1 Thursday, 21 April 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m.
5 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Mr. Court Deputy.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
7 IT-01-48-T, the Prosecutor versus Sefer Halilovic.
8 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. Good morning, ladies and
9 gentlemen. As we planned yesterday, we will spend about a few minutes on
10 the motion for the judicial notice.
11 Ms. Chana, are you in the position to tell us the Prosecution's
12 position on that motion filed by Defence?
13 MS. CHANA: Yes, Your Honour. Good morning. The Prosecution does
14 come bearing a solution to this, Your Honour. What we propose and we have
15 sent to the Defence this morning, the annex A and the annex B to the
16 judicial -- to their adjudicated fact motion and we have put in italics
17 and we give Your Honours a copy, of what we are prepared to agree to,
18 Your Honour. We are not going to -- we do not think the facts as posed by
19 the Defence are suitable for adjudicated facts, but the Prosecution is
20 prepared to -- by agreement to agree on the facts which we have put in
21 italics there.
22 Your Honour, there is nothing to preclude this Chamber under Rule
23 65 ter (H) at the trial phase to do them by agreement, to the extent that
24 no evidence needs to be led by the Defence on the facts that we agree to.
25 Your Honours, they are not capable of being considered adjudicated facts,
1 these are two Trial Judgments, Your Honour, they are not on appeal, and
2 one of the purposes of adjudicated facts is to achieve consistency at the
3 appellate level, and I think the solution is that we agree to the facts,
4 and most of those facts are the ones which are factual finding of the
5 court as opposed to a lot of those facts which are just a retention of
6 the -- of the evidence of the witnesses which I don't think are capable of
7 being considered adjudicated facts. So I have isolated those facts which
8 are findings of the court and I think for the purposes of the Defence,
9 they will be more than adequate and I think this is a sensible solution to
10 this -- the proposal as put forward by the Defence.
11 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
12 Any response? Yes, Mr. Mettraux?
13 MR. METTRAUX: Yes, good morning, Your Honour. As the Prosecution
14 has indicated we received a what seems to be a -- if you want, a
15 counterproposal to our original proposal and we are quite happy with the
16 idea submitted by the Prosecution. I mean, we think that the facts in
17 question would be and could be regarded as adjudicated fact but the
18 solution suggested by our colleague seems to satisfactory indeed. We
19 haven't had the time to go through the whole document carefully but if
20 given some time during the day, we think that we could just sit with the
21 Prosecution and find a solution which would avoid the Chamber having to
22 rule on this issue and I think that the fact identified by the Prosecution
23 are indeed those which the Defence was most interested in having agreed
24 upon or adjudicated upon. So given some time during the day we can
25 certainly find a solution, we believe.
1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much indeed. Of course we will give
2 the Defence sometime to go over those facts. And as for how do we regard
3 those facts, I believe it's just a matter of the formalities, and whether
4 it could be regarded as adjudicated facts or not is another matter but the
5 facts are there. If the parties agree with those facts, we don't care
6 about whether it's -- has already been adjudicated or not. But the other
7 matter is that the motion filed by Defence on the 1st of March, which has
8 been on the table for a long time, and we are very sorry that we haven't
9 got any response during that long period. But anyway, we will see whether
10 we could make a ruling on those facts before the recess. I don't think
11 it's wise for us to leave it further along.
12 Yes, are there any other matters that the parties would like too
13 raise? It seems to me, none.
14 Could we have the witness, please?
15 [The witness entered court]
16 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, Witness.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
18 JUDGE LIU: Did you have a good rest yesterday?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So so.
20 JUDGE LIU: You are not satisfied with your stay in The Hague.
21 Well, we will try our best to let you go home at this weekend, but I
22 cannot promise you anything at this stage. We will do our best. Are you
23 ready to start?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I had to change my hotel
25 last night so that's why.
1 JUDGE LIU: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry to hear that.
2 Yes, Mr. Re, are you ready?
3 MR. RE: Just about.
4 WITNESS: VAHID KARAVELIC [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Examined by Mr. Re: [Continued]
7 MR. RE:
8 Q. There was one thing from yesterday -- General, good morning to
9 you, that I over looked clarifying before one of our breaks. Could we
10 please return to Exhibit P122?
11 There was a question I asked yesterday before there was a break,
12 after there had been a reasonably lengthy objection and some discussion
13 with the Trial Chamber, and that was about the resubordination. What I
14 was asking you was who was -- who was being resubordinated and to whom
15 within that -- by the terms of that order?
16 A. As it states in this order, the Dreznica Battalion was
17 resubordinated to the Zulfikar Brigade, and since it's the plural here
18 they mean all the units from the 1st Corps which arrived or are on the
19 way, and the artillery and their crews -- its crews. And as it states
20 here under item 3, 220-millimetre mortars, 105-millimetre howitzer,
21 276-millimetre cannons, 132-millimetre Howitzer, and launcher rocket
22 system of 107 millimetres. So this is the order under which these units
23 were resubordinated to the Zulfikar Brigade.
24 Q. And on the terms of the order, is it Mr. Halilovic who is
25 resubordinating units from the 1st Corps to the Zulfikar unit?
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I object to that. The face of this document
2 reveals that it's sent from Jablanica on the 6th of -- 6th of September.
3 It appears to be directed to, if you look at the people who it's addressed
4 to, at the back of the document it appears to be addressed to a number of
5 corps and to Sefer Halilovic personally, to him.
6 JUDGE LIU: Well, that will be a major issue, whether this
7 document is Mr. Halilovic's document or is a document to him. Maybe we
8 could make that sure first.
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. On the terms of the document, Mr. Karavelic, who does it appear,
11 from what is written on the document, is doing the resubordinating and
12 from who to who? It is a who-is-doing-what-to-who question.
13 A. First of all, I would like to say again that amongst other things,
14 this also is a question for a military expert. However, since these are
15 very sensitive issues, and I'm here also involved in some way directly or
16 indirectly, and I am stating that openly here before this Tribunal, and in
17 my wish to be as objective as I can be, regardless of who bears how much
18 responsibility, I can comment on that. Could I just see the bottom part
19 of the document?
20 I think that that's how it was, and that is that a team or a group
21 of officers -- I wouldn't call it a forward command post or an inspection
22 team or so on, they will -- it will be determined what that was, headed by
23 General Sefer Halilovic, and it's a fact that at the time they were in the
24 Neretva River valley. Of course, due to numerous various circumstances,
25 they were not able to install and form their own separate communication
1 centre, which, from a military point of view, was possible to do, but on
2 the other hand, there was no need if they could use one of the existing
3 communication centres, such as, for example, in this case, the 6th Corps
4 communication centre. Why double the resources is the already-existing
5 means of communication or the 6th Corps communication centre could be used
6 for their own purposes? That is why the 6th Corps communication centre
7 was used, of the 6th Corps Command, and all communication by General Sefer
8 Halilovic and the members of his team, in terms of receiving and sending
9 documents, were dispatched and received through the 6th Corps command
10 communication centre, and this is quite logical and quite proper from a
11 military point of view.
12 This document, since it states here that it was sent to the Chief
13 of Staff, Sefer Halilovic, personally, it's possible that at that time
14 this document, I assume, since there are no initials down here who drafted
15 the document, very few or practically no document was drafted by
16 General Sefer Halilovic himself. It's not his job to personally draft the
17 documents. He issues general directives and guidelines, instructions, and
18 then, based on that, the assistants, officers, write the orders, each in
19 his own area of responsibility, and depending on the type of combat
20 operations and the type of activity. So the person whose duty was from
21 the team to do so drafted this order. At that moment, Sefer Halilovic was
22 not close by, was not there, and that's why it states here that it is also
23 to be delivered to him personally so that he can see for himself what it
24 says in the document and which units are mentioned and so on, because this
25 is impossible to remember off by heart, the units, the types of weapons
1 and so on. It's not possible to keep them all in mind, the ones that are
2 mentioned in the document.
3 Q. All right. Your view is that probably someone else, not
4 General Sefer Halilovic, actually drafted this document, but in light of
5 your experience, who does it appear on the face of this document is doing
6 the subordinating? I mean, whose order is it?
7 MR. MORRISSEY: I'd object to that again. The document itself
8 makes it clear and the witness's answer makes it clear and the Prosecutor
9 is having a second try now at something he didn't get before, and I
11 MR. RE: I press the question because my question is a different
12 one to the one the witness answered. The witness answered about the
13 process. I'm asking him for an opinion as to whose order it appears to be
14 based upon the terms of the document. He hasn't asked that -- he hasn't
15 answered that, and it's certainly within his area of expertise as a very
16 senior army officer to look at this document and say, well, this was
17 whoever. It appears, I don't know but it appears within normal military
18 doctrine to be a document of X or Y or Z. That's all I'm asking for, an
19 opinion as to whose document or who appears to be doing the subordinating
20 and I haven't got to that point. It's not a question of me asking a
21 question to an answer I didn't like the answer to. I didn't get the
22 answer at all to that particular question. So I press it.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, if that's the new question
24 then I object to it because the witness has said that he doesn't have the
25 expertise and that it should take a proper expert who has had the chance
1 to properly prepare and see all the documents before making -- giving such
2 an opinion. My friend says he's plainly got the expertise. The witness
3 appears to say that he hasn't. And I object to the witness being asked to
4 give opinions on the run. He may be capable of having the expertise if
5 he's given the chance, but at the moment he thinks he hasn't and the
6 Defence thinks he hasn't and we object accordingly.
7 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe that the witness has already answered
8 the question. Of course there is some problems concerning this document
9 and there are different views between the two parties. The next work will
10 leave to the Bench's judgement. We will consider the document as well as
11 the testimony of this witness and we'll come to a conclusion on that.
12 Mr. Re, would you please skip this question?
13 MR. RE: Could I please move to document P270.
14 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm sorry to trouble the Prosecutor here but my
15 eyes are missing the 65 ter number of that. Could I just inquire what
16 that --
17 MR. RE: 78.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, I'm grateful, thank you.
19 MR. RE:
20 Q. That's a document dated the 25th of September 1993, under the
21 letterhead of the 2nd Independent Motorised Battalion. It's addressed to
22 the 1st Corps Command, is a report from the field for the period of 7th of
23 September to the 20th of September and is signed by Zakir Okovic and Adnan
24 Solakovic. Have a look at this document, you said yesterday you needed
25 assistance with looking at documents to remind you of the dates of the
1 return from the field of the various units, including this one. Have you
2 seen or do you remember seeing this document in 1993?
3 A. I don't remember.
4 Q. Does reading this document assist you on the dates of the dispatch
5 of the 2nd Independent Battalion to Jablanica and their return from the
7 A. It states in the document that they left on the 8th of September
8 That's what it says on the -- in the second passage in this document. And
9 then at the end of the document, it says that they returned the last day,
10 that was the 19th or the 20th of September 1993.
11 Q. Do you have any reason to question the accuracy of those dates?
12 A. I don't.
13 Q. What about the other two brigades? That's the 9th and the 10th.
14 What can you say about the time when they departed in respect to the -- in
15 relation to the dates in this document, which is the 8th of September
16 1993, when it says the 2nd went to Jablanica. When did the 9th and the
17 10th go? Was it the same time or days earlier or days later?
18 A. I'm afraid that I could make a mistake. It's hard to remember all
19 the dates but I think that those two companies from the 9th and the 10th
20 Brigades left a few days before this unit from the 2nd Independent
21 Battalion, and that also they returned - I think, but I'm not sure; we
22 would need to check the documents - that they returned to Sarajevo a
23 little later, after the units from the 2nd Independent Battalion.
24 Q. Now, did you issue -- did you issue orders to parts of the 9th and
25 the 10th to return to Herzegovina later that month, after they had
1 returned to Sarajevo?
2 A. I would need to check my orders issued after General Sefer
3 Halilovic issued the order of the 23rd of September to form the new unit
4 from the battalion which I was supposed to send down there. I don't -- to
5 see whether a unit from the 10th Mountain Brigade was a part of that or
6 not. I'm not sure.
7 Q. What do you mean you would need to check your orders?
8 A. To see in the orders which units were part of this new unit, this
9 battalion, so that I could send it there, in accordance with the orders of
10 the 23rd of September by the order by General Sefer Halilovic, as I said.
11 I don't know just like that, off the top of my head, which units I used in
12 order to form this new battalion. I don't know which -- the brigades that
13 these companies came from. I don't know.
14 Q. If you looked in your orders, that would tell you, would it?
15 A. Of course.
16 Q. Where would we find these orders, Mr. Karavelic?
17 A. In the archives of the federation of the army -- of the Army of
18 the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 Q. And when was the last time you saw copies of these orders,
20 Mr. Karavelic?
21 A. I did see them. I can't say when. Recently, recently. Often
22 parts of documents -- I have actually copies of some documents in my own
23 personal archive.
24 Q. Well, do you have any of those documents here with you in court
25 today relating to orders to units to travel to Herzegovina?
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Just a moment. Your Honours, we have a 65 ter
2 list and documents that the Prosecutor is proposing to ask questions
3 about. Now the Prosecutor doesn't just fly blind, doesn't just make up
4 questions as they go along. I don't know what my learned friend has in
5 mind here. If he's referring to documents that we've got, that have been
6 provided to us by the Prosecutor in the proper way, that's one thing. And
7 if there are documents that we know nothing about that the Prosecutor is
8 trying to bring into evidence, that's quite another thing. Now, I don't
9 wish to embarrass anyone in court, well, I'll say no more about it. The
10 Prosecutor ought to indicate what the possible relevance of these
11 questions is and why it's being pursued in the way it has.
12 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Yes, I think that's a reasonable request. And
13 Mr. Re, would you please clarify this matter?
14 MR. RE: I'll withdraw the question. I'll move to another area.
15 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
16 MR. RE:
17 Q. Mr. Karavelic, I want to ask you about conversations you had with
18 Mr. Halilovic in relation to his order of the 23rd of September, that's
19 P389. That was the order asking you to form a company of soldiers to the
20 Vrdi front.
21 A. Battalion.
22 Q. I want to ask you about a conversation with Mr. Halilovic on the
23 22nd of September 1993. Were you aware whether your telephone was tapped
24 in 1993, whether people were intercepting your telephone calls?
25 A. If I say that I knew 100 per cent, the next question will be how
1 come I knew? I don't have any firm arguments in this respect. But I can
2 say that I did know, because, as corps commander, my conversations were
3 monitored all the time. I became sure of that after a few situations, but
4 I wasn't bothered by the fact.
5 Q. What about Mr. Halilovic's telephone? Were you aware whether his
6 telephone was intercepted at the same time yours was?
7 A. Well, I didn't know that, but if my conversations were
8 intercepted, as I was corps commander, then it is only logical to expect
9 that General Sefer Halilovic's conversations were intercepted, too.
10 Q. Do you know who was intercepting your telephone conversations,
11 which organisation?
12 A. At any rate, the service of the Ministry of the Interior.
13 Q. Did -- do you remember speaking to Mr. Halilovic about Caco and
14 Celo on the 22nd of September 1993?
15 A. I do not remember that specifically. I don't know what you mean
16 actually. As I say, there were conversations, so if you remind me, I'll
17 tell you.
18 Q. Did Mr. Halilovic request to see Caco and Celo?
19 MR. MORRISSEY: If my friend wants to ask leading questions, then
20 he shouldn't, and I object to it. But Your Honours, there is another
21 issue that has to be raised here, I'm not sure -- no, I'll wait until my
22 learned friend goes further. But I object to that question. There is to
23 be no leading.
24 MR. RE: The witness specifically asked me to remind him about a
25 particular conversation. That's the one I want him to testify about.
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, it's still objectionable. There
2 might have been such a conversation, there might not have been such a
3 conversation. And it's not for my friend to give evidence from the bar
4 table that there was such a conversation. Now, in my respectful
5 submission, it's just a leading question and it's not permitted. Even if
6 the witness did ask.
7 MR. RE: Well, the witness could answer no, he could say "yes,"
8 "no," "I don't know," "I don't remember."
9 JUDGE LIU: Maybe you could ask a more general question, for
10 instance, in the conversation, whether Caco or Celo were mentioned or
12 MR. RE:
13 Q. Was there a conversation between you and Mr. Halilovic in which
14 Caco and Celo were mentioned on the 22nd of September 1993?
15 A. It is hard for me to say whether it was on the 22nd of September.
16 Given the time distance, I cannot recall whether I had a conversation on
17 the 22nd of September with Sefer Halilovic. I can say that I did have
18 conversations and in these conversations those two men had been referred
19 to. It is possible that it was on the 22nd of September, but how can I
20 say now?
21 Q. In September? After the troops returned from -- after the 9th and
22 the 10th returned from Sarajevo, that's what I -- that's what I -- sorry,
23 returned from Jablanica.
24 A. So by then, the unit of the 2nd Independent Battalion had
25 returned. Now, whether at that moment the companies from the 9th and 10th
1 had returned or not is something I cannot say just off the cuff. I don't
2 know the exact date, whether they returned by then, but it is that time.
3 Q. What did Mr. Halilovic want from you, if he indeed wanted anything
4 from you? What did he say to you?
5 A. Probably to have the units sent again, to speed up the process of
6 preparing the unit, things like that.
7 Q. Which units?
8 A. Well, that battalion, and its establishment had been requested. I
9 think that in his order of the 23rd of September, there is no
10 concretisation in terms of what unit is involved but only the number of
11 soldiers involved, as opposed to the first order of the 2nd of September
13 Q. What did he say to you when you contacted him or when he contacted
14 you about which units he wanted to go back to Herzegovina? That is in
15 response to his order of the 23rd of September?
16 MR. MORRISSEY: Once again it's a leading question. Your Honours,
17 in my respectful submission -- no. Actually I withdraw the objection.
18 MR. RE:
19 Q. All right. The objection is gone. Please answer the question.
20 A. It's hard for me to be precise in giving an answer. I cannot
21 recall all the details of the conversation. It's hard.
22 Q. No one expects you to. I mean, I couldn't recall it. No one here
23 expects you to. It's the impression, it's what you remember, the
24 impression of what he said to you. Not the exact words. No one would
25 ever, ever ask you to say what the exact words were, unless it was
1 extremely specific.
2 A. Well, your question was whether he had asked for units from the
3 9th and 10th again, if I understood your question correctly. I don't
4 recall that that is exactly what he had asked for yet again. I really
5 cannot remember.
6 Q. I want you to look at a document, number 63 ter 101, which is
8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 390.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Excuse me, Your Honours, there is an objection to
10 this. Your Honours, I just want it to inquire of the Prosecutor, is this
11 what's being shown now, something that purports to be a transcript of a
12 telephone conversation?
13 JUDGE LIU: It seems to me it is.
14 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes. Well, at the moment, the Prosecutor would
15 need to indicate what the source of this is, and whether the chain of
16 custody is properly established, and who the transcript is supposed to be
17 proved through.
18 JUDGE LIU: We have not started yet. I believe that the
19 Prosecution will lead us to that area.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, well that may be so, Your Honours, but in
21 showing the document to -- well, no perhaps you're right, Your Honour,
22 sorry, perhaps -- Your Honour is always right. So, I'm sorry. I didn't
23 mean to say it in those terms. I'll wait until he's read it.
24 MR. RE:
25 Q. I want you to have a look at that document, Mr. Karavelic. It --
1 on its face it's a the transcript of a telephone conversation between you
2 and Mr. Halilovic, with the date of the 22nd of September 1993. Now, what
3 I want you to do is to look at it and to tell us whether that accords with
4 the information -- whether the information there accords with a
5 conversation, a telephone conversation you had with Mr. Halilovic?
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I object to that again. There is the same
7 problem we had yesterday, Your Honours. If the witness doesn't bring the
8 document into being himself, then he can't be asked to refresh his memory
9 from it. Now, you remember my learned friend's banana submission
10 yesterday. This is another banana, frankly, and I object to it. It's
11 just not a possible thing to ask the witness to do, to refresh his memory
12 from something that he didn't himself create. Perhaps he could be asked
13 if he created this record and then we could go forward.
14 MR. RE: The objection is legally nonsense, it's nonsense. It is
15 absolute nonsense.
16 JUDGE LIU: Well, well, well, well, let's not come to this
17 argument. I believe that, first of all, you have to ask this witness to
18 read the contents of the document. Then you ask whether that will refresh
19 his memory that he had a conversation with Mr. Halilovic on the 22nd
20 September 1993.
21 MR. RE:
22 Q. Have you read it yet, Mr. Karavelic?
23 A. First of all, it's very hard to read this. I can just read part
24 of it.
25 Q. Would a paper copy assist you? I can provide you with a paper
1 copy, if it's easier to read.
2 A. Certainly. Is there a copy in English? Can I try to read it in
3 English, if there is no Bosnian copy?
4 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, while the witness is reading that,
5 perhaps I should raise a matter of general interest about these
6 transcripts. I'll do it in neutral terms because the witness is present.
7 As I understand it, there is a number of transcripts the Prosecutor wants
8 to tender. I thought that based upon indications in the past, that these
9 transcripts would be ultimately tendered through a witness with another
10 name, another witness, who is coming later. And it's important that there
11 just be some consistency about it. I don't want to put the Prosecution in
12 a difficult position now because the witness is here of course, and it's
13 not fair to the Prosecutors to say, well, he has to wait until that
14 witness has come to authenticate it, all these transcripts. But at the
15 same time, it raises a real issue for us on the Defence side because we
16 may want to object to some of these transcripts. There may be questions
17 of the legality of how they were obtained and so on, and using transcripts
18 like there, if they were obtained illegally, is something that the
19 Tribunal would have -- at least be required to have some thoughts about,
20 whether you decided to admit them in the end would be a matter for you --
21 for your discretion. Now, I'm not being critical of the Prosecution at
22 all in this regard, the witness is here and they have to deal with this
23 matter now, but the Defence also has a problem because by agreeing to or
24 taking a stance in respect of one document, we then might --
25 JUDGE LIU: What is your suggestion?
1 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, my suggestion is perhaps this little part of
2 the -- of the cross-examination be deferred - it's only a suggestion - be
3 deferred until the next break. It might be then that I could speak to my
4 learned friend and another counsel from the Prosecutor who are dealing
5 with these matters. It's not something I ask to you do now, but I think
6 it better be raised now because otherwise to protect my position I'll have
7 to take lengthy objections to this document, which may not be the
8 appropriate document to do it with. I'm sorry, perhaps I'm being a bit
9 obscure but I don't want to go into the facts with the witness here, as
10 Your Honours might understand.
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, of course. In every case, there will be a
12 dispute between the parties concerning of the so-called tapped
13 conversations. I believe that is quite normal. My suggestion is that we
14 go along with this witness concerning with this document, because this
15 piece of document was a conversation between himself and Mr. Sefer
16 Halilovic. Unless there is some evidence that this document is obtained
17 illegally, we will allow the use of this document in the courtroom. It's
18 applicable to all this kind of documents. As for whether we should admit
19 it or not, we might do it all together, concerning all those intercepts in
20 the future during which both parties are free, especially Defence, to file
21 a submission explaining their positions in details. Is it agreeable to
22 the parties?
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, if our position is protected, that's
24 appropriate, Your Honour. Yes, thank you.
25 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
1 MR. RE:
2 Q. Mr. Karavelic, you've put it down, have you read the -- the
3 English of it?
4 A. Yes. I've read the first page and a half, until the following two
5 interlocutors. I mean, I don't think this has anything to do with me.
6 Q. No, it doesn't. Having read that, does that refresh your memory
7 as to a conversation you had with Mr. Halilovic in which Caco and Celo
8 were mentioned?
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I'm sorry, I have to repeat the
10 objection from before. It's not appropriate to have the witness refresh
11 his memory from a document that he didn't create. And I think I should
12 add some legal substance to this. It's always the case in common law
13 systems that before a witness is entitled to refresh his memory from a
14 document, it has to be proved that he made the document, that the events
15 were fresh in his memory at the time he made the document, that the
16 document was -- that the information in the document was accurate, at the
17 time, and that he has recently refreshed his memory from it. Those are
18 the four preconditions in every common law jurisdictions, as my learned
19 friend must know. But if there needs to be a submission filed about this
20 we'll do that because that's clearly the law and everyone knows it.
21 That's the first thing.
22 It may be appropriate to get a witness to comment upon the
23 contents of a particular document, as the witness has done. And as I've
24 said all along no objection to him saying what he remembers, no objection
25 to him offering - if it's appropriate to do so - a comment about
1 something. But to try to effect his memory with a document he may never
2 have seen, and my friend hadn't even asked him that yet, that he may never
3 have seen is not permissible. So I object to the question.
4 JUDGE LIU: Well, I'm afraid that I could not agree with you,
5 because during the previous testimony, this witness said that he had
6 conversations with Mr. Sefer Halilovic during that period. The problem is
7 that he could not remember the exact date and time, he could not remember
8 the exact contents of that conversation. So in this way, this is the
9 basis for the Prosecution to put this document to him, try to refresh his
10 memory of that particular day. I don't think there is any problem on
11 that, Mr. Morrissey.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I won't -- I won't -- I'll say
13 one more thing about it, if I may, and that will be the last comment I
14 make about it, but my objection is not to what Your Honour has raised, but
15 it's different to that. My objection is that in assisting his memory, you
16 can't show him something that he doesn't know if it's accurate, true or
17 not, that he's never seen. Now the Prosecutor could ask him, have you
18 seen this before? Is it accurate? If it is, does it refresh your memory?
19 But to put it in front of him after 11 years when it may be, I don't know
20 yet because the question hasn't been asked, but it may be that he's never
21 seen this before or only recently, and he's not in a position to verify
22 whether it's accurate or edited or any of those sort of things. He may
23 not know. He may. If he knows, I'm finished. But if he doesn't know, it
24 may be a matter that is of concern, and in my submission, he ought to be
25 asked that preliminary question before we go any further. That's as far
1 as I will add to my submission.
2 JUDGE LIU: Yes, yes. Yes, of course. But the question here is
3 not whether he has seen this document before or not. The question is
4 whether he did that conversation or not. As you request, Mr. Re, you may
5 ask a question about whether this witness has seen this document, I mean
6 that piece of paper, before or not.
7 MR. RE:
8 Q. Well, apart from me showing it to you last week when I was
9 proofing you, had you ever seen it before?
10 A. Since there is doubt as to whether I have brought this document, I
11 did not bring this document. I first saw it last week here when I arrived
12 in The Hague.
13 Q. All right. What I'm asking you to do is to look at the document,
14 I think you've read it now, and to answer this: Having read it, does it
15 refresh your memory as to a conversation you had with Mr. Halilovic in
16 which Caco and Celo were mentioned? You mentioned earlier in your
17 evidence having such conversations with Mr. Halilovic. Does this
18 particular document refresh your memory as to any conversation you had
19 with him?
20 A. It's very hard for me to be very specific, and to confirm that
21 with any degree of certainty. I cannot say, in view of the many facts
22 referred to in this document, that they did not take me back to that
23 period of time, but to an equal extent, they created confusion in my mind,
24 so it is hard for me to get things in the right order, whether it was all
25 in that conversation or whether it was a mix, whether that was the case or
1 whether that was not the case, it's very hard for me to say anything.
2 Basically, I stand by what I gave by way of an answer before having read
4 Q. Well what do you remember about speaking to Mr. Halilovic in
5 September 1993 after the troops came back from Jablanica?
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, I object to that. That was asked before.
7 Now my friend is putting this document before him and asking it again when
8 the witness has given a clear answer as to the effect of this document and
9 his memory.
10 MR. RE: I actually wasn't. I withdraw that question because I
11 don't want to get into another five minutes of speeches from the other
12 side on this particular issue.
13 Q. Mr. Karavelic, I'm asking you about conversations you had with
14 Mr. Halilovic after the 9th and 10th came back from Jablanica or
15 Herzegovina. I'm specifically asking you about whether Mr. Halilovic at
16 any time requested to see any of those who had been to Herzegovina.
17 A. Do you mean officers or soldiers? I'm sure you mean soldiers -- I
18 mean, I'm sure you mean officers.
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. I think that that document is here too. I first saw it here when
21 I came to The Hague, or was it before that? I need to be reminded on
22 that. There is a document, I don't know the exact date, but it does say
23 in that document when he asked for these people to come for a meeting with
24 him, and they did go to meet him in Sarajevo. That document exists.
25 Q. All right. Who were the people he wanted to meet?
1 A. If we are talking about that document, on that document it says
2 the commander of the 10th Brigade, the deputy commander of the 9th
3 Brigade, and of delta and of the 2nd Independent Battalion respectively, I
4 think that's what it says there.
5 Q. Do you remember Mr. Halilovic asking to meet the commander of the
6 10th, the deputy commander of the 9th, the commander of the delta and the
7 commander of the 2nd Independent Battalion?
8 A. There is a written document which can give you an answer to your
10 Q. Well, my question is whether you remember it. Do you remember him
11 asking to see those people?
12 A. I think that I do remember. I myself signed the document.
13 Q. What sort of document is it? Was it an order?
14 A. I think that it's my order ordering these four officers of mine to
15 report to General Sefer Halilovic's office for a meeting at a certain time
16 and date as stated in the document.
17 Q. And was that after they had all returned to -- returned from
18 Herzegovina and before Operation Trebevic?
19 A. This was certainly before the Trebevic operation, but I cannot say
20 whether all of them had returned up until that point. I really don't know
21 off the top of my head the dates when each of the units returned.
22 Q. How did General Halilovic request of you that they come -- that
23 those four officers come and see him? Was it by telephone or in writing,
24 or in a meeting?
25 A. I really don't remember. I would need to read the document and
1 then I could say more about -- or I could say more, give you an answer, if
2 I could be just -- if I could see the document, then I could refresh my
4 Q. Is the document you're referring to an order you sent to those
5 particular people?
6 A. I just said that. I did give you an answer to that question.
8 Q. And did you send orders to each of those four people to go and
9 meet General Halilovic?
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, sorry, I have an objection there.
11 There seems to be some mystery about the document here. Could I just ask
12 the Prosecutors, are they referring to a document that they have in their
13 possession or not?
14 MR. RE: No.
15 JUDGE LIU: Well, the witness mentioned there is a document first.
16 I also have the question whether this document is in the possession of the
18 MR. RE: The document is not in the possession of the Prosecution,
20 Q. My question was: Did you send written orders to each of those
21 people to go and meet General Halilovic?
22 A. I think that I did.
23 Q. Did those four people, to your knowledge, go and meet
24 General Halilovic?
25 A. I cannot be 100 per cent certain, but I think that they did. I
1 wasn't informed about the outcome. I didn't receive any information about
2 it later. I don't remember.
3 Q. And are you saying that these orders exist in written form?
4 A. In the archives of the army of the federation, yes.
5 Q. When was the last time you saw these orders, Mr. Karavelic?
6 A. Often. If I signed it at the time and issued it, that was when I
7 saw it, and also recently.
8 Q. Which orders did you recently see?
9 A. Amongst others, the ones that we are talking about now.
10 Q. Where did Mr. Halilovic want the meeting with those people to take
11 place? Was it in his office or in some other place?
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I've got a matter of law I think
13 should be raised in the absence of the witness here. I'm sorry to do
14 this, but I think it has to be done now.
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Well, Madam usher would you please show the
16 witness out of the room for a while?
17 [The witness stands down]
18 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey?
19 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, the Prosecutor is asking specific
20 questions about documents here. The Prosecutor has got to explain what
21 they know about these documents and where they think these documents are
22 if they are not in their possession. We are getting indirect evidence
23 about -- about documents. And it's very difficult for the Defence to deal
24 with those and I don't know whether -- frankly, I don't know what the
25 situation is with those, but I'm not in a position to be able to object
1 I'm not in a position to get instructions. I'm not in a position to deal
2 with these matters at the moment and I can't let it proceed any further
3 unless something is done. So I ask the Prosecutors to indicate now where
4 are these documents and what do they know about them, and what's the
5 basis -- my friend must have a basis for asking these questions in quite a
6 close way of the witness. Are there some documents here that we haven't
7 been given, I'm not making any accusations but I need to know what the
8 situation is in order to properly do my job, frankly. So I ask the
9 Prosecutor to explain what the situation is with these documents.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re?
11 MR. RE: The Prosecution has none of these documents in its
12 possession. If it did, it would be using them.
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
14 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, that's not an answer, Your Honour. Where
15 are they? That's what we need to know. I mean the Prosecutor is relying
16 on this issue of possession. We want to know what the situation is. Why
17 are they being questioned about them and why are things proceeding as they
18 are in this mysterious way. I mean, because this raises issues for me,
19 how do I cross-examine this witness about these ghostly documents? It's
20 not an answer to say that I haven't got them. We rather guessed that they
21 didn't have them. I think that would have been obvious. The question is,
22 they know about them, they're questioning about them closely, so where are
24 JUDGE LIU: Well, as I said before, that this witness himself
25 mentioned that document and he testified about the meetings between people
1 coming back from Jablanica with Mr. Halilovic on that day, out of his own
2 memory. Of course, he said that there is a document, and he alleged that
3 this document is in the archive at home. So, Mr. Re, would you please
4 shed us more information about this document? I believe that
5 Mr. Morrissey is eager to get hold of those documents.
6 MR. RE: If we could move into private session for a moment.
7 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we will go to the private session, please.
8 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 JUDGE LIU: And could we have the witness called back?
23 [The witness entered court]
24 MR. RE:
25 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Karavelic. My question before our short
1 break was: Where did Mr. Halilovic request the meeting to take place?
2 Was it in his office or some other place?
3 A. I think that it was in Sarajevo, in his office.
4 Q. All right. I wish to move to another area now. If you just bear
5 with me for one moment.
6 Before I do, just to complete this area, did units of the 9th and
7 10th return to Herzegovina, to Mr. Halilovic, in late September 1993?
8 A. When I received the order of the 23rd of September that I talked
9 about, and following my attempts to form a battalion, as it states in the
10 order, I think I talked about that yesterday, I named the commander and
11 the deputy commander of the battalion, Zijad and Fuad, and because of
12 certain circumstances, I had to appoint other commanders to those duties,
13 a few days passed and as far as I can remember, I think that the units did
14 not go to Jablanica any more, but I am not 100 per cent certain about it,
15 because the operation was suspended quite soon after.
16 Q. You gave some evidence several days ago about the activities of
17 the 9th and the 10th in Sarajevo in 1993. You gave some evidence about --
18 when a cannon was trained upon you and the 1st Mountain Brigade
19 headquarters, when President Izetbegovic thought that Caco's men were
20 firing at the Presidency building. You gave evidence about hearing about
21 the surrounding of a police station, about their refusal to obey orders.
22 What I want you to ask you about is the steps that were taken by the -- or
23 any steps that were taken by the 1st Corps Command in 1993 to do something
24 about what the 9th -- to do something to control the activities of the 9th
25 and 10th.
1 A. I don't know specifically what you're thinking of. Could you
2 please be a little more clear?
3 Q. All right. When you were the deputy commander and then the
4 commander of the 1st Corps, what steps did the corps take to control the
5 activities of the 9th Motorised Brigade and the 10th Mountain Brigade?
6 You've given us evidence about their indiscipline and criminal activities.
7 What steps were taken to -- to control these activities?
8 A. The first measure that was taken was taken already in May or June.
9 There is a document relating to that as well. I don't know if you have it
10 or if it's in the archives of the Federation army. When the first
11 commander of the 1st Corps, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, passed the document on
12 requesting the replacement of a number of officers, brigade commanders and
13 other officers, this document was sent to the Chief of Staff of the
14 Supreme Command, Sefer Halilovic, and I think that this same document was
15 sent to the Supreme Command, and President Izetbegovic, by Sefer
16 Halilovic. Why President Izetbegovic did not do that then, it's hard for
17 me to say. A very similar document was also sent out by me, in an
18 expanded form, with a number of officers and brigade commanders, including
19 the ones that you are talking about. This was in late August or early
20 September, when I drafted this document, and of course sent it to Rasim
21 Delic and Rasim Delic sent it to the Supreme Command and President
22 Izetbegovic. These were the sorts of measures that were being taken. The
23 political leadership did not - I don't know why - take that seriously, and
24 did not take steps to replace these people with a -- I was deeply
25 convinced that the Supreme Command and President Izetbegovic were very
1 well informed about these matters. We were waiting for a plan for the
2 Trebevic operation. Why? Well, I could just give you arbitrary comments
3 but I would rather not go into that. Other steps that were taken, many
4 such steps, attempting to approach these people, to advise them, and to
5 try to bring these people into the system, into a routine called military
6 hierarchy, rules and order, the proper conduct according to military
7 rules. I would need to look at the documents to check, but I think that
8 there was certain disciplinary measures as well. There were also
9 attempts, through various other subjects who could contribute to these
10 activities, to inform these people and to use their skills, their combat
11 abilities, and bravery, in the struggle against the aggressor rather than
12 to dilute these skills and serve the purposes of the aggressor and take
13 away from our own objectives.
14 Q. What did the commander Talijan inform the Supreme Command,
15 Mr. Halilovic, and the Presidency of, in June of 1993?
16 A. He said a lot in the document, and it would be good to have the
17 document here to read it. The document was confirmed by Sefer Halilovic
18 and sent to the Supreme Command, and as I said, to Alija Izetbegovic. He
19 said a lot in the document but I don't know what he said in the
20 conversation with them. He was the commander. I was the deputy, and I
21 rarely had the opportunity to attend talks of Mustafa Hajrulahovic, the
22 1st Corps commander, with Sefer Halilovic, or the Supreme Command as a
23 whole, or only with President Izetbegovic.
24 Q. After you became first -- I withdraw that.
25 Why didn't the 1st Corps commander, Talijan, take steps, positive
1 steps, to try and control these two brigades? That is before you assumed
2 command at the end of July 1993.
3 A. I would need a lot of time to give you a detailed, reasonable
4 answer. The briefest response would be to ask you a question. What could
5 he have done?
6 Q. Well, I don't know. I actually wasn't there. You were. If you
7 could give us a brief answer to the problems confronting him and why
8 there -- why they stopped him doing anything, it would really assist.
9 A. The capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina is Sarajevo. From early April
10 1992, it was completely under siege. Only a bird would be able to go in
11 and out of the city, and perhaps some individuals, but they would be
12 exposed to fire. Throughout 1992 and 1993, and until 1995, a battle for
13 the city was waged. The aggressor wanted to capture the town at any cost.
14 If they managed to get into the city, and I spoke about that a little bit,
15 what would be the -- I said what the people were thinking, including
16 myself as deputy commander and later when I took upon the duties for which
17 it would have been better of me not to have taken upon myself.
18 Q. I --
19 A. I will -- I will come to the question, yes. Yes, here's a direct
20 answer. In the formation of units of the 1st Corps, in the city of
21 Sarajevo, the units - please - were not formed in accordance with any kind
22 of mobilisation plan. The units were not formed in accordance with
23 somebody's decisions, this soldier will go here and this soldier will go
24 here, this officer will be a commander of a battalion, this one will be
25 the commander of a brigade. It wasn't done like that. This was done when
1 the system fell apart in 1992, in April 1992, and people simply formed
2 units in their streets, in their neighbourhoods, and this is how we got
3 the largest number of brigade commanders, battalion commanders, platoon
4 and company commanders. Regardless of whether these people were fit to do
5 so, whether they were mentally and physically fit to do so or not. And
6 this is very important when we are talking about military organisation.
7 By forming such units, which was not done in accordance with
8 strict organisational rules and control, nobody passed any kind of testing
9 for that.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. Of course, you had certain --
12 Q. We are running short of time. I really do --
13 MR. MORRISSEY: No, no, no. This is an important question. He's
14 entitled to answer it in the way he is. He's been asked what the problems
15 were facing Talijan and he's entitled to give a proper answer, not to be
16 told we're running short of time.
17 MR. RE: We are in April of 1992. I only want him to answer about
18 1993, what the problems were in 1993. For my purposes, I don't require
19 the historical background from 1992. Mr. Morrissey is quite entitled to
20 cross-examine on that but it's not what I'm after.
21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, of course.
22 Witness, I think you have to understand that Judge El Mahdi was a
23 Judge in Galic's case. He's very familiar with the situation in Sarajevo
24 during that time, and I was a Judge in Naletilic case and I'm very
25 familiar with the situation in Mostar so all those background informations
1 are not new to us. Would you please focus your answer to the question put
2 by the Prosecution and come to that directly?
3 MR. RE:
4 Q. In 1993, please, we really do understand, there has been a lot of
5 evidence about 1992. What was preventing you and your predecessor in 1993
6 from taking action against the 9th and the 10th, up until Trebevic? What
7 were the problems confronting you? Why couldn't you do it? What were the
9 A. A simple answer would be he could not, he did not have the
10 manpower, the means, and had he dared to do so, and tried to do that, his
11 corps would have fallen apart and Sarajevo would have fallen into the
12 hands of the enemy. This is something that I believe 100 per cent. We
13 can talk about it but excuse me, I'm not saying anything. If anybody says
14 that they know the situation in Sarajevo in 1993, just because of one
15 criminal procedure, then they are deeply deluded. I myself, who lived in
16 Sarajevo throughout that period, and held such a high position, am only
17 finding out about certain facts today that I was not aware of, that I did
18 not know about, and that I did not understand. And only today am I afraid
19 when I think back of what I did and the times that I lived through. And
20 I'm still not quite sure how I managed to come out of it alive.
21 MR. RE: I note the time. It's about 10.30.
22 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We'll take a break and I hope that your direct
23 examination is approaching to its end, as you promised yesterday, Mr. Re.
24 MR. RE: It certainly is. I'm getting very close.
25 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We will resume at 11.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
3 MR. MORRISSEY: Sorry, might I just mention one matter briefly
4 before we -- my friend resumes. This is just a matter that arises out --
5 it may be an interpretation issue but -- I'm sorry.
6 At page 21, line 10, the witness gave an answer in response to
7 something that was said -- I think there was a question by the
8 Prosecution, but then I raised some matters, I'm advised by the Bosnian
9 speakers on our team that in the translation process, it might have
10 appeared that the Defence was suggesting that the witness, Mr. Karavelic,
11 had actually brought a document to The Hague, that that transcript, that
12 telephone transcript. That wasn't our submission at the time, but the
13 Bosnian speakers here have just pointed out that that may be how it came
14 across. The witness gave an answer at line -- at line 10, "since there is
15 doubt whether I have brought this document to The Hague," and we just
16 don't want to leave any confusion for the Prosecutors or for the Bench:
17 We are not making any such allegation at all, and if that was a mistake
18 that occurred in translation, which frankly, I can't say anything about,
19 but I'm told it might have, the Prosecution don't have to fight that --
20 nobody has to deal with it because we are not making that allegation.
21 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. I believe that the translation
22 section will have that checked.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, thanks.
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re, would you please proceed?
25 MR. RE:
1 Q. Before the break, you were telling us about the problems in
2 Sarajevo and the difficulties in dealing with the 9th and the 10th. What
3 was your assessment in 1993, when you were both deputy commander and
4 commander, of what the consequences could have been had you attempted to
5 militarily deal with the 9th and the 10th?
6 A. This question, had it been dealt with a lot earlier, in relation
7 to when it actually happened, from political point of view, and I am first
8 of all speaking about the political aspect of it, because the military is
9 only a product of the political, there could have been polarisation within
10 the corps, a split-up into two parts at least, if not even more, two or
11 three or even more than that. This polarisation of the corps, along
12 political lines, would have, of course, inevitably led to consequences
13 which belong to the military aspect. There would have been military
14 polarisation too, which would indubitably cause mutual conflicts,
15 including armed conflicts.
16 This further on leads to the fact that such steps would quite
17 simply lead to the self-destruction of the corps, the 1st Corps of the
18 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in this way, the defence of Sarajevo, which
19 would all work in favour of the aggressor. And how? Since the basic
20 mission of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the mission
21 that it was given by the command of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a political and
22 military body, that is to say to defend the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina
23 at all costs. This shows that the corps commanders' intention was to
24 preserve the internal unity of the corps at all costs to prevent internal
25 conflicts and disputes either politically or militarily and to keep the
1 corps facing the aggressor in order to carry out their primary mission.
2 Q. Perhaps putting my question more directly to you, what was your
3 assessment of what would have happened had you gone down to the brigade
4 headquarters of the 9th or the 10th, with your military police battalion,
5 and attempted to arrest Caco or Celo?
6 A. We are now talking about the 9th and 10th, but, please, that is
7 not the only case, the 9th and 10th. But we are talking about the 9th and
8 10th now.
9 Q. Yes, I want you to talk about the 9th and the 10th, not anything
11 A. What would happen, would ten or 50 or 100, I don't know how many
12 casualties. That's what would happen. And now the question is: Would
13 that be the objective of the corps commander?
14 Q. What was your position in August and September 1993 as to what
15 should happen to bring the 9th and the 10th under your discipline?
16 A. My position was clear: As soon as I came corps commander, which
17 was the top position, that was in mid-1993, I said that directly and
18 personally, in the Office of the President of the Presidency of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, I said that to him himself:
20 "Either make it possible for me to carry out political preparations and
21 give me a document in writing that I can use any kind of armed force
22 against all those who do not respect the chain of command, or simply
23 remove me from this position that you appointed me to a month ago, or two
24 months ago, a month or two ago."
25 Q. What was President Izetbegovic's response to you?
1 A. He kept quiet for a long time, and then he asked me whether I
2 seriously meant this. My answer was, "Yes," and then he said, "Wait for
3 about 15 days" - he was not very specific as far as time was concerned -
4 "for him to carry out political preparations." That's what he said,
5 verbatim, and that I would get such a document in writing that would
6 enable me to do so.
7 Q. Then what happened? You said you were waiting for a document.
8 A. I was waiting, and I got this document. Political preparations
9 were carried out. The unity of the civilian police and of my military was
10 ensured, and we did that together on the 26th of October 1993.
11 Q. Did you -- you've referred to a personal conversation you had with
12 President Izetbegovic in his office. Did you ever write to the president
13 or Mr. Delic, the Supreme Commander, about these problems, proposing
15 A. Well, I think that when I spoke about this other document a few
16 moments ago, when I sent when I came to the head of the 1st Corps, in that
17 document n addition to all the names that I referred to in terms of being
18 removed from their positions, I think that I said quite a few things about
19 what my proposals were, and there were other documents, too.
20 Q. If you could be a little bit more specific, did you -- you said
21 there were documents. Did you actually write to the president and
22 Mr. Delic in relation to dismissing commanders and proposing solutions?
23 A. Well, that's what I'm saying now. That's the answer I gave a few
24 moments ago. Yes. But I hardly ever abused the right to write to the
25 Supreme Command or rather the president of the Presidency, although in
1 certain situations I did that as well. It is for me to write to the
2 commander of the staff of the Supreme Command, and it is for him to send
3 this document further on, to the Supreme Command, either yes or no.
4 Q. Which commanders did you propose the dismissal of?
5 A. A larger number. I think it was between six and ten persons. I
6 would have to be reminded. I have to have a look at the document. But at
7 any rate I think it was the commander of the 10th Brigade, the 1st
8 Brigade, the 2nd Brigade, the deputy commander of the 9th Brigade, the
9 commander of delta and so on.
10 Q. Why did you want the commander of the 2nd Brigade? Is that the
11 commander of the 2nd Independent Motorised Brigade or a different brigade?
12 A. The 2nd Mountain Brigade of the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades that
13 were between the 10th Mountain Brigade and the 9th Motorised Brigade. All
14 of these four brigades were in the old town, in the area of the old town
15 of the city of Sarajevo.
16 Q. Why did you want the commander of the Delta Brigade dismissed?
17 A. Well, generally speaking, because of consistent disregard for the
18 chain of command. As far as I can remember, even when this brigade was
19 not within the 1st Corps, I don't know when exactly, but in the summer of
20 1993 it was supposed to become part of the 1st Corps organically, in line
21 with the decision of the Supreme Command. Throughout that time, there
22 were deviations from strict observance of the chain of command. I
23 remember when General Sefer Halilovic was Chief of Staff of the Supreme
24 Command, that once he took me to a meeting up there to have some of these
25 problems resolved. He himself could not deal with their problems from
1 that point of view. It was in that sense. They did not observe the chain
2 of command. He did everything for them to be within the chain of command
3 that they should not listen to politics or this person or that person.
4 There was talk of this nature, that they are directly linked to such and
5 such a person from political life, they are linked directly to President
6 Izetbegovic, whoever. I remember talk like that. I'm not sure whether
7 they were directly linked to the Supreme Command at first or were they
8 later on linked to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. I'm not
9 sure. But I know that Sefer Halilovic Chief of Staff of the Supreme
10 Command tried to bring all of this into order. Now, later, they -- or
11 rather that brigade became an organic part of my corps.
12 Q. If you can answer this simply, please do so. Who did you regard
13 them as reporting to? That's the 2nd -- sorry, the Delta Brigade. You
14 said they weren't within the chain of command. Who were they reporting
16 A. When they became an organic part of the 1st Corps they were
17 supposed to report to me, or if they became part of it before I came to
18 head the 1st Corps, then to the commander of the 1st Corps. My
19 predecessor. Until then, or rather before that, who they reported to is
20 something that I don't want to go into because I have not studied this. I
21 may make a mistake. I don't know who it was that they reported to.
22 Q. After you became the corps commander and you wanted to have them
23 dismissed, who did you regard them as reporting to if they weren't
24 reporting to you?
25 A. I was quite clear a few moments ago. When they became an organic
1 part of the 1st Corps when they were placed within the 1st Corps, then
2 they reported the same way the commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade did,
3 to the commander of the 1st Corps but that was not consistent. That was
4 not the way other brigades did this.
5 MR. RE: Could the witness please be shown P217? While that
6 document is coming, when was it that you wrote to Delic and Izetbegovic
7 proposing the dismissal of these commanders? Was it after the soldiers
8 had gone to Herzegovina or before? Or putting it another way, how long
9 was it before Operation Trebevic was carried out?
10 A. I don't remember the exact date of the document. I'd have to see
11 the document, if you have it. Is it a secret? Is it not a secret?
12 Q. Well, personally, I don't have the document but I'm asking you
13 from your memory, not for a precise date but approximately when you sent
14 it in relation to Trebevic.
15 A. If I took over the command of the 1st Corps in mid-August, it was
16 around that date, perhaps just before the operation or the beginning of
17 the operation, or during the Neretva operation.
18 Q. You have that document there now on the screen in front of you.
19 It's a 1st Corps Command security document signed by Sacir Arnautovic of
20 the 7th of October 1993. What I want you to do is to look -- first of
21 all, had you seen this particular document before coming to The Hague?
22 A. I don't think so.
23 Q. I just want you to have a look through the document and comment,
24 based upon your own knowledge as the 1st Corps commander and what you'd
25 seen, heard, and been told, comment on the accuracy of the information in
1 that document. If it's -- if it's quicker to look at it I can give you a
2 paper copy of the whole document, because I think there is about ten
4 A. Yes. I first saw this document here now when I came to The Hague.
5 I read the content of this document. I believe that the order that we
6 talked about an hour ago, my order -- I mean that's why I mentioned that
7 order of mine, and I lost sight of this document, which I had a look at
8 here. That order of mine that we discussed when I wrote the order that I
9 should send a certain number of officers to this meeting with Sefer
10 Halilovic, it does correspond with this document.
11 Q. You're referring, are you, to the first two pages of that
12 document, which is the -- appears to be the -- or the report or letter
13 part which attaches a much lengthier document?
14 A. I'm talking about the first page of this document, which is on the
15 screen now. As for these ten or so pages here, they speak of the report
16 of the security service about the alleged criminal activities of Ramiz
17 Delalic, Celo, for the most part, and Musan Topalovic, Caco.
18 Q. Based upon your knowledge, the reports you had received at the
19 time, your own sources of information, your own observations, I just want
20 you to comment on the accuracy of the -- those ten or so pages, which is
21 headed "information".
22 MR. RE: Well, I can take it through him line by line or I can ask
23 him to do it generally, and the quickest way is to ask him to look at it
24 generally and to comments on whether it's accurate and if there are any
25 inaccuracies to point out those which he -- he knows?
1 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Morrissey?
2 MR. MORRISSEY: I object to that. If the -- if he's being asked
3 to -- it's again it's something I've complained about before, that the
4 witness can be asked, simply, what did he know? Then, he could be asked
5 to comment on specific things if it's within his knowledge, but to be
6 asked generally, "Is that accurate?" when it's ten pages worth is just
7 going to produce a meaningless answer and nor is it appropriate to say are
8 there any inaccuracies. What might be more appropriate to say is there
9 anything accurate in there that he's prepared to say is accurate.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
11 MR. RE: That's a fair compromise.
12 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
13 MR. RE:
14 Q. Looking at that document, is there anything there that based upon
15 your knowledge and experience about what happened and what Celo and Caco
16 were up to that are accurate?
17 A. I read this document last week, the entire document, if I may say
18 so. Perhaps I skimmed through some of the lines a bit quickly, but to
19 confirm this entire document, and the content of all these pages, all of
20 them that are here -- how many are there? 12? No. 13 pages. I cannot
21 confirm that. I cannot confirm many allegations made here in this
22 document. I must admit that it was the first time I heard of some of
23 these allegations at all when I first read this document. However, on the
24 other hand, I must say --
25 Q. I just wants you could confirm those which are accurate, that's
2 MR. MORRISSEY: No, no, look.
3 MR. RE: We are going to be is a very long time if we are going to
4 have these sorts of explanations. I just want to know it is accurate this
5 is accurate, that's all.
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours --
7 JUDGE LIU: At least allow the witness to finish his answer. But
8 the witness has to be as concise as possible.
9 THE WITNESS: I also must say it's hard for me to say the
10 percentage of the perhaps 10, 20, 30 per cent, 10 or 20 per cent of all of
11 these allegations in this document, I can say that I heard of them, that
12 they came to me through other channels, and that I informed my superior
13 command about that. However, and I will finish with this, I also must say
14 that in all of my attempts to really prove anything of what is alleged
15 here in the document about Caco and Celo, my security service was not able
16 to initiate proceedings or verify anything, whether it was not able to do
17 so or whether this was not possible for some other reasons or because this
18 information is false or wrong, it's very difficult for me to give you the
20 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Re, it seems to me that this witness could
21 not assist us, at least for this document.
22 MR. RE: He might be able to if he went through it but I'm not
23 going to waste the Trial Chamber's time by asking him to go through it
24 bearing in mind the time constraints we have. In my submission it would
25 certainly help if he told us which of the percentage -- which ones in
1 there he thought were or he'd heard of before, but if the Trial Chamber is
2 against me on that, in the interests of conserving time, I won't -- I
3 won't attempt to go there.
4 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, the Prosecutor has the full right to
5 ask the questions he wants to ask, if he persists with a question and asks
6 Your Honour for permission to go on, he can do that. But the witness did
7 give a full answer and it's the risk that the Prosecutor takes when he
8 shows documents like this to the witness that he gets the sort of answer
9 that he got. That's the danger of doing this, and it's not useful in my
10 submission for that concluding speech to be made, that he doesn't want to
11 go on with time. If he wants to get something out of that, it's up to him
12 to do so. Not to say he's stopping because of time. It's up to the
13 Prosecutor to either do that, or seek to do it or not to do it. And
14 Your Honours the reason I intervened in that way is because at a later
15 time I don't want it to be said in submissions that he could have explored
16 this more but chose not to for time purposes. Either he explores it or
17 doesn't explore it, in my submission.
18 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Re, I think if this is your case, I believe
19 that you have the right to do anything possible to present your case.
20 MR. RE:
21 Q. Karavelic, I just want you to look at it, and you said some of it
22 was accurate or you'd heard of it before, just point out the bits in the
23 document --
24 MR. MORRISSEY: It has to be pointed out that he didn't say it
25 was accurate. He said that he'd heard of it before.
1 MR. RE:
2 Q. That you'd heard of before.
3 A. The first ten lines in the document is something that I am more or
4 less aware of. I had heard about that. However, if you're asking me if
5 that is so, 100 per cent, I cannot confirm it. I would be putting myself
6 in the position of judging this. It's very hard for me to confirm that
7 all of this is 100 per cent as it states here. There is something of this
8 here, to a minor extent, but it's not like this, 100 per cent.
9 The middle part of the first page, talking about racketeering, and
10 about the cooperation of Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic, Celo and Caco.
11 I also heard and got information from other channels. However, this is
12 just information.
13 Whether people who had been subjected to the racketeering did not
14 dare or did not want to confirm it, or perhaps that these allegations are
15 true or not true, it's something that I really cannot say.
16 This last part on the first page, I can say nothing about.
17 Q. All right. Over the page there are a number of specific incidents
18 with specific dates. All I want you to do is just day say the date,
19 whether you'd heard of it, the date, whether you'd heard of it, the date,
20 whether you'd heard of it, if you could make a comment. The first is the
21 9th of September 1992 and so on.
22 A. On the 9th of September, I did not hear -- I did not hear about
23 this, these allegations that pertain to the 9th of September.
24 Q. Next one, 29th of September.
25 A. The 29th of September is also something that I cannot confirm but
1 something is there vaguely in my thoughts about it.
2 Q. The 2nd of October 1992?
3 A. I cannot confirm it.
4 Q. 8th of October --
5 A. On the 8th of October 1992, I cannot confirm it.
6 Q. The 12th?
7 A. The 12th of October 1992, also I cannot confirm it. The 15th of
8 October 1992, I cannot confirm that either. The 16th of October 1992, I
9 cannot confirm that either.
10 Q. When you say cannot confirm, do you mean you hadn't heard of it?
11 A. Yes. I hadn't heard of it, no.
12 Q. The next one is the 21st of December, 1992, raid on Markale
13 market, seizure of 3.815 Deutschmarks?
14 A. Perhaps this is in that context but here it is stated specifically
15 how much money and that it was at Markale. On one occasion I was called
16 directly by President Izetbegovic and at the time he said "Vaha, what are
17 the members of the 9th Brigade doing over there?" I think he said also
18 directly, "What is Ramiz Delalic doing?" I replied, "I don't know what
19 they are doing. What are they doing? Can you please tell me?" "Well,
20 you go and see what's going on. They are walking up and down these
21 streets and going in these buildings and is it true that they are taking
22 money through racketeering?" So I instructed the security service to
23 do -- to start an investigation, but there was no argumented evidence
24 ultimately. So perhaps this corresponds to this part of the 21st of
25 December 1992. As far as the 28th December is concerned is something that
1 I hadn't heard of and cannot confirm.
2 The next paragraph is also on the same date. I didn't hear
3 anything about it and cannot confirm it.
4 January 1st, 1993? Specifically, this vehicle, this PUCH, is
5 something that I did not hear about, but I did have information that from
6 time to time, some types of vehicles were seized or taken from someone.
7 Whether it was from socially owned companies and organisations or from
8 individuals. This is in the context of January 1st, 1993.
9 Q. That's by Ramiz Delalic, the seizure? The seizure was by Ramiz
11 A. I beg your pardon?
12 Q. You just said you did hear about -- you did have information that
13 vehicles were seized or taken from someone. Taken by whom? Was it Ramiz
14 Delalic? Is that what you're saying? Or his men?
15 A. The information that came most frequently would say members of the
16 9th Motorised Brigade. After that, public opinion would be formed.
17 Whatever was not good in the 9th Motorised Brigade, you would immediately
18 think of Ramiz Delalic, Celo, regardless of whether he was really
19 responsible for that or not. So it's possible but --
20 Q. Flex one, 10th of February 1993. I'm sorry, there is also a --
21 before that, there is a meeting chaired by Ramiz in which he rudely
22 attacked the political and military leadership of the country.
23 A. Yes. I seem to vaguely remember some of that. However, I cannot
24 confirm it. The 10th of February 1993, I cannot confirm anything here.
25 Q. 23rd of March, Delalic and three armed persons threatening the
1 owner of the delta catering establishment in Breka requesting 4.000
2 Deutschmarks, which they eventually got.
3 A. There was information of this sort, but at the same time, what it
4 states here in the past age referring to the 23rd of March is something
5 that I'm hearing for the first time, actually now that I've read the
7 Q. Next one is the 28th of March, the seizure of a freight motor
8 vehicle at Bradina, when Delalic's unit was at Mount Igman. They were
9 committing criminal acts and violations of discipline on a daily basis.
10 A. During the stay at Igman, the units of the 9th Motorised Brigade
11 and Ramiz Delalic, there was some information about them, but it wasn't so
12 much that the information was about him. It was more about Caco. That's
13 a fact. The 11th of May 1993. There was information from time to time
14 with his quarrels with the civilian police, so perhaps this would
15 correspond to what it states here for the 11th of May 1993.
16 Q. The 26th of -- sorry, 29th of June 1993, a raid on a cafe ordering
17 the cafe owner to pay 9.000 Deutschmarks a month to him, and then ordering
18 all the customers and staff to be taken for trench digging?
19 A. I cannot confirm that.
20 Q. 7th of July 1993, two members of the brigade throwing a hand
21 grenade into number 33 Sekerova street, killing Hadziba Humic and wounding
22 seven people.
23 A. I seem to remember vaguely that there was some bomb throwing by
24 members of the 9th Motorised Brigade in some street in the town, but I
25 don't know whether that is this specific incident when these people were
1 killed. I cannot confirm that.
2 Q. 24th of July, 1993. The seizure of eight bullet proof vests from
3 local and foreign journalists, that's Reuters and other press agencies.
4 A. I think that this is what I recollect the best, because I think I
5 was also involved to a certain extent in the return of those items.
6 Q. Next one, the 1st of August, 1993, Delalic firing a gun at the
7 back glass of a vehicle driven by Boris Krstanovic, Cile.
8 A. I don't know when he did this shooting, because there was
9 shooting. There was constant shooting in Sarajevo, and I don't want to be
10 funny, but sometimes you didn't know who was shooting at whom. But this
11 refers to what I was explaining about the conflict between the 9th
12 Motorised unit held by Ramiz Delalic, Celo, and Boris Krstanovic, Cile,
13 who was the commander of the sabotage unit in front of the corps command
14 when I personally, with the corps commander, Mustafa Hajrulahovic,
15 prevented this conflict. This corresponds to that incident. These are
16 their mutual clashes.
17 Q. The 2nd of August 1993, surrounding by five armed soldiers of a
18 Land Rover containing 4 BBC journalists, holding them at gun point seizing
19 their bullet proof vests and a significant amount of US dollars. And so
21 A. I cannot confirm this. Perhaps I'm mixing this up with the
22 previous incident with the bullet proof vests. I'm not sure. I'm not
23 quite clear whether it's the same thing or not.
24 Q. 17th of August, 1993. Members of the 9th Motorised Brigade
25 military police searching apartments in Cvijetina street looking for fuel.
2 A. I cannot confirm this either.
3 Q. 23rd of August 1993, Celo and 20 members of the brigade assaulting
4 Ramiz Patura [phoen] of the 4th Motorised Brigade military police.
5 A. I cannot confirm that. These are quite minor incidents.
6 Q. 25th of August, 1993. 9th Brigade military police bringing in
7 Adija Mulahalilovic [phoen], brother of the owner of the Bakara [phoen]
8 cafe, and seizing 2.000 Deutschmarks by force from him and being forced to
9 sign a "contract of donorship" for 50 Deutschmarks a week.
10 A. This is derived from those general reports given to the chief,
11 which I saw from time to time, but I really cannot confirm this incident.
12 The same thing can be said for the next incident also.
13 Q. All right. There is a number of other incidents mentioned. Can
14 you just briefly tell us if you can confirm any of the other ones? And
15 that's the end of the document.
16 A. Yes. But I really don't know all the documents that are in the --
17 all the incidents that are in this document. I've talked about some of
18 them. Most of these incidents mentioned, the place names, and specific
19 names. I don't know where each cafe is or the names of the persons
20 involved. I am seeing most of these incidents in this document for the
21 first time and I'm wondering myself whether this is all true or not, and
22 if it's true -- if it's true, that's not good, but if it's not true,
23 that's not good either, all the more so.
24 Q. All right. I want to move from that document. What -- what was
25 your involvement in Operation Trebevic?
1 A. During the Trebevic operation, I was the commander of the 1st
2 Corps, Bakir Alispahic was the minister for internal affairs, the minister
3 of the civilian police. General Rasim Delic was the commander of the
4 Supreme Command Staff. A document signed by President Izetbegovic, as far
5 as I can remember, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Supreme
6 Command Staff, the civilian police were assigned, as well as people from
7 the 1st Corps, to carry out this task. The operation was prepared. On
8 the 26th in the morning at around 4 a.m., I think the armed combat began.
9 The names of the people that I mentioned, this team, was formed. It was a
10 coordination team, which was located in the centre of old town, Stari
11 Grad, and this is more or less the location between the 9th and the 10th
12 brigades. In front of me, in front of my command, I sent my deputy Ismet
13 Dahic to represent me in that team. Kemo Arnautovic was there representing
14 the minister of internal affairs, and so on and so forth and another group
15 of officers because we were all linked up into a unified communication
16 chain and command chain. The operation began in the morning. It was
17 planned to last for two days, most probably, but more or less the
18 operation was brought to a close on that same day, late at night, around
19 midnight or after midnight, something like that.
20 Q. How many units were involved in Operation Trebevic? And what was
21 the numerical strength of those who were engaged in Operation Trebevic?
22 A. I was at my main command post the whole time, and I commanded and
23 controlled all the units directly with my deputy. It's hard to say
24 exactly how many units participated. I could -- I would have to refresh
25 my memory by looking at documents. I think that practically all of the
1 brigades that I trusted 100 per cent, let's say, that they would not
2 betray me, not in the sense of the brigade as such but in terms of the
3 officers in that brigade, commanders of the brigades, of the battalions
4 and so on. So from five, six or seven brigades, I took an average of a
5 battalion that was specially formed over the previous 15 or 20 days during
6 the preparations for the operation, and on the 25th, 26th of October 1993,
7 I issued the tasks and at the same time, even the direct participants in
8 the operation did not know exactly what they would be doing, and I did not
9 tell them this because I was concerned that this information could be
10 leaked and the operation could fail, and --
11 Q. Numbers, numbers, figures.
12 A. About 5.000 men in the encirclement of the command posts,
13 commands, and officers of the 9th and 10th Brigade.
14 Q. Who was it directed at? Trebevic. What was its aim?
15 A. I'm now talking about this part of the Trebevic operation, which
16 in some elements had also broader context. The part that I'm talking
17 about was aimed at eliminating Musan Topalovic, Caco, and Ramiz Delalic,
18 Celo, and all of their followers.
19 Q. Why was it considered necessary to employ 5.000 men to do that?
20 A. Because I had to ensure considerable superiority in strength in
21 relation to the estimated number of soldiers who could, at a certain point
22 in time, decide to stand by Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic.
23 Q. Was there fighting?
24 A. Quite fierce fighting. Whether we are talking about the 10th
25 Mountain Brigade and Caco. However, when we talking about the 9th
1 motorised and Ramiz Delalic, Celo, we did not have serious fighting in his
2 case because he acted wisely. He surrendered. He didn't kill anyone.
3 His soldiers did not kill anyone either. Whereas on the other side, Caco
4 and his followers killed about 15 people, I think, soldiers. And in
5 particular, four military police officers from my military police and four
6 civilian police officers from civilian police, including amongst those
7 four civilian police officers who took part in that operation the son of
8 minister Avdo Hebib was killed. And excuse me, when we are talking about
9 this, at that point in time, I'm not sure whether it was Avdo Hebib or
10 Bakir Alispahic who were minister of internal affairs. I'm not sure about
11 that right now.
12 Q. Why was it considered necessary to eliminate Caco and Celo and all
13 of their followers?
14 A. I think that enough was said already so far, in order to establish
15 a unified chain of command in the 1st Corps of the Army of Republika
17 Q. Why did you have to undertake military means? Why couldn't it
18 have been done by other means?
19 A. Because it was very difficult to do this by other means, most
20 probably, and the political side decided to do it like that. I could not
21 go into action without a political decision, and without a decision of the
22 Supreme Command, because I was aware that if I did not have political
23 support for any military operation, that military operation would be
24 doomed to fail in advance.
25 Q. You told the Trial Chamber earlier that there were disciplinary
1 problems within other brigades and some instances of criminality. Was
2 action -- this military action taken against them or was it confined to
3 the 9th and the 10th?
4 A. When I say to establish a unified chain of command in the 1st
5 Corps, that's why the action was undertaken. So along with eliminating
6 the people and the groups of those people, we would also eliminate all of
7 these things that we read about in the previous document which numbers 13
8 pages, because probably the political side finally decided that this
9 cannot be confirmed. But they could not deal with all of these
10 accumulated problems either, which they were encountering. These problems
11 were being hyperproduced and in order to prevent these alleged crimes by
12 Musan Topalovic, Caco, and the racketeering, and along with that, in
13 accordance with certain information, committed by Ramiz Delalic, Celo, as
14 well. That's why the operation was initiated, Not only because of Caco
15 and Celo. A month later, an armed action was carried out against a
16 brigade, the Croatian brigade, in Sarajevo.
17 Q. The other brigades you mentioned yesterday in your testimony, in
18 which there were disciplinary or criminal problems, was military action
19 taken against them at the same time? Was it confined to the 9th and the
20 10th? If it wasn't taken against the others, why not? Why was it
21 confined to the 9th and the 10th, if it was?
22 A. I find the question far too general. It depended on the extent of
23 the problem involved.
24 Q. But you said you needed 5.000 men to go in against the 9th and the
25 10th. That was a military action. Did you take similar military action,
1 armed soldiers and fighting, against the other brigades in which there
2 were disciplinary or criminal problems, apart from the HVO one a month
4 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I don't think -- the witness didn't
5 say HVO, I think he said the Croatian unit.
6 JUDGE LIU: Yes, that's a different --
7 MR. RE: I apologise.
8 MR. MORRISSEY: It's very different.
9 MR. RE: That was a completely unintentional lapse. I meant the
10 Croat unit, Croat doesn't necessarily mean HVO.
11 THE WITNESS: I made a mistake. It was the brigade of the Croatian
12 Defence Council. I made a mistake when I said a Croatian brigade. What I
13 said was about the Croatian Defence Council brigade in Sarajevo that was
14 there. After that, some other armed actions were taken against certain
15 commanders in Sarajevo. Not to that extent. To a far lesser extent.
16 MR. RE:
17 Q. You said that Celo surrendered but Caco didn't. Did you get to
18 see both of those men during the operation? I don't -- I want the short
19 version of this, please.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Were they brought to your office?
22 A. As agreed, if I can put it that way, although it is not for me to
23 seek any kind of agreement with my superiors, but when this action was
24 planned, it was said that if anybody is taken prisoner, especially those
25 two men, that they would be taken to the Supreme Command, to the staff of
1 the Supreme Command, or, rather, to the Supreme Command,
2 President Izetbegovic. That's the information that I had.
3 Q. My question was, were they brought to your office?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. One at a time or together?
6 A. One at a time.
7 Q. Who came first?
8 A. I'm not sure. It's not that important.
9 Q. Let's talk about Celo.
10 A. I think -- I beg your pardon, first Ramiz Delalic, Celo, came, or
11 rather he was brought in by the military police, the security service.
12 Q. Was he under arrest?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did you speak to him?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. As a result of your speaking to him, was he taken elsewhere and
17 detained, taken into custody?
18 A. After I finished speaking to him, I asked the security service to
19 have him handcuffed in my office, and I ordered the security service to
20 take him to prison, that he should be taken into custody, and then the
21 relevant proceedings were supposed to be initiated. That is what was
23 Q. All right. Now Caco, was he brought to your office under arrest?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Did you speak to him too?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did he likewise leave your office in handcuffs?
3 A. I think the answer is yes, yes.
4 Q. Where was he on his way to when he left your office? And who was
5 he with?
6 A. The same security service.
7 Q. Was it your --
8 A. From me, he was sent to the same person -- same place to where
9 Ramiz Delalic, Celo, was sent, to the Viktor Bubanj barracks. That's
10 where he was sent. Or Ramiz Sultan [phoen] barracks. When he left the
11 corps on his way to the prison, somewhere along the way he was liquidated.
12 Q. Are you saying he didn't make it to the barracks?
13 A. I don't think so.
14 Q. Do you know on whose orders he was liquidated or how he was
16 A. Now, that's the question that's been bandied about for the past
17 ten years and no one has an answer to that. So neither do I on this
18 occasion, before this Court.
19 Q. All right. You said that Mr. -- sorry, Delalic was to be taken
20 into custody and relevant proceedings were supposed to be initiated. My
21 questions now are about military -- the system of military discipline. I
22 want some fairly short answers if possible. Was there a district military
23 court operating in Sarajevo at that time, August, September, October,
24 1993? It's really a yes or no answer, if you can possibly confine it to
25 that, because I will then ask you other questions.
1 A. You're asking me yes or no. It kept changing all the time. The
2 first courts were transformed into the second courts and then the second
3 courts were transformed into the first courts. I think that's the way it
5 Q. Well, was there a court, however styled, of the district military
6 court operating in Sarajevo in that period?
7 A. That is beyond my competence. I don't want to go into all of
8 that. Legal people know that best of all.
9 Q. Were cases of criminality by soldiers in the 1st Corps referred to
10 a district military court in Sarajevo in the second half of 1993?
11 A. Is your question whether I had any such cases?
12 Q. The 1st Corps. You were the commander. Do you know of cases?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Being referred to a district military court in Sarajevo?
15 A. Yes, yes, yes.
16 Q. And was the Court dealing with these cases that were referred
17 there by the 1st Corps?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Were there other district military courts operating or functioning
20 in the territory held by the Federation in that same period?
21 MR. MORRISSEY: I object to this. The Prosecutor took a
22 deliberate decision not to call the person who could answer these
23 questions, clearly. There witness has indicated that he's not comfortable
24 in answering questions about this area of competence. I have to put it on
25 the record, as I did last time, that this happened, that when the
1 Prosecution deliberately makes a decision, frankly in cold blood, not to
2 call a particular witness, and then seeks to get this material, I have to
3 object. Your Honours overruled me on this one before I have to say but I
4 have to place it on the record, and I do make the objection.
5 JUDGE LIU: Let's not engage in pointing fingers with each other
6 at this stage.
7 Well, I believe that this question is the natural course from the
8 previous questions. I believe that Mr. Re is entitled to ask these
9 questions. It depends on the witness how to answer this question.
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Of course.
11 MR. RE:
12 Q. The question is were there other district military courts
13 functioning in the territory held by the Federation in that -- in that
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Was there a court in Zenica?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Was it functioning?
19 A. I can say now that when preparing my military expertise for the
20 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura case, that inter alia I partly touched upon that
21 question too. There was such a court. However, it had enormous problems
22 on different grounds, in terms of its functioning. And among other
23 things, what was proven was, if I can refer to it now, it was burdened
24 with a great many cases from the commander of the 3rd Corps and they
25 didn't manage to do their part of the job with regard to these cases.
1 Q. Was there a court in Tuzla functioning?
2 A. I think the answer is yes.
3 Q. Was there a court functioning in Travnik?
4 A. It was established with a bit of a delay but the answer is yes
6 Q. What about Mostar?
7 A. As far as Mostar and Tuzla are concerned, I'm not too sure, but
8 they should have been there. Now, I cannot make any assertions in terms
9 of whether there was or whether there wasn't. Or in Konjic, I don't know.
10 I don't know. I do not know. I cannot confirm anything.
11 MR. RE: Could the witness please be shown Exhibit D146.
12 Q. I'm going to show you the inspection team order of the 30th of
13 August 1993. Now, first of all, what, in military terms, in Bosnia, in
14 the Bosnian army in 1993, was an inspection team?
15 A. This is a question which is directly and 100 per cent suited for
16 an expert. However, I can speak in general terms and in terms of
17 principle. When we say inspection, that means that we are talking about
18 inspection when one says inspection or inspection team, which is one and
19 the same thing, according to the customary rules or mode of operating and
20 what I know from the Yugoslav People's Army that I originally came from,
21 and in accordance with the fact that we practically inherited all the
22 documents of the Yugoslav People's Army or regulations to the largest
23 extent, inspection is a body or organ established by, say, specifically,
24 or rather in most cases, the highest command.
25 Q. What --
1 A. In our case, it was the staff of the Supreme Command or the
2 General Staff or even the Supreme Command, or outside the military, the
3 Ministry of Defence can also set up an inspection. Once an inspection is
4 established, then its composition is determined, its timing, and it is
5 given precise tasks and instructions, depending on the type of task for
6 which an inspection is established, appropriate profiles of officers are
7 sought who would serve on the said inspection team. It is then directly
8 responsible to the top military authority or the Ministry of Defence, if
9 they set up the inspection. That is one thing. And another matter is the
10 following: An inspection can have practically all the powers of the body
11 that establishes it; however, the body that establishes the inspection
12 most frequently restricts the scope of that inspection according to
13 certain matters, and so on and so forth. I tried to give you the key
14 elements, as far as inspection is concerned.
15 Q. Can an inspection team be authorised to engage in combat
17 A. I wouldn't want to make a mistake. An inspection team -- I mean,
18 the word "inspection" itself denotes the inspecting of something. That
19 means that it can have the right to inspect combat activities.
20 Q. What about to direct or command combat activities?
21 A. As far as commanding combat activities is concerned, the chain has
22 to be somewhat clearer. Although in the army, everything has to be clear,
23 let us be clear on that. That's the way it should be, although it is not
24 always. However, I can just repeat this particular word yet again.
25 Everything depends on what the concrete case involved is. And I is a see
1 that we are discussing a concrete case. What Rasim Delic, the head of
2 staff of the Supreme Command, gave to General Sefer Halilovic, in terms of
3 authority as head of the inspection team, did he give him every thought or
4 did he restrict his authority? This is related to the sentence I gave you
5 in response to the general question about inspections as such.
6 Q. If we could just have a look at the document, D146, I want you to
7 give your opinion as a person who was at the time the commander of one
8 corps, as to what that order authorise s the inspection team to do.
9 A. I think that I was clear. All the authority that the person
10 establishing -- the person or body establishing the inspection team has
11 can be vested in the inspection team. So if the staff of the Supreme
12 Command establishes an inspection team, if they so wish, they can give or
13 he, rather, as head of the staff of the Supreme Command, can vest all his
14 authority in the inspection team. As I've already said, that is usually
15 not the case, to give absolutely all authority to the inspection team,
17 Q. I'm asking about --
18 A. In the Yugoslav People's Army --
19 Q. I'm asking about this document. I want you to read this document
20 and I want you to read order 1, where it says "the team's main assignments
21 are." And the next sentence. And particularly the use of the
22 word "rukovodjenje"?
23 A. I also saw this document once I came here. That is to say I
24 hadn't seen it before, and I read it. As for these four items under
25 paragraph 1, it says what the certain powers vested in the team are. In
1 item 1, where the first dash is, "viewing the combat readiness of the
2 commands and units, specifically in the field," and the last part of that
3 sentence is, "And directing combat operations". So, of course, this is
4 the 4th and 6th Corps that is referred to as in the previous text. And
5 directing is a higher level than command and control, but you cannot
6 translate that into English. So there cannot be a proper distinction
7 between the two words in the English language. In Bosnian, there can be
8 that kind of distinction. This word "directing," which is in this
9 document, is stronger and more all-embracing than the word "command and
10 control." Command is part of this word, rukovodjenje.
11 Now, the second item, where the second dash is. "Assessing the
12 resources and forces available and their use accordingly." The second
13 sentence stems from the first sentence.
14 Now, the third item, "resolving personnel problems and logistic
15 support in all segments." As a soldier, if any expert would be brought
16 in, I mean, this question, resolving personnel issues, those who set up an
17 inspection team most often say "I give all authority to the inspection
18 team except for..." and then he usually keeps finance for himself so that
19 the inspection team cannot overspend. And also that the inspection team
20 cannot have personnel moved around. However, here, in item 2, or item 3,
21 we see that this inspection team can resolve personnel issues and
22 logistical issues and so on.
23 Now, the 4th item, of course, being derived from all the
24 above-mentioned, it relates to an overview of the functioning of civilian
25 authorities and bringing them in line with the needs of the armed
2 Q. What I want you to comment on is just going back to the first one,
3 where you said that "directing is a higher level than command and
4 control," but you can't translate it into English. What, in a practical
5 sense, do you mean by directing is a higher level than command and
6 control? What does that mean in a practical sense, that the team is
7 authorised to do?
8 A. The lower the level is of the military structure, let me be most
9 clear. The section is the lowest military formation. Then we have the
10 platoon and then the company. In these lowest military structures and
11 formations, there is practically no direction. There is only command,
12 because the squad or platoon commander directly orders the soldier to do
13 such and such a task, period. And there is practically nothing of this
14 other element of direction. And then, as the level of the structure gets
15 higher, the brigade, battalion, operative group, corps, army, as we get up
16 the chain, the category of command is lower and the part of direction or
17 control increases. So at the higher levels of the military structure, the
18 term "command" is less present, where the term of "direction" or "control"
19 is present much more.
20 But one cannot go without the other. It would be very hard. They
21 go together. That's why you have this term "command and control."
22 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Re, I believe that it's time for a break.
23 Otherwise, the tape will run out. And we'll resume at 1.00.
24 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re.
2 MR. RE:
3 Q. Going back to D146 which is the inspection team document and the
4 answer you gave just before the break, you were talking about direction
5 and command and control. In real terms, what does this authorise the
6 inspection team to do in relation to combat activities?
7 A. It's hard for me to say anything else about the last part of the
8 sentence in item 1, and direction or control, control of combat
9 activities. That term speaks for itself, if we are talking about the
11 Q. Does that on its face authorise the inspection team to initiate
12 combat operations?
13 A. These are just details now, which can include what you say, but
14 they don't have to. It all depends on the direct mutual contact between
15 those who set up the inspection team and the leader of the inspection
16 team. In this case, since we are talking about this document, it depends
17 on the communication between General Rasim Delic and General Sefer
19 Q. I want to ask you now about an operation -- about operations
20 groups, and just as briefly as you possibly can, tell the Trial Chamber
21 what an operations group was.
22 A. Operations groups were often used in the army of the Republic of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operation groups as a term are not used for the first
24 time in the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina but were inherited
25 from the doctrinal guidelines of the Yugoslav People's Army. What is an
1 operations group? Namely, as opposed to structures in the army, the
2 organisational establishment structures from the lowest such structure,
3 squad, then platoon, company, battalion, regiment, division, corps, army,
4 and so on and so forth, which are permanent. It's very important, this
5 word, permanent establishment structures. An operations group, which is
6 placed as an equal of a division, because in the English language, there
7 is no special word that can differentiate the words "divizija"
8 and "divizion." These are two different things, even though the same word
9 is used for them. If we use the word "divizion," it's a unit, the rank of
10 a battalion, but it's an artillery unit. I'm not thinking of that unit.
11 I'm thinking of the term "divizija," division, a larger unit, which can
12 number up to 10.000 soldiers. So an operations group would be equal to
13 that division, which can number up to 10.000 soldiers on average, from
14 five to 10.000. An operations group, as opposed to all of these other
15 organisational establishment structures in an army, is not a permanent
16 structure, but a provisional one, and I'm ending on that.
17 Q. Okay. What typically what functions did an operations group
18 perform? Why were they set up? What were their tasks?
19 A. An operations group more or less has the same functions as the
20 division command. The command of the operations group would be the same
21 as the division command. It doesn't have all the services, however, all
22 the organs.
23 Q. Are they used for combat, specific combat operations?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Who commands an operations group? And how is the command
2 A. In the same way as the commanders of other permanent structures
3 and establishments, the same as the brigade commander. The operations
4 group commander would be appointed in the same way that a battalion or a
5 brigade commander would be appointed.
6 Q. There is an operations group?
7 MR. MORRISSEY: Just a moment, sorry, excuse me. Your Honours, I
8 object to this. Your Honours it has to be clarified by the Prosecution,
9 is it now set to be part of there case that there was an operations group
10 in existence here? And we can't have this just drifting along. We need
11 this to be clearly enunciated now. The Prosecution is seeking to add this
12 as part of their case, that there was an operations group and that it's
13 relevant to this case.
14 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Re.
15 MR. MORRISSEY:
16 MR. RE: Well, I reminds my learned friend of our opening in which
17 we said this was tantamount to an operations group. It wasn't called one
18 but its structure and purpose was tantamount to an operations group. Of
19 course, Mr. Morrissey, I do recall, cross-examined I can't recall which
20 witness now, but a witness I took as an operations group and who set them
21 up, was it the president or the chief of the -- commander of the -- of
22 the -- sorry, the Supreme Commander. So it is an issue in the trial, so
24 JUDGE LIU: You mean that the inspection team, in your view, is
25 the -- is an operational group?
1 MR. RE: It's tantamount to it. It has the same functions as an
2 operations group, it does have a different name. We opened on that. It
3 was in Ms. Chana's opening statement.
4 JUDGE LIU: You may go along this line but there must be
5 differences between the two, team and group.
6 MR. RE: I do intend to explore that, Your Honour.
7 MR. RE: Mr. Karavelic --
8 MR. MORRISSEY: Before that's done, Your Honour, this is a
9 pleadings matter. It's a significant matter. Your Honours, it's not in
10 the indictment, the Prosecution ought to identify where it is in the
11 pleadings. It's not good enough to say that something arises, something
12 is said in the open be to be tantamount to -- we are not talking -- I
13 mean, Mr. Halilovic might be tantamount to guilty or not guilty but that
14 won't be a verdict. "Tantamount to" is not a significant concept. Either
15 it is or it isn't an operations group, and Your Honour, the Prosecutor has
16 to be specific about this. Where is it in the pleadings? It can't be --
17 it can't just drift along in this "tantamount to" manner. We ask the
18 Prosecutor to point where it is in the pleadings, if anywhere.
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, taking into consideration of the time
20 constraints, I believe that I would like to allow Mr. Re to continue along
21 this line, and maybe during the cross-examination, or at a later stage,
22 Mr. Re will furnish us with whatever is said or whatever is pled in the
23 opening statement. Do you agree with this proposal?
24 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honour, I think what I have to do is
25 put on record now my objection to any questions about this. Your Honour
1 has three options in that case. You can uphold my objection, you can
2 reject it, or you can allow Mr. Re to proceed. My -- my submission is and
3 I want it to be on record that I'm objecting to any more questions. I
4 recognise there is a number of pragmatic options open to the Court, and I
5 recognise the time situation, too, but it's a serious matter and it arises
6 at this stage, not later, because it's not in the pleadings. And if we
7 are now facing an operations group, rather than something tantamount to
8 it, well, that changes the case and it changes the nature of things. So I
9 put that on record now. I make my request that no further questions be
10 asked about this. And I leave it to Your Honour to rule and I recognise
11 there are a number of consideration that is you have to deal with in
12 relation to it.
13 JUDGE LIU: Well, there may be another option, that is we defer
14 our rulings on this issue, but I'll let this part of the evidence to be
15 heard in this courtroom, and later on we will decide what shall we do with
16 this piece of the evidence?
17 MR. MORRISSEY: Okay, well could I -- may I just say -- I just
18 want to protect my position, in the sense -- I don't want to object to
19 every question my friend asks, so could it shall taken I'm making a
20 general objection like this. It's on the record now.
21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, of course.
22 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE LIU: You may proceed, Mr. Re.
24 MR. RE:
25 Q. Mr. Karavelic I was talking to you -- we were talking about the
1 structure formation operations groups. We were talking about the
2 appointment. And I was about to ask you, I think, about the structure of
3 the command of the operations group. Was it -- did it have the same
4 structure as all the other major units within the army? Only talking
5 about the command structure, with all the usual assistants, assistant
6 commanders for security or whatever.
7 A. You could say that they had a similar, or the same, structure as
8 another command at that level, but numerically, it's not even close, when
9 we look at the number of people at the command of a division, which would
10 be the same rank as an operations group, compared to the number of people
11 that you would have in the command of an operations group. The command of
12 an operations group most often, usually, has a certain number of people,
13 depending on the segment to segment in the command. One to three men by
14 each segment who make up the command. I said previously that the
15 operations group command does not have all the other organs and services
16 completely developed through which each command carries out the bulk of
17 its duties. So the operations group command, the way we soldiers say it,
18 is a miniature command in relation to some other command at that same
19 level. For example a division command.
20 Q. You said the appointment to an operations group was done in the
21 same way as an appointment to other units in the army. Could an
22 operations group be formed by the Supreme Commander, here as in Mr. Delic,
23 or did it require a presidential -- an order of the Presidency?
24 A. A brigade would be at the lowest level or -- I apologise. I
25 started off -- from the brigade upwards to the higher levels, the
1 brigade -- the command would form all of those, but the operative group,
2 operations group, of course, is above the brigade. An operations group
3 would be somewhere between the brigade and the corps.
4 Q. Okay. My question is: Who was authorised to form or appoint an
5 operations group? Could Mr. Delic do it or did it require an order of the
7 A. Of course, everything that happened in the army of the Republic of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina came out of the chain of command. Therefore,
9 General Rasim Delic, if he did form it, would form it at his proposal. He
10 formed it. But formally, legally, the Supreme Command had to verify this
11 with its own document, because the Supreme Command would be the one to
12 implement this, as far as the paper work was concerned. Rasim Delic,
13 however, would propose it.
14 Q. Could he authorise it? That's what I'm after. Could he authorise
15 it himself or did he require presidential authorisation?
16 A. I didn't understand the question. The question is not clear.
17 Q. Mr. Delic wants to form an operations group. Can Mr. Delic, as
18 the Supreme Commander, issue the order for it to be formed, or did he
19 require the authorisation or approval of the Presidency to form an
20 operations group?
21 A. And now again we come to the key question, and that is the
22 question of the relationship between the commander of the Supreme Command
23 staff and President Izetbegovic, specifically between Rasim Delic and
24 President Izetbegovic. He could have told him or perhaps not to form an
25 operations group, but ultimately, this had to be covered by an official
1 document which would have had to, and should have been, issued by the
2 Supreme Command.
3 Q. Look at D146, the inspection team order of the 30th of August
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, just before that is done, it should
6 be made very clear what is meant by the term "Supreme Command" that is
7 found at line 22 there.
8 MR. RE: I'll clarify that.
9 Q. Mr. Karavelic, by Supreme Command, what do you mean? Do you mean
10 Mr. Delic and the staff or Mr. Izetbegovic? All I want to know is, did
11 the president have to authorise it or could Mr. Delic do it himself?
12 Clarify what Supreme Command means.
13 A. When I say "the Supreme Command," I mean the Presidency of Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina, in whose composition during wartime, besides the members
15 of the Presidency, you also had the president of the assembly of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Prime Minister, I think. I'm not sure about the
17 Minister of Defence and the commander of the Supreme Command staff. And
18 when I say the commander of the Supreme Command, I mean the president of
19 the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 Q. Thank you. That's completely clarified. Now, look at the
21 document, and I want you to comment on the structure in point 2 of the
22 personnel there. I want you to comment on whether the personnel there is
23 consistent or inconsistent with that of a -- an operations group.
24 A. It's hard to bring this into the context of an operations group or
25 to bring the operations group into context with this. In item 2, it says
1 that "as team leader, I appoint chief of the Main Staff, Halilovic, Sefer,
2 and members would be representatives of the General Staff of the armed
3 forces," and he meant -- and six names are mentioned. If I would talk
4 about the number of people, then that would be this number 6 of six people
5 is too few a number for a command of an operations group.
6 Q. What about a smaller --
7 A. However --
8 Q. Well, however, go on.
9 A. I said that the command of the operations group, and the
10 operations group as such is something that is of a temporary nature, and
11 this is all done at the proposal of the command -- commander of the
12 Supreme Command Staff. So that the operations group command, if there are
13 several such commands of several operations group, they don't have to be
14 of the same structure because this is a temporary body. So it would
15 depend on the commander of the Supreme Command Staff, and from the
16 command -- Supreme Command, which approves it.
17 Q. Could you have an operations group with as few as six people
18 appointed to the staff of it, or the command staff of it?
19 A. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I have to say it like
20 that, it was not customary but everything is possible.
21 Q. I just want you to quickly, as quickly as we can, look at two
22 documents which are on our list relating to a cease-fire. That's --
23 sorry, one document, 65 ter Exhibit 69, list. Thank you. Which is
25 THE REGISTRAR: MFI 391.
1 MR. RE: 391, thank you.
2 Q. It's a document dated the 17th of December 1993, an order to put
3 in -- signed by Deputy Commander Siber, addressed to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
4 4th, 5th, 6th Corps to the ministry of the interior relating to the London
5 cease-fire agreement. Is that a document your corps command received?
6 A. I think that it is, yes.
7 Q. All right. I move that it be received into evidence.
8 MR. MORRISSEY: I haven't got -- I apologise for this but I
9 haven't got it on the screen yet. I'm having trouble. If the Prosecution
10 would just excuse he me for a moment while we achieve that outcome.
11 JUDGE LIU: You may proceed.
12 MR. RE: Thank you.
13 Q. The next document I wish to show you is Prosecution 65 ter Exhibit
14 number 28, which is 01833893.
15 MR. RE: I can lend the Defence my hard copy if they want to have
16 a look at it.
17 MR. MORRISSEY: I'm grateful to that but perhaps -- perhaps if my
18 friend wants to tender them both, perhaps he could just get an MFI number
19 for them and we will respond in a minute when we get ourselves organised.
20 But our screen seems to be frozen completely now, Your Honours, I'm sorry.
21 We can't even close the things we've got open. I'm sorry, Your Honours.
22 It may not take too long if we just don't panic, if we just take a
23 minute. I'm sorry, Your Honour, but --
24 THE REGISTRAR: This will be MFI 392.
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Perhaps while we are waiting, if the Prosecution
1 can just remind me of the 65 ter number of the last document and this
2 document. It may be that we can work that way, manually.
3 MR. RE:
4 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number for the last document is 101, and the
5 present one is 28.
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you.
7 MR. MORRISSEY: The LiveNote we have on the E-court is about ten
8 pages behind the other one.
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. Mr. Karavelic look at the document which should be there on the
11 screen. It's a document dated the 26th of August 1993, under the hand of
12 Nedzad Ajnadjic--
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. -- dated the 26th of August 1993 to the commander of the 1st Corps
15 personally relating to the behaviour of the soldiers of the 10th Mountain
16 Brigade. Did you see this document at the time, it being addressed to
18 A. I think that I did, if I remember it correctly.
19 Q. Is the information in it given to you at the time about the
20 behaviour of the 10th Mountain Brigade?
21 A. More or less, yes.
22 Q. Okay. May that also be received into evidence, please?
23 JUDGE LIU: Are you in the position to make a reply,
24 Mr. Morrissey? If not, we could defer it.
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, could we defer it, although that one I
1 probably won't oppose, I must -- have to say.
2 JUDGE LIU: Of course.
3 MR. RE: Next one could we please move to 65 ter Exhibit number
4 29, which is 02000095?
5 Q. This is a document dated the 28th of August 1993, under the hand
6 of deputy commander of the Bosnian army, Jovan Divjak?
7 THE REGISTRAR: MFI 393.
8 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I can say without any shadow of
9 difficulty that I'll oppose this one being tendered. Unless the witness
10 says that he's looked at it, which might change everything.
11 JUDGE LIU: Let me hear the witness first.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes.
13 MR. RE:
14 Q. Mr. Karavelic is the document there on the screen?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. All right. Have you seen this one before you came to The Hague?
17 A. I don't think so.
18 Q. Did you have discussions with Mr. Divjak about problems within the
19 9th and 10th Brigades?
20 A. From time to time, I think, yes.
21 Q. If you look at the document, under paragraph or point 3, it refers
22 to the resolution of problems, "The issues and commands of the following
23 units, delta, to my knowledge, they did not become part of the 1st Corps,"
24 close brackets, "Zulfikar, the 9th and 10th brigades, should be resolved."
25 Now, does that reflect the content of conversations that you had with
1 Mr. Divjak about problems within your corps?
2 A. General Jovo Divjak was one of the deputy commanders of the
3 Supreme Command Staff. I had many, many contacts with him. This was a
4 topic that was discussed. He was quite often with me directly on the
5 front lines, directly commanded units in combat and so on. So he was
6 aware of this. I cannot specifically confirm whether on that date I
7 talked to him, but it's quite close to this context that you are talking
9 Q. The next document I wish to show you -- I will move to tender it,
10 but I understand it's objected to and we can deal with that later, if
11 Your Honours are satisfied with that -- is 65 ter Exhibit 34 which is
12 01850308, which is an order of the 30th of August 1993 from the Supreme
13 Commander to the command of the 1st Corps relating to organizational
14 changes within the 1st Corps.
15 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 394.
16 MR. RE:
17 Q. Firstly, Mr. Karavelic, is that a document you received in the
18 course of your business as a corps commander in August or September 1993?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Were the organisational changes or the proposals or the -- sorry,
21 the directions in this order actually carried out?
22 A. Yes, but not immediately.
23 Q. I move to tender that one into evidence as well.
24 MR. MORRISSEY: There is no opposition to that one.
25 JUDGE LIU: So it's admitted into the evidence.
1 MR. RE:
2 Q. Mr. Karavelic, based upon your observations and your experiences
3 as the 1st Corps commander and deputy commander in 1993, what did you
4 observe about the relationship between Celo and Mr. Halilovic, and Caco
5 and Mr. Halilovic? Taking Celo first.
6 A. I don't know what else I can say except for what has already been
7 said through my testimony so far. That is one thing.
8 Secondly, there were stories going around, coming from a variety
9 of sources to the effect that Ramiz Delalic, Celo, et cetera, would go to
10 see General Sefer Halilovic. Now, whether he did go or whether he did not
11 go, that is something I cannot confirm. There is nothing special I can
12 say, except for what I have already said during my testimony so far.
13 Ramiz Delalic, Celo never addressed me in that way, and he never tried to
14 use Sefer Halilovic as a shield or did he ever, on any occasion, in any
15 way, defend himself by using Sefer Halilovic. No. That never happened,
16 as far as Ramiz Delalic is concerned. Roughly, the same answer could be
17 given as far as Caco is concerned. That is to say the commander of the
18 10th Mountain Brigade.
19 Q. Were you aware whether Mr. Halilovic ever attended a meeting or
20 meetings at the 9th Mountain Motorised Brigade command?
21 A. I was not aware of it until I saw a document. I don't know how
22 else this information could be there. A lot earlier, if not in the spring
23 of 1993, that he was at one of the meetings at the command of the 9th
24 Motorised Brigade.
25 Q. I'm sorry, you said you saw a document. You mean a document
1 reporting on his attendance or something else?
2 A. I think it was last week that I received this information. I
3 don't know how. Perhaps I saw a document.
4 Q. Had Mr. Halilovic attended such a meeting, what would have been
5 the proper -- or formalities to be observed?
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, that's a leading question.
7 There might not have been any formalities to observe and so the witness
8 has got to establish that before it's said that he stepped outside the
9 formal chain of some sort.
10 MR. RE: I didn't actually suggest that. I just asked what were
11 the formalities to be observed.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: If he adds "if any," I'll be happy.
13 MR. RE:
14 Q. Well, if any?
15 A. General Sefer Halilovic, at that time was I assume the Chief of
16 Staff of the Supreme Command, the first man in the army and, as such, he
17 does have the right to go diagonally and directly to visit units at lower
18 levels. In terms of skipping over certain inter-levels. However, after
19 every such meeting, it is customary, I believe in any army in the world,
20 that after that, from that unit, or from that brigade or by the assistants
21 who, for example, accompanied the Chief of Staff on the visit to that
22 unit, to submit a document, a type of report, to the corps command so that
23 the purpose of the visit and the motive of the visit would be known.
24 However, there is another fact involved, too, that most often the
25 chain of command is observed, and when such a visit is paid to a brigade
1 headquarters, the corps command should know about this and the corps
2 commander or the deputy commander or the Chief of Staff would come to
3 attend such a meeting. However, I cannot say anything further
4 specifically about that meeting.
5 Q. Did you ever see a report suggesting that Mr. Halilovic had gone
6 to a 9th Brigade meeting? If you can answer yes or no, please do so.
7 A. I do not recall.
8 Q. Were you present at a meeting when -- in June 1993, when
9 Mr. Halilovic's replacement was announced? That is, that Mr. Delic was
10 going to be the -- was going to take a position above Mr. Halilovic in the
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. What was Mr. Halilovic's reaction to the news?
14 A. I would rather say that his reaction was like 99 per cent of all
15 people would react in such a situation. Now, what am I trying to say when
16 I say this? I'm trying to say that quite simply put, at that meeting he
17 displayed a bit of anger because of what was being done, and because of
18 the way things were being done. Nothing special. Basically, that it was
19 only natural and that probably any person would react that way, if not a
20 lot worse.
21 Q. Did you say anything to him concerning his reaction to the news?
22 A. Well, I did, because after that, I think that a document was
23 brought to that meeting by Konjicija Abdulah, an MP in the parliament of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. After he read this and after a brief interventions in
25 the discussion, all of us who were present there were asked to say a few
1 words. I think, if I manage to pair phrase my own words, I only asked
2 General Halilovic, if I can put it that way, to calm down completely, to
3 take this as a normal thing, let's move on, there is a war going on, and
4 time will show, the future will show, et cetera, the correctness or
5 incorrectness of certain steps taken by politics, and so on.
6 Q. Are Zakir Okovic and Sakib Okovic different people?
7 A. Everything I said in my statement meant -- was about Zakib Orovic
8 [phoen], I did notice Sakib Okovic first in that document. I mean, I
9 don't know a person by that name.
10 Q. There is a document which I think I neglected to show you earlier,
11 which I should have, and that's number 14 on our list, 00585517. Which is
12 an order of the 24th of September 1993, addressed to the command of the
13 9th Motorised Brigade, ordering them to Jablanica.
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 395.
15 MR. RE:
16 Q. Has it come up on the screen yet? You referred today earlier to
17 sending an order to Mr. Delalic in response to Mr. Halilovic's order
18 requesting more soldiers. Is that the order which you sent to Mr. Delalic
19 on the 24th of September 1993? Sorry, the date on the English translation
20 says the 24th. It should be the 23rd. No, sorry, the 24th. Is that it?
21 A. Probably.
22 MR. RE: All right. I move to tender that into evidence.
23 JUDGE LIU: Maybe you could defer that at a later stage.
24 MR. RE: All right.
25 Q. And Mr. -- sorry, Karavelic, was Mr. Halilovic, to your knowledge,
1 aware of the problems within the 9th and the 10th Brigade at the time he
2 requested that they travel to Jablanica?
3 MR. MORRISSEY: That question has got a number of problems with
4 it. First of all, it has to be clear whether he's asking about this
5 request that they travel to Jablanica early in September, the first time,
6 or whether we are talking at a later time. Secondly, there are two
7 different brigades, and thirdly, there is a range of different problems
8 and rumours and stories that were floating around. And -- is this witness
9 being asked to confirm that Halilovic knew about all of them, some of
10 them, none of them? Which ones? That really -- so I object to the
12 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Well, but I believe that is a general question.
13 Let's see the answer. Then if there is a necessity, Mr. Re will go into
14 the details.
15 MR. RE:
16 Q. Mr. Karavelic, when Mr. Halilovic requested the 9th and the 10th
17 to travel to Jablanica in September 1993, early September, 1993, was he
18 aware, to your knowledge, of the problems within the 9th and the 10th, all
19 the problems you've testified about, or some of the problems you've
20 testified about over the last few days?
21 MR. MORRISSEY: I object once again. It's the use of the word
22 "within the 9th and the 10th Brigade" that concerns me. Just about all
23 the evidence that's been given here concerns the leaders of -- the leader
24 of the 10th Brigade or commander of the 10th Brigade, Musan Topalovic and
25 the deputy commander of the 9th Brigade, Ramiz Delalic. These problems
1 within the brigade have been the subject of very little evidence over the
2 last few days. And to put it in that -- those terms, frankly, is too
3 broad to be meaningful and again I object to it. Because -- and the
4 distinction I'm drawing here is within the 9th and 10th Brigade as opposed
5 to concerning the leaders about which the evidence that is been led.
6 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe that the Prosecution made a kind of
7 qualification for this question. That is all the problems the witness
8 testified about in the last few days. I think that's enough.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, the question thus qualified I would
10 agree entirely that that's right.
11 MR. RE:
12 Q. Can you answer that one, Mr. Karavelic? That's the state of
13 Mr. Halilovic's knowledge, to your knowledge.
14 A. I'll try to be specific. Sefer Halilovic was in the Patriotic
15 League. He admitted me into the Patriotic League. His headquarters were
16 in Sarajevo. From the days of the Patriotic League, the first days of the
17 aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and the siege against Sarajevo,
18 Sefer Halilovic was incessantly in Sarajevo. His command post was in
19 Sarajevo. As for all the political and military developments in Sarajevo
20 he was there from day one. And in direct response to your question, I
21 would say that as far back as in 1992, I remember very well a situation
22 that Sefer Halilovic as Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, he had many
23 other problems, and he knew of many other problems. When he tried to
24 remove the commander of the 4th Brigade, Fikret Prevljak when he sent
25 Salko Gusic as the new commander, however, he, as the Chief of Staff of
1 the Supreme Command, the number one man in the army, did not manage to
2 carry this through.
3 Now, many questions can be put why it was so. Well that is the
4 key problem in relation to everything. He could not remove a brigade
5 commander and he wanted to. Then, 1992, Caco and Celo, and everything
6 concerning the 9th and 10th Brigades is something that went on over a long
7 period of time. Caco and Celo did not come into being in September 1993.
8 They were a consequence of what had been going on for a long time and what
9 had not been resolved. Towards the ends of 1992 and the beginning of
10 1993, and the spring and summer of 1993, and so on. Deeply convinced as a
11 soldier, as a human being, as a fellow fighter of his, that he only wanted
12 people to defend a Bosnia-Herzegovina that was internationally recognised
13 as an independent state. Now, why things turned out the way they did and
14 why we are in a courtroom now is a completely different matter.
15 Q. I was actually asking you about the state of his knowledge. What
16 do you know about his knowledge about the activities of the 9th and the
17 10th at the time that he requested parts of those units go to Jablanica?
18 A. At any rate, as the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command until
19 then, and after that, at the same position, no longer the number one man
20 of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, though, he had to know about certain
21 activities of Caco and Celo if they actually did carry out these
22 activities. At any rate, he could not know nearly as much as the security
23 service knew about that. Or as much as the command of the 1st Corps knew
24 perhaps. Let me be very specific and objective. It is the security
25 service that knew the most. And then secondly the corps command and so
1 on, and finally, Sefer Halilovic himself.
2 Q. And finally, what was the Sandzak lobby?
3 A. In Sarajevo, if I'd start enumerating all of them I think that
4 there would be a countless number of lobbies. The Sandzak lobby is only
5 one of this endless number of lobbies.
6 Q. Who was in it and what was their reputation?
7 A. Oh, please. This is far too difficult a question for me.
8 Practically, in order for me to be able to give any kind of answer to that
9 question, that would not be serious at all. I am sorry. There is the
10 Krajina lobby, the Drina lobby, the Eastern Bosnia lobby, the Sandzak
11 lobby, the Albanian lobby.
12 JUDGE LIU: Well, well, Witness, I believe that we heard some
13 evidence on that Sandzak lobby already, and please concentrate on the
14 question. Who was in it and what was their reputation?
15 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I give you the same answer that I gave
16 to the Prosecutor. It would lack seriousness on my part to say anything
17 about a document I first saw last week when I came here to this Court in
18 The Hague. In one of these documents, from the security service, it says
19 that this lobby was headed by Ejub Ganic. Throughout the war I was very
20 close to him, and he helped me such a great deal, as an experienced
21 politician. He helped me as a professional soldier. He fought for
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina just as I did. I was surprised by that, but I read
23 that. And now can I say that he was a member of the Sandzak lobby? I
24 can't say that. Or would I say that of anyone else?
25 MR. RE: That's the evidence in chief.
1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. We have already eight minutes
2 past the time, and we might start this afternoon a little bit early.
3 We'll start at 3.30 in the afternoon, and we have one hour and 30 minutes
4 for this afternoon.
5 Yes. The hearing for this morning is adjourned.
6 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.53 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 3.32 p.m.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Mettraux?
9 MR. METTRAUX: Yes, good afternoon, Your Honour, as promised this
10 morning we have had a little bit of time over lunch to sit together with
11 the Prosecution and we would like to express our gratitude to Sureta
12 Chana. We have now reached an agreement with the Prosecution as to quite
13 a large number of the facts which were actually put forward as proposed
14 adjudicated facts and it seems that Your Honours will not need to rule on
15 this matter. We have agreed to finalising a copy of those agreed facts,
16 which we will do in later afternoon, which will then be signed by both
17 parties and what we propose to do is perhaps to file a new motion with
18 those agreed facts attached to them and the Defence would then withdraw
19 its motion on adjudicated facts so that Your Honour will not have to rule
20 on this matter.
21 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much indeed for this progress. I hope
22 that new version could be filed as early as possible and maybe -- well, we
23 have a very busy schedule this week, I must confess. Maybe early next
24 week? Is that possible?
25 MR. METTRAUX: Certainly, Your Honour. We will undertake to do it
1 tomorrow morning.
2 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. I believe that Judge El Mahdi has been
3 very kind enough to postpone his contempt case until Monday, so tomorrow
4 afternoon, we will have some extra time to hear this witness.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour in my opinion it's my opinion that
6 it's possible to finish this witness tomorrow, given that extra time and
7 that's what we hope to do.
8 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. Could we have the witness,
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey, your cross-examination, please.
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
13 Cross-examined by Mr. Morrissey:
14 MR. MORRISSEY:
15 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Karavelic. I just want to commence by
16 asking you about the platform for the activities of the Presidency of
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina in conditions of war.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this matter -- this document has yet
19 to be uploaded into the system, unfortunately, and so I have paper copies
20 which will now be distributed. It may be that both English and Bosnian
21 can be provided to the witness, whichever he wants to use.
22 Q. I believe this document that's coming now is a document headed
23 "the platform for the activities of the Presidency of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina in conditions of war," and the first question is going to be,
25 are you familiar with that document?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And can you remember how did you come to be familiar with that
4 A. I think I had an opportunity of reading the document. I don't
5 know when and where, but I examined it just now, because there was some
6 military expertise in the Hadzihasanovic/Kubura case that referred to it.
7 Q. Very well. Could I ask you to do, please, to point 5 of that
8 document, which is headed "political basis of the all people's war of
9 defence"? Do you see there in the second paragraph it provides that
10 "patriotic forces in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, our lives together, and the ethnic equality of Muslims, Serbs
12 and Croats, as well as members of other peoples and nationalities its,
13 ethnic minorities, shall take part in a common multi-ethnic front." Now
14 do you see that passage there? While you're looking, Mr. Karavelic, I'm
15 reading from the English, but you feel free to read from whichever one
16 suits you the best. I'm stuck with the English, frankly. Okay. Do you
17 see that passage that I've just directed your attention to?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. All right. The next passage reads, "the armed forces of Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina shall include in their ranks members of all peoples who
21 live in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, multi-ethnic units and
22 commands are able to conduct the struggle for the liberation of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina against the aggressor with more success." And there -- there
24 is more there. Now what I want to ask you is, what were the -- what were
25 the implications of this presidential platform for those of you who were
1 conducting at a higher level the actual fighting? In other words, what
2 was the importance of the presidential platform for the army?
3 A. If I can use one word to describe it, the greatest possible
4 importance is what I'd say.
5 Q. Very well.
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours could I offer that for tender,
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes, I see no objections.
9 MR. RE: There certainly is no objection, but I want to raise a
10 matter on the issue of documents. Can my learned friend indicate how many
11 documents he intends to show to the witness, because we have no idea what
12 documents he has or where they are coming from or what size they are.
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Well, as for the later -- the other questions, I
14 believe that the Defence will introduce it one by one, but at this stage,
15 at least, Mr. Morrissey could tell the other party how many documents are
16 you going to use or tender through this witness?
17 MR. MORRISSEY: I think this evening it's likely to be eight to
18 ten, and I am endeavouring to slash brutally the original 60 that I had on
19 the list.
20 MR. RE: Could I ask if Mr. Morrissey would be kind enough to give
21 us the documents we will go away and photocopy them and bring them back to
22 court so that we are in a position to look at the documents as they are
23 given to the witness and we, the Prosecution, are in the position to
24 assist the Trial Chamber by being able to comment or object on the
25 documents, if necessary, in an informed manner? Because if they are just
1 shown to us on the screen, there is no way we can, firstly, do our job or
2 assist the Trial Chamber especially if they are multi-page documents. I'm
3 suggesting if Mr. Morrissey could just give us the list, we will go away
4 and photocopy them now. And if he could just move to the documents and we
5 will bring them back very quickly.
6 JUDGE LIU: Well, I understand that there is a motion filed by the
7 Prosecution which is pending, and the Trial Chamber is considering the
8 decision on that motion. We haven't come to any rulings yet at this
9 stage. As a compromise, as a compromise, if some documents have been
10 already admitted into the evidence, could Mr. Morrissey be kind enough to
11 provide that list to the Defence?
12 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, I can but I can't say the
13 order in which this -- this cross-examination is going to proceed. There
14 is a number of pressures that we have to bear at the moment. And, to be
15 honest, I'm very reluctant to do it right now. I just started
17 JUDGE LIU: Of course. But you also have a team. Maybe just
18 write down some numbers and draw up a list.
19 MR. MORRISSEY: Would Your Honour excuse me for a moment? I'll
20 see if I can accomplish something in short notice in this regard.
21 MR. RE: The ones which are admitted into evidence are not a
22 problem. We have paper copies of all of those there. I can -- and I'm
23 basically familiar with them. I can access them straight away. It's the
24 new documents which we are not familiar with that are suddenly shown to a
25 witness. The witness may well be familiar with them and we are not. We
1 are at the greatest disadvantage in assisting the Trial Chamber because we
2 haven't got them. It would not be difficult for Mr. Morrissey to give
3 them -- give us the pile of documents and we could bring them back
4 probably within ten minutes and he would have one copy and we would have
5 the other copy. Now, in my respectful submission, that would be a very
6 fair compromise in these circumstances. It he keeps the document he's
7 about to use and gives us the rest, the Defence isn't photocopying them,
8 it's not from the Defence budget we will go away and do it ourselves and
9 we will happily assist in that manner.
10 JUDGE LIU: As I said, that there is a motion pending before us,
11 we haven't come to any rulings at this stage. So I'm afraid that I have
12 to repeat whatever I said, that this Bench encourages the Defence to
13 furnish the Prosecution a list of the documents they are going to use as a
14 good gesture. But as for there is an obligation or not, we haven't come
15 to a decision yet. So before doing that, I'm afraid we have to follow the
16 past practice, unless the Defence voluntarily would like to furnish that
17 list to the Prosecution.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: The Defence declines to help now. We might
19 consider helping at the end of the day. Right now I'm starting to
20 cross-examine. I wish this hadn't have been sprung on me like this, and
21 although the Chamber might take one view and the Prosecution might take
22 another, this could have been raised at any time today. It's been raised
23 a number of times before. To raise it right now, I don't know what the
24 reasoning is, but I refuse to give them any such thing at the moment and I
25 decline to help in the way suggested. But, Your Honours, what I'll do is,
1 of course, despite the fact that we have the protection of the court's
2 ruling, I'll give some thought to this as soon as we finish today. But we
3 are against the clock, Your Honour, and that's why I'm very anxious to
4 proceed if I can.
5 JUDGE LIU: Let's proceed.
6 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you.
7 Q. Very well. Now we were discussing the importance of this
8 particular platform to the armed struggle and to the consequences it had
9 for the Bosnian army. And could I just ask you this: So far as you
10 understood your role in the war, and the role of others, officers who had
11 been in the Patriotic League, you were determined to bring about, to
12 fight, to protect a multi-ethnic Bosnia; is that correct?
13 A. Precisely.
14 Q. And to your recollection, the senior commanders that you had
15 contact with, whether it be Sefer Halilovic, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, Rasim
16 Delic, all shared that view in the time when you were fighting, of a
17 multi-ethnic Bosnia in which all the people would live together and fight
18 together so long as the war lasted. Is that true?
19 A. I believe in that 100 per cent, without any doubt.
20 Q. And because of that commitment to a multi-ethnic Bosnia was it an
21 important thing for your army to try to do, and particularly the senior
22 commanders to try to do, to ensure that no atrocities were committed on an
23 ethnic basis against distinct ethnic groups?
24 A. Many steps were taken, both political ones and military ones,
25 precisely to prevent that.
1 Q. Very well. Now, I'm going to ask you some questions about the way
2 in which the army grew into an army in a moment but there is one specific
3 aspect of that I want to deal with now and that is following from what you
4 just said, what steps were taken by way of giving some reality to the
5 Geneva Conventions and giving some reality to protection of civilians by
6 the army, in particular by the high levels of the army, in 1992 and 1993?
7 And if you can't give an exactly exhaustive historical list from memory
8 could you provide some examples of the sort of steps that were taken in
9 that regard?
10 A. It is difficult for me now to list all the many documents,
11 documents without force of law and with force of law, that were issued and
12 published and to give you their titles. There were quite a number of such
13 documents and during 1992, in actual fact, during the summer of that year,
14 many such documents were issued, and all of them explicitly demanded
15 absolute, 100 per cent adherence to the international Geneva Conventions
16 on the rights of civilians and generally speaking, a wide range of rights,
17 regardless of who they refer to, during a state of war, also respect for
18 the provisions of international war law and so on and so forth.
19 Q. Now, was the same information provided at all levels of the army
20 or was a distinction drawn between how you would explain Geneva
21 Conventions to officers, on the one hand, and how you would explain it to
22 the soldiers on the line on the other hand? In other words, how was it
23 done at the different levels?
24 A. In the same way. From top to bottom, from the Supreme Command to
25 the last soldier in the Bosnia-Herzegovinian army, without exception to
1 one and all. And I'm quite convinced of that.
2 Q. Who had the job of communicating the rules to the soldiers on the
3 line? Was that the job of you as corps commander, or was that a job that
4 you would delegate to battalion, company commanders, having provided them
5 with materials to help them?
6 A. In the military hierarchy, everybody had -- was duty bound to do
7 so towards his immediate subordinates, the superior officers to their
8 immediate subordinates. And my task as corps commander was not to do this
9 immediately with the soldiers themselves.
10 Q. And are you able to say which level of commander at the lower
11 levels would have the primary responsibility for telling the soldiers
12 their obligations? Would it be a company commander or would it be at
13 platoon level? Where would that be?
14 A. It would be the platoon commander, the company commander and,
15 depending on the circumstances, you might have a battalion commander
16 involved in this. That would be the maximum top level.
17 MR. RE: Could I just interrupt. I'm loathe to, but the question
18 was their obligations. I'm not quite sure to what Mr. Morrissey was
19 referring, obligations under the Geneva Conventions or obligations to --
20 to follow the line of hierarchy or what it is. I think that should be
22 MR. MORRISSEY: I meant obligations as this witness understood
23 them, Your Honour. And I would submit that that's okay. But perhaps we
24 can clarify that somewhat.
25 Q. In explaining to the soldiers that they shouldn't massacre
1 innocent civilians or behave in a bigoted or racially prejudiced way with
2 respect to other groups, did you draw a distinction between their
3 obligations under Bosnian law and under international law, or did you just
4 explain to them what their duties were?
5 A. Referring precisely to all the positive provisions regulating on
6 an international level this area and supported by provisions taken by the
7 state organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's the way. And so there was no
8 distinction among the soldiers. All of them were told this in the same
10 Q. And to conclude this part of my questions, is it the fact that
11 events like the killings at Grabovica or at Uzdol were an absolute
12 disaster from the point of view of encouraging people to join and to fight
13 for a multi-ethnic and tolerant Bosnia? In other words, those sort of
14 events did not advance the war effort as you understood the war effort to
16 A. Precisely. And many of us experienced this as both a military and
17 moral, and human and a catastrophe which would be against the civilians as
18 well. So this was an enormous surprise to all of us, to all the members
19 of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the present day, is
20 it possible that something like that happened and that members of the BH
21 army did something like that?
22 JUDGE LIU: Well, since you're changing the subject, I believe
23 that if there is no objections from the Prosecution, that document you
24 used has been admitted into the evidence and the Court Deputy will assign
25 a number to it.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D396.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you and I apologise. Naturally I do have
3 one last question about that.
4 Q. That was, at the time the Presidency passed the Presidency
5 platform, to your understanding, Sefer Halilovic was a member of the
6 Presidency by virtue of his office as the number one man in the army in
7 1992; is that correct?
8 A. I think that is correct, yes.
9 Q. I now want to move on to the question of the nature of some of the
10 units that were defending Sarajevo in 1993. And my focus in asking these
11 questions will be on 1993, but of course if you need to refer to something
12 earlier, you have liberty to refer to whatever is relevant, of course.
13 Now, you indicated earlier on that the units which defended
14 Sarajevo were not placed there had by some mobilisation plan but arose
15 spontaneously as a result of a sudden and dangerous threat of extinction.
16 What I want to ask is, can the same be said of the commanders of those
17 units? Did they arise effectively out of the units themselves rather than
18 because of some directive from the authorities?
19 A. Precisely.
20 Q. Now, was Musan Topalovic, Caco, one such person?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Was Mujo Zulic another such person?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Just so that the Tribunal knows, because we have not heard much
25 about Mujo Zulic, which unit was Mujo Zulic the commander of? By the time
1 we get to 1993, I mean.
2 A. He was commander of the 1st Mountain Brigade, which bordered on
3 the 10th Mountain Brigade, the left flank of the 10th mountain and the
4 right flange of the 1st Mountain Brigade.
5 Q. Was Ramiz Delalic another such person?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And apart from the three that I've named, were there many other
8 commanders who emerged from the ranks of their own unit by the will of
9 their own soldiers?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to those units, was it a plan and a hope
12 that the senior officers from the Patriotic League had, that one day you
13 would bring these units into a sensible line of command and control?
14 A. Yes, precisely.
15 Q. And I understand this is a question that is almost impossible to
16 answer in a short way, so I'll put a proposition and you tell me if you
17 agree or not. At the start, the collection of brave people who were
18 fighting for Sarajevo could not really be described as an army in any
19 military sense of the term "army." Is that correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. But those of you, and I mean by these yourself, Mustafa
22 Hajrulahovic, Talijan, Sefer Halilovic and others with JNA training, those
23 of you who did have some expertise in military command, tried to assist
24 the patriotic forces to organise themselves better and ultimately come to
25 form a proper, regular army; is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. But although it's again stating the obvious, I think it has to be
3 stated, you didn't have time to form the army before the fighting began,
4 did you?
5 A. Precisely.
6 Q. Very well. Now, throughout 1992, is it the fact that various
7 steps were taken by way of introducing rules to introduce into the
8 patriotic forces, elements of command and control?
9 A. Yes, that was precisely done with that goal in mind.
10 Q. I won't take you to all of these different manuals, but were the
11 military rules and regulations of the former JNA, generally speaking,
12 adopted as the rules of the new Bosnian army?
13 A. Can I just clarify this? You mean in the original version or
14 generally speaking.
15 Q. I mean generally speaking.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Very well. Now, I understand in asking these questions that I'm
18 skating over some issues of complexity of organisation concerning the TO
19 and other bodies, but so it will have to be. In 1992, for example, did
20 the army under the leadership of Sefer Halilovic bring in rules governing
21 the operation of the military security service, the SVB?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Very well. And perhaps let me ask you this: In late 1992 and
24 into 1993, where -- to whom would a commander, an inexperienced commander
25 who had no military training, to whom would such a commander turn to find
1 out what the official -- Mr. Karavelic, that question has just got lost.
2 I'm going to start it again. I apologise for that. Very well.
3 Apart from the SVB rules that I've just referred to, were rules
4 concerning the military police introduced?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Were rules concerning the military prosecutors and military courts
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Very well. Now, is it accurate to say that some units came into
10 the line of command and control earlier than other units did?
11 A. Yes, precisely.
12 Q. And are you able to say whether or not the units that came into
13 the line of command and control were generally speaking units that had
14 senior ex-JNA officers commanding them or in their staffs? Or was there
15 no such correlation?
16 A. This was precisely the case, or most often the case.
17 Q. Was Fikret Prevljak an ex-JNA person or was he one of the
18 spontaneous commanders?
19 A. The latter.
20 Q. I'm going to come back to that individual a bit later on. Very
21 well. Now, considering the concrete case of Ramiz Delalic for a moment,
22 you have indicated that despite whatever rumours or gossip there might
23 have been about Ramiz Delalic, that at least in one respect, good can be
24 said of him and that was he was a very brave and dedicated fighter; is
25 that correct?
1 A. Absolutely.
2 Q. But for various reasons, and chiefly his refusal to cooperate with
3 the command and control system, he came to be viewed in 1993 as a
4 commander who the Bosnian army staff wished to remove from his command; is
5 that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Later on I'm going to ask you some questions about the importance
8 of command and control and how it operates, but it's the fact, isn't it,
9 that by 1993, Ramiz Delalic was in his place as deputy commander of the
10 9th Brigade not because the army command wanted him there but because his
11 soldiers wanted him there?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And you might recall you were asked some questions by the learned
14 Prosecutor earlier on as to why Ramiz Delalic wasn't simply dismissed from
15 his post or dealt with or arrested. The reason why he wasn't simply
16 displaced or dealt with or arrested is because to do so was likely to
17 cause an armed conflict on the spot; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And is it also the fact that some of these popular commanders
20 recognised a common interest and were therefore potentially able to help
21 each other if one of their number was to be arrested in that way; is that
23 A. Probably. That probably was the case. I would agree with that.
24 Q. Now, I was going to put some questions to you about whether that
25 was the case during the second of July 1993 incidents, but before I do put
1 any such proposition I just have to clarify something. It seems from your
2 answers that you were absent from Sarajevo and in the Igman region at the
3 time when that incident took place; is that true?
4 A. Yes.
5 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Morrissey, could you ask the witness about
6 in which period, to be exact?
7 MR. MORRISSEY: About his movements from one to the other?
8 JUDGE LIU: Well, no, his absence from Sarajevo, the witness.
9 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours could I just -- if you just bear with
10 me for two minutes I was going to get him to give us -- well, I can do it
11 now, of course.
12 Q. Yes, all right. Just to anticipate something that's coming, your
13 own position was that you came to be the deputy commander to Mustafa
14 Hajrulahovic, Talijan, in the 1st Corps, and could you say approximately
15 what date you took up that office as deputy commander in Sarajevo?
16 A. Early September 1992.
17 Q. Very well. And did you remain in that post until departing for
18 Igman in the middle of 1993?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Very well. Can you say approximately when it was, as near as
21 possible to the date, when you departed to go to Igman?
22 A. I think the first half of July, or perhaps mid-July, but I can't
23 give you the precise date. It was thereabouts, about that time.
24 Q. And you remained on Igman until sometime in August, and could you
25 tell us when it was that you came back?
1 A. I stayed there for a month, or just over a month perhaps, so the
2 return date is between the 10th and the 15th of August 1993.
3 Q. Very well. Now, and to clarify, your position a little further,
4 before you left for Igman, were you formally appointed to become the
5 commander of the 1st Corps replacing Mustafa Hajrulahovic?
6 A. No.
7 Q. You took up your position as commander of the 1st Corps when you
8 returned from Igman. May I ask you, did Mustafa Hajrulahovic remain corps
9 commander at all times up until you came back from Igman or was he acting
10 corps commander for some period of time there?
11 A. While I was at Igman in late July 1993, I heard over the radio
12 that I had been appointed commander of the 1st Corps, having received no
13 prior notification whatsoever, and never having been consulted. Upon my
14 return to Sarajevo, I was ordered to take up my duties and I obliged. In
15 order to be quite specific about the latter part of your question, I can't
16 be very precise about that, simply because I don't remember clearly.
17 Q. Well, that's okay. All right. Now there are some other
18 chronology matters that might assist here, just to put them in order, and
19 you can confirm whether you were aware of these matters or not. You
20 indicated that while Sefer Halilovic was still the number one man in the
21 army -- I'm using that term because of the change in nature of the Chief
22 of Staff office. But before the 8th of June, when Sefer was the number
23 one in the army, you indicated in evidence that Mustafa Hajrulahovic,
24 Talijan, sent a request to Halilovic asking that Musan Topalovic, Caco,
25 Ramiz Delalic, Celo, and a number of other individuals be removed from
1 their command positions and you indicated that Sefer Halilovic confirmed
2 that document and sent it on to -- to President Izetbegovic. Now, did it
3 have to go to President Izetbegovic because only he had the power to
4 dismiss brigade commanders? Or only the Presidency had the power to
5 dismiss brigade commanders or higher level commanders?
6 A. No. Only the person who appoints a brigade commander has the
7 power to remove a brigade commander or dismiss a brigade commander, and
8 this would be the Supreme Command, the president or the Presidency of
10 Q. I understand. And so -- and perhaps just to take the concrete
11 example of Fikret Prevljak, was he one of the people who -- I'm sorry,
12 pardon me, Mr. Karavelic. Taking the concrete case of Fikret Prevljak,
13 was he one of the individuals who Talijan, I'm sorry, who Mustafa
14 Hajrulahovic requested be removed from his command?
15 A. I think so, and I think the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command
16 tried to achieve precisely that. I'm not sure what was eventually
17 achieved. Maybe the Supreme Command had blocked the move or it may have
18 been for some other reason.
19 Q. Whatever the reason was, Fikret Prevljak remained safely in his
20 position commanding the 4th Hrasnica brigade despite all efforts to the
21 contrary by senior Bosnian army officers to have him removed; is that
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And indeed in the end, even though he was charged with serious
25 criminal offences, he still survived in that position; is that correct?
1 A. Yes. What you said about serious criminal offences, I'm not sure
2 about that. But for the most part, yes.
3 Q. Very well. In any event, the Court proceedings that you referred
4 to -- I'm sorry, when I said "serious criminal offences," perhaps I stated
5 it inaccurately. I was referring to court proceedings that you yourself
6 mentioned here so perhaps I misrepresented what you said, and I apologise
7 if I did.
8 Very well. Now --
9 A. That was later.
10 Q. Yes, yes, I understand that. Yes. Okay, so now that initiative
11 of Talijan's and Sefer Halilovic's to have those commanders removed,
12 you've indicated that occurred early in June. Is it the fact that on the
13 8th of June, by a presidential order, Sefer Halilovic was replaced as the
14 number one man in the army by Rasim Delic?
15 A. Can we just clarify this? The first part of your question you
16 spoke about Fikret Prevljak and this happened in 1992, if I remember
17 correctly, or late in 1992. There was an attempt to get him removed. On
18 the 8th of June 1993, on the other hand, it's quite correct that
19 General Rasim Delic became the commander of the Supreme Command.
20 Q. Yes. Well, my mistake there was caused by diverting on to the
21 subject of Fikret Prevljak. What I really meant was that early in June
22 1993, plus Mustafa Hajrulahovic sent the letter concerning Topalovic,
23 Ramiz Delalic and others, which you've indicated. Then on the 8th of June
24 we have the removal of Halilovic from the number-one position in the army.
25 Which you've just confirmed. And then, were you aware - you may be or you
1 may not be - that in the middle of June, a legal opinion was given to the
2 Presidency that the way in which the army had been restructured may have
3 some legal difficulties and that further clarification was needed? You
4 may know this, you may not, but I'll ask you whether you were aware of
5 that legal opinion that happened.
6 A. I think I heard something about it. It does ring a bell but it's
7 difficult for me to comment on that.
8 Q. That's okay. I'm going to come back to that. What we are doing
9 at the moment is just establishing a chronology so some of the events make
10 sense to the Tribunal. After that, on the 7th -- now, you're aware that
11 there was a large offensive by the forces of the Republika Srpska which
12 took you into battle on Igman; is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. When did that battle -- can you put a date or an approximate date
15 on when that battle commenced?
16 A. The battle commenced much earlier. It dates back to April or May,
17 in the spring.
18 Q. Are you able --
19 A. Starting with Gorazde and then Trnovo and eventually Igman,
20 including the broader area.
21 Q. Yes. Both in your evidence and in other people's evidence there
22 has been a sense of an acute crisis developing on Igman. Can you say when
23 the crisis developed on Igman approximately?
24 A. The crisis on Igman -- I'm not sure what specifically you have in
25 mind but it goes back to 1992. If we are considering the period of July
1 and August 1993 on Mount Igman, then the crisis began in the last days of
2 July, and the situation was disastrous, over the first 10 days of August,
3 in every way.
4 Q. And some details of that will be necessary, but later on. But
5 just to keep the chronology going, in July, although you were absent, you
6 did hear some news of an armed confrontation between the soldiers of
7 Topalovic and Ramiz Delalic and certain members of the military security
8 services and also the MUP; is that correct?
9 A. We can put it that way, yes.
10 Q. Then did you become aware that on the 7th of July, Sefer
11 Halilovic's wife was killed by a large explosion on the balcony of her
12 flat, or of Sefer Halilovic's and her flat?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, did you have the opportunity to make contact with Sefer
15 Halilovic in that time or were you engaged in combat activities?
16 A. I was engaged in combat activities throughout, for as long as I
17 was on Igman. Sefer Halilovic came to see me on Igman. It may have been
18 the last days of July or the first days of August. I think it was on the
19 5th or 6th of August that he came to Igman to assist me.
20 Q. Yes. Well that was going to be my next question, that -- did
21 Sefer Halilovic can come on to Igman as part of an inspection team late in
22 July, early in August, in order to assist you with the desperate situation
23 you were facing at that time?
24 A. No. I was not aware of any inspection team of any kind. He came
25 as the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command and he was followed by a
1 number of officers.
2 Q. Okay. Were you ever shown the order that appointed him? I'm not
3 suggesting you should have been but perhaps you were. So --
4 A. I'm not sure what order you're referring to. Appointing him to
5 what position exactly?
6 Q. The order which sent limb on to Igman. Were you aware of whether
7 there was an order that caused him to go to Igman and if so, did you see
8 any such order?
9 A. No. I'm not aware of that. I have never seen any such order.
10 Nor am I aware of any such order being issued.
11 Q. Okay. Now, after the first week and a half, perhaps two weeks, of
12 August, the crisis on Igman had been controlled to some degree, is that
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And after that, you heard the news that Rasim Delic wanted -- or
16 there should be summoned at Zenica a conference of corps-level commanders
17 in order to consider future directions of the armed struggle?
18 A. Commanders were summoned, corps commanders, and this all happened
19 at the Supreme Command staff level of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So
20 the answer is yes.
21 Q. Just excuse me a moment, sorry, I've got a wrong note, a document
23 Would you mind looking please at the Exhibit -- could the witness
24 be shown Exhibit 219? Here comes a document that you have already seen.
25 Can I just indicate -- thank you for providing some chronology for us, we
1 are going to come back over some of those details now. Exhibit 219 is the
2 appointment of a commission to consider some trench digging and taking
3 away of civilian activities which you've already looked at in this matter.
4 Now, just concerning the digging of trenches, it is the fact, is
5 it not, that those trenches saved Sarajevo in a very real sense at
6 different times? Is that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And is it also correct that you, Sefer Halilovic, Mustafa
9 Hajrulahovic and other senior leaders and commanders in Sarajevo tried
10 many, many times to get the units to get their trenches dug in the proper,
11 legal way?
12 A. Precisely. We were aware of the fact that the only way to defend
13 our manpower from enemy missiles was just this.
14 Q. Yes. And manpower was all you had, really, wasn't it?
15 A. You could say it like that, yes.
16 Q. I think you indicated you had three tanks? How many helicopters
17 did you have?
18 A. The 1st Corps of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had none. The
19 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, well, believe me, I don't know the exact
20 figure, several I'd say.
21 Q. Very well.
22 A. Several helicopters MA -- M8 helicopters. Those are helicopters
23 used for transport. They are not combat helicopters or fighter planes.
24 Q. Yes, thanks for that. So the document that's on the screen in
25 front of you now which is that order establishing the commission, was just
1 one of a number of other efforts made to regulate and to bring under
2 control the taking of people to dig trenches; is that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Okay. I just want to show you another document here.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, again, this one is yet to be
6 uploaded unfortunately. This is a document as signed by -- well, we'll
7 see who it's signed by but we'll be putting it -- that it's signed by
8 Mustafa Hajrulahovic. I just wonder if --
9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 397.
10 MR. MORRISSEY:
11 Q. I just want you to compare this -- this document to the one that's
12 on the screen. And what we are suggesting is that this is a document it
13 that is a follow-up to that commission, where Mustafa Hajrulahovic,
14 Talijan, has attempted to assist that commission by issuing an order.
15 Does that appear to you to be the case?
16 A. I don't remember this document. I've never seen it before. But
17 there is not a shadow of a doubt that that was precisely what General
18 Mustafa Hajrulahovic did and there is precisely what he did.
19 Q. Very well. I offer that document and -- perhaps before I do so,
20 just -- just make this clear. By this order -- now, this was an order
21 addressed to the 10th Mountain Brigade command proposing that that
22 particular organ establish all necessary conditions for the work of the
23 commission chaired by Rifat Bilajac and the other four members; is that
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And indeed, it specifies that the meeting at 1600 hours is to be
2 attended by the 10th Brigade corps command. Do you see that at number 3?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, Mr. Karavelic, can I just ask you this: In a normal army, if
5 you saw an order like that, would you draw the conclusion that since there
6 was an order, ordering a lesser unit to meet somebody somewhere, the
7 chances are that order would be obeyed?
8 A. In a normal army, yes, that should be the case.
9 Q. But in the Bosnian army, when you look at an order like this, the
10 mere fact that someone issues an order has no connection to the question
11 of whether it's going to be obeyed or not; is that correct as well?
12 MR. RE: I object to. That it's a very, very general question,
13 asking for some speculation. My learned friend is quite entitled to ask
14 it in relation to the 10th Brigade, given the evidence, but generally I
15 think it's going a little bit far in my submission.
16 JUDGE LIU: I believe that is the Defence counsel is talking about
17 this particular order.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: I can put the question.
19 JUDGE LIU: Whether there order has been obeyed or not.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours I must confess my learned friend is
21 correct in putting that I'm putting the matter more generally. He's right
22 about that. So I'll ask the question in a different way. Because I was
23 seeking to make a more general point.
24 MR. MORRISSEY:
25 Q. Sorry about that, Mr. Karavelic, sometimes the questions aren't
1 very precise or good so I'm going to try another one. What I want to ask
2 you is this: Just because a commander in the Bosnian army issued an
3 order, that was no guarantee that it was going to be obeyed; is that
4 correct, as a general proposition at this time?
5 A. Absolutely true.
6 Q. And in particular, when issuing orders to the 9th Brigade or to
7 the 10th Brigade, it was a question of the will -- I'll withdraw that.
8 I'm going to put that question nor precisely.
9 You as a deputy commander and ultimately a commander could issue
10 orders to these units but in real terms, it was a matter of their choice
11 whether they obeyed or not; is that correct?
12 A. Generally speaking, frequently, but if you're speaking
13 specifically, then yes.
14 Q. Sometimes the 10th Brigade did, in fact, appear to comply with an
15 order; is that correct?
16 A. That's also correct, yes.
17 Q. And sometimes the 9th Brigade would appear to have complied with
18 an order; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. But you couldn't conclude from that fact that either of them was
21 in the line of command and control, could you?
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. Because when a unit obeys orders when it feels like it, it's not
24 in the line of command and control, is it?
25 A. Well, I can say that it isn't, but I can put it differently and
1 say not completely, not fully.
2 Q. Now, just moving forward for a moment to another -- sorry,
3 perhaps, yes, there is one other document I'd like to show. I offer that
4 document for tender. Did I do that already?
5 JUDGE LIU: Any objections is.
6 MR. RE: No, subject, of course, to some information on its
7 provenance, its chain of custody, how the Defence got it, and how it came
8 to be before the Tribunal today.
9 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey?
10 MR. MORRISSEY: Just excuse me a moment, please. I'll ask those
11 who know better.
12 [Defence counsel confer]
13 MR. MORRISSEY: Could we go into the private session, please,
14 Your Honour?
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we will go to the private session, please.
16 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D397.
23 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour. There were two documents
24 provided by that individual on request by the Defence, and now I turn to
25 the next of those. Could the witness please be shown -- this is Defence
1 65 ter number D1550. Again it's not uploaded as a hard copy yet but of
2 course will be in due course.
3 THE REGISTRAR: MFI 398.
4 MR. MORRISSEY:
5 Q. The document that's coming now is on the face of it a report by
6 Bilajac, Maslak, Komad [phoen], Kinja [phoen], and Hasinovic. I just
7 wonder if you wouldn't minds taking a moment to look at that document, and
8 as you're doing so would you just note the order number at the top there?
9 In particular, what I'm going to ask you about is the recommendations.
10 Mr. Karavelic, you can indicate when you're finished reading that and --
11 A. I've finished.
12 Q. All right. There is just two parts I want to draw your attention
13 to. The first is the recommendations there. It's recommended that Musan
14 Topalovic, also known as Caco, be relieved of duty. That's not the first
15 time that a recommendation was made to remove Musan Topalovic from duty,
16 is it?
17 A. I think you're right.
18 Q. And the second thing I wanted to take you to was -- back in
19 paragraph number 2, you can see that there is a reference to a previous
20 order dated the 25th of December 1992, prohibiting the unauthorised
21 bringing in and take of citizens.
22 A. Prohibiting, yes.
23 Q. And in short, this is -- this document, to your knowledge, is just
24 one of a long line of efforts made to bring the trench-digging problem
25 under control; is that correct?
1 A. Precisely.
2 MR. MORRISSEY: I offer that document for tender as well.
3 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
4 MR. RE: I don't think my learned colleague asked the witness
5 whether he'd ever seen it before.
6 MR. MORRISSEY: I thought I had, Your Honour, but I apologise if I
8 Q. Have you ever seen that document before?
9 A. I don't think so. At least I don't remember having seen it.
10 Q. At all events, does it appear to you to be entirely consist tends
11 with the two other documents that you were shown, namely the commission of
12 the 3rd of June 1993 and the order of the 5th of June 1993 and indeed to
13 be a report by that very commission?
14 A. I think so, yes.
15 Q. And finally, it may be -- you may be able to remember, although I
16 know it's 11 years later, but if you wouldn't mind just looking at the
17 signature on the other side, you might confirm whether you're now in a
18 position to say that you recognise the signature of Rifat Bilajac or Enver
20 A. The only signature that I used to see more was Rifat Bilajac and
21 Maslak, Enver. Those two signatures. I think those are the signatures
22 but of course I can't say 100 per cent, just as like I -- just as I
23 wouldn't be able to say for any other signatures.
24 Q. I understand that.
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honour, us I do offer it for tender.
1 MR. RE: No objection.
2 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. This document is admitted into
4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D398.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: Very well, thank you very much for that.
6 Q. Now, arising from that little sequence of documents, we know --
7 well, perhaps -- I'll just put the question as a cross examining question.
8 Musan Topalovic despite that report, was not removed from his commanding
9 post at the 10th Brigade at that time, was he?
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. I just want to list a couple of reasons why it wasn't appropriate
12 to use force against Musan Topalovic or indeed against Ramiz Delalic at
13 that time, and I'll get to you comment on each one as I raise it. First
14 of all, if the SVB, military security service, and any military police
15 with them, went to arrest either of the two individuals, Delalic or
16 Topalovic, the -- there was a high likelihood of armed conflict with --
17 between those military police and the local units; is that correct?
18 A. Absolutely.
19 Q. And this -- any such conflict had a number of bad effects. First
20 of all, it might result in significant numbers of casualties; is that
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Secondly, it could be very damaging for army morale more
24 generally; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thirdly, it might provide a specific military opportunity for the
2 Republika Srpska forces when such a conflict was going on; is that
4 A. Precisely.
5 Q. And fourthly, there was in the middle of 1993 some level of
6 tension and distrust in some parts of the front between the fighting front
7 line soldiers on the one hand and the MUP policemen on the other hand,
8 whatever the reasons might be; is that correct?
9 A. Absolutely.
10 Q. And triggering a conflict by going to arrest Ramiz Delalic or
11 Musan Topalovic was something that might have very far-reaching
12 consequences in terms of civil strife in Sarajevo; is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And finally, there was a danger that if a confrontation took place
15 between security organs on the one hand and units of Delalic or Topalovic
16 on the other hand, that other units might take the decision to join in or
17 contribute to such a conflict. Was that a danger?
18 A. If I may just add something, the key problem was that this applied
19 to both sides, and you are entirely right.
20 Q. I'm not asking to you enter a judgement on who was right and wrong
21 about this question, but what was the grievance, if you like, that the
22 army soldiers had against the MUP, the military police? And by "army
23 soldiers," I mean the soldiers on the ground.
24 A. In Sarajevo, people used to say that those were Baba's sons or
25 fashion models. They had everything. They had very fancy uniforms, nice
1 boots, good weapons, sufficient ammunition. And that on the other hand,
2 their total contribution to the Defence of Sarajevo was quite inadequate.
3 They were called "daddy's little boys" for that reason.
4 Q. And at a higher level in the army, did some of you, and I'm
5 perhaps talking of people at the level that were you at and at the corps
6 level with Mustafa Hajrulahovic and others, and perhaps also staff members
7 such as Mr. Bilajac, Mr. Suljevic, Mr. Karic, and that level of people,
8 was there a shared feeling there that there needed to be more coordination
9 and more cooperation in military matters between the army and the forces
10 of the MUP?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Sorry, just excuse me, please, one moment. There is a document
13 I'd like to show you.
14 MR. RE: Could I clarify something? The question -- the two
15 questions back, my learned friend said "grievance, if you like, the army
16 soldiers had against the MUP, the military police." I'm not sure whether
17 the witness's answer was referring to the military police or to the MUP.
18 Perhaps that could be clarified.
19 MR. MORRISSEY: Of course. Of course it could be.
20 Q. Well, I don't -- I don't know if you understood the objection
21 there. But there has been a request for a clarification about whether the
22 soldiers on the ground -- I'll ask the question another way. When you
23 were talking about the daddy's boys there, were you talking about the
24 civilian police, the MUP, or the military police, or both?
25 A. Civilian police, or the MUP, if you like.
1 Q. Yes. Thank you. Now, there is a -- just have to excuse me a
2 moment, sorry. There is a document I want to go to now and I just have to
3 turn it up.
4 Okay. Before I come to this document I just want a couple of
5 other general questions to ask. With respect to the -- the need for there
6 to be further coordination between the MUP forces and the army forces, do
7 you recall Sefer Halilovic making it clear on a number of occasions, one
8 of which I'll put to you in a minute, that he thought that the extensive
9 human and material and technical potential of the MUP for war tasks and
10 duties ought to be mobilised to a much greater extent than it was
11 currently being? In other words, did you understand that to be Sefer's
12 position in the spring of 1993?
13 A. I remember that. I know that. And that is correct.
14 Q. And do you recall whether or not there was a proposal made -- I'm
15 just going to show you a document now. Just excuse me one moment, please.
16 Pardon me, I'm sorry about that. This document is uploaded. This is
17 Defence 65 ter number DD000198. Sorry, 65 ter number D52 and it's
19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 399.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: I might have provided the wrong number there.
21 It's DD00-0195. My apologies for that. Very well.
22 Q. The document that's going to be shown to you now is the document
23 under the name of Sefer Halilovic, chief of the SVK of the Bosnian army.
24 It's dated Sarajevo, 27 May 1993. So it's maybe a bit over a week before
25 he was removed from his position as the number one man in the army. Now,
1 this is a document that you may have seen before you may not, and you
2 might need to read the whole thing to find out. If you look at it and
3 tell us that you've read it before, please tell us, otherwise just take
4 your time to read it and then I'll ask you some questions about it.
5 MR. RE: We don't have there document. I've just tried to find it
6 on the screen but it's come up saying you are not authorised to view there
8 MR. MORRISSEY: That was the plan. Your Honour, I'm sorry about
9 that. It should be released. I think it's released now, is it? I'm told
10 it's released, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We saw it on our screen.
12 MR. RE: It's a four-page document we have not seen before. I
13 cannot deal with that document on this screen and attempt to look at a --
14 the transcript a metre away. I physically can't do it. I really need a
15 paper copy. I cannot do my job trying to look at a four-page document,
16 scrolling through it while the transcript is a metre away. I just can't
17 do it. So I really request a paper copy of the document.
18 MR. MORRISSEY: That's going to be provided, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.
20 MR. MORRISSEY: Meanwhile, the witness might just do the very best
21 he can to read it on the screen at the moment.
22 THE WITNESS: I've finished the first page.
23 MR. MORRISSEY:
24 Q. As you read, I just draw your attention to a matter that I want to
25 ask you a question about. You'll see in about the middle of the document
1 that there is a call made by Mr. Halilovic that -- and I'm quoting, "the
2 substantial military potential of the MUP is placed under a single
4 MR. RE: Which page is this in the English, page.
5 MR. MORRISSEY: In the English it's page DD000200 and it's at the
6 top, perhaps about four lines down. Your Honours, while the witness is
7 looking at that might I mention a very brief housekeeping matter? In
8 situations like this, I certainly understand my learned friend's position
9 about a document that's got some more pages to it. Just because of the
10 way things have unfolded with this witness we are rushing here and I
11 acknowledge that's the sort of document I would like to have given him and
12 perhaps if we had a bit more time. I understand we outmatch the
13 Prosecution in resources overwhelmingly, but, anyway, we just weren't
14 quite able to get there.
15 But I did notice the possibility of printing a document in court.
16 I don't know if that's something that the Court is able to discuss with us
17 in future because sometimes if a paper copy were needed in a hurry, if the
18 Court were able to print one, that can help and it certainly can -- my
19 learned friend today showed a paper copy to a witness which helped and
20 that may be a pragmatic thing that we can do in the future. I just
21 mention it now. I'm not saying that the Court has --
22 JUDGE LIU: I believe that's a very good suggestion. Maybe each
23 party's table will be furnished with a printer so whatever document they
24 lack they could print it out on the spot rather than going back and forth.
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Thanks.
1 Q. Now, sorry, Mr. Karavelic, I understand I've given you a lengthy
2 document at short notice here. What's the progress report? Are we nearly
3 finished or not?
4 A. I've finished reading the part that talks about the civilian
5 police and the MUP.
6 Q. Okay. Well, look I just want to confirm this. First of all, have
7 you ever seen this document before?
8 A. I can't really confirm, but the substance is very familiar. I
9 believe it tallies with what I've read so far with the document. The
10 conclusion is either I'm familiar with the document or I actually read it
11 at some point, but I don't remember it exactly when. Or if I did at all.
12 However, as to the substance, I can confirm everything the document
13 appears to say, and I think it's safe to assume the same in relation to
14 what I have not read. I was familiar with this at the time. That much is
16 Q. Very well, Your Honours I offer that document for tender.
17 MR. RE: There is no objection.
18 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. It's admitted into the evidence.
19 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you.
20 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D399.
21 MR. MORRISSEY: Do Your Honours propose to sit on -- any further
23 JUDGE LIU: Well, I think I'm not in a position to do so because
24 the time allocated to us for today is over. So ...
25 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours play I just say I think the learned
1 Prosecutor and I would both agree in thanking the Court staff who have
2 helped to do these long hours and so on. Your Honours, can I indicate
3 that I think we will finish this witness tomorrow. I expect to do so.
4 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Thank you very much. So the hearing for
5 today is adjourned. We'll resume at 9.00 tomorrow morning.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.01 p.m., to
7 be reconvened on Friday, the 22nd day of April,
8 2005, at 9.00 a.m.