1 Tuesday, 18 January 2005
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Would the registrar please call
6 the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you. Case IT-01-47-T, the
8 Prosecutor versus Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you., Registrar.
10 Would the Prosecution please introduce themselves.
11 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,
12 Your Honours, Counsel, and to everyone in and around the courtroom.
13 For the Prosecution, Mathias Neuner and Daryl Mundis, assisted
14 today by our case manager, Janet Stewart.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] May I have the appearances for
16 the Defence.
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.
18 Good morning, Your Honours. Appearing for General Enver Hadzihasanovic,
19 Edina Residovic, lead counsel, and Alexis Demirdjian, the legal assistant.
20 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.
21 Appearing for Mr. Kubura, Rodney Dixon, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Nermin
22 Mulalic, legal assistant.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 The Chamber wishes a good morning to all who are here today on
25 Tuesday, the 18th of January, 2005. Good morning to the Prosecution, the
1 Defence, the accused, and all the personnel in the courtroom.
2 We are five minutes late in starting because some new instruments
3 have been installed in the courtroom which one hopes would make it easier
4 for us to do our work. It seems that the Defence is not convinced of
5 this, but we shall see. We'll try.
6 Before me now, I have a keyboard, which is something quite new
7 for me.
8 Today we shall hear a witness, who should be ready, so I will ask
9 the usher to come and bring in the witness.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good morning, sir. Before we
12 begin, I would like to check that you hear the interpretation of what I am
13 saying. If this is the case, please say, "I can hear you and understand
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hear you and understand you.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Sir, you have been
17 called as a witness for the Defence. Before you read out the solemn
18 declaration, you must introduce yourself or, rather, tell us your first
19 and last name and your date and place of birth.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My name is Serif Kadric. I was
21 born on the 28th of August, 1948 in a village near Pjelavaje [phoen] in
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Are you employed at
24 present? What's your occupation?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am now a retired officer of the
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You are a retired officer.
3 What is your rank?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My rank is that of colonel.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1992 and 1993, did you hold
6 any military post, any military duty? And if so, what was it and in what
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1992, I was the commanding
9 officer of the Regional Staff of the Zenica Territorial Defence as
10 assistant commander for morale, information, and religious matters. And
11 when the corps started being formed, I was transferred to the corps, where
12 I performed the same duty.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you were in the
14 3rd Corps.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you already testified
17 before a national or international court or tribunal about the events that
18 took place in your country in 1992 and 1993 or is today the first time?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Today is the first time.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I will now ask you to read out
21 the solemn declaration handed to you by the usher.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
23 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: Thank you. You may sit down now.
25 WITNESS: SERIF KADRIC
1 [Witness answered through interpreter]
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before I give the floor to the
3 Defence, who will conduct your examination-in-chief, I would like to ask
4 you whether you wish to be addressed as sir or as general.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not a general. I am a retired
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It seems there has been a
8 misinterpretation. I meant to say "colonel," not "general." I ask the
9 interpreters to take more care. I will address you as "sir."
10 You will now respond to the questions put to you by the Defence.
11 The Defence is sitting on your left-hand side. You know the counsel for
12 the Defence because you will have met them when preparing for today's
14 After they conclude their examination-in-chief, which will
15 consist of non-leading questions, the Prosecution, sitting on your right,
16 will put questions to you for the same length of time, and this will be
17 the so-called cross-examination. The questions put to you by the
18 Prosecution may be leading questions, which means that they can contain
19 part of a response or lead you to make a certain response. This is one of
20 the principles of the Anglo-Saxon system, the adversarial system.
21 After this, the Defence will be able to put additional questions
22 to you pertaining to the questions put to you in cross-examination.
23 The Trial Chamber may put questions to you at any time, according
24 to our Rules, but in general the Judges prefer to put their questions
25 after both sides have completed their examination. The Judges will ask
1 you questions either to clarify certain points raised during the
2 examination or because they feel it is in the interests of justice to
3 clarify some points in the trial.
4 The Judges in this particular case, as in any other, are
5 completely neutral and objective. We are not familiar with what you will
6 testify about today. We have no prior information about this.
7 You will understand that for this reason, your oral testimony is
8 highly significant. Everything you say will be entered into the record,
9 which you can see on the monitor in English, to be sure, because this is
10 an interpretation of everything we are saying here in the courtroom.
11 If you do not understand a question that is put to you, you may
12 ask the person putting the question to reformulate it.
13 I must also draw your attention to two-points, which are very
14 important. I do this in the case of every witness. You have solemnly
15 declared that you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
16 the truth, which means you must not testify falsely, and if you did so,
17 that would be a criminal offence and you could be punished by a prison
19 The second thing I wanted to draw your attention to is the
20 following: If a witness feels that a response to a question put to him
21 might one day be used against him, then he may refuse to answer the
22 question. In that case - and it doesn't happen very often - the Trial
23 Chamber may require the witness to respond, but in this case it will
24 guarantee a certain immunity. I wish to remind you of this because it is
25 contained in our Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 If at any point you face any kind of difficulty, please tell us
2 so at once so that we can resolve the situation.
3 I will now give the floor to the Defence, which will start with
4 their examination.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
6 Mr. President.
7 Examined by Ms. Residovic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kadric.
9 A. Good morning.
10 Q. Apart from the important information you have just received from
11 the Trial Chamber, I will add something: You and I speak the same
12 language, and as soon as I put a question to you, you can answer it.
13 However, my question and your reply have to be interpreted so that our
14 learned friends and the judges can understand what we are saying. For
15 this reason, I ask you when I put a question to wait, to pause a few
16 seconds, and reply only then. I will do the same after I hear your reply.
17 Did you understand me?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 Tell me, Mr. Kadric, when the war started on the 6th of April,
21 1992, when the Serbian forces attacked Bosnia and Herzegovina, what was
22 your duty?
23 A. I was then assistant commander of the Regional Territorial
24 Defence Staff of Zenica for morale, information, and religious matters.
25 Q. Mr. Kadric, did you have any military rank at the time?
1 A. Yes. That of reserve captain first class.
2 Q. Can you please tell the Court what your education is and where
3 you acquired it.
4 A. I am a teacher by profession, and I worked in the education
5 system for five years. In the meantime, after completing my military
6 service, I became a reserve officer. In 1973, I left the education system
7 and became employed in the Territorial Defence or, rather, in the Kakanj
8 Municipal Territorial Defence Staff, where I remained for ten years.
9 After ten years, in 1983 I was transferred to the Regional Staff, to the
10 superior command, where I performed a certain duty and remained there
11 until the beginning of the aggression on our country.
12 Q. When asked by Mr. President, Mr. Kadric, you said that after the
13 corps was established, you were transferred to the 3rd Corps. Can you
14 tell me when this was and what was precisely your title in the corps.
15 A. I think it was on the 16th of November that I was transferred to
16 the 3rd Corps, to the duty of assistant to the corps commander for morale,
17 information, and religious matters.
18 Q. Mr. Kadric, who was your superior in the corps? Were you linked
19 to the staff or to the commander?
20 A. I was directly linked to the commander. I was his assistant, not
21 the assistant to the Chief of Staff or some other officer in the staff.
22 Q. As throughout 1992, you were in the Regional Territorial Defence
23 Staff as the assistant commander for morale, information, and religious
24 matters, can you please tell us what the general situation was and what
25 the problems were facing Commander Enver Hadzihasanovic on his arrival in
2 A. Zenica was a town that received a large number of refugees
3 expelled from Eastern Bosnia, Central Bosnia, practically all parts of
4 Bosnia, where they found refuge, sought accommodation, and tried to
5 resolve the issues pertaining to their welfare. The Zenica Hospital was
6 an institution taking care of the wounded from, I think, 83
7 municipalities. In Zenica itself, there were over 100 lower-ranking units
8 and soldiers know what leading such a large number of units means and how
9 difficult it is to ensure a system of command. This was not the situation
10 only in Zenica but also in the entire area of responsibility of the
11 Regional Staff, which was still operational.
12 When Enver Hadzihasanovic arrived - and we didn't know who he was
13 at the time - Asim Muradic -- Mehtic [phoen], who later became the Chief
14 of Staff of the commander of the 3rd Corps, the local politicians were not
15 very happy. When they heard that a corps was being established, they all
16 wanted a local commander to be appointed, one of their own, or the local
17 commanders wanted the duty for themselves. And these were the problems
18 and challenges facing the commander of the 3rd Corps and his subordinate
20 Q. Thank you very much.
21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I will now ask the usher to show
22 the witness and the Trial Chamber a set of documents which I will use
23 during my further examination of this witness.
24 Q. I will ask you, Mr. Kadric, to look at the document in the first
25 section, where it says "Morale, information, and propaganda," under tab 2.
1 And the number of the document is 0701. This is a document issued by the
2 staff of the Supreme Command dated the 2nd of February, 1993, and
3 addressed to the 3rd Corps. Please pay attention to the third and fourth
4 paragraphs and tell me whether you knew of certain objections or, so to
5 say, expressions of lack of confidence toward the commander when he faced
6 the challenge of creating the 3rd Corps.
7 A. I didn't say -- I omitted to say, that is, that apart from all
8 these problems in Zenica there were quite a few war presidencies of
9 municipalities in -- who had been displaced. Unfortunately, there was one
10 in Zenica, one in Sarajevo, and we didn't really know which was the real,
11 true one. And they were all jostling for position, all wanting to command
12 units of their own, and God knows what else.
13 In this document, we can see that the regional assemblies are
14 complaining about the commander saying they are unable to establish
15 cooperation. I don't know what sort of cooperation they wanted, but I
16 know that the commander and I, as his assistant, and everyone else, we
17 were all available round the clock to talk to them, of course about issues
18 relating to the army, not other issues. And I see no reason for them to
19 have complained about anyone, and especially about the commander of the
20 3rd Corps in this regard.
21 Q. Mr. Kadric, as you were in the Territorial Defence before the
22 war, when the regulations on All People's Defence were in force, where
23 civilian organs had power and authority over the military, tell me, was
24 this a period in which such complaints had something to do with a loss of
25 competency of the civilian organs over the army, or did the army really
1 not want to cooperate with the civilian organs?
2 A. In Zenica, we used the legislation inherited from the former
3 state, that is, Yugoslavia, and we heard only later that a new legislation
4 had been enacted. Unfortunately, we had been cut off from Sarajevo, so we
5 didn't know about this new legislation.
6 The authorities wanted to command, to appoint and dismiss people,
7 and this was not in the spirit of the new legislation. We didn't know
8 about the new legislation, and we all used the old legislation. This is
9 the kind of letter they would write to the 3rd command, make -- making
10 matters even more complex in the canton or, that is, in the area of
11 responsibility of the 3rd Corps.
12 Q. As the commander and the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Corps had
13 arrived from Sarajevo, where this legislation had been published and
14 promulgated and where the 1st Corps had already been established, did you
15 agree, then, that the army had to behave in accordance with the
16 legislation of its own country?
17 A. Yes, precisely so. We wanted to establish the corps and to have
18 command and control really function, to have a clear chain of command
19 where everybody knew his place, and to have clear tasks carried out in the
20 defence of the country. However, unfortunately, we had such problems and
21 objections and complaints.
22 And there is something else I have to explain: The commander of
23 the corps, his Chief of Staff, I, and many others, we were either
24 active-duty officers or reserve officers from the previous system. Let me
25 remind you - and I think we all know this - that in the previous system,
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 it was the League of Communists that was in power, and they had supreme
2 authority and they said there was no God. Suddenly there was a new system
3 and they said there was a God. Those who were able to accommodate
4 themselves to the new system had it easier. The rest of us were viewed as
5 agents of KOS, as spies, as enemies, and we had to prove ourselves with
6 the results of our work and gain real authority, not just formal
7 authority, but real authority in the corps.
8 Q. Thank you. Mr. Kadric, could you now tell me: What were the
9 main tasks that you had in your sector? What were your main duties?
10 A. The Sector for Morale, Information, Propaganda, and Religious
11 Matters - and that is the proper term - this sector had to above all
12 inform soldiers, and in this case members of the 3rd Corps, about actual
13 events, about activities of our state Presidency, and about activities of
14 the International Community, about the activities of the Supreme Command
15 Staff, about combat action in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in
16 particular in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Corps, because if we
17 hadn't provided such information, then rumours and lies would have been
18 spread. The soldiers would have lost their bearings and they wouldn't
19 have the necessary morale and the necessary motivation to engage in
20 combat. There were a lot of negative factors that could affect them, and
21 it was necessary to inform them in good time.
22 Naturally, when providing them with information, we also tried to
23 inform them of our ideas, of our platform, our position, of the objectives
24 and tasks that we had set ourselves. There were many other methods that
25 we also used. Within this sector, we also had a service for information
1 and propaganda. They -- this section consisted of journalists, more or
2 less professional -- it's easier to assess their professionalism given
3 that time has passed since then. We had psychologists. We had a wartime
4 cameraman. We had a press centre. We also had a service for social and
5 status matters, and this had quite an effect of the morale and behaviour
6 of the soldiers. This service for social and status matters also had an
7 official for housing affairs, for social affairs, because if a soldier
8 went to the front line and his family didn't have the minimum necessary to
9 survive, in such a case such a soldier would quite naturally not think
10 about combat very much. He would be thinking about how to return home and
11 how to help his family or about how to bring something back for them.
12 Q. Let me just interrupt you there. As far as these social matters
13 are concerned, you said that they were of great significance for soldiers'
14 morale. Tell me, to what extent did these social matters burden your
16 A. The social issues, especially in 1992 and the first half of 1993,
17 were in fact the main task that this sector had to deal with and that the
18 corps officers had to deal with. We were all trying to find a way of
19 providing regular parcels via the authorities and via other humanitarian
20 organisations to ensure decent burials for our fallen soldiers and to
21 ensure that the families of soldiers who had been killed were taken care
22 of, to ensure that there was accommodation for soldiers and for their
23 families. These are the sort of problems that we all had to deal with,
24 and for a certain period of time were a matter of priority.
25 Q. When you were talking about these social matters, you said that
1 if a soldier's family didn't have the minimum necessary to survive, a
2 soldier would then abandon the front line. When you look back at the
3 situation now, and given the fact that this is something that you
4 experienced on that daily basis, to what extent was this social affair
5 also the matter of establishing a system of combat and control that
6 functioned for all the combatants?
7 A. Well, this social issue was one of the key issues in the Sector
8 for Morale and from a security point of view, because if ten or 20 out of
9 30 soldiers abandoned the line, well, you can imagine what sort of a
10 situation that would result in. They might not be able to hold the line.
11 And if a soldier knows that his family has no fuel and winter is
12 approaching, well, these were problems that we had to deal with in various
13 ways. We somehow managed to resolve these difficulties, but these
14 difficulties presented an increasing problem. The blockade imposed by
15 Herceg-Bosna -- because we were in fact under a blockade and we could not
16 bring anything in, and unfortunately our neighbours in Zenica in 1992 also
17 started charging for passage for vehicles and individuals through
18 Herceg-Bosna. In Zenica, we'd have to spend -- or pay 5, 10, or 50
19 convertible marks. That would be about 25 Euros if we wanted to leave
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina or enter Bosnia-Herzegovina again.
21 Q. Mr. Kadric, you mentioned housing problems and earlier on you
22 said that a lot of refugees had arrived from other parts of the country.
23 Who dealt with the housing problems that combatants and refugees had?
24 Whose responsibility was this and did you have any tasks to perform in
25 this area?
1 A. The housing problems also had a negative effect on combat morale,
2 and we tried to resolve these difficulties as efficiently as possible.
3 The civilian authorities were responsible for dealing with the housing
4 affairs -- or rather, the municipal organ whose competence it was to deal
5 with these affairs in accordance with the laws and regulations that had
6 been adopted on abandoned flats.
7 Within the corps, a subcommission was formed by order from the
8 Supreme Command Staff. I had to deal with certain affairs. I was the
9 president of a sort of subcommission which made a list of those who had to
10 be given flats from the 3rd Corps. The families of men who had been
11 killed were given priority, and then invalids, et cetera. This list was
12 provided to the Municipality, and the Municipality would then find
13 temporary solutions and move people into those flats, not only into flats
14 but also into private houses that had been abandoned. These houses were
15 also allocated, and the authorities allocated them to various individuals.
16 I believe that that was a correct way to proceed because if no one moved
17 into a house, then various criminals would loot -- engage in looting and
18 the house would be destroyed.
19 Q. You mentioned abandoned houses, abandoned property, but the flats
20 that were allocated, were these also abandoned or were they flats that
21 were being built in Zenica at the time?
22 A. They were flats that had been abandoned. When the JNA left
23 Zenica, we know that a lot of Serbs left with them or, rather, inhabitants
24 of Serbian nationality. Later the War Presidency of Zenica Municipality,
25 in order to bring families together, authorised inhabitants of Zenica of
1 various nationalities to leave and all these flats were declared to be
2 abandoned and they were distributed -- allocated to the people on the
4 Q. Thank you. Have a look at the document after section three,
5 please, which is a document that is only in B/C/S. Please could you read
6 out the preamble, the introduction, the title of the document in Article
7 9. Is this the law that you mentioned, the law that concerned abandoned
8 houses and property.
9 A. This is the decree, law on abandoned flats. Article 9 say that
10 is someone who -- the person who can give abandoned flats for temporary
11 use is the municipal organ competent for housing affairs and in
12 municipalities where this organ is not functioning, the relevant body is
13 the Ministry for Urban Planning, for Construction, and for the Protection
14 of the Environment. And for flats of the former JNA, the Ministry of
15 Defence is competent. We had some of -- some flats in Zenica. The
16 ministry would distribute them. I think there were 92 in Zenica and about
17 100 in Travnik. These flats were allocated by the commission of the
18 Ministry of Defence. And as you can see, all the other flats were
19 allocated by the municipal organ responsible for this.
20 Q. Thank you. For the sake of the transcript, this document is 419.
21 Since you were mentioning the issue of morale and instilling a
22 feeling of patriotism in soldiers, a minute ago you said that this was
23 done on the basis of the Presidency's platform. Could you please have a
24 look another document 1, DH209, and tell me whether this is the platform
25 which was the basis upon which your organ functioned. Naturally, these
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 were the policies of the 3rd Corps in the area.
2 A. Yes. This was the platform for the functioning of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina in wartime conditions. And everything stated here were
4 guidelines that we followed and this is what we wanted and most of the
5 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted.
6 Q. Mr. Kadric, in connection with the affairs that you were
7 responsible for, did you sometimes draft reports, inform subordinate
8 units, or provide information to your superiors on the state of morale and
9 the general state in the area of your corps?
10 A. Yes. The Sector for Morale, Information, and Propaganda, and
11 Religious Affairs, it was our -- within that sector, it was our
12 responsibility to regularly provide written reports to our subordinate
13 units on the basis of information from the sector for morale of the Main
14 Staff and on the basis of decisions and on the basis of the activities of
15 our Presidency, we'd provide them with information about what was
16 happening in the state, about what the International Community was doing,
17 because initially, to be quite frank, we thought that the war in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina would be over in a few months' time. Since they
19 disarmed us, since we'd been -- we were under a blockade on both sides, we
20 believed that the international community would put an end to the war and
21 to the bloodshed and to the destruction, in particular of one people that
22 suffered the most.
23 It was also our duty on the basis of information from subordinate
24 units, on the basis of our information, on the basis of information from
25 other command organs, to draft reports and forward them to our superior
1 command so that they could be informed of the situation and so that they
2 could issue orders for the measures that had to be taken in order to
3 strengthen patriotic feelings, combat morale, and to protect the image of
4 the ABiH.
5 Q. Please have a look at document number 5, 0879. We don't have a
6 translation of this document, so could you please read out the name of the
7 person who drafted the document, the title of the document, and then I
8 would like you to read out a few paragraphs in this document. I would
9 then like you to tell me whether this is one of the documents that you
10 drafted on the activities within your sector.
11 A. This is a report on the deterioration of relations with the HVO,
12 which was forwarded to all subordinate units on the 17th of April, 1993.
13 There are a few indications here.
14 Q. Could you please just have a look at page two -- page 2, from the
15 word "At the same time of the attacks involving the HVO," could you read
16 that paragraph which finishes with "both sides sustained a lot of wounded
17 and dead." Could you please read out that part and tell me whether this
18 is one of the ways in which you informed your own units and combatants.
19 A. Yes, this says: "At the same time that these attacks were taking
20 place, the HVO started spreading propaganda and engaging in psychological
21 warfare, and it declared that the ABiH was responsible for all the victims
22 and all the conflicts. The truth is quite different, because
23 representatives of the army forwarded a number of appeals for cooperation
24 and negotiations; however, HVO commanders responded to all these appeals
25 by engaging in a brutal aggression. In Ahmici, a real massacre was
1 committed against the innocent population who were found sleeping there,
2 and this village, as well as the neighbouring village of Nadioci is being
3 burnt and being destroyed. About 150 members of this village have found
4 refuge by fleeing towards Zenica. They have already arrived there and
5 they've been taken care of. An incredible a crime -- an atrocious crime
6 was committed in the town of Vitez, and the HVO also targeted innocent
7 civilians there, especially those from mixed marriages and those who had
8 any sort of connection with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
10 Q. Thank you very much. Since the this passage says that the army
11 did all it could to avoid a conflict with the HVO, since that's what you
12 say in this passage, what sort of policies did the 3rd Corps pursue as far
13 as the conflict with the HVO is concerned or what sort of measures were
14 taken to avoid such a conflict?
15 A. The ABiH and the 3rd Corps, I think they took all the measures
16 that they could have taken, and I believe that many officers actually did
17 everything they could to avoid a conflict with the HVO and it was in a
18 certain sense beneath their dignity, but they accepted such a procedure.
19 However, the HDZ policies and the policies of the Croatian Army and of the
20 HV, representing the armed component to the HDZ, their policies were such
21 that they wanted to take over territory that they thought was their own
22 according to the Vance-Owen Plan. According to this plan, they believed
23 that this territory was their own. And they wanted to do everything they
24 could to relocate some of their population from other areas, and they
25 wanted to have ethnically pure areas. As the corps -- just like the corps
1 commander, I and others came across a form of propaganda that was a
2 propaganda worthy of Goebbels. On HTV in Zagreb they would show photo
3 montages of Croats who had been hanged, about 30 of them in Zenica. They
4 were hanging by the church in Zenica where we had celebrated the Feast of
5 Our Lady and combatants wanted to find us -- wanted to beat us. They
6 said, "We are fighting and look at what you've been doing in Zenica."
7 These are the problems that were really a problem for the corps
8 command and for all of us. We kept negotiating. We kept discussing. And
9 the commission that was formed in Busovaca and later in Vitez had to
10 monitor the agreements, the items of the agreement, but up until the peace
11 agreement that was signed these problems became more and more present. So
12 this is the sort of area that the corps had to engage in. We had one
13 front. We had to open another front. And that's the situation we
14 remained in, and I don't know how we managed to survive it.
15 Q. Mr. Kadric, apart from the fact that this propaganda had such an
16 effect on the morale of our combatants, tell me, at that time were you
17 also faced with propaganda the purpose of which was to scare one's own
18 people and were there any ideas on relocating people and what sort of
19 attitude did the 3rd Corps have towards such attempts, if there were such
20 attempts, such attempts to affect one's own people and to ensure that
21 one's own people moved to other areas?
22 A. Well, I've just said that the HDZ policy was to divide Bosnia.
23 They wanted their own ethnically pure territory in the first stage, and I
24 don't know what their intentions were after that, for the next stage.
25 In their propaganda, they suggested that humane relocations of
1 the population be carried out and that the population of Croatian
2 ethnicity on territories not belonging to the so-called Herceg-Bosna
3 should be peacefully relocated and they would also relocate the Muslim
4 population, as they called it. Today it would be called the Bosniak
5 population. And thus there would be an exchange of ethnic populations.
6 As this was not successful, they expelled our people from their homes by
7 burning and looting, and of course people fled to Zenica and other areas
8 where they were not under such severe threat from the HVO.
9 The command of the 3rd Corps kept explaining and in all its
10 orders to all units, it insisted on a humane and proper attitude toward
11 the population, their property, their houses of worship, their religious
12 leaders and priests, and we were always trying to prove that we could live
13 together and that Bosnia as an internationally recognised country was a
14 Bosnia belonging to three equal peoples, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, and
15 that only such a Bosnia could survive. We did everything in our power in
16 this respect, even though our own men often held it against us and
17 wondered why we were giving away to such an extent, why we were behaving
18 like this when they were not behaving in the same way. And our commander
19 in all his statements kept explaining that this was how it had to be, that
20 we wanted a unified Bosnia in the spirit of the Presidency's platform, and
21 that's how we behaved.
22 Q. Mr. Kadric, have you ever heard of Anto Valenta?
23 A. Yes, I have heard of Anto Valenta. I think I met him personally.
24 Because for a time he was a member of a commission in Busovaca which was
25 established after the agreement was signed. I don't know whether it was
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 on the 28th of January, 1993. And I think he was one of the ideologues
2 who proposed these so-called humane relocations, or he was a spokesman for
3 the HDZ policy. And I know him personally. But he's a man who doesn't
4 say much but does what he wants to do.
5 Q. I will now ask you to look at document number 6. This is a
6 document addressed to Mr. Thebault. Do you know who Mr. Thebault was?
7 A. I think he was a European monitor: I'm not sure, but I think he
9 Q. This is a document sent by Anto Valenta to Mr. Thebault. And
10 would you please take a look at it. Is this the platform of the
11 so-called humane relocations that you have just mentioned?
12 A. I think this is it, and I think that this is the HDZ policy. I
13 haven't seen this document before. I don't have time to read it all. But
14 what I can see at a glance is that yes, this is it. The Vance-Owen Plan
15 had to be carried out and all three ethnic groups would have their
16 provinces in which they would constitute the majority. That was the goal.
17 Q. Thank you. As you have said that the army wanted Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina to remain as the joint homeland of all the peoples that had
19 lived there for centuries, would you please look at the document numbered
20 8. That's DH162. And please tell me whether this is one of the documents
21 reflecting the way in which the 3rd Corps treated the issue of the
22 coexistence of all ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina in their own homes,
23 of all three peoples, that is.
24 A. This is a document drawn up by the command of the 3rd Corps on
25 the 18th of June, 1993. It says for example: "We have information that
1 the global political goal of the group around Mate Boban, after the
2 political defeat of his concept about the so-called Herceg-Bosna as an
3 exclusive national state, the creation of such a situation on the ground
4 primarily in terms of demographics, which would make the implementation of
5 the peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina impossible and serve as a pretext
6 for its division along ethnic lines," and so on and so forth. The
7 commander then orders --
8 Q. Very well. Thank you. If I understood you correctly, this was
9 one of the ways in which the policy of the 3rd Corps was expressed in
10 relation to all the nations and the right of all people to remain in their
12 A. Precisely so.
13 Q. You have recently spoken about what you did in the area of
14 information. What means did you use to pass on information to your
15 subordinate units and soldiers but also to inform the public? What sort
16 of media did you have at your disposal?
17 A. Well, we used various means. An important one was press
18 conferences, which the information and propaganda service held based on
19 information arriving in the operative centre, based on information
20 arriving from our units or, rather, our organs in the units, and based on
21 information we collected from other competent organs, such as the Security
22 Services Centre. We organised press conferences from time to time to
23 inform the general public of what was happening, what was being done, and
24 what was happening on the ground. These press conferences, sometimes the
25 representatives of the command took part in them. I remember one of the
1 first press conferences took place when the commander of the 3rd Corps
2 explained to the public that the 3rd Corps had been established and
3 introduced some of the staff officers and explained what their tasks were.
4 Then when Jasmin Jaganjac, Ante Prkacin, and other officers
5 arrived working on a link-up between the HVO and the army, we introduced
6 that to the public as well. Communiques were another method of
7 promulgating information. In the 3rd Corps, we printed the patriotic
8 newspaper, Patriotski List. That was a newspaper which presented what the
9 situation in the country was, what the activities of our president were,
10 what was happening in the subordinate units, what was positive, what was
11 negative, the anniversary of our recognition. But we also spoke about
12 negative phenomena.
13 Q. You mentioned communiques for the public. On the basis of which
14 were these public communiques drawn up? Who drafted them? And to what
15 extent did the corps commander have to know this information and to what
16 extent did he influence the contents of these communiques?
17 A. The communiques were in most cases drafted by journalists, people
18 who are professionals in the field, and these communiques were published
19 on the basis of certain information. For example, I remember a communique
20 when Mr. Zivko Totic was kidnapped or abducted - I don't know what term to
21 use - and our press centre in the 3rd Corps immediately issued a public
22 communique condemning this act. When preparing these communiques, I
23 sometimes participated in their drafting. The commander participated only
24 when we quoted him directly, because we wanted him to authorise our
1 In the majority of cases, however, these were professionals from
2 the press centre who on the basis of the global platform and our ideas
3 drafted these communiques.
4 Q. In addition to the Patriotski List in which you published
5 information, did you also include in this newspaper information on
6 negative events and occurrences in the army and was the aim to develop a
7 patriotic consciousness among the men?
8 A. Yes. Most of the contents were affirmative, positive, in order
9 to strengthen morale, to strengthen motivation for combat. Because I have
10 to say that as the war went on and as we began to lose faith that the
11 International Community would do anything to stop the conflict, the men
12 and the soldiers started asking, "What is the nature of this war? We want
13 Bosnia. Others don't want it. What's going on?" They were simply lost,
14 confused. We had to inform them. We had to tell them that we had to
15 trust our -- ourselves, to rely on ourselves and our own forces, and lead
16 Bosnia to freedom. On the other hand, everyone knew what the code of
17 behaviour was for members of the army and where there were negative
18 occurrences, we mentioned them. I have to mention that apart from the
19 Patriotski List, all our subordinate units had their photographers, their
20 reporters, journalists, and they had their internal bulletins which wrote
21 about the life and work of their unit. This was another form of form of
22 spreading information and propaganda.
23 Q. Mr. Kadric, as you mentioned these communiques, would you please
24 look at the document under tab 13 and then documents under tabs 14, 15,
25 and 16. The document under 13 is number 1372. Would you please tell us
1 whether you recognise this document and whether this is one of the
2 documents in which you evaluate the -- the state of combat morale in the
4 A. This is a document of the command of the 3rd Corps, the Sector
5 for Morale and Information, Propaganda, and Religious Matters. This is an
6 evaluation of the combat morale in the 3rd Corps. We know that morale is
7 one of the most significant elements of combat readiness because if the
8 mood and motivation of the men is not good, if they are not well armed, if
9 the manpower levels are not up to the -- those required, they will not be
10 able to carry out their tasks.
11 Q. Would you please look at page 7 of this document, line 3, and
12 tell us what extent the policy of the 3rd Corps was for all those who
13 failed to respect the law and obey orders had to be prosecuted and how
14 important was this policy for the morale of the men.
15 A. In this information, we had a summary of the morale situation in
16 all the units and we proposed certain measures which were to be
17 incorporated in other orders. And as there are not many, let me read out
18 what these measures were: "Urgently seek a solution to improve the social
19 status of the men and their families." I've already explained the
20 importance of social status.
21 Secondly: "Speed up the establishing and strengthening of
22 military fellowship, military discipline, and a soldierly turnout among
23 the soldiers."
24 Thirdly: "Tighten up disciplinary and criminal punishments of
25 soldiers who violate the norms of behaviour and the military code of the
1 Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
2 "Ensure equal treatment -- or rather, ensure that the organs of
3 the civilian authorities execute the tasks within their competence."
4 These are measures that we proposed.
5 Q. Mr. Kadric, would you please look at the following documents,
6 document 0859, under tab 14; 1159, under 15; and 1131, under number 16.
7 You mentioned communiques. Without entering into the content, please tell
8 us, are these communiques issued by your press centre, which was part of
9 your sector? Are these the communiques that you spoke about at some
11 A. Yes, these are the press statements issued by the press centre of
12 the 3rd Corps.
13 Q. Mr. Kadric, apart from these issues of information, evaluating
14 morale, raising morale, developing patriotism, and so on and so forth, and
15 resolving issues of social welfare, what else did your sector deal with?
16 What other matters did it deal with?
17 A. The Sector for Morale, Information, and Propaganda Activity and
18 Religious Matters also dealt, as its name says, with other matters, with
19 the organisation and functioning of religion. From April 1994 I think we
20 also dealt with the exchange of prisoners of war. We also organised
21 cultural and entertainment activities. All these were issues that this
22 sector dealt with, and they all had one single goal, and that was to
23 inform, to strengthen patriotism, and to protect the image of our members,
24 to have it as we wished it to be and as it was prescribed in the
1 Q. You said that you dealt with issues of exchange. Why did you
2 begin dealing with issues of exchange? Who did this? And in what manner
3 were these issues dealt with?
4 A. I think that Their Honours and all of us know that after the
5 start of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina a state commission
6 was established which had its lower-level commissions at district or
7 municipal level. As we were the military, we called them civil
8 commissions. And these civil commissions were duty-bound to keep track of
9 and exchange both the bodies of those who had been killed, soldiers and
10 civilians, and to exchange these. The army was probably not satisfied
11 with the efficiency of these commissions when it came to exchanges of
12 members of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most often we received the
13 bodies of those who had been killed. And in the prisoner of war camps on
14 both sides, there was torture and the conditions were very difficult, and
15 there was enormous pressure exerted on us by the families of these
16 soldiers. So it was decided that at the army level we should also set up
17 a commission for exchange.
18 On the 21st of April, 1993, I think, a commission for exchange
19 was established within the 3rd Corps and the president of this commission
20 entered into the Sector for Information, Propaganda, Morale, and Religious
21 Matters. They worked in the spirit of what had been regulated and in
22 cooperation with the civilian commissions.
23 Q. Mr. Kadric, under section Roman III, "exchange," in these
24 documents, would you please look at the documents under tabs 1 and 2, and
25 would you please tell me whether these are the documents marking the
1 beginning of the work of this commission dealing with prisoners of war.
2 It's a bit hard to find this, Roman III.
3 Q. At the top, you have these cover pages separating the various
5 A. I found it. I found it.
6 Q. Will you please look at documents in tabs one and two -- 1 and 2.
7 The first is DH163/1. It's handwritten. The second one is number 1447.
8 A. Yes. These are the documents
9 Q. Please tell me, Mr. Kadric: You said that you cooperated with
10 the state commission in carrying out these tasks. Tell me, how did you
11 cooperate? What problems did you come across in order to ensure the
12 exchange of soldiers of the army who had been killed or imprisoned?
13 A. When it came to the exchange of prisoners of war or bodies of
14 soldiers, we had a lot of problems. First of all, we had to ensure that
15 we had precise lists of these prisoners of war and the bodies. We had to
16 collate these lists with those of the state commission. We had to create
17 the conditions for exchange. We had to have direct and immediate
18 cooperation with the International Red Cross. And when all these elements
19 had been agreed on, then an exchange was carried out somewhere and we had
20 to secure the area. We had to secure a cease-fire, we -- transport, a
21 medical corps. And when all this was done, then an exchange would take
22 place. There were occasions -- several occasions when we negotiated an
23 exchange that did not take place. I will recall only one of these.
24 In January 1993, when the first agreement was signed with the
25 HVO, we agreed in that agreement that there should be not only a
1 cease-fire but also an exchange of all prisoners of war. And this was to
2 take place right away, immediately at Kacuni, at the bridge, where there
3 was an UNPROFOR checkpoint. However, no lists were forthcoming from the
4 HVO, and I think that Mr. Fleming then said that the 3rd Corps had
5 complied with the agreement, delivered all the lists, the International
6 Red Cross had received the lists. But the HVO was late, so the exchange
7 took place later on. And there are other examples like this.
8 Q. As far as this pressure on the state commission is concerned and
9 you had to agree to certain things with the other party with which you
10 were involved in an exchange, if there was such pressure, tell us what
11 sort of pressure was at stake.
12 A. Well, when an HVO soldier or member of the Army of Republika
13 Srpska who -- whom we used to see before the war in Zenica, if he crossed
14 over to the other side after the conflict, they would then mention the
15 first and last name of people for exchanges. Our commission only had to
16 exchange army members, soldiers. But on a number of occasions, we also
17 had to inform women and children in exchanges, mothers, the sisters, and
18 daughters of those officers. They would say -- or they would set certain
19 conditions. They would say, "If you want these five officer, give me,
20 Marija, Zdravka, Kata, et cetera, et cetera, otherwise there will be no
21 exchange." Since we knew what the conditions were like in the camps,
22 those camps, and since the families of those captured men kept exerting
23 pressure, we agreed with the state commission to compile lists and we were
24 forced to get involved in such exchanges. We had to do this; otherwise,
25 we would have had problems with our members, with our army members whose
1 brothers or family members were detained over there. We wouldn't know
2 whether they would be coming or not. So this was a problem that really
3 burdened the work of the commission.
4 Q. You mentioned cooperation with the International Red Cross. Tell
5 me, within your sector were measures taken to explain the necessity of
6 respecting the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law? Was
7 this explained to units and soldiers? And if so, how did you do this?
8 A. Well, I can say that most of the officers of the ABiH were
9 active-duty officers from the former JNA or members of the Territorial
10 Defence who had completed certain school, some training courses. At these
11 courses, they were informed of the Geneva Conventions and they studied the
12 Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. I'm not sure about
13 this, but I don't think we had copies of the Geneva Conventions at the
14 beginning, so we weren't able to provide them to our subordinate units,
15 but all the orders from our commanders for any activities were used so
16 that we could also specify how prisoners of war, the civilian population
17 or -- or property and religious buildings and member of the clergy should
18 be treated. We specified the treatment in these orders.
19 I remember that when the fighting started in May or June - I
20 don't know the exact time - I know that commanders informed in a
21 particular document that if there was combat towards Kraljevo and
22 Sutjeska, it was necessary to protect the monument in Kraljevo -- the
23 monastery in Kraljevo and Sutjeska. Two soldiers did something stupid.
24 They were brought in. They were punished. They had stolen things from a
25 vehicle. They had stolen a vehicle and some items. They were punished.
1 The monastery was saved and there were no problems after that. I think
2 that the corps command did everything it could to avoid unfortunate
3 incidents. I don't know whether we were successful in doing that, but we
4 did punish crimes and misdemeanours that were detected.
5 Q. Thank you. Could you now have a look at the documents after
6 section -- after number 3, 4, and 5 and 6 and tell me whether these
7 documents are documents used for that purpose too, used for the purpose to
8 inform the combatants of the law and of the necessity of protecting
10 A. Yes. On the 26th of June, 1993 from the Supreme Command Staff we
11 received an extract from the criminal law or, rather, a decree law on
12 adopting the criminal law on war crimes against the civilian population.
13 This is in fact part of the Geneva Convention. And if anyone failed to
14 respect these laws, that person would be punished. We provided this
15 information to all subordinate units in order to ensure that international
16 humanitarian law was respected and in order to ensure that the population
17 and their property were protected.
18 Q. The second document is document number 1695. Tell me, is this
19 also a document that deals with war booty and does it explain to
20 combatants what war booty is? Is it purpose of the document also to
21 protect people and protect property and to prevent individuals from
22 engaging in crimes?
23 A. Yes. This is one of the numerous documents in which the corps
24 commander explained how war booty should be treated, explained the idea of
25 war booty. All this was done in order to ensure that the Geneva
1 Conventions and international humanitarian law were respected.
2 Q. Document number 5 is 0771. Did the corps command just draft
3 orders, or did they also want to be informed about how their orders were
4 being implemented?
5 A. Well, in the army, we say it's easy to draft a law if you don't
6 monitor its implementation and don't take punitive measures, then such
7 orders have no purpose. This is on criminal reports that were filed. In
8 the cases that we had information, the relevant organs would take certain
9 measures against those who violated the rules of conduct.
10 Q. Have a look at the next document, 0971 -- 0917. Does this also
11 concern the measures you took and the 3rd Corps Command to ensure that the
12 laws were respected and to ensure that the rules of war were respected?
13 A. Yes, that's correct.
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since I will now
15 be Muffing on to another subject, I suggest that we have a break now.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Before we have a break,
17 there's perhaps a translation error which could have certain consequences.
18 Page 27, line 11. According to the French translation, I heard
19 the witness say that there were prisoners of war in camps who had been
20 tortured on both sides, and in English this is how it was translated. As
21 you are on your feet, you probably didn't see the transcript.
22 Have a look at page 27, line 11. And if necessary, could you ask
23 the witness to repeat what he said, because we might have a problem.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember what I said. If you
25 like, I could clarify this.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Yes. So which camps were you speaking about? What were you
3 speaking about when you answered my question? Because here it says there
4 were prisoners of war in camps on both sides. Which sides were you
5 talking about? You mentioned the ABiH members.
6 A. We were mentioning -- or we were talking about an exchange here.
7 I said that there was abuse and torture on both sides, but I meant in the
8 camps of the Serbian and Montenegrin army and of the HVO, because that's
9 where there were problems. And on the basis of their requests, we were
10 forced to exchange certain individuals that we shouldn't have exchanged.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It was necessary to
12 clarify this.
13 It is now half past 10.00. We will now have a break, and we will
14 resume at five to 11.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will now resume.
18 You may take the floor.
19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Mr. Kadric, on a number of occasions you said that you were also
21 involved in religious affairs. Could you please tell me: Were there any
22 policies or was there a document in the ABiH that formed the basis for
23 your work in the field of religious affairs and what was your attitude
24 towards members of various religions, individuals of various religions in
25 the ABiH?
1 A. Since the Sector for Morale, Information, Propaganda, and
2 Religious Affairs also had this field to deal with as part of its work and
3 since the citizens of the ABiH had the right work and since the citizens
4 of the ABiH had the right to practice their religion, and members of the
5 ABiH also had the right to express their religious feelings and to
6 practice their religion. The Sector for Morale and Religious Affairs
7 within the Main Staff, we received instructions that we forwarded to all
8 the units and all the units also made it possible for religion to be
9 practiced, to the extent that this was possible. Naturally, later quite a
10 lot of people practiced their religion or did not practice their religion,
11 and this was particularly present with the village population. So we had
12 an official for religious affairs who organised religious life and
13 provided assistance and, when necessary, trained people -- instructed
14 people on how to express their religion.
15 Q. Tell me, was any difference made between ABiH members who had
16 various religions?
17 A. I don't think anyone would say that all religions were not
18 treated equally. Everyone had the right to express their religious
19 feelings as they deemed appropriate. Each people, each nationality could
20 practice their religion.
21 Q. Mr. Kadric, you have also already said that the policies of the
22 3rd Corps were such that special care was taken of religious buildings and
23 members of the clergy. In that field, did the 3rd Corps have policies
24 that differentiated between individuals on the basis of their religion or
25 on the basis of the religious buildings concerned or were all religious
1 buildings and all members of the clergy treated in an identical way?
2 A. The policy of the 3rd Corps Command was the same for all
3 religious buildings, institutions, and for all members of the clergy.
4 There are a number of documents and orders in which the 3rd Corps
5 commander specifies in an item how religious buildings and members of the
6 clergy should be treated. When there are indications that there might be
7 more serious problems, in addition to such an order there is a specific
8 document which issues orders to this effect. And if there were any minor
9 problems, then measures were taken. I mentioned measures taken in
10 Kraljeva Sutjeska, two ABiH members who had stolen a Golf, were
11 punished -- or rather, they were brought in and punished for this offence.
12 Q. Mr. Kadric, with regard to the instructions you received from the
13 Supreme Command Staff, please have a look at a document in section 2,
14 Roman II, entitled "Relation towards religion." That's what it says in
15 English. Have a look at document 1 and could you just tell me whether
16 this is a document that you mentioned when responding to my answer -- my
17 question. This is document P122.
18 A. Yes, that's the document I was referring to.
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 On a number of occasion, when responding to my questions you said
21 that there was a Busovaca Commission. You also mentioned Mr. Fleming, who
22 reported to the Busovaca Commission about certain matters, et cetera. My
23 question is: Were you a member of the Busovaca Commission? And if so,
24 during which period?
25 A. On the 27th of January, 1993 the corps commander formed or sent a
1 group of officers to engage in discussions in Kiseljak with Mr. Blaskic
2 because tension was rising at the time in Busovaca and there were
3 certainly clashes. I also attended the meeting on the 27th together with
4 Mr. Merdan, who was the deputy commander at the time. I don't know who
5 was presiding. I think it was General Simpson, but I'm not sure.
6 At that time meeting, we agreed on certain items, but Mr. Blaskic
7 didn't want to sign the agreement because he had apparently received
8 information according to which a negotiation team of his had been affected
9 somewhere in the Dusina area. They were victims in the Dusina area. When
10 we returned to the corps command on the following day, Mr. Merdan checked
11 the information, verified the information, and realised that it was
12 incorrect. And on the following day, it was said that in Dusina a
13 conflict had broken out but that this information was incorrect. And I
14 believe that the agreement in question was signed on that day. When the
15 truce was agreed on, it was also agreed that a joint commission should be
16 formed with three ABiH members, three HVO members, and with members of the
17 European Community whose duty it was to provide logistics and transport
18 and the headquarters was -- were to be in the Hotel Tisa, or
19 as the Croats called it, Kroatsia [phoen]. It was also agreed that in a
20 few days we should meet to see what was to be done -- and the second
21 meeting was in Kiseljak -- in fact, not in Kiseljak but in Vitez, at the
22 UNPROFOR headquarters. The meeting was presided by Colonel Stewart. I've
23 forgotten to mention that at the last meeting Mr. Blaskic said that since
24 the 3rd Corps commander wasn't present, he wouldn't attend the second or
25 other meeting. He said he would be represented by Mr. Nakic as deputy.
1 And at that second meeting, items of the agreement were specified,
2 returning the units to their initial positions was mentioned. There was
3 the problem of our 305th unit, which was formed in Gornji Vakuf, and
4 naturally there's the issue of exchanging everyone for everyone.
5 At that meeting, I remember that Mr. Fleming said that one group
6 of men went to Dusina and they had seen some people who were scared there.
7 There were some damaged houses. But no reference was made to war crimes
8 having been committed. Similarly, it was stated that the army had
9 obtained lists of all the individuals detained. The HVO had not done this
10 yet. And as a result, it was not possible to carry out an exchange at the
11 time agreed in the Kacuni to Busovaca sector.
12 Q. Mr. Kadric, how long were you a member of the commission and as a
13 member of the commission, did you submit reports to the command -- or
14 rather, to the corps command on what you had been involved in in the
16 A. I was a member of the commission for two or two and a half
17 months, and the task of the commission was to supervise the implementation
18 of the agreement, that is to say, the cease-fire. Its task was also to
19 deal with all other contentious issues. It had such competence. It had
20 to deal with the agreement, with the establishment of joint checkpoints,
21 with free circulation, and in particular with the circulation of vehicles
22 for humanitarian aid. It was also ordered that the road towards Zenica
23 should be opened up, and the HVO always said as a condition of the return
24 of units. I think they mentioned 8.000 Muslim troops who had arrived in
25 Busovaca. So opening up that road took a long time. Establishing joint
1 checkpoints also went slowly. So these are the matters the commission
2 dealt with.
3 As far as the method of work is concerned, in Hotel Tisa we tried
4 to agree on matters on a daily basis. We formed teams. Usually there
5 were three teams. And when they received information or proposals, these
6 teams would go into the field to observe the situation, to make a record
7 of buildings that had been damaged, observe any problems that concerned
8 the cease-fire, et cetera, et cetera. Naturally, every evening this
9 commission sent a report to the corps command. The corps command was
10 informed of our activities, and almost every evening we were taken in
11 personnel carriers to our territory and then to Zenica. And on the
12 following day, the personnel carriers would be waiting for us and they
13 would take us to Busovaca, where we would continue to work according to
14 the plan of the European monitors, or, rather, according to their
16 Q. Mr. Kadric, would you please look at the last section, Roman IV,
17 the Busovaca Commission, and could you please look at documents under tabs
18 4 and 5, and tell me whether this document under tab 4, which is DL681,
19 speaks of the meeting in Vitez you testified about, and whether the
20 document under tab 5, that is, 0713, is one of the reports you were
21 duty-bound to submit.
22 A. Yes, these documents have to do with this commission.
23 Q. My last question, Mr. Kadric, is the following: Did the 3rd
24 Corps and its commander take any measures to implement the entirety of
25 this agreement and what was ultimately its policy in relation to the
1 conflict with the HVO?
2 A. I think that Mr. Fleming's report of the 30th of January, 1993 in
3 Vitez shows that during those few days the corps command took all possible
4 measures and cooperated to the greatest possible extent in order to
5 implement all the points of the agreement.
6 Secondly, I think that it was not at all in the interests of the
7 3rd Corps to raise tensions and escalate conflicts with the HVO because
8 then we would have been in a total blockade if supplies through Croatia
9 had been cut off. As there was an arms embargo, I wonder how we managed
10 to survive at all.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kadric.
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have completed
13 my examination-in-chief.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I will now ask the
15 other Defence team if they have any questions for the witness.
16 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we have no
17 questions for this witness.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Mr. Mundis, you may take the floor.
20 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. The Prosecution has no
21 questions for this witness.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor has no questions
24 for you, sir, nor do the Judges, which means that your testimony of today
25 has just been concluded. We wish to thank you for coming to testify
1 before the Tribunal in The Hague. You have replied to the questions of
2 the counsel who called you to testify. I wish to thank you once again,
3 and on behalf of the Trial Chamber I extend to you my good wishes and wish
4 you a safe return to your country.
5 I will now ask the usher to escort you out of the courtroom.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 [The witness withdrew]
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I assume that the next witness
9 is ready.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Sir, we had envisaged only this
11 witness for today. The second witness is not ready yet. He will be here
12 tomorrow morning. We have two witnesses tomorrow. In the afternoon, I
13 have proofing sessions with these witnesses for tomorrow.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Tomorrow we have
15 witnesses. Tomorrow is Wednesday. And we have one witness remaining for
16 Thursday because we have three witnesses for this week.
17 As we still have time, do you wish to deal with any other topics?
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] We have nothing to raise,
19 Your Honour, apart from tendering the documents we have shown to this
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Can you please tell
22 us what documents these are, because not all the documents in the bundle
23 were used.
24 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] From the first part, we wish to
25 tender the following documents: Tab 2, document 0701; tab 6, document
1 0988; tab 13, document 1372; tab 14, document 1859 -- 0859; tab 15,
2 document 1159; tab 16, document 1131; in section three -- section 3, tab
3 2, document 1447; tab 4, document 1695; tab 5, document 0771. I wish to
4 mention that the document in tab 6 is already an exhibit, DH0917, although
5 this is not marked on our list.
6 In section 4, I tender tab 4, document 0681; and tab 5, document
8 I will tender the following -- or rather, may the following
9 documents be marked for identification.
10 Excuse me just for a moment.
11 [Defence counsel confer]
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] With the assistance of the
13 registry, we have learned that we do have translations for documents 3 and
14 5 in section 1, 0419 and 0879, and therefore we tender these documents
15 also. The translations have already been submitted to the registry, but
16 unfortunately when preparing for today's session I did not have them at
18 Thank you.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Mr. Prosecutor, the Defence has just listed the documents they
21 wish to tender. Have you any objections to these documents which have
22 been identified by the witness?
23 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, we have -- the Prosecution has no
24 objection to the documents being admitted into evidence; however, we would
25 respectfully request an opportunity to review documents 0419 and 0879,
1 which my learned colleague informs English translations are now available.
2 Not having had the benefit of looking at those documents, we would reserve
3 our position with respect to those two documents.
4 The other documents for which we do have translations, we have no
5 objection to those being admitted into evidence at this time.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The solution is
7 to -- is to admit the documents that have not been challenged, and we will
8 mark for identification documents 0419 and 0879 until we hear from the
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
11 We have two categories of documents: The first are those being
12 admitted into evidence, and they will have the following numbers: DH701
13 with English translation DH701/E; DH988 and the translation into English,
14 DH988/E; DH1372 and the English translation, DH1372/E; DH859, with the
15 English translation, DH859/E; DH1159 and the English version, DH1159/E;
16 DH1131 and the English translation, DH1131/E; DH1447, and the English
17 translation, 1447/E, DH of course; DH1695, and the English translation,
18 DH1695/E; DH -- DH771, and the English translation, DH771/E; DH917, and
19 the English translation, DH917/E; DH68 -- DH713, and the English
20 translation, DH713/E.
21 Documents DH419 and DH879 have already been admitted into
22 evidence or, rather, have -- on the 20th of September. They simply have
23 to be marked for identification.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. The
25 Chamber takes note of the numbers of these documents.
1 And now, Mr. Mundis, do you wish to say anything?
2 MR. MUNDIS: Yes, please, Mr. President. Just so that we're
3 clear with respect to tomorrow, I'm looking at the schedule, and according
4 to the list we have there's one witness for tomorrow and two for Thursday.
5 But based on what my learned colleague has informed us, I'm assuming it's
6 the first witness for Thursday that will commence perhaps late tomorrow
7 morning. We'll stay in the same order. Okay.
8 And also, at their earliest convenience if we can be provided
9 with the documents to be used for the remaining three witnesses for this
10 week. We still haven't been notified of -- of documents or exhibits to be
11 used for the rest of this week. We would appreciate that.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Residovic, the Prosecutor
13 wishes to know which documents will be used.
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, by 3.00 p.m. today
15 we will deliver to the Prosecution the list of documents we will use with
16 our second witness, Mr. Ziko. We will not have any documents for the
17 other witnesses that have not already been tendered.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you for this
20 Does the other Defence team have anything to add? No one is
21 asking for the floor.
22 In that case, today's session is adjourned, and we shall continue
23 at 9.00 a.m. tomorrow. Thank you.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.22 a.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 19th day of
1 January 2005 at 9.00 a.m.