1 Tuesday, 8 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody [French on English channel].
6 Are we hearing French? Now it's okay.
7 There's one ruling to be issued orally today. On 31st May 2010,
8 the accused filed the motion to exclude testimony of Richard Philipps.
9 He requested the Chamber to exclude Richard Philipps' testimony on the
10 basis that it would not be of any assistance to the Chamber at this stage
11 of the proceedings. The Prosecution filed its response on 2nd June 2010
12 The Chamber has considered the parties' submission and will now issue its
13 decision thereon.
14 The accused merely asserts that Philipps' evidence will not
15 assist the Chamber in the determination of the issues of this case but it
16 does not provide any basis for this assertion. However, he is charged
17 with the responsibility for crimes that allegedly were committed in
19 Bosnian VRS of which he is said to have been the supreme commander.
20 According to the Prosecution, Philipps will provide evidence
21 concerning the command and reporting structures of the SRK. Based on its
22 review of Mr. Philipps' report, diagrams and amalgamated statements, the
23 Chamber is satisfied that his evidence will indeed be of some assistance
24 to the Chamber. Therefore, the Chamber denies the accused's motion.
25 Having said that, we are coming to the overall time for
1 cross-examination on the part of the accused. As I said yesterday that
2 we would come to the issue again, so as regards the time remaining for
3 Mr. Karadzic's crosses examination of Dr. Donia, having observed the --
4 his conduct of cross-examination so far, we are not satisfied that
5 Mr. Karadzic has used his time efficiently in compliance with the Court's
6 guidance. In particular, at the outset the Chamber made it clear that
7 his estimated time of 40 hours was not reasonable. He referred back to
8 it yesterday when asked how much time he had for remaining time. He used
9 often, usually often, open questions, making comments, statements,
10 reading out unnecessary parts of all the documents. So at this time, the
11 Chamber has decided to require him to conclude his cross-examination of
12 Dr. Donia by tomorrow. So by tomorrow, he will have had more than
13 18 hours, which the Chamber finds more than sufficient.
14 And as regards Mr. Philipps, the Chamber notes that he has asked
15 for 20 hours for cross-examination of Mr. Philipps. The Chamber also
16 finds this estimation patently unreasonable, particularly as the accused
17 sees no benefit for the Chamber of Mr. Philipps' evidence pursuant to his
18 motion. Moreover, the Chamber notes that Mr. Philipps' evidence will be
19 very specific, limited to the command and reporting structures of the
21 20 hours he has estimated for cross-examination. Therefore, the Chamber
22 expects the accused to take no longer than five hours for his
23 cross-examination of Richard Philipps.
24 That said, we'll bring in the witness.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I address you?
1 JUDGE KWON: On what, Mr. Karadzic?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I have to say that I'm not
3 protected enough from the evasive answers of the witness and his
4 partiality. Therefore, this will not be sufficient. Please reconsider
5 your decision in view of how the proceedings evolve today, because the
6 trial will certainly suffer if this witness is not cross-examined on all
7 the facts that he dealt with.
8 JUDGE KWON: You have two full days, and get on with it, and
9 we'll see at the end of -- yes, we'll see at the end of these sessions.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
12 JUDGE KWON: Dr. Donia, we apologise for your inconvenience.
13 There was something we needed to discuss in your absence.
14 THE WITNESS: I understand, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning to all.
17 Could I please have 1D181 in e-court.
18 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
19 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Donia, did you know towards the end of
20 August we had reached an agreement to the effect that all three ruling
21 parties together follow all developments and do their best to reduce
22 political tensions?
23 You have before you -- well, I believe there's a translation too.
24 No, there's no translation. All right. You want me to read this out to
25 you, at least the first paragraph?
1 A. Please.
2 Q. "To all Municipal Boards of the SDS and to the regional --"
3 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's an English translation.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. Sorry I didn't rise earlier. 65 ter 14837.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. That will be faster.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. You will see here, Mr. Donia -- actually, I can read this. This
9 is the Serbian version, what we see right now. The first paragraph. I
10 would like to draw your attention to the first paragraph. The rest is
11 not important for this particular issue.
12 I can't see the translation. Then I'll have to read it
14 "I hereby inform you that I have reached agreement with
15 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic." Here it is. Here it is, "President of the Party
16 of Democratic Action and Mr. Stjepan Kljujic president of the Croatian
17 democratic community that these three political parties establish
18 observer groups tasked with monitoring all developments in their respect
19 communities --"
21 JUDGE KWON: We have English translation now.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Right. Thank you.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Have you seen this document before?
25 A. No, I've not.
1 Q. Did you know about this from some other source? Did you know
2 about these joint commissions?
3 A. No. I've also never seen the -- I've never seen the agreement.
4 If there's a written agreement, I don't know about that either.
5 Q. I say here that we have reached an agreement. It's not that we
6 signed an agreement. We have reached agreement. We have accommodated
7 our views. That's my point.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to, we'll admit it.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D264, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have 1D39.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. While we're waiting for that, Mr. Donia, do you know that after
15 this crisis, when Izetbegovic withdrew from the historic agreement, that
16 then, on the 11th of September we reached a new milestone in the Assembly
17 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that we then passed certain conclusions in the
18 Assembly that are now going to appear before you. Are you aware of these
19 conclusions of the 11th of September?
20 A. Just may I -- when you say "we," did you mean the SDS since you,
21 yourself, were not a member of the Assembly?
22 Q. We, I mean the joint Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At that
23 time it was still the joint Assembly, because there was still a one and
24 only Bosnia
25 A. Okay. I know you were not a member of that Assembly, but you're
1 saying "we," and so I take it you mean the party.
2 Q. All parties. All parties in the Assembly. Have a look at these
3 conclusions. Would I like to draw your attention to the last one.
4 Actually, the penultimate one. "The Assembly is committed to finding,"
5 et cetera.
6 You see that here we reached agreement that there has to be a
7 political solution, that all proposals are legitimate and that no force
8 would be resorted to and that no one would impose anything upon anybody
10 Were you aware of this conclusion?
11 A. I was not, no.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D265, Your Honour.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D40, please.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Did you know what the Party of Democratic Action was doing at
19 this very same time? Did you study their activity at all?
20 A. Yeah, I've studied their -- their general position and
21 activities, but I certainly haven't followed it on a day-by-day basis.
22 Q. Do you see this document before you? You can read our language,
23 but there is a translation too. I see that.
24 On the 26th of September it was received, and the Party of
25 Democratic Action, on the 20th of September, had ordered the monitoring
1 of all activities and movements, primarily of the Yugoslav People's Army.
2 Were you aware of that?
3 A. I'm sorry, I need just a minute to look at this if I may. Okay.
4 I see that they are simply monitoring developments.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3 of this
7 document. In English as well, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you see this instructions as to how all of this should be
10 monitored and how one should act in general? Can you see all of that?
11 A. Yes, and the -- I think the rationale here is contained in the
12 third -- third paragraph here where they are -- where the SDS is
13 discussing this movement of civilian vehicles which had been in the near
14 recent past transporting both personnel and weapons from across Bosnian
15 territory. It seems to me to be the point of concern that probably
16 generated this request for monitoring.
17 Q. Are you trying to say that this was legal activity? Yes or no?
18 A. I don't know whether it was -- I don't know whether the transport
19 of troops and weapons in civilian automobiles was -- was legal or not,
20 and I'm not sure that the -- the monitoring itself -- I wouldn't think
21 it's illegal but don't know.
22 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that three weeks before that we had
23 passed a decision that we should monitor together all phenomena that may
24 be of relevance? Remember the first document that I showed you?
25 A. I would have to look at that document again, but it didn't -- as
1 I recall it, it didn't seem to preclude other activities by the parties.
2 It was -- I interpreted that first document as to be a reference to
3 efforts to work out conflicts in the inter-party agreements and other
4 personnel issues, but I wasn't there, wasn't a party to it, so I'm not
5 really certain what was actually intended in those passages.
6 Q. Thank you. You're right. The first one said that all three
7 parties should follow social developments in order to reduce tensions,
8 whereas this is secret monitoring of the JNA.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D266, Your Honour.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D41.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you know, Mr. Donia, that the OSCE established a Crisis Staff
15 for monitoring developments in Yugoslavia
16 established a Crisis Staff for monitoring developments in Yugoslavia?
17 A. I very much doubt that the OSCE used the word "Crisis Staff," but
18 I'm not surprised at all to know that the OSCE established some sort of
19 body to honour developments in Yugoslavia
20 Q. Both Germany
21 know that Croatia
22 and every municipality?
23 A. There just seemed to be Crisis Staffs everywhere, and in -- in
24 former Yugoslavia
25 that Germany
1 their body -- their bodies, but I'm not surprised to find -- would I not
2 be surprised to find that Crisis Staffs existed at the level of one or
3 more governmental bodies or -- at individual municipalities in Croatia
4 I don't -- I very much doubt that there was a Crisis Staff at every -- in
5 every municipality.
6 Q. Thank you. We will see whether that's how it was. Do you know
7 that the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina established the
8 Crisis Staff also in September of 1991 and that Ejup Ganic was in charge
9 of that Crisis Staff?
10 A. Yes. I actually reported on that in my submission, one of the
11 three papers that I prepared for this -- this Chamber.
12 Q. Thank you. Can I read out a very brief passage from the middle
13 column about what Professor Plavsic said as the chairman of the council
14 for preservation of constitutional order. She says:
15 "When I was appointed to the Crisis Staff, whose president is
16 Dr. Ejup Ganic, I believed that some urgent matters would be resolved
17 such as, for example, accommodation for refugees, ensuring food and the
18 similar. However, the Crisis Staff started getting involved in affairs
19 which are far from its area of responsibilities. By expanding on what
20 this was about, Dr. Biljana Plavsic pointed out that the Crisis Staff
21 took over the responsibilities of the council for All People's Defence."
22 And then further down Biljana says:
23 "Can you believe it? The situation is what it is, and the
24 council for All People's Defence is not functioning, whereas the Crisis
25 Staff took everything upon itself."
1 And then further down it says that she concluded that an informal
2 group was actually allowed to deal with the most delicate problems.
3 So, Professor Plavsic and Professor Koljevic at the time publicly
4 stated that Ejup Ganic was establishing the Crisis Staff in order to
5 circumvent the Serbs in the Presidency and in order to do things that
6 actually do not belong within the remit of the Crisis Staff.
7 Was there a single Serbian Crisis Staff in existence on the
8 20th of September, 1991?
9 A. I don't know.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
12 evidence. Can it be marked for identification and translated, please?
13 MS. EDGERTON: On this one, Your Honour, I do object. The entire
14 article is not displayed. Dr. Karadzic has only read out one small
15 passage of the article. We have no translation from which to be able to
16 assess the context and other statements of the article, and frankly,
17 Your Honour, the question that was asked of Dr. Donia had absolutely
18 nothing to do with the passage of the article that Dr. Karadzic read out.
19 JUDGE KWON: Correct. You may call Professor Plavsic if
20 necessary. We will not admit this. Dr. Donia didn't confirm anything
21 about this. This is just a news clipping.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Dr. Donia confirmed that he had
23 written about Crisis Staffs, and this is an article about Crisis Staffs
24 and a member of the Presidency, Dr. Biljana Plavsic. So please
25 reconsider. This is a document that speaks of the same matter. I asked
1 Dr. Donia --
2 JUDGE KWON: Dr. Donia testified he knew about the Crisis Staff
3 of the BiH, and he knew that Mr. Ganic was appointed as chairman. That's
4 the farthest he can testify, but he has nothing to do with Plavsic's
5 comment. Let's move on.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Mr. Donia, do you know that Mrs. Plavsic resigned because she
8 considered that that was an informal group that was doing things that it
9 wasn't supposed to do things that it was doing? She resigned from her
10 position in the Crisis Staff.
11 A. I find that plausible, but I don't know when she resigned. If --
12 I mean, if -- she continued to actively head up this council for
13 constitutional preservation, or whatever it was, for many more months
14 after this. What -- I can certainly affirm that, but what she did with
15 the Crisis Staff, I have no idea.
16 Q. Well, she resigned on the 3rd of October. Do you remember that
17 this staff was disbanded pursuant to a request of the -- on the 2nd or
18 3rd March after the people were killed at the barricades? It was
19 disbanded at the request of one of the political parties. Do you
20 remember that?
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, your question was not translated in
22 full, I gather. Pursuant to a request of what?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Pursuant to the request of the
24 Serbian Democratic Party. After the barricades -- or, rather, while the
25 barricades were there a session was held to which Mr. Lukic was invited.
1 He set out his requests, and one of the requests was to disband this
2 illegal body, this Crisis Staff, whereas Professor Plavsic resigned on
3 the 3rd of October, claiming that it was an illegal body.
4 THE WITNESS: Well, there's two different time frames you're
5 speaking of here, I think. And as to the one on the 2nd, 3rd of March at
6 the time of the barricades, the SDS
7 at that time which was headed by Mr. Dukic, because at that time you were
8 in Belgrade
9 was a member of that Crisis Staff or not. That was, I think, one of
10 those Crisis Staffs that lasted about something like 48 hours and then
12 Now, at that time, if there was an initiative to disband the
13 Crisis Staff, it would have been of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
14 I'm not aware of that. I don't see the Crisis Staff of the Presidency
15 doing very much at that time, but perhaps I'm just not seeing any --
16 seeing activity that -- that may have been there.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would the Chamber reconsider or
20 consider the admission into evidence of this document?
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the answer is simply no. Evidence is
23 Dr. Donia's response to your questions. Let's move on.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have 65 ter
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Donia, now we are coming to the key point in your testimony,
3 and I also believe to the key point of the indictment, which is the 14th
4 and 15th of October, 1991, when an Assembly session was held at which the
5 memorandum on sovereignty was adopted.
6 We need page 1 to 2 in Serbian, and in English page 116.
7 Did you see the entire minutes from this Assembly session,
8 Mr. Donia?
9 A. I have read them, yes. Not recently, but I've read through them,
11 Q. And did you read in the entirety everything that I said on that
13 A. I -- yes, I did.
14 Q. I believe that this speech is of huge importance for the
15 indictment and that now we should deal with this speech as a central
16 development and that session as the also central point for the
17 indictment. I don't know whether the OTP has the audio recording of that
18 session. It would be good if they did. If not, I will just read certain
20 JUDGE KWON: Are you in a position to answer that question,
21 Ms. Edgerton?
22 MS. EDGERTON: Not immediately Your Honour, but I'm just
23 wondering why Dr. Karadzic would need to read certain passages when we
24 have a full translation of the transcript in front of us.
25 JUDGE KWON: You could have asked that question earlier. Let's
1 move on with this transcript, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case, I will have to read
3 out certain passages.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. It says here:
6 "Before explaining the proposal, whether I will do it or somebody
7 else, I have to explain something which stems from the interpretation of
8 what we say at this speakers' platform. That thing is namely related to
9 the issue of war and peace. For the hundredth time I have to repeat that
10 the Serbs do not threaten with war. Serbs only make it public that they
11 would not be able to accept any decision reached by out-voting and to
12 their detriment and that the Serbs could not be forced to live in the
13 state that they do not want. Serbs and Muslims, we understand each other
14 well. That is, Muslims are afraid that they will become a minority in
15 the -- in the Rump Yugoslavia, even though they enjoy the protection of
16 the republic which would never become a constituent part of Serbia
17 which would be completely equal to Serbia. So Serbs are also afraid that
18 in Bosnia-Herzegovina they would be out-voted now or several years later.
19 It is completely the same. Please, gentlemen, Muslim leaders have
20 clearly stated so far that should this catastrophe occur, it would, above
21 all, be the catastrophe of Muslim people and also the catastrophe for the
22 Serbs and Croats as well, especially the Serbs and Muslims since we are
23 mixed in Serbia
24 from the geographical point of view except in the big cities, naturally."
25 Now, did you have this part of the speech in mind?
1 A. What do you mean "in mind"?
2 Q. Did you take into consideration the entirety of this speech when
3 you produced your report?
4 A. Yes, I did.
5 Q. I beg for your patience, but everybody can, of course, read for
6 themselves. We can skip over some parts and then I will -- it reads that
7 the Serbs had never attacked Muslims, nor would they ever attack Muslims,
8 nor is there such a sentiment among the Serbs in relation to Muslims. In
9 the English it's on the following page. But the chaos that could be
10 produced by the illegal out-voting, the chaos that could be produced, the
11 chaos that nobody would start, but the chaos that has it's own logic, the
12 one that we spoke about here, somebody has control over the order. The
13 chaos is not in -- is in nobody's hands. Nobody has control over it.
14 The basic characteristic of chaos is that nobody generates it. Rather,
15 it has its own logic and generates itself. This is why in such a chaos
16 there could be wrong intentions above all, intentions of the Muslim
17 leadership to perhaps do something that would be good for the Muslims but
18 would not be good for the Serbs. This could produce a chaos which would
19 be beyond anybody's control.
20 But to make it clear, the Serb Democratic Party does not support
21 chaos, and precisely because we do not support chaos, we keep insisting
22 that not a single decision be passed that would be against any nation in
24 should there be chaos, Serbs, Muslims and Croats would suffer, especially
25 Serbs and Muslims, just as today a mine or grenade does not choose whose
1 house it will hit in Croatia
2 This is page 117 in the English.
3 Did you take into consideration, did you comment on this position
4 of mine in your report?
5 A. Well, in my report I characterised this as an impassioned speech,
6 and I think I hear that same passion as you read it again today, and
7 there is no doubt in my mind that when you said it then or you read it
8 now that you really believe this.
9 I look at it as a very aggressive statement of the position that
10 you've taken on -- you had taken on out-voting, that is, the right to
11 veto any -- any measure at the same time that you were incorporating
12 repeated protestations of innocence and peaceful intentions. And as I
13 say, I don't have any reason to doubt any of that. I think I probably
14 didn't capture fully the entire argument that you're presenting here, but
15 I believe that in referencing the speech and the paper on formation of
16 Republika Srpska I, in fact, did take note of what you said.
17 Q. Thank you. We will get to the aggression a bit later. Let's see
18 a few sentences down there:
19 "This is how we can announce that there would be no war, that
20 there would be no chaos, because we control the order, and chaos is in
21 nobody's hands any longer."
22 In English it begins with the words, "I ask you." "I ask you to
23 think about this and to say --" this is seven lines from the bottom,
24 seven lines up.
25 So our position is that we control the order and nobody controls
1 chaos, and you think that this was an impassioned speech supporting the
2 war; right?
3 A. No. I called it an impassioned speech in total, some of it
4 impassioned very much in protesting the desire not to have war. I
5 characterised the entire speech as impassioned. I think you got very
6 animated -- I guess you're not interested in my answer because you're not
7 listening to it --
8 Q. I'm listening to you. Sure, continue, but, Mr. Donia, you wish
9 to say that this is a war mongering speech. Thank you very much. Let me
11 JUDGE KWON: Let the witness complete his answer, please.
12 Dr. Donia, please.
13 THE WITNESS: I characterised the entire speech as impassioned,
14 and I believe you became more animated and more -- louder and more
15 impassioned as the speech went along, right up until the last few lines.
16 So as I say, I don't have any reason to doubt the sincerity of your --
17 your words here, that you felt very strongly about it and presented
18 varying points of view.
19 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Donia -- here. Would you say it was a war
20 mongering speech?
21 THE WITNESS: Only at the very end.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Page 106 in the English version of this document. Let's skip
24 over as much material as we can, but the Chamber has the entire minutes
25 at its disposal, as does the OTP.
1 See here, it says: "Gentlemen." I did not appear here as the
2 God of war as somebody described me.
3 Can you lower this down. Page 106, lower please?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Last -- last paragraph, bottom of it.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Yes. I do not appear here as the God of war, which is how
7 somebody from the Croatian Democratic Party depicted me. I repeated for
8 the hundredth time, and I said it in our conversations, "It is not the
9 Serbian Democratic Party that creates the will of the Serbian people,
10 rather it interprets it."
11 Did you take this into consideration, namely that the Serbian
12 people exist, that the nation has its own will and that no party can
13 impose its opinion on the nation, rather, a political party serves the
15 A. Yes. And this is what I have been referring to. I think you
16 absolutise the notion of the Serbian people, make it into an
17 anthropomorphic concept and reduce its will to whatever the Serbian
18 Democratic Party determines it to be, and you, yourself, determine what
19 the position of the SDP
20 a will of a group that you postulate as existing and just ran with
21 that -- that belief from well before this and express it very clearly
22 here. I think your -- your words are absolutely clear on what you mean
23 by that.
24 Q. Do you believe that we invented it or we heard this from the
25 people? Do you know that we organised referendums?
1 A. At this point you hadn't yet organised a referendum, I believe.
2 You had the election, of course, but I don't believe at this point there
3 had been a referendum yet.
4 Q. You agreed that there were 86 Serbs at the parliament out of this
5 and 82 in the Serbian Democratic Party. Do you remember that out of
6 those 86, 83 Serb members of the parliament supported this?
7 A. Well, I think we talked about this election results before and
8 just to point out that -- that the voting that took place for the
9 Presidency, the two SDS
10 the SDS
11 about 558.000 for Mr. Koljevic, 570.000 votes for Mrs. Plavsic.
12 Mr. Kecmanovic got 500.000 votes. He was not a member of the SDS.
13 Mr. Pejanovic, I think, got about 350.000 votes.
14 So I grant your point about the number of delegates in the -- in
15 the parliament, in the Assembly, but that does not derive from a high
16 percentage that is the numbers that you've suggested, 90 or more plus
17 per cent of the actual votes that were delivered for candidates of the
19 Q. Well, Mr. Donia, we had less than 32 per cent in the general
20 population, and we won 31 per cent of the votes. This is what I keep
21 insisting on. But let us stick to what you said. I'm not discussing the
22 Presidency. Kecmanovic and other delegates also supported our platform,
23 and this involves all Serbian delegates but three, which is to say that
24 only 4 or 5 per cent of Serbian delegates did not take part of this. Out
25 of 86 the three didn't, but all other 83 did, and they did not represent
1 only the Serbian Democratic Party.
2 Is that how it was, that there were 83 delegates back then and
3 also today in the Serbian parliament?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Can we see English page 108. This is still my speech which is
6 essential for everything we're dealing with now, so that's why I ask you
7 to be patient. I say here:
8 "We do not object you starting the initiative for amending the
10 It's page 106. It should be the page before. It may be even
11 page 105. At the bottom of 105. No, no, 107. I apologise:
12 "We do not care if you submit ..."
13 "We do not object --" it's not translated well:
14 "We do not object, we do not oppose you submitting an initiative
15 to amend the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it will not work
16 that way. It has to pass through the constitutional commission and then
17 to the chamber of citizens and a vote should be taken there, but, again,
18 you cannot interfere in the matters that are regulated by the federal
19 constitution. I am trying in the most peaceful way to tell you this as
20 well. The Serbian people know what you want. You want to achieve -- to
21 ensure in The Hague
22 republic that does not wish to exist in Yugoslavia, and that is not true,
23 because we want to live in Yugoslavia
24 All sovereign people in Bosnia-Herzegovina should speak for themselves.
25 No other group of people should do it on their behalf. We even reached
1 such a conclusion at this Assembly. We will prevent you before domestic
2 and international public from -- from implementing violence against the
3 Serbian people, the constitutional violence, because after constitutional
4 violence all other types of violence could follow.
5 "This has been repeated here hundred of times. We do not have
6 any say in the situation if we get into the situations in which Slovenia
7 and Croatia
8 would be thousand times more grave, and there would be no way to stop
10 And then further down:
11 "I ask you, once again, I'm not threatening, I'm asking you to
12 take seriously the interpretation of the political will of the Serbian
13 people ..."
14 A better interpretation would have been, "I beg you. I'm begging
16 And then further down:
17 "I'm pleading with you to take this seriously, that this is not
18 the proper way, that the road that you chose for Bosnia and Herzegovina
19 is the same highway of hell and suffering which Slovenia and Croatia
20 taken. Do not think that you will not take Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 hell, and Muslim people into obliteration, because should there and a
22 war, Muslim people would not be able to defend themselves."
23 And then somebody said that these were big words, and then I
25 "Well, big situations require big words. How will you prevent
1 people from killing each other in Bosnia and Herzegovina?"
2 Do you still claim that this is a war mongering speech, a
3 belligerent speech?
4 A. Well, as I indicated in answer to -- to Your Honour's question, I
5 believe that the very last part of it is, and essentially the last six or
6 seven sentences that you have read in the context of the time, with their
7 repeated references to violence and parallel republics in which wars had
8 raged or were raging and the manner of your delivery made this into what
9 I would call a -- a brief but final part -- or brief warmongering part of
10 an overall speech that otherwise was not. And I would have to share the
11 rather understated response of Mr. Izetbegovic, who asked for the floor
12 just after you finished, in which he said that the message you delivered
13 and the manner in which you delivered it gave good reason to doubt
14 whether we can, that is he was speaking of Bosnia, can remain in
16 Q. Do you remember that at the previous session of the Assembly
17 Muhamed Filipovic had uttered the same words: "If things go this way, my
18 people will disappear"? Did you notice that sentence?
19 A. No, I've not -- I've not seen that sentence.
20 Q. Thank you. That is quite literally the previous session of the
21 Assembly. However, now let's go back to the beginning. The beginning is
22 actually the end of the speech, when we said we have to clarify things.
23 116 in English. We have to clarify a particular matter that stems from
24 the interpretation of what we're saying from this rostrum. This actually
25 has to do with an issue of war and peace. We have to repeat for the
1 hundredth time that the Serbs are not threatening with war. They are
2 simply making it public that they will not be able to accept any decision
3 that is reached by out-voting.
4 Mr. Donia, do you believe that I was supposed to deceive the
5 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to say to them, Just go ahead, the Serbs
6 will accept that, when I know full well that the Serbs would not?
7 A. Well, you were clearly speaking on behalf here of the SDS and
8 what you envisioned as the Serb people, and you were speaking to a
9 member -- or to a body of which you were not a member. So clearly you
10 were there in your capacity as president of the party, and I think you
11 were delivering the message on behalf of the party and certainly what you
12 believed to be the near unanimous opinion of the Serb people. So I don't
13 believe you were trying to deceive anybody with these pronouncements. I
14 think you were speaking out of genuine conviction and of representing
15 your view points very forcefully, even angrily, but straightforwardly.
16 Q. Thank you. You see, Mr. Donia, even if the Serb Democratic Party
17 had had 51 per cent of the support of the Serb people, they are a
18 legitimate representative. However, I am speaking here because I have
19 the support of 83 MPs out of a total of 86 Serbs -- Serb MPs. That is
20 more than two-thirds from the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that
22 A. More than two-thirds of the what? Of the Serb --
23 Q. More than one-third of the total number of MPs. There is a total
24 number of 248 [as interpreted] MPs, and I have the support of over 80
25 MPs. Eighty is one-third; right?
1 A. At this point on this -- I think on this issue you did.
2 Q. 240. The transcript says 248. So can this be corrected. And
3 I'm not talking about the Serb Democratic Party anywhere over here. I'm
4 talking about Serb people because I have the support of 83 MPs. Ten days
5 before that they had separated into the Serb Assembly. Thank you. Can
6 this be admitted into evidence.
7 JUDGE KWON: Is it not already in evidence?
8 MS. EDGERTON: The -- about three minutes of the audio of this
9 speech is in evidence. The whole audio of this speech is found at 65 ter
11 JUDGE KWON: 45005.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, and it's also transcribed. If we are
13 limiting matters to this speech itself, I actually understood
14 Dr. Karadzic earlier on to be talking about the audio file of the whole
15 session, which was what we are trying to fine, and my apologies for my
16 misunderstanding. In any case, the three minutes is -- has -- which is
17 the portion that we played in Dr. Donia's examination-in-chief is -- has
18 been admitted as P959.
19 JUDGE KWON: That contains only the last part of his minute.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Correct.
21 JUDGE KWON: And 45005 contains whole speech of Mr. Karadzic.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, but to be a hundred per cent sure, I should
23 have somebody check that so that we -- just to confirm that we don't have
24 anything missing at one end or the other, and I could probably have that
25 done in fairly short order.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: Given that Mr. Karadzic wanted to show us the
3 video-tape, we are minded to admit all the video-clip as well as the
4 transcript. So what is the practice? We admit it in separately or
5 altogether? I'll consult the Court Deputy.
6 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
7 JUDGE KWON: So video-tape together with the transcript will be
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, just to clarify, that will be 65 ter
10 45005. That will be Exhibit D267.
11 JUDGE KWON: Together with the English translation, of course.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: Bear that in mind, Mr. Karadzic. With the
14 assistance of the OTP, you should tender the CD that contains that
15 relevant video to the Chamber.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I hope that I will
17 receive that, because I think that what I receive from the OTP was only
18 this part that could be used against me, whereas I would like the
19 Trial Chamber to see the speech in its entirety.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, no, Your Honour. The 65 ter 45005 was
21 disclosed in 2009.
22 JUDGE KWON: Maybe some problem in locating it, so in that case I
23 have no doubt that Ms. Edgerton would be so kind to assist you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Donia, this is the 14th and 15th of October; right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. This comes after everything we had been through before the
4 elections, and then there were the elections and then the division of
5 power and then the first months of government, the attempt to reach a
6 historic agreement between the Serbs and Muslims, the 11th of September,
7 the agreement on not imposing a solution and the legitimacy of all
8 options, and then on the 14th and 15th we have this out-voting. Do you
9 think that it is possible to pass constitutional decisions in an
10 unconstitutional way?
11 A. Well, I'm just completely baffled myself about what the
12 constitution said -- says about this, about the action that was -- that
13 was subsequently taken. I have always thought it looked to me more like
14 a matter of the rules of order of the Assembly than the constitution, but
15 I really don't -- don't know if that's the case and wouldn't pretend
16 to -- to interpret it. I can certainly tell you that you viewed it as
17 unconstitutional and illegal and had for some time before that. That was
18 very clear. And others either didn't comment on it or believed it to be
19 in accord with the constitution. Big controversy about it, but whether
20 it was against the constitution or not, I can't make that judgement.
21 Q. Can we now have 1230. Do you have -- do you know the name
22 Rasim Kadic [Realtime transcript read in error "Tadic"]?
23 A. Yes. He was -- I believe I have the right Kadic here. I think
24 it's wrong in the transcript. It's Kadic. Was the president of the --
25 was it delegates club of the SDA, I believe. He was in the Assembly and
1 spoke for the SDA.
2 Q. Dr. Naim Kadic. Yes, you have a good memory, don't you. But
3 this is Rasim Kadic. He is also a Muslim, but he is the president of a
4 liberal party, right, that came into being on the basis of what used to
5 be the youth party.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that this is not what we
7 asked for. 1290, 1290 is what we're asking for, that is the conversation
8 between myself and Mr. Rasim Kadic on the 16th of October, and in this
9 conversation Rasim Kadic informs me that he had not voted and that his
10 party had not voted in favour of this memorandum on sovereignty, and he
11 said that the road was now open for extra institutional behaviour.
12 I believe that the OTP has a translation. Yes. Yes, here it is.
13 The first page is not really very important. Could we have the next
14 page, please. Could I have the next page in English and in Serbian.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Rasim Kadic, the third line:
17 "I feel it is necessary after everything that had happened for us
18 to meet on a party basis during the course of the next few days, if you
19 can accept that," and then I say, "Well, yes, we can agree on that."
20 And then Rasim Kadic says:
21 "Radovan Karadzic, I am convinced that you know that all of this
22 is illegal and that it has nothing to do with anything whatsoever. The
23 shame that I am now -- is the disgrace that I announced from the stand,
24 that is something that nobody in Europe will be able to swallow."
25 Rasim Kadic says:
1 "I have to say that I didn't take part in the vote, nor do I want
3 And I ask:
4 "You did not participate in the vote, did you?"
5 And Rasim Kadic says:
6 "Of course not. Read today's newspapers."
7 And so on and so forth:
8 "I want you to clear things up in government."
9 And then I say:
10 "Well, we kept saying other things for three months.
11 Mr. Izetbegovic and I had almost reached an agreement and to finish the
12 job so that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina could breathe an sigh of
13 relief. Everybody would have had their own part of Bosnia and
15 used to be it Turkish times. It's all known Taslihan is over here."
16 You know what Taslihan is? That is the part of Sarajevo
17 the Serbs used to live in Turkish times. Mr. Donia, do you know that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. The Turkish district is over here and Latinluk is over there.
20 That's where the Catholic used to live. Everyone minds their own
21 business and all of them together deal with what is everybody's business.
22 That would be possible to do as well. Some would have been involved in
24 We would have found that it was unique solution, Europe, similar to the
25 one that existed in Switzerland
1 sudden all these talks -- after all these talks a paper showed up which
2 was completely different, that is a disgrace, and so on and so forth.
3 Now Rasim Kadic says -- can we move on to the next page so that I don't
4 read everything out. The next page please. The next page.
5 Now, Mr. Rasim Kadic says he doesn't want to mediate. He is
6 trying to find a possibility to -- that would leave to an alleviation of
7 the situation and then he says -- I have to find that part now. He said
8 that in that way the road was open -- yes, here it is the third one, yes,
9 but it is obvious that the mistakes of others are giving rise to an extra
10 institutional solution to the crisis, so that suits no one. This is a
11 Muslim, the president of the Liberal Party. He did not vote, and he is
12 calling me the very next day with sympathy and support, and he is seeking
13 a solution, and he says that the road had been opened for extra
14 institutional behaviour. Were you aware of that? Have you seen this
15 intercept before?
16 A. No, I've not.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence,
19 this intercept? For identification, MFI, because it's an intercept.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll mark it for identification.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 6416. Could we have that,
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Donia, this was the pinnacle of an intensive political life
1 that had started once political parties were established, when
2 multi-party democracy was introduced. Now I would like us to have a look
3 at something. I'm afraid it's not this. 14 -- no, 6416. 6416. That's
4 the 65 ter number.
5 Now I would like to deal with this as briefly as possible and to
6 see what the state of mind of Radovan Karadzic was in July 1990. Let us
7 see what it was that he was thinking, feeling, and saying,
8 Radovan Karadzic, and what it was that he advocated from then up until
9 this moment, that is to say the 15th of October.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, before reading out something, you
11 could -- should tell the witness, as well as to the Chamber, what this
12 document is about. You said pinnacle. What is pinnacle?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The pinnacle of the crisis,
14 Your Excellency, is the 15th of October, when there was a collapse in all
15 our talks and when there was the walkout of the Serb MPs and when the
16 Assembly was established, when the chances of resolving things
17 differently went down the drain. Temporarily though. However, up until
18 the end of March we tried. However --
19 JUDGE KWON: My question was whether it was your interview.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Mistake. 6146. 6146.
21 This is my interview from the 20th of July, 1990.
22 My intention is to see mens rea in this way, to see what the
23 state of mind of Radovan Karadzic was from that moment onwards until the
24 15th of October, and I believe that Mr. Donia is quite familiar with
25 this. He has already spoken about it. Actually, during the first day of
1 cross-examination he made a reference to it. The interview is available
2 to all in it's entirety. I think that the OTP got it, but would I like
3 to call up page 10 in English.
4 Answer number 68.
5 THE WITNESS: What publication is this in, sir? I'm afraid I --
6 JUDGE KWON: Then let's go back to the first page.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. "Nin." That was the most eminent news magazine in all of
10 JUDGE KWON: Doctor, are you satisfied with this?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, I would agree.
12 JUDGE KWON: All right. Then let's go back to that page.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Sixty-eight or 67. The journalist is saying, Are you talking
15 about reconciliation? Karadzic says, Reconciliation is indispensable.
16 The Serbs need to seek peace with others and to forgive as much as
17 possible. We shouldn't be forcing anyone to repent. The penitent
18 himself has to have motivation and moral strength, otherwise there is no
19 use. The Serbs also have to reconcile themselves amongst themselves.
20 The civil war amongst the Serb people has to be brought to an end because
21 it has already brought so much evil. You see I'm talking about the clash
22 between the Royalists and the Republicans, that is to say the Communists.
23 I'm talking about the inter-Serb conflict or clash; right?
24 A. Yes. The Partisan Chetnik, is that what you're suggesting?
25 Partisan-Chetnik clash.
1 Q. Yes. Yes. The first part has to do with our reconciliation with
2 other peoples; right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Now let's move on to 69. However, reconciliation
5 does not mean that the vanquished should rise to the position of victor
6 by dragging the victors down to the place where the defeating were kept
7 in the past. That would also mean a continuation of the civil war. Both
8 the victors and the defeated must leave their positions, their trenches,
9 and meet each other halfway. Do you remember that I had asked for Serbs
10 to stop being both Serbs and Chetniks, rather, to be a modern European
11 people without any such divisions?
12 A. Yes. This was you in July 1990, was frankly the Radovan Karadzic
13 that I liked, who was expressing, I think, a very realistic and sober
14 assessment of the situation amongst the political parties and the
15 assessment of the needs of Serbs to put behind them these clashes from
16 the past between Chetniks and partisans. I mean, it's not my testimony
17 or my account that would paint you as having, back at this time, the kind
18 of animosities that you displayed nor the kind of hard-line positions
19 that you assumed later on in the conflict. I think -- you know, I agreed
20 with you from going back to your days living with and amongst Muslims and
21 your working with Meho as your barber and other things, about that period
22 of your life. I have no problem agreeing with what you actually state
23 here and acknowledging it.
24 JUDGE KWON: With that we'll have a break for 20 minutes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into
1 evidence, this interview?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D269, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Tieger, your motion regarding the witness
5 who is supposed to come at the end of the month, my understanding is that
6 you asked for a leave to reply to the response of the accused, which is
7 now granted, but I wonder whether you can do it by today, end of today.
8 MR. TIEGER: I believe so, Your Honour. If there's any reason to
9 think otherwise, we'll let the Court know immediately.
10 JUDGE KWON: That's granted.
11 Twenty minutes.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have 65 ter
16 31805 in e-court, please.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And to to inform you, Mr. Donia, about what I'm going to put to
19 you now, there's a number of these interviews, and you probably saw most
20 of them, and they go along these lines all the way up until February of
21 1991, and at some future occasion I will tender them into evidence, but I
22 would like now to shed light on the issue of war and peace when it comes
23 to political developments.
24 This is an intercept of a conversation between me and
25 Vitomir Zepinic. It is very interesting, and we will go back to it
1 regarding other issues, because here you can see that I didn't know him.
2 I didn't know Mandic or anybody else, but we will get back to that.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 13 in the
4 English text.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Would you please look at -- I guess the interpreters would need
7 the Serbian version, and for you it is this portion here: "Tomorrow is
8 the question ..." "Tomorrow is the issue of the fate of Bosnia
10 JUDGE KWON: Could you wait a little bit. The interpreters
11 wanted to see the B/C/S version.
12 In the meantime, Doctor, do you know who Mr. Zepinic was?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes.
14 JUDGE KWON: Okay.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Both of them on the screen --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the beginning. Both
18 versions are in B/C/S. One can be in English. It's okay.
19 Let me just tell the others that Vitomir Zepinic was the highest
20 Serbian representative in the Ministry of the Interior. Muslims were
21 given the office of the minister, and the Serbs were allocated the
22 position of the deputy minister, and Zepinic was nominated for that
24 JUDGE KWON: Doctor, do you agree with his --
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, just noting that that was in accord with the
1 inter-party agreements that were reached in the formation of the
2 government in January 1991.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, however since in your presentation,
4 your comment does not constitute evidence. Evidence should come through
5 the witness's words. Let's move on. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'm rushing. I wish to
7 inform you as much as possible.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. The words where it begins, "Tomorrow is the question," so I say
10 to Zepinic:
11 "Tomorrow is the question of the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I
12 have no chance or anyway of changing anything there. Either -- neither
13 the people nor the deputies would accept any exception. Bosnian will
14 remain in Yugoslavia
15 this will be clearly seen tomorrow. Tomorrow, maybe the political
16 system -- or, rather, maybe Bosnia-Herzegovina would collapse and then it
17 would be the end, but we can't help there. We cannot bow our heads down.
18 There's no way we can do that. We're absolutely determined and
19 absolutely clean in that sense."
20 And then his following comments goes.
21 And Karadzic says again:
22 "No. We don't stand a change. Well, I can say -- I can go in
23 front of the Assembly and say that we accept sovereign Bosnia and
25 JUDGE KWON: While the interpreters are following very -- in an
1 excellent manner, but the e-court does not show the relevant B/C/S page,
2 I gather.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In B/C/S it should be page 9, I
4 think. Page 9 of this document.
5 JUDGE KWON: Please carry on.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So then I say:
9 "In two hours there will be chaos in Bosnia." And then I say,
10 "Even were I to accept it, nothing would come out of it because chaos
11 would ensue in two hours."
12 And then could we see the next page in the English version.
13 Then I say:
14 "I have neither right, no efficiency, because in two hours there
15 would be chaos in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
16 So I inform the deputy minister here that even were I to accept,
17 were I to say that we accept the sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, that there
18 would be chaos on the ground and there would be no control over the
20 Have you seen this intercept?
21 A. Yes, I have.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted in the way
24 that intercepts are admitted?
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll mark it for identification.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. This is still the month
3 of June of 1991. Could we now have 65 ter 30055, which is an intercept
4 with Mr. Vukic, a physician from Banja Luka, who was the regional head of
5 the SDS
6 will now only deal with the issue of war and peace.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I rarely intervene, but as regards the
8 previous intercept, having read out all the parts, your only question to
9 the witness was whether he has seen that intercept. What's the point of
10 reading out all the contents of the document? Bear that in mind.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I hope that Mr. Donia
12 produced his report on the basis of everything he had seen, and I'm
13 interested in learning whether he had seen this. If he did see it, then
14 we also have to see how this affected his expert report, and I think
15 that --
16 JUDGE KWON: Put your question to the witness.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. See here, in page 2 in English, I inform Mr. Vukic, and I say:
20 "I think that it is clear now that Izetbegovic wants to wage
22 And then he mentions Babic, and then I say he is basically doing
23 things that favour the belligerent Izetbegovic. Do you remember that I
24 always had to fight against Babic's actions in Bosanska Krajina which
25 favoured the split of Bosnia-Herzegovina? I think you've mentioned this;
2 A. Well, that's not quite right. I think you at times brought him
3 into play in support of your initiatives; and at other times, in fact,
4 most of the time, both you and Mr. Milosevic found him to be a royal pain
5 who kept messing up your plans, and I think what you keep referring to
6 here is the looming initiative of both the Serbs of -- the Serbs of both
7 the Bosnian Krajina and the Krajina in Croatia to proclaim unity, the
8 unity of the two Krajinas which was something they were planning to do
9 toward the end of June. So it stands to make sense to me here that you
10 were speaking with Mr. Vukic in an effort to -- the beginning of your
11 effort to head off this impending union. You followed that up with some
12 other efforts to do it, and eventually when it was proclaimed sort of let
13 it die of neglect. But the -- the role of Babic in that was he was
14 clearly a provocateur and he was promoting it by his travels to
15 Banja Luka as part of officially representing the -- the Krajina in
17 Banja Luka in preparation for proclaiming this union which was -- would
18 have been a real, I think, something the international community would
19 have found extremely distasteful and dangerous.
20 Q. Thank you. Can it be gleaned on the basis of this that I was
21 against the war and that I believed that Izetbegovic wanted to wage a war
22 and that Babic's provocations could give justification to Izetbegovic for
23 his actions?
24 A. Well, I think in some sense these are very general anodyne
25 statements that do, in fact, correspond with your position on what Babic
1 was about to do, but I -- I wouldn't accept the -- the premise that they
2 in general refer to -- or that reflect your belief that Izetbegovic wants
3 a war and so does Babic. I wouldn't go that far. I think in the context
4 in which you are speaking with Mr. Vukic here, they refer to this
5 specific issue of the union of two Krajinas.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, this
8 intercept? I will be going back to this intercept when dealing with
9 other topics too.
10 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification for the time being.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 31813.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. There is my intercept. We're still in June. 24th of June, 1991.
15 It is a conversation between Karadzic, Zepinic, and Mandic.
16 Momcilo Mandic is also one of the officials of the Ministry of the
17 Interior and he was a Serbian candidate; right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Could we now see page 2 in English and also page 2 in
21 I'm having a conversation with Zepinic here, and I say that I
22 went to Nevesinje and that some Muslim paramilitaries had beaten up three
23 young men. There were some 20 of them. They beat three young men, and
24 they were armed with this particular kind of weapon. And then I go on to
25 say that I told them that they shouldn't do anything unlawful there at
1 any cost, even if they are beaten, even if they have great suffering.
2 And then four lines down I say because I know what is behind it. And
3 then I go on to say there is a need to provoke, and Zepinic says chaos
4 and provocation, and I say provocation and only when Serbs are in
5 majority. So precisely in places where Serbs are in majority will let it
6 develop into, and so on. And then I mention Visegrad and then I say and
7 this thing with Visegrad is a disgrace. It will put pressure on
8 Izetbegovic. This is page 2 in English still. And I go on to say that
9 an Orthodox priest in Visegrad was pulled by his beard, and then we go on
10 to say that in Visegrad the Muslim side had already put up a border
11 toward Serbia
12 Have you seen this intercept before during your preparations?
13 A. I did not see it prior to preparing my report. I have seen it
15 Q. Can it be seen on the basis of then that I pleaded with them,
16 saying that they should suffer, put up with all the sufferings and that
17 they should let -- they should put up with beatings even just in order to
18 preserve peace?
19 A. Well, again I think based on the context here I would attribute a
20 more limited significance to your comments, to the statements that you
21 made here. This was taking place at a time that there was indeed a
22 general unrest taking place, much of it under the agitation of
23 Mr. Vucurevic in Eastern Herzegovina. That entailed rallies, some Serb
24 nationalist rhetoric, and a -- enough of a threatening situation so that
25 some Muslim representatives from that area made a trip to the Presidency
1 in Sarajevo
2 that area at this time. And I -- I take it that this is part of your
3 effort to reassure the two people who would have a lot to say about it
4 that the party was, you know, the party was, in fact, wanted to calm
5 things down, that the party was well-intentioned toward the issue of war
6 and peace in that regard.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, so far you have tendered the
10 intercepts in several occasions as evidence, so at this point of time can
11 I get a sort of clarification from you what your attitude as to the
12 intercept is. My understanding is that you are generally opposed to the
13 admission of intercepts into evidence. So is it your position that only
14 those you are referring to should be admitted into evidence or that you
15 are not objecting to the admission of them into evidence?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, for me these
17 intercepts are first and foremost an evidence showing that the Muslim
18 authorities intercepted in an unlawful way conversations of Serbian
19 authorities. Why unlawful? Because this could not be done without the
20 decision of the court and approval of the Presidency, and those are
21 lacking. And the main prosecutor of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a Serb. He
22 was not a member of the SDS
23 serves as evidence that they were intercepting our conversations, that
24 they were unloyal partners. So this is my general objection. And I
25 don't know whether you will admit this or not. I'm doing this just
1 wanting to show what it is that I uttered in my telephone conversations
2 without knowing that this would be intercepted or presented as evidence.
3 If, however, none of this is every going to be admitted, then
4 it's a different matter.
5 JUDGE KWON: We'll leave it there, and then let's continue.
6 We'll mark it for identification.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we see 65 ter
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. You have probably seen this. These are shorthand minutes from
12 the Assembly of the SDS
13 June, 1991, St. Peter's and Paul's day, just so that you know what it is
14 about. So English page 133. You know, that this was the first Assembly
15 held after the SDS
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You see that the fight, which is the next page in the Serbian,
19 118, and I'm talking to them.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 118 in the Serbian
21 version, please. Another two pages. 118, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. It says here you see that the -- "this fight has been taking
24 place in the parliament. It's good that it is taking place in the
25 parliament rather than in the streets. We will do nothing --
1 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you. B/C/S page should show the
2 118. Yes, that's correct. The bottom part. Please continue.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a feeling that you speak
4 Serbian, Your Excellency.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So you see that:
7 "This fight has been taking place in the parliament. It is good
8 that it is taking place in the parliament rather than in the streets. We
9 will do nothing to contribute to this fight spilling into the streets."
10 And then I continue saying:
11 "This is why we have no need for that or anything else except for
12 the strengthening of the JNA which is unfortunately the only federal
13 constitution that we can have trust in."
14 So do you see that back on the 12th of July, 1991, we had a very
15 firm position against the street fights?
16 A. Yeah. I think this is a very -- it's a lengthy speech by you and
17 followed by some by others that contains a lot of different viewpoints
18 on -- on major issues, and -- I mean, one of them that is clearly
19 interesting here is how you've basically rejected the federal
20 institutions except for the Yugoslav People's Army, which raises the
21 question of the significance one would attach to your two previous
22 sentences. So I would -- and then repeat your subsequent remarks here
23 about Mr. Markovic and Mr. Mesic who were the representatives of the
24 federal Prime Minister and the president of the Presidency, respectively.
25 So it isn't here clear here which parliament you're speaking of. Was it
1 the parliament of federal Yugoslavia
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina? It's -- it's certainly a statement of your desire to
3 keep conflicts within parliamentary boundaries, but it's also, I think, a
4 nuance somewhat by some of the remarks that you make surrounding it.
5 Q. Thank you. I'm referring to the parliament of Bosnia and
7 All I'm doing now is showing that, and this is something that you
8 identified yourself, what we wanted was to keep the fighting in the
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this into evidence,
12 JUDGE KWON: If it hasn't been admitted yet, we will admit it
13 into evidence.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D273, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 31843,
17 please. Unfortunately, we do not have the translation here, but I will
18 read this out. It is quite brief.
19 MS. EDGERTON: There should and translation available and
20 uploaded in e-court.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much again. Yes, we have it.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. All right. This is my conversation with Dragan Djokanovic, a
24 physician on the 26th of July, and he was the chairman of the Democratic
25 Party of Federalists. It was a small party which was not represented in
1 the parliament but was quite active in preserving the federation.
2 Do you remember Dragan Djokanovic? Have you seen that name
4 A. I don't recall what -- what his position was or what party he
5 belonged to, no.
6 Q. Have you heard of the Democratic Party of Federalists?
7 A. Yes, I've heard of it. I don't really know what its programme
8 was or anything more about it.
9 Q. Thank you. Here I say:
10 "Because Alija --" this is the last sentence in the English, I
12 "Because Alija has nowhere to go. It's a dead end. All the
13 legal matters are in our hands, and if they were to do something stupid
14 to us now, because the Muslims are turning fiercely against Alija's
15 war-bent intentions."
16 And then on the English side -- on the English page, next page in
17 English, and then I say:
18 "The Muslims who are opposed to the war."
19 It's the next page in English:
20 "The Muslims who do not want to wage war. They have a republic.
21 They have Yugoslavia
22 to wage war in order to change it. Now Alija cannot explain to the
23 Muslim people were they should wage war, and if they do something stupid,
24 then he could say to them, well, this is why you should wage war."
25 So here I explain to Mr. Djokanovic, who is a chairman of a small
1 political party why I was against some minor stupid things that our
2 people did, saying that that would play into the hands of Alija's wish to
3 wage war.
4 And then in the Serbian text we need the next page.
5 I go there to say that now he needs an alibi -- alibi for the
6 war, and we should not aid him in this.
7 So do you remember that at this time, on the 26th of July, the
8 preparations for the historic agreement that we had with Zulfikarpasic
9 and Filipovic was quite advanced and that these were the Muslims that I
10 was referring to?
11 A. Yes. I think that adds the proper context to this -- this
12 conversation. It was at that time when the -- again I think of it as the
14 historical agreement between the Serbs and Muslims. This efforts was
15 underway and both you and Milosevic had decided that the best way to
16 pursue it was to undermine Izetbegovic and force him or somehow influence
17 him to make this agreement come about. It was then your -- it was mainly
18 Milosevic's idea to hold a series of meetings or rallies in Bosnia
19 first of which I think was held about the -- I don't know, the 8th or
20 10th of July, and then this one obviously planned for the 2nd of August.
21 And these were represented as peace rallies. The one that isn't clear to
22 me exactly where this one was scheduled for. The one I'm more familiar
23 with was in Sarajevo
24 the -- you and Milosevic desperately wanted to get this agreement to get
1 republics broke away, that this was part of that effort to represent the
2 ambitions of the party at this point as purely peaceful and as allied
3 against any anybody who was pursuing war.
4 Q. Thank you. Leaving Milosevic aside, who had joined in and
5 Izetbegovic who had approved, but do you agree that the honour of the
6 initiators of the agreement should go to Zulfikarpasic? Right?
8 A. Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Professor Filipovic were the initiators of
9 this proposal. They walked into your office, as I understand it, and
10 proposed it.
11 Q. And you do remember that they had said that Professor Koljevic
12 and I joyfully accepted that. That is what Filipovic wrote in his book;
14 A. I don't remember that, but I don't doubt it a bit. I mean, I
15 the -- these two people who were also the principles of a minor party
16 that got no traction, really, in the elections, were at that time doing
17 all sorts of things to try to gain support or take support away from the
18 SDA and to criticise and, in a sense, marginalise Izetbegovic, and even
19 though they co-operated with him well in some areas, this was very much a
20 part of their effort to get some traction and attention to their party,
21 and they did, indeed, avidly pursue this arrangement with you and
22 Mr. Milosevic when they went to Belgrade
23 Q. Thank you. Mr. Donia, do you agree that the agreement was
24 reached in Sarajevo
25 eventually because Zulfikarpasic wanted a broader framework? Yes or no?
1 Were the main protagonists of the agreement in Sarajevo
2 and the MBO?
3 A. That was not my understanding of -- of it at that point. I -- I
4 think that when the -- when the idea first came about and they walked
5 into your office and you met, I think at the SDS headquarters, you walked
6 into the next room, called Milosevic and arranged for them to go -- or
7 for at least Zulfikarpasic to go up there the next day, and they had a
8 conversation that next day in which he offered a number of things in
9 order to secure the agreement and --
10 Q. [No interpretation]
11 A. And if -- you know, I really -- I'm trying to answer your
12 questions. I'm trying to listen carefully to what you ask me and hope
13 that you listen to what I have to say to you.
14 Subsequently, Milosevic and you were in touch, but he actually
15 then sort of delegated to you and actors in Bosnia the primary
16 responsibility for reaching the agreement, drafting it, and then he
17 reviewed its terms.
18 Q. Well, Doctor, I'm listening to what you're saying, and I'm
19 reading this, so I see exactly what your answer is.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this intercept be admitted into
21 evidence just like all the rest?
22 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.
23 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 31849 is the 65 ter
1 number I'd like now.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
3 Q. This is already the 1st of August. Before I deal with this, I'd
4 like to ask you whether you remember that Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic
5 confirmed that we went to see Izetbegovic together and that he asked that
6 we go on with the agreement and that he actually said that he had lost
7 the confidence of the Serbs and that it's better for the MBO to pursue
9 A. That's generally my -- in general my understanding. Maybe not
10 the specific words, but that was the -- the essence of the agreement that
11 you reached at that time.
12 Q. Thank you. Can we now have page 4 in English. Page 4 in
13 English, and in Serbian it's also 4.
14 It's the 1st of August, and I am saying -- I'm speaking to
15 Mr. Krajisnik, actually. He is asking me whether I attended that
16 commission, that conference, and I said yes. I said that we had
17 disclosed that and that it is prepared for signing, and once the peoples
18 get their bearings and reach agreement, then -- and he says: "Alija says
19 that?" Yes. I said I did not talk to him about that. And then I say
20 here, "Politika" carried the news that he would -- that he said that they
21 would fight if there's a war. The Muslim would fight on the side of the
22 Croats. And Krajisnik says a-ha, and I say I thinking it something
23 really terrible and then further down, now we have to tell the Muslims
24 whether what Alija is saying is correct.
25 Do you see that? In the midst of our talks Izetbegovic made a
1 statement saying that the Muslims would fight on the side of the Croats.
2 A. If I'm following this correctly, that was something published in
3 "Politika," and I would, on that basis, raise serious questions about its
4 reliability, because while "Nin" was indeed a quality publication at that
5 time, "Politika" had become basically a voice, a mouthpiece for the
6 Milosevic regime.
7 Q. However, there's no doubt that I did read that and that I was
8 making comments when speaking to Krajisnik that this was terrible and
9 that we will have to see whether what Alija is saying is correct. Do you
10 agree with that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll mark it for identification.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 30136, 65 ter. 30136,
18 65 ter. Again, Karadzic/Krajisnik, on the 7th of August. As for the
19 other aspects, we'll deal with them on some other occasion. Now we are
20 just going to deal with the issues of war and peace. So it's page 2.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. You can see the date. We're waiting for the English. Yes.
23 Karadzic and Krajisnik, on the 7th of August. And then on page 2 I am
24 saying all of these things in relation to the agreement. And around the
25 middle of the page I say:
1 "I think that our 'hawks' can be sorry that they also went.
2 There are some of 'our' people --" Yes, it's the second page in Serbian,
3 as well, yes.
4 A. I'm sorry, I don't see where you're -- oh, I see it now. Okay.
5 Q. Below Zulfikarpasic you see the quotation marks:
6 "'Our' people who say, well, let them start," and then there is
7 some profanity, "so that we can finish it once and for all." So I am
8 quoting our hawks. And Krajisnik says, "Yes." "For all time," says
9 Karadzic. "So many of our 'own' people will be disappointed if we reach
10 an agreement with the Muslims." Krajisnik says, "You know, what they're
11 saying. Our hawks will not agree with that for sure." And I say, "They
12 will not agree. They won't."
13 And then English page 4 and page 3 in Serbian. English page 4,
14 Serbian 3:
15 "We don't want to fight with you any more. If you leave, we are
16 going to vote against, but we are not going to fight any more." And up
17 here it says that, "We are reaching an agreement with Adil, and we are
18 getting -- taking care of our business. We have other things to do. So
19 as for departures from Yugoslavia
20 fight if somebody wants to leave but we are going to vote against it."
21 Can you see that line?
22 A. No, I'm sorry, I don't --
23 Q. In Serbian it's six from the bottom, and in the English it's the
24 first line from the top.
25 A. Okay, I see -- I do see that line, yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Does that not confirm our position that it is
2 necessary to vote but not to wage war?
3 A. I -- I'm -- without reviewing this further, and I'm a little bit
4 uncertain about the flow of the conversation, I -- I don't know whether
5 this is another one of those anodyne statements that is put out for good
6 measure or whether it may refer to the specific situation in one part of
8 agree that's what it says here, but I'm just not able to give it much
9 more context -- or any context.
10 Q. Well, the context is what recedes it, the preceding sentence, the
11 same document, that our hawks, because the Muslim hawks, too, see it says
12 that up here, or, rather, on the previous page, on page 2 in English.
13 The SDS
14 convincing on Belgrade TV that he presented 100 arguments, I mean
15 arguments in favour of the agreement. And then further down I say that I
16 understand them because our hawks would be opposed to the agreement too.
17 And then towards the end I say that our position is that we are going to
18 vote against it but we're for the going to fight with anyone. Do you see
19 the context now?
20 A. Yeah, do I see some further context now. I see the very top of
21 the page here in English, "Tunjo," which is a reference to Filipovic,
22 said that he would have 40 per cent in new elections, he said, of the
23 Muslim votes. And that's his use of this potential agreement to try to
24 get -- ratchet up the position of his small party in any future
25 balloting. So I think it is, indeed, an effort that you're promoting to
1 make anybody who opposes this agreement look like a war monger.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
4 JUDGE KWON: Likewise.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I would like to remind you, Professor, that I am now dealing only
8 with traces or, rather, evidence pertaining to the state of mind in view
9 of war and peace.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 30161 is the 65 ter number I'd like
11 to have now.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. This is a telephone conversation between Nenad Stevandic, a young
14 student of medicine then at the time, and Karadzic on the 18th of August.
15 So all of this is in August. Serbian page 2, English page 1 for the time
17 It says here:
18 "Tell them not to do anything stupid."
19 English page 1.
20 JUDGE KWON: At the bottom of the page. Bottom of the page.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. "Tell them," yes:
23 "Tell them not to do anything stupid on any account, because then
24 we would be accused of these stupidities. Alija, and tell them this
25 outright. Alija, remember this, does not have any arguments against the
1 Serbs. He cannot tell the Muslims we don't want to reach an agreement
2 with the Serbs. However, he cannot say why it is that we don't want
4 So --
5 JUDGE KWON: Could you wait. We need to see the next page.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, the next page in English.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, carry on.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. So he says to the Muslims, "We don't want to reach agreement with
10 the Serbs," but he cannot say why. So we shouldn't provide him with any
12 Don't you see that I am asking this young man to use his
13 influence so that nothing stupid is done and not to strengthen that line
14 within the Muslim leadership that is opposed to the agreement?
15 A. No. I -- I take it somewhat differently. The -- it seems to me
16 you're dealing here with -- you're struggling to deal with the leadership
17 of the Bosnian Krajina, the ZOBK, the Community of Municipalities of
18 Bosnian Krajina, who had been, in a sense, brought to heel in the wake of
19 the proclamation of the unity of the two Krajinas in late June with a
20 decision reached at that meeting that you reference where you gave the
21 speech on St. Peter and Paul's day to put all regionalisation under the
22 Main Board, and that had evoked a series of efforts, threats, if you
23 will, by the leadership of the Bosnian Krajina to declare a separate
24 polity of some sort there.
25 So what's going on here, I think, is that you're trying to use
1 this young medical student who -- I don't know if he -- I don't know if
2 he held any political position, but to try to use them to keep these
3 people in -- in Banja Luka in line, keep them quiet until the agreement
4 is signed, which you anticipated, I believe, would be signed very
6 Q. For your information, this young man was a member of the
7 committee of the Serb Democratic Party in Banja Luka and in Krajina, and
8 he was against any breakups that contribute to tensions. So you felt
9 this right. I am asking him to prevent hotheads from making mistakes.
10 And now let's move on to page 2. In Serbian it's still page 2.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please do not make statements without
12 asking the witness.
13 Dr. Donia, would you like to comment?
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Isn't that right?
16 A. I agree. That's my understanding as well.
17 Q. Thank you. Can we have page 2 in English, please, and then
18 Radovan Karadzic says:
19 "Yes. Therefore, why would we help him now find his way? Let
20 him sink. Zulfikarpasic is trying to send him as well and everybody
21 else. He has to tell the Muslims why he wants war against the Serbs. He
22 has to explain that. And now if they do something stupid there he's
23 going say this is why we want war against the Serbs. That is along the
24 lines of what we were saying a few moments ago; right?
25 A. Yes, all of it. I think the effort here is to undermine
1 Izetbegovic, try to enlist this young man and painting him as a war
2 monger and to use the prospect of the -- giving him an occasion or a
3 pretext for turning away from the agreement to calm the -- those Serbs in
4 the Bosnian Krajina leadership who were making noises about autonomy of
5 their own.
6 Q. Thank you. However, do you agree that I don't want to undermine
7 Izetbegovic? I'm just talking about the possible alibi he might have for
8 waging war against the Serbs or how he could explain things to the
9 Muslims, why he wanted to wage war against the Serbs; right?
10 A. No. I think this is part of the overall effort to undermine
11 Izetbegovic and to force him, basically, to concur in this agreement by
12 working against him with both Muslims and Serbs who were similarly
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document please be
16 admitted as usual.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now have 30242, 65 ter
21 Could I now please have --
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Actually, this is a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and
24 Vojo Kupresanin on the 18th of September, 1991, as we can see on page 1,
25 and then Serbian page number 3 and English page number 2.
1 Radovan Karadzic is advocating the following here: That
2 reservists should respond to the JNA call-up. And we're going to see now
3 why it is that I'm saying that. I am saying that this has proven to be
4 the case now. They should all urgently go to the local boards. Mass
5 response, because whether there will be war or peace depends on that.
6 Again there's a profanity there.
7 Let me respond. The barracks should be brought up to normal
8 levels. And then further down, yes, yes, yes.
9 Let the barracks be as full as possible. Let there be this army
10 replenishment so that we can show and prove to Europe that peace is the
11 only way out, that they should not wage war.
12 Can't you see that we are advocating mobilisation in order to
13 avert the danger of war?
14 A. I think this goes to the fundamental decision that was made
15 sometime in 1990, or maybe earlier, by President Milosevic that the Serbs
16 should not organise their own army, that they should instead support and
17 join the JNA in accord with various call-ups and mobilisations in order
18 to retain for the Milosevic regime and its allies the services of the JNA
19 as by far the most significant military force in the region.
20 Now, I think that was a fateful decision, because it meant
21 that -- it put the JNA in the position of supporting the various Serb
22 political movements outside of Serbia
23 absolutely in accord with your position on -- on that, which was you
24 wanted to prevent the leaders in the Bosnian Krajina from organising a
25 separate Serb army, and in this situation, specifically you wanted to
1 prevent them from marching off on their own into Croatia in support of
2 the Serbian uprising there -- or Serb fight with the -- with the Croatian
3 security forces. And that became a huge issue at this time, and it was
4 absolutely essential for you, both at Milosevic's behest and to keep your
5 own control over the party in that area --
6 Q. [No interpretation]
7 JUDGE KWON: No, no, Dr. Karadzic. Don't -- you interrupted
8 Dr. Donia's response in a different manner. Please continue. Please
9 concentrate on the doctor's evidence.
10 THE WITNESS: So I think this -- this intercept is really, to me,
11 a very appropriate illustration of the position that you were in right
12 then, and that's why I will certainly agree with the statements you made
13 about peace. I'm not too sure it makes sense to say that we're going to
14 mobilise and add a bunch of soldiers and thereby increase our military
15 preparedness in order to -- because we're so committed to peace, but
16 those are your words here. And again I don't accept them as a broad,
17 general statement of your peaceful intentions for all time and eternity,
18 but I certainly accept them as a statement of your policy at this point,
19 which was you didn't want these people to be marching off on their own
20 into Croatia
21 that regard.
22 Q. Thank you. But you do agree, don't you, that in mid-September
23 the JNA was a legal and legitimate military force and that -- the fact
24 that we advocated response to mobilisation also meant that we opposed
25 paramilitary formations, which is something that you said as well.
1 Now, tell me, please, was the JNA at that point in time a
2 legitimate military force in Bosnia
3 A. Yes, it was. It may have -- it was engaging in some activities
4 at that time which some people in Bosnia believed were not legitimate and
5 legal, but as a whole, as a force it was indeed the Yugoslav People's
6 Army and therefore a legitimate military force in all republics.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, please, in
8 the regular way.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now call 65 ter 30335.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. This is an intercept of my conversation with a writer,
14 Gojko Djogo, and this conversation is known. It is quite complicated,
15 and we will now only deal with the page that speaks of the war. So could
16 we have page 2 both in English and in Serbian. And to avoid me reading
17 this, would everybody please look at the portion where I say, "At the
18 Assembly." "At the Assembly Alija Izetbegovic spoke two or three times,"
19 and then I go on to say what I said, how we are allowing them to do that.
20 So I'm informing my friend Djogo about what we were doing at the Assembly
21 and how we were trying to avert the war and how they would fare well,
22 fare badly should there be a war, and that -- how they should be beaten
23 if they initiate the war and how they would disappear, disappear from the
24 face of the earth if they continue with these efforts and that they were
25 offered more than the Serbs had ever been offered, and that they should
1 go to the Assembly of Yugoslavia if they wanted to achieve that, because
2 there was no chance of them achieving that here.
3 So do you remember that we established that the Federal
4 Presidency adopted the procedure for seceding from Yugoslavia and that it
5 was done in a constitutional manner in the Assembly of Yugoslavia?
6 A. Dr. Karadzic, how can you cite this intercept and these few words
7 about peaceful intentions without following it with the context of what
8 you portrayed as this apocalyptic destruction of the Serb people -- or of
9 the Muslim people? That is -- is to me the most -- you can't be
10 indifferent to the fact that you first offer up these nice little
11 comments about the desire for peace then and go into this wildly imagined
12 destructive scenario which would seem to just push aside any significance
13 one would attribute to the earlier comments in your -- in your remarks
15 Q. We will qualify this later, but let us look now at what I
16 uttered. This intercept is frequently quoted as detrimental to me, and
17 now I am putting it before all of us.
18 I say we are allowing them to do this. However, they are
19 preparing to wage the war, and they will try to start a war. So the
20 topic is war and peace. And in the middle of the second page I say we
21 are allowing them. We are allowing them to do what they want. And then
22 Djogo says at the top, "Gentlemen, you are doing what you want." And
23 then I say we are allowing them, and then towards the bottom I am telling
24 them that they should go to the Assembly of Yugoslavia, to seek a
25 constitutional manner of seceding from Yugoslavia. And it is true that I
1 anticipated that should there be a war they would fare the worst, and
2 that's how it was because they went to war against the Serbs and the
3 Croats and everybody else. So why do you think that I'm wishing for
4 this? I'm simply warning that this is how it could be. Am I wishing for
5 war or am I trying to prevent the war?
6 JUDGE KWON: Just before you answer, Doctor, I take it that you
7 remember the context or the contents of this intercepted conversation,
8 because it -- because all of the parts were not shown to us now.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. Yes, I do, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. On that basis you may proceed to answer,
12 THE WITNESS: You speak here -- I'm sorry.
13 JUDGE KWON: No. Please continue.
14 THE WITNESS: Okay. You speak here as one who is totally in
15 control of the situation, and you say to your interlocutor that you will
16 allow the Muslims to take this way out, and if they don't take this way
17 out that certain things are going to happen to them, and the certain
18 things that are going to happen to them amount to their near total
19 destruction. The issue of war or peace is something that you say you
20 hold in your hands depending on how they behave. It's a clear statement
21 in the first part of this paragraph that you just read that you are going
22 to grant them at your largess the opportunity to do what you think they
23 ought to do or else these consequences are going to be dire.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Well, let us be more specific. Am I saying here that they were
1 getting ready for the war while we were proposing a political solution?
2 Yes or no? They were getting ready for the war. They would try to wage
3 war here. Do you see that on page 2 in the English version?
4 A. You're saying that, "We let them, but they are preparing for
5 war." Yes.
6 Q. And previously, Djogo says let them do what they want, and I'm
7 saying we are letting them doing what they want, but they do not want to
8 go to the Assembly. Rather, they're getting ready for the war. So I'm
9 not controlling anything. I'm just saying that they were getting ready
10 for the war, and should there be a war there could be a catastrophe. And
11 let me ask you this: You didn't know this on the first day. Did the
12 Presidency of Yugoslavia
13 manner of seceding from Yugoslavia
14 JUDGE KWON: Before that, Doctor, would you agree with the
15 observation of the accused in interpreting that "we let them"?
16 THE WITNESS: No. I have a somewhat different interpretation of
17 it, but they are his words, and I'm not too sure that I would -- well, I
18 can't -- I can't, you know, speak for what was in his inner heart at that
20 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed to answer. Thank you. To his
22 THE WITNESS: All right. The question then is did the Presidency
23 of Yugoslavia
24 of the other day was that there was a -- you suggested there was a
25 proposal entered but not -- not adopted.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, with that we'll have a break for half
2 an hour.
3 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
5 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Therefore, we're still dealing with this document. Could we now
8 see page -- this is an intercept that I think you're aware of, Mr. Donia,
9 because the indictment relies on it heavily.
10 Djogo and I are talking here, and we are anticipating various
11 difficult scenarios.
12 Now I would like us to turn to page 8 in English. Page 8 in
13 English, and 228 in Serbian. So five pages down.
14 I here speak of Faletici, and I say tonight they fired at a
15 warehouse near Sarajevo
16 And I say in Faletici, just above the Old Town however, the warehouse is
17 completely mined and they can only take a very narrow path to past. And
18 then I say that it is completely clear, that even the MUP works against
19 the army, and they know exactly who in the MUP is doing that, and they
20 are following the movements of the army and making assessments and on.
21 They were preparing. They did had some weaponry. The MUP distributed
22 the weapons to them. And we said to Izetbegovic we don't mind that the
23 Muslims having weapons, although we hope that you're not crazy enough to
24 use weapons against the Serbs, and it will be difficult for the Serbs but
25 you will see how they will fare. You don't stand a chance. Dissociate
1 yourselves from the Ustashas and have your own policies and mind your own
3 So you see here that I said I didn't mind the Muslims getting
4 weapons if they wanted to defend themselves. Do you remember me stating
6 A. I remember the passage from my earlier review of the document.
7 Q. Do you remember me stating in the media, publicly, that we didn't
8 mind the Muslims arming themselves if they were procuring weapons in
9 order to defend themselves? We didn't mind them getting weapons, as long
10 as they were not going to attack us with those weapons.
11 A. No.
12 Q. Thank you. Could we now see page 9 in English.
13 I go on to say, "But we still have negotiations scheduled for
14 tomorrow." We have negotiations tomorrow, and we will try to come up
15 with an option which would be acceptable to everybody. That we had
16 nothing against them separating out their own areas, but what will they
17 do with that? They can't do anything with that. They can only have a
18 somewhat greater autonomy and so on.
19 And then below that I say they have no way of carrying out a
20 secession. I think that this is clear to everybody, including the army.
21 It will be a bloody slaughter, and on this occasion the army will not use
22 only two planes.
23 So that's page 9. And then if we can see page 12 in English. Do
24 we have page 12? Where I say:
25 "They, because you really can't -- you want really say that there
1 aren't any. There are some ordinary people out there, and I think that
2 we should stretch out both arms to them, but as far as the leadership is
3 concerned, there is no hesitation there. They have to know that if they
4 want to secede, they will have to start a war against us and beat us,
5 fight us, and then we will respond back. That goes without saying."
6 Do you remember that we were saying that we had what we needed in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina? We had our territory. We had had our power, and if
8 they wanted to declare a state of their own, they couldn't do that in our
9 territory. Do you remember us saying that?
10 A. Well, I think what you're saying here is what I characterise as
11 the -- as part of -- closely related to the disappearance diatribe which
12 is what you engage in in this intercept as a whole and indicate that the
13 Muslims have only a couple of options. You determine what is successful
14 or what is acceptable for the options that they can pursue, and if they
15 choose to pursue other options or don't comply with your conditions that
16 there will be this war, conflagration that will result in their
17 disappearance. And this is, I think, language that you -- I first
18 encounter at -- in a telephone conversation that you had with --
19 intercept that you had with Mr. Krajisnik on the 4th of September in
20 which he cautioned you, he coached you in a sense, against using this
21 type of language, and he said be sure that you use -- when you use this,
22 say, Hey, we're all going to disappear. He said that to you, and you
23 essentially disregarded his advice. And in a number of subsequent
24 telephone conversations, and this is one of them, continued to use the
25 formulation that the Muslims would disappear. The Muslims would be the
1 primary losers in any conflict. And then, you know, you further allowed
2 that same language to creep into the last few sentences of your public
3 speech to the Assembly session on the 14th, 15th of October.
4 So the language here, to me, is clearly a one that is threatening
5 and one that is directed against the Muslims whom you now have given just
6 a few options which if they don't take terrible Draconian -- horrific
7 things are going to happen.
8 Q. First of all, by using those threatening words as you call them,
9 am I talking them into a war or am I trying to talk them out of going to
11 A. Well, I think that have you were -- and just to note that in this
12 case you're not talking to them in this conversation, but use of the
13 language in general contributed to heightened tensions and certainly made
14 them more inclined to prepare for war.
15 Q. Do you believe that somebody had a right to impose a solution to
16 Serbs? Do you think that somebody had a right to change the position of
17 the Bosnia and Herzegovina in an unconstitutional way and that we were
18 duty bond to accept that? Please answer with yes or no.
19 A. Well, I think you've asked that question a number of times before
20 and I think I have indicated at that time I can't sort out constitutional
21 issues in the departure of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the federation.
22 Whether it would be constitutional or not, I don't know. Whether there
23 would be a constitutional way to do it or not, I don't know.
24 Q. Thank you. But you see here, professor, we can see here that we
25 are leaving some options for them. We have the situation we want. We
1 are in Yugoslavia
2 unconstitutional way, and we are giving them several options. We are
3 saying you can do it this way, that way, but you cannot force us. And
4 where can you see the fault with the Serbs here?
5 A. Where do I see the fault with the Serbs? I see the fault with
6 you. I see the fault with your statements which are clearly threatening
7 and clearly issued from the point of view of someone who believes he has
8 command of the situation and can dictate to the Muslims what their
9 options are.
10 Q. Well, Mr. Donia, you will see now that I'm saying that I could
11 accept that the things would go their way and that there was no chance.
12 Did you see that in other intercepts, even the one with Mr. Zepinic, as
13 well as this one with Mr. Djogo? I'm saying to everybody that regardless
14 of what I would accept, there would be chaos. A chaos would ensue in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina in two hours. Do you think that I could control
16 2 million Serbs who would rebel against this attempt to take them back to
17 the Turkish times?
18 A. Yes, do I believe you had sufficient control of the SDS and the
19 broader Serb followers of the party to do that.
20 Q. Could we now see page 7 of this document in English. Page 7 in
21 English. "No, they don't understand":
22 "No, they don't understand that the Serbs are at a boiling point,
23 that the Serbs take time to ignite, but they burning for a long time.
24 They don't have a clue. I can't tell our Muslim partners here," and then
25 there's a curse. "Don't you understand that the Serbs will fight to the
1 last man for their state so as not to lose it?"
2 Do you remember that Zulfikarpasic said that, in the Turkish
3 times, the Serbs and Croats were a second-rate nation and they were
4 afraid they could become one once again? Do you remember what
5 Zulfikarpasic said? We read that just the other day.
6 A. I think you are here again absolutising the Serb people and
7 assuming that they have a single will, a single wish of which you are the
8 interpreter, and basically then opting out of your own responsibility for
9 these statements and these threats by blaming it on some inevitable
10 response of the Serb people. I don't think that was, in fact, the case,
11 and I stand by my point that I think this is a choice you made to express
12 things in these terms and to invoke the imminent will of the Serb people
13 for something that you were, in fact, responsible for.
14 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, it may have been said and I may
15 have missed it, I can see who you're speaking to here, Djogo, but what
16 position did he hold?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He's a poet. He had no political
18 position. He's a friend of mine. We were talking, and I explained to
19 him what our situation was like. This is two friends talking. He held
20 no political office.
21 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, that's what I thought, but I wanted to
22 clear that up.
23 THE WITNESS: If I may, I think that's wrong. I agree with
24 everything you just said, but he was also president of the Association of
25 the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade, which was -- one could
1 consider a NGO.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. It was a humanitarian association. They held no political power.
4 They dealt with humanitarian issues, the association, didn't they?
5 A. Well, they -- I call them a NGO. I think that's essentially the
6 same thing, but you did have him speak at a number of different SDS
7 sponsored events, and I believe he even addressed the founding Assembly
8 or one of the early Assemblies under the title of the president of the
9 Association of Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade.
10 Q. Yes. But don't you agree that there were several presidents?
11 There was Dr. Jamagija [phoen] who held that post. So it was not a
12 political position, was it?
13 A. Well, it was a political position, because he used the title to
14 express political views, and I agree fully that he was a long-time friend
15 of you -- yours, and you'd done great things for him, and he for you, and
16 I agree that this is a conversation between two long-time friends and
17 therefore a very candid conversation. You, at the end, indicate best
18 greetings to his wife and child, but he did hold a post from which he
19 issued political opinions and did play that role.
20 JUDGE KWON: Just out of curiosity, Doctor, how did you know that
21 Mr. Djogo and Mr. Karadzic had been long-time friends?
22 THE WITNESS: Well, he -- each of them, actually, have written
23 about it in some articles that were published. There's a wonderful book
24 which is called "Radovan," edited and gathered by a woman named
25 Bulatovic, Ljiljana Bulatovic, which contains a whole variety of essays
1 and a number of speeches, some of Dr. Karadzic's poetry. It's a very --
2 to me a very rich resource on Dr. Karadzic's life and his entry into
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: Is that book published in English, do you know?
6 THE WITNESS: No, it is not, I'm afraid. I'd be glad to provide
7 a copy of the book and -- for possible translation if you would like.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: No. I think that would be too big a task. But
9 the chance of me learning Serbo-Croat is so remote that I'll just leave
10 it up to your description, thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Thank you. Can I now just draw your attention to the last
13 portion that I read out where I'm making a distinction between the people
14 and the leadership. You know, that there are different leaderships and
15 that I was on good terms with the MBO leadership and with Abdic.
16 However, as far as the leadership is concerned, well, whatever, but then
17 the Muslim -- we should put a hand out to the Muslim people -- or,
18 rather, both hands out to the Muslim people. That's on page 12 in
20 If you wish, I can read it out.
21 A. I'm sorry, I just don't see it.
22 Q. "They -- well, because you really can't, you know, you can't say
23 that there aren't any because there are ordinary people out there, and I
24 think that they should be welcomed with open arms, but as far as the
25 leadership is concerned, there will be no hesitation. They must know
1 that if they want to secede they will have to --" see so we make a
2 distinction between the people and the leadership; right?
3 A. Yes, I think you did this quite frequently, actually, to have
4 very different views about the leadership, by which you meant the
5 leadership of the SDA, and what you conceived of as a broader Muslim
7 Q. Thank you. Did you notice when a Muslim intellectual, Causevic,
8 was leaving the SDA before all the conflicts, that he said to
9 Izetbegovic, "Do you think that the Serbs are fools and that they cannot
10 see what you're doing?" Did you notice that sentence?
11 A. Where? When? I'm not --
12 Q. It was an open letter of Causevic to Izetbegovic, and he provided
13 an explanation why he was leaving the SDA. "Do you think that the Serbs
14 are fools and that they don't see what you're doing?" If you haven't
15 seen it, never mind. I'm going to bring it one day and you'll see.
16 A. I've not seen it. I think, you know, this happened in all the
17 national parties. In the early days there was a great deal of back and
18 forth about who was going to be in the party and who was not, and
19 splinter parties formed. Let's just say I would be certainly unsurprised
20 to find that kind of a comment coming from someone leaving the party.
21 Q. He left the party providing the explanation that Izetbegovic is
22 pursuing the wrong kind of policy against the Serbs or vis-a-vis the
24 Now, that sentence itself shows that that was the reason that he
25 mentioned; right? If that sentence is correct, would that be right then?
1 A. Well, I think you've got very similar or even stronger
2 pronouncements coming outs of, you know, Mr. Filipovic or
3 Professor Filipovic and Mr. Zulfikarpasic. Yes. These allegations that
4 Izetbegovic were -- was -- was anti-Serb were not uncommon among people
5 who were -- who either left the SDA or formed separate parties.
6 Q. Thank you. And did you notice how Zulfikarpasic explained his
7 split with the SDA? He said -- I mean, he amnestied or pardoned the
8 entire SDA and that's what I'm doing too. And he said that within the
9 SDA there was a conspiratorial nucleus of the young Muslims who were
10 doing everything behind the backs of the rest of the Party of Democratic
12 A. Yes. I think that was again pretty routine critique coming from
13 the MBO at that time, basically attacking Izetbegovic for any number of
14 things amongst his policies or his -- his views.
15 Q. For your information, you know, that I had objections against
16 Izetbegovic for as long as this had to do with the Muslims, but do you
17 agree that I was saying that this could not pertain to the Serbs? We
18 were never trying to be the arbiters of what the Muslim people would be
19 like or what Islam would be like. Our only concern was that this should
20 not affect the Serbs?
21 A. Well it certainly doesn't sound it from the language in the
22 intercept that you just -- that you just -- that we have on the screen
23 before us. I -- I have no question at all you were on good terms with
24 Izetbegovic for a long time and that your -- even as your differences
25 increased politically you actually stayed on decent personal terms for
1 some time into the -- into the conflict. After all, you saw him
2 regularly in the course of Assembly sessions and even later on in the
3 course of activities related to the Presidency.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this intercept already been
6 admitted as a Prosecution exhibit or should we tender it now?
7 JUDGE KWON: I don't think so. We will mark it for
9 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you believe, Professor, that I was an autocrat or do you think
12 I was a democrat, say in the inter-party life -- or, rather, within the
13 party of -- of the SDS
14 A. That's probably not an either/or question. It is a question of
15 where one is on a continuum between one and the other. I believe you
16 really worked hard to become the -- the autocrat of the party, if you
17 will, the SDS
18 you basically dealt with it very constructively and became a very
19 powerful leader of the party.
20 Now, I think any party leader is -- of any political party,
21 democratic, communist, or any other kind, is to some degree an autocrat
22 if he or she is to be effective. So I think that was where your -- your
23 greatest success lay, in a sense, at acquiring power as the leader of the
24 party. I think you later did so as a leader of the state, but I'm not --
25 I wouldn't say that any of that is inherently antidemocratic. It's just
1 the way that organisations work in any society, democratic or otherwise.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the stage of reaching decisions is
3 something that requires democracy, whereas the phase of implementing
4 decisions calls for efficacy and responsibility?
5 A. Well, I would take that as basically a statement of democratic
6 centralism. The way decisions were made in the Communist period with a
7 lot of open discussion and debate followed by a phase of complete
8 consistent -- consistent implementation and intolerance of opposition to
9 the -- the point of view that may have been defeated in the
10 decision-making process. So that's, I think, the way that you formulate
11 it, I would say that in general you have to execute decisions there are
12 made democratically with some sort of executive body that does, in fact,
13 carry out such orders, but I think the way you formulated it is, in fact,
14 a bit closer to the specific democratic centralism that characterised the
15 Communist period.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 30414. That's the
18 65 ter number. Could we have that in e-court, please? Page 6 in
19 English. The 9th of November, yes.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. That's around the time of our plebiscite; right? It was in
22 November that it took place; right?
23 A. 9th and 10th of November; yes.
24 Q. Now, this is a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and
25 Vojo Kupresanin.
1 Could I please have page 6 in English. It's fine in English. 2,
2 4, 6. Six would be right in Serbian as well.
3 Now, this is -- well, this is how it starts well, "Britain
4 there's a reference to Britain
5 "The Serb Assembly passed a decision Saturday and Sunday from
6 7.00 to 1900 hours. There is no person who can change it, neither
7 Karadzic nor Milosevic nor God himself. From 7.00 until 1900 hours that
8 is what the Assembly decided. That Assembly where he and Vukic are
9 members, must be respected by everybody in some way, it is the only way."
10 And then one answer further down:
11 "If the Assembly makes a decision then who am I to change it? I
13 people. I am not some kind after big shot or a boss who could change
14 things. Neither is he. None of us are. We are here to serve that
16 See? That's the authority I have. It has to do with
17 implementation, not with a passing of decisions. On the other hand,
18 don't you see that we are saying that the Serb Democratic Party is not
19 making decisions but seeking solutions? Did you not notice that even
20 Mr. Krajisnik always asks for unanimity? If there is one person against
21 something, he asks for things to be changed so that decisions would be
22 unanimous. Do you agree that decision-making was very long and
23 painstaking in our situation?
24 A. I think that the pattern was that the debates were very long and
25 painstaking and sometimes quite -- quite contentious, but the actual
1 votes were almost always unanimous, and so I kind of took that as an
2 indication of your authority as head of the party and enforcing party
3 discipline when actual votes were taken as opposed to the discussion
4 which seemed to be free-wheeling exercise in speech, including some
5 speech that was very critical of you and critical of Milosevic, critical
6 of Mr. Krajisnik. So it was -- it was indeed a pretty free-flowing
7 debate. The decisions, however, almost always unanimous or very close to
9 Q. And did you notice that every decision was invariably changed
10 during the course of the debate and ultimately a decision would be
11 reached that would be almost unanimous? You mentioned one example
12 when -- when Krajisnik asked one MP, Why are you against that? And then
13 finally when the decision changed then it was unanimous at the end;
15 A. Yes, I did give that example. And I think that's a pretty good
16 instance for the drive for unanimity in -- in decision-making. The
17 problem, of course, was at that point, specifically to that example, was
18 that that session is the one which so totally frustrated Mr. Krajisnik
19 that he abruptly dismissed the session, stormed out, and a deputy chair
20 then took over the session and resumed the -- the deliberations and the
21 decision-making, and you and he spoke that evening of your respective
22 frustrations with this wide open democratic procedure, and I think you
23 proposed that it be brought more under the guidance that would be offered
24 by various ministers of the government in the making so that they would
25 prepare proposals in advance.
1 Q. Thank you. Well, that's the way things are done otherwise,
2 right, that the government sends proposals to the Assembly and the
3 Assembly takes a stand.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this intercept being admitted?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 31839. That's the
8 65 ter number. I'm afraid we're not going to have a translation, but I'm
9 going to deal with it very briefly.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. This is a conversation between Miodrag Simovic, the deputy prime
12 minister, and myself.
13 JUDGE KWON: I wonder whether Ms. Edgerton and Mr. Reid could
14 help us again.
15 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sure we'll be able to but not immediately,
16 Your Honour.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. We're still dealing with the subject of my attitude towards
20 responsibility, towards duty, and towards democracy. For example, here
21 on page 1, 2, 3, towards the bottom of page 3, I am expressing my
22 dissatisfaction with what Vito is doing on his own, Vito Zepinic, that
23 is. And I'm saying to Simovic this is not a private thing. I asked 50
24 people about Simovic, and they said that he was excellent. Simovic was
25 chosen, and then Simovic would be deputy prime minister.
1 "You're not my cousin, and I had no private reason whatsoever to
2 appoint you. We have been assured of the kind of person you are." So
3 this is the bottom of this page. You can read your language, can't you?
4 I asked 50 people about Simovic, and they said Simovic is
5 excellent, and that is why Simovic was chosen. I didn't even know him.
6 Can we look at page 2 now. It says "Yes," that's what it says on
7 page 2, "Yes," it's towards the bottom or, rather, towards the middle,
8 and then what is it that I'm saying? Well, the last sentence:
9 "Well, I'm not pursuing Serb policy from my very own head. I am
10 convening elders here. I am convening the academy of sciences in order
11 to ask questions and present my ideas."
12 Did you know that my -- that our political council was on very
13 good terms with intellectuals, with top scientists, scholars, everybody
14 that -- actually, we had a lot of them in our own ranks too.
15 A. Well, there's -- if you're asking a question about the -- the
16 political council, you refer here to the academy of sciences and say that
17 you convene it or call it. I think actually you appointed a few members
18 of the academy of sciences of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the political
19 council, and some -- some of them were, I think, you would say, avid
20 supporters of the ideas that you expressed and provided some good council
21 along the way. Others fell off from your policies at various times,
22 including the actual chairman, Slavko Leovac, who remained in Sarajevo
23 during the siege and renounced your policies in August of 2000 -- or
25 So I agree. There was a, let's say, group of prestigious
1 intellectuals that were appointed to the political council and some of
2 them came from the academy of sciences.
3 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I use the academy here as a metaphor.
4 You will agree with that. I'm talking about convening the elders. You
5 agree? I mean, I use this as a metaphor. Do you agree?
6 A. Yes. I see that, yes.
7 Q. For your information, Professor Leovac, the late Professor Leovac
8 stayed on in Sarajevo
9 However, he never distanced himself from us. He did criticise us, but he
10 never -- he never denounced us or renounced us. He stayed by us and our
11 policy. Would you accept that?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Everybody knows that I'm right, all of those who are familiar
14 with our situation. Professor Leovac was a great friend of ours, and
15 since he was an elderly gentleman, we listened to him, of course, and he
16 was critical.
17 JUDGE KWON: Is that a question, Mr. Karadzic? Don't make a
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. The question was: Is
20 that right? At the end I meant to say, "Isn't that right?"
21 THE WITNESS: I would agree that you listened to him in the -- in
22 the period that we're talking about roughly here in the fall of 1991,
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, can this be admitted,
25 this intercept.
1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I don't have any objection, of
3 course, on the basis that this is a contemporaneous statement but just to
4 note that the question, the initial question that was asked by
5 Dr. Karadzic to begin this line of questioning had absolutely no relation
6 to the passage from the intercept that he read out in court.
7 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification. Thank you for
8 your observation, Ms. Edgerton.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D281.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This was part of the intercepts that could illustrate my attitude
13 towards the passing of decisions and the implementation of decisions.
14 Probably I put questions that went sort of left and right and centre.
15 Now, Professor, do you agree that we briefly deal with a topic
16 called regionalisation? Let us see how the topic evolved mentally and
17 politically in Radovan Karadzic's activities. Do you agree?
18 A. Yes, and I would hope in the course of that we would also examine
19 the section of my excerpts report which is entitled "Regionalisation" to
20 see the various statements there that you made as a part of my report.
21 This is the excerpts report.
22 Q. Well, if we get enough time, you are indeed one of the most
23 important witnesses in this case. We are going to put things in context
24 and shed a great deal of light if we're given enough time.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 065 -- 457. That's the 65 ter
1 number I'd like to have now, please. 06457.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. May I inform you that these are statements of some of the
4 presidents of different parties? There's Izetbegovic. There's Karadzic.
5 There's several of them you will see. Yes. This has been translated,
6 the part that -- actually, it's my statement that was translated. The
7 26th of July is the date. The 26th of July, 1990. That is two weeks
8 after the Serb Democratic Party was established; right?
9 A. Formally established, yes.
10 Q. Current municipal regionalisation:
11 "The Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not happy with it. It
12 does not pertain to regionalisation from the point of view of exercising
13 national rights but from the point of view of development."
14 Can you see the sentence? The Serbian text:
15 "[In English] The Serbian people are not satisfied with --"
16 [Interpretation] Toward the middle of the medium, the middle of
17 the page:
18 "[In English] The Serbian people are not satisfied with the
19 current municipal organisation. This is not only the regionalisation
20 from the aspect of realising national rights but also from the
21 developmental aspect."
22 [Interpretation] Do you agree that we put this forward quite
23 early as our platform, as our legitimate right, for this to be
25 A. Certainly, yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, please.
3 JUDGE KWON: "Oslobodjenje" is a kind of newspaper?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. It was the -- basically the newspaper
5 of the city of Sarajevo
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll admit it.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D282, Your Honour.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we see 65 ter
10 1 -- rather, 31793. In English page 2, and in Serbian as well.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Let me ask you this in passing: Did you hear that Vojvodina
13 gained financial independence and a greater right to use its revenues,
14 that it was just a recent development? Did you hear of it?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Please look at what I said. It says that I said:
17 "We have to prepare legal regulations so that the regions can
18 decide how to use their money and to send to the republic a certain
19 portion for its needs."
20 And then further down it says:
21 "We will give it -- they will give it to the republic but not so
22 that we get back 18 dinars out of hundred."
23 This is the objection they had in Krajina, that they would give
24 hundred dinars to the republic out of which 18 would be returned back to
25 them for their needs.
1 A. What -- what's the question?
2 Q. Do you know that in the socialist state this is what the system
3 was? Everything would flow to the republic and then the republic would
4 distribute it as it wanted?
5 A. No, that's not a very accurate characterisation of how things
6 worked. The communities -- I'm sorry, the communities of municipality
7 did, in fact, exercise some financial role, but their functions were very
8 limited, and as I said before, limited to things like sewer, water
9 supply, in some cases education. The mantra that all the people used
10 when this was being debated in 1991 was that they were for cultural and
11 economic and information purposes. Those three were characterisations of
12 the function of the communities of municipalities. The municipalities
13 themselves were a primary source of income, tax revenues, if you will,
14 and -- although they were regulated by the -- by the republic, were
15 always generating much of their own income.
16 This number of 18 out of after hundred dinars is a -- I mean,
17 it's -- it's a fantasy. There's no kind of evidence as -- as Mr. Jaksic
18 said in April of -- or March or April of 1991, there are no numbers to
19 support these allegations of wily discriminatory distribution of
21 Q. But you do agree, don't you, that Mr. Jaksic, who was not a
22 member of the SDS
24 A. Certainly he did, yes. He was, in a sense, the principal
25 architect of that argument and proposal.
1 Q. And do you agree that he had nothing to do with the Serbian
2 Democratic Party, that he had been advocating this a long time before
4 A. I don't agree that he had nothing to do with the SDS. He became,
5 I think, a working ally of the party in this period, but I think he had
6 been advocating these views for some time, yes.
7 Q. Could we have page 3, please, in English. As for the Serbian, we
8 can keep the current page.
9 And I say here it would be good if we could speed this up so that
10 the region feels that they can use their money as they want so that the
11 cultural life can start developing.
12 And then further down I say at the level of the municipality,
13 everything that is at the level of the municipalities, libraries and so
14 on; and at the level of region, would be what belongs to the region,
15 theatre and so on. And then a further line down that the funds would go
16 back to them or, rather, remain with them so that they can use them as
17 they want so that they could send it to the republic.
18 That's democracy. There's no longer this socialist
19 redistribution where one entity collects everything and then distributes
20 as it pleases.
21 So this is what the system was previously, that one entity would
22 collect all the funds and then redistribute it, whereas our democratic
23 proposal was that the smaller units at the lower level would collect
24 revenues and then send it up. Do you remember that that was the
25 difference between our democratic proposal and the old system? And this
1 is what I say here, that this socialist redistribution system was
2 something different. Do you agree that that's how it was?
3 A. Could I -- I'm not sure of the date of this intercept, and it may
4 not be all that important, but it -- I'd like to see when it is,
5 because --
6 Q. On the 8th of June. We can see that on the first page. I am
7 talking to Momir on the 8th of June, and I think that this is the late
8 Momo --
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did in the hear the last name.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Who was also -- who was the director of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
12 bureau for protection of monuments and so on. So he was -- he worked in
13 the cultural sphere.
14 So do you agree that there is a difference there? One system is
15 if the republic collects the funds and then sends it back, and the other
16 democratic system was for municipalities to collect revenues and then
17 send them up.
18 A. I would say you're espousing this viewpoint is a very sanitised
19 way of describing what was then going on in the Bosnian Krajina community
20 of municipalities where the board was finding different ways to cut off
21 all financial support to the central government and seizing economic
22 assets that were within the territory that it claimed to be a part of.
23 It is indeed the case that this was a part of your original
24 concept as you've described it here, but the reality on the ground by
25 that time was very different. The Bosnian Krajina was, in fact, moving
1 forward with seizing assets and seizing power in that part of the
2 republic in ways that didn't have much to do with these very genteel
3 sounding measures that you suggest here.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you tell us the last name of
5 this gentleman again for the record?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Momir Jungic.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. But, Mr. Donia, on the 8th of June, what you have just described
10 still hadn't materialised. I think that at that point even Slovenia
11 still paying federal taxes. And then if you remember, Slovenia stopped
12 paying them and then Croatia
13 until 1992; right?
14 A. We're talking about the 8th of June 1991. That's -- that's
15 false. The Krajina was -- as I say, these board meetings are -- the
16 minutes of the board meetings are available for inspection, and as soon
17 as the association was formally established on the 25th of -- of April,
18 the next board meetings dealt with exactly these topics that I've
19 indicated, as well as the recruitment of large numbers of people from
20 these municipalities to fight with the JNA in Croatia. It also happens
21 to be the day that the Serbs from Croatia
22 incursion, into Bosnia
23 by the SDS
24 So this was a hot topic, if you will, the efforts that were being
25 made to weaken or cripple and challenge the government of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a part of the regionalisation strategy or what I've
2 called the municipal strategy of the SDS.
3 Q. Do you know, Mr. Donia, that even now there is a struggle going
4 on to return the property back to municipalities so that they can have
5 control of them as is the case elsewhere in Europe and that our
6 municipalities to this day do not have their own property, whereas
7 previously they used to have it?
8 A. I think that's the case. What you're saying is they had them
9 under socialism, and then in the course of the seizure of these assets by
10 various political formations they lost that property and restitution of
11 that property has been a long, slow, difficult process, I think, not only
12 in Bosnia
13 Q. Let me remind you. On page 2, the first lines that I read out,
14 I'm talking to this gentleman on the phone, and he's the director of the
15 bureau for protection of monuments, and then I say we have to prepare the
16 regulations, the legislation, we in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the joint
17 Assembly, because we still had the joint Assembly, so that the regions
18 could control their own money rather than everything going into the same
19 centre and then being redistributed.
20 So what I'm telling you that on the 8th of June, 1991, we still
21 have the joint Assembly. A director of one of the joint institutions is
22 talking to me about how to advance the development of cultural sphere in
23 the regions, and I'm suggesting that the regions should be given a
24 certain amount of power. And you see here that we are discussing it in
25 economic and cultural terms, not in any national terms. And this was
1 back on the 8th of June.
2 A. Yes, it was, and prior to that, in early April, the Assembly
3 actually suspended its session while it asked the people who were forming
4 the community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina to, in fact, submit
5 their proposal to the Assembly so that the Assembly could regulate this
6 process, and the SDS
7 single-party project with the opposition of the other national parties
8 and people like Milorad Dodik, who were in the opposition parties, to
9 form the association outside of any regulated process of rules or
10 guidelines from the Assembly.
11 I -- I only can look at these submissions of yours, here
12 statements to your interlocutor as disingenuous because you had the
13 opportunity to do exactly what you're proposing here a month before and
14 had passed on the opportunity.
15 Q. That's not how it was, Professor, and you will see that later.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence,
18 And we will get to what you said about what was going on in the
19 Assembly. We're see what the Assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina said.
20 Is this intercept admitted just like the others?
21 JUDGE KWON: Some -- I'm telling you again, Mr. Karadzic, to
22 refrain from making such comments at the end of the questions and
24 "That's not how it was, Professor. And you will see that later."
25 You are not giving evidence. That statement is totally
2 We will mark it for identification.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree with you, but
5 Professor Donia is giving broad answers to narrow questions and I cannot
6 leave it without a comment.
7 JUDGE KWON: No.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 65 ter 6225.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. And while we're waiting for that, Mr. Donia, you know, what the
11 Assembly adopts, legislation, resolutions, declarations, constitution,
12 decisions, conclusions and recommendations, and there is a hierarchy
13 there, and recommendations come at the very bottom of that hierarchy;
15 A. I certainly know that there's a hierarchy. I'm frankly not
16 certain exactly what it is, but I don't have any reason to doubt that
17 it -- that recommendations are at the bottom of it.
18 Q. Thank you. So this is the Official Gazette of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I don't know whether it has been translated. It is
20 possible that it has. So the Official Gazette of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
21 dated the 18th of April. And here the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 recommends to the municipalities to refrain from adopting decisions on
23 regionalisations or joining into associations of municipalities. So they
24 did not ban them from doing that. They did not condemn them for doing
25 that. They simply recommended. And this is the mildest form of
1 intervention on the part of the Assembly. There is no milder
2 intervention than this.
3 Can you read this? So they adopt this recommendation, and then
4 they go on to explain what the recommendation is about. If you want, I
5 can read it:
6 "The Assembly of the Socialist Republic
7 here recommends to the Municipal Assemblies to stop adopting decisions on
8 regionalisation or, rather, on joining the association of municipalities
9 until the negotiations on resolving the constitutional crisis and future
10 constitutional order of Yugoslavia
11 So they did not ban it. They simply recommended that this is
12 what the municipalities should do.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be adopted, please, this
16 cover page of the Official Gazette.
17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
18 MS. EDGERTON: No objection, but we were never notified on this
20 JUDGE KWON: What is your explanation, Mr. Karadzic?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Donia mentioned that the
22 Assembly challenged it, and I had to put this forward. This document was
23 initially placed on the OTP list, so I thought there was no need to put
24 them on notice. This is 65 ter 6225. And otherwise, I wouldn't offer
25 this into evidence unless -- but then Mr. Donia spoke about the
1 regionalisation and what his position was about it.
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's carry on. We'll mark it for
3 identification pending translation.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
5 JUDGE KWON: With the indulgence of interpreters and court
6 reporters, I wonder if we can carry on until 2.00. If it is okay with
7 you, Doctor.
8 THE WITNESS: Certainly.
9 MS. EDGERTON: And if I may, Your Honour, just on this last
10 document, since this is something that we'll have to do, perhaps we can
11 be guided as to what should be translated.
12 JUDGE KWON: Only that item. Do we need other things? This is,
13 given that this is an Official Gazette, what we need is the only relevant
14 part. The entire part that contain the part referred to.
15 MS. EDGERTON: And that's passage number 120, if I'm not
17 JUDGE KWON: I take it that is the case. It is item 120,
18 Mr. Karadzic? Yes. Let's move on.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I agree to work until 2.00.
20 Could we have 65 ter 30045. And just very briefly let us see
21 what Brdjanin and Karadzic say about this same aspect.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. It says here, "Very well ..."
24 Karadzic says:
25 "Tell me, please, you need to prepare. Have you already done
1 this? You need to address the cultural fund. I think that is the most
2 realistic option now." Brdjanin says, "Okay." Karadzic says, "So that
3 the fund for culture is established and so that the money is channeled
4 from all municipalities that join the regional fund and then the regional
5 fund would send the money up to the republic for the republican
6 institutions that you all agree on."
7 So this was a consistent position whereby we advocated that the
8 funds be sent to the republic but only those funds that belong to the
9 republic and then that was in the interest of municipalities and the
10 associations of regions.
11 A. Yes. I think this shows the cultural funds to be an innovation,
12 that is, it's yet to be established, and it takes money from those
13 municipalities that joined the region and then decides for what purpose
14 and how much to forward to the republic. This suggests to me it's just
15 part that have process of relocating power in the region and taking it
16 from the central government.
17 Q. Do you remember that previously we said that municipalities
18 should have libraries, but not every municipality can have a theatre.
19 And then an association of municipalities can have a theatre, whereas a
20 republic would have even more institutions. So a municipality can fund a
21 library, but not every municipality can fund a theatre; right? And that
22 was our motive, namely that an association of municipalities could have a
23 theatre, whereas the republic would have more institutions because it
24 would receive its portion, what was allocated to it, from regions and
25 municipalities; right?
1 A. Well, I think I indicated yesterday the motive that drove you and
2 Mr. Kupresanin to create this thing. He expressed it pretty clearly at
3 the time. You expressed it quite clearly in -- in retrospect in July of
4 1992. And I certainly don't blame you for cutting me off from reading
5 paragraph 179 of my excerpts report, because you would certainly not want
6 to hear your own words refute this very benign hypothesis that you're
7 putting forth here about your own motivations.
8 Q. Mr. Donia, my thesis is as follows: Had Bosnia remained in
10 independent and they would have control over their funds. Nothing else
11 would have happened. That was the agreement reached with Zulfikarpasic;
13 A. I think you have you've just switched time zones a bit. We're
14 talking about April -- we have been talking about April of 1991, by which
15 time -- or let's say by May the process of using the regional
16 association, in particular Bosnian Krajina, to cripple the government of
18 have been reversed had certain agreements been reached. In fact, that
19 was the first message that Mr. Milosevic delivered to Zulfikarpasic in
21 regionalisation, We've just been doing this to pressure the Muslims and
22 we're prepared to call it off if you demand that we do so and we come to
23 an agreement.
24 So you -- you may, in fact, be right about that, but make no
25 mistake about where things were as of May and June of 1991. The
1 association was -- of communities and municipalities was being used
2 specifically to seize economic assets, to tighten its authority, increase
3 its authority in the region, seize gas stations, a relay tower, and
4 promulgate regulations in general to consolidate authority at the expense
5 of the central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence
8 and can we have 1D01355.
9 JUDGE KWON: This will be marked for identification again.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01355. That would be the next
13 JUDGE KWON: Doctor, I noted, if I may, you were sometimes
14 distracted by the demeanour of the accused consulting his legal advisor,
15 but please bear in mind you are answering the question to the Chamber.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I also apologise, but believe me
18 that I'm following the transcript and listening at the same time. So
19 first and foremost, I care about hearing properly:
20 Can we see this call to non-Serb municipalities, under quotation
21 marks, to join up.
22 A. I just note I know you have that ability to multitasks and
23 believe you.
24 Q. Do you see this call to non-Serb municipalities to join in as
25 well? That is the part that has been circled. No. No. The other part
1 that is marked. Can you please go back to where you were. Yes. Right.
2 That's it. You see the one that's marked red, and can you enlarge the
3 last paragraph. In English it's page 2. English, page 2.
4 The leaders of the Krajina, Kupresanin, Brdjanin, Dragan Knezic,
5 the man from Drvar, et cetera, this is what they were saying:
6 "However if doubts about the economic motives for joining may
7 have been somewhat justified because scientific and other arguments
8 possibly lacked convictions, such doubts ought to have been dispelled by
9 the invitation which the Banja Luka deputies voiced through the last
10 Municipal Assembly session when they called on all other Bosnian Krajina
11 municipalities which have remind outside the regional community for
12 whatever reason to join them so that the Bosnian Krajina would finally
13 get out of destitution and poverty."
14 Do you agree that there was always rivalry between Banja Luka
17 A. This is an excerpt from the SDS party newspaper, "Javnost," I
18 take it; is that correct?
19 Q. Yes, but that is a report from their conference, the conference
20 of the Krajina leadership.
21 A. I think only in the official SDS newspaper could this kind of
22 story fly, because it is a purely one-sided account of what was going on,
23 and it's very clear that I agree fully that the leaders of the ZOBK were
24 inviting all other municipalities in the region to -- to join them. In
25 fact, even let's say suggested that they should do so in -- in pretty
1 strong terms. However, the likelihood that they were going to do so by
2 the time this article was published was just about zero, because the
3 other parties and representatives of the non-national parties saw this as
4 purely an exercise in SDS
5 municipalities that had a less than nearly absolute majority accepted
6 this offer. The only time that subsequently municipalities joined the
7 successor to this organisation was after the -- it had become the
8 Autonomous Region of Krajina, and the Municipal Assemblies that joined
9 were the Serb separatist municipalities founded subsequent to the
10 publication of the A/B document in October of 1991.
11 Q. Well, it's not exactly October, but we'll get to that. Can we --
12 A. [Previous translation continues]... [overlapping speakers].
13 Thank you for correcting me. December.
14 Q. [In English] September, December.
15 A. December.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this part be admitted into
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. And let me ask you the following: Do you make a distinction
20 between an official newspaper, an Official Gazette, and ownership? This
21 was not an SDS
23 A. Oh, I think there's every evidence, including many statements in
24 the Bosnian Serb Assembly and in various SDS meetings that this was the
25 party newspaper. It was edited by one of your closest confidantes and
1 bragged about the achievements of the party regularly and represented the
2 party's viewpoint. I don't think there is any question that it was the
3 official newspaper of the SDS
4 accurately, faithfully reflected the party viewpoint in its stories.
5 Yes, there is difference between the Official Gazette, which is a
6 publication of decisions and so on, and a newspaper of a party organ.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
8 JUDGE KWON: Well, this is -- it will be admitted as
9 Exhibit D286. We will have the last question for today.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D1418:
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Now you're going to see that the Muslim side looked at this in
13 the centre of Banja Luka itself and made a decision on the establishment
14 of a new municipality and passed a decision to the effect that this
15 municipality should join up with the region of the Bosnian Krajina. You
16 see, activities follow three directions:
17 "1. Adopting a political decision and proclaiming the
18 municipality of Banja Luka-Stari Grad.
19 "2. Adopting a political decision to join the municipality of
20 Banja Luka-Stari Grad to the Bosanska Krajina region.
21 "3. An economic project for the municipality of
22 Banja Luka-Stari Grad."
23 This is the Party of Democratic Action in Banja Luka. Let's just
24 have a look and see what date this is. September. September. Right.
25 September 1991. Did you know that the SDA also had its own activities
1 aimed in that direction?
2 A. Yes. The SDA did, in fact, propose to establish and established,
3 I think, three or four local municipalities in areas in which there were
4 substantial Muslim inhabitants but regions or municipalities that were
5 largely Serb. One of them, I think, was in Janja. One was of them was
6 in Ilijas in Sarajevo
7 of a plan to breakdown the Banja Luka municipality, which was a large
8 one, had an Assembly of 130 delegates, into, I believe, five sub -- five
9 new municipalities, two or three of which would be Serb and -- I believe
10 two were to be Serb, two were to be Muslim and one was to be something
11 else. I may have those numbers wrong.
12 But that reaction was, it seemed very -- very much a reaction to
13 the SDS
14 very far. It -- none of these ever took on a real life and was clearly
15 contrary to the party's, the SDA's, policy on local municipalities.
16 I'm, frankly, puzzled by the reference to the Bosanska Krajina
17 region. That would -- could refer to the -- the SAO or the ARK, the
18 region -- the autonomous region of Bosnian Krajina could also refer to
19 the old association which had been superseded, at least for the Serb
20 position, by the ZOBK, and it also could refer to this Bihac association
21 which was a different one prior to the commencement of the
22 regionalisation campaign in early 1991.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I just put one more question?
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Don't see you that the autonomous region of Krajina is not the
1 same thing as a SAO, a Serb autonomous district? That is one thing. But
2 an autonomous region is not the same thing. And here they are calling
3 upon non-Serb municipalities to take part as well; isn't that right? The
4 autonomous region of Krajina, does it refer to Serbian at all in its very
6 A. That's correct, it does not. Like I say, I'm not sure what it
7 refers to.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That's it for today. I appreciate the
9 patience of all the staff as well as Dr. Donia. We'll admit this.
10 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit D287.
11 JUDGE KWON: 9.00 tomorrow morning.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.03 p.m.
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day
14 of June, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.