1 Monday, 8 October 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court].
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.25 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon to
8 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-84-T, the Prosecutor
9 versus Ramush Haradinaj et al.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Mr. Haradinaj, in your absence, the Chamber expressed that it very
12 much regretted the circumstances which led you to apply for provisional
13 release. The Chamber hopes that it has assisted you and your family in
14 overcoming this loss.
15 Then I would like to give some guidance to the parties in respect
16 of the annexes to the 92 ter statement of Zoran Stijovic.
17 The Chamber tries to work as precisely as possible on the matter.
18 The Chamber, which may not be a surprise, sometimes has logistical
19 difficulties also in finding moments to deliberate and to express views
20 internally so as to come to decisions, so therefore I'm not at this moment
21 giving a decision, but I announce that the parties should not be surprised
22 if the following annexes would not be admitted into evidence, and I also
23 can tell you already that this does not cover the whole range. It covers
24 the range up till number 52 on the list of annexes. So therefore the
25 parties should not be surprised if annex 17 and 18 would not be admitted
1 into evidence; if annex 25 would not be admitted into evidence; if 40, 41,
2 42, and 43 would not be admitted into evidence; if 46 would not be
3 admitted into evidence; and if 49 would not be admitted into evidence.
4 I'm not going to give you at this moment detailed reasons. You
5 may have noticed that reports as such -- DB reports as such are not yet
6 announced as -- to be of no surprise if they would not be admitted into
7 evidence. This can have different kinds of reasons, such as sometimes you
8 find elements in there which corroborate some other evidence or show a
9 certain awareness of events having taken place or still to take place.
10 And therefore admission also doesn't mean that for the content that the
11 Chamber accept that automatically as being true.
12 Furthermore, you -- if you would analyse this announcement in
13 further detail, you might also find that if a statement points at very
14 specific acts of a specific accused, that the Chamber apparently hesitates
15 to admit such material into evidence.
16 If you analyse it as well as far as statements given just after
17 the 24th of March, 1998, of -- statements given by persons who were
18 apparently as a result of what happened on the 24th of March detained,
19 that there the Chamber hesitates to admit such statements into evidence.
20 Sometimes also because we have heard a lot of viva voce evidence on what
21 happened on the 24th of March and sometimes there seems to be in the
22 written statements, there seems to be quite some contradiction.
23 This is not full reasons, but it may also guide the parties when
24 considering the remainder of the annexes.
25 Further, I would like to ask you, Mr. Re: Annexes 1 and 26 were
1 related to portions of the 92 ter statements, which have been redacted by
2 now. This is not to say that you could not seek to tender them, but the
3 Chamber just draws your attention that the direct link between the 92 ter
4 statement, which is not the same as the direct link to the evidence given
5 by the witness, but the direct link with the 92 ter statement has gone
7 This, as far as guidance is concerned for the time being.
8 Mr. Re, are you ready to continue the examination-in-chief of the
10 Then, Madam Usher, would you please escort Mr. Stijovic into the
12 [The witness entered court]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Stijovic.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: I'd like to remind you that you are still bound by
16 the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony.
17 And I think there was another matter about the proposal for any
18 decision on the Operation Krug. I think you would look in your hotel room
19 whether you would have it with you. Have you found it?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What we were discussing was the
21 Bezbednost magazine. I said that I have that issue. However, I wasn't
22 able to locate it; although, I can tell you that it was issue number 5
23 for 1998.
24 I have another copy here. It is a professional magazine of the
25 Ministry of the Interior. This copy, however, is from 2005. The one I
1 referred to in my testimony was edition number 5 from 1998. It is a
2 professional magazine that deals with topics of security.
3 JUDGE ORIE: First of all, I -- I mixed up two matters - that's
4 true - that this is especially the basis for the statistics.
5 Mr. Emmerson, would it assist you if Mr. Stijovic would give it
6 just for the time being so that you can have a look at this 2005 copy?
7 MR. EMMERSON: My instinctive reaction is no, since it's not the
8 source of the information that the witness quotes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then if any of the other Defence counsel would
10 like to have a look at it, then I'll wait for -- for an application.
11 Mr. Re, are you ready to continue?
12 Then Mr. Re will now continue his examination-in-chief.
13 WITNESS: ZORAN STIJOVIC [Resumed]
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 Examination by Mr. Re: [Continued]
16 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Stijovic.
17 A. Good afternoon.
18 Q. On Thursday afternoon I was asking you about paragraph 20 of your
19 statement and the statistics you noted there of the number of attacks by
20 separatists between 1992 and 1998, ranging from 8 in 1992 to 1.486 in 1998
21 through the 30th of November.
22 Just to complete --
23 I'm sorry, I think someone turned this microphone off and not the
24 other one. I just got the --
25 JUDGE ORIE: I beg your pardon? Someone did ...?
1 MR. RE: Can I just ask whether I can be heard. I have a
2 difficulty with this microphone because it's --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now they are both switched on.
4 MR. RE: Yes, okay. But this one, the papers rattle right next to
5 it. Someone keeps turning them on and off.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --
7 MR. RE: And I'm not doing it.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the one who does is invited to --
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. The question I want to ask you is in relation to the rest
11 paragraph, the part where it goes (a) to (t). Each of those attacks you
12 have outlined there, included in the statistics of the beginning of the
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. On Thursday afternoon you also gave us some evidence about the
16 murder of one Luftu Ajazi in paragraph 19. What was your information at
17 the time as to why he was killed?
18 A. Either there was a mistake in interpretation or there is a
19 miscommunication. I wasn't talking about a homicide. I was talking about
20 a terrorist attack on Luftu Ajazi whereby he was seriously wounded. In
21 the interpretation I am receiving, there was a murder that was mentioned.
22 Q. My mistake. I meant "attack," as opposed to "murder."
23 What was the information you received at the time about why he was
25 A. Luftu Ajazi had worked for a great number of years for the RDB in
1 Kosovo. He was from the area of Drenica, from Glogovac, who was very well
2 acquainted with the functioning of the Albanian extremism and terrorism.
3 Over a period of time --
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Guy-Smith.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm going to object to his answer as being not
7 responsive. The question was: What information did you receive?
8 If he wishes to expand the answer, I have no difficulty with it.
9 But my concerns are since in the absence of knowing the source of the
10 information, this gentleman is going to give us a long lecture with regard
11 to what this particular individual did as a job and we won't get to the
12 ultimate issue, which is information.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Guy-Smith, to some extent, of course, if you --
14 if you talk about information you receive about an attack on a certain
15 person, then the position of that person and perhaps specific knowledge he
16 may have had does not exclude from that type of information.
17 But, Mr. Re, at the same time you are invited to elicit from the
18 witness what the source of his information was. Please proceed.
19 MR. RE:
20 Q. For every question like that, I want you to tell the Trial Chamber
21 - but as briefly as possible - the source of your information.
23 A moment ago, you were telling us about Mr. --
24 A. I understand the question. I was about to answer. I wanted to
25 explain why he was chosen to be the target. But since you are insisting
1 on the source of information, it was my direct knowledge that I gained in
2 a telephone conversation with his brother immediately after the terrorist
3 attack had been carried out, as well as the information we obtained
4 subsequently through our operational activities concerning that attack.
5 Q. That's -- that's what I'm interested in, the latter. What was the
6 information you had as to why he was attacked, why he was targeted and
7 attacked? What was the source of that information?
8 A. The source of information were the people who immediately
9 participated in the work of the terrorist group around Adem Jashari that
10 was located in Prekaze near Srbica.
11 Q. What were you told or what did you find out?
12 A. We obtained some information from our source stating that the
13 terrorist group of Adem Jashari is in possession of lists of people that
14 they are to carry out attacks on in the area of Drenica. In that regard,
15 particular focus was placed on the workers of the police, of the Security
16 Service, as well as Albanians employed by the various bodies of the
17 Ministry of the Interior of Serbia.
18 Luftu Ajazi was one of the most competent and highly positioned
19 people in the area of Kosovo within the category mentioned on the list.
20 Q. Was his name on the list?
21 A. Yes, it was.
22 Q. Was your name on the list?
23 A. No, it was not.
24 Q. Why wasn't your name on the list?
25 A. I don't know. I suppose -- I suppose that Luftu Ajazi's name was
1 on the list because he was from the area. He was a well-known person
2 there, and he directly worked with the People's Movement of Kosovo over a
3 number of years and he -- he had been a year-long employee of the State
4 Security Service. He began working for the RDB in early 1970s.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harvey.
6 MR. HARVEY: All right. I've got -- I have a light.
7 I was slow getting to my feet, but the question called for
8 complete speculation.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. HARVEY: The answer was pure speculation. And in my
11 submission, Mr. Re didn't need to go there and shouldn't have gone there.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I've given that some thought as well, and I
13 wondered how I would have put that question to the witness. I think I
14 would have asked the witness under those circumstances whether he knows of
15 a reason why he was not on the list, as the first question.
16 The answer then most likely would be "no." And then perhaps the
17 next question could have been whether he made any observations as to the
18 composition of those lists. And then he might or might not have said that
19 those on the list were locals and there were -- there was something to
20 explore there which came out into the answer, but I tend to agree with you
21 that the way in which the evidence was elicited was not perfect in terms
22 of trial techniques.
23 MR. HARVEY: Thank you.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: We have a -- we have another problem with the
25 manner which this particular question and answer is proceeding, which is
1 there's an assumption that in fact there is a list, a physical --
2 MR. RE: Well, let me --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, that came into my mind as well, and then
4 it should have said the -- the reported list. Yes, I --
5 MR. RE: I'm just getting constant objections. I could have got
6 through this three minutes ago without these objections.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --
8 MR. RE: My next question was going to be: Did you see the list?
9 But I can't get to it because I keep getting interrupted.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: I apologise but --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Well, perhaps -- perhaps if you start with: Have you
12 seen the list? Then you avoid all these objections and then all the
13 thoughts that came into the mind of Defence counsel and some of the
14 thoughts that came into my mind as well, would not have been there. But
15 that's -- as I said before, it's -- it's not dramatic but it's also...
16 Mr. Emmerson.
17 MR. EMMERSON: I simply want to take this moment, if I may, to
18 reiterate as far as this evidence and all subsequent testimony is
19 concerned, the witness is citing a source unnamed and we are assuming
20 without raising objections from here on in at each occasion that where
21 that is the case the source is not -- the witness is unwilling to name the
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that is what we discussed last Thursday.
24 If the witness is in a position to give the name of the source,
25 he's invited to do so. If he doesn't give a name, it is interpreted as
1 the witness having reasons for not using that name.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Re.
3 MR. RE: I still, of course, stand guided by the Trial Chamber,
4 but I can't always ask the questions in the order that other people
5 anticipate that -- I will ask them. I will ask them.
6 JUDGE ORIE: No, of course not how they anticipate but there is
7 some logic in it. If you start with -- if you wanted to ask whether the
8 witness has seen the list, then before asking explanations on who is on
9 the list and who is not on the list, I think you avoid a lot of problems
10 if you first establish whether he has seen the list so that we know
11 exactly what the basis of his knowledge is as far as who is on the list,
12 who's not on the list, and then next question, why A is on the list and B
13 is not on the list.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. RE:
16 Q. Mr. Stijovic, we're talking about this list and I was asking you
17 whether your name was on the list and you said "no."
18 Did Serbian State Security see this list or have a copy of it?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Did you see the list?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And that's the reason why you're able to tell the Trial Chamber
23 that your name wasn't on it, because when you looked at it, you didn't see
24 it there; is that right?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. Do you know whether the people who compiled the list knew who you
2 were? Given your --
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. What's the answer to that?
5 A. Probably yes.
6 Q. All right. How did Serbian State Security obtain this list?
7 A. During 1994, in mid-1994, to be more specific, we carried out an
8 action arresting a broad group of members of the so-called Ministry of the
9 Interior of the Republic of Kosovo. And during investigations and the
10 criminal proceedings that were subsequently conducted, we established that
11 the so-called parallel service of the public security service of the
12 Republic of Kosovo made very detailed investigations of the movements, the
13 conduct, and the relationships of members of the SDB in that area; that it
14 revealed or discovered people who were in contact with the DB; and that
15 they got a list or knew of a number of Albanians who had been in the -- in
16 contact with the Serbian RDB.
17 What we discovered as the DB during that investigation was that
18 this parallel service -- this parallel security service --
19 Q. I'm really interested in a shortcut answer, as in, like, who gave
20 you the list.
21 A. We received the list from employees of the State Security Service
22 after searching the apartment of Avdija Mehmetovic, who was at the time
23 the head of the State Security of Kosovo. That was that parallel Albanian
24 Security Service or DB.
25 Q. Okay. What happened to the list? Where is it now?
1 A. The list is in the archives of the State Security Service of the
2 Republic of Serbia or in the archives of the BiA [as interpreted]
3 currently and the action in relation to this was an operative action named
4 Zeto [phoen].
5 Q. Can you please turn to paragraph 17 of your statement. And I just
6 inform you the Trial Chamber is not admitting that paragraph into
7 evidence. However, I wish to ask you about the document which is annex
8 1 -- or referred to annex 1 in that paragraph. It's a LPK public
9 declaration published in Zeri i Kosoves on the 1st of September, 1993.
10 What I want you to do is have a look at the annex and --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And for the record, it's P933. Please proceed.
12 MR. RE: P933.
13 Q. I want you to tell the Trial Chamber what the significance of that
14 document was to the State Security when they read it.
15 And while the witness is doing that, can I remind the Trial
16 Chamber that these -- these extracts are from the book that Mr.
17 Jakup Krasniqi brought with him to the Trial Chamber to the -- to the
18 court and the Trial Chamber asked Mr. Krasniqi questions about this book
19 which contains the communique. And that's at pages 5159 to 5160 of the
20 transcript. So every annex of Mr. Stijovic's statement which refers to
21 these communiques from that book, this book, it relates to the book that
22 Mr. Krasniqi brought to the Trial Chamber at the conclusion of his
24 The question is, Mr. Stijovic: What was the significance to the
25 State Security when they read it?
1 A. The meeting that was held in August in the area of Drenica LPK was
2 especially significant for us because the results of the meeting were the
3 general commitment of the People's Movement of Kosovo to prepare people
4 for armed actions in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.
5 Q. How does that relate to the political declaration in MFI P933?
6 A. It is directly connected or directly related because the LPK in
7 that political declaration publicly and openly advocated the need to
8 activate or carry out active measures to stand up against the authorities
9 in Serbia, first of all, in terms of armed activities and armed actions in
10 the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.
11 Q. And where does that fit in in the general transition from the
12 isolated or the eight attacks you've referred to in paragraph 20 leading
13 up to the 75 attacks you've referred to in 1997? Where does this document
14 fit in in that general pattern of increased -- or the increasing attacks
15 over those years?
16 A. Based on even a superficial analysis, it can easily be determined
17 that after this Drenica meeting the activity or the terrorist activities
18 and violence in Kosovo and Metohija registered an increase and the
19 culmination of the activities began from 1995 onwards.
20 From 1995 onwards, you could see a dramatic increase of the
21 attacks, which then escalated in late 1998, which is mentioned in
22 paragraph 20 from -- counting or numbering 1.486 attacks through the 30th
23 of November.
24 Q. Can you please turn to paragraph 20(b) of your statement.
25 Can that please be displayed in Sanction. Thank you.
1 Ask you referred to KLA communique number 18, that's annex 6 of
2 your statement.
3 What's the exhibit number? It's annex 6. I'm just getting the
4 exhibit number.
5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar has prepared a -- a list with all the
7 MFI numbers in relation to the annexes. 6 would be P938.
8 [Prosecution counsel confer]
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. In paragraph 20(b), you refer to: "The synchronised nature of the
11 attacks indicates a significant degree of integration and communication
12 between different KLA groups, even in early 1996."
13 Now, if you can just turn to the communique itself, and in
14 particular the first paragraph.
15 If that could be displayed in e-court. Of -- in the English,
16 where it says communique number 18, the first paragraph on the 11th of
17 February, 1996: "The guerilla units of KLA initiated military actions in
18 operative zone number 1. Actions were carried out using hand-grenades in
19 the camps of Serb colonizers arriving from the Krajina in the capital of
20 the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, as well as Mitrovica, Peja, Podujevo,
21 Suhareke, and Vushtrri."
22 How do you come to assess those particular attacks as
24 A. I can answer this very clearly. Self-organising of the actions
25 carried out within ten minutes on a broader area of Kosovo and Metohija
1 indicates that there was a plan and that there was an intention to carry
2 out these actions. It's not easy to carry out so many attacks without
3 good logistics and good preparation.
4 The targets of the attacks were not chosen at random; although, in
5 this case the direct target were the facilities where persons under the
6 protection of the United Nations were located.
7 The actual target of these attacks were the authorities and the
8 message to the authorities was, as you read in the announcement, that
9 those so-called Serbian colonisers should be moved from the territory of
10 Kosovo and Metohija. In that sense, the term to take over responsibility
11 used by the KLA in this announcement points to a logical development of
12 events in which way and how they were planning their further activities.
13 After this action and after several more actions, we made the
14 decision, based on analysis, to turn around the operative action, because
15 these attacks and some subsequent attacks that took place at the same time
16 provided us with the absolute right to conclude that they were backed by a
17 well-organised group or organisation that was carrying out these actions.
18 Q. All right. Can I please -- I know you've -- there's a lot of
19 information you want to tell the Trial Chamber, but can you please try and
20 confine the answer to the question, which was about synchronisation, if
22 My follow-up question in relation to this is - it's on the screen
23 in front of you, it's the first paragraph in communique number 18, and you
24 just referred to "Serb colonisers." Who were these people that the
25 communique is referring to as "Serb colonisers" and what was their
1 significance in terms of the KLA's objectives and the actions they took?
2 A. These were persons who, as refugees from the territory of the
3 Republic of Croatia, were accommodated in the territory of Kosovo and
5 Q. Also in relation to the so-called Serb colonisers, can you please
6 turn to paragraph 22(e) of your statement. And it refers to KLA
7 communiques. And in particular, number 22, in relation to an attack on
8 three houses in Babaloc. And we --
9 JUDGE ORIE: I take it your reference was to 20(e).
10 MR. RE: Yes, I do mean 20(e). I apologise.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. Also because the term "so-called" is actual
12 a term of argument within these proceedings. Within regard to the
13 communique that we're referring to, that particular language,"so-called,"
14 does not exist. Mr. Re has just used that language, that "so-called." I
15 just wish for there to be a distinction between who is making a
16 determination about so-called Serb colonisers.
17 And I'm dealing specifically with "so-called"." And this will
18 become self-evident. As a matter of fact, it's one of the issues that was
19 raised in the motion that we filed with regard to this gentleman's
20 testimony in terms of particular terminology that was being used.
21 Since the word "so-called" is being used, I'm alerting the Chamber
22 to that and I just ask that there be some careful use of language here.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, "so-called" suggests that the name does not
24 reflect what the object or the person or the group actually is. And at
25 the same time, I see that this is the terminology the witness used in his
1 92 ter statement, so to that effect it is -- there's no problem if you
2 refer to --
3 MR. RE: That's what I did. I'm just referring to --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm dealing specifically with -- no, let me
5 just -- let me just check exactly what ...
6 If you would have said also in relation to what you refer to as
7 the "so-called," then it's clear you're referring to what the witness
8 said, rather than you use the term yourself.
9 Please proceed.
10 MR. RE: And at the same time, I'm saying that I'm displaying it
11 on the screen his statement, in which he says "so-called Serb colonisers."
12 And I'm just referring him to that so I can move to the document.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. RE: That's all I'm telling you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Guy-Smith, this -- this way of using language
16 might perhaps easily confuse a jury. It certainly will not confuse this
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: I appreciate that. I just want to make sure we
19 don't have difficulty with it at a later point in time.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Because it will be something in issue.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Please proceed.
23 MR. RE: .
24 Q. Mr. Stijovic, I'm only referring to paragraph 22(e), and you
25 relate --
1 JUDGE ORIE: I take it, again, 20(e)?
2 MR. RE: Sorry, 20 -- 20(e). I saw the words 22 -- sorry,
3 communique 22, paragraph 20(e). And you say: "Attack on three houses in
4 Babaloc in which so-called Serb colonisers (refugees from the Krajina)
5 were being accommodated."
6 Were those people you referred to there as "so-called Serb
7 colonisers" were they in the same category as the Serbian refugees you
8 referred to a few moments ago?
9 MR. EMMERSON: Just before the witness answers, annex 10 is the
10 source of this paragraph, and the relevant provision in annex 10 refers to
11 an attack not on houses in which refugees were being accommodated but on
12 apartments that were in the process of being constructed. In other words,
13 on a building site.
14 MR. RE: Thank you for that. But I'm sure the appropriate
15 submission can be made at the appropriate time or questions asked in
17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, there are two matters. The first is that
18 references should be as precise as possible already in chief and not only
19 corrected in cross-examination. And at the same time, whether the houses
20 were meant to be used for accommodation of so-called colonisers and
21 they're under construction or whether already used, I wouldn't say it
22 makes no difference but --
23 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. It is simply --
24 JUDGE ORIE: The difference is limited.
25 MR. EMMERSON: The question is being asked about people --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. EMMERSON: -- who were accommodated within those buildings.
3 That -- that's --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Well, no, that's not true either, Mr. Emmerson. And
5 it was an attack on three houses. It's not an attack on individuals.
6 MR. EMMERSON: No.
7 JUDGE ORIE: It is still -- the object is the house.
8 But let's try to avoid to spend hours and hours on what may be not
9 an important but still details and not -- certainly not the main matters
10 with which this Chamber is concerned.
11 Please proceed, Mr. Re. So therefore I -- the Defence is invited
12 to save -- I think in the song it's save it for a rainy day. That's too
13 long, but at least save it for a while and not to interrupt and -- the
14 flow of evidence again and again.
15 Please proceed, Mr. Re.
16 MR. RE: In respect to the last objection, can I remind the Trial
17 Chamber - and, of course, Mr. Emmerson - I'm sure he's aware of this -
18 that annex 3 to Mr. Jakup Krasniqi's Rule 92 ter statement - that's
19 Exhibit P328 - is a report of that very attack and it's been tendered into
20 evidence and it refers to an -- quote -- "An attack at a settlement of
21 Serb and Montenegrin refugees at Babaloc village of Decan." And that
22 is -- and that is a KLA communique which has been published in Pristina
23 Kosovo --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It still doesn't resolve the matter on whether
25 these houses were at that moment inhabited by persons or not yet.
1 And as I said before, details of minor importance. Let's proceed.
2 MR. RE:
3 Q. I just want to take you to -- I'm sorry. Excuse me for a moment I
4 just want the question. I was asking you about the attack on that
5 particular settlement, whether the houses were being built or not. Were
6 they the same types of refugees that you were referring to a little
8 A. No, they were not. This settlement - and perhaps it will help if
9 I clarify the situation for the Trial Chamber - the settlement of Babaloc
10 was a specific settlement with a large number of houses where Serbs and
11 Montenegrins who had fled from Albania, who had come as refugees, were
12 supposed to be accommodated. This was financed with UNHCR funds. And as
13 the houses were being completed, people were moving in. There were scores
14 of houses there. It was a restricted area or smaller area where those
15 houses were located. And as the houses were completed, people were moving
17 Everybody in the area knew that it was a settlement where refugees
18 from Serbia and Montenegro were accommodated.
19 Q. Also in relation -- in that particular KLA communique, which was
20 number 22, can you please look at the first paragraph, in which it said:
21 "As stated in the communique, number 22 on July 7th and 10th, KLA has
22 executed two attempted attacks. The first attack was carried out on the
23 collaborator of the Serb regime, Shukri Krasniqi from Ostrozubi, and the
24 second one in Podujevo on the criminal Sredoje Radojevic"?
25 Did you have any information at the time about those particular
1 attacks, that is, the collaborator and the police officer?
2 A. Yes. Shukri Krasniqi was killed at a catering facility, and our
3 subsequent information that we gained during our investigations was that
4 among the three people who had killed Shukri Krasniqi included
5 Fatmir Limaj. As for Radojevic, the police officer we know reliably that
6 the executor was Jasir Barasiti [phoen], called Vuk, Wolf, who was leading
7 the KLA activities in the areas of Lab and Podujeve.
8 Q. Who was Shukri Krasniqi, referred to as a collaborator in this KLA
10 A. I don't have specific information about who he was, other than
11 this was a person who had been seen with members of the police, and it's
12 possible that that was the criteria on the basis of which he was picked as
13 a target.
14 Q. The person called Wolf, who was leading the KLA activities in Lab
15 and Podujevo, does he have a name?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harvey.
17 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, it has begun to rain. You said save it
18 for a rainy day. But it is pouring at the moment.
19 This is -- again, we have no idea what the sources of this
20 information are, what the relevance of any of this information is to this
21 witness's testimony is -- is really getting very far afield, in my
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, as far as sources are concerned.
24 MR. RE: I do intend to cover it. I mean, an objection is not
25 going to make me do it any faster. Before I move away from this document,
1 I will cover that.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The other issue is -- I've asked that myself --
3 what level of detail we will need where it apparently seems to -- that you
4 want to establish that already quite a few events happened years before
5 the year of the indictment which were related to KLA and which are covered
6 by KLA communiques.
7 The level of detail of that material, of course, is -- as needed
8 is questionable.
9 MR. RE: It goes, of course, to the reliability or the accuracy of
10 the matters contained in those KLA communiques. The Trial Chamber has
11 heard evidence from Mr. Krasniqi as to the fact that they were
12 disseminated. And the Defence of Mr. Haradinaj has specifically objected
13 or has -- has said they question or object to the Prosecution attempting
14 to tender them for the truth of the contents.
15 Mr. Stijovic is well-placed to give evidence of the truth of the
16 contents and to verify the accuracy of each of the KLA communiques which
17 are annexed to his statement. And the significance of the KLA communiques
18 shows the escalation of the KLA activities against Serbian collaborators
19 and police officers until it escalated into an armed conflict during the
20 indictment period.
21 So it's highly relevant to show the buildup and how it came to
22 turn from terrorist attacks upon collaborators and police to a -- an armed
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, the Chamber understands that on the basis of
1 the objections made, as far as the content of this material is concerned,
2 that you spent some time on it, but the level of detail could be really
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. RE:
6 Q. Mr. Harvey was interested, over there, in the source of your
7 information in relation to the attacks on Shukri Krasniqi and the police
8 officer Mr. Radojevic. Can you please tell the Trial Chamber as briefly
9 as you possibly can where the DB or the MUP obtained its information about
10 what happened?
11 A. By carrying -- or by intercepting a group of the LPK people,
12 including the brother of Fatmir Limaj and a series of other persons who
13 had been included in this activity. This is in terms of Shukri Krasniqi.
14 As for Sredoje Radojevic, through our associate we found out about
15 a person who was carrying out attacks in the Podujevo area. We received a
16 phone number and a pseudonym that he used in telephone communications.
17 And that pseudonym was Vuk, Wolf.
18 An example of the measures we used was bugging. Then we
19 determined that that person was a key person for the execution of
20 terrorist attack in -- attacks in the area of Podujevo.
21 Q. Do you have a name for Wolf?
22 A. Zahir Pajaziti.
23 Q. How do you assess the reliability of the information you obtained
24 at the time?
25 A. Absolutely, yes. Yes.
1 Q. Why?
2 A. By combining the technical means at our disposal and the human
3 sources I discussed.
4 Q. Why was it so reliable?
5 A. Because the source that informed us about the murder of
6 Sredoje Radojevic was a person who was in close contact with the late
7 Pajaziti, Zahir. And if I may, I would like to explain something, however
8 I would like to do it in private session when stating where that person
9 was at the time so as not to put him in any danger.
10 JUDGE ORIE: We'll turn into private session.
11 Then we have to -- since we're in Courtroom II now, we have to
12 move the curtains down as well.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in private session.
14 [Private session]
12 [Open session]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
14 MR. RE:
15 Q. Can you please turn to paragraph 20(h) of your statement, in which
16 you refer to the serious wounding of the dean of the University of
17 Pristina, Radivoje Papovic, on the 16th of January, 1997. And it appears
18 in KLA communique number 29, which is annex 13, MFI P946.
19 In your statement, you note that the KLA has taken responsibility
20 for that particular --
21 I'm sorry, if I said "946", I meant 945. I just correct that.
22 What was your information in January 1997 - I'm displaying the
23 relevant portion of communique number 29 in Sanction - as to the
24 collaborationist -- I'm sorry, as to why Radivoje Papovic was attacked by
25 the KLA. He is described there as an enemy of the people. Why was that?
1 A. Radivoje Papovic was a professor at the University of Pristina and
2 also the dean of the university.
3 In addition to that, he was a well-known figure, and as such he
4 often openly discussed the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. Since he was
5 well acquainted with the situation and the continuity of operation of
6 Albanian separatists, he was able to clearly define their true intentions
7 and goals.
8 In that regard, in the Albanian media he was presented as a
9 hard-liner among the Serbs. He was often the target of many attacks --
10 verbal attacks. And as we can see here, a physical attack followed.
11 Q. Was he a civilian?
12 A. Absolutely, yes. A professor at the school of mathematics and
13 natural sciences. I think he specialised in chemistry. He had a Ph.D. A
14 well-known person, an influential figure among the Serbian population in
15 the area of Kosovo-Metohija.
16 Q. How does the information the DB had compare with the information
17 in communique number 29 published by the KLA on the 19th of January, 1997?
18 I mean, what I'm asking you is: The KLA communique, does it reflect what
20 A. It compares absolutely, yes.
21 Q. The next one in that communique refers to the third attack. "The
22 third attack targeted the collaborator of the Serbs, Xun Dervishi from
24 What information did you have in particular about that attack?
25 Just very briefly, please.
1 A. The RDB, a few hours after the attack, learned of the event. We
2 quickly put two and two together. We followed the sequence of events and
3 the behaviour of those who we were monitoring, realising that the
4 terrorist group from Prekaze was behind the attack in its wider
5 composition, that the attack was carried out by the members of the group
6 surrounding Adem Jashari in that area.
7 Q. The Trial Chamber also wants the know the source of the
8 information. Where did the DB get its sources from?
9 A. The sources were first and foremost -- well, I can mention
10 pseudonyms, if it is of any importance to the Chamber. I can mention the
11 pseudonyms of our live sources who were positioned highly within the
12 terrorist nucleus in Podujevo.
13 Q. Are you telling the Trial Chamber that highly placed sources
14 within the KLA provided you with information about what had happened?
15 A. Those people were very close to the innermost leadership of the
16 KLA. I think that would be a precise way of putting it. They were active
17 members of the KLA.
18 Q. Would revealing pseudonyms endanger these people if it were done
19 in open session?
20 A. Absolutely not, since that associate of the RDB after 1999 was
21 compromised. Certain members of the KLA and NPK learned of his identity.
22 I think I can say what his pseudonym, his first and last name is, and
23 other details. That person, after he was killed in Drenica, received the
24 rank of colonel in the KLA. His pseudonym was Moralec. There was a
25 brigade in the Shala area that was named after him. If you want me, I can
1 state his first and last name, since the -- his award and the name of the
2 brigade had subsequently been changed.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Is --
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It cannot do any harm either to him
5 or to his family.
6 JUDGE ORIE: If it does no harm, you could just give the name.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mehe Uka. A year-long member of the
8 NPRK, he spent over 15 years in prison. He was also somebody who worked
9 for us and we enlisted him during his prison sentence.
10 Once he was released, he worked within the group of Adem Jashari,
11 as well as the National Movement for the liberation of Kosovo that were
12 led by --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Perhaps the witness could repeat the two names
14 he mentioned. The interpreter did not hear.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Through him, we were able to put
16 together our arrest operation very quickly.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 MR. RE:
19 Q. Why was he providing information, this colonel in the KLA, to the
20 Serbian State Security Service?
21 A. He was posthumously pronounced general. A KLA brigade got its
22 name after him. The basic reason why Mehe Uka accepted to cooperate with
23 the RDB had to do with his disappointment in the relationship and
24 opportunism that was prevailing at the time among certain members of the
1 Ideologically speaking, he was a Marxist-Leninist, a hard-liner,
2 and his position was clear. In his interview with us, he told us that he
3 very much disagreed with what was going on in the NPK and he said that
4 that was not what he had opted for at the time he had joined the party.
5 Q. What did the DB give him in return for his information?
6 A. Unfortunately, apart from some support, nothing else.
7 Q. [Microphone not activated] And how did you assess at the time the
8 reliability of the information he was providing you?
9 A. He was such a reliable associate that I can mention two very good
10 examples which can easily be corroborated.
11 Q. Are they referred to in your statement? Do they relate to
12 incidents referred to in your statement?
13 A. No.
14 MR. RE: If it would assist the Trial Chamber, I can lead the
15 evidence. If the Trial Chamber has a general concern about the
16 reliability of the information the DB was relying upon.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harvey.
19 MR. HARVEY: Oh, there we go.
20 It might insist the Trial Chamber to know whether the Mehe Uka
21 that the witness has just spoken of, is the one who according to a statue
22 that I am looking at courtesy of Mr. and Mrs. Google appears to have died
23 in 1996.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- we are talking about -- first of all, is
25 that -- is that your information as well, that he died in 1996?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct. Mehe Uka.
2 Mehe Uka.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, we see under paragraph 20 a lot of
4 information about early years. So therefore as such, that does not
5 necessarily come as a surprise, because it's not covering the events in
7 So therefore, Mr. Harvey, I do not know whether your reference to
8 Mr. and Mrs. Google -- what do -- is -- are you suggesting that he could
9 not have given reliable information because he died already before the
10 events happened that he would have given information about? Is that what
11 you suggested?
12 MR. HARVEY: No, I'm not suggesting that. I'm suggesting that --
13 we've spent a lot of time in 1996.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. HARVEY: And I'm wondering whether we're going to move on to
16 anything that's really relevant to this case.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That has got nothing to do with the reliability
18 of this source and that was what was on the table at the time.
19 Mr. Re, the Chamber has no specific concerns about --
20 Mr. Emmerson -- has no specific concerns about the reliability of the
21 person who died in 1996.
22 Please proceed.
23 Mr. Emmerson.
24 MR. EMMERSON: I just wonder if it might be clarified. It may be
25 my misunderstanding, but I had thought that this related to information
1 acquired as a source in respect of events taking place in 1997.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Then I have to check that.
3 Mr. Re.
4 MR. RE: It doesn't say that in the communique. The communique
5 was issued on the 19th of 1997, referring to a third attacked target. It
6 doesn't say when they attacked the Serbian collaborator, Mr. Xun Dervishi.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: In terms of -- in looking at the communique
9 itself, the first attack dates the 13th of January. Then chronologically,
10 the second action dates the 16th of January, and the third attack, which
11 has no date, since it's a third attack, one would think that it would come
12 after that date as a matter of logic and the year would be 1997.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just check.
14 Mr. Re, and your chronology following the logic of Mr. Guy-Smith
15 or would you like to --
16 MR. RE: I have no --
17 JUDGE ORIE: -- elicit --
18 MR. RE: I have no information in that communique as to the date
19 of the attack on Mr. Xun Dervishi at all. I'm not going to make a
20 submission as to whether it occurred in that month or the month before or
22 MR. HARVEY: Your Honours, again, the -- Messrs. Google insists
23 that the attack on the rector of the university who was also a major
24 leader of the Serb socialist party took place on the -- it was either the
25 15th or the 16th of January, 1997.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And talking about reliability, you consider
2 Mr. and Mrs. Google a reliable source, Mr. Harvey? Is that --
3 MR. HARVEY: More so than this witness, Your Honour.
4 MR. RE: Is that a --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.
6 MR. RE: Is that an admission from the Defence that the KLA
7 attacked and -- attacked the rector of the University of Pristina on the
8 basis he was a Serb collaborator on the 16th of January, 1997?
9 JUDGE ORIE: No --
10 MR. HARVEY: I'm not going to sink to this level, Your Honour.
11 MR. RE: Well, why simply Google then?
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, an imperfect attempt to verify certain dates
13 and an imperfect attempt to see whether a person who allegedly has died in
14 1996 could give any information about an event that may have taken place
15 in 1997, that's the issue we're talking about, reliability of that source
16 and whether the Chamber, not consulting Mr. and Mrs. Google on a frequent
17 basis, had no -- at firsthand, no serious concerns about reliability.
18 Perhaps on the basis of what was put forward again -- again, not as a
19 final answer but as a -- as a -- as an attempt to quickly seek
20 verification of certain data, might require further exploration of the
21 reliability of this source.
22 Please proceed.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me. Your Honour, may I
24 address you?
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you -- where you may have noticed that some
1 matters have been raised in relation to who could give information about
2 events that had taken place at a certain time. If -- if you can --
3 although you are a witness, if you have any matter, to your knowledge,
4 that could assist us in better understanding these documents, you're
5 invited to give that information.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When we were discussing
7 Zahir Pajaziti, a mentioned a person who was sending us information from
8 the prison, including the phone number and the pseudonym of Vuk, used by
9 Pajaziti. That person, however, was not Mehe Uka. Mehe Uka used the
10 pseudonym Moralec, and he participated in the activities of the KLA and
11 the group of Adem Jashari in Prekaze.
12 He also assisted us in surveying Zahir Pajaziti and it made us
13 possible to confirm that he was the key organiser of the action against
14 Mr. Radojevic. The person who helped us with the latter portion was
15 another person, not Mehe Uka. It was somebody who was also in prison in
16 Serbia. I can tell you what his name was. However, these are two
17 separate people. One of them helped us with the attack on
18 Radivoje Papovic.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.
20 MR. RE:
21 Q. I want to take you to paragraph 20(o) of your statement. And it
22 refers to communique number 40, which is MFI P953. Mr. Jakup Krasniqi
23 gave evidence in the Limaj trial T33 -- page 3325. It's part of the Limaj
24 testimony which is in -- in evidence here. And it refers to a number of
25 attacks in November 1997 upon various people.
1 And you referred to these in your statement. One of them refers
2 to -- the first one is a -- one Zdravko Tomcic, the communique refers to
3 it as the Serbian-imposed chairman of the commune of Podujeve in
4 Operational Zone number 5.
5 What was the information the DB had at the time about that
6 particular attack and what is meant by "Serbian-imposed chairman of the
8 A. I'll start from the beginning. I believe the person's name was
9 Zdravko; although, I am not 100 per cent certain. He was appointed by the
10 Serbian Assembly to the position of the president of the Municipality of
11 Podujevo since there was a boycott in place on the part of the Albanians
12 from that area, they refused to participate in work with the authorities.
13 He wasn't imposed per se; however, he was placed there in order to ensure
14 the functioning of the local authorities, since the Albanians there did
15 not wish to do that. The assembly had to come up with a decision
16 appointing a person to discharge the tasks envisaged by the law.
17 This was quite a surprise to us, the attack on that person, since
18 his residence was in the municipality of Kursumlija, which is the adjacent
19 municipality of Podujevo. However, the message was a clear one. Be it
20 Kursumlija or anywhere, even the president of the municipality or any
21 other person cannot be safe.
22 Q. Was he a civilian?
23 A. Yes, absolutely.
24 Q. Was the information in this KLA communique, that is, that he was
25 attacked by a hand-grenade, accord with what the DB was informed actually
2 A. Yes, absolutely. The RDB also conducted an on-site investigation,
3 and we found certain pieces of the hand-grenade that was thrown at
4 Mr. Tomcic's family house. There was a complete file in existence
5 concerning this case.
6 Q. In your statement, you also at paragraph 20(r), 20(s), and 20(t),
7 refer to this same communique in relation to --
8 Can we have the rest of that page --
9 In relation to an attack on a colleague of your, Dragan Davidovic,
10 another police officer, Zeljko Lutovac, the murder of Dalup Dugoli, and
11 the claimed shooting down -- or shooting of a Cessna 310 aeroplane at
12 Golesh aerodrome.
13 A general question, to try to move quickly to the point here: How
14 accurate was the information in the KLA communique or how does it compare
15 to the information which the DB had at the time?
16 A. As regards this specific case, it is absolutely incorrect. The
17 quote from item (T) mentions the shooting down of a Cessna 310 aeroplane
18 on the 26th of November, 1998. That is incorrect. It was another thing
19 that appeared regularly in one -- in many communiques by the KLA. They
20 often used propaganda stating that in their actions, in general, they
21 caused or inflicted serious losses to the occupiers and that they withdrew
22 without any consequences.
23 Q. How much of this particular communique was -- I think you said
24 20 -- I heard the words 26 November, 1998. Did you say 1998 or 1997 a
25 moment ago? The transcript says "1998".
1 A. 1998? It's 1997. However, in this subparagraph the year is
2 wrong. That is what confused me. This was probably a typo.
3 Q. Okay. Just --
4 JUDGE ORIE: I may take it that a report of December 1997 could
5 not deal with any matter that took place on the -- in November 1998.
6 I further, Mr. Re, I would like to draw your attention that in
7 annex 10 there is a rather confusing typo in the English text. The first
8 communique mentioned there should be 21, as in the original, and not 22.
9 MR. RE: Oh, I see. Yes.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. RE: I'll ask for that to be corrected.
12 MR. EMMERSON: And on the same document that we've just been
13 looking at in subparagraph (s), presumably the same date error applies.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.
15 MR. RE: I assume so, but I can certainly clarify that with the
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you would do that and we will then have a
19 MR. RE: Yes. Okay.
20 Q. I want to clarify something. The date in paragraph (s), should
21 that be 1997?
22 And the other thing I wanted to ask you was: The accuracy in
23 relation to what you've written in paragraph (s) and -- sorry, (r) and (s)
24 and how it compares to the accuracy of what's in the KLA communique. Is
25 the KLA communique accurate, as far as you know? And can you correct the
1 date to November 1997?
2 A. As for paragraph (r), it is absolutely accurate as far as dates
3 and information are concerned contained in that paragraph relating to the
4 killing of Dragan Davidovic.
5 As for paragraph (s), the mistake is in November 1997.
6 Q. The KLA communique, do they accurate reflect, as far as your
7 information says or what was available to you, do they accurately reflect
8 what actually happened? That's communique 40, with the exception of the
9 alleged attack on the Cessna being brought down.
10 A. In my view, it does not, because Zarko Milosevic is a close friend
11 of mine, a policeman, and he explained to me and also through the official
12 documents I knew how this event occurred in their public communique,
13 Gjocaj is being presented as a prominent member of the KLA. We did not
14 have information that he was in the KLA. We knew that he was a KLA
16 And in a quite cunning way, he pulled out his gun in the vehicle
17 he was when he was being detained, and due to the lack of attention of the
18 police officers, he killed a policeman, injured or wounded Zarko Milosevic
19 and this, the third one who was there, Lutovac.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. One general question in relation to all these
21 documents. If you give dates in your 92 ter statement, now, usually have
22 you taken them from the documents or do you have any personal recollection
23 of these dates?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am speaking on the basis of
25 recollection about the month. But then when I look at the document, then
1 I can give you a precise date.
2 In some situation, I can directly refer to the date or the time
3 frame when this happened. This is something that was clear to remember,
4 because on the same day there was an attack on the police section in
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I then ask you -- one second, please.
7 The -- one of the documents you referred to was about the two attacks:
8 One against Shukri Krasniqi and the other one against Sredoje Radojevic.
9 The other was about the attack on four police posts, and the third event
10 mentioned there was the destruction of three apartments in Babaloc.
11 Now, these three events, as far as the publication of the
12 communiques is concerned, how -- where is your -- your memory serves you
13 in what way in relation to the communiques in relation to these events?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The communiques would appear a day
15 or a few days after an incident was carried out. The publication of the
16 communiques in Zeri i Kosoves depends -- it's a paper that is published in
17 Switzerland -- would then depend on its periodical issues. The attack
18 would be carried out on one date and then with the development of the
19 terrorist activities, the KLA after a while was able to publish
20 communiques immediately after an action.
21 Sometimes the communiques would be published a day or two
22 afterwards and subsequently would be then published in Zeri i Kosoves.
23 Later these communiques would be sent out to all the media locally
24 and also internationally.
25 JUDGE ORIE: But the communiques always followed within, you said,
1 one or two days? Could it be more than one week or -- or were these
2 communiques always within one week of the event?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am convinced that three to five
4 days would be the maximum period, according to analysis that would pass
5 from the carried-out event until the publication later.
6 In 1997, 1998, 1999, the taking of responsibility would be done
7 from attack to attack.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I'm asking you for the following reason: In your 92
9 ter statement, under (e), you are referring to three KLA communiques and
10 you say they were all dated the 14th of August. And I wondered what made
11 you accept that events described to have taken place on 7th and 10th of
12 July, the other attack on four police both dated the 2nd of August, and
13 then finally the attack against the apartments in Babaloc taking place on
14 August the 8th, what makes you believe that all these three communiques
15 are dated the 14th of August? I'm -- I was wondering.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember very well this communique
17 and this event. What -- this day when it was published in Zeri i Kosoves,
18 there was a presentation of all -- of the statements 21, 22, and 23 about
19 the attacks that had been executed in that area. They were all dated of
20 the 14th of August -- well, perhaps maybe I made a mistake there. Maybe I
21 was mistaken that this all happened on the same day.
22 If we had communique 21 here, when Radovic was killed, it would be
23 one to five days after the killing of Radovic.
24 In this case, Zeri i Kosoves put together the three communiques
25 and described what had happened on this particular occasion.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.
2 MR. EMMERSON: I'm simply looking in this connection at the
3 translation of annex 10.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MR. EMMERSON: Which is indeed the translation of the Zeri i
6 Kosoves article in which all three communiques are reported.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. EMMERSON: But not on the 14th but on the 29th of August.
9 JUDGE ORIE: No. No, Mr. Emmerson, I'm afraid that you're making
10 a mistake. The publication was dated the 29th of August.
11 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: But from what I understand, there's no reference to
13 the dates of the communiques --
14 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: -- covered by it.
16 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: And the witness, therefore, when he gives in his
18 statement the 14th of August as the date, I wondered what made him --
19 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- say that they were all on the 14th of August.
21 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Whereas, the other communiques usually are quite
23 separate in time.
24 MR. EMMERSON: Yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Further, Mr. Re, I have a similar question, then
1 we'll really have the break.
2 In relation to 20(a), could we have that on the screen, that is
3 annex 5, and annex 5 is P937.
4 Could that be on the screen. Oh, it is -- perhaps it is already.
5 Yes. In your -- let me just check that.
6 Yes. Mr. Stijovic, your statement, your 92 ter statement tells us
7 that in June 1995 the police station in Rznic was attacked. I have some
8 difficulties to find support for that in annex 5, which is P -- I think --
9 could you please have a look at that. P937.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the second paragraph, it says
11 that the command --
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the names that
13 were attacked.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you -- could you please repeat it. The
15 interpreters couldn't follow you.
16 THE INTERPRETER: The witness was reading in Albanian.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please read the -- what you said was
18 the second paragraph.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not in the second paragraph. I am
20 reading -- I have announcement number 13.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And in the second paragraph, it says
23 that the police station or command was attacked. The police station of
24 the Serbian police in Rznic was attacked, that an attack was carried out.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And when was that carried out?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the same day when the Davidovic,
2 Plutov [as interpreted] and Milosevic incident occurred. That attack,
3 which was carried out in Rznic, in the radio communications there was a
4 certain lack of care or attention by the security officials who were
5 driving these people who had committed this incident in the vehicle.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. My problem is the following: That in your
7 statement, you say this happened in June 1995. However, in my translation
8 of the communique number 13, the attack on the police station at Rznic -
9 and that seems to be in accordance with some other evidence we heard -
10 took place in April. Is that -- and not in June. Although, the communique
11 dates from June, but it doesn't ...
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's absolutely certain that the
13 police section in Rznic was frequently exposed to attacks. And there was
14 an attack in April in the village of Rznic. This is correct. This can be
15 checked in the documents of the public security -- or the SUP of Decani.
16 It is also correct that that day when Davidovic was killed in the
17 vehicle and when Lutovac and Milosevic were wounded, that day at that
18 point in time an attack was carried out on the police section in Rznic.
19 And what they heard on the communication system was the call for
20 assistance from the police station in Rznic, which led to a moment of
21 inattention, which the person they were driving used, pulled the gun
22 from -- off from one of the police officers, killed Davidovic, wounded the
23 other two, and after that in the mutual exchange of fire he was killed as
25 So at the point in time when the Rznic section was attacked and a
1 call for assistance was issued, Mehe used that moment of inattention and
2 carried out his attack. But I didn't go in to checking exactly how many
3 attacks there were at that time. This is something that can be checked.
4 Ultimately, the police withdrew from that particular section and left that
5 police station without any staff.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Do you remember when that happened, that they
7 withdrew? Without leaving any staff behind?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Very soon after the events of
9 March 1998 or after the conflict of the 24th of March in Glodjane, when
10 policeman Otovic was killed, not long after that time the police withdrew
11 from Rznic, because as I said, that police department was exposed to
12 constant attacks, bomb attacks, sniper fire, attacks from automatic
13 weapons. And in my view, then an erroneous decision was made from the
14 police administration to pull out and relocate the police staff from Rznic
15 to Decan, and in the end the police carried out their activities by
16 stepping up the numbers of police groups that were patrolling that area.
17 The building itself was abandoned.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And -- and now, it's not entirely clear to me.
19 You referred also to what happened in June. Was there then another attack
20 on the police -- on the police command post in Rznic in June or ...?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In June and in April. And, Your
22 Honours, I can state with full responsibility that those attacks were so
23 frequent that it would be very important for you perhaps to get that list
24 attacks and the effects of the attacks that were going on there.
25 The Rznic police station was a constant target just as the
1 Klincina station was and Celopek. These places were constantly under
3 JUDGE ORIE: I might have been confused with the last question, is
4 that, of course, is all 1995 and not 1998.
5 Thank you for reminding me that it was 1995.
6 We'll have a break until 4.30.
7 --- Recess taken at 4.03 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 4.33 p.m.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, please proceed.
10 MR. RE:
11 Q. Mr. Stijovic, before the break you were looking at annex 21, which
12 is MFI P953. I just want to alert the Trial Chamber to the fact that that
13 is referred to in annex -- or cross-referenced to annex 5 of Mr. Jakup
14 Krasniqi's 92 ter statement, which is P328. And the reference there is
15 publication in a -- have I got the right one?
16 Excuse me.
17 [Prosecution counsel confer]
18 MR. RE:
19 Q. Mr. Stijovic, the next thing I want to take you to is: In
20 paragraph 20(k), you referred to the death of Ali Qullapeku, and you say
21 in the 1940s and 1950s he had been an informer for the DB. Now, the KLA
22 assumed responsibility for killing him in its communique number 35 of 5th
23 of August, 1997, which is annex 16 to your statement, which is MFI P948.
24 I just want you to briefly tell the Trial Chamber what you mean there when
25 you say that he was an informer in the 1940s and 1950s.
1 A. He was an active associate of the State Security Service.
2 Q. And to your knowledge, how well known was that to the people in
3 the village of Tertenik, near Glogovac, where he lived?
4 A. The name of the village is Trstenik. Maybe there's a mistake in
5 the translation, Tertenik. In the early 1980s and 1990s when the
6 political turbulence in Kosovo and Metohija began and when the significant
7 number of people on the call of the Democratic alliance of Kosovo left the
8 institutions of the system, following that appeal a number of State
9 Security employees also left.
10 From the start of the 1990s, it was known in the broader area
11 where he was that he was an associate in the earlier period of the DB.
12 Q. And in the communique number 35, which is on the screen, which is
13 MFI P948, it says: "Prior to this, our guerilla units took care of the
14 assassination of Ali Qullapeku from Trsteniku [phoen] and Ramiz Luku from
15 Bajiqa [phoen] of Gllogovcu [phoen] motivated by the anti-nationalist
17 Where it says took care of the assassination, what did these
18 guerilla units actually do? What was your information about what they
20 A. Qullopeku was of an age where nobody could do anything in that
21 period. He was an elderly man of poor material status.
22 Q. That's in the statement. I'm actually asking you what they did to
24 A. Ali Qullopeku was killed in the village where he lived. He was
25 killed by members of the KLA.
1 Q. And that is also cross-referenced to annex 2 of Jakup Krasniqi's
2 92 ter statement, Exhibit P328.
3 Paragraph 21 of your statement. Can we please go to that now.
4 The Trial Chamber has decided not to admit the statement in that form.
5 You said -- you referred to use of the term "sabotage and terrorist
6 group." I want you to elaborate what was meant by the term "sabotage and
7 terrorist group" and who used it and in what context.
8 A. In the initial development of terrorist activities of the KLA, the
9 qualification of somebody who executed those terrorist attacks was that
10 this was committed by sabotage and terrorist groups. The name was, first
11 of all, related to the careerism in the power hierarchy and nonacceptance
12 of the need to call things by their proper name, to call a spade a spade.
13 In that period, when the term was used in communications and
14 information in the DB, already at that time it was a quite clearly
15 pronounced organised terrorist organisation. That was a period of
16 terrorism. And after that, the escalating terrorist activity led to armed
17 uprising in 1998. I think that the political and the police leadership -
18 and I mentioned why it was the police leadership - unnecessarily minimised
19 the degree and level of danger that the KLA presented for Yugoslavia. And
20 this contributed to an inadequate and late adoption of decisions of the
21 state leadership to combat those activities.
22 Q. Just in relation to the term "sabotage and terrorist group," what
23 is that in Serbian? Just say the words.
24 A. Diverzantsko-teroristicka grupa.
25 Q. And was that abbreviated to DTG?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. When documents refer to DTG - that's the documents annexed to your
3 statement and other documents emanating from Serbian official archives for
4 that period - is that referring to the KLA or something else?
5 A. The KLA. And the term DTG is erroneously used. In analysis -- we
6 in analysis did not use that term. The information that we received from
7 the field, the reports, we would collate them. And in our reporting, we
8 would use the term "so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo."
9 Q. And if you turn to annex 23 in your pile of documents, which is
10 MFI P955, which is an information from the Deputy Federal Minister of
11 Foreign Affairs in relation to the correct descriptions of the operations
12 of -- by the Ministry of Interior organs in Kosovo-Metohija dated the 16th
13 of March, 1998.
14 I want you to turn to the information where it says: "We believe
15 that the operations by organs of the MUP cannot be described as an
16 internal armed conflict in the sense of Article 3 of the Geneva
17 Conventions. This concerns a police action directed at preventing crimes,
18 acts of terrorism. It's a very important distinction. To describe the
19 aforementioned incidents as an internal armed conflict could be
20 interpreted as an implicit recognition of the so-called KLA as a warring
21 side, which would also have certain international legal implications.
22 This is also significant in order to determine any possible jurisdiction
23 of the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague, which is responsible
24 exclusively for crimes committed in internal -- international internal
25 conflicts with the exception of genocide."
1 Then proposing you don't use the word armed conflict but to speak
2 of the operation by the MUP to prevent crimes. I'm just paraphrasing
4 Was this a document -- or how widely distributed was this
5 document, to your knowledge? And what was its nature?
6 A. I did see this document, but the document was not broadly
7 distributed. It was sent to the leadership in the state and the public
8 security service, and they sent out information to lower units about
9 actions and the use of terminology relating to that.
10 It's actually what I said, they did not deal with the essence and
11 the actual facts on the ground of what was happening. It was more a
12 matter of form and minimising everything that was happening, which in turn
13 led to everything that happened.
14 Q. You just a moment ago referred to the use of "DTG" instead of
15 "KLA." How does this particular document disseminated by the Deputy
16 Minister for Foreign Affairs fit in with the use of the term "DTJ" instead
17 of -- "DTG" instead of "KLA"?
18 A. It does fit in in the sense that this document, as far as I
19 understood - it's from March 1998 - and in March 1998 it talks about acts
20 of terrorism.
21 In March of 1998 in Kosovo and Metohija, actually what was
22 happening was the beginning of armed uprising. So again we have this
23 minimising of the actual situation on the ground because of some other
24 interests. You've read the reasons why this was so.
25 Q. What do you base your view you just expressed there on, where you
1 say that March 1998 was the beginning of armed uprising?
2 A. I say that because as of March, their activities escalated. The
3 political activities of the Albanian political parties were there for the
4 purpose of the NPK. In the field, it specifically meant the merging of
5 Albanian parties, the Democratic League of Kosovo, the parliamentary
6 parties of Albanians and the rest within the structures of the KLA in
7 order to assume control of large parts of territory in Kosovo.
8 This was followed by interrupting regular communication by using
9 roads in Kosovo and Metohija. We can say that as early as March the road
10 between Pec and Pristina, which was of strategic importance for Serbia,
11 was completely insecure for any movement, to be civilian or military.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Guy-Smith.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. If I might. To the extent the gentleman
14 is -- is interposing an opinion at this point, with regard to the issue of
15 an armed uprising, I would object. He's not being offered as an expert
16 witness and --
17 JUDGE ORIE: No, he wasn't asked. I think, as a matter of fact,
18 he was asked what was the basis for a certain view, and then I understand
19 that Mr. Re was seeking factual basis for his --
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, if --
21 JUDGE ORIE: It's clear that we have here a bit of a mixture.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, we do. And to the extent that it -- to the
23 extent that it relies upon an opinion, I object on those -- on that
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. RE:
2 Q. Don't worry. I'm not asking you for a legal opinion on anything.
3 I just want to ask you about what you just said about the merging of
4 Albanian parties in -- within the structures of the KLA in order to assume
5 control of large parts of the territory of Kosovo. What was the
6 significance of that at that time? That's in March 1998.
7 A. It was of decisive nature for further developments in Kosovo and
8 Metohija. On the 21st of March, 1998, in Tirana, Albania, there was a
9 press conference held by the NPK, chaired by Emrush Dzemailji. In
10 assistance was also Rexha Iberdemaj, a member of the Presidency of the NPK
11 and another person whose name escapes me.
12 The essence or the message from the press conference was that
13 there is no more room for politics and that the time has come for the NPK.
14 It was a clear message --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's Correction: For the KLA.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The message was that there will be
17 no more discussion and that everyone should participate in the armed
19 Emrush Dzemailji came illegally from Tirana to the territory of
20 Kosovo and spent the period after that in Glodjane in Ramush Haradinaj's
21 headquarters using a pseudonym so that he wouldn't be recognised and for
22 his own safety.
23 MR. RE:
24 Q. On the transcript -- or I've heard you different being interpreted
25 as your being saying "the NPK." Is that the same as the LPK or is it
1 something different?
2 A. No, NPK or -- in Albanian, it is NPK. It is the same thing.
3 Q. All right. Let's move to paragraph 23 of your statement. It's
4 referring to the presence in 1996 -- for example, starting: "In 1996, the
5 KLA had a visible presence in the village of Jablanica in the form of
6 guards, check-points, and the imposition of a curfew."
7 The Trial Chamber has asked for further elaboration or to
8 establish the basis of what you've written there. Now, I don't want to
9 spend too much time on this, but I want you to give your sources for the
10 information there and how you've come to express the view that you've
11 expressed there.
12 A. The source of information was the reports of the RDB. At all
13 meetings with members of the RDB, the information was that their forces
14 and their patrols do not wish to go to the area of Jablanica since there
15 could be clashes there. It was obvious at that time -- or by that time
16 that what was in existence was terrorist activity and that movement at
17 night in the area of the village of Jablanica was unsafe, that it was
18 under their control, and any police presence may provoke a conflict that
19 may take on different or larger shape. In essence, that was the
20 information they shared.
21 Through our activities of the RDB, we managed to confirm all that.
22 We informed the -- the public security sector about what was going on in
23 that part of the country.
24 Q. And towards the bottom of the paragraph, you say: "The KLA was
25 still a clandestine organisation in Glodjane in 1996 and did not assert
1 its presence visibly as in Jablanica."
2 Please tell the Trial Chamber the source of your information to
3 enable you to put that in your statement.
4 A. Excuse me. Can you repeat the question.
5 Q. The -- I think it's the second-last sentence, where you say: "The
6 KLA was still a clandestine organisation in Glodjane."
7 I want you to tell the Trial Chamber the source of your
8 information that allowed you to put that sentence in your statement. And,
9 of course, the quality of the information.
10 A. The source of information were numerous reports from the field.
11 Also, the knowledge we gained via technological means, such as wiretapping
12 of conversations within the Brahimaj family; also by surveilling Brahimaj
13 in his frequent visits to Pec and also via his contacts and the network he
14 had established.
15 By analysing all that, we clearly managed to find relationships
16 between the structure. At that time, the organisation functioning in the
17 area of Jablanica was far more important than the one in Glodjane and
18 Lahi Brahimaj was of key importance to that.
19 Q. What allowed you to conclude that?
20 A. I've already said that it was based on the following:
21 Lahi Brahimaj was surveilled by the RDB. We applied measures, such as
22 surveilling, wiretapping telephone conversations, and in his immediate
23 surroundings we had several live sources that were monitoring and
24 documenting his activities for the purposes of the RDB.
25 Q. If you can turn to annex 24, which is MFI P956. There are two
1 particular passages I want to take you to.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MR. RE:
4 Q. If you can look at the -- there's a paragraph which refers to
5 reconnaissance patrols having been established and positioned on the
6 elevations of the so-called Crmljanska Suka and Grgocko Brdo.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, if you take us to annex 24, as you do at this
8 moment, I see that there are redactions in this document. Could you tell
9 us about the origin of these redactions and what is hidden there from our
11 MR. RE: I can.
12 Q. If you can look in the Serbian there are some redactions on this
13 document, Mr. Stijovic. The first one is on the top of the first page and
14 left. Under 3rd of April, 1998, what's been blotted out there?
15 A. It says here: "Brahimaj, Lahi." Oh, up there. Okay. In the
16 upper right-hand corner, this is the typist's initials, the person who
17 typed out the document. That's in the left-hand corner just below the
18 date. Those are the initials of one of the technical staff who typed the
20 Q. There's another redaction further down that page, after the name
21 "Lahi Brahimaj," something has been covered over. What's that?
22 A. What is hidden there is the particular measure used to surveil
23 Brahimaj Lahi. I explained that during the first day of my testimony, and
24 that stage was termed "initial measure." He was a person against whom
25 measures were being taken at that time by the service, and at that time
1 the measures -- or the measure in place was the initial measure, the PO,
2 as it stood in the document.
3 I can perhaps explain, if you wish. There was a file on him, the
4 persons used in his contacts, the technical measures used. Therefore, we
5 surveilled him all the time. We managed to find out about his activities
6 and connections in Jablanica and wider, further on, in the wider area of
7 his activity.
8 Q. Just in relation to what's been blotted out, you said that refers
9 to the -- the measures. Do you know what was there before?
10 A. I suppose - I cannot state for certain, though - that it should be
11 "PO," initial measure, or predhodna obrada. And there should be a file
12 number there, the number of his file with the centre of the RDB in Prizren
13 and in Djakovica, which was processing his file.
14 Q. Do you know of any reason why that -- that particular piece of
15 information would have been blackened out?
16 A. I was quite surprised to see that. I don't see any reason for
17 that to be blackened out. I actually wanted to have his file brought here
18 so that we could actually see who it is that is in question there.
19 Q. Now, just moving to the passage which is on the -- which will
20 display on the screen, which is on the last page of the Serbian in MFI
21 P956, which is the Official Note of the 3rd of April, 1998. I just want
22 to ask you about the passage relating to the reconnaissance controls being
23 established and positioned on those elevations.
24 Is that referring to MUP, military, or KLA reconnaissance patrols?
25 A. The reference is to patrols by the KLA.
1 Q. All right. The -- two paragraphs down from -- oh, sorry, the
2 second paragraph under that, it says: "For more than five years, MUP
3 members have not entered" - the next page - "have not entered the village
4 of Jablanica and neither have employees of other state organs and
6 Is that accurate based upon the information that you had at the
7 time? And if it is, please tell the Trial Chamber the source of your
9 A. This is absolutely correct. The source of information is the
10 knowledge gained by our subcentre in Djakovica through their activities.
11 In particular, by surveilling their activities in Jablanica.
12 Q. Then it goes on to say: "There is a tendency to 'widen' this area
13 and create a corridor towards Klina and Drenica, that is, towards Glodjane
14 and onwards towards the Republic of Albania, and this represents an
15 organised preparation for conducting a 'guerilla war', that is, for a more
16 widespread armed conflict in Kosovo-Metohija."
17 Was that accurate and correct? And if so, what is the source of
18 your information to give that opinion?
19 A. It is fully correct. The overall knowledge of the RDB in Kosovo
20 and Metohija not only the things that were going on in the place of
21 Jablanica, referred to here by the Djakovica subcentre - it was all
22 pointing to a clear idea of the KLA that was to establish a corridor
23 between Glodjane, Jablanica, and Albania in order to be able to introduce
24 weapons, terrorist equipment, and terrorists into the country. This was
25 supposed to be a corridor that could be used unhindered to secure the flow
1 of equipment.
2 Along that axis, there were also operations carried out by which
3 the Serbs who lived along that axis were attacked. Their villages were
4 attacked in order to provoke fear and for them to be moved out.
5 That corridor at a certain moment during the period when the
6 Pec-Pristina road was out of operation, was particularly active. Then
7 from Albania via Jablanica and Glodjane in 1998, massive quantities of
8 weapons, equipment, and volunteers, terrorists of the KLA, came to the
9 area of Drenica and further afield in the territory of Kosovo and
11 Q. During --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re. Mr. Re, could I ask for a clarification of
13 one of the previous answers.
14 When asked about MUP members not having entered Jablanica for --
15 not having entered the village of Jablanica for five years, you said:
16 "This information is correct. The source of information is the knowledge
17 gained by our subcentre in Djakovica through their activities. In
18 particular, by surveilling their activities in Jablanica."
19 Now, who was surveilling whose activities in Jablanica?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The village of Jablanica, as I said
21 at the beginning, was surveilled by the RDB. The RDB in Kosovo and
22 Metohija was organised territorially and professionally.
23 Territorially speaking, the village of Jablanica was under the
24 centre of the RDB in Djakovica. It is a subcentre -- or rather, it was
25 under the regional centre of Prizren, and then further up the chain to
2 Djakovica was a subcentre of the RDB that was tasked with
3 following what was going on in Jablanica. The subcentre in Pec was tasked
4 with following the activities in the village of Glodjane, in their -- in
5 their respective area.
6 JUDGE ORIE: What I'd like to know is whether this was physical
7 surveillance of what happened in Jablanica or whether this was
8 surveillance through informers, collaborators, whatever. I mean, was the
9 RDB in any way present there? Employees? Or just received information
10 from others?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. However, you are correct, Your
12 Honour, the RDB had a degree of operational control over the activities in
13 Jablanica. We knew that there was an armed terrorist group in existence
14 there, that it was headed by Lahi Brahimaj, and that the movement in that
15 area was unsafe. We gained that information through our live sources.
16 Also, we gained that by surveilling the activities of
17 Lahi Brahimaj. We forwarded all of our warnings on time to the State
18 Security sector, asking that they react adequately and cut the thing at
19 the core while the group comprised of only 40 or 50 armed members.
20 However, the police had a wrong estimate, and they excluded that area from
21 their control. They simply did not go into the area and had no physical
22 control over the territory.
23 We had operational control and we know -- we knew at every moment
24 what was going on.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Would RDB employees follow Mr. Brahimaj? You said
1 "surveilling the activities" could mean a lot of things. Would that mean
2 that someone would follow his -- how he moved around? And would RDB
3 employees go to Jablanica as well or would they also stay out of the
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Our employees of the RDB did not go
6 to Jablanica; however, once Lahi Brahimaj would leave Jablanica, they
7 would take him and follow him in his movements in Kosovo and they took
8 photographs and they documented his movements as well as the contacts he
9 had, and then they would return him to the borders of Jablanica and let
10 him in. Therefore, we knew his movements and who he had contacts with.
11 Outside of Jablanica and inside, we knew what the relationships were
12 within the organisation and who the people were with whom Lahi Brahimaj
13 had contacts.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Were RDB employees instructed not to enter Jablanica?
15 Were they instructed that it would be a no-go area for them?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The RDB was relatively small in
17 numbers. Objectively speaking, those people would be -- would stand out
18 in such environments. In the area of Jablanica, there were some 30
19 operatives, and everyone knew them. It was unsafe for the uniformed
20 police to go there in large numbers. Realistically speaking, it was also
21 impossible for us to send in an operative who is well-known, in a vehicle.
22 Therefore, we used indirect sources, operative contacts and associates, to
23 obtain information as well as through various statements. Therefore, in
24 answer to your question, the RDB did not go in directly, physically.
25 JUDGE ORIE: My -- my question was whether employees were
1 instructed to stay out.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was not a formal written
3 direction, but it was a well-known fact and it was recommended that our
4 employees do not go there, and they did not.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And in your statement, you're talking about the MUP
6 not entering Jablanica. Now we are talking about RDB employees not
7 entering Jablanica. Did you have personal experience with that? Did
8 you -- I mean, did you have personal knowledge of RDB employees not going
9 any further than the boundaries of Jablanica?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely. They did not go to
11 Jablanica, and the same applied for Prekaze, where Adem Jashari's group
12 was. They also didn't go to a part of Podujevo. There were certain areas
13 within which our employees of the RDB, due to the security risk, did not
14 go physically. That is why, Your Honour, we asked the public security
15 sector, the police, to ensure law and order in that area, so as to enable
16 us to move in, to engage our people in those areas. We thought that they
17 had uniformed police; they had vehicles and equipment; and that it should
18 not be that much of a problem to establish law and order in an area.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Were you personally involved in -- in requesting the
20 uniformed police to -- to ensure law and order, the security -- the public
21 security sector? Were you personally involved in asking them to do that?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not me. I wasn't present at those
23 meetings and I did not convey directly such proposals to the public
24 security sector.
25 The analysis department warned of this great risk, and we always
1 stress that in our reports. We kept stressing that -- what was the --
2 what was the decisive factor was the lack of police presence; thus,
3 allowing those illegal structures to expand and to increase in numbers.
4 In that regard, to respond to your question, we acted in --
5 pursuant to our tasks and duties. We forwarded analysis of the situation,
6 stating that law and order must be established in that area. However, it
7 wasn't up to us to move in operationally. The analysis department could
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So I do understand that the absence of MUP in
10 Jablanica had an impact on the functioning of your service.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
13 Mr. Re, you may proceed.
14 MR. RE:
15 Q. Mr. Stijovic, can you please turn to the next paragraph of your
16 statement, which is paragraph 24. That's also a statement -- or a portion
17 of it, as the Trial Chamber is interested in receiving further
19 In that paragraph, you say that: "In March 1997, huge quantities
20 of weapons and other materiel were looted from army barracks in Albania as
21 the government collapsed and the KLA used it to obtain and stockpile many
22 weapons and equipment."
23 What was the source of your information which enables you to put
24 that in your statement and what was the quality of that information?
25 A. I think that this is information of the highest quality, with
1 several sources. First is our information about the events in Tirana, and
2 it was well known in that period that -- I apologise.
3 It was broadly known to the public at the time that in
4 January/March 1997, the system in Albania broke down and weapons were
5 seized from military warehouses without any control.
6 In Albania, this was something that was broadly reported by TV
7 stations, not only in Albania but abroad as well. And we had concrete
8 information about this, the most concrete of which affirmed the danger for
9 the further destabilisation of Kosovo was the report of the commission of
10 the United Nations, which specifically because of this was in that area;
11 and in cooperation with the Albanian authorities, established that in that
12 period - this is an official UN report from the summer of 1997 - that over
13 650.000 pieces of weapons, a vast quantity of weapons disappeared from
14 official military depots in Albania. All measures taken by official
15 Albanian authorities later, with the help of the International Community,
16 led to an estimate by this UN commission that 30 to 40 per cent of these
17 weapons were not under the control of the authorities and that the bulk of
18 that quantity, 30 to 40 per cent out of 650.000 pieces, ended up in the
19 possession of the KLA.
20 The KLA used this situation in the best way possible. I am -- I
21 have to grant them that. And right in the beginning, they used that
22 breakdown of the systems in order to compile and store those weapons. And
23 when the thaw, the spring thaw came, the weapons started to arrive to
24 Kosovo and Metohija in vast quantities. The weapons, automatic,
25 semiautomatic rifles, bombs and other types of weapons. These were
1 enormous quantities of weapons that we're talking about. And information
2 about this is contained in the report by this UN commission that
3 investigated this.
4 Q. If we could just go back for a moment to the previous paragraph.
5 I'd just -- I neglected a moment ago to ask you to clarify something. And
6 that is: You referred to a widening or a tendency to widen the area and
7 create a corridor towards Klina and Drenica. I put that to you. And you
8 said that the idea was to establish a corridor between Glodjane,
9 Jablanica, and Albania in order to be able to introduce weapons, terrorist
10 equipment, and terrorists into the country.
11 Which period are you talking about?
12 A. The weapons were continuously coming to Kosovo and Metohija.
13 However, the events -- this was in the summer continuously, perhaps in
14 smaller quantities, because in that area the borders between Yugoslavia --
15 or Serbia and Albania are quite inaccessible. It's a mountainous area
16 with an altitude of over 2.000 metres and sometimes it's completely
17 impassable or smaller groups can manage to get through.
18 When this happened, from January to March of 1997, in late March
19 and in early April, the thaw, the spring thaw started. The snows began to
20 melt. And then there were routine channels for the smuggling of weapons.
21 And that is when the weapons started to pour in, weapons and materiel en
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stijovic, the specific question by Mr. Re was
24 the --
25 MR. RE: The corridor widening.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. No, it's clear. Thank you.
2 MR. RE:
3 Q. I was interested in annex 24, which is MFI P956. It's the last
4 page or the portion where it says that the -- more than five years MUP
5 members have not entered Jablanica and there is a tendency to widen this
6 area and create a corridor.
7 My only question is this: Which period are you talking about when
8 the corridor was being widened?
9 A. A more serious story about the corridor would begin in 1997. The
10 corridor from 1997 to 1998 was more or less successfully functioning
11 throughout that time, depending on the activities and the success of the
12 police in their actions in order to cut off these activities.
13 Q. Okay. And Judge Orie a few moments ago was asking you about
14 surveillance -- DB surveillance operations in Jablanica. Did you yourself
15 ever travel in 1997 or in 1998 to the area near Jablanica?
16 A. I did not hear that question by the Presiding Judge. We mentioned
17 reconnaissance groups from the KLA. No, no, I did not. No.
18 Q. Why not?
19 A. Because I was the head of analysis and operational work in the
20 field was not in my sphere of -- of work. I was in Pristina at the time.
21 We had a special or a separate DB organ that did those kinds of
23 Q. The next paragraph the Trial Chamber required some further
24 information from you as to the source of your information and the quality
25 is paragraph 25. Just -- can you just read that to yourself for a moment,
1 paragraph 25 of your statement.
2 A. We can go on.
3 Q. What was the source of your information in relation to the control
4 of Jablanica and Glodjane by the Brahimaj and Haradinaj families
5 respectively and the fact that they became KLA logistics bases of a sort?
6 A. Live sources, persons who were arrested by the military or police
7 organs while crossing the border, and interviews that were conducted about
8 the things that I mentioned.
9 As for the family Haradinaj, I said in my statement, which later
10 contributed to the Haradinaj family taking over an important role in the
11 KLA. And I'm just saying this position, this location, and the
12 significance of Glodjane and the importance of the Haradinaj clan was
13 something that greatly influenced matters and enabled them to take over a
14 leading position in the KLA.
15 What I say further in the statement is that they decided who could
16 travel through there and who could not, and it all confirms when the
17 family Haradinaj -- or rather, Ramush Haradinaj became the lord and master
18 of that area.
19 Q. I'd just like some elaboration, if you could, on the live sources,
20 that is, persons who were arrested by the military or police
21 organisations. Can you give the Trial Chamber any examples of the live
22 sources and the information that was provided to military and MUP organs.
23 A. You mean names or should I just speak in general?
24 Q. Let's -- let's start in general. And if you can be specific
25 without endangering anyone in public, we'll -- we'll move to that.
1 A. Any possibility that the DB had to speak or get in touch with a
2 person from that area, the DB took. That means that this was information,
3 public information, information gathered from the citizens or the
4 population who lived in that area. Possibilities for that were different.
5 People from there would come to Decani, Pec, Djakovica. There would be
6 daily activities that were being carried out, contacts that were created
7 via the police, because there were some things that these people had to do
8 in the SUP offices. For example, issuance of IDs, travel documents, and
9 other things.
10 Besides that -- again, I apologise for speaking too fast.
11 Besides that, a significant number of information was received
12 during conversations with people who were arrested, detained in attempts
13 to illegally cross the border, and the main - key - way in which we
14 acquired information and made conclusions on this were, of course, our
15 associates; that is, the most important category of sources and the most
16 important live source from which we obtained information and based our
17 conclusions on this information.
18 Q. I just want you to look at this -- the statement. The Trial
19 Chamber has asked for further information before it would admit into
20 evidence the first nine lines of that paragraph.
21 Now, after the first nine lines is the sentence: "See, for
22 example, annex 25, a report of the DB Pec dated 24th of March, 1998."
23 What I'm just asking you is: How does the information which
24 you've put into the second -- or the next two-thirds of that paragraph
25 relate to the opinion conclusion that you've put in the first nine lines?
1 What's the connection between the two?
2 A. I see a direct connection or a link. In the first part, I talked
3 about the importance of Glodjane and Jablanica. This is a report of the
4 DB from Pec from the 24th of March, 1998. And it just goes into further
5 detail of this situation and the significance of the Jablanica group, led
6 by Brahimaj, had in the smuggling of weapons, ammunitions, explosive
7 devices that came from Albania.
8 So in that sense, it presents a very correct conclusion that the
9 village of Jablanica constitutes a base for rebel, sabotage, and terrorist
10 units in the territory of Glodjane. And absolutely that is in that
11 function. It confirms the importance of Jablanica for the smuggling of
12 weapons from Albania and its distribution deeper and wider into Kosovo, to
13 the Drenica and broader.
14 Q. Just pause for one moment. For the benefit of the record, the
15 document you just referred to is MFI P957. That's annex 25.
16 Had you completed -- had you completed your answer?
17 A. Yes, I have.
18 Q. The next portion of your statement I want to take you to is
19 paragraph 27, which is another one which the Trial Chamber is concerned to
20 hear more from you about.
21 You say: "On the 26th of November, 1997, a serious armed clash
22 took place in the village of Lausha, when the KLA attacked a motorised
23 police convoy from an ambush. During the withdrawal, an Albanian named
24 Halit Geci was killed in the crossfire by a stray bullet and Shaban Rrecaj
25 was wounded."
1 Now, what's the source of your information for that, the quality
2 of the source, and the significance? Three things.
3 A. Several sources for this information. The first source is the
4 official report of the MUP; the police units on their work duties; the
5 mechanised on the road that is mentioned in an ambush was trapped and
6 there was a fierce clash where grenade-throwers were used.
7 The second source were the Albanian language media that praised
8 this as being the first KLA battle where the police was defeated, and this
9 propaganda material even provided information that some combat vehicles of
10 the police were seized in the fighting, information about the death of
11 Halit Geci. He's a teacher from this village. He was wounded and then
12 died later. The other person, Rrecaj, was wounded. This is also
13 information that was widely known. This is something that TV Tirana
14 extensively reported about in their evening news, and the next day all the
15 Albanian language media published in Pristina very -- published very
16 detailed reports about this incident.
17 Q. And what was the significance of this particular incident --
18 sorry, incident in what was going on at the time?
19 A. The significance was in fact that this was a combat mechanised
20 police unit with a large number of policemen using armoured vehicles.
21 It's a very respected police unit that was caught in an ambush. And then
22 open conflict ensued, which lasted for a certain period of time. And
23 objectively the situation was that such a respected strong police force
24 with considerable weapons had to pull out from that region. And in this
25 exchange of fire, this teacher was killed. He had nothing to do with the
1 battle. He was killed by a stray bullet. And Rrecaj was wounded.
2 Later this incident and then the funeral assumed quite a lot of
3 importance for the KLA.
4 Q. The next paragraph I refer you to is paragraph 32 of your
5 statement. The Trial Chamber also seeks further information on the first,
6 I think, nine lines of that, up to where it says -- up to the second-last
7 sentence. Just read that to yourself.
8 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Sorry to interrupt.
9 MR. RE: I apologise.
10 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Before we go to the next paragraph, may I ask
11 you: What is the basis of your information about the cause of death in
12 this shooting. Halit Geci, how was he killed? And how do you know about
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What was published in the Albanian
15 language media corresponds to the official report of the MUP which we
17 Halit Geci, a teacher from Lausha - unfortunately, I'm going to
18 use an expression that is not adequate - well, he was a collateral victim
19 of the conflict during the withdrawal of the police, he was hit by a stray
20 bullet. Whose bullet this was is something I cannot say. I do not rule
21 out that it was possibly a bullet that was fired by the police. But he
22 was a completely innocent victim of that clash. He was not armed. He was
23 not the object of the attack or anything like that.
24 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: I have one -- one additional question in this
1 respect: Was it investigated whether the bullet came from a police
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know the answer to that
4 question. I personally doubt if there was any investigation in this
5 particular case, because very soon that whole area became very unsafe for
6 movement and it was very difficult to carry out a proper investigation.
7 There were no conditions for something like that. So I really -- I don't
8 know the answer to -- to your question.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.
10 MR. EMMERSON: I wonder if I -- if I may. The witness refers to
11 this shooting as having occurred during the withdrawal of the police. I
12 wonder if he's in a position to assist the Trial Chamber as to how far
13 away from the alleged clash it was that Mr. Geci was shot during that
15 JUDGE ORIE: If the witness know, of course.
16 Do you have any knowledge as to what was the distance between
17 where the clash took place and where Mr. Geci was shot?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I can assist by giving
19 a geographical description of the place where the ambush was staged and of
20 the place from where the police was withdrawing. It's a hilly area with a
21 narrow winding road at a favourable spot, surrounded by villages and
22 family houses at a favourable spot. That place has a name, but I cannot
23 remember the name right now, but the name of that place is known. It was
24 a suitable spot because that's where mechanised vehicles have to slow
25 down; there is a difficult curve in the road. This is where the ambush
1 was. And the police returned fire. The clash took place, and then the
2 police began to withdraw. Both sides were firing. So I really don't know
3 exactly how this happened.
4 I -- I said that I was not ruling out the possibility that the
5 stray bullet could have been fired by the police, but it was a very
6 difficult situation in order to determine where the bullet came from.
7 The -- the man was to the side. He was not in any contact with
8 the police or the other side. There are houses around to the side in that
9 area. But I don't know how it came about that he was hit.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps one very specific question: Was the body
11 recovered? Was the matter then investigated and was the bullet
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think that there was. The
14 body was found. The person was buried two days later in his birthplace,
15 Laush. And the funeral was also very important. And if you permit me --
16 JUDGE ORIE: I'm specifically asking whether the bullet was
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would you agree with me that if someone has
20 been killed by a bullet and if a limited number of police officers would
21 have been the target of an attack by ambush, that it is relatively simple
22 by comparing the bullet that killed the victim with the weapons used by
23 the police to identify whether or not the bullet was fired from one of
24 their weapons?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You are right, Your Honour, but only
1 in the situation if the police was able to do such an investigation, if
2 the police was able to do a post-mortem of the body and carry out other
3 tests. But they did not have the possibility of performing these
4 examinations and tests.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 Mr. Re, looking at the clock, we put a couple of additional
7 questions to the witness. If this would be a suitable moment, fine, but
8 I'm aware that I interrupted your examination as well. A suitable moment
9 for a break, I mean.
10 MR. RE: It would be suitable, yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we'll have a break, and we'll resume at
12 five minutes past 6.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 5.40 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 6.07 p.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, please proceed.
16 MR. RE:
17 Q. Before we broke, I was asking you to look at paragraph -- sorry.
18 Excuse me. Paragraph 27. And from there we moved to paragraph 32.
19 Please just read paragraph 32.
20 Now, the first line says: "Attacks by the KLA against the police,
21 army, Serbs, and other non-Albanians and Albanians loyal to the State
22 accelerated in January and February 1998. The attacks occurred daily and
23 followed a common pattern designed to provoke the Serbian forces into
25 The same questions: The Trial Chamber is interested in the source
1 of the information, the quality of the information, and its reliability
2 and how you come to give that opinion in your statement.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, with regard to the issue of opinions, once
4 again, I interpose the same objection as before.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course, what the -- the effort now is, to
6 make it less an opinion and more facts.
7 But your objection is on the record.
8 Please proceed, Mr. Re.
9 MR. RE: I probably misspoke when I say "opinion." It is actually
10 open to interpretation --
11 JUDGE ORIE: That's what you said, as a matter of fact.
12 MR. RE: I know it's what I said. But I probably misspoke in
13 saying "opinion." It could be interpreted as facts.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By using the method of analysing the
16 sequence of events and analysing the activities of the KLA, we easily
17 concluded that the KLA attacks on the police, military, and citizens were
18 the result of more intensive operation of the KLA between January and
19 March 1998.
20 I don't have that documentation with me, but by your leave, I
21 might suggest that if you look into the statistics of what was going on in
22 January and February alone and the attacks during that time, based on only
23 these two general methods of analysis, it is quite easy to come up with
24 that conclusion.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's Note: Could the background noise
1 please be kept to a bare minimum.
2 JUDGE ORIE: It's usually someone typing at the same desk as where
3 the microphone is switched on. This is perhaps not to switch the
4 microphone off but to stop typing from the same desk. If we could keep
5 this in mind.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. RE:
8 Q. You then say: "Police would then set up check-points that the KLA
9 would attack soon afterwards using shoot-and-run tactics. In the chase
10 that the police launched, the villagers also fled and withdrew to the
11 hills. The KLA used this to arm the villagers and recruit new members,
12 accusing Serbian security forces of excessive use of force."
13 Then you refer to an overview of KLA activities in a Pec DB report
14 of the 24th of March 1998, which is annex 17. And that would be MFI P949,
15 for the record.
16 I just want you to elaborate on the source of -- sources of your
17 information and what would enable you say the KLA engaged in shoot-and-run
18 tactics, et cetera.
19 A. By using our analytical strategies when analysing and forecasting
20 events, it was clear to us - and I only mentioned two methods we used - it
21 was clear to us that the KLA did not care at all to initiate an open armed
22 conflict with the police and the army. It was their wish to rely on the
23 sympathies of the International Community. Their only maxima for that
24 behaviour was the worse, the better.
25 Within that context and the context of those events, I used the
1 term "shoot and run" from an ambush by using snipers or throwing a
2 hand-grenade or using a hand-held launchers and then they would withdraw.
3 Policemen were killed in the field that way, and when the police would
4 react and open fire at them -- and then usually there would be a pursuit
5 and villages would be searched, resulting in the villagers fleeing, and
6 then the KLA would make use of that situation to recruit and arm new
7 members. It was a well-known tactic.
8 Q. What was the source of your information?
9 A. The source of our information, first of all, were the operational
10 situations that happened with various police members in the field. The
11 source of information were our people in the villages controlled by the
12 KLA. When I say "our people," I mean our sources of information for the
13 RDB, who would tell us what was going on and what the KLA was doing.
14 In my view and in the view of the RDB, the police did not respond
15 to this properly. In their tactics, instead of -- well, I -- I'd rather
16 not go into any details, but what they would do, they would set up
17 check-points when such events would occur. They would try to keep
18 control, first and foremost, of various roads by establishing
20 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, the report which you refer to, the
21 overview of the KLA activities in the Pec DB report of the 24th of March,
22 1994, which is annex 17, MFI P949, I just want you to comment briefly on
23 the sources within that and the reliability of the sources, but as briefly
24 as possible, please.
25 A. It is an authentic document by the RDB drafted by the office of
1 the RDB in Pec. It is an analytical summary by way of information of what
2 was going on within their area between the 30th of December and the 24th
3 of March. The 30th of December, 1997 until the 24th of March, 1998 in
4 that area.
5 This document -- well, I think I had this information at my
6 disposal a few days after that. It was compiled based on numerous reports
7 from the field. In essence, it is merely a summary of all those reports
8 through an analytical summarising of the events.
9 This is a standard measure used to inform the leadership of the
10 service and in order to try and see what the subsequent activities of the
11 State Security Service should be.
12 Q. Based on everything you know and knew at the time, how accurate do
13 you assess that report to be?
14 A. The report is absolutely true, since the RDB, when -- when direct
15 attacks are in question, made use of police reports, which precisely
16 registered any incidents of unlawful behaviour and disorder.
17 In addition, this document also contains information gained
18 through interviews with live sources used by the RDB in order to assemble
19 data on the activities of that group.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.
21 MR. EMMERSON: I appreciate that -- that the indications given at
22 the outset of today's session are not yet in the form of an order.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 MR. EMMERSON: It was certainly my understanding annex 17 was
25 amongst those --
1 JUDGE ORIE: 17 and 18 are at risk of no admission. And it may be
2 clear that 18, as a -- the statement given by the person under 18 is
3 specifically mentioned for the report under 17. And in view of the
4 details of 18 and also in view of the fact that the statement relates
5 rather directly to acts and conduct of one of the accused, Mr. Re, since
6 also the circumstances under which this statement was taken, certainly
7 after search and seizure and, I take it, from the context that also after
8 this person was arrested - but that's not entirely clear - that I wonder
9 whether we should proceed in the way we're doing now, saying everything is
11 MR. RE:
12 Q. Can you move to the next one, which is annex 18. It's a statement
13 of --
14 MR. RE: There's an apparent objection. I don't know why.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. EMMERSON: Just so that it's absolutely clear -- I mean, maybe
17 Mr. Re is doing this intentionally. But annex 18 is the statement from
18 which annex 17 is drawn.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. EMMERSON: And it's also the subject of the Trial Chamber's
21 provisional indication --
22 MR. RE: That's why I want to ask him about it.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But of course I also raised at least one
24 question, and I would not create any expectation that an answer to that
25 question would immediately put 18 out of the atmosphere of being at risk
1 of not being admitted.
2 Mr. Harvey.
3 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, I just hark back to the first nine lines
4 of paragraph 32 of this witness's statement, where he makes the assertion
5 that "Attacks by the KLA against the police, army, Serbs, other
6 non-Albanians and Albanians loyal to the State accelerated in January and
7 February 1998. The attacks occurred daily."
8 The KLA -- ... "the KLA would announce their presence in an area
9 first with night patrols, to provoke police reaction and their arrival in
10 the area. Police would then set up check-points that the KLA would attack
11 soon afterwards using shoot-and-run tactics."
12 Your Honours, I have searched in vain both in 17 and 18 for a
13 single word that corroborates those allegations for January and February
14 of 1998. And Mr. Re has repeatedly asked the witness - and I have yet to
15 hear an answer from the witness that is actually responsive to that
16 particular question. That's the reason I'm on my feet.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Are you seeking that the witness responds to
18 that question or do you want to --
19 MR. HARVEY: Exactly.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Or do you want the Chamber to establish that there
21 was no response?
22 MR. HARVEY: Well, I would seek that the witness should respond to
23 that particular question.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's see what --
25 MR. RE: Which question was that? I'm a bit lost. Just tell me
1 the line.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, to give a proper factual basis and to provide
3 a -- sources which would satisfy the Chamber to accept this portion of the
4 statement as something which the witness could state without going beyond
5 what the witness can say.
6 MR. RE:
7 Q. Can you give the Trial Chamber some more information about how you
8 know about the things that Mr. Harvey just read onto the record in
9 paragraph 32 of your statement.
10 A. I can mention a few examples, if that would be of help.
11 Q. Oh, very much so. Please.
12 A. A very characteristic case which caused panic among the Serbian
13 population in that area was the murder, for example, of Djordje Belic, he
14 was a farmer from one of the villages surrounding Klina. He was killed by
15 a sniper bullet during the night. That is as far as farmers go.
16 In order for me to illustrate the panic that murder caused, was
17 to say that a group of Albanians wrote a letter and publicly announced to
18 the president of the US, to the OSCE, and high international officials by
19 which they requested that an investigation be carried out into the matter
20 and that they ensure the possibility of a normal and peaceful existence
21 for all in Kosovo.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Let me stop you there for a moment. You say that the
23 attacks against -- and there you mentioned quite a number of categories --
24 accelerated in January and February. You said they occurred daily and
25 "followed a common pattern designed to provoke the Serbian forces into
2 First KLA would announce their presence in an area first with
3 night patrols in order to provoke police reaction, and then the police
4 would then set up a check-point and then the KLA would attack.
5 Now, the example you give, could you tell us whether there was any
6 such announcement of -- because what you told us, as a matter of fact,
7 that someone was killed that night, which, of course, is far more limited
8 than what is claimed in paragraph 32.
9 Could you tell us this first example, whether there was an
10 announcement of the presence first with night patrols to provoke police
11 reaction. Did that precede this event?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you tell us a bit more about that. How
14 was it announced?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The mentioned person was in a
18 village next to the road Pec-Pristina. Directly -- or immediately in its
19 environs there was the corridor we mentioned through which weapons and
20 equipment were sent from Albania to Drenica.
21 The area of the corridor was tried to be free and safe to
22 introduce terrorists and weapons over -- across the border. In that
23 regard, the village of Kijevo, which is along that axis, posed a
24 significant problem because there were many Serbs in it, and there was
25 also a strong police station there.
1 The murder of Djordje Belic caused great unrest and fear among the
2 Serbian population and a lack of trust in -- in the authorities to
3 establish control. KLA patrols, if I may call them that, were frequent
4 all around that village at the -- at distances between 3 and 5 kilometres.
5 One could not leave the village during the night. It includes citizens,
6 the police, and the military.
7 This is what made the police to set up a strong check-point at the
8 entrance of the village. It was also decisive for the police that several
9 months later, when they again tried to establish control of the corridor
10 and when the entire village and the police station, which was numerous,
11 were blocked for a few days -- it was then that the special forces by
12 executing a helicopter landing managed to reinforce the forces there and
13 provide security finally for both the police personnel and civilians.
14 This event is important -- may I continue, Your Honour?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you would -- if you'd give a similar
16 example. Could you first say the police check-point was established which
17 side of the village? Which direction?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The check-point was to the left from
19 the village of Kijevo, to the left of the road, the road between Pristina
20 and Pec.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you give us another example, also with
22 the details about how there was a more intense, as you said, KLA activity
23 provoking the police.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For example, in January, if I'm not
25 mistaken, in the area of the municipality of Decani a former policeman by
1 the name of Radosevic was killed from an ambush. He was in a vehicle.
2 Another example is the 28th of February, 1998, when --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Let me stop you. Let me stop you there. You said
4 the pattern was announcement of intensified KLA presence, night patrols in
5 order to provoke ...
6 Could you give us the -- such details in relation to the former
7 policeman by the name of Radosevic.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He was killed in the vehicle. He
9 was with a woman. I knew the name of that woman. I can't remember it
10 now. That incident caused a lot of fear among the Serbian population in
11 the Decani area and the area of those villages, where there weren't too
12 many Serbs anyway. The entire municipality of Decani numbered a total of
13 800 Serbs. When I say "800", I include everybody from child to the
15 The police after that set up a -- a check-point --
16 JUDGE ORIE: After the killing or ...
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After the killing, they set up
18 several check-points with an attempt to cut off and make it difficult for
19 the KLA to move around. And then, on the other hand, to make it possible
20 for police units in the field to provide assistance as soon as possible.
21 They wanted to cover the territory where these night patrols and movements
22 were happening.
23 The Drenica part and the part of the road was at night under the
24 control of the KLA. By attacking the check-points that had been set up --
25 or because of these attacks, the police had to intervene. They had to
2 An example of this was the case from the 28th of February, 1998.
3 A police patrol was attacked from an ambush in the village of Likoshani.
4 And when the police patrol summoned by radio for assistance police forces
5 were sent out to assist them; then they realised that it was just a KLA
6 trick. It was a -- a fire and run incident. And in the course of the
7 night, they placed several check-points in the directions of movement
8 around these check-points, and then in the movements they killed four
9 police officers. Of course, this made the police in turn strengthen the
10 road, strengthen the check-points, and to set up a corridor towards the
11 territory that was held by the KLA. They tried to cover the area by
12 setting up check-points.
13 I can provide another example. I actually started to talk about
14 it. It was particularly important. And it constituted a turn-around
15 regarding the population, actually, and the distrust of the Albanian
16 population in terms of normal life in that area.
17 After the killing of this citizen, Djordje Belic, a group of
18 Albanians wrote a letter requesting the Serbian authorities and the
19 president of the United States, the OSCE, and all international
20 institutions to resolve that particular case because, according to them
21 and what was mentioned in the letter, they felt it was a very honourable
22 householder and person.
23 What happened shortly after that: A signatory of that letter,
24 Ibrahim Zogaj, who is from actually the same village of one of the
25 accused, Iglarevo, was kidnapped by -- with his two sons from their family
1 house in the presence of their family members, wives and children. And
2 several days after that -- and the kidnapping was carried out because of
3 that public demand for these cases to be resolved and to make people -- to
4 make it possible for people to live a normal life. A few days after their
5 kidnapping, they were found by the road with two other brothers, Berisha
6 brothers. They had been abused. Traces of abuse were found and -- and
7 bruises on their bodies. And they had been executed, killed.
8 So if you have a map or if you're able to look at a map of that
9 area, as the crow flies, it's 15 to 20 kilometres. So father and two
10 Zogaj sons were killed because the father had asked the authorities in
11 Belgrade, Serbia, and the International Community, prominent figures from
12 the International Community, that this question be resolved.
13 Next to them were the bodies of these two other brothers,
14 Berishas. One of them was the owner of a petrol station.
15 There are many such incidents, but like I say, I'm now remembering
16 but it would be important if you could actually review the daily
17 occurrences in the January/February period in that area. Then it would be
18 very clear that any police reaction was preceded by a terrorist attack.
19 And the reaction of the police was in response to a terrorist action.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that answer.
21 Mr. Re.
22 MR. RE:
23 Q. I want to take you to annex 18, which is MFI P950.
24 Now, I just don't want it displayed for the moment because it's a
25 statement dated the 21st of February, 1998 with a particular individual.
1 Before I ask you about that person, I just want you to tell us
2 whether revealing his name would endanger him.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. On that basis, I'd like -- I'd ask that that be -- that MFI be
5 kept under seal for the moment.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, that would be MFI P950, to be kept
7 under seal for the time being.
9 MR. RE:
10 Q. What do you know about the circumstances of the taking of that
11 statement from that person?
12 A. From what I can recall, this is a KLA member who was arrested by
13 the police and with whom the DB conducted a number of informative talks,
14 gathering information about his knowledge and his role in KLA activities.
15 I think that later proceedings were initiated against him, court
17 Q. What do you know about the -- about the conduct of the police and
18 the DB in taking this statement from him?
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could we first ask him whether he has been present
20 during the taking of this statement and -- were you present when this
21 statement was taken? Did you receive --
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Did you receive any detailed information about
24 the circumstances under which the statement was taken?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I read two documents connected to
1 this person. The first document is an official note on an informative
2 talk. That's the name of the document. And the second was a statement
3 taken according to the Law on Criminal Procedure by DB organs in Pec.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Were you provided with any additional information as
5 to the circumstances on -- well, let's say, how long the -- it took to
6 give this statement, where it was taken, by whom?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Pursuant to the Law on Criminal
8 Procedure, the Republic of Serbia at the time police, on the basis of that
9 particular article of the law, had the right for 72 hours to interview
10 that person. Using some procedural options, the period could be extended
11 for an additional 24 hours, for a total of 96 hours.
12 The DB could speak with him for 96 hours. After that, he would
13 have to be handed over to the judicial organs.
14 JUDGE ORIE: That's not what I was seeking. I wanted to know, for
15 example, whether the person was interrogated for six hours or twelve hours
16 or nine or eighteen.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Definitely he would have been
18 interrogated for several hours. We used all the procedural possibilities
19 to spend three or four days with the person; and if he could take that
20 psychologically and physically that we could speak with him for that long,
21 that is what we did. We definitely spoke with him for ten or more hours.
22 I mean, I don't know the exact number of hours.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Have you reviewed that statement?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that person's statement,
25 because it's a statement that is quite comprehensive about the situation
1 of the KLA. It talks about persons who are part of those activities --
2 JUDGE ORIE: My first question was just whether you reviewed that.
3 Was it --
4 THE WITNESS: Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: -- usual to -- to name the persons who made the
6 interview or who did the interrogation? Was that usual? Do we find the
7 persons, the authorised official of the Pec ORDB, do we find their names
8 in this document?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't really find my way around
10 these papers. I can tell you what the regulations were and then you can
12 According to the Law on Criminal Procedure, a statement --
13 JUDGE ORIE: I'm mainly interested in what you reviewed, as to
14 whether you could find the names of those officials who -- you find it
15 under tab 18, the B/C/S version follows the English version.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found it. I found it in the
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's in the lower right-hand corner.
20 The marking there is "U0003533." There is the citizen's signature, the
21 person that we are referring to. And then below that are the signatures
22 of the three operatives of the DB. And based on these signatures, I can
23 recognise two of the operatives for sure. And I believe that even for
24 this -- this -- this third one is a person that I -- I know.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please tell us who these officers were.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Operative Jokic. He worked in our
2 detachment, in our DB office in Decani. That's the second signature,
4 The third signature is Vladimir Mircic's signature. He's also an
5 operative of ours who worked at the Decani office of the DB.
6 The first signature I'm not sure about. I really couldn't say;
7 although, I do think that I know who it could be.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, do the rules dictate that the names are
9 written down, or is it sufficient under the rules that a signature of the
10 person who takes the statement is --
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The signature was sufficient, in
12 view of the fact that this statement that was taken could not be used in a
13 court procedure. It was given to the investigative judge and the judge
14 should have placed the statement in a special envelope and he could use
15 that to put his own questions, but the statement could not be used in a --
16 a trial pursuant to our regulations.
17 However, on the basis of the statement, the investigative judge
18 would have been able to question the witness in the presence of the
19 lawyer, the deputy prosecutor, which is what the procedure provides for
20 for this type of proceeding.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Re.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Now, could we get the first name of the operative,
24 if that's not privileged information. Only because there are a number of
25 Jokics involved in the case.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do you know the first name of Mr. Jokic who...
2 If you don't know, please tell us.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really don't know, but all of the
4 accused do. I mean, it's not a problem. They can say it.
5 These are three operatives that worked in Decani. There's only
6 three of them. All -- everyone there knew them. Jokic ... I cannot
7 remember. I'm sorry.
8 JUDGE ORIE: No, I can understand after so many years.
9 Mr. Re, please proceed.
10 MR. RE:
11 Q. Looking at that particular statement, there's a -- a reference to
12 an attack on a school in Rznic -- I'm sorry, a meeting at the school in
13 Rznic and attacking the Rznic police station. That's at page 8 in the
14 English. And I think that's at page 6 in the Serbian.
15 And then a reference to -- over the page in English, in 9, the top
16 paragraph -- to attacking a refugee settlement in Babaloc and throwing two
18 I just want you to find those two references, if you can.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I have no page numbering in Serbian, Mr. Re.
20 MR. RE: Page 6. It's right at the very top. It should be
22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Thank you.
23 Oh, yes, yes, that's the -- that's the only -- well, that's the
24 first -- no, it's hardly visible, but it's there. I apologise.
25 MR. RE:
1 Q. There's a reference to a meeting someone at the school in Rznic
2 and then attacking the Rznic police station and then underneath that a
3 reference to attacking a refugee settlement in Babaloc with two bombs.
4 Now, I want to -- just bearing that in mind, I want to refer you
5 to KLA communique number 36, which is -- excuse me. I had it a moment
7 JUDGE ORIE: It is behind tab 19, Mr. Re.
8 MR. RE: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Behind tab 19, which will be Exhibit P9 -- P MFI 951.
10 Do the -- does the incidents -- do the incidents referred to by
11 the person who gave that statement -- who gave that statement relate to
12 the subject of KLA communique number 36, which is MFI P951?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. What can you say about the accuracy of that communique and what is
15 described in the statement?
16 A. As for the communique published by the Liberation Army of Kosovo,
17 it's absolutely true that in -- at the beginning of September, on the 11th
18 and 12th a series of synchronised actions was carried out in the so-called
19 first operations zone, which implied --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the name of the
22 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please repeat the name of the zones you
23 just mentioned.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I am speaking a little
25 faster, so that's creating a problem.
1 So actions are mentioned, synchronised actions that the KLA
2 carried out on the 11th and the 12th of September in the areas of the 1st
3 Operative Zone, in the subzones that had already been formed then of
4 Drenica, Jerenik [phoen], Pastrik, Dukagjin, Karadak, and Llap. And the
5 places where the police stations were have been accurately mentioned:
6 Glogovac. That is in the area covered by the Pristina RDB, Kijevo, Pec,
7 Rudnik, Pristina, Rznic, Prizren Ponoshac, Prizren Suhareke, Prizren
8 Ratkovac [phoen], Prizren Ozren, Prizren Calap [phoen]. I'm just
9 mentioning the names of the police stations, the places where these
10 attacks were carried out, and it's all absolutely accurate.
11 MR. RE:
12 Q. The next part of that is a reference to an attack on the -- the
13 date is the 26th of November, 1997. And it's at page 11 of the English,
14 and it refers to an attack on a police station which appears to be in
15 Rznic. They passed through Ratis?
16 A. Ratis.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Can you please turn your other microphone on.
18 Thank you.
19 MR. RE:
20 Q. I want you to turn to KLA communique number 40, which is annex 21,
21 Exhibit MFI P953. And I want you to comment on that KLA communique
22 vis-a-vis the information in the statement, which is MFI P950.
23 A. Can I comment? Communicate 140 -- sorry, communique 40 with the
24 statement of the person. The person talks about his direct participation
25 in attacks that were carried out in the subzone Dukagjin and speaks
1 directly about the persons with whom -- I mean, he's a participant -- with
2 whom he attack -- participated in the attacks, right from the very
3 beginning, from the preparation carried out by one of the accused, he
4 participated in the attacks and he is trying to explain when, where, and
5 how they agreed and what were the kind of weapons that they used in the
6 execution of these attacks. That is basically the content of the
7 statement that he gave to the police.
8 He explains his role in great detail and his place in the group.
9 He talks about the role and the place of the accused, Brahimaj.
10 Q. Are they referring to the same incident, that is, what's in
11 communique 40 and what's in this person -- this KLA member's statement?
12 A. To a degree, yes. His statement also contains the same things
13 more or less that are referred to in communique 40.
14 Q. All right. Moving to paragraph 37 of your statement. It's
15 another one which the Trial Chamber --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Let me -- let me try to fully understand. Now, in 18
17 we're talking about page 11 in English, 26th of November. They meet. I'm
18 trying to find exactly where that police station which was apparently
19 attacked is situated, apart from 200 metres from the road.
20 The "more or less" in the answer of the witness makes me have a
21 thorough need to know whether they are talking about exactly the same
22 thing or more or less the same thing, which is not the same for me.
23 At the same time, I'm looking at the clock. Perhaps it would be
24 something to be explored. And it also would give me time to thoroughly
25 compare the two sources here.
1 Mr. Stijovic, it's close to 7.00. We have to conclude for the
2 day. We'd like to see you back tomorrow morning 9.00 in Courtroom I?
3 Is that correct, Mr. Registrar?
4 Yes, it would be Courtroom I, 9.00.
5 And I'd like to instruct you again not to speak with anyone about
6 the testimony already given or still to be given.
7 Madam Usher, before we adjourn, could you already escort the
8 witness out of the courtroom.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, could you give us any indication on how much
11 time you would still need? I think there's no need to further explain
12 that, of course, the course of the presentation of this evidence has been
13 interrupted now and then. I'm aware of that.
14 At the same time, it might also be that you've been perhaps a bit
15 over optimistic in trying to get all this material into evidence in a
16 relatively simple and perhaps what is to be a very efficient way, but
17 where both, I think, the Defence and the Chamber would like to look at it
18 very precisely before excusing the witness.
19 MR. RE: Well, in that sense, I'm, of course, in the Trial
20 Chamber's hands. I was trying to finish today. I'll endeavour to finish
21 it in the first session tomorrow.
22 JUDGE ORIE: First session tomorrow.
23 MR. RE: That's my best estimate. I certainly hope I can, but
24 some of the answers are a bit longer than --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, of course, you also could interrupt the
1 witness now and then and say this is not exactly what I'm seeking or to
2 say please focus on this or that. And --
3 MR. RE: Thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.
5 MR. EMMERSON: Your Honour, I would expect to be about three
6 sessions in all with this witness.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. EMMERSON: I understand that he has difficulties that mean
9 that he needs to complete his testimony before the end of the session on
11 JUDGE ORIE: Wednesday, yes.
12 MR. EMMERSON: But --
13 JUDGE ORIE: That, of course, that makes me curious to know how
14 much time you would need, Mr. Guy-Smith, and you, Mr. Harvey.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: I hope to be one session and perhaps a bit more,
16 but I'm trying to keep it to one session. And depending, obviously, what
17 occurs before me, I may be able to do it in a lesser period of time. But
18 based on my estimation right now, I believe it will be one session.
19 It's going to be relatively -- I think we're going to be dealing
20 with a fair number of documents.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harvey.
22 MR. HARVEY: I think I'm going to be roughly one session as well.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I would encourage, especially in relation to 17
24 and 18, I would encourage, Mr. Re, and you, Mr. Harvey, to see whether the
25 issue of the act and the conduct of Mr. Brahimaj could be resolved in one
1 way or another. Because at this moment we are comparing participation of
2 this -- of the -- of the source of the person who gave the statement with
3 KLA communiques to see whether they -- they match or not. That's, of
4 course, an exercise which is entirely different from testing evidence on
5 direct interactions with Mr. Brahimaj. That is of a different category.
6 I do not know what I expect from Mr. Re any further in this
7 respect, but that, of course, is one of the concerns the Chamber had with
8 17 and 18. And to the extent that you could delimit perhaps the use of 17
9 and 18 and then avoid further argument about admission, non-admission,
10 that would be -- that would certainly assist the Chamber.
11 Of course, if you can't do that, if you can't reach any agreement
12 on that, then the Chamber will have to take its responsibility.
13 MR. HARVEY: I respectfully accept what the Chamber has already
14 said about the -- well, I'm paraphrasing -- the limited usefulness of 17
15 and 18. And I'd -- I wouldn't propose to delay the Chamber too much on
16 any further precise analysis of those.
17 There's one matter that I am troubled by which the witness
18 mentioned in passing, which is that it appears that there's -- that there
19 is an entire file on my client and that he expressed surprise that that
20 file has not been disclosed and is not available here.
21 JUDGE ORIE: If -- it's a disclosure issue. And as always with
22 disclosure issues, you're, first of all, encouraged to get in touch with
23 Mr. Re to see whether there's any -- any suspicion -- whether there's any
24 reason for nondisclosure or whether Mr. Re is just as surprised of the
25 existence of such a file as you appear to be.
1 We adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00, Courtroom I.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day
4 of October, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.