Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 1

1 Friday, 27 May 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

6 JUDGE LIU: Call the case please, Mr. Court Deputy.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number

8 IT-01-48-T, the Prosecutor versus Sefer Halilovic.

9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

10 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

11 And good morning, Witness.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE LIU: Are you ready to continue?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am.

15 JUDGE LIU: We'll try our best to let you spend your weekend at

16 home.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would be grateful very much

18 indeed.

19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you very much, Your Honour.


22 [Witness answered through interpreter]

23 Cross-examined by Mr. Morrissey: [Continued]

24 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Alispahic.

25 Now, yesterday I was asking you some questions about particular

Page 2

1 transcripts, and I wanted to ask you a couple of details about such

2 transcripts.

3 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown - just excuse

4 me - Exhibit 436. Yes, Your Honours, I'm sorry. I don't believe this has

5 been uploaded. We distributed copies of this yesterday. I don't know --

6 I think the witness probably doesn't have it in front of him here, so

7 could the witness just be given the Bosnian copy, please.

8 Q. I just ask that you -- I'm not going to ask you about the content

9 of this document because you've made it clear that you as minister didn't

10 normally have the job of looking at these documents. But I have another

11 formal question to ask you and that is that on the front page of this

12 document in the top right-hand corner there is certain writing. Would you

13 mind just looking at the top right-hand corner there. And in particular

14 it says the letters STR.POV. and then below that it says linija rada 02.

15 Do you see those notations?

16 A. I do.

17 Q. Very well. Now, the meaning of that marking 02 in professional

18 terms was that the person who was subject to these --

19 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Morrissey, I'm sorry to interrupt you. It

20 seems to me we did not get that document.

21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22 MR. MORRISSEY: Well, Your Honours, this --

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes. And how about the B/C/S version?

24 MR. MORRISSEY: I think it was distributed both in English and

25 B/C/S --

Page 3


2 MR. MORRISSEY: The limited English version of it.

3 JUDGE LIU: Yes, thank you.

4 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, thank you.

5 Q. Sorry, Mr. Alispahic. I'll just resume the question.

6 That notation 02, does that mean that the person who was target of

7 the -- of the operative measure of phone-tapping had the status of an

8 internal enemy or potential internal enemy of the state?

9 A. Your Honours, can I explain certain matters that I believe to be

10 of key importance in this context in explaining this documentation?

11 Q. Well, it may be possible to have an explanation. I would just ask

12 if, are you in a position to answer the question I asked, first of all,

13 what is the meaning of that 02 number?

14 A. I will reply to any question of yours to the best of my abilities.

15 02 stands for the line of work, the kind of work. And as for your

16 suggestion that 02 stands for some kind of an enemy, be it internal or

17 not, is something that I don't know and it is not immediately obvious

18 based on this. Based on what is stated here in the heading, no conclusive

19 opinion can be drawn on the status of the person against whom the measures

20 of this service were implemented.

21 Q. You made it clear yesterday that you were a minister and not a

22 technician. Is it known to you what the -- what this 02 number means in

23 precise terms?

24 A. What it stands for can be verified with this service. These

25 figures and these marks are not permanent ones. They change from time to

Page 4

1 time. This is something that is regulated by regulations. Figures 02,

2 01, 03 are not fixed ones; that can be changed depending on the

3 organisation of the service. What you need to do is check what at that

4 period of time 02 stood for. Nowadays I'm sure that 02 stands for

5 something else; you can verify this. I'm saying this because the same

6 situation was when I took the job from my predecessor. At that time we

7 also changed certain codes. So I assume that the same would apply

8 nowadays as well.

9 Q. Yes, well I'm grateful for that explanation. And could I just ask

10 you one step further. There must have been in existence at the time some

11 sort of document which explained the meaning of these numerals, and can I

12 ask you what would be the title of such a document and where would it be

13 stored?

14 A. This is the general document, the rules on the internal

15 organisation of the state security service. In this case it was the

16 sector of the state security service. But I would still like to ask the

17 Bench to allow me to give an explanation.

18 Q. What is it that you want to give an explanation about? What topic

19 is it that you want to give an explanation about?

20 A. Precisely this topic, the documents that we are currently

21 discussing. This is of procedural nature, of legislative nature. That's

22 what I wanted to explain.

23 Q. Well, perhaps if you deal with the questions I have to ask you

24 about these matters it may be that those questions cover what you want to

25 say, and if they don't then could you indicate that there's something that

Page 5

1 we're missing that's important. And we'll see how far we can go that way.

2 Very well. Well, thank you for that indication. Now, I just had

3 some other -- I have one further question concerning that 02. You've

4 indicated that -- in your evidence now that there would be -- that there's

5 a general document, the rules on internal organisation of the state

6 security service. But that document itself would not contain a precise

7 explanation of the term 02 because the term 02, as you've indicated, is

8 one that would change from time to time. And therefore --

9 A. Unfortunately, you're not right. There are always explanations

10 which define what 02 or other figures stand for. This is something which

11 is always defined within the service. The code stands for a certain task.

12 You just simply have to make a connection between the type of the task and

13 the code.

14 Q. Very well. So that I understand you well, we can find the meaning

15 of 02 in that particular set of rules to which you referred. Is that

16 correct?

17 A. Yes. In the enactment of the SDB you will be able to find what 02

18 stands for. The document will set forth this type of tasks is defined

19 as 02.

20 Q. And the final on that topic is that: To your recollection did the

21 meaning of the term 02 change during your term of office as Minister for

22 the Interior or did it maintain the same meaning from the start to the

23 finish?

24 A. I couldn't say. I don't remember whether there were any changes

25 during that period of time. A lot of time has passed since then. That

Page 6

1 was directly under the responsibility of the chief of the SDB, therefore I

2 really couldn't tell you.

3 Q. And which particular chief of the SDB are you referring to? Are

4 we speaking there of Mr. Mujezinovic?

5 A. No. Jozo Jozic.

6 Q. Sorry --

7 A. And later on Nedzad Ugljen.

8 Q. Yes, thank you. You're right. Very well. I just have a couple

9 of other questions to ask of a professional nature.

10 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown -- I'm sorry,

11 just excuse me, I just want to select the document to be provided.

12 Your Honours, what is to be shown to the witness here is the rule

13 on the work of the SDB adopted in August 1992 by the Ministry of Interior

14 Affairs at the time. That was not this witness; it was before he was

15 there. Now, this document is not uploaded, it is not translated -- pardon

16 me, it is translated. It is not proposed to rely upon or take the witness

17 through document after document about it. And as I say, it's a lengthy

18 document. There are certain questions I want to put to him about it of

19 very much a formal nature just to indicate what the rules were and to make

20 them available, should anyone need to look at them. Very well.

21 Q. Mr. Alispahic, what's about to be shown to you is a document I

22 think authorised by your predecessor, Mr. Pusina, and I just ask you to

23 look at it and confirm what it is.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Morrissey, this document will be MFI 438.


Page 7

1 Q. I won't ask you to read the whole thing, but if you wouldn't mind

2 flicking to see if it appears to be a familiar document to you and then to

3 indicate to the Court -- indicate to the Tribunal what that seems to be.

4 A. I don't think it would be proper for me to say whether I am

5 familiar with the rules or not. I think that there should be some

6 supporting documentation with these rules which would state that it was in

7 force during a certain period of time. I think that within the SDB one

8 could obtain documentation going to the validity of this document. I

9 think that from a professional standpoint it would be improper for me to

10 interpret the rules of -- on internal organisation of the SDB, which was a

11 document in force even before I came to office.

12 In addition to that, I would like to ask the Honourable Trial

13 Chamber not to require me to draw some conclusions, which would be

14 improper. These are highest-ranking documents within the SDB. The

15 documentation that is being shown to me here for the first time is

16 something that cannot be seen outside of the service. These are secret

17 documents, and if such secret documents are being shown to me, then there

18 should be some supporting documentation explaining how this came to be in

19 your possession.

20 Therefore, Your Honours, it is not up to me to assess whether

21 there is a valid document, whether this is an authentic document; this is

22 something that you should ask the service to confirm. The service that

23 provided the documents should also be able to give a confirmation of the

24 authenticity of these documents, because if you ask me to do that then I

25 would have to engage in speculation and that would only produce negative

Page 8

1 effects. It could cause damage and I think that it would direct the

2 proceedings in the wrong direction. Thank you.

3 JUDGE LIU: Witness, I believe that the Defence counsel just want

4 to know how much you know about this document. We'll see how far you

5 could go. If you cannot answer certain questions or maybe some issues are

6 out of your knowledge, just tell us. There's no problem about it.


8 Q. Very well. But, Mr. Alispahic, it's -- I understand why you raise

9 those matters. From a security point of view, if you see a -- if you see

10 something that's potentially damaging to the organisation or that should

11 not be discussed in public, you should tell us that straight away because

12 there is an ability to move into the private session here where such

13 things will not then be broadcast to the public.

14 However, I'll just persist with a formal question here at the

15 moment. The document there, I do not ask you to interpret it or to look

16 at it -- or to give any legal opinions. What I wish to ask you is: Do

17 you recall whether that document was in operation at the relevant time,

18 which for our purposes is 1993?

19 A. I truly couldn't say. I couldn't reply to your question whether

20 precisely this -- these rules were in force in 1993. What I can say is

21 that there always was in existence such a document, the rules of the

22 service. But as to which particular document was in force at which

23 particular time, I really couldn't say.

24 Q. And I take it what you would also say is that the Bosnian

25 government would be in a position to provide some documentation as to when

Page 9

1 a particular set of rules was in force and when it ceased to be in force?

2 A. Within the state security service, one should be able to find all

3 sets of rules which were in force in different periods of time; this is

4 something that could be established easily. They could give you an answer

5 to this question.

6 Q. Okay. Well, I'm grateful for the -- for your persistence with

7 this. And I have one further question and that is: When you mentioned

8 the document that explains what is the meaning of 02, were you referring

9 to this document or whichever document it was that succeeded this document

10 in your time as minister or are you referring to a completely different

11 set of rules?

12 A. I think that these were the rules on internal organisation of this

13 service. What you have here are the rules on the work of the SDB which

14 provide a framework for methods and -- that are applied in work, whereas

15 internal organisation is quite another matter. The rules can define

16 certain segments of work; however, internal organisation, I think, defines

17 what 02, 03, et cetera, stands for.

18 Q. Very well. Thank you. Just excuse me one moment, Mr. Alispahic.

19 I just have to raise something with the Judges.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, in the circumstances of that, I

21 won't seek to tender this document because the witness has made it clear

22 he can't say that it was in force at the relevant time. We really have to

23 make further inquiries about this issue, and the matters have been put to

24 this witness because he's the only witness called who would appear to be

25 capable of saying anything about it, but he's given his answer so I do not

Page 10

1 offer this document for tender at this stage.

2 Q. Very well. Thank you for that. I just have to put a couple of

3 other transcripts before you now in the same way that I put the transcript

4 yesterday concerning Mr. Halilovic and General Jasarevic. If you haven't

5 seen the document before, tell us; and if you don't remember the contents

6 of the document, you also should tell us that. But we wish to put them

7 into evidence here, and therefore I'm going to show them to you and you

8 can comment.

9 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, first of all, could the witness please be

10 shown Defence document D408A. That is uploaded and it's DD00-1779.

11 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 439.

12 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, we have a hard copy -- because this

13 runs over four pages, we've got a hard copy of this for the Prosecutor.

14 Q. Mr. Alispahic, do you have on the screen in front of you now a

15 copy of a transcript dated 24th of --

16 A. I do.

17 Q. Very well. Very well.

18 A. 408.

19 Q. Yes, that's correct. Now, this is a conversation that occurs on

20 the 24th of September, 1993, between Ismet Dahic and Sefer Halilovic. And

21 I just wanted to ask you first of all before I come to the document, Ismet

22 Dahic, as you recall, was the deputy of Vahid Karavelic within the

23 military structure of the 1st Corps. Is that correct?

24 A. I think that's right, but please don't ask me to confirm with

25 certainty what role Dahic had at the time. I suppose you're right.

Page 11

1 Q. Yes, certainly. And again, I make it clear that given your

2 answers yesterday we don't presume that you've seen this document before,

3 but we have to ask you whether you have. So would you mind just having a

4 look at it and if you remember seeing it before tell us; and if you

5 haven't seen it before or you don't recall, tell us that too, please.

6 A. I have never seen this document.

7 Q. Okay. Well, nevertheless, I'll just ask you whether you're

8 familiar with any of the information in it from other sources; in other

9 words, whether your memory tells you that you can recall this incident.

10 Perhaps about six or seven lines from the bottom there's a comment here

11 from Mr. Dahic where he says -- where he's asked, sorry -- or he says

12 this: "These units were available" --

13 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is at the bottom of page 1 of

14 the English transcript and it says -- I'm probably going now about 10

15 lines from the bottom or perhaps even a bit more, 12.

16 Q. "These units were available. The deltas have refused. They

17 never even responded, won't speak to me -- the duty officer won't speak to

18 me. He hung up on me last night. The commander isn't returning my

19 calls."

20 Sefer says: "Uh-huh."

21 And Dahic says: "These here have agreed and so has Mujo, 125 men

22 as agreed. We talked to them and they were about to set off last night

23 but the 9th has refused. There are no available troops from other units."

24 And Sefer's then recorded as saying: "Fuck it, what shall we do?"

25 Now, just from your own subjective memory, does this ring a bell?

Page 12

1 Do you recall this incident where Halilovic and Dahic were trying to get

2 troops to go and having trouble, as described here?

3 A. I really couldn't give you any comments, either in relation to

4 this document or to its contents. This is the first time I've seen this

5 document, and the best I can tell you is that this is a reflection of what

6 was going on in Sarajevo at the time, nothing more than that.

7 Q. Yes. Well, thank you for that comment. And because of that

8 answer, I'll move on to the next one and ask you exactly the same

9 questions about it.

10 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness please be shown D408B. This

11 also is uploaded. It's DD00-1785.

12 Q. Mr. Alispahic, while that's being brought up, I'll just explain,

13 this is a similar document between the same two people, and I just ask you

14 to look at it. And do you have that in front of you now, that document?

15 A. Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 440.


18 Q. Is the situation the same with this document, you haven't seen it

19 before?

20 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't get the witness's answer.


22 Q. Would you just mind repeating your answer, please; the interpreter

23 didn't get it.

24 A. No, I haven't seen this document before.

25 Q. Thank you. Very well. Very well. I won't ask you any further

Page 13

1 questions about that document, frankly. Very well.

2 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness now please be shown another one.

3 Q. I have about six of these to put to you one after the other in the

4 same way that I have.

5 MR. MORRISSEY: So the next one is D323. This document is not

6 uploaded, so we'll have to provide hard copies to everyone, which we'll

7 do.

8 Q. While this is arranged I'll explain what is coming. This is

9 another similar transcript, this time dated the 9th of October, 1993.

10 This one is a conversation -- it's a short conversation between Stjepan

11 Siber, who was a deputy commander of the army at the time, and Sefer

12 Halilovic. And I'll ask you exactly the same questions: Have you seen it

13 before? Do you remember the incident? And you simply tell us what you

14 remember about that.

15 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI 441.


17 Q. Would you mind just taking the chance briefly to look at that and

18 seeing if you recall seeing this transcript before.

19 A. No. This is the first time I see this document. Should I go

20 through it?

21 Q. If you wouldn't mind just briefly looking to see whether it helps

22 your memory. You may remember such an incident, as is described in there,

23 or you may not. And if you remember it, tell us; and if you don't, tell

24 us that, too.

25 A. I can't remember. I have never seen the document before. What it

Page 14

1 talks about doesn't ring a bell.

2 Q. And there was no need for -- very well, I withdraw that. Very

3 well. Thank you. Could I just ask you as a question of form and the form

4 of the documents you've been shown, the two Dahic documents and this Siber

5 document, do they appear to you to be the products of the same process of

6 phone-tapping that we've discussed yesterday and today?

7 A. I couldn't say either way, but it's possible.

8 Q. At all events do you agree that the documents appear consistent

9 with that conclusion? And I mean in a formal sense, not in terms of their

10 content.

11 A. These documents -- this document looks very much like the ones

12 we've looked at. It belongs to the same group of documents, but I must

13 express a reservation with regard to all these documents as long as

14 there's no explanation that would go to their authenticity, like I said at

15 the outset. This is just an assumption on my part, but it's something you

16 may be interested in. I think it talks about measures applied against

17 General Halilovic.

18 Q. Yes. Yes. Well, we understand you personally did not review

19 these documents, and therefore we don't ask you to authenticate them

20 yourself. Is that a fair way to put the matter?

21 A. Precisely what I said, and I'll repeat it. There's a procedure

22 precisely for this kind of document for perfectly understandable reasons,

23 human reasons, and technical reasons. This is the sort of measure that

24 can be applied against anyone, but there are certain procedures to follow.

25 And the same applies to these documents being produced. All you could

Page 15

1 find in the file is a list of persons, but never anything else in relation

2 to the state security or the intelligence service. Everything else would

3 imply that there was a procedure in place and how this -- these documents

4 were to be used. I'm telling you about this as a matter of principle,

5 that there had to be a procedure according to which these documents were

6 compiled and used.

7 Q. Yes. Well, thank you for that explanation. Very well. Thank

8 you. Now, that completes for the moment the questioning concerning the

9 telephone transcripts, and I wish to turn now to another measure.

10 Mr. Alispahic, yesterday you were shown a document which was the

11 decision signed by you concerning measures against -- or concerning

12 measures about General Halilovic. And at that time, two measures were

13 authorised, the zolja measure and another measure called the agava

14 measure. Now, was the agava measure a different measure involving the

15 placement of listening devices within physical locations such as offices

16 or other such places?

17 A. I really can't talk about the definition of the agava measure,

18 whereas the previous measure was used more frequently and that's why I

19 remember it more clearly. But all measures change over time and their

20 names change in order to protect the secrecy of these measures, and this

21 is the reason why I can't comment on specific documents or anything like

22 that.

23 Q. Well, I understand that and I wasn't proposing to ask you to

24 comment on specific documents. Just on the terminology question, in the

25 case of Mr. Halilovic the phone-tapping method was called zolja, but --

Page 16

1 A. I think that's correct.

2 Q. But I take it from what you say that the terminology your service

3 used to describe phone-tapping changed over time, too. Is that correct?

4 Sometimes it would be zolja; sometimes it would be another name?

5 A. Yes. The name of that measure changed frequently over time.

6 Q. Very well. Now, as to agava, as a matter of principle I think

7 you've made it clear you don't recall exactly what that involved. Could I

8 just ask you -- I'll ask you to look at a document now that we're going to

9 show you.

10 MR. MORRISSEY: We don't have this uploaded, but this is Defence

11 document D816, and we'll just circulate copies of this. I think it would

12 be MFI 442.

13 Q. What's going to be shown to you now - it's being circulated around

14 the room - but there's -- this is a photocopy of what seems to be a map of

15 Mr. Halilovic's office. I'LL just ask you to take a moment to look at

16 that and familiarise yourself with it while I explain something to the

17 Judges at the same time.

18 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, there is a rough translation -- when

19 I say "rough," we hope it's not rough but we hope it correct. It's done

20 by a team member here not by CLSS. It was done I believe yesterday or the

21 day before. It's simply is a translation of the terms used on the

22 previous page. You'll see on the left there's a list 1 to 9 -- sorry,

23 1 to 10. And this is -- sorry, 1 to 10, pardon me. It goes down to 9 at

24 the bottom and then 10 is to the right of that. And that list is

25 translated on the following page. And I'm reminded that there's an

Page 17

1 official translation of this pending and we'll provide that as soon as

2 possible.

3 Q. Very well. Thanks. Now, what -- first of all, have you seen this

4 document before?

5 A. No, never.

6 Q. Have you seen documents of this form before, not necessarily

7 connected with Mr. Halilovic but concerning the placing of listening

8 devices in other cases?

9 A. Yes. That was a long time ago while I was still working as an

10 operative for the state security service. I saw documents like this one.

11 These documents were produced by people from a technical department within

12 the state security. This was not done by operatives; these were purely

13 technical matters. So I think there were very few people who were ever in

14 a position to look at these documents. It's been 15 or 20 years since I

15 last saw one like this.

16 Q. Yes. This document does not have a date on the face of it. Are

17 you able to say by reference to this document the time period in which --

18 well, perhaps I'll ask you another question first.

19 Is this document consistent with the measure agava which was

20 proposed against -- proposed concerning Sefer Halilovic in the order

21 signed by you? In other words, was Mr. Halilovic's room subject to

22 listening device measures?

23 A. I can't give you the sort of specific answer that you expect, but

24 I can give you my opinion.

25 Q. Yes.

Page 18

1 A. And we can see how far that will take us or how useful you find

2 it. This is a document that indicates that there's a plan for a room to

3 be bugged or that it has already been done. What that says to me is that

4 this measure that you refer to as agava is a measure to bug a room.

5 That's what I can conclude based on this document and based on our

6 previous discussion. I couldn't commit myself on anything else. I

7 couldn't say whether it was done before, at this time, or after, or

8 whether it was ever actually applied at all. I simply can't say. If the

9 measure was applied, then probably this was done. If not in that case,

10 well, I don't think I could possibly comment.

11 But if I may, this is also within the sphere of operative work.

12 This is a very complex measure. It's not particularly simple to apply,

13 and sometimes teams simply give up because things happen that they can't

14 control, and the result is it becomes impossible to take the measure. But

15 if we're asking ourselves whether this measure was applied or not, it must

16 be possible to establish that in some way, this certainly not being one of

17 them.

18 Q. Yes. Well, I understand that. Thank you for the clarifications.

19 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, I offer that document for tender.

20 JUDGE LIU: Well, would you please provide us with some

21 information concerning of the source and chain of custody of this

22 document.

23 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, Your Honours, I've got a general answer.

24 I'll just see if I can get a more specific one. If you'll just excuse me.

25 [Defence counsel confer]

Page 19

1 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honour, this document was provided by the

2 organisation FOSS to the Defence some five months ago. That's the chain

3 of custody that we have about it.

4 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

5 Any objections, Mr. Re?

6 MR. RE: Well, not really. Just a question as to the relevance of

7 it to the proceedings. I'm still unsure whether it's referring to a

8 listening device or telephone interception. There's been a fair bit of

9 evidence about telephone interception. I think the witness mentioned in

10 part -- I think he said it was a listening device, but I'm not sure from

11 looking at the document whether it was actually a listening device or

12 telephone interception. But in any event, we probably don't object, we

13 just question the relevance to the proceedings of this particular

14 document. Perhaps that could be explored, though, whether it's a

15 listening device or an intercept.

16 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much.

17 Well, the Bench believes that this document will help us to

18 understand and to consider the admission of all those intercepts. So we

19 believe in this sense it's a relevant document. Since there's no serious

20 objections from the Prosecution, this document is admitted into the

21 evidence with the official translations; I believe that will be checked by

22 this Tribunal.

23 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes. Well, Your Honours, as soon as we have it,

24 we'll forward it. And to the extent that it conflicts with our

25 translation here, the official one should prevail.

Page 20

1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

2 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you. Very well thank you.

3 Q. Now, some final questions on that topic. And, Mr. Alispahic, you

4 yourself are not aware of any material produced by the agava method in

5 relation to Mr. Halilovic. Is that correct?

6 A. I'm not familiar with that.

7 Q. In the circumstances of surveillance of Mr. Halilovic, it was a

8 perfectly logical thing for the service to do, to place a listening

9 device -- or attempt to place a listening device in his office. Is that

10 correct?

11 A. I wouldn't comment on that. Those who decided on the application

12 of the measure -- I merely studied the measure. But those who decided on

13 its application made the call as to which measures would be applied

14 against General Halilovic eventually.

15 Q. Yes, I understand that. Is it within your knowledge whether a

16 listening device was placed in any car or vehicle used by Mr. Halilovic in

17 August and September 1993?

18 A. I'm not familiar with that.

19 Q. Is it within your knowledge whether a listening device was placed

20 in any other location -- well, I withdraw that question. I'll ask a more

21 specific one.

22 Is it within your knowledge whether a listening device was placed

23 at the IKM, the -- the location which you indicated you visited, in

24 Jablanica in September of 1993?

25 A. I don't know that there was a location, as you say, at the IKM,

Page 21

1 forward command post. What I can say is link these statements to the

2 general or Skup, as the code-name implies or to a more general context.

3 If you want my opinion based on information that I had as a member of the

4 Ministry of the Interior, I don't think they had adequate equipment at the

5 forward command post to begin with, not that I'm an expert but I'm just

6 trying to help.

7 As for the location itself, I'm not familiar with any measures

8 being taken there. I never received any reports to this effect, and it

9 would have constituted a technical matter.

10 Q. In whose -- who did have responsibility for deciding whether or

11 not to place such a listening device at the IKM at the operative level?

12 Who had to make that decision?

13 A. The military and intelligence bodies. I'm not sure about the

14 level, whether corps level or the level of the unit in question. I can't

15 possibly be more specific when it comes to the army. I can't say how

16 exactly measures were applied there or at what level.

17 Q. Mr. Alispahic, you've been patient in answering these questions,

18 and I've nearly finished this part of the cross-examination now. The last

19 thing I want to ask you about concerns how the material gained by

20 application of the zolja method was passed over to the military security

21 service? In other words, how did your service pass that over?

22 So my first question is: Who was responsible at the SDB for

23 passing that material over to the military? Was that Mr. Ugljen?

24 A. U-g-l-j-e-n, that's the spelling.

25 Q. That's what I thought it was. But in any event, is that the

Page 22

1 person?

2 A. He was the number one man of the service. He had the closest

3 cooperation with other services, specifically the military intelligence

4 service. If assistance was provided to the army applying these measures,

5 then certainly each and every document you've shown me should be recorded

6 somewhere in the archives and it should say exactly who received the

7 relevant document. Someone from the service who was in charge of General

8 Halilovic, for example, and then this person would pick up the transcripts

9 and conversations. These, after all, were the people who used these

10 measures for their own end.

11 Q. Yes. At that time can you recall -- well, we've had some evidence

12 from General Jasarevic here in this Tribunal already, and he explained to

13 us the structure of his office. And he indicated that he had about 30

14 people working for him. Could I ask you: Does that accord with your

15 recollection of the situation, that his staff in Sarajevo at the SVB, and

16 in particular the UB, consisted of about 30 staff members?

17 A. Yes, but I really can't say more about that. I've no idea how

18 strong the security service or the security administration were. I'm not

19 familiar with the way these services were organised, nor did I have any

20 free time on my hands to deal with these issues.

21 Q. No. I understand that and you've made yourself clear about that,

22 too.

23 So in terms of the person to who Mr. Ugljen gave the

24 documentation, do you know the identity of that person?

25 A. I really don't know the name of the person who directly and

Page 23

1 frequently communicated and/or received such information or documents. We

2 had cooperation on several levels. There was cooperation between the

3 services, between the SDB chief, Ugljen, and Jasarevic, and before

4 Jasarevic, there were offices from the state security service. And there

5 was cooperation on the lower level of the SDB and the military bodies in

6 the field and in Sarajevo, alike. If there was communication in Sarajevo,

7 it could have been with Mujezinovic, who was the centre chief at the time.

8 There could have been communication regarding operative activities.

9 Q. Yes. And one final question coming from that. Contacts at the

10 high level between Mr. Ugljen and Mr. Jasarevic can be distinguished from

11 contacts at a lower, more local and operative level between employees of

12 each service. Is that correct?

13 A. That's correct. What they define would eventually lead to what

14 you are discussing right now.

15 Q. Very well. Well, thank you for those answers.

16 Now I need to move to a new topic -- oh, sorry, there is one --

17 there is one residual one. I've forgotten about that.

18 Apart from the measures zolja and agava that are mentioned in that

19 document, was it also -- was it also within the discretion of the person

20 organising these measures, in this case possibly Mr. Ugljen, to adopt

21 other measures as well, such as personal physical surveillance, following

22 of General Halilovic, and so on?

23 A. All measures which are regulated by various regulations and can be

24 applied within the security service, including the military security

25 service, can be used at the discretion of the chiefs of these services.

Page 24

1 I'm going -- I'm speaking now in general terms --

2 Q. Yes, I understand that.

3 A. -- not specifically regarding General Halilovic.

4 Q. Yes, now I understand you're speaking at that level of generality.

5 You've indicated that the military security service needed your

6 organisation to help because you were technically better equipped than the

7 SVB. When it comes to physical surveillance, having operatives follow a

8 particular target and so on, did the SVB from the military need your help

9 with that sort of thing, or were they able to do that much on their own?

10 A. I can't remember whether the SVB asked for assistance from SDB in

11 any other field except for the technical measures. I don't remember them

12 asking any other kind of assistance.

13 Q. Very well. And another, if you like, formal matter. In the case

14 where operatives of the SDB are used in such surveillance activities -- in

15 fact, I'll withdraw that question. I'll ask you a more general one.

16 Where SDB operatives are involved in measures of any sort against

17 a particular target, is it necessary for the SDB to retain a list of those

18 operatives on the file? For example, in the case of General Halilovic,

19 was it necessary for the SDB to maintain a list of those operatives who

20 were concerned in the measures against him?

21 A. Within its structure, the service has a department where there are

22 a number of officers of the secret service who do exclusively that type of

23 work. That measure is a lower-ranking measure in terms of other technical

24 measures that require approval. And the employees who do that kind of

25 work are identified by their first name, last name, and affiliation to

Page 25

1 that department.

2 Q. And just finally, it's necessary for a copy of a document with

3 those names on it to be preserved in the archives at the technical

4 section. Is that correct?

5 A. Either the activities of that department or the names have to be

6 recorded.

7 Q. And they have to be recorded in a document that is stored at the

8 archives. Is that correct?

9 A. As far as I remember, the reports coming from that surveillance

10 apparatus normally are sent to an operative who follows the target. And

11 this is stored in the archives, either in that file or in another file.

12 These people finish their task, write up a report, and that's it. It is

13 possible that they have a logbook where this information is recorded in

14 rough terms. I have never engaged personally in that type of work,

15 therefore I'm not very familiar with the technical methodology.

16 Q. No. I'm grateful to the assistance you've given, and that is the

17 end of those questions.

18 MR. MORRISSEY: Now, Your Honours --

19 Q. And, Mr. Alispahic, I wish to turn to some narrative matters on

20 how this case unfolded and your memory in the best way that you can give

21 it. Were you ever shown by the Prosecutors -- or perhaps first of all.

22 Were you ever shown at the time, that is in August and September 1993 -- I

23 think I'll show you the document first and then I'll ask you if you've

24 seen it.

25 MR. MORRISSEY: Just excuse me one moment.

Page 26

1 Could the witness please be shown Exhibit 146.

2 Q. What I'm going to show you now is an order appointing Sefer

3 Halilovic in charge of an inspection team consisting of himself,

4 Mr. Karic, Mr. Suljevic, Mr. Bilajac, a security officer named Namik

5 Dzankovic and two other individuals who play no part in these proceedings.

6 I'll just ask you whether you've ever seen that before. Do you have that

7 order on the screen?

8 A. No, I don't have it yet.

9 Q. Neither do we. Do you have it now?

10 Now, Mr. Alispahic, I'm not going to ask you for a military expert

11 opinion here, but I just wanted to ask you: Have you ever seen that

12 document before?

13 A. No, never.

14 Q. Did the Prosecutors not show you this document at any time during

15 the investigation?

16 A. No, I've never seen it.

17 Q. Okay. And let me ask you: Was there any necessity for you as

18 Minister of the Interior to be shown such a document back in

19 August/September of 1993?

20 A. I don't think that was necessary.

21 Q. No, very well. Well, I won't ask you to consider the text of it.

22 The only thing I'd ask you to note is the date there. Do you see that

23 it's dated at Sarajevo, 30th of August, 1993? And I'm looking at the top

24 left-hand part. Do you observe that date?

25 A. I can see that.

Page 27

1 Q. Very well. Was -- were you aware of the -- the process by which

2 Mr. Halilovic -- well, I withdraw that.

3 Did you know that he was appointed the head of an inspection team

4 at the time or was that level of detail not necessary to be provided to

5 you at the time?

6 A. I don't see why would the army send this type of an order to me?

7 They didn't normally send such documents to me. So it's not up to me --

8 up to me to say. It was up to them to decide whether they would send

9 something like this to me or not. I never really focussed on the role of

10 General Halilovic and his function. It was not necessary for me to know

11 that some kind of an inspection team was established, led by General

12 Halilovic. I don't think I needed to know that.

13 Q. No, I -- well, that's the -- that also is the proposition I was

14 going to put to you. In light of that -- nevertheless, you gave evidence

15 earlier in the week that you considered or it was your view that Sefer

16 Halilovic was the commander of this operation, and I have some questions

17 for you on that topic.

18 First of all, you indicated -- and I just want to confirm that

19 this is the reasons why you gave that evidence. You indicated that you

20 gave that evidence because of things that were said at the Zenica

21 conference. Is that correct? I'm going to put a number of these things,

22 but first of all Zenica was one basis for that opinion that you had. Is

23 that correct?

24 A. I learned that General Halilovic was the commander of that

25 operation based on several things, including the meeting in Zenica where

Page 28

1 the general explained why the operation was needed. Then I was also asked

2 to allocate a special unit to be resubordinated in that operation. In

3 addition to that, I knew that General Halilovic was the chief of the Main

4 Staff. I also was familiar with the communications with the IKM or

5 forward command post. Then I went, myself, to the forward command post.

6 It was no weekend cottage; it was a typical forward command post. Being

7 under oath now and wishing to state only the truth, I couldn't tell you

8 now that I ever saw a decision appointing General Halilovic commander of

9 that operation. However, the fact that the operation was indeed

10 implemented and that I knew all other things point in that direction.

11 Q. Yes. Well, I understand that. And I'm just going to ask you

12 about some of the specific bases one after the other that you've given and

13 put some questions to you about them. And the first ones concern the

14 meeting at Zenica. You've indicated that Sefer Halilovic raised the issue

15 at Zenica. Could I ask you: What was the reaction of the other generals

16 who were present at Zenica to Sefer Halilovic's proposal? In other words,

17 was it a popular move? Was it unpopular? What do you recall about that?

18 A. At the time when all of these discussions were held, these issues

19 were debated, and the meetings which I attended allowed me to infer or

20 understand how important it was to launch such combat activities and to

21 liberate the territory. I think that even if we disregard other facts, it

22 is undoubtable that General Halilovic was a much more prominent figure

23 than any other commanders. He was a much more charismatic figure. And

24 personally, I and other leaders always treated his proposal, suggestions,

25 with respect.

Page 29

1 In addition to what I have stated previously, based on that and

2 everything else I understood that General Halilovic was the commander of

3 the operation and the number one man in the field.

4 Q. So I understand what you say about that, but I have to ask you

5 perhaps some more precise questions about the Zenica meeting. Do you

6 recall the presence at that Zenica meeting of a man called Salko Gusic,

7 who was the commander -- and in fact the relatively new commander of a new

8 corps, the 6th Corps?

9 A. I truly -- I truly couldn't claim with any certainty that it was

10 Salko Gusic. As I saw things, he was a lower-ranking officer in the army,

11 lower than others who attended the meeting. I hope he will not take this

12 as an insult, Salko Gusic, but other officers I knew much more and they

13 ranked much higher at the time, were much more established, whereas Salko

14 Gusic was just appearing on the scene, so to speak. That's really all I

15 can tell you because I have no additional information.

16 Q. No, that's okay. Are you able to recall how Salko Gusic responded

17 to Sefer Halilovic's proposal, that there be an operation in Herzegovina,

18 at the Zenica meeting?

19 A. I can't recall. I would like to remind the Defence that the

20 meeting was recorded, both on audiotapes and videotapes. So perhaps you

21 could use that material to find answers you're looking for.

22 Your Honours, I was an observer there, somebody who came to see

23 and hear what was going on and what needed to be done further. I was not

24 in the same position as active army members. I did not have an active

25 role. I had a small minor task to participate and assist to the extent of

Page 30

1 my abilities and that's all.

2 Q. Yes. And I make it clear, there's no criticism of the role that

3 you played at this meeting at all, Mr. Alispahic, but I have to ask you

4 some details because we have witnesses -- evidence from other witnesses in

5 the case.

6 You recall that Arif Pasalic, the commander of the 4th Corps, was

7 present. Do you remember how he responded to Sefer Halilovic's proposal

8 at the Zenica meeting?

9 A. I think that Arif Pasalic, as commander of the corps -- and

10 please, you have to analyse my position from another angle as well. All

11 officers attending meetings normally have their logbooks, their diaries

12 where they record things that transpire. Therefore, it is much easier for

13 them to explain and to recall what happened at a particular time, whereas

14 I, as an interior minister, did not have any such diary or a logbook where

15 I would record my activities. Our work procedures are different. And

16 when I left the ministry, I didn't take with me any documents, any diaries

17 or logbooks that army officers have and which could help me reconstruct

18 the events.

19 Q. Of course we understand that. If we could just come back to the

20 Arif Pasalic issue. How did he respond at Zenica to the suggestion or

21 proposal that you've described of General Halilovic?

22 A. No, I couldn't remember Pasalic's reaction.

23 Q. But Pasalic was present, I take -- or Pasalic and all of these

24 generals were present at the time when Sefer Halilovic made this proposal.

25 Is that correct?

Page 31

1 A. Everybody was present the entire time, at least that's as far as I

2 can remember. Perhaps somebody did leave the conference room for an hour

3 to attend to something else, but that's all I could tell you.

4 Q. And do you remember whether General Halilovic tabled any paperwork

5 or plans concerning this proposal at the Zenica meeting in that conference

6 room?

7 A. I can't say that General Halilovic presented any such paperwork.

8 However, I do remember that there were various discussions which also

9 focussed on various problems. Not everybody had the same viewpoint and

10 position as to how things ought to be done. Officers had different views,

11 and they elaborated on their views in military terms. I did not

12 understand that completely. Therefore, I didn't really go into the depth

13 of what they were saying; it was beyond me. If a commander was speaking

14 about a battalion or brigade or an artillery unit, this is not something

15 that I fully understand. Therefore, I didn't really focus, I didn't pay

16 so much attention to what the army people were saying.

17 Q. Yes. Well, I understand your account. Thank you.

18 Could you indicate with respect to the resubordination of the

19 Laste Unit whether you provided to the Prosecutor any document concerning

20 that.

21 A. Until today, I never provided any documents to anyone. All

22 documents relating to my position, my office, could be found at the

23 Ministry of the Interior. I know for a fact that a dispatch or an order,

24 whichever way you want to define it, was sent from the Ministry of the

25 Interior about the deployment of that unit where various elements of that

Page 32

1 deployment were specified, the date of deployment, accommodation, and so

2 on. So I would urge you to look for that document in order to fully grasp

3 the role of the police within that operation.

4 Q. And we don't have that document here, Mr. Alispahic, so I have ask

5 you the questions to answer as best you can now after these many years.

6 And the question is: Do you recall the date or the approximate date of

7 that written document?

8 A. First of all, the document had to be signed by Munir Alibabic,

9 chief of the security services centre because Laste belonged to that

10 centre. I, as a minister, was able to approve the participation of the

11 unit in the operation, and that document had to be drafted in early

12 September before they were deployed. I know that the document exists

13 because the commander and his deputy told me about receiving a dispatch

14 where this is defined. However, to this day I have not read that

15 document, but it must exist because without that document the unit could

16 not have been deployed.

17 Q. It ended up being the case -- perhaps I should ask you this -- no,

18 I'll come to the question -- I'll come to the Mostar question in a few

19 moments' time.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I'm about to move to another topic

21 now. Now might be a moment to take the break.

22 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll take a break and we'll resume at 11.00.

23 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

25 JUDGE LIU: Well, I'm so glad that Mr. Weiner is present in these

Page 33

1 proceedings.

2 MR. WEINER: Sorry, Your Honour. Thank you very much for

3 welcoming me back. Thank you.

4 JUDGE LIU: And I might, I might, ask the parties to have a

5 meeting this afternoon, but this hasn't been decided yet. But I just

6 remind the parties to be available this afternoon.

7 Yes, Witness, let's continue with the proceedings.

8 Mr. Morrissey.

9 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. Thank you again, Mr. Alispahic. Very well. Now, I have to put

11 some matters concerning the Zenica meeting to you and ask for your

12 comments on these. Excuse me a moment, please.

13 In these proceedings -- what I'm going to do is put an account of

14 another witness here to you. In these proceedings we heard evidence --

15 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is at page 64 of the 4th of

16 February of 2005, and it's from the evidence -- it's from the evidence of

17 Mr. Gusic.

18 Q. I'm going to read this evidence to you and then I'm going to ask

19 for your comment about it.

20 "Q. You can confirm, I take it, the following facts: No

21 Operation Neretva 93 was mentioned at all. Is that correct?

22 "A. The name of the operation was never mentioned. I did not

23 hear it mentioned at the meeting. I did not hear the term "Neretva 93"

24 mentioned at the meeting.

25 "Q. The next point. Sefer Halilovic offered no plan at that

Page 34

1 meeting for an operation related to Mostar or indeed related to

2 Herzegovina at all at that meeting. Is that correct?

3 "A. As far as I remember, no, he didn't, not an operation. No.

4 "Q. In fact, in a statement you made to the Prosecutors

5 recently -- the most recent statement that you made you made the

6 comment 'listening to the statements of General Sefer Halilovic during the

7 meeting and on the recording I can see that his main focus was the

8 warehouse in Zemunica, Hadzici, and an explosives factory in Vitez, Vitez

9 being the priority. General Halilovic did not even mention Mostar. The

10 situation in Mostar was presented by General Arif Pasalic.' And that's

11 what you said to the investigators and that was the truth. Correct?

12 "A. Yes, yes, yes.

13 "Q. Okay. And at that meeting no one was appointed to command an

14 operation in Herzegovina. Is that correct.

15 "A. As far as I recall, that is correct. No one was appointed."

16 Now, Mr. Alispahic, we have a problem because that's different to

17 what you say. Can I ask you what you have to say about that difference?

18 A. The obvious difference is between my status and the status of the

19 remaining officers who were present in Zenica. Secondly, the difference

20 is I was only there for one day, and I was asked to resubordinate this

21 special unit to them. Another thing I said in my testimony, and Gusic

22 agrees, that I didn't hear the name of the operation used and defined in

23 Zenica. It was never said that the operation would have this or that name

24 or anything like that. What I testified reflects what I remember about

25 this. I can't say more than that. I can't speculate about Gusic's

Page 35

1 statement. It is possible that Gusic's testimony related to their entire

2 stay in Zenica. I also said that at the meeting I didn't hear that anyone

3 was appointed as commander of the operation, and the same applies to

4 General Halilovic. I also said my understanding of the meeting in Zenica

5 was that a framework was defined for the operation that was to follow, and

6 our own police unit was supposed to be part of this, about 50 strong. I

7 said it then and I'm saying it now.

8 Q. Well, I understand that. But you also understand we have to put

9 these materials to you. It's not fair to just leave them behind your back

10 without giving you the chance to comment.

11 MR. MORRISSEY: And the next thing I'd ask is that the witness be

12 shown Exhibit D109.

13 Q. The Prosecutors have already shown you this document,

14 Mr. Alispahic, but this is a document we've been calling the "Zenica

15 Conclusions" dated 29 August and produced, as we understand, by Commander

16 Delic.

17 Do you remember being shown this document by the Prosecutor?

18 A. Yes, and that was the first time I saw that.

19 Q. I understand that. But it's apparent on the face of the document

20 that there's no reference to any operation to relieve Mostar nor to the

21 appointment of General Halilovic to lead such an operation. Now, do you

22 know why that is, if there was an operation -- an operational plan and --

23 sorry, I withdraw that.

24 Do you know why that is at all?

25 A. I don't understand the question, but I can look at the context and

Page 36

1 try to answer your question. It's stated that I, the Minister of the

2 Interior, was only there on the first day. It doesn't strike me as

3 particularly important; there's only one line here mentioning that. I

4 left after that, but I remember that I was supposed to be part of the

5 combat operations to free the area, and General Delic and General

6 Halilovic and all those present can confirm this. But my testimony now is

7 that police involvement was requested to liberate the area around Mostar.

8 I never said it was about Mostar itself; I was being quite specific. But

9 combat operations were to take place that would liberate the area

10 surrounding Mostar. Bearing in mind the difficult situation in Mostar

11 itself from a military point of view, or at least that's how I understood

12 what the soldiers were saying, that was the topmost priority at the time,

13 to help that area.

14 Q. Well, I understand what you say about that, but I think we have to

15 deal specifically with what Salko Gusic said. He specified in evidence

16 what General Halilovic talked about at the Zenica meeting, and he

17 specified a focus on Vitez -- I'll mention them again just so that we're

18 clear, Vitez, and Zemunica, and Hadzici. He mentioned those three as

19 being the areas that General Halilovic spoke about.

20 But what you've said is that he spoke about an operation to

21 liberate the area around Mostar. Now, that's a conflict we have to focus

22 upon. Let me ask you this: Do you think at this distance in time many

23 years ago, do you think your memory might be mistaken about what happened

24 at Zenica, and in particular what Sefer Halilovic said about Herzegovina?

25 A. I really think that at this meeting in part what was discussed was

Page 37

1 the problems in the Mostar and Neretva areas and the need to carry out

2 combat operations in that area in order to liberate the area and in order

3 to reopen communications with Mostar. I think that is what -- what was

4 discussed. This may not have been a crucial issue at the meeting they had

5 then, which was some sort of a conference really. Maybe these issues were

6 relegated to the operative sectors within the army, but the reason I

7 remember this is I was asked to participate, just that, nothing else. And

8 I wasn't up to date about any of the plans that were or were not being

9 prepared. I had no idea what the army was planning. It would have been

10 impossible for me to know.

11 Q. And we fully appreciate that's the case, and I'm not going to

12 press you with questions about that. But I do have to press you with some

13 other questions, and one concerns the videotape that was taken. Did the

14 Prosecutors give you the opportunity to view that videotape before you

15 gave your evidence here?

16 A. No, I haven't seen any videotapes here.

17 Q. Well, rather than keeping us all here for five hours or so

18 watching it, I'm going to put to you what's in it and if I put it wrongly

19 the Prosecutor will correct that. But we've all -- we have that

20 videotape; it's in evidence here. And Mr. Gusic had the chance to look at

21 it before he gave his evidence and commented on it.

22 Mr. Alispahic, that videotape reveals you, yourself, clearly

23 indicating a concern for the plight [Realtime transcript in error "plot"]

24 of Mostar and a need for the Bosnian armed forces to focus upon that area.

25 And frankly, so far that's consistent with what you say here, that you

Page 38

1 were concerned by that. Do you remember expressing such a concern in

2 the -- in the course of the meeting, saying that you thought there was a

3 danger we'd fail the test at Mostar and that we should really focus on

4 that area?

5 Sorry, now we have a translation problem here. Before you answer

6 that question, just excuse me a moment, it's been identified and I'm going

7 to have to rectify it, so hold on, please.

8 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, there's a problem here, and I better

9 record what it is. At page 39, line 1, the interpreter has recorded my

10 question as referring to the "plot of Mostar," whereas in fact I referred

11 to "plight." Plight, bad situation, in other words. The danger for

12 Mostar. That would change the question -- the meaning of the question

13 completely for the witness.

14 Q. So, Mr. Alispahic, forgive me, and I'm going to ask that question

15 again and I'm going to use another word so the interpreter is not placed

16 in a bad position by the Australian accent.

17 Mr. Alispahic, the videotape which we're seeing here clearly

18 reveals you expressing a concern for the dangerous situation of Mostar and

19 a concern for the need to help in that area. We agree that's consistent

20 with what you say up to now. But do you remember making comments to that

21 effect in the meeting?

22 A. Based on information provided by the Mostar security services

23 centre, I was aware of the fact that the situation was extremely difficult

24 in the town of Mostar itself. They were facing great difficulty treating

25 the wounded and putting up the wounded. They were facing a crisis

Page 39

1 regarding food supplies because the enemy forces were in control of the

2 road into Mostar. As for all the ideas that people talked about, all the

3 possible activities that were brought up, what I said was about that area,

4 the Mostar area and to remain within that context, something to the effect

5 that operations should be carried out to liberate the area. I said that

6 the situation was disastrous and I can't reproduce this word for word, you

7 must understand this. I proposed that the special unit be the first to be

8 dispatched to Mostar to give them a hand with combat operations and to

9 relieve the people down there who were extremely exhausted because they'd

10 been involved in the operations for weeks and months by this time, while

11 the other units were to carry out operations along the axis leading to

12 Mostar.

13 The other reason was really quite simple. The army, within the

14 context of their own plans and operations and what they were supposed to

15 do on the ground, that would only have entailed military units but no

16 police units, and that was perhaps one of the reasons to have the special

17 unit dispatched to Mostar. This was not discussed at any great length,

18 but when I think back I think I said this to mean that those combat

19 operations were necessary. I believed so at the time, and I still

20 believed it was necessary at that point in time to carry out combat

21 operations in order to relieve the situation of Mostar.

22 Q. Yes. Well, I have two questions arising out of that. First of

23 all, did you mention -- do you say you mentioned the Laste Unit by name at

24 that meeting?

25 A. I can't remember. It's possible that I did.

Page 40

1 Q. Second question: Do you recall whether the resubordination of

2 that unit was discussed at that meeting?

3 A. It's possible. It's possible that this was said in passing, but

4 this was not a subject that was singled out for special treatment. That

5 was to happen later but nothing needed defining at that point in time. I

6 think one of those present actually came up with the Laste Unit. I don't

7 think the original proposal was mine. I think it was one of the soldiers,

8 one of the officers, who had spent some time fighting alongside that unit,

9 and they requested that particular unit as assistance, which I didn't

10 oppose.

11 Q. Do you remember which officer that was?

12 A. No. I don't think I could possibly remember. Those were just

13 talks. It wasn't like someone was being interviewed or interrogated.

14 Q. You were aware at all times that that video -- that that meeting

15 was being videoed and that wasn't anything secret. That was quite open

16 that it was being videoed. Correct?

17 A. I don't know. I think I didn't. I believe that I didn't think at

18 the time that the meeting was being videotaped at the time -- or perhaps I

19 did. It didn't matter. That's what I think. I think the meeting was

20 being videotaped. There was the military information service there and I

21 think they were taping the meeting, but I'm not sure about the context, to

22 be quite specific.

23 Q. That's okay.

24 A. There was an awareness, yes.

25 Q. Yes. All right. But just to continue with the document on your

Page 41

1 screen there, would you agree with me -- feel free to look at it if you

2 need to, but I'll put to you the proposition, and the Prosecutor can

3 interrupt if it's wrong, that that document, the Zenica Conclusions

4 document of the 29th of August, doesn't make any reference to Sefer

5 Halilovic being appointed to command any operation in Mostar or in the

6 region surrounding Mostar.

7 And what I'd ask you is this: Are you entirely certain that in

8 the discussions at Zenica, General Halilovic really was made the commander

9 of any operation in that area? Given what's on the tape, given what's in

10 the evidence of Mr. Gusic, given what's on -- what's not in the document

11 before you, what's your answer to that?

12 A. I can say that I think that I said before that I didn't understand

13 that anyone was appointed at that meeting by name, that any operation was

14 defined under any specific name or even a plan. It was my understanding

15 that all these things would happen; that's as much as I gathered at the

16 meeting itself. But I understood nothing about what you're suggesting.

17 Q. Very well. After the Zenica meeting, did your duties involve you

18 holding any further conferences or formal discussions with Commander Delic

19 concerning any operations in Herzegovina prior to the departure of the

20 Laste Unit?

21 A. I don't remember that we held any talks on that occasion in order

22 to make matters more specific. The officers stayed in the meeting and I

23 left to attend to my other duties.

24 Q. Yes. And in subsequent days, was it any part of your duty to

25 speak to Commander Delic about military operations in the Herzegovina

Page 42

1 area, and the time period I'm asking you about is between Zenica and the

2 departure of the Laste in the early days of September?

3 A. It wasn't my duty to talk to Delic. Normally we didn't discuss

4 military operations. I remained duty-bound, or rather I had accepted the

5 duty as soon as the time was set for the special unit to be in a certain

6 place that the unit would be dispatched according to the plan. But I

7 assume you're thinking about -- or rather, you're saying -- well, we

8 didn't talk, nor did I talk to anyone else later about any possible plans

9 for any activities or the operation, the way it's defined here. We are

10 treating it as the Neretva operation. No, I didn't talk about that plan

11 or about any other military activity.

12 Q. Very well. Thank you. And on the question of the Laste and its

13 resubordination, who was it who ultimately drafted the -- any order

14 concerning the moving of that unit down to Mostar? Was that Munir

15 Alibabic who did that?

16 A. I think it was Alibabic that wrote the order for the unit to be

17 sent. I think that order must exist because that was the order followed

18 by the unit command.

19 Q. Now, I think you confirmed that you, yourself, had not seen this

20 order, but in what archives might that order be expected to be found?

21 A. It should be in the archives of the security services centre in

22 Sarajevo.

23 Q. Very well.

24 A. Perhaps -- or if I may be of any further assistance in this

25 context, as they say, you should go and look. It might be in the archives

Page 43

1 of the special unit, which again is part of the security services centre

2 archives.

3 Q. Very well. And although I'm jumping forward to Mostar briefly,

4 it's in relation to the Laste Unit. In Mostar at the CSB at that time --

5 sorry, perhaps if you could just explain to the Judges what the CSB is.

6 A. That's an abbreviation for security services centre, which is an

7 organisational unit within the Ministry of the Interior covering a region,

8 an area, in which there are further police stations. There could be

9 anywhere from three to ten or 11 police stations in the region.

10 Q. Yes. Now, in the case of the Mostar CSB, there was a man named

11 Maslesa, M-a-s-l-e-s-a. What was his position at the CSB?

12 A. He was the chief of the security services centre, the CSB.

13 Q. There was another man called Alica Bilic. What was his position?

14 A. I think that Alica was an employee of the state security service

15 in Mostar.

16 Q. A man named Sejad Brankovic. Do you recall him and what was his

17 position?

18 A. I think that he, too, was an employee of the state security

19 service.

20 Q. And was he, too, based in Mostar?

21 A. I couldn't say whether he was in Mostar. The CSB covers a large

22 area, so he could have been based in Jablanica, Konjic, or anywhere else,

23 although his -- the institution that he belonged to was certainly based in

24 Mostar.

25 Q. Yes. Well, my question was imprecise and you have repaired it.

Page 44

1 Thank you for that answer.

2 Well, now, returning to the issue of the Laste, it's -- in terms

3 of the order, are you now able to say what date it was that the Laste

4 actually set off?

5 A. I can't really state anything about the dates with full certainty.

6 The unit must have left Sarajevo on or about the 4th or the 5th of

7 September, but I couldn't be more specific than that. I couldn't tell you

8 where they were at a particular time because I didn't closely monitor its

9 departure. All I'm saying is that my visit to Mostar coincided in time

10 with the travel of the unit to Mostar. We, in fact, travelled together.

11 Q. Yes. It may be possible to build a chronology by reference to

12 some other events. Did you come out through the tunnel yourself on an

13 occasion when you were passing through the tunnel and you met Sefko

14 Hodzic, a journalist, and Sefer Halilovic going back into Sarajevo for a

15 brief visit on or about the 5th of September?

16 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]


18 Q. This being a chance meeting, as you passed through the tunnel.

19 A. It's possible, but I can't be certain because we would meet in

20 many places, on many occasions. Our meetings were frequent. We had many

21 activities together, so I couldn't be more specific.

22 Q. Yes. I understand that. We have had such evidence from

23 Mr. Hodzic that this was a -- just a passing meeting, accidental and

24 probably of no consequence, but that it took place on the evening or night

25 of the 5th of September. Do you have any comment to make about that

Page 45

1 beyond saying that it's possible it happened? Do you have any specific

2 recollection that you can help with or not?

3 A. No, I don't have any.

4 Q. That's okay. Did the Laste leave before you or after you?

5 A. I couldn't say. I don't know when they left because their

6 departure had to be planned in advance because they're quite a large

7 formation, and it's quite a different matter when an individual travels.

8 It's arranged in different way. So I couldn't tell you anything more.

9 Q. Very well. Can you say whether the Laste Unit came to be billeted

10 at Konjic on the way down?

11 A. I wouldn't know where they were billeted. All I know is that

12 their first destination was in Tarcin because some other members of the

13 unit were waiting for them there. This is where the two parts of the unit

14 linked up. They had their own plans detailing their travel, their

15 billeting. This was done in the assistance with lower formation, because

16 after all this involved 50 people and they couldn't just sleep anywhere.

17 Q. Of course. And who had the responsibility -- you don't have to

18 provide a name if you can't remember. But what organisation and what

19 officers had the responsibility to arrange transport and accommodation for

20 the Laste Unit as they made their way down towards Mostar?

21 A. I think that what you're talking about now is specified in the

22 document dispatching the unit. Normally such a document will specify who

23 exactly will provide accommodation for the unit and so on. Therefore, I

24 couldn't tell you whether it was the police station that they reported to

25 or some military command.

Page 46

1 Q. Very well. Did you meet up -- when you came to travel down to

2 Mostar in the company of the Laste, did you meet up with them in Konjic

3 and commence the journey from there?

4 A. I truly believe, but I can't be absolutely certain, that we met up

5 in Jablanica in the foot of the mountain over which we had to go in order

6 to reach Mostar.

7 Q. Yes. Well, I was going to put some transcripts to you about that.

8 We have some evidence in this case from -- or from a number of witnesses,

9 actually, and I'll put them to you. Just excuse me while I find the right

10 parts.

11 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I'm sorry, I have about 30 pieces of

12 transcript, not that they're all going to be put to this witness, but it

13 will take me a moment to find them.

14 Q. Just excuse me, Mr. Alispahic, while that's done.

15 The first of these pieces of evidence is -- comes from a

16 deposition taken on the 10th of July, 2003, from Vehbija Karic, who was a

17 member of the inspection team under General Halilovic at that time. This

18 was recorded at an earlier time. I'm going to put it to you and I'm going

19 to ask for your comment, same way as I did with Salko Gusic's material

20 earlier.

21 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is at page 118, commencing at

22 line 7, and it's discussing a meeting that takes place on the day when,

23 according to this witness, Caco and Celo arrive in Jablanica.

24 Q. So this is what the witness says:

25 "During the mentioned meeting with the authorities and the

Page 47

1 commanders of local brigades, the 44th Brigade from Jablanica, Enes

2 Kovacevic, we had a meeting on the premises there, that is at the building

3 of the hydroelectric power plant, Jablanica. Bakir Alispahic appeared

4 during the meeting. We all said hello and he conveyed the

5 following: 'I've come to see you. The supreme commander, President

6 Izetbegovic, sends his regards to you. He's giving you his moral support,

7 wishing you success in the operation, and I've brought you 50 members of

8 the Laste Detachment to help you in the operation.'

9 "We accepted that and the same night he went to Mostar via Mount

10 Prenj taking the Lastes with him. And we found it strange the next day

11 because we had given the assignment to Enes Kovacevic to put them up and

12 deploy them the next day according to the existing plan of the operation.

13 So nothing came out of it in actual fact.

14 "During this meeting I found out that Caco had arrived from

15 Sarajevo as well as Ramiz Delalic with their troops, and I saw, as I was

16 entering the premises where the meeting was held, I saw Adnan Solakovic

17 with a group of his soldiers. We greeted his -- we greeted each other and

18 I let them go and find their accommodation because Zulfikar Alispago had

19 been given the assignment earlier to find proper accommodation for them.

20 That's it."

21 Mr. Alispahic, that's what's recorded from Mr. Karic, and I just

22 ask you for some comments from you arising out of that.

23 The first is: Do you recall arriving in Jablanica and entering a

24 meeting involving Mr. Karic and other members of the inspection team? And

25 this is on your way to Mostar, not on the way back.

Page 48

1 A. I remember that these people were down there, but I don't remember

2 that I attended that meeting. I especially do not remember these words

3 being uttered, namely that I had come there to convey greetings from

4 President Izetbegovic. I never uttered those words in any place. It was

5 up to Izetbegovic to send his greetings if he wanted to do that.

6 Now, it's true that these people were down there. I saw Vehbija

7 Karic in that area several times; we had contacts, formal ones, proper

8 ones. The Zulfikar unit had already been there for quite a while, which I

9 was aware of. I can't remember the name. Enes Kovacevic might have had

10 to do something to help with the accommodation of the unit. Everything

11 concerning the movement of the unit and its accommodation was something

12 that was discussed and decided upon by the commander of the unit and the

13 organs to which they reported. This was once they left the -- Sarajevo it

14 was out of my hands. And I'm not quite clear about the date that Karic

15 gave as the date of the meeting.

16 Q. No. Well, he didn't give a date in that -- in that passage that

17 I've put to you. And you recall I -- and so that's why I'm asking you --

18 it's one of the reasons I'm asking you questions about it.

19 Do you recall being in Jablanica when the units -- when certain

20 units under the -- or units taken from the 9th and 10th Brigades arrived

21 in that town?

22 A. I do not recall that. I truly can't say that I know that. I

23 really wouldn't know whether any such unit arrived somewhere or where it

24 was supposed to be. I did not have such information. Let me also clarify

25 that it was easier for me to obtain information about a special unit of

Page 49

1 the MUP because there are all these policemen out there in the field who

2 could provide you that information about the movement of the unit. This

3 was logical. Policemen knew each other, but they did not know the army

4 brigades. They didn't know members of those brigades, the 9th, the 10th,

5 or any other one for that matter.

6 Q. Okay. Well, I just want to take you now to evidence on the same

7 topic from a man named Dzankovic who gave evidence in this court on the

8 21st of March, 2005.

9 MR. MORRISSEY: And this is at page 73 of that day, Your Honours,

10 at line 12.

11 Q. Once again, I'm going to put this transcript to you and ask for

12 your comment:

13 "Q. I want to now turn to the meeting that you did attend. This

14 was a meeting that had as its focus the provision of logistics to the

15 units that were going to arrive in Jablanica on that day. Is that

16 correct?

17 "A. Yes.

18 "Q. And this was a meeting that in fact did take place at the

19 IKM. Is that correct?

20 "A. Yes.

21 "Q. And present at that meeting were Karic, Suljevic, and

22 Bilajac. Is that correct?

23 "A. Yes.

24 "Q. And also the Minister for the Interior, Bakir Alispahic?

25 "A. Yes.

Page 50

1 "Q. The War Presidency president, does the name Safet Cibo assist

2 your memory?

3 "A. I heard of him, but he wasn't present."

4 Mr. Alispahic, there's then a gap of other irrelevant

5 conversation, and then the next question was:

6 "Q. Now, to your knowledge, Sefer Halilovic was absent up in

7 Konjic area on that date. Is that correct?

8 "A. As far as I know, he wasn't in Jablanica.

9 "Q. Yes, okay. Anyway, during the course of this meeting did

10 Vehbija Karic announce that in fact the units from Sarajevo had arrived in

11 Herzegovina?

12 "A. Yes.

13 "Q. And was it in fact in that context that the discussion about

14 supplies took place? In other words, we've got to feed these troops

15 because they've arrived from Sarajevo?

16 "A. Yes. Because the units that were there in that area had

17 their own logistics and had the accommodation and food problems resolved."

18 Now -- then there's another gap, and the relevant part I want to

19 put to you is --

20 And this is on -- on line -- on page 75, line 10, Your Honours:

21 "In the meantime there was also talk that the Lastes had come.

22 All these troops needed to have food and accommodation provided for.

23 "Q. And to your knowledge, were the Lastes a civilian -- a

24 military unit directly under the control of the Minister for the Interior,

25 Bakir Alispahic, and administratively speaking under the Ministry of the

Page 51

1 Interior rather than the army?

2 "A. Yes. It was not around of the army; it was a unit comprising

3 police officers and it was directly under the command of Mr. Alispahic."

4 Mr. Alispahic, can I interrupt there, I'm going to put something

5 more. But that's something you can respond to as well specifically. If I

6 forget to ask you the question you should have the chance to answer that

7 proposition.

8 But to go on, the last thing this. This is at line 20, Your

9 Honours.

10 "It was discussed where this group should be accommodated,

11 however, later it left for Mostar."

12 And then he's asked: "When you say later, do you mean later on

13 that day?"

14 And he said: "Whether it was on the same day or the next morning,

15 I don't know. But they left without telling anyone, without telling

16 anything about it in advance because we from the inspection team actually

17 found out about it once they had already left the area."

18 Now, Mr. Alispahic, there was a lot of information I understand

19 there and a lot of things to respond to. The first one I want to -- the

20 first thing I want to do is a timing question and then I want to put to

21 you whether you agree with what's been put in there.

22 First of all, do you agree that it's possible that your units and

23 you were in Jablanica on the 8th of September in the morning?

24 A. I can't be firm about the date, but I think that at around that

25 time we were in Jablanica, the 7th, the 8th. So it could be that we were

Page 52

1 in Jablanica at around that time, especially since I believe that on

2 the 4th, 5th, and 6th the unit left Sarajevo. So it could be at around

3 that time.

4 Q. Thank you. Next of all I turn to the substance of the meeting

5 that's just been described in the evidence of Namik Dzankovic. Do you

6 recall, and I ask you to search your memory as best you can, do you recall

7 going to a meeting in Jablanica just before you left for Mostar where

8 Sefer Halilovic was not present, but Karic, Suljevic, and Bilajac and

9 Namik Dzankovic all were present and discussing logistics matters. Can

10 you recall attending such a meeting.

11 A. I really couldn't because I don't know who Namik Dzankovic is;

12 that's first. The second is that that certainly wasn't a meeting that I

13 was invited to attend. Third, it's possible that these persons mentioned

14 here, Karic, Suljevic, Bilajac, and so on are persons I met, not had a

15 meeting with. I probably exchanged some information with them concerning

16 the areas of our interest, such as logistics, accommodation, and so on.

17 So we might have exchanged that type of information, and that was the

18 substance of our communication.

19 When I went to Mostar, I did not see General Halilovic on my way

20 there. The first time I saw him was at the IKM, as we call it, upon my

21 return. That's what I remember.

22 Q. Very well. What do you say as to the comments by both Dzankovic

23 and Karic that the Laste Unit effectively left Jablanica without them

24 knowing anything about it and went down to Mostar?

25 A. I can't really give any comments. Perhaps they didn't have to

Page 53

1 know. Perhaps the unit wasn't supposed to return to them. What we should

2 do is check as to who was informed about the travel of the unit and with

3 whom it had been agreed.

4 Q. The key issue really in determining the units of the Laste Unit is

5 to find this document that you've referred to that must have been prepared

6 by Munir Alibabic. Is that correct?

7 A. I think that this document would be of great assistance in

8 determining exactly what were the movements of the Laste Unit. It is

9 possible that the document specified everything, which is how it should

10 have been. On the other hand, it is possible that it only specified

11 certain issues, whereas other issues were specified en route, as the

12 situation developed. It is impossible to specify in a dispatch where the

13 unit would be billeted that night if that was not physically possible. It

14 is impossible to foresee all complications that might arise in the field.

15 So while the unit is there in the area of responsibility of another unit

16 where it needs to be resubordinated to somebody else, it is impossible

17 sometimes to foresee everything in advance.

18 Q. Yes, I understand what you say about that.

19 A. I apologise. Once the unit leaves, then the fate of the unit and

20 the responsibility for the unit is something that's in the hands of the

21 commanders of the unit and commanders of the unit to which the unit is

22 resubordinated during the operation.

23 Q. Very well. Now -- and another question for you. You were present

24 when the Laste Unit arrived in Mostar. And I want to ask you to which --

25 under which military commander was the Laste Unit directly resubordinated

Page 54

1 or directly controlled at all events when it took up its positions on

2 Santiceva Street?

3 A. I am unable to answer that question, simply because I don't know.

4 This is something that you can check with the 4th Corps in Mostar, and

5 perhaps, perhaps, the CSB in Mostar, they might have this information.

6 That's where you need to address your inquiry.

7 Q. Yes. I take it, though -- well, perhaps you can confirm this.

8 From what you observed when you were down there, they were under the

9 control of a local commander, I take it, someone subordinate to Arif

10 Pasalic, the 4th Corps commander. Is that correct?

11 A. I really can't say. That would be a very long shot. I really

12 can't answer this question.

13 Q. Well, I --

14 A. I -- the first time I came to Mostar was during the war. I didn't

15 know too many people. I knew the security services centre chief and

16 commander, Pasalic. I hardly knew anyone from the police. The only

17 person I knew was the chief of the security services centre.

18 Q. Yes. I understand. Very well. Now, we've been going in

19 chronology. We were at Zenica. We've gone through the issues concerning

20 the Laste. We've gone through the departure of you and the Laste

21 separately in the early days of September, and we've gone to your meeting

22 with the Laste in Jablanica and your journey down to Mostar.

23 Could I just indicate, I'm not going to repeat that chronology

24 now, overlapping with what we asked yesterday. It's the fact that you

25 spent some time in Mostar and it's the fact that you came back to

Page 55

1 Jablanica on the -- arrived back in Jablanica on the morning of the

2 10th of September. And my questions now concern what happened there.

3 You've indicated that you went to the police station and made

4 contact with Emin Zebic. Is that correct?

5 A. I think so. I think that's what I said, and I think your

6 understanding is correct.

7 Q. Yes. Very well. What I want to do now is show you a document

8 that arose from a local policemen there named Ahmed Salihamidzic. That

9 will come on the screen now as soon as we have the exhibit number to tell

10 you, which we're just finding now.

11 Could I just ask you: Do you recall a man called Ahmed

12 Salihamidzic with a nickname Cicko?

13 MR. MORRISSEY: And, Your Honours, it's 222, Exhibit 222.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first time I heard this name was

15 when a Sarajevo weekly called Slobodan Bosna indicated that he worked at

16 the public security station in Jablanica. This newspaper published what

17 they alleged was the testimony of this person before the Tribunal in

18 relation to General Halilovic, but that was the first time I heard the

19 name. So I think that must be the person you're speaking about.


21 Q. Well, yes, it is. It is the person I'm speaking about. I can

22 promise you this: I am not going to be putting Slobodna Bosna to you.

23 I'll just put this report to you which has been tendered in evidence and

24 you can make the comment.

25 MR. MORRISSEY: Very well. Can the witness please be shown this

Page 56

1 document, D -- excuse me, Exhibit 222.

2 Q. This is an official note. I'll ask you to comment on the form of

3 the document and then I'll ask you to comment on whether the information

4 in it matches, in effect, the information which you were provided when you

5 got to the police station. I understand you were provided that

6 information orally, but we have this document and I just want to ask you

7 about the document.

8 A. Can I just ask to see the entire document?

9 Q. Of course.

10 A. From the heading to the bottom.

11 Q. Yes. And when you see the heading, I just -- I'll ask you at the

12 end of your reading just to comment about that and what the meaning of the

13 term "official note" is there and so on.

14 Could I indicate to you that the -- probably the key things I'll

15 ask you about are on the first page there but you should, of course, just

16 take the opportunity to look at the rest.

17 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, I might -- I'm just noticing the

18 time now and I wonder if it might be appropriate to -- Your Honours

19 sometimes break at a quarter past 12.00. I wonder if it might be

20 appropriate to -- a copy of this could be printed. It occurs to me the

21 witness could have the chance to look at a printed copy of it during the

22 break rather than we all sit -- he should be given the chance to read it;

23 I acknowledge that, and --

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes. So are you suggesting that we take a break right

25 now?

Page 57

1 MR. MORRISSEY: Yes, please. And could I ask if the court would

2 assist by printing a copy of this exhibit. We could provide it to the

3 witness right now so that he could look in the break. I know it's not the

4 usual procedure, but it's...

5 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Maybe it's the time for us to take a break, and

6 we'll resume at 20 minutes to 1.00. Yes.

7 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.

8 [The witness stands down]

9 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.

10 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey, are you going to address the

11 Bench?

12 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you very much, Your Honours, for the

13 opportunity.

14 Your Honours, I'm likely to finish this witness and I intend to.

15 There's been, as you know, ongoing issues of finding material. My learned

16 friend Mr. Mettraux has been mostly concerned in that. There's a matter

17 that he's going to raise with you in just a moment. It's very desirable

18 to finish this witness immediately, as we can, send him home, and not

19 delay things, and for that reason I'm just going to ask Mr. Mettraux to

20 explain what our problem right now is. It may be that it doesn't delay

21 anything, and I think we can handle it by finishing this witness and just

22 putting what we have to put on record now, so that if we have to make an

23 application later, we've put it on record and it's understood, and we

24 won't seek to have things adjourned.

25 Perhaps I could ask Mr. Mettraux to speak now.

Page 58

1 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.

2 MR. METTRAUX: Yes, good afternoon, Your Honour.

3 We have been informed yesterday that two witnesses -- and perhaps

4 we should go into private session before I start.

5 JUDGE LIU: Yes, we'll go to the private session, please.

6 [Private session]

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20 (redacted)

21 [Open session]

22 [The witness entered court]

23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Morrissey, please continue with your

24 cross-examination.

25 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 60

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Alispahic. Did you have the opportunity to read

2 that document in the break?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Yes. I'm not going to take you to every part of it but I would

5 just ask you in relation to some of the -- question one: Have you ever

6 seen it before?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Very well. Well, then I'll just ask you about your actual memory

9 of your meeting with Zebic and what you were told there. Were you given

10 the information that the deputy chief of the CSB and also Mr. Kurt, a

11 military policeman, went to Grabovica and spoke to Adnan Solakovic there?

12 Were you given that information?

13 A. I remember the public security station and Emin Zebic. His

14 commander and some other members of the police station tried to verify

15 information. They tried to find out what had happened. They tried to do

16 something to help the population in the area, but they also pointed out

17 the existence of checkpoints that the police were not allowed through.

18 They said they believed that if they pushed it it could only lead to a

19 clash between the military and the police in the area.

20 Q. Yes. And what I'm really asking, I think, is whether that

21 information given to you by Emin Zebic on the morning of the 10th appears

22 consistent with the information within this document where it says that -

23 and I'm looking at the first paragraph here on the first page - where it

24 says that there was an improvised checkpoint -- I'm sorry. I'm looking at

25 the wrong improvised checkpoint now.

Page 61

1 Would you go down about 20 lines down the page, I think. There's

2 a sentence where it says: "We were advised by the commander that it was

3 not possible to protect the lives of Ivan Pranjic and his wife Stoja

4 without use of weapons, and it was recommended that we should try to

5 organise an evacuation of Croatian inhabitants from this part of

6 Grabovica. Because of this and for personal security reasons, we did not

7 go to the suburb where Celo's unit was billeted which was about 100 metres

8 downstream. An improvised checkpoint that had been set up could also be

9 seen close to Ante Maric's house."

10 Now, it's that checkpoint that I want to ask you about. Do you

11 remember whether or not Mr. Zebic got as specific as this report here in

12 that section, or indeed whether he told you anything about that particular

13 checkpoint?

14 A. I really can't talk about all these details from this note. But a

15 good deal of this same information was conveyed to me by Emin Zebic at the

16 time. Whether he used the word "checkpoint" or the word "swing-gate," I

17 really can't say which specific word he used. But there was obviously a

18 checkpoint; whether it had a swing-gate or not makes little difference.

19 Certainly Emin talked about this difficult situation. He said people had

20 been killed over there. He said there was no way to approach the area.

21 And he said that if they pushed the situation there could be a clash with

22 the soldiers who were there.

23 That was what he told me and that's what led me to believe that

24 the situation was complex and that the problem was huge and needed

25 tackling. I think even then they had a lot of information on this

Page 62

1 problem, but they, in their capacity as a police body, a police station,

2 having a limited number of men to work with, were in no position to deal

3 with this, and they couldn't have done anything at all without

4 coordination, without explicit approval, and without authorisation by the

5 military.

6 Q. Very well. Thank you. Those are my questions on that topic.

7 Now, the next topic concerns the discussions that you had with

8 Sefer Halilovic on the 10th of September. This cross-examination does not

9 concern the content of those discussions. In other words I'm not asking

10 you questions about what you said to him and what he said to you; you've

11 already given that evidence. But what I am asking you questions about is:

12 Where those conversations took place.

13 Now, you've indicated that you went to the IKM and spoke to Sefer

14 Halilovic there on that morning. I just want to ask you to look at a

15 statement that the Prosecutors have provided to us. I'm just going to

16 show this to you.

17 MR. MORRISSEY: Very well. Could this please be circulated. This

18 is just a copy to assist the Court and to assist Mr. Alispahic of an OTP

19 statement given to us.

20 Q. Mr. Alispahic, what's going to be shown to you is a document

21 provided to us by the Prosecutors which is dated the 1st - sorry, that's

22 your birthday - the 24th of May, 2001, conducted with an interview Nikolai

23 Mikhailov and apparently signed by you. In this document --

24 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, on the fourth page of the English

25 document, it's the third paragraph.

Page 63

1 Q. I'm not sure what page it is on yours, Mr. Alispahic, but it's a

2 paragraph beginning with the words: "One day, it was in the morning."

3 Do you have that paragraph? It says: "One day, it was in the

4 morning, I was in the Konjic police station." It's on the fourth page --

5 fourth page of the Bosnian. It's the third paragraph on that page

6 beginning with "jedno gdana."

7 A. What's the problem?

8 Q. Do you see that -- I hope there's no problem. Do you see the

9 paragraph?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Very well. Very well. The Prosecution have given us this

12 document and I just want to -- I'll have to clarify with you its

13 implications. So if you just read through it, then you will be in a

14 position to comment.

15 It says: "One day, it was in the morning, I was in the

16 Konjic police station together with Jasmin Gusa, chief of the Konjic

17 police station. Emin Zebic arrived from Jablanica and informed me

18 verbally that Bosnian army soldiers had killed Croatian civilians in the

19 village of Grabovica. I ordered Emin Zebic to prepare a report on the

20 event in Grabovica and to send it to the Ministry of the Interior on

21 Sarajevo. I also ordered him to gather more information without

22 interfering with the military because before the operation the military

23 command staff requested in writing not to conduct any police activities in

24 the zones of operational activity, that is, the zone of the preparation

25 for combat activities and the zone of combat activities itself. Thus, the

Page 64

1 Ministry of the Interior was not allowed to conduct any criminal

2 investigation in this zone. I do not remember whether I informed Sefer

3 Halilovic immediately after I'd been informed by Emin Zebic.

4 "From Konjic I went to Jablanica in my car. There was the IKM

5 forward command post of the supreme command staff in the Jablanica

6 hydroelectric in the town of Jablanica. I do not remember when I arrived

7 at the IKM. There was a hall in the Jablanica HE where Bilajac, Suljevic,

8 Karic, Halilovic and others were."

9 Then you go on to say what the substance of the discussion was.

10 Very well. Now, Mr. Alispahic, that appears to be different from

11 what you've said in this court. Can you indicate how it came about that

12 this was said to Nikolai Mikhailov, the OTP investigator?

13 A. If I may comment, the Defence is right. These are two different

14 things, in a way, but essentially they both come down to the same thing.

15 There is a possibility, it's one which I can't remember right now.

16 Following my return from Mostar, I spent the rest of the night resting,

17 whether in Jablanica or in Konjic. These two towns are not far apart.

18 It's a 20- or 30-minute drive, perhaps a half-hour drive, depending on

19 who's driving. I was with both station chiefs at that time in Konjic and

20 in Jablanica. Back when I gave this statement, I think it's -- it was in

21 2001, I really believed it was Mr. Zebic who had come and we had the first

22 briefing in Jablanica. Only then did we go to Konjic.

23 Between 2001 and the present time, I think I read this somewhere

24 or someone provided me with information in relation to this situation, and

25 that is the only document. I'm not sure if anything else could be found,

Page 65

1 a document that talks about this meeting or a public security station

2 report from Jablanica, that was sent to the ministry, but the essence

3 remains the same. It is still my submission that I was in touch with the

4 general, that following that I met the general in person, that I met both

5 police chiefs, the Jablanica police chief and the Konjic police chief. So

6 that's how I can explain this slip in my two statements dated 2001 -- in

7 my statement dated 2001 and my testimony now, in 2005.

8 Q. Yes. Well, now, Mr. Alispahic, as I said earlier on I'm not

9 asking you questions or criticising you in any way concerning the content

10 of the discussion between you and Mr. Halilovic. We're not pressing you

11 about that. So it's really about where and when it all took place that

12 I'm pressing you. I need to ask you -- I need to put something to you

13 from the evidence of Mr. Zebic here, and if you just excuse me I'll find

14 that passage for you.

15 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, this is at page 80 of the transcript

16 of Emin Zebic on the 16th of March.

17 Q. And this was Mr. Zebic's evidence in this court, Mr. Alispahic --

18 MR. MORRISSEY: Line 23, Your Honours.

19 Q. "Q. Did anybody else visit the police station?

20 "A. At around 2000 hours, my minister, Bakir Alispahic, arrived.

21 "Q. Why did he come to your place?

22 "A. A few days previously he'd taken a unit of the Ministry of

23 the Interior to Mostar to assist the public security services centre

24 there. In view of the fact that to reach Mostar from Jablanica you had to

25 go on foot over the mountain crags, he stayed there for a few days. And

Page 66

1 on that day, the 9th of September, he came back across mountain Prenj to

2 Jablanica, and then he dropped into the public security station. He was

3 on his way to Sarajevo. He was passing through in other words."

4 So Mr. Zebic has given an account that you came along on the night

5 of the 9th, that's at about 8.00 in the evening or 2000 hours in the

6 evening on the 9th. Do you have any comment to offer on that evidence?

7 A. No comment. I think my recollection is much clearer than that of

8 Emin Zebic, that at least is my position. I simply don't believe it would

9 have been possible for me to be in two different places at the same time,

10 in Jablanica and Konjic, with Mahmutcehajic or perhaps there is a

11 phenomenon involved that I failed to understand.

12 Q. Well, the one I have to ask you about is: Do you say at that time

13 it took 30 minutes to get to Jablanica from Konjic?

14 A. Yes. Those two places were not far apart. There were no

15 checkpoints or barriers along the road.

16 Q. We've heard some evidence in this court that there was an HVO

17 checkpoint along that road and that it actually took six hours or so,

18 between four to six hours, to get between those towns on a mountain track.

19 In fact, we had some evidence to that effect from Ramiz Delalic -- I

20 should be clear to you that he gave that evidence. Is that your

21 recollection, that it took four to six hours on a mountain track?

22 A. He's right, and this in fact was the case at certain points in

23 time. But the checkpoint was not there all the time. It was there for a

24 period of time in which the relations with the HVO were strained. There

25 was the checkpoint that was set up and throughout this period you did need

Page 67

1 to take a roundabout route.

2 Q. Yes. So in light of that, what was the time that you would have

3 to take in early September 1993 to get from Konjic to Jablanica?

4 A. If this happened at a point in time when there was no checkpoint

5 and you could just drive straight through, it would have been a short

6 journey. If this was in one of those periods when you had to take one of

7 the mountain routes, it would have been like he said. But I can't be

8 specific right now as to these respective periods of time. When you could

9 go from Jablanica to Konjic unhindered, after all you can go back to

10 operative documents and check.

11 Another thing you can go back to operative documents for is to see

12 when exactly I was at each of these police stations. I think this is

13 recorded. I mean every visit by the Minister of the Interior must be

14 recorded, I should assume. One thing is certain: It would have been

15 quite irrational for me to go to Konjic, spend four or five hours doing

16 that, and then drive back to Jablanica. I don't think any of these

17 propositions are true, frankly, but we're each entitled to have our own

18 memory and we each have our own conclusions. I remember what I remember,

19 which is different from what you're putting to me.

20 Q. Well, I'm putting evidence of other witnesses to you. I'm not

21 putting anything from my own head, and I certainly wasn't there,

22 Mr. Alispahic.

23 But I have to ask you this question, too. You heard me reading

24 out Mr. Zebic's account and he said that you had taken a unit -- that you

25 had taken a unit of the Ministry of the Interior to Mostar to assist the

Page 68

1 public security services centre there.

2 Now, once again, you've indicated your belief that the -- I

3 understand you didn't see the order but you've indicated your belief that

4 this unit was to be resubordinated to the military there. Now, what do

5 you say to this comment here of Emin Zebic that a few days previously you

6 had taken a unit of the Ministry of the Interior to Mostar to assist the

7 public security services centre there?

8 A. That's Zebic's opinion; that's all it is. That's what Zebic

9 believes and that's what he has stated. He was a police station chief. I

10 don't think he was in a position to define who did what within the

11 ministry, who did what in relation to that unit, least of all what I did.

12 Q. Very well. Well, in light of what's contained in your statement

13 that you've looked at and in light of what Mr. Zebic says, do you concede

14 this possibility: That it's possible that you had the discussion that you

15 had with Sefer Halilovic in Konjic but not at the IKM, or the so-called

16 IKM, in Jablanica on the 10th of September? And again, it's the location

17 I'm asking you about, not the substance of the discussion.

18 A. I'm really doing my best to be as objective as possible. The

19 substance doesn't matter. The substance and all the communication that

20 went on was more than proper. What I'm trying to do is get the chronology

21 right.

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. And get the places right. But I'm stating this with certainty: I

24 was with the general both in Konjic and in Jablanica. Our meetings were

25 brief and entirely proper. In the context of this situation, I know that

Page 69

1 he was greatly concerned. Now, this is something I remember with great

2 clarity.

3 But if you're asking me about the specific chronology of my

4 movements at the time, if I had known at the time that this would have

5 been one day required, I would have noted everything. And when I was in

6 Sarajevo, I would have consulted with the security services centre, I

7 would have consulted with both police stations, and then you could have

8 the exact chronology and all the concomitant facts.

9 So I can't be specific about how long these meetings were. We

10 were both in leading positions at the time and we were both at the same

11 time in Jablanica and in Konjic. If memory serves, most of these people

12 were billeted in Jablanica after all, Karic, Bjelovac, Zijic, Suljevic.

13 It must have been easier for them to work from them. As far as I

14 remember, General Halilovic was billeted at Konjic at the military

15 installation there, and sometimes we went there to meet Mahmutcehajic or

16 for another reason. So please understand me and take my words exactly for

17 what they are.

18 Q. I just have two more areas of questioning and then I'm finished

19 all together, Mr. Alispahic. The first one concerns some comments about

20 Trebevic. It is the fact that on the 26th of October, numerous people

21 were arrested, including numerous people from the 9th Motorised Brigade.

22 Is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Responsibility for investigating the crime at Grabovica you

25 understood to be a matter to be for the SVB, the military security

Page 70

1 service, albeit assisted by your service, rather than being an

2 investigation by the MUP, is that correct, or by the civilian police. Is

3 that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Nevertheless, I should ask you this question. Out of all those

6 who were arrested during the course of Trebevic after the 26th of

7 the 10th -- sorry, the 26th of October, 1993, is it the fact that until

8 1998 no indictment was raised against any of those men. Is that correct?

9 A. I don't understand which case you're talking about, which

10 situation.

11 Q. You're correct and -- you and my co-counsel at the same time.

12 What I'm referring to is the crimes at Grabovica. To your

13 understanding, no indictment was raised against any of those 9th Brigade

14 individuals concerning the crimes at Grabovica until 1998. Is that

15 correct?

16 A. I can't be positive, but I think you're right.

17 Q. And certainly whatever may have been the situation for Sefer

18 Halilovic at other times, he was removed from the position of Chief of

19 Staff on the 1st of November, 1993. Is that correct?

20 A. I'm not familiar with the exact date that the general left this

21 position, but apparently there's been testimony about that.

22 Q. Yes. Yes. Well, we have --

23 A. I think we read a note from one of the Presidency meetings. I

24 think that was about that.

25 Q. It was. It didn't specify the date, but in any event we know the

Page 71

1 date from another documents, so I won't trouble you further about that.

2 But were you aware that numerous of the -- you may be aware you

3 may not be aware, numerous of the 9th Brigade people who were arrested on

4 the 26th or in the following days in Trebevic were granted an amnesty.

5 Did you know that that was the case?

6 A. I'm not sure I understand the question, first of all. Let's

7 review the problem as a matter of principle. When you say "amnesty," I'm

8 not sure in relation to what offence. I do agree that on that day quite a

9 number of members of both the 9th and the 10th Brigades were arrested the

10 same day. Many of them were released immediately because they had been

11 brought in for different reasons, those who had put up armed resistance,

12 well, of course they had to be arrested in order to make them stop. There

13 was a brief procedure, and those people were released. Some people were

14 kept in detention because information had been obtained, intelligence had

15 been obtained that those people had committed criminal offences. And this

16 needed to be investigated and established, and that's as much as I know.

17 Q. Yes. All right. Thank you. And the final questions relate to

18 one aspect of the lead-up to Operation Trebevic. Now, at the -- during

19 the -- sorry, after the crimes at Grabovica and indeed the incident that

20 took place at Uzdol, it's the fact that Sefer Halilovic continued to be

21 under the operative measures that we've discussed earlier, in particular

22 the zolja measure, that is the wire-tapping. Is that correct?

23 A. I don't think I can answer the question as to the exact time when

24 the measure was applied. What I testified about here was that the measure

25 was applied. I think that if you found the document, you would find the

Page 72

1 exact time when it was applied.

2 Q. Well, the document itself I think reveals the timing of it, which

3 is a year. I can bring it up on to the screen if you want. But when you

4 sign a proposal -- sorry, when you authorise a proposal to institute

5 wire-tapping, that authorisation has to specify a time period, doesn't it?

6 A. That's not right. The measure is applied based on the assessment

7 and if it is established that it is needed. The time period can be

8 extended; however, the need must be justified. And within the service, we

9 have a rule to the effect that every so often, every six months or every

10 year or so, the measure needs to be re-evaluated in order to see whether

11 it needs to be continued with the measure or not. And that is what you

12 need to understand.

13 Q. Yes. And we do. And thank you for that explanation. But

14 however, in that time between the crimes at Grabovica and Trebevic, let me

15 ask you the question: Wasn't the telephone-intercept material concerning

16 Sefer Halilovic circulated and analysed at a very high political level?

17 In other words, wasn't that material made available to yourself, to the

18 President, and members of the Presidency, to General Delic, and General

19 Jasarevic, and others at that very high level?

20 A. I would like to kindly ask you to split this into subquestions,

21 otherwise you're covering a very broad topic and I'm not sure I can

22 respond.

23 Q. I'll split it this way. Wasn't that level in that period leading

24 up to Trebevic -- wasn't that material leading up to the Trebevic made

25 available to you personally?

Page 73

1 A. The material from the Trebevic operation, the one that was needed

2 at certain levels in order to issue approvals and to -- and for other

3 action reached me, the general, and the Presidency in the context for the

4 preparations for the operation.

5 Q. Yes. Now, in relation to -- these are just final questions now,

6 cleaning-up ones.

7 Were you aware that on the 15th of June, 1993, the President,

8 Alija Izetbegovic, met with the then-president of Croatia, Mr. Tudjman,

9 and indicated to Mr. Tudjman on tape that Halilovic had been removed from

10 the army and that he now had no power to command anyone, although he'd

11 been made Chief of Staff? Were you aware of that conversation and

12 particularly of that -- those words of Mr. Izetbegovic on that occasion?

13 A. At that time, I really knew nothing about that.

14 Q. Have you found out something about it since that time or not?

15 A. No, I haven't heard anything.

16 Q. Were you ever shown an order of Commander Delic dated the 5th of

17 October, 1993, which -- sorry, it's just what I want to show him now and

18 this will be the last -- very well. This is Defence number D65.

19 It's DD00.0253.

20 This is a military order. You may have been shown it, you may

21 not, and I'll ask you to comment on it.

22 THE REGISTRAR: This will be MFI 443.


24 Q. Do you have that in front of you?

25 A. Yes.

Page 74

1 Q. Very well. First of all, did you ever see that order before?

2 A. I don't think so. No.

3 Q. Very well. In your discussions, though, with General Delic, did

4 you ever have it brought to your attention that these particular units

5 that are mentioned there, Zulfikar, Muderis, Akrepi and Silver Fox,

6 although they were supposed to join the 4th Corps, they had - in practice

7 that order had never been implemented. Were you aware of that problem

8 within the army from your conversation with General Delic?

9 A. I was never informed about that particular problem. I knew that

10 the army was dealing with that internal structure, as we discussed just a

11 while ago. And in Zenica itself, there was some announcements that the

12 army would be reorganised, that various formations would be defined and

13 their areas of responsibility and so on.

14 Now, as to these particular units, whether they were supposed to

15 become a part of a certain corps, I really know nothing about that. Out

16 of all these units, as I've told you, I only knew about the Muderis unit.

17 I only knew about that one. As for the others, I didn't even know that

18 they existed.

19 Q. Very well.

20 MR. MORRISSEY: Could the witness just be shown, please, D -- a

21 document that's MNA, marked not admitted, 244. And page 3 of the B/C/S in

22 particular. It's page 3 of the English version, too, Your Honours.

23 Page 2 of the English, Your Honours, is where the passage starts.

24 This is a document dated the 11th of June. It's a transcript gained from

25 Croatian archives following the release of those, the opening of the

Page 75

1 presidential archives there.

2 Alija Izetbegovic says this: "So you had -- this has to remain,

3 too, between us. It needn't be like this now. We removed Halilovic, you

4 know. There were complaints that he might not want peace with the Croats,

5 that he was not implementing the agreements, that he was maybe even

6 obstructing them.

7 The president says: "Where? Moved where?"

8 And Alija Izetbegovic goes on to say: "Moved -- he is not a

9 commander anymore."

10 The president, who is Tudjman, says: "So what is he?

11 Alija Izetbegovic says: "Formally he's the Chief of Staff. I

12 think it seems to me, you know, he isn't. He can retain some professional

13 duties but he will not conduct tasks, he will not command units, he will

14 not issue orders, he cannot issue an order to go into action anywhere. He

15 cannot do anything. Perhaps we could not remove a man who did fight after

16 all. We do not have reliable facts."

17 Now, having seen that transcript, does that refresh your memory on

18 the topic?

19 A. This is the first time I see this document. That was on the

20 11th of June, as you've stated. This document never reached me.

21 Q. Since you didn't see the document, I'll ask you one final

22 question. Does that information accord with what you knew to be the

23 position of Alija Izetbegovic at that time, approximately the 11th of

24 June, 1993?

25 A. At that time General Halilovic was removed from the post of the

Page 76

1 commander and was appointed Chief of Staff. I'm not sure that I described

2 the positions properly.

3 Now, what was the explanation given to -- given by Izetbegovic to

4 President Tudjman or to the Presidency or anybody else is something that

5 was purely his explanation, his decision, and did not concern either

6 myself or the government or anybody else. At the time, President

7 Izetbegovic was the supreme commander, in he had full authority to make

8 such decisions, and he did.

9 Q. And to your knowledge, he did so on that basis. Is that correct?

10 A. That's right.

11 Q. Yes. Well, thank you.

12 MR. MORRISSEY: On that basis, I offer this document for tender.

13 Your Honours, that can be debated later. I understand the position. And

14 those are also my questions.

15 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Thank you very much.

16 Any re-direct examination, Mr. Re?

17 MR. RE: Yeah, there is. Thank you.

18 Re-examined by Mr. Re:

19 MR. RE: Just so we're organised here, I wish to show the

20 following documents, Exhibit 429, 415, and 390.

21 Q. Firstly, if you could -- the first one I'll show you is 429.

22 While that's coming I'll ask you something else.

23 Today my learned Defence colleague, Mr. Morrissey, asked you about

24 the forward command post and you said that it was no weekend cottage. It

25 was a typical forward command post. That's the one we visited -- at which

Page 77

1 you visited Mr. Halilovic. What was typical about this particular forward

2 command post that you went to?

3 A. I can tell you that from my perspective, based on what I know and

4 the extent of my knowledge is not tremendous, this was a place where there

5 were only officers present and there were maps hanging and depicting the

6 situation on the ground. I visited the premises. And based on what I saw

7 there, I called them forward command post. Some people refer to it as

8 simply command post. This is something that is within the domain of the

9 military definitions. I called it a forward command post because the top

10 military leadership was present there, the top leadership below General

11 Delic, and they were commanding from that spot.

12 Q. You were also questioned about the number of visits you had. How

13 many visits do you remember to that forward command post at which

14 Mr. Halilovic was present?

15 MR. MORRISSEY: It better be clarified. Is he asking about visits

16 when Mr. Halilovic was present or visits to that IKM generally?

17 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

18 MR. RE: Well, at which -- when he was present.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. Perhaps I can give an

20 answer to both questions. I was obviously there in passing. I was not in

21 the conference room where I later saw the general. So while passing

22 through, I saw Karic and Bilajac in that general area, and that was the

23 only time I went there. I stayed very briefly, exchanged maybe just a few

24 sentences about what we were discussing and which was related to the

25 incident, and that was it. I think that the premises were not used as

Page 78

1 forward command post for a long time. Before the war --

2 Q. Mr. --

3 A. -- those premises were owned by a company producing electrical

4 power.

5 Q. Please concentrate on this: I'm just asking you how many times

6 you went there when it was a forward command post, that's all.

7 A. I think just once.

8 MR. RE: Is document 429 on the screen?

9 Q. Just please look at document 429. Mr. Morrissey asked you about

10 that and in particular about the fact that it says the "9th Mountain

11 Brigade." And your evidence was that you were thinking that it was Ramiz

12 Delalic's Brigade that it was referring to. Why do you think it was

13 Mr. Delalic's brigade?

14 A. First of all, it does say there that this was the 9th Brigade --

15 excuse me. There are facts here in this document about members of the

16 army causing a certain incident registered by the police station. It was

17 them who established that these were members of the 9th Brigade. At the

18 time, the incidents were almost exclusively caused by this unit, incidents

19 with policemen.

20 Q. When you say "9th Brigade," are you referring to the 9th Motorised

21 Brigade or the 9th Mountain Brigade?

22 A. I'm not familiar with the military terminology, therefore I

23 couldn't tell you. It was the 9th Brigade. I don't know whether it was

24 motorised or not, but it was led by Delalic. The incident itself was

25 caused when somebody spat at Celo's badge, and this was what provoked the

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1 incident. I don't know how the corps defined it, but when I

2 say "the 9th," that's what I'm referring to.

3 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown P415.

4 Q. Now, this was the document of the 16th of October -- sorry, it was

5 the official secret highly classified document dated the 16th of October,

6 1993. Mr. Morrissey asked you some questions about this, and throughout

7 the document it refers to the 9th Motorised Brigade. What I want you to

8 do is look at the last page, and there's a handwritten comment at the

9 bottom referring to -- it says: "In June 1993, Delalic organised armed

10 rebellion in the 9th Mountain Brigade attacking the brigade headquarters

11 and holding the brigade commander Suljo -- Suljevic and his closest

12 associates as hostage under the threat of weapons."

13 I just want you to comment on were it says "the 9th Mountain

14 Brigade" in handwritten -- in handwriting at the bottom, but throughout

15 the text, the remainder it said "9th Motorised Brigade." In your view, is

16 it referring to the same particular brigade, that is, Delalic's brigade?

17 A. I'm referring to the same brigade.

18 Q. My learned friend, Mr. Morrissey, also put to you an extract from

19 Mr. Dzankovic's evidence to this Tribunal in which he said that the Laste

20 police units were "directly under the command of Mr. Alispahic."

21 My question is simply this: Were those units -- or was that unit

22 directly under your command when you were in Jablanica on the way to

23 Mostar?

24 MR. RE: Can you please have 390 ready.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That unit, from the time when I was

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1 appointed the minister of the interior, was never under my direct command.

2 When the unit was deployed to Mostar, it was allocated or resubordinated

3 to the BH army. So it was a police unit within the Ministry of the

4 Interior and, as such, it was subordinated to the minister because the

5 minister is in charge of all police formations.

6 However, the unit also has its own autonomy, which means that that

7 unit falls under the responsibility of the Sarajevo CSB. And for those

8 reasons, the chief of the Sarajevo CSB, due to procedural reasons and

9 substantial reasons, had to write up an order deploying the unit and

10 specifying to whom it would be resubordinated. The logic they used was

11 that I as minister was out in the field at the time and that because of

12 that everything was resubordinated to me. But that logic is flawed.

13 Q. Look at the document on your screen, which is MFI 390. It's in

14 the -- I just want you to comment on this. You were shown a number of

15 documents by Mr. Morrissey purporting to be transcripts of telephone

16 intercepts between Mr. Halilovic and people he was speaking to on the

17 phone. I just want you to comment very briefly on this. Does that

18 document there, purporting to be a conversation between Mr. Karavelic --

19 or a transcript of a conversation between Mr. Karavelic and Mr. Halilovic

20 on the 22nd of September, 1993, does that appear to be in the same form as

21 all the other ones you were shown?

22 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honours, could I just indicate that this

23 particular document does not arise out of cross-examining, but however, in

24 light of what I have sought to do with these documents, I must say I

25 reluctantly concede that -- it would just save everyone time and trouble

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1 so we can deal with it with this witness while he is here.

2 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much for your cooperation.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my view, this is flawed, as I've

4 explained earlier. But I believe that this could be the document of the

5 same type and that ...

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness finish the sentence or repeat

7 it, please.

8 MR. RE:

9 Q. The interpreters missed the part of your sentence you said: "But

10 I believe that this could be the end of the document -- sorry, "could be

11 the document of the same type and that" -- at that point you trailed off.

12 Could you just repeat that part, please.

13 A. As in the previous documents. I think that in this case as well,

14 this has to do with a contact between Halilovic and Vahid Karavelic as

15 commander of the 1st Corps.

16 MR. RE: Thank you.

17 JUDGE LIU: Well, thank you very much.

18 Well, I think we have passed the time that is allocated to this

19 trial, and it seems to me that we have no time to deal with the document

20 issues. At this stage I just simply lost track of which documents have

21 been admitted and which are not. So I hope the parties will file to this

22 informally or formally, whatever you like, a list of the documents you

23 would like to submit into the evidence, and we'll consider it later on.

24 Witness, thank you very much indeed for your coming to The Hague

25 to give your evidence. I think I've fulfilled my promise to you that

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1 we'll let you spend the weekend, and we wish you a very pleasant journey

2 back home. When we adjourn, Madam Usher will show you out of this

3 courtroom.

4 I hope to meet the lead counsel as well as their assistants

5 at 4.00 in the lobby. We'll try to find some meeting room this afternoon.

6 Yes, the hearing for today is adjourned.

7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,

8 to be reconvened on Monday, the 30th day of

9 May, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.