100507ED

Page 2056

1 we're fortunate enough to have a positive decision and receive some more

2 documents, those may be things we would want to visit with this witness.

3 So I just want to make a note at this stage that there may be an

4 application to call this witness back if things develop in that way.

5 Thank you.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for your notice, Mr. Robinson.

7 [The witness takes the stand]

8 WITNESS: DAVID HARLAND [Resumed]

9 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Harland.

10 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: We're going to start today the cross-examination by

12 the Defence.

13 Mr. Karadzic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Good morning, Mr. Harland.

18 First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to you for

19 your readiness to meet up with the Defence, where we managed to agree on

20 certain matters and discuss various matters. But what I particularly

21 appreciated was your motivation, your intention of ensuring equi-distance

22 in view of the Prosecution and the Defence. Is that your position today

23 as well?

24 A. Well, I think I said, you know, I agree to participate in this

25 process in the hope that it gets us closer to the truth, yes.

Page 2057

1 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you something. Who held that position

2 before you?

3 A. Immediately before me was a colleague called Emma Shitaka.

4 Q. I'm sorry that I did not manage to remember you and that I cannot

5 remember her either, but that doesn't really change the situation. Could

6 you please tell me who held that position before she did?

7 A. I'm not sure, because I took up the position as soon as I

8 arrived, so I knew my immediate predecessor, but I didn't necessarily

9 know her predecessor. Sorry.

10 Q. Thank you. However, when you came to that position, did you --

11 you did actually look into matters, didn't you? You wanted to see what

12 had been done up until then; right?

13 A. Yes. But there were a lot of things going on when I arrived, so

14 I must say there was not a lot of -- not a lot of time to do a lot of

15 research about what had been done before in the office.

16 Q. However, you did familiarise yourself with everything that your

17 superiors had signed up to, I assume.

18 A. Yes, most -- a lot of it. No, I can't say all of it, but most of

19 it.

20 Q. Thank you. Could you now tell us a bit about your chief mandate

21 and what it was, and were there any other obligations involved?

22 A. My personal mandate or the mandate of the organisation I worked

23 for?

24 Q. Both.

25 A. Well, the mandate of the organisation I worked for, the mandate

Page 2058

1 of UNPROFOR, was laid out in a series of Security Council resolutions,

2 which were often not very clear because they represented a compromise

3 between very different views about the conflict in Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina, but the -- and it's almost 20 years ago, but if I remember

5 correctly, there's 713 is the arms embargo, I think. 817 or 81 -- no,

6 770 mandates UNPROFOR to protect humanitarian assistance coming into

7 Bosnia and Herzegovina. 776 asks UNPROFOR to take certain measures to

8 protect those convoys and Sarajevo Airport, I think. Then 817 or 819

9 about -- give it a particular role with respect to Srebrenica. 824

10 creates some safe areas. 836 authorises the use of all necessary means

11 to deter attacks against those safe areas. So the mandate of UNPROFOR

12 was large and complicated.

13 My little role was to try and be the political eyes and ears for

14 the UNPROFOR leadership in Sarajevo.

15 Q. Thank you. That means that you focused on the political aspect

16 rather than the military; right?

17 A. Yes, though every morning I was required to sit through the

18 briefing by the UNMOs, the United Nations Military Observers, and others,

19 but -- and sometimes I would go to negotiations that were principally of

20 a military character, so about cease-fires or anti-sniping agreement.

21 But your general characterisation is correct, that the heart of my work

22 was on the political side.

23 Q. Thank you. Was there a person similar to yourself on the

24 military side, that is to say, writing up military analyses?

25 A. The person who was probably -- had the most similar role to mine

Page 2059

1 was the military assistant to the BH commander, so the military assistant

2 then to General Briquemont and then General Rose and then General Smith.

3 That person was usually a colonel, usually a British colonel, but it

4 changed. I think I was the only one who stayed through most of the war.

5 Q. Perhaps I got things a bit confused in that sense, mentioning

6 Jeremy Braid, because I thought that he was doing more or less the same

7 thing. Your joint superiors had two wings, as it were; one was political

8 and the other was military. So you were the political assistant and

9 there was this other military assistant; isn't that right?

10 A. That's correct. I think if I remember -- I mean, I have only a

11 vague -- I have a feeling that Jeremy Braid was not with UNPROFOR,

12 because there was -- as well as UNPROFOR, which was a peacekeeping

13 mission, there was an intergovernmental negotiation process, Lord Owen

14 and these other characters, and they also had a political staff. My

15 responsibilities were exclusively limited to UNPROFOR's operations in its

16 mandated area.

17 Q. The political aspect of these operations; right?

18 A. I should say my -- my job, when I was in BH Command, was to write

19 the overall assessment, that is, at the end of each week, which is: What

20 was the reporting and analysis of the mission in all its mandated areas?

21 And those mandated areas covered a range of political factors and a range

22 of humanitarian and military factors. But my job was to try and report

23 on the full spectrum of them and to attempt some synthesis.

24 Q. Thank you. However, your colleague on the military side was

25 involved in his own line of work, the military assistant, that is? I'm

Page 2060

1 trying to say that you authored weekly political assessments, and what

2 about him? Did he author the weekly military assessments or reports?

3 A. I don't remember well, but I don't think so. I don't think there

4 was a weekly UNPROFOR military situation report from BH Command. Maybe

5 there was, but I don't recall it, but -- and I don't recall who wrote it.

6 But my job was to try and make a synthesis of the events that had taken

7 place across UNPROFOR's mandated activities during the preceding

8 seven days.

9 Q. Thank you. But you do not have any military education, do you?

10 A. Nothing.

11 Q. Thank you. Can we then say this: There was UNPROFOR, whose

12 heads had a military -- or, rather, a political assistant for political

13 assessment, an assistant for military assessment. There were also UN

14 military observers who had their line of reporting. There was also the

15 European Commission and Monitoring Mission. They were completely

16 independent from you, and they had their own line of reporting; right?

17 And they all provided daily and weekly reports. Is all that correct?

18 A. It's generally correct. But whether our military provided a

19 separate military report, I don't know. The way our system normally

20 works is that at the level of the theatre headquarters, the streams of

21 information are meant to be integrated: the political, the humanitarian,

22 the development, the human rights, the military. And that was my

23 particular job. It's a job that takes place in all UN peacekeeping

24 missions, the job of trying to synthesise the different streams of

25 information. But it's possible that what you say is correct and that

Page 2061

1 there was a separate stream of purely military reporting to the military

2 headquarters in Zagreb.

3 Q. If I understood you well, you said that you drafted your reports

4 based on other people's reports.

5 A. I certainly used the information from the UNMOs and our

6 battalions, but I also had my own office. We had, I mentioned yesterday,

7 a medical doctor. We also had a statistician. We had political officers

8 making meetings with people in the city and outside, and, of course, I

9 attended directly the meetings with the leadership on both sides. I was

10 usually sitting quietly in the background. But -- so I would say it's

11 not correct to imply that what I had was second-hand information. There

12 was a range of sources.

13 Q. You're saying that you had a direct insight, a direct assessment,

14 but most of your report was a compilation and analysis of other people's

15 reports. Could you please tell us what you based your reports on? You

16 had two types of documents, reports and political assessments, so tell us

17 what kind of documents you produced and what they were based on.

18 A. Okay, sure. So the reports on specific incidents, whether it's a

19 meeting or something that happened to a convoy or on the battle-field, if

20 it was at a meeting, normally I was present. Normally, I didn't say

21 anything, but normally I was present with yourself, or

22 President Izetbegovic, or any of the other actors, or General Mladic, or

23 General Delic, or many others. And so normally I observed, myself. If I

24 did not observe, myself, I had a couple of colleagues who could play the

25 same role. In fact, I think one of them may be coming to testify later

Page 2062

1 in this case. And then I would also -- for example, if it was about

2 electricity or gas, I would also speak to the technical experts on either

3 side, and then often the French engineers, the UNPROFOR engineers, would

4 take me to the site and they would explain to me the problem. If it was

5 about a military episode, sometimes the UNMOs would say what they had

6 observed, and sometimes the French would take me in their little VBLs,

7 their light armoured vehicles, to the site, and we would look at what

8 occurred.

9 So if it was reporting about a particular meeting or about a

10 particular incident, it was normally my own observations and notes plus

11 whatever additional material would be given to me by people who were

12 either there or who were experts.

13 For the weekly reporting, that was largely done on the basis of a

14 discussion between me and those people who were providing the stream of

15 information in, those people who were giving us the statistics on the

16 amount of shelling, the amount of humanitarian aid coming in, the amount

17 of sniping, or who were giving us the information on the battle-field

18 situation, and with my superiors. And we would generally agree on how to

19 characterise the situation. And then I was given the task of writing it

20 down.

21 Q. And then, as we have already agreed, you synthesised all that at

22 the end of the day; is that correct? You did it at the end of every day?

23 And now I would --

24 A. I certainly did it at the end of every week. We would generally

25 meet with the leadership of UNPROFOR every morning, but we would

Page 2063

1 generally not attempt to make any synthesis of the situation or to make

2 any overall analysis that we would send to Zagreb and New York. That

3 would just be a meeting to get a factual update, on the basis of which

4 the commander, General Briquemont or General Rose or General Smith, could

5 give his orders for the day. It was only at the end of the week - I

6 can't even remember now which day of the week it was - that we would try

7 to sit together to make some synthesis of this to have a slightly bigger

8 strategic approach.

9 Q. Was that decision based on a consensus, or was there a voting

10 process leading to that?

11 A. The UN is a difficult operating environment. It's not full,

12 always, of like-minded people. But we managed to avoid voting on our

13 reports. We -- but there was a sort of negotiation, I think you can say

14 that, sometimes about how to characterise certain events.

15 Q. Thank you. I'm going to ask you about UN military observers.

16 But before that, just one more thing.

17 Besides those meetings, and the thinking aloud, analysis, were

18 your political assessments and reports based on some other reports, and

19 what reports were those? What reports did you analyse in order to make

20 your own reports through the process of synthesising those other reports?

21 A. For a lot of it, we were the raw material. We were at the

22 meeting, or our military observers were on the front-line, or our

23 battalions were observing a change in the confrontation line, and we went

24 to see it. There were other streams of information that needed to be

25 included, of course, like UNHCR would give us the data every -- I can't

Page 2064

1 remember, every few days or maybe once a week on where the convoys were

2 and how many had been allowed in, and what volumes, but -- so there was a

3 range of data, and this data became quite large, so much so that in the

4 end we had to hire a professional statistician; in fact, I think a

5 colleague of yours from Kosevo Hospital.

6 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to ask you this: Am I to

7 conclude that if I were to participate in negotiations or, God forbid, a

8 new war campaign, that I should pay more attention to those quiet ones

9 sitting at the back of the room, the back-benchers; is that what you're

10 saying? Of course, you don't want to answer the question.

11 Tell me, what was the name of that statistician from Kosevo?

12 A. His name was -- I think it was Cavaljuga. I think. I'm not

13 sure. Maybe, I think, Mladen -- I think Mladen Cavaljuga. But that's

14 just one example of -- I mean, to explain how we handled large amounts of

15 information.

16 Q. Thank you very much. Owing to our previous meeting, I believe

17 that we can briefly run through a certain number of things that we

18 already agreed on.

19 Earlier today, you mentioned something that we already discussed

20 and agreed on, and that was the fact that the 15 to 18 years lapsed from

21 the events blur the memories somewhat; am I right?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Thank you. In your statements, you say that you attended about

24 15 meetings or so that I attended as well; for example, that you met with

25 Koljevic and Krajisnik on a different number of occasions. But when it

Page 2065

1 comes to meetings that I attended, there were 15 such occasions. Am I

2 right? Yes, thank you.

3 Would you please try and remember what meetings those were?

4 Maybe you can consult your notes. What I'm interested in is what

5 meetings you attended, yourself, and which ones were those that you had

6 your assistant sitting in on your behalf.

7 A. Well, there were a series of meetings in 1990 -- in the early

8 summer of 1993 about Igman. Unfortunately, it was always me. I didn't

9 have any assistants. I was the assistant. Then after Igman, there were

10 a series of meetings, almost always at this Hotel Panorama, about the

11 withdrawal from Igman and problems that arose with that withdrawal almost

12 from the beginning. Then there were meetings about the pre -- in 1993

13 about the preconditions for political negotiations on the

14 Owen-Stoltenberg Agreement or the so-called HMS Invincible Agreement. If

15 I remember correctly, President Izetbegovic said that he would not go to

16 Geneva to meet with you unless something was done, and I now forget

17 exactly the details of the "something." I think whether it was about

18 electricity or about convoys, I can't remember. So then there may

19 have -- there were a couple of meetings about that. Then, around the

20 time -- in the period immediately -- so that's what I remember from 1993.

21 There were other little meetings, too. Sometimes we would go --

22 on a smaller point, I would sometimes go with colleagues, sometimes

23 Victor Andreev, the head of Civil Affairs, or someone to about some

24 specific smaller incident which I now forget.

25 Then in early 1994, there were the meetings around the Markale 1

Page 2066

1 incident. After the Markale 1, there was a lot of pressure from Western

2 countries, and the question was how the Serbs would respond. Then there

3 was, I think, a brief -- and then there were ultimatums, and weapons had

4 to be withdrawn, and by certain dates, and so on. And then, around

5 Gorazde, we met again. There were a series of urgent meetings. I

6 went -- I was sitting in the room when General Rose saw you about -- at

7 the Hotel Panorama on that occasion. I think -- I believe you were --

8 there were several meetings on that in April. Then I went separately

9 with Sergio de Mello and Victor Andreev on the question of how -- whether

10 the Serbs would be willing to withdraw from the right bank of the

11 Drina River in Gorazde. Then there were meetings about the -- ah, yeah.

12 No, then I had a -- because there was a Russian envoy, Mr. Churkin, and

13 Mr. Churkin was based in Sarajevo, and he had no way to get to Pale, so I

14 was -- in addition to my job, I was given the new and most responsible

15 job of being his driver. And so I took him to two additional meetings

16 also on that, and so on.

17 So the -- the exact details and dates escape me, but this was

18 roughly it. So either it would be Rose or Briquemont or Hayes. Ah,

19 yeah, there was some more in 1993 with a British brigadier who was the

20 number 2, I think, under Briquemont. There would have been one or two

21 meetings also with him.

22 So this is roughly -- I don't have the count now, and, in fact,

23 if you ask me to make an exact count, I'm not sure I could, but these can

24 be -- I guess people's diaries can be compared. I mean, I don't have the

25 exact number.

Page 2067

1 Q. Thank you. Thank you, that won't be necessary. However, I would

2 like to ask you this: Sometimes some of your colleagues informed you

3 about things, for example, the investigation at Markale. So I suppose

4 that you did not attend all the meetings. When you did not attend the

5 meetings yourself, were you the one who drafted political assessments and

6 a political analysis? So if you did not attend a meeting yourself, was

7 it you who drafted them, or was it somebody else? And if so, who was it?

8 A. My immediate superior was a Russian. And simply because he was

9 not a native English speaker, he thought it was easier if he would just

10 come back and tell me what had happened, and I would write very quickly a

11 note on the basis of what he told me. So -- and, similarly, for some of

12 the weekly reporting, he would simply tell me what had -- what had

13 happened and what he thought the main points should be. So -- but then

14 there -- there was, at least during one year, during -- or at least

15 during part of one year, there was another native English speaker in the

16 office who had a similar job to me, Tony Banbury, an American. And so,

17 for example, there were a series of negotiations involving yourself and

18 President Carter, and those negotiations, somehow, normally I would have

19 gone to, but he went to. I mean, he was American, and I think he might

20 even have known President Carter, or I can't remember now. But, anyway,

21 he went to those meetings.

22 So I wouldn't say that I went to all the meetings that UNPROFOR

23 had with yourself or with even other senior members of the Serb

24 establishment. And, similarly, sometimes the military just met by

25 themselves with General Mladic. So I can't say that I went to all or

Page 2068

1 even most of the meetings with the Serb leadership during my period, but

2 I went to a lot of them, and maybe too many.

3 Q. Thank you. You will remember that those negotiations or talks,

4 rather, President Carter was not the opposing side, and they resulted in

5 a four-month-long cease-fire towards the end of 1994 and the beginning of

6 1995; am I right?

7 A. Yes. I don't think it worked very well, but I don't think that

8 was -- I don't think that was President Carter's fault, no.

9 Q. Thank you, thank you. You remembered something that happened,

10 and that was that Mr. Izetbegovic, who was the presiding of the

11 Presidency, and I was the president of Republika Srpska, and yet you

12 referred to him as "President," and you referred to me as "Dr. Karadzic;"

13 is that your official position? Is that part of your doctrine? What is

14 it?

15 A. Yes, this is always a problem in the United Nations, what is the

16 form of address that is used for the senior officers of a state

17 recognised by the United Nations as a member state, versus the senior

18 officers of political structures not represented -- not recognised as

19 member states of the United Nations. Our position is that we are

20 impartial, and we will discharge our mandate impartially, but that the

21 presidents and prime ministers and senior officers of member states of

22 the organisation do have terms of address that are reserved to

23 themselves. I hope it doesn't compromise our impartiality, but I must

24 say, to this day, I live with this problem with respect to, if I can say

25 to you, the Republic of Cyprus. We would refer to President Christofias.

Page 2069

1 We mean no disrespect to Mr. Talat, who is viewed in his community as,

2 quote, "President" - or was until the election last week - viewed in his

3 community as the president of the, quote, "Turkish Republic of North

4 Cyprus." But after constant engagement with our lawyers and political

5 advisors, we find it impossible, in the end, to simply treat officers of

6 recognised member states the same as others, at least at the level of

7 terms of address.

8 Q. Thank you. However, you will agree with me, won't you -- I'm

9 waiting for the interpretation. You will agree with me that the Serb

10 side was one-third of the power in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11 I'm going to move on to things that we agreed on, so I would

12 kindly ask you to just answer yes or no whenever you can.

13 Will you agree that the Serb side that I headed, represented

14 one-third of the state power and the state structure in Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Who was it who represented the Serb side? What I'm talking about

18 is the fact that we won in the elections in 1990 and we held one-third of

19 the power. Am I right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I'm not talking about the rump presidency, because the Presidency

22 of Yugoslavia was referred to as a rump presidency, and your superiors

23 also referred to the Bosnian Presidency as a rump presidency. The

24 representatives of the Serbian people separated their sovereignty and

25 their part of the state monopoly, and we represented that one-third that

Page 2070

1 was missing from the Bosnian Presidency; am I right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you. You mentioned earlier today that Mr. Izetbegovic, the

4 president of the Presidency, on the eve of all the conferences, usually

5 gave me ultimatums that I had to meet in order for the two of us to meet

6 in Geneva; am I right or not?

7 A. I don't think I said "usually," but the example I gave was

8 certainly an example of that, yes.

9 Q. Thank you. Now I would quickly like to move through everything

10 that we agreed upon when we met.

11 In response to my question as to whether you had been warned

12 about the possibility of cheating and deceits, your answer was, Yes, and

13 you said that it was a shadow land; right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you. You said that your political assessments, your weekly

16 political assessments, were written up by relying on military sources.

17 The battalion reports were something that you found more useful, and that

18 there were differences involved. First of all, can you tell me whether

19 we have agreed on that. And, secondly, could you tell me what the

20 differences actually were. And could you reply as briefly as possible,

21 please.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you. Why did you prefer relying on the battalion reports

24 rather than on the military observers' reports? In my view, their main

25 job was to observe. Wasn't it?

Page 2071

1 A. Yes. I should say I preferred them for different things. The

2 UNMOs, the military observers, did some things that were very useful.

3 They counted all of the shell fire, and they made -- they were -- and

4 they count -- they gave statistical and quantitative data with respect to

5 shooting. But the battalions lived and operated in particular areas of

6 the confrontation line, and I often found that they had better depth of

7 knowledge for just -- I'll try to be brief. But, for example, when they

8 said they saw evidence that one side or the other was trying to prepare

9 some military operation, my experience was that the battalion reports

10 were more generally accurate in this regard, though they didn't count as

11 rigorously and almost religiously the number of firings that the UNMOs

12 did. So I used them for different purposes.

13 Q. Thank you. However, the difference was not like the one in the

14 top echelons of the UN, the one that you spoke about that was decisively

15 impacted by the background of those coming from different countries.

16 There was something else involved here, wasn't it?

17 A. Usually, though I should say there was, in fact, sometimes a

18 discernibly different approach from UNPROFOR units of different

19 nationalities, depending on the way in which that country generally saw

20 the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21 Q. Thank you. Then it is probably because of that that you

22 established another thing, that in our situation back there, things were

23 not always the way they seemed; right?

24 A. Right.

25 Q. Thank you. We agreed that the Muslim intention and the pattern

Page 2072

1 of behaviour of the Muslim leadership was to provoke a military

2 intervention by the West; right?

3 A. They openly stated that they wanted direct military support from

4 the West, correct.

5 Q. Thank you. You also gave an example; namely, that the president

6 of the Presidency, Mr. Izetbegovic, was against having civilians leave

7 town, and that that was motivated by political objectives. He wanted to

8 have civilians stay there, and he wanted them to be victimised, in order

9 to secure emotional support and military support from the West; right?

10 A. What he -- yeah, what he -- yes. What he said to me and to

11 others was that he did not want the civilian populations of, for example,

12 Sarajevo or Srebrenica to be able to leave.

13 Q. Thank you. You will probably recall that our representatives

14 signed, even before the war, in London, and during the war, in London

15 again, during the Carrington Conference, an agreement on freedom of

16 movement on the part of civilians. Have you heard of that agreement? It

17 was signed in the summer of 1992, but you probably had insight into what

18 you had inherited, as it were.

19 A. I can't remember.

20 Q. Thank you. We also agreed --

21 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Harland, may I ask one question.

22 Did he give you a reason why he didn't want the population to

23 leave at all?

24 THE WITNESS: When I was speaking to him, I believe he said -- I

25 asked him about his decision to block -- in 1993, he had instructed

Page 2073

1 UNHCR -- he had told UNHCR that he would not accept the evacuation of

2 civilians from Srebrenica at a time when there was great difficulty in

3 Srebrenica. And when I asked him about that, he said that it would be

4 giving in to ethnic cleansing, so it would be giving that territory which

5 previously had a Bosniak majority. It would be giving that territory to

6 the Serbs. So he thought that the -- he thought that the people should

7 stay there.

8 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much.

9 JUDGE KWON: In the question of Dr. Karadzic to you, he asked

10 whether he wanted the civilian population to be victimised. What is your

11 answer to that?

12 THE WITNESS: I wasn't sure that it was useful to speculate as to

13 people's deeper motivations. There was certainly -- there was certainly

14 people who believed that the West, NATO, would not intervene unless they

15 saw the situation as being particularly dire, particularly difficult. So

16 there were certainly those who believed that, among other things, having

17 the civilian population basically present on the battle-field would make

18 it more likely that Western nations would be shocked into wanting to

19 intervene militarily.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Harland.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I could agree with you that Mr. Izetbegovic tried, by keeping

23 civilians in Srebrenica, to keep Srebrenica in military terms, although

24 he could do that on the basis of the Agreement on Safe Havens. But I

25 believe you will recall that General Morillon kept trying to obtain our

Page 2074

1 agreement to have the civilians from Srebrenica evacuated to Tuzla. Do

2 you remember that? There are a lot of documents attesting to that.

3 A. That was happening just before I arrived. So I spoke to

4 General Morillon about it, but I was not in the country during the events

5 of April 1993, which I think you are describing.

6 Q. Thank you, yes. But after that, up until 1995, someone kept

7 asking him to ask us to give our approval for the transfer of civilians

8 from Srebrenica to Tuzla, and in return we asked him to make it possible

9 to have Serbs evacuated from Tuzla. Do you remember that?

10 A. I don't remember it.

11 Q. Thank you. Then we're going to use other documents. However,

12 what I asked about civilians primarily pertained to Sarajevo.

13 So Mr. Izetbegovic, as we have agreed, was against having

14 civilians leave Sarajevo. Yesterday, with the previous witness, we

15 discussed this and saw that renowned physicians were sentenced to 28 and

16 32 months in prison because of their attempts to leave Sarajevo. What do

17 you think was the reason why Mr. Izetbegovic did not allow people to

18 leave Sarajevo? Of course, criminals were very happy to see that,

19 because they made people pay money in order to cross the lines. What do

20 you say to that?

21 A. You want me to speculate on his motivation?

22 Q. No, no speculation, no speculation. But we have agreed that he

23 was against having civilians leave town; right? I mean Sarajevo.

24 A. Yes. In fact, I believe there were -- you needed a formal -- if

25 you wanted to leave the city, you needed to get some sort of formal

Page 2075

1 document. So I think it was not simply my reporting; I think it was an

2 established fact known to everybody. I think if you tried to leave the

3 city without this, you could be in grave danger.

4 Q. That's what their state authorities did; right?

5 A. Yes. I think, if I remember correctly, you needed a document, a

6 permission, to get out of the city if you wanted to leave. For example,

7 when there were buses with little NGOs that were allowed through, I mean,

8 I remember the one, the Children's Embassy, if you wanted to get on that

9 bus, you needed clearances from, I think, from both the Bosnian Army and

10 from the civilian authorities, if I remember correctly.

11 Q. Thank you. We agreed that you were aware of the fact that at the

12 time, the Serbs had agreed to the Muslims having their own territories in

13 the Drina River Valley; right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you. We agreed that re-arming had taken place in protected

16 areas, and that Mr. Izetbegovic actually confirmed that to you after the

17 war, when you were compiling reports on the fall of Srebrenica; right?

18 A. Yes. I believe he even said that in his own book.

19 Q. If I remember correctly, and I believe that we are going to

20 tender that during this examination, he told you that he never wanted to

21 exchange Srebrenica, because he had wanted to do that, he would not have

22 sent sophisticated weapons there, physicians, helicopters, et cetera. On

23 one occasion, one of the helicopters was downed, three physicians were

24 killed, and there were sophisticated weapons there. He said that, didn't

25 he?

Page 2076

1 A. Yes, and I believe he also again said that in his book when he is

2 quoting his interview with me.

3 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that one of your co-workers was

4 involved in the Markale investigation, and you said that you did not take

5 part in this investigation and that you were not at Markale when what

6 happened did happen; right?

7 A. Right.

8 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to remind you of some very important

9 things that you said on many occasions.

10 You said, in General Milosevic's trial, in Dragomir Milosevic's

11 trial, ID 98-29, transcript dated the 15th of January, 2007, that is, on

12 page 395, you said that if it were possible to observe sniper action at

13 Grbavica, it would be evident that Muslims, Bosnians -- we're Bosnians,

14 too, but, okay, the Muslims, used sniper fire against the civilians,

15 perhaps more than the Serbs, taking into account sniper victims and

16 sniper shooting in the area that was under the control of the Muslim

17 government; right?

18 A. I don't think I said that there were maybe even more sniper

19 victims --

20 Q. If you allow me, then I'm going to read it out in English:

21 [In English] "When it had been possible to monitor sniping in

22 Grbavica, it appeared that the Bosnians were sniping at civilians

23 probably more than the Serbs, based on counting sniper rounds and sniper

24 victims in areas controlled by the Bosnian government."

25 A. Certainly, we did keep -- our UNMOs kept statistics, and our

Page 2077

1 battalions, on the number of sniper rounds, so that may be statistically

2 correct with respect to that area, yeah.

3 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. In the preceding against

4 President Milosevic in 2003, transcript page 28684, you said:

5 [In English] "In late summer 1994, to the extent that the UN

6 could monitor sniper activity in Grbavica, it appeared that the Muslims

7 were sniping more civilians than the Serbs."

8 [Interpretation] Isn't that right? That's what you stated;

9 right?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Thank you. Also in the trial of President Milosevic, on the 5th

12 of November, 2003, on page 286797 [as interpreted], you said:

13 [In English] "In meetings in Grbavica, the Serbs would often

14 complain that they were suffering from sniping from the Bosniaks."

15 [Interpretation] Is that what you said?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Thank you. In your statement dated the 4th of September, 2009 --

18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

19 Yes, Mr. Edgerton.

20 MS. EDGERTON: Sorry, Your Honour. My apologies, but page 286797

21 actually doesn't exist in the Milosevic transcript. Maybe there's one

22 number off.

23 JUDGE KWON: Probably. He can correct the number. What page did

24 you refer to? November 2003 evidence.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 28679, probably. There is an extra

Page 2078

1 "7" that is superfluous.

2 JUDGE KWON: I hope you can locate the part.

3 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, that's helpful.

4 JUDGE KWON: And whenever it is convenient, you can take a break.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's for you to decide.

6 JUDGE KWON: Now we'll have a break for 20 minutes.

7 --- Recess taken at 10.22 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 10.45 a.m.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10 MS. EDGERTON: On that page reference number, with

11 Mr. Sladojevic's help, we found that it's 28697, and that refers to the

12 page of the transcript in the trial of -- in the Milosevic case mentioned

13 at page 29 of this transcript.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 Q. Mr. Harland, for the sake of the participants in these

18 proceedings, we would like to show a map now. We talked about Grbavica,

19 and I would ask you to mark Grbavica, the parts of town that were held by

20 the Serbs, city proper.

21 1D790. Could I have that map, please. 11790 [as interpreted].

22 I think it is a satellite image rather than a map. Thank you.

23 Could Mr. Harland please be given a pen, an electronic pen.

24 I think that should be it, yes.

25 I would like to ask you whether you see a red line and a blue

Page 2079

1 line here, and I'm asking you whether these are the lines of separation,

2 or the front-line, or whether this is the area of Sarajevo in general.

3 A. Yes, yes, and yes. So red is the Serb forward positions, blue is

4 the Bosniak forward positions.

5 Q. Could you now please mark Grbavica that we discussed in relation

6 to Muslim sniping, Muslim sniping at Grbavica. So could you please mark

7 Grbavica now.

8 A. [Marks] Can you see that?

9 Q. I can see it, but I think that you've marked Vrace. Grbavica is

10 further down.

11 A. [Marks]

12 Q. Thank you. Could you now please mark Iradramsko Naselje [phoen]

13 near Dobrinja. That's an area in the south-west of Dobrinja that we

14 held.

15 A. Well, I've never been very good at maps, but maybe --

16 Q. Right, yes. Could you please put little Xs or crosses or

17 something. Could you please mark Nedzarici.

18 A. Somewhere here. [Marks]

19 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you put initials, so for the future

20 reference, "G" for Grbavica, "D," and "N," or something.

21 THE WITNESS: Okay.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you can write.

23 THE WITNESS: [Marks]

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Q. Could you now mark the eastern part of Dobrinja. We controlled

Page 2080

1 some of the buildings in that area. Could you please just put a little

2 cross or a letter D?

3 A. I guess that would be here or here, yeah. [Marks]

4 Q. There as well, yes, thank you. Could you please put an "I" next

5 to the Serbian part of Ilidza within the red front-lines. It's the

6 western-most part of that map.

7 A. Right there. [Marks]

8 Q. Precisely. And now could you please mark Hrasnica. That's an

9 area within the Muslim lines, south of the runway. In depth towards

10 Mount Igman and adjacent to the runway is Butmir, is it not?

11 A. Butmir, yes. So Butmir is here somewhere, yeah. [Marks]

12 Q. And south of that is Hrasnica, it continues?

13 A. I think barely on this map, maybe. I'm not sure. Here, maybe.

14 I'm not sure. [Marks]

15 Q. Thank you. And now west or, rather, left of Butmir is the

16 so-called Sokolovic colony; right?

17 A. Right. Somewhere here. I don't know. [Marks]

18 Q. Correct, yes. Thank you. I think that you can sign this map.

19 But before that, can we please look at Vogosca. It is not clearly

20 visible, but it's in the north up on the map; right?

21 A. I think somewhere up there, I think. Yeah. I'm not sure.

22 [Marks]

23 Q. Yes. And below this initial, can you see that the front-line

24 goes through Vogosca, itself, Gornji Hotonj, Donji Hotonj, and

25 Kobilja Glava, and Ogorsko [phoen] as Muslim villages are under the

Page 2081

1 Muslim control; right?

2 A. Are we going west from my V or east from my V?

3 Q. South.

4 A. Right.

5 Q. South, yes.

6 A. So I forget which one was which, but, you know, Kobilja Glava,

7 somewhere in here, these places. [Marks]

8 Q. I believe that what you have just marked is Zuc. But next to the

9 red line is a blue line in the city, about a centimetre and a half below

10 your initial V.

11 A. Yeah, uh-huh. Okay. So right here, yeah. [Marks]

12 Q. Right, yes. Thank you. And can we now identify which parts of

13 the city proper are controlled by the Serbs? Grbavica is a neighbourhood

14 with large blocks of buildings, and the same is true of the adjacent

15 area; right?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. And what about parts of Dobrinja and the airport and

18 neighbourhood? The height of the buildings there is the same as the

19 height of the buildings in the adjacent neighbourhoods; right?

20 A. I think that's correct, yeah.

21 Q. Thank you. Could I please ask you to mark Mojmilo? I believe

22 that it is clearly visible above Dobrinja. I'm sure that you're familiar

23 with the area. Can you just put an M?

24 A. Is it there? [Marks]

25 Q. You're sure, yes, of course, that's it.

Page 2082

1 A. Actually, I was never very good a geography, but --

2 Q. Can we agree that Nedzarici was an area of residential buildings

3 not more than one or two storeys high at the most?

4 A. I think that's correct, yes.

5 Q. And it was a 100 per cent Serb settlement; right?

6 A. I think that was -- that was the case when I was there. Whether

7 that was the case before, I'm not entirely sure.

8 Q. Yes, it was. The Serbs moved into the city by setting up

9 Nedzarici. Do you agree that Alipasino Polje and whatever the neighbours

10 of the neighbourhoods are called adjacent to Nedzarici, and those

11 neighbourhoods north-east of Nedzarici, mostly consisted of high-rise

12 buildings or blocks of buildings? Do you agree? Those are high-rise

13 buildings, blocks of buildings, modern buildings; right?

14 A. Exactly.

15 Q. Thank you. Could --

16 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, for the record, is it the place where you

17 marked as A?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is the one, Alipasina Polje.

19 JUDGE KWON: When you read the transcript later on, it's very

20 difficult to find where it is. Thank you.

21 Let's go on.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Could you put a Z next to the place where you identified Zuc?

24 A. It's this high ground somewhere, yeah, somewhere in there.

25 Q. Yes, but a bit more to the west. The first cross that you placed

Page 2083

1 on the map, I believe that that's Zuc.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. Could you identify whom for us, whom village with the relay --

4 this is an isolated hilltop across from Alipasina Polje; right?

5 A. Yeah. I looked at it every day on the map, the tower with the

6 bulb. But where it is exactly on the map, I don't know. It might be

7 this one. [Marks] I'm not sure. It's one of those hills to the north of

8 the main down-town area, but exactly which hills, I'm not sure I can

9 easily mark it.

10 JUDGE KWON: If you could circle it in order to distinguish --

11 THE WITNESS: Actually, I'm not sure whether I -- I'm not sure

12 whether I'm passing my geography test. I'm not sure whether I have, in

13 fact, placed my H on the hill that was precisely --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, you're right. Yes, that is

15 Hum, right.

16 THE WITNESS: Okay.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Could you please mark Sokolje and the part above Rajlovac. Do

19 you know where Rajlovac is? In the very west, in the left.

20 A. Here [indicates], yeah?

21 Q. No, no, quite a bit more south, and the hilltop is above Rajlovac

22 itself. Can you see that? I believe that you marked Mr. Krajisnik's

23 village, and you can see the urban part of Rajlovac next to the border of

24 the map, southward, next to the border, close to the margin.

25 A. Uh-huh. [Indicates] Here?

Page 2084

1 Q. Yes, yes. Is the hilltop above Rajlovac known as Sokolje?

2 A. [Indicates] This one?

3 Q. A bit more to the east, at the very top, the very summit.

4 A. Uh-huh. I'm -- yes, I think so.

5 Q. That's where your radar was; right?

6 A. At one point, yes. We had one radar position there at one point,

7 and then another radar position, I think, near the -- exactly at the

8 opposite end of the town. Earlier, we had, I think, also

9 a mortar-detecting radar on Zuc and Hum, but I think they came to a bad

10 end.

11 Q. And now above the S, where the radar position was, could you put

12 an R or a circle or a triangle to mark the radar position?

13 A. Maybe somewhere here. [Marks] I don't know exactly.

14 Q. I believe that it was at the very top, which was a bit more

15 south. I believe that you marked it as if it had been in the valley, and

16 that's --

17 A. That would be a bad place for a radar.

18 Q. Oh, yes. And can we now move on towards the old part of the

19 city. Can you see Grdonj?

20 A. I don't think Grdonj is in the old city.

21 Q. Well, yes, it is. But can you see the Jajce barracks in this

22 map?

23 A. It's on the slope somewhere here at the far eastern end of the

24 city. Just one second. I forget now which one is Jajce barracks, which

25 one is Turkish Fort. Shall I --

Page 2085

1 Q. Precisely, precisely.

2 A. Shall I put a J for Jajce barracks there?

3 Q. Yes, thank you.

4 A. [Marks]

5 Q. And now if you move towards the western part of the map, so in

6 the left-side direction, would that be the Grdonj hilltop?

7 A. West of -- north-west of Jajce barracks, yeah, maybe. Yeah.

8 Q. Yes -- the promontory, the hill top that you see, the lighter

9 colour. Is that Grdonj?

10 A. It might be there, yeah. [Marks]

11 Q. Yes, yes. But that's still within the Muslim lines, a little bit

12 below the blue line; right? You marked the village of Mrkovici.

13 However, the lighter area depicting the summit, that's Grdonj Hill;

14 right?

15 A. I guess so.

16 Q. Thank you. There's no doubt about the fact that Grdonj was under

17 Muslim control; right?

18 A. Right.

19 Q. Thank you. And can we now move into the southern part of the

20 city east of Grbavica. There are some hilltops there. Do you know where

21 Colina Kapa is?

22 A. The only one I visited there was Debelo Brdo, but I'm not sure

23 I can exactly say which one it is there. You mean, you know, next to

24 Grbavica, yeah, just east of Grbavica, yeah?

25 Q. Yes, yes, the north-east of Grbavica. The first one is

Page 2086

1 Debelo Brdo, and the next one is Colina Kapa within the blue lines. They

2 held both Debelo Brdo and Colina Kapa; right?

3 A. [No verbal response]

4 Q. Thank you, yes.

5 A. Something like that.

6 Q. And now between Mojmilo and Vrace, can you see the ridge? That's

7 Hrasno Brdo; right?

8 A. Yes, somewhere in here above the little settlement of Hrasno,

9 yeah. [Indicates]

10 Q. Yes. But I'm talking about the ridge from M, south of the H that

11 you marked, all the way up to the Vrace, and the line -- the distance

12 between the blue and the red line is about 20 to 50 metres [realtime

13 transcript read in error "250"], not more than that; right?

14 A. It certainly looks close.

15 Q. Do you agree with me that east of the letter H that you marked --

16 in the transcript, it says "250," and it should read "between 20 and 50

17 metres."

18 Do you agree, Mr. Harland, that where the lines are the closest

19 east of H, that that is Ozrenska Street, and that in Ozrenska Street, the

20 Muslims were on one side of the streets and the Serbs were on the other

21 side of the street? Do you agree?

22 JUDGE KWON: We are talking about H in the middle of this map.

23 We have three Hs in this map.

24 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I can remember exactly where the line

25 ran in that point, but certainly there were places where the line ran

Page 2087

1 down the middle of streets, or sometimes even where it went through

2 buildings. There's one building, I think, near -- well, a little

3 north-east of there, I think, where it even cut through some buildings.

4 But the general point is certainly correct, that the lines were extremely

5 close in that southern portion of the confrontation line.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. In the northern hilly part, the distance was between 230 and 300

8 metres, but here in the south, the distance was anything between 20 and

9 50 metres, not more than that. I'm talking now about the southern part

10 of the city.

11 A. I think that's right.

12 Q. Right. Thank you.

13 Can we now agree about a number of issues? First of all, did

14 Muslims hold Mojmilo?

15 A. By the time I arrived, they did, yes.

16 Q. Did they also hold the ridge north-east of Mojmilo, the ridge

17 known as Hrasno Brdo?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did they hold Sokolje, the area in the very east of the map where

20 your radar position had been or was at the time?

21 A. West --

22 Q. In the west, in the west, above Rajlovac. Did they hold the

23 entire mountain range over there?

24 A. Yes, I think that Sokolje was held.

25 Q. Did they hold Hum?

Page 2088

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did they hold Zuc Hill? By the time you arrived, we had already

3 lost it. We had controlled it before you came; right?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. Did they hold Grdonj, in the very north, above the old city?

6 A. I think so.

7 Q. Sedonj [phoen], Grdonj, and so on and so forth. They also held

8 the Jajce barracks; right?

9 A. Yes, certainly.

10 Q. Do you agree that they held Debelo Brdo, Colina Kapa, and those

11 trig points on the slopes of Mount Trebevic?

12 A. I thought that Debelo Brdo was contested, but it may be correct

13 as you say.

14 Q. Do you agree that those positions of the Muslim Army were

15 dominant with regard to the neighbouring villages populated by the Serbs?

16 In other words, they were on the hilltops and we were in the valleys.

17 Look at the map and it will become clear. Right?

18 A. In the narrowest sense, yes.

19 Q. In the narrowest and broader sense, all Serbs around Mojmilo were

20 in an inferior position, as it were, and the same applies to Sokolje;

21 right? The Serbs were in an inferior position with regard to the

22 positions of the Muslim Army; right? Was Rajlovac inferior in contrast

23 to Sokolje? I mean, it's clear on the map, in geographical terms; right?

24 A. Yes, but I don't think it's representative of the broader

25 picture, but yes.

Page 2089

1 Q. Was Nedzarici inferior with regard to Mojmilo and at the

2 high-rise buildings in the neighbouring Alipasino Polje?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. And what about the airport settlements and the

5 eastern part of Dobrinja? Would you say that the Serbs were inferior

6 with regard to Mojmilo?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Thank you. And now what about Vogosca; was it inferior vis-a-vis

9 Zuc and the neighbouring Muslim positions, just as Grbavica was inferior

10 with regard to Zuc and Hum?

11 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

13 MS. EDGERTON: My apologies again, and it may be just me, but

14 perhaps I could ask for some clarification. I'm unsure what Dr. Karadzic

15 means by his use of the word "inferior" in these repeated questions. I

16 see Mr. Harland might have some understanding of it, by his answers, but

17 I'm unsure what he means by the word "inferior." Inferior in what

18 regard, in fact?

19 JUDGE KWON: He has been able to answer the questions.

20 THE WITNESS: But, actually, I would be keen to comment, if

21 I can.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.

23 THE WITNESS: If the point of these dozens of questions is to

24 give the general impression that the Serb communities, geographically,

25 were tactically inferior or tactically more exposed, then I think it's

Page 2090

1 basically an inversion of the reality. The basic reality is that

2 hundreds of thousands of people in the valley of the city [marks], which

3 is where most of the people lived, were right on the floor of the valley,

4 very exposed to Serb fire. And I think narrowly and factually,

5 Dr. Karadzic is right, as we go around from one little specific example

6 to another, that he has found a Serb community that is at a tactical

7 disadvantage because it is at a lower elevation from a

8 Bosnian-government-held hill or tall building, but it's not at all

9 representative of what was going on in the city.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. You already said it was not representative of

11 a bigger picture earlier on.

12 THE WITNESS: All right, okay.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the intervention on

14 the part of my learned friend from the Prosecution should have been part

15 of re-examination. It was not an objection.

16 I wanted to assist Mr. Harland in expressing himself. I wanted

17 to hear from him whether there were places where they were in an inferior

18 position, and there were also places where we were in an inferior

19 position. Was that recorded? I don't think that your answer has been

20 recorded.

21 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Can we then say that all Serb neighbourhoods had a hilltop or two

24 towering above them and held by the Muslim Army? I can name them for

25 you, if that's of any assistance. Grbavica, Nedzarici, the airport

Page 2091

1 settlement, Dobrinja 1 and 4. I don't know which one we held. In the

2 east, in any case. Rajlovac, Ilidza, Gornji Kotorac, Lukavica.

3 Could you please mark Lukavica for the benefit of the

4 Trial Chamber.

5 A. Oh, God, I thought I had escaped my geography lesson. Is it

6 somewhere --

7 Q. East -- [overlapping speakers]. No, no, I believe that what

8 you're marking now is Gornji Kotorac. Lukavica is east of D1 and 2, east

9 of Dobrinja. Right?

10 A. I don't want to go as far as Kasindol or somewhere, but here, I

11 don't know. Lukavica [marks] --

12 Q. Right. I believe that what you're showing now is Tilava, and

13 Lukavica is between L and D; right?

14 A. Yes, perhaps. But to answer your question, I would say that

15 certainly as you walked or drove around Serb areas, Serb-held areas of

16 Sarajevo, like Ilidza, you felt much less exposed to fire than almost

17 anywhere on the inside of the confrontation line. But you are certainly

18 right that there were communities very close to the confrontation line

19 that were exposed to fire and felt very dangerous, like Dobrinja and

20 Grbavica.

21 Q. Would you please make an arrow pointing from Hrasnica towards

22 Igman. Igman towers above Hrasnica in the entire southern area; right?

23 It's a dominant position.

24 A. Is that the --

25 Q. Yes, yes, yes, that's --

Page 2092

1 A. Below our map, I think.

2 Q. Yes, very well. We'll see that later.

3 And now could you please answer this: The Serb part of Vogosca,

4 which is below Zuc, Hotonj, and Kobilja Glava, was it tactically inferior

5 vis-a-vis Muslim position? And what about Rajlovac vis-a-vis Sokolje,

6 was Serbian Ilidza tactically inferior with Mojmilo and Igman? And

7 Nedjarici, was it tactically inferior vis-a-vis Mojmilo, the high-rise

8 buildings in Igman? And then the airport settlement, the part of

9 Dobrinja held by Serbs, Lukavica, Tilava, and Kasima [phoen], were all

10 those inferior vis-a-vis to Igman? If you held Igman, could you actually

11 shell all those areas as you will, whenever you wanted?

12 A. If you had weapons to do that, yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Will we agree that Grbavica could be targeted from

14 Grdonj, Zuc, Hum, and from the city, from anywhere in the city, from

15 Hrasno, for example, from Pofalici, and so on and so forth? Was Grbavica

16 at a tactical disadvantage vis-a-vis Debelo Brdo, Colina Kapa? Could

17 Grbavica be targeted from by many dominant positions which were held by

18 the Muslim Army?

19 A. It was on the floor of the valley of Sarajevo. And like other

20 places on the floor of the valley of Sarajevo, most of them

21 Bosnian-government-held, it was rather exposed, yes, that is correct.

22 Q. Thank you. Could you please initial this, and I would like to

23 tender this map into evidence as a Defence exhibit.

24 JUDGE KWON: And before we keep it, could you mark -- add "1" to

25 one of the Ls which you erroneously marked as Lukavica for identification

Page 2093

1 purpose, a "1."

2 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure we've ever perfectly identified the

3 real Lukavica in here, but it's certainly somewhere in there. [Marks]

4 JUDGE KWON: Just to add "1" to the -- yes.

5 THE WITNESS: So add "1," all right.

6 JUDGE KWON: And then could you put the date of today. So it is

7 the 7th of May.

8 THE WITNESS: [Marks]

9 JUDGE KWON: And, Ms. Edgerton, I'm concerned about reading this

10 part of the transcript later on, again. So I wonder whether you can sit

11 down with either Mr. Robinson or Mr. Sladojevic, with the assistance of

12 the mapping unit, whether you can put all the full names of these places

13 into this map.

14 So we'll mark and keep this map separately, but think about

15 whether you can produce a map, with the assistance of the Map Unit, with

16 the full names of these locations discussed today.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Of course, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

19 MS. EDGERTON: And, Your Honour, if I may, this -- the base map

20 of this satellite map, and I'm sure Your Honours are probably already

21 aware, but for the record is Map number 2 in the Prosecution's map book.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we have it.

23 And then if you can produce while the witness is here, then you

24 can get the confirmation from Mr. Harland as well. It's for you.

25 Let's proceed.

Page 2094

1 Yes, we can admit this map as marked.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the map marked -- the marked map

3 will be Exhibit D134.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Q. Mr. Harland, now I'd like to remind you of what you said in your

7 statement of the 4th of September, 2009.

8 066-9895, up until 9984, and then on page 66-9918, or, rather,

9 81. And I would also like to remind you of what you said in the

10 Dragomir Milosevic trial. Actually, it has to do with the same number.

11 It's the same -- the transcript reference is the 16th of -- 19th of

12 January, page 405. This is what I'm referring to.

13 You said that you were aware of two incidents:

14 [In English] "... one in late 1893 [sic] and one in early 1994 of

15 Bosniak snipers shooting at Bosniaks, including one where General Rose's

16 bodyguard returned fire at the Bosniaks shooting at the Bosniaks."

17 [Interpretation] Is that right, is that what you said?

18 A. I can't recall if I said that, but I do remember the two

19 incidents that are referred to there. So it's probably correct.

20 Q. Thank you. Then in General Milosevic's trial, on the 16th of

21 January, 2007, transcript page 405 through 407, you asserted the

22 following:

23 [In English] "... that there was a victim of shelling or sniping

24 on Bosnian-controlled territory. It was assumed in the international

25 media that the firing had been from the RS Army territory."

Page 2095

1 [Interpretation] Is that right that these were assessments from

2 the media?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. Then again the Dragomir Milosevic trial, the 16th of

5 January, 2007, the same page numbers, 405 through 407, this is what you

6 said. You said that you were:

7 [In English] "... aware of any instance whether the

8 Republika Srpska Army shot at their own civilians and doubted if there

9 was any such instance. This was separate to any incident where one Serb

10 group might have been conflicting with another or a Serb might have

11 killed another Serb due to criminal or political differences."

12 [Interpretation] Is that what you said?

13 A. I can't remember, but it sounds correct.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, on this one, I feel I have to rise.

16 Without reference to the line numbers, I found what I think is the

17 passage that Dr. Karadzic is referring to. And while I accept there

18 might be some variation in translation, it might be preferable to work

19 off the actual transcript, and that's not what the transcript that I have

20 in front of me records.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree with what Mr. Karadzic referred to is

22 only four or five lines, but he referred to three pages.

23 And so could you check the reference again, whether it is

24 correct, and then whether what you read out, is it a correct reflection

25 of that part of the transcript?

Page 2096

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's on page 406. It's that

2 transcript, page 406, line 15.

3 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed.

4 Mr. Harland said he can't remember, but it sounds correct.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Q. Then in your statement of the 4th of September, 2009, 066-9895,

7 up until 9984, on page 66-9932, you said -- you established that there

8 was an anti-sniping agreement.

9 Now I'd like to ask you about something that you had said. You

10 said that with regard to the anti-sniping agreement, the leadership had

11 more success in preventing sniper activity than in terms of orders

12 outside the sniping agreement. Is that right? That's what you said

13 yesterday.

14 A. I'm not sure I understand. Sorry.

15 MS. EDGERTON: If that's what Mr. Harland said yesterday, please

16 could we be assisted by at least a page reference from yesterday's

17 transcript.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We're going to find it

19 now. I was taking notes. I didn't look at the transcript.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. But the essence was that you said that the leadership could

22 prevent things, but that they were not successful outside the

23 anti-sniping agreement. However, your proof of this is that for a while,

24 while there was an anti-sniping agreement, there was some success; is

25 that what you said?

Page 2097

1 A. Exactly what I said, I can't remember. But my position is that

2 there was a substantial reduction in sniper fire after the signature of

3 the anti-sniping agreement. We could count fewer shots and fewer victims

4 after that agreement was signed. And to us, that was indicative of a

5 degree of effective command and control over this by both sides. I hope

6 I said the same thing yesterday.

7 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to put another possibility to you as

8 well. If I issue an order for sniping to stop and that is not within the

9 agreement, do you agree that it is more difficult for my army to stop if

10 the other side doesn't stop as well? I mean, if the other side is

11 shooting, how can my unilateral order be successful, or it simply cannot

12 be as successful as it would be in the case if the other side stopped as

13 well? I would like to have an audible answer for the sake of the

14 transcript.

15 A. Right.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Then in General Milosevic's trial, in the transcript on the 15th

18 of January, 2007 - 335 is the page reference, 336 as well - you said:

19 [In English] "... the agreement was intended to limit sniping

20 against civilians, but also that might be called legitimate military

21 sniping between the opposing forces, since the UN believed that the two

22 could not be distinguished properly."

23 [Interpretation] Is that what you said?

24 A. Apparently. Yes, that is my position. I can't remember whether

25 I said exactly that.

Page 2098

1 Q. Is that because many soldiers waged war wearing civilian clothes?

2 You, or rather the UN, had this dilemma as to distinguishing between

3 civilians and the military. Was that, for instance, because 75 per cent

4 of the Bosnian Army did not have uniforms? That is based on their

5 sources. Is that the reason why you had that position?

6 A. No.

7 Q. So what was the reason?

8 [In English] "... could not be distinguished properly."

9 A. When I visited sniper positions either on the Bosnian side or on

10 the Serb side, they, themselves, were normally trying to avoid getting

11 shot at, so normal -- they might make a small hole in a wall, and

12 sometimes they would even make another hole in a wall behind, and then

13 they would rest their rifle. So they have an extremely narrow view of

14 fire. That was true for Bosnian sniper positions and for Serb sniper

15 positions that I saw. But the same snipers would move from one nest like

16 this to another, sometimes even after a few minutes, it seemed. And

17 sometimes the alignment of their line of sight was onto an area where

18 civilians might pass. Sometimes they were firing against other snipers.

19 Sometimes they were firing against trench lines. But it was the same

20 people, with the same weapons, doing the same jobs from the same set of

21 many positions, so our view was that it was extremely difficult to stop

22 one type of this activity if you didn't just tell them all to stop --

23 give them all an order on both sides to stop their activities.

24 Q. Thank you very much. Do you remember that sniper shooters also

25 availed themselves of empty buildings, especially government buildings,

Page 2099

1 so they would move in depth so as not to be exposed, whereas they had a

2 clear line of sight?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. Yes, it was hard to eliminate that by other snipers;

5 right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Thank you. Then in your statement of the 10th of February,

8 1998 - 005-8216 up until 005-8243, but this is on page 58226 - this is

9 from the Milosevic case as well, the transcript is from the 15th of

10 January, 2007, on pages 394 through 396, this is what you said:

11 [In English] "The background of this anti-sniping agreement, the

12 sniping of Serb civilians by the Bosniaks which had been partly behind

13 the closure of the blue routes, there had been a number of particularly

14 nasty incidents, including one notorious episode where two young Serb

15 girls were killed by a sniper who had apparently boasted that he had

16 waited until they were properly aligned -- perfectly aligned."

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Edgerton.

18 MS. EDGERTON: I apologise again for perhaps my own confusion,

19 but I don't see that, those words, anywhere in the transcript. Is

20 Dr. Karadzic quoting from his statement or from the transcript? Just to

21 have this precision, please.

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you have to be very precise as to the

23 reference.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is the essence of what

25 Mr. Harland said on those two pages.

Page 2100

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Isn't that right? Do you agree? And in the statement, I mean.

3 Do you agree, Mr. Harland?

4 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic. When you put to the witness about

5 what he said, you have to be precise, without paraphrasing them. If you

6 are going to paraphrase, you have to say that it is paraphrased.

7 THE WITNESS: I can comment that it is a generally correct

8 characterisation. I cannot remember what I said in the 1998 statement,

9 which was 12 years ago, of course, or even exactly what I said in the

10 trial, but the general characterisation is correct, and there was -- I

11 know the -- remember the specific incident about these two Serb girls,

12 I think, and I think it was actually the beginning of 1995. But I can't

13 remember exactly what was said by me in which statement or whatever. But

14 the general characterisation is correct.

15 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Karadzic, one just technical advice. When

16 you change your language and when you start reading out in English, you

17 need to put a short pause for the benefit of the interpreters and court

18 reporters. Thank you.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I do apologise for this

20 lack of precision in respect to the transcript. However, what

21 Mr. Harland confirmed is on page 11 of the statement from 1998.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Those two girls were killed with a single bullet, and he waited

24 for them to be properly aligned so that he could shoot them with one

25 bullet; right?

Page 2101

1 A. Yes, that's my understanding.

2 Q. Thank you. Then in Prosecutor versus Slobodan Milosevic - the

3 transcript reference is from the 5th of November, 2003 - on page 28684

4 you stated, and now I'd like to read it in English:

5 [In English] "During late summer 1994, to the extent that the UN

6 could monitor sniper activity in Grbavica, it appears that the Muslims

7 were sniping more civilians than the Serbs."

8 [Interpretation] Is that right?

9 A. I can't remember whether I said exactly that, but I believe that

10 is what the statistics for the Grbavica area said, yes.

11 Q. Thank you. Just one more example in relation to snipers.

12 In your statement of the 10th of February, 1998, pages 005-8216

13 up until 005-8243, on page 58266 -- or, rather, 226, sorry, and also in

14 the proceedings against Dragomir Milosevic, General Milosevic, or,

15 rather, nine years later on the 15th of January, 2007, on page 397, and

16 on the 16th of January, on 458 page, this is what you said:

17 [In English] "The French were sometimes unsure if long-distance

18 shots at Bosniak civilians occasionally came from the Bosniaks rather

19 than the Serbs."

20 [Interpretation] Is that what you stated?

21 A. I think there might be a mistake in the translation, uh-huh,

22 or -- what is this -- how does the sentence begin?

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I'm really quite lost as to where

25 this quotation comes from. Please. I don't see it on page 458 of the

Page 2102

1 transcript in the Dragomir Milosevic case. I don't see it on page 397 of

2 the transcript. If we could just have some guidance, please.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I really don't know how can I help you out.

4 But, Mr. Karadzic, please be precise in the future in references. Let's

5 move on, and find out the precise page number.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's on page 397, and now I'm going

7 to tell you what the lines are. Between 1 and 13, in that area.

8 Have we found it now?

9 MS. EDGERTON: I've found something, and I appreciate that,

10 Dr. Karadzic. Thank you.

11 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on. Could you put your question again.

12 Mr. Harland didn't understand what it was.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Well, on these two or three occasions, you said that the French

15 were sometimes unsure as to who was shooting at Muslim civilians, was it

16 the Bosniaks or the Serbs?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to draw your attention to the

19 transcript of the 5th of November, 2003, in President Milosevic's trial.

20 28699 is the page reference. And you said something similar in the

21 transcript in the proceedings against General Dragomir Milosevic the 16th

22 of January, 2007. The page reference is 444. I'm going to quote it, but

23 the essence is, and now I am going to speak in English -- I'll

24 paraphrase, rather:

25 [In English] "It was more common in Sarajevo for the Muslims to

Page 2103

1 launch an attack in order to provoke a response from the Serbs."

2 [Interpretation] And now comes the quotation:

3 [In English] "They wanted the media to see the Serbs attacking

4 and thought they had to sometimes create the conditions for that."

5 [Interpretation] Now I'm paraphrasing:

6 [In English] "The media was not present in other parts of the

7 country, so the Muslims would have less incentive to do that."

8 [Interpretation] Probably in other areas. I mean, the second

9 part is paraphrased, and it's from President Milosevic's trial, the

10 transcript of the 7th of November, 2003, page 28699.

11 Is that the way it was?

12 A. I don't remember, but I -- but the overwhelming volume of fire

13 into Sarajevo came from the Serb side. But in some cases, it did not,

14 and in some cases, we could not determine. But these specific quotes, I

15 cannot anymore exactly confirm, but the general characterisation is

16 correct.

17 Q. The emphasis here is on the media and on the Muslim need to

18 engage in provocations where the media were, not in other parts of the

19 country where there were no media; isn't that right?

20 A. Certainly, the media was a key factor in the strategy of the

21 Bosnian government.

22 Q. Well, thank you. Now I would like us to recall what you stated

23 earlier on, and primarily what we agreed upon the other day.

24 You said that you felt that Sarajevo was under siege; right?

25 A. Well, Sarajevo was under siege.

Page 2104

1 Q. And then I told you that a lieutenant colonel told you that

2 Sarajevo was not under siege, but rather within a military encirclement;

3 right? Lieutenant Fuhrer -- Fuhrer, yeah?

4 A. But if I remember our conversation on Monday correctly, I said

5 that there had been a siege of Sarajevo. You asked me whether I was

6 aware that Colonel Fuhrer had said that he would not characterise it as a

7 siege, he would characterise it as a military encirclement. And I said I

8 felt that was a little pedantic. Nobody denied that the siege of

9 Leningrad was a siege, even though the Soviet forces were able to move

10 some tiny amount of material, some small amount of material over

11 Lake Lagoda. So, I mean, I don't want to get into a debate about what we

12 said to each other on Monday. But, roughly, my position has been, at the

13 level of common sense, there was a siege of Sarajevo, and the vast

14 majority of victims were the victims of fire coming in from the Serb

15 side, but that there was some uncertainty about some cases. I hope

16 that's what I conveyed to you on Monday, and it's certainly a view I have

17 long held. But I met Colonel Fuhrer, and I respect his opinion as a

18 military expert.

19 Q. Thank you. Can you try and remember how many times Hitler

20 approved those transports across Lagoda Lake?

21 JUDGE KWON: It's not relevant. Let's move on.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, if Leningrad has been

23 mentioned and put within the context of Sarajevo, I'm putting it to

24 Mr. Harland that Sarajevo --

25 JUDGE KWON: No, let's move on. Let's move on.

Page 2105

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. You stated -- or, rather, we agreed, the two of us -- or, rather,

3 your position was that the Army of Republika Srpska did allow water, gas,

4 and electricity to reach Sarajevo, but it was not an act of mercy, but an

5 act of interest, because there were a number of Serbs living there,

6 between 20.000 to 50.000, and then your conclusion was they needed each

7 other.

8 A. There was no question.

9 Q. Is that right? Is that correct? That was the question. Is that

10 what you said, and did we agree to agree on that?

11 A. No. Perhaps Mr. Sladojevic or Ms. Edgerton will correct me, but

12 as I recall our conversation on Monday, I said that -- you said that if

13 it had not been for the Serbs, the Muslims would have had nothing but

14 air; they had no springs of water or sources of electricity or gas. I

15 said it's not quite true they had no water. They had some control of

16 water at, I think, Lapisnica and Mostanica, and that it's true that much

17 of the water and gas and electricity came from the Serb side of the line.

18 But I don't think I said it was because of this population of 20.000 to

19 50.000 in -- Serbs in the Bosnian-government-controlled territory. I

20 believe, perhaps those who were there can confirm, that I said it was

21 because Serb communities, such as Ilidza and Grbavica, which were

22 controlled by the Serb forces, also needed the water and electricity and

23 gas that was coming into the district. So there was an interest on both

24 sides, the Bosnian government side and on the Serb side, and so I said I

25 did not feel that the Serbs had provided any -- the small amount of water

Page 2106

1 and gas and electricity that got through as an act of charity, but as an

2 act of interest, and this is what created the negotiations. But I think

3 I'm right about what we talked about on Monday, but there are others in

4 this room who can confirm it if there is a disagreement.

5 Q. You did say that. You did say that ones depended on the others,

6 and if the Serbs had closed things on the one side, the Muslims would

7 have done it on the other side. That's how they depended on each other,

8 that's how they needed each other. That's your sentence. I'm quoting

9 you. "They needed each other."

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 Q. Thank you. It seems that we agreed that in the zone of Sarajevo,

12 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or, rather, its 1st Corps, had a large

13 numerical advantage with regard to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps or,

14 rather, the Serb Army. This means that the Muslim Army had anything

15 between 30.000 and 50.000, at least on paper 50.000, whereas the Serbs

16 had about 17.000; right?

17 A. As I recall it, you asked me whether I knew how many people were

18 serving in the 1st Corps of the armija, the Bosnian Armija, and I guessed

19 that it was up to about 50.000, at least on paper.

20 Q. Do you agree that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had about

21 17.000 troops?

22 A. Again, we had to guess, and we guessed that it had about 20.000

23 on paper.

24 Q. Do you agree that we agreed that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had

25 to defend its zone from attacks coming from town and those coming from

Page 2107

1 Central Bosnia, that anything between 17.000 to 20.000 men had to defend

2 themselves from the 1st Corps, which was in town, and also from the

3 attacks from the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps that attacked from the areas

4 where Serbs were dominant?

5 A. You asked that question, and I agreed that was correct. But you

6 didn't ask the next question, which was: Were all of the members of the

7 Bosnian Army 1st Corps within the area that was encircled by the Serbs?

8 In fact, I think that just as the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the Serb

9 Army had other military problems, other than the siege of Sarajevo, that

10 is also true of the Bosnian Army 1st Corps, which used to rotate large

11 units of troops, many of them, through the tunnel out into other areas

12 that were within the area of responsibility of 1st Corps through this

13 Igman zone that you will recall and into many other areas. So broadly

14 speaking, your characterisation is correct.

15 Q. Thank you. And one more question before the break.

16 Am I right? Are you planning our next break any time now?

17 It seems that we also agreed that every neighbourhood, at the

18 very beginning of the conflict, which means on the 5th or 6th of April,

19 1992, that those neighbourhoods created front-lines which more or less

20 did not change up until the end of the war; am I right?

21 A. Well, I remember we had a discussion in which you pointed out

22 that the communities that had been dominantly Serb prior to the war were

23 then controlled by the Serbs during the war, and the communities that

24 were dominantly Bosniak were generally controlled by the Bosniaks. And I

25 pointed out that there were -- the great majority of the urban area of

Page 2108

1 Sarajevo was somewhat ethnically mixed. So we had a long discussion on

2 that, but the general characterisation that the front-lines, as they came

3 to be shaped, did emerge from the dynamics that you described, yes.

4 Q. Thank you very much. We will be talking about those settlements.

5 We have a map that I already showed you, but, yes, I agree that we agreed

6 on that. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, is it time for our

8 break?

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

10 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Just before we break, I wanted to indicate that, as I mentioned

13 this morning, since we received Mr. Robinson's list of challenged

14 documents last night, we began preparing a short chart in order to -- so

15 as not to take valuable court time, indicating a response to the

16 objections document by document, so we'll be submitting those

17 electronically at the break to the Chamber and the parties.

18 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

19 We'll have a break for half an hour.

20 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.

22 JUDGE KWON: So let's continue.

23 We, with the indulgence of the interpreters, reporters, all the

24 staff, we will continue until 2.00 today.

25 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, may I have just one minute at the

Page 2109

1 very conclusion of the session. Thank you.

2 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

3 And on Monday, as I indicated, we'll have an extended sitting.

4 We'll have four times one-and-a-half-hour sessions, starting from 9.00,

5 and we'll have a break at 10.30. The next session will start at 11.00,

6 continuing to 12.30, and we'll have a one-hour break, and then we'll have

7 another two one-and-a-half-hour sessions from then.

8 Let's continue.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Q. Mr. Harland, I'll try not to quote, but to face you with some of

11 the positions that you advocated, and then we shall see whether we will

12 agree or not. If we don't, I'll have to accept that. But I believe that

13 we will agree.

14 Do you remember that your position was that some Muslim officials

15 or leaders believed that the worse it was, the better it was, and they

16 tried to portray the sufferings of their own people in Sarajevo as being

17 even bigger and more substantial than it was in order to provoke the

18 Western intervention? Was that your position? Is that what you stated

19 at one point?

20 A. It is my position, yes, that the Bosnian government tended to try

21 to overstate the suffering of the population, while the Serbs tried to

22 understate it. Yes, I would say that's correct.

23 Q. Thank you. You also stated that the Bosnian government refused

24 to reopen gas lines, even when the Serbs agreed to that, or allegedly

25 caused outages by shelling electrical production facilities, or

Page 2110

1 transformers, or whatever they're called, or, rather, high-voltage lines,

2 and they would snipe those in order to break the electricity supply. Did

3 you confirm that; did you?

4 A. With the gas, yes, there were occasions of that. With the

5 electricity, I don't think on the generators or the transformer stations.

6 But, yes, I am aware that there were cases when they were shooting at the

7 insulators on the electrical lines from the Bosnian side of the line,

8 yes.

9 Q. Thank you. We saw a document in this courtroom when

10 Ambassador Okun was here. Shall I maybe bring it up? The document says

11 that Mr. Cuny, or Cony -- did you know Mr. --

12 A. Fred Cuny, yeah, who died in Chechnya.

13 Q. Yes. He wrote Morton Abramowitz about an astonishing discovery,

14 and that was that the Serbs enabled the repair of water lines. He

15 invited the government to open those. The government didn't want to do

16 that. They did it of their own will, without asking them. And then the

17 government officials came and closed it. And then he described how,

18 after that, water was being sold on the black market, and so on and so

19 forth. Are you familiar with that case?

20 A. Yes, I remember he was very involved in trying to increase the

21 flow of water at Lapisnica, yeah, and there were a lot of obstacles he

22 encountered from the government side, yes.

23 Q. Thank you. Did you also maintain a position that the Serbs, or

24 perhaps Muslims and Croats who -- or even Muslims and Croats who found

25 themselves in the Muslim-controlled part of Sarajevo and wanted to leave,

Page 2111

1 would not be allowed to do that, the Muslim authorities would forbid them

2 to do that, and that was another violation of human rights?

3 A. My experience was they didn't allow any civilians to leave,

4 except in exceptional circumstances. But the decision was generally not

5 based on whether they were Bosniak or Serb or Croat. They wanted all the

6 civilians to stay, I think.

7 Q. Thank you. However, at the time when you stated that, your

8 position was that that was a violation of human rights, the rights of

9 civilians to free movement; right?

10 A. Yes. That's my understanding as a non-lawyer.

11 Q. You also stated that you had met with such a position on the part

12 of Mr. Izetbegovic, vis-a-vis to Sarajevo, vis-a-vis to Srebrenica; the

13 position was equal, despite the level of danger and threat that the

14 civilians were exposed to and despite their desire to change their places

15 of residence; right?

16 A. Yes, President Izetbegovic was very clear that he would not give

17 permission to the civilian population to leave, even if they wanted to

18 escape from areas of danger.

19 Q. Do you know, when we're talking about General Morillon, that

20 local authorities pleaded with General Morillon to take their civilians

21 out so as they could fight more freely? Let me jog your memory. There

22 was such a case in Besici, and there's a case like that in Podrinje. Do

23 you remember?

24 A. When you say "the local authorities," you mean the Bosniak local

25 authorities?

Page 2112

1 Q. Yes, yes, and the military commanders as well. They wanted the

2 civilians to leave. There was a case like that in Kotor Varos, in

3 Vecici, Siprage, and then along the Drina River. And General Morillon

4 was under a lot of pressure. We would have allowed that under the

5 condition that he also took Serbs out of Tuzla. Do you remember that?

6 A. I think that was before my time, but I certainly can confirm that

7 it was the position of President Izetbegovic that the civilian population

8 should stay in Srebrenica even though there had been trucks organised

9 between UNHCR and the local authorities to evacuate them. But he did

10 confirm that they would not be allowed to enter Bosnian-government

11 controlled territory around Tuzla, so that's what I remember from the

12 period I was there.

13 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you saw a letter written, by

14 Mr. Izetbegovic and sent to the United Nations, to that effect about

15 Srebrenica?

16 A. Yes. From 1993, yes --

17 Q. Thank you. He wrote to the Secretary-General about his report

18 about Srebrenica, and you saw the letter; right?

19 A. I can't remember now whether it was to the Secretary-General or

20 to the UN High Commission for Refugees. I originally saw the letter, in

21 fact, in the archives of UNHCR in Geneva, which they gave me access to

22 when I was doing some research about Srebrenica some years later.

23 Q. Thank you. Also, you were in a position to confirm Izetbegovic's

24 requests for thousands of tons of ammunition and weapons that had passed

25 through the Sarajevo tunnel, and that that tunnel was used to support the

Page 2113

1 black market or -- the black market while Sarajevo was either encircled

2 or besieged; right?

3 A. I can certainly confirm that weapons and ammunition and many

4 other goods came through the tunnel, yes.

5 Q. Thank you. I believe that you also established that when you

6 arrived in Sarajevo, there were about 40.000 Serbs there, and, according

7 to you, before that 140.000 had left Sarajevo. Let me rephrase that.

8 When you arrived in Sarajevo, 40.000 Serbs were there, and

9 140.000, according to you, had left; right?

10 A. It's true that we estimated, in 1993, that there were up to

11 40.000 Serbs in the -- the part of Sarajevo controlled by the Bosnian

12 government, but I can't remember the exact statistics now on those who

13 had left.

14 Q. Thank you. You also stated that Karadzic had never expressed or

15 directly denied the people's right to stay in their territories, which

16 means that I never expressly denied the rights of people to stay in any

17 shape or form; is that what you also stated?

18 A. No. In our discussion on Monday, I referred to a discussion you

19 had had with one of my superiors about ethnic cleansing in 1993, and you

20 had said at that time that the international community had to carry some

21 of the responsibility for that because they had not agreed to any of the

22 mechanisms for, for example, peaceful exchange of properties and

23 populations of people who wished to leave. And I had said that it was a

24 heavy implication that those who did not leave, who would remain as

25 minorities, say Bosniaks within Serb territory, would be in a -- you

Page 2114

1 know, under pressure or in a difficult position. And you had -- you said

2 on Monday -- you asked, you know, whether they would want to stay in a

3 hostile environment, and then Mr. Sladojevic and I had a little exchange

4 about why that environment might be seen. So I -- I was aware that the

5 forcible removal of populations -- of non-Serb populations from Serb-held

6 territory was an ongoing activity during my period and was widespread as

7 to be, clearly, centrally directed.

8 Q. We will challenge that with pleasure during your stay here, or

9 maybe with somebody else. However, what I just quoted is what you stated

10 on 18 September 2003 in the Milosevic case on page 26997, lines from 10

11 through 14. You said:

12 "I never expressly denied the right of the people to stay."

13 But it seems to me that we agreed on Monday that what I had

14 requested from the international community applied to the individual

15 right of the Serbs to leave an area, and when they did that, not to leave

16 empty-handed, but rather to either be able to exchange property or do

17 something to that effect. You know that our government put a ban on the

18 sale of property, but the international community was in a position to

19 help.

20 Do you agree that the Serbs and Karadzic advocated the individual

21 rights to move -- for the people to move out and exchange properties;

22 they did not advocate a mass relocation of people? You agreed with that,

23 did you not?

24 A. I certainly saw a lot of mass relocation of people. I can't

25 remember whether it was on Monday. But as I moved around the country,

Page 2115

1 whether in the Drina Valley or in the Prijedor area, you would come

2 across large areas where there would be blown-up mosques and blown-up

3 houses. And then I think I said to you on Monday, right, that you would

4 sometimes find hundreds and hundreds of houses blown up, burnt-out, or

5 destroyed, and then one house would not be destroyed in the middle, would

6 have a little garden or something, and then they would have written on it

7 in big paint "Srpska Kuca," meaning this is a Serbian house, indicating

8 that huge numbers of the non-Serb population had been violently expelled.

9 So whatever the stated intention was, what I witnessed was a force -- the

10 results of a forced exodus. And sometimes I would meet these people,

11 themselves, as they -- those who were being expelled would arrive at the

12 confrontation line.

13 Q. What I'm asking you now is something that you stated about my

14 position. I'm also you again. What was my position? Was my position

15 the way described in the Milosevic case or was my position different?

16 Was my position to advocate the rights of individuals, or, rather,

17 individual right of the people to cross over to a different territory,

18 but with some property to their name, not de-robed of everything they had

19 ever had?

20 A. I could only see the results of the policy, and the results of

21 the policy was the huge-scale violent expulsion of non-Serb populations.

22 Q. In 1993, you saw the consequences of something that had happened

23 in 1999; right? Did you also see the remains of a church that had been

24 destroyed?

25 A. Sorry?

Page 2116

1 Q. Did you saw [as interpreted] any destroyed churches in Trnovo or

2 elsewhere? You said that you saw mosques that had been destroyed. I'm

3 asking you about churches.

4 A. Oh, yes, I saw destroyed churches during my time in Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina, both Catholic churches and Orthodox Christian churches.

6 I think there was also one at Trnovo. I remember another, I think, near

7 Gorazde, as you came in. Certainly, yeah. And then in Central Bosnia

8 and also near Mostar. Certainly the destruction of Christian places of

9 worship, I was able to witness.

10 Q. Thank you. However, we agree that what you saw in Prijedor and

11 elsewhere, that that happened a year and a half before you came or,

12 rather, that you only saw the consequences of something that had happened

13 a year and a half before you came; right?

14 A. In Prijedor, yes, that happened before I was -- I was there.

15 Later, I saw much more recent evidences of forced evictions by the

16 different communities in different parts of Bosnia.

17 Q. Perhaps you will remember you stated that when you had arrived,

18 there were villages around Bijeljina, Muslim villages, which lived

19 happily, and on Monday I asked you to try and remember whether, before

20 your arrival, you learned of a single Serb village in the Muslim or

21 Croatian territory which had persisted and where people continued living

22 unharmed, happily, without any conditions.

23 A. I don't want to be pedantic, but I don't think I used the word

24 "happily" about them. And, in fact, I think that one of the reasons that

25 we were aware of the Bosniak villages around Bijeljina is because they

Page 2117

1 had expressed their concern about it. And I think I added that while I

2 was not aware of villages, name by name, in territory controlled by the

3 Bosniaks or Croats, that there were tens and tens of thousands of Serbs

4 and Croats and others living in Sarajevo and Tuzla, particularly in these

5 bigger areas. But it's true, when you asked me if I could name a Serb

6 village in Bosnian-government-held territory that had not been ethnically

7 cleansed or which continued to live happily during that period, I could

8 not name one.

9 Q. Thank you. I said "lived calmly and peacefully," so that may be

10 due to "happily." We don't know what happiness is, so I'm sure I didn't

11 say "happily."

12 Do you agree that the Serbs and Croats who resided in Sarajevo

13 were not there of their own ilk, as we have just established; they were

14 ethnic hostages, as it were? Wouldn't you agree with that?

15 A. I would agree that a large number of them wanted to leave, but

16 I think that a large number of Bosniak and other civilians also wanted to

17 leave. My observation did not lead me to the conclusion that they were

18 being held hostage, as you put it, simply because of their nationality.

19 There may have been some cases of that, now that I think about it, but it

20 was not the general situation.

21 Q. Then we should agree that their ethnic rights may not have been

22 jeopardised, but their civic and human rights were certainly threatened;

23 right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you. Did you know that on Mount Romanija -- or let me

Page 2118

1 first ask you, do you know where Mount Romanija is between Pale, Sokolac,

2 and Rogatica?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you know that there were several Muslim villages there which

5 had surrendered their weapons at the very beginning of the war and

6 remained living there without any problems until the very end of the war?

7 A. Oh, that was not my experience. My experience, as I drove around

8 Eastern Bosnia, was of the total destruction of villages which had

9 previously been predominantly inhabited by Bosniaks. I remember, when I

10 first drove from Sarajevo to Gorazde, I passed through Rogatica, and you

11 would pass through villages that -- and towns that were completely

12 devastated and bombed, and you would see the minarets of the mosques

13 lying on the ground. So I -- if there were surviving Bosniak villages in

14 that area of Eastern Bosnia which were not destroyed and not living in

15 very difficult circumstances, I admit that I was not aware of them and I

16 did not see them.

17 Q. Well, there were a few villages; Buratisa [phoen],

18 Toravici [phoen], et cetera. We will have a look at that here. But I

19 agree that we were not very good on propaganda. However, did you see

20 Serb villages in the Drina Valley that had been burned?

21 A. I think around Srebrenica, outside of Srebrenica, I -- I had

22 occasion once to visit a tiny community called Kravica. I'm not sure.

23 I think it was predominantly Serb before the war. Is that correct? And

24 in that community, that place, there was evidence of violence against the

25 village and the community, which presumably happened by Bosnian

Page 2119

1 government forces. But I generally can't name the villages one by one,

2 these tiny little communities.

3 Q. Thank you. Do you know that General Morillon attended mass

4 burials of Serbs when you got there and later on as well? Also, do you

5 know that before you came, 1.500 Serb civilians were killed around

6 Srebrenica, between Srebrenica and Zvornik, and by the end of the war it

7 was 3.500 Serbs that had been killed? General Morillon honoured us by

8 his presence at these mass burials where these mass graves were. Do you

9 know about that?

10 A. I am aware that in the period prior to my arrival, there had been

11 substantial operations from Bosnian government forces and that

12 civilians -- Serb civilians had been killed. I'm not sure whether the

13 international community was able to independently confirm some of them.

14 I think in the case of this little community, Kravica, there had been

15 some independent international confirmation, yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Did you know that Kravica was attacked on

17 Christmas Day, Orthodox Christmas Day, and that Serbs were invariably

18 attacked during Orthodox Christian holidays, whereas during Muslim

19 holidays I publicly issued orders stating that Serbs should not attack?

20 Do you know about that? First of all, was Kravica attacked on

21 Christmas Day out of the blue, without any necessity whatsoever?

22 A. It was just before I arrived, but that was the report that I

23 received from my colleagues, yes.

24 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you about the silo and other

25 prisons where Serbs were held. In one case in 2009, you said that

Page 2120

1 although most of the prisoners in the silo were not killed, they were

2 used to clear minefields, to dig trenches at Treskavica, and so on. Was

3 that your position; was that what you knew?

4 A. Yes. We're talking about the grain silos at Tarcin, yes.

5 Q. Yes, yes, Tarcin. In relation to the villages we mentioned

6 previously, what I wanted to point out was that the villages that had

7 surrendered their weapons near Sokolac, Rogatica, and Pale, they had not

8 been touched, and we can show that to you on Monday, if you wish.

9 However, I would like to know whether UNPROFOR or NATO ever

10 issued any threats or carried them out because of these crimes committed

11 against Serb villages and Serb civilians, to the best of your knowledge.

12 A. Actually, I think there was at least one attempt by General Rose

13 to invoke the threat of possible air-strikes against the Bosnian

14 government side, but I think he might be coming at a point, and he can

15 describe that. I now actually admit that I'd forgotten the details. But

16 in general, the threats made by UNPROFOR to use NATO air attacks were

17 overwhelmingly directed at the Serbs.

18 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about

19 cease-fire violations and violations of the demilitarised zone.

20 Do you remember that you stated that there is information showing

21 that during three months in 1993, the Muslim forces violated the

22 cease-fire 196 times?

23 A. I don't have the exact numbers, but there were a lot of

24 violations of the cease-fires.

25 Q. I have the figures from your statements and from your testimony.

Page 2121

1 On the 2nd of February, 1994, up until the 27th of April, 1994,

2 you said that Muslim forces violated the cease-fire 318 times. Do you

3 remember that?

4 A. No, but it might be true.

5 Q. Then you stated that Karadzic, and now I'm going to speak in

6 English:

7 [In English] "Karadzic issued an order on July the 2nd that

8 Akashi and the UN were to be informed on a daily basis about all Muslim

9 violations of the cease-fire."

10 [Interpretation] That's what you stated in 2003 at the trial of

11 President Milosevic on page 28678. Do you remember that?

12 A. No.

13 Q. But you do agree that these numerous violations were not followed

14 by threats against the Muslim side by UNPROFOR, let alone NATO? Do you

15 agree that they were absolutely spared of that kind of pressure?

16 A. Yes, UNPROFOR's threats were principally directed at the Bosnian

17 Serbs, though I must say General Rose had a very frank and direct

18 relation with the Bosnian government authorities, too, particularly

19 Dr. Ganic, but it never or very rarely -- very rarely reached the level

20 of direct threats of military strikes which we did use against the Serbs.

21 Q. Let me put a question to you now. Do you think that that was a

22 legal means for attaining a legal objective, I mean, the fact that we

23 Serbs were under sanctions, the Republic of Serbia, and we, the Serbs, in

24 general, and later on Serbia imposed sanctions on us, and ultimately

25 there were air-strikes? Do you think that that was a legal means? Was

Page 2122

1 it alright to keep us in that situation, under such pressure?

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

3 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, Mr. Harland has already said on,

4 I think, more than one occasion that he's not a lawyer. And it would be

5 unfair and improper, in my submission, to ask him to make legal

6 conclusions.

7 JUDGE KWON: Not as a lawyer, if he can answer the question,

8 based on what he observed at the time, he can answer the question.

9 Otherwise, he may not.

10 THE WITNESS: I believe that we were acting in accordance with

11 our legal mandate from the United Nations Security Council, particularly,

12 I think, in accordance with Resolution 836 of the Council, when we

13 threatened the use of force, and when we prepared for the use of force,

14 and when, ultimately, in the summer of 1995, we used force on a massive

15 scale, both from the air and from our artillery. I do believe it was

16 consistent with our mandate from the Security Council, which was the

17 basic legal context for our operations.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Q. Do you agree that the Security Council gave explicit authority to

22 UNPROFOR to call NATO in for close air support when the UNPROFOR forces

23 are under threat? As for the strategic bombing of the Serbs and in order

24 to change the picture on the ground, the Security Council never actually

25 gave explicit permission for that?

Page 2123

1 A. Well, the Security Council is my boss, so I have to be a little

2 bit careful. But I would say that clarity is not the greatest of the

3 Security Council's virtues. But in Resolution 836, in operative

4 paragraphs 5, 9, and 10, there are references to the use of all necessary

5 means to deter attacks by the Bosnian Serb party against six designated

6 safe areas. And we sought not to have to use force on an extreme scale.

7 But in the end we came to the conclusion that the killing and the

8 suffering of the war could not be ended unless we used our mandate to its

9 maximum extent, and, therefore, UNPROFOR quietly prepared the ground in

10 1995, without telling anybody, for very wide-scale use of air and

11 artillery attacks. But I believe that those air and artillery attacks,

12 which were successful in their objectives, were consistent with

13 Resolution 836, even though it involved hitting targets such as the

14 bridges over the River Drina and communication facilities that were not

15 immediately in the tactical area surrounding the six designated safe

16 areas referred to. But I say this with great hesitation in a room full

17 of lawyers, but we can, presumably, look at that resolution and other

18 resolutions at some point.

19 Q. Thank you. We will discuss that and reach some agreement.

20 Do you remember that General Mladic said to General Wahlgren and

21 others that whenever his soldiers opened fire at the UN, that they can

22 respond freely, and strongly at that, and that our acceptance of close

23 air support was unopposed, we did not grumble about that? However, I am

24 a bit confused that UNPROFOR was preparing strategic bombing in order to

25 change the situation on the ground and with a view to reaching a

Page 2124

1 political solution. We knew that, but we did not know on which basis

2 that was being done. Can you help us on that? On which basis did

3 UNPROFOR prepare that?

4 A. UNPROFOR came to the conclusion in the summer of 1995 that it

5 could not discharge its mandate to protect the civilian populations of

6 these six designated areas without using its mandate to use all necessary

7 means to maximum effect. It was, therefore, decided that preparations

8 would be made for air and artillery attacks far beyond just close air

9 support.

10 Q. Thank you. But I think that we saw yesterday that that had been

11 done with a view to bringing the war to an end, and that Markale -- isn't

12 that right? You do agree, don't you, that the plan for strategic -- of

13 strategic bombing was made with a view to having the war brought to an

14 end?

15 A. It was certainly our view by that point that we could not

16 discharge our mandate unless we directly helped to end the war. So, yes,

17 UNPROFOR decided that it had to use the "all necessary means" described

18 in Resolution 836 and elsewhere to protect the civilian populations

19 through the extreme means of ending the war, including by force. But our

20 understanding was that was, in some ways, the intention of Resolution

21 836, so yes.

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, hearing the interpretation and looking

23 at the transcript, I note that "Markale" is somewhat hanging in the

24 question. Did you ask any question regarding Markale?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I wanted to go back to that,

Page 2125

1 because Mr. Harland said yesterday that that operation had been prepared

2 for weeks in advance, with an intention that they probably considered to

3 be noble, to end the war, and that Markale was used as a pretext, and it

4 was as if it had fallen from heaven in order to have a pretext for the

5 strategic bombing at that point in time.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Isn't that right?

8 A. Not exactly. The position of UNPROFOR was that we needed to be

9 in a position to apply force, directly and on a large scale, in order to

10 insist on the compliance with our mandate to protect civilians. If

11 anything happened that would indicate that the Serb side was not

12 respecting our absolute insistence that the civilian population be

13 protected, that instead of simply having a threat, we would implement --

14 we would initiate those attacks from the air and from the artillery. And

15 what I indicated yesterday was that the Markale massacre had not been

16 foreseen by anybody, but was certainly such an attack as would trigger

17 not just a threat, but the actual implementation of widespread attacks

18 against the Serb forces by the UNPROFOR artillery, the Rapid Reaction

19 Force, and by NATO.

20 Q. Thank you. We'll get back to that, with your permission.

21 Now let us see what your position was. I think I can actually

22 quote this; namely, that the Bosnians just wanted breaks, as far as

23 cease-fires were concerned. However, if there weren't any positive

24 negotiations, they would go on fighting. And then I quote:

25 [In English] "The Serbs said that either there is a war -- no

Page 2126

1 agreement or that there is no war, a complete cessation of hostilities."

2 [Interpretation] You correctly interpreted my position there;

3 namely, that Muslims use cease-fires for consolidation and that, on the

4 other hand, we get weaker day after day and that we want either war or

5 peace, not to allow them cease-fires that would make them stronger and

6 stronger, better armed, et cetera.

7 [In English] Correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. Now, this is page 96, line 9,

10 yesterday's transcript. You say:

11 [In English] "This takes a minute or two, if that's okay. There,

12 General Smith had a plan to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or at

13 least a series of initiatives that would contribute to the end of the

14 war. And central to those initiatives was the need to direct NATO

15 air-strikes against the Bosnian Serbs on a massive scale."

16 [Interpretation] So it is quite clear that without Markale and

17 without an awareness of some intentions of ours to take anything, a plan

18 was being drawn up:

19 [In English] "Now nobody could predict when these Markale

20 atrocities happened, that this would be the incident that would trigger

21 these air-strikes."

22 [Interpretation] Now I would be interested in the following,

23 Mr. Harland: Did the Security Council ever pass a decision for the UN

24 forces to change the balance of power in the field, that is to say, to

25 weaken one side, in order to have a solution finally found? I understand

Page 2127

1 that have you to talk about your bosses, but it's not the same persons.

2 The persons who were there then haven't been there for a long, long time.

3 A. We could no longer implement our mandate to protect the civilian

4 populations without having the most -- without making maximum use of the

5 mandate we had received from the Security Council. If we had gone to the

6 Security Council, in advance of the operation we launched on the night of

7 the 29th and 30th of August, and had explicitly asked for their legal

8 imprimatur in advance, I don't know. Perhaps you are correct. The

9 mandate was relatively obscure, and -- but it gave very broad goals and

10 very broad authorities, and in the end, we felt we could only reach those

11 broad goals by the extensive use of those authorities.

12 Q. Thank you. Mr. Harland, don't you think that less force could

13 have been used, and less resources, had you made it possible for the

14 protected areas to be demilitarised? We see that we do agree that we

15 were being killed from Srebrenica and Zepa every day. Wouldn't it have

16 been easier to pass and carry out that kind of resolution,

17 demilitarisation of the protected areas, or safe havens? That was

18 explicitly ordered by the Security Council, instead of bombing the Serb

19 side. Why were these safe havens not demilitarised?

20 A. Well, to the first question, I would say that UNPROFOR was

21 extremely patient. In fact, after Markale 1, which is one year and a

22 half before we finally launched these major operations, there had been a

23 very active consideration of using air power on a large scale then, but

24 we were always attempting to discharge our mandate, to deliver

25 humanitarian aid, and to help the sides reach a cease-fire, in the hope

Page 2128

1 that they could reach a negotiated settlement without having to use

2 force. And I think, frankly, if the massacre at Srebrenica had not

3 happened, it is unlikely that UNPROFOR would have taken the final

4 decisive steps to prepare the large military operations that came in

5 August and September and ended the -- helped to end the war.

6 Q. Can I take you back to the issue of protected areas. What I'm

7 putting to you, sir, is this: Those protected areas did not protect the

8 civilians, but, rather, the Muslim fighters who, as the Secretary-General

9 of the United Nations had established, opened fire on Serbs and then

10 returned to the protection of the United Nations, why they were not

11 demilitarised in keeping with the resolution of the Security Council

12 which ordered for these protected areas to be fully demilitarised? Why

13 was that not implemented?

14 A. I don't have these resolutions in front of me, but if I remember

15 correctly, the resolutions, I think probably 824, but maybe 819 or 836,

16 calls for the withdrawal of all forces except Bosnian government forces.

17 I don't have the text and I don't recall the exact words, but my memory

18 is that the mandate -- the obligation placed on UNPROFOR to try to deter

19 Serb attacks by all means necessary was not predicated on the Bosnian

20 government's previous demilitarisation of the areas. We certainly

21 supported the demilitarisation of the areas, and we pursued negotiations

22 in that direction, but I have a feeling that the language of the

23 resolution does refer to the withdrawal of your forces, but does not

24 refer to the withdrawal or removal of the Bosnian government forces. But

25 I could be wrong. Those resolutions I haven't looked at for a long, long

Page 2129

1 time.

2 Q. [In English] You are excused, because you said that you are not

3 military expert.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, can the Court please

5 produce 1D953.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. While this is being done, let me remind you that safe havens or

8 safe zones, according to the International Rules of War, have to be

9 agreed between the parties. They have to be delineated or delimitated,

10 which means that borders have to be agreed, and they have to be

11 demilitarised inside so as to make sure that no threat comes from the

12 inside of them on the surroundings, and vice versa. As one of the

13 conditions is met and the is another not, you will agree with me that the

14 military and the civilians who suffered daily killings and attacks from

15 that safe zone cannot be satisfied?

16 This is a document entitled "An agreement on the demilitarised

17 zones of Srebrenica and Zepa," and this was signed by

18 General Ratko Mladic and General Sefer Halilovic on the 8th of May, 1993,

19 in the presence of General Philippe Morillon. Do you see the document in

20 front of you, sir?

21 A. The answer to your first question is -- is, No. I mean, you and

22 I are two of the only people in this room who are not lawyers. But my

23 understanding is that what you are referring to, which is the safety

24 zones described in the protocol -- is it the 1947 Protocols Additional to

25 the Geneva Conventions, the 1st Protocol with respect to international

Page 2130

1 armed conflicts, but I think the same provision appears in the protocol

2 on non-international conflict, describe safety zones which can be agreed

3 between the parties, and it describes demilitarisation, and it describes

4 markings with red crosses, and so on. Whereas what was created by the

5 Security Council, at least in English, has a completely different name.

6 They're called safe areas, and there is no reference that is saying that

7 these are the same as those safety zones referred to which -- in the

8 Geneva Conventions, which I think are envisaged as very tiny things,

9 basically for the protection of hospitals and similar; that what was

10 being described by the Security Council was a completely different

11 concept from which the Security Council demanded that the Serbs withdraw

12 their forces, but did not demand that the Bosniaks demilitarise or

13 withdraw their forces. Now, I don't claim that this was a very

14 intellectually coherent mandate. It was full of problems.

15 The agreement which you have pointed to is not, in our view,

16 determinative on the Security Council. There was a negotiation going on

17 between General Wahlgren -- General Mladic, Gvero, and General Halilovic

18 were there, and General Wahlgren. But I think our view was that

19 whether -- it was obviously good if that agreement would be implemented,

20 though most agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina were wildly violated by

21 all sides. And, in any case, our view was that the Security Council

22 resolution calling for the Serbs to withdraw would have legal effect on

23 us and oblige us to continue, irrespective of that agreement. But now we

24 are wading into a legal swamp and are likely to get caught by our peers.

25 Q. I would like to draw your attention to the first page and the

Page 2131

1 preamble, which mentions all those things that I am talking about. And

2 then I would like to go to page 3. In this document, will you see that

3 we're both right. However, the order is in my favour.

4 Article 11, please. Page 3, Article 11. When the Serbs withdrew

5 weapons, let me read in English:

6 [In English] "When both sides in the presence of UNPROFOR agree

7 that the operation has been completed, all heavy weapons and units that

8 constitute a menace to the demilitarised zone which will have been

9 established in Zepa and Srebrenica will be withdrawn. Heavy weapons and

10 tanks will be concentrated in limited areas that will be monitored by

11 UNPROFOR and, in principle, out of range of the demilitarised zone.

12 Infantry will be withdrawn to a range from which their weapons cannot

13 constitute a menace to the security of the demilitarised zone, in

14 principle, one and a half kilometres."

15 [Interpretation] Up to Article 11, there are explanations of the

16 conditions for the withdrawal of the Serb troops. Complete

17 demilitarisation. Nobody but the police. Very small numbers of them

18 could wear a uniform. And then the Serb forces were supposed to withdraw

19 at a distance of one and a half kilometres and put heavy weapons out of

20 range. And the Serbs even did that. However, they suffered daily

21 losses, on average a soldier a day, and some civilians. And the

22 Trial Chamber will have an opportunity to see the atrocities that we

23 suffered from the demilitarised zones.

24 Tell us, please, why did not UNPROFOR demilitarise those zones?

25 The first ten articles and the conditions set out therein had to be met

Page 2132

1 in order for Article 11, and the conditions therein could be met; do you

2 agree with me?

3 A. No. The agreement -- nobody wanted the agreement honoured more

4 than us. But that agreement is an agreement between -- if I remember

5 correctly, between General Mladic and General Halilovic, in our presence.

6 It is one of hundreds of agreements made between the Bosnian -- or at

7 least dozens of agreements between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian

8 Serbs, which were subject to absolutely continuous violations on all

9 sides.

10 Our view was whether or not they made or honoured an agreement

11 between themselves, we had a mandate flowing from the Security Council.

12 To be absolutely frank, we were not happy with the mandate from the

13 Security Council. The mandate from the Security Council asked us to

14 deter attacks by your forces. We said, If you want us to do that, we

15 would need 36.000 troops. We officially said that. The

16 Secretary-General said that to the Security Council, and the

17 Security Council did not provide the troops. So we had only a tiny

18 amount of people, so obviously we pursued everything we could within our

19 means to make this -- to fulfill our mandate by encouraging these sorts

20 of agreement. But, frankly, we were not very surprised when all sides

21 were in massive violation of them. And in the end, the mandate from the

22 Security Council to deter attacks still continued, even though we had not

23 the troops that were needed given to us by the countries which gave us

24 that mandate.

25 Q. However, do you agree with me that you should have thwarted

Page 2133

1 attacks against the Serb civilians from the protected areas under your

2 protection? Under whose protection were we? How was it possible to

3 prevent the attacks on us? Could you have used NATO? Could you have

4 threatened us with NATO, as did you when you decided to bomb the Serbs?

5 How come you did not have the power to put Muslims before -- an

6 alternative. Either you're going to stop attacking the Serb villages,

7 or, alternatively, we're going to stop protecting your protected zone.

8 A. The mandate from the Security Council, like it or not, was to

9 designate six Bosnian government, Bosniak-majority areas as safe areas

10 that would be safe from attack by your forces. The Security Council had

11 come to that decision for its own reason; presumably, because they felt

12 that your forces were overwhelmingly militarily dominant and were

13 conducting a campaign against those six areas and others that required

14 some sort of international action. So the Security Council mandate did

15 not ask of UNPROFOR the sort of equivalence that you are referring to.

16 And when General Rose considered seriously the use of air attacks against

17 the Bosnian government when it had considered -- had committed certain

18 violations, I think he found that it was not politically possible to

19 proceed.

20 Q. But we agree that you didn't have the mandate to bomb the Serbs

21 within the range of strategic bombing; right?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I now -- can this agreement

23 between Mladic and Halilovic, in the presence of Morillon, be admitted?

24 Can we please look at page 4 to display the signature.

25 THE WITNESS: The question, can we agree that you didn't have the

Page 2134

1 mandate to bomb the Serbs within the range of strategic bombing, no --

2 JUDGE KWON: By all means.

3 THE WITNESS: My answer to that question is, No. On the

4 contrary, our understanding of the mandate is that we did, if necessary,

5 have the mandate to use all necessary means to bring about the intended

6 goals of the mandate, and in the end we reached the conclusion we could

7 only do that by bringing the war to an end by force.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Are you saying that there is a decision of the Security Council

10 that peacekeeping forces should become peace-imposing forces? Is there a

11 document to such an effect?

12 A. There -- first of all, I have already said that the mandate of

13 UNPROFOR is relatively obscure. In my view, it was an expression of the

14 lowest common denominator of international will to address the problem in

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 Specifically to answer your question, UNPROFOR was never really a

17 peacekeeping force because there was no peace to keep. There was a war,

18 a raging war, with up to -- over 300.000 combatants, and we were a small

19 force of less than 10 per cent of that, dropped into the middle of it,

20 and there was no peace to keep. And there was a mandate later in the

21 war. There was a mandate under Resolution 836 to use all necessary

22 means. The problem was that we didn't have the necessary means. And if

23 General Smith had not worked very carefully to create the conditions to

24 deal with these problems we discussed yesterday, the Mogadishu problem

25 and the hostage problem, he would never have been able to reach the

Page 2135

1 successful conclusion that was reached. And even so, it happened far too

2 late.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could page 4 please be displayed,

4 the signature page, and can this document please be admitted.

5 And now can the Court please produce 1D978.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Do we see General Morillon, General Mladic, and

8 General Halilovic's signatures? Do you agree that this page is part of

9 the same document? Right?

10 A. Yes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the agreement please be

12 admitted into evidence.

13 JUDGE KWON: I don't think there will be an objection to this.

14 It will be admitted as ...?

15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D135, Your Honours.

16 JUDGE KWON: Next document, 978?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next one is 978, yes.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Just the first paragraph, on the 27th of June, 1995, and this

20 document was produced by the Muslim Army, by the 2nd Corps. The

21 BiH Army, the commander of the 2nd Corps, "Strictly confidential," and so

22 on and so forth. And this was sent to -- and here's what it says:

23 "On the 26th of June, 1995," which was some 10 days before the

24 operation in Srebrenica, "in the morning hours of 26 June 1995, our

25 forces attacked from the Srebrenica sector and set fire to the village of

Page 2136

1 Visnjica. According to as yet unconfirmed intelligence, the Chetniks,"

2 which means Serbs, "suffered casualties among the civilian population."

3 Which ethnic community and which army would have tolerated any

4 such thing, despite any resolutions of the United Nations? Do you agree

5 with me that we were fully in our right not to tolerate that?

6 A. Well, I certainly agree with you that this appears to be a

7 violation of the agreement you referred to, yes.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document

9 please be admitted into evidence.

10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

11 MS. EDGERTON: That's fine.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D136.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce

15 1D980.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. While this is being done, do you agree with me that there is a

18 complete agreement about the fact that the original Serb plan was not to

19 take over Srebrenica, but to separate the enclaves and to reducing them

20 to the previously-agreed borders, as per this agreement? Your own

21 sources say that. They say that there was no plan to take over, that it

22 was a sudden development, because Srebrenica was no longer defended after

23 they had withdrawn from Srebrenica. Do you agree with me?

24 A. No. I would say that the intention of the Serb forces was not

25 simply to return the safe areas to the size they had been at the moment

Page 2137

1 of their creation by the Security Council. On the contrary,

2 General Mladic even agreed -- even told General Smith that the hope, or

3 the expectation, or the plan of the Serbs was to reduce them to very tiny

4 areas. I forget what, one and a half kilometres or three kilometres

5 across, or something much smaller than at the moment of demarcation.

6 As to whether or not the Serb intention had actually been to --

7 at the outset of the operation against Srebrenica, had been to take it

8 completely and to massacre its population, or whether that decision was

9 taken opportunistically at a late stage, I'm not sure that I am in a

10 position to comment.

11 Q. Thank you. We will go on talking about that. But the fact is

12 that your information, the information in the possession of the

13 United Nations, was to reduce the areas to an area less than agreed. The

14 Serbs claim that it was within the agreed area, and they left the areas

15 to torch Serbian villages. Their goal was to link up all the Serbian

16 territories and tie up the Serb forces around Sarajevo, where the summer

17 offensive was underway in 1995. I'm sure that you observed -- you were

18 an eye-witness to all that offensive. Do you agree with all of what I'm

19 saying?

20 A. I can agree with it all, except for the comment that the Serbs

21 claimed that it was -- that they only intended to reduce the safe areas

22 to the agreed area. I think the Serbs explicitly told General Smith that

23 they intended to reduce them much further than that.

24 In my written testimony, there is a reference to an order.

25 I think it's signed by yourself, a certain Directive 7, which also