1 Wednesday, 28 April 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Good morning, Ambassador.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
8 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]
9 JUDGE KWON: A slight procedural matter before we begin today.
10 I was told that some confidential information was revealed
11 through our redaction order, so I hereby -- the Chamber directs the
12 Registry to reclassify the public redaction order filed on 23rd of April,
13 2010, with page number D34952 as a confidential document in order to
14 protect the identity of the witness concerned.
15 Mr. Karadzic.
16 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Good morning, Mr. President.
18 I would just like to take care of two housekeeping matters, very
19 briefly, if you don't mind.
20 This one document, D77, which was an MFI document because the
21 translation had not been attached, the translation is now there and I've
22 been told that it's necessary for me to make an oral application to now
23 turn this into an admitted exhibit. It's number D77.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Secondly, during the testimony of Ambassador Okun,
1 it was indicated that a letter had been sent concerning the shelling of
2 the Sarajevo Hospital
3 locate a letter from General Morillon to President Izetbegovic, and we
4 would ask that that letter be admitted. We've discussed this with the
5 Prosecution, and they don't have any objection. It's in e-court as
6 1D900. We would ask that it be admitted.
7 Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: 1D900. If you could remind me whether that letter
9 was dealt with yesterday, Mr. Robinson.
10 MR. ROBINSON: It was mentioned, actually, I believe, the day
11 before yesterday. It was part of the supplemental information that
12 Ambassador Okun had provided to the Prosecutor upon his arrival in
13 The Hague
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, as Mr. Robinson indicated, we don't
16 object to the admission of that letter. There's not a representation
17 that that specific letter was referred to in the testimony, but the
18 issues connected with that letter, as Mr. Robinson indicated, were,
19 indeed, addressed, and we have no objection to its admission.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Both of the documents are admitted.
21 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
22 We'll give the exhibit number to the last item.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 1D900 will be Exhibit D99.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Good morning to Your Excellencies and to you, Mr. Ambassador, and
1 everybody else.
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, before I pick up from where we
4 left off yesterday, I'd like to ask you this: Did you have a chance to
5 read something from the extensive diary of Professor Koljevic? I'm sure
6 you know that he left behind him a very precisely-written diary with
7 entries -- with daily entries.
8 A. No, I did not.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, if we have time, we'll come back to that. But
10 since you say you haven't read it, then it's not a priority.
11 I'd like to call up on e-court next 1D217 now, please. 1D217.
12 All we need is the English version. May we zoom in to the English
13 version, please. We don't need the other one.
14 Mr. Ambassador, there's been a lot of correspondence between --
15 there was a lot of correspondence between us and the Red Cross. Now,
16 this is one of my letters to the Prime Minister Branko Djeric, who
17 says -- and it says:
18 "Respected President, I'm enclosing copies of the reports I just
19 received regarding the state of the prisons of Manjaca and Bileca. In
20 relation to these reports, I sent a letter to Mr. Cornelius Sommaruga,
21 the president of the ICRC, and General Ratko Mladic.
22 "I expect that the government, through the ministries of Law and
23 Internal Affairs, based on these reports, take immediate measures for the
24 improvement of the living conditions in the jails that are operated by
25 civilian authorities on our territory."
1 Now, did you know about this, that this was something we dealt
3 A. I knew, from the International Committee of the Red Cross, that
4 they were in touch with you in connection with their desire that the
5 condition in the detention camps be improved.
6 Q. Thank you. May I have 1D244, please.
7 I'd like to tender that previous document, Your Excellency.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D100.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Here we have an order to the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska,
12 the ministry -- just a moment. Let me remind you that the previous
13 document was dated the 7th of August, 1992, and the date of this document
14 is the 19th of August, 1992. And we were in the full throes of
15 co-operation, working on the Vance-Owen Plan.
16 Now, the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska to the Ministry of
17 the Interior, to all centres -- to all the security service centres. And
18 you know that these centres provided for a number of neighbouring
19 centres. You know that, I assume. And then it says:
20 "According to our act of the 13th of June, 1992, in respect --
21 respect for international norms of war, once again," and I'd like to
22 stress that I said "once again," "I hereby order:
23 "That all entities honour their commitment to comply with the
24 International Humanitarian Law, especially the 3rd and the 4th Geneva
1 "2. To issue instructions to all combatants and all employees of
2 the Ministry of Internal Affairs to respect imprisoned individuals,
3 civilians, medical institutions, private and public places, the emblem of
4 the Red Cross Red Cross, and the people and resources of the
5 United Nations.
6 "3," we're going to come back to that, "To prevent the forced
7 resettlement and the taking of other illegal actions against the civilian
8 population, and the possible confirmation of selling the property or
9 statement that the refugees will not return, have no legality and are
10 declared null and void.
11 "4. To immediately take steps to improve conditions in all
12 prisons within the Serbian Republic
13 recommendations given by the International Red Cross, during its visits
14 to those places. In accordance with the previous decision, all prisoners
15 of war who are ill and will not become members of enemy armies should be
16 released immediately.
17 "5. To immediately notify the International Red Cross about the
18 state of all prisons within the Serbian Republic
19 lists to this organisation of people held in those prisons."
20 And now we come to number 6, although it says "5":
21 "All members of the Army and police of the Serbian Republic
22 obliged to provide every assistance to members of the
23 International Red Cross and the High Commissioner for Refugees to the
24 United Nations and other humanitarian organisations."
25 And then the general position reads as follows:
1 "Every organs of the army and police in the area of
2 responsibility is obliged to carry out a vigorous investigation of any
3 suspicion or sign of violation of International Humanitarian Laws."
4 Now, did you know that we repeated several times, up until the
5 19th of August, 1992, express orders that were never rescinded and
6 withdrawn, instructing the authorities how they must behave towards
7 civilians, prisoners of war, international organisations, and the like?
8 A. We were aware from ICRC directly about their -- about their
9 communications with you, as I just mentioned. They also made us aware
10 that the conditions in the camps did not improve, as Dr. Sommaruga stated
11 in his speech of August 26, 1992
12 letter that you just read is certainly commendable.
13 Q. Thank you. Can I just put you right? This is an order. I
14 didn't send the army letters. I sent orders to the army and the police.
15 Thank you.
16 Now, may this document be tendered into evidence. 1D244 is the
18 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, there's no objection.
19 I just wanted to note that this bears, in the English
20 translation, the heading of "Defence translation," and this is a
21 previously-translated document. It appears in the Prosecution's 65 ter
22 list, and I even believe it's a previous exhibit. But, in any event, I
23 only mention that because there was mention made of limited translation
24 resources, and so I would encourage the review of documents about to be
25 translated to see if, in fact, it's already been accomplished. But
1 there's no objection to the admission of this document.
2 JUDGE KWON: Is there -- I wonder if there's a regime through
3 which the Defence team can know whether some documents were already
4 translated or not.
5 MR. TIEGER: It would have been uploaded in e-court, part of the
6 65 ter list, I think -- I accept the fact that there may be some
7 documents for which some additional inquiry might be made. I think this
8 is one that just might have slipped through the cracks, and it's not --
9 it's no matter of finger-pointing, but I think in the interests of mutual
10 efficient use of resources, it needed to be mentioned.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It is admitted as number ...?
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D101, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Let's move on.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Now, the next document I'd like called up on e-court is 1D312,
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. While we're waiting for that to come up, Mr. Ambassador, let me
20 tell you what it's about.
21 As we said before the war that law and order was in our hands and
22 that chaos was in nobody's hands, there were killings, and here's how the
23 state organs acted if they learnt of something like that. This is dated
24 the same day as the previous document, the 19th of August, 1992, to the
25 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic
1 "There are indications that in the village of Bastezi
2 Celinac, five Muslim civilians were killed.
3 "I hereby order the most thorough investigation to be conducted,
4 criminals to be identified and brought to justice.
5 "Ministry officials from the Security Services Centre of
6 Banja Luka, the Station of Public Security Celinac, must take all
7 measures to protect the Muslim civilian population of Celinac
8 municipality, which, according to our knowledge, has no military
9 organisation, neither is prepared for military intervention against the
10 Serbian people."
11 Mr. Ambassador, if something similar were to happen, for example,
12 in your country, I'm sure that from a central level, somebody would show
13 interest or order the FBI to intervene; isn't the that right?
14 A. Probably.
15 Q. Thank you. We consider it to be what you call a federal case in
17 Now, what I want to ask you is this, Mr. Ambassador: Did any of
18 your associates tell you that General Galic informed -- gave out
19 information that by September 1992, there were 6.300 criminal reports
20 filed, mostly from the military domain, but from other areas, too, and
21 that Stojan Zupljanin, the chief of police of that general area, informed
22 people that there were two and a half to 3.000 criminal reports filed?
23 They informed us of this and requested that the judiciary should step up
24 its work, that the court authorities were lagging behind. Now, did they
25 inform you -- did you know about this number of criminal reports, and
1 trials are still going on in Bosnia
2 at the time?
3 A. I don't recall that we knew of the specific number. We were
4 aware of the interchanges of all parties with their subordinates. And it
5 is also to be noted that we had no capacity to check on whether these
6 orders were ever carried out by the local police.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this
8 document into evidence.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. And while we're waiting for 1D235, 235, the next document to be
11 called up, please, let's just reinforce what you just said,
12 Mr. Ambassador.
13 The Serbs were really rather weak in their propaganda, in
14 advertising, so that these things during the war passed unnoticed,
15 really. And that's our mistake, but we felt that it wasn't in good taste
16 for us to publish the steps we were duty-bound to take anyway.
17 JUDGE KWON: I think your statement warrants an answer from the
18 ambassador, if he so wishes.
19 THE WITNESS: I have nothing to say on that. It certainly was
20 not in good taste to ethnically cleanse people.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, you do not object to the order to
23 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: And it will be admitted as D102?
25 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D235 is the next document. It is
3 a letter to the commander of the Main Staff, Ratko Mladic, to
4 Mico Stanisic, the minister of police, and to Momcilo Mandic, justice
5 minister. And the date is the 22nd of October, 1992, and we're still
6 together -- you are still with us in our crisis:
7 "Gentlemen. As you know, I have in the past signed an official
8 authorisation to the representatives of the International Committee of
9 the Red Cross, on the basis of which they must be allowed, in accordance
10 with the Geneva Conventions, unfettered access to prisons and prisoners.
11 I am sending you, again, a copy of this authorisation.
12 "I have been informed that some local police, military, and
13 civilian authorities are completely ignoring this document and are
14 obstructing the normal work of the representatives of the
15 International Committee.
16 "I urgently demand that you immediately inform all your
17 subordinate officers that the authorisation for the
18 International Red Cross Committee representatives affixed with my
19 signature must absolute be respected.
20 "I shall order a thorough investigation in all cases of failure
21 to comply with this demand."
22 Now, Mr. Ambassador, let me ask you this: Although the
23 Republika Srpska and the United States of America cannot really be
24 compared, does your president have any separate organs or does he have to
25 go through the official organs in requesting that the law be complied
1 with? Does he have direct connection with the local level or does he
2 have to issue orders and contact the central level of government.
3 A. He would go through a regular procedure, not direct, but
4 indirect, as you indicate.
5 Q. Thank you. And let me ask you this: Does the president of the
6 United States, outside these structures, does it have some bodies of
7 investigation within his cabinet, for example?
8 A. Yes, he does. As you mentioned previously, there is the
9 Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the president of the United States
10 is, under our Constitution, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
11 so his wishes in that regard are automatically obeyed by all military
12 units at every level.
13 Q. Thank you. Yes, I did believe that that was so. I assumed that
14 that was so. But outside those structures, he doesn't have a secret
15 police, for example, of which nobody knows anything about, anything like
17 A. He certainly does not.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Now, Your Excellencies, I'd like to tender this document, 1D235,
20 into evidence.
21 JUDGE KWON: It's admitted as ...?
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D103.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 The next document I'd like called up on e-court is 1D253.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. And while we're waiting for that, 1D253, let me inform you,
3 Mr. Ambassador, what the document is about.
4 The date now is the 11th of March, 1993. We're still together,
5 you're still at our conference, until, I believe it was, mid-May 1993,
6 wasn't it? Now, this is a directive. The president of the republic
7 issues the following directive to the Main Staff of the Army of
8 Republika Srpska, which we had from the autumn of 1992, we had
9 Republika Srpska.
10 Now, the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army is obliged to
11 continue, in future, the following:
12 "1. To enable the undisturbed passage and protection of mail,
13 equipment, and personnel who render assistance intended for the civilian
14 population of the opposite side."
15 Now, 2 is:
16 "To prohibit any misuse, for military purposes, of food supplies,
17 crops, plumbing and drinking water reservoirs, and water dams."
18 And number 3, it says:
19 "To abide by the Geneva Conventions for the protection of victims
20 of war and their protocols, 1 and 2, as well as The Hague Convention on
21 the Laws and Customs of War -- Ground War from 1907, and other provisions
22 of International War Law, and;
23 "4. To ensure that all army units make themselves acquainted
24 with this direction and to sustain it, enforce it."
25 You know that on the 13th of June, 1992, we issued basic
1 instructions and extensive instructions about this, applying to prisoners
2 of war and conduct with prisoners of war, and now this is underlined and
3 emphasised once again in March because, as we know, in the chaos of a
4 civil war, arbitrary behaviour can come about. So this is to restrict
5 that arbitrary behaviour and to ensure that everything functions
6 properly. Do you agree with that.
7 A. Well, we were aware of this general directive. It was an
8 important issue because this praiseworthy directive was not observed,
9 neither by the Bosnian Serb Army, nor by the other armies. Food convoys
10 under the protection -- or perhaps I should say accompanied by UNPROFOR
11 troops were routinely stopped, robbed, made to pay money to get through
12 certain check-points. So while this directive is certainly praiseworthy,
13 it has to be noted that it was observed in the breach.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, Mr. Ambassador, do you know of a single case
15 whereby the Serb Army or the Serb police asked for money for the passage
16 of convoys, free passage of convoys?
17 A. Many cases. You will find them in the UNPROFOR records.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then, could the Prosecution
19 provide us with that evidence then in some way?
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, do you know how many convoys passed through
22 and how many convoys encountered problems along the way? And I say that
23 it is less than 1 per cent, and perhaps an even smaller number than that.
24 A. I could not accurately put a number on it, except to repeat that
25 UNPROFOR told us, on more than one occasion, that the convoys were being
1 routinely disturbed by all parties to the conflict.
2 Q. I will confirm, Mr. Ambassador, that checks were enforced and we
3 issued instructions about how these convoys should be checked and
4 examined, and do you agree that there was abuse in the use of convoys;
5 taking supplies to our adversaries, for example?
6 A. Yes, there was abuse on all parties:
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have 1D274 now,
9 While we're waiting for it, I would like us to clarify a
10 particular matter.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Was there smuggling of war material? Was there abuse of that
13 kind in humanitarian aid convoys which made it incumbent upon us to carry
14 out routine checks of the content of the vehicles in these convoys? Was
15 ammunition, weapons, and the like found?
16 A. I never knew that for a fact, but I can imagine it to be the
17 case. I have already testified that, for example, President Tudjman
18 escorted me once to the Zagreb Airport
19 from Iran
20 for the Bosnian Muslim Army. They were mostly gas masks, however, which
21 were not useful, but they were military supplies.
22 Q. Thank you. Well, we were more worried about gas masks than
23 uniforms. We don't mind if they are not dressed properly. However, if
24 they are ordering gas masks, then they're planning on using poisonous gas
25 and the like. So that is what I'd like to say in this regard.
1 And could we now have 174, please -- 274.
2 While we're waiting, Mr. Ambassador, do you remember that I asked
3 a very high-ranking official of Republika Srpska, Professor Koljevic, to
4 chair the committee for co-operating with the United Nations, so that he
5 could intervene from that very high level, even when I was not there, in
6 order to improve the situation?
7 A. I do remember that Mr. Professor Koljevic and Mr. Krajisnik took
8 charge of your affairs at the conference when you were not present. I
9 was never made aware of the specific instructions you gave Koljevic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have the
11 number I asked for.
12 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, the previous document, 253, will be
13 admitted, unless there's objection, as ...?
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D104, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. Mr. Ambassador, this is from the 7th of May. It is being sent to
18 the Main
19 republic is passing the following decision:
20 "1. Stop immediately with all military offensive activities.
21 "2. In case of the enemy attack on positions of
22 Republika Srpska, offer resistance," et cetera.
23 3 is noteworthy with regard to this topic:
24 "Enable undisturbed distribution of humanitarian aid to areas of
25 the opposite side. Check the humanitarian aid completely, efficiently,
1 with as little delay as possible and in a fair way. For this task,
2 immediately train the necessary personnel from the military police and
3 police and facilitate them with necessary resources for carrying out
4 their work.
5 "Facilitate compliance with UN Resolution 824, and concrete
6 measures are to be agreed upon through negotiations."
7 This is yet another one of the many orders issued to the military
8 so that they could carry out, as specifically as possible, their tasks
9 based on the commitments that we undertook. Do you agree?
10 A. Yes. And the conclusion I come -- from the multiplicity of
11 orders, directives, instructions, letters that you sent on this subject
12 to your military, from that I conclude that they were not being followed.
13 If they were listening to you, you would not have had to send so many
14 orders. So apparently the orders, while praiseworthy in themselves, were
15 not being observed by your troops in the field.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Could I have 1D256, please.
18 In the meantime, I would like to inform you - I don't know
19 whether you knew about that - that I always took into account the
20 observations made by representatives of the international community, and
21 I often accused my own military officers on the basis of these
22 allegations, and very often these allegations proved to be untrue. So
23 sometimes I attacked them for no reason whatsoever.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you agree that there were such cases as well?
1 A. I could imagine there were such cases.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Could I please have a number for the previous document, and now
4 I'm asking for 256.
5 JUDGE KWON: 274 will be admitted.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D105, Your Honour.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Now we're dealing with the 12th of May, 1993. The Ministry of
9 the Interior of Republika Srpska. It's being sent to Mr. Ratko Adzic,
10 the minister:
11 "On the basis of the Constitution of Republika Srpska, I hereby
12 order that all places of worship in the town and its surroundings be
13 secured and protected from increased terrorist activity by means of
14 reinforced Banja Luka Security Services Centre patrols.
15 "Execute this order immediately and report the measures
16 undertaken to me."
17 Did anybody report that to you, that we took place of religious
18 places, places of worship?
19 A. Yes, we knew of the -- we knew of the bad situation in
20 Banja Luka. Churches were being destroyed, mosques were being destroyed
21 by Serbian forces. And you will recall, Dr. Karadzic, that because of
22 that, Secretary Vance and Lord Owen asked that you allow them to go to
23 Banja Luka to seek to prevent the wanton destruction of these Christian
24 and Muslim religious buildings, and you did give them that permission.
25 They went there with your acquiescence.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I actually have that particular piece
2 of news. We received this from the Prosecution, so could it please be
3 put on the overhead projector, but it could be zoomed in. It's in
5 You are right, but there is something I'd like to add. I asked
6 Mr. Vance and Lord Owen to come to Banja Luka. They did come at my
7 invitation, and I met them in Gradiska, at the border crossing there.
8 A. That is correct. It is noted in my journal.
9 Q. We used to call this machine "Episcope" a long time ago, although
10 now it is called "Graphiscope."
11 For the time being, the document is not on the list. Yes, that's
12 it. Could it be enlarged a bit more, please. Thank you:
13 [In English] "Banja Luka, September 15.
14 "Bosnian Serb leader expects co-chairmen of Conference on
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina Serb leader Radovan Karadzic Friday said he was
17 confident that the co-chairman of the Conference of Yugoslavia,
18 Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, would disprove allegations about the existence
19 of ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka, a town in Bosnia controlled by
20 Bosnian Serbs. Vance and Owen arrived in Banja Luka on Friday and met
21 with representatives of the town's Muslims and Croats. Vance and Owen
22 can see for themselves that there exists no discrimination against the
23 Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka, Karadzic said at a news conference held
24 in the town. He added that believed the co-chairmen to be impartial.
25 "Stressing that he was against all forms of forcible expulsion,
1 Karadzic said that owing to the war, itself, many Serbs, Croats, and
2 Muslims were leaving their areas."
3 [Interpretation] So, Mr. Ambassador, I would like us to clear up
4 a matter.
5 It seems, on the basis of your explanation, that we did not deny
6 that we were doing this, whereas Mr. Tieger very skillfully alleged,
7 during his direct examination, that I had agreed that my forces were
8 carrying out ethnic cleansing. What I am saying here now is that we
9 could understand that there might be fear and departures from zones where
10 people were a minority to zones where they were a majority. I forecast
11 that in the speech made on the 25th of January that we looked at
12 yesterday. Here, you see that we have constantly denied that it was the
13 state organs that were forcefully or forcibly expelling the population or
14 doing anything of that regard.
15 Do you see now, Ambassador, that we denied this, that the state,
16 indeed, had nothing to do with this; however, the phenomenon, itself, was
17 there, and I had even forecast that before the war? Anyone can forecast
18 that kind of thing can happen during a civil war. Do you agree to that?
19 A. Sorry, Your Honours, I heard that only in Serbo-Croatian, and now
20 I'll have to read it.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please take your time to read --
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
23 JUDGE KWON: -- the transcript. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry that you didn't receive
25 the interpretation.
1 THE WITNESS: I'll be quick. I know time is short.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. The point is that we did deny that it was the state that was
4 carrying out ethnic cleansing.
5 A. Dr. Karadzic, in answer to your question, I must report that I
6 had extensive discussions with Secretary Vance when he returned from
7 Banja Luka, and his report to me was not in accord with what you said.
8 He had seen intense destruction of Muslim and Christian shrines and came
9 away with the impression that the expulsion and the intimidation of the
10 Croat and Muslim people in Banja Luka was an organised affair.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. However, we never received such
12 information from Mr. Vance, either in writing or orally.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted or
14 at least marked for identification, Excellency? Actually, we have it
15 because it was the ambassador that --
16 JUDGE KWON: 256, before that, will be admitted, and as ...?
17 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me. 256, I was going to ask if
18 that could be MFI
19 that before admission.
20 JUDGE KWON: 256 is his order that we saw?
21 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
22 JUDGE KWON: So you're --
23 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I'd like to check with the Defence and perhaps
24 other ways, just a quick check on the provenance of that document before
25 it is admitted.
1 JUDGE KWON: What do you mean by "provenance"? It's his order,
2 and -- do we have its original?
3 MR. TIEGER: Yes, that's exactly right. I'd like to know how it
4 was obtained, from what sources. And I appreciate, on its face, that
5 it's an order of a particular date. That may not present any problem at
7 JUDGE KWON: How long would you need to come back to us?
8 MR. TIEGER: Certainly I would get back to the Court by the next
9 court date, which I guess is next week, but --
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be marked for identification
11 for the time being.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
13 JUDGE KWON: And before we come to -- could you tell me what it
14 is about the document we saw through the ELMO? Is it a news clipping
15 or -- Mr. Karadzic?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for the interpretation
17 to finish, Excellency.
18 This is a review, a survey of news agency news that came in on
19 that day. The OTP has a collection of such reviews, and I received it
20 from them under that number.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: I believe that's correct. I believe, if I saw that
23 correctly, it was part of a "Tanjug" excerpt. In any event, I don't have
24 any objection to the admission of that excerpt.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be admitted.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D107, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: My understanding was that it was not listed in the
3 65 ter list, and then you also requested the addition of it to the list.
4 Am I correct in so understanding?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You are correct, Excellency. I
6 actually refrained from proffering it too soon, but the ambassador spoke
7 about Banja Luka and I wanted to show this in order to jog the
8 ambassador's memory in terms of what happened when Mr. Vance and
9 Lord Owen came to Banja Luka.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, Your Honour, I don't -- it seems to me that
12 this was not something that was held back in any way. It arose in the
13 context that the accused mentioned, and I have no objection to its -- to
14 an oral motion to add to it as proffered.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 Let's move on.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Now I'd like to ask for 1D258 in e-court, please. Is it the
19 12th? No. This is in the Serbian language. Could we please have it in
20 English for the benefit of the others in the courtroom? Thank you.
21 I'll read the Serbian version, but could we have the English
22 version for the benefit of all others in the courtroom. 1D258 is the
23 English version. If it hasn't been translated, allow me to read it, and
24 then we are going to provide a translation.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. The 9th of June, 1993:
2 "I hereby order to the Main Staff of the Army of
3 Republika Srpska:
4 "1. Soldiers of the Croatian Defence Council who sought shelter
5 from Serb territory in Vlasic should be transported in an organised
6 fashion, along with all their weaponry, to Vares."
7 You remember that 10.000 civilians and all soldiers fled from
8 Travnik after an attack by the Muslim Army. They fled to Vlasic, the
9 Serb territory, and this pertains to that:
10 "2. As for Croatian civilians who fled to Serb territory, they
11 should be allowed to go to Herceg-Bosna or the Republic of Croatia
12 they wish.
13 "3. This should be carried out straight away, and report back to
14 me on the outcome."
15 May I remind you that Croatian civilians at the time often said,
16 "Big deal, UNPROFOR. For us, the Serb Army is UNPROFOR." Do you know
17 that we took in an enormous number of Croatians who had fled, we took
18 them in in our territory, and we let them to go wherever they wanted to
20 We actually have a translation on the ELMO, so could all others
21 in the court have access to it?
22 A. Is that a question to me?
23 Q. Yes, Mr. Ambassador. Did you know --
24 A. Well, in that connection, Dr. Karadzic, I was not aware. By
25 June 9, 1993
1 were directing our attention, at the instruction of the Secretary-General
2 of the United Nations, towards the Greek-Macedonian dispute. But I see
3 this document, and I can well believe that it's accurate, because as I
4 have testified previously, and indeed as is widely known, in many
5 respects the Bosnian Serb Army and the Croatian Army co-operated against
6 the Muslims, as, indeed, the leaders also co-operated from time to time.
7 This period, the spring and summer of 1993, saw intense fighting
8 between Bosnian Croat forces, on the one side, and Bosnian Muslim forces,
9 on the other, so it is not surprising that the Bosnian Serb Army was told
10 to help the Bosnian Croat soldiers.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I would like to remind you that --
12 and, actually, I believe you know about this - that from a religious
13 point of view, we are closer to the Croats, but in ethnic terms, we
14 thought that the Muslims were closer to us because we thought that they
15 were Serbs - that's what most Serbs believe, anyway - who converted to
16 Islam against their own will. But why would there not be Serbs, ethnic
17 Serbs, of all three or four faiths? Croats are Christians, like we are,
18 but ethnically we consider the Muslims to be totally identical to Serbs.
19 Do you agree with that?
20 A. There's no question that you believed that, and I was aware of it
21 at the time. It should also be noted that the Croatians make the same
22 argument, that the Bosnian Muslims were Croats that -- who had been
23 converted to Islam after the Turkish conquest of Bosnia.
24 President Tudjman made that point. Mate Boban made that point
25 repeatedly. Indeed, President Tudjman made the point -- the additional
1 point that it was precisely because Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims were
2 really Croatians that during World War II Bosnia and Herzegovina had been
3 given to Croatia
4 So it is correct, Dr. Karadzic, to say that the Bosnian Serbs
5 regarded the Muslims as originally Serbs, and it's also correct to say
6 that the Croatians regarded the Bosnian Muslims as originally Croatians.
7 It also should be added that there was much intermarriage
8 particularly between Serb and Muslim, and also, but to a lesser degree,
9 between the Roman Catholic Croatians and Muslims.
10 I think the basic point on all of this is that, indeed,
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina was a multi-ethnic/multi-religious state in which the
12 groups lived peacefully until 1991.
13 Could I have this printed on the screen, please?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could 258 please be admitted?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the accused referred to a translation
17 of this document, which I didn't receive and didn't see on the screen.
18 That's my --
19 JUDGE KWON: It was on the ELMO.
20 MR. TIEGER: Okay. I would just ask that it be -- two minor
21 things, then. I would ask, to the extent that can be provided early,
22 that would be helpful.
23 Secondly, it seems to me it might be a preferable practice, if
24 there is an English translation, for the -- when a document -- when there
25 is reading of a document for which there is an English translation, that
1 we read from the translation rather than from the original. Otherwise,
2 we have two translations of the document; one, the English that is
3 submitted, and, two, the one that's contemporaneous in court. So I
4 only -- I raise that to the Court. I think that's the way it's typically
5 dealt with. The Court may have something different in mind, but I wanted
6 to note that issue doesn't need to be resolved at the moment. I know we
7 are pressed for time.
8 JUDGE KWON: It's inevitable when the accused is reading from the
9 B/C/S version, then the translation, which might be a bit different from
10 the English translation --
11 MR. TIEGER: Which is why, I think in other Chambers, we've been
12 encouraged to read from the translation that's been submitted. But,
13 again, I only raise that as a matter that can -- that may be an issue
14 and, in any event, can be dealt with when we have a bit more time.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. No objection to the admission, in any
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D108.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 I believe that we did e-mail this translation, that my team
21 e-mailed it. These are translations that are arriving from elsewhere,
22 because the archives were destroyed when all of this happened. It was
23 given to the OTP in 1997 and 1998, without any impediments whatsoever,
24 believing that these are investigators of the Tribunal, not of the OTP.
25 They were given these documents twice, so --
1 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Ambassador -- well, may we have 1D221 displayed next, please,
5 on e-court.
6 And while we're waiting for that, Mr. Ambassador, do you know of
7 a manifest of ours of the 21st of August, 1992, when we determined our
8 position in a document that was called "We accept/we propose/we shall
9 carry out"? It will come up on our screens in just a moment. "We
10 accept/we propose/we shall do," and there we let the international
11 representatives know how they can count on us in their co-operation with
12 us, what they can count on. Do you see that? It's on our screens.
13 Now, at that time you were deep in -- well, not "deep." You
14 arrived one week later and were thrown into the midst of our crisis.
15 But, anyway, I'd like to draw your attention to this document. It says:
16 "We accept to form, together with the other two national
17 communities, the community of states of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
18 existing external borders.
19 "We accept that the territorial issues be resolved within the
20 framework of the conference initiated by the European Community."
21 And it was still Carrington's conference:
22 "We shall not accept territorial claims by neighbouring
23 countries, if there are any."
24 And then under "We propose," it says the following:
25 "We propose an absolute cease-fire and the signing of a truce
1 with UNPROFOR supervision.
2 "We propose signing an agreement on the free return of refugees,
3 the free circulation of civilians, with full guarantee of human and
4 proper rights.
5 "We propose immediate bilateral and trilateral talks between the
6 representatives of all three national communities concerning all issues."
7 And then under the heading, "We shall do":
8 "We shall make possible for all humanitarian convoys to move
9 freely to all directions and shall give guarantees for their safety over
10 all Serb territories.
11 "We shall prevent ethnic cleansing.
12 "We shall carry out investigations into all cases where forceful
13 transfer of civilian population and suspected -- and shall punish all
14 responsible persons.
15 "Any documents on selling or giving up of property, made under
16 duress, will be declared null and void and without any validity.
17 "We are ready to exchange all prisoners of war on the 'all for
18 all' basis and shall close all prisons."
19 Now, Mr. Ambassador, is this a fair offer?
20 A. This offer was made a few days before the London Conference
21 opened. We were, of course, aware of it. It was made in the obvious
22 attempt to put a good face on the actions, the ethnic cleansing, the
23 deportations, the expulsions, that were largely being taken by
24 Bosnian Serb forces. We were always aware of the offer, for example, to
25 exchange prisoners on an "all for all" basis. Dr. Karadzic made that
1 offer directly to the International Conference.
2 The general picture, with relation to this document, was given
3 most clearly five days later by President Sommaruga of the ICRC. That
4 document has already been discussed and introduced to the Court. And he
5 gives a totally different picture of the situation on the ground. But I
6 have no doubt that this document, as I say, was presented at the
7 London Conference in order to put a good face on the situation which, in
8 reality, was quite different.
9 With respect to another item, to propose a cease-fire and the
10 signing of the truce, we've discussed that several times in the court.
11 Since the Bosnian Serb armies at this point controlled approximately
12 70 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was, of course, in their interest
13 that the fighting stop while they were way ahead, and they repeatedly
14 offered to stop fighting. They never offered to retreat from their
16 Q. Thank you. Yes, that will be given a response.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But in the meantime, may we have
18 1D288, dated the 22nd of April, 1992. I have to put that to the Court,
19 in view of your answer.
20 But in the meantime, may we get a number -- be given a number for
21 this 221 document?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D109.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. While we're waiting for 1D288, the next document that I'd like us
1 to look at, Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to remind you that at all times we
2 envisaged that we would come down to 53 per cent, because we always
3 accepted the fact that the Muslims would have 30 per cent and the Croats
4 17 per cent. That was confirmed in all plans. But I always said that
5 there was no chance of us withdrawing until peace was signed and
6 guaranteed, because then we would lose the war. We couldn't withdraw
7 from strategically-advantageous positions, and I'm sure you'll agree.
8 Now, this next document is the platform which I proposed, still
9 as party president, without any state function, and the date of that is
10 the 22nd of April, 1992. So I'm going to read it in English:
11 [In English] "Platform offered by Radovan Karadzic for solving
12 the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13 "1. Unconditional and immediate cease-fire and respect for the
14 April the 4th, 1992
15 "2. Urgent continuation of the Conference on B and H and its
16 continuing work until reaching final solution.
17 "3. Under the Conference on BH, priority given to making maps of
18 the city of Sarajevo
19 "4. Public commitment by all sides in B and H that the
20 constituent parts will not be annexed to the neighbouring states and that
21 armed forces out of Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be sent for or
23 "5. Public commitment by all sides in B and H that the policy of
24 an accomplished act," fait accompli, "even the one originated from the
25 Communist heritage, will not be accepted, and territorial advantages
1 gained through the use of force will not be recognised.
2 "Urgent application of constitutional agreements," and so on and
3 so on.
4 [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, this was two weeks after the
5 outset of the war, a little over a fortnight. Now, were you aware of
6 this, and is this a fair offer made on time?
7 A. I was not in Bosnia
8 document. I should note that the third point refers to what we've
9 discussed earlier; namely, the desire of the Bosnian Serbs to partition
11 And I should also mention that April 22 is about 10 days after
12 the Bosnian Serb artillery started shelling Sarajevo.
13 And this, on its face, seems to me a reasonable offer. How it
14 was accepted by people who were being shelled mercilessly in Sarajevo
15 of course, another matter.
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Let me just remind you. On the 22nd
17 of April, there was no Army of Republika Srpska. Right up until the 20th
18 of May, it was the JNA Army. Now, after that -- furthermore, let me say
19 on the 22nd of April, the Serb side did not control 70 per cent, and we
20 didn't know who controlled what percentage of anything. And then the
21 proposal that is made is that the municipalities, the opstina, be freely
22 formed in Sarajevo
23 public comparison between Sarajevo
24 municipalities in Brussels
25 carried out of the municipalities in Sarajevo to make the Serbs the
1 minority in most of those municipalities, and those are the facts. And
2 there would be no wolves [as interpreted] in the town, because on the
3 22nd of April we still hoped that there would be no war.
4 Do you agree -- do you agree that on the 22nd of April, we could
5 have thought that there would not -- it would not come to war and that
6 the Army of Republika Srpska did not exist at that time?
7 A. Well, it is correct, and I apologise for using the word "army" of
9 the Bosnian Serbs a few weeks later in May, as Dr. Karadzic has said.
10 The military situation in April, though, was mis-described by
11 Dr. Karadzic, because, in fact, the fighting began in March, not in
12 April. I was in Sarajevo
13 flak-jacket and looking rather awkward with a helmet, but I remember very
14 clearly the fighting that began in March.
15 So by April, it was pretty well advanced. The full force of war
16 had not been unleashed in Bosnia
17 like September 1939 in Europe
18 the Soviet invasion by Russia
19 time. And, as I say, the guns were already on the hills surrounding
22 fact, a siege, was becoming a fact of life. So hostilities were pretty
23 well advanced by April 22.
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Well, you're forcing me to expand the
25 topic, but let me tell you this: Up until the 1st of April, in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was only the Croatian and Muslim parties that were
2 attacking and killing Serbs, but -- and then the 25th and --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic kindly slow down, please,
4 for the benefit of the interpreters. Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters were not able to
6 follow you because you spoke too fast. So could you kindly repeat your
7 previous question.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. The question was: Do you challenge the fact that up until the
11 1st of April, in March, the attacks were solely conducted by the Croatian
12 and Muslim forces, Croatian forces from Croatian even, and that in March,
13 there was no shelling in Sarajevo
14 A. The attacks in March were primarily Bosnian Serb attacks against
15 the Muslims. I was in Sarajevo
16 myself. It is true that the Croatian Army also entered Bosnia in March
17 at Bosanski Brod, and this was well known. It is not true that attacks
18 were made in any number by the Muslim forces against the Bosnian Serb or
19 the JNA, because the fact is the Muslims had no army and were merely in
20 the process of organising themselves.
21 Q. Thank you. Yes, we'll prove that very easily.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, Your Excellencies, I'd like to
23 tender this document 288 into evidence. I didn't think I would be
24 dealing with it today, but I've been brought into that situation. It was
25 confirmed by the witness, and it was a platform that was generally known
1 of the 20th of April -- 22nd of April.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
4 As the accused has indicated, it was not a document that was
5 noticed. However, we don't object.
6 JUDGE KWON: Addition to the list is granted, and it will be
7 admitted into exhibit.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D110, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. I'd like to ask you this now -- well, that was -- 211, was that
12 admitted into evidence, 211? Yes, I'm told it has.
13 May we have 1D853 called up next, please.
14 While we're waiting for that, Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to draw
15 the Court's attention to the position taken by the state organs of
16 Republika Srpska, stating that nothing that was a war option was an
17 acceptable option and that there was no fait accompli. And here we have
18 an instruction of the 23rd of August, 1992. We have the original
19 somewhere as well. But this is a set of instructions, and I'm going to
20 read it out in English:
21 [In English] "Instructions to all presidents of municipalities.
22 "It has become common for local people to move into empty flats
23 instead of refugees, and they sometimes even retain some kind of 'right'
24 for several flats.
25 "The occurrence or issue of abandoned flats is a war issue, and
1 so are the refugees. This means that both occurrences are temporary.
2 "Please strictly observe the following instructions:
3 "1. Temporarily-abandoned flats can be given for temporary use
4 to refugees only, not to local people.
5 "2. Accurate records are to be kept on both the
6 temporarily-abandoned flats and the refugees. The temporarily-abandoned
7 flats can be given for use by a commission only, which issues the
8 decision on the temporary use.
9 "3. Any abuse, nepotism, and failure to observe these
10 instructions entails not only political responsibility, but also criminal
12 "In addition to legal obligations regarding conduct, you must
13 display political awareness and the tact that dealing with the refugees,
14 their accommodation and employment, as is required in you by the
15 programme or the party that has brought you to office."
16 [Interpretation] The original exists, too, somewhere. But I'd
17 like to remind you, Mr. Ambassador, that the government, in April, forbid
18 the trafficking of property while the war was on, and that with this
19 document the Presidency prohibited the use of abandoned property by the
20 local population so that that should not become a motive for which to
21 exert pressure on neighbours -- Muslim and Croatian neighbours to leave.
22 Did you know about this set of instructions?
23 A. I don't believe so. I do recall our discussion, Dr. Karadzic,
24 yours and mine, on the question of apartments, in which you told me that
25 the war began when you were expelled from your flat in Sarajevo. And
1 this document is certainly a worthy document, in and of itself.
2 As I've mentioned in connection with the other documents, all
3 praiseworthy, they would not have been issued had there not been a need
4 for them to be issued. And it is certainly welcome to see now that the
5 intentions of the Presidency were good. It's a great pity that the
6 reality was different.
7 Q. Thank you. Yes, that's true, there were occurrences of that
8 kind, and that is precisely why these instructions were issued, and
9 people were also punished. But practice generally needs laws and
10 regulations to see that the laws are implemented, so new provisions are
11 need to do prevent anything like this.
12 I'd like to tender 1D853. The original is on e-court, but we
13 have just displayed the English translation.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit D111.
16 JUDGE KWON: And in the meantime, before we dealt with this
17 document you mentioned 1D211, but I don't have a recollection we admitted
18 that into evidence.
19 With that, we'll have a break for 20 minutes.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 221, Your Excellency.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we don't have a translation for
2 JUDGE KWON: I note that we are missing a Court Reporter now, so
3 I don't think we can proceed.
4 Okay. Mr. Robinson, could you kindly repeat your submission?
5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
6 I'm advised that we have the translation for MFI 97, and I would
7 ask that be admitted as D97.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 May we have called up on e-court D101, just briefly, please.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Ambassador, we already had this document. The date is the
14 19th of August, a week before you arrived. Now, I'd just like to draw
15 your attention to point 3 there, point 3 of this order, which reads as
17 "According to our act of the 13th of June, to prevent the forced
18 resettlement and taking other illegal actions against the civilian
19 population," and now this part is important, "and the eventual
20 confirmation of selling the property or statement that the refugees will
21 not return, do not have any legal validity, and are abrogated, null and
22 void ."
23 Now, can one annul anything that happens illegally on the ground
24 by anybody else, by the president -- or, rather, do you agree that this
25 has the force of law, that this order has the force of law?
1 A. I would hope that it has the force of law. It certainly is a
2 praiseworthy sentiment.
3 Q. Thank you. Well, I can inform you, with satisfaction, that no
4 document and no act, and there were certain unlawful acts in the
5 municipalities, that none of this was implemented.
6 And may we have 1D427 next, please, on e-court.
7 This is 101, so we don't have to tender that into evidence again.
8 1D247 next, please.
9 And while we're waiting, let me tell you that the date is the 1st
10 of September, 1992, when your conference was already underway.
11 The number is 247. What did I say? 247. If I misspoke, it's
13 And here in point 2, it says:
14 "All refugee families, regardless of their religion and
15 nationality, are obliged to return to their place of residence in the
16 Serbian Republic
17 returning refugees."
18 Now, this came from the level of the Presidency, with the plan
19 for the refugees' return, and it was sent to Serbia, addressed to Serbia
20 and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia
21 fact, and we did have relations with Serbia, with the ministry. And I
22 would like to remind you that you noticed in your diary that out of a
23 total of, I don't know how many hundreds of thousands of refugees in
25 and that the UN officials -- high-ranking officials informed you that
1 they had been taken in there in a non-discriminatory manner.
2 A. What is the question?
3 Q. The question is: Do you remember from your journal that they
4 informed you that our of 320.000 Serbs who had fled from Eastern and
5 Western Bosnia, in addition to that there were 15.000 [as interpreted]
6 Muslims who had fled, and this is a letter stating that they could return
7 in accordance with the plan made for each and every municipality? Do you
8 agree to that?
9 A. Yes, I certainly remember that the refugees -- Muslim refugees
10 were taken, accepted into Serbia
11 into Croatia
12 mentioned yesterday that a very large number went to Switzerland.
13 One minor point. Dr. Karadzic mentioned that September 1st
14 the -- that on September 1st, the International Conference on the former
16 September 3rd, the opening day of the International Conference was
17 September 3rd. It's a minor point. I don't mean it as a contentious
19 Back to the point of refugees or internally-displaced people.
20 There were, of course, hundreds of thousands, and that was a major issue
21 throughout the war.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 For the transcript, could we please correct it? It is
24 15 per cent, not 15.000.
25 248, please, could we have that in e-court now. It's the same
1 kind of letter, but it's sent now to the Montenegrin ministry, and it
2 contains the same paragraph number 2. The content is the same. So we
3 wrote the same thing to Montenegro
4 And could we please have these two documents admitted into
6 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to, they will be admitted into
8 THE REGISTRAR: 1D247 will be Exhibit D112, and 1D248 will be
9 Exhibit D113, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now call up in e-court
12 249, 1D249.
13 This is a document of the Assembly, not the Presidency, and I'll
14 only deal with paragraph 3 once we have it on our screen:
15 [In English] "All citizens who have left their homes due to war
16 operations, feeling of personal insecurity and jeopardised ... to return
17 to the territory of the Serbian Republic
18 established. All citizens of other nationalities will be recognised all
19 their rights according to the Constitution and law.
20 "All those who were members of the enemy forces, but have not
21 committed crimes against the Serb people, will not be criminally
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Ambassador, as we can see here, this comes from the level of
25 the Assembly. This is the first pardon for persons who just took part in
1 fighting. Do you agree with that?
2 A. That's what the words say, yes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have this
4 document admitted, please?
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: The Court inquired yesterday about whether the -- I
7 have only an English version here. I think that's all I was provided,
8 unless there is a technical error. The Court inquired whether the
9 English was -- the original into B/C/S previously. I'd have the same
10 inquiry there. Otherwise --
11 JUDGE KWON: I was about to ask the same question to the accused.
12 Mr. Karadzic, can you confirm that whether this is the original?
13 The e-court says this is an original document. So whether
14 Bijeljina Assembly issued this declaration in English.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, this is the Assembly of
16 Republika Srpska. However, they held that session in Bijeljina. So the
17 level is that of the republic, Republika -- so it is the Central Assembly
18 that we're dealing with here. I believe that in the transcript of that
19 session, there is a reference to this document. The OTP has all these
20 transcripts. This document was probably published in both languages.
21 However, you know that our archives were damaged significantly, so we
22 only managed to obtain this.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 With that explanation, it will be admitted.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D114, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 Let's continue.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Could we please have 65 ter 00041 in e-court. It's a Prosecution
5 number. Page 75 in English, please. In Serbian, it's 77. So could we
6 have page 75 of this document. The Prosecution number is 41.
7 Page 75, we are referring to Vladimir Lukic's expose, who -- he
8 was prime minister at the time. It's the first paragraph here. This
9 isn't it.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. It's line 10, roughly, in the first paragraph:
12 "Already today we must start creating conditions for all citizens
13 who have left their places of residence due to war operations, the
14 feeling of personal insecurity and that of their property, to return to
15 the territory of Republika Srpska, upon establishment of lasting peace.
16 Under the Constitution, we must guarantee the rights of all citizens of
17 other nationalities. We have assumed these obligations, and we must meet
19 The prime minister is telling the Assembly here about what the
20 executive is doing in this regard. This is the 19th and 20th of January,
21 1993. At that point in time, we are together. I think that we were in
22 New York
23 Do you agree with this?
24 A. I read it. That's what it says, yes.
25 Q. This is a document that the Prosecution has; all the Assembly
1 transcripts, that is. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this paragraph from this
3 document number 41 please be admitted, although it is my understanding
4 that transcripts are being admitted in toto.
5 JUDGE KWON: So you are tendering 82 pages in English, in its
7 Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D115, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.
13 Now I'd like to move on to a different topic, if possible.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
15 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to move on to another topic. There's
16 quite a bit about this in your journals as well. I would like to ask you
17 whether you remember that all sources of water, except for one small
18 source, and all sources of power in the town of Sarajevo had to come from
19 Serb territory or go via Serb territory. Do you agree with that?
20 A. The question of the electricity supply to Sarajevo was at issue,
21 and it was resolved peacefully.
22 Q. Thank you. Well, they had electricity in Tuzla and Kakanj, and,
23 in a way, we depended on their electricity. However, we controlled the
24 entire water supply. All sources of water were on the Serb side. Do you
25 agree with that?
1 A. By and large, that's correct.
2 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to ask for your journal number 1 to be
3 called up, 06534. Yes, page 36. This is what you wrote --
4 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit 784.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This is what you wrote:
7 [In English] "Water supply very difficult. Land convoys are
8 getting through. One got through today."
9 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this section of your diary?
10 A. I haven't located it yet, but I'm sure I agree with it. Is it on
11 the left side or the right side?
12 Q. On the left-hand side: "Land convoys above Kumin."
13 A. Yes. Well:
14 "Water supply very difficult. France is providing water supply.
15 Land convoys are getting through."
16 Yes. The issue here clearly was the fact that Sarajevo was under
17 siege by the Bosnian Serb forces, and all supplies had to be admitted
18 through the Bosnian Serb lines. And sometimes they were, and it -- often
19 they were. They had to be negotiated through -- and as I've previously
20 mentioned, the airport had been turned over to UNHCR by the Bosnian Serb
21 forces so that air communication also existed. But on the ground,
22 everything material had to be admitted in through the Bosnian Serb lines,
23 and that was a constant source of discussion.
24 With respect to water that Dr. Karadzic has mentioned, that was
25 difficult, and, indeed -- and, indeed, Western governments and
1 individuals made it possible for the water supply to all parties, all
2 citizens of Sarajevo
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. That is correct, to a large extent,
4 because they gave us material for repairs, and we made these repairs
6 Can we see "UNICEF," on the right-hand side:
7 "Water and electricity."
8 [In English] "Muslims control key electric power-plant in Tuzla
9 [Interpretation] That's also page 36, but it's on the right-hand
10 side. That is what you wrote down; right?
11 A. Yes, the Muslims remained in control of Tuzla throughout the war.
12 They, of course, were also being shelled, but Tuzla, on the whole, was a
13 pretty safe place to be throughout the war.
14 Q. Thank you. Could we now go to page 46 of the same document. 46,
15 "Karadzic," on the left-hand side. Karadzic says:
16 [In English] "We never cut off water and electricity in Sarajevo
17 We will accept UN people monitoring water and electricity supply. UN
18 people can manage."
19 [Interpretation] In addition to the airport, are we not offering
20 sources of water supply to UN personnel?
21 A. The reason this conversation took place, and it's reported
22 accurately in the journal, is that the water supply under control of the
23 Bosnian Serbs had been irregular to the point of nonexistent, and it
24 caused a great problem. So this was raised, and here we see that
25 Dr. Karadzic denies having cut off the water supply. You see it in the
1 middle, on the left:
2 "We never cut off the water supply or electricity."
3 That statement was not true, but it was a fact that, after much
4 heavy persuasion, the Bosnian Serbs did agree to allow the water supply
5 of Sarajevo
6 Q. Thank you. You will see, Mr. Ambassador, from another document
7 that that is what was done by the other side, for the reasons that we
8 referred to yesterday; to increase the suffering of their own people.
9 So could we have this same document now -- no, actually, 06535,
11 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit P785.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 24, "Karadzic"?
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. [Interpretation] This is what you wrote down:
15 [In English] "Not only humanitarian, but also economic. Water
16 and electricity should be under the UNPROFOR."
17 [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, we were saying all along that
18 the other side resorted to war trickery, with the intention of accusing
19 us. In order to avoid that, we offered that UNPROFOR should be in charge
20 of water and electricity supplies and that corridors should be used for
21 economic supplies, as such, and this led to two UNPROFOR officers saying
22 that Sarajevo
23 see that, perhaps, on another day. It's in Mr. Izetbegovic's book. It
24 was not in a blockade, Sarajevo
25 It is smugglers who stopped convoys in order to control rifles and other
1 military equipment, whereas the other side was stopping war supplies in
2 order to tarnish the image of the Serbs, to vilify the Serbs.
3 Do you agree that you wrote that?
4 JUDGE KWON: Is that a question? That's --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, there is a question.
6 JUDGE KWON: Refrain from making comments.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Did you write down that we made an offer to the effect that water
9 and electricity should be under UNPROFOR?
10 A. Yes, we can read it. It's in front of us. And the reason that
11 we pressed you on that issue was because you had not been permitting
12 regular supplies to go through, and that became an issue and was raised
13 with you. And you agreed, as I note here, that water and electricity
14 could be supplied. This was September 1992. Sarajevo had been under
15 siege since April, five months, so that you could imagine it became an
16 issue, and it was resolved successfully. The siege continued, but the
17 water and electricity were supplied.
18 JUDGE KWON: Would you have any comment on the statement that the
19 smugglers stopped convoys in order to control rifles and other military
21 THE WITNESS: There were smugglers on all sides and all over
23 One point that I think I mentioned earlier was that criminal
24 elements from all three communities were active throughout the war and
25 made life miserable for everybody.
1 JUDGE KWON: The points made seems to be that it is Bosnians who
2 stopped convoys.
3 THE WITNESS: No, that's not true. They had the greatest
4 interest in having the convoys come through, since they controlled
6 sense at all and was not true.
7 In addition, UNHCR provided food by air. General McKenzie's book
8 is specific on these points. He was commander of UNPROFOR at this
9 period, a resident in Sarajevo
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ambassador.
11 Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Q. I would just like to draw your attention to the fact that this
14 was my offer. I said it should be that way. No one asked for it. I
15 wanted to get rid of that burden, and I said it should be UNPROFOR.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, these journals have
17 been admitted already, I mean, these numbers?
18 JUDGE KWON: They are admitted in their entirety.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, thank you. Thank you.
20 Now I'd like 1D383, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. While we're waiting for the document, I would like to remind you,
23 Ambassador, that whenever a humanitarian convoy would pass by, prices
24 went down in Sarajevo
25 smugglers preferred it --
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Just a moment ago, I rose before the Court. I asked
3 the accused to refrain from making comment. I rise again for the same
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
6 You are just wasting time by making further comment.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're waiting for the document.
8 That's why I wanted to illuminate a particular matter.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I'm not sure we have a translation of this, but I'm going to read
11 it out. It is the Presidency of Republika Srpska -- actually, it is the
12 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Management that is writing
13 to us, to the Presidency. They are probably responding to a question
14 that we had put. And the subject is the delivery of water, drinking
15 water, to Sarajevo
16 On that date, at Pale, a meeting was held between the
17 representatives of this ministry and the waterworks companies from the
18 territory of the Serb municipalities of the city of Sarajevo. The agenda
19 of the meeting included the delivery of drinking water to part of
21 large number of Serb population that is practically detained in this
22 city. The basic conclusions made at this meeting were as follows:
23 "1. On our side, there is goodwill to deliver the necessary
24 quantities of drinking water. However, in this situation, that is not
25 possible for the following reasons: There is not a continuous flow of
1 electricity to the pumping stations; rather, there are interruptions in
2 the power supply of the pump stations, and that is mostly due to war
3 operations of the Muslim forces.
4 "In the protected areas of water sources, especially in the first
5 and second protection zone of the source of Bacevo, as well as in the
6 general area of this source, there is a large number of personnel and war
7 equipment. New cemeteries are being opened, and dumps are being
8 established. Also, several epidemics have started."
9 Further on:
10 "Some parts of the water supply system is damaged and should be
12 And now could we move on to the second page of this document,
13 please: It says that significant material resources are still lacking
14 for obtaining chemical agents needed for the purification of water.
15 And on the second paragraph, it says:
16 "Along with securing the above-mentioned necessary conditions,
17 the ministry shall, on the basis of the agreed methodology, together with
18 the water supply companies, establish a unit price for the delivery of
19 drinking water in water systems. It should be noted that without proper
20 maintenance of the water supply system, there can be no proper drinking
21 water supplies. We suggest that when there are negotiations with
22 UNPROFOR, expert representatives of the water system should be invited to
23 attend, as was the representatives of this ministry."
24 And at the bottom of the page, we see, written in my own hand, I
25 agree, my signature, "Radovan Karadzic."
1 So the meetings are held with UNPROFOR and with the other side in
2 order to resolve these issues. This was sent to me by the minister,
3 Borivoje Sendic, and I just wrote down "agreed," and I signed my name,
4 "Radovan Karadzic."
5 Do you see this document, Ambassador?
6 A. Yes, I have read it. I should also note that it was
7 September 1992, that you previously referred to, when you said to
8 Mr. Vance and me that the water supply could be resolved by UNPROFOR.
9 And here it is 10 months later, and it has not yet been resolved. I
10 mention that because it indicates the disparity between words and deeds.
11 Q. Well, I would prefer to say between words and possibilities,
12 because people did receive as much water as was possible. And now here
13 it sets out how this could be supplied in a continuous fashion, so the
14 accent there is on continuous supplies.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
16 into evidence now, and we will supply a translation of it in due course.
17 JUDGE KWON: It will be marked for identification, pending
19 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, the next document is 1D895
21 that I'd like called up on e-court, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. And while we're waiting for the document, Mr. Ambassador, let me
24 ask you this: Do you know Morton Abramowitz?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. I spoke to him on the phone several times, I never met him
2 personally, but do you know his friend, Fred Cuny?
3 A. Yes, Fred died in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was there at the behest
4 of the well-known financier and philanthropist George Soros. The reason
5 he was there was precisely this very question, the water supply of
7 at this time was working closely with Soros in an effort to resolve the
8 problem, and they sent Cuny there, who helped quite a lot until he died.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And Morton Abramowitz, otherwise, was
10 a high-ranking official; right? I think he was in the Council for
11 Foreign Policy, or whatever, but at any rate, he was a prominent
13 Now, on this document -- in this document --
14 A. Retired diplomat. He was a retired Foreign Service officer. He
15 had been ambassador to Turkey
16 Q. Mr. Ambassador, this is a long letter from Fred Cuny to
17 Morton Abramowitz, and it's dated -- we'll find the date. Let's see when
18 he's writing this to Morton Abramowitz. Anyway, we found this letter
19 over the internet.
20 May we have page 6 of this document displayed, please. Yes, the
21 date is January 1994. Page 6, please. Paragraph 1, page 6:
22 [In English] "One of the officers in the UNPROFOR claims that
23 they have information that some members of government are opposed to
24 turning on the water because it will take away one of the most
25 omnipresent images of suffering in the city. According to this source,
1 the radicals in the government feel they need to offset the negative
2 publicity that the Bosnians have been getting due to their siege of Vitez
3 by -- with images of Sarajevans carrying water, fuel," and so on, "under
4 the Serbs' shelling. (I personally discount this theory given all the
5 publicity the system has received, but UNPROFOR thinks it's a
7 [Interpretation] So I think we can believe this man, Cuny, can't
9 A. Well, the writer of the letter does not believe him, because he
11 "I personally discount this theory ..."
12 Q. Well, now, on page 5 -- well, he's receiving information from
13 UNPROFOR, and UNPROFOR is present in the field more than he is, and is
14 trying to inform objectively, but says that information is coming in
15 about that from UNPROFOR.
16 Page 5, please:
17 [In English] "We have been told by someone close to
18 Dr. Mohammed Zlatar that the reason that some officials are trying to
19 prevent the water from being turned on is that the officials are engaged
20 in selling water from the brewery and Bacevo. Tankers routinely take
21 water from those sources and deliver it to a number of enterprises,
22 including the Holiday Inn. Some is also sold to households. Water sales
23 are brisk, especially during the winter. Our information tells us that
24 the city will eventually allow us to turn on the water, but only after
25 they have limited the area served (by closing critical valves) and after
1 the winter, when the demand and price for water deliveries will
2 drop - thus, the three-month testing regime."
3 [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, I was astonished to learn of
4 this and reports about this that I got from our own people, not from the
5 United Nations. Now, do you see that they were selling water and that
6 our assistance in water supplies upset their prices?
7 A. We've already established that there was criminal activity by all
8 sides, Dr. Karadzic, and this item, which I see now for the first time,
9 confirms that fact.
10 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ambassador.
11 THE WITNESS: I have nothing more to say.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Now, on page 6 -- or that was page 6.
15 Staying with page 6, paragraph 3:
16 [In English] "If the government continues to stonewall us, we
17 have several options. I could ask General Rose to simply order us to
18 turn on the system or turn it over to the UN. That may be the easiest
19 and politically the best way for the Bosnians to deal with that."
20 [Interpretation] It's a long letter, but in this letter Mr. Cuny
21 claims that we enabled water maintenance to be carried out and that they
22 informed the Muslims that the water should be allowed to run, but that
23 the Muslim government did not accept the water being switched on, and
24 that the authority switched it on regardless of that, and that they came
25 and shut the water supply off to prevent it from reaching the city of
2 A. It's more complicated than that, Dr. Karadzic. If one looks at
3 the very next paragraph, it reads, I quote:
4 "I would like to mention that we have a lot of support from
5 various sectors of the government."
6 No surprise there. We had a divided government, as we've
7 discussed frequently, about the Bosnian government divided as between
8 secularists and religious people, divided between military and civilian,
9 divided between those who sought to appease the attacking Serbs, and
10 those who sought to accommodate them. There were divisions within the
11 government. I don't think there's any argument about that. There were
12 divisions within most governments.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Now, may we have page 2 displayed, please, paragraph 1 -- the
15 middle of paragraph 1 on page 2, please:
16 [In English] "However, after --"
17 [Interpretation] Paragraph 1, the top of the page:
18 [In English] "However, we have been unable to persuade the city
19 authorities to allow us to turn it on, even during the heavy shelling
20 that occurred in January. At one point, after several people were killed
21 trying to collect water from the taps at the brewery, I ordered the water
22 turned on on my own authority, but the authorities intervened and cut it
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. So, not the Serb authorities, the Muslim authorities, they didn't
1 allow the water to be turned on and flow into the city. Is that the
2 conclusion that one can draw from this letter? And I'm not interested in
3 factions of the government, but the government, as a whole, that
4 succeeded against his order to turn the water supply off again for the
5 town to suffer?
6 A. That would be the conclusion we could draw.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender 1D895 into
9 evidence, please.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit D117.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we have on e-court 1D336,
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I'm not sure that we have the translation of
18 that, but this was obtained from the Prosecution. It's the Republic of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so the Muslim part, the Supreme Command Staff of the
20 Armed Forces, the Security Administration, copy number 1, dated the 23rd
21 of October, 1993.
22 On page 2 -- may we have page 2, please.
23 It reads:
24 "The president of the Novi Grad municipality, Enes Cengic, in
25 talks with the narrow portion of the Command of the 101st Motorised
1 Brigade, presented a number of security-related information about the
2 functioning and problems of civilian authority in this municipality. He
3 stressed the -- Ismet Hadzic, the commander of the 5th Motorised
4 Brigade --" he made particular reference to Ismet Hadzic,
5 Huso Cesir [phoen], Ismet's assistant for logistics, and Sefkija Okeric,
6 the former president of the Executive Board of the municipality, who are
7 hard-line advocates of the SDA policy and intend to raise the Muslim
8 people about -- against the legally-elected organs of Novi Grad
10 We don't have to read this further, but it says lower down
12 "Cengic stresses that the citizens and fighters of Dobrinja do
13 not support the conduct and work of the Command of the
14 5th Motorised Brigade, which they demonstrated through a petition for
15 which they collected 500 signatures, asking that the commander and
16 Command of the 5th Motorised Brigade be replaced, as well as the Command
17 of the Civilian Protection."
18 In the petition which Cengic had on him or with him, the petition
19 stresses irregularities with respect to humanitarian aid and assistance,
20 because individuals are being deprived the right of that assistance and
21 aid, and that the stream is focused on the priorities -- on giving
22 priority to the commander and his friends?
23 Now, this is a secret police intelligence report, or, rather, the
24 military intelligence report, to the effect that their commander, which
25 uses the electricity that he received through Serb territory instead of
1 giving the electricity to hospitals and other needy institutions, he is
2 connecting them up to his friends' flats and homes. Did you know about
4 A. I think you mentioned this is October 1993. I ceased my direct
5 activity with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina in May 1993, so I was not
6 aware of this since I had nothing officially to do with Bosnia in
7 October 1993.
8 Q. But you don't deny that or challenge it, Mr. Ambassador?
9 A. Well, you produced it and I read it.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 I'd like to tender 1D366 into evidence now, please.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: As the accused indicated, Your Honour, there is no
14 translation, we haven't had a chance to see it, so that will need to be
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It will be marked for identification
17 as ...?
18 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have displayed now on -- do
21 they have it on e-court? Yes. 1D899 next, then, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Ambassador, while we're waiting for that to come up, I would
24 like to tell you what it's about. It's the Serbian Republic of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency, and it is an appeal to the Muslims to
1 cease their hostilities. And it is dated May 1992. 1D899 is the number.
2 May we have the English version displayed on our screens, and
3 I'll read it out in Serbian. So may we have the English version, please.
4 JUDGE KWON: I don't think we have 1D899.
5 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
6 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's entitled: "Announcement to
8 Muslims, appeal for cessation of hostilities."
9 "To all Muslim men and women, the unfortunate fragmentation of
11 from Yugoslavia
12 coalition, have shoved us into the worst of civil wars, religious and
13 ethnic war. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia also led to the
14 transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three units. A number of
15 Muslims and Croats is to live in the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, a
16 number of Serbs is to live in the Muslim and Croat Bosnia and
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That will depend on political agreement, which is
19 inevitable. For the time being, you are in Serb BH, and you are to enjoy
20 the same rights as the Serbs do. Many Muslim villages have laid down
21 their arms and are enjoying the full protection of the Serb Army and Serb
22 state organs. Since we are dealing with a religious war, we do not bind
23 them to fight on our side. And in all other respects, they are equal
24 with the Serbs. The Muslims are being treated in our hospitals, which
25 are also their hospitals. Muslim women are giving birth successfully in
1 the Sokolac Hospital
2 are not fighting against the Serbs.
3 "Why are you waging war against the Serbs? Can't we preserve
4 peace and wait for a political solution? Why should your families
5 starve? Why should you live in forests, where you may fear winter? How
6 many Serbs and Muslims are to be killed for the crazy ideas of an Islamic
8 JUDGE KWON: What is your question? What's the point of reading
9 out your statement at the time? Put your question.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Ambassador, can one see, on the basis of what has been read
12 out so far, that the Serb side is not counting on a fait accompli and
13 [indiscernible]; rather, they believe that ultimately there will be a
14 political solution as to which part of Bosnia will belong to who?
15 A. I find this document thoroughly disingenuous, Dr. Karadzic. I
16 must tell you that frankly. The statement at the end, for example, I
18 "The West will not allow it, for the West wants you Muslims to be
19 obliterated in battle with the Serbs and the Croats."
20 No statement could be more ridiculous than that.
21 In addition, it has to be remembered that this was May 1992. You
22 said that yourself. And it was on May 12 that the Bosnian Serb Assembly
23 issued that directive or statement, I'm not quite sure what you called
24 it, the one that gave your war aims. It's been introduced into the
25 court. We discussed it extensively in the Krajisnik case.
1 And it was clear, from your official document, what and where you
2 wanted the borders of your self-declared Republika Srpska to be. That's
3 what it was largely about. And those borders would have given you about,
4 roughly, two-thirds to 75 per cent of the entire territory of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that's one of the major issues that the war was
6 all about. And so I find this appeal to be consistent with your policy,
7 with the policy of the Bosnian Serbs, in the sense that it called for the
8 Muslims basically to surrender, since you were doing very well on the
9 ground. No surprise there. We've established that. But as for the
10 reasoning behind it, it is untrue to the point of ridiculousness.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. However, I will tell you a few things
12 now that I will prove here while you're here and later.
13 There is widespread belief among some Serb and Muslim
14 intellectuals that the West had intended to neutralise the Muslims in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina by using the Serbs and Croats. Are you denying that?
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
17 Mr. Tieger, I take it that he is putting his case to the witness.
18 Thank you.
19 Yes, Ambassador.
20 THE WITNESS: That's nonsense. The sympathy of the West, whether
21 correct or incorrect, was overwhelmingly on the side of the Muslims.
22 We've established that already. Dr. Karadzic has made that point
23 repeatedly, and it's correct. That's why, for example, somebody like
24 Fred Cuny had been sent by George Soros to Sarajevo to see what could be
25 done with the water supply. That's why UNPROFOR was there, that's why
1 all of this happened. So to say that the West intended to neutralise the
2 Muslims in Bosnia
3 belief, it's laughable.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Now I will have to add even more
6 evidence coming from Muslim sources. However, I would like to ask you
7 whether you were part of that international community that was
8 overwhelmingly on the side of the Muslims.
9 A. Of course not. I was a negotiator for and with the
10 United Nations. You know that, Dr. Karadzic, as well as I.
11 Q. Well, it seems to me that your journals are impartial, but not
12 your testimony. That will compel me to introduce yet another topic that
13 I had intended to spare us of.
14 We have Izetbegovic's book, where he says that President Tudjman
15 told him that the European Community had entrusted him with taking care
16 of the Bosnian Muslims, and Izetbegovic was opposed to that. Are you
17 saying that that is not correct?
18 A. Well, I was not present when this statement that you say
19 President Tudjman made to President Izetbegovic. I rather doubt it,
20 unless what he means to be saying is that the words "to take care of the
21 Bosnian Muslims," meant that he should support them, meant that he should
22 be with them in their struggle against you. I regard that statement as
23 just rather ambiguous, frankly.
24 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to read out what Izetbegovic had
1 "As for Tudjman's bragging that some Europeans had entrusted to
2 him the Europisation of the Bosnian Muslims and the prevention of the
3 creation of a Muslim state on European soil, I think that there was some
4 truth in these stories of Tudjman's. Many in Europe and America
5 few honourable exceptions, viewed with suspicion what was going on in
7 to be extinguished. Many ugly things were done in order to achieve this.
8 One of them was the criminalisation of the Bosnian authorities in the BH
9 that would intensify after the war and culminate in a 'New York Times'
10 article in 1999."
11 I assure you, Mr. Ambassador, that an MP of ours also said -- I
12 mean, we were chosen to be the executors of the Muslims, and we refused
13 to be that. Executioners, rather. The thesis among the Muslim
14 intellectuals is that it is the West that gets the biggest possible
15 advantage from a conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims. Regardless
16 of whether this is true or not, that is deeply rooted. We will find it
17 in Izetbegovic's books, in Zulfikarpasic's books. Are you denying that,
18 as you did a few moments ago?
19 A. With regard to Tudjman's bragging, that is, what Izetbegovic
20 called Tudjman's bragging, that's believable, because as we know, as I've
21 testified, it's been made very clear from my journals, Tudjman had great
22 disrespect and dislike for Muslims. He routinely referred to me, when
23 discussing Izetbegovic, as "that fundamentalist Izetbegovic," and this is
24 well known. There is no argument about that. There's also no argument
25 about the Bosnian Serb and Serbian interest, along with the Bosnian Croat
1 and Croatian interest, in dividing -- in carving up Bosnia and
2 partitioning it. That's been well established.
3 What is odd and unbelievable in what you've read is that it
4 suddenly makes the Muslims the guilty party, on the part of the West.
5 You spent the last three days, Dr. Karadzic, in seeking to make the point
6 that the Bosnian Serbs were incorrectly opposed by the West, and now
7 you're coming forth with this document that claims, quite incorrectly,
8 that the West, whatever that means, are suddenly wanting to see the
9 Bosnian Muslims wiped out. I can assure you, Dr. Karadzic, that
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina -- not one person in 10.000 in America had heard of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina before 1992, and the points in this document that
12 you're reading, somehow that Bosnia-Herzegovina occupied some special
13 place in Western policy, whatever that was supposed to be, is entirely
14 fanciful. There's no -- there's nothing to it.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. However, like everywhere else in the
16 world, the broad masses who do not know about Bosnia-Herzegovina do not
17 actually pursue policy. It is governments that pursue policy. And the
18 Western governments knew full well everything about the Balkans.
19 However, a small correction, Mr. Ambassador. Izetbegovic is not
20 saying that all of this is bragging. He says, I think that there was
21 some truth in these stories of Tudjman's. Another correction,
22 Mr. Ambassador. The Serbs besieged the Bosnian Muslims to have Bosnia
23 remain as a whole, together with them, in Yugoslavia, not to have any
24 kind of partition. Partition was advocated by Alija Izetbegovic, as we
25 will prove here.
1 A. Dr. Karadzic, let me remind you of your statement to us, which is
2 in my diary, that the problem could be solved if Tudjman and Mate Boban,
3 the Bosnian Croat leader, were on one side of the table and you,
4 Milosevic, and Hadzic were on the other side of the table. What that
5 meant -- and you can comment on this, of course. What that meant to
6 everybody who read that statement, meant that the Serbs and the Croats
7 were interested in the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina or in the legal
8 fiction of maintaining a state called "Bosnia-Herzegovina," in which, in
9 effect and in reality, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats ruled.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Had you been told that after the
11 crisis in Croatia
12 Serb Krajina in Croatia
13 was always that it was Serb-Croat relations that lay at the heart of the
14 Yugoslav crises, and that we could not make any progress in Bosnia
15 because the question of the Serb Krajina had not been resolved. That was
16 the point. That is why we needed Tudjman and Milosevic, not for Bosnia
17 because if the question of the Serb Krajina were to be resolved, then it
18 would be easier to find a solution for Bosnia.
19 I will remind you, Mr. Ambassador, that up until the breakout of
20 the war, throughout 1991 we were making offers to Bosnia to remain in
22 agreement reached between us and the Muslim Bosniak organisation. At
23 first, it was supported by Izetbegovic, but after that, these chances
24 went down the drain. Are you denying that?
25 A. It is correct when you say that the principal issue in the
1 conflict, the principal underlying issue, was always the relationship
2 between Serbia
3 former Yugoslavia
4 essential. It still is.
5 Where you are incorrect, Dr. Karadzic, is when you say that,
6 Throughout 1991, we were making offers to Bosnia to remain in Yugoslavia
7 Why you were making those offers is clear. The reason you were making
8 those offers is that Yugoslavia
9 of Croatia
10 old Yugoslavia
11 effect, a Serbian state, because it would consist of Serbia, Macedonia
12 and Montenegro
13 in a Serbo-Slavia. That's what they used to call it. They told that to
14 us frequently, there's no more Yugoslavia
15 that's why they didn't want to remain in Yugoslavia, and that is why in
16 the vote independence on February 29 and March 1, 1992, the vote that
17 your party boycotted, they voted in favour of independence. That point
18 has been established. In my opinion, that point has been established.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We'll get back to that.
20 Excellency, D899, can we have that admitted now? It's still
21 available to us, and we will see which villages -- which Muslim villages
22 lived in peace in our parts up until the end of the war, so we will see
23 how sincere he was.
24 As for this page 252 of Izetbegovic's book, perhaps we can agree
25 on that.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, first 1D899.
2 MR. TIEGER: We're starting a bit from scratch on that,
3 Your Honour. I don't think that was notified to us.
4 JUDGE KWON: No, I don't think so.
5 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure I can anticipate a particular problem,
6 but I think prudence requires me to at least review it and give it the
7 consideration I would have had it been notified earlier.
8 JUDGE KWON: It seems to be an excerpt -- a compilation of his
9 speeches, so shall we mark it for identification for the time being?
10 MR. TIEGER: That would be fine, Your Honour. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency --
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D119.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Prosecution does have six
15 volumes of my speeches, orders, et cetera, and this is on page 233 of
16 Volume 4, I think. Yes, book number 4. That was published while I was
17 in hiding. It was published by the Committee for the Truth.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador --
20 JUDGE KWON: As for President Izetbegovic's book, what number is
21 it, in terms of 65 ter?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, as the
23 ambassador's testimony developed, I was compelled to draw on this
24 argument which I did have in mind, but I did not offer it because I
25 didn't want to deal with this particular topic with this witness. This
1 stemmed from Ambassador Okun's allegations that this appeal of mine was
2 disingenuous. We are discussing whether the West pursued a perfidious
3 policy against the Serbs and Muslims, and there are many books that state
4 that in the West as well. Many Muslims think that that was, indeed, the
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the relevant passage was read into the
7 transcript. We don't need to admit it separately, so we'll not deal with
8 that book right now.
9 I see the time. It's time to have a second break. And given
10 that you have had almost 12 hours with the ambassador, I think you should
11 be able to finish your cross-examination in three-quarters of an hour
12 when we resume at half past 12.00.
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, could I make a brief statement in
14 connection with what Dr. Karadzic just said?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
17 Dr. Karadzic, I'm surprised to hear you say that I alleged that
18 your appeals were disingenuous. I said the opposite. I said they were
19 praiseworthy, I said they were commendable, I said they had merit. I
20 said they were not observed in the field, but I never accused those
21 documents of being anything but sincere.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
23 JUDGE KWON: Half an hour.
24 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Q. Ambassador, I believe that you know of a psychology test that is
4 called "Unfinished Sentences" in our language. May I remind you, that's
5 a test in which the client is given an unfinished sentence, and then
6 everyone finishes the sentence whichever way they wish or feel. At any
7 rate, there are no two identical finishing parts of a sentence. Do you
8 recall that?
9 A. I'm aware of that.
10 Q. Thank you. I think that in your journals, and I consider them to
11 be invaluable material, a lot was written on the basis of these
12 unfinished sentences. Would you agree to that?
13 A. Well, I don't really know what you mean by that, Dr. Karadzic,
14 because the journals record what people said. Occasionally, in fact
15 often a bit more than occasionally, I would note my own comments on what
16 they were saying at the time, whether I believed them, or disbelieved
17 them, or that sort of thing, in order to make it possible for me, in
18 retrospect, to understand what they were saying. But I don't think that
19 the concept of unfinished sentences really applies. I think in
20 negotiations there are always positions taken that are sometimes worthy,
21 sometimes unworthy, sometimes are put out just to test the waters, so to
22 speak; but I'm not sure that I could call these unfinished sentences.
23 Excuse me, but that's as far as I can take it.
24 Q. Thank you. What I meant was that the readers of your journals
25 would engage in that. However, there is no doubt about one thing. Your
1 journals were in statu nascendi, they were created at the time when the
2 phenomena actually took place, when talks were held, et cetera; isn't
3 that right?
4 A. That's correct, yes. And your point -- the earlier point you
5 make, that the readers of the note-books could draw different conclusions
6 from them, is also correct. But I should mention that they were not a
7 momentary product. They began in October 1991 and stretch into May 1993,
8 so they covered a good period of time and allowed me to make better and
9 better judgements as time went on.
10 Q. Thank you very much. I hope that all the participants --
11 actually, I'd like to have something distributed.
12 What I like about your entire testimony is the part that pertains
13 to the journals. Perhaps I'm a bit surprised by the part that came after
14 the "but" that you would insert, and that would actually be expert
15 testimony, expert opinion. I wouldn't mind, because who would do it
16 better? However, then I'd have to have different preparations.
17 I made an analysis here, or, rather, my team did, as to how your
18 subsequent testimony -- or, rather, to what extent is it based on what is
19 written in the journals, so I would like us to go through that quickly,
20 if you agree.
21 So the first part, we called it "Okun versus Okun." I hope you
22 don't mind. So let us have a look at this. The most important topic is
23 that of ethnic cleansing.
24 So the first and second assertion -- that's what you said,
25 actually, when you testified in Mr. Krajisnik's trial on the 22nd of
1 June, 2004
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It is read out too fast
3 and we do not have the document.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. What you said during your testimony is something that we did not
6 find at all in your journal.
7 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me.
8 THE WITNESS: What are you referring to, Dr. Karadzic?
9 JUDGE KWON: I said, "Excuse me," Ambassador, just wait a minute.
10 Since the interpreters were not provided with this document, they have
11 difficulty following you, given that you are reading out so fast, and
12 then they stopped interpreting your statement after you made:
13 "When you testified in Mr. Krajisnik's trial on the 22nd of
14 June ..."
15 And then please continue from there.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. So, Mr. Ambassador, number 1 and number 2, the assertions made
18 here, that is what you said on the 22nd of June, 2004, on page 4158 and
19 4204. And the second assertion also in the Krajisnik trial on the
20 22nd of June, 2004, on page 4169, and this is the assertion:
21 [In English] "Bosnian Serbs had six political goals. Third, to
22 be ethnically pure Serb or overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb."
23 [No interpretation]
24 [In English] "At a later stage, the Bosnian Serbs were removing
25 Muslims from their territories to create an ethnically-pure
1 Republika Srpska."
2 [Interpretation] We're going to prove very easily that that
3 wasn't the case, but the Defence and I personally would like you to go
4 away from that conviction too, that that was not so.
5 Why is that not contained in the diaries?
6 A. Two points, Dr. Karadzic. It is contained in the diaries. It is
7 perfectly clear from the diaries [Realtime transcript read in error "It's
8 clear on the points]. The second point, on the question of ethnically
9 pure, that was the term used by Mr. Krajisnik, himself, when he gave that
10 video representation of the Republika Srpska in which he claimed and
11 stated that the Republika Srpska occupied land that was Serb before the
12 war, and that was demonstrably untrue because the very map he was using
13 indicated all the Muslim opstina along the Drina.
14 Last, but not least, the statement about the war aims, the goals
15 of the Bosnian Serbs, I stated were known publicly and privately, and
16 that is true, because on May 12, 1992
17 your government issued those war aims, and they were fully consistent
18 with the six that I have listed in previous trials. And in the Milosevic
19 case, he agreed with me that those were the Bosnian Serb war aims, if you
20 read the transcript.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ambassador, if you could take a look at the
22 transcript, the starting point of your answer doesn't seem to correctly
23 reflect what you said in the first point. It just said:
24 "It's clear on the points --"
25 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't say that.
1 JUDGE KWON: I remember you having said that it's clear from the
2 journal, itself.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes. What I said was I was drawing a correct
4 conclusion from my note-books.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I didn't find that in
7 your note-books, neither did my team find it either.
8 Now, I'd like to clear up two or three other points.
9 Q. Mr. Ambassador, linguistic problems in this Tribunal are
10 considerable because of the idioms used, and I'm going to rely on the
11 fact that the interpreters confirm that according to an idiom in our
12 language, when it says that it's purely Serb territory, it means
13 incontestably Serbian, that is, over 50 per cent Serbs. Now, in my
14 testimony in the Krajisnik trial, I underlined that. If we say that
15 something is purely Croatian or Muslim, it doesn't mean that it has been
16 cleansed of the rest, but that it is, without a doubt, incontestably
17 that. So we recognised 80 per cent of territory being incontestably
18 Serbian, Muslim, or Croatian, and that 20 per cent had to be resolved in
19 some other way.
20 Now, this specific feature of our language might have led to this
21 misunderstanding. Do you agree?
22 A. It might have, but it didn't.
23 Let me recall for you your own statement in January 1993 to the
24 combined Serbian -- Bosnian Serb Co-ordinating Committee, in which you
25 describe the situation in Zvornik 50:50 per cent Serbian and Muslim
1 before the war, and now the same population, 50.000, you said --
2 actually, it was bigger than 50.000, but you said 50.000, now
3 100 per cent Serb. So I certainly accept your linguistic -- your
4 semantic differentiation of the word "purely," which can also, in
5 English, mean "incontestably," but it also was used to describe the
6 ethnic cleansing as it was taking place. Indeed, you, yourself,
7 described it.
8 Q. Thank you. Now, to go back to the January 1993 meeting, I have
9 to say this: Prior to that sentence of mine, Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic
10 advocated to have the exclusion -- advocated against the forcible removal
11 of any of the population, and I supported him, and I said that, Why would
12 we do that, because it's happening spontaneously? So I didn't justify
13 it, I didn't advocate the displacement of the population. I just said,
14 What would forcible displacement mean if the population was moving of its
15 own accord? That's all I wanted to say.
16 Now, I'd like us to go back to this analysis, an analysis of --
17 A. Could I comment on that? I'll be brief.
18 Jovanovic was the foreign minister of first Yugoslavia and then
20 discussing, the meeting of June -- of January 1993 of the Co-ordinating
21 Committee, he began his remarks by saying that he was no expert.
22 Jovanovic said that he was no expert on the specific situation of ethnic
23 cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, as an experienced diplomat, he
24 knew of the exchanges of populations peacefully that occurred after the
25 First World War as between Greece
1 fact, and he was suggesting to the group, the Serb Co-ordinating
2 Committee - I guess he was actually suggesting it primarily to the
3 Bosnian Serbs - that that was a way to accomplish their goal, that they
4 didn't have to forcibly expel people, that they could do it peacefully.
5 That was his remark. That's a matter of record. You can read it in the
6 Co-ordinating Committee document which was entered into the Krajisnik
7 trial. And I should say Krajisnik never contested that point.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, may we have the six strategic
9 goals? It's 00781, a Prosecution document, or, rather, it's an exhibit
10 already. And I'd like to point out there, as I did during the Krajisnik
11 testimony, that the third goal was that the Drina should not be the
12 border between two worlds, meaning there the East and the West, because
13 that's what the Drina River
14 the Krajisnik trial, but between two worlds, and that is quite clear in
15 the original. And nowhere in those goals does it state that the Serb
16 unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be ethnically pure or overwhelmingly
18 Now, can we have the document with those goals put up on e-court?
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. But you're right on one count, Mr. Ambassador. It was no secret,
21 and already in June we had decided that, together with the map, we send
22 the European Community those goals as our starting point for the
23 negotiations. Of course, we had to count on losing something, some of
24 that, forfeiting some of that.
25 A. Well, I've mentioned, Dr. Karadzic, previously, and I don't want
1 to take your time or the Court's time, that your goals published on
2 May 12th, 1992
3 them into reality, that horseshoe around Sarajevo we've discussed
4 previously would have been fully affected. You, for example, wanted your
5 western border, that is, the border on the eastern side of the horseshoe
6 in the Neretva Valley
7 The Croats, of course, denied it and then defeated you in a battle there.
8 They were not about to let you get the Neretva, since their self-declared
9 capital, Mostar, is on the Neretva.
10 So these issues stayed in contention during the war, but I cannot
11 agree with you when you say that your goals, as stated in May, were
12 inconsistent with the goals that I have described. I think they were
13 fully consistent, so I disagree with you on that point.
14 Q. Well, very well, Mr. Ambassador. It doesn't say that we're
15 calling for an ethnically-pure state anywhere. That's what this is
17 And I'd like to inform the Trial Chamber that the
18 transcription -- the transcribing of those goals is termed a decision one
19 year later due to some personnel replacement in the administration. So
20 could I have it on the record that in my speech at the Assembly, in the
21 transcript that we have here it says that the Drina should not be the
22 border between worlds or two worlds, and that is in keeping with what
23 Mr. Izetbegovic said, that Una will not be a border for the Croats and
24 the Drina
25 said that they will be -- I termed them "soft borders," as certain
1 borders in Europe
2 Now, Mr. Ambassador, if we look at number 3, you said:
3 [In English] "Karadzic said we want peace or it would be
5 [Interpretation] Now, in your testimony, and that is to be
6 found -- that third statement is to be found in your note-book number 4,
7 06530, page 46 -- at page 46, but in relation to this you testified in
8 the Krajisnik trial, on the 22nd of June, 2004, on page 4400, there was
9 an addition, and it says:
10 [In English] "Okun does not believe he was being sincere when he
11 said that unless he meant that it would be disastrous for Muslims and
13 [Interpretation] Do you agree, Mr. Ambassador, that the Serbs
14 were a third of the population, and the anti-Serb coalition amounted to
15 two-thirds, and that it was Croatia
16 temporarily or permanently was against them, that is, in the ratio of
17 1:8, and with the inclusion of the West against the Serbs in Bosnia
18 ratio was 1 to an indefinable number? So why did we want war? Why did
19 you add this in your testimony, whereas it does not exist in your diary?
20 A. Well, that's easy to answer, Mr. Karadzic. I'll be brief.
21 It's important not to take each entry -- each statement of yours
22 in isolation. You said war would be disastrous. I was well aware that
23 before that, in October 1991, when you walked out of the old
24 Bosnian Assembly, you said if they declared independence, that would lead
25 the Muslims on a path to hell, so that I was taking your remarks in the
1 total context, not in the individual case.
2 Now, when you say that you were heavily outnumbered, you have
3 failed to mention that you had behind you Serbia, with 10 million people,
4 and the Yugoslav People's Army, the JNA, with almost half a million
5 troops. So your contention that you were the weaker party, particularly
6 at the beginning, is clearly not the case, since the JNA was totally with
8 Q. Well, we have to enter into a debate there.
9 Mr. Ambassador, do you remember that Serbia accepted any plan and
10 all plans, and that this co-ordinating body was established at the
11 proposal of the West, saying that Serbia
12 influence us, and that our first disagreements with Serbia came with the
13 Vance-Owen Plan which Serbia
14 A. That is correct. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, after it was
15 accepted by the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, it was not accepted by
16 the Bosnian Serbs, the only party not to accept it. And the Serbs, led
17 personally by President Milosevic, in my presence, made what I regarded
18 as a sincere effort to convince Dr. Karadzic and Krajisnik to accept the
19 Vance-Owen Peace Plan. They never did.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Please believe me that they were more
21 than sincere, and that's where we and the Serbian leadership disagreed
23 Now, I'm interested in why there are so many differences here.
24 And looking at point 4 there, you say, in the transcript of the Krajisnik
25 trial on the 22nd of June, 2004, page 4172:
1 [In English] "Tie Serb opstinas to Yugoslavia. Otherwise, war
2 will result."
3 A. It was you who said that, Dr. Krajisnik -- excuse me,
4 Dr. Karadzic.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Why isn't that in your diary, Mr. Ambassador?
6 A. I believe it is in the diary. Can we check it? I would be happy
7 to do so, but it might take too much time. But I would suggest that the
8 Court, the Defence, and the counsel check it, because I think it's in the
10 Q. Let me remind you, Mr. Ambassador, of our priorities. The first
11 priority was that the whole Yugoslavia
12 The second priority was Bosnia
13 priority, which Izetbegovic proposed, was that only the Muslim parts of
15 and demonstrate it. It's contained in Muslim sources. And in that case,
16 then, it would be the type according to West Virginia, the Serb variant
17 that Serb opstinas remain within Yugoslavia
18 that these municipalities, too, should step down from Yugoslavia, but be
19 given their unit.
20 So I think it's all this case of unfinished sentences once again.
21 A. I can understand you would say that, Dr. Karadzic, and it's
22 partially true. That is to say, your priorities were to, in the first
23 case, make no change in the Yugoslav administrative structure. But, of
24 course, there was change that already happened. Croatia had declared
25 independence and pretty much gained it. Slovenia had declared it and
1 completely gained its independence. And the situation that you mention
2 of West Virginia, which we've discussed previously, differs in this case:
3 You made and make the point that West Virginia seceded from Virginia
4 while the Civil War was in progress because they were not a slave-holding
5 area, and that is correct. The difference between the West Virginia case
6 and your case is that you effectively started the war in Bosnia with your
7 self-declared declaration that you would either remain in Yugoslavia
8 have your own Republika Srpska. So while the West Virginia case was the
9 result of a war, your declaration started the war. I do not expect you
10 to agree with that, but it is the case.
11 Q. We have proof and evidence, Mr. Ambassador, that the
12 unilateral -- and all your colleagues from the West, from
13 Warren Christopher, even President Clinton, James Bissett, and so on,
14 Henry Kissinger, all of them say quite the reverse, the unilateral
15 secession. And even in the Milosevic judgement, it says Slovenia
16 proclaimed independence and caused the war. Now, later on, they amend
17 that, but even this OTP says that the fact that Slovenia had stepped down
18 caused the war. And I say that the unconstitutional proclamation of
19 independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina caused the war, not us. We didn't
20 need a war. We didn't -- weren't seeking to acquire their territories.
21 But let's move on. That's something that we shall prove and show here
22 quite easily.
23 But all I want to tell you is that there are enormous differences
24 between the note-books, which I accept, and your testimony, in your
25 subsequent testimony, that is to say, 10 years later. There are quite a
1 lot of examples of that.
2 For example, if we look at point 13 on page 2, you testified to
3 the fact that Milosevic -- you said that the Greek president, although
4 Milosevic was on good terms with the prime minister, not the president --
5 anyway, you say Milosevic would accept 45 per cent of B and H land for
6 Bosnian Serbs:
7 [In English] "But it's hard to accept the segment given to the
8 Bosnian Serbs by the Vance-Owen Plan, because it is not ethnically clean.
9 So the negotiators had a problem, because they cannot support ethnic
10 cleansing by Milosevic is saying he will accept 45 per cent if it is
11 ethnically clean. The leadership of Republika Srpska was even tougher."
12 [Interpretation] There's none of that in the diaries,
13 Mr. Ambassador, and our objection/comment was not ethnic purity, but
14 poverty, because we got 10 or 15 per cent of the common wealth. Is that
15 so or not?
16 A. That's not correct, Dr. Karadzic. You will find in my journals
17 numerous comments particularly by Aleksa Buha, your colleague, in effect
18 the foreign minister of the so-called Republika Srpska. You'll find in
19 the note-books numerous comments by Buha that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
20 was unfair to the Bosnian Serbs, among other reasons, because it did not
21 put them all together. His specific charge was that 50 per cent of the
22 Bosnian Serbs were not in Bosnian Serb majority provinces. The fact is
23 it was about 40 per cent. But he was correct, because the very purpose
24 of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was to cure the ethnic cleansing, was to end
25 it, and mix the parties so they could live in a postwar peaceful
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina all together, the way they had before the war.
2 So, Dr. Karadzic, this superb exercise you've gone through in
3 parsing my journals, and I appreciate that you have found them effective,
4 but you have and your team has been very selective in what you've chosen,
5 and, therefore, in many respects it is misleading.
6 Q. Well, Mr. Ambassador, here's what you wrote with respect to
7 Mitsotakis, and it's journal number 2, 0635 is the number. The page
8 number is 53:
9 [In English] "Mitsotakis: We must solve Serb-Croat differences.
10 They are ready to talk. Today, Muslims are the problem."
11 [Interpretation] And that's what you wrote about Mitsotakis.
12 Now, in your testimony, you say that the comments made by the Serbs is
13 that the territories they receive were not ethnically pure, they were
14 poor territories, no infrastructure, no industry, no mines. And we have
15 a whole study conducted why the Vance-Owen Plan is unacceptable, was
16 unacceptable. A whole study was conducted, and I'm going to present it
17 to this Trial Chamber. It was a contemporaneous study, where it says how
18 much of the housing fund was given to the Serbs, how many mines and
19 mineral ores and so on, and these were territories which had been Serb
20 for centuries.
21 So is this not a drastic difference between the diary and the
23 A. Not in the least, Dr. Karadzic. I have pointed that out. I just
24 again pointed out what Buha said, and Buha used to make that point to
25 us -- to me regularly. He would say, in his colourful terminology, The
1 only thing you've given us are the snakes and the stones. So there was
2 no secret there.
3 Also, it should be noted that the Prime Minister Mitsotakis of
5 war, both Serb and Bosnian Serb position. Indeed, it was he who convened
6 the conference in Athens
7 Vance-Owen Peace Plan on May 2nd, 1993
8 to the Bosnian Serb Assembly with President Milosevic a couple of weeks
9 later in May to try to convince you to sign again and to agree to the
10 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and you rejected his plea and you rejected
11 Milosevic's plea, and the war continued for two more years, until the
12 Croatians ended it.
13 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you this: Did you understand Mr. Buha
14 correctly? What language was he speaking to you, what language did he
15 say that in?
16 A. He spoke to us in both English and Serbo-Croatian.
17 Q. Well, I'm afraid that his English is not good even today, and it
18 was even worse at the time. But "stones and snakes," so it wasn't a
19 question of the population; it was a question of poverty. And this
20 confirms that our objections were because of the natural resources and
21 the infrastructure, which the plan provided for, didn't it?
22 Now, we have your Athens
23 the Athens
24 Mr. Ambassador -- can you find this:
25 [In English] "The Serbs are ready to accept less than
1 50 per cent. Milosevic would help."
2 [Interpretation] So this relates to the Bosnian Serbs, that
3 they're ready to accept less than 50 per cent, although we always counted
4 30 per cent for the Muslims, 70 per cent to the Croats, and 53 per cent
5 to the Serb -- now, this entry, can it lead to this kind of testimony?
6 A. There has never been any dispute between us and I have never said
7 that you insisted on holding all of the land that your army occupied. I
8 have stated, and it is correct, that the army -- the Bosnian Serb Army,
9 the VRS, occupied about 70 per cent of the territory, but it was clear at
10 all times that there would have to be some adjustment to this.
11 Now, in the Vance-Owen Plan, you ended up with 43 per cent of the
12 territory, that is to say, 43 per cent in Serb-majority provinces. That
13 would have required your forces to withdraw from about 40 per cent of the
14 land they occupied at the time. Vance and Owen thought that was fair.
15 They were heavily criticised in certain quarters in the West, above all
16 in the United States, for, quote, "legitimatising" ethnic cleansing and,
17 quote, "legitimatising" Serb aggression. They did not agree with that at
18 all, because they felt that reducing your occupation from 70 per cent to
19 43 per cent was something of an achievement. But that was the reality,
20 that they were attacked for it. And as we know, the Bosnian Serbs were
21 not the only party that rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The US
22 government rejected it.
23 That you were willing to accept less than your army occupied was
24 never a point at issue, since the army had been very successful in taking
25 three-quarters of the country.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, conclude your cross-examination in 10
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Ambassador, that at the Carrington-Cutileiro
5 conference, without a war and before the war, we agreed to even less than
6 we had gotten now, 45 per cent, and without contiguous territories, when
7 it was assumed that Bosnia
8 than were we got now; do you agree?
9 A. Yes, that's correct. We saw that on the Darwin draft map. I
10 agree it was in the draft.
11 Q. Thank you. Since I'm running short of time, I would now like to
12 draw your attention to part 4. Since we cannot go through all of it, I
13 would like to say, though, that the analysis shows significant
14 discrepancies in relation to the diary that I highly appreciate.
15 Look at paragraph 2:
16 [In English] "Karadzic says that Trnopolje was an open camp where
17 people were free to come and go, but that is not true. When asked about
18 phasing out the camp, Karadzic forecast on Serbs being held by others,
19 which is true, but they were held in much smaller numbers."
20 [Interpretation] That is a transcript of your testimony in
21 Krajisnik the same day, the same year. The page is 4200 and 4201.
22 Now let us see -- well, Ambassador, there is no reference to that
23 in your diaries. Trnopolje was always an open camp, and there were more
24 Serbs in prisons, except for these prisoners of war who were released
25 very soon. I'm afraid that something happened between the period when
1 you kept your diary and the period when you testified. What can you say
2 in relation to that?
3 A. Well, I can say that's not true, Dr. Karadzic, except that, of
4 course, with the passage of time we all learn things.
5 I refer to you again Cornelius Sommaruga's speech of August 26,
6 1992, at the London Conference, in which he listed the detention centres,
7 the bad ones, the ones where people were horribly mistreated, and they
8 were all detention centres run by the Bosnian Serbs. He also, and this
9 is in the record, used the number several hundred thousand. He also gave
10 as an example - I have not mentioned this previously, but it's in
11 Dr. Sommaruga's speech - that at Sanski Most, the Bosnian Serbs -- he
12 doesn't say it specifically, but Sanski Most had been taken by the
13 Bosnian Serbs, so it's clearly the Bosnian Serbs he's referring to. At
14 Sanski Most, civilians were driven across the battle-field between the
15 lines. I find it very hard, Dr. Karadzic, agree with you, although it is
16 flattering that you've paid such attention to my journals.
17 Q. It's a unique opportunity, Mr. Ambassador, that we have a person
18 like yourself here.
19 What I wish to say is you've just confirmed that that is based on
20 your subsequent knowledge. I'm afraid that Mr. Sommaruga was also
21 misinformed, or, rather, incompletely and incorrectly informed.
22 I would like to draw your attention to page 2, paragraph 3, where
23 it says:
24 [In English] "Karadzic: Wants political settlement of our
25 situation. We have to arrive at a solution. Cannot abandon sovereignty
1 and equality of our people or our land. We'll shortly close last
2 prisoner of war camps, give war criminals over to the ICRC. No
3 offensives from us. Unilateral cease-fire already declared. Ready to
4 talk until a solution is found, but cannot accept: 1, unitary state; 2,
5 central state; 3, loss of national status or our land."
6 [Interpretation] Mr. Ambassador, that is in your diary. I can
7 confirm it now as well. It is Volume 6, note-book number 6, 06539,
8 page 9. So you very faithfully recorded what my position was: No
9 unitary state, no centralised state, and we cannot lose our status of
10 nation and become a national minority.
11 However, your testimony is different. That's why I'm afraid that
12 someone misinformed you later on. While you were in a position to see
13 things for yourself on the spot, I have no objections.
14 A. I'm not sure what your question is, Dr. Karadzic, but let me
15 respond as I understand it.
16 I recorded correctly, and I'm pleased to hear you agree, your
17 statement of -- your position. I have also stated that to the Court
18 earlier, then you mentioned it, so there's no disagreement there. You
19 did not want a unitary state, you did not want a centralised state. You
20 refused to live in that kind of a country, and that's why you started a
21 war to prevent it from happening.
22 Now, on the question of President Sommaruga being misinformed or
23 only partially informed of the situation, that anyone would find very
24 difficult to believe. He had the entire resources of the International
25 Committee of the Red Cross working down there, his people were there.
1 You have cited several times Thierry Germond's comments to us, et cetera,
2 and that's appeared before the Court. So I do not think the ICRC did not
3 going on [sic]. The ICRC is officially charged in the Geneva Conventions
4 with visiting prisoners, whether they're civilians in conflict or
5 military. For example, to this day, the ICRC visits the American
6 Detention Centre at Guantanamo Bay
7 permitted to do so.
8 So I find it hard to believe that you say he was misinformed or
9 only partially informed. I think you say that because he was very well
10 informed and said things that are very unpleasant for Bosnian Serbs to
11 hear about their war crimes.
12 I do not agree that my testimony, now or in the Krajisnik case,
13 differ from my contemporary comments and recording of what you and others
14 said. I repeat, it is flattering to be complimented on that point.
15 Nobody has ever challenged my journals, not Milosevic, not Krajisnik.
16 They are accurate.
17 Now, it is also the case that I am not -- as we have pointed out,
18 I am not a court stenographer. Every word that is said is not there; the
19 gist of the meetings are there. And as we said earlier, I often would
20 not report what I said, because I knew what I said and I wasn't
21 interested in having my journals turn into an egoistical exercise. I
22 would never do that. So that, for example, when you do not find in my
23 journals my comment to you already before the war started that you would
24 commit a genocide, I didn't write that down because I know I said it. I
25 didn't believe it at the time, but I know that I said it, and the reason
1 I said it, Dr. Karadzic, is because of your constant emphasis on the
2 genocide of the Serbs during World War II. And that's amply recorded in
3 the journals, including one entry where I note that it was somewhat of a
4 surprise because three minutes passed before you mentioned the
5 Bosnian Serb genocide suffered in the second war. I'm not arguing that
6 point. There was a genocide committed against the Bosnian Serbs.
7 Incidentally, when I once discussed this subject with
8 General Mladic, the very same subject you raised about the Serbs, he said
9 to me that the principal areas where the Bosnian Serbs had suffered the
10 genocide in World War II were Sarajevo
11 Srebrenica. Interesting that he mentioned Srebrenica, in view of what
12 happened later.
13 Dr. Karadzic is the psychiatrist. I am not. It would be
14 interesting to know what was in his mind in July 1995.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
16 I think what you've just seen is a demonstration of what we
17 Americans call filibuster. I wonder if you could give Dr. Karadzic
18 another five minutes.
19 THE WITNESS: I was answering his charges, but I'm happy to
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. --
22 MR. TIEGER: I already was patient about the amount of time cut
23 into my redirect. I don't know how much -- I don't mind the additional
24 five minutes. I don't think it should be due to an alleged filibuster.
25 I think the witness is trying to answer the questions and the issues
1 raised. But I don't want to have no time at all for redirect. There are
2 just a couple of quick issues I think need to be addressed.
3 JUDGE KWON: I take it that was the last question. How many more
4 questions do you have, Mr. Karadzic?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, as far as this
6 kind of witness is concerned, with such vast experience, one would have
7 to put a great many more questions. However, I'll reduce it to two or
8 three questions and I'll be done.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Ambassador, do you agree that what you write
11 contemporaneously is more authentic than what one thinks of that
12 situation 10, 15, or 20 years later? Just yes or no. We can deal with
13 that briefly.
14 A. No.
15 Q. You think that our recollections are more accurate and more fresh
16 than at the moment when things actually happen; yes or no?
17 A. No. There's a reason, but if I'm not allowed to state my reason,
18 I simply answer no. I can give you the reason why I say that. That's up
19 to you.
20 Q. So you think our recollection is not more fresh and that it is
21 not more accurate 20 years later?
22 A. I remained active in the former Yugoslavia after my period of
23 activity in Bosnia
24 aware of what was happening at that period. I remained concerned with
25 affairs after 1997. I began my testimony here at this Tribunal in 2001
1 with Milosevic, so - and I do not say this happily - I have been closely
2 involved with the former Yugoslavia
3 that is why I say, without filibustering, that my recollection is quite
4 good, because it is not just recollection. I've been dealing with the
5 issue for many years.
6 Q. Then, Mr. Ambassador, may I ask you -- or, rather, may I infer
7 that what happened was a considerable evolution, in terms of your
8 positions and knowledge? To which extent did your appearance before this
9 Court and your co-operation with the OTP influence the evolution that
10 took place since the period when you recorded these events and when you
11 were there?
12 A. I was not influenced at all by the OTP. My appearance before the
13 Court was to tell the truth and the whole truth. I have tried to do
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank
16 you for everything, especially for your journals.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Dr. Karadzic.
18 And I should say at this point, because Dr. Karadzic has
19 mentioned that he has many more questions, that if the Court wishes me to
20 return, I am fully prepared to do so.
21 JUDGE KWON: Very kind of you, Mr. Ambassador.
22 Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
24 Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:
25 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Ambassador. I have just a few moments to
1 raise a couple of quick matters.
2 First of all, with respect to the contention of the accused over
3 the last few moments that there -- that you -- that your testimony in the
4 Krajisnik case about entries in your diary was not reflected in that
5 diary, I'd like to turn to those, so first to the Mitsotakis reference.
6 That concerned testimony in the Krajisnik case beginning at page 4232,
7 4233, 34, a diary entry of November 23rd, 1992, which can be found at
8 P787, e-court page 68.
9 And Dr. Karadzic pointed out that you testified to hearing from
10 Mitsotakis that Milosevic had said he would accept 45 per cent if it was
11 ethnically clean, and according to Dr. Karadzic, none of that was in your
13 If we could look at the reference at the top left of the screen,
14 which immediately precedes a meeting that begins at 4.35 -- have you
15 found that reference, Mr. Ambassador?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Okay. And can you read it -- can you indicate to the Court
18 whether, in fact, the reference you testified to in the Krajisnik case
19 is, indeed, recorded in your diary?
20 A. Yes, it is. Let me just read it to you. This is Prime Minister
21 Mitsotakis talking to us in November 23rd, 1992, and I quote:
22 "The problem is not percentages on land. Milosevic could live
23 with 45 per cent. He told me so.
24 "What is hard to accept is that Milosevic's segment," meaning the
25 Bosnian Serb segment, "is that Milosevic's segment is not ethnically
2 "But we cannot admit ethnic cleansing in any case."
3 That's Milosevic talking to me and Vance. That's what he said,
4 and that's what I recorded in the diary.
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. The accused also directed your
6 attention and the Court's attention to testimony in the Krajisnik case
7 which stated:
8 "Tie Serb opstinas to Yugoslavia; otherwise, war will result."
9 And asked you:
10 "Why isn't that in your diary, Mr. Ambassador?"
11 You said you thought it was.
12 Can we turn, please, to P777, e-court page 23, please.
13 A. What is the date?
14 Q. That would be the 2nd of December, 1991.
15 A. 1992, I think.
16 Q. I believe 1991, Mr. Ambassador.
17 A. September 1991, I was not in Yugoslavia.
18 Q. I'm sorry, December, December.
19 A. Oh, December. Excuse me.
20 I apologise to the Court. These note-books are rather heavy.
21 JUDGE KWON: Take your time, Mr. Ambassador.
22 MR. TIEGER: And presumably the --
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have the pages, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
25 Q. I believe you'll find that at page 49, and let me ask you, then,
1 whether or not the reference "Tie Serb opstinas to Yugoslavia; otherwise,
2 war will result," is, indeed, reflected in your diaries.
3 A. You've just quoted them:
4 "Tie Serb opstinas to Yugoslavia; otherwise, war will result."
5 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
6 Now, yesterday there was also an exchange between you and the
7 accused when he asserted -- when he asked whether any of those involved
8 in the negotiations said that he was a liar, asserted that none of them
9 had said that, and also a suggestion by the accused that your position
10 differed from that of your colleagues or those who were at the head of
11 these undertakings and those who assisted you. That was a quote. So in
12 that connection -- oh, and that last remark that I quoted was in
13 connection with an excerpt from the book by Lord Owen, so I'd like to
14 turn to Lord Owen's book and look at excerpts which were not brought to
15 your attention very quickly.
16 First, if we could turn to -- and this is 65 ter 06285. If we
17 could turn to e-court page 186. And looking at the left side of the
18 page, the paragraph that begins:
19 "Ever since I had clashed with Karadzic in Banja Luka over ethnic
20 cleansing in September 1992 ..."
21 That passage goes on to note Mr. Karadzic's excuses for ethnic
22 cleansing and the fact that he didn't raise any objections to the
23 championing of human rights safe-guards by the negotiations.
24 And then I turn your attention to the last sentence of that
1 "All this, however, was a facade to cover up a deep-seated
2 commitment to Serbs not living alongside Muslims and to conducting an
3 ethnic cleansing programme with a bare-faced dishonour of even greater
4 magnitude than his continued inability to respect or even to know the
6 And one more passage, Mr. Ambassador, with time drawing short.
7 That's at page 120 of the e-court. It begins at the top left part of the
8 page, which begins with:
9 "Karadzic's especial skill, and it is a considerable one, is to
10 deflect and defuse a hostile question with an innocent facial expression
11 and apparent concern in his voice."
12 It continues on a question about shelling Sarajevo, and the
13 answer that it's the Muslims who were shelling, and Serbs are just
14 protecting their homes.
15 That paragraph ends with a reference to the fact that
16 Dr. Karadzic's claim that Serbs cannot live together with Muslims and
17 Croats, and not to dump them in the sake sack, like cats and dogs."
18 And, finally, this comment:
19 "Perhaps because we have both trained as physicians, I have found
20 it hard to believe that he could be a practitioner of ethnic cleansing
21 and espouse such an odious philosophy, so totally at odds with the
22 Hippocratic Oath. I initially hoped that there was more respect within
23 the inner man for human life and dignity, but I was doomed to illusion
25 Ambassador, very quickly, was Lord Owen one of those persons, in
1 addition to Lord Carrington whom you noted yesterday, one of those
2 involved in the negotiations, who told you that Dr. Karadzic did not tell
3 the truth?
4 A. Yes. He was deeply disappointed, as he said, with Dr. Karadzic's
6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. I realise there wasn't much
7 time, I'm already running over, so I will conclude.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
9 Ambassador Okun, this concludes your evidence. Thank you very
10 much for coming to the Tribunal yet again and for sharing your experience
11 with us when you worked in Bosnia
12 Tribunal as a whole, very much appreciates your efforts to come here over
13 and over again and help us with our work.
14 I hope that now that your testimony is over, you can relax and
15 enjoy your future endeavours. Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: I thank you, Your Honour, and the Court, and I
17 appreciate all the courtesies that have been shown to me by the Court,
18 the Defendants, and the Prosecution.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, we can take care of the
21 housekeeping later, but I'll be tendering those excerpts.
22 JUDGE KWON: Ambassador, you are now free to go.
23 The part of "Balkan Odyssey" has already been admitted as P799,
24 so I'm wondering what the practice should be, then. The added part will
25 be added to the existing part? We'll deal with it when we resume on
1 Wednesday, Wednesday afternoon.
2 I hope everybody has a good rest until then. We'll rise.
3 [The witness withdrew]
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 5th day of May,
6 2010, at 2.15 p.m.