Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2896

 1                           Friday, 28 May 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody.  I read the Prosecution

 7     notice for the -- of witnesses for the next week.  I take it from the

 8     fact that Mr. Van Lynden is scheduled to come back on Monday that it has

 9     been agreed by the parties that, Mr. Karadzic, you will conclude your

10     cross-examination by today.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope so, Your Excellencies.

12             JUDGE KWON:  How much -- how much would you need for your

13     redirect, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Not more than ten minutes.

15             JUDGE KWON:  There are several matters to deal with on the part

16     of the Chamber at the end of today's session, so, Mr. Karadzic, I would

17     like you to bear in your mind to conclude at least 40 minutes before the

18     end of today's session.

19             Let's continue.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to say

21     good morning to everyone.

22                           WITNESS:  COLM DOYLE [Resumed]

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, yesterday we showed what we had

25     undertaken as our obligation at the London Conference and how we reacted,

Page 2897

 1     and I'm glad that you noticed that I did what I said I would do three

 2     days after our meeting.

 3             Now I would like to see 65 ter 01559 - this is a Prosecution

 4     document - to see what our army did in terms of our obligations from the

 5     conference.  This is a document of the 6th of June, after the Lisbon

 6     conference where we were together.  This is one of those notorious

 7     directives by General Mladic, so let's see what General Mladic ordered

 8     and how he understood things.

 9             This is a directive for further actions, dated the

10     6th of June, 1992.

11             In the first paragraph it says:

12             "The enemy started a general offence in the direction of

13     Sarajevo."

14             And the last sentence in that paragraph states:

15             "The operation is intended to be carried out in the next five to

16     six days in order to create favourable conditions for possible

17     negotiations about demarcation in the broader area of Sarajevo."

18             Paragraph 2:

19              "The military of the Serbian Republic of B and H received the

20     task to use offensive actions with the restricted objective of improving

21     the operational tactical position in the broader area of Sarajevo ..."

22             And then paragraph 4, the first sentence.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And in the English it's on the next

24     page, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 2898

 1        Q.   "I have decided with a persistent defence to defend the achieved

 2     lines."

 3             And then:

 4             "The goal of the action, secure parts of Sarajevo with a majority

 5     Serbian population, mop up or cleanse the broader area ..."

 6             Now, a new page in the Serbian.

 7             "... the broader area of the Sarajevo airport, and mop up or

 8     cleanse its wider area of remaining groups and of individuals belonging

 9     to the enemy, thus ensuring the safety needed to bring in -- for

10     aircraft's bringing in humanitarian aid and render possible the normal

11     supply of food and medication to the civilian population."

12             And then C:

13             "Open the following roads for the traffic:  Sarajevo, Trnovo,

14     Kalinovik, in order to provide regular supplies of humanitarian aid to

15     the population."

16             If you recall, we had agreed to have humanitarian aid deliveries

17     through Metkovic as well.  Do you recall that?

18        A.   No, I don't recall that.

19        Q.   All right.  It's in the documents.  We took it upon ourselves

20     that we would open the Metkovic route through Eastern Herzegovina, and

21     Mladic is ordering the security of that communication here.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page is both in English

23     and Serbian.  Actually, we need to look at page 4 in the English.  Where

24     it says:

25             "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps ..."

Page 2899

 1             Last sentence:

 2             "Secure the communication -- the broader area of the airport to

 3     ensure the safe arrival of humanitarian aid."

 4             Then 6, paragraph 2, can we look at the next page in the English,

 5     please.

 6             "I strictly forbid the abuse of the civilian unarmed population

 7     and treat the prisoners in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions."

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Is this more or less in accordance with what we agreed in Lisbon

10     at the end of May, Colonel, sir?  If you recall, I signed a statement

11     which we can show.  I signed it in Lisbon.  I signed it there from which

12     all the instructions issued by Mladic arise.

13        A.   I don't recall the exact details of -- as is portrayed in this

14     letter, which -- which I'm totally unaware of.  My understanding of the

15     main achievement in Lisbon was as a consequence of the mortar attack on

16     the bread queue in Sarajevo that we secured your general agreement for

17     the consideration of handing the airport over to the United Nations.

18     That's the main achievement, as I recall.

19             These are all details of a letter that was sent out by a general.

20     It doesn't mean very much to me.  I'd like to see the spirit of it going

21     into being implemented rather than just being written in a letter.

22             So I have no knowledge of this letter.  I have no knowledge of

23     the details.  And, therefore, I have no further comment on it.

24        Q.   Colonel, sir, you can comment on everything when it's in favour

25     of the Prosecution, but when the Defence is putting something evident to

Page 2900

 1     you, what do you think about what I'm saying to you now?  Colonel, sir,

 2     you are quite partial now.  This is not a letter.  This is an order, a

 3     directive, which must not be understood as a letter.  It has to be

 4     executed.  Whoever knows Mladic knows that this had to be executed.  And

 5     the fact that a shell forced me -- well, this is quite partial, Colonel.

 6     Since you don't know anything of the things that I was ordering, do you

 7     recall the directive of the 12th of April?  How can you be so partial,

 8     and why are you so partial?  Can you explain this to everybody?

 9        A.   What I'm simply saying, Mr. Karadzic, is that you have produced a

10     plethora of documents allegedly giving directives.  What I'm saying to

11     you is I have no proof as to whether the contents of those directives

12     were obeyed.  It's as simple as that.  I have never seen any of these

13     documents.

14        Q.   I didn't ask you that.  I asked you whether the contents of this

15     directive are in accordance with what I stated and signed in Lisbon.

16        A.   And I'm saying to you that I do not know the exact content of

17     everything that was agreed in Lisbon.  If you can produce the document

18     that was signed, then I might be in a position of commenting on it.  I

19     don't recall its exact detail, except the portion which emphasised the

20     need for the airport to be handed over to the United Nations in order to

21     provide humanitarian assistance.

22        Q.   How can you say, Colonel, sir, that a shell forced me to do it

23     when it was something that I proposed even before the conference and when

24     you know about my platform of the 22nd of April?  We have been listening

25     your quite partial testimony for the past three days when you say, Yes,

Page 2901

 1     but the Serbs did something in Zvornik.  But you don't know what was

 2     actually going on in Zvornik.  You have to be aware that the Defence

 3     considers you to be a completely partial witness who is defending

 4     himself.  I'm not attacking you.  I'm asking for your knowledge, your

 5     conclusions.  I'm asking for what you know about the events as somebody

 6     who was actually there.  Yes, you can tell us what you are thinking.  I

 7     am just saying that you are evading to answer.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Put your question one at a time instead of making a

 9     long speech.

10             Mr. Doyle, you are --

11             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I'm simply saying that my recollection

12     of what was discussed in Lisbon was only achieved after the attack of the

13     mortar, the mortar attack in Sarajevo.  Up to that time, there was no

14     progress made on anything.  And it was a consequence of that mortar

15     attack that the chairman of the peace talks, Mr. Cutileiro, persuaded

16     Mr. Karadzic to give something out of that conference that would be of

17     some benefit.  And that is my clear recollection.  All of these details

18     that are in this letter I'm certainly not familiar with.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Colonel, sir, you will agree that the 17th of May came before the

22     27th of May.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this document,

24     Your Honours, please?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It will -- unless it is objected to, it will

Page 2902

 1     be admitted.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, Your Honour, no objection.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit Number D232.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] can we now look at 1D891 in

 5     e-court, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 7        Q.   And while we're waiting, sir, this is my letter to

 8     Ambassador Cutileiro of the 17th of May, and you will see that the

 9     Serbian side is constantly making initiatives, and you are saying that I

10     was forced to do something by a bomb which we didn't fire, and it's not

11     in my indictment, and I can prove that we did not fire it.

12             Here is the letter, sir.  For example, we would like to keep you

13     properly informed about the situation [In English] in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

14     particularly in Sarajevo.  The war is getting worse and worse, and it is

15     turning into a disaster.  We have made many peaceful proposals directly

16     to the Muslim side and UNPROFOR, but there was no response but more and

17     more fire.  Finally our Assembly," excuse me.  "Finally our Assembly

18     declared a unilateral cease-fire, and it expires tomorrow, May the 18th.

19     Our unilateral cease-fair was understood as our weakness, and we were

20     attacked even more savagely.  In spite of talks and at the time the talks

21     were being held, Mr. Izetbegovic made two statements in two days that

22     they were going to victory, until they clean Bosnia from terrorists.  By

23     terrorists, he meant Serbs.  His statement sounds -- sounded as a call

24     for jihad.  Today next-door neighbours in the Serbian suburbs of Pofalici

25     killed at least 50 Serbs."

Page 2903

 1             [Interpretation] To correct this, 250 Serbs.  We knew at that

 2     point in time that Colonel, sir, 250 Serbs were killed in Pofalici at

 3     that time, and that was the only Serbian settlement we were not

 4     controlling.  At least 50 Serbs.  But some estimation make it 200.

 5              "[In English] Every day, Muslims make savage attacks on Serbian

 6     municipalities, particularly on Ilidza, and Serbs never attacked Muslim

 7     municipalities.  As far as the Croatian side is concerned, Kupres is

 8     quiet.  The situation in the Neretva valley is better but not good.

 9     [No interpretation] [In English] In Bosanski Brod, Croatian regulars has

10     doubled armed forces and chasing Serbs out of this municipality.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we look at the last page,

12     please, page 2.  Ah, we can stay on this one.

13             MR. KARADZIC:

14        Q.   "Mr. Izetbegovic does not want this conference anymore.  He is

15     asking for foreign military help from Islamic countries.  We have strong

16     evidence that Libya is involved and that it is the only country which has

17     its consulate in SarajevoTurkey, Egypt, Morocco, and other Islamic

18     countries are getting interested in the outcome of the Bosnian crisis.

19     If the conference does not continue, the war will become even more

20     terrible, and it will not stop until the side is - next - is completely

21     defeated.  As you know, all my predictions have become true, and I am not

22     happy about it.  So we propose unconditional resumption of the

23     conference.  If it is conditioned by cease-fire, that means that

24     Mr. Izetbegovic will have a way to hinder and sabotage it as long as he

25     wants to do it."

Page 2904

 1             [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, may I remind you of the directive

 2     of -- actually, the platform of the 22nd of April, and would I like to

 3     ask you if you have anything of our statements or declarations to show

 4     that was warmongering and that was against a political resolution of the

 5     conflict?

 6        A.   No, I don't have any documentation, and I would just say for --

 7     during that period that was made out, I was in the United Kingdom.  I

 8     wasn't in Bosnia.  So I don't have any knowledge of the content of this

 9     letter.

10        Q.   You don't -- that's -- you were not in Sarajevo on the

11     27th of April, but in Lisbon.  But you know that a bomb influenced me.

12     Colonel, sir, you are partial, and you can see that from the moon.  By

13     the 22nd of May we had made these proposals, but the shell fell on the

14     27th of May.  This was on the 17th.  It was five days after you arrived.

15     But you knew what was going on; you were in Lisbon, weren't you?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, the accused is arguing with the

18     witness.  He's not really asking questions any more.  He's making

19     statements and arguing.

20             JUDGE KWON:  To a certain extent.

21             Mr. Doyle, if you could answer the question.

22             THE WITNESS:  What I'm saying in relation to this is that if this

23     is a letter that was made out on the 17th of May, I was not in Bosnia on

24     the 17th of May.  I had left on the 12th of May when I was evacuated from

25     the city of Sarajevo and between then and the time that I returned home

Page 2905

 1     on the 1st of October I was in Bosnia on three occasions.  I was with

 2     Mr. Cutileiro for the talks in Lisbon, yes.  I recalled the general

 3     content of the agreement that was attained in Lisbon, yes.  But in

 4     relation to this letter, I have no knowledge of, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE BAIRD:  But, Colonel, do you have any idea at all of its

 6     content, any idea at all of it?

 7             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, of this letter?

 8             JUDGE BAIRD:  Yes.

 9             THE WITNESS:  No. I have not.

10             JUDGE BAIRD:  No idea at all?

11             THE WITNESS:  No, sir.

12             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Then, Colonel, if you have no knowledge of that, why then do you

18     not withdraw your allegations and those additions you made to your

19     answer -- in your answers to questions I didn't ask you?  How can you

20     say, if you have no knowledge and awareness of this and if you weren't

21     informed properly in the conference where you took part as

22     Lord Carrington's representative, why are you stating that a shell forced

23     me to be humane and peace-loving?

24        A.   Because, Mr. Karadzic, I've already explained under testimony as

25     to what the consequences of that mortar shell was on the peace talks in

Page 2906

 1     Lisbon.  You may recall that as soon as this occurred, Mr. Silajdzic came

 2     into the conference and informed Mr. Cutileiro that because of this

 3     mortar attack, which everybody saw on international television, he saw

 4     there was no use to continue the talks.  He said he was leaving.  And

 5     then you come in a short time later to inform the conference or to inform

 6     those of us who were there that the Serbs were not responsible for the

 7     mortar attack on the bread queue.

 8             Mr. Cutileiro was of the view that if the talks were to be

 9     suspended without any progress, this would not look well; and, therefore,

10     he suggested to you that as a gesture and that if you were to give under

11     certain conditions an assurance that the airport of Sarajevo would be

12     handed over to the United Nations, that would be a positive outcome of

13     the talks, and that's what was achieved.

14             Nobody is saying who fired the mortar bomb.  I don't know who

15     fired it.  I've already said that in testimony yesterday.  I assumed the

16     United Nations, who had a large contingent of troops in the city and

17     would have done a crater analysis would be a better judge to make that

18     call.  I do not know.  I don't have an answer for it.  So I have nothing

19     further to say on that mortar attack, except that the conference

20     exploited that attack to get you to give an undertaking that under

21     certain circumstances you would be agreeable to hand over the airport to

22     the United Nations to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

23        Q.   And do you know, Colonel, that I proposed that even earlier and

24     that we were always in favour of having humanitarian aid delivered?

25        A.   No, Mr. Karadzic, I'm not aware of that.

Page 2907

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Well, in the meantime, I'll find that statement of

 2     mine made in Lisbon that I gave unilaterally.  But do you see this

 3     directive of General Mladic's, Colonel, both from -- the one from June --

 4     well, that one's been adopted.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But can I have

 6     Prosecution Exhibit 1600 up next, please.  The previous document has been

 7     admitted; right?  Is the directive in evidence?  Well, it's a letter

 8     actually.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think so.  Let's -- it will be admitted.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D233, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             May we have Prosecution 65 ter 1600 next, please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   This is also one of Mladic's directives for further action on the

15     8th of August, which completely reflects the continuity of his efforts to

16     ensure that humanitarian deliveries arrive.

17             Now, let me ask you first, Colonel.  You said that Silajdzic

18     arrived and that he used the mortar to interrupt the conference.  Now, we

19     claim and state that all those incidents were geared towards stopping the

20     conference, because they were offered the whole of Bosnia.  What do you

21     have to say to that?

22        A.   Well, that's -- that to me is -- is an opinion being expressed by

23     you, and that's fine by me.  It's not the opinion that I would have.  I

24     agree with you when you say that the conference -- the main reason why

25     the conference was stopped was because of this attack which took place in

Page 2908

 1     Sarajevo.  Yes, I am in agreement with that.

 2        Q.   And do you also agree that the Serbs didn't want the conference

 3     to be stopped, whereas the Muslims did?  And that you never had to

 4     prevail upon the Serbs to attend the conference, whereas you did have to

 5     persuade the Muslims to do so?

 6        A.   I don't know of any occasion when I had to persuade the Muslims

 7     to attend a conference, Mr. Karadzic.

 8        Q.   Well, that's what it says in your diary.  You had to persuade the

 9     HDZ and SDA to go to the conference, and we looked at that yesterday.

10        A.   No, Mr. Karadzic.  I've already explained that the reason why we

11     had to persuade the president to go was because he thought he would be

12     killed by Bosnian Serbs on his way to the airport.  It wasn't a question

13     of his unwillingness to attend the conference.  It was his concern about

14     his own safety in getting to the airport.  No more than that.  It was a

15     security measure and a matter of safety.

16        Q.   May we now have a look at this directive from General Mladic from

17     August.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Partly due to the accused's habit of asking multiple

19     questions, but how about the first part of his question, whether you

20     would agree that Serbs didn't want the conference to be stopped, whereas

21     the Muslims did.  What is your observation?

22             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I -- I -- my only observation is, I

23     don't know if any side wanted the conference to cease.  I don't know if

24     any side took efforts to ensure the conference would cease, so I don't

25     have a -- I don't have an answer for that.

Page 2909

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now, can we just for a moment look at another document, and we'll

 5     come back to this one.  It is 65 ter 05875, 05875, just for a brief

 6     moment, and then we'll get back to the directive.

 7             It's my letter to Ambassador Cutileiro, dated the 5th of June.

 8     And that's the first page.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to the second page,

10     please.  This is the Serbian version.  The second page in English,

11     please.  Here it is.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   "Dear Mr. Cutileiro.

14             "Tonight, the 5th of June, Mr. Izetbegovic gave a negative reply

15     to Lord Carrington's letter about the conference on Bosnia.  On the news,

16     television news, he explicitly said," and I quote, "that now everything

17     is different and that he does not want any conference about the

18     constituent units."  Those are his words.

19              "Despite the goodwill we showed in our readiness to open the

20     airport unconditionally," unconditionally I repeat, "we were blackmailed

21     with the lives of JNA families to leave the heavy arms in the

22     Marsal Tito Barracks.  That same evening the Muslim side started shelling

23     Serb residential areas in Sarajevo.

24              "We hope that you can still mediate and bring the Muslim side to

25     the conference.  However, we have to know the truth because the Serbian

Page 2910

 1     people feel both tricked and in jeopardy.  Namely, if you cannot keep

 2     your promises, publicly announced and confirmed by the

 3     European Community, we have to protect the Serbian people on their ethnic

 4     territories."

 5             And it is to be sent to Lord Carrington, forwarded to

 6     Lord Carrington, as well.

 7             Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic, in the television news, said

 8     that he was no longer interested in any conference about constituent

 9     units and that everything was different now, and that was his permanent

10     position, that the conference was to be avoided?  First of all, do you

11     know that he said that?  Let's take that first.

12        A.   No, I have no personal knowledge that he said that, Mr. Karadzic,

13     but I'm sure Mr. Cutileiro might be in a better position, because the

14     letter was addressed to him.

15        Q.   Well, Colonel, I have a problem here with witnesses.  Not only

16     with you but some others too.  With all due respect, it would be better

17     if your bosses came in to testify then because you know nothing about the

18     conference.  You know nothing about the conference, and yet you were a

19     participant and this letter is important.  And you're testifying as an

20     eyewitness and a participant and yet you say you know nothing.  How come

21     you know nothing about this?  Did you follow the conference?  Were you a

22     participant and associate of Lord Carrington's or not?

23        A.   I was assisting the peace conference on Yugoslavia based on my

24     experience and my service as head of the monitor mission in whatever

25     capacity it was felt I might be able to make a contribution.  If you deem

Page 2911

 1     that not to be sufficient, that's your choice, Mr. Karadzic.  But I'm

 2     trying to give a truthful account of what I did, what I didn't, what I

 3     saw, and what I didn't, and beyond that I really do not have any comment.

 4        Q.   And did you see Zvornik and Foca and that's what you're

 5     testifying about?

 6        A.   No, I did not see Zvornik and Foca.  I repeated earlier that I

 7     was given the content of a verbal report from the monitor mission who

 8     attempted to get to Foca.  And I was given the content of a verbal report

 9     given to me by Mr. Martin Bell of the BBC in relation to Zvornik, and I

10     believe that's what I said here under testimony.

11        Q.   Colonel, you were in Sarajevo already on the 10th of April.  Do

12     you know what happened to the hotels in Sarajevo proper, both -- and to

13     the Serbs working in those hotels?  We heard what you said about the

14     hotel at Ilidza, that they were taken to the centre of town for their

15     security.  Now, down what happened to the hotels in Sarajevo?

16        A.   I know that I witnessed a battle outside the hotel, the

17     Bristol Hotel, the day the barricades went up, and I know what happen

18     outside the hotel or in the confines of the hotel that I stayed in.

19     Those are the two incidents in which I personally witnessed.

20        Q.   And do you know that the Green Berets took control of all the

21     hotels and forcefully evicted all the directors and Serb employees?  We

22     had a document showing that.  We presented it with another witness.

23             Do you know that that's what happened when you were there?

24        A.   No, Mr. Karadzic, I do not know.

25        Q.   Did you have anyone in town?  You had 50, 60 people in town, did

Page 2912

 1     you not?

 2        A.   I had 56 or approximately 56 people when I was head of the

 3     monitor mission.  When I went back to Sarajevo on the 10th of April, I

 4     was on my own in a different capacity.

 5        Q.   But from your diary we can see that you were in town frequently.

 6     You had meetings in town.  So how is it possible that you didn't know

 7     what was going on in town, whereas you knew what was going on in Zvornik

 8     and Foca?

 9        A.   Because, Mr. Karadzic, I don't give you the opportunity of making

10     accusations against me of being biased.  Therefore, I will stick exactly

11     to the truth, and I will say exactly where I was and what I did.  And

12     that's what I'm doing.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender that now,

15     please.  And may we have the directive back, 1600 was its number.  This

16     is my letter to Cutileiro, and there's no doubt about that.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there will be no objection.  It will be

18     admitted.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No objection, Your Honour.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 05875 will be Exhibit D234.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Would you focus on the document from August 1992, that is to say,

24     before the London Conference, during Carrington's time; you were still an

25     associate of his.  And this is what General Mladic writes.  It's one of

Page 2913

 1     the directives.

 2             Number 3.  I'd like to focus on item 3.  No, number 1.

 3             "The enemy started violating the agreed 14-day cease-fire before

 4     its end, and offensive operations, in particular, have been underway

 5     since an agreement was reached between Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic on

 6     joint operations aimed at crushing the Army of the Serbian Republic of

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina and subjugating and exterminating the Serbian people."

 8             Not to read the whole paragraph, the beginning of paragraph 3

 9     goes:

10             "The objective of the planned operation is to break the blockade

11     of Sarajevo by a concentrated attack by part of the forces on a suitable

12     axes while simultaneously utilising part of the forces from," et cetera.

13             "The enemy has settled scores mercilessly with the Serbian people

14     and captured members of the SR BH army who were skilled with brutal and

15     savage torture unrecorded in history."

16             Now, Colonel, do you know that on the 3rd of June the Muslim

17     forces in the village of Cemerno slaughtered these civilians in a very

18     brutal way.  They resorted to mutilation of Serb civilians.  It was a

19     very drastic event.  Do you know about is it?

20        A.   No, I do not.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's continue.

22             "Certain European countries are doing their utmost during their

23     influence in the Security Council and the EC to legalise the arming of

24     Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent the implementation

25     of United Nations sanctions against Croatia because of the aggression

Page 2914

 1     against Bosnia-Herzegovina."

 2             Did you know that the regular units of the Croatian Army were

 3     constantly present in certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 4        A.   I was aware that certain elements of Croats wearing Croatian Army

 5     uniforms were periodically in the territory of Western Herzegovina, and

 6     I've already mentioned that in my testimony.  Beyond that, I have no

 7     knowledge in relation to this directive.

 8        Q.   Let's be very precise, Colonel.  Were they elements of an entire

 9     brigade, or were they tactical units?  Were they the elements of the

10     whole brigade, the 108th Brigade of the Croatian Army, the Guards

11     Brigade, and other brigades - and we'll show proof and evidence of

12     that - but are they those elements, or is it an army?

13        A.   I have no idea.

14        Q.   You have no idea whether they were elements.  When we say

15     "elements," it might seem that these are some tourists coming to wage war

16     in Bosnia over the weekend.  I'm talking about brigades, up to 50.000

17     Croat soldiers present in Bosnia.  Did you know about that?

18        A.   No, I have no knowledge as to how many Croatia soldiers were in

19     the territory of Bosnia.  I know that some were.  I don't know how many.

20        Q.   Did you do anything about this matter or did the conference do

21     anything about this?  Was Croatia threatened with sanctions or was it

22     threatened with bombing or anything that would have been done had the

23     Army of Serbia been present in Bosnia?

24        A.   I have certainly no comment on that suffice to say, Mr. Karadzic,

25     you were seeing a document that you have in your possession of a report I

Page 2915

 1     made out on the situation of the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia.  Beyond

 2     that, I have nothing to say.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  We can now go back to the directive.  Last paragraph:

 4             "Some of these countries, Germany, Austria --" actually, can we

 5     look at page 3 in the English.

 6              "Just like some countries of the Islamic Community who are

 7     financing the Islamic jihad want to equip Muslim units so that they would

 8     be superior enough in strength to deal with the Army of Republika

 9     Srpska."

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can now move to the third page

11     in English and also the second page in the Serbian.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   "The international community did not undertake specific measures

14     that would treat equally all the forces in the conflict, but there is the

15     influence of the major powers supporting the blockade of the

16     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, threatening the Serbian people of

17     aggression, and threatening with armed intervention while the Croatian

18     peoples are being declared the victims of aggression and tacit approval

19     is given to their shipments of weapons through Austria and Croatia?"


21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think -- actually, I think this

22     is page 2 in the English.  Perhaps we can go back to page 2 in the

23     English so that all the parties could actually follow what I'm reading.

24     This is paragraph 2:

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

Page 2916

 1        Q.   "The international community has not taken any peace steps.  The

 2     so-called peace conference of BH and London under the leadership of

 3     Lord Carrington have not produced the desired results, and the conclusion

 4     can be drawn that their objective was to buy time for the consolidation

 5     of Croatian and Muslim forces in order to settle their score with the

 6     Serbian people?"

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Slow down, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   And let's continue.  It says --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, instead of reading out all the

11     documents, put your question.  What is your question?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Well, then I have to back and look

13     for page 5 to show what Mladic ordered.

14             Can we look at page 5 in the Serbian, please, and also 5 in

15     English, please.

16             Before that, it is said, I have decided who will do what, and

17     then he talks about the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters are waiting to see the text on

19     the screen.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 5, please.

21     This is page 3.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   We see it in the Serbian.  In the English it's not so important.

24             5.4:

25             "The Sarajevo Romanija Corps with persistent and active defence

Page 2917

 1     by main forces keep the positions reached in Sarajevo and the broader

 2     area and with part of the forces coordinate operations with the

 3     Hercegovina Corps in opening the Sarajevo-Trnovo-Kalinovik and

 4     Visegrad-Ustipraca-Gorazde road.

 5             And then it says:

 6             "Task," last sentence, "with persistent and active defence and

 7     gradually tighten the siege of Sarajevo and prevent the penetration

 8     towards Sarajevo."

 9             So the encirclement -- or, actually, that's the word.  It's not

10     "siege."  It has been wrongly translated here.  Colonel, do you see that

11     in this article 5 -- actually, paragraph 4, Mladic insists on the opening

12     of the road through Herzegovina?  And we also see from the previous

13     directive that the task or the objective of that is to have a way to

14     deliver humanitarian aid?

15        A.   Yes.  That's what it says in the -- that's what it says in the

16     document in front of me.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please tender directive

19     number 3.  Actually, this is already a Prosecution number.  I don't know

20     if it's already been admitted.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Do you agree with the -- Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, with

22     the accused's observation that that word - I don't know what it is - but

23     it's wrongly translated as "siege"?  It should have been translated as

24     "encirclement"?  I hope there's a way we can sort it out.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I think that's rather a matter

Page 2918

 1     for the CLSS to decide what's the correct word.  This document has not

 2     been, so far, admitted, but there's no objection to doing this.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it will be admitted.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D235, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Colonel Doyle, is that -- as I under it, all

 6     that you're saying is that, as all of us, you're reading the document and

 7     confirming that what is in the document is in the document.  You're not

 8     confirming that you had a personal knowledge or that you were aware of

 9     the -- the opinions or the objectives of General Mladic.

10             THE WITNESS:  That's perfectly correct, Your Honour, yes.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Colonel, sir, we now have to go back to the transcript of your

14     examination-in-chief so that we could be more specific about things.  I'm

15     afraid that there have been things that were said easily and imprecisely,

16     and they can reflect very negatively on the Defence.

17             I'm not accusing you of doing that deliberately, until I give you

18     an opportunity to maybe be a little more specific.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to look at page 67 of

20     the 21st of May now, please, so that we can look at that page.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation.

22        Q.   I'm going to read it to you.  This is a summary by

23     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, and she says:

24             He recalls that the local Serbs -- [In English] Serb leaders were

25     often referred back to historical events and atrocities of the Second

Page 2919

 1     World War and expressed fears of their repetition."

 2             [Interpretation] Colonel, did you believe that we shouldn't be

 3     doing that, that we didn't have any grounds or reason to recall what was

 4     happening to us during World War II?

 5        A.   What I meant here, Mr. Karadzic, is that on very many meetings

 6     that I had with various political parties there was the tendency for a

 7     lot of emphasis to be put on the atrocities in the Second World War.

 8     This was from all sides.  I'm not accusing this of being only the Serbs.

 9             And I found that it wasn't helpful to use up a lot of valuable

10     time in referring back constantly to what happened in the Second World

11     War.  So it became my practice to request the parties not to give me a

12     history lecture any time I entered into negotiations or discussions.  I

13     felt it wasn't going to make any contribution towards understanding the

14     current situation.  And I felt it would be more important to talk about

15     the concerns and the fears and the views and the opinions that the

16     various parties had at the time that I was there.

17             So I simply referred and asked the parties to please refrain from

18     giving me a history lecture, because it seemed to be the tendency in that

19     part of the world of referring constantly back to events of the past.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Can we be a little bit more specific.  Now, you

21     didn't say that Serbs talked about it constantly; you said the sides, the

22     parties did.  But here in the transcript it states that only the Serbs

23     constantly referred back; is that correct?

24        A.   Well, I can say that, yes, I will acknowledge that.  It was

25     predominantly Serbs, but it was also Croats.  I --

Page 2920

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Excuse me.  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 3     Excuse me.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, we are talking about page 2646,

 5     and the witness did not say "only Serbs."  He only refers to local Serbs,

 6     what they told him, but he doesn't say "only Serbs."

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Colonel, do you know -- do you agree with my assertion that there

10     was no war in the Yugoslav territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina without

11     having a fratricidal component, a component of civil war?  Would you

12     agree with that?

13        A.   Yes, I would.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that we had reason for concern because

15     Mr. Izetbegovic wore a Nazi uniform during World War II and was a friend

16     of -- Hitler's friend, the great Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Husseini, and he

17     hosted him in Sarajevo?

18        A.   No.  I have no knowledge of that.

19        Q.   And if I were to tell you, Colonel, sir, that Mr. Izetbegovic, as

20     an extremely developed intellectual person, from 1991 until his death he

21     continuously developed the kind of thought regarding Islamic ideas, and

22     because of that this could not be something that was far from our minds

23     once he came into power in 1994, and because of that do you believe that

24     we were not right to be concerned about that when he came to power?

25             Mr. Izetbegovic was a member of the Young Muslims Organisation

Page 2921

 1     from 1939, and he never changed these beliefs.  So I'm correcting the --

 2     the year in the transcript.  He never changed those beliefs from then

 3     until the beginning of the war.

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, where's the question in that?

 5     What you've done is made a statement of what you believe to be the

 6     factual situation.  The proper way that that should come into the

 7     proceedings is, if and when you elect to give evidence, that you can

 8     explain your views and the historical basis for them, but I doubt very

 9     much whether Colonel Doyle is an expert on Mr. Izetbegovic and his

10     intellectual and philosophical views as to Islam.  If I'm wrong,

11     Colonel Doyle will no doubt direct me.

12             THE WITNESS:  No, I agree with you, Your Honour.  I'm aware that

13     the ideological principles of Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Izetbegovic would be

14     different because they are from different ethnic groups.  That's to be

15     understood.  But beyond that, I don't have a view as to what

16     Mr. Izetbegovic might have been thinking or what was the basis of his

17     philosophy.  No, sir, I don't.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  There was a question,

19     but it did not enter the transcript.  My question is -- and then I will

20     go back to what you said:

21             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

22        Q.   My question is:  As far as we're concerned, is that a remote

23     distant past which should not have been mentioned once a person came to

24     power who had worn a Nazi uniform during the war and socialised with

25     Hitler's closest associates in the Middle East?  Was that something that

Page 2922

 1     should not have been taken into account, this historical aspect as far as

 2     the Serbs were concerned, or was it something that had become a part of

 3     our present?

 4        A.   Well, history always has a tendency of becoming part of the

 5     presence, Mr. Karadzic, but I wasn't aware of these allegations against

 6     Mr. Izetbegovic.  I was aware of his general background of being a Muslim

 7     and having different philosophies to you, and if that was some concern

 8     for you in the current situation, then I can understand that, but I have

 9     no basis for thinking that this was a strong influence on his current

10     thinking.  I simply don't know, and I don't have a view on it beyond

11     that.

12        Q.   Colonel, sir, you were in Sarajevo in the fall of 1991.  Do you

13     recall I made a public appeal to Mr. Izetbegovic to give up his

14     Islamic Declaration so that tensions could be relieved and lessened, and

15     he refused to do that?  Do you remember that?

16        A.   No, Mr. Karadzic, I do not remember that.

17        Q.   Are you familiar with this programme called the Islamic

18     Declaration?

19        A.   I've heard reference to it, but I have no knowledge of it in any

20     detail.

21        Q.   Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic, in 1947, was brought to trial

22     because he continued the activities of young Muslims illegally, and in

23     1983 he was brought to trial because of the Islamic Declaration as a

24     programme for the forceful change of the regime in Bosnia and in

25     Yugoslavia?

Page 2923

 1        A.   I was aware that he was brought to trial in 1983, but nothing

 2     about 1947.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Let us now go back to the differences between me and

 4     Izetbegovic, stemming from the fact that we originate from two different

 5     communities.  Do you know that Adil Zulfikarpasic is also a member of the

 6     Muslim ethnic community as well as Muhamed Filipovic and that they are

 7     very committed Muslims?  Do you know that they are Muslims as well?

 8        A.   No, Mr. Karadzic.  I don't know these people.

 9        Q.   Both of them are leaders of a smaller Muslim party, a

10     Muslim-Bosniak organisation, and do you know that we, with that party,

11     with the agreement of --

12             JUDGE KWON:  If the witness said he didn't know the two Muslims

13     you referred to, there's no point on your part to continue that question.

14             What is your next question?

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you know or -- well, do you know Fikret Abdic?

17        A.   Yes, I do.

18        Q.   Do you know that we agreed with Abdic and that we signed a truce

19     sometime in 1993 with him?

20        A.   No, I don't.  I wasn't in Bosnia in 1993.

21        Q.   And do you know that Mr. Abdic won the most votes from the Muslim

22     people and that he wasn't considered a fundamentalist, labelled a

23     fundamentalist, and that is to be respected, that the Muslim people voted

24     for a man who wasn't a fundamentalist.

25        A.   No.  I'm not aware of that.

Page 2924

 1        Q.   Do you accept now, Colonel, since I have informed you about this,

 2     so you do know now, that we had a historical Serbian-Muslim agreement

 3     and -- with Abdic who was from the SDA, that we concluded a truce and

 4     adhered to that?  So do you accept that the difference between myself and

 5     Mr. Izetbegovic is not merely from our affiliation to the Serbian or

 6     Muslim corpus but that it is something deeper?

 7        A.   If you say so, Mr. Karadzic.  I don't have a problem with that.

 8     What I'm saying to you is that I'm not aware of these points that you are

 9     raising and therefore don't wish to comment on them.

10        Q.   But you're behaving as if you do know.  And you say that the

11     differences stem from the fact that he's a Muslim and I'm a Serb, whereas

12     I am telling you that there were Muslim parties with which we agreed with

13     and got on well with.  And I'm saying that it's because Mr. Izetbegovic

14     was a fundamentalist, whereas these other Muslims were not.  Do you

15     accept that?

16        A.   I -- I accept what you're saying.  The dilemma I had was that

17     most of the political parties in Bosnia were established along ethnic and

18     religious lines, and that made the dilemma of getting them to a common

19     agreement far more difficult to achieve.  The various elements of

20     whatever type of Muslims was not something that was of a major concern to

21     me.  I was dealing with members of the Presidency.  As far as I was

22     concerned, there were two members who were Serbs, there were two who were

23     Muslims, and there were two who were Croats, and I think there was one

24     other.  So to me I wasn't concentrating in any way in the degrees of

25     whether one was a fundamentalist Muslim or whether one was a different

Page 2925

 1     type of Muslim.  No, I wasn't.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Unfortunately, we did have to deal with that kind of

 3     thing, and this third person was Ejup Ganic, also a Muslim extremist.  Do

 4     you agree?

 5        A.   If you say he was an extremist, that's fine.  I don't think he

 6     was an extremist, but that's my opinion, and --

 7        Q.   But he represented those others, the Jews, the Czechs, the

 8     Italians, all those minorities living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He

 9     represented them; right?

10        A.   Well, he wasn't a strict member of the SDA, the SDS, or the HDZ,

11     and my understanding was that he was -- well, what you just referred to,

12     as a Bosniak.  In other words, somebody who didn't have a strong

13     affiliation to any one side, and I accepted that.

14             If you say he was representing the Jews and all the other

15     non-main parties, I don't have a -- I don't have a comment on that.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Colonel, he couldn't be a Bosniak because that

17     was for other ethnicities, for minorities.  That was that place.  And so

18     we nominated a Jew for that post.  Now, the SDA wanted to camouflage

19     Ganic and make him a Yugoslav to have three members in the Presidency.

20             Are you aware of the fact that it wasn't following the party

21     line?  It couldn't have been a Serb, a Croat, or a Bosniak, whereas he

22     was.  So was that trickery?  Was that intended to dupe and deceive?

23        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I have no idea.  If you say this was trickery,

24     that's your opinion.  It isn't mine.  So there we stand.

25        Q.   Very well, Colonel, but I have to fight against many of your

Page 2926

 1     statements that you made in passing which are not precise.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we have a prosecution

 3     exhibit.  09446 is the number.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 5        Q.   And when we go through your transcript, we'll be able to have a

 6     look and see what that is like in documents, on the basis of documents.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, for the record, this was admitted

 8     as Exhibit P925.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This is the 10th of April, Colonel, 1992, 10th of April, 1992,

11     and it's still the JNA there, the command of the 2nd Military District,

12     the operative duty team, et cetera.  Now let's see what they say about

13     the enemy.  Second sentence:

14              "Under the guise of demobilisation of Croatian Army units,

15     members of the HV who are from BH are being sent to BH in an organised

16     manner, and conscripts are being mobilised in Croatia to replace them.

17     Heavy weaponry is being brought in to the area of Bosanski Brod from

18     Croatia intensively.  The Croatian leadership is preoccupied with a

19     situation in BH and hopes for large-scale armed conflicts as soon as

20     possible.  The enemy forces in the Kupres sector have been defeated at

21     the Kupres-Vrata pass;" et cetera.

22             Now, did you know of this large scale operation launched by the

23     regular Croatian Army in the area of Kupres?

24        A.   I was aware of action that had taken place in Kupres which

25     involved members of the Croatian Army.  The exact size, I wasn't.  I'm

Page 2927

 1     just wondering, Mr. Karadzic, in that document, what does the enemy --

 2     who does "the enemy" refer to?

 3        Q.   Well, the Yugoslav People's Army refers to the Croatian Army as

 4     the enemy, and later on you will see that they were the paramilitaries,

 5     too, that were the enemy.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we move on to page 3 -- or,

 7     rather, page 2 in the English.  And I think it's page 2 in the Serbian as

 8     well.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

10        Q.   I'll read it out in Serbian:

11             "The situation in the territory --" [No interpretation]

12             "[In English] The situation in the 2nd "Vojna Oblast," military

13     zone of responsibility, is becoming increasingly troubled and is reaching

14     boiling point.  The situation is deteriorating in trouble spots,

15     especially in Visegrad, Zvornik, Jajce, and Sarajevo sector."

16             [No interpretation]

17             "[In English] Hatred of the JNA among the Muslims and Croatian

18     population is becoming even greater.  The president of B and H claims

19     that the JNA is the only force capable of acting to save the Muslim

20     population in the Zvornik sector but is unwilling to do so, which will

21     only compound further the hostile stance of the Muslim population toward

22     the JNA."

23             [Interpretation] Then the next page.

24             "[In English] Armed conflict between the Sarajevo Romanija --

25     Romanija SAO and Green Berets and the MUP of Ministry of Interior

Page 2928

 1     continues throughout the day with occasional pauses with the use of

 2     small-arms fire and mortars.  Mortar fire was again used today, directed

 3     at feature -- at -- in the city of Sarajevo.  The armed formations of

 4     Green Berets, armed citizens, and MUP members control all movement in the

 5     city of Sarajevo and all the roads in the corps zone."

 6             [Interpretation] So here this intelligence officer is informing

 7     that the Muslim part of the MUP, the Green Berets, and the armed

 8     civilians took over control of the city of Sarajevo.

 9             Is that what you knew too?

10        A.   My information at that time was that certain areas of the city

11     were under control by the various parties and that there was continuous

12     harassment and attacks.  The exact detail of what occurred, I simply

13     don't know.  This refers to a report on the 10th of April.

14             The 10th of April is the day I returned to Bosnia, having been

15     away for some weeks back in Ireland.  But I'm aware generally that there

16     was quite a considerable amount of conflict going on.  Movement in the

17     city was very difficult, so I wasn't in a position at that stage to be

18     able to get detailed information as to who was doing what.

19             And I had met with the commander of the second group, but he

20     certainly didn't give me the detail that is in this document when I met

21     with him.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Now under the title "5th Corps," third sentence:

23             "The arming of the SDA [In English] party and the HDZ.

24     Paramilitary formations is being legalised under the guise of the newly

25     established Territorial Defence.

Page 2929

 1              "In the Banja Luka garrison, acts of sabotage in the town and

 2     attacks against Islamic and Catholic places of worship are on the

 3     increase which may cause the situation to escalate even further."

 4             [Interpretation] Do you see, Colonel, that this intelligence

 5     officer of the Yugoslav People's Army is painting the right picture and

 6     stating that it was uncontrolled elements who were responsible for doing

 7     all this?

 8        A.   Well, certainly in reference to his report from Banja Luka saying

 9     that the sabotage at the time and the attacks against Islamic and

10     Catholic places are on the increase certainly would indicate that the JNA

11     were painting a picture from all sides.  These acts of sabotage in the

12     town and attacks, I don't know who these were committed by against the

13     places of worship.  So, I mean, have you a specific question for me on

14     that?

15        Q.   Well, what I want to ask you, Colonel, is this:  Do you see that

16     the Yugoslav People's Army is monitoring the situation, not taking part,

17     and that the assessment was -- that it made, was that there was an

18     uncontrolled eruption, and we'll see that on the penultimate page,

19     conclusions and forecasts.  And I'll come to my question after I read

20     this bit out.  Or, rather, after you take a look at the penultimate page.

21     The activities of the ECMM are there too.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's L006-8130 in English.  That's

23     the page number.  May we have page 130 of the English.  Or, rather, it's

24     number 7.  Here it is.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] He says that Cutileiro has arrived

Page 2930

 1     at about 1500 hours.

 2             "[In English] On April the 10th in 1992, the Portuguese

 3     ambassador Mr. Cutileiro arrived in Sarajevo."

 4             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.  And then down there

 5     conclusions and forecasts.

 6              "[In English] Uncontrolled eruption of fighting in B and H can

 7     be expected in the situation of widespread anarchy and lawlessness, and

 8     the units of the 2nd military district will -- will very probably be

 9     dragged into it.  Large-scale provocation and attacks on JNA units,

10     military installations, officers and their family members can be

11     expected."

12             [Interpretation] Now let's see how you characterise this.  The

13     question is this, Colonel:  Do you see that the army is taking an

14     objective and neutral stance with respect to the situation that it is

15     assessing?

16        A.   At that time in Sarajevo, I was quite satisfied that the JNA were

17     not getting actively involved in the various -- in the various attacks

18     that were taking place in the city of Sarajevo.  I have no evidence or

19     information as to what they might have been doing in other areas of

20     Bosnia.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is already an exhibit, I

23     believe; right?  Thank you.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Now may we take a look at page 68 of the transcript where your

Page 2931

 1     views are being interpreted by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 2             Have we got that page?  I'll read it out:

 3             "[In English] On March the 2nd, 1992, the day after the results

 4     of the referendum were announced, shooting commenced in Sarajevo, and

 5     barricades were elected by the Serbs.  "

 6             And at the end it says that you said:

 7             "[In English] Colonel Doyle was informed by the person in charge

 8     at that time barricades would only be dismissed upon Karadzic's specific

 9     direction."

10             [Interpretation] Do you agree that that's not what it says in

11     your diary?  And do you agree that the barricades were dismantled only

12     after the agreement reached between Mr. Dukic and the Presidency?

13        A.   Excuse me.  I just need to check my diary here.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honour, just for orientation,

15     we're talking about page 2647 of the transcript.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   You already answered that, but I'd just like to -- well, we

19     showed you that.  Do you remember the agreement -- or, rather, the

20     Presidency meeting of the 2nd of March?

21        A.   This was the one in which there were demands.  Are we talking

22     about that?  Okay.  Yes, I do.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's see what it says here.  On the

24     10th of April, 1992, Martin Bell of the BBC informed Colonel Doyle

25     [In English] That about 25.000 refugees were moving from Zvornik,

Page 2932

 1     [Interpretation] and so on.

 2             Now, you say that you were informed about ethnic cleansing.  Now,

 3     who informed you of this ethnic cleansing, and how was that piece of

 4     information formulated precisely?

 5        A.   That information was given to me by members of the ECMM.  And So

 6     that's where I got the information.  How it was compiled, I don't know.

 7     I wasn't a member of the ECMM.

 8        Q.   Was it said that ethnic cleansing was being committed?

 9        A.   As far as I recall, yes, that people were being forcibly removed

10     from their areas where they lived.

11        Q.   I'm interested in the phrasing.  Were you told that ethnic

12     cleansing was being committed?

13        A.   Yes.  We understood this to be ethnic cleansing.

14        Q.   If I were to tell you that the term "ethnic cleansing" was

15     introduced publicly much later, what would you say?

16        A.   Well, I can't -- I don't have a comment on that.  I would have to

17     say now that after 18 years I don't have as good a recollection as I

18     might have had at the time, but we were -- we were satisfied that there

19     was a huge amount of displacement of residents from various locations

20     generally along the east side of the country in places like Bijeljina and

21     Zvornik.

22        Q.   And do you know about the departure of a large number of Serbs

23     from Livno even before the war, in late March and early April?

24        A.   No, I don't.

25        Q.   Do you know what was actually going on in Zvornik?

Page 2933

 1        A.   I had no detailed knowledge of what was going on in Zvornik

 2     except on the basis of what I was informed by Mr. Bell of the BBC, and

 3     you will see there that I simply put down that 25.000 refugees were on

 4     the move.  I don't know what direction they were going in, but they were

 5     leaving the town or the area of Zvornik.  And that's the information I

 6     passed on to you.  You asked me where I got the information from, and I

 7     told you I got it from Martin Bell of the BBC, and you said you did not

 8     believe it.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We will have a break.  This time we will

10     have a break for half an hour.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.22 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Colonel, you noted the address by Mr. Vojo Kupresanin and one

17     part of his speech in the Assembly cited here.  First of all, do you know

18     that Vojo Kupresanin was the president of a small party that was in

19     coalition with us, the homeland front, and that he was not a member of

20     the SDS?

21        A.   No, I was not aware of that.  I don't know this gentleman.

22        Q.   But on page 75, the question was -- just to say, it's

23     Mr. Kupresanin speaking.

24              "[In English] This can be seen from the two pages previous, and

25     he is saying," and so on and so on.

Page 2934

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter number 39,

 2     please.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   I am not trying to disown Kupresanin, but I would just like you

 5     to know something a little bit more about him.  He was not a member of

 6     the Radical Party.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 5921.  That document has already

 8     been admitted, I think.  P921, P921.  Prosecution document.  And then

 9     page 53 of that document, please, which is quoted in the transcript.  In

10     the English, this is page 77.  In the Serbian, it's page 53, and in the

11     English it's page 77.  The English text, that's not it; but in the

12     Serbian, we are on the right page.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   In the middle paragraph:

15             "The generals and the Serb army --" I'm going to be reading in

16     the Serbian because the translations are not good.  I'm going to point

17     that out.

18             "The generals and the Serb army did not have adequate Serb

19     leaders."

20             Colonel, I'm reading what the Prosecution failed to present as a

21     whole statement.

22              "... they didn't have adequate Serbian leaders.  Nobody told

23     those Serb officers, Gentlemen, this and that is your task.  After all,

24     the Serbian Democratic Party was not preparing the Serbian people for

25     war.  We do remember that our leaders, and I'm not criticising here but

Page 2935

 1     only try to point out the mistakes we made, thinking of the leaders, said

 2     that there would be no war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that we would

 3     politically solve the problems.  That is exactly the same thing that is

 4     going on in Geneva, and they have been pulling our leg for years.  So the

 5     head of a small party which was in the coalition with us is pointing out

 6     that the Serbian Democratic Party did not adequately prepare the people

 7     for war."

 8             And now the next paragraph, we have it in the transcript

 9     partially from line 12 on page 75, and it says:

10              "Now we're going back to this.  We had aviation, howitzers,

11     tanks, cannon, but what did the Muslims have?  A gun here and there, a

12     machine-gun that they had bought from the Serbs," and so on and so forth.

13             First of all, sir, Colonel, we have the tense wrongly translated

14     here.  It says "we have," and in the Serbian, in the original, it says

15     "we had had," and so I would like to indicate, Colonel, that this is an

16     important matter.

17             Secondly, Mr. Kupresanin is speaking about Yugoslavia and the

18     army, which was actually not told what it was supposed to do in

19     Yugoslavia, not about Republika Srpska.

20             Do you see the difference here, now that you are able to see both

21     of these paragraphs?

22        A.   Well, Mr. Karadzic, you seem to be rather selective in the

23     portions of this document that you -- you are referring to.  I've seen

24     the sentence which talks about possession of the aviation and the

25     howitzers and the tanks --

Page 2936

 1        Q.   I'm not asking you that, Colonel.  I put a question to you, so

 2     please answer the question and don't go beyond the -- what is being

 3     asked.  And don't work for the Prosecution.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.  That's not a proper comment on your

 5     part.  Don't interrupt the witness when he answers your question.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, he's not answering my

 7     question.  And this is something that can be put in the re-examination by

 8     the Prosecution.  Now, I see that the witness is completely biased.  He's

 9     answering questions that I didn't actually put to him.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Your interference is unacceptable --

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- to show the Serbs in a worse

12     light.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Please, Mr. Doyle.

14             THE WITNESS:  I would ask Dr. Karadzic to ask the direct question

15     again because he has said so much in the last few minutes that I don't

16     know how many question he wants me to answer.

17             So if you would ask me a question, Mr. Karadzic, I will attempt

18     to answer it.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, you remember I told you some time

20     ago, if you ask broad open-ended questions you get broad open-ended

21     answers.  If you closed, direct questions and concentrate the witness's

22     mind on a single issue, you are much more likely to get a single, concise

23     answer.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 2937

 1        Q.   My question is:  The Prosecution interpreted only this bottom

 2     paragraph for us.  The previous passage speaks about how the Serbian

 3     Democratic Party did not prepare the people for war, and that is being

 4     said by a leader of a different party that -- and that he's taking issue

 5     with that.

 6             Do you see that here, please?

 7        A.   Well, what I'm reading here is that the generals and the Serb

 8     army did not adequate Serb -- did not have adequate Serb leaders.  So

 9     I -- I really don't understand what is being said here.

10        Q.   Continue:

11             "Finally, the Serbian Democratic Party did not prepare the

12     Serbian people for war."

13             Do you see that written there?

14        A.   Yes, I do.  And, Mr. Karadzic, I can see it, but I'm trying to

15     understand exactly what that's supposed to mean.  The Serb Democratic

16     Party was not preparing Serb people for the war.  What -- I'd like to

17     have the context for that.

18        Q.   The context, Colonel, is this:  In the transcript it is presented

19     as if Mr. Kupresanin is saying that at that point in time we had planes,

20     howitzers, tanks, cannon, and so on and so forth.  What I'm actually

21     telling you now is that this is something that was in the past, that we

22     had had, thinking of the Yugoslavia, which should have been preserved.

23             Now I am giving you two paragraphs for your consideration instead

24     of one that the Prosecution opted for.  Do you see that this previous

25     paragraph explains better this subsequent paragraph that is cited in the

Page 2938

 1     transcript?

 2        A.   Well, what I'm getting from this, Mr. Karadzic, is that you're

 3     not happy that there's an exact accurate translation of the document that

 4     is in your language to the English language.  So I'm not too sure what I

 5     should be referring to.  Am I referring to what you believe the English

 6     translation should be or what exactly the translation is on the document?

 7     That's my dilemma at the moment.

 8        Q.   Colonel, what I'm trying to point out here is that with the

 9     previous paragraph, this paragraph is properly translated as "we had

10     aviation," and it looks different than it looks in the transcript.

11        A.   But I don't read Serbo-Croat, so what exactly do you wish me to

12     say?  The only document that I understand is the document that's in the

13     English language in front of me, and are you saying that that's not an

14     adequate translation of the original document?  I'm sorry, I think you

15     will have to explain it to me because I really don't understand what

16     we're getting at here.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the document that's translated before

18     us says:  "We had aviation," in past tense.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But in the transcript it is not

20     cited correctly by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  It says here "we have aviation."

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   And, Colonel, do you agree that this is a major difference?  At

23     this point in time we "have" in January 1993 or we "had."  Is this a

24     significant difference or not?

25        A.   Well, if there are two different documents with two different

Page 2939

 1     translations that are different, then, of course, there are differences.

 2     But I'm looking at a document in front of me which simply says "we had

 3     aviation, howitzers, tanks, and cannons."  Now, if you're telling me

 4     there's another document which says "we have aviation, howitzers, tanks,

 5     and cannons," then, of course, it's different.  But I don't know what the

 6     official translation is at this stage because you are -- what you're

 7     saying is the translation isn't accurate.  So I'm not too sure what I

 8     would be looking at.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  And I'm looking -- I'm reading the transcript of

10     21st of May, the last line, line 25 of 2654.  Madam Uertz-Retzlaff is

11     cited as correctly citing:

12             "We had aviation, howitzers, tanks."

13             If you have the transcript which says "we have," it's a typo.  I

14     don't know how come you have that translation.  And the correct one

15     should be the document we have in the e-court, in our exhibit, and our

16     transcript.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a transcript where it says

18     on page 75, line 12, "We have aviation, howitzers, tanks," and so on.

19     This is the translation that I have -- actually, the transcript that I

20     have.

21             JUDGE KWON:  As I told you before, the transcript is being edited

22     by a court reporter, correcting all the typos, et cetera, so the

23     official -- you have to check what the official transcript would look

24     like.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I assume that Dr. Karadzic is

Page 2940

 1     looking at LiveNote, but LiveNote, of course, always has a lot of

 2     mistakes in it.  But what we get in -- a few hours after the session is

 3     the correct version.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I'm looking at the corrected LiveNote.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Then this has been

 6     resolved.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Colonel, sir, does the leader of a smaller party here criticise

 9     the Serbian Democratic Party for opting for a political solution and for

10     not preparing the people for war?

11        A.   That would appear to be what's inferred in this document, yes.

12        Q.   And now when it is said "we had aviation," you allow for the

13     possibility that Mr. Kupresanin, who is the leader and the founder of a

14     party called the Otadzminski Front [phoen], the Homeland Front, speaks

15     about Yugoslavia, which had everything it needed to preserve the country,

16     and not about Republika Srpska?

17        A.   Well, I don't know.  I really don't know.  I simply don't know,

18     Mr. Karadzic.  I'm getting confused now because we have a document in

19     front us and you're indicating that it's not an accurate translation of

20     an official document.  So I don't know.  What it says here is the

21     generals in the Serb army did not have adequate Serb leaders.  That's one

22     point.  Then they talk about the party was not preparing the Serb army

23     for war.  That's a second point.  And then the third point relates to

24     munitions and -- and tanks, et cetera.

25             Now, you're saying if the official document that we are to accept

Page 2941

 1     actually says "we had aviation" as if that were to mean we had it in the

 2     past and we don't have it now, that could be an interpretation.  That may

 3     be something which is the opinion of something.  I simply don't know.

 4     And if that's the case then, this was an official transcript from the

 5     Assembly of the Republika Srpska, and maybe it should be more accurate to

 6     give a more definitive explanation as to what exactly it meant.  But here

 7     I think we're talking about opinions.  And I don't want to give my

 8     opinion on this because if I give you my opinion, I may be accused of

 9     being biased, and I don't want to do that.

10        Q.   Thank you, but the Prosecution used that in their interpretation

11     of your meeting with Mr. Kupresanin whom you actually considered as more

12     radical.  So the Prosecution used this to corroborate your impression

13     about Mr. Kupresanin.  Mr. Kupresanin is a deputy.  He has the right to

14     say whatever he wants.  And he cannot be held responsible for that.  And

15     the government and the Assembly is held responsible for the documents it

16     issues.  Resolutions, conclusions, and so on and so forth.  So anyway, we

17     have finished with this.

18             Not only did he say what you mentioned, but he also said one more

19     thing:  Nobody told the Serb officers what their task was.  That's what

20     he said, and that is the objection by all the Yugoslavs, that the

21     Yugoslav Army was not issued with the assignment of protecting Yugoslavia

22     in accordance with its constitutional duties.

23             Do you agree with that?

24        A.   No, I have no comment to that because I simply don't know what

25     directives were given to the Federal Army of Yugoslavia.  I mean, how

Page 2942

 1     would I know that?  I assume the JNA Army was an army for all of the

 2     republics, a federal army, and that it was doing its tasks.  Exactly what

 3     those tax were individually, I simply don't know.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 82 of the

 6     transcript, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 8        Q.   Where you are cited as saying that:

 9             "The president of Bosnia-Herzegovina claims that the JNA's [In

10     English] only force capable of acting to save the Muslim population is

11     Zvornik sector but it is unwilling to do so which will only compound

12     further the hostile stance of the Muslim population towards the JNA."

13             [Interpretation] Let me just ask you briefly:  Up until Zvornik,

14     was the position of Izetbegovic and the Muslim political elite friendly

15     towards the JNA or was it hostile right from the very beginning towards

16     the Serbian side, the JNA?  To simplify, when do the misunderstandings

17     begin between the Muslim leadership and the JNA?  Would you agree that

18     this was at the point in time when they refused to send recruits and

19     reservists to the JNA?

20        A.   Yes, I would say that is one of the factors that may have

21     contributed to it.  The other factor, of course, is the first time - and

22     I refer to this in my testimony - that I had a meeting with the prime

23     minister in which he referred to the JNA as an army of occupation and

24     that the JNA were taking in munitions from another republic under what

25     could only be described as -- as covert means.  So there was a general

Page 2943

 1     suspicion.

 2             You'll also be aware of the fact that it was my recommendation to

 3     the prime minister as head of the monitor mission that there was no

 4     reason why there should not have been dialogue between the Government of

 5     Bosnia and the federal army because they were a major force in the

 6     territory.  And that was my recommendation.  So I don't disagree with the

 7     points that you're raising there, no.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I just want to add that Mr. Pelivan was defending the

 9     interests of Croatia, and he was a Croat, and not the interests of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That was not an official B and H government

11     decision.  You didn't have a government decision.  This was actually an

12     opinion of Mr. Pelivan at that point in time when you had your meeting

13     with him.

14        A.   Well, I think I've adequately explained that yesterday, so I'm

15     not going to repeat it, Mr. Karadzic.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             The question is not in the transcript.  I asked:  "Is that so?"

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this transcript been admitted

19     in its entirety from the session of the National Assembly of Republika

20     Srpska?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now look at

23     1D01260.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   And while we're waiting, Colonel, this is a report by

Page 2944

 1     General Kukanjac of the 5th of May after what happened.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The same document is a 65 ter

 3     document, 3721.  That's a Prosecution document.  And there is an English

 4     version as well.  So perhaps it would be better to look at that, 3721.

 5             This is of May 7th, after the massacre in Dobrovoljacka Street,

 6     and he's writing -- the command of the 4th Corps writes to the commander

 7     personally, and this is a very interesting and important document.

 8             Can we now look at page 2 in the Serbian, and then this is page

 9     8A in the English.  Sorry.  This is page 2, but it's paragraph marked

10     with the number 8.  I think it's actually the same in the English and the

11     B/C/S.  Page two, please.

12             Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   And it says, under (A):

15             "Based on the experience gained in Slovenia, Croatia, and

16     Macedonia, the district command made a timely assessment that the

17     soldiers of the army are facing a difficult time and that we have to

18     start evacuating to safe areas in which connection the following was

19     carried out:

20              "For months, weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives, and

21     other equipment are being relocated to safe areas with long-term

22     potential for the army."

23             Colonel, sir, do you agree that the army should not remain in an

24     encirclement where it is considered to be an enemy side or entity?

25        A.   Well, if this is based on the attack on the convoy on the

Page 2945

 1     2nd of March, I can well understand the comments of the military

 2     commander putting this down in writing.  I can certainly understand that,

 3     yes.

 4        Q.   Now I'd like to draw your attention to where they are relocating

 5     their equipment.

 6             "To safe areas with long-term potential for the army," it says.

 7             Now, Colonel, are they moving the weapons for the Serbs to Serb

 8     territory or for themselves?

 9        A.   Well, according to this report, they are moving weapons,

10     ammunition, mines and explosives to safe areas so that they can be used

11     by the army at a future date.  That's my interpretation of that -- first

12     point.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document already an

15     exhibit?  It's a Prosecution document.

16             JUDGE KWON:  We did not admit this over the agreement on the part

17     of the Prosecution, but given the answer offered by the witness right

18     now, we are minded to admit it this time.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit Number D236.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Now, Colonel, on page 84 there was a question from

23     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  She said:

24              "Colonel, you testified that you spoke about information on

25     ethnic cleansing in Foca.  With Mr. Koljevic in April 1992. [In English]

Page 2946

 1     The term ethnic cleansing, what did you understand it to entail?"

 2             [Interpretation] You say what you understand the term to mean,

 3     and I say that the term ethnic cleansing came into use later on.  But let

 4     me ask you, How did you know what was going on in Foca?

 5        A.   The reference I made to Foca was simply that the monitor mission

 6     was attempting to go to Foca because of certain information it received.

 7     I don't know what that information was, and I was aware that when they

 8     came back, after failing to get to Foca, and I asked them, Why is it you

 9     didn't get to Foca?  They told me that they were stopped by the JNA who

10     told them that they could not guarantee their safety and security.  And I

11     a general discussion with Mr. Koljevic who approached me about that, and

12     Mr. Koljevic regretted that we weren't able to get there, that's what he

13     said to me, and that he would try to see -- could he arrange passage to

14     Foca, which subsequently did not occur.

15             That's the only reference I have to Foca.

16        Q.   I remember that, Colonel, and I know that Mr. Jeremy Brade was

17     with Koljevic and that there was still snow on the ground and that

18     Mr. Koljevic was threatened by the local territorials because he failed

19     to protect the people, as they said, and that he was threatened by

20     execution.  Did Mr. Brade inform you of that?

21        A.   No, he didn't.  I'm not too sure why you're mentioning Mr. Brade,

22     because I don't have a recollection of -- of Mr. Brade at that time.  So

23     you might have to remind me, but I just don't recall that.  Not the

24     element to do with Mr. Brade, no, I don't.

25        Q.   There was an attempt to break through to Koljevic and Brade in

Page 2947

 1     April, and both of them informed me that the people were furious over

 2     there, having been left without protection and that they threatened

 3     Vice-President Koljevic, although they liked him, but they threatened him

 4     because they considered him to be responsible as a person in authority.

 5     But, right, you say you don't remember that.  So I just told you about

 6     that.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D77 next, please.  Or,

 8     rather, 00077.  1D77.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And while we're waiting for that, Colonel, I'm going to show you

11     a document from the Muslim intelligence service about the circumstances

12     and situation in Foca, and I want to ask you, Did you know that

13     Halid Cengic, the father of Hasan Cengic, formed the first Muslim

14     paramilitary formation during the days of the Communists, before the

15     elections in 1990 in Foca?

16        A.   No, I did not.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's take a look at this document from the

18     Muslim intelligence -- Military Intelligence Service.  That's the first

19     page, the cover page.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to page 2, please.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

22        Q.   And towards the end it says "namely," the paragraph starting with

23     "namely."

24             "Namely, after the democratic elections, Taib Lojo, an electrical

25     engineer, respectable citizen of the vice-president of the Foca SDA, was

Page 2948

 1     appointed president of the Foca SO.  However, from the very beginning,

 2     Senad Sahinpasic, also known as Saja, and Halid Cengic, who are related,

 3     have had the greatest political influence in the SDA, thanks to the

 4     powerful support of influential relatives and friends from Sarajevo,

 5     especially Muhamed Cengic, the then deputy prime minister ..."

 6             Now, do you know of a journal by the name of "Vox," owned by this

 7     same man, Senad Sahinpasic, who was a deputy in the Assembly?

 8        A.   No, I don't.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There seems to be an error in the

10     transcript.  The journal "Vox" was owned by Sahinpasic.  It was a

11     journal, a magazine.  Now we'll see what it wrote about, that journal.

12     Magazine, magazine.  "Casopis" as in "magazine."

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Now let's continue.

15             Sahinpasic is a private trader from Foca and a deputy in the

16     citizens' Assembly of BiH.  And Cengic is an accountant at the

17     Mljin [phoen], a work organisation in Uskopljina, and councillor in the

18     Foca SO.

19             Now, let's move further down.

20             "From the time they came into power, having gathered around them

21     their family and friends, they started with all kinds of fraud and

22     smuggling which brought them huge amounts of money.  The increasingly

23     complex political situation and deteriorating interethnic relations

24     during 1991 played into their hands since arms smuggling was flourishing.

25     And they did nothing to appease the situation, but on the contrary,

Page 2949

 1     incite it with their actions and political activity.

 2             "They included Aziz Sljivo and a wide circle of men loyal to them

 3     in the armed smuggling so that the Muslim people in this area from fear

 4     of the ever-increasing Chetnik threat are giving their last penny to

 5     those whom they have elected to protect their interest to supply them

 6     with weapons.  So they pay, the rifles that Sahinpasic and Cengic sell

 7     them, for from 1.200 to 1.500 German marks.  According to some

 8     intelligence, 5.200 rifles came to Foca via the SDA, which Sahinpasic and

 9     Cengic sold."

10             Now, did you know that the SDA of Foca was armed in this way

11     before the outbreak of the conflict?

12        A.   No, I have no knowledge of that.  As I said, attempts to get to

13     Foca failed, so I have no information from it.  And I notice this report

14     was made out in July, I think, 1993.  I saw from the front.  Even though

15     it refers to something in 1992.  So, in other words, this document was

16     made out a year after I had left Bosnia.  So I'm not familiar with it or

17     the people that are being mentioned in it or the -- the contents of what

18     it says.

19        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Now, what I want to say is the following:

20     It was known to us, and it was known to the Serbs in Foca as well, and

21     the conflict broke out because the SDA had 5.200 rifles and units, while

22     the Serb side was waiting for the JNA to protect it.  And that is why

23     they threatened Professor Koljevic, because the JNA did not reach Foca in

24     time to protect them.  So are you aware of the fact that the JNA was late

25     in coming to Foca?

Page 2950

 1        A.   No.  I have no knowledge of this, Mr. Karadzic, and as I said,

 2     if -- if the JNA had given an escort to the team to go in, maybe events

 3     would have been different, but they didn't, and they didn't go in, so

 4     we'd no information.

 5        Q.   And do you see now why the JNA was not able to guarantee

 6     security?  Do you see that it was because of these 5.200 rifles that the

 7     JNA was not certain that it could guarantee its own safety, let alone the

 8     safety of a foreign delegation?

 9        A.   Well, I mean, if what is said in this report is true, then that

10     may well have been the case.  But I don't know.  I mean, this is just

11     another document.  How true it is, I simply don't know.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have the last page of

13     this document so that we can see that it was signed by the chief of the

14     military security administration, General Fikret Muslimovic, who was a

15     Muslim and that there's no room for doubt.  He is informing his command

16     about the situation in Foca from before the war to the present day, that

17     is to say, until 1993.

18             Here we have the original seal and signature of

19     Fikret Muslimovic.  But since it's 1993, I won't pursue the subject, but

20     we can see that they are describing 1991 and 1992.

21             May I tender this document now, please.

22             JUDGE KWON:  No.  The witness couldn't confirm anything about the

23     content.  Pursuant to our consistent rule, we will not admit it.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But then I have to ask the Colonel

25     whether he stands by his assertion about the events in Foca.

Page 2951

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  I don't recall the Colonel making any stand

 2     about events in Foca.

 3             THE WITNESS:  What events --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, on page 84.  I just quoted it

 5     all.  On page 84 of what I have.  The question was:

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Colonel, you testified that you spoke about information on [In

 8     English] ethnic cleansing in Foca with Mr. Koljevic in April 1992.  The

 9     term ethnic cleansing and so on.  [Interpretation] And then the Colonel

10     answers:

11             "Well, my interpretation of the term ethnic cleansing was ..."

12     and so on and so on.

13             So its linked to Foca.  It is linked and refers to Foca.

14        A.   I think I've already mentioned, Mr. Karadzic, the only reference

15     to Foca that occurred at that time, and it was information I received

16     from the monitor mission.  Exactly what happened and who did what, I

17     simply don't know.  The reference was made to the term ethnic cleansing,

18     or I thought it was.  Certainly a forced removal of a population.  And

19     the monitor mission was not in a position of going to Foca in order to

20     check it out because the JNA stopped them and said they couldn't go

21     forward.  That's all I know.

22        Q.   And did the JNA prevent them, or could they not guarantee their

23     safety?

24        A.   The JNA physically prevented them, and the excuse for preventing

25     them was they said, We cannot guarantee your safety and your security.

Page 2952

 1        Q.   And how do you know that that was an excuse?

 2        A.   I'm simply letting you know what I was informed of by a team of

 3     the monitor mission.  I have absolutely no reason to disbelieve what they

 4     said to me.

 5        Q.   But Mr. Brade informed me quite differently of the situation.  Do

 6     you, Colonel, maintain that in Foca there was not any heavy fighting

 7     going on before the Serbs left and went to one area of Foca and the

 8     Muslims to the other?  Did this happen without fighting or was it because

 9     of the fighting and after the fighting?

10        A.   I have no idea, Mr. Karadzic.  The monitor mission did not get

11     into Foca, and I don't want to make any comment on what you might feel is

12     speculation on my part.  So I'm not going to say anything more on

13     something I don't know personally about.  As to what Mr. Brade may have

14     said, I -- I have no idea what you're talking about there.  Mr. Brade may

15     have said to Mr. Koljevic what you think he said or he did say it.  I

16     simply don't know.  I can't verify that.

17        Q.   So you don't have reliable information to the effect that there

18     was any ethnic cleansing in Foca; right?

19        A.   I never said it was any reliable information, Mr. Karadzic.  I

20     simply said what the monitor mission told me.  I've said that on a few

21     occasions.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Now, on page 85 you say that you don't remember --

23     or, rather, when I questioned you, you said you don't remember the letter

24     sent to you by Prime Minister Djeric, and you said that you kept

25     the letters -- you kept your letters, but you didn't keep that particular

Page 2953

 1     letter.  So may we ask you now to hand over your correspondence, the

 2     correspondence you had during the war and that you kept and everything

 3     related to Bosnia?

 4        A.   I'm not too sure what you're getting at here, Mr. Karadzic.  All

 5     of my documents I handed in to the Tribunal when I made my witness

 6     statement in 1990 -- 1995 or 1996 - I can't remember.  So beyond that,

 7     I'm not too sure what -- what you're seeking.  I certainly -- I certainly

 8     have absolutely no recollection of receiving any letter from

 9     Mr. Djerkic [sic].  The name is not familiar with me.

10             And I suggested yesterday, if that letter was sent in English, I

11     certainly would have reacted to the content of that letter had I received

12     it in English because its content is directly different to my

13     interpretation of what happened up in Pale.  So there would have been no

14     reason for me not to have taken action on that, had I received it.  I

15     have no recollection of receiving it.  I have no record of receiving it.

16     I have no knowledge of what it says.  What I have done is I have

17     commented on the content of that letter which I totally disagree with.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And when you explained that, you said that you kept

19     your letters but that you don't have that letter amongst your collection.

20        A.   I'm sorry.  You may have misinterpreted me.  I haven't -- I

21     haven't possession of any letters of this nature that I haven't -- or

22     reports that I haven't handed in to the Tribunal.  So maybe -- maybe I --

23     I said it incorrectly.  If I did, I do apologise.  I don't have any

24     letters of a personal issue that -- that I haven't handed up and that

25     refer to my service in the former Yugoslavia.

Page 2954

 1        Q.   Well, possibly you said "recollection," whereas the

 2     interpretation I got or I heard "collection," so that is also possible.

 3             Now, on page 86, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff says -- we now go down to

 4     paragraph 5, and I'll read to you.  It says -- and that's from a report

 5     by Mr. Goulding:

 6             "All international observers agree [In English] that what is

 7     happening is a concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina with

 8     the acquiescence and at least some support from the JNA to create

 9     ethnically pure regions in the context of negotiations on the

10     cantonisation of the republic in the EC conference on Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina and chaired by Ambassador Cutileiro.  And the techniques used

12     of the seizure of territory by military force," and so on and so on.

13             [Interpretation] Who informed Mr. Goulding in this way?

14        A.   I have no idea.  I would assume it was the United Nations force

15     that was operationally deployed in Bosnia, and maybe a certain amount of

16     the United Nations observers who were deployed in different parts of

17     Bosnia.

18        Q.   Colonel, can you say which territories did the Serbs take or

19     occupy that was not already theirs?

20        A.   Well, I'm not able to say that, Mr. Karadzic, but I certainly was

21     aware at the time, that there was -- there was assertions by Serbs that

22     they were the original occupiers of certain territories and that's the

23     reason why they were taking them.  I have no exact detail of that.  It

24     was just a general view that people of all races and all ethnic

25     backgrounds were being expelled from certain territories.

Page 2955

 1        Q.   How do you know that, Colonel?

 2        A.   I know that because of the information that I received when I was

 3     head of the mission by the monitors.

 4        Q.   This was information from the Presidency of Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina.  You say that in one place, don't you?

 6        A.   Well, then, of course, I received a lot of information from the

 7     Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina because I had frequent meetings.

 8        Q.   You think that that information should have been checked that, it

 9     could have been one-sided?

10        A.   The information would have been better checked if we had been

11     guaranteed and continued to enjoy the freedom of movement that was part

12     of the condition under which the monitor mission was deployed.  The

13     monitor mission was an unarmed observer group of monitors who were

14     deployed into the territory with the agreement of all sides.  And the

15     conditions under which they were deployed was that they were to be given

16     freedom of movement and safety and security.

17             The monitor mission was withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia on

18     the morning of the 11th of May, which was 24 hours before I left, I

19     think, because that guarantee of freedom of movement and safety and

20     security could not be guaranteed.  That left the monitor mission in a

21     predicament of wondering why they couldn't have been given these

22     guarantees any more and the questions as to whether there were events

23     taking place that people didn't want them to become aware of.  That's

24     what I assume.

25             The United Nations, on the other hand, stayed deployed in Bosnia.

Page 2956

 1     So maybe they're in a better position to give you some idea, better

 2     than -- than myself or the monitor mission.  And as I mentioned, the

 3     UNPROFOR also had in its -- in its ranks a group of monitors that were --

 4     a group of observers that were deployed in the early days who were based

 5     in different parts of the republic.  So maybe some of those personnel are

 6     in a better position to answer your queries in this regard.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Are you aware, Colonel, that we were in favour of a

 8     greater presence of Asian and African elements that we believed were

 9     impartial and that we distrusted representatives of the West, especially

10     those from NATO countries, and that is why we asked for more Asian and

11     African troops and observers?  Are you aware of that?

12        A.   No, I have no idea to that.  I had no hand, act, or part in the

13     deployment or selection of observers for the United Nations.  As you

14     know, I wasn't a member of the United Nations, so I have no idea.  I know

15     that the original United Nations observers that were deployed into Bosnia

16     were volunteers of those nations that were already in service in other UN

17     missions.  The first UN people to go into Bosnia were officers from

18     existings -- existing United Nations missions throughout the world.

19             But, no, I'm not aware of your point in relation to Asian and

20     African elements.

21        Q.   Colonel, the mission of the European Community actually ignored

22     Serbs to quite an extent.  They avoided being photographed, being

23     photographed with them out of fear that that would be understood as some

24     kind of recognition, although we were not actually asking for anything.

25     So do you doubt that we considered Western countries' representatives as

Page 2957

 1     biased towards the Serbs?  Of course, not you personally.  We considered

 2     you to be quite impartial, but representatives from European countries.

 3        A.   Well, for the period that I was held of the monitor mission,

 4     there was no instance that was every brought to my attention that the

 5     European Community ignored Serbs or that they avoided being photographed.

 6     I never issued any directive as head of the mission to that extent, so I

 7     can't accept that.  And I'm surprised you actually bring it up,

 8     because -- and I'm also quite surprised on the reference to Western

 9     countries, because I wasn't aware of it.

10             As I've said before, the ECC mission that I was a member of was

11     made welcome by all sides, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, by all political

12     parties, and we attempted to do our job in an impartial manner, and we

13     were never at any stage refused any meetings by any sides in the

14     conflict.  It was only when the military situation appeared to be

15     escalating that the monitors were being stopped from going to areas.  As

16     I said, they were -- this was done by the JNA on the premises that they

17     wanted to ensure that the monitors who were unarmed would have safety and

18     security and freedom of movement, and this became more difficult to

19     achieve and for some reason that I'm not directly aware of because I

20     wasn't with the monitor mission at the time they were evacuated.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  I'm waiting for the interpretation.

22             Can we look at D217 to see what General MacKenzie says about

23     this, who was there at the same time.  But let me remind you, Colonel,

24     sir, you refused to go to a dinner in Ilidza so you won't be photographed

25     with the Serbs and in Pale so that that would not be taken as recognition

Page 2958

 1     of Republika Srpska.  We were not asking you to recognise

 2     Republika Srpska, but we were an acknowledged, recognised party in the

 3     negotiations and in the conflict, so you couldn't have been surprised.

 4     You were probably restrained in relation to the Serbian side, but -- but

 5     you believe the Presidency on its word.

 6        A.   I'd just like to correct you there, Mr. Karadzic.  I did not

 7     refuse to go to the dinner in Ilidza.  It was during the dinner when I

 8     listened to comments that I certainly didn't agree with that I decided

 9     that I would leave the dinner.  So that's one correction.

10             And as I mentioned before, the conditions under which I went to

11     Pale that were agreed upon with not honoured by the Serbs of Pale on that

12     occasion.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that I officially said, when I was asked

14     do I accept foreign troops, that I officially said to the mediators that

15     we would be glad to see Asian and African troops for which we believed

16     didn't have any interest in the matters and for whom we believed -- and

17     who we believed would be impartial.  Could you just answer with a yes or

18     no, please.

19        A.   Did I know that you officially asked for these?  No, I don't know

20     that.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 182 now,

23     please, of this book by General MacKenzie.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   11th of May you were still there.  I'm going to read it.  We will

Page 2959

 1     have it.

 2             "[In English] The European Community had been conducting marathon

 3     peace talks over the previous few days."

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 182, not 183.  That's it.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   "[In English] The EC continued to exclude the Bosnian Serbs from

 7     the deliberations and as a result was becoming less and less popular with

 8     them."

 9             Do you see that General MacKenzie had a good sense and is of the

10     same opinion as myself?

11        A.   I can see that General MacKenzie has a different sense, not

12     necessarily a good sense, because it was the same that you had,

13     Mr. Karadzic.  I've already explained why it is that we did not have the

14     Bosnian Serbs at those talks.

15             The Bosnian Serbs were invited, and they didn't want to come to

16     the location because they had more or less left the city.  They had

17     established their headquarters in Pale.  And just because they weren't at

18     the talks doesn't mean that they weren't invited.  They were invited.

19             The second point on that is most of these talks were

20     concentrating on the withdrawal of the federal army, the JNA, from the

21     territory of Bosnia, and they came to the talks.

22             And the third point is that General MacKenzie is a United Nations

23     military officer.  I was a monitor from the European Union doing a

24     different task.  He is entitled to his opinion, as I'm sure I am to mine.

25        Q.   Thank you, Colonel, sir.  I agree as to the opinions, but we're

Page 2960

 1     talking about criminal proceedings here now, and we need to stick to the

 2     facts.  And the facts were that we were always available for all talks at

 3     the airport, in Lukavica, in Pale, and abroad, Brussels, London, Lisbon,

 4     and so on and so forth.  Do you remember a single conference that we left

 5     early or did not attend?

 6        A.   No, I don't.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Can you look at February 28th.  You were with Hebib,

 8     high-ranking police official.  I'm talking about your diary.

 9             This is D217.  Can we put that away now?  We don't need it.

10             But in your diary of the 28th of February, you were with Hebib,

11     and you were at the Presidency then, on the 2nd and the 3rd of March.

12             On the 28th, you didn't see any Serbs.  You did see Hebib.  On

13     the 2nd and the 3rd of March, you saw the Presidency.  On the

14     5th of March, you saw the Presidency and met with Ganic.  There are no

15     Bosnian Serbs anywhere.  On the 6th you were at the Presidency, and you

16     met with Hebib, who is not a Presidency member, but you did see him.  On

17     the 7th you had dinner with Kukanjac and Aksentijevic from the army, but

18     they are not Bosnian Serbs.  On the 9th, Spanish monitors.  On the 10th,

19     the Presidency.  There are no Serbs anywhere.  On the 11th, Presidency.

20     On the 12th, Konjicija and Prlic.  And then here we have the 13th, there

21     is nothing.  The 14th, again, Hebib.

22             Look, for half a month you had no connection with Bosnian Serbs,

23     Colonel, and the conference was underway, and we were getting ready for

24     the 18th of March to accept the Lisbon Agreement.  16th, the Presidency.

25     On the 17th, Dr. Hadzic; he's also a Muslim.  On the 18th there was an

Page 2961

 1     interview on television, and then on the 19th Ganic and the Presidency.

 2             So for almost a month you had no contacts with the Bosnian Serbs.

 3     Wasn't General MacKenzie right?

 4        A.   No, he was not right.  I made myself available to anybody in

 5     Bosnia that wanted to come and talk to me; all sides, all communities,

 6     all religions, all ethnic groups.  There were some people who were more

 7     available than others.  Any day I went to the Presidency, I was available

 8     to talk to members of the Presidency, any members of the Presidency;

 9     Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.

10             If, Mr. Karadzic, you are trying to get the message across here

11     that somehow I was trying to treat the Serbs any less than any other --

12     any of the other ethnic groups, I refute it strongly.  And I will not

13     have my integrity questioned in any way by those comments.  I take it as

14     a personal insult.  I never ever refused to meet you or anybody else in

15     the Bosnian Serb side.  You can look at the diary all you want.  People

16     came to me.  I went to people.  I made myself available.  There has never

17     been an accusation against me or members of the monitor mission of the

18     type that you're trying to make here, and I refute it vehemently.

19        Q.   Colonel, please don't be insulted.  I am speaking about official

20     matters, not private matters.  You were without contact with the Serbian

21     side for a whole month.  Should Professor Koljevic have asked to have

22     been received by you or Mrs. Plavsic for you to be able to receive them

23     and inform the European Community on Serb positions, or you should have

24     perhaps asked for meetings with them.  And if I am wrong, is your diary

25     wrong, which indicates that there have been -- there were no contacts

Page 2962

 1     with the Serb side for a whole month?  And is General MacKenzie right

 2     because he was saying the same thing that I am saying, that you were

 3     being -- that you were excluding us and that is why you were popular [as

 4     interpreted].  I mean, not you, but the European Monitor mission.

 5        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I've already said everything I'm going to say about

 6     this matter.  I have no intention of repeating myself or changing any of

 7     it.  You can take it or you can leave it.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             And can we accept this diary with the redactions in which I state

10     that the European Monitor mission does not have any insight into the

11     state of affairs and the political efforts by the Serbian side?  We were

12     not in Pale then.  It was March.  We were in the middle of Sarajevo, so

13     it was very easy to communicate with us.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No -- of course I object against his remarks

16     that are just being made, but I have no objection against admitting this

17     document.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Page 63, line 7 of the

19     transcript, Dr. Karadzic says: "... and that is why you were less

20     popular."

21             JUDGE KWON:  What is the 65 ter number of this diary?

22                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have to put it under seal?  I take it that you

24     voluntarily handed over the photocopy of it, redacting some confidential

25     part?

Page 2963

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour, I did, yes.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That will be admitted as evidence as ...

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D238 [sic], Your Honours.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Can we look at 65 ter 11086 now, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   And let me ask you briefly, Colonel.  Is that my statement that I

 8     signed in Lisbon on the 27th of May, 1992?  Do you remember that I asked

 9     our police to escort the convoys, that you didn't ask me to do that; I

10     did that of my own accord?

11        A.   I'm sorry.  You're asking me about a statement, which I -- oh,

12     hold on.  Here.  I'll have a look at it.  Can I have a moment, please.

13             Yes, that's the document that was signed.

14        Q.   Now, in paragraph 2 does is say that the Serb police was

15     prepared, although we didn't ask for that, was prepared to extend their

16     full co-operation for regular escorts of humanitarian aid through

17     Serbian-controlled territory to any destination and to members of any

18     community to avoid any misunderstandings?  Do you remember that, and do

19     you remember that the proposal came from us?  It was our proposal.

20        A.   I don't remember that it came from you, but I accept it fully.

21     It's in the document which you signed, so I accept it.  Whether it was

22     actually put into practice or not is quite another matter.  I simply

23     don't know.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

Page 2964

 1     into evidence now, please.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  It has already been admitted as Exhibit P949.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  949.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  How much longer do you have, Mr. Karadzic, for your

 5     cross-examination?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had hoped to have until the end

 7     of today's proceedings, but I see that I'll have to accelerate.  If I

 8     were to ask shorter questions and get shorter answers, I could manage.

 9     And leave you the 50-odd minutes that you said you needed.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We will have a break now for ...

11             THE ACCUSED:  Fifteen minutes, no?

12             JUDGE KWON:  We had 30 minutes in -- during the first break.  We

13     will have 20 minutes' break.

14                           --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 12.24 p.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, a clarification on the record for

18     the exhibit number for the diary will be D237.  Thank you.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Also, Mr. President, I will ask to --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  I just will ask to clarify that the diary that's

22     been admitted goes from the period of the 1st of March to the

23     11th of May.

24             JUDGE KWON:  It's from 11th March -- could you give the date

25     again.  The first -- the beginning date.

Page 2965

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  1 March to 11 May.

 2             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  You have no objection to that, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.  May I now have P927 next, please.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   And while we're waiting for that, Colonel, I'd like to draw your

10     attention to page 100 of the 21st of May where Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff asked

11     you the following:

12             "[In English] My last question is, Dr. Karadzic have control over

13     these Bosnian Serb paramilitaries?"

14             [Interpretation] And you were answer was:

15             "[In English] Well, I always assumed that he did, because as --

16     as the conflict escalated, he seemed to be always in the presence of

17     people who were armed who were close to him.  Some of those were wearing

18     the uniforms of JNA on occasions and sometimes they weren't.  So it was

19     my -- I suppose it was my interpretation or my view that as the leader of

20     Bosnian Serbs, that he controlled or should have controlled over all

21     aspects of the Bosnian Serbs, and that would include armed forces."

22             [Interpretation] Let's clarify that a bit.  We've already said

23     that the escort I had was a police escort sent to me by our joint MUP and

24     then our own MUP later on, but do you agree that when I was going to

25     Belgrade with them or to some institutions that they had to wear civilian

Page 2966

 1     clothing, they had to be in civilian clothing?

 2        A.   I'm not aware of the details of the security that you would have

 3     had going to meetings, so I don't know.

 4        Q.   I'm just referring to the comment you made that some of them

 5     weren't in uniform, but never mind.

 6             Can you now tell me --

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Or, rather, may we have on e-court

 8     P927 first, please.  Page 3.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And then I'm going to ask you whether you can tell me here and

11     now which --

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, that's not it.  That's not the

13     document I would want, I need.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   So what paramilitary forces were they that I could control before

16     the 20th of May?

17        A.   I'm talking about people who were armed, who were Bosnian Serbs;

18     whether they were actually armed forces or not, I don't know because most

19     of the time they weren't in uniform.  So this is an assumption I have.

20             But such was the amount of firing and conflict that going on in

21     Sarajevo, that it would be naive for me to think that it was all Muslims

22     attacking Serbs and there was no response.  I'm mindful of the siege that

23     took place in that city, but ...

24             So I thought I had mentioned this yesterday, Mr. Karadzic, in

25     relation to those people who were -- that you had protecting you.  I

Page 2967

 1     don't know whether they were an armed, whether they were a unit of such,

 2     or whether they were just people who just had weapons who were giving you

 3     their protection.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  That was 8 to 12 people assigned to me by the police,

 5     but what I'm saying is that we agreed that each municipality had its

 6     Territorial Defence and that the president of the municipality was the

 7     commander of the Territorial Defence, and you accepted that and said that

 8     that was in keeping with the Law of Yugoslavia and Tito's Doctrine of All

 9     People's Defence.

10             Now, do you consider that I could have controlled any

11     Territorial Defence until the 12th of May in the municipalities, that I

12     had a system of communications and the necessary authority, official

13     authority, to be able to be in charge of those people?

14        A.   No.  What I am saying is that as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs

15     I would be my assumption that you as the leader would have had or should

16     have had control over all armed and unarmed elements of Bosnian Serbs,

17     whether they were armed or not.  I'm not talking about -- and here I'm

18     talking mainly about the city of Sarajevo where I was based and -- and

19     where you were frequently present.  So that's what I'm saying, that part

20     of the authority of holding a position of leadership is to have control

21     over those elements that are under your influence.  And whether that be

22     military or not, it's all the one to me.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have 65 ter 11591 next,

25     please, and then we'll look at page 3 of that document.  It's a report

Page 2968

 1     from the Secretary-General, 23.900, of the 12th of May.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Now, Colonel, do you agree that up until the 12th of May I was

 4     the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs and that it was only on the

 5     12th of May that I was elected to some state organ, that is to say, to

 6     the Presidency?

 7             Perhaps I was speaking too fast.  This is what I asked you:  Did

 8     you -- do you agree that I, until the 12th of May, 1992, was only the

 9     political leader without any state functions, state posts, public office,

10     and that it was only on the 12th of May that I was elected to the

11     Presidency and that I became the president of the Presidency elected at

12     the Assembly on the 12th of May in Banja Luka; right?

13        A.   Yes, from a state organ that may have been the case, but I have

14     no doubt you had a huge influence over the actions of armed Bosnian Serbs

15     in the city of Sarajevo.  We can refer to the time that there was a

16     firing coming from the Holiday Inn hotel, and there were many other

17     instances.  So I do not accept that you had no influence over armed Serb

18     elements in the city of Sarajevo.

19        Q.   And who and when shot from the Holiday Inn, Colonel?

20        A.   We're talking about a period after the referendum results.

21        Q.   Now, do you know, Colonel, that there was shooting from the Unis

22     tower and that the Serbs wouldn't have dared to shoot with 50.000 Muslim

23     demonstrators, that Juka Prazina did the shooting in order to create

24     chaos?  And we have footage of that, Colonel.  So how can you maintain

25     that it was a Serb shooting from the Holiday Inn?  Do you have proof or

Page 2969

 1     evidence to show that?

 2        A.   I don't have proof or evidence but I'm saying that that is

 3     something that was generally accepted.  The point I'm trying to get

 4     across here is that you were the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, you had a

 5     huge amount of influence in the city, and therefore it is my belief that

 6     you had influence over armed elements of Serbs in that city.  That's what

 7     I'm saying.

 8        Q.   That's your opinion and belief, but I'm asking for your

 9     knowledge.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now let's have page 3 of this

11     document that's an exhibit already.

12        Q.   And I'd like to focus on the end of paragraph 5 where it says:

13             "There will leave -- Mr. Goulding had informed the

14     Secretary-General --"

15             Well, let's start this way:

16             "Further concern has been caused by the decision of the Belgrade

17     authorities to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina [In English] by

18     May the 18th, all JNA personnel who are not citizens of that republic.

19     This will leave in Bosnia-Herzegovina, without effective political

20     control, as many as 50.000 mostly Serb troops and their weapons.  They

21     are likely to be taken over by the Serb party."

22             [Interpretation] So this was reported on on the 12th of May,

23     Colonel.  And from this it clearly follows that the Serb side, up until

24     then, did not have political control over the army and that for the time

25     being it would not have.  And I claim that the decision to form an army

Page 2970

 1     was taken on the 12th of May coming into force as of the 20th of May.

 2             Is that so or not?

 3        A.   I don't know.  I do know that you made a statement to the effect

 4     that there would be an army raised.  We're not talking here about an

 5     army.  We're talking about armed Bosnian Serbs that, in my view, were

 6     under your control and under your influence.  That's what I'm talking

 7     about.

 8        Q.   Do you have proof of that, Colonel?

 9        A.   No, but I have service in the Republic of Bosnia, and I'm --

10     I'm -- I'm rather anxious here about giving my opinion about anything,

11     because you've always looked for facts, but when you're given a position

12     of responsibility, you carry out certain acts and then you're asked to

13     make a summary and your views and your recommendations and your

14     conclusions, and I've always attempted to do that.  If you don't accept

15     those as my conclusions, that is your privilege.

16        Q.   But, Colonel, do you make the difference between a party function

17     and a public function, state function?  Is there any -- is there a

18     differentiation there be it the head of a political party, the political

19     leader, who, only on the 12th of May, became part of the official state

20     structure?  Do you make that difference?

21        A.   Yes, there is a difference.  I repeat again that in my view you

22     had an influence over the actions of Bosnian Serbs in the city of

23     Sarajevo who were armed.  That is my conclusion.  You may accept it or

24     you may not.

25        Q.   Now, a conclusion is one thing; a belief is another.  Now, what

Page 2971

 1     strings could I pull for organising the self-organised people of the

 2     local community and Territorial Defence?  How could I command them and

 3     who could I command them?  How could I put this into practice, sitting in

 4     the Holiday Inn negotiating with you, with Izetbegovic, with Kukanjac,

 5     how would I have been able to do that then?

 6        A.   I don't know, and I have no evidence of it, but I assume you

 7     would have a people who would have done that on your behalf.

 8        Q.   Well, let's leave your assumptions to one side.  We'll have a

 9     glass of wine after these proceedings and then we can assume all we like.

10             But would you focus on paragraph 7 now of this report by the

11     Secretary-General.  Who killed this representative of your mission?

12        A.   I'm sorry, what are you referring to here?

13        Q.   Paragraph 7.

14        A.   Okay.  I'll have a look at that.  Yes.  I was aware of the fact

15     that a member of the monitor mission was killed near Mostar.  He was from

16     Belgium, I think.  But I have no -- I have no -- I have no details of how

17     it happened or who did it.  Is this -- is this what you're referring to?

18        Q.   [No interpretation]

19        A.   Okay.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Well, we've finished with this document.

21             Now, Colonel, the next thing I want to address is not on e-court,

22     but I'm just going to read it out to you.  It dates to 1994, the

23     numerical state of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army.  Officers, 18.803; and

24     soldiers, 228.000; non-commissioned officers, 24.000; which makes a total

25     of 271.000.  Yes, 271.000, and I've been asked to speak slower.

Page 2972

 1             Anyway, Colonel, can you tell me where these 18.803 officers were

 2     schooled and educated and the 24.263 non-commissioned officers?  Were

 3     they officers and non-commissioned officers of the former JNA?

 4        A.   I have no idea.

 5        Q.   And which other army could they have belonged to?

 6        A.   I have no idea what other army they could belong to.  I assume

 7     most of them came from the JNA, but if you're talking to the numerical

 8     state of the Bosnian Serb Army as in -- sorry, the not the Bosnian Serb

 9     Army, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army as in those elements that were not

10     Serb, a number of 18.800 officers and 228.000 men and 24 [sic]

11     non-commissioned officers seems a huge number to me, so I really don't

12     know.  I don't know.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Dr. Karadzic was reading from a document,

16     but we don't have that document.  Nobody else has this document.  So I

17     wonder what -- what value it is when he reads from an unknown source.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I agree.

19             When you put the document, you should introduce the foundation of

20     the document.  I take it you're going to do that.  If you could tell us

21     what the document is about.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the Muslim review of the

23     replenishment of the BH Army on the 1st of November, 1994.  I will

24     present that and tender it on another occasion because the Colonel wasn't

25     there at the time.  I'd just like to show him that on that day they had

Page 2973

 1     almost 300.000 soldiers and officers, all of whom were officers of the

 2     Yugoslav People's Army, and the soldiers were the reservists of the JNA.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   So I'm putting that to you Colonel and asking you the question

 5     that I asked you a moment ago.  Do you accept the fact that the Yugoslav

 6     People's Army was the mother of all the republican armies that came into

 7     being after the disintegration of Yugoslavia?

 8        A.   Yes, I do.  I agree that the JNA was the federal army which

 9     represented all of the republics.  The figure of these -- these

10     Bosnian-Herzegovinian army at that time with that amount of officers,

11     non-commissioned officers and men, I have no idea.  I don't know how they

12     were constituted of where they came from or who trained them or what

13     percentage would have come from the federal army.  I simply don't know.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to call up another document on the ELMO.

15     Well, I'm not going to tender it today.  I'd just like you, Colonel, to

16     have a look at it, and I'd like us to objectivise, that is to say, to see

17     what forces the parties in Bosnia had at there are disposal.  And in

18     saying that I want to say that the Muslim side had more than two and a

19     half times more soldiers than the Serbs did and that from the very

20     beginning they were ready for war, that they were well armed, especially

21     after they left the JNA barracks.

22             And now, as I say, I'm going to put this document on the ELMO for

23     you to look at, but I'm not going to tender it today.  Just to give you

24     an idea of the actions launched by the 2nd Corps of the BH Army during

25     the period you were there, that is to say, up until the 12th of May.

Page 2974

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Before you put it to the witness, tell us what this

 2     document is about.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is -- well, the number of the

 4     document on the top is 020 -- can you lower it down?  0203-1418.  It's a

 5     Prosecution document.  And the title is a list of -- can we see the top.

 6     Yes.  Thank you.  A list of combat operations conducted in the area of

 7     responsibility of the 2nd Corps from 1992 to 1995.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   And that's the Tuzla Corps, isn't it?  The Tuzla Corps; right,

10     Colonel?

11        A.   Sorry, I don't know.

12        Q.   You don't know that Tuzla had a corps, the 2nd JNA corps -- or,

13     rather, BH Army Corps?

14        A.   Yes, I know it had a corps, but I don't -- I don't understand the

15     title of this document.

16        Q.   There's an ERN number at the top.  It's one we were disclosed by

17     the Prosecution.

18        A.   I'm sorry, I'm talking about the actual document itself, not the

19     number that's on it.  What does it mean?

20        Q.   The title is the following: "List of combat actions," BD is

21     combat actions, "carried out in the area of responsibility of the

22     2nd Corps from 1992 to 1995."

23             So I have marked in red only those offensives that were launched

24     while you were there.  Number 5, the attack on Cer, for example.  That

25     took place on the 26th of April.  Otherwise, from the beginning, the

Page 2975

 1     defence that we have, Becirevic Defence, Potocari Defence, an ambush

 2     there, Snagovo, attack on Cer.  So number 5, listed under number 5.

 3             Then under number 8, attack on Setici.  And then it says,

 4     Serb Setici in Zvornik - there's the Muslim Setici in Zvornik, but they

 5     attacked the Serb Setici, Zvornik, on the 1st of May.

 6             Then we come to number 13, a diversion at Srpski Nezuk.  You have

 7     a Muslim village and a Serb village there.  The Muslim made up of the

 8     initial Serb village.  But it's all in Zvornik municipality.  Then we

 9     have the attack on the village of Sapna -- and so on.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, what is your question?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question is this,

12     Your Excellency, while the Colonel was in the area, the 2nd Corps of the

13     BH Army, fully ready and prepared, launched a number of armed operations,

14     many of which were offensives, offensive, and I want to show the Colonel

15     that the Muslims weren't helpless and attacked.  They did have their own

16     army, and they did launch combat actions.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

18        Q.   Let's -- and this lists all the actions undertaken by the

19     2nd Corps, Colonel, while you yourself were there.

20        A.   Could I ask you, Mr. Karadzic, is this document that was made up

21     by the official JNA Army or by the army that you're calling the Army of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23        Q.   The army which I called and which was the Army of Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina.  I also refer to it as the Muslim Army because there were a

25     negligible number of Serbs and Croats in it.  This is the corps of the

Page 2976

 1     officially called Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, from the first

 2     day, had offensive combat actions.  And Mr. Martin Bell informed you

 3     about the departure of civilians from Zvornik.  And you can see that in

 4     Zvornik and around Zvornik fierce fighting was being carried out and that

 5     the Tuzla Corps was taking parted in them.

 6             My question is:  Did you know that the corps from Tuzla was in

 7     readiness from the 1st of April to go into action, the Muslim Corps from

 8     Tuzla, from the 4th of April?

 9        A.   No, I was not aware of that.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll down to

12     number 12 to see how many offensive actions this corps carried out.  Can

13     you move the page a little bit, please.

14             JUDGE KWON:  What point is there if the witness has no -- knows

15     nothing about it?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, the Colonel should

17     know.  He was the head of the monitor mission.  He was in Krajina, in

18     Derventa.  If I had time, I would show him the massacres around Derventa

19     of the Serbian population at the time that he was there.  He should know

20     that the Muslim army was numerous and well armed and that already as of

21     the 4th of April it was capable of conducting extensive combat actions.

22     And if he knows, this is quite significant information; and if he doesn't

23     know, then by his own admission he should state that he was not highly

24     enough placed to know about these things and then we would need to listen

25     to what his superior would have to say.  He -- we have a reference that

Page 2977

 1     he was in Zvornik and the -- Zvornik is in the area of responsibility of

 2     the 2nd Corps.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Instead of reading out the document, put your

 4     specific questions one at a time.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I put the question and I received

 6     an answer.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   My thesis is that the Muslim army had plenty of soldiers and

 9     weapons as of the 4th of April, 1992, to embark on extensive offensive

10     actions, and this is what this document indicates.  Did you know that?

11     You said that you didn't know that.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I do have a translation of this document

15     here, and what we hear here from Mr. Karadzic is a misrepresentation.

16     Because looking at the document and the English version, it's -- I

17     haven't counted it, but I would say it's mostly defence of certain

18     villages.  And it's not, as it is shown here, offensive actions

19     throughout.  If we continue to use this document, I would rather think

20     that we should also have the English version of it because it's

21     definitely -- it gives it a different character, at least the actions

22     that are referred to.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, that's very helpful.  But I think we

24     almost exhausted this topic.  Would you like to bring up the English

25     translation and pursue further on this line?

Page 2978

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't have to insist any more.

 2     I just wanted to say that I marked the assault actions.  Of course, there

 3     were defensive actions as well, but the entire document you will see

 4     later I limited myself up until the 12th of May.  But the entire document

 5     will indicate that they attacked much more than they defended themselves.

 6     I state that it is not correct that the Muslims were disorganised and

 7     unarmed because on the 4th of April this corps began to undertake

 8     actions.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   My second question, Colonel, is this:  Do you know that

11     Mr. Izetbegovic declared a general call-up on the 4th of April?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you accept that you did not receive complete

14     information from Mr. Bell about the events in Zvornik?

15        A.   Well, I don't know whether the information was complete or not.

16     He came to me about a particular incident, and that -- that's all.

17             In relation to this document here, I did a survey of all the

18     senior JNA commanders in Bosnia, and none of these issues were brought up

19     by them when I met these commanders.  There were general issues.  The JNA

20     army commanders were concerned about the future stability of the

21     republic, but when I made myself available to all of them, I met the

22     commander, I think his name was Djeneral Jankovic, up in Tuzla in this

23     area and none of these matters were brought to my attention at that

24     meeting.  So I'm not denying that they took place, I just have no

25     knowledge of it and I don't have any reports on it.

Page 2979

 1             JUDGE KWON:  And, Colonel, as for the general call-up, we are

 2     talking about 1992.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Oh, I'm sorry.  I thought -- that's an error there

 4     on my part.  I thought we were talking about the decision by the

 5     president.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE WITNESS:  To -- to --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  President Izetbegovic's declaration of a general

 9     call-up.  You answered yes to the question of whether it was on the 4th

10     of April.

11             THE WITNESS:  No, I'm actual not aware of that instance.  I'm

12     sorry.  I thought Mr. Karadzic was referring to the declaration by the

13     president that there would not be a mobilisation of -- by the JNA.

14     That's my error.  I apologise.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Thank you.  And did you know that Izetbegovic had declared the

18     general mobilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the Territorial Defence

19     the police and everything on the 4th in the evening?

20        A.   I do recall he making an appeal for -- for call-ups, but I don't

21     know -- I don't recall when that was.

22        Q.   Thank you.  For your information, Serbian members of the

23     Presidency, Plavsic and Koljevic, objected to that, and could not have

24     called for a general mobilisation without their agreement.

25             I would now like to call up one of your reports of the 7th of May

Page 2980

 1     when you informed Ambassador Cutileiro about the events in Mostar.  There

 2     were two UNPROFOR members in Mostar who were wounded at the time, one of

 3     them seriously.  And then you go on to say -- this is an associate of

 4     yours, Boban HDZ.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D018 -- 1D01281,

 6     please, in e-court.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   You are informing here that Boban and Karadzic have reached an

 9     agreement [In English] at a meeting concerning the resolution of all the

10     differences between the two nations through conciliatory means including

11     the territorial delimitation and at the auspice of the

12     European Community.  They reassured firmly the agreement of principles

13     defined in the conference in Lisbon.  There is no further reasons for the

14     continuation of armed conflict between the Serbs and the Croats.  The

15     territorial delimitation between the -- between the nations will be made

16     until the 15th of May.  Cease-fire will be decreed from today,

17     2400 hours."

18             [Interpretation] Do you remember these events and this report?

19        A.   No, I don't.

20        Q.   On the way back from Lisbon, Mr. Boban and I met in Graz, and we

21     concluded, in accordance with the conference and the call by

22     Mr. Carrington, that we should accept the working map and that there was

23     no point in fighting over a small number of disputed territories.  You

24     don't remember that, but I think this was sent while you were still

25     there.  Is that correct?

Page 2981

 1        A.   Well, this is the EC monitor mission, and it's from head of

 2     mission.  The head of the mission was based in Zagreb,

 3     Ambassador Salguero.  So I have no knowledge of this document.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document accepted?  I would

 5     like to tender the document.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No objection, Your Honour.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Considering this document has come from the

 9     organisation the witness belonged to and then there's no doubt as to the

10     authenticity, we'll admit it.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D238, Your Honour.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D01247.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

14        Q.   And while we're waiting, let me inform you that this

15     Djeneral Jankovic whom you've mentioned is informing on the 3rd of April

16     about events up to the 3rd of April and on the 3rd of April.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's no translation, is there?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

19        Q.   There is no translation, but I am going to read it to you.  We

20     can see here in paragraph 3 that the paramilitary formations from the

21     direction of the village of Koraci [phoen] opened fire at the JNA units

22     located in the Kostrec and Barice villages.  Then in the next paragraph

23     it says one of our soldiers was killed in the conflict.  This is before

24     the official beginning of the war.  Then it goes on to say in the last

25     paragraph on the first page:

Page 2982

 1              "On the 3rd of April, 1992, a meeting was held in Tuzla of the

 2     council for national defence."

 3             I think you have been given the minutes from the meeting.  At

 4     1700 hours also, a meeting was called of the Municipal Assembly of Tuzla

 5     on the political security situation in the territory of the SO Tuzla to

 6     which our representative was not invited.  On the 3rd of April there was

 7     also a meeting on the political security situation in the municipality of

 8     Doboj which was attended by the commander of the 6th Militarised Brigade

 9     on the territory and so on and so forth.

10             In the territory of the municipality of Brcko, the reserve police

11     forces had been called up and police stations have been set up in certain

12     village settlements.  Leaders of national parties are carrying out

13     intense preparations for new conflicts.  Arms are being publicly

14     distributed to members of the SDA at several public places.  At 1500

15     hours on the 3rd of April, weapons were distributed to SDA members in the

16     village of Ciljuge, the Zivinice municipality near Dzamir [phoen].  And

17     these men were supposed to move towards Bijeljina in the course of the

18     3rd and 4th of April, 1992.

19             So you mentioned the general who was not sympathetic towards us

20     at all.  He was an old-fashioned general, against all national parties

21     and against the multi-party system, but here his soldiers are getting

22     killed before the beginning of the war, and he's informing his command

23     about what was going on there.  I am -- I have to admit to you that we

24     Serbs did not know how to sell our misfortunes very well, but do you

25     accept that there were tensions, that it was very tense around Tuzla,

Page 2983

 1     even though former Communists were in power in and around Tuzla at that

 2     time?

 3        A.   I have no reason not to accept the content of this report by the

 4     general.  I have no detailed knowledge of each of the incidents he's

 5     referring to, but I have no reason to have any objection to it.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would I like to tender this

 8     document for identification only.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, we do have actually a

10     translation, because it is a duplicate of an exhibit that the Prosecution

11     actually also wanted to bring forward at some point in time, and it's

12     0 -- 07089.  And we do have a translation, and it should be available

13     through e-court under that number.  And there is no objection to

14     tendering it.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE KWON:  It will be admitted.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 07089 will be admitted as Exhibit D239.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Now, Mr. Karadzic, you have to conclude your

19     cross-examination.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much time do I have?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Five minutes.

22                           [Defence confer]

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D225 in e-court,

24     please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 2984

 1        Q.   Colonel, do you remember what the confrontation line was like?

 2     What did it look like at the time that you were there?

 3        A.   I think you'd have to be more specific as to the time.  I was --

 4     I was there for --

 5        Q.   The conflict began on the 6th of April on our side, although the

 6     conflicts began before.  But let's say from the 6th of April until the

 7     12th of May, what did the demarcation line look like or the line of

 8     confrontation; do you recall?

 9        A.   No, I don't at all.

10        Q.   Do you see these blue areas marking the areas with a pronounced

11     Serb majority?

12        A.   Yes, I can see the map in front of me.

13        Q.   Do you recall that the demarcation line mostly followed the

14     outlines of these blue areas?

15        A.   Not to any great extent.  In general detail, yes, but the monitor

16     mission wasn't in any way involved in making out detailed divisions of

17     territories depending on their ethnic percentages.  It was something we

18     did not want to get involved in, because then, as I had mentioned before,

19     we stayed away from internal borders in opstina, et cetera, et cetera.

20             In other words, most of our -- most of our work was done in

21     actually speaking with people, speaking with political groups, and didn't

22     have very much to do with maps.

23        Q.   Do you accept that what was referred to in the war as

24     Republika Srpska was mostly limited to these areas that are represented

25     here in blue?  Was that Republika Srpska?

Page 2985

 1        A.   In -- in general terms, yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D01275, please.

 4     1D01275.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   That is a document of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the

 7     29th of April.

 8             Colonel, do you see this conversation between -- in the English

 9     it says the 28th of August, 1992, but I believe, actually, it's April

10     according to the contents.  By the contents, I believe that it is April.

11     Now, let's see.  This General Siber is speaking with Hosen.  Hosen is

12     probably an UNPROFOR officer.  And it says here three French soldiers

13     were seriously wounded in Nedzarici today.  One is in critical condition,

14     and the second one lost an eye.  And then later, 500 metres away from our

15     facilities, they are not being observed.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Mr. Karadzic is kindly asked to point to the

17     interpreters where he's reading from.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters were not able to

19     follow your reading, so could you kindly indicate what part -- from what

20     part you are reading and --

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am reading from the middle of the

22     first page.

23             "... in Nedzarici.  That is not a game.  That is not a game.  I'm

24     very open.  I have come to help as much as I can.  The desire of the

25     United Nations in term of establishing the peace should be achieved.

Page 2986

 1     Guns should be silenced.  And the beautiful song of peace should be

 2     heard."  And so on and so forth.

 3             And then a few sentences later:

 4             "Three French soldiers were seriously wounded in Nedzarici

 5     today."

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Do you agree that Nedzarici is Serbian settlement next to

 8     Dobrinja?

 9        A.   No, I'm not familiar with it.

10        Q.   And then it goes on to say are --

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we zoom down the page to see

12     the bottom of the English page.  Around about "500 metres."  Can we see

13     the English better, please.  You can -- that's right.  Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   "[In English] In relation -- [Interpretation] In relation to the

16     500 distance from our facilities, it is not respected."

17             And r. Hosen is the person speaking.

18             "Three days ago, some mortars were active near the PTT building.

19     The Serbs responded and hit our building, but luckily there were no

20     casualties.  I'm asking for your co-operation and understanding.  Please

21     order a 500 metre distance from our facilities."

22             And Siber says:

23             "We've already issued that order."

24             And then Hosen goes on to say:

25             "We received this from London -- the following from London."

Page 2987

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page for the English page,

 2     next page.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   "In London we got from the Serbs as well guarantees that within

 5     96 hours they would allow UNPROFOR access to all locations of heavy

 6     artillery around Sarajevo.  I expect that you will provide us with that

 7     as well."

 8             Now, you mentioned the PTT building, Colonel, and I'm telling you

 9     that this was what happened all the time, that Muslim artillery and

10     mortars would come close up to the United Nations installations and open

11     fire on them.  And then when we respond, they accuse us and blame us.

12             Now, in the previous paragraph it said that in Nedzarici the

13     United Nations were repairing installations, gas installations and other

14     things that everybody needed including the Muslims, whereas the Muslims

15     shot at a Serb settlement and wounded three French soldiers.

16             Now, do you know about this formula for behaviour on the part of

17     the Muslim army?  They bring their weapons close up to UN installations

18     and then open fire as this gentleman, Mr. Hosen, says.  And he's asking

19     them to keep a distance of 500 metres.

20        A.   I know from my experience of severing with the United Nations as

21     a military officer that parties to a conflict have always used -- has

22     often used a United Nations position in which to launch fire at their

23     enemies so that the enemy doesn't want to respond by firing into a

24     United Nations position.  That's been something that's been done by all

25     sides in most of the countries that I have served in with the

Page 2988

 1     United Nations.  This particular document I'm for the familiar with.  I

 2     don't know who the Hosen is.  You say he may be a general of the

 3     United Nations, I don't know.  This is something that might be better

 4     taken up with respect with somebody who served with the United Nations

 5     and UNPROFOR.  I'm not familiar with it.

 6        Q.   I'm not only speaking about that particular case, but the general

 7     formula according to which they acted.  And did the Serb side do anything

 8     like that during the war?  You said the Serb side -- you said the various

 9     sides, but I claiming that the Serb side didn't.

10             Now, the last document - I'd like to tender this document - but

11     let's see what the Serb police has to say and the information it put out

12     by looking at the next document.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this document?

14             JUDGE KWON:  The witness didn't have anything to comment upon.

15     We will not admit it.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the witness did say earlier on

17     that the Serbs shooted at the PTT building without reason.  That what

18     said a long time ago and in the statement.  And I said that there was

19     every reason.  It wasn't that there wasn't a reason.

20             JUDGE KWON:  You will have another opportunity to introduce

21     evidence.

22             So was that your last examination -- question?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to show another Serb

24     police document on this same event to see -- to show that the two things

25     are identical.

Page 2989

 1             JUDGE KWON:  If the witness was not able to answer the question

 2     about the incident you are referring to, there's no point.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Colonel, then, my last question:  Looking at this document and

 6     taking into account the fact that I'm speaking about a pattern of

 7     behaviour, not individual incidents, do you exclude the possibility that

 8     the Muslim side used this war ruse, especially with respect to the PTT

 9     building but also in respect of other UN installations?

10        A.   When I was in the PTT building, it was the headquarters of the

11     United Nations UNPROFOR operation.  They might be in a much better

12     position to answer that than I would.  I do know that mortar bombs fired

13     at the building when I was in the middle of trying to negotiate a

14     cease-fire.  Who exactly fired those, I don't know.  The general feeling

15     at the time, they were coming from high positions on the outskirts of

16     Sarajevo which would have led one to suspect it was coming from

17     Bosnian Serb positions.  But I have to say to you that I -- I don't have

18     any evidence of this.  Rather, I have a suspicion and nothing more than

19     that.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Colonel.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Before the Prosecution asks some

22     questions in redirect, Judge Baird has some questions.

23                           Questioned by the Court:

24             JUDGE BAIRD:  Colonel Doyle, I would like your assistance in a

25     particular area, and I shall direct your attention to the evidence that

Page 2990

 1     was given yesterday.

 2             Now, you stated in answer to Dr. Karadzic, he asked you:

 3             "Did you understand that there were discrimination in rent, one

 4     price for the Muslims and another for the Serbs?"

 5             And your answer was:

 6             "That was my understanding of that meeting."

 7             Do you agree with that?

 8        A.   Yes, I do, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE BAIRD:  Yes.  And he then asks you:

10             "And did you then check that out with the Serbs?  Did you ask the

11     mayor about that and check it out?"

12             And your reply was:

13             "I did not bring it up with the mayor, and I did not check it

14     out."

15        A.   That's my recollection, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE BAIRD:  Now, my question, Colonel, is did you -- is there

17     any reason at all why you didn't check it out?

18        A.   A lot of the points that were brought to our attention at the

19     various meetings, we would have tried to discuss those at the next

20     highest level.  I can't recall whether or not I brought up that specific

21     point with the mayor.  It is 18 years.  And rather than say I did, I

22     probably said, Well, maybe I didn't.  But there were many issues that

23     were brought up around that time.

24             What we were attempting to do was we were attempting to bring the

25     concerns of one side to the attention of the authorities, to find out if

Page 2991

 1     they would have a response.  So the answer is, I can't answer that

 2     question, Your Honour, because I don't recall.

 3             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 6             I would like to have the 65 ter number 07868 brought up in

 7     e-court.

 8                           Re-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

 9        Q.   And, Colonel, you discussed with Dr. Karadzic a letter that

10     Karadzic sent to Cutileiro on the 5th of June, 1992, and you said that

11     you do not remember this and you do not know about this.

12             Now, we have now on the e-court -- we have the answer, as it says

13     here:

14             "Thank you for your letter of the 5th of June."

15             It's the answer of Cutileiro on the 12th of June, and it refers

16     here in the -- in the first paragraph it refers to Lord Carrington and

17     his views, and it's stated here:

18             "I firmly believe that the only way to bring peace to Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina is through negotiations."

20             And a lit bit further down in that paragraph:

21             "Territorial claims which have been pursued by force are totally

22     unacceptable."

23             Is that what the views of Lord Carrington were at that time?

24        A.   Yes, they were.

25        Q.   And now to the last paragraph.  Cutileiro writes here as follows:

Page 2992

 1             "Let me add one thing.  Referring to the last paragraph of your

 2     letter, the EC has not made any promises to you.  What happened, as you

 3     well know, is that talks on future constitutional arrangements for

 4     Bosnia and Herzegovina among the three main political parties (Muslim,

 5     Serb, and Croat) under my chairmanship, were established by

 6     Lord Carrington and in early -- in early February.  On 18th March, we

 7     reached agreement on a set of principles.  The validity of that

 8     agreement, however, can only be upheld if borders and competences of the

 9     constituent units be defined by negotiated consensus and not by force,

10     and if ethnically cleansed territories be restored to their antebellum

11     ethnical composition.  I am sure you relies that it is in your interest

12     to do everything from your side to help achieve those results."

13             Do you have any further comment on this, Colonel?

14        A.   No, I would say that, as I had mentioned before, I was aware that

15     there was to be the elements of agreement, which was dated to the

16     18th of March, the content of which I certainly was not aware of.  So

17     this probably reinforces what Mr. Cutileiro was saying, which I have no

18     reason to -- to oppose.  But I personally had not been involved in those

19     negotiations and, therefore, I have -- I have no definite views on it.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, the Prosecution would like to

21     tender this document.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can I now, please --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit number ...

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Please.

Page 2993

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, Exhibit P952.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Could we now have Exhibit 65 ter 12051, the

 3     first page both in the English and the B/C/S, brought up.

 4        Q.   Colonel, yesterday Dr. Karadzic on several occasions addressed

 5     with you the existence or nonexistence of a Bosnian Serb Army before the

 6     official establishment of the VRS and before the withdrawal of the JNA in

 7     May 1992, and he put to you - and I'm referring here to page transcript

 8     page 2890, line 4 - he put to you the following:

 9              "You accept that up until the 20th of May the Bosnian Serbs were

10     under the command of the JNA or of their own municipal territory

11     organisation while during the same time the Muslims had their own armed

12     formations."

13             Looking at the first page here, it -- it is a press report on

14     Srpska "Oslobodjenje" titled "Happy Birthday, Republic," and it's an

15     interview that Radovan Karadzic gave on the 6th of January, 1995.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have page 3 in the

17     English, and page 1 of the B/C/S remains.

18        Q.   In the -- in the first paragraph -- let me just ...

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Page 3.  Is that page 3 in the English?

20        Q.   In the first -- in the first paragraph it says -- and

21     Dr. Karadzic is quoted as saying:

22             "Of course, Republika Srpska is a reality, the same as the

23     Republic of Serbian Krajina is a reality, and we believe that these are

24     just steps in creation of a single Serbian state."

25             Colonel, this notion of a single Serbian state, is this something

Page 2994

 1     that you heard being mentioned during meetings or conferences?

 2        A.   Yes, the -- the general feeling at these conferences was that the

 3     overall objective of Serbs was to join physically the territories that

 4     the Serbs controlled in Bosnia to the territory of Serbia to create a

 5     Greater Serbia.  That was the general understanding.

 6        Q.   And further on that same page - and it is page 2 in the -- in the

 7     B/C/S - further down in this -- in the English Dr. Karadzic is quoted as

 8     saying:

 9              "We had a list of the actions and steps to take, but we always

10     waited for the Muslims to make a mistake, and after they made one, we

11     created a union of municipalities and the Serbian autonomous areas next,

12     followed by the regions, and eventually our Assembly, and finally

13     republic.  Every time that the Muslim and Croat -- Croatian

14     representatives told us that we were breaking up former Bosnia and

15     Herzegovina, we replied that our actions were only in response to their

16     mistakes and their aggression against our political rights."

17             Colonel, is that consistent with the information that you had

18     during your term of office?

19        A.   Yes, it is.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And now if we go to page 4 of the English,

21     and it's -- it remains to be page 2 of the B/C/S.

22        Q.   And I -- I'm reading now another of the quotes:

23             "The Serbian Democratic Party also endured the armed struggle in

24     a superior manner.  It was the first time that the people knew what was

25     in store for them.  With such well-organised defence, the majority of our

Page 2995

 1     people has been saved, and lines towards the enemy were established.  We

 2     should always remember that the people themselves and the SDS fought and

 3     set up the front lines in 45 days from 5th of April to 20th May while our

 4     army was still being established.  Eventually, of course, this army

 5     became non-Partisan, but we did not want to appoint any SDS commissioners

 6     to it because we relied on the patriotism of each of our officers and

 7     soldiers."

 8             Colonel, is this consistent what -- with what you saw and what

 9     you have referred to before during your term of office?

10        A.   Yes, it is.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, that -- one other point.  One

12     other point.  Sorry.

13             Can we again have the Exhibit 11591.  Oh, I forgot.  I would like

14     to have this -- this document admitted.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P953, Your Honours.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you.  And, again, the item 11591, the

18     65 ter.  That was already admitted, but now it's the further report --

19     no, that's the wrong.  It should be the further report of the

20     Secretary-General of 12 May 1992.  It's item 11591, 65 ter.  It has a P

21     number.  937, sorry.  937.  And I would like to have page 3 and --

22     page 3.

23        Q.   And that's the paragraph number 5 on top of it that you just

24     discussed with Dr. Karadzic.

25             When we look at it, it says here:

Page 2996

 1             "Further concern has been caused by the decision of the Belgrade

 2     authorities to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina by 18 May all JNA

 3     personnel who are not citizens of that republic."

 4             And then the next sentence:

 5             "This will leave in Bosnia-Herzegovina without effective

 6     political control as many as 50 [sic] mostly Serb troops ..."

 7             Does this relate to the form JNA troops or not?

 8        A.   I assume it would relate to those members of the JNA who were

 9     Serbs and were from Bosnia.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this concludes the

11     re-examination.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Just one question, Colonel Doyle, just to

14     satisfy my own curiosity.  Were you an infantry officer?

15             THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  I thought you were.

17             JUDGE KWON:  That concludes your testimony, Colonel Doyle.

18     Thank you for your coming yet again to give it.

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Now you're free to go.

21                           [The witness withdrew]

22             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure whether the Court Deputy is able to do

23     it without the assistance of the usher.  Can you draw up the exhibit

24     number D324?  No, it's not -- or it may be -- might have been D235.

25             Where we can find the word "siege," for which the exact

Page 2997

 1     translation should have been "encirclement," according to the accused?  I

 2     think it was page 5 in the e-court.

 3             Yes.  In the middle of the page.  Along with "task," we can see

 4     the word "siege of Sarajevo."

 5             And can you go back to page 3 there.  In the "I have decided"

 6     column or the "Operation Objectives," third paragraph, Mladic says:

 7             "Keep Sarajevo from the -- under blockade."

 8             So with the -- if the Court Deputy would relay with the CLSS to

 9     find out what words in B/C/S were used for the "siege" and "blockade" and

10     compare them with the transcript of 19th of May as well as 27th of May

11     when the -- Mr. Karadzic tried to explain the difference between the

12     "encirclement" and "siege," and I'd like to know what B/C/S words were

13     used at those times.  So I would like the CLSS to produce a written memo

14     on those things and file it.

15             There are several matters, administrative matters, to deal with.

16     I'll begin with some minor things.

17             There's a motion from the Prosecution to add a witness,

18     Amir Begic, to its witness list.  And I take it there is no opposition

19     from the Defence, but there is a request from the Defence that

20     Prosecution would call the witness after the summer recess.

21             Do you have any position?

22             MR. TIEGER:  I think we can accommodate that, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE KWON:  With that understanding, we'll -- your motion is

24     granted.

25             And there are two further motions:  Leave to reply; one in

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 1     relation to the videolink testimony, and the other related to certain

 2     protective measures.  So they are granted.

 3             And this relates to the -- the motion from the accused for

 4     extension and adjournment:  Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber has received a

 5     request from you for an extension of time to respond to the Prosecution's

 6     second motion for leave to amend its Rule 65 ter exhibit list which

 7     pertains to the Mladic notebook.  We have also taken into account the

 8     Prosecution's response to that request filed today.

 9             The Chamber considers some extension of time is appropriate for

10     you to prepare your response to the motion and that an addition two weeks

11     is sufficient.  You are, therefore, required to file your response to the

12     Prosecution motion, if any, by 14 June 2010.

13             You have also requested that the Chamber adjourn the trial

14     proceedings for a period of 30 days to allow you to study the Mladic

15     notebooks which were disclosed to you in your own language first on

16     12th of April, 2010, and determine their impact on your cross-examination

17     of the upcoming Prosecution witnesses.

18             The Prosecution has stated its opposition to this request.

19             Having considered all the submissions made, the Chamber finds

20     that it is not necessary nor in the interest of justice to adjourn the

21     trial proceedings at this time.  As we have previously stated, you have

22     had sufficient time to prepare your cross-examination of the

23     Prosecution's witnesses and have been on notice of the witnesses to be

24     called in this initial phase of the trial for many months now.

25             If after reviewing the notebooks that have been disclosed to you

Page 2999

 1     or indeed any other material recently disclosed by the Prosecution you

 2     determine that there are additional questions you would wish to put to a

 3     particular witness on cross-examination, you may make the appropriate

 4     application to the Chamber.

 5             With regard to the majority of the upcoming witnesses, the

 6     Chamber is convinced that this remedy would suffice.  We will, therefore,

 7     deny your motion for an adjournment at the present time.

 8             Having said that, the Chamber would like to encourage the

 9     Prosecution to rethink its order of upcoming witnesses and suggests that

10     it would be appropriate to move Witness KDZ88 down the schedule so that

11     this evidence might be heard a little later in the proceedings after the

12     accused has had a little more time to analyse the notebooks disclosed to

13     him on 12th of April.  Given the expected content of KDZ88's evidence, it

14     seems to the Chamber that such a rescheduling will be prudent.

15             The last matter, last agenda that I have, relates to your conduct

16     of your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.  In relation to that, I would

17     like to make some comments on behalf of the Chamber concerning the manner

18     in which you are conducting your cross-examination in general.

19             Before your cross-examination of the very first witness, I told

20     you that the Chamber did not consider your time estimate for

21     cross-examination of the initial witnesses to be realistic or reasonable.

22     The Chamber has, nonetheless, given you significant latitude to conduct

23     your cross-examinations in the way you consider most appropriate and has

24     granted extensive time to you to do so.  This is partly because we

25     recognise that you are not a trained lawyer and that effective

Page 3000

 1     cross-examination can be a difficult skill to master.

 2             Asking open questions or multiple questions in cross-examination

 3     is not only a poor technique but is not likely to be effective.  Closed,

 4     direct questions put one at a time are both more effective and in general

 5     more likely to generate more concise and precise answers.

 6             You should also note that it is only the answers of the witness

 7     to your questions that amount to evidence as well as the documents or

 8     parts thereof that the witness adopts and which are admitted into

 9     evidence.  Reading out the whole or large parts of a document into the

10     transcript is a time-consuming procedure which does not have the effect

11     of turning the transcripted parts into evidence if the document is not

12     ultimately admitted.  It's a far better use of time to formulate the

13     questions from the document and only resort to the document if necessary

14     to contradict the witness's answer.

15             You have received such advice repeatedly from the Bench about how

16     to more effectively conduct your cross-examination as well as warnings

17     not to make statements and comments, not to read out extensive passages

18     from documents, but, rather, to show documents to the witnesses and ask

19     pointed questions in relation to them and not to put questions to

20     witnesses about matters which they have stated they have no knowledge of.

21             Despite our efforts in this regard, and I hope also the efforts

22     of your own legal advisors, to guide you, the Chamber is concerned that

23     you are not making more effective use of your time for your

24     cross-examination.  We are also concerned again by the time estimate you

25     have recently given for the next nine witnesses.

Page 3001

 1             The Chamber is therefore contemplating setting time limits on

 2     your cross-examination of each witness, which we will determine on a

 3     witness-by-witness basis, and which you will be required to comply with

 4     unless you can show good cause why additional time is necessary.

 5             Should you not demonstrate during your cross-examination of the

 6     next witnesses that you are taking seriously our advice, the Chamber will

 7     begin to impose such time limits.  Having said this, the Chamber is of

 8     the view, based on the time you have already used for cross-examination

 9     of Mr. Van Lynden, your own estimate of how much additional time you need

10     with him and on the nature and content of Mr. Van Lynden's evidence, that

11     you should be able to complete your cross-examination of him within two

12     hours.

13             The Trial Chamber's primary task is to ensure a fair trial, but

14     that entails fairness for everyone involved, and undue delay is not

15     consonant with fairness.

16             We will rise for today.  We will resume again on Monday afternoon

17     at 2.15.  Everybody have a good weekend.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 31st day

20                           of May, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.