071022ED

Page 9639

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 [Open session]

4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

6 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.

7 Q. Did -- did (redacted) continue to reside in the house after this

8 occasion when he handed over those items?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And did you have any more visits?

11 A. Yes. Yes.

12 Q. And in relation to the last time you ever saw (redacted), when

13 was the next visit? Or was it, in fact, on that occasion, the -- the last

14 day you saw him?

15 A. Before (redacted) disappeared, two days earlier than that two

16 people came. They searched the house and they couldn't find anything.

17 And they came two days later then and took (redacted).

18 Q. Thank you. Now, tell us a bit more about this visit where the

19 house was searched. Firstly, did you know the -- the names or identities

20 of the persons? And just indicate with a "yes" or a "no" and don't tell

21 us the names, if you know them; but did you know the names, or not?

22 A. No, that day, no.

23 Q. Okay. So now I just want you to tell us more details of these --

24 of these people whose names you did not know and who came and searched

25 your house. Were they -- how were they dressed?

Page 9640

1 A. The last day they came and asked for (redacted) was

2 sleeping at the time because he had had a heart attack, so he was taking

3 medicine for that. Three people came and asked for him. We did not know

4 them.

5 Q. Can I just interrupt you there. We'll get on to this, but, first

6 of all, I want to know about the occasion when two people came and

7 searched the house before, before (redacted) disappeared. Okay? Now,

8 let's just stick your mind -- keep your mind on that episode. All right?

9 That's -- that's --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I'm -- that's the episode I'm asking you about now.

12 Now, on this day when the two people whose name you did not know

13 came to the house, can you remember how they were dressed? These two

14 people whose names you did not know?

15 A. They were -- they were in uniform, black uniforms.

16 Q. And were they armed?

17 A. I don't know. I cannot say. But they had big jackets on and we

18 did not have time to look properly. But they searched us.

19 Q. Thank you. Okay. They -- they searched the house, you've told

20 us. And did -- did you -- did they ever say what it was that they were

21 looking for? Did you ever get any information about what they -- they

22 were looking for?

23 A. Yes. Weapons and other uniforms.

24 Q. Did they find anything?

25 A. No, they didn't, because we did not have any.

Page 9641

1 Q. Now, I take it they left and (redacted) continued to stay at

2 home?

3 A. Yes, they left. Yes.

4 Q. All right. Now, thank you for telling us about that visit. Now,

5 after that visit, were there any more visits?

6 A. Only when he disappeared.

7 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to ask you about that one. So focus

8 your mind on that day, and we'll start getting you to tell us the story

9 about that day. Okay?

10 Now, first of all, can you remember the date of the day that

11 (redacted) disappeared?

12 A. It was the 1st of August.

13 Q. Of what year?

14 A. 1998. It was 11.00.

15 Q. Thank you. Who came to the house?

16 A. Three persons; two that had been two days earlier and another one

17 whom we didn't know.

18 Q. Okay. So the result is that of the three people who came to your

19 house, you didn't know the name of any of those three.

20 A. No, we didn't know them.

21 Q. And tell the Trial Chamber in your own words what happened on the

22 day that they came.

23 A. That day - it was around 11.00 - (redacted) was sleeping, because

24 he had just taken his medicine. The three men came and asked for him and

25 said that they had an order from the commander to take (redacted) for 20

Page 9642

1 minutes and he would be brought back again.

2 Then I went and woke (redacted) up. I told him everything what I

3 had been told, and they stayed for about ten minutes there with us. They

4 were waiting. We didn't know them at all, because they were unknown to

5 us.

6 (redacted) got up and went.

7 Q. And can you remember how these men were dressed?

8 A. Yes. Two of them in black clothes, while the third one had a

9 camouflage uniform.

10 Q. And can you -- if you can recall, can you tell us if they were

11 armed or unarmed?

12 A. I couldn't say. I don't remember.

13 Q. And how were they traveling?

14 A. They came by car, but when they came into the yard, they were on

15 foot, of course, and they spoke to us.

16 Q. Thanks. Did you -- were you provided with any information about

17 where they were taking him?

18 A. Yes. They said that they had an order from a commander. They

19 didn't say where, though. They just said that they would bring him back

20 in 20 minutes.

21 Q. All right. And these men, were they Albanians or

22 Albanian-speaking?

23 A. Yes. Yes, they were speaking Albanian.

24 Q. Okay. Did you -- did (redacted) return that night?

25 A. No.

Page 9643

1 Q. Did you in the -- in the day or days following, did you or members

2 of your family start to try and make inquiries about where he was and what

3 had happened to him?

4 A. Yes. We went to make inquiries. We asked in the village. There

5 was a -- what we called a headquarters in the village in a basement. We

6 didn't know about it, as a matter of fact, but by asking people we learned

7 about it, and we asked, "Where is he? Why did he not come back?" And we

8 were told, "He will be back. He will come back. Don't worry."

9 Q. All right. This was --

10 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Sorry to interrupt. In order to understand

11 completely, the time, was it 11.00 in the morning or 11.00 in the evening

12 when they came and took (redacted)?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the morning.

14 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you.

15 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.

16 Q. Now, these inquiries, were they made in your -- in your own

17 village?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And who was it who was telling you, "He will be back. He will

20 come back. Don't worry"?

21 A. There were many people there. We didn't know who we were talking

22 to. I was with my grandmother and younger brother. We went there to ask

23 about the whereabouts of (redacted). And they just told us, "He will be

24 back." I had the impression they didn't know what to tell us themselves.

25 Q. And were these men who were saying these things to you, that --

Page 9644

1 that he would be back, were they -- can you tell us how they were dressed?

2 A. They were wearing everyday clothes.

3 Q. And this place called a headquarters in the village, headquarters

4 of what?

5 A. Headquarters of what? This was the basement of a villager.

6 Q. But you -- you -- you yourself, your own words are that "there was

7 a headquarters in the village." Now, headquarters of what?

8 A. Of the KLA.

9 Q. Thank you. How many times did you go to the KLA headquarters

10 making inquiries about (redacted)?

11 A. Two or three times, but in vain.

12 Q. And is that the only place that you were able to make inquiries,

13 or did you go elsewhere?

14 A. We only went there because we did not know where else to go.

15 Q. You've told us (redacted) disappeared on the -- or, sorry, the

16 last time you saw him was on the 1st of August, 1998. Using that date as

17 a reference point, how long did you remain in your village living in your

18 house following that?

19 A. If I'm not mistaken, about a month after that we continued to stay

20 there, because the villagers had not left yet. We were waiting for

21 (redacted) to come back. Two or three days later a couple of people came for

22 his medicine, and we gave them his medicine and also a jacket. But as I

23 said, everything was in vain.

24 Q. Thank you. And do you know who these -- do you know the names of

25 these people who came to collect his medicine and his jacket?

Page 9645

1 A. No. No.

2 Q. Had you ever seen them in your village before?

3 A. No. They were not from our village.

4 Q. Can you tell us if -- how they were dressed?

5 A. They were wearing a green -- greenish uniform, multicoloured, I

6 think. It was mixed colours.

7 Q. Thank you. Was there any insignia that you could see on this

8 uniform?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. What insignia?

11 A. Of the KLA on their caps and on the sleeve of their jackets.

12 MR. DI FAZIO: Could Your Honours just give me a moment, please.

13 [Prosecution counsel confer]

14 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you for answering my questions, Witness.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Witness 52, you will now be examined by Defence

16 counsel. The first one is Mr. Emmerson?

17 MR. EMMERSON: It is, but I have no questions.

18 JUDGE ORIE: You have no questions.

19 Mr. Guy-Smith?

20 MR. GUY-SMITH: No questions.

21 JUDGE ORIE: No questions.

22 Mr. Harvey?

23 MR. HARVEY: No questions.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Where I said that you would be examined by

25 Defence counsel, Witness 52, I did not know yet that they had no questions

Page 9649

1 time ago in relation to the expected testimony of the witness then still

2 on the list, Mr. Delic, that the Defence has asked -- has put six

3 questions, questions relating to documents, questions relating to -- no,

4 that comes later -- that you ask for whether any investigations were made

5 in relation to, let's say, the circles, same circles as where Mr. Delic

6 appeared as well.

7 MR. EMMERSON: Can I?

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 MR. EMMERSON: In essence, on the 10th of May, the request to the

10 Prosecution came in two forms.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

12 MR. EMMERSON: There was one letter concerned with specific

13 matters of disclosure, which has not been brought to the Trial Chamber's

14 attention because there's no issue outstanding in relation to it.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

16 MR. EMMERSON: But there was also a letter drawing attention to

17 the fact that during the Milosevic trial the position taken by the Office

18 of the Prosecutor was that Colonel Delic, as he then was, was responsible

19 for the commission of systematic war crimes.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

21 MR. EMMERSON: Including within the indictment region, including

22 within the indictment period.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, which we find in the correspondence as having

24 been committed in 1998 and 1999.

25 MR. EMMERSON: Exactly so. As well as having been involved, so it

Page 9650

1 was put to him, at least in a supervisory capacity, in the disinterment

2 and transfer for the purposes of concealment of the remains of victims --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

4 MR. EMMERSON: -- of crimes committed by Serb forces. And in

5 essence, what we were seeking from the Prosecution at that stage - and

6 it's quite right to say "at that stage." It was on the assumption that he

7 was to be a witness for the Prosecution - was clarification the

8 Prosecution maintained those allegations; if so, whether or not they had

9 been investigated; and if not, why not.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Why not.

11 MR. EMMERSON: The next development -- and I -- was the

12 Prosecution's decision to abandon Mr. Delic as a witness and thereby, in

13 Mr. Re's view, rendering those questions moot; and his substitution by the

14 witness who is now to be called without protective measures, as I

15 understand it.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

17 MR. EMMERSON: Branko Gajic.

18 Mr. Gajic's testimony concerns matters relating to the deployment

19 and activity of the 549th Brigade, even though he was not himself a member

20 of that brigade and it's not been alleged by the Prosecution in past

21 trials that he was personally involved or authorised the sorts of crimes

22 that were alleged by the Prosecution against Colonel Delic.

23 In essence, there were two essential issues outstanding,

24 disclosure having been given of a number of documents and other materials.

25 The first was a request to the Prosecution for an explanation --

Page 9651

1 JUDGE ORIE: Why.

2 MR. EMMERSON: -- for the decision to abandon General Delic; and

3 the second is the outstanding request for clarification as to whether the

4 Prosecution approaches this trial on the same basis as it approached the

5 trial of Milosevic; namely, that General Delic and those under his command

6 committed war crimes systematically in the indictment region during the

7 indictment period and thereafter.

8 Now, as far as the first matter is concerned, Mr. Re's response is

9 contained in the letter of the 17th of October, indicating in essence that

10 the Prosecution's decision to abandon General Delic is a non-reviewable

11 discretion and that there's nothing to be disclosed in relation to the

12 reasons for that decision; and in the letter of the 19th of October, as

13 regards the second matter, in essence the Prosecution's position is that

14 since they have taken the decision not to call General Delic, the issues

15 of substance are moot.

16 In short, whether the first question requires an answer or not is

17 perhaps much less important than whether the second question requires an

18 answer. It isn't simply a matter relevant to the credibility of the

19 witness now abandoned. It is also a matter relevant to the conduct and

20 the deployment of the Serb forces within the indictment region, within the

21 indictment period and thereafter. The potential that that has for

22 alternative explanations for otherwise unexplained deaths and for the

23 removal and manipulation of remains. And so we would respectfully invite

24 the Prosecution or invite the Chamber to request the Prosecution to state

25 what its position is in relation to the conduct of the 549th under the

Page 9652

1 command of General Delic, or Colonel Delic, as he then was.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, that's the question that is put to you.

3 By the way, I suggest to the parties that this whole

4 correspondence will be perhaps in a joint filing be put on the record,

5 because it -- it's not just a practical matter and in line with the policy

6 that the Chamber has set out earlier, that is, either purely practical

7 matters just by e-mail, matters of some substance to be mentioned in

8 court, matters of greater substance to be filed. The Chamber suggests

9 that, to have everything clearly on the record, that this correspondence

10 will be subject to a filing.

11 Mr. Re.

12 MR. RE: I'm not quite sure what I'm supposed to be responding to.

13 I mean, the Prosecution's view is we're quite mystified by the Defence

14 pursuing a line of inquiry in relation to a witness who we advised the

15 Trial Chamber and the Defence on the 20th of June, that is, close on four

16 months ago, to -- to -- it's more than four months ago that we were not

17 calling the witness.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

19 MR. RE: Now, Mr. Emmerson is not putting the position correctly

20 when he says the Prosecution suggested in effect, to use his phrase, in

21 terms that General Delic was a war criminal, because we certainly didn't.

22 Some suggestions were put to Colonel Delic as to the state of his

23 knowledge during operations in 1998 and 1999, but the Prosecution has not

24 taken or maintained a view in relation to Bozidar Delic.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

Page 9653

1 MR. RE: And Branko Gajic has nothing to do with Delic. Gajic was

2 in military intelligence in Belgrade. He was not in the 549th Brigade.

3 As far as -- and I -- and I -- we have no knowledge that the

4 Defence is about to put any allegations to General -- retired

5 General Gajic, and as far as I know, Mr. Emmerson has told me they're not.

6 The matter is not just moot. It's irrelevant. We decided not to

7 call Delic some months ago, four months ago. We've moved on. It's just

8 beating a dead horse.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Well, whether the horse is yet dead or still alive is

10 still to be seen.

11 Mr. Re, the way in which I understand it is the following: That

12 the Defence would very much like to know whether the position taken by the

13 Prosecution in the Milosevic case is that a series of crimes are committed

14 and there was concealment of victims of crimes apart from whether

15 Mr. Delic committed them or had some responsibility, because they may have

16 been committed under his command, but these questions they'd like to know

17 what the present position of the Prosecution is, because I take it that

18 the Defence, as they said, would consider in those circumstances that

19 there might be an alternative explanation for bodily remains being found

20 in that area; and therefore, the Defence would like to know whether that

21 is or still is the position of the Prosecution that crimes were committed

22 by other forces at that time in the area so as to -- well, to see whether

23 there's disagreement about that element between Prosecution and Defence.

24 Mr. Emmerson, Mr. Guy-Smith, Mr. Harvey, is that approximately --

25 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, that's an entirely fair summary.

Page 9654

1 Two matters, just if I may. First of all, I don't recall having

2 indicated to Mr. Re that I did not wish to explore with this witness

3 allegations of war crimes committed by Serb forces, and I certainly do.

4 And secondly, I am slightly surprised by the suggestion that it

5 was not the Prosecution's case in the Milosevic trial that Mr. Delic was

6 responsible for war crimes. We've set out in our letter specific extracts

7 from the allegations put in terms to him by counsel for the Office of the

8 Prosecutor. For example, at paragraph 3: "The reality is that you and

9 the police were engaged in an unrecorded exercise in ethnic cleansing.

10 The army and the police were engaged in criminal conduct to their certain

11 knowledge in 1998 and 1999."

12 And paragraph 4 that: "The grave removal exercise must have been

13 done with your knowledge and consent."

14 It's surprising to hear Mr. Re in those circumstances suggest that

15 that is not a fair summary or it was not fairly summarised in the way in

16 which the matter has been put. And indeed it rather reflects the

17 difficulty of a Prosecution position which -- which lacks clarity in

18 respect of these matters.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.

20 MR. RE: I mean, that's just getting worse. Mr. Emmerson told me

21 he wasn't going to cross-examine Mr. Gajic on crimes having been committed

22 by Mr. Gajic. I understand that's the Defence position.

23 In relation to whether Serbian military units committed crimes in

24 Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, well, of course they did. One only has to read

25 the Milutinovic and Milosevic indictments to see that's the Prosecution

Page 9655

1 case. There's absolutely no tension between the Prosecution prosecuting

2 the KLA for crimes committed in 1998 and alleging that the Serbian

3 military also committed crimes in the same -- in the -- in the same year

4 in the same territory.

5 In relation to whether or not there was -- whether the allegation

6 of the Serbs taking bodies to -- from Kosovo to -- to Serbia is in somehow

7 way connected with the allegation, which I think but cannot be sure is

8 being made, because it hasn't been properly put to any witnesses that

9 there was some sort of body-burying operation by the Serbs somehow in

10 September 1998, there's no connection at all. There is nothing in the

11 Milosevic transcript, the Milutinovic transcript, or anything in the

12 Prosecution's possession to suggest that the Serbs planted the bodies by

13 the canal in Lake Radonjic in September 1998.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

15 MR. RE: If that's what he's getting to.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Is that -- therefore, then, what I understand is that

17 there is no disagreement about Serbs having committed in general terms

18 serious crimes in the area during the time also relevant for the

19 indictment but that the main disagreement lies in whether this could ever

20 be an alternative or an alternative explanation for what is charged

21 against the accused in this case. That's how I now understand the

22 position of the Prosecution to be and where it differs from the Defence

23 position and where it does not differ from the Defence position.

24 I further understood that the all-relevant material is, as always,

25 disclosed in the electronic -- in the electronic system and that from

Page 9656

1 whatever the Prosecution has investigated or learned about matters in

2 relation to the witness Delic, who's not on the list any more, or any

3 other witness, if it would amount to Article 68 material, that would be

4 that it could be understood to be exculpatory or may be exculpatory, which

5 means that you might have different views on whether it exculpates or does

6 not exculpate - that's exactly what we are just talking about that is,

7 whether it provides for an alternative explanation for events or whether

8 it does not. That's, of course, the interpretation and the evaluation of

9 the material - that all disclosure obligations have been fully met by the

10 Prosecution.

11 Is that correctly understood, Mr. Re?

12 MR. RE: As far as I know, we have disclosed all relevant

13 material.

14 But just one other tiny little thing, and that is the references

15 Mr. Emmerson keeps bringing up in the Milosevic transcript. I'm sorry to

16 say this, but he's taking them out of context. The Prosecution did not

17 allege any specific crimes by Colonel Delic. If they had -- if we had,

18 Mr. Emmerson would have quoted them instead of talking in terms or in

19 summary or in paraphrasing.

20 The -- what was suggested to Delic was he must have known

21 something was happening. There was no specific allegation of criminality

22 leveled against Delic, as far as I can see, and in talking to the lawyers

23 who were in court conducting that cross-examination.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I do understand that in you're in a command

25 position, if you know about crimes, if you haven't done anything to

Page 9657

1 prevent them or to punish them, that might amount to criminal

2 responsibility for crimes you have not committed yourself. If that --

3 MR. EMMERSON: I don't, if I may say so, think this is the right

4 moment for know enter a debate on this, but the Prosecution called

5 testimony of crimes allegedly committed on the direct orders of

6 General Delic in the Milosevic trial. Indeed, I'm going to raise some of

7 that in cross-examination, if I may.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 Mr. Guy-Smith.

10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, if I might too, just to make sure that

11 we all are operating on the same basis. Since you have indicated that

12 it's your understanding that all material has been made available to us in

13 the electronic system, if the Court is relying on that being the

14 electronic disclosure system, as opposed to the Prosecution identifying

15 for the Defence what precise information is either relevant or

16 exculpatory, which not -- has not necessarily been done with regard to --

17 to the --

18 JUDGE ORIE: It may be clear that any exculpatory evidence should

19 be pointed at precisely, not to be hidden somewhere in an electronic

20 disclosure system. That may be clear.

21 I do understand that to the extent the Prosecution itself sees

22 that there is material that could be considered relevant but on which it

23 will not rely, that it nevertheless will be disclosed as relevant material

24 in the electronic disclosure system; whereas, if the Prosecution finds

25 anything which may be interpreted as, well, we know the exact -- just call

Page 9658

1 it briefly exculpatory material, that is, material that tends to

2 demonstrate the innocence of -- well, we have the nice formula which

3 doesn't come literally to my mind at this moment. But under those

4 circumstances, then specifically that attention will be labeled as

5 potential exculpatory material and be brought to the attention of the

6 Defence.

7 That's how I understand the disclosure obligations, Mr. Re. And I

8 also understand that in this respect, the Prosecution takes the position

9 that it has met all its disclosure obligations.

10 MR. GUY-SMITH: I raise a concern with that and specifically with

11 the guidance that is found in the Karemera decision concerning the

12 electronic disclosure system of the 30th of June, 2006, paragraph 10, in

13 which there is specific reference to the Prosecution's duty with regard to

14 the disclosure of information.

15 I actually would like to note on a separate point and alert the

16 Chamber to something which I think it probably knows from a review of the

17 annexes, that many of the annexes that are being relied upon by the

18 Prosecution for the testimony of the next witness happen to be authored by

19 the very individual, Mr. Delic, who is the subject matter of this

20 conversation.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand. We'll have a look at that.

22 But then it comes more to specific documents to be used during the

23 testimony of the next witness.

24 MR. GUY-SMITH: The concern being, of course, that if we're in a

25 situation where there's picking and choosing as between documents, it

Page 9659

1 raises some of the problems that Mr. Emmerson raised initially and some of

2 the difficulties that we have expressed previously with regard to whether

3 or not the Prosecution is taking disparate positions, depending on who

4 they are prosecuting, with regard to the evidence they're presenting.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

6 MR. GUY-SMITH: We're back -- we're back into the ballet situation

7 of the Prosecution being splayed once again potential.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That is an unattractive position.

9 Mr. Harvey, would you like to add anything?

10 MR. HARVEY: No, I fully endorse everything that has been said by

11 my colleagues on this matter, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

13 Then there was another matter and then we'll have a break.

14 There was another matter about recently discovered material which

15 you were seeking to add to the 65 ter list, exhibit list.

16 MR. RE: There's -- I think it was six reports of the 14th, a

17 counter-intelligence brief --

18 JUDGE ORIE: I thought there were eight -- I thought there were

19 eight.

20 MR. RE: There's seven, sorry.

21 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe there's -- there's seven. There's seven

22 and a diagram. And as a result of -- of the assertions made by the

23 Prosecution with regard to the discovery of this material, there certainly

24 is no objection.

25 MR. RE: What do you mean -- what do you mean "assertions"? I've

Page 9660

1 just made a submission as an officer of the court. I don't like being

2 told that they're assertions.

3 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that the facts, Mr. Re has pointed to

4 that in support --

5 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm agreeing.

6 JUDGE ORIE: -- of his application, that in view of that that you

7 do not oppose.

8 I take it, Mr. Re, that if there would be serious doubts about the

9 facts you would have presented, that the Defence might not have accepted

10 your proposal.

11 MR. GUY-SMITH: I certainly don't mean to ruffle his feathers at

12 this point.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 Is that the position of you as well, Mr. Emmerson, and of you,

15 Mr. Harvey?

16 MR. EMMERSON: I think -- unless I misunderstood the position,

17 there was one further document produced this morning for which Mr. Re

18 indicated that an oral application was going to be made in addition to the

19 written application.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Then I may have missed that. I'm thinking about the

21 documents of which Mr. Re explained when he found them and where, not in

22 Kosovo but in Belgrade, I think.

23 MR. RE: Yes. They're from the archive of the 14th Intelligence

24 Group.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

Page 9661

1 MR. RE: The Prosecution didn't even know existed until the --

2 JUDGE ORIE: No, that has been explained --

3 MR. RE: Recently.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson points that there would be one other

5 document. I'm not quite sure they know what document Mr. Emmerson is

6 referring to.

7 MR. EMMERSON: Well, it arrived by e-mail this morning. It's an

8 18th of May proclamation concerning the extending of the border belt

9 within which the VJ constitutionally was permitted to operate to 5

10 kilometres. And it was served upon us as an additional document today

11 with an indication that Mr. Re would be making an oral application to add

12 it to the list.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Is that new apart from the -- the 14th - what was

14 it? - the 14th Intelligence Group? Is this a document that is related in

15 any way to it?

16 MR. RE: No, this isn't new. This was disclosed to the Defence in

17 April 2006. It's simply a --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Was it on the list? I think that's issue.

19 MR. RE: It wasn't on the list. It only came up after

20 Mr. Zivanovic gave evidence last week about the border zones,

21 cross-examined about the proclamation of the border zones and when it came

22 into effect. And we found the proclamation of General -- of Colonel

23 Lazarevic dated the 18th of May, 1998, extending the border zone 5

24 kilometres, referable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslav government

25 decision of the 23rd of April, 1998.

Page 9662

1 JUDGE ORIE: So, as a matter of fact, that is now raised because

2 it gains some relevance in relation to the testimony given by

3 Mr. Zivanovic.

4 MR. RE: That's why we went looking for it, yes.

5 MR. EMMERSON: I certainly would have no objection to its being

6 added. I simply note that maybe Mr. Re can clarify the position. I had

7 thought that in re-examination with Colonel Zivanovic, Mr. Re had sought

8 to establish that the day for the extension was the 8th of May. I don't

9 think it was this document that was put in re-examination, but I may be

10 wrong about that. But we can --

11 JUDGE ORIE: If you sort that out during the break. Because if

12 there's no objection --

13 MR. EMMERSON: Certainly no objection.

14 JUDGE ORIE: And, of course, now clarifications could be sought

15 during the break.

16 May I take it, Mr. Guy-Smith and Mr. Harvey, that since you are

17 not jumping up that you would agree with the -- with the other documents

18 about the 14th Intelligence - what was it? - Group, that there's no

19 objection against adding them to the 65 ter list? In the absence --

20 MR. GUY-SMITH: I've already indicated that --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I was looking at Mr. Harvey.

22 Okay. Then that request is granted.

23 MR. RE: Thank you.

24 In relation to the exhibits, could it be -- could they be done in

25 the same way as we did Mr. Zivanovic and Mr. Stijovic, that is, they be

Page 9663

1 given numbers by the registrar in the spreadsheet so that they can

2 sequentially follow with this one.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, would that be a possibility?

4 MR. RE: I think there are 35 -- 37 annexes.

5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, Mr. Registrar asks me whether it's your

7 intention to have them MFI'd first or whether it -- this is already an

8 announcement of tendering them. I take it that that only comes during the

9 testimony.

10 So just first to give them numbers?

11 MR. RE: It's an announcement of an intention to tender them.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

13 MR. RE: But first get an MFI.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. So we'll take it in two steps.

15 Then since we have to change from interpreter teams, we need a

16 break of half an hour.

17 We will resume and -- at 4.30.

18 --- Recess taken at 3.58 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 4.35 p.m.

20 [The witness entered court].

21 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has considered the oral submissions by

22 the parties and the order to file the correspondence is still there, but

23 it -- the Chamber finds no reason the exchange of views until now not to

24 start with the witness at this moment.

25 I have another request for you. I asked -- and I said similarly

Page 9664

1 and earlier was talked about this week to receive a response on the

2 videolink. If there would be a possibility, even if by oral submissions,

3 to express yourself at an earlier stage, the videolink has been scheduled

4 for the 31st of October. It needs quite a lot of time to prepare for it.

5 So if that would be possible already by tomorrow, that would be highly

6 appreciated.

7 MR. GUY-SMITH: We will meet after court or during one of the

8 sessions and try to get back to the Chamber as quickly as possible.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much. Your cooperation is much

10 appreciated.

11 Then, finally, my attention was drawn to the fact that there might

12 be some unclarity as to the eight documents to be added on the 65 ter

13 list. I think I said at one moment that the request was granted. If I

14 have not said that, then I hereby say that the addition to the 65 ter list

15 of the eight documents is granted. And I noticed that there were no

16 objections against the other document, which you have sorted out over the

17 break, Mr. Emmerson, with Mr. Re, I take it? Or at least there's --

18 there's no major problem there.

19 So therefore no problems with that respect. Neither.

20 Then, Mr. Gajic, it's very unpolite not to address a witness who

21 appears in court and to deal with other procedural matters. Apologies for

22 that.

23 Mr. Gajic, before you give evidence in this court, the Rules of

24 Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that

25 you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Page 9665

1 The text is now handed out to you by Madam Usher. May I invite

2 you to make that solemn declaration.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

4 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Gajic. Please be seated.

6 You'll first be examined by Mr. Re, who's counsel for the

7 Prosecution.

8 Mr. Re, please proceed.

9 WITNESS: BRANKO GAJIC

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 Examination by Mr. Re:

12 Q. Good afternoon. Your name is Branko Gajic. Your date of birth is

13 the 17th of July, 1944. And you are a retired major general from the

14 Serbian army and before that, the VJ and the JNA. Is that correct?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And you recently testified in the case Milutinovic, et cetera. So

17 you're familiar with these proceedings and the process here.

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. I want to show you a statement which you have a copy there in hard

20 copy, dated the 2nd of October, 2007. It's of some 18 pages in English.

21 It's a statement I wish to tender under Rule 92 ter of the Rules of

22 Procedure. But first I have to ask you two questions.

23 I note that no objection has been made to any portion of this

24 statement to this point.

25 The first one is: Does it bear your declaration and is true?

Page 9666

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And the second question is: If I were to ask you the questions to

3 which answers are given in this statement, would you give that same

4 testimony in this court?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And it's 65 ter number 2090. May it be received into evidence on

7 that basis.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, I think the first question is not whether it

9 was signed by the witness but whether he has read the statement and

10 whether this statement reflects the answers you gave at the time.

11 Is that the reason why you signed it?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Then, since there are no objections, then,

14 Mr. Registrar, the exhibit number would be?

15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be P1138.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

17 Since there are no objections, it is admitted into evidence.

18 MR. RE:

19 Q. And in front of you, Mr. Gajic, do you have a folder there

20 containing the 38 documents which you have referred to in your statement

21 including your diagram which is the first annex? Just to confirm that you

22 have it in front of you?

23 JUDGE ORIE: Just reading the transcript, I missed the word "and

24 is true" otherwise, I would not have added that question. I refer to page

25 50, line 24. It says: "Does it bear your declaration and is true?" I

Page 9667

1 understood whether he has signed it. But if I would have read this, I

2 would not have added the question I put to the witness before.

3 Please proceed.

4 MR. RE: I'm always confused by the wording of 92 ter myself.

5 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not confused.

6 Please proceed.

7 MR. RE:

8 Q. I'm going ask you some questions about the statement to clarify

9 some of the things in your statement to give the Trial Chamber a better

10 picture of the contents of your statement.

11 The first thing I'm going to ask you about is the 29 -- in

12 paragraph 1, you refer to having had 29 years in the counter-intelligence

13 service of the military in which you served and your retirement position

14 was, I understand, as the deputy head of the security administration.

15 A. Assistant and deputy at the same time. This is how it was

16 officially proclaimed.

17 Q. In terms of seniority, where were you in the military hierarchy as

18 of your retirement on the 31st of December, 2001, as a major-general?

19 A. In early October 2000, I, together with General Vasiljevic, who

20 was deputy head of the administration, removed -- was removed from that

21 position and other people were brought in. I was appointed to a different

22 sector, to an additional formation. However, pursuant to the order of the

23 then-Chief of the General Staff, I and General Vasiljevic was reassigned

24 to the security administration and worked there until our retirement.

25 Q. General, please focus on the question, if you can. And the

Page 9668

1 question was: Where were you in the terms of the military hierarchy as of

2 the date of your retirement? Number one, two, three, four, five, six, or

3 whatever?

4 A. When it comes to the security administration, I was number three

5 there.

6 Q. In 1998, in the period covered by the indictment, what was your

7 level of seniority?

8 A. I was both number two and number three. I was deputy head of the

9 administration and assistant to the head of the administration, which

10 means man number two and man number three.

11 Q. That's in the security administration.

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. What about in the military? Could you rank where you were in the

14 military hierarchy?

15 A. The security administration is one of the independent

16 administrations of the General Staff, and the head of the security

17 administration is one of the assistants to the Chief of the General Staff.

18 In his absence, I stepped in for him.

19 Q. Are you saying you were fairly senior in 1998?

20 A. Yes. Yes.

21 Q. Were there military secrets to which you would not have had access

22 in 1998?

23 A. Whatever came within the competence of the military security was

24 known to me. There were no secrets in that domain that I was not aware

25 of. And even broadly speaking, in relation to military matters, to the

Page 9669

1 matters of the army.

2 Q. I want you to turn to paragraph 6 of your statement.

3 If that could just be displayed in English in Sanction and if you

4 could look at the hard copy in front of you, please.

5 That's the paragraph where you refer to: "Counter-intelligence

6 reports being distinct from other types of routine reporting in the VJ;

7 namely, operational reporting and command reporting."

8 And then you say: "Counter-intelligence reports would often

9 contain information from operations reports, to the extent that it was

10 relevant to the mandate of the UB."

11 The next paragraph, which is 7, you refer to an independent unit

12 in Kosovo called the 14th Counter-Intelligence Group. What was the role

13 of the 14th Counter-Intelligence Group within the VJ in that time period?

14 A. The 14th Counter-Intelligence Group, as you say - and it is

15 mentioned here - was connected to the security administration and it was

16 the spatial structure, the territorial structure of the

17 counter-intelligence service covering the situation on the ground with

18 regard to the activities placing the army and the defence system in

19 jeopardy, and it went down from the service to the unit commands, and it

20 directly reported to the security administration on its work.

21 Q. You say in that statement that it had about 20 individuals. Where

22 did they work from? Where were they based?

23 A. They were based in Pristina.

24 Q. Did they do fieldwork?

25 A. Yes.

Page 9670

1 Q. Can you briefly describe to the Trial Chamber how they went about

2 their fieldwork, that is, how they collected their information in the

3 field.

4 A. They had, as we called it, their intelligence sources in the

5 territory of Kosovo and Metohija, and these intelligence sources were

6 members of the population, civilians, as well as members of different army

7 structures residing in the area. Furthermore, they exchanged information

8 with the MUP and the State Security Service and had daily contacts with

9 the population which were quite well-developed. The population was not --

10 were not agents as such, but they were informants on whom they relied.

11 And these were the ways on the basis of which they gathered information.

12 And I apologise, they also exchanged intelligence with military

13 intelligence organs, because they also had their infrastructure in the

14 territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

15 Q. Mr. Gajic, I want to ask you about informants. You just referred

16 to "informants upon whom they relied." What was the difference between

17 the type of informants the DB was using and the type of informants that

18 military intelligence was using?

19 A. There was no difference, except for the fact that this was the

20 counter-intelligence department, as it is written here, and the difference

21 lay in the contents of the information that was of interest. The

22 counter-intelligence service was interested in the information concerning

23 whatever placed the army in jeopardy; whereas, the military -- or rather,

24 the State Security Service was interested in the situation in general,

25 including that which concerned the army itself. The sources were more or

Page 9671

1 less the same and the methodology they used was the same.

2 Q. Did counter-intelligence have informants within the KLA?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Are you able to say in 1998 approximately how many informants were

5 within the KLA?

6 A. I wouldn't be able to tell you with any precision. Still there

7 were sufficient numbers of them, because some of the sources were

8 developed in early 1980s and are still being used to this day. Therefore,

9 I can't tell you how many there were.

10 The 14th Department certainly had no less than 50 or 60 different

11 sources of different ranking, quality, and so on and so forth, and I'm

12 only referring to the counter-intelligence department and not referring to

13 the counter-intelligence structures of the different units.

14 Q. The 50 or 60 different sources, were they within the KLA?

15 A. There were those among them who were in the KLA and others who had

16 direct or indirect contacts or links with the KLA. For instance, some of

17 them had close relatives or friends who were members of the KLA, and these

18 were what we call indirect contacts.

19 Q. You said they were of different ranking and quality. First I'm

20 going to ask you about the ranking, then quality.

21 How high up within the KLA - and no names, of course - were these

22 sources placed?

23 A. Well, for the most part they were former officers of the Yugoslav

24 People's Army with whom operative contacts were made in 1981 and later, at

25 the time of those mass-scale demonstrations you're probably aware of, and

Page 9672

1 we had actions combatting such activities.

2 Q. Just concentrate on 1998 for the moment. In 1998, how high up

3 within the KLA were informants for counter-intelligence?

4 A. I wouldn't be able to give you the exact figure now or the exact

5 information. There were those among them who held the rank of major, even

6 lieutenant colonel, and then the occasional colonel as well of the former

7 JNA. I don't know which ranks they held in the KLA. I know the duties

8 they held. They were commanders, chiefs of staffs, and so on and so

9 forth. And, of course, I'm aware of the ranks they held in the former

10 JNA.

11 Q. You also said they were of different quality. How did your

12 department assess the quality of the information it was receiving from

13 these informants? In other words, what was the methodology used to assess

14 its reliability and quality?

15 A. The main practice was vetting. Or rather, we double-checked the

16 information that they provided us with against other sources.

17 Secondly, we would have some earlier information about the

18 activities or events they were supposed to gather information on. So we

19 would double-check that with the MUP, with the security service, with the

20 intelligence service, and we did that.

21 If the persons involved had for many years had operative contacts

22 with the intelligence service, we already had some valid indicators of

23 their sincerity, veracity, reliability, and so on and so forth, but we

24 always double-checked the information we received from them, especially if

25 the information was sensitive.

Page 9673

1 Q. I just want to take you to an example of a report. It's annex 3

2 of your statement -- of the -- the bundle there. It's dated the 23rd of

3 January, 1998.

4 If that could be displayed in e-court, please. If you could just

5 go to annex 3. It's the report of Colonel -- Chief Colonel Aco Tomic,

6 23rd of January, 1998 to the VJ -- I think it's GS -- General Staff of the

7 VJ Security Service, 3rd Army. That's -- and it -- it says: "Through

8 operative work by the 14th Counter-Intelligence Group and the Pristina

9 Corps, information was obtained regarding an armed clash on the territory

10 of the Srbica-Donje Prekaze village, kidnapping and maltreatment of Serbs

11 by members of the so-called KLA, the presence of members of the 'Serbian

12 Guard', headed by Arkan, and propaganda by the Albanian media in the state

13 and abroad."

14 And then it refers to the attack on the Jashari compound, and then

15 it goes down to refer to three other particular incidents. The ones I

16 wish to ask you about are on the 22nd of April, 1998, there's an attack on

17 Desko Vasic, an assemblyman in the Zvecan Municipal Assembly --

18 A. 22nd of January.

19 Q. Well, I meant January.

20 MR. EMMERSON: And I'm sorry, whilst there is that interruption,

21 lest the transcript should remain unclear, the reference is not to the

22 attack on the Jashari compound in the sense that we have heard other

23 evidence about the attack in March but to earlier incident in January.

24 MR. RE: Yes, quite. There's one on the 22nd of January, 1998,

25 quite.

Page 9674

1 Q. There are three particular incidents described which I ask you to

2 comment on. That's 22nd of January, 1998; the attack on Desko Vasic, the

3 stopping of a bus on the same day on the Klina-Srbica road by the

4 so-called KLA inflicting serious bodily injuries on Nenad Nikolic; and

5 thirdly, the stopping by a KLA patrol of Ljiljana Ilijev, a public -- or

6 employee of the SDK public auditing service and her sister

7 Darinka Andjelkovic. The two of them were maltreated and then released

8 with the words "your brothers are killing our brothers."

9 What I want you to comment on and tell the Trial Chamber is the

10 source of those three incidents allowing it to come into this particular

11 report by Chief Colonel Aco Tomic.

12 A. The first incident, which took place on the 22nd of January, 1998,

13 relating to Desko Vasic, who was a deputy of the Zvecan Assembly,

14 Municipal Assembly, was reported by his relatives, because the man went to

15 work and never showed up.

16 And then on the 23rd, when the MUP - because this was within the

17 competence of the MUP - tried to conduct an investigation, he was found

18 killed next to his car with another passenger, who was unidentified at the

19 time. That's the first incident.

20 The second incident also had to do with the stopping of the bus on

21 the Klina-Srbica road, where the bus was pulled over. The IDs were asked

22 of the passengers, who were maltreated and beaten up.

23 The information was received from the driver and the other

24 passengers who reported the incident and described the perpetrators. As a

25 result of that, since the perpetrators wore uniforms with the KLA

Page 9675

1 insignia, it was concluded that they were indeed responsible for this.

2 And then the third incident, which also took place on the 22nd of

3 January, 1998, involving this lady Ljiljana and her sister, she reported

4 the incident to the MUP. She described the problems she had and she told

5 them what she had observed, the trench-digging and so on and so forth.

6 And also on the basis of the -- or rather, it was on the basis of -- of

7 our regular exchanges of information with the MUP that we received the

8 information. And the head of the 14th Counter-Intelligence Department

9 thought it interesting enough to be sent to the security administration

10 and the command of the 3rd army and to report to them about it.

11 Q. Why were incidents of this nature being included in

12 intelligence -- or counter-intelligence reports going up through the

13 hierarchy?

14 A. They were significant because we followed what was happening in

15 the area to the civilian population. The strategy of the leadership of

16 the secessionist movement was to carry out ethnic cleansing, not only of

17 Serbs, Montenegrins, but also of many, many Albanians who were deemed

18 loyal to the Serbian state, were styled as spies. They suffered a great

19 deal. They were targeted. And we were monitoring the situation and the

20 developments with regard to that.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.

22 MR. EMMERSON: I appreciate the question did not set out to elicit

23 inadmissible opinion evidence of that nature, but I wonder if Mr. Re might

24 confine the witness or control the answers in a way that doesn't allow

25 them to transgress into areas which are not proper for the witness to be

Page 9676

1 giving opinion evidence about.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.

3 MR. RE:

4 Q. If we come to the next part of the report --

5 Of course, I will endeavour to --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's understood. Please proceed.

7 MR. RE: It's implicit.

8 Q. The next part. Underneath that, you refer to -- sorry, it refers

9 to "operative information" indicated that Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, is on

10 the territory of Zvecan municipality with members of the Serbian Guard.

11 They are staying in the Trojka Hotel.

12 A. Zvecan.

13 Q. I apologise for my sloppy pronunciation.

14 The next paragraph: "This stay was noted a few days ago when

15 Arkan came to this area by helicopter."

16 What the significance of that particular incident, that is,

17 Arkan's presence there, such that it was put in this report? I mean, why

18 was the 14th Counter-Intelligence Group reporting on Arkan's presence?

19 A. Because the unit of Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, was in view of the

20 army a paramilitary formation. They were in contacts with the State

21 Security Service but in the army's view, they were a paramilitary

22 formation. There existed a strict order of the Chief of Staff according

23 to which paramilitary forces and groups should not be allowed access in

24 Kosovo and Metohija. Therefore, they arrived there without the approval

25 or the knowledge of the army and it was considered that this ought to be

Page 9677

1 included in the report. Besides, there were great problems precisely with

2 that formation -- there had been great problems with that formation ever

3 since 1991.

4 Q. [Microphone not activated]?

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

6 MR. RE:

7 Q. Were you aware of KLA communiques being published in the 1990s?

8 A. Yes, I was. Although, I did not have occasion to read them at the

9 time. But I knew that they were releasing these communiques.

10 Q. That's at paragraph 11 of your statement, where you say you first

11 became aware of them in the mid -- of the KLA in the mid-1990s from

12 communiques issued in the name of the organisation.

13 When did you begin to --

14 If paragraph 11 could please be displayed in Sanction at the

15 moment.

16 When did you become aware -- when did you first start to read the

17 KLA communiques?

18 A. That must have been back in 1997. I know that they published two

19 communiques. One was on the 12th of January, and the other one on the

20 19th of January, as far as I remember. They concerned the -- or

21 contained, rather, warnings to the MUP and the army about them having to

22 leave Kosovo, since they were occupiers there. I'm not quoting. I am

23 paraphrasing.

24 The first communiques -- communique was dated the 12th of January,

25 and the other one --

Page 9678

1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter isn't sure whether the witness

2 said the 29th of January.

3 MR. RE:

4 Q. Did you say the 29th or the 12th of January?

5 A. The 12th of January, 1997 and the 19th of January, 1997.

6 Q. Can you please turn to annex 2, which is 65 ter number 2092. It's

7 an information issued by the counter -- 14th Counter-Intelligence Group of

8 the 5th of December, 1997.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Let's first find out whether the previous document

10 has been assigned an exhibit number.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1997.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, annex number 2 is 65 ter number

15 2092. It will be marked for identification as P1140. Annex 3 is 65 ter

16 number 2093, and that's marked for identification as P1141.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

18 MR. RE:

19 Q. Can I take you to the portion where in the English it says: In

20 the most recent underground newspaper of the People's Movement for Kosovo,

21 there is a KLA communique in which the KLA accepts responsibility for the

22 following: First, bomb attack, 11th of November, 1997, against the house

23 of the president of the Podujevo municipality, Tomcic, in Tasec village;

24 next, clash in the villages of the Drenica area between 25th and 28th of

25 November this year; next one, striking down a Cessna-310 on the 26th of

Page 9679

1 November; then the attack on Rznic police station, 27th of November; and

2 the next one, the murder of Danilo Dugolija from Petrastica village,

3 Stimlje, 28th of November.

4 I want you to comment upon those incidents in relation to the KLA

5 and its publication or claiming responsibility for various attacks.

6 A. As far as I can remember - and with regard to the killings, well,

7 that in fact did take place - but as far as the Cessna is concerned, I

8 don't think that happened. I don't think it was struck down. But fire

9 may have been opened on that plane, because they would often open fire on

10 those planes. I remember these events, but I've already told you what I

11 thought about the Cessna. I don't want to repeat that.

12 Q. Okay. You say you don't think the Cessna happened, but other --

13 the other one, two, three, four -- the bomb attack on the 11th of

14 November, 1997; the clash in Drenica; the attack on the police station;

15 and the murder of Danilo Dugolija and --

16 A. That happened.

17 But I'd like to point something out. The police station near

18 Rznic was frequently attacked. It was frequently attacked and finally

19 it -- a point in time came when it was necessary to withdraw the men,

20 because they were really in a very difficult situation. There were

21 frequent attacks.

22 Q. What I'm getting at is the veracity, in your experience, of the

23 KLA communiques. Now, you've said the attack on the Cessna you didn't

24 think happened but the other things did happen. What about other KLA

25 communiques that you read at the time?

Page 9680

1 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MR. EMMERSON: Before the witness answers, I've forborne from

4 intervening in the manner of the questioning because when a witness is

5 asked to give evidence about a particular incident, the Trial Chamber has

6 indicated -- and until now the Prosecution has abided by that

7 indication -- that sources of knowledge need to be specified, that in

8 respect of each particular incident the manner and basis upon which this

9 witness speaks need to be clarified and explained.

10 Now, I left it in respect of this collection of reported

11 incidents, but if Mr. Re is now inviting the witness to extrapolate and

12 give a generalised opinion on documents that are not in the bundle and on

13 which he's not being asked to comment, then -- then, in our submission,

14 that takes it a stage too far.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.

16 MR. RE: I'm asking the witness to comment on this particular

17 communique, which is referred to in this document and which has been --

18 which is before the Trial Chamber.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

20 MR. RE: The witness's experience of this communique vis-a-vis

21 other communiques and whether the KLA was, in his experience --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Let's -- let's limit it at this moment. Let's ask

23 the witness where he says that he has doubts on whether it happened with

24 the Cessna what information he gained which allows him to tell us about

25 the veracity of these documents. Would you please do so.

Page 9681

1 MR. RE:

2 Q. But -- but very shortly, please. I just want the information

3 which allows you to conclude that the attacks there -- described there

4 actually occurred.

5 A. Well, this information was obtained from the MUP. That's for

6 sure, because the MUP acted through its bodies to carry out on-site

7 investigations. On the basis of those investigations, they determined the

8 circumstances under which they were killed and all other relevant factors

9 were also established. So this information was obtained from the MUP.

10 There was an exchange of information with them. And as we followed all of

11 this, Colonel Tomic believed it should be included in the report.

12 And as far as the Cessna is concerned, well, that's an important

13 event. Had a Cessna been struck down, one would have been aware of the

14 fact. An investigation would have been carried out and the department

15 would have been informed of it. I would certainly have remembered an

16 event of that kind. I don't exclude the possibility that fire was opened

17 on a Cessna, but as far as I can remember - and I'm 99.9 per cent sure of

18 this - a Cessna was not brought down. Perhaps there was a helicopter that

19 was forced to land as a result of fire being opened from the ground, and

20 that concerns the entire period we're interested in.

21 Q. In paragraph 11, in the middle, you say: "In 1996 and 1997, the

22 KLA expanded its attacks to include VJ forces along the border with

23 Albania."

24 Then at the bottom of the paragraph, you say: "I remember that on

25 the 28th of January, 1998, you received information that in 1997 there

Page 9682

1 were 55 KLA attacks against the VJ along the border and 51 attacks against

2 the VJ throughout the rest of Kosovo. This number increased dramatically

3 in 1998."

4 What was the source of your information about the 106 attacks

5 which you refer to there?

6 A. Well, the inspection of the 28th of January, 1998 involved a team

7 led by myself. We were in the counter-intelligence unit of the 3rd Army

8 and the chief of the counter-intelligence of Rade [as interpreted] Corps

9 was there, the chief of the 14th and 15th, and these are reports of

10 theirs. It was on the basis of their reports that we obtained this

11 information.

12 They also had the relevant dates, and so on and so forth, but I

13 didn't put the dates in the report. That was for the year 1997.

14 Q. You then go on to say: "This number increased dramatically in

15 1998." What was your information about the number of attacks in 1998?

16 A. On the basis of the reports that we received, on the army's

17 problems with the KLA. In 1998 at the border, there were 196 incidents --

18 or rather, attacks, on the border with the Republic of Albania, and there

19 were 191 attacks in the territory. So that makes a total of 367 attacks.

20 And in comparison with 1997, this was four times more attacks, so there

21 are factors that show when these attacks took place, the dates on which

22 they took place, et cetera. So we do have the relevant documentation.

23 Q. What was the source of your information for the figure you've just

24 given of 367 attacks?

25 A. As far as the border incidents are concerned, we had reports from

Page 9683

1 border units of the 53rd and 55th Border Battalion. We had their reports

2 about attacks on border units that they forwarded to us. And as far as

3 attacks on the territory are concerned, we had unit reports, the reports

4 that were forwarded from the units that had been attacked there.

5 Q. And what do you define as "an attack"?

6 A. Well, I define something as an attack if at least a group is

7 involved, a group of three individuals at the least are involved in an

8 armed attack. So I would exclude individuals, I'd exclude just one

9 person; although, such things can happen too. But such incidents aren't

10 that serious, so to speak. But here I'm referring to an organised group

11 with a particular objective, a particular task in mind, and so on and so

12 forth.

13 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry. Just for purposes --

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

15 MR. GUY-SMITH: -- of clarification, are we talking about the

16 entire calendar year of 1998?

17 JUDGE ORIE: Could you tell us whether these figures covered the

18 whole of the year or ...

19 THE WITNESS: That's correct. That comment is quite correct. I'm

20 referring to the entire period, the entire calendar year 1998. But

21 Mr. Prosecutor, let me add something with regard to 1998. I do apologise.

22 In July and August 1998, out of the total of 196, in July and

23 August there were 71 attacks. 71 attacks on border units, units of the

24 border with Albania, and 18 were on the Kosare point, which was the most

25 exposed point in that area when it came to these attacks, these armed

Page 9684

1 attacks.

2 MR. RE:

3 Q. What about before July and August? In, say, March, April, May.

4 A. There were far fewer attacks then. In mid-March there were more

5 attacks. In April there were quite a few attacks. May, June, and July,

6 and so on -- well, it depended on the situation the KLA was in, its

7 reorganisation. It depended on the need to arm. So in light of these

8 factors, the incidents became more frequent and the escalation was

9 gradual.

10 Q. What were the estimates of the size and strength of the KLA in

11 early 1998 based upon? When I say "early," I mean January, March --

12 sorry, January, February, March 1998.

13 A. Well, we believed that there were about up to 3.000 armed men who

14 had organised themselves and there were between 6 and 8.000 who had

15 weapons. So the distinction is an important one. There was a group of

16 about 3.000. They were armed, but they were also organised. They formed

17 certain units. But then there was this other group who had -- members of

18 which had weapons, and occasionally they participated in certain

19 operations or they were involved in protective operations in villages, in

20 staffs, et cetera.

21 Q. In which area are you referring to?

22 A. I am referring to the entire area of Kosovo.

23 Q. What -- upon what do you base that assessment?

24 A. The assessment is based on information obtained through the work

25 of special services, and it was also obtained through discussions with

Page 9685

1 imprisoned KLA members and discussions with other individuals who had

2 direct contact with the KLA. They provided such information, and there

3 were also conversations in villages. And then we put all the information

4 together. We collected all this information. This information isn't 100

5 per cent reliable, so we can say it's approximative.

6 Q. How did the information the military have compare with that of the

7 state intelligence? Or state security?

8 A. Yes, we had certain misunderstandings, so to speak. Perhaps the

9 expression is not the most appropriate one, but I think you'll understand

10 what I mean. The army was far more realistic when it came to these

11 assessments. Above all, we are soldiers and we have a professional

12 approach. It's easier for us to assess the situation, and it wasn't in

13 our interest to exaggerate the situation or to diminish its seriousness.

14 Although, there was a little exaggeration on the other side, but we kept

15 to our military information.

16 Q. Were the DB's estimates, in your view, based on everything you

17 knew, underestimates, overestimates, or just about right of the strength

18 of the KLA?

19 A. Well, there were certain exaggerations. Everything wasn't really

20 as it had been described. So sometimes we would rely on their information

21 and then realise once we were in the field that the information was not in

22 fact correct.

23 So one learned to be cautious. As the people say, once burnt,

24 twice shy.

25 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown Exhibit MFI P955, which

Page 9686

1 is a publication of the Deputy Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the

2 16th of March, 1998.

3 When that comes on the screen, I just want you to have a look at

4 the portion that says "Information," and where it says that: "We believe

5 that the operations by organs of the Ministry of Interior in Kosovo cannot

6 be described as an internal armed conflict in the sense of Article 3 of

7 the Geneva Conventions. This concerns a police action directed at

8 preventing crimes, acts of terrorism. This is a very important

9 distinction," and so on.

10 Now, did you see that document at the time?

11 A. No. This is the first time I've seen the document.

12 Q. Now, is the information -- what is the information there

13 consistent with in your military experience?

14 A. No.

15 Q. All right. Maybe I didn't phrase the question well enough. Is it

16 consistent with what was actually occurring on the ground based on

17 everything you saw and was reported to you?

18 A. No. Terrorism was at stake, and here reference is made to

19 preventing crimes. But it was a case of pure terrorism. I don't know

20 whether someone is playing with politics here, but I believe that this

21 document has been drafted very unprofessionally.

22 Q. Is it consistent with the view being expressed by the military to

23 the higher echelons of state?

24 A. No, it isn't.

25 Q. What was the military telling the higher echelons about what was

Page 9687

1 happening in Kosovo? That is, in that period, March 1998.

2 A. Well, they relayed information, had very valid evidence according

3 to which a paramilitary formation was being established in Kosovo. And

4 this was to be the means for realising the political objectives by having

5 recourse to force, by having recourse to terrorist methods, and

6 irrefutable evidence was provided to this effect, because Yugoslavia had

7 its own army.

8 Q. Paragraph 14 of your statement - if that could please be displayed

9 in Sanction - you refer to Colonel Delic proposing -- engaging his units

10 in areas of KLA control to restore security and you say that it must be

11 understood in the context of the constitutional limit on the VJ, which

12 prohibited operations beyond the limited area of the border. The proposed

13 operations would have required the President to declare a state of

14 emergency.

15 I just want you to elaborate on that. What was the requirement

16 for a declaration of the state of emergency?

17 A. According to the Law on the Defence of the Federal Republic of

18 Yugoslavia, there is the possibility of declaring three states. One of

19 them is a state of emergency. And such a state is declared when security

20 is under threat in a certain part of the territory and the territorial

21 integrity and sovereignty of the state is at risk. So the threat is posed

22 by an armed organisation that has objectives that it wants to attain

23 through force, and on the basis of such a threat, it is possible to

24 declare a state of emergency.

25 MR. RE: Can the witness please be shown MFI 2100. Oh, 65 ter

Page 9688

1 2100, which is a proclamation dated the 17th of May, 1998. Can that --

2 and I don't think that one has a -- an MFI number yet.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be marked for

5 identification as P1174.

6 MR. RE: I said it was dated the 17th of May. I'm in error. It's

7 actually the 18th of May.

8 Q. Just very briefly tell the Trial Chamber the significance of this

9 particular proclamation extending the border zone pursuant to a -- a

10 federal government decision of the 23rd of April, 1998. I mean, what does

11 it mean?

12 A. Well, let me just remind you of the fact that the Army of

13 Yugoslavia had to secure the lines when it came to securing the borders.

14 That means the border itself and an area to the depth of 100 metres from

15 the border. If the border belt or the depth of the border belt is

16 changed, that involves changing the borderline and the federal bodies are

17 responsible for such a thing, the federal government in the former

18 Yugoslavia. So an extension can be made to the depth of 5 or 10

19 kilometres, which in fact results in tracing a new border from a military

20 and security viewpoint.

21 That's what it means. It means that the army then has certain

22 responsibilities, certain military responsibilities to a depth of 5

23 kilometres. So they are not just responsible for the border itself but

24 for the area to the depth of 5 kilometres from the border. They

25 communicate -- they control disarming. They have contact with the

Page 9689

1 population. They try to make sure that the population abides by

2 well-established rules. And the Ministry of the Interior also has greater

3 responsibilities when it comes to public law and order in this area. And

4 this was a very significant decision.

5 Q. If I could just take you back to paragraph 17 -- sorry, 14 and the

6 second part of it.

7 If that could just be displayed in Sanction for a moment, on page

8 8.

9 You said: "I remember that request to declare a state of

10 emergency were rejected by the state leadership for fear that it could

11 lead to civil casualties and that international reaction would be

12 negative."

13 What -- what sort of international reaction or international

14 discussion had taken place by then?

15 A. International.

16 Q. Yes, international.

17 A. Well, at the time - I won't comment on how sincere this was - but

18 at the time, there was a preference to deal with the problems in Kosovo

19 via political means. As far as the state of emergency is concerned, well,

20 introducing the state gives the army greater responsibility, and if the

21 army had more responsibility, that would have had consequences in relation

22 to the violation of the Geneva Conventions and international war law. So

23 the political leadership didn't want to adopt such a decision. The

24 government believed that a political solution could be found to the

25 crisis, but they also believed that the MUP was sufficient, because MUP

Page 9690

1 had the responsibility of fighting terrorism and they believed that the

2 MUP could be successful in dealing with the terrorist problem in

3 cooperation with the army.

4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me. I -- at this point, I would move to

5 strike the answer as non-responsive to the question asked. The question

6 was: Well, what sort of international reaction or international

7 discussion had taken place by then? And there's been no answer to that

8 question.

9 MR. RE: I'm happy to press the question and -- and use the answer

10 just given.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think more important is that you seek an

12 answer to the question. That's ...

13 MR. RE:

14 Q. Had there been international discussion about these issues and, in

15 particular, the KLA?

16 A. Yes. There were international political discussions about the

17 situation in Kosovo. And I can also say that from the 5th of March until

18 about the 20th of May, 1998, the federal government had 13 contacts with

19 the representatives of Kosovo and Metohija. This was under the auspices

20 of the International Community, but they attempted to find a political

21 solution, but it's a well-known fact that this was all to no avail. So

22 there was much activity, but unfortunately what transpired is something

23 that I, as a human being, did not want to see happen.

24 Q. Was there an intelligence exchange between the Federal Republic of

25 Yugoslavia and other nations about the KLA?

Page 9691

1 A. Yes. Thank you for putting this question to me. First off, back

2 in 1997 the State Security had contacts with the high representatives of

3 the American CIA. I believe that the then-CIA director, who was at the

4 head of the intelligence service in the USA, was involved in these

5 contacts.

6 Then in late 1997 and in 1998 we also had contacts with them, and

7 the last one was on the 2nd of March, 1998, that we exchanged information

8 on this matter as well as on the Islam -- on the Islamic factors, because

9 they were quite interested in that. And unfortunately, this transpired

10 later on in September 2001.

11 Q. Did you participate in these particular discussions?

12 A. Yes, I took part in these discussions. I was even given a task to

13 develop a platform for these contacts. We had plans for long-term

14 activities and the platform was given by the then-Chief of the General

15 Staff, General Perisic. There was a total of five meetings.

16 Q. You just referred to the Islamic factors. Is that -- well, what

17 are you referring to there?

18 A. Are you referring to the contacts and exchange of information with

19 the CIA?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. They were primarily interested in the Islamic factor in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They did not speak of al-Qaeda at the time, but they

23 spoke of extremists, fundamentalists, and so on and so forth. They were

24 especially interested in the training centres of the Mujahedin, the

25 largest one being in Zenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other one in

Page 9692

1 Doboj. They were also interested in knowing who these persons were who

2 had come from Arabic countries to Bosnia-Herzegovina and joined the Muslim

3 army. It was general knowledge that a Mujahedin brigade was formed in

4 Zenica called the El Mujahedin. To cut the long story short, we provided

5 them with interesting information that they did not have before, but we

6 also told them that there existed certain contacts that led down to

7 Kosovo. This was something we knew at the time and we were confirmed in

8 that information.

9 They also provided us interesting information with regard to the

10 Islamic situation and the situation in Kosovo.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, I am looking at the clock. Would this be a

12 suitable moment --

13 MR. RE: Yes.

14 JUDGE ORIE: -- to have a break?

15 Then -- one second, please.

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Guy-Smith, the Chamber still owes you a decision

18 on your request to have that answer struck from the record. Although the

19 Chamber does agree with you that it's not responsive to the question, it

20 nevertheless is not irrelevant for those reasons.

21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Understood. I really was more seeking a mechanism

22 whereby we get an answer to the question.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. At the same time, we're listening.

24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you. I appreciate it.

25 JUDGE ORIE: If you say you request the question be struck from

Page 9693

1 the record, then you'll get a decision.

2 MR. GUY-SMITH: I appreciate it very much.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Re, could you give us any time indication?

4 MR. RE: I think about 20 minutes.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could the Defence give us any time indications?

6 MR. EMMERSON: Might we confer amongst ourselves over this

7 adjournment and return to the Trial Chamber afterwards? I -- I'm at --

8 I'm certain that we'll finish with the witness tomorrow if that's what

9 Your Honour is inquiring about.

10 MR. GUY-SMITH: If that's the concern, then the answer is

11 absolutely "yes."

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think there are no other witnesses on the

13 list for this week. And this -- tomorrow's the last day and if you're

14 confident that we'll finish the testimony of this witness by tomorrow,

15 then further details at this moment are --

16 The only thing, Mr. Harvey, I'm always look at you. Take care

17 that you're not the last one on my list.

18 MR. HARVEY: I'm always nodding.

19 JUDGE ORIE: No. My concern was that you might be the victim

20 again at the very end of the cross-examination.

21 MR. HARVEY: I do appreciate your concern, but you'd have seen me

22 on my feet earlier if I'd had any serious worries.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that.

24 We'll resume at five minutes past 6.00.

25 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.

Page 9694

1 --- On resuming at 6.13 p.m.

2 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber apologises for the late start.

3 Mr. Re, you may proceed.

4 MR. RE: Can we just go to annex 31, please, which is an

5 operations -- it's a report -- a regular combat report of the 11th of May,

6 1998, from the Djakovica forward command post, and that is 65 ter 417.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Does it need an exhibit number, Mr. Re?

8 MR. RE: 65 ter number 417.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Would be, Mr. Registrar?

10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be P1165.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12 MR. RE:

13 Q. If you could just, please, turn to paragraph -- or point 5, where

14 it says: "The situation in the territory." And in the middle of that

15 paragraph, it says:

16 "According to operative information from the security service,

17 Mujahedin dressed in traditional Mujahedin dress have been observed in

18 Donji Nec village. Women and children from surrounding armed villages

19 have been accommodated in Junik village."

20 Just before the break, you were referring to the presence of -- or

21 discussions about Mujahedin. Were there Mujahedin operating in the

22 Dukagjin area or zone in the first half of 1998?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. How many Mujahedin units were there and where were they?

25 A. There was one unit consisting of some 50 men, the commander of

Page 9695

1 which was Afrim Ljulji, it was active in the area of Smonica and

2 Jablanica. We identified another group. We couldn't determine the

3 strength of it, but it was active in the area of the villages of Prilep

4 and Voksa, somewhere there in that area. In the Dukagjin operational

5 zone, occasionally groups of Mujahedin would arrive from the area of

6 Drenica. There was one group called Abu Bekir Sadik, the commander of

7 which was Ekrem Avdija [phoen], a hodza, who was in Bosnia-Herzegovina

8 fighting in the war in 1992 and in the Mujahedin centre in Zenica, where

9 he completed training. He had connections with Saudi Arabia and so on and

10 so forth. So this was one unit.

11 We had information which was not verified that there was another

12 unit of some 40 Mujahedin active in the area of Drenica.

13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the name of it.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And they occasionally entered into

15 the Dukagjin operational zone.

16 MR. RE:

17 Q. I'm only interested in verified information. Were these Mujahedin

18 units within the KLA structure?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What was the source of your information about these Mujahedin

21 units?

22 A. Primarily the tactical units, the VJ and the MUP who were active

23 in the area, came across some soldiers who were killed and had IDs on them

24 so they could be identified. Besides, they had that -- the characteristic

25 dress and they were wearing their typical headwear and they spoke Arabic.

Page 9696

1 So we had that sort of information and we also had information that the

2 service obtained from their own sources, from the MUP, and so on and so

3 forth.

4 Q. What was your information about how they were being funded?

5 A. We had quite accurate information in that regard. I believe that

6 my recollection is right when I recall some nine humanitarian

7 organisations that were formed by some Arabic countries, primarily by

8 Saudi Arabia, but there was also -- there were also some organisations

9 from Iran, Iraq and Yemen. Some of these humanitarian organisations had

10 their branch offices in Kosovo and Metohija too, and they raised funds for

11 them. Some -- I apologise.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. Mr. Re, we need -- going into this area,

13 we really need great precision. I take the witness back to -- to the last

14 question. The last question was: Were these Mujahedin units within the

15 KLA structure? And the answer was yes. And then you asked what

16 information there was.

17 If I try to analyse and understand the answer, you said: "Tactical

18 units, VJ and MUP, came across some soldiers who were killed and had IDs

19 on them so that they could be identified." Well, that's what I still

20 understand.

21 "Besides, they had the characteristic dress." That's also

22 something I understand.

23 "And they were wearing their typical headwear and they spoke

24 Arabic." I take it those deceased persons did not speak Arabic any more,

25 would they?

Page 9697

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were -- you're quite right in

2 observing this, but there were some individuals who were captured. Some

3 of these individuals had their diaries, kept notes, and it was on that

4 basis that we obtained our information too.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We need greatest precision here, Mr. Re,

6 because it -- it seems that testimony in this respect brings a lot of new

7 elements in where we -- we hardly, if at all, we have any information from

8 elsewhere.

9 So therefore from seeing how they're dressed, what their identity

10 is, to -- to just conclude that, therefore, they are in the KLA structure,

11 that is -- and then go on to financing, that -- and financing seems not to

12 be very much integrated in KLA finances. So therefore if -- if you want

13 to introduce this evidence, then we really have to be very precise,

14 careful, and thoroughly explore the sources used.

15 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

17 MR. EMMERSON: It may be that the point that I was about to make

18 rather dovetails with the point that Your Honour has just made, but I

19 don't know whether Mr. Re is able to help me in identifying where in this

20 witness's statement or in any of the material served by the Prosecution

21 thus far we find that the Defence have been put on notice of this line of

22 examination, because it's not something that I'm aware of at all.

23 MR. RE: Annex 31, the document which refers to the Mujahedin.

24 MR. EMMERSON: It refers to --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

Page 9698

1 MR. EMMERSON: -- information received from the DB about

2 individuals having been seen in an area some considerable distance remote

3 from the subject of the questions Mr. Re is putting to the witness.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, I think that to that extent perhaps

5 Mr. Emmerson and I are on the same line, that it comes a bit as a surprise

6 and it's relatively new and that, therefore, it needs full exploration in

7 order -- if -- if you want to take this seriously.

8 Please proceed.

9 MR. RE:

10 Q. Can I take you, please, Mr. Gajic, to annex 10, which is 65 ter

11 number 2098, and it's on the top peak of KLA weaponry.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Does it need a number?

13 MR. RE: Yes, please.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours that, will be marked for

16 identification as P1148.

17 MR. RE:

18 Q. I just want to take you to the reference to Stinger-type rockets,

19 which is in the 7th paragraph in the Serbian, and it refers to members of

20 the OVK in Glodjane have at their disposal around 10 anti-aircraft rockets

21 of Stinger type.

22 What sort of -- very briefly, what sort of weaponry are Stingers?

23 What's the significance of their having Stingers?

24 A. This is an anti-aircraft weapon, portable. It is fired from the

25 shoulder, of American make. Its significance lies in the fact that the

Page 9699

1 weapon targets aircraft flying low and helicopters too. Since very few of

2 the aircraft were flying low, it was the helicopters that were targeted by

3 these weapons most.

4 Q. Did that present a military threat to the VJ, the presence of

5 these Stingers?

6 A. Objectively speaking, yes. Up to that point, they had had

7 difficulties in obtaining cutting-edge weapons and they mostly carried

8 firearms.

9 Q. Could you turn to paragraph 15 of your statement, please, which --

10 in which you refer to the discovery of weaponry apparently abandoned by

11 KLA members attempting to cross the Albanian border into Kosovo.

12 From your position in counter-intelligence, can you give the Trial

13 Chamber a very brief overview of the weaponry that was recovered or

14 discovered in the first six months of 1998.

15 Can that be displayed in Sanction, please. Thank you.

16 A. Yes. According to information we received in the security

17 administration, down -- or up the counter-intelligence line and down the

18 command line, in the first six months some 25.000 weapons of different

19 calibre and type were recovered together with some 500.000 bullets and

20 shells of different calibre, some 10.000 hand-grenades, greater quantities

21 of hand-held launchers and mortars, mostly of 60-millimetre, not that much

22 of 82-millimetre, and several tonnes of military equipment.

23 Q. In which territory was this?

24 A. Roughly speaking, 90 per cent of these weapons crossed the

25 territory -- crossed the border with Albania, and the other quantities of

Page 9700

1 weapons crossed the border of Macedonia and to -- to a lesser extent the

2 border of Montenegro. In essence, there were two channels across which

3 arms were carried in.

4 JUDGE ORIE: I'm sorry, just for my information, I interrupted the

5 witness more or less in the middle of his answer concerning financing of

6 Mujahedin. I then very much encouraged you to further explore details of

7 what had been said before. It -- it seems that you're now covering other

8 ground. Is that that you give up on that or how do I have to understand

9 that?

10 MR. RE: Well, it's a timing issue, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE ORIE: It's --

12 MR. RE: If Your Honour wishes -- if the Trial Chamber wishes us

13 to explore the issue of the funding of the Mujahedin, we'll willingly do

14 that.

15 JUDGE ORIE: No, not that. No, of course. My first concern was,

16 well, the Mujahedin being within the KLA structure. Where I -- and if --

17 I do understand that if you say for reasons of time I'm not further

18 exploring that matter at this moment.

19 MR. RE: At this moment.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.

21 MR. RE:

22 Q. Paragraph 23, Mr. Gajic. If you could please turn to paragraph 23

23 of your statement, which refers to attacks on the 52nd Military Police

24 Battalion on the 22nd of April, 1998. And you say: "The 52nd Military

25 Police Battalion responded by" -- I'm sorry: "The attack continued,

Page 9701

1 responded by firing a double-barreled anti-aircraft gun. The attack

2 continued until a 155-millimetre Howitzer was fired at the attackers."

3 Now, that's described in the annexes referred to in that

4 paragraph. I won't take you to those. I just want to ask you: In

5 military terms, what's the significance of firing a Howitzer? Why would

6 they fire a Howitzer?

7 A. The question is an appropriate one, because Howitzer is a very

8 powerful artillery weapon, especially the 155-millimetre Howitzer.

9 This is my answer: The 52nd Military Police Battalion was

10 deployed in the Lake Radonjic area, a very specific area. It was

11 frequently attacked - and I know this on the basis of various reports, and

12 this can be checked. We have the documentation. Between 22nd April and

13 the 20th of July, 1998, the battalion was attacked on 16 different

14 occasions. Sixteen. It was deployed in a -- in an area that was quite

15 problematic because it was cutting off the roads leading to Metohija.

16 This is an opinion of mine and perhaps an explanation for this:

17 It was decided to fire a shell from a 155-millimetre Howitzer because the

18 battalion had been under frequent attacks. This was to have a

19 psychological effect, because when a Howitzer is fired, a large crater is

20 produced by the projectile and it has its psychological impact.

21 To the best of my knowledge, had there been any victims as a

22 result of this attack, this would have been contained in the report.

23 Q. Just go to the paragraph preceding that, paragraph 22, in which

24 you refer to the 52nd Military Police Battalion. And you've just said

25 there were 16 attacks in that period, 22nd April to 20th of July, 1998.

Page 9702

1 In the middle of the paragraph, you say: "These were forward

2 positions and acted as a bone in the throat of the terrorists."

3 Can you explain to the Trial Chamber what you mean by "bone in the

4 throat of the terrorists."

5 A. I believe I explained this. When you look at the position of Lake

6 Radonjic and the entire area, and in view of the continued attempts to

7 expand the territory, to connect Kosovo and Metohija with other parts of

8 Kosovo or vice versa, other parts of Kosovo with Metohija, and to take

9 control of the main roads and secondary roads, you have to look at where

10 the battalion was deployed. It was deployed in the general area which

11 made all of these attempts impossible. It was a well-equipped and trained

12 battalion. These were military police officers. That's why I use this

13 term. Meaning they were a thorn in their side.

14 Q. Can you please turn to paragraph 24 of your statement in which you

15 start off by saying: "Colonel Delic ordered a heightened level of

16 readiness on the 22nd of April, 1998." And you refer to a specific order,

17 which is annex 21, which is 65 ter number 385.

18 Could that please be given a -- a number.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 385 will be marked for

21 identification as P1157.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re, I find behind tab 21 a document with clear

23 large letters "tab 22" on the document itself. How should I interpret

24 this?

25 MR. RE: I don't think you should. I suspect it's come from

Page 9703

1 another trial.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MR. RE: And has been marked in that way.

4 JUDGE ORIE: But we are then -- because we have no 65 ter -- it's

5 the specific order annex 21. Under annex 21 I've got an order for

6 deployment of stand-by forces dated the 22nd of April, 1998. Is that the

7 document you're talking about?

8 MR. RE: That's the correct document, yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.

10 MR. RE:

11 Q. Mr. Gajic, I just want you to tell the Trial Chamber the

12 significance of that particular order in your military experience in terms

13 of what was then happening in Kosovo.

14 A. Yes. Well, this is an order the form of which and the content of

15 which is quite standard. It has to do with engaging forces that are

16 ready. Those are forces that are ready to be engaged at any point in time

17 at all times. It's efficient to press a button, as they say. And the

18 commander of the 449th [as interpreted] Brigade, Delic, decided to issue

19 such an order for the reasons you can see expounded in the first paragraph

20 under item 1.

21 Item 1 concerns the escalation of KLA activities, the formation of

22 new units, massing of men; there's the threat to the territory and to the

23 borders and border posts in particular. It wasn't possible to have access

24 to them in order to provide supplies, et cetera. So Delic decided to

25 issue such an order to prevent this from happening and to take preventive

Page 9704

1 action, because he believed that the situation would just become worse,

2 would deteriorate if something wasn't done about it.

3 Q. Was there anything more Delic could have done at the time when he

4 issued this order?

5 A. No, I think he did everything that was possible. Had any other

6 measures been taken, had he planned for any other steps, it would have

7 been necessary for him to receive a preparatory order, as we term it, from

8 the command of the Kosovo Corps. This can be seen in the documents. But

9 this is what it was possible for him to do on the basis of the authority

10 he had at the time, and it wasn't necessary to request a preparatory order

11 for this to be done.

12 Q. I just want to -- to finish, I just want to return to the issue

13 which the Trial Chamber was -- which we were at before, which was in terms

14 of the integration of Mujahedin into the KLA. I'm just trying to find the

15 reference.

16 The question which wasn't -- which needs a little bit of further

17 clarification or expansion was the -- I asked you: Were these Mujahedin

18 units within the KLA structure?

19 Can you precisely, with some precision, tell the Trial Chamber

20 whether they were within the KLA structure, where they were within the KLA

21 structure, and how you know this.

22 A. Well, first of all, not a single outside unit could have come to

23 the territory of Kosovo without those in power in the KLA being aware of

24 the fact and without the political wing of the KLA being aware of the

25 fact. It wouldn't have been possible for any single unit to do this

Page 9705

1 without their knowledge. And similarly, the army or the MUP would also

2 have been aware of the presence of any unit in the territory.

3 And secondly, Abu Bekir Sadik's unit was also the Bravo Unit. The

4 Bravo Unit was divided into two units, Bravo 1 and Bravo 2 and it

5 consisted of about 40 men, and they were in the territory of the Drenica

6 operative zone. This is where they operated. But occasionally, groups

7 from Abu Bekir Sadik's unit went to the territory of Kosovo, or rather

8 Metohija, but they went to other territories too, Malisevo and so on and

9 so forth. But it's essential that they were active in the territory of

10 Drenica, and that concerns both units and the unit under the command of

11 Afrim Ljulji was in Metohija. I have seen a diagram from the beginning of

12 1999, but it was actually part of the establishment of the operative zone

13 of Dukagjin. But that was at a subsequent time.

14 Q. How does presence within Kosovo equate to integration within the

15 KLA? That's what the Trial Chamber is interested in. How do you

16 precisely know that Mujahedin present in Kosovo were actually integrated

17 within the KLA structure?

18 A. Well, they were because there were -- there was combat activity

19 carried out there and they weren't isolated. There were KLA units next to

20 them. So it wasn't a secret formation that no one knew nothing about.

21 And previously they had all been to training centres in Albania

22 and they were then moved to Kosovo. The main centre was located in

23 Tropoje.

24 MR. RE: That's the evidence in chief.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Re.

Page 9706

1 Mr. Emmerson, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?

2 MR. EMMERSON: Your Honour, I am.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Gajic, you'll now be cross-examined by

4 Mr. Emmerson, who's counsel for Mr. Haradinaj.

5 MR. EMMERSON: I'm going, if I may --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, but perhaps I -- I have -- if you would not

7 mind - perhaps you do, Mr. Emmerson, but nevertheless - there was one --

8 there was one question -- one answer you gave which I had difficulties to

9 fully understand. I'll try to find it. It should be yellow somewhere.

10 I'll come back to it when I -- once I've found it. It might be at the end

11 of the today,.

12 Mr. Emmerson, please proceed.

13 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. I wonder if the witness could be handed the

14 white file of cross-examination documents. And perhaps I should just

15 explain, first of all, to him.

16 Cross-examination by Mr. Emmerson:

17 Q. Mr. Gajic, I'm going to ask you some questions now. And for that

18 purpose, you will be handed a white file of documents which includes some

19 of the annexes to your witness statement, but they're put in this file in

20 a slightly different order because it's the more logical way in which they

21 appear with other documents.

22 And I want to start, if I may, please, by taking you back to

23 paragraph 22 of your 92 ter statement whilst that file is being handed

24 around.

25 In paragraph 22, you describe the --