will be the Prosecution
24 who will conduct their cross-examination in chief. Obviously this will
25 last throughout the following week. This is more or less how your
1 testimony will proceed.
2 I'm going to give the floor to the Defence team of General Kubura.
3 WITNESS: DZEMAL MERDAN [Resumed]
4 [Witness answered through interpreter]
5 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Cross-examined by Mr. Ibrisimovic:
7 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
8 A. Good morning to everybody.
9 Q. I'm going to ask you several questions on behalf of General
10 Kubura's team. They will be relative to your testimony over the past
11 three days.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A little mistake in the
13 transcript in line 11. I believe that questions should be addressed to
14 General Merdan, not to General Kubura. I believe that this was a mistake
15 in translation. Proceed, please.
16 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Than you, Mr. President.
17 Q. General, during your testimony, you were talking about the
18 establishment of the 7th Muslim Brigade. You said that when you were
19 talking about the reorganisation of the corps and the establishment of
20 brigades within the 3rd Corps. The 7th Brigade was established in
21 November 1992; is that correct?
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since we will be
24 using some documents during our examination, with your permission I'd like
25 the witness to be shown these documents. We have provided copies for the
1 Trial Chamber as well as for all the other participants in this hearing.
2 Q. General, can you please look at document number 1 and document
3 number 2. The first document is P124. This is a letter or a request that
4 you sent to the Supreme Command Staff on the 18th of December, 1992. You
5 drafted this document and you signed it yourself. Have you been able to
6 find it?
7 A. Yes, I have.
8 Q. In the second line here, it says: "These forces number about
9 1.200 soldiers, armed, equipped, and ready to fight." You're referring to
10 the Muslim forces. Your request to the Supreme Command Staff was to use
11 these men for the establishment of the 7th -- of the 7th Muslim Brigade.
12 How come that you sent such a letter to the Supreme Command Staff?
13 A. I've already said that the situation was very complex following
14 the occupation of Jajce. In Travnik and in the Vlasic plateau, the
15 situation was very difficult and very complex. As the commander of the
16 regional staff at the time, I faced a number of problems. First of all, I
17 had to stabilise the defence line, and I was not successful in that. The
18 aggressor kept on advancing. There were a lot of refugees. The
19 population that joined from the region of Kraula, they were volunteers
20 whom I could not put under control since the aggressor kept on advancing.
21 The territory of Kraula also fell and the Chetnik, that is aggressor, came
22 very close to Travnik. I have a lot of problems with men. I could not
23 stabilise my defence line. I engaged all of my troops, and after a very
24 difficult period of time, I managed to stabilise the line and I could see
25 that there were a lot of people from Krajina who were not organised. They
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 expressed their willingness to fight but they had not been organised up to
3 Together with my personnel from the staff, I estimated that there
4 were about 1.200 men there. That is why my proposal was to establish a
5 new unit, the 7th Muslim Brigade, to unite all these men.
6 Q. These men, the 1.200 men that you have mentioned both in your
7 testimony and in your letter, they were all Bosniaks, weren't they?
8 A. Yes, they were. And it was my assessment that there were about
9 1.200 of them. I don't know whether they all wanted to join the brigade,
10 however, this was my estimate, and I thought that a written request is --
11 was due in order to establish such a brigade. Those people hailed mostly
12 from Krajina, from the territory that had already been occupied by the
13 aggressor. They wanted to fight, but I did not find any other means to
14 organise them for fighting.
15 Q. Can you please look at document number 2. That is P125. This is
16 an order of the Supreme Command Staff.
17 In this order, you can read under item 1, organisational
18 preparations, under one formation: "From a Mountain Brigade under the
19 name of the 7th Muslim Brigade from the RBH army, from the brigade, in
20 accordance with the temporary wartime establishment," and so on and so
22 A. I've noticed that.
23 Q. So the 7th Muslim Brigade was established pursuant to this order?
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. You know, Mr. Merdan, that the command of the 7th Brigade was in
2 A. Yes, the command of the 7th Muslim Brigade was in Zenica.
3 Q. The 1st Battalion was established in Travnik, the 2nd in Zenica,
4 and the 3rd in Kakanj; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. When the brigade was being established -- actually, when the 2nd
7 Battalion was being established in Zenica, the people who joined this
8 battalion was the population of Zenica and the surrounding area. When the
9 Kakanj battalion was being established, it was composed of the population
10 from the region of Kakanj and the surrounding areas.
11 A. Yes, that is correct. The 7th Muslim Brigade was replenished on
12 the territorial principle from almost all the municipalities. So these
13 battalions were formed with the population from those areas, as you have
14 just said.
15 Q. When the 1st Battalion was being established in November 1992, it
16 had about 300 men. Are you aware of that?
17 A. Yes. That would be more or less the number, 300 men.
18 Q. General, I shall put it to you and -- that some officers of the
19 306th brigade were here as well as the commander of the 227th and the
20 312th Brigade were here. They told us that some of the fighters from the
21 Vlasic plateau joined some other units, not only the 7th Muslim Brigade.
22 Are you aware of that?
23 A. Yes. I said that there were about 1.200 men in the area who could
24 be organised into a unit. We could not put all of these units into only
25 one brigade. Some other brigades were formed at the same time, and these
1 men were then assigned to the other brigades as well.
2 Q. If you look at the number of 1.200 men, and if you know that the
3 1st Battalion of the 7th Muslim Brigade, which was in Travnik, was the --
4 was the 7th Muslim Brigade, then most of the men went to other brigades.
5 A. Let me explain. I said that I had information that certain groups
6 called themselves Muslim forces, that they fought the aggressor in the
7 area, but these Muslim forces, as they called themselves, were not on the
8 strength of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 And obviously only parts of these forces joined the 7th Muslim Brigade.
10 The rest of the men joined other brigades. I assume that the group that
11 called itself Muslim Armed Forces, or the MOS, which was the customary
12 abbreviation for them, was spread across several brigades in the area, one
13 of them being the 7th Muslim Brigade.
14 Q. In your request to the Supreme Command Staff, you only used the
15 term "Muslim forces," not MOS.
16 A. I've already said that there was a lot of propaganda and different
17 names were used. I did not have, on the strength of the Territorial
18 Defence, a unit of that kind, and I just went along with the rumours. I
19 could not know exactly what forces were in question, whether they were
20 Muslim forces or MOS. So this does leave room for mistakes, because at
21 the time, there were a lot of rumours; I did not have the precise
22 information at that time.
23 Q. General, can you please look at document number 3, which is the
24 Prosecution number 192. The English version is at the beginning.
25 Do you recognise this document?
1 A. Are you referring to this report?
2 Q. Yes. The report of the command of the 3rd Corps, and the date is
3 August 1993.
4 A. Yes, I do recognise this document.
5 Q. The 7th Muslim Brigade, as a brigade of the 3rd Corps, was
6 established as an independent brigade, according to this report. Can you
7 look at page 0 --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please repeat the number.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found the page: 01051603.
10 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. You can see that within the 3rd Corps, which is composed of three
12 operative groups, there are four independent brigades; the 314th, the
13 303rd, the 301st, and the 7th Muslim Brigade.
14 A. Yes, I've noticed that.
15 Q. One can see in this report that the 7th Muslim Brigade relied for
16 the logistics of -- relied on the logistics of the 3rd Corps.
17 A. Yes. It was on the strength of the 3rd Corps.
18 Q. Can you please look at page number -- the page speaking about the
19 replenishment of the brigade. The number is -- the last three digits are
20 604. Several pages after the one that you have just had a look at.
21 A. I found the page.
22 Q. If you look at the replenishment of units, you can see that the
23 7th Muslim Brigade was replenished up to 76 per cent of its full strength.
24 A. Yes, I've noticed that.
25 Q. You look at the replenishment status of some other units. For
1 example, the 3rd; the 304th Brigade, the 302nd Brigade from Visoko, the
2 306th Brigade, the 308th Brigade from Zavidovici are better replenished
3 than the 7th Muslim Brigade.
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. Thank you, General. The 7th Muslim Brigade was the only brigade
6 within the 3rd Corps which was known as a Muslim Brigade?
7 A. Yes, that is correct.
8 Q. General, do you know if there were other brigades within other
9 corps that were known as Muslim Brigades? I'm just going to mention some
10 of them that we found in the documents of the Sarajevo police. Within the
11 5th Corps, there was the 101st Muslim Infantry Brigade. The 1st Podrinje
12 Muslim Brigade, the 1st Muslim Brigade of the 1st Corps, the 4th Muslim
13 Brigade, the 17th Muslim Brigade, 241 Sprecanska Infantry Brigade, and
14 242nd Muslim Zvornik Brigade.
15 Are you aware of all this?
16 A. Yes. I had information that in other territories under other
17 corps, in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina army, there were other
18 Muslim brigades. I've already said that this was not the first time the
19 word "Muslim" is used as part of a brigade name. This was the case during
20 Austro-Hungarian Empire, during the Second World War. There were Muslim
21 brigades then. So this is nothing new in the history of this part of the
23 Q. Thank you very much. During your testimony, you were also talking
24 about religious practices in the BiH army, and if I understood you well,
25 you said that unlike in the former JNA, the BiH army allowed its troops to
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 express their religious beliefs and practice their religion.
2 A. Yes, that's what I said, and that's what the case was in practice.
3 We did not prohibit the expression of religious feelings irrespective of
4 the religion.
5 Q. Can you please look at the following document. The Exhibit number
6 is P122.
7 A. Yes, I've found the document.
8 Q. This document was drafted by the Ministry of Defence and regulates
9 the issues of religion in the army.
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Can you please look at the following document. The exhibit number
12 is -- it's a new document, actually, and the origin is the Sarajevo
14 This document was drafted by the command of the 3rd Corps.
15 A. Yes. This is an instruction to Muslim fighters.
16 Q. Yes. On religious practices at defence lines outside of urbanised
17 areas and under specific circumstances.
18 A. Yes, I've found it. This is a 3rd Corps document which was signed
19 by Mr. Serif Kadric, the assistant commander for moral guidance.
20 Q. Yes, that is correct. This document was sent to all the units of
21 the 3rd Corps; is that correct?
22 A. Yes, to all the fighters within the 3rd Corps.
23 Q. This is the instruction to Muslims with regard to practising their
24 religious beliefs under specific conditions.
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. General, you have just told us that the command of the 7th Brigade
2 was in Zenica. Do you know where the seat of the military police of the
3 7th Brigade in Zenica was?
4 A. I know where the military police of the 7th Muslim Brigade was.
5 Q. It was in the music school in Zenica, wasn't it?
6 A. Yes. When I received information that the military police of the
7 7th Muslim Brigade had been established, I also received information that
8 it was headquartered in the then-music school.
9 Q. Did you ever visit the music school and the headquarters of the
10 military police of the 7th Brigade?
11 A. The first time I visited the headquarters of the military police
12 was when we received information that the 7th Muslim Brigade kept
13 prisoners of war and that they were kept by the military police of the 7th
14 Muslim Brigade. This was the first time that I ever went to the music
15 school where the military police of the 7th Muslim Brigade was billeted.
16 Q. Did you get there on your own or did you go with representatives
17 of the international community or with an officer from the 7th Brigade or
18 with someone else?
19 A. The first time was with representatives the international
20 community, because the international community said that prisoners were
21 being kept there and that we weren't aware of that. I went there together
22 with representatives of the international community, and on that occasion
23 we didn't see any prisoners of war on the premises -- on the premises of
24 the 7th Muslim Brigade. After that, I went there on two to three other
1 Q. Did you find anything unusual there? Did you notice anything
3 A. We went there on the first time with the representatives from the
4 international community. Well, after this visit, we continued to receive
5 complaints about prisoners being held in the music school. I wanted to
6 verify that information. At the time, I thought that these were just
7 rumours that were being spread.
8 I went there later with a policeman who escorted me, but on that
9 occasion, I didn't find any prisoners of war there either. I informed the
10 international community of the fact that I had visited the premises and
11 that I hadn't seen any prisoners of war there. Obviously the
12 international community wasn't satisfied. They had other information. I
13 thought that perhaps something was being concealed from me.
14 On one occasion I went there without having announced myself.
15 Again, even on that occasion, I didn't find any prisoners of war there.
16 As I have said, I went to the premises of the military police of the 7th
17 Muslim Brigade on several occasions, but I really didn't see a single
18 prisoner of war there.
19 Q. Was that in 1993, General?
20 A. Yes. Everything that I've referred to occurred in 1993.
21 Q. If you had noticed anything unusual, you would have probably
22 informed the brigade command or you would have asked the brigade command
23 for some sort of an explanation?
24 A. Yes, that's correct. If I had noticed anything unusual, anything
25 particular, if I had seen that there were prisoners of war there and that
1 we in the corps command weren't aware of the fact, in such a case we would
2 have reacted. I would have asked the brigade commander to draft a
3 detailed report and to inform the brigade command of the measures that had
4 been taken. I've mentioned this on a number of occasions.
5 The corps command issued clear instructions on the way in which
6 prisoners of war were to be treated. We controlled the way these orders
7 were being implemented. These orders reached the brigades. I would have
8 asked for a detailed report from the brigade commander if I had noticed
9 that there were any prisoners of war there.
10 Q. Thank you, General. I'd now like to move on to another subject
11 that you testified about yesterday in the course of your
12 examination-in-chief. I'd like to move on to the events in Miletici.
13 Please have a look at documents number 7, 8 -- 6, 7, and 8.
14 A. Yes, I've had a look at those documents.
15 Q. I think you saw these documents yesterday.
16 A. Yes, I've seen them.
17 Q. Yesterday in the course of your testimony, you said that after you
18 found out about the events in Miletici, you visited the place on the 25th
19 of April, 1993. That was one day after the events in Miletici.
20 A. Yes, that's correct. That was my testimony.
21 Q. As you said yesterday, you received information about how
22 individuals were killed in Miletici.
23 A. Yes. That's what I was testifying about yesterday. That's what I
24 knew, and I mentioned information I had, and I mentioned what I myself
25 observed in Miletici.
1 Q. You received information in Miletici, or in Mehurici, from
2 inhabitants who were there; is that correct?
3 A. Yesterday I was quite precise. I said the first information I
4 received was at a meeting of the joint commission in Vitez, and then I
5 went to the scene, and after I had returned from the scene in Miletici, on
6 my way back - this was on the road - Franjo Nakic and I got out of the
7 personnel carrier and met a group of local people there. They weren't in
8 the village, they were on the road. And those local people who were there
9 - later we found out that they were from Miletici, there were Croats and
10 Muslims among them - these people, these Croats and Muslims, told us about
11 what had happened in Miletici.
12 So I wasn't in either of the villages or, rather, I didn't find
13 out about what had happened in either of the villages. I mentioned that
15 Q. The information you received at that time and subsequently shows
16 that members of the BH army didn't participate in those events.
17 A. Yes, that's correct. That's what the inhabitants of that village
18 said. They said that only the Mujahedin had taken part in those murders.
19 I didn't know who the Mujahedin were then. Yesterday, I told you when I
20 first meet a group of foreigners whom they called the Mujahedin.
21 Q. Yesterday, you said that you also met a local commander of the BH
22 army in respect to him.
23 A. Yes, when I asked whether there was anyone present, a soldier said
24 he was the commander. I don't know his name, but he said he was the local
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 Q. He wasn't a member of the 7th Brigade, this commander?
2 A. No. He said he was a member of the 306th Brigade and not of the
3 7th Muslim Brigade.
4 Q. You didn't notice the presence of soldiers of the 7th Muslim
5 Brigade on that road?
6 A. In Miletici there weren't any soldiers and there weren't any
7 inhabitants either. I noticed that there were a few soldiers with a group
8 of people on the road, five or six of them. I can't remember how many
9 exactly, but there were five or six of them who were in uniform.
10 Q. And you didn't notice a single officer from the 7th Brigade when
11 you saw those soldiers?
12 A. No, I didn't see a single member or single officer of the 7th
13 Muslim Brigade. I said that the local commander said that he was a member
14 of the 306th Mountain Brigade, and I believed him.
15 Q. No one told you that the 7th Brigade was in Miletici a day before,
16 and the commander from the 306th Brigade didn't confirm the presence of
17 members of the 7th Muslim Brigade?
18 A. I had no information [Realtime transcript read in error "I had
19 information"] according to which one day earlier there were members of the
20 Muslim Brigade in the village of Miletici.
21 Q. I think there may be an error in the transcript. Page 16, line
22 22. It says "I had information", and it should say "I had no
23 information." "I didn't have any information on the presence of members
24 of the 7th Muslim Brigade in Miletici."
25 A. That's correct. I had no information that there were members of
1 the 7th Muslim Brigade one day earlier in the village of Miletici.
2 Q. If you have a look at the documents we have been referring to,
3 P576, Osman Tahirovic is mentioned here, Vahid Jasarevic, Lutvo Malanovic,
4 Osman Tahirovic.
5 In P561, Senad Vukovic is mentioned, Jasmin Jasarevic, then Osman
6 Tahirovic again, Esref Prcanovic, Edin Colo.
7 In P687, Osman Tahirovic, Jasmin Jasarevic, Tahir Jasarevic,
8 Sabahudin Koric, Kasim Jasarevic. These names appear in this document.
9 These are names of local people who were somehow involved in the
10 events in Miletici. I assume that these names don't mean anything to you,
12 A. No, I don't know these people. I don't know who they are.
13 Q. I would just like to suggest that on the basis of the evidence we
14 have on the members of the 7th Brigade none of these men were ever members
15 of the 7th Muslim Brigade.
16 A. I really don't know about that. I knew brigade commanders and
17 some battalion commanders, but I didn't even know who the company
18 commanders were let alone the platoon commanders. How would I know the
19 soldiers in brigades? There were a lot of soldiers, there wasn't much
20 time. People rotated very rapidly and brigade commanders were frequently
21 replaced. I wasn't able to know the names of soldiers.
22 Q. Thank you, General. I'd now like to move on to the events in
23 Maline. You testified about these events yesterday. Have a look at
24 document number 9, please, P174.
25 This is your report dated the 21st of October, 1993.
1 A. Yesterday, I referred to it.
2 Q. In this report, it says in the combat in Maline, members of the
3 306th Brigade and armed inhabitants took part who were not members of the
4 BH army. And at the end it says that the assistant commander from the
5 306th Brigade was on the site and compiled a report which he sent to the
6 superior command.
7 A. Yes. I said that I drafted this report on the basis of the
8 reports that I received from subordinate commands.
9 Q. Before this report, there was a request from the 3rd Corps Command
10 dated 17th of October, 1993, to the commander of the Bosnian Krajina
11 Operations Group to forward information from subordinate units on the
12 events in Maline. This is document number 10.
13 A. Yes, that's correct, and I testified about this yesterday.
14 Q. The basis of your report is the reports you received from
15 subordinate units or, rather, the Operations Group for Bosnian [Realtime
16 transcript read in error "Kosovo"] Krajina and information you received
17 from the 306th Mountain Brigade; is that correct?
18 A. Yes, that's correct. And yesterday, I also said that at the
19 beginning of August, I was at the site with a mixed delegation, European
20 Monitors and Mr. Stipe Radic. So in August, I had personal knowledge of
21 the situation because I was up there as a member of that mixed commission.
22 I saw the location of those two gravesites, and I've testified about this
23 in detail yesterday.
24 Q. Please have a look at document number 11.
25 On page 18, line 15, it should say the Operations Group Bosnian
1 Krajina, and not the Operations Group Kosovo.
2 A. It says Krajina here.
3 Q. I was mentioning -- I was referring to the transcript, but please
4 have a look at the document. Have you found document number 11?
5 A. Yes. This is a report from a military unit of the 306th Mountain
7 Q. From October 1993.
8 A. Yes. I've seen this document. This report was the basis upon
9 which you drafted a report that you sent to your superior command, a
10 report that had to do with the events in Maline?
11 A. Yes, that's correct.
12 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is a new
13 document. The Defence obtained this document when going through the
14 archives of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 Q. General, in order to compile this report which you sent to the
16 superior command, the Operations Group Bosnian Krajina and subordinate
17 units had information on the identity of those who participated in the
18 operation around the village of Maline and on how the operation finished;
19 is that correct?
20 A. I think that's correct.
21 Q. Could you please have a look at document number 12. It's also a
22 new document. It's a war diary from the 3rd Corps, an excerpt from the
23 war diary, and it's from the Sarajevo collection. That's the source.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Mundis.
25 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I briefly rise to my feet simply to
1 indicate that it might be preferable for these new documents to be given
2 some kind of number, even if it's just for identification purposes, to
3 keep the transcript a little bit cleaner. There have been a number of
4 documents with tab numbers, and clearly the tab numbers will be
5 meaningless as we review the transcript in the future.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Does the Defence
7 object to giving these new documents and only the new documents numbers
8 for identification as you will be tendering these documents into
10 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] We have no objections, but we
11 can make a list of the new documents during the break, and this might make
12 it easier for all of us when it comes to tendering these documents into
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the document dated
15 19th of October, 1993, was shown to General Merdan in the course of his
16 examination-in-chief, and it is also in the list of documents that Defence
17 counsel will be tendering into evidence. So when a list is being
18 compiled, just try to make sure that we don't tender the same document
19 into evidence twice.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The document dated the
21 19th of October had the number 1418 [as interpreted], but the problem is
22 if the other Defence team wants to tender this document into evidence as
23 well, because the interests of both teams might not be identical.
24 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Our document is 1498, not
25 1418, which is what it states in the transcript. We have nothing against
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 the Defence requesting that they tender this document into evidence. We
2 have no problems with that.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Line 22, it's not 1418; the
4 document number is 1498.
5 As far as document 1498 is concerned, dated the 19th of October,
6 could we have a number for that document.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The registrar would prefer to
8 have the list during the break so that we don't get confused. We'll wait
9 until the break for the list. Please continue. For the moment, everyone
10 is following. Please continue.
11 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. We're referring to document number 12, an excerpt from a war diary
13 of the 3rd Corps. This is also a new document which we will be including
14 in the list that I'll provide after the break.
15 General, have you found the document?
16 A. Yes, I have found the document.
17 Q. If you have a look at the date, 5th of June, 1993. It says 1/7,
18 the 1st Battalion of the 7th Muslim Brigade was engaged in the direction
19 of Hajdareve Njive.
20 A. Yes. I can see that part.
21 Q. Do you know where Hajdareve Njive is?
22 A. Yes. I know where that location is.
23 Q. Hajdareve Njive is in the immediate vicinity of Travnik.
24 A. Yes, that's correct. It's to the east of Travnik, right next to
25 the town of Travnik itself.
1 Q. Please have a look at the next document, number 13. It's also a
2 new document.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. The Judges can't
4 find the reference you mentioned. You said in document number 12, at the
5 bottom of the document, reference is made to the 1st Battalion of the 7th
6 Brigade. Which page is this on?
7 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] It's on the second page in the
8 English translation. It first mentions the 312th Brigade engaged against
9 the Chetniks.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct. Yes. In
11 fact, in English it says that 1/7 Muslim Mountain Brigade is engaged in
12 Hajdareve Njive. Very well.
13 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. We were talking about document number 13, which is also a new
15 document. It's a interim combat report from the command of the Bosnian
16 Krajina Operations Group, dated the 5th of June, 1993.
17 A. Yes. I've managed to find the document.
18 Q. Under number 2, when it says "our forces," reference is also made
19 -- again it says the 1st Battalion of the 7th Brigade was engaged towards
20 the direction towards Hajdareve Njive, and it was being covered by its
22 A. Yes. I found that. It's similar to the record in the diary.
23 Q. In document number 12, we had an excerpt from the operations diary
24 of the 3rd Corps, and this is an interim report from the Bosnian Krajina
25 Operations Group. And their information as far as the battalion of the
1 7th Muslim Brigade is identical; is that correct?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. General, let's have a look at document number 14 now.
4 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is also a
5 new document which was also on the list of Mr. Hadzihasanovic's Defence,
6 and Mr. Kubura's Defence wants to use this document too. I will we deal
7 with this issue during the break.
8 Q. Have you found this document, General?
9 A. Yes, I have. This is a report and suggestions from the Bosnian
10 Krajina Operations Group forwarded to the command of the 3rd Corps. Yes,
11 that's correct.
12 Q. This report mentions the problems that you talked about, the
13 problems that the 306th Brigade had, and you can see that the commander of
14 the 306th Brigade was ordered to organise a unit, the strength of one
15 battalion with 300 combatants out of parts of the 306th Brigade and out of
16 inhabitants from Mehurici, and he was to go in the direction of the
17 Maline-Krpeljici-Bukovica. Have you found that part?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. General, could we now have a look at document number
20 15. It's also a new document. It's a war diary from the 306th Mountain
21 Brigade. The source of this document is the Sarajevo collection.
22 Have you found the document?
23 A. Yes, I found the document.
24 Q. Do you see the date, the 7th of June, 1993? The 306th Brigade was
25 organised, and units, available units from the 306th Brigade were to
1 participate in the action that we have already spoken about in the village
2 of Maline sector.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you, General. I'd now like you to have a look at P465,
5 dated the 8th of June, 1993. It's a regular operations report from the
6 command of the Bosnian Krajina Operations Group.
7 A witness who has already testified here said that this was
8 General Alagic's handwriting. At the bottom you can see that it says that
9 the 1st Battalion of the 7th Muslim Brigade - and the date is the 8th of
10 June - was to take action at the Hajdareve Njive feature and in the
11 direction of Bukovica.
12 A. Yes, I can see that.
13 Q. In item 3, it says that the 306th Mountain Brigade was the only
14 one that engaged in military operations on that day.
15 A. Yes, I can see that.
16 Q. This was on the 8th of June, 1993, at 1900 hours. This was
17 processed at 1945 hours.
18 General, can you please look at P579, under number 17 in your
19 binder. This is a telegram of the 306th Brigade sent to the 3rd Corps
20 Command, in which it says: "We are currently under line Maline, Guca
21 Gora, Mosor, Velika Bukovica." The date is 8 June 1993.
22 A. Yes, I have this document in front of me.
23 Q. When we compare the previous document, the report written by
24 General Alagic and the telegram drafted by the 306th Brigade, we can see
25 that the information in the Bosanska Krajina OG is identical.
1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. Can you look at document number 18. This is a new document, and
3 it was found in the archives of the BiH army. Again, this is a telegram
4 of the 306th Brigade sent to the command of the 3rd Corps on the 9th of
5 June, 1993.
6 At the end of the telegram, it says: "Yesterday, our forces
7 reached the line of villages Maline, Guca Gora, Mosor, Velika Bukovica."
8 And this was drafted on the 9th of June, 1993. Can you see that?
9 A. Yes, I can.
10 Q. Thank you very much. General, since you have had a look at all of
11 these documents and we have analysed them together, could you agree with
12 me that these documents, all of them, show what the situation was in the
13 field? Do they also show that members of the 7th Muslim Brigade were not
14 involved in the combat operations on the 8th of June in the Maline village
16 A. Based on all of these reports drafted by subordinate units, one
17 can conclude that this is correct.
18 Q. General, the documents that you have just had a look at are all
19 relevant and were probably used both by the Bosanska Krajina OG and the
20 306th Brigade when they were sending this report based on which you
21 drafted your report on the events in Maline that you sent to your superior
22 command. I believe that these reports were relevant.
23 A. I believe that they should have been relevant. However, at that
24 time I did not have an occasion to compare any of the reports. I just
25 received the reports that we asked for. But basically I can now see that
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 this was the case.
2 Q. General, I shall put it to you that before this Trial Chamber we
3 had a witness called General Reinhardt. He is an expert. And when my
4 colleague Mr. Dixon was examining this witness, his question to the
5 witness was that, according to the documents that General Reinhardt had at
6 his disposal, he was certain that the 7th Brigade was not involved in the
7 events in Miletici and it wasn't involved in the military operations in
8 Maline. General Reinhardt confirmed that.
9 Can you now agree with my statement that you, based on the
10 information that you had at the time and subsequently, did not find any
11 evidence of the presence and participation of members of the 7th Brigade
12 in Miletici and Maline in 1993?
13 A. Yes. I fully agree with that statement.
14 Q. During your testimony, you have mentioned the developments in
15 Kakanj at the beginning of June. You mentioned the dates the 9th, 10th,
16 11th of June, and you mentioned that the intense fighting had already
17 started in the area of Kakanj at that time.
18 A. Yes, I testified to that effect. According to our information,
19 the incidents already started on the 8th, and they escalated into an armed
20 conflict on the 10th and 11th of June, of course.
21 Q. In 1993?
22 A. Yes, in 1993.
23 Q. Are you aware of the fact that the 2nd and 3rd Battalion of the
24 7th Muslim Brigade were engaged in the combat operations in Prevoja and
25 Ovnak in June 1993?
1 A. Yes, I'm aware of that fact. A tactical group was established at
2 the time, if my memory serves me right, and the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions
3 of the 7th Muslim Brigade were engaged in that Tactical Group. They came
4 from Zenica via Ovnak towards the Bila valley, and I've already said
5 something about that.
6 Q. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were engaged in operations only up to
7 the Ovnak pass, and they cooperated with some other units of the 3rd
8 Corps, such as the 314th Brigade and others.
9 A. Yes. A tactical group was formed. It was a mixed tactical group.
10 I did not mention all the units that formed it. The 2nd and the 3rd
11 Battalions of the 7th Brigade were tasked with lifting the blockade off
12 Ovnak in order to make the road to the Bila valley passable. That is
13 because the 306th Brigade was in a very difficult situation. They asked
14 for assistance, and I testified to that yesterday.
15 Q. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Muslim Brigade, at the
16 beginning of conflict in the area of Kakanj, found themselves in Kakanj.
17 They had returned from Ovnak pass, and they participated in the operations
18 to liberate Kakanj.
19 A. Yes, that is correct. When the operation around Ovnak was
20 finished, then the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Muslim Brigade were
21 sent to Kakanj.
22 Q. The situation at the Ovnak pass was stable on the 8th of June, and
23 you confirmed that you were there on that day, very briefly.
24 A. Yes, that is correct. I was up there very briefly. I personally
25 saw that the Ovnak sector had been liberated. I, however, said that there
1 were still fightings west to Ovnak or south-west to Ovnak. There were
2 still skirmishes but Ovnak itself was freed. It had been liberated.
3 Q. Thank you very much. The 2nd and the 3rd Battalions of the 7th
4 Brigade, on the 10th and 11th of June, 1993, left this area, the area
5 around Ovnak. Kindly look at the documents marked by 21 and 22 in your
7 Document number 21 is a new document. The source of this document
8 is the Sarajevo collection.
9 Were you able to locate this first document?
10 A. Yes, I were.
11 Q. The date is 10 June 1993, and it is a plan of commander's
13 A. Yes, I've got it.
14 Q. This document shows that this is a plan of commander's
15 reconnaissance which was drafted by the assistant, Safet Junuzovic. It
16 was approved by Commander Kubura, the date is 10 June, and this plan is
17 relative to the Kakanj sector; is that correct?
18 A. Yes. One can conclude that based on this document.
19 Q. If you look at the following document, under 22, this is a new
20 document again, and its source again is the Sarajevo collection. You can
21 see that -- have you got it, General?
22 A. Yes, I have.
23 Q. This is an order for attack dated 11 June 1993.
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. This order is relative to the combat activity of the 7th Muslim
1 Brigade in the Kakanj sector.
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. General, having looked at these two documents, can you tell us
4 whether these two documents confirm that the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions,
5 on the 10th of June and the 11th of June, 1993, were deployed in Kakanj in
6 order to participate in combat there?
7 A. Yes, that's correct.
8 Q. Can you please look at the second document, at the last page of
9 this document, under number 14, when the words "Command and
10 communications" are mentioned. It says: "The brigade command post in
11 Zagradje village sector will commence work at 2200 hours on the 11th of
12 June, 1993."
13 A. Yes, I can see that.
14 Q. Since the order refers to the operations carried out by the 7th
15 Muslim Brigade in the Kakanj sector, Zagradje village is very close to
16 Kakanj, or in Kakanj municipality, which is clear from this document,
17 because it would be logical for a command post to be in the zone where the
18 operations are taking place.
19 A. Yes, that is absolutely correct.
20 Q. Thank you. Since we have managed -- mentioned the village of
21 Zagradje, can you please look at document number 23. This is an order of
22 the command of the 7th Brigade to train recruits in the 3rd Battalion of
23 the 7th Brigade. Have you got it?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. You've already told us that the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Muslim
1 Brigade was deployed in Kakanj.
2 A. Yes, I've said that.
3 Q. Look at item 5. "The commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th
4 Muslim Brigade shall inform the commander of the 309th Mountain Brigade
5 and the commander of the Kakanj Municipal Staff of the execution of this
7 A. Yes, I've got that and this is exactly what it says under this
9 Q. The 309th Brigade was based in Kakanj?
10 A. Yes. It was the Kakanj Mountain Brigade.
11 Q. Under item 1, you can see that one company of the 3rd Battalion
12 shall be deployed to the village of Zagradje.
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. When we look at this document, which is P564, the village of
15 Zagradje, where one company of the 3rd Battalion was being trained, is the
16 place where the command post of the 7th Muslim Brigade was during the
17 operations in Kakanj?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. The Municipal Staff, since you were the commander of the regional
20 defence staff, you are also aware of the existence of the municipal
21 defence staff in Kakanj, and it existed, didn't it?
22 A. Yes, it existed in Kakanj.
23 Q. The municipal defence staff of Kakanj could exist and could carry
24 out operations only in the territory of the municipality of Kakanj. There
25 is no way it could undertake any other activities or carry out any
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 operations in any other municipalities.
2 A. That is true. It is a territorial unit which covered only the
3 territory where it was located.
4 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Dzemal. General, you were the deputy
5 commander of the 3rd Corps. At the beginning of November 1993, did you
6 hold that position, the deputy corps commander?
7 A. In November 1993, I was still the deputy commander of the 3rd
9 Q. At the beginning of November 1993, while you were in that
10 position, a very important military operation was taking place to liberate
11 Vares; is that correct?
12 A. Yes. I'm aware of that.
13 Q. Can you please look at the following document under 24. This is
15 A. Yes, I've got the document.
16 Q. Do you recognise it?
17 A. Yes. I signed the document on behalf of Commander Enver
19 Q. At that moment he was no longer the commander of the 3rd Corps.
20 A. This was the transitional period. He was being transferred to
21 another position, and the new commander was being appointed. So this was
22 the hand-over period. I know that after this, General Hadzihasanovic left
23 the 3rd Corps. This was the hand-over period, and I signed the document.
24 We had still not received the order on the appointment of the new
25 commander. However, I knew that it was on its way from the Main Staff of
1 the Supreme Command. That's why I signed this document.
2 Q. Did you know that the 7th Muslim Brigade was involved in the
3 military operations to liberate Vares? And this is clear from the order
4 that you signed.
5 A. Yes. I prepared this order based -- pursuant to the order of the
6 Supreme Command staff for the engagement of the 7th Muslim Brigade in the
7 territory of the municipality of Vares in order to liberate the
8 municipality of Vares.
9 Q. Can you please look at the following document, which is under
10 number 25. This is P47 -- 487. The date is 4 November 1993.
11 A. Yes. I have found the document, and this is a report on the
12 engagement of units.
13 Q. Yes, it is. In the combat operations around Vares, units of
14 several corps were engaged.
15 A. Yes. I knew that other corps were also taking place in those
17 Q. You're referring to the BiH army?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Can you please look at document number 26, which is P449.
20 Have you had a look at it?
21 A. Yes, I found this document.
22 Q. This is a report of the 3rd Corps Command. The date is 8 November
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. It was signed by Commander Mehmed Alagic.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. The 7th Muslim Brigade, according to this report, was late for the
3 operations in Vares. They had transportation problems from Zenica to
4 Breza, so they were late by one day.
5 A. Yes, I have noticed that in the document.
6 Q. Given the situation that this brigade was late, according to some
7 reports the 7th Muslim Brigade entered the town of Vares or came to its
8 very entrance without a bullet fired. It had not engaged in any fighting.
9 By that time, the combat operations had been over.
10 A. Yes. Yes, that is the case.
11 Q. In the town of Vares, General, there was no fighting. There were
12 no combat operations?
13 A. I know that the units of the HVO withdrew from the town of Vares
14 without a bullet fired. They did not engage in fighting.
15 Q. At the moment when the units of the BiH army and units of the
16 civilian police entered the town of Vares, many buildings in the town of
17 Vares were damaged, torched, and this was done by the Croatian Defence
18 Council when they were abandoning the town.
19 A. Yes, I heard such reports. However, at that moment I was not in
20 Vares, and I did not see all those things. I only knew about that from
21 reports. I personally didn't see any such thing.
22 Q. Are you aware of the fact, General, that in addition to the 7th
23 Muslim Brigade, there were some other units of the BiH army in the town of
24 Vares as well as members of the municipal defence staff of Vares and also
25 members of the 2nd Tuzla Corps?
1 A. Yes. I can speak only based on the reports. There were a lot of
2 units there as far as I know. A special technical group had been
3 established. There were several units there. There were also units of
4 the 2nd Corps, because the combat operations were carried out on the axis
5 towards the 2nd Corps as well.
6 Q. Let's go back to the report of the command of the 3rd Corps, dated
7 the 13th of November, and let's look at line 5. And the date on the
8 report is 8 November.
9 A. Is that document number 25?
10 Q. No, it's 26. The report that we have just looked at, signed by
11 General Alagic.
12 "When we arrived in Vares, looting started." Did you find that?
13 A. Yes, I did.
14 Q. In his report, Commander Alagic says that due to the quick
15 intervention of the military police of the Istok Operations Group, the 7th
16 Muslim Brigade and the Ministry of Interior, this was stopped.
17 A. Yes. This is exactly what happened.
18 Q. General, do you know that the commander of the 7th Brigade ordered
19 to all the members of the 7th Muslim Brigade to enter the town of Vares?
20 Can you please look at document number 27 in this binder.
21 A. Can you please repeat the question?
22 Q. Are you aware that the commander of the 7th Brigade forbade
23 members of the 7th Muslim Brigade to enter the town and to stay there?
24 A. I did not see any such order. I only know that brigade commands
25 in all of their orders forbade looting and plunder. I know -- I know that
1 there were such orders.
2 Q. Have you found this document under 27?
3 A. No, I haven't yet.
4 Q. Can you please look at it when you find it.
5 A. I've got it now.
6 Q. It says here that troops are not allowed to enter Vares and stay
7 there without the commander's approval.
8 A. Yes. This is the first item in this order.
9 Q. General, after this order, all members of the 7th Brigade who were
10 found in Vares were lined up, and they had to leave the brigade. Did you
11 know that?
12 A. I heard that information, but I was not there and I didn't witness
13 that. However, I did know of this order, and I was aware of this
15 Q. And now the last document in this binder. This is P450. You will
16 find it under our number 28.
17 A. Yes, I have found the document.
18 Q. This is the document dated 17 November 1993 by the armed forces
19 Supreme Command Staff.
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. It was signed by the deputy commander, General Jovan Divjak.
22 A. Yes. This is what it says in the document.
23 Q. You can see in this document that the minister of the interior has
24 sent a document which says that on the 16th of November, 1993, a unit of
25 the 2nd Corps, about 300 troops, entered the city of Vares, and that after
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 the arrival of that unit, individual cases of stealing and looting began.
2 A. Yes, I can read that in the first paragraph of this document.
3 Q. This document was sent to the commands of the 2nd and the 3rd
4 Corps, and General Divjak asked for all these things to be prevented and
5 that measures should be taken against the perpetrators.
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. I'd like to point out that the date is the 16th of November 1993.
8 That's when the unit entered Vares, but the date of the document is the
9 17th of November, 1993.
10 A. Yes, I noticed that.
11 Q. A minute ago I showed you some documents. Now I suggest that the
12 7th Muslim Brigade left the town of Vares on the 6th of November, 1993, as
13 early as that date.
14 A. Yes. On the basis of the reports that I had, that is correct.
15 Q. Thank you, General, for your answers.
16 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this concludes
17 our cross-examination.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. It's half past ten.
19 We will now have our technical break, and we'll resume at about five to
20 eleven. When we resume, General Kubura's Defence will tell us what they
21 intend to do with the documents and whether they have compiled their list
22 of new documents.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll now resume. I'll give the
1 floor to Mr. Mundis, but before I do so, there are documents that Defence
2 counsel has to deal with.
3 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We
4 have compiled a list and provided it to everyone. There are nine new
5 documents, and we have mentioned the source for each of these documents,
6 and we'd like to tender these nine documents into evidence.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, any comments with
8 regard to this list of nine documents?
9 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. The Prosecution has no
10 objection to the nine documents being admitted into evidence.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar -- any objections
12 that the other Defence team would like to raise?
13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Just for the sake of the
14 transcript, I would like to say that we have no objections.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. But that was
16 understood. Mr. Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] There are nine documents that will
18 be admitted into evidence. The first one D416, the English version D416.
19 Its title is "Instructions for Muslim Soldiers." The date is the 9th of
20 February, 1993. I'll correct the transcript: It's DK16.
21 The second document, DK17. The English version DK17/E. Its title
22 is "Information," and the date the 19th of October, 1993.
23 The third document will be DK18, and the English version DK18/E.
24 Its title is "War Diary." The date, the 5th of June, 1993.
25 The fifth [as interpreted] Document will be DK19, and the English
1 version DK19/E. The title of the document "Extraordinary Combat Report,"
2 dated the 5th of June, 1993.
3 The fifth document will be DK20, and the English version DK20/E.
4 The title of the document is "Report and Proposal" and it is dated the 5th
5 of June, 1993.
6 DK21 will be the number for the sixth document, and the English
7 version DK21/E. The title of the document is "War Diary" and the ERN
8 number is 01826763.
9 The seventh document will be DK22, and the English version DK22/E.
10 The title of the document is "Telegram," and it is dated the 9th of June,
12 The eighth document will be DK23, and the English version DK23/E.
13 The title of the document is "Plan of Commander's Reconnaissance," and it
14 is dated the 10th of June, 1993.
15 And finally, document number 9 will be DK24, its English version
16 DK24/E. The title of the document is "Order For Attack," and it is dated
17 the 11th of June, 1993.
18 That concludes the list of documents, Mr. President. Thank you.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
20 As we're dealing with the documents, I'd like to take this
21 opportunity to address General Hadzihasanovic's Defence. In the course of
22 the examination-in-chief, you provided us with the three binders. In
23 these binders we noticed that there were some documents which have already
24 been admitted into evidence and there are others that you showed to the
25 witness and asked him to identify them, and it was your intention to
1 tender them into evidence, perhaps not all of them but some of them. So
2 would you be able to make a new list for us including the documents that
3 you want to tender for next week. You can disclose this to the
4 Prosecution, too, and this will make it easier for everyone to keep track
5 of the documents, and it will make it easier for the registrar to give the
6 numbers. This shouldn't take long and it will be useful for everyone.
7 Having said that, I'll now give the floor to the Prosecution and
8 they will have the floor for about three days.
9 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Cross-examined by Mr. Mundis:
11 Q. Good morning, General. My name is Daryl Mundis, and along with my
12 colleagues here today, we represent the Prosecution in this case. I know,
13 sir, that you've testified here before, so this is nothing that you
14 haven't experienced, but let me first of all reiterate that my purpose is
15 not in any way to confuse you, and if there is any question that I ask
16 that you don't understand, simply interrupt me and tell me that and I'll
17 either rephrase or reformulate the question so that you do understand. Do
18 you understand?
19 A. Good morning. Yes, I do understand you.
20 Q. I'd also, just as an aside, like to say, as a former US naval
21 officer, it's nice to have a former fellow member of the seagoing services
22 in this courtroom since we've had a large number of army people with us.
23 Let me start out by saying -- or asking you some questions about
24 the relationship that you had with General Hadzihasanovic. And I'd like
25 to start out by asking you whether, prior to the time that he assumed
1 command of the 3rd Corps, if you knew General Hadzihasanovic or knew of
2 him prior to the time you began working together in the 3rd Corps.
3 A. No, I didn't know General Hadzihasanovic before that time. I met
4 him when he came to Zenica for the first time.
5 Q. And do you recall -- that was in November 1992, sir?
6 A. That's correct. In November 1992.
7 Q. During the initial period when you were getting to know General
8 Hadzihasanovic, did you sit down with him and perhaps discuss or get to
9 become familiar with his background, his military background?
10 A. Well, if I may start with the first day. It was the beginning of
11 November or the end of October, I'm not quite sure, but at that time we
12 didn't have time to talk about our previous military careers. We had
13 certain tasks to carry out. As I have already said, as the commander of
14 the regional Territorial Defence Staff, it was a very complicated
15 situation. We only discussed our previous military careers very briefly
16 later on.
17 Q. Can you tell me, sir, what, to the best of your recollection, you
18 came to learn about General Hadzihasanovic's military career prior to
19 becoming commander of the 3rd Corps?
20 A. Well, on the basis of what General Hadzihasanovic told me, he said
21 he was a member of the 1st Corps. Are you referring to the period up to
22 the beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina? That's the period
23 you're referring to. He said he was in the 1st Corps. At the time, the
24 1st Corps had already been formed, as far as I know, and that is the
25 position he left when he came to Zenica.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Q. General, did you know that General Hadzihasanovic had been with
2 the JNA prior to the war in Bosnia?
3 A. Yes. When General Hadzihasanovic arrived, he said that he was a
4 former JNA officer.
5 Q. Did he tell you or did you at any point in time learn what types
6 of assignments or command positions he had held within the JNA?
7 A. We didn't discuss this in detail. We didn't discuss our previous
8 positions in the former JNA, but he said that he had been a brigade
9 commander at some time, and just before the war he said that he was in
10 Sarajevo -- he had been in Sarajevo.
11 Q. Did you know, sir, that he had formerly commanded a military
12 police battalion in the 7th Army of the JNA?
13 A. In our first conversations we didn't go that far back. We didn't
14 deal with the posts we had in the former JNA. I didn't inform General
15 Hadzihasanovic of these things nor did he inform me. Perhaps he mentioned
16 this at some point in time but I can't remember having discussed this
18 Q. Did you ever learn that at any other point after the initial
19 period that you and General Hadzihasanovic met each other? Did you ever
20 learn that or did you ever become aware of that?
21 A. I can't remember all those details. I really can't remember, I'm
23 Q. Let me ask you if you can tell us in general terms about the
24 professional relationship that you developed in late 1992 and throughout
25 the early part of 1993, the professional relationship you developed with
1 the corps commander, General Hadzihasanovic.
2 A. After the time the 3rd Corps was formed, up until the time that
3 General Hadzihasanovic was appointed as a 3rd Corps Commander, we did have
4 contact, and I think we were on quite good terms. He had arrived in the
5 area where I was commander as a professional soldier, and I believed that
6 he understood that I had a high-level command position. He had come -- of
7 course, he had been assigned a certain task, and I was to help him carry
8 out this task. I think that we were on good terms. We treated each other
9 correctly both in military terms -- both from a military point of view and
10 from a personal point of view. We developed a very normal relationship.
11 Q. During the first, say, two to three months that you were assigned
12 as the deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, how frequently did you meet with
13 General Hadzihasanovic?
14 A. Well, when General Hadzihasanovic was appointed as a 3rd Corps
15 Commander, I became his deputy, and we continued to have a normal
16 relationship. I accepted the fact that he was the commander and that I
17 was his deputy.
18 After we had received an order to form the 3rd Corps, I had
19 frequent contact with General Hadzihasanovic. At the time, he had already
20 become the commander. It was necessary to proceed with the establishment
21 of the 3rd Corps, and he wasn't familiar enough with the field, with the
22 units. He didn't know what the structure of the Territorial Defence in
23 that area was. As a soldier, he had general knowledge about plans, about
24 the situation in Sarajevo, but he didn't know anything about the situation
25 in Zenica. So for the first month, throughout the month of December, we
1 frequently went into the field, and we had discussions on a daily basis.
2 We discussed these matters far into the night. We discussed how to form
3 corps units. And at that time, General Hadzihasanovic paid a lot of
4 attention to my suggestions. Naturally, if we have a look at the other
5 months, in January, well, that was a good period, and then later I spent
6 some time in Gornji Vakuf, and we didn't have such frequent contact.
7 In February, combat had started in Busovaca, and we would see each
8 other but not as frequently as in December. But in any event, I think
9 that we did see each other, given the time available. I was always on
10 trips, and I had additional duties, duties other than the duties of deputy
11 commander of the 3rd Corps.
12 Q. Can I just ask you about the last phrase you said, sir. You said
13 you had additional duties, duties other than the duties of deputy
14 commander of the 3rd Corps. What were you referring to?
15 A. Well, as I have already said, in January, I was appointed as a
16 member of the military and political commission for Gornji Vakuf, and I
17 spent some time at the UN headquarters in Gornji Vakuf. In February, I
18 became a member of the Busovaca joint commission, together with
19 representatives of the European Monitoring Mission and representatives of
20 other international organisations, of UNPROFOR. Later, I became a member
21 of the joint commission in Vitez, which was also under the auspices of the
22 European Monitoring Mission. These were my additional duties. And later
23 on, I was a member of the joint command that was formed in Travnik. The
24 composition of these bodies was mixed, but I remained the deputy commander
25 of the 3rd Corps. So these were the other duties that I was referring to.
1 Q. And, sir, with respect to these additional duties, this long list
2 of activities that you were involved in, you were representing General
3 Hadzihasanovic on these various commissions or in this role, meeting with
4 international organisations?
5 A. Well, I was a representative of the 3rd Corps at those meetings
6 or, rather, in those joint commissions, and the commander had given me a
7 significant amount of authority. It wasn't necessary for me to contact
8 him for minor matters. I didn't have a radio link with my commander. I
9 often travelled between Busovaca and Zenica; almost every day. When
10 returning from those trips, I would report to the commander. I would
11 inform him of the work of those commissions and of the results achieved in
12 the field.
13 Q. So the information that you obtained at these commission meetings
14 or in the field, part of your duties was to relay that information to the
15 corps commander in order to keep him informed?
16 A. Well, when I went to the corps command, I informed the commander
17 of the situations I had been in, of the situations I had to deal with.
18 Together with the monitoring mission, I tried to ensure that hostilities
19 came to an end in the field.
20 Q. So I take it, then, sir, that based on the information you've just
21 given us, that General Hadzihasanovic relied on your experience and
22 judgement, your military experience and your judgement?
23 A. Well, in -- usually, yes.
24 Q. And I take it, sir, that based on the importance of these various
25 commissions and other tasks that you were assigned, that General
1 Hadzihasanovic had delegated substantial authority to you with respect to
2 representing him and obtaining information for him.
3 A. Yes, one could say so.
4 Q. So I would assume, then, sir, that that would be an indication
5 that General Hadzihasanovic trusted you.
6 A. I think one could put it that way. General Hadzihasanovic never
7 told me that he didn't trust me.
8 Q. And, sir, based on all of the events that you learned about at the
9 joint commissions or during the time you were out in the field, you kept
10 General Hadzihasanovic appraised of these developments to the best of your
11 ability. Would that be fair?
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 Q. And in fact, sir, as the deputy commander of a military
14 organisation as large as a corps, it was part of your fundamental
15 responsibilities and duties to be kept as fully abreast of developments as
16 possible; isn't that right?
17 A. Well, I tried to be as well informed about the situation as
18 possible. As deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, I was able to be present
19 when various activities were being carried out in the field through the
20 intermediary of the European Monitoring Mission or through UNPROFOR
21 representatives, for example, especially in areas where there was ongoing
22 combat, in areas where one couldn't pass through without passing through
23 in an UNPROFOR vehicle. Well, I have also testified about this in my
24 previous testimony.
25 Q. Sir, would it be fair to characterise the role that you had with
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 respect to attending commission meetings or meetings sponsored by
2 international organisations in your role as being the eyes and ears of the
3 corps commander with respect to developments at these meetings and out in
4 the field?
5 A. One could say so, yes.
6 Q. And in effect, you were also kind of like a scout, if you will.
7 You were going out to deal with problems as they arose and to try to solve
8 those problems so the corps commander didn't have to get involved with all
9 of them?
10 A. Well, "scout," that's perhaps a simple term. I wasn't really a
11 scout. I was supposed to observe the situation in the field with the help
12 of the European Monitoring Mission. I mentioned the main objective of
13 those meetings or, rather, of the work of those joint commissions.
14 One wouldn't say that this is the work of a scout. A scout is
15 someone who is invisible. I was visible. A scout tries to approach the
16 enemy, come close to the enemy. Those weren't my objectives. My
17 objectives weren't to approach the enemy to see what the enemy was doing.
18 I wanted to carry out the requests of the international community. I
19 wanted to carry out what the -- I wanted to do what the international
20 community had asked me to do at that time.
21 I wasn't a scout. For me, a scout means something else. A
22 soldier knows what a scout's work involves.
23 Q. Let me ask you now, sir -- let me turn to documents, that is,
24 orders sent from the 3rd Corps or reports received back to the 3rd Corps
25 from subordinate units.
1 As part of your duties, did you routinely or regularly review and
2 read such documents?
3 A. I really did my best given the time that I had available. I
4 really attempted to read all the reports, but I couldn't read all of them
5 because there were a lot of units and there were a lot of reports. I was
6 constantly in the field, but I was familiar with the substance of the
7 reports that would be received from the field, especially in cases where
8 the joint commission intervened, especially in cases when the joint
9 commission was in the field. I tried to read those reports in order to be
10 prepared for a meeting on the following day.
11 Q. And, sir, did the same go for orders sent out by the commander of
12 the 3rd Corps to the subordinate units? Did you try to keep abreast of
13 what orders were being sent out into the field?
14 A. I tried as best as I could to be informed about most of the
15 orders. I do not exclude the possibility that an order may have escaped
16 my attention.
17 I would like to repeat again that there was quite a number of
18 units, and the situation was complex, as I've already told you. We did
19 not have any means of communication, no feedback from our subordinate
20 units. It is a big question whether all these orders reached every single
21 soldier in due course. I do not exclude the possibility that I did not
22 see all the orders that were sent from the corps command to the
23 subordinate units.
24 Q. Sir, what about the 3rd Corps war diary or war log? Did you
25 routinely review the war diaries of the 3rd Corps?
1 A. No, not routinely. Maybe we have different views of the meaning
2 of the word "routine." When you say routine, what I -- how I interpret it
3 is just to go quickly through the pages, but this is not how I approached
4 the war diary. I did not have the time to read everything that the
5 operations officer -- officers entered into the diary. However, in the
6 areas that were important to me, that were interesting to me, I tried to
7 at least read as much information as possible about those areas.
8 It is possible that when I reviewed the diary, faced with the fact
9 that I couldn't read everything, I skipped a thing or two. So in other
10 words, I was not in a position to read the war diary thoroughly.
11 In any case, I did not approach any job routinely, and that
12 includes the reviewing of the war diary.
13 Q. Sir, based on what you've just told us, would it be fair to say
14 that you were involved in a large number of activities but, nevertheless,
15 you did the best you could in terms of familiarising yourself with the
16 orders of the 3rd Corps, reports received from the subordinate units, and
17 the 3rd Corps war diary?
18 A. Yes, that's correct. I tried very hard to do precisely that.
19 Q. And in fact, that was of particular importance for a deputy corps
20 commander, because one of the main reasons why there was such a position
21 was to step in for the corps commander in the event he was absent or in
22 the unfortunate event that he was killed in action.
23 A. That's correct. Deputy corps commanders are war positions, and
24 the duty and main missions of a deputy corps commander was precisely what
25 you have just said.
1 Q. And if you were kept as fully informed as possible about all of
2 the events going on within corps' area of responsibility, that would
3 permit you to step in and assume command in a moment's notice, if
4 absolutely necessary?
5 A. If the situation was such, if the commander was not present, and
6 in an unfortunate event that a commander was killed, then I would have had
7 to have taken over and step in. Whether I would have been familiar with
8 all the activities in the area of responsibility of our corps is a big
9 question. I'm sure that on the first day, I would have had major
10 problems, but those problems would have decreased, and I believe that the
11 superior command would have had a say in whether I could continue
12 performing the duties of a commander or whether I would continue being the
13 deputy commander.
14 I don't know what the Supreme Command would have decided, whether
15 they would have decided for me to become an acting commander or something
16 else, but these are just speculations. In any case, I'm a professional
17 soldier, and I would have honoured the orders of my superior command. In
18 any case, I would have endeavoured to command all the duties of a
19 commander. I would have endeavoured to be abreast of all the information,
20 all the data that I did not become familiar with up to then. I was a
21 member of this commission, and the tasks that the corps had were tactical.
22 They were more of a tactical nature than a strategic nature.
23 Now that you've mentioned this, there is a lot that can be said
24 about this topic. There are all sorts of scenarios that have to be played
25 one against each other to see how I would have reacted in such an
1 unfortunate event.
2 Q. Let me turn now, sir, to the actual staff of the 3rd Corps
3 Command. In 1993, approximately how many staff members were there within
4 the 3rd Corps Command?
5 A. I can say about the 3rd Corps staff that it was composed of
6 officers and people who did not have any military training. Some people
7 were attached to the chief of staff.
8 Are you referring to the entire corps command or just the corps
9 staff? At the head of the corps staff was the chief of staff who had his
10 bodies. This person was an officer of the former JNA who had not
11 completed higher military education, unlike me and the commander. There
12 was some people who did not have any military training. I can't remember
13 exactly how many members of corps staff there were, but I know that it was
14 not replenished to the full strength. A corps command should have
15 anything between 110 and 120 men. In our case, the corps was not brought
16 to the full strength, and their professionalism and their skills are
17 another matter. In order to perform the control and command duties,
18 people have to be trained. In a normal situation, the chief of staff of
19 such a corps should be a general or a staff general. We did not have
20 anybody with such education in the area of responsibility of the 3rd
22 General Hadzihasanovic and myself, we didn't have that much
23 experience in the former JNA. We were lower-ranking officers despite our
24 education. We did not have any experience in commanding larger units.
25 And the chief of staff who wasn't educated, given the task to command such
1 a large unit, you can imagine what position he was in.
2 Q. Sir, you made reference to higher military education. Can you
3 tell us what, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, what higher
4 military education General Hadzihasanovic had completed?
5 A. General Hadzihasanovic told me that he had completed the command
6 Staff College, and this education enables one to perform high-level duties
7 in the JNA, but not the highest level duties. For the highest level
8 duties in the former JNA you were supposed to complete the command war
9 school which was in Belgrade. This school provided one with the
10 theoretical knowledge to perform the highest level duties in the former
11 JNA, duties at the corps level or operational duties at the level of the
12 Main Staff of the former SSNO.
13 General Hadzihasanovic had graduated from the school that allowed
14 him to be the commander of a brigade and to subsequently be promoted.
15 This school allowed him to be promoted but not to duties that are normally
16 performed by a general.
17 Q. Let me ask you this, sir: How frequently in -- from the formation
18 of the corps until the time period General Hadzihasanovic left, how
19 frequently were there meetings where the brigade commanders met with the
20 corps commander or the deputy corps commander?
21 A. I can't tell you precisely. It depended on the situation. It is
22 very difficult for me to remember the frequency of these meetings. We did
23 not have regular meetings, so I can't tell you that we met every week or
24 every month. But we did have meetings, a lot of them, quite regularly.
25 We had regular and interim meetings. I can't tell you after such a long
1 time how often these meetings took place. I only know that meetings did
2 take place involving the corps commander, the brigade commanders.
3 I myself never called a meeting of brigade commanders. However, I
4 did attend meetings with brigade commanders. I participated actively in
5 the work at these meetings as the deputy of corps commander. However,
6 after such a long time it is very difficult for me to remember the
7 frequency of these meetings.
8 Q. What were the types of issues that were discussed at these
10 A. The issues varied. Mostly the commanders reported on the
11 situation in their respective units. The corps commander informed brigade
12 commanders about the overall situation in the territory of the entire
13 corps. He informed brigade commanders about the requests and orders
14 received from the superior command, the upcoming tasks, and so on and so
15 forth. This is what took place at the so-called general meetings.
16 However, there were the so-called extraordinary meetings which preceded
17 particular missions, which required for all the brigade commanders to
18 gather, or maybe only some of them. This depended on the task that we
19 received from the superior command or on the axis where the defence had to
20 be put up or the area where either combat operations or offensive
21 operations were to take place, or even where an attack was to take place.
22 I shared with you an example when the Supreme Command was to
23 launch an offensive on a certain axis. It was up to the Supreme Command
24 to evaluate the situation and issue orders and it was up to us to carry
25 out such orders. In any such situation, the corps commander gathered the
1 commanders who were active on those axes, and after such meetings written
2 orders were issued to the commanders of these brigades to enable them to
3 be as successful as possible in the completion of their tasks.
4 Q. Sir, I believe you testified earlier in the week about a meeting
5 where General Halilovic from the Supreme Command was at one of these
6 meetings with the brigade commanders.
7 A. I remember the meeting. I have already testified about this
8 meeting. I believe that this was around 20, 21st, or 22nd April. I can't
9 remember exactly. However, I remember the meeting itself, because the
10 corps command has informed us about the problem that we had already
11 encountered in the field.
12 I remember this meeting, which was in the corps command. It was a
13 long meeting. It lasted up to very late in the night. I can't remember
14 how long it lasted, but it finished very late in the evening.
15 I can't be sure of the date. I believe it was the 20th, the 21st,
16 or the 22nd of April, 1993. Yes, I remember the meeting well.
17 Q. General, we may have an opportunity early next week to talk a
18 little bit more about that meeting. I simply wanted to know if that was
19 an example of a meeting where the brigade commanders were, or some of the
20 brigade commanders were present at the 3rd Corps and someone was also
21 there from the Supreme Command Staff, and I believe you've confirmed that
22 that is in fact an example of such a meeting.
23 Now, sir --
24 A. Very well, then. I would like to provide a comment to this. I
25 don't know what the objective of the corps commander was when he called
1 this meeting, but I know what was said at the meeting.
2 The corps commander was not duty-bound to inform me as his deputy
3 of all the things that he knew, and I myself did not have the right to
4 demand from my superior to tell me everything that he knew. I was roughly
5 aware of the goals of the meeting because the commander did inform me. I
6 wouldn't go into great length at this moment since you've just told me
7 that you want to come back to this meeting. Probably I'll be given the
8 opportunity to provide you with some more detail at that point.
9 Q. Thank you, sir. Let me ask you this: Based on the information
10 that you provided to the corps commander as well as the information he
11 received from the subordinate units' reports and these meetings of the
12 brigade commanders and the 3rd Corps staff, would you say that General
13 Hadzihasanovic was fully informed and aware of the developments going on
14 within the 3rd Corps area of responsibility?
15 A. It is a very difficult thing for me to assess. I am sure that he
16 did not know everything that was going on in the field. I'm sure he had a
17 lot of information, but nobody was in the position to know everything that
18 was going on in the field. A lot of things were happening. The
19 responsibilities were huge. I've already said that communication was a
20 major problem. We lacked professional staff to analyse reports.
21 Sometimes reports that reached us were rather illegible because they had
22 been composed by people who lacked skills to draft them.
23 So I cannot confirm that the corps commander had all that
24 information available to him. He did have information. However, I'm sure
25 that he did not have all the information about everything that was
1 happening in the field. He was not abreast of all the tiniest details.
2 He, I'm sure, didn't know what was happening at any of the lines at a
3 lower tactical level. However, when it came to the higher tactical level,
4 I'm sure that he had all the information.
5 Q. And of course the brigade commanders and yourself were putting the
6 most important information forward for the corps commander's consideration
7 so that he could take action on it. Isn't that correct?
8 A. That was the case in principle. However, I do not exclude the
9 possibility that a brigade commander who attended a meeting or his staff
10 who drafted a report for the corps command was not well informed and the
11 report did not contain all the relevant information. There were cases
12 when brigade commanders were not fully abreast of what was going on in
13 their respective areas of responsibility. Sometimes, due to the lack of
14 communications, the reports did not arrive the corps commander in time.
15 So sometimes when the corps commander drafted his report, this report did
16 not include all of the details describing everything that was at that
17 moment going on in, for example, a trench or on a defence position.
18 Q. Well, I have two follow-up questions, sir, on what you've just
19 been explaining to us. First of all, correct me if I'm wrong, but it
20 would seem that one of the reasons why the corps commander would have a
21 deputy and a staff and brigade commanders reporting to him through such a
22 system would be to ensure that the commander has only the important
23 information or the information the commander needs to know. Because if
24 the corps commander were being sent information on every platoon and what
25 every squad within what every platoon was doing, the corps wouldn't be
1 able to function. Is that -- is that a fair summary?
2 A. Well, if the corps commander were to have all the information
3 about every single soldier, about whether that soldier has enough ammo,
4 food, whether his wife was ill, then such a corps commander would have a
5 head bigger than this building. That's why there are officers, liaison
6 officers providing communication with the corps commander.
7 Obviously the corps commander does not have to have all
8 information, but there are other people in the command who evaluate the
9 information and assess what is important for the corps commander to
10 receive. At their level, they could unify all this information.
11 For example, when it came to logistics, the logistics men did not
12 inform the corps commander whether units have food or ammunition. That
13 would have been too much of a burden for the corps commander. And if the
14 corps commander received all that information, obviously he would not have
15 been able to process all that information.
16 Q. That's exactly my point, sir, that the corps commander had
17 available to him lower-level commanders, a staff, and a deputy commander
18 who could filter the information and ensure that the commander's attention
19 was focused on the really important issues.
20 A. Yes, that's correct. In addition to a deputy, there are also
21 assistants covering various areas. The corps duties did not rely only on
22 two men. There was an assistant commander for logistics. He was not a
23 staff member, but all these assistants provided the commander from -- with
24 information pertaining to their respective areas.
25 Q. Let me ask you one final question about reports. Now, based on
1 your military experience, and particularly the experience that you gained
2 during the war, would you agree with me that sometimes combat reports,
3 interim combat reports written and transmitted while the conflict is still
4 going on are not as accurate as reports submitted after the conclusion of
5 the combat and when the lower level subordinate commanders can actually
6 figure out what was happening? Would you agree with that?
7 A. I must say that my military experience, first in the peacetime and
8 subsequently in the wartime are two types of experience. If you did not
9 participate in a war, you cannot understand how different this is. This
10 is the most complex situation that one person can find themselves in.
11 During combat, the initial information reaches you within a
12 certain time, and then half an hour later the situation may change
13 completely. For example, if you have initial successes, after an hour you
14 may suffer huge losses, and you may lose that battle. So interim reports
15 may differ from one moment to another. In the time difference between the
16 interim report and the final combat report the situation may differ
17 drastically. If there are no changes, then no interim reports are sent.
18 Then an interim report is identical to the regular combat report.
19 I do agree that an interim report, unlike the regular report, is
20 not that accurate. I have to point out for -- again that all the reports
21 are sent either by communications means or by couriers. We did not have
22 any communications means. We did not have a good courier service. The
23 distances were large. We did not have any transportation means for the
24 couriers to bring the reports to the corps command. So there was room for
25 discrepancies between the interim report and the regular report. Such
1 situations are known, and they are possible.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I would ask that we briefly go into
4 private session so I can put some additional questions to the witness,
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, let's go into
7 private session.
8 [Private session]
11 Page 13250 redacted. Private session.
11 Page 13251 redacted. Private session.
20 [Open Session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We're back in open session,
22 Mr. President.
23 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you.
24 Q. Now, General --
25 A. Could I make a comment?
1 Q. I think it might be best if we go back into private session,
2 please. If it concerns that testimony, sir, I would think --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's go back into
4 private session.
5 [Private session]
11 Pages 13254-13262 redacted. Private session.
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session, Your
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, we shall now resume.
17 The Prosecution is going to continue putting questions to you.
18 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. General, during 1993, would it be fair to say that if -- it was in
20 the best interests of both sides that the HVO and the ABiH would seek to
22 A. A year is a long period of time, so you cannot say anything in
23 general terms about the whole year, and I cannot confirm this statement
24 for the whole year. But globally speaking, that was the case.
25 Q. Well, let's turn, then, to the issue of the joint command. The
1 purpose of establishing the joint command, or one of the main purposes of
2 establishing it, was because it was in the best interests of the ABiH and
3 the HVO to do so; is that right?
4 A. I've already said that a year is a very broad term. I've already
5 testified that we had intelligence showing us that the HVO and the
6 adversary were cooperated. The BH army did not cooperate with the
7 aggressor. Later on it was proven that this cooperation did exist between
8 the HVO and the Serbian aggressor, because the HVO ceded their positions
9 to the Serbian aggressor. I said that this was a very long period of
10 time, so one cannot say in general terms that that was the case. Things
11 were different in practice.
12 Yes, we did try to agree. We even tried to establish joint units
13 facing the aggressor. However, this was not possible in practical terms,
14 and I've already testified to that effect.
15 Q. At what point in time were the ABiH and the HVO trying to set up a
16 joint command in Central Bosnia? What time period?
17 A. There were attempts in 1992. I have shared with you an example of
18 that. There were some proposals to set up a joint command for the region
19 of Lasva or the Lasva Valley. I said that Mr. Filip Filipovic came to the
20 command of the regional staff. We wanted to set up a joint command with
21 him as commander and with me as his deputy commander. However, this fell
22 through. So the first attempts to set up a joint command happened in
24 The next attempts were in 1993, at the highest level. As a result
25 of that, at the corps level we appointed a joint command on paper. This
1 was in May 1993. The headquarters of this joint command was to be in
2 Travnik. I've testified to that effect.
3 Q. You also mentioned that you attempted to set up joint units. When
4 was that? What time period are we talking about?
5 A. There were some attempts in 1992 to set up joint units, especially
6 when the situation was very difficult in the defence of Jajce and in the
7 defence of Karaula. I've already testified about that so far. However,
8 we could not set up a joint unit that would put up joint defence against
9 the aggressor.
10 There were some subsequent attempts. First we had to establish a
11 joint command, which would then result in the establishment of joint
12 units, or at least we should have defined a common goal, which would have
13 been a defence against the aggressor. In practice, this could never be
15 Q. You've told us also earlier this week and also earlier today about
16 a number of joint commissions; Busovaca, Vitez. Were those joint
17 commissions also the result of the ABiH 3rd Corps and the HVO realising
18 that it was in their best interests to establish such commissions?
19 A. The initiative was launched by the European Monitoring Mission.
20 It was their initiative to establish a joint commission in order to put up
21 -- to put an end to the conflict and to build trust on both sides.
22 Before that initiative on the part of the European Monitoring
23 Mission, we tried in a written form and in documents sent to the joint
24 command, to avoid conflicts, but again this fell through. The joint
25 command was established by the representatives of the European Monitoring
2 Q. Would the ABiH have participated in the joint commissions if it
3 wasn't in their best interest to do so?
4 A. When a commission is established, obviously your interest is to
5 achieve your goals, and I've told you what the goals of the joint
6 commission were. If it had not been in our best interest, we would have
7 not become members of this joint commission. We did not want to enter a
8 conflict with the HVO. We wanted to avoid that.
9 Q. Sir, now I understand that the number varied throughout 1993, but
10 can you give us your best estimate of the strength of the 3rd Corps of the
11 ABiH during the spring of 1993?
12 A. The corps command wanted to establish the corps according to the
13 establishment order that it received from the superior command. We could
14 not establish the corps according to the regulations on the establishment
15 of the corps. I have used the 301st Mechanised Brigade to explain that.
16 I told you how many tanks they had. I did not give you any detail, but I
17 can give you now.
18 We could not establish all the motorised brigades either. Our
19 motorised brigades had to be transformed into mountain brigades. Some
20 mountain brigades had to be transformed into light brigades.
21 We could not establish the corps according to the establishment
22 order. We tried to establish it as best as we could, however, we were not
23 very successful. Bringing the corps up to strength was never complete.
24 Some of the brigades were fully replenished but some were below their 50
25 per cent strength, or even below that.
1 It was not so much the troops that were the problems but the arms.
2 I told you that we had weapons for only 20 or 30 per cent of the troops,
3 which meant that one-third of brigade was armed and two-thirds were not.
4 You know that there was an embargo on the import of weapons into
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Weapons were purchased -- were being purchased on
6 the black market. Individuals invested their funds to purchase weapons.
7 The 3rd Corps did not have its depot where it kept all arms. It couldn't
8 say, well, we have mobilised people, we have given them weapons, now we
9 can have a corps as we should have it. This was just not possible.
10 Q. Let me ask the question again, sir. I'm not interested in the
11 establishment strengths, I'm interested in your best estimate of the
12 number of soldiers in the ABiH 3rd Corps in the spring of 1993.
13 A. I can't be a hundred per cent sure of the strength, but I believe
14 that we had between 25 and 30.000 men altogether. Certainly not more than
15 that. I can't give you a precise number. I don't want to be faced with
16 my statement at any possible appearance before this Trial Chamber when
17 somebody's going to face me with a figure that I have given today. I
18 can't be sure of the number.
19 Q. Do you have any recollection as to the number of soldiers in the
20 HVO Central Bosnia operation zone in the spring of 1993?
21 A. No, I can't give you that estimate, but I believe that they were
22 inferior with regard to the 3rd Corps. I can't give you the number.
23 However, I did not have information about the strength of the HVO, but I
24 believe that the number of the HVO troops was lower than the number of the
25 BiH army troops. I don't know what the difference was. It's very
1 difficult for me to say that at this point in time.
2 Q. Let me ask you this, sir, in order to clarify your last answer.
3 Is it a question of you not recalling the HVO strength or is it your
4 testimony that in 1993, you never had the intelligence about the number of
5 troops within the HVO Central Bosnia operation zone?
6 A. As far as I can remember, we did not have reliable information
7 about the strength of the HVO in the Central Bosnia Operational Zone.
8 Q. When you say that they were inferior, were they -- I'm just trying
9 to get a sense of your recollection, sir. If you say the ABiH 3rd Corps
10 had 25 to 30.000 men and the HVO was inferior, did the HVO have 2.000 men,
11 15.000 men, 20.000 men? Can you give us a better estimate of the number
12 of men the HVO Central Bosnia operation zone had in the spring of 1993?
13 A. When I said that their position was inferior, I did not have such
14 a huge difference in mind. If that had been the case, then they would
15 have had only one brigade. I'm sure that they had about 15.000 troops at
16 the time.
17 When I said they were inferior, what I had in mind were -- was the
18 number of troops. In Central Bosnia, it was not possible to mobilise a
19 larger number of HVO troops, so that would be the inferiority that I was
20 referring to. But it was not as drastic as you are inferring; 2.000 as
21 opposed to 25.000. That would be drastic. That would be impossible.
22 Q. Well, sir, I'd like to ask you some questions about the tempo of
23 combat operations between the ABiH 3rd Corps and the HVO Central Bosnia
24 operation zone units during -- let's begin with the formation of the 3rd
25 Corps. From the formation of the 3rd Corps in November 1992 until the end
1 of 1992, were the HVO and the ABiH engaged with each other as military
2 opponents in Central Bosnia?
3 A. If you take into account the period from the moment when the corps
4 was established in December up to the end of 1992, we did not have any
5 armed conflicts in the area of responsibility, either of the 3rd Corps or
6 the Central Bosnia operation zone. There were skirmishes at checkpoints,
7 some looting, but we did not have any armed conflicts in the month of
9 Q. Let's move, then, into 1993. In January 1993, was there armed
10 conflict between the 3rd Corps and the HVO Central Bosnia operation zone?
11 A. Yes. One can say so because, in January 1993, there were armed
12 conflicts in Busovaca, and this was part of the Central Bosnia operation
13 zone, as well as part of the 3rd Corps area of responsibility. However,
14 we had a specific situation in Gornji Vakuf where combat activities
15 started in mid-May [as interpreted] 1993. The area of Gornji Vakuf is
16 within the operation zone of the 3rd Corps, but it was not in -- within
17 the operation zone Central Bosnia and the HVO. Gornji Vakuf is in a
18 different system of organisation of the HVO.
19 As far as I can remember now, this was the area of responsibility
20 of the North-western Herzegovina operation zone. I believe that this was
21 its name. And I know the commander there was Colonel Zeljko Siljeg.
22 However, if you look at the entirety of January 1993, one can say that
23 towards the end of January, there were armed conflicts in the area of
24 responsibility of both the military formations; namely, the HVO of Central
25 Bosnia and the BiH army or, rather, the 3rd Corps of the BiH army.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Defence.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] On page 78, line 18, either I have
4 not heard the witness properly, or there is a mistake in transcript. It
5 says that the conflict in Gornji Vakuf was in mid-May 1993. Maybe the
6 witness should be asked to answer this question again. Maybe the witness
7 did say so, but I didn't hear him. I'm sorry.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, can you answer this?
9 In the transcript we had mid-May 1993. Was it in mid-May, mid-June?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was in mid-January 1993. If I
11 said May, I say apologise for the slip of the tongue that I made.
12 MR. MUNDIS:
13 Q. Sir, in January 1993, you've told us about conflict between the
14 ABiH and the 3rd -- and the HVO in Busovaca and in Gornji Vakuf. Was
15 there armed conflict between the HVO and the ABiH 3rd Corps anywhere else
16 in January 1993?
17 A. Yes. There were incidents, but there were no large-scale armed
18 conflicts. There were conflicts in Gornji Vakuf and in Busovaca in
19 January 1993, that's all.
20 Q. How about February 1993? Do you recall any periods of armed
21 conflict between the ABiH and the HVO in February 1993?
22 A. The conflicts that started in January in Gornji Vakuf never
23 stopped. Their intensity changed. And the conflicts in the area of
24 Busovaca municipality, which started in January and escalated in January,
25 actually, and throughout the entire period of conflict with the HVO, which
1 ended with the Washington agreements, there were constant fightings in
2 that area. The intensity might have changed but there were was an ongoing
3 fighting. In February there were combat activities in Gornji Vakuf as
4 well as in Busovaca. Their intensity was not as prominent as at the very
6 Q. How about March 1993? Do you recall armed conflict between units
7 of the 3rd Corps and the HVO in March 1993?
8 A. I can say that in February and March the situation was the same.
9 There was fighting to a greater or lesser intensity. Nothing had
10 significantly changed. There was fighting. There was a lot of tension.
11 The units were in a state of readiness. In those areas where there was no
12 fighting, there were difficult situations, but there was no fighting in
13 other areas; for example, in the areas of Busovaca and Gornji Vakuf.
14 Q. How about April 1993?
15 A. In April, the situation changed, and an armed conflict broke out
16 in the area of the municipality of Vitez too. The fighting there in April
17 1993 was real. This doesn't mean that combat ended in the municipalities
18 of Busovaca or Gornji Vakuf. I said that right up to the Washington
19 Agreement, there was ongoing fighting of greater or lesser intensity.
20 Q. Can you tell us about combat operations between the HVO and units
21 of the 3rd Corps in May 1993.
22 A. Yes. In April, there was intense fighting in the area of the
23 municipality of Vitez. In other municipalities, the situation became more
24 complicated. There were difficulties in other municipalities. There were
25 incidents in Travnik, in the municipality of Travnik, or the greater area
1 of Travnik municipality. This came to a head towards the end of May 1993.
2 But there were small-scale conflicts in Busovaca and in Gornji Vakuf.
3 I couldn't say that other municipalities were particularly
4 affected by combat. There were small-scale incidents in Zepca, in Kakanj.
5 These were incidents that were dealt with, but the most difficult
6 situation developed in the Travnik centre. The incidents there really
7 increased in the month of May.
8 Q. Sir, in the period between January and the end of May 1993, can
9 you tell us whether any cease-fires were in effect?
10 A. We signed a large number of cease-fires, and it's true that this
11 took place in a short period of time, a narrow stretch of territory, but
12 there was always fighting at the lines, and snipers were quite active, and
13 the army was quite poorly equipped, and we sustained a lot of casualties
14 as a result of sniper activity on the part of the HVO. And when you lose
15 a soldier or a couple of soldiers as a result of sniper activity in a
16 narrow area, then naturally the intensity of the fighting changes. And
17 within the framework of your defence, you have to take positions that will
18 enable you to mount a more effective defence.
19 There was fighting, naturally. There wasn't such fierce fighting.
20 It wasn't large scale, but at the lines -- well, we constantly had men at
21 the lines. We couldn't withdraw. There were defensive forces there
22 defending the territory, but that's what the situation was like during
23 that period.
24 Q. Now, sir, based on your experience as the deputy commander of the
25 3rd Corps from its formation through 1993, you were familiar with the
1 locations of the front lines, both the Serbian front lines or the Serbian
2 aggressor front lines, as you've put it, and the HVO lines and the lines
3 held by units of the 3rd Corps. Would that be correct?
4 A. On the whole, yes. I couldn't tell you about all the tactical
5 situations, but in operational terms, I knew where the 3rd Corps units
6 were deployed. Similarly, I had information on the deployment of HVO
8 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I would ask -- I've had what's been
9 marked as Prosecution Exhibit 930 for identification placed on an easel.
10 I would like to ask the witness to make a number of markings on this map.
11 I'm not sure if we'll be able to do that with the amount of time left, but
12 I would propose that we at least start and see how far we can get before
13 we have to break.
14 Q. Sir, I've placed a map here, and let me tell you that a previous
15 witness has made some markings on the map. I would ask that you take a
16 blue marker, since the previous witness has marked in black, and I would
17 like you to mark, to the best of your recollection, the following: The
18 lines separating the VRS and the ABiH, to the extent they're visible, the
19 lines separating the ABiH and the HVO, the ABiH units within the various
20 sectors, that is, where the various 3rd Corps units were located; and of
21 course, if you do know where corresponding HVO units on the opposite side,
22 on the HVO side of the line are located. And I would ask if you could do
23 this based on the situation on the ground as of mid-June 1993. Would you
24 be able to assist us by doing this?
25 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.
2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the Prosecution mention
3 exhibit number, and could we be told who the witness is, if there is a
4 date and a signature at the bottom. Well, in fact, perhaps this might be
5 confusing for the witness. Perhaps we could be told whether the witness
6 mentioned is our witness or a Prosecution witness, or perhaps we should
7 cover this part.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.
9 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, you will recall, I believe it was one
10 of the very, very first Defence witnesses. It was Prosecution Exhibit 930
11 marked for identification. At the time we had the witness from the 306th
12 Mountain Brigade testify, I indicated on the record that we might be
13 showing the same map to other witnesses, which is why we did not tender it
14 into evidence.
15 I am completely fine with the notion of the current witness not
16 having to mark the lines of the 306th, because we had a witness from that
17 unit, and I believe it was a senior witness of that unit, who made the
18 markings of the 306th Mountain Brigade. So if we want to just leave the
19 306th alone, since those are already marked on the map, that's fine. So
20 if the witness could then, based on his knowledge as the deputy commander,
21 if he could complete the map or complete to the best of his recollection
22 the map, that would be fine with us, but that's -- this is a map that
23 we've used and we did indicate that we would be asking other witnesses who
24 would have information to make additional markings on the map.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The other Defence team.
1 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
2 think a member of the 312th Brigade marked this map, not a member of the
3 306th Brigade.
4 MR. MUNDIS: I stand corrected. It was the 312th Brigade. My
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, you have heard the
7 Prosecution's question. Would it be possible for you to indicate the
8 lines of the various parties, using this map? This would concern
9 mid-June, that period of time.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will mark those
11 lines. This will take some time, given the length of the lines, given the
12 length of the front and given the area of the zone of responsibility.
13 This will take some time for me to mark. I can't deal with the tactical
14 level but I can deal with the operational level. I will indicate the
15 locations of the brigade, the areas they were engaged in, but I won't be
16 able to locate the areas of battalion and brigade engagement. I won't be
17 able to locate the areas of company engagement. I'll try and deal with
18 that, but the time period is also problematic. In the month of June, the
19 situation was difficult. The front facing the HVO in the municipality of
20 Travnik was also opened. This is why I should be given a specific date.
21 Was it the 15th or the 16th, or the 17th? Because in June the fighting
22 was very intense. There was fighting in Kakanj. There was fighting in
24 This is a vast area. I would need officers here to draw all of
25 this. But, Your Honours, I will try to draw these lines. I can stay on
1 for longer today, if necessary. I will also try to indicate the sectors
2 where the HVO was present. But could I be provided with more specific
3 information, more specific request?
4 Thank you, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Prosecution will
6 certainly provide you with additional information, but we have to adjourn
7 in five minutes' time. So there are two solutions: The general can think
8 about this over the weekend, he can try and locate the lines, sketch them
9 for himself, and this will make it easier for him to indicate the
10 positions on the map on Monday. Or we could do what we did last time; a
11 witness appeared in the afternoon and marked a map in the presence of the
12 Defence and the Prosecution.
13 There are two ways of proceeding.
14 Yes, the Prosecution.
15 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Let me, with respect to
16 the two options that the Chamber has presented us with, perhaps I could
17 ask the witness how long he anticipates it might take him to make those
19 Q. Sir, if you have any estimate of how long would it actually take
20 you to do this?
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. General, you've followed
22 what's been said. There are two ways of dealing with this. You can think
23 about the matter over the weekend, and then on Monday you could indicate
24 the respective positions of the 306th, the Serbs, the HVO, or in the
25 afternoon, in the presence of the registrar, Defence counsel, and the
1 Prosecution, you could come and mark the positions on the map. In that
2 case, how much time would you need?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honours, I prefer the
4 second solution. As a soldier, I first like to finish my work and then
5 have a rest. But I think that this would take me between an hour and two
6 hours. I suggest that we adopt the second solution, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The witness would
8 prefer to mark the map in the presence of the parties. He would prefer to
9 do this in the afternoon, after the hearing.
10 Mr. Mundis, this is the procedure that we have already recourse
11 to, so there is a precedent.
12 MR. MUNDIS: We will discuss this after we rise with the Defence
13 and the court officer and work out the modalities. I did want to put one
14 additional -- because of course I won't be communicating with the witness
15 once we do that.
16 Q. But, sir, let me -- you've said that the situation was very
17 complex in the middle of June, and everyone in the courtroom is very much
18 aware that there was a high degree of combat activities during the early
19 part of June or the first half of June. When did those combat operations
20 more or less cease and the situation stabilise?
21 A. The combat activities did not come to an end until the Washington
22 Agreement. When the situation, when the conflict escalated in Zepca, that
23 was at the end of June 1993. Well, at that time, the combat activities
24 between the army and the BH -- between the army and the HVO in the zone of
25 responsibility of the 3rd Corps hadn't come to an end, and this was the
1 case right up until the Washington Agreement.
2 Q. If that's the case, sir, and the confrontation lines did not
3 stabilise in June of 1993, then I would suggest that you pick the 20th of
4 June, 1993, as the date that you use to try to draw the lines to the best
5 of your recollection. And we'll give you an opportunity on Monday, if
6 there are certain areas along the line or within the area of
7 responsibility where the situation was extremely unstable in June of 1993,
8 we'll give you an opportunity to explain that.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, the Prosecution would
10 like you to mark the lines as they were on the 20th of June.
11 I'm now addressing the Defence to hear what their position is with
12 regard to the witness's desire to mark the positions. And this will take
13 him an hour or two. This will require your presence, but naturally the
14 witness will not be allowed to discuss matters with either of the parties
15 as he's taken the solemn declaration.
16 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we agree that it is
17 the Prosecution conducting their cross-examination now, and we'll accept
18 the suggestion after having discussed the matter with the Prosecution. I
19 know what the witness suggested as far as the Defence is concerned. From
20 1530 until 5.30 we have certain duties, but we could be present, someone
21 could be present when the witness marks the map. We'll see how we can
22 proceed most efficiently to obtain the result the Prosecution wants to
23 obtain, but I don't think the task has been specified sufficiently. All
24 we know is the date that the Prosecution has referred to, the 20th of
25 June. We'd like to know whether the Prosecution will be requesting that
1 all the positions of the army and the HVO be marked throughout the zone of
2 responsibility of the 3rd Corps. This is an additional factor that might
3 enable us to follow the lines the witness marks, so we need to know not
4 only about the dates but the exact positions that the witness will be
5 asked to mark.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The other Defence team?
7 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] In light of your suggestions,
8 Your Honours, I think it would be best to do this on Monday before the
9 hearing, and this would give the witness some time to prepare, and it
10 would be possible for the Defence to also be present when these positions
11 are marked on the map.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Kubura's Defence would
13 prefer this to be done on Monday before the hearing. The registrar says
14 that's not a bad idea. I don't know what the Prosecution position is.
15 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, we have no objection to doing it
16 today, tomorrow, Sunday, Monday. The witness could take the map away with
17 him to the hotel and do it. We're indifferent as to how that needs to be
18 done, but I do want, in light of the comments of my learned colleague from
19 the Hadzihasanovic team, to -- I believe I did indicate exactly what I
20 wanted the witness to do, but let me do that again for the benefit of the
21 witness to ensure that he has no questions about what it is we want him to
22 mark on the map, and I will try to do this as clearly as possible.
23 Q. Sir, what we're asking you -- what I'm asking you to do --
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. The witness
25 wants a pen to make a note of what you're saying. Mr. Registrar, could we
1 have a sheet of paper and a pen, please.
2 Go ahead.
3 MR. MUNDIS:
4 Q. General, what we would like you to do is, again, on the 20th of
5 June, 1993, the situation as it existed on the ground as depicted on this
6 map which we've marked as P930 [Realtime transcript read in error "P390"]
7 for identification. I would ask you to do the following, and again, if
8 you don't remember, that's fine, but what we're asking you to do is mark a
9 line separating the VRS and the ABiH, the lines separating the ABiH and
10 the HVO. If there are any point where there were HVO/VRS lines, please
11 mark that. And some of these might not be visible on the map. That's
12 fine. To the extent you can remember within the 3rd Corps area, mark the
13 lines or where the units were of the 3rd Corps and the areas that they
14 were responsible for. To the extent you know the units on the HVO side,
15 which brigades were there, if you could mark those, if you recall. And if
16 you recall or -- any of the VRS units that were on the opposite side of
17 the ABiH with respect to these lines.
18 I do note, Mr. President, page 89, line 10, should say P930, not
20 Now, General, is it clear what I'm asking you to do on this map?
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll summarise. You have been
22 asked to mark the VRS ABiH line on the map, then the ABiH HVO lines, the
23 HVO VRS lines; if necessary, indicate the position of the 3rd Corps units,
24 indicate the HVO unit positions, and to the extent that this is possible,
25 indicate the position of the VRS units.
1 This is quite clear, and it shouldn't be difficult to indicate
2 these positions on the map to the extent that the witness can remember
4 You have taken note of what have been requested of you.
5 Defence counsel.
6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, perhaps it's our
7 mistake, because we were not able to check this, but could the Prosecution
8 tell us what the scale of the map is and which area it covers. Does it
9 cover all the municipalities that were covered by the 3rd Corps so --
10 because I don't think we have the entire map. Could they tell us about
11 the dimensions of the map, or the scale.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, what is the scale of
13 the map, and more importantly, does this map represent or cover the zone
14 of responsibility of the 3rd Corps?
15 In fact, the general will have a look now.
16 MR. MUNDIS: It's a 1:50.000 map covering the Central Bosnia area.
17 And again, it's a map that we have used in this courtroom on several
19 If the general has any comments, I welcome his contribution.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, you had a quick look at
21 the map. What would you like to say?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've had a look at this map the
23 scale of which is 1:50.000. It doesn't cover the entire zone of
24 responsibility of the 3rd Corps. I can use this map and indicate the
25 positions I've been asked to indicate to the extent that it's possible on
1 this map. If I'm to inform the Chamber of everything that I can remember
2 in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Corps on the 20th of June, 1993,
3 then I would need a map the scale of which is 1:100.000. I have been
4 given three tasks so I need three colours so that -- I need to be able to
5 use three colours so I can depict this accurately. Otherwise, it will be
6 confusing. Could these maps be put together? Because otherwise I won't
7 be able to carry out my task. I need scissors, I need glue. This is a
8 process that takes some time. If you asked an American general to do this
9 I don't think he would be able to carry out the task in ten days' time.
10 I'm trying to do my best, but if you bring an American general here and
11 give him this task, well, I'll take my hat off to him if he actually
12 manages to do it.
13 I have been asked to do a lot here. I'll do my best because I
14 want to contribute to the truth. There are 50 staff members who are
15 involved in carrying out such a task, and bear this in mind. This is why
16 I suggested I should do this here immediately, so that no one suggested
17 that I use different means to carry out the task. But if you provide me
18 with the equipment I need and the map or other maps, I'll do my best to
19 mark all these locations.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Mundis, the only
21 problem we have now is that the witness would prefer to have a map the
22 scale of which is 1:100.000. The witness claims that the current map
23 doesn't cover the entire area of the 3rd Corps zone of responsibility.
24 Could we provide the witness with a map the scale of which is 1:100.000?
25 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the large [B/C/S on English channel].
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Switch to channel 7 to hear the
2 English interpretation.
3 MR. MUNDIS: Now it's back on 4.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Switch back to channel 4.
5 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, perhaps the best course of action
6 might simply be for us to discuss this with the Defence and the Chamber's
7 legal officer and the representative of the Registry and to come up with a
8 solution so that we're not debating this issue ad infinitum. If the
9 witness wants a 1:100.000 map, we will endeavour to produce that for him
10 to mark on.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, then. So it will be
12 map 1 to 100.000 that is going to be provided to the witness, and the
13 registrar is going to provide the witness with pencils in three colours.
14 So among yourselves you are going to discuss this operation and how it can
15 be carried out. It will be best if it could be done Monday morning just
16 before the hearing. It would be more practical.
17 General, you have the floor.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would also like the
19 maps to be put together. I need more people who would put these maps
20 together. There's no way I can finish that before Monday. Can I have a
21 team of people? You must have a team of people who work here who could
22 put these maps together. I don't have conditions for that in the hotel.
23 My hotel room is very small. Do you know how big a desk I would need to
24 put these maps before me? In my hotel room I have a small desk. Okay.
25 I'll put the map on the bed, I will really try hard to do whatever I can.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Rest assured you're not going to
2 have to work in the hotel. You will work here. So rest assured you're
3 not going to have to spend the entire weekend drawing lines on a map. On
4 Monday morning you're going to have everything. The registrar will be
5 here, the legal officer will be here, and we will deal with the problem,
6 and we will save time.
7 As we have already said, on Monday we will sit in the afternoon,
8 on Tuesday we will sit in the morning, Thursday's also morning as well as
9 the afternoon -- I'm sorry. On Wednesday also in the morning, Thursday
10 morning, Thursday afternoon, Friday also in the morning. But if we finish
11 on Thursday afternoon, there will -- there will not be any sitting on
13 So in theory, you might have an additional sitting next week. So
14 Monday afternoon, Tuesday morning, Wednesday morning, Thursday afternoon
15 -- Wednesday afternoon, Thursday morning, Thursday afternoon, and if
16 necessary, Friday morning, but we shall see. If everything goes well,
17 maybe we won't have to sit in -- on Friday.
18 We have added an additional session because we are going to have
19 an additional afternoon.
20 If there are no other pressing matters, we will deal with this
21 issue of map immediately.
22 General, of course you are not supposed to contact any of the
23 parties. The only time you're going to be in the presence of any of the
24 parties is when you're going to work on the material, which is going to
25 happen on Monday in the course of the morning. The registrar is going to
1 provide you with the necessary information.
2 I wish you all a pleasant weekend, and we shall resume on Monday
3 at quarter past two.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.05 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Monday, the 13th day of
6 December, 2004, at 2.15 p.m.