1 Tuesday, 27 April 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning.
7 Good morning, Ambassador.
8 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please continue your
11 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]
12 THE ACCUSED: Thank you, Your Excellency.
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Ambassador.
15 A. Good morning, Dr. Karadzic.
16 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, I would like us to have a
17 soft landing and to go through some things as quickly as possible,
18 because through your statements you gave me quite a few topics to deal
20 Your journals are invaluable. The only problem is a lot of it is
21 abbreviated, and then it can be interpreted this way and that way,
22 whereas I would like us to come to the right interpretations together.
23 Could we please try to deal with this now through yes-and-no
24 answers as much as possible. I truly appreciate your inclination to
25 defend the other side, but let us try to deal with this without resorting
1 to tu quoque.
2 What about your bosses, the heads of the European diplomacies and
3 others; did they tell you that Mr. Izetbegovic could not be trusted?
4 A. No, I don't think that ever arose. I can't recall --
5 Q. Thank you. Prosecution 065633. P780, actually. Page 61 in
6 e-court. Do we have it now? The right-hand side, could we zoom in on
7 the right-hand side, "Denis Pinheiro." The penultimate paragraph, "Denis
8 Pinheiro." This is from your journal. It says:
9 [In English] "Cutileiro was very concerned about what they see as
10 Genscher’s efforts to lay all the blame on the Serbs and Milosevic for
11 everything that goes wrong in B and H. Cutileiro says bluntly that
12 Mr. Izetbegovic is a liar and cannot be trusted. Denis Pinheiro thinks
13 it would be disastrous for the CSCE to de-recognise and expel Yugoslavia
14 on the 29th of April. He is probably going to Yugoslavia, including
15 B and H, before the CSCE April ..."
16 And so on.
17 [Interpretation] So it seems that they did report that to you,
18 but it was an oversight on your part; isn't that right? I mean, is this
19 not in your diary?
20 A. Yes, it is. We heard comments along those lines about all of the
22 Q. Well, that's tu quoque, I think, Mr. Ambassador. [Overlapping
24 A. Mr. Karadzic, it's also true.
25 Q. Yes. But say that to Mr. Tieger if he asks you about that. Now
1 I'm asking you about Izetbegovic. None of them said that I was a liar.
2 Could I please have page 62.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please refrain from making comments.
4 Put your question. Making comments does not help the Tribunal.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
6 Q. 62, on the right-hand side:
7 [In English] "Bring pressure on all parties to calm down
8 situation in B and H and tell Serbs and Croats to stop interfering. Tell
9 the Muslims, especially Izetbegovic and Silajdzic, to work more with
10 Cutileiro and stop running off to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for
11 money, weapons, and general support."
12 [Interpretation] Do you agree that that's what you wrote.
13 A. Yes, indeed.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic.
16 Ambassador, the accused made this statement like this in the
17 course of his questioning. Let me find it again. Yes:
18 "Now," the internationals, "none of them said that I was a liar,"
19 being Dr. Karadzic.
20 Do you have any comment on that?
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do have a comment. People did say that
22 Dr. Karadzic did not tell the truth. Lord Carrington said that, and we
23 had direct experience of it. The issue was not really tu quoque. As I
24 mentioned right at the outset, none of the three parties in Bosnia
25 innocent. They all did very bad things. As we saw from the journals
1 from the ICRC, from the UNHCR, things that were reported to us by actions
2 on the ground, the overwhelming number of the bad things were done by the
3 Bosnian Serb side, and I've said that. I don't have to say it again.
4 In connection with the negotiations, specifically, that is, the
5 attitude and the behaviour, we're quite used, as negotiators and as
6 impartial mediators, to misstatements by one or the other side, to
7 exaggerated statements by one or the other side. That's what makes
8 negotiation difficult. There, again, are no angels.
9 If I might give an example, I'm sure that Dr. Karadzic will
10 welcome this.
11 President Izetbegovic, in early March with the other leaders,
12 signed a tentative agreement regarding a draft map for
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some other items. When he returned to Sarajevo
14 at the end of March, he withdrew his signature. No question about that.
15 And this angered, naturally, the negotiators and clearly the other
16 parties, but that's the kind of thing that happens in negotiations. It
17 does not mean that this person or that person is inherently a liar. It's
18 part of the game of negotiations, although it's not a game. But there's
19 a good deal of back-and-forth on this as each party tries to enhance its
20 own position.
21 Thank you for giving me the chance to explain that.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ambassador.
23 Mr. Karadzic, see so refrain from making comments. Put
24 questions. If you think that the witness lied, then put to the witness
25 whether he lied, directly, instead of making comments.
1 Let's proceed.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Q. Nevertheless, from the previous document, Mr. Ambassador, we see
4 that Denis Pinheiro and Cutileiro say that the Serbs are being blamed
5 unnecessarily and that it's somebody else who's a liar. With all due
6 respect, Mr. Ambassador - now I'm dealing with your journals - nowhere in
7 your journals does it say that Karadzic is a liar, but that kind of
8 statement is made in respect of Izetbegovic in several places. What do
9 you say to that?
10 A. As I said a moment ago, Lord Carrington was the first person,
11 probably, who told us that all sides lied, and that included the
12 Bosnian Serb side. A leading Bosnian Muslim politician once
13 characterised the three sides to me in the following fashion. He said
14 the way to understand the fighting in Bosnia is as follows: The Serbs
15 are butchers, the Croats are killers, and we Muslims are assassins. So
16 even the parties, themselves, recognised that we were not dealing here
17 with pure evil on one side and pure good on the other, but rather a
18 mixture on all sides.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. We're going to show here the latest
20 statement made two or three days ago, speaking of butchers, that it's not
21 really the Serbs.
22 Can I now have -- oh, I see, I see. It's already been admitted
23 into evidence. I see.
24 Now, can I remind you of yesterday's transcript. 75 is the page:
25 [In English] "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. However, that is not
1 correct. You mentioned December 1992. That is exactly when it was
2 published in the 'Jerusalem Post,' that there are more Serb refugees than
3 Croat and Muslim refugees put together. Are you denying that?"
4 [No Interpretation]
5 [In English] "It's false, that's totally false and demonstrably
6 false. We have the account from the ICRC. They took the refugees out.
8 [Interpretation] Could I now call up -- or, rather, do you stand
9 by what you said yesterday?
10 A. Yes.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can I now call up
12 P784. The OTP 65 ter number is 06534.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you give the number again?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P784 on page 35, the meeting in
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. On the right-hand side, Mr. Kumin:
18 [In English] "Situation deteriorating in Serbia
19 heard. Many Muslims going into Serbia
20 inflow is a good one. On whole, non-discriminatory."
21 Three points:
22 "Needs to tell donor community that too much aid going to B and H
23 and Croatia
24 [Interpretation] This is your diary, isn't it?
25 A. Yes, it is.
1 Q. Thank you. On page 36 --
2 JUDGE KWON: By the way, who is Kumin?
3 THE WITNESS: Judith Kumin was at that time the leader of the
4 UNHCR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Q. On page 36:
8 [In English] "UNICEF - Lack of support from international
9 community for refugees in Serbia
10 [Interpretation] That's also from your diary, isn't it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to ask for P785, page 65, the
13 meeting held on the 25th of September, 1992:
14 [In English] "Mendiluce. Bosnian Serbs (and Muslims) also under
15 pressure; either fleeing, fighting in Eastern Bosnia, or fleeing
16 persecution by Muslims and Croats.
17 "About 350.000 refugees now in Serbia and Montenegro
18 and Herzegovina
19 "Displaced Serbs in East B and H: 170.000.
20 "Displaced in Western B and H: 150.000."
21 [Interpretation] Does this add up to 320.000 expelled Serbs who
22 had been moved out of their homes already in September 1992?
23 A. The largest out-flux of Serbs came from Western Slavonia. The
24 situation there was, after the Croatian, Serb, and Muslim attacks in June
25 and July and August, the Serbs and the JNA continued to the hold
1 Eastern Slavonia
3 they destroyed, utterly destroyed. But in Western Slavonia, which is in
4 the middle of the country, the Croatians rallied, defeated the JNA, and
5 the Serbs -- the Croatian Serbs went south to Bosnia, which was
6 Western Bosnia
7 Now, excuse me, I should add it's one of the reasons why, when
8 you see in my journal remarks by the ICRC and the UNHCR people about the
9 Serb detention camps in Western Bosnia, Trnopolje, Omarska, Manjaca,
10 really concentration camps, and they mention that the whole area is
11 hostile, that even when the prisoners of the Bosnian Serbs are allowed
12 out, they're in trouble, and the reason for that is that the area was
13 largely populated by these people from Croatia, and it's to be expected
14 that they were hostile. So that happened, and there's no question that
15 the Serbs were expelled from Western Slavonia.
16 And there's no argument that all the sides, leaving Croatia
17 now, talking about Bosnia
18 acts. There's also no question that the overwhelming number was
19 committed by the Bosnian Serbs, and we have quite accurate refugee count
20 of the Bosnian Muslims who went largely to Croatia and then went all over
22 And, Dr. Karadzic, since you quoted my journal, could I quote you
23 for a moment.
24 During the Prlic case to which you referred yesterday -- excuse
25 me, sorry. During the Krajisnik case, there was introduced into the
1 record, and no objection was made, the minutes of a meeting between the
2 Bosnian Serb leadership and the Serbian leadership at the Co-ordinating
3 Committee in January 1993. I'm sure you'll remember that. And it was to
4 discuss the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and this was the top leadership from
6 here I have to be very careful, as saying -- really boasting about the
7 following situation, and this is what he said: If you look at Zvornik,
8 the city in Bosnia
9 it had 50.000 people evenly divided between Serbs and Muslims. Now it
10 has 50.000 people, all Serbs. Well, what happened to the 50.000 Muslims?
11 So Dr. Karadzic was not ashamed, was not worried, was not
12 defensive about the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Bosnian Serbs,
13 and this is a reality.
14 I again repeat that all parties were guilty, to some degree,
15 about mistreatment of civilians belonging to the other ethnicities.
16 There was no question of that. Yesterday, I spoke about the fighting
17 between the Croats -- the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims in the
18 Lasva Valley
19 And, indeed, we have many eye-witnesses to it.
20 And, furthermore, that is precisely why these people have been
21 brought to this Tribunal to be charged. After all, it is only a few
22 doors away that the principal Croatian general, Gotovina, is on trial
23 here at the Tribunal. Halilovic and Oric were tried here. So we all
24 know --
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, yes.
1 THE WITNESS: -- that they all did it.
2 But the point I'm trying to make, and with which Dr. Karadzic
3 disagrees, is that the overwhelming number of crimes of this nature,
4 crimes against humanity, were committed by the Bosnian Serb side, in
5 accordance, actually, again Dr. Karadzic, October 1991, when you left the
6 old Bosnian Assembly, you said to them, If you vote for independence, it
7 will take the Muslims on a path to hell. And that's just what you did.
8 So you kept your word, you took them on the path to hell.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ambassador, for your kind explanation. I
10 hope your points were taken, but I have to note that this is sort of a
11 digression from the question. The question was whether there were
12 320.000 expelled Serbs who had been moved out of their homes already in
13 September 1992.
14 THE WITNESS: I thought I answered that by saying, yes, they came
15 from Western Slavonia. They were not Bosnian Croats.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's proceed.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, thank you.
18 Q. I agree that many Serbs from Western Slavonia fled in 1991. I
19 also visited sports halls in Krajina, where the richest citizens of
21 people. Thank you for having reminded me of that.
22 However, here a reference is made to Bosnia-Herzegovina. From
23 Eastern Bosnia
24 Eastern Bosnia
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 A. Excuse me. Might I just point out that on the previous page, you
3 will read:
4 "About 200.000 additional Muslims still in Serb areas run risk of
6 Indeed, they were displaced.
7 Q. Well, we'll see in what way they were displaced and expelled.
8 But, Mr. Ambassador, at that point in time they were still in
9 Republika Srpska, whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the Croatian
10 Muslim control at this point in time, that is to say, to the end of
11 September, there was not a single village that was not destroyed and
12 people expelled, where in Republika Srpska there were. And at that time,
13 right up to 1994, in fact, many Muslims and Croats lived on, and the
14 International Red Cross, in an organised way, tried to take them out of
16 evidence of that.
17 Do you challenge that?
18 A. Far from challenging it, Dr. Karadzic, that was one of the
19 principal crimes of the Bosnian Serbs. Let me refer you to the
20 August 26, 1992
21 International Committee of the Red Cross. He mentions several detention
22 camps in Western Bosnia as being particularly bad and holding upwards of
23 hundreds of thousands of people. He mentions, by name, Trnopolje,
24 Manjaca, and Omarska. Those were all camps run by your people, those
25 were all Serb camps.
1 Now, as I mentioned earlier, you offered to open up the camps.
2 You will recall that. We haven't mentioned it yet, but at one point
3 Dr. Karadzic offered to open up the camps, knowing full well that the
4 surrounding population from Western Slavonia were very bad, and that was
5 one of the reasons why the situation was complicated. The additional
6 situation was complicated for the ICRC and the UNHCR was that the
7 Bosnian Serbs, after much discussion, said to the ICRC and to the UNHCR,
8 You can take the people out of these camps, the Bosnian Muslims and
9 Bosnian Croats who were imprisoned. And this was a real moral dilemma,
10 and you'll find many conversations in my journals to that effect. It was
11 a moral dilemma for the ICRC and the UNHCR because, as they said to us,
12 We will be co-operating in ethnic cleansing, and that, indeed, was the
13 case. But they also finally reached the conclusion that it was a
14 question of life or death for the prisoners being held by the Serbs, and
15 so they did, in fact, take the prisoners from these camps into Croatia
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. With all due respect, this is a
17 rather sweeping statement and has to be established.
18 Now, I'd like to call up Prosecution Exhibit 786 next, please.
19 And what we claim all the time, Omarska and Keraterm were
20 investigative centres where the state organs conducted investigations:
21 41 per cent were released, and 59 per cent of people were sent to Manjaca
22 as prisoners of war, but we're going to show proof of that.
23 But let's see what it says about Trnopolje in your diary, and the
24 page is number 20 -- who was Thierry Germond, Mr. Ambassador?
25 A. Excuse me?
1 Q. Who was Thierry Germond?
2 A. Thierry Germond was the principal delegate for Europe of the
3 International Committee of the Red Cross and active in the former
5 Q. Thank you. Now let's see what it says on page 20 of this
6 Prosecution Exhibit P786, or OTP 06536.
7 On the left-hand side, Thierry Germond -- it says "Trnopolje":
8 [In English] "Trnopolje, more than 1.000 people have entered the
9 camp voluntary. The since it was empty a few days ago, that is the
11 [Interpretation] I say the following, and I have proof of that,
12 which we might not be presenting during your testimony, but, anyway, we
13 have them: Omarska and Keraterm were investigative centres where the
14 state organs investigated more than 1.600 prisoners of war in speedy
15 fashion, and Trnopolje was a centre where the Muslims, themselves --
16 well, they could come and go whenever they wished, and we have proof and
17 evidence to show that.
18 What do you have to say to that?
19 A. Well, as I mentioned a few moments ago, the Serbs from
20 Western Slavonia who had been evacuated to the western region were so
21 hostile to the local population that the Muslims and the Croats were
22 afraid, and some did, indeed, go into the camp at the end of the period,
23 because going into the camp then meant that they would be evacuated under
24 the auspices of the ICRC. So this is a question, Dr. Karadzic, largely
25 of timing. There's no question that the camp was eventually emptied, or
1 I should say closed and pretty much emptied, but the situation was very
2 bad while it was open, and that's why President Sommaruga specifically
3 referred to it to the world community at the London Conference in August
5 Now, also, Dr. Karadzic, along this same line, you haven't
6 mentioned but I will mention Tarcin Silo. Tarcin Silo was a prison camp
7 run by the Muslims which had the Bosnian Serbs in it, and it was also
8 visited by the ICRC. And we were told that the conditions there were
9 very bad, about as bad as in the Serb camps. But I've said that, and I
10 don't think I really need to repeat the point that all parties, in terms
11 of quality, behaved badly. In terms of quantity, the Bosnian Serb side
12 overwhelmingly was the biggest offender.
13 Q. Thank you. I am going to challenge that before this
14 Trial Chamber during the entire trial. Thank you for remembering Tarcin.
15 Do you agree that Tarcin, the Tarcin Silo, was closed only in the
16 spring of 1996, that is to say, several months after peace was signed?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Since you mentioned Zvornik and the meeting in
20 opposed to any forcible movement of the population and removal of the
21 population; and I said, supporting Mr. Jovanovic, that that was a crime
22 and that it was completely unnecessary because, in a natural way, people
23 were moving anyway and fleeing anyway, and I repeated that several times
24 at the Assembly sessions.
25 And I'd now like to refer to one particular Assembly session of
1 the 9th to the 11th of November, 1994. I think it's 65 ter document
2 00079. No, the 23rd of November. We need the meeting from the 9th to
3 the 11th of November before that. The same session was held from the 9th
4 to the 11th and the 23rd of November; 65 ter 00077 is the document
5 number, or 00079. So 7, 8 and 9 are three pages of the transcript or
7 Here's what I said:
8 "Never in history have we had a situation whereby war does not
9 create a reality of some kind, and this war has done the same. The Serbs
10 from Zenica are here now. Now, if you want to give the Muslims Zvornik,
11 then you have to wage a new war to expel those Serbs back to Zenica. And
12 it is according to that right that we are seeking Zvornik and a state of
13 our own, and we will get it."
14 So that, then, was an explanation on my part, not justification.
15 It was an explanation. I did not justify the various phenomena that took
16 place. I want to understand them. And they are my intellectual debates
17 with you and with everybody else, all the international representatives,
18 and not justifying something that took place and something that is
19 stronger than me and which no power structures can harness.
20 A. I understand your point of view, Dr. Karadzic. I have to say,
21 briefly but forcefully, I disagree with it. There were not so many
22 voluntary movements. There were, yes, voluntary movements, but the
23 winning side always claims voluntary.
24 The Israeli founding myth was that about half a million
25 Palestinians voluntarily fled their homes in Palestine during the War of
2 There are voluntary movements and there are forcible
3 displacements, and the latter far exceed the former.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I don't believe that it was
5 voluntary, but it was through people's own will, and the cause was the
6 fear of a hostile environment. You mentioned that they were expelled
7 from Western Slavonia because the inhabitants had this hostile attitude.
8 Now, we prevented that, but what I'm doing here is defending state
9 policy, and I'm also trying to understand the civil war and everything it
11 I'd like to call up OTP document 11358 next, please, page 3,
12 which is Lord Owen's book, "The Balkan Odyssey." Have we got that?
13 Page 3, please, "The Balkan Odyssey." It's page 40 and 41 in the book.
14 That's right.
15 On the right-hand side, towards the bottom of the page, it says
16 the following:
17 "Once nationalism has found independent expression in Croatia
19 [In English] " ... he felt he had to establish Bosnia
20 independence from Serbia
21 [No interpretation]
22 [In English] "Izetbegovic knew that these would lead to bloodshed
23 in this -- in his 'Islamic Declaration,' he warned that the Islamic
24 renaissance cannot be imagined without people prepared for enormous
25 personal and material sacrifice.
1 "I have often wondered whether Izetbegovic might have found it
2 easier to negotiate with the Serbs if he had not been a devote Muslim."
3 [Interpretation] Do you know Lord Owen's position, as expressed
4 here? Do you know that that was so?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you. You see, many of your colleagues, those who were at
7 the head of these undertakings and those who assisted you, have
8 completely different opinions to yours, and that is why I want to make a
9 distinction between your explanations and what you actually saw and
10 wrote. And do you agree that there is, indeed, a difference between the
12 A. No, I do not agree.
13 Q. Thank you. May we call up the next document, which is -- no, I
14 have a private question to ask you first. Are you a Republican or a
16 A. Dr. Karadzic, in the United States one does not ask anybody
17 what's his religion and what's his party, so while I'd like to be
18 co-operative, that is a question that we don't ask and we don't answer.
19 I consider myself a centra-liberal.
20 Q. Thank you. Yes, I expected an answer like that, but I know that
21 diplomats as a whole, professional diplomats, career diplomats, are not
22 affiliated in party terms.
23 May we have 1D157, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, are you going to tender this bit of
25 Lord Owen's book? It was already admitted, it was part of the evidence;
1 799, I was told. Thank you.
2 Let's proceed.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I hope everything has
4 been tendered so far. If not, we'll do so at the end of the session.
5 But do we have the next document? 1D157 is the number. Here it
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And that's precisely why I asked you about your party
9 affiliation. This is a Republican policy committee, and I'd like us to
10 turn to page -- well, it says here:
11 [In English] "Clinton
12 turn Bosnia
13 getting arms into Bosnia
14 to dig and create good relations with the Bosnian government, a senior
16 we will live to regret, because when they blow up some Americans, as they
17 no doubt will before this thing is over, it will be in part because the
18 Iranians were able to have the time and context to establish themselves
19 well in Bosnia
20 co-opted, contradicting US
21 This is "Los Angeles Times."
22 [Interpretation] 31st of December, 1996, is the date:
23 [In English] "Izetbegovic is the Muslim president of Bosnia
24 [Interpretation] Tell me now, please, are you aware of this
25 report by the Republican policy committee?
1 A. This is the first time I see it, but it doesn't have anything in
2 it that is a surprise to me. I've already reported that
3 President Tudjman on one occasion took Secretary Vance and me to the
4 Zagreb Airport
5 was loaded with arms and gas masks destined for the Bosnian Muslims.
6 That was an open secret, that the Muslims, who were not armed, were
7 trying to get arms from wherever they could. And we also have to bear in
8 mind that the reason they were doing this was that since September of
9 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 713 established an arms embargo on
10 all of Yugoslavia
11 legally no way to defend themselves, which was anomalous situation, to
12 say the least. And almost everybody we dealt with felt that lifting the
13 embargo was the fair thing to do. Secretary Vance did not agree with
14 that. He believed that lifting the embargo would widen the war, spread
15 it over all of the ex-Yugoslavia, and he was quite specific in that. He
16 was condemned for that position, but that didn't bother him because he
17 believed it to be true, and I think it was true. President Tudjman, for
18 example, believed it. President Gligorov of Macedonia believed it. But
19 it was a complicated situation. I mean, here was a recognised
20 government, after April 1992, in Sarajevo being shelled every day, 3.000
21 to 5.000 Bosnian Serb shells were falling on Sarajevo, and they were
22 under an arms embargo. They couldn't get weapons legally to fight back.
23 I think everybody knew that was anomalous situation, but the situation
24 was so complex that nobody had an answer for it.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I like your documents very much, and
1 the Muslims, I'm sure, will like your explanations, so we'll all be
3 Now, let's take a look --
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that's the kind of statement I
5 referred to. Do not make statements. Put your question. Your
6 statements lengthen the answers by the witness. Let's not waste your
8 What is your next question?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my question was a yes-or-no
10 question, whereas we received a tu quoque answer, which deserves a bit of
11 humour, humorous comment.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Now let's look at the next paragraph:
14 [In English] "If you read President Izetbegovic's writings as I
15 have, there is no doubt that he is an Islamic fundamentalist, says a
16 senior Western diplomatic with long experience in the region. He is a
17 very nice fundamentalist, but he's still a fundamentalist. This has not
18 changed. His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia, and the
19 Serbs and Croats understand this better than the rest of us."
20 [Interpretation] Were you the diplomat with a great deal of
21 experience in the region, or can you guess who said this?
22 A. I was not the diplomat, and I cannot guess who said it.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 A. But it's a very arguable point. I mentioned at the very outset
25 of my testimony with Mr. Tieger -- I outlined for you the war aims of all
1 of the parties, and I mentioned that the last aim was open to question.
2 Would they or would they not establish a Muslim state? Nobody knows the
3 answer to that, because there were also very strong secularist tendencies
4 inside the Muslim leadership. But there's no doubt that Izetbegovic was
5 a religious man.
6 And on that point, Dr. Karadzic, on the point of that Muslim
7 declaration which you've read in extenso for the Court, we cannot forget
8 that in February and March of 1992, when an expression of democratic will
9 was called for by the Badinter Commission to determine whether or not
11 leadership and on your recommendation, that refused to take part in this
12 democratic election. So I think it's a bit unfair not to mention those
13 points when you also mention how non-democratic the Muslim declaration
14 was. That was words; yours was an action.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. We'll come to that, all the points
16 you raised. But the only problem is we can't challenge whether it says
17 this in the document or not. We can't debate that, because that's what
18 it says in the document; right?
19 A. You mean the Republican document you just read? It's what it
20 says, yes.
21 Q. Thank you. Now may we have 1D93 for a moment, and we'll come
22 back to this document. But let's have 1D93, Mr. Ambassador, so you can
23 see what deeds and acts are.
24 Do you challenge the fact that -- and deny the fact that the
25 Muslims procured weapons from Germany
1 including nuclear components?
2 A. I have no knowledge of any nuclear components being delivered,
3 but there is no question that the Bosnian government did receive weapons,
4 including from the United States. They landed largely at Tuzla Air Force
5 Base. Everybody knew that. As I said a moment ago, it was an open
6 secret, that people felt that the imposition of an arms embargo on a
7 defenceless state was an immoral act, and therefore they broke the
8 embargo. In terms of German weapons, most of those went to Croatia.
9 Q. Thank you. The fact is -- yes, thank you. They violated the
10 embargo, and the reasons were other reasons, but the embargo was violated
11 with the knowledge of the prime forces of the world and their
13 Now, would you look at this document, which is a document from
14 the investigative organs from Munich
15 the indictment dates back to 1993. It says:
16 [In English] "Investigative proceedings against Senad Sahinpasic,
17 for arms," et cetera, et cetera.
18 [Interpretation] So it's an indictment of the 9th of March, 1993
19 Now, they have we have "Explanation":
20 [In English] "The defendant is accused of violating the Law on
21 Arms, Law on War Arms Control and Law on Foreign Trade in 1992/1993 by
22 shipping conventional weapons and procuring atomic parts and by procuring
23 and delivering armament material to the Bosnian Army."
24 [Interpretation] Is there any doubt with respect to these
25 investigation organs of Germany
1 A. It's already been established that the arms embargo was widely
2 violated, and, I repeat, it was an open secret.
3 Q. You said that what they dealt with was words and that we dealt
4 with actions. And you see that these are actions, actions aimed at
5 procuring nuclear weapons, at that.
6 1D102, please, could I have that now.
7 Excellency, can this be admitted into evidence; 1D93, I mean.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll deal with first 157, the Republican committee
9 report, and this one.
10 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, with respect to 1D157, I have some
11 difficulty understanding the relevance of a partisan -- clearly a
12 partisan document, an attack by the Republican committee against a seated
13 Democrat president. I'm not sure what the relevance is to our
14 proceedings. Insofar as the rest of the document is concerned, it seems
15 to be comprised of various newspaper clips that allegedly support that
16 position. My understanding from the recent Bar table motion was that the
17 Court was not receptive, or at least particularly receptive, to those
18 documents for purposes other than perhaps some form of notice.
19 So for those reasons, given the previous guidance by the Court
20 and the tangential nature of the underlying nature of the document,
21 I think I would have to object.
22 JUDGE KWON: It's a bit difficult to follow your objection as to
23 the relevance of it. Probably, you are challenging the probative value
24 of the document.
25 MR. TIEGER: Well, the underlying document seems to be about
1 Republicans attacking President Clinton. That's a bit far afield from
2 the issues we're dealing with. The reason it's tendered, I believe, is
3 because it contains allegations based on newspaper -- various newspaper
4 accounts that support some of the propositions the accused is positing.
5 But my understanding is that the Court has not been particularly
6 receptive to such newspaper articles. If it is, that's -- I understand,
7 and then the document has a basis, but the Prosecution will be submitting
8 other newspaper articles that may well dispute those cited in this
9 article -- or in this report, bearing in mind, in particular, that the
10 report was prepared for a particular purpose; to attack the president's
11 positions and marshal documentation that would support that particular
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
14 Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Robinson, do you have anything to say? Would
15 you like to reply to this submission?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency.
17 First of all, I would not underestimate, by any means, the
18 Republican committee, the political committee of the Republican Party.
19 It certainly would not be showing off by providing false information and
20 referring to significant French sources, like the prime minister,
21 et cetera. I will be going back to this document yet again, so if that
22 will make things easier for Mr. Tieger, you will see how relevant it is
23 when I finish dealing with this document.
24 I mean, really, if you can have hearsay arguments here and if
25 they are not being challenged, and if what is being challenged is a
1 document of the US Congress, I don't believe that, in the United States,
2 any kind of congressional material can be declared irrelevant, any
3 material related to either one of the two big parties.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll confer.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber finds both documents relevant, albeit
7 the probative value is a matter to be assessed at a later stage by the
9 Let's admit them both and then give the exhibit number.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 1D157 will be Exhibit D79,
11 and 1D93 will be Exhibit D80.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's proceed.
13 Thank you for your patience, Ambassador.
14 THE WITNESS: Could I have a word? Might I speak?
15 JUDGE KWON: About the --
16 THE WITNESS: About this document, specifically.
17 JUDGE KWON: Very briefly, Ambassador.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'll be very brief.
19 Since you admitted it, it seems to me relevant to point out that
20 the decision of the Court was to suspend the investigation, in other
21 words, to stop it. They had information based on telephone wire-taps.
22 It says that, but it also says that no documentation could be found. So
23 what you have here in this document, with the word "Decision" at the top
24 and then "Explanation," is a guess -- I would say an educated guess as to
25 some actions based on wire-taps that were unproven.
1 So while it's in the record, and I don't object to that, that's
2 not my place to do so, but I think it's my place to point out that is a
3 document of extremely dubious value.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Once again, I have to say that the
7 conclusion is not the way the ambassador had put it. The conclusion was
8 that US
9 stated that the arms embargo of the UN was not violated, so US law was
10 not violated, and this was an elegant way to save President Clinton.
11 However, I'd now like to have 102, and then we're going to go
12 back to this document, 157, because it contains important statements made
13 by important people, regardless to what extent they were taken into
14 account, but there are quotations there of statements made by
15 high-ranking UN officials and officials from other countries.
16 Q. You see here that Hasan Cengic, who we know very well, and who
17 was in power now, and who perhaps would not have been that dangerous if
18 he were not in power, as you had put it, so he is providing information
19 on the 2nd of February, 1994
20 Mr. [Indiscernible]:
21 [In English] "We are informing you and confirming that
22 declaration whereby Amer Cviko is replacing Senad Sahinpasic in all
23 transactions and mediations of goods. The document is valid as of today.
24 Hasan Cengic."
25 [Interpretation] Were aware of such activity in terms of
1 procuring weapons, that there were indictments, investigations,
2 dismissals, replacements, and so on? At that point in time, did you know
3 that Germany
4 investigations on the arming of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, violations
5 of the arms embargo, and even this dangerous access to nuclear weapons?
6 A. On the point of nuclear weapons, as I mentioned in my previous
7 answer, that was unproven. It's only mentioned in this document, which
8 was suspended, and it's based on bugged telephone conversations with a
10 As regards your question, was I aware that the arms embargo was
11 being violated, the answer is, of course, yes. I've said that probably
12 ten times this morning. And it was being violated openly. There's no
13 doubt of that.
14 Q. Thank you, thank you. However, I meant this reference to nuclear
15 components, nuclear material, in the German document, not in the American
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I have 175 again -- or,
18 rather, 157 again, please.
19 Excellency, can we have at number assigned to the previous
20 document? Can it be admitted?
21 JUDGE KWON: If it is not objected to.
22 Mr. Tieger, 102, Mr. Cengic's letter.
23 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Your Honour. Can we pass on that
24 briefly, and let me just take a quick look at 102 again?
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, let's move on to D79.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please have the next page,
2 and then under number 3.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. While we're waiting for the page:
5 [In English] "The radical Islamic character of the Sarajevo
6 regime," page 8, "underlying the Clinton administration's misguided green
7 light policy as a complete misreading of its main beneficiary, the
8 Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic, rather than being the
9 tolerant multi-ethnic democratic government it pretends to be, there is
10 clear evidence that the ruling circle of the Izetbegovic party, the
11 Party of Democratic Action, has long been guided by the principles of
12 radical Islam. This Islamist orientation is illustrated by profiles of
13 three important officials, including President Izetbegovic, himself, the
14 progressive Islamisation of the Bosnian Army, including creation of
15 native Bosnian Mujahedin units, credible claims that major atrocities
16 against civilians in Sarajevo
17 operatives of the Izetbegovic government, and suppression of enemies,
18 both Muslim and non-Muslim."
19 JUDGE KWON: We need to go back to page 3, I gather.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, 3, you're right,
21 Your Excellency.
22 JUDGE KWON: Unfortunately, we're on the wrong page. Number 3
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it's paragraph number 3, the
25 one that I just read out. You can see it here. That's the way it was
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Irrespective of its provenance and the political party it came
4 from, Ambassador, these are claims made by significant circles in
5 American politics, that the regime in Sarajevo is Islamist and that it is
6 committing crimes against civilians in Sarajevo in order to stage -- now,
7 how do we say that? Yes, staging -- staging events for propaganda
8 purposes. Is that what is written here? And do you think the Republican
9 committee would lie with regard to this matter?
10 A. On the first question, it needs to be said, and we have to remind
11 again this is a partisan document; Republicans attacking the Democrats.
12 You can find everything like this today in Washington about the war in
14 accuse your opponent of the most heinous crimes.
15 With regard to the second question, would they lie in this
16 matter, the answer is, yes, but they were probably misinformed.
17 Q. Thank you. I don't agree with that, if it's a partisan document,
18 that that makes it false or less valuable. However, let's leave that to
19 the American voters. They would certainly punish any political party
20 that lied.
21 Let us look at page 10 now, page 10 of this document. The
22 paragraph is entitled "Sniping":
23 [In English] "French peacekeeping troops in the United Nations
24 unit trying to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo
25 concluded that until mid-June some gun-fire also came from government
1 soldiers deliberately shooting at their own civilians. After what is
2 called a 'definitive' investigation, a French marine unit that patrols
3 against snipers said it traced sniper fire to a building normally
4 occupied by Bosnians."
5 [No interpretation]
6 [In English] "A senior French official said, 'We find it almost
7 impossible to believe, but we are sure that it is true.'"
8 [Interpretation] The reference here is "The New York Times" of
9 the 8th of January, 1995:
10 [In English] "Snipers shoot at civilians."
11 [Interpretation] Should this be rejected as well, Ambassador?
12 A. Not necessarily. We've already discussed yesterday that it was
13 Bosnian small-arms fire that killed some French peacekeepers, so this is
14 not a contentious point.
15 Q. Thank you. This has to do with killing one's own civilians in
16 order to vilify the Serbs.
17 Let's look at the next paragraph:
18 [In English] "Breadline Massacre. United Nations officials and
19 senior Western military officers believe some of the worst killings in
21 queue, were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders, not Serb
22 besiegers, as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and military
23 intervention ... Classified reports of the UN force commander,
24 General Satish Nambiar, concluded ... that Bosnian forces loyal to
25 President Alija Izetbegovic may have detonated a bomb. 'We believe it
1 was a command-detonated explosion, probably in a can' ..."
2 [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, should this be taken seriously
3 as well?
4 A. Oh, this should be taken seriously. As we can read by the very
5 language, it's not definitive. "May have detonated a bomb," quote, "may
6 have -- Bosnian forces loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic may have
7 detonated a bomb." Well, maybe they did, maybe they didn't. They're not
8 accusing the government of a specific action.
9 But we've already discussed yesterday, Dr. Karadzic, the point
10 that I brought to your and to the Court's attention about the
11 Bosnian Muslim Army firing from the grounds of the hospital in order to
12 draw return fire, so I can assure you I was no abject defender of the
13 Bosnian Muslim position. My job is to bring the facts before the
14 Chamber. Wherever the evidence leads us, I am willing to go, which is
15 why I mentioned that hospital incident. We would not be discussing this
16 if I had not raised it. I don't mean that we wouldn't be discussing
17 these specific points, but the hospital incident.
18 But there was a good deal of confusion about who was shooting at
19 whom. As we've said several times, it was a very complex war. It was
20 not a two-sided war, side A, side B. It was at least a three-sided war
21 as between the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims, and the
22 Bosnian Croats, and alliances shifted during the fighting. I think we've
23 established that. I think we're all agreed on that. I don't think
24 there's any argument on that.
25 It's important to remember what I mentioned right at the
1 beginning, that since the Muslim side was basically unarmed, that for
2 most of the fighting between 1992 and 1995, about 80 per cent of the
3 front-line on the Bosnian side was, in fact, manned by Croatian soldiers.
4 And yet at the same time, while they were fighting against the Serbs,
5 Mate Boban and Dr. Karadzic had a very important and quite friendly
6 meeting in Graz, Austria
7 situation. Their soldiers were shooting at each other while Dr. Karadzic
8 and Mate Boban were chatting up in the Austrian mountains.
9 JUDGE KWON: Probably you meant 1992.
10 THE WITNESS: Pardon? May 1992.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 With that, we'll have a break for 20 minutes.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.21 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 10.44 a.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. We were dealing with document 157, page 10. I hope that we've
18 completed that, and now I'd like to ask for page 11. Page 11, thank you:
19 [In English] "The 1994 Markale market massacre":
20 "French television reported last night that United Nations
21 investigation into the market-place bombing in Sarajevo two weeks ago had
22 established beyond doubt that the mortar shell that killed 68 people was
23 fired from inside Bosnian (Muslim) lines."
24 [Interpretation] That was published in "The Times" in 1994, on
25 the 19th of February:
1 [In English] "A senior UN official has admitted the existence of
2 a secret UN report that blames the Bosnian Muslims for the February 1994
3 massacre of the Muslims at the Sarajevo
4 crater left by the mortar shell and the distribution of shrapnel, the
5 report concluded that the shell was fired from behind Muslim lines."
6 [Interpretation] Now, it says:
7 [In English] "Policy":
8 [Interpretation] On the 22nd of December, 1994, by David Binder:
9 [In English] "A veteran 'New York Times' reporter in Yugoslavia
10 had access to the suppressed report. Bodansky categorically stated that
11 the bomb 'was actually a special charge designed and built with the help
12 of Hezbollah Party (pro-Iranian terror group) expert and then most likely
13 dropped from a nearby rooftop onto the crowd of shoppers. Video cameras
14 at the ready recorded this expertly-staged spectacle in gore, which
15 dozens of corpses of Bosnian Muslim troops killed in action (exchanged
16 the day before in the body swap with the Serbs) were paraded in front of
17 the cameras to raise the casualties count."
18 [Interpretation] Does this change your position, Mr. Ambassador,
19 about Serb misdeeds and specifically about these incidents?
20 A. Two questions, two answers.
21 About these incidents, I was aware, although I was not actively
22 involved at the time, of the differences of opinions as to the origin of
23 the market massacre in 1994 and the 1995 incident.
24 On the second point, does it change my opinion, I have to say,
25 no, it does not. I mean, if I could just give an example of an incident
1 in 1995, about the same time, that nobody has disputed - the evidence is
2 overwhelming - namely, the Bosnian Serb Army's murder of 7.000 Muslim men
3 and boys at Srebrenica. If Dr. Karadzic wants to raise that, I'd be
4 interested to hear his views, but it's an unarguable fact that this
6 Again, just to be brief, all sides behaved badly. The
7 Bosnian Serb side behaved worst of all. And since they had the better
8 arms, because they had not only their own Bosnian Serb Army, they had the
9 Yugoslav Army behind them, they were able to do more damage. But it is
10 an unarguable fact, and we've established that, I think, here,
11 Dr. Karadzic and I, that some blame attaches to all sides in wars like
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Do you agree that this answer of
14 yours makes it right for me to appreciate your writings and documents
15 more than your opinions and assessments? Just give a yes-or-no answer.
16 That will do.
17 A. No, it does not make you right to draw those conclusions because,
18 unfortunately, they are not the correct conclusion.
19 Q. Thank you. And now my cue comes from you to speak about
20 Srebrenica. However, we will get to that as well.
21 Let's just quickly finish dealing with this document, the next
22 paragraph, and then move on to other subjects:
23 [In English] "The 1995 second market massacre":
24 "A crucial UN report stating Serb responsibility for the market
25 massacre is a classified secret, but for specialists - a Russian, a
1 Canadian, and two Americans - have raised serious doubts about its
2 conclusion, suggesting instead that the mortar was fired not by the
3 Serbs, but by Muslim government forces. A Canadian officer added that he
4 and fellow Canadian officers in Bosnia
5 government dropped both the February 5, 1994
6 mortar shells on the Sarajevo
7 contends that the available evidence suggests either the shell was fired
8 at a very low trajectory, which means a range of a few hundred
9 yards - therefore under the Sarajevo
10 shell, converted into a bomb, was dropped from a nearby roof into the
12 [Interpretation] That was published in "The Nation" on the 2nd of
13 October, 1995.
14 A bit further down:
15 [In English] "French managing editor Jean Denir [phoen] put the
16 question directly to Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, 'They,'" meaning
17 Muslims, "'have committed this carnage on their own people.' I explained
18 in consternation. 'Yes,' confirmed the prime minister without
19 hesitation, 'but at least they have forced NATO to intervene.'"
20 [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, do you have Prime Minister
21 Balladur would be partial or would have any reason to present something
22 that was not the truth?
23 A. I think we're all agreed that violence was committed by all
24 sides. It's one of the reasons, Dr. Karadzic, these incidents that you
25 bring to our attention, it's one of the reasons why we implored with you
1 the Serb shelling of Sarajevo
2 once that it was probably the single biggest item that harmed your side;
3 namely, the daily shelling of an innocent city, which, by the way, one
4 cannot forget, is, in itself, a war crime.
5 I have to admit that even at this late date, I do not understand
6 why you didn't order General Mladic to stop shelling Sarajevo and Gorazde
7 and the other cities that you besieged. It surely did you harm with the
8 rest of the world, and it is something of a mystery to me still, why you
9 continued this shelling, knowing that it was bringing you this harm.
10 Now, I'm aware of your argument - we discussed this - about
11 60.000 Serbs allegedly being held hostage in Sarajevo. Of course, you
12 know that. But even so, I have to say that was actually not true,
13 because after UNHCR took over the airport of Sarajevo
14 there were relief flights and mercy flights taking people in and out.
15 That was how the negotiators actually got in, on the UNHCR flights, and
16 very few Serbs applied for those flights. But that takes us down a path
17 that is of historical interest, and, of course, it's a charge that this
18 Court will decide.
19 But I have to say that I still do not understand why you didn't
20 order General Mladic to pull his troops off Mount Igman
21 shelling Sarajevo
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. That's a separate issue, and evidence
23 will be led, evidence of a very precise nature, in respect of that.
24 Now let's go back to another stand of yours, and a stand taken by
25 the Prosecution; namely, that I ruled out the possibility of living
1 together with Muslims in Republika Srpska. We claimed that we did not
2 want to live in an independent Bosnia under Bosnian domination. We
3 always asserted, in all our speeches and in all our documents, that we
4 did, indeed, have minorities. Now, you challenge that as well.
5 Could I have OTP 65 ter 2. That is the session of the Assembly
6 of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is when we walked out
7 of Parliament and established our own assembly. Number 2, 65 ter 2, OTP.
8 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for that document, Mr. Tieger,
9 what's your position on 102?
10 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Cengic's letter is admitted, the number being
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D81, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: 81 or 91?
15 THE REGISTRAR: D81, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Now, these are the stenographic notes from that session, and may
19 we have page 47 displayed, please. In English, it is page 24; 24 for the
20 English, please. And may we just have the English version on our
21 screens, please.
22 Professor Koljevic, whom you met and whose English was far better
23 than mine, I'm sure you'll agree, do you?
24 A. Yours is very good. His was somewhat better.
25 Q. Professor Koljevic says:
1 "But this assembly of ours, we're not creating it to hold back
2 somebody else's right. That is not in the nature of the Serb being.
3 I think that --"
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could we check whether we're on the
5 correct page?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 24 of the English. I can't
7 see the page number there, and I can't see Koljevic speaking, who was a
8 member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.
9 May we scroll down to the bottom of the page, please.
10 Let's try page 22. I think that Professor Koljevic takes the
11 floor there. Yes. Now let's find that passage. It begins -- let's go
12 back to page 24, and it's the second paragraph from the top on page 24.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Paragraph 2:
15 "What we sought to do by this act ...":
16 "But we are not establishing this assembly to prevent somebody
17 else from having their rights. I don't think any Serb would be able to
18 sign up to something like that. When this sort of thing is being done,
19 then it's not done in public, as we have been doing things. And ever
20 since olden times, when they would assemble around churches to discuss
21 issues, the Serbs have always done things publicly."
22 Do you have any objections or comments to make to what
23 Mr. Koljevic says here?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Thank you. Now page 25, please, in English. Page 25. After:
1 [In English] "Confusion caused by treachery is passing":
2 "... we want to preserve a state that will bring political and
3 state unity to the Serbian people and to all those who want to share the
4 state with us on the basis of full equality."
5 [Interpretation] So we want to preserve a state that will bring
6 political and state unity to the Serbian people and to all those who want
7 to share this state with us on the basis of full equality. So this is --
8 he's advocating for Yugoslavia
9 A. Yes, I think that these statements of yours, that "we want to
10 preserve a state," that will bring political state unity to the Serbian
11 people, is consistent with President Milosevic's and, I suspect, your
12 desire for a Greater Serbia. And it is surely consistent with your
13 comment to me, when we first met, that if the Bosnian Serb opstina were
14 not allowed to remain in Yugoslavia
15 course, recall saying that. And, indeed, you made it happen, because you
16 did start a war.
17 With respect to the point that Dr. Koljevic made about Nikola's
18 point was about allowing minorities in the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska,
19 you misquoted me a bit there, Dr. Karadzic, because you said I challenged
20 that. I didn't. What I said was your war aim was to make the
21 Republika Srpska as Serb as you could. I didn't expect it to be
22 110 per cent Serb; and, indeed, during the trial of Krajisnik he pointed
23 out that there would be certain reservations, he called them, like Indian
24 reservations, inside Republika Srpska where Muslims could live. So there
25 would be these Muslim exclaves in Republika Srpska, very small ones, and
1 that was understood.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. But this is October 1991. There was
3 no mention of Republika Srpska. This is Yugoslavia here at that time.
4 Nobody mentions any Republika Srpska, and our priority was Yugoslavia;
5 whereas Republika Srpska was a choice of necessity because we did not
6 manage to keep Yugoslavia
7 Republika Srpska that's mentioned here, but the unity of the state of
9 Do you agree with me that in October 1991, there's no mention of
10 Republika Srpska at all?
11 A. Yes, but I just said that you were talking about linking the
12 Bosnian Serb opstinas to Yugoslavia
14 Q. But, Mr. Ambassador, it's at this point that we're asking for
17 A. Well, you're certainly entitled to ask. On the other hand, the
18 referendum that was held, unfortunately for you aside, voted for
19 independence, and in a democratic vote the people voted not to remain in
21 doesn't mean they were wrong. There was a difference of opinion as
22 between you, the Bosnian Serbs and the SDS, on the one hand, and the
23 Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, on the other side. We've
24 discussed that already.
25 Q. Thank you. All that was later, and we'll come to that in due
1 course, the illegality question and the referendum question and the
2 unlawful decision. And I'll put that to the Chamber in due course.
3 But now may we have OTP 65 ter 5, please, document 5.
4 And I'd like to remind you, Mr. Ambassador, that
5 Republika Srpska, or, rather, a separate republic of the Serb people, is
6 mentioned for the first time only after the illegal government
7 decision -- BH government decision to seek independence. But here we're
8 still dealing with the month of October and the struggle to preserve
10 within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 May we have page 13 displayed now, please, on document 5. Yes,
12 13 of the English, that's right:
13 [In English] "The basic principal":
14 [Interpretation] "The basic principle that we need to maintain in
15 our activities is not to force the will of the Serbian people,"
16 et cetera.
17 This is what Mr. Krajisnik says:
18 "Everything we do must take into account the complex political
19 conditions, and all decisions offered up must be based on the
20 Constitution and the law and reflect the interests of the Serbian people
21 and not at the expense of the other nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
22 basic principle that we need to maintain in our activities is not to
23 force the will of the Serbian people on other nations. We have to
24 respect the justified will of the Muslim and Croatian population ..."
25 And then we come to the crux of the matter, the substance of
1 this. Where is that? I can't find it. Yes:
2 "The essence of our strivings is clear, a life together in a
3 joint state."
4 So that is the position taken by the president of the
5 Joint Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik, in a situation in which we were out-voted
6 unlawfully and then went to form an assembly of the Serb people which
7 could, as such, take part in the work of the Joint Assembly. And it
8 wasn't only the SDS
9 the other Serb parties as well. Do you agree with that?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Thank you. Now may we have OTP 65 ter document 7. Number 7,
12 please, page 13 of the English. And the date is the 11th of December,
14 Radovan Karadzic says here:
15 "I see. When we're thinking about the situation properly and
16 well, and when we project the future, regardless of what we -- regardless
17 of staying in Yugoslavia
18 remain in Yugoslavia
19 not be able to be organised like all the other republics, ethnic
20 republics, because it's a republic with three ethnic communities,
21 national communities, and I would like us to move ahead and use this term
22 'three national communities.'"
23 It's paragraph 5 or 6:
24 "When we think things over, we plan the future."
25 It's the middle paragraph.
1 Now, do you agree, Ambassador, that I'm striving to have Bosnia
2 remain in Yugoslavia
3 three national communities in doing so?
4 A. Dr. Karadzic, it has never been a point of contention in this
5 Court, and certainly not between us, that you wanted to divide up the
6 state into three states, that is, three states within one state. And
7 this is what you called, in various ways, a composite state, a federal
8 state, a confederal state, and other expressions that all meant the same
9 thing; namely, three states within one state. That's never been argued,
10 and that's exactly what the Croats wanted also. The people who did not
11 want that were the Muslims, and the reason they didn't want it we've also
12 discussed in the map that we looked at, where they were given this patch
13 of land in the middle, based on the Sarajevo-Tuzla-Zenica-Travnik
14 diamond, and the rest of the country basically would belong and be
15 partitioned between you and Mate Boban. That was the issue, but nobody
16 has argued that you did not want your own state.
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I would like to remind you, and we'll
18 come back to your map, that it was always envisaged that the Muslims
19 would get at least 30 per cent of the most developed part of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina because they lived in the towns, they were
21 concentrated in towns, whereas the Serbs were farmers living on a large
22 surface area of land.
23 Now, I'm asking you something else now. Is it clear that we are
24 advocating political solutions here and solutions which would take into
25 account the interests of all three national communities?
1 A. No, it's not clear. In fact, the opposite is clear. If the --
2 if we go back to the preceding page, the one that you showed us just
3 before this one, you'll see Nikola Koljevic saying that, if I could find
4 it, that "we have all the advantages."
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it's 65 ter 5, page 13.
6 THE WITNESS: And what he meant by saying "we have the
7 advantages," which is another way of saying, We have the upper hand, was
8 that you were already by this time in the winter of 1991/1992, well
9 armed, you're paramilitaries and the SAOs were doing okay, and you had
10 the JNA, the Yugoslav Army, which as you pointed out a few days ago was,
11 by this time, a Serb army, and they were behind you, and so of course you
12 had the advantages.
13 If I could read exactly the words:
14 "We shouldn't underestimate our advantages, expressed through
15 realistic ratio of political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we
16 cannot renounce our rights for others."
17 You were stronger on the ground, and everybody in your party and
18 all observers knew that.
19 Q. Thank you. With all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, your
20 explanations and interpretations of Mr. Koljevic's words are
21 unacceptable. He was never a military man, so you cannot change the
22 sense of his sentence, where it says "political advantages," to translate
23 them as being military advantages. We didn't need the agreement of
24 Croats and Muslims to remain in Yugoslavia
25 agreement to step down from Yugoslavia
1 JUDGE KWON: Before, Ambassador, you answer: Mr. Tieger?
2 MR. TIEGER: Well, I'm not sure there was something to answer.
3 My objection was going to be we're having further commentary and
4 argumentation, rather than putting questions.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador, do you think you can answer the
7 THE WITNESS: The answer is -- to the question, "They did need
8 our agreement to step down from Yugoslavia
9 the answer to that is, no, they did not need your agreement because you
10 boycotted the referendum of February 29 and March 1, which gave you and
11 your party the chance to express your views. You chose not to, and,
12 therefore, they went forward.
13 I should also mention here, for the benefit of the Court, that
14 already before the referendum on Bosnian independence of February 29 -
15 March 1, 1992
16 had declared its independence, so that the fait accompli that they were
17 facing was your previous declaration of independence in January of 1992,
18 and that is also a matter of historical record.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I limited myself to saying that you erroneously
21 interpreted the words of Mr. Koljevic and that he didn't have in mind any
22 military advantage, but political advantage, because we were a
23 constituent people and against our will there could be no secession for
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But let's leave that to one side. You have your
25 view, I have mine.
1 Let's go on and look at page 14 of this same document, please.
2 JUDGE KWON: What document? 65 ter 7?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right, the same
4 document, number 7.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Now, there, at the very beginning, it says:
7 "Whatever we do --"
8 Paragraph 2: [In English] "Even the smallest --"
9 [Interpretation] No, paragraph 1:
10 [In English] "Perhaps these three national communities will have
11 the three school system perhaps --"
12 [Interpretation] And so on. So in the formulation of this
13 recommendation, one should perhaps say that where the Serbs, because of
14 out-voting, are not able to retain their civic, national, economic, and
15 other rights, that the Serb Assembly recommends that they set up their
16 own municipality.
17 Now, was it explained to you, Mr. Ambassador, that we were
18 striving for having large municipalities, with many inhabitants, could be
19 transformed into two or three municipalities according to the will of the
20 citizens, as is the case in many other instances, that they can -- and
21 that they can set up those municipalities on an ethnic basis?
22 A. Two points, if I might mention.
23 The text on line 19 of the English, there's an error. It says
24 "June," where it should say "January." The declaration of independence
25 by the self-appointed Republika Srpska was January 1992, not June. I
1 mention that because it's important to know that it preceded the vote --
2 the referendum of the next month.
3 Now, on this point, Dr. Karadzic, whether the municipalities
4 should be enlarged and have control of their own affairs, it's
5 interesting to read it here, because when that was given to you in the
6 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which had 10 provinces instead of 109 opstina, 10
7 provinces, with large powers devolving to the provinces, and three of
8 those provinces were Serb-majority provinces and they would have had all
9 the rights that you mention here, you rejected the plan. So I have to
10 ask whether and how much credence we can put in these words, when, in a
11 concrete case after the fighting, with the peace plan on the table, you
12 rejected it.
13 Q. Mr. Ambassador, allow me to make some corrections.
14 On the 9th of January, 1992, was when Republika Srpska was
15 proclaimed, whereas on the 7th of April, independence was proclaimed for
16 Republika Srpska, not January.
17 Secondly, I mentioned here that the Government of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the 21st of December, which it did not have the
19 right to do - that's not what a government does - it sought independence,
20 asked for the European Community for independence.
21 Now, we're talking about 1991 here, Mr. Ambassador. The
22 Vance Plan was in 1993, after the war, after the death of the babies --
23 the 12 babies in Banja Luka because nobody could provide them with oxygen
24 on time, so those are two different periods and plans.
25 Now look at this:
1 "Even the smallest municipality can have three municipalities if
2 we so decide."
3 It's on that same page.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Your Honour, and I'm very reluctant to
6 intervene, but the Court has repeated said -- noted the nature of
7 cross-examination, and it's for asking questions, and the accused
8 repeatedly uses it as an opportunity for introducing comments and
9 arguments, and I would note that's not appropriate.
10 JUDGE KWON: I tend to agree, Mr. Tieger.
11 Please concentrate on asking questions.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Thank you. I can ask a question, and that is this: Do you agree
14 that the Republika Srpska was only proclaimed -- founded on the 9th of
15 January, but not operational until the 27th of March, whereas
16 independence was proclaimed in April, after Bosnia had gained
17 independence, or, rather, there was a session simultaneously in
18 Banja Luka of Republika Srpska; yes or no?
19 A. Dr. Karadzic, you're playing with words. Excuse me.
20 Let's look at the situation on January 8th, 1992. You have
21 something called the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The next day, you
22 proclaim your independence, the existence of a separate unit. I think
23 that meant what it meant at the time. We all understood it at the time.
24 And I really think your interpretation now, the gloss you put on it is
1 Q. Well, all right. We'll come to that. All I want to do is to
2 establish the facts. But let's go back to this document:
3 "Even the smallest municipality can have three municipalities if
4 an agreement to that effect is reached."
5 Now, do you agree, Mr. Ambassador, that when the Serb assemblies
6 were formed, the Serb Assembly, for example, of Sanski Most
7 municipality - let's take that as an example - that that meant and
8 implied that it would be both a Muslim municipality and -- here in
9 December 1991, it says that if the Croats have the necessary conditions
10 and prerequisites, they can form their own municipality within the
11 frameworks of the former municipality; yes or no?
12 A. That formula was clearly unworkable.
13 Q. That wasn't my question, but thank you.
14 May I have OTP 65 ter 04984. Could I please have page 3,
15 SA025898. This is the agenda, and page 3 of that document, ending with
16 "98," I guess that's the ERN number.
17 So let us move two pages ahead in relation to the page we see
18 now, page 3 in relation to this one.
19 At the very top of that page -- I don't know whether we have it
20 in English yet. It's paragraph 2, and then further on the president of
21 the Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, so you have to move on to page 3:
22 "The president of the Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, reiterated the
23 need to establish Serb municipalities, where Serbs are the minority,
24 without the obligation of having this done in all municipalities."
25 Do you understand, Mr. Ambassador, that when the Serbs say that
1 they formed an assembly somewhere where they were a minority, it doesn't
2 mean that they proclaimed the entire municipality to be a Serb
3 municipality. But it's only that part of the municipality where the
4 Serbs live that they call the Serb part, just like in Brussels, where you
5 have Flemish or [indiscernible] neighbourhoods?
6 A. That is partially true, Dr. Karadzic. Let me complete that
7 thought of yours for the Court.
8 More than once, the Bosnian Serb leadership was asked about the
9 Republika Srpska and about the Serbian opstinas or municipalities which
10 joined it, and what were the criteria for joining. And the answer was
11 that in an opstina where a majority of the Serb population voted in
12 favour, that municipality became part of Republika Srpska. What that
13 meant, and this we saw in reality, is that let us suppose that we have a
14 municipality A and it has a population of 10.000; 5.000 Muslims, 3.000
15 Serbs, 2.000 Croats. So the 3.000 Serbs vote, and if 2.000 of the 3.000
16 vote in favour of joining Republika Srpska, it goes to Republika Srpska,
17 but that's 2.000 out of 10.000. And so while it is correct to say that
18 the majority of Serbs voted, it is not correct to say that the majority
19 of the populous voted. And that was precisely one of the problems,
20 because these documents that we're being shown here, which I'm seeing for
21 the first time, and I appreciate that, are all leading up to the
22 proclamation of the independence of Republika Srpska. These documents
23 are from December 1991, by which time it was becoming pretty clear that
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina was going to follow Croatia and Slovenia
25 of independence. And so here we see the Bosnian Serbs preparing
1 themselves carefully to take their land out of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- out
2 of the rule of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I don't mean they were going to
3 physically move themselves.
4 Q. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, do you agree that this session was
5 held on the 11th of December, 1991; yes or no? At least we can have a
6 yes-or-no answer in this case.
7 A. If you say so, Dr. Karadzic, I always say yes.
8 Q. Thank you. On the basis of what the MPs are saying, and the
9 speaker of the Assembly, is it not clear that what is envisaged is that
11 municipalities; any community can establish its municipality, there is no
12 regions, there is no partition? That is the 11th of December. Is it not
13 clear that what is envisaged here, that even the smallest municipality
14 can be established and that no one should be separated in any way; yes or
15 no? What you spoke of earlier on, that's different, but this is the
16 session of the 11th of December.
17 A. The answer to your question is, no, it is not clear, and the
18 reason is - and you and I know this - that the SAOs, that is to say, the
19 Bosnian Serb autonomous oblates, were already being formed, and Bosnian
20 Serb paramilitaries were already being armed by the Yugoslav People's
21 Army, the JNA.
22 Q. I'm challenging all of that, Ambassador, but I want to ask you
23 the following: If, in a municipality, 10 local communes, Serb local
24 communes, decide to establish a municipality, and after the 21st of
25 January -- sorry, December, they link themselves up to a Serb entity, are
1 you saying that these 10 Serb local communes decided on behalf of the
2 entire municipality or only on behalf of the Serb part of that
4 A. I am saying -- I am quoting Mr. Krajisnik, who said that these
5 decisions by the Serbs were made and involved the entire municipality,
6 not just at few streets in some town somewhere.
7 Q. Thank you. We are going to challenge all of that.
8 Well, actually, number 7 -- or, rather, number 5 has been
9 admitted into evidence, 65 ter 5, that is.
10 JUDGE KWON: Let's deal with those minutes.
11 We have dealt with, so far, four documents, number 2 -- in terms
12 of 65 ter number, number 257 and 4984.
13 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: So we are admitting only those pages dealt with by
15 the accused?
16 MR. TIEGER: I think I've indicated if that's what's tendered, of
17 course, that's right. If the entirety of the session is tendered,
18 I think that's appropriate too. I have no objection to either course.
19 JUDGE KWON: It is a separate matter, procedural matter, but I'm
20 concerned about admitting extensive pages, while having dealt with part
21 of it. But these documents, I take it, will be used extensively during
22 the course of examination-in-chief and in cross as well?
23 MR. TIEGER: I think, in particular, we're going to find the
24 Assembly sessions referred to repeatedly by both parties, yes, and I
25 don't think there's any dispute about that.
1 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any observation, Mr. Karadzic, on this,
2 or Mr. Robinson?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have no objection whatsoever to
4 the admission of all the transcripts of all the sessions, regardless of
5 whether they were public sessions or secret sessions, or, rather, ones
6 closed to the public. Everything the Serbs did, we have no objection
7 whatsoever. However, then they will be viewed in their entirety as well,
8 won't they?
9 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber needs to confer briefly on this matter.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: Following the principle we have been adopting so
12 far, we'll be admitting only those pages dealt with in the courtroom. So
13 can we give the proper name so far, the 65 ter 2.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 2 will be Exhibit D82.
15 65 ter 5 will be Exhibit D83. 65 ter 7 will be D84. And 65 ter 04984
16 will be D85.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Just for clarification purposes, I understand that
21 4984, in fact, should be 0006. I just want to make sure we're talking
22 about the same document, but I've been advised that it was listed as
23 such. We can move on, and we can check that with the Registrar later. I
24 just wanted to note that possibility.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, they can be sorted out. I noted that it is on
1 page 7 -- I'm sorry, is a seven-page document.
2 Let's move on.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could I now have OTP
4 65 ter 9, 0009, that is, and page 41 straight away.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. While we're waiting for that, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to
7 remind you that we've moved on to the 21st of December [Realtime
8 transcript read in error "12th of October"] already, and this is one day
9 after the government unlawfully, in our view, asked for a recognition,
10 and all the Serb ministers were opposed to that and they left that
11 session of the government.
12 Now, we have page 40 -- it should say "the 21st of December,
13 1991" in the transcript.
14 As you know, there is intensive activity going on. After the
15 decisions made by one side, the other side - in this case, that is the
16 Serb side - makes its own decisions.
17 Page 41 in the English language, Karadzic's remarks:
18 [In English] "Our proposal is that in achieving this goal, it is
19 possible to realise territorial and individual autonomy. It is possible
20 for the little Muslim enclaves surrounded by Serbian territory to have
21 their own administration, so that no nation can exercise power over other
22 nations. Nobody's sovereignty must be threatened or denied.
23 "Sovereignty primarily means power, the ultimate power over
24 oneself," that means not the others.
25 [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned that there would
1 be some kind of ghettoes or enclaves. In this paragraph, I'm advocating
2 a single Bosnia
3 can organise an administrative unit of their own, for instance. It was
4 precisely then that the Swiss Canton Euro was established precisely on
5 that principle, the most recent one. There is no reference to
6 Republika Srpska here now. It is only Bosnia that is being referred to.
7 Any unit can have its own administration; isn't that right?
8 A. Well, what we're seeing here is basically your position that
9 you've maintained as long as I've known you; namely, that the Serbs
10 should rule the Serbs and not be ruled by anybody else. I don't find
11 that surprising, because that is a position you've taken consistently.
12 That's why you created Republika Srpska. That's why you ethnically
13 cleansed mostly the Muslims, but lots of Croats, out of it. That's not
14 at issue.
15 Q. That is totally at issue, but I'm not going to challenge that
16 while you're here. However, I am going to challenge it successfully,
17 Mr. Ambassador.
18 Now I would like to ask for this to be admitted into evidence,
19 this session, or, rather, the numbers -- number 9, OTP 65 ter 9, page 41,
20 the words I quoted here.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D86.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Now I'd like to call up OTP 06147. While we're waiting for the
25 document and -- it's page 029641 -- I think it's page 7, actually. In
1 e-court, it is page 107.
2 Let me explain briefly what this is all about. This is a
3 Joint Assembly meeting attended by Serb MPs on the 24th and 25th of
4 January, before the decision on the referendum. So a decision is in the
5 making as to whether the Serbs are going to take part in the referendum.
6 In our view, the referendum is worthless without the participation of the
7 Serbs. Also, it doesn't work numerically, because they could not have a
8 two-third majority to vote in the referendum. And even from the voters
9 that did vote in the referendum, there wasn't a two-third majority.
10 Now let us see what the situation was, whether the conditions
11 were created for voting in the referendum.
12 Now we have Radovan Karadzic on page 107. In English, it's 103.
13 In English, it's 103 in e-court. So that's it:
14 "Not to impose anything on each other. We will not stop. We
15 will work around the clock until we achieve such a state organisation and
16 such form which all three nations will agree to, Croats, Serbs and
17 Muslims. Then we will hold a referendum that can be finished in 15 days.
18 Gentlemen, that is the only way in which we can avoid unwanted effect, so
19 that people calm down, so that they start living normally, finally.
20 Believe me, we have no influence over war or peace. Situations are often
21 outside our control, and I and all of us can imagine what would happen
22 if, God forbid, riots would start now or an inter-ethnic and religious
23 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We can draw that on the board. Serbs would
24 run away from Muslim areas, Muslims from Serb areas, Croats would go to
25 their own areas. Along the way, there would be shooting, there would be
1 destruction of towns, there would be bloodshed, and we would find
2 ourselves exactly where we are now; Serbs in Serbian areas, Muslims in
3 Muslim ones, Croats in Croat ones, but fully homogeneous. And what will
4 we have to do? We would again have to sit down and agree and place three
5 signatures. Without all three signatures, there is no solution for
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Were you aware of that speech of mine on the 24th and 25th of
9 January, and this proposal of mine to speed up the transformation of
11 organisation, and to have the Serbs join in the referendum?
12 A. I was not aware of that particular speech. We were aware, in a
13 general fashion and sometimes in a specific fashion, of the Bosnian Serb
14 position on the question of the independence referendum, the decision not
15 to participate and the decision to form units of your own in Bosnia
17 Q. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, your colleagues subsequently made
18 many comments to the effect that it was a major mistake to consider Serb
19 claims to be illegitimate. Do you agree with that?
20 A. The claim to establish your own state within Bosnia-Herzegovina,
21 along with a Muslim state and a Croat state, was an illegitimate claim
22 because we also knew that it would ally the Bosnian Croats and their
23 Community of Herceg-Bosna with the Bosnian Serbs and their
24 self-proclaimed Republika Srpska and would be the opening measures in a
25 partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbs and Croats. This was not a
1 theoretical proposition. It was not a matter of saying that each
2 individual is sovereign in his own personality, that sort of thing. It
3 was a reality of how a country would be ruled. And you have always been
4 consistent, Dr. Karadzic, and I've said it since the first five minutes
5 on the stand here, in wanting your own state within a state.
6 Q. Thank you. I shall remind you that it was my wish that we remain
7 in Yugoslavia
8 A. But the problem, excuse me, Dr. Karadzic, was that Yugoslavia
9 ceasing to exist. So that, you know, it sounds perfectly reasonable to
10 say you wanted to remain in Yugoslavia
11 remain in.
12 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, Yugoslavia
13 more of a state than Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia existed a lot
14 more than Bosnia
15 crumbling, there were three entities that were being formed. So was
17 A. Badinter's decision on the question of whether Yugoslavia existed
18 was negative. His exact words were, It is a state in a "position de
19 dissolution," a state in the process of dissolution. That was not my
20 opinion; it was the Badinter Commission. I'm just repeating it for your
21 benefit, because I know I've said it before, but it does have to be taken
22 into account that as the state was dissolving, the Bosnian Serbs wanted
23 to join what, in effect, was Greater Serbia.
24 Q. Thank you. We'll deal with all of that in due course.
25 Please look at the middle of this page. My speech continues:
1 "We think that Bosnia and Herzegovina can turn into Switzerland
2 we can organise it as a link between Serbia
3 and prior to that, everything is a catastrophe.
4 "I was delighted with Mr. Cengic's proposal," Muhamed Cengic,
5 that is, the deputy prime minister, not Hasan Cengic. "Let us go in this
6 direction, let us make the decision, let us set a firm dead-line for the
7 democratic transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After that, 15 days
8 later, let us hold a referendum. Whatever we agree to, it must be agreed
9 in such a way that all three peoples have full freedom."
10 Were you aware of my position, as well as that of Mr. Cengic?
11 A. I was aware of your position. It was consistent, and we were
12 well aware of it. Namely, you wanted a state of your own, and that you
13 and Mate Boban were discussing the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You
14 say it here, only it's more polite -- I quote your words, Dr. Karadzic:
15 "We think that Bosnia and Herzegovina can be Switzerland
16 organise it as a link between Serbia
17 No mention of the Muslims, who happen to be the most numerous
18 people in the state: "A link between Serbia and Croatia
19 was consistent, because we knew that you were interested in partitioning
20 the state. So it's fully consistent with what we understood at the time.
21 And, of course, it was -- it led to a war.
22 Q. Mr. Ambassador, please, let's stick to our timetable. I talked
23 to Boban on the 6th of May about something different, about not resolving
24 territorial issues by war.
25 However, let's go back to this. We say here that Bosnia
1 transformed not into three units, as you have been suggesting; rather, it
2 will be transformed in the sense that ethnic communities can have their
3 own administration. Switzerland
4 Wherever there are 30.000 people, they can have their own canton. That's
5 the case of Switzerland
6 January, are you saying that the Serb side ruled out the possibility of a
7 single Bosnia
8 A. Quite the contrary, I've said consistently, and you agree, that
9 you wanted three states within one state.
10 But with regard to your previous question about the decentralised
11 nature of the state, and the opstinas, and how people should be able to
12 rule themselves, when you were offered that in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,
13 you rejected it. It would be interesting to know why, Dr. Karadzic. You
14 had in front of you what you were asking for, and you rejected it.
15 Q. Mr. Ambassador, that was after a year of war, and I'm sure you'll
16 agree with that.
17 Now, Your Excellency, I'd like to tender the previous document
18 into evidence, including what it says on page 103 of the English version.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will admit this page of this document.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D87, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE KWON: And we'll have a half-an-hour break.
22 --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
1 I'd like to call up on e-court number OTP 65 ter 17, and the page
2 in English is 5. No, sorry, 10, page 10 in English.
3 It starts with: "Members of minorities ...," that paragraph.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. And before that, Mr. Ambassador, let me clear up one matter.
6 It's my duty to put this to you, to avoid confusion over time. We're
7 dealing with the 25th of February, 1992, here. That's the date. Now, it
8 was just pending the referendum, but the Conference on
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, within the frameworks of the Carrington Conference on
11 ongoing. Now, I want to do ask you this: What date do you put to the
12 cessation of this conference and the start of your conference? The 25th
13 or 6th of August, 1992, would that be the date?
14 A. The date would be the conclusion of the London Conference, which
15 was at the very end of August. I don't have the date in my head.
16 Probably the 28th or 29th, something like that. And the beginning of the
17 International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, the one co-chaired by
18 Vance and Owen for the UN and the EC, was a few days later. I believe we
19 arrived in Geneva
20 ended Lord Carrington's operation.
21 Q. Thank you. But this is the 25th of February that we're dealing
22 with now, and in English -- yes, we have that page in English, the
23 paragraph begins with "Members," in the middle paragraph:
24 "Members of minorities in a constituent unit would be protected
25 in a way similar to that envisaged in Article 3, paragraph 3, of the
1 Draft Agreement (The Hague
2 absolute freedom of movement, includes total freedom of movement, which
3 means moving from one constituent unit and taking up residence in
4 another. In other words, major relocations from one unit to another
5 without a special permit and not foreseen, as that would upset the
6 national mix."
7 Now, there, Mr. Ambassador, I am tabling a report to our
8 Assembly, telling them how far we have come at the conference under the
9 chairmanship of Mr. -- or, rather, Ambassador Cutileiro. Did you know
10 that this was put to our Assembly and adopted?
11 A. Yes.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this
13 document into evidence now.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, the Chamber had the opportunity to
15 reconsider the issue of admission of these kind of contemporaneous
16 record, given that they are minutes of the assemblies, and, as such, they
17 are relevant and of probative value. And if both parties agree, for
18 convenience and everything, we are minded to admit it in its entirety.
19 What do you think about it?
20 MR. TIEGER: I think that's quite appropriate for a number of
21 reasons, Your Honour, including knowing -- understanding different
22 references at different points by different witnesses. I think we'll
23 find it much more suitable, so I quite agree and think they should be
24 tendered in their entirety.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I'd like to emphasise that this practice is
1 limited to these kind of contemporaneous records, not to books or
2 et cetera.
3 So this will be admitted in its entirety. As well, on the same
4 token, the 65 ter number is Exhibit D82, 83, 84, 85, 86, will be admitted
5 in their entirety. What is this number?
6 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 10 will be Exhibit D88, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE KWON: 17 or 10?
8 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 10.
9 JUDGE KWON: I take it it should be 17. Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: I stand corrected. 17.
11 JUDGE KWON: D88, Exhibit D88.
12 Let's proceed.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 I'd like to call up OTP 65 ter 18 now, please.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] And that, Mr. Ambassador, is the
17 28th of February. That means the next Assembly session.
18 And while we're waiting for that to come up on our screens, let
19 me say that in the space of three days, there was a lot of activity in
20 the Parliament, in the Assembly.
21 May we have page 8 displayed, please, page 8 of the English:
22 [In English] "The chair said ..."
23 [Interpretation] In the middle paragraph:
24 "The chair said," and the chair was Momcilo Krajisnik, "said that
25 the aim was that in Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina no one should feel
1 their status is different in a subjugated status. We do not wish to rule
2 over anybody. Nobody who lives with us -- they should be treated
3 equally," that's what it says.
4 Now, two or three lines down, it says:
5 "All three peoples, the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims, and
6 there will be certain minority peoples. In Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina,
7 it will be others, and among the Muslims, the Serbs will be a minority.
8 "That is why we must formulate it in such a way as to avoid
9 making a mistake and putting somebody in a second-rate position."
10 Q. Now, this concept about the protection of minorities, was that
11 something you were aware of, Mr. Ambassador?
12 A. Yes.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can I tender this? I'd
14 like to tender this number 18 into evidence, please.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D89.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to call up OTP 65 ter 20
18 now, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. And while we're waiting for that, let me inform you,
21 Mr. Ambassador, that this is my report -- my reporting to the Assembly
22 after full agreement was reached by the three sides about the
23 Lisbon Agreement, or the Cutileiro Plan, as we referred to it at times.
24 So we went on until early in the morning, and then that same day I
25 reported to the Assembly, and all the negotiators did too. We reported
1 to the Assembly about what had been achieved and what we had agreed, and
2 we asked for the Assembly's support to have it adopted.
3 Now, I'd like to turn to page 9 in the English. All we need is
4 the English version, page 9, on our screens, please.
5 [No interpretation]
6 [In English] "The institutions will proportionally --":
7 [Interpretation] "The institutions will proportionately reflect
8 the composition, and we do agree that they do so in the constituent
9 units. If we have 6 per cent Croats in our units, then there should be
10 6 per cent of Croats in the police, the national guards, the judiciary,
11 et cetera, just as there should be 12 per cent of Serbs outside our
13 Are you familiar with this proportionate representation, which
14 was the position we advocated? Were you aware of that, are you familiar
15 with that?
16 A. I was aware of it. I was not aware of this particular document
17 that you're showing now.
18 I might add that the Cutileiro Plan, as it was called, was well
19 known to us, and we discussed it at length and on numerous occasions with
20 Ambassador Cutileiro, and it was acceptable to the Bosnian Croats and the
21 Bosnian Serbs, above all, because it established three states within a
22 state. As we saw in the previous document that Dr. Karadzic had us read,
23 Krajisnik refers to the three units as republics, three states, three
24 republics, and that indicates pretty clearly that, in his mind, each one
25 was, in fact, going to be independent. And that is the reason why the
1 Bosnian Muslims didn't care for that plan, because they knew that they
2 would be squeezed both between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs
3 and that they would be squeezed out by the two larger parties. We've
4 covered this extensively, I don't think we have to go into it, but it
5 does explain the concern that the Bosnian government had with the
6 Cutileiro Plan, and it does explain the acceptance, nay the joyful
7 acceptance, of the partition by the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs.
8 Q. Thank you. The evidence will show something quite different,
9 Mr. Ambassador, in due course.
10 But just another small question. Here I'm asking whether the
11 agreement envisages everybody staying where they are and that there would
12 be no population exchange or abolishing the existing minorities; yes or
14 A. That's what you said.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, another small question. Did you know,
16 Mr. Ambassador, that the number-one personage who mentioned the partition
17 of Bosnia and Herzegovina was Alija Izetbegovic, and this was well known
18 to Zulfikarpasic, and we have enough documents to bear that out? But
19 just let me ask you whether you're aware of that? Just yes or no.
20 A. I'm not aware of that. I am aware of the Cvjetkovic-Macek plan
21 which in August 1939 was decided upon between the Serbs and the Croats,
22 and it envisaged the partition, the map was drawn. And I think 1939
23 comes before anything that Alija Izetbegovic ever said about partition.
24 Q. Yes. Well, I'd have to say that three states were envisaged and
25 proposed by Ambassador Cutileiro. But let's now focus on page 16 in the
2 May we have page 16 displayed, please. And the paragraph I'd
3 like to look at begins with: "We shall ..."
4 And I continue:
5 "We shall now have to establish a full structure of government on
6 the ground, because this is our duty to the people who live there, Serbs,
7 Muslims, or Croats, so that we can ensure peace. Then, through
8 negotiations, we shall try to achieve the maximum requirements ..."
9 Did you know of that position taken by the Serb side, that as
10 soon as it is determined what our unit is, that we would establish peace
11 and security for all three national entities, communities; yes or no?
12 A. Of course, we knew this. But the whole point, Dr. Karadzic, and
13 I must reiterate this, is that partitioning up -- dividing up Bosnia
14 never accepted by the international community until much later. It was
15 later, but at this time it was not acceptable. So all of the points that
16 you make about how the country was to be divided up were considered
17 illegitimate, since nobody wanted the country to be divided up except you
18 and the Bosnian Croats.
19 Q. Except for the majority in Bosnia; is that what you want to say?
20 Isn't it true that this is Cutileiro's plan, proposed by him on behalf of
21 the European Community?
22 A. There's no argument about that. As I've mentioned earlier, the
23 Cutileiro Plan, which you, of course, approved, envisaged three states
24 within one state.
25 Q. Thank you. Just another small question: Do you remember that
1 the Muslim side, with jubilation, stated that it was -- on the 19th of
2 March, that it was happiest because the fewest Muslims would stay with
3 the Serbs and Croats and that they accept the plan, and that it was only
4 after the intervention by Ambassador Zimmermann that the Muslim side
5 withdrew its agreement; yes or no?
6 A. We've already discussed and I have already mentioned the fact
7 that Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the draft plan at the very
8 end of March 1992, when he returned to Sarajevo from the discussions.
9 Your remark about Ambassador Zimmerman has been denied, formally and
10 under oath, more than once by Ambassador Zimmermann, so I can't accept
11 that, and nobody else accepts it.
12 Q. Thank you. May we have the same document, but page 45 now
13 displayed in English, please.
14 Page 49 begins as follows:
15 "We shall --" or, rather:
16 "I think --" "I think --"
17 The third paragraph from the bottom:
18 "I think that the Council of Ministers --"
19 [In English] I think the Council of Ministers will have to work
20 around the clock to be able to prepare some additional laws, establish
21 the SDK," this is a payment agency, "and so forth."
22 [Interpretation] Then it goes on to say:
23 "We shall announce our withdrawal from MUP, not to mention that
24 we have already obtained badges. Our police will have to act in
25 accordance with the law. No one -- not the hair of anybody's head must
1 be harmed, regardless of their religion and nation. Everybody must feel
2 absolutely safe."
3 Now, do you see, Mr. Ambassador, that from the agreements
4 reached, on the 18th of March we proceeded to have the Council of
5 Ministers finish its job, and that we said that our police would be
6 established, which we had a right to do under the agreement offered up to
7 us by the European Community by Ambassador Cutileiro; yes or no?
8 A. We've already agreed, Dr. Karadzic, you and I, that you were
9 delighted with the Cutileiro Plan because it partitioned
11 Q. I won't pursue the matter. But the Muslims were even more
12 delighted, and we're going to show that here, but we don't have time now.
13 But staying with page 45 now, I'd like you to focus on the last
15 "That is why I ask you to do whatever is necessary on the ground
16 to establish the de facto situation based on justice and the law, to have
17 good and complete control of our destinies and territories, with full
18 respect for the citizens of other nationalities. That is what people
19 will be judged by."
20 Now, since you have confirmed that, I'd just like to put this to
21 you: Does this mean that we were ready to have minorities and that those
22 minorities would be protected, and, of course, all this is happening on
23 the 18th of March within the frameworks of the agreement reached to avoid
24 a war; isn't that right?
25 A. Well, since it never actually happened, all one can say is that
1 it might have happened and it might not have happened. I mean, it's
2 entirely hypothetical, the point you're making, and I can understand
3 that. But it is impossible to give a definitive answer to a hypothetical
4 question that, in fact, never ensued in reality, because already by this
5 time the fighting had started, by the middle of March, and by the end --
6 by the end of March, your army was already moving its artillery onto the
7 hills around Sarajevo
8 began in early April. So it's a bit hard to -- I realise it's a little
9 difficult to take these words off the paper and deal with the existing
10 realities in Bosnia
11 words, unfortunately for everybody.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I like far more the "but," I liked
13 what you said before the "but" rather than what you said after the "but."
14 But may we have 1D75, please, which is Mr. Cutileiro's map to
15 which we agreed. And it shows, Mr. Ambassador, that we accepted the
16 external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that we also accepted the
17 existence of administrative units within Bosnia-Herzegovina, without any
18 territorial continuity, and that we also accepted that what you denoted
19 as Eastern Bosnia should be in the Muslim administrative unit.
20 May we have the map displayed now, please. Have we got the map?
21 1D675 is the number. I see we have to place it on the overhead
22 projector. I think it's in e-court under the number 675. Yes, here it
23 is. We have it on our screens.
24 Now, Mr. Ambassador, this is the map we had agreed to, that we
25 accepted along with the possibility of making slight corrections. Now,
1 do you see that all three ethnic communities, national communities, have
2 their administrative units which don't have territorial continuity; isn't
3 that right?
4 A. I'm well aware of this map.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you see where it says "Srebrenica," "Zepa,"
6 "Gorazde," that we agreed that this be within the Muslim unit?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, was this plan, in its different
9 versions, the basis for all other plans up to the Dayton Agreement?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Did all these plans envisage administrative units? One envisaged
12 three, another envisaged ten, the third one envisaged three, and the
13 fourth one envisaged three as well, and the Dayton Agreement envisaged
14 three; isn't that right?
15 A. The Dayton Agreement envisaged and contains not three, but two.
16 One is called the Federation of Croats and Muslims. The other is called
17 Republika Srpska. But --
18 Q. I think you're right.
19 A. -- to your direct question, where the concept of three states
20 within a state -- or two states within a state, was that envisaged by
21 future negotiators, the answer is yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
23 Excellency, could this map, this very well-known map, be admitted
24 into evidence?
25 Now, Ambassador --
1 JUDGE KWON: We'll first admit the previous one, 65 ter 20.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 20 will be Exhibit D90.
3 JUDGE KWON: And I take it there would be no objection to this
4 Cutileiro map.
5 MR. TIEGER: I think based on discussion, this map will come in
6 as no objection. In that sense, Your Honour, I'm not sure of the precise
7 provenance of this particular map. There is a map which the Prosecution
8 has on its exhibit list, which is appended to something provided by
9 Ambassador Cutileiro, which doesn't look like this, although it does seem
10 to be -- it's not in colour. I haven't compared this precisely, whether
11 this is a coloured depiction of the same thing. In any event, I don't
12 have any objection to this map going into evidence. But to the extent
13 it's characterised as the Cutileiro map, I'm not in a position to verify
14 that, especially in light of the information I just provided.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 With that caveat and with the confirmation from Ambassador Okun,
17 we'll admit this.
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ambassador.
20 THE WITNESS: A point that should be said about the map that is
21 relevant, it was never completely accepted. It was always a draft map.
22 And Cutileiro, when he presented it, said, This is for further
23 discussion. So what we're looking at is a draft map, not a definitive
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 Exhibit number ...?
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit D91.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's proceed.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Just another small matter by way of a reminder.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Mr. Ambassador, on Friday the distinguished Mr. Tieger proposed
8 an exhibit from my press conference in Geneva. Mr. Tieger highlighted
9 the second or the third paragraph. However, the first paragraph of that
10 document says Mr. Darwin has passed away. I expressed my condolences,
11 and I say that we are going to remember him as the first creator of a map
12 of Republika Srpska, and for that we pay our due respects to him. If we
13 find that document, we will show this to you, but we are not challenging
14 that it was Mr. Darwin who was the author of this first map of
15 Republika Srpska; isn't that right?
16 A. That's entirely correct. This map was routinely referred to as
18 Q. Thank you. Can you confirm, Mr. Ambassador, that all maps were
19 open to further adjustment on the basis of agreement reached by all three
20 sides, three parties, including the contact group, all the maps all the
21 way up to Dayton
22 territories; isn't that right?
23 A. Well, your question is: Were all maps open to further adjustment
24 on the basis of agreement? The answer is yes. Quite obviously, until
25 and unless the three sides agreed on a map, the fighting was going to
1 continue endlessly.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Now I'd like us to have OTP 65 ter
4 While we are waiting for that, I would like to remind you,
5 Mr. Ambassador, that the Muslims had accepted this agreement and also
6 conditionally the Owen-Stoltenberg map, on the condition that they
7 receive an additional 3 per cent of the territory, and that they signed
8 on the 16th of September, 1993, Izetbegovic and Krajisnik, that is, that
9 the Republika Srpska had the right to a referendum, including secession.
10 Do you agree to that? We have that document.
11 A. Well, yes, I'm aware of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, which was
12 never put into effect.
13 Q. Thank you. Could we please have page 87, 87 and 88 in English.
14 Let's just check the English page, actually. 86, it is actually 86 in
16 Radovan Karadzic, speaking on the 25th and 26th of July, 1992 --
17 that is to say, the war is still going on, but the Carrington Conference
18 is still underway, until it was replaced by the Vance-Owen Conference, as
19 we've agreed.
20 The last paragraph on this page -- let's see whether we have the
21 right page. 86, right. It's not on that page:
22 [In English] "In the state --"
23 [Interpretation] "In the state that we are building, we have to
24 ensure that they have all the rights that we have, under the condition
25 that they are not hostile towards us and that they drop their weapons.
1 The villages in Romanija should drop their weapons like those who lived
2 in Bijeljina and other villages did. The main condition is that they
3 drop all weapons in order to be able to enjoy all rights."
4 I have to say that the translation is imprecise.
5 [In English] "Should leave their weapons ..."
6 [Interpretation] Instead of saying --
7 [In English] "Some villages in Romanija are leaving their
9 [Interpretation] So, Ambassador, the war is still underway. It's
10 still the first Carrington-Cutileiro conference that is underway as well.
11 And the position that we are taking is that we are going to ensure fall
12 equality of rights on the condition that we are not being shot at. And
13 I'm saying specifically that there are villages in Romanija that had
14 already surrendered their weapons, and that they are living in peace like
15 those in Bijeljina. Were you aware of that?
16 A. Yes. I was also aware, since this is July 1992, that Arkan and
17 his Serb paramilitaries had already started ethnic cleansing in
18 Bijeljina. Milosevic admitted that to us. We've discussed it earlier,
19 that Arkan was there with his paramilitaries. So while you were
20 expressing these noble sentiments, the Bosnian Muslims were being
21 ethnically cleansed from Bijeljina.
22 Q. Thank you. For the time being now, because of the "but" -- I
23 keep telling you, whenever you insert that "but," you give me a lot more
25 Let us move on to another topic.
1 Ambassador, do you agree that Arkan was in Bijeljina on the 1st
2 and 2nd of April, while Yugoslavia
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence, and already on the 3rd and 4th
4 of April, Arkan was no longer in Bijeljina? Do you agree with that?
5 A. No, because what you've just said, Dr. Karadzic, is not correct.
6 He was, indeed, there with his paramilitary troops, but the statement
7 that Bosnia-Herzegovina did not exist is not true, because by April
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as we know and we've said endlessly here, had already
9 declared its independence, and, by April 7, had been admit into the
10 United Nations and had been recognised by the European Community and by
11 the United States. So it was a recognised state no later than April 7.
12 Q. Well, you've said just now that it was admitted into the
13 United Nations along such a fast track that it was unprecedented. I
14 agree with that. Mr. Ambassador, I did not say it did not exist at all.
15 I said that on the 1st and 2nd of April, Yugoslavia still existed, and
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina was within that Yugoslavia, and Republika Srpska did
17 not function. It was the authority of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was in
18 Bijeljina, isn't that right, until the Republika Srpska started
19 functioning on the 7th of April; isn't that right?
20 A. During this time, Yugoslavia
21 the very next month the name of the country was changed, as we all know,
22 from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
23 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Anyway, the army was changed,
24 institutional names were changed to take account of the reality, namely,
25 that Slovenia
2 important matter. More important is what was happening on the ground in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina in April, and what was happening was very unfortunate.
4 The displacement and the ethnic cleansing, particularly of the Muslim
5 community, was already well underway at the hands of both the
6 Yugoslav Army and the Bosnian Serb armed forces and paramilitaries.
7 I know, Dr. Karadzic, that this is hard for you to hear, but it
8 is the truth, and we both know it.
9 Q. Thank you. That sounds like a judgement, rather than like
10 testimony, Mr. Ambassador. I denied that, I challenged that.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, I would like to have 1D934
12 called up. And could the previous document from the Assembly be admitted
13 into evidence, although we will go back to some paragraphs later if there
14 is enough time. However, since you will admit the entire document --
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D92, Your Honour.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D194, please.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. While we're waiting for that, Mr. Ambassador, let me remind you
20 that I took office on the 12th of May, and already on the 13th of May,
21 and on the 13th of June, on behalf of the Presidency of Republika Srpska,
22 I made the following decision, on the 12th of May orally and on the 13th
23 of May in writing. The English version is not exactly legible. However,
24 I'm going to read it. So this is the decision of the Presidency on the
25 ban to establish armed groups and individuals in the territory of the
1 republic that are not under the single command of the army or the police.
2 What is also banned is the establishment and the activity of all
3 self-organised groups and individuals in the territory of the Serb
4 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Existing groups and individuals are
5 duty-bound to place themselves under the single command of the Army of
6 the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within three days or the Ministry
7 of the Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
8 Presidency of the Serb Republic
9 that would continue to operate independently and will order the
10 sanctioning of their existence -- the punishment of their existence and
11 activity. Re-subordination to the single command of the army or police
12 also means strict observance of the provisions of International Law of
14 Were you aware of this order of mine, Ambassador?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. I'd like to go to -- back to one of the answers that
17 you gave, or, rather, it's something that you wrote down in your diary.
18 What you wrote down was that I had said that I controlled the
19 Army of Republika Srpska and 95 per cent of the paramilitaries. Now,
20 what I'd like to put to you is a different interpretation: that I
21 re-subordinated -- I ordered the re-subordination of all independent
22 groups to the army, and that my only control was through the army rather
23 than along parallel lines, lines parallel to that of the army. Yes or
25 A. Well, of course -- of course you preferred to control
1 95 per cent, and 5 per cent was either out of your control or perhaps
2 just lesser. In that same conversation, you said that you were the
3 commander, that you controlled the army. And when we asked you about
4 General Mladic, you said, and I quote, He's obedient. So from that, one
5 can conclude that when General Mladic led his troops onto the mountains
6 around Sarajevo
7 should we conclude that he was doing that on your direct order? Since
8 you said he was obedient, and there's no argument about his troops
9 shelling Sarajevo
10 I think perhaps you might want to comment to the Court on that, but
11 that's your decision, of course.
12 But to the point, none of the leaders liked the paramilitaries
13 because, you know, they're all difficult to command. Tudjman didn't,
14 Milosevic really didn't, and neither did Dr. Karadzic, and I think that's
15 understandable. But the reality was that the combat activities of the
16 Bosnian Serb Army, the VRS, were under your control, as you so stated to
17 us, and I think we have to bear that in mind when we discuss irregular or
18 paramilitary activity.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. My question was whether I had some
20 parallel units, apart from the regular army, and I think that you
21 accepted that I controlled them because I ordered their re-subordination
22 to the single command of the army; is that right?
23 A. They were already doing the army's business, so it was to be
24 expected that they would become officially subordinated to the army, that
25 is correct.
1 Q. Do you know, Mr. Ambassador, that we arrested the remaining
2 5 per cent on several occasions; whenever we found an independent group
3 of that nature, we had it arrested?
4 A. Well, I suppose that may have happened on one or two occasions.
5 It's also worth bearing in mind that we have had, before this Tribunal,
6 cases of Serb irregulars who committed mayhem and murder and ethnic
7 cleansing. Several of them have been convicted by the
8 International Criminal Tribunal. So that the point you make is perhaps
9 valid in 1 per cent of the cases. I'm just estimating. Perhaps it's
10 2 per cent. But the reality was that the VRS, aided and abetted by some
11 irregulars, policemen, for example, was carrying out extensive ethnic
12 cleansing during the period you are discussing.
13 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I'm going to challenge all of that here, and by
14 way of documents, at that.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, could this decision,
16 1D194, be admitted into evidence.
17 And now I would like to ask for 1D -- or, actually, just a
18 moment, please.
19 JUDGE KWON: Of course, you are not obliged to answer, but which
20 one is original, English or the B/C/S, Mr. Karadzic?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Both were signed on the same day.
22 In English, it was sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
23 But we have a better copy in English. Actually, this was damaged while
24 being up-loaded in e-court. Otherwise, it is more legible when it's not
25 in e-court. It was e-mailed to the relevant service, so it will be
2 JUDGE KWON: It's admitted.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D93, Your Honour.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 1D205, could I have that document, please.
6 These are congratulations being proffered by myself, the
7 president, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the founding of
8 the party:
9 [In English] "The state, which we the Serbs are creating --"
10 [Interpretation] "The state that we are creating has to be based
11 on the rule of law and humaneness ..."
12 And then we have, under quotation marks, a quotation from the
13 great Serbian poet, [indiscernible]:
14 "A kingdom does not demand inhumane people to defile itself
15 before the world. With that, I ask all members and representatives of
16 the Serbian Democratic Party to constantly monitor our behaviour so that
17 the glory of our just battle would not be tarnished by inhumane actions.
18 Special attention should be given to just behaviour towards civilians of
19 other ethnicities within our republic. Similarly, towards our defeated
20 enemies, we need to not only honour the clauses of the Geneva Convention,
21 we also need to show our Orthodox Christian mercy."
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Were you aware of this appeal?
24 A. No. And I read it now, and I find it very touching. It's a pity
25 it wasn't not carried out in reality.
1 Q. It will be shown that it did happen in reality as well. This was
2 published in all media, and, indeed, it did have certain influence.
3 Could it please be admitted? Have we have been assigned a
5 JUDGE KWON: Is it Exhibit D94?
6 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
7 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D206, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Ambassador, this is a telegram, a secret telegram at that, to
12 all presidents of municipalities in the area of Gorazde, because we held
13 half of Gorazde, Foca, Han Pijesak, Sokolac, Rogatica. Now, Visegrad,
14 Rude, Cajnice, Gorazde, Foca, you see, all of that is in the Drina
15 Valley, and this is the text:
16 "All villages in which the Croatian and Muslim inhabitants hand
17 over their weapons and do not intend to fight against us must enjoy the
18 full protection of our Serb state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
19 responsibility for this must be borne by the presidents of the
21 The date is the 14th of July, 1992. Are you aware of the fact
22 that we took such measures as well?
23 A. I'm aware that on paper, these measures were taken, and I'm also
24 aware, in the video that showed Krajisnik discussing these particular
25 areas, the overlay after your army occupied them showed that numerous
1 municipalities were Muslim, but by the time Krajisnik was showing us that
2 map, between September and December 1992, they were all blue, indicating
3 they were all Serbian. So that is something that has to be taken into
4 account; namely, that these words -- this message that you sent was
5 either not observed by the recipients or perhaps they understood that
6 maybe you didn't really mean every word of it. Because the ethnic
7 cleansing in Foca, for example, was horrific, and several of the Serb
8 cleansers have been tried and convicted here at the
9 International Criminal Tribunal. There is really no argument about that,
10 Dr. Karadzic, unless you wish to accuse the Tribunal of inventing things,
11 and I don't think that's what you want to do.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. As we've already said, and I believe
13 you'll agree with me when I say that everything that came before the
14 "but" is usable, whereas everything after the "but" I reject, when you
15 give your assessments and appraisals of the situation.
16 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.
18 I'd like to tender this document next, and I'd like to call up
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Now, along with this document, Mr. Ambassador, you see you spoke
22 tu quoque. This was a secret telegram and order. It was a strict order
23 and calls upon the presidents of the municipality to accountability. And
24 where some municipalities, such as Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica remained
25 Muslim until 1995 and not Serb; isn't that right?
1 Did those municipalities remain Muslim municipalities until 1995,
2 and did the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and Vance-Owen Plan, did they both
3 envisage them as remaining Muslim municipalities?
4 A. Gorazde was always seen to be Muslim. Indeed, it was a Muslim
5 area. Today, it is within the federation of Croats and Muslims. It's
6 not in Republika Srpska. Milosevic insisted on that at the very end of
7 the day -- excuse me, he didn't insist on it. The Muslims insisted on
8 it. Since the Serbs had been given their corridor from Belgrade to
9 Banja Luka, through Brcko, they said they should have a corridor to
10 Gorazde, and it was indeed the last night at Dayton when, over a certain
11 amount of whiskey, Milosevic and General Clark and others decided that
12 Gorazde should remain with the Muslim Croat federation.
13 Srebrenica is a similar case up to a point, similar in that both
14 were UN protected areas, safe havens. The UN Security Council and
15 UNPROFOR had declared six cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be safe havens;
17 that as we well know, Srebrenica held many refugees, since it was
18 considered safe. There was a unit of UNPROFOR protecting the city. They
19 were, in fact, Dutch soldiers. And it's also known that in July of 1995,
20 the Bosnian Serb Army, in the presence of General Mladic, and we know
21 that because we have the newspaper -- videos of him addressing his
22 troops, that they murdered 7.000 Bosnian Serb men and boys. Now, if you
23 want to contest that, Dr. Karadzic, I'm fully prepared to enter into a
24 discussion, but I don't think it needs to be argued. It was the most
25 horrific crime during the entire war, and it was the worst single crime
1 of war committed in Europe
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. My objection remains the same. I
3 reject everything after the "but."
4 And may we have the next document --
5 A. Does that mean, Dr. Karadzic, that you are denying that
6 Srebrenica occurred -- excuse me for asking, excuse me for interrupting.
7 And I can appreciate that you don't like what I say, but I think in all
8 fairness to the Court, denying the massacre at Srebrenica, I think you
9 owe the Court an explanation for that.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: I think it's time to bring the witness to order.
13 I think he's playing a role here that far exceeds his position as a
14 witness. So, please, I think you should ask him to restrict himself to
15 answering the questions, not to making the Prosecution's closing argument
16 or putting questions to Dr. Karadzic. I think it's time for the Chamber
17 to step in and exercise some control over the witness. Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 Ambassador, as you see we have limited time, so please --
20 THE WITNESS: I appreciate that.
21 JUDGE KWON: -- be brief in answering the question. Thank you
22 very much.
23 So in the meantime, unless it is objected to, we will admit
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D95, Your Honour.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 May we have 1D300 next, please.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. And while we're waiting for that, Mr. Ambassador, let me inform
5 you that the date is the 23rd of July, my order containing four points, a
6 four-point order.
7 1D300 is the document number, 1D300: That's it. The English
8 version will suffice. I'll read it in Serbian.
9 So the first conference, the London Conference, is still taking
10 place in London
11 "Now, on the basis of -- pursuant to the constitutional powers
12 and in keeping with the obligations undertaken at the London Conference,
13 I hereby order:
14 "1. The Serbian authorities must act in accordance with the law
15 and the Geneva Conventions towards the civilian population of any
16 ethnicity who do not exert aggression and combat operations against our
17 army and the civilian population.
18 "2. All the inhabitants who surrender weapons and agree to live
19 peacefully and in keeping with the law must be enabled to remain in their
20 own homes and enjoy our protection."
21 Number 3, and we'll come back to that tomorrow:
22 "Any inhabitants who wish to -- who, from combat operation zones,
23 wish to move temporarily or permanently to other areas must be enabled to
24 do so. The date and route to be used by the population must be agreed
25 upon, and complete security must be provided for the civilians on the
2 "4. I hereby warn all representatives of the authorities of the
3 SAO of Birac of their great responsibility before the law to execute this
4 and other orders in keeping with the law and the Geneva Conventions."
5 And the date there is the 23rd of July, 1992.
6 Now, you accuse me of conducting a tu quoque -- tu quoque
7 proceedings, but did you know about this order and orders of this kind?
8 Without the "but" this time, please.
9 A. I did not know of this order.
10 I must also state, in connection with Mr. Robinson's point, which
11 I appreciate, that it was not I who raised Srebrenica, it was
12 Dr. Karadzic in his question to me who raised Gorazde and Srebrenica. I
13 was answering his question.
14 Q. Well, I just challenged the fact that you said that all the
15 municipalities became blue already in 1992, and we could have stopped
17 But I'd like to tender this document into evidence, the order,
19 MR. TIEGER: No objection.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may we have 1D215 called up
22 next, please. Do we have 1D300; is that admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Was it Exhibit D96?
24 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour, Exhibit D96.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 And now we have the conclusion here, dated the 6th of August, of
2 the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And it says:
3 "The Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Ministry of Justice," et cetera, "is charged
5 that through its municipal organs of the Interior, in a co-ordinated
6 fashion, collect written information about the relation and conduct of
7 the Serb authorities towards prisoners of war and the conditions of life
8 for prisoners in prisons on the territory of the municipality in which
9 there are such cases -- such prisoners," and then that that be sent to
10 the Presidency within a ten-day dead-line.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Now, did you know that the Presidency made this demand, that it
13 be reported back to and informed about the situation?
14 A. No, I did not, and I'm pleased that you did. It's a pity it
15 wasn't followed.
16 Q. Thank you. I will show you that it was -- I will prove that it
17 was, but unfortunately you won't be here then. But I would like you to
18 gain a different impression and picture of the situation while you're
20 Now may we have document number 205 next, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification, pending
23 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
24 JUDGE KWON: We are talking about 215.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 216 next, please. 1D216 next,
2 While we're waiting for that, this was on the same day, a
3 statement of the Presidency on the arrest of renegades. The previous one
4 was the conclusion. Now we're asking for a different one.
5 215 has been translated. We did have a translation of it and the
6 Serbian version as well.
7 JUDGE KWON: This should be the last question for today.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Ambassador, the date of this is the 6th of August, 1992
10 is a statement from the Presidency on the arrest of renegades:
11 "The Presidency of the Serbian Republic
12 informs that several weeks ago, it issued an order whereby all groups and
13 individuals should be placed under the united command of the army and the
14 police. This idea was, for the most part, carried out, except in the
15 case of certain groups of renegades in Podrinje and Kljuc. The Ministry
16 of the Interior of the Serbian Republic
17 arrested groups and individuals who were renegades from the law and who
18 looted and burnt. So it's not a case of the arrest of politically
19 organised individuals or units with other names that were attached to the
20 united command and courageously fighting for the freedom of Serbian
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina and deserve all commendation."
22 Now, this was issued to quell the people, to show them who we
23 were arresting, who it was we were arresting; that it wasn't combatants
24 who were organised, but that they were renegades. Do you agree?
25 A. That's what the document says.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I'd like to tender
2 this document as well.
3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, with respect -- no objection with
4 respect to this document and the previous document. There's a
5 translation for both. Both are on the Prosecution's 65 ter list. The
6 215 was 65 ter 01116. This document is 65 ter 00865, and I think the
7 accompanying translation should suffice.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
9 Mr. Karadzic, we'll adjourn for today, but you have had more than
10 nine hours with Ambassador Okun for your cross-examination, and you
11 originally indicated -- you had asked for fourteen hours. So given that
12 you have approximately -- it would be less than four hours tomorrow, the
13 Chamber expects you to conclude your cross-examination by tomorrow.
14 But I take it that you will have some re-direct, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: How much longer do you have for Ambassador Okun,
17 Mr. Karadzic?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, it all depends
19 whether we're going to be efficient in asking questions and getting
20 answers. I think that this is a unique occasion, when the Trial Chamber
21 has such a prominent personage before them, who was partly a participant
22 and partly learnt about the situation from other sources. Now, unless
23 the ambassador is adverse to spending more hours in Europe, there could
24 be more -- I would like to have more time, but a minimum of 14 hours, the
25 14 hours I said to begin with. So if the ambassador agrees, I would like
1 to have more time, because we really do have a lot of documents to get
2 through and to throw light on many more facts.
3 JUDGE KWON: Given the ambassador has been spending more than two
4 weeks already here, so it seems impractical, if not in-humanitarian, to
5 ask him to stay longer. So could you try to finish -- could you try to
6 leave about 20 minutes before the end of tomorrow? Let's see how we go
7 on tomorrow.
8 Tomorrow --
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE KWON: What's the number of the last exhibit?
11 THE REGISTRAR: 1D216 will be Exhibit D98.
12 JUDGE KWON: With that, we'll adjourn for today.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.
15 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day of
16 April, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.