100609IT

Page 3536

1 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

2 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue.

3 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Dr. Karadzic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Once again, good morning to

5 everybody. And may I have 65 ter 11452 on e-court, please.

6 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

7 Q. [Interpretation] And while we're waiting for that to come up, let

8 me ask you, Mr. Donia, do you know of a document -- well, do you know

9 what the Serbs are proposing and proposed in a document that was

10 officially published in the summer of 1991?

11 A. I don't know what you're referring to, no.

12 Q. It's a document in which the Serbian Democratic Party and

13 associated other parties, and there are several of them, parliamentary

14 ones as well, are proposing how the Yugoslav crisis should be resolved.

15 It's is very important document by which the Serbs legitimised, if I can

16 put it that way, their position and announced their position and

17 standpoint.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm told that document hasn't been

19 uploaded in the e-court. Yes, Ms. Edgerton. Good morning to you.

20 MS. EDGERTON: Good morning, Your Honour. And if I could for the

21 record note that my senior trial attorney, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff has joined

22 us today, please.

23 Could I suggest that we turn to 65 ter 00942, and I think

24 Dr. Karadzic will find there the document he's requested.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

Page 3537

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Here we have it, Dr. Donia. We have a publication in two

3 languages in July, published and distributed already in July, what the

4 Serbs propose, and the views of the Serbian Democratic Party, and of

5 course those who supported us as well, about a solution to the Yugoslav,

6 and by the same token the Bosnian and Herzegovinian crisis. Are you

7 aware and familiar with this document?

8 A. Now that I look at it, yes, I have seen it before. I seem -- I

9 recall that it was associated with or came out of the meeting of the 12th

10 of July, the St. Peter and Paul's Day meeting, but that may be wrong.

11 But I do recognise the document.

12 Q. Thank you. I don't think it was linked to any meeting but

13 negotiations. And can we see the next page, please. Into the text.

14 These are all the title pages, but into the text. And the English

15 version, please. May we have the English version.

16 Can you read this, Professor Donia?

17 A. Yes. Give me some time and I'll be glad to.

18 Q. If you want me to, I can read it out, but we don't have the

19 English version.

20 JUDGE KWON: No, I think the English version seems to be at the

21 end of the document. I'm checking.

22 MS. EDGERTON: The document is in two languages itself. That's

23 why there's no independent translation.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Can we take a look at page 8 in e-court.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the introduction. May we

Page 3538

1 move on and see what the Serb side proposed. The signatories are

2 Radovan Karadzic and the president of the deputies' club,

3 Professor Maksimovic.

4 Now, let's see what the initial positions are of the Serb side

5 with respect to a resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the place of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia.

7 Take a look at that last page in the chapter positions:

8 "[In English] It is therefore necessary for all Yugoslav

9 institutions, the Presidency, the Assembly and the government to function

10 because final agreement on the democratic organisation or relations in

11 Yugoslavia must be verified in these Yugoslav institutions."

12 [Interpretation] And so be and so forth. Now, may we turn to the

13 next page, please.

14 Number 2:

15 "[In English] The original sovereignty belongs unquestionably to

16 the citizens and peoples. The citizens and peoples realise their

17 sovereignty partly in their respective republics which are regulated by

18 the republican constitutions and partly in the federal state which is

19 regulated by the federal constitution."

20 [Interpretation] So that I don't have to read it all out, can I

21 draw your attention to this document, take a look at it -- or, rather,

22 perhaps you could take a look at this during our first break, and I

23 recommend this document to the Trial Chamber because it was one of the

24 more important documents, official proposals, for a solution to the

25 crisis, and I'm afraid that without this document and, in fact, I'm very

Page 3539

1 surprised that you haven't received this document because without it you

2 cannot understand the Serb positions.

3 Now, shall I tender it into evidence later once Dr. Donia has had

4 a chance to look through the document or should I do that now?

5 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Dr. Karadzic?

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Well, Dr. Donia, do you consider this to be an important

8 document, the substance of which must have been taken into consideration

9 when you wrote your expert report.

10 A. Just from what I have seen so far, I don't see anything striking

11 about it. I don't see a significant change from the party's previous

12 position. I think the -- I would again suggest that the context in which

13 it was issued probably was important and perhaps called for a restatement

14 of some of these views, and that context was, of course, that the

15 Federal Presidency had refused to confirm Mr. Mesic in the position of

16 president of the Presidency on May 15th, and so the Presidency was in

17 effect deadlocked at the time that the independence declarations were

18 issued by Slovenia and Croatia on the 25th of -- of June, and of course

19 that was followed by the ten-day war in Slovenia and the agreement

20 reached at Brioni which specified, among other things, that Mr. Mesic

21 would be installed in that -- in that post.

22 Now, I assume that all that required some restatement here of the

23 principles of what the -- what the party wanted, but as I say, don't

24 see -- I don't see anything striking about this relative to some of the

25 earlier positions of the party.

Page 3540

1 Q. But, Mr. Donia, do you agree that this is a document in which the

2 party's going public as a Serb proposal? Would that be right?

3 A. I'm not -- I don't know who -- who signed it or who prepared it,

4 so I don't see -- again, I don't see anything here that would have been

5 in the public domain for the first time, but I have not had a chance to

6 review the entire document, so I wouldn't want to say that definitively.

7 JUDGE KWON: Can we go to the last page.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. You have the members of the Presidency signed there,

10 Professor Plavsic, Professor Koljevic, party President Karadzic, and

11 President of the Serbian members of parliament club,

12 Professor Maksimovic. So there you have the party and the top

13 representatives, Serb representatives, in the government bodies. This is

14 an official platform for a solution to the crisis, and I think that it

15 merits a place in your report, at least as a mention, as an aside, if

16 nothing more.

17 A. Well, I did not -- I have reviewed this document previously but

18 didn't feel that it brought anything riveting to -- to change the

19 picture.

20 Q. Take a look at this paragraph:

21 "[In English] Cantonal territories are not all embracing for

22 there are also enclaves and separate local communities surrounded by a

23 territory to which they do not belong. This is especially frequent in

24 the boundary regions of the French and German speaking cantons. This

25 principle is particularly applicable to the ethnically analogous areas in

Page 3541

1 Yugoslavia."

2 [Interpretation] Do you remember that we proposed that -- or,

3 rather that, we supported a proposal coming from Croatia that wherever

4 the conditions existed, cantons should be founded and that they did not

5 have to have any territorial links?

6 A. I'm not certain at what level -- that proposal was certainly

7 floating around and was favourably -- the SDS was favourably disposed to

8 it. I don't know that it ever reached the level of an agreement with

9 anyone, Croats or anyone else, or whether it was advanced in specific

10 negotiations. It -- very familiar and really fully consistent with --

11 with where the party was at that point in time in -- in supporting what I

12 call the -- the municipal strategy.

13 Q. Do you remember that we put this paper aside because the MBO came

14 out with a propose that will there should be no regionalisation and that

15 Bosnian should remain in Yugoslavia, the so-called historical Muslim-Serb

16 agreement, July, August 1991. Yes or no?

17 A. I hear a couple questions there. I don't know that you set this

18 proposal aside. I didn't see it retracted. Certainly events with --

19 with the proposals made by Messrs. Filipovic and Zulfikarpasic, it was to

20 be sure superseded in many respects, probably more than anything else put

21 at a second priority position, but I don't know that it was ever set

22 aside.

23 Q. Thank you. You see, I claim and put it to you that this proposal

24 kept the peace in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I also claim

25 that the next proposal that came from Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic to give

Page 3542

1 up on the creation of cantons, to abolish that idea on the basis of the

2 Serbian-Muslim agreement, also preserved the peace in Yugoslavia and

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they are two possibilities both of which the

4 Serbs accepted. One they proposed, the other they accepted. Yes or no?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

8 now.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D288.

11 JUDGE KWON: Can we have the date when this was published.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the beginning of July 1991,

13 before the negotiations on the historical Serb-Muslim agreement started.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have 65 ter

16 30249, please. 65 ter 30249, and this is the 19th of September, a

17 conversation between Karadzic and Dr. Vukic, who was in Banja Luka, and

18 in the Banja Luka Krajina or Bosnian Krajina he was the head of the SDS

19 there.

20 May we look at page 2 of that, please.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Let me remind you Krajina itself alone proclaimed itself to be an

23 autonomous region after Izetbegovic rejected the Serb-Muslim peace

24 agreement. Now let's see what it says here.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Second page in English, please.

Page 3543

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Dr. Vuk says:

3 "[In English] However, it goes on --"

4 [Interpretation] And he says that they proclaimed the region and

5 so on, and so this can go.

6 And then Karadzic says: "[In English] All right.

7 [Interpretation] All right. [In English] Well --"

8 And then he says:

9 "No referendum is needed for that. It is in accordance with what

10 we are agreeing upon with Izetbegovic, only that Izetbegovic we are

11 afraid that they want to cheat us on us because Izetbegovic is saying

12 one thing and Silajdzic in The Hague is saying something different, and

13 that is why you did the right thing to proclaim it, and that is why I did

14 not resist it. However, we shall sit and make a deal with them to what

15 the Muslims have a right to in the Serb regions and what the Serbs have a

16 right to in the Muslim regions, but we shall agree on everything."

17 Dr. Donia, don't you see that I did not initiate this but I did

18 not oppose the proclamation of the Autonomous Region of the Krajina, and

19 I confirm that we were negotiating such matters with Izetbegovic?

20 A. Well, I think the history of the Serbian autonomous regions would

21 say otherwise. The Serbian Democratic Party made the decision to

22 proclaim these regions in early September and over the next month and a

23 half they were, in fact, proclaimed more or less one by one. In -- I

24 think on the 16th, if I'm not mistaken, 16th of September, the community

25 of municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina effectively transformed itself

Page 3544

1 into this -- what's frequently called the ARK, the autonomous region of

2 Krajina, which gave it a slightly different title than the other SAOs and

3 in a sense made it first among equals.

4 This appeared to me to be in conjunction with the overall effort

5 to proclaim these SAOs on a large part of Bosnian territory.

6 Q. I'm asking you about this answer. Can one not see on the basis

7 of this answer that they had proclaimed it? I did not initiate it. I

8 simply didn't resist it.

9 Second question: Do you not see here that what is envisaged is

10 the existence of minorities and the regulation of their rights?

11 A. That -- you're asking about the sentence, "That is why you did

12 right to proclaim it. That is why I did not resist it"? Yes, it says

13 that. So, true. My understanding of the development was somewhat

14 different from what you state here, but certainly you did explain it in

15 those terms here. And you hope to make a deal about regions with

16 Muslims, and that's, I think, also clear from the -- from the text here.

17 Q. Thank you. You, yourself, had confirmed that I fought a fierce

18 battle with the regions, telling them to wait and to be behave in

19 accordance with the negotiations. The initiatives were theirs, but I was

20 trying to put a brake on them as it were.

21 A. I think on this question you have to be very careful about what

22 time you're talking about. I think you fought a fierce battle with the

23 people in the ARK -- or the ZOBK in June, late June and early July when

24 they proclaimed the union of the two Krajinas, and then that issue kind

25 of receded for a while as other events took centre stage, and it really

Page 3545

1 was not again until the -- I think the events in December of 1991 when

2 the question arose of the character of the Serbian state that was about

3 to be proclaimed, should include in the view the people in the Krajina,

4 an autonomous or even separate polity for the Krajina. So I view this

5 struggle that you had with the people in Krajina as probably the biggest

6 challenge that you faced in unifying the party, but it was intermittent,

7 and at this particular time I don't view it as -- my own research

8 wouldn't suggest that it was a particularly acute issue.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Do you agree that in the first sentence we quoted I'm saying they

13 should not call a referendum because that is in accordance with what we

14 are negotiating with Izetbegovic; right?

15 A. Yes. I believe you also told someone else, about this time, that

16 you didn't think you'd get the -- you'd win a referendum in the

17 Bosnian Krajina. So, yes, I agree. You were trying to avoid a

18 referendum going forward in the Bosnian Krajina on this issue.

19 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

20 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D289, Your Honour.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We do have a translation,

22 Excellency. Oh, I see. Because it's an intercept. I agree. Very well.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Dr. Donia, do you agree that I had said we cannot count on being

25 able to get a two-thirds majority of the referendum and that is why we

Page 3546

1 cannot win at a referendum?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And do you remember that I said that that pertained to all of

4 Krajina, because in Cazinska Krajina, in Bihac there are 300.000 Muslims

5 and the Serb population in Krajina is about 5- or 600.000.

6 A. I don't recall what the unit of analysis was that you were

7 talking about. I don't recall it from memory. It was in another

8 telephone intercept, and I don't recall the specific number of

9 municipalities or area that you were speaking of.

10 Q. Thank you. May I remind you that we objected to the SDA that

11 constitutional decisions cannot be made by a simple majority. Everything

12 that had to do with the constitution required a two-thirds majority

13 because that was prescribed by the constitution; isn't that right?

14 A. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

15 MS. EDGERTON: That was comment, with respect, Your Honour, and I

16 also suggest that as soon as I took to my feet, Dr. Karadzic concluded

17 his comment with the question, "Isn't that right."

18 JUDGE KWON: I understood that to be the question. But be

19 careful, Mr. Karadzic. There's no need on your part to remind the

20 witness of something. You can ask questions.

21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. If I could also observe. It

22 might be better for the Prosecution to wait until he has completed his

23 question before making an objection, because I think it's very fair to

24 ask a question at the end of the sentence rather as well as --

25 JUDGE KWON: Let's not waste time.

Page 3547

1 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. I understand that you're not a constitutional expert, but you do

6 recall that that was our position. That's why I asked you whether you

7 recall that our position was that constitutional matters had to be

8 resolved on the basis of the constitution, that is to say about a

9 two-third majority.

10 A. Not always, and I think depended on the particular body that you

11 were -- you were dealing with at the time. Clearly you did not have that

12 position in Municipal Assemblies where in many cases the votes to join

13 the community of municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina were by simple

14 majority votes or in some cases even contested. When the other parties

15 raised the objection that those votes should be by two-thirds vote, the

16 SDS delegates rejected that position and voted them into the ZOBK by

17 simple majority.

18 Now, that's one example of a body that the two-thirds rule was

19 not insisted on, in fact, was resisted by the SDS. I would certainly

20 agree that you felt that way about issues voted upon in the -- in the

21 Assembly, in the parliament of Bosnia.

22 Q. Thank you. Am I right when I say that when a change in the

23 association of municipalities takes place it does not mean a change in

24 the constitution? It is simply a change by law and that requires simply

25 a simple majority.

Page 3548

1 A. Well, of course, you always had an opinion on what was

2 constitutional and what was not constitutional, and you may have felt

3 that this was just a matter of law, but the situation in which I just

4 cited, the representatives of the HDZ and SDA felt that it was a matter

5 of constitutional procedure. So you had one view of that, and the

6 members of the other parties had a different view of it.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 07288 in

9 e-court, please.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. We are going to cast a brief glance, so there is an English

12 translation. Could I have page 34 in English. These are stenographic

13 notes from the Assembly meeting that you mentioned on the 12th of July,

14 1991. The second page in Serbian, please. Page 27, actually, in

15 Serbian, and 34 in English. Twenty-seven in Serbian, and 34 in English.

16 We need the next page in Serbian. This is 26, and we need 27.

17 This is my response to Dr. Vukic that pertains precisely to this

18 issue. I would like to draw your attention to my words:

19 "Those who will attend our afternoon session will be able to hear

20 a part of last year's report in which we presented a general objection to

21 the regionalisation and territorialisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina after

22 the war which had been carried out consistent to the detriment of the

23 Serbian people. Thus the idea of the re-regionalisation of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina --" Can we have the next page in English please --

25 "Has been present from the very outset among the founders and creators of

Page 3549

1 the SDS ideas -- founders and creators of the SDS ideas from the very

2 start, and the Main Board has always taken that into account and members

3 of the Main Board and then regions."

4 Page 35 in English:

5 "The regions that we envisage, that we proclaimed as communities

6 and municipalities within the framework of the BiH constitution, are not

7 socio-political communities yet at this point in time. In order for them

8 to become that we have to go through the BiH Assembly so that there is a

9 law that says that such and such a region is not only a community of

10 municipalities but a socio-political community with all the elements

11 after full political life."

12 Dr. Donia, can we not see on the basis of this that they are

13 irrelevant, these associations of municipalities, but in the Assembly

14 if -- or, rather if they become regions, then in the Assembly we have to

15 ensure on the basis of a law that these regions have a political life.

16 A. Yes. I regard this passage as actually part of the evidence for

17 the process that was going on in the aftermath of the proclamation of the

18 union of the two Krajinas, which roil your own sense of what should be

19 done and resulted in a strong effort by the party to make sure that that

20 actually was not carried out. And I take it what you're taking here is

21 that it is time to put this whole issue of regionalisation under the Main

22 Board as it was originally, that basically the ideas for regionalisation,

23 the proposals for regionalisation came from the Main Board of the party,

24 or, at the very least, members of the Main Board of the party. And it

25 was now important to, in a sense, re-centralise the party -- party's

Page 3550

1 control over this process and make sure that it proceeded in a way that

2 was consistent with the party's overall objectives.

3 I think it's -- I'm a little bit puzzled by the references to the

4 Bosnian Assembly, because as you cited yesterday, the Bosnian Assembly

5 had already passed a recommendation that the formation of the community

6 of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina not go forward. So the Assembly had

7 already staked out its position on this, and of course that

8 recommendation did nothing to deter the process that moved forward of

9 creating the ZOBK.

10 Q. Yesterday we established that that was the recommendation that

11 was there, not to give up on it but to wait until the Yugoslav crisis is

12 resolved. However, we see here that it does not have much importance,

13 and it doesn't really have any powers. However, for the region to start

14 life of its own we intend to deal with it through the Assembly of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina so that it is regulated by law, not by constitution

16 but by law; isn't that right?

17 A. I'm sorry, I'd have to hear that question again. I wasn't clear

18 what you were asking.

19 Q. You see what I said, and, on the basis of that, it means that

20 associations of municipalities have not become socio-political

21 communities. They do not have powers of their own. They cannot pass

22 regulations, and they cannot function as a municipality can function. So

23 a municipality is more important than an association of municipalities.

24 Are we trying to deal with this through a parliamentary procedure, not to

25 change the constitution but to change the law. Can you not see that that

Page 3551

1 is our intention, to have regions legalised by passing relevant laws

2 through the Assembly; right?

3 A. Yes. From this it would suggest that your view was that raising

4 the status of a community of municipalities to the highest level of an

5 organisation, socio-political community, could be done simply by a law in

6 the Assembly. Yeah, that's your view expressed here.

7 Q. Thank you. Can we have page 36 in English. I have before me the

8 recommendation that we saw yesterday. It says it is recommended that

9 they stop all decisions concerning regionalisation while negotiations are

10 underway on the constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia. 6225 that's what we

11 adopted yesterday. So it is not declared unlawful. The political

12 recommendation is that we have a standstill before the political crisis

13 is resolved.

14 It should be page 29 in Serbian, I think.

15 And you see my words here again:

16 "We will not create. We will not create anything that is in the

17 constitution for as long as the constitution exists."

18 That is imprecise, and then I say further on:

19 "However, everything we have done so far we have done within the

20 framework of the constitution of BiH and Yugoslavia."

21 If someone violates the constitutions of BiH and Yugoslavia then

22 we no longer have any obligations towards the constitution and then we

23 are going to do what Mr. Vukic and Mr. Kupresanin have announced. So

24 others have -- another party has to violate the BiH constitution to try

25 to affect the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if they do so then we

Page 3552

1 will prepare a democratic response of the Serbian people on all lies and

2 in every respect. Can you not see that I am advocating observance of the

3 constitution for as long as it exists?

4 A. I think you're saying here that you're arrogating unto yourself

5 the decision about whether any particular act is unconstitutional, and

6 should you deem an act to be unconstitutional, then all bets are off and

7 the party can go and organise whatever it wants to in response. That's

8 again -- the interpretation of constitutionality here you place wholly in

9 your hands with this statement, and given that proviso, I agree with what

10 you've just formulated, that actions won't be taken until someone else

11 violates the constitution first, and that was very consistent with your

12 position at that time and even earlier in the party.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be

14 admitted.

15 JUDGE KWON: I note it already has been admitted as Exhibit D273.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's possible. Thank you.

17 30243. Can we have that, please. That's the 65 ter number.

18 65 ter 30243. The date is the 18th of September, so all of this is

19 September. The beginning of the second half of September.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. So this is a conversation between Karadzic and Brdjanin, Brdjanin

22 and Karadzic. So can we see the next page.

23 So they have proclaimed the Autonomous Region of the Krajina, and

24 now they are discussing the referendum, and I'm saying:

25 "All right. Look. You don't need any kind of referendum. All

Page 3553

1 of your decisions are lawful."

2 And he says, "Oh, really."

3 And then the next sentence or rather, paragraph:

4 "Well, yes, why would you expose yourself to some kind of risks

5 and expenses? I am negotiating with Alija. All of that is in accordance

6 with this. Now it is a question of whether they're going to be called

7 Serb or whether they were not -- will not be called Serb." It's the

8 second page in English as well. "Whether they will be called Serb or

9 whether they will not be called Serb." Sorry. The third page in

10 English. Is it? The third. Yes.

11 "[In English] Yes, why would you expose --"

12 [Interpretation] And now the next page.

13 "[In English] Serbian will not be called Serbian."

14 [Interpretation] Now on the next page:

15 "Whether they will be called Serb or whether they will not be

16 called Serb, will there be any exaggerations or not. Where will the

17 borders run of one and where will the borders of the other run?"

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm not sure the doctor is able

19 follow. Let's locate the relevant page first.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The bottom of the second page in

21 English and then it continues on the third page.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I see the passage.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. I'm saying:

25 "All right. Listen, you don't need any referendum. All of your

Page 3554

1 decisions are legal," and then I say, "But I am negotiating with Alija.

2 All of that is in keeping with this. The question remains whether they

3 will be called Serbian or whether they will not be called Serbian,

4 whether they -- whether anyone will push matters too far or not, where

5 the borders of one or the other will run."

6 The next page in English then:

7 "How much of the legislative power will belong to the region?

8 How much to the republic? How much to the joint state? I mean

9 everything he talked about on television last night has fallen through.

10 Yesterday after the news programme we talked and reached an agreement,

11 that is in keeping with our agreement. Regionalisation is on and the

12 reason is our side is going faster is that your Silajdzic is acting

13 differently in Europe, in The Hague."

14 So I'm trying to dissuade the people of Krajina. It is

15 unnecessary, because talks are being held with Izetbegovic. They are

16 underway. However, Silajdzic is saying something completely different in

17 Europe and that is what we were afraid of. You know that at the time

18 Silajdzic and Izetbegovic were in the same party. Remember that.

19 A. I'm wondering what the question was.

20 Q. The question was whether Silajdzic and Izetbegovic were in the

21 same party at the time.

22 A. Yes, they were both in the SDA.

23 Q. Thank you. Can one see on the basis of this that Izetbegovic is

24 negotiating one thing with us and Silajdzic is saying completely

25 different at the conference in The Hague?

Page 3555

1 A. I don't view this -- I don't view your representation here as --

2 as authoritative on the positions that Mr. Silajdzic and Mr. Izetbegovic

3 were taking at the time, and the -- the suggestion here that they were

4 somehow clambering on board with the idea of regionalisation in

5 particular the formation of the SAOs seems to me to be completely wrong.

6 The -- I know that at some point the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at

7 least its majority, over two-thirds majority, denounced the formation of

8 the SAOs, and I believe the government did as well in a Resolution. So

9 it was the position of the SD -- yeah, of the SDA and the HDZ at that

10 time in -- they were completely opposed to this measure. There may have

11 been some talks going on, but, certainly at the time we're talking about,

12 they were condemning it rather than looking to resolve the -- whatever

13 conflict might exist about the specific nature of them.

14 Q. Please have a look at this sentence:

15 "Last night," that is to say Izetbegovic and I, "were on the news

16 programme the previous evening. Yesterday after the news programme we

17 talked and we reached an agreement. That is in accordance with our

18 agreement. Regionalisation is underway."

19 So, Mr. Donia, are you trying to say that I'm lying, that I am

20 telling Brdjanin a lie, that I had agreed with Izetbegovic that

21 regionalisation should go on?

22 A. I think it's very possible, yes.

23 Q. Thank you very much. Can we have this document admitted for

24 identification.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

Page 3556

1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D290, Your Honours. I apologise, MFI

2 D290.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. May we now have 1D1422 next, please. There should be an English

5 translation. There it is. Now let's have a look and see which party is

6 preparing. Well, they made the proclamation, and they say:

7 "Looking at the report on the needs and possibilities of the

8 territorial organisation of Banja Luka municipality and the founding of

9 Banja Luka-Stari Grad municipality is adopted in its entirety the SDA,

10 HDZ, SDS, SDP and Liberal Party of Banja Luka at a meeting held on the

11 24th of October, 1991, issues the following proclamation: The analysis

12 of the needs and possibility for the territorial organisation of Banja

13 Luka municipality and the founding of Banja Luka-Stari Grad, Old Town

14 municipality, is adopted in its entirety, and a transformation of the

15 present municipality of Banja Luka and the six municipalities is proposed

16 as follows:" And then it goes on to enumerate the municipalities.

17 Do you see that the question of territorial reorganisation for

18 the municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina is being considered at all

19 levels without necessarily thinking about secession from Yugoslavia?

20 A. Could we go to the second page of this document?

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please. By all means. I see no signature

22 there.

23 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE KWON: In B/C/S.

25 THE WITNESS: Right. This is a -- actually, we referred to this

Page 3557

1 briefly yesterday. This is a proposal, and it's in the form that is --

2 was often submitted for consideration by a legislative body, prepared by

3 one of the parties, and usually that -- the party that prepared the

4 proposal would have its name first and then space would be left for the

5 presidents of the parties to sign if, indeed, an agreement was reached.

6 This was the -- indeed the propose of the SDA to break up this large

7 Banja Luka municipality into five units and providing very specific

8 boundaries of it. I can tell you from press reports that this died a

9 sudden death shortly after it was proposed and was rolled out with great

10 fanfare by a spokesman for the SDA I believe sometime in late September,

11 maybe as late as November of 1991, and then won the support of no one

12 else, and it appeared that even the central party of the SDA in Sarajevo

13 distanced itself from it.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Well, many proposals fell through, Mr. Donia. Do you agree that

16 the events put lots of proposals to one side? There might have been

17 proposals, but the developments pushed them to one side; isn't that

18 right?

19 A. I couldn't agree more, and so many of the proposals that you have

20 been showing to me in the last several days died a similar death. They

21 failed to reach the level of agreement necessary to be formally adopted

22 and fell by the wayside.

23 Q. But you're not challenging the fact that they were conducting

24 negotiations and that the process was ongoing; right?

25 A. I would agree that negotiations were ongoing again perhaps

Page 3558

1 intermittently but throughout the period we're considering here, that is,

2 at least up until, say, the 24th of October.

3 Q. Thank you. Now, do you see here in the Serbian version, I don't

4 know whether you can see that in the English, that citizens are called in

5 all municipalities, villages, and so on, to state their views about the

6 founding of each of these municipalities. So the local communes were the

7 basic unit to decide which municipality they would belong to; right?

8 A. Yes. The SDA terminology was most frequently to use "citizens"

9 and that was their proposal here, that citizens vote.

10 Q. Thank you. I'd like to tender this document now and call up

11 document 1421 next, please.

12 JUDGE KWON: That will be Exhibit D291.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. 1D1421 next, please. And here we have the statutory decision of

15 a group of citizens of the local communes of Banja Luka, Hiseta, Majdan,

16 Gornji Seher, et cetera. The meeting of the citizens of the local

17 communes and then the communes are enumerated and they're mostly Muslim

18 populated local communes?

19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Can you set -- establish the date

20 first. Is it November, Doctor?

21 THE WITNESS: I believe it to be November, yes.

22 JUDGE KWON: Continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. So this is a continuation of the previous document, the previous

25 action that was taken. These local communes did as was proposed and

Page 3559

1 brought in a statutory decision on the organisation of the

2 Stari Grad-Banja Luka municipal Assembly and the founding. Article 1,

3 the municipality of Stari Grad-Banja Luka is a basic democratic,

4 socio-political community of equal citizens, nations, and nationalities

5 living in it.

6 And can we look at the last page now, please. Last page in

7 English, please, as well. Last page in the English. The penultimate,

8 before this diagram. It's a diagram of the local communes but that's the

9 one we need and Article 21:

10 "This decision enters into force on the date of its adoption."

11 And it was signed by the president of the working Presidency,

12 Dr. Sead Hadzagic, and you know what our circumstances were like, and you

13 can judge by the name and say that it's a Muslim; right?

14 A. I think your representation about the nature of this document

15 is -- is false. This was a draft of a resolution that would have been

16 adopted by the individual municipal or local Assemblies had it, in fact,

17 passed the Banja Luka Assembly. This was very common at the time. The

18 same thing was done, actually, in the formation of the ZOBK where there

19 was a boilerplate resolution put together for the local communes to use

20 in actually declaring themselves a member of the ZOBK. This is

21 essentially the same thing in an individual copy. It is not signed by

22 Dr. Hadzagic. It is type script and it would not have been signed

23 without having actually been enacted through the actions of the bodies

24 concerned.

25 Q. May we have the first page displayed again, please, and you'll

Page 3560

1 see that that's not the case. Here it says at a meeting of the 17th of

2 November 1991 the following statutory decision was taken. So what was up

3 to the local communes they did. They fulfilled their obligation. They

4 passed the statutory decision to form an Assembly like that. So from

5 there point of view they did everything they needed to do and then

6 further procedure was necessary in the municipality. So this is a

7 decision. The decision was made on the 17th of November. It's a final

8 decision following recommendations from the previous document.

9 Does it say, Has taken the following decision? And does it refer

10 to the document, the previous document I mean.

11 A. Well, I think without a -- without a signature and without actual

12 publication in the Official Gazette, this does not represent evidence of

13 what you have you've said it is, that the action is actually even taken.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

15 evidence.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D292.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D1419 next, please.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. This is a document dated the 12th of November, Studeni. The SDA

21 document was the 17th. Here we have the 12th of November, and they are

22 conclusions from a joint meeting of the Herzegovina regional community

23 and the Travnik regional community organised by the HDZ, the Croatian

24 Democratic Union. So we have two Croatian regions here, predominantly

25 populated by Croats. Two regions meeting. And the first sentence says:

Page 3561

1 On the 12th of November, Studeni, the Croatian town for November 1991, a

2 working meeting was held, attended by the presidents of the Crisis Staffs

3 of the Herzegovina regional community and the presidents of the Crisis

4 Staffs of the Travnik regional community was held and the following

5 conclusions were reached.

6 Did you know about this document?

7 A. Yes, do I.

8 Q. And did you also know that already at that time they had Crisis

9 Staffs?

10 A. I think these were formed within a few days prior to this, but

11 did I know that there were Crisis Staffs at the time that these

12 declarations were actually issued, yes, I did.

13 Q. Did the Serbs have Crisis Staffs at that same time?

14 A. I don't know.

15 Q. Thank you. May we now see -- well, let's look at the conclusions

16 and start off with the sentence that reads in Busovaca it was unanimously

17 decided that the Croatia people in Bosnia-Herzegovina must finally wage a

18 joint active policy which should lead to the realisation of our

19 centuries-old dream of a joint Croatian state. For this historical goal

20 to become a reality soon these two regional communities request the

21 commencement of activities to formulate an issue, legal and political

22 documents, the proclamation of a Croatian Banovina in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

23 a referendum on -- I can't see that word, that next word. On -- on

24 accession to the Republic of Croatia, et cetera. Did you know that this

25 conclusion was reached?

Page 3562

1 A. Yes. This is kind of standard fare, I think. It's the origins

2 or the beginning of a split within the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which

3 one group, which was more under President Tudjman's sponsorship, declared

4 these regions within Bosnia. Many people at the time viewed them as a

5 response to your declaration of the Serbian autonomous regions and

6 referred to them as HAOs, Croatian autonomous regions. And, in fact, at

7 the end of the day they declared, I think, on the 19th of November, the

8 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, which I'm sure you have a document on

9 coming up here, and attempted to delineate territorially their claims to

10 this autonomous area of Bosnia very similar to what you had done with the

11 SAOs.

12 Q. Do you mean to say that the Croats were afraid of Serb hegemony

13 and did this because of the Serbs and not because of the Muslims and

14 Muslim hegemony; is that what you're trying to say?

15 A. Well, I think that the wing of the party that was closest to

16 Tudjman was worried about you getting too far ahead of them in staking

17 out territorial claims in Bosnia. There are some differences, but

18 basically they were working to be sure that their claims were taken note

19 of very shortly after your own claims were staked out in the formation of

20 the SAOs. I think the primary purpose of both was to marginalise or

21 eliminate -- reduce to the lowest -- least area possible that area which

22 would be subject to Muslim territorial claims should they seek to advance

23 them.

24 Q. May we now turn to the next page of this document, please. And

25 while we're waiting for that, let me ask you this, Dr. Donia: You talk

Page 3563

1 about two wings of the HDZ. When did the HDZ divide and separate into

2 two parts, parties?

3 A. I did not speak of two wings of the party. I said it was a split

4 within the party, a split on viewpoints, and never did formally divide.

5 In early February 1992, the leadership of Stjepan Kljujic was --

6 Stjepan Kljujic and his immediate followers were purged at a meeting of

7 the HDZ. I believe it was in Grude or Siroki Brijeg. And that

8 represented the kind of final triumph of this separatist wing within the

9 party. But in the meantime, until that happened, there were people of

10 differing views inhabiting the same party and having some pretty serious

11 disputes about which approach to take. Also note, however, that when

12 this announcement of Herceg-Bosna was made, it was made without the prior

13 knowledge of Mr. Kljujic who was president of the party. He was holding

14 a press conference in Sarajevo and learned from a reporter about the

15 proclamation and did his best to disguise the fact that it was a complete

16 surprise to him and, in fact, ended up sort of tepidly endorsing the

17 proclamation.

18 Q. Thank you. I'd like to draw the participants' attention to

19 points (b) and (c) of item 3. Launch political and legal actions on the

20 democratic scene and internationally and (c) preparing better military

21 for clashes with all those forces which will try to stop this inevitable

22 process in the establishment of free Croatian state.

23 That then is the 12th of November.

24 When was the decision taken to form Republika Srpska? Do you

25 remember that? Do you agree that it was the 9th of January, 1992?

Page 3564

1 A. I think the name Republika Srpska was adopted in August of 1992.

2 The republic of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina was proclaimed

3 on January 9.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

6 evidence.

7 JUDGE KWON: What is your question about clause (b) and (c)? You

8 just read out without posing a question.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well I think I did ask a question.

10 Dr. Donia answered and said that he knew about this document knew about

11 this process. Now, his interpretation is one I don't agree with but

12 never mind. He knows it was a process and that this line or stream

13 within the HDZ prevailed and that Kljujic lost. So the question was, in

14 fact, was this process -- or, rather, did Dr. Donia take into account

15 this process that happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina among the Croatian

16 population.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. I think it's described in not great

18 detail but in a paragraph or two in my -- one of the reports that has

19 been submitted for this case.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. With the question and answer we'll have

21 a break for 20 minutes. Before that we'll admit this one.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit D293.

23 --- Recess taken at 10.22 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 10.45 a.m.

25 JUDGE KWON: Before you begin, Mr. Karadzic, Judge Baird has

Page 3565

1 something to say to you.

2 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Karadzic, before we continue with your

3 cross-examination, may I say something here. I fully agree with the

4 comments of my colleagues that your cross-examination yesterday was

5 clearly in keeping with the guidelines the Chamber gave you sometime

6 earlier. Your technique and the quality of your cross-examination

7 yesterday left nothing to be desired, but today you seem to be reverting

8 back to the original situation where your questions don't appear to be

9 impacting, generally speaking, on the indictment.

10 Now, be it admitted that the Chamber is not aware of the details

11 of your defence, you alone would know what you want to explore and what

12 you want to establish, and, indeed, I just said that this morning you are

13 making some progress. I mean, there's no two ways about that. But it

14 would be good if you could continue in the vein that you adopted

15 yesterday in your cross-examination: Succinct questions, pertinent

16 questions, no comment.

17 Thank you.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I'll

19 do my utmost to follow those guidelines.

20 May I now call up on e-court --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the microphones be switched off, please,

22 that aren't in use. Thank you.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- 11365, next document, please.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Do you agree that the Serb side saw the Assembly, the Assembly

Page 3566

1 meeting of the 14th and 15th of October very dramatically, 1991?

2 A. Yes, I think actually all sides did.

3 Q. I'm not -- 11306 is the correct document number. I don't know if

4 I misspoke earlier on. That's not the document, so may we have 11306,

5 please.

6 Dr. Donia, these are notes from the council of the

7 Serbian Democratic Party, but before that let me ask you a question. Do

8 you remember that the council was first established as a council for

9 inter-party co-operation?

10 A. Headed by Professor Koljevic, I believe, yes.

11 Q. And that there were some prominent people, members of it, who

12 weren't members of the SDS to begin with; right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And also that Mrs. Plavsic, Professor Plavsic, as a member of the

15 council was nominated although she was a party member, but she was

16 nominated.

17 A. I wasn't aware of that. I note that at this meeting there were a

18 number of party members there, too, so it wasn't clear to me at the

19 meeting that we're talking about who was actually on the council and who

20 was not.

21 JUDGE KWON: Is that the document you're going to tender?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

23 JUDGE KWON: It says Exhibit -- no, no.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the 65 ter number is 00962.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

Page 3567

1 MS. EDGERTON: I was standing up for two reasons, Your Honour.

2 Exactly that which my friend has indicated, and this is not a document

3 we've been notified on.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do believe that Dr. Donia

5 mentions this document somewhere in his report, to the best of my

6 recollections.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. But let me ask you: Are you familiar with these minutes from the

9 party council session?

10 JUDGE KWON: Whether or not Dr. Donia mentioned on this document

11 is a separate matter from the fact that you have to inform the other

12 party of the documents you're going to use during your cross-examination.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes I agree, but unfortunately we

14 don't have an enough members on our team, but may we continue.

15 THE WITNESS: Your question was, I believe, am I familiar with

16 the document, and yes I am.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Thank you. Here the president of the council was Professor

19 Slavko Leovac, a member of the academy.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I'd like to draw your attention, and everybody else's, to what

22 Mr. Najdavov says -- Najdanovic. The Muslims are in hurry to adopt the

23 declaration because of The Hague conference, but they are also in a hurry

24 because of the strong pressure by the Croatian leadership which wants to

25 reduce the pressure of the army on Croatia by opening up a front in

Page 3568

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 Do you remember that Stjepan Mesic, who was at the time -- well,

3 he wasn't president of Croatia but a member of the of Presidency said

4 that the war would spill over from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina?

5 A. I don't remember the specific verb he used, whether it would or

6 might or there existed a possibility of. I certainly remember he made

7 some -- raised the possibility that war would spill from Croatia into

8 Bosnia.

9 Q. Thank you. Now, would you -- I'd like to draw your attention to

10 the third sentence from the reply made by academician Milorad Ekmecic,

11 who was one of the most respected and prominent of our historians; right?

12 A. Certainly, yes.

13 Q. Thank you. And what he proposes here is this: Therefore, we

14 should continue our contacts with the leadership of the Croatian

15 Democratic Union and the Party of Democratic Action in our search for a

16 political solution. The Serbs have created regions which are not

17 interconnected, and these regions must not be allowed to establish their

18 governments which would not be interconnected.

19 May we turn to the next page, please, so that we can go through

20 the whole document first and then I'll come to my questions. Well, in

21 English it was actually the first page. So page 2 for the Serbian but

22 back to page 1 for the English. Back to page one for the English,

23 please.

24 Do you remember that Todor Dutina, who at that time was in the

25 Reformist Party of Ante Markovic went on to make the next statement and

Page 3569

1 Kecmanovic too. Do you recall that?

2 A. Do you recall what, his statement or -- or --

3 Q. That he was a reformist at the time. He became an SDS party

4 member only during the war.

5 A. I don't -- I didn't know prior to now what his party affiliation

6 was at the time of this meeting, no.

7 Q. Thank you. Let's see what Mr. Dutina proposes. You know, that

8 Dutina was otherwise a writer. He was also Bosnian's ambassador after

9 the war; right?

10 A. I didn't know that.

11 Q. Number 1 it says:

12 "Issue a proclamation addressed to the Party of Democratic

13 Action, the Croatian Democratic Union (the leadership) asking them to

14 withdraw within seven days from the decision they have adopted, otherwise

15 the Serbian Democratic Party will instruct its members to leave the

16 existing government institutions and begin creating parallel ones. "

17 Now, I'm sure you know that frequently when there is a

18 parliamentary crisis the people would leave the various government

19 institutions. Do you agree?

20 A. Not always. Sometimes they stayed in government institutions.

21 Sometimes some people left and others stayed. I wouldn't make that a

22 general conclusion, no.

23 Q. Thank you. Now let's see what Professor Koljevic has to say.

24 With the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Union, we

25 can do nothing -- nothing can be done legally. And let's see what Mitar

Page 3570

1 Miljanovic goes on to say. He says the strategic goal of those

2 confronting us is the creation of autonomy followed by republic and

3 ultimately a Jamahirija. And Velibor Ostojic says the party policy, up

4 to now, was suited to peacetime conditions. And may we turn to what

5 Mr. Karadzic says.

6 JUDGE KWON: Having heard from the witness that he knows about

7 this document, I don't see much of the point of reading out all those

8 quotes, you can put your case in a succinct manner to the witness and

9 then you can decide what to do afterward.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Do you remember and do you agree that we published in the papers,

13 proclaimed and sent officially to the Party of Democratic Action and the

14 HDZ a request for them to repeal their decision, withdraw their decision

15 that we considered to be unlawful and unconstitutional, and that we

16 waited for them to do that until the 24th of October?

17 A. I think the -- this -- this dead-line was, in fact, seven days,

18 but the dead-line was to expire, as I recall, at 5.00 p.m. on the 24th of

19 October, just an hour before you had scheduled the meeting of the --

20 first meeting of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

23 evidence now.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D294.

Page 3571

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D1411 next, please.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I don't know if it's been translated, but you speak our language,

4 so just take a brief look at what it says and we can see that it was

5 published in the media, and you're quite right, the dead-line was from

6 the 15th to the 25th of October. Does it say here request for --

7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Also not notified to the Prosecution, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE KWON: I note it's now being repeated.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, our team members who will no

11 longer be paid are now looking for work. Quite literally. In the

12 literal sense, they're looking for work, so we're facing difficulties,

13 but I think we did send this by e-mail.

14 JUDGE KWON: That is beside the point. You do your best to

15 inform the Prosecution of the documents in the future. Let's move on.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Now let's see. You said that the dead-line was until 1700 hours;

19 right?

20 A. Yes. It appears I was correct.

21 Q. Do you want me to read out the first sentence? Journalists

22 requested that Dr. Karadzic should more closely explain his statement

23 whereby a constitutional order should be established in BiH by 1700

24 hours. We said that publicly. They violated the constitution in a

25 brutal manner, and they proclaimed the Assembly session at an illegal

Page 3572

1 meeting.

2 Now, do you remember that we questioned the right for the

3 vice-president of the Assembly to be able to call an Assembly session?

4 Do you remember that?

5 A. Yes, I do. This, I take it, is from the SDS party newspaper; is

6 that correct? From "Javnost"?

7 Q. No, this is "Politika."

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. Can we have the top now? Can we have the very top of the page?

10 Let me read the title and what it says. It says, "Request to

11 annul unlawful decisions." Isn't that right? You speak our language.

12 You can understand this.

13 A. That's what the headline says, yes.

14 Q. Well, now let's see what it says underneath:

15 "If this is not done by the set time, and if constitutional order

16 is not established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, an Assembly of the Serb people

17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be proclaimed consisting of its legitimate

18 representatives"; is that correct?

19 A. I think you just read it, yes.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

22 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D295, Your Honour.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01362, please. 1D01362. It

25 hasn't been translated. We do not see that there is a translation, but

Page 3573

1 this is a session of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the

2 15th of October. That is to say, immediately after the Assembly meeting,

3 the meeting of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 Page 31, please. Can we have page 43, actually. It says page 43

5 at the bottom. Yes.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Dr. Donia, I would like to draw your attention to what it was

8 that Professor Plavsic said. She says that the police is checking

9 military transports, that they're working unlawfully. And now what does

10 it say here?

11 As for the Crisis Staff on which I was at first, the one that had

12 been established by the Presidency, in the belief that the Crisis Staff

13 would deal with the problem of refugees that we have in the republic and

14 in order to allow these people to have at least a semblance of a normal

15 life, and so on and so forth, and then part of the Presidency took over

16 some of the authority that is otherwise vested in the council for the

17 constitutional order. And then I saw that the Crisis Staff was debating

18 such issues, and then I resigned from that Crisis Staff, and --

19 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether Dr. Donia has been following.

20 I think it should show the upper part.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's around the 20th line here. It

22 has to do with the Crisis Staff.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. You see that, Dr. Donia? In the middle of the first paragraph?

25 JUDGE KWON: And what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

Page 3574

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. I just want to say this: The Crisis Staff should really deal

3 with the problems that are outside the scope of a federal institutional

4 that is called the JNA.

5 Do you see now that this crisis in the Presidency had been a

6 protracted one and that the Serb representatives were protesting strongly

7 against unlawful conduct?

8 A. Dr. Karadzic, I'm going to question the authenticity of this

9 document. It is actually a publication that was put together from a

10 publication, and you haven't showed me the title page or the source, put

11 together by a group of people around Miroslav Tudjman, and it was noted

12 in the preparation of this that it was subject to editing and,

13 furthermore, subject to the use of headlines and highlighting to make the

14 specific didactic points involved in the text that was presented.

15 It's -- since these clearly are transcripts that are available,

16 I'm wondering why I'm not looking at an actual document rather than a

17 possibly edited version of the -- of the transcript of the Presidency.

18 I see what you've just read and note that you have read it, but I

19 don't know that I can go any further than that.

20 Q. I believe that the distinguished Ms. Edgerton had confirmed on

21 earlier occasions the authenticity of these transcripts. These are tape

22 recordings, and they were not edited in any way.

23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. I recall that we had this

25 situation already at an earlier stage with another witness, and on this

Page 3575

1 occasion we double checked with the Presidency minutes and found that the

2 document and the parts that were in this book were correct. So my

3 proposal would also be to again check -- double-check it. We will

4 probably be able to find this very session and then see whether it's

5 correct or not.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.

7 THE WITNESS: You know, I find it irregular that I'm being shown

8 a document for which there is a more authentic, genuine source and not

9 the actual authoritative version which is obviously available to both

10 sides.

11 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Can we have the next page, please, and we see towards the

14 bottom -- actually can we scroll down so that Dr. Donia can see that this

15 is Mr. Izetbegovic's reply.

16 Now let us move on to the next page. Somewhere around the third

17 of the page. The third. I think that it's in bold anyway. Actually,

18 the sentence before that.

19 We are fully aware of the fact that by declaring the neutrality

20 of Bosnia-Herzegovina we may have indirectly violated some laws.

21 However, at this point in time everything is a bit fluid. There are laws

22 and there are laws.

23 Do you see that Mr. Izetbegovic thought that there were laws that

24 didn't have to be observed?

25 A. No.

Page 3576

1 Q. So what does it mean when he says that there are laws and there

2 are laws? And he says, "We may have violated some laws indirectly."

3 A. I don't accept that as an authoritative statement that he did.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Scroll down a bit. A bit further

5 down.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. "We are aware that there are certain things there that constitute

8 a violation of certain federal laws," do you see that sentence? "We are

9 aware of the fact that there are some things there that constitute a

10 violation of some federal laws," do you see that sentence?

11 A. I don't, I'm afraid.

12 Q. Let's follow it. One, two -- line six from the bottom.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, can I suggest to you that you just

14 leave this matter aside and then given Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's comment that

15 she would double-check the authenticity or correctness of this quote. So

16 wait until she comes back to it and then proceed to another topic first.

17 Or you can bring up the real transcript of this.

18 Let's move on to another topic for the time being.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Just for the very end, were you aware of the fact that

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina or some of its institutions were violating laws?

23 A. Again, that's a matter of interpreting not only laws but the

24 constitution, and the constitution court certainly ruled that certain

25 bodies were violating laws and, in fact, certain bodies were illegal,

Page 3577

1 including the SAOs and the Croatian associations that were created on the

2 12th and 19th of November, and that the SDS rejected the suggestion of

3 referring the question that was debated on the 15th of October to the

4 constitutional court. So I again will say the determination of what was

5 legal and what was illegal was very much in the eyes of the beholder.

6 That split took place more or less along party lines, and there was

7 almost a unanimous reluctance to refer matters in contest to the

8 appropriate courts.

9 Q. Thank you. Can we go back to 11306 for a moment. That is 294.

10 Actually, our document that was admitted.

11 Do you agree that Petko Cancar was president of the Chamber of

12 Municipalities, one of the two Chambers in the Assembly of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

14 A. I don't know -- I didn't know that.

15 Q. Now let us see page SA 40-- actually, it's page 3 in this

16 document. 1D8294, actually. D294. That's it.

17 Let, let me inform you while we're waiting for it, as for these

18 notebooks on -- concerning this council held on the 15th of October,

19 Petko Cancar says, "The president of the constitutional court stated

20 today that the decision taken by the Assembly does not cause any legal

21 effect."

22 Page 3. Let us go to page 3 of this document. Page 3. Perhaps

23 it's different in English. The third page of the document. Page 2 in

24 English. Can we have page 2 in English. Thank you.

25 We see it here, Cancar, in English. It is the last quarter of

Page 3578

1 the page or the third:

2 "[In English] Today the constitutional court stated that the

3 decision adopted by the Assembly did not have any legal effect."

4 Did you see that the president of the constitutional court said

5 that this was an unlawful decision taken by the Assembly, but the SDA

6 continued as if it had been a legally valid decision.

7 A. You're citing here a statement by an SDS leader about another

8 statement that he alleges was made by the president of the constitutional

9 court. He's not citing a decision of the constitutional court itself.

10 And, in fact, the -- there was a proposal in one of the negotiating

11 sessions during the time of this dead-line that you put on the talks of

12 the 24th, between the 15th and the 24th, to submit the entire issue to

13 the constitutional court. The SDS rejected that suggestion, and on the

14 grounds that they didn't trust the composition of the constitutional

15 court to come up with the decision that they made. So I don't

16 necessarily disbelieve that he said that, but I think that this is not an

17 adequate statement of the fact, claim, that the constitutional basis for

18 the decision was -- was invalid.

19 I think in general this -- to save a lot of time, this is -- this

20 is a meeting at which a lot of different viewpoints were put forward, and

21 they were aired very openly, very democratically, if you will, on the

22 part of the members of the council, and so you can find here a lot of

23 very differing ideas. There weren't sharp disagreements about what to do

24 next. I think there was general agreement on this idea of a seven day or

25 ten day hiatus to allow the negotiations to go forward. I'm not

Page 3579

1 contesting that at all. And then there were some suggestions about

2 intensifying regionalisation.

3 So this is what I see as the first, sort of the beginning of the

4 extended planning process that was set off in the immediate aftermath of

5 the events of the 15th of October, the planning process that you and the

6 SDS went forward with, and it's -- it's a very open discussion of the

7 options that are available.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I said I was wondering about the

9 relevance of your line of questioning, in particular how they are

10 impinging upon the indictment. Do not take it for granted that your time

11 for cross-examination will be extended.

12 As you suggested, there are a lot of further issues which are

13 very important and relevant to your case. For example, Variant A or B.

14 Bear that in mind and please continue.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I just wanted us to see

16 that the president of the constitutional court had actually made such a

17 statement but that the SDA nevertheless continued with this kind of

18 activity. Thank you. This has already been admitted. Can we now have

19 00972. That's the 65 ter number.

20 JUDGE KWON: That was yet again unnecessary comment from you.

21 THE REGISTRAR: This has been admitted as Exhibit P958,

22 Your Honours.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I believe, Mr. Donia, that you have referred to this speech of

Page 3580

1 mine that relates to the plebiscite. The Assembly of the Serb people had

2 already been established on the 25th; right?

3 A. 24th, I believe.

4 Q. Possibly. Possibly. Yes, but it was published on the 25th.

5 So we established that to this day the Assembly consists of 83

6 MPs, and in addition to the SDS, there was the Serb Renewal Movement in

7 this Assembly, then the Reformists, the Socialists -- or, rather, the

8 Communists, and one member who came from the ranks of the Liberals;

9 right?

10 A. Yes. I -- I believe there were -- it's four or five delegates.

11 The original Assembly had 11 members of the Reformist Party and 11

12 members of the Social Democratic Party in the Council of Citizens, and I

13 believe a few of those Serbs who were in those parties joined the

14 Assembly, joined the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 24th.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that at the time a decision was

16 passed to organise a plebiscite of the Serb people to see whether the

17 Serb people actually supported our policy of remaining in Yugoslavia?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you remember, Dr. Donia -- I'm sure that you are more familiar

20 with this particular field than I am, and that is American history, and

21 that is that President Lincoln started a war against the south because

22 they wanted to change the nature of the American federation?

23 A. That's false.

24 JUDGE KWON: I don't see the relevance of the question.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance is in the following

Page 3581

1 question:

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Do you remember, Dr. Donia, that part of Virginia had refused,

4 refused to join the confederacy and that they stayed with the union, and

5 that is the present-day state of West Virginia?

6 A. I'd love to talk about the American civil war forever. I think

7 it's very interesting. But I don't believe that what you have just

8 characterised as a -- changing the state of the federation is an accurate

9 representation of the -- of the condition in the American -- in the

10 American state as of -- in the United States as of 1861.

11 Q. [Microphone not activated]

12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

13 JUDGE KWON: Microphone. Mr. Karadzic, turn your microphone on.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. But you are not disputing that the war started because the south

16 wanted a confederacy? The southern states, rather.

17 A. Yes, I would dispute that. It was a factor but certainly not the

18 only factor in a very complex situation that included issues about

19 admission of new states to the union, the issue of slavery and states'

20 rights, a number of things that I just don't see happening here. Perhaps

21 you do, but I don't see the -- I don't see the riveting parallel that

22 would lead me to conclude what you have, evidently.

23 Q. Do you remember that Virginia was a single state and that

24 West Virginia was created during the course of the war?

25 A. I don't remember when West Virginia was created. Approximately

Page 3582

1 at that time, yes.

2 Q. May I just remind you, the western part of Virginia refused to

3 join the confederacy. They stayed within the union. Do you think that

4 this west part of Virginia was secessionist in relation to the

5 confederacy, or, rather, they had voted for the union and they stayed in

6 the union; isn't that right?

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, said I was wondering the relevance of

8 the questions, but you still continue that line of questions, ignoring

9 the advice from the Bench.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I'm sorry. This is a

11 flagrant precedent but let's move on. Can we have page 8 in this

12 document.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Can you see this here? "What is important for us is that the

15 plebiscite goes off with dignity and good spirits the way Serbs can do

16 it, like gentlemen," et cetera? And towards -- and further down:

17 "Be on best terms with your Muslim and Croatian neighbours. Just

18 like that, that's no problems for you, no problems for us either. We are

19 just expressing our will. Everything will be fine, no conflict anywhere

20 whatsoever. There can be no shooting. I -- I don't know who gave those

21 weapons to Serbs, but -- oh, go ahead, shoot. Oh, no, you are shooting.

22 You are shooting. That's what I'm saying. You are shooting. See,

23 there's no discipline. This morning at Pale, I said that I would want

24 Serbs to be meek like Muslims or Croats."

25 And then further down it says:

Page 3583

1 "Serbs don't trust a leader until they have weighed him

2 carefully, and then they watch him to see if he would do something wrong

3 or betray them."

4 So I'm talking about the plebiscite. I'm asking that there be no

5 shooting. I'm asking for a good life together with Muslim and Croatian

6 neighbours. The plebiscite is just an expression of one's will, not

7 entering a conflict; right?

8 A. I think there are about six or seven statements that preceded

9 your question "Right," and I'd have to go back over them one by one to

10 affirm them or deny them.

11 I -- I love this paragraph, because it -- it must have been fun

12 to give that talk. I didn't know any of these people except

13 Professor Koljevic, and I just can't imagine urging this crowd, be sure

14 you don't drink and be monks at your job. It was obvious that you were

15 worried that some sort of unrest might break out and that you were intent

16 on making sure that this happened without incidents as logically you

17 should have, so that the results would be more likely to be accepted as

18 valid by other Bosnian and by the international community.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted. Oh,

21 it has already been admitted. Thank you. Can we have 65 ter 5842.

22 This is the Official Gazette of the Serbian people in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 1. So we started issuing our own

24 Official Gazettes -- has that come up on our screens? Yes, it has. I

25 need the first page. Page 1, please. 7315 are the last digits, whereas

Page 3584

1 the last digits are 7321 here. So six pages on, please. Or, rather, six

2 pages back.

3 JUDGE KWON: I was told that the e-court has only two pages.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, what's the second page then?

5 Let's have a look at that. This is the whole of that Official Gazette.

6 So can we put it on the overhead projector, page 1 on the overhead

7 projector, please.

8 It's the decision on the founding of the Assembly of the Serb

9 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that decision was published. Now I'd

10 like us to focus on paragraph III, which says why it was formed in the

11 first place, and what its aims are.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Are you familiar with the decision, Dr. Donia?

14 A. Yes, I am. I'm familiar with the parallel Official Gazette that

15 you formed, I guess believing it to be the equivalent of the legal

16 Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I -- can I

17 ask if this decision was also published in the Official Gazette of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

19 Q. Well, we considered the -- that the Official Gazette of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not exist, was no longer in existence, because the

21 state was abolished.

22 A. So you believe that the --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Constitution, the constitution. Interpreter's

24 correction, the constitution was abolished.

25 THE WITNESS: Okay. So this is, indeed, a parallel document to

Page 3585

1 the official legal gazette of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Look at item number III:

4 "The Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina shall

5 consider and decide upon all issues which relate to the realisation of

6 the equality of the Serbian people with the other nations and

7 nationalities living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the protection of the

8 interests of the Serbian people if those interests were to come under

9 threat by decisions of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina."

11 Now, does this remind you of what the council of Chambers should

12 have been doing or the council for national equality, for instance?

13 A. Well it reminds me what the Bosnian Serb Assembly was doing which

14 was arrogating unto itself the role of a sole spokesman for the Serb

15 people in these matters.

16 Q. Do you see lower down it says that Serbian deputies would

17 continue the work in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the working

18 bodies to which they were elected, et cetera, et cetera. That's in

19 paragraph 4. Now do you see that the role the Serbian people there is a

20 corrective role against the unconstitutional decisions of the joint

21 Assembly?

22 A. Yes, again it arrogates to the promulgator of this decision, the

23 right or the judgement of what was constitutional and what was not.

24 Q. Yes. Well, now I have to ask you this: How did Badinter come to

25 the make the decision that Yugoslavia no longer existed? But I don't

Page 3586

1 want to expand the topic. Let me tender this document into evidence

2 first, please.

3 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification pending

4 translation.

5 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D296, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. But I'm not sure you, Doctor, have

7 answered to the question of the accused: How did Badinter come to the --

8 come to make the decision that Yugoslavia no longer existed?

9 THE WITNESS: You're correct, Your Honour, I have not. The --

10 what's called the Badinter Commission was, in fact, the Arbitration

11 Commission of the European Community, and it was assigned the task by the

12 European Community ministers of assessing the applications for

13 independence of any of those republics of Yugoslavia that wish to apply

14 for recognition. This body took on this task in December of 1991,

15 deliberated, issued a couple of different statements, the most -- the two

16 most significant of which were a statement of principles whereby they

17 intended to apply the basic principles of human rights and international

18 law to the situation in both the former Yugoslavia -- or the Yugoslavia

19 and the Soviet Union, which was also at that time in turmoil with some of

20 the -- or with the various republics separating from one another, and

21 then subsequently issued a finding citing the various principles and

22 criteria that had been outlined previously based on applications from the

23 various republics.

24 Of the republics -- of the six republics, four ended up applying

25 for recognition. Croatia -- the republics of Croatia, Slovenia,

Page 3587

1 Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the decision on each of those

2 applications was a little bit different, but in the case of Slovenia and

3 Croatia was an agreement to recognise those two republics on the 15th of

4 January, 1992. I forget what the date was to be for Macedonia, but the

5 provision for Bosnia-Herzegovina was that the will of the people of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina to opt for independence had not been sufficiently

7 established, and, in fact, cited as evidence of the fact that it had not

8 been sufficiently established, the meeting of the Assembly of the Serb

9 people, the Bosnian Serb Assembly, on the 24th of October. And to remedy

10 that prescribed that Bosnia-Herzegovina should hold a referendum on the

11 question of whether the populous sought independence -- sought

12 recognition, I'm sorry, sought recognition as an independent republic at

13 some future time.

14 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the order and sequence of events

15 was different? The Badinter Arbitration Commission was supposed to

16 propose a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, what it did was it proposed

17 that Yugoslavia cease to exist.

18 A. No, that's not at all the case. That's wrong.

19 Q. Do you recall that the sentence that was uttered was "Yugoslavia

20 ceased to exist," that that was the sentence that was remembered?

21 A. The memorable sentence was that Yugoslavia was in a process of

22 disillusion. It wasn't that it cease to exist.

23 Q. Very well. Process of disillusion. But a year before that,

24 Gianni De Michelis said Yugoslavia has ceased to exist -- or, rather,

25 that the death of Yugoslavia was proclaimed as a natural phenomenon of

Page 3588

1 Yugoslavia withering and dying away.

2 A. I don't know that to be the case and I don't have any document in

3 front of me to suggest that that was the case.

4 Q. Very well. I'm going to present the Badinter findings in due

5 course. I didn't think we would need that, but we might.

6 Now, do you agree that it was stated that the republics who

7 wanted to, after the Badinter Commission, that is, that was the

8 conclusion of the ministers of the European Community, that by 21st of

9 December, I think it was, that the republics should tender their request

10 for recognition of independence; is that right?

11 A. Yes. Tender their request for recognition by the EC.

12 Q. And is it also true and correct that before the Badinter decision

13 was made only two republics, Slovenia and Croatia, had put in that

14 request, and they held their referendums; right?

15 A. Well, the requests, I think, did come in -- the formal requests

16 came in subsequent to the Badinter Commission inviting them. There is,

17 of course, a whole history prior to that going back to June 25th, 1991,

18 when Slovenia and Croatia actually declared their independence, the

19 interventions of the EC and negotiations which led to the deferral of the

20 effectiveness of those proclamations for three months until October 18,

21 1991. So certainly one could say that the -- the process of moving

22 toward independence was very well advanced prior to the

23 Badinter Commission's solicitation of requests. But it did, in fact,

24 invite all republics to respond and, in fact, to comment on its

25 procedures. And Serbia and Montenegro did so liberally, and opined upon

Page 3589

1 both the standards that were to be used and the specific decisions that

2 that the Badinter Commission reached.

3 Q. Thank you. I'd like to tender the previous document as a whole,

4 the Official Gazette, Official Gazette number 1. May it be given a

5 number. I'm sure it exists somewhere. It must exist.

6 JUDGE KWON: Are we talking about Exhibit D296? It has been

7 admitted in its entirety. It's admitted, but -- yes, it's admitted.

8 Being marked for identification.

9 MS. EDGERTON: And in the interim, Your Honour, while we're back

10 on the subject, we have been able to locate a translation which hasn't

11 been uploaded in e-court yet, but perhaps we could sort that out at the

12 break.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now may we have

15 65 ter 225 next, please.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Donia, we're now going to move on to the document with

18 Variants A and B, the well-known document that's been exploited so many

19 times. And while we're waiting for that to come up, let me ask you this:

20 Do you remember that the government, on the 20 -- or, rather the 19th of

21 December, I think it was, the BH government, with opposition from the

22 Serb ministers, asked nonetheless that the European Community launch

23 proceedings -- or, rather, called for independence for Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina?

25 A. Not exactly. It was the case that both the Presidency and the

Page 3590

1 government, that is the Council of Ministers, appealed in response to the

2 invitation of the European Community appealed for recognition of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a -- as an independent republic.

4 Q. Do you remember that we had three comments and criticisms to

5 make? First of all, that the Assembly should do that, not the government

6 or Presidency; and secondly that neither the government nor the

7 Presidency could reach that decision by out-voting the Serb members

8 because it was an important subject matter which required a consensus.

9 A. Yes, your position basically shifted from wanting a two-thirds

10 vote to wanting consensus.

11 Q. Well, we asked for a consensus in the government and Presidency,

12 but a two-thirds majority in the Assembly; right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, do you remember that the Serb ministers left the

15 government -- or, rather, left the government session and made a public

16 announcement saying that Serb rights had been violated and that of those

17 ministers only one of them was an SDS member?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, do you remember that on the 21st of December

20 held an Assembly session, an Assembly of the Serb people, and called for

21 those decision to be withdrawn?

22 A. You're referring now to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Assembly

23 of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 21st of December.

24 Yes.

25 Q. And you will remember that we said that if that wasn't withdrawn

Page 3591

1 by Christmas or whatever that we would set up our own unit in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?

3 A. It was a little bit more specific than that. I think you -- the

4 SDS or the delegates to the -- what I call Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to

5 make preparations for the proclamation of a separate state, separate

6 Bosnian Serb state and indicated your intent to proclaim that state if

7 the HDZ and the SDA didn't change their behaviour.

8 Q. Thank you. I'd like to draw everybody's attention to the title

9 page of this document.

10 Do you see there, Dr. Donia that, it says that the Serbian

11 Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Main Board, and that there's no

12 reference number or the usual attributes that attend documents that have

13 been adopted?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Are you aware of our position -- or, rather, what we stated, that

16 we received this document from well-intentioned pensioned officers after

17 they and we proclaimed that their flats should be marked with respect to

18 a tax against their apartments?

19 A. I'm aware of your contention, yes.

20 Q. Have you come across a single document stating that this document

21 was discussed and adopted by the organs of the Serbian Democratic Party?

22 A. A lot of documentary evidence that it was forwarded to local

23 Municipal Boards by the -- by the Main Board, and this from a variety of

24 different municipalities. I think if your question more narrowly is have

25 I seen a document that is, you know, stamped and signed from the party of

Page 3592

1 the Main Board, the answer's no, I've not. And, in fact, the document

2 internally has a certain inconsistency, because on the front page it

3 says, "Main Board," and the last page it's signed as "Crisis Staff of the

4 Main Board."

5 Q. Thank you. May we have page 2 of the Serbian, and it's still on

6 page 1 in the English, so that we can look at the first paragraph:

7 "Because there is reasonable grounds for suspicion that certain

8 forces are working persistently, thoroughly, and in an organised way to

9 take Bosnia-Herzegovina and then also the Serb people out of Yugoslavia

10 by force, we hereby issue these instructions detailing the common tasks,

11 measures," et cetera.

12 Do you see that? And may we turn to page 2 in the English as

13 well now, please.

14 Thank you. I claim, and we stated this straight away, that this

15 was supplied by that group of well-intentioned officers and many of them

16 were alive in 1941, and that we -- we gave this to people, or, rather, we

17 told people to take note of this and act accordingly should they see fit.

18 A. What's the question?

19 Q. The question is: Do you agree that once we received this at the

20 Main Board session, that we distributed it without a discussion?

21 A. I don't know. I wasn't -- I have not seen any documentation on

22 that Main Board session that would lead me to either agree or disagree

23 with that.

24 Q. Thank you. All our documentation stayed behind, because we

25 didn't expect a war. And you know that all our documents were seized.

Page 3593

1 That's right, isn't it?

2 A. No. Not all your documents were seized, no.

3 Q. Well, what wasn't seized then by the Serbian Democratic Party --

4 of the Serbian Democratic Party?

5 A. Well, I don't know. You do. I don't. Clearly there were a lot

6 of things that were not seized because some of them were kept by you and

7 other people in the party over the years.

8 Q. May we now turn to page 4279, or, rather, page 5 of this same

9 document to look at item 8. In English it's probably page 4.

10 JUDGE KWON: I think it should be the previous page in English.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. It's the next page in Serbian and the previous page in English.

14 And would you look at item 8 in English. And it will come up in

15 the Serbian on page 5. Next page in the Serbian, please.

16 The recommendation made here in point 7 is:

17 "To prevent uncontrolled shipment of deficient products, raw

18 materials, and manufacturing components, step up information -- or,

19 rather, place under control existing commodity reserves," et cetera.

20 And in point 8:

21 "Step up, or, rather, ensure respect for national and other

22 rights of the members of all nations and nationalities and their

23 engagement in the organs of power of authority that the Serbian Assembly

24 will establish in the municipality."

25 Do you agree that this piece of paper is a recommendation for

Page 3594

1 action in a situation of crisis?

2 JUDGE KWON: I am not sure whether you read out the item 8 which

3 is consistent with the English translation we have.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. It wasn't that. Where it

5 says "Variant B." Before we come to chapter Variant B, that item 8. I

6 think it might be page 4 of the English translation.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we're on page 4. Could you help us locate the

8 passage.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then it must be page 3. That's it.

10 Paragraph 7, they're telling us to prevent uncontrolled distribution of

11 food and other deficient commodities, stop smuggling and so on, and then

12 point 8 it says:

13 "When taking all these measures [In English] make sure that

14 national and other rights of members of all nations are respected and

15 that they are later engaged in government organs established by the

16 Assembly of Serbian Republic of -- Serbian people of -- in municipality."

17 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this document was a

18 recommendation for action in extreme situations of crisis where there

19 would be no central power and authority?

20 A. No. I would agree with the first part of that formulation. It

21 certainly is a document that directs activities to be undertaken in a

22 situation of crisis.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If this was page 6 of the English,

25 6 of 10 pages, then I think we need to turn to page 8 of 10. And it's

Page 3595

1 also page 8 of the Serbian. Or maybe it's page 9 of 10 in the English.

2 Probably page 9 in English.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. In the previous paragraph, Mr. Donia, do we see that the rights

5 of others are to be respected and that they also be included in the

6 organs of power and authority as soon as the situation allows for that?

7 A. I didn't think it said quite that. I think it said after --

8 again, you're asking me about something that's no longer in front of me,

9 so -- I'm perfectly willing to go back to it, but you've moved on to

10 something else here, so I can't attest to what it -- what it said in the

11 previous section.

12 Q. I'm sorry. Can we go back to point 8 on page 6 in English. Page

13 6 in English. So let us see what is envisaged. Can you have a look at

14 it now?

15 "[In English] When taking all these measures," [Interpretation]

16 measures had already been listed, "[In English] Make sure that national

17 and other rights of members of all nations are respected and that they

18 are later engaged in government organs established by the Assembly of

19 Serbian people in the municipality."

20 A. Yeah. I think the sequence here is revealing. That is, these

21 measures are to be undertaken first while fully respecting the rights of

22 members of other nations and then later, not specified when or under what

23 conditions they are to be engaged in government organs established by the

24 Assembly of the Serbian people. So it is clear that this is something

25 that will take place at the sufferance of the Assembly of the Serbian

Page 3596

1 people which had been established a month before. Two months before, I'm

2 sorry.

3 Q. [Interpretation] However, there is a reference here to Municipal

4 Assemblies, Serb Municipal Assemblies; right?

5 A. Yes. I'm sorry, the -- and some of those had indeed -- those

6 were to be established under the terms of the instructions. So I erred

7 in assuming that was the central Assembly of Republika Srpska, but, in

8 fact, it is the newly created parallel Assemblies of the Serb peoples

9 that would be created under the terms of the instruction that will then

10 decide when and if others would be engaged in units of government.

11 Q. Were they supposed to decide or is the recommendation that they

12 should join in? [In English] "Make sure they are later engaged."

13 A. "Make sure that "-- this is in the English and I'd have to go to

14 the Serbian to be absolutely certain, but "make sure that national and

15 other rights are respected and that they are later engaged ..."

16 So, yes, it's a statement of -- at some unspecified later time,

17 the members of these other nations would be engaged in an unspecified way

18 in unspecified government organs established by the Serb municipality.

19 JUDGE KWON: I'm noting the time. We will have a break for half

20 an hour.

21 --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.

22 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Just a couple of matters that arose from the last

25 session, Your Honour, if I may. The first is with respect to the

Page 3597

1 document which bore the 65 ter number 1D01362, and we -- that was

2 mentioned at pages 41 and 42 of today's transcript. This document is

3 what -- Dr. Karadzic described this document as a session of the

4 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on the 15th of October. It, in

5 fact, appears on the basis of the translation of the heading to have been

6 a meeting between the president and members of the socialist Republic of

7 Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency and the socialist Republic of Bosnia

8 and Herzegovina of president of the government with high officials of the

9 SSNO and the SFRJ armed forces HQ, and we do not have that document in

10 house, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 MS. EDGERTON: The second item is with respect to 65 ter 05842,

13 which was admitted in full as D296. That has now been up loaded in full

14 in e-court in English and in the original language.

15 JUDGE KWON: And you have no objection to admission of it in its

16 entirety.

17 MS. EDGERTON: None at all.

18 JUDGE KWON: Then it's admitted. And taking this opportunity,

19 whether you are in a position to answer questions -- questionnaire

20 provided to the accused some time ago.

21 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, Your Honour. That -- we've been looking at

22 those proposed facts in detail and note, Your Honours, that much of those

23 proposed facts are indeed irrelevant on the basis of Your Honour's --

24 this Chamber's own ruling of 13 April 2010 in regard to the -- from the

25 decision on the Prosecution's motion for admission of the evidence of

Page 3598

1 KDZ172, in particular, paragraph 19 of that decision.

2 There are some matters that may be relevant that we're looking at

3 in more detail, and we'll be able to respond in writing on those,

4 Your Honour.

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

6 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I ask for the

8 document to be returned, 225? That's the 65 ter number.

9 Q. In order to get to the war as soon as possible, Mr. Donia, I'm

10 going to try to put questions that are as short as possible. Do you

11 remember that the Serb side had proposed that wherever there was a

12 concentration of one or the other people or nation within a municipality

13 that they actually could establish a municipality of their own?

14 A. I'm not aware of any formal proposal to that degree. It was

15 certainly inherent in some of the party's programme and policies, but I

16 don't -- couldn't identify a specific document or demand that says that.

17 Q. And do you remember that we had proposed that Sarajevo be

18 reorganised like Brussels? To have ethnic municipalities established,

19 just like municipalities in Brussels are?

20 A. Yes. That was my understanding of the way that you ultimately

21 did organise the Serb municipalities in Sarajevo in January/February

22 1992.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, do you see what is meant by this, namely that

24 they would take part in this life when there is a Serb municipality,

25 meaning that there might be a Croat municipality as well or a Muslim

Page 3599

1 municipality?

2 A. No, I don't interpret this instruction to be -- to say that at

3 all.

4 Q. I'm not talking about the instruction. I'm just talking about

5 that sentence, namely that they would take part in the political life of

6 the municipality once it is established. Is the reference being made to

7 a Serb municipality?

8 A. I believe it is. I'm -- again, it's not in front of me here,

9 so ...

10 Q. And do you know -- I'm sure that you did that --

11 JUDGE KWON: Page 6 of the English.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

13 Mr. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Yes, paragraph number 8. The last sentence in paragraph number

15 8.

16 A. Yes. I think -- as I said earlier, this clearly establishes that

17 the government organs concerned have to be established by the Assembly of

18 the Serb people. So any such organisations or organs would be created or

19 not by the -- the Assembly of the Serb people, and at some unspecified

20 future time those of other nations might enter into those government

21 organs. It doesn't, for example, say the members of other nations have

22 the right to establish their own organs within a declared Serb

23 municipality. It simply says the government organs established by the

24 Assembly of the Serb people in that municipality will be open at some

25 future time to participation by those of other nationalities.

Page 3600

1 Q. And do you know that in practically all municipalities there were

2 negotiations to the effect that each community would establish its own

3 municipality. In Sanski Most, for instance, in Vlasenica and Bratunac.

4 Actually, in Vlasenica and Bratunac that had already been established.

5 And in Ilidza it had almost been accomplished, too, that is to say to

6 establish a Serbo-Muslim municipality wherever possible?

7 A. The only situations that I know of like that, and I would be open

8 to knowing of other ones, were those negotiations undertaken essentially

9 at the point of a gun starting in early April 1992, usually with an

10 ultimatum of some sort issued by the SDS just prior to the actual

11 takeover and ethnic cleansing of the municipality concerned.

12 Q. Well, you cannot put it that way, Mr. Donia. Let's actually

13 finish with this document.

14 Can you find in the document any measure that is offensive -- or,

15 rather, are they all defensive, protective?

16 A. Offensive -- you're making the distinction between offence in the

17 sense of advancing and taking something as opposed to defensive which is

18 just to protect what one already has? Is that the distinction you want

19 to make here?

20 Q. Yes, yes, yes. Yes, for instance. However, does it have to do

21 with the defence of the Serb people, or does it have to do with conquests

22 of any kind? Is there anything offensive in this paper?

23 A. Yes, it is offensive to me, and in various ways it specifies that

24 the representatives of the Serb Democratic Party or other organs

25 established by them take from the existing institutions of the

Page 3601

1 municipality control over raw materials, commodities, and various

2 procedures. They essentially seize parts or functions, take over

3 functions that would have been previously exercised by the government of

4 the municipality.

5 Number 6:

6 "Take over the staff, buildings and equipment of security

7 services centres and place them at the disposal of the newly established

8 organs ... "

9 That's seizure. That's a seizure of power. It's an offensive

10 act not a defensive preservation of the -- what you're characterising

11 here as the Serbian people.

12 Q. Do you know that in these negotiations on the establishment of

13 two or more municipalities in previously existing municipalities it had

14 been envisaged for the other side to do the same thing, to establish

15 their own police station and their own organs? Yes or no?

16 A. As I said, I'm not aware of any -- I'm not aware of any

17 negotiations of that character beforehand. Would I think it likely that

18 some did and some were undertaken, but I don't really know of any, so I

19 can't really answer your question.

20 Q. And do you remember when one says the Serb municipality of

21 Sanski Most, it means that there is also a Muslim municipality of

22 Sanski Most?

23 A. Well, that's your characterisation of it. Anything that's not

24 Serb is automatically part of a different nation's property, and you

25 don't seem to recognise that there was something called the common life

Page 3602

1 that was shared by various -- all -- all peoples or peoples in that

2 particular municipality, and that presupposition is critical to your

3 argument about the right of the Serb people or the right of the SDS in

4 the name of the Serb people to seize these -- these assets. You

5 presuppose that the only way this can be dealt with is through division

6 or separation of economic resources, of means of production, of goods and

7 services, of governmental institutions. It goes right to your assumption

8 that all possession must be ethnic in character and that you have the

9 right to act on behalf of the Serb people.

10 Q. Thank you. I've been waiting for the interpretation. D85, D85

11 temporarily. That has already been admitted. D85. English page 4, the

12 last paragraph. You will see what kind of recommendation this was and

13 with cases it actually referred to.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D85. That is a document that has

15 already been admitted. Page 4, the last paragraph in the English

16 version. In Serbian it's page 3. In English it's page 4.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Here it is in English:

19 "[In English] On the basis of the discussion."

20 JUDGE KWON: Is it page 4?

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In English, page 4, the last

23 paragraph. And in Serbian, page 3.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [In English]

25 Q. "On the basis of the discussion, the president formulated two

Page 3603

1 amendments to the recommendation.

2 "It is recommended that the SDS, Serbian Democratic Party

3 deputies clubs in the municipality Assemblies in B and H where decisions

4 against Serbian interests are imposed through out-voting ..."

5 [Interpretation] So where decisions are detrimental or were

6 detrimental because they were imposed through out-voting.

7 "[In English] The decision of the Serb Democratic Party deputies

8 clubs to transform themselves into Assemblies of Serbian people in ..."

9 [Interpretation] Could we have the next page now, please:

10 "[In English] Municipality," I suppose.

11 [Interpretation] The next page, please:

12 "[In English] In B and H shall be verified by the Assembly of the

13 Serbian people ..."

14 [Interpretation] Mr. Donia, the recommendation for establishing

15 new municipalities was amended by either myself or Krajisnik, I'm not

16 sure who it was. Namely that this should be done only in municipalities

17 where decisions are being imposed on the Serb people by way of

18 out-voting, decisions that are detrimental to the Serb people. And in

19 the Municipal Assembly or parliament then the MPs would form a separate

20 municipality and Assembly and then they would form their communities of

21 municipalities; isn't that right?

22 A. The -- this is this very, I think, pivotal third session at which

23 the proposal initially made by Mr. Krajisnik and endorsed by you was

24 to -- language to the effect that it was required that the SDS delegates

25 in most municipalities inhabited by Serbs form these separate Serb

Page 3604

1 associations or municipalities, Assemblies, if you will. And that

2 resolution passed with one dissenting vote, after which there was an

3 extensive discussion by various delegates in which you participated and

4 Mr. Krajisnik participated in which it became clear that many delegates

5 felt this was an ill-advised measure to take in some municipalities,

6 because it would destroy the co-operation, such as it was then, under the

7 terms of the inter-party agreements and make -- convey the impression

8 that the SDS would invite formation of separate municipalities by -- by

9 other national groups, and it was after this extensive discussion that

10 the amendments came forth, and I also don't remember exactly who proposed

11 these, but it was eventually passed owing to the objections of these

12 various delegates in such a way that it was made voluntary. And, in

13 fact, the -- I think the cover sheet that was to be distributed to the

14 municipalities was to specify that it would be a voluntary action. And

15 the judgement in this situation, the judgement of whether the interests

16 of the Serbian people had been violated, whether there was out-voting,

17 would, of course, rest in the hands of the local SDS or even the republic

18 SDS officials, and then on that basis they would decide whether to

19 proceed and form a Serbian Municipal Assembly.

20 Q. Dr. Donia, do you agree that we should look at the results, the

21 products of every Assembly, the documents that are adopted rather than

22 the discussion that take place while the Assembly is in session? Don't

23 you see that this decision or recommendation was improved by way of these

24 amendments and that it pertained to those municipalities where solutions

25 were imposed by way of out-voting the Serb delegates? This is a good

Page 3605

1 example showing that one should look at decisions reached by Assemblies

2 rather than the debates that take place beforehand. Do you agree?

3 A. Partially. I think one should look at the decisions that were

4 preached at various Assembly sessions. I think they tell a very

5 interesting but incomplete story of the direction in which the party

6 policy was moving. I think one also should look at the debates, and, in

7 fact, that's the source of the richness of these transcripts, and I think

8 they're going to be used because of their richness by you, and as well

9 they are rich in terms of the kind of things that I investigate. So I

10 don't agree that we should just look at decisions. I would think we

11 should look at the way in which decisions were reached and also what --

12 what happened afterwards, and I think that your own dissatisfaction with

13 the decisions reached at this -- the voluntary nature of these things is

14 a direct source of the nature of the document, the A/B document that

15 we've been looking at.

16 Q. And where was it that you found that I was dissatisfied with this

17 decision? Let not waste any time. Just indicate it to us. Where is

18 this?

19 A. Well, I can't, sitting here, go through the whole Assembly

20 session. I think your -- your dissatisfaction with it was -- was

21 expressed during the course of the debate about it when you defended the

22 notion that it was important to establish these, and in your subsequent

23 conversation with Mr. Krajisnik that evening.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This has already been admitted, but

Page 3606

1 now could I have a new document, 1D01405. 010415. It hasn't been

2 translated. It is hand written.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. I hope that you will be able to read this in Cyrillic. This is

5 an agreement between the two peoples, the SDA and the SDS. I mean, they

6 represent the two peoples. That's what I'm saying. On the basis of a

7 principled agreement between the representatives of the SDA and the SDS

8 and the representatives of the two municipalities on the partition of the

9 municipality of Bratunac into two Assemblies, the Serb and the Muslim

10 Assembly, reached on the 5th of April, 1992. The representatives of the

11 two parties in power, that is to say the SDA and the SDS, met up on the

12 8th of April, 1992, and reached --

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

14 MS. EDGERTON: I'm really sorry. 65 ter 00739, with the

15 translation available.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. That is excellent.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. And then further on before we get it, it says that:

20 "The representatives of both peoples accepted reality, that the

21 partition of the municipalities was inevitable and could be carried out

22 in a peaceful and democratic way."

23 Then number 2: "The establishment of a Serbian public security

24 station in that Bratunac and the partition of the existing public

25 security station is the first step in that direction.

Page 3607

1 "3. We should also try to explain these agreements.

2 "5. The people who have moved out of our areas should be invited

3 back and the schools should re-open.

4 "7. The relocation and demobilisation of military and other

5 armed formations in the area of municipalities should begin immediately.

6 "9. To make it impossible for any kind of paramilitary and

7 military formations to come to this area and that both peoples should

8 resist aggression if they feel --"

9 JUDGE KWON: Slow down. Slow down, please.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. "11. To involve equal numbers of Serb and Muslim policemen, that

12 they should be engaged.

13 "12. That both public security stations should guarantee peace

14 and safety to the citizens.

15 "13. Plans and tasks of both chiefs should be co-ordinated and

16 joint on-site investigations should be conducted.

17 "14." -- or, "15. Disputes and problems should be resolved in

18 a peaceful and democratic way."

19 And my question is: Do you see, Mr. Donia, that this is one --

20 that this is a municipality which -- or one of the municipalities which,

21 at the beginning of the war, endeavoured to reorganise one joint

22 municipality in two municipalities, and this happened in Vlasenica so

23 those two agreements were reached; right?

24 A. I'd like to see the signatures.

25 Q. I don't have them here, but we have statement by Rabija Subic.

Page 3608

1 Do you know who she was, Rabija Subic?

2 A. Yes, she was an extreme nationalist spokesperson for pretty much

3 everything you believed in. And spoke on a number of occasions to the

4 Bosnian Serb Assembly. She was, I think, the head of a small party which

5 was called the Serbian Socialist Party or something like that. Yugoslav

6 Socialist Party in Bosnia.

7 This document bears all the earmarks of an agreement dictated by

8 one side. It is in Cyrillic, which would only be used by a Serb, at a

9 fraught time in this municipality and cannot possibly have been agreed to

10 on a voluntary basis by the people that you said agreed to it. I think

11 it's a good example of what I just cited, these last-minute talks held at

12 the point of a gun, usually with an ultimatum attached as the SDS was

13 preparing to take -- assume full power in the municipality.

14 Q. And how do you think that 30 per cent Serbs can force 70 per cent

15 Muslims in Bratunac to do this job?

16 A. We are talking Bratunac; right? Not Vlasenica. I think somebody

17 mentioned Vlasenica earlier. They had the backing of the JNA. They had

18 paramilitaries available to them. It was, as I say, at the point of a

19 gun, and I think subsequent events in Bratunac in the period after this

20 supposed agreement bear that out, and I don't -- it's not my -- my role

21 to go into what those were, but I think it also makes all the more empty

22 and all the more just -- it makes it into a mere gesture these statements

23 about the rights of other peoples in the course of the Serb seizure of

24 power.

25 Q. Mr. Donia, I am deeply dissatisfied with the breath of your

Page 3609

1 explanations. Do you know that throughout Bosnia there was this process

2 of agreement and negotiating between Muslims and Serbs to reorganise the

3 municipalities into two municipalities, ethnic ones? Yes or no?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Very well. Now, I put this to you, I put it to you that what was

6 envisaged was that in that kind of Serb municipality there would also be

7 Muslims and that they would be included into the political life of the

8 Serb municipality. Yes or no?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, do you know that a similar agreement was reached

11 at -- well, in Vlasenica first and then at Ilidza later on, and that the

12 process of negotiation had progressed in Sanski Most, Kljujic, and other

13 municipalities?

14 A. No.

15 Q. But you must have known that, Mr. Donia, because they're facts,

16 and we'll show that. We'll show that they're facts. And if you don't

17 know about them then you didn't do your job.

18 A. I'd love to see the documents that -- that show that.

19 Q. You'll see them. You'll see proof and evidence, but I'd like to

20 tender this document first.

21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

22 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.

23 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D297, Your Honours.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we briefly go back to 65 ter

Page 3610

1 225 to finish our discussions on that document and then we can move on.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Do you agree that whoever wrote this, the document was

4 distributed on the 19th of December, 1991, after the government of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina had asked for recognition of independence?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, do you see anywhere there that any kind of

8 aggressive or offensive action is anticipated vis-a-vis others outside

9 the realm of the protection of the Serbian people?

10 A. Well, as I indicated, in expressing its intent to take over the

11 functions and resources of the existing municipalities, yes, it does

12 express a hostile intent towards the property and -- of others and the

13 functions being exercised by others in the municipality, and those others

14 would necessarily have involved those members of other peoples and

15 probably some Serbs as well.

16 Q. So you're going back to the thesis that there wasn't a plan and

17 intention and programme and platform and the realisation on the formation

18 of Serb municipalities, because we're dealing with Serb resources in

19 those municipalities.

20 A. Well, I think you kind of define Serb resources the way you chose

21 to. You certainly define Serb land in a way that was convenient to

22 justify the seizure of land and expansion of authority at the municipal

23 level right from about this time into really at least the summer of 1992.

24 Q. Mr. Donia, this seems to be a criticism rather than an answer.

25 Based on international pact on human rights, who do resources belong to,

Page 3611

1 the people that live there or to somebody else?

2 A. I'm sorry. I'd have to look at the specific provision you have

3 in mind to -- to give you an answer to that. I wouldn't say it belongs

4 to somebody else, but exactly how it's formulated I'm not sure.

5 Q. Well, you must have known that. If you hold it against us that

6 we said that the Serb power and authority and the Serb portion of the

7 municipalities would manage its resources, then you must know that this

8 is net based on the international pact and covenant on human rights. It

9 is an important article, resources and natural wealth belong to the

10 nation living on the land. That's what it says in the international

11 covenant.

12 Now, can you give another example which this group of officers of

13 an offensive action, that this group of officers envisaged? And please

14 understand that we're talking about the Serb part of each municipality.

15 A. I'm not too sure what you mean by "Serb part of each

16 municipality." The municipality was an administrative unit that didn't

17 distinguish between people on the basis of their ethnicity and didn't

18 distinguish between pieces of land on the basis of the ethnicity of who

19 owned it. So that remains to me to be clarified before I could really

20 answer that part of your question.

21 We can go through the document if you wish, and I can point out

22 those passages which, to me, indicate an aggressive or intent to seize or

23 to -- to contemplate or prepare for the seizure of commonly held assets.

24 I would be glad to do that. I see only, you know, the first page in

25 front of me here, which is really the title page and the preamble which,

Page 3612

1 in my mind, is the only thing that probably wasn't written by military

2 officers, the rest of it being very military in its -- in its structure

3 and composition.

4 Q. Thank you. May we turn to the second page.

5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Ms. Edgerton, do you have the hard

6 copy of this one?

7 MS. EDGERTON: Not immediately but shortly.

8 JUDGE KWON: That can be handed over to -- to the witness.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Donia, where did you see state property at that point in

11 time? Did state property exist at all at that point in time?

12 A. Yes, it did exist, and so did -- so did social property. And

13 as -- we talked about this last week, probably about 53 per cent of the

14 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina made up socially-owned land, and so

15 private property, privately held land, was, in fact, a minority of the

16 total territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of sometime in the very late

17 1980s.

18 Q. Very well. While we're waiting for that document to come up, may

19 we -- or, rather, may we now have another document on our screens,

20 1D1170. May we have that called up.

21 And let's have a look, Mr. Donia, what is going on parallelly to

22 the Serb actions, what the other side is doing.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon, 107 is the

24 correct number. 1D107. 1D107.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 3613

1 Q. In the Serbian version we see that it is a decision on promoting

2 to the rank of brigadier-general of the army of -- the Republic of Bosnia

3 [indiscernible] for Sefer Halilovic, signed by Alija Izetbegovic; right?

4 A. I -- I can't -- I see a B/C/S document here dated 26 April 1994

5 and an English translation dated 8 April 1994.

6 Q. On the 8th of April, 1994, is his statement, his request. The

7 decision came after that, on the 26th of April. But this is on the 8th

8 of April, 1994. Sefer Halilovic is requesting that his status be

9 resolved. That's the subject of this document: "[In English] Request to

10 resolve status."

11 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, Mr. Karadzic. In the B/C/S,

12 Alija Izetbegovic signed the document, but in the English document we

13 only see the name of Sefer Halilovic. So I take it those two are

14 different documents.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps I could assist, Your Honour. If we go to

16 page 2 in the B/C/S version, I think you'll see the same content in

17 English and B/C/S.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's page 2 of the Serbian. The

19 first page is Izetbegovic's title -- decision pertaining to Halilovic's

20 request, and the right-hand side is Halilovic's request two weeks before

21 the decision.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Now, do you see in paragraph 1:

24 "[In English] As an active serviceman."

25 [Interpretation] "As an active serviceman of the former JNA,

Page 3614

1 Yugoslav People's Army, seeing what was going to happen I left that army,

2 and in September 1991, applied myself with total commitment to the

3 function of organising preparations for the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina

4 from the aggression I anticipated."

5 Do you see that paragraph?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, in the next paragraph after the word "Corps":

8 "[In English] Corps I drew up a proposal. [Interpretation] I

9 drew up a proposal for organising the Patriotic League for the Sarajevo

10 region and the regional staff of the Patriotic League and a plan of

11 defence for the Sarajevo region. When I met President Alija Izetbegovic

12 in Hrasnica, when I informed him of what had been done up until then and

13 proposed a way of organising the Muslim people and other citizens of the

14 republic," et cetera, et cetera, "and a strategy," et cetera. And the

15 last paragraph in Serbian, probably English too, it reads:

16 "After that," that's right: "After that, I set out to realise

17 the plan that had been accepted in organising the Main Staff of the

18 Patriotic League of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 regional

19 military staffs, 19 municipal military staffs of the Patriotic League,

20 and a large number of manoeuvre area and logistical units."

21 Now, do you know what in the meantime was being done by the SDA?

22 A. Meantime of what?

23 Q. Well, at the same time. You know, what the Serbs were doing at

24 the time: Exclusively political moves they were making. Now, did you

25 know what the other side was doing and forcing the Serbs to react and

Page 3615

1 take political steps? They were provoking the Serb side.

2 A. I don't share the premise of your question that the Serbs at that

3 time were only doing political moves. I think that the SDS was busy

4 arming its -- its people and becoming essentially a paramilitary unto

5 itself, and all sorts of things were going on to make sure that the SDS

6 had the co-operation and support of the JNA in pursuing whatever course

7 it might choose to take after the fall of 1991.

8 This account squares very well with my own understanding of the

9 growth of the Patriotic League, which was a really skeletal organisation

10 until at least this September 1991 date when the war in Croatia really

11 alienated a lot of the non-Serb officers of the JNA and caused them to

12 leave the JNA and join various other bodies that were organising at the

13 time. So --

14 Q. Professor, I'm not interested in your interpretation of this.

15 I'm just interested in facts. Do you want to say that in September 1991,

16 the Serbian Democratic Party was in favour of the disintegration of

17 Yugoslavia and that it -- and that it -- the JNA served it apart from the

18 fact that the SDS supported the JNA?

19 A. I did not make that statement and don't believe that that was the

20 case. I think the -- the coming together of the SDS and the JNA or what

21 really proved to be a very close working alliance was just getting

22 started in the early couple of weeks of -- of September 1991, and they

23 grew closer but somewhat erratically in the months after that. There

24 clearly were some efforts on the part of the JNA to distribute arms to

25 members of the SDS prior to that, but in terms of the kind of top-level

Page 3616

1 co-operative relationship that -- that started about this same time.

2 Q. We'll come to the question of the JNA. What I'm asking you now

3 is this: You noticed and said yourself that the Serbian Democratic Party

4 claimed that all its moves were in response to the moves made by the

5 other side; right? Like moves on a chessboard.

6 A. Not exactly. I just referenced your statement, and you made it,

7 I think, twice later in the war to the effect that you basically timed

8 your actions to wait for a measure taken by Mr. Izetbegovic before taking

9 that action. I would be glad to look at those specific quotes that I

10 referenced if you'd like. I don't know exactly the number in my report,

11 but that's what I referenced. That's what I believed to be the case.

12 Q. I asked you whether you knew of our position. Were you aware of

13 our position that our moves were provoked by the moves and steps taken by

14 the other side? I asked you that on day one, and you said, Yes. And I

15 asked you why you hadn't studied the moves of the other side, and now I'm

16 putting one of these other moves to you. You thought that we didn't know

17 what Halilovic was doing; right?

18 A. I thought -- I'm sorry. I thought that you didn't know what

19 Halilovic was doing? I don't know.

20 Q. The interpretation wasn't the right one there. Let me put it in

21 simpler terms. Mr. Donia, you said -- you agreed that the Patriotic

22 League was founded on the 31st of March, 1991; right?

23 A. Yes, I have, yes.

24 Q. That the committee for the protection of the Muslim peoples had

25 already been constituted and -- with some 500 members and held a meeting

Page 3617

1 in June 1991; right?

2 A. June 10th, yes.

3 Q. And that in September 1991, the Crisis Staff was established in

4 the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 A. I've written of that, yes.

6 Q. And now I'm putting it to you that Halilovic, Sefer Halilovic

7 left the JNA and already as in -- already in September of 1991 had --

8 that 98 municipalities had military staffs, 9 regional staffs, 98

9 municipal staffs, and a large number of manoeuvre logistical units and

10 units in the rear. Was that also a SDA activity then?

11 A. Was it a SDA -- no, it was a Patriotic League activity,

12 recognising that the Patriotic League was formed and certainly operated

13 under the general guidance of the -- of the SDA. I don't think he says

14 here that there were 98 municipal military staffs in September. I think

15 he says that he began realising that plan in September, which again would

16 be pretty much according to my understanding of it, this, if you will,

17 embryonic organisation, didn't really take form until September when the

18 war in Croatia began to heat up substantially. And it really wasn't

19 until probably the first of the year that you could speak of a

20 significant force, first of 1992, in a wide variety of municipalities.

21 Q. And did you come across a document confirming that part of the

22 Patriotic League, a part of the leadership of the Patriotic League asked

23 to go to war straight away against Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991?

24 A. No.

25 Q. We'll be showing the document in due course. Mr. Donia, up until

Page 3618

1 the beginning of the war -- their document, the SDA documents. It says,

2 up to the beginning of the war, they had military staffs in 103

3 municipalities. But let's stay with the 98 municipalities. In those 98

4 municipalities, were there any Serbs living there?

5 A. If there were 98, there certainly were Serbs living in some of

6 those municipalities, yes.

7 Q. In most of these municipalities, in fact; right? Except for

8 Cazin and Velika Kladusa; right?

9 A. I think that's -- yes.

10 Q. Therefore, at least 90 per cent of the municipalities. Well, the

11 Serbs watched what Halilovic was doing, organising a secret army,

12 assisted by the Muslim section of MUP, and you considered that the Serbs

13 steps were not conditioned and provoked by this unlawful and illegal and

14 dangerous steps taken by the Party of Democratic Action; right?

15 A. I wouldn't share your characterisation of it, no.

16 Q. So you think that this wasn't dangerous, that it wasn't dangerous

17 to be building up an army is? Who was this army supposed to fight

18 against in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

19 A. Well, there's two questions there. It -- it could have been

20 dangerous, indeed. It was actually the -- it was -- it was not a huge

21 secret. It was a -- something the -- the meeting of June 10th was well

22 covered in the press. Everybody knew about this defence council for the

23 protection of the Muslim peoples, and this specific preparations and

24 arming certainly did go on outside of, let's say, the public -- public

25 eye, but the general movement was -- was well known at the time, and it's

Page 3619

1 well known that you were and the SDS were keeping very careful

2 surveillance of these activities, pretty much knew exactly what was going

3 on. In fact, maintained a very active network of informants and people

4 in these various municipalities and at the republic level who -- who were

5 informing you about this.

6 Q. Right. Now, do you know when it was that we -- well, you saw the

7 letter that we showed earlier on. When did we send this demand for

8 events to be monitored and reported on? That was also the end of

9 September 1991; right?

10 A. I don't recall the date.

11 Q. Do you agree that at this time the Serbs still did not have any

12 Crisis Staffs?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Well, what Crisis Staffs did the Serbs have at that point in

15 time?

16 A. You asked me if I agreed that they didn't have any, and I can't

17 agree that they didn't because I've answered your question several times

18 now that I don't know.

19 Q. Oh, you don't know. Right. So how can you confirm that the SDS

20 itself became a paramilitary formation?

21 A. Well, the various arming activities that took place in the --

22 starting about May of 1991, put hands in the very -- or arms in the hands

23 of various local SDS committees. There's a rich gathering of

24 documentation that attests to that, including meetings that members of

25 the SDS had with the officials of the government in Belgrade, a letter

Page 3620

1 from a colonel in the JNA. In fact, the very colonel who was with

2 Mr. Milan Martic when he was detained on the 8th of September, 1991,

3 discussing the distribution of arms in Bosnia. I consider that very well

4 established. And the recipients of those arms were SDS members and SDS

5 local units.

6 Q. You have no proof of that, Mr. Donia. But let me ask you

7 something: Do you know of the doctrine and law -- actually, the doctrine

8 is the armed people, and the law has to do with the armed people and all

9 national defence. Do you know of that? Yes or no?

10 A. Are you speaking of People's Defence?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. Okay. There was a poor translation, so I just wanted to clarify

13 that.

14 Yes, I do know of the -- let's say theory or doctrine of

15 People's Defence and know that there was a rather elaborate code of laws

16 about the People's Defence, that it was in existence in 1990.

17 Q. Do you know -- do you know that reservists would always and

18 invariably take their equipment and uniforms home? They would take them

19 out for exercises, training, and bring them back home.

20 A. I think some of them. I don't think they brought their bazookas

21 home and didn't take their tanks home, but at least in the realm of small

22 arms I think that was a common practice for everybody who was in the

23 People's Defence force.

24 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Now I'm going to put something to you.

25 The Serb Democratic Party, all the way up until the end while there was

Page 3621

1 peace, supported the JNA and sent reservists on the ready to respond as

2 soon as they were called up by the JNA. Yes or no?

3 A. I think all three parts of your proposition are the case.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please,

6 to see what the scope of the further activities of Mr. Sefer Halilovic

7 was.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Do you agree that these were secret activities of his, that he

10 had concealed them from the army?

11 A. I haven't had a chance to read the document, and I can't answer

12 the question until I do.

13 Q. Look at this part:

14 "From the beginning of December 1991 up until the end of March

15 1992, five or six times I stayed in all regional municipal staffs of the

16 Patriotic League and in several units of the Patriotic League throughout

17 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, constantly travelling with false

18 papers, other people's papers, lest I be discovered."

19 Did you see he did that secretly and with false documents?

20 A. That's the suggestion in this document, yes. I'm just

21 remembering that he was looking for a promotion here and certainly wanted

22 to optimise his own achievements in order to get that promotion.

23 Q. You think that he could have deceived Izetbegovic? You think

24 that he could have said this without actually having done it? You don't

25 think that Izetbegovic would have known?

Page 3622

1 A. Not necessarily. Not if the -- what's doing here is just a bit

2 of exaggeration and not -- not making it up. And I -- clearly he's not

3 making it up out of whole cloth, but I wouldn't -- having been a party

4 myself to some efforts to gain promotions for myself and other people in

5 a military organisation, a little exaggeration isn't -- isn't out of the

6 question.

7 Q. Thank you. Even with exaggerations this, nevertheless, did cause

8 fear among the Serb people. Your answer is going to be "not

9 necessarily."

10 A. Well, if you ask me a question, I'll try and come up with an

11 answer.

12 Q. Is it your understanding that that vast activity, even if there

13 was a bit of exaggeration involved, did lead to fear amongst the Serbs in

14 these 98 municipalities?

15 A. It -- it could have, yes.

16 Q. Now, do you have a somewhat different view of Variant A and

17 Variant B now?

18 A. No.

19 Q. The Serbs were not supposed to take any measures of caution and

20 defence and protection? No?

21 A. Well, I think the A/B document really outlines a series of

22 offensive aggressive actions to seize power and resources in the

23 municipalities, and the defensive component is -- is certainly there, but

24 probably not a -- an appropriate response to what we're looking at here.

25 I think the -- my view of the A/B document remains the same, that it was

Page 3623

1 a critical part but only a part of an extended planning process which

2 brought the SDS and its affiliated Serb nationalist organisations to a

3 state of high readiness to seize power.

4 Q. And after this that you had seen, Mr. Donia, you think that the

5 Serbs on the 19th of December, even if -- well, I'm sorry that the SDS

6 had not formed that. We're not smart enough to have done that. This has

7 to do with a military smartness. You are trying to say that after all of

8 this secret military activity on the part of the SDA the Serb people were

9 supposed to wait for the Almighty to save them and not to carry out any

10 kind of self defence. Is that what you're trying to say?

11 A. I don't believe this was an appropriate response to what was

12 going on. You know, I think looking at this document, we really don't

13 have a very good sense of how active and widespread these activities

14 were, and so it's really not possible to say. You had a much better

15 sense of that, I think, with your ability to weigh these things. You had

16 a better sense of that than I would sitting here today. The -- as I say,

17 the fact that the Patriotic League was organised, the fact that it was

18 gaining strength and units and spreading activities starting in September

19 of 1991, I don't -- not only do I not contest that, I've described it in

20 some of my writings.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can these two

22 documents, actually paper A and B, and this one, can they be admitted.

23 Oh, A and B have been admitted. So can this paper be admitted, the one

24 that we just had on our screens now. 107.

25 JUDGE KWON: What is the exhibit number of 225, Variant A and B?

Page 3624

1 Is that the exhibit number? Ms. Edgerton.

2 MS. EDGERTON: P0005. Maybe I've missed one zero, but --

3 JUDGE KWON: P5. And I take it there's no objection in admitting

4 this Halilovic promotion document.

5 MS. EDGERTON: No. No, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE KWON: The first page of the B/C/S hasn't been translated.

7 Would you like to insert that as well?

8 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, please.

9 JUDGE KWON: Izetbegovic's decision, yes. So we'll mark it for

10 identification pending --

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it has been translated,

12 Excellency. 1D108. That's a separate document. This is a decision in

13 relation to that request.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but we'd like to see that decision as well,

15 because it's there in B/C/S. So we'll mark it for identification pending

16 the translation of the first page of the B/C/S.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D298.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm noting the time. What subject

19 matters are there that remain to be cross-examined?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, believe me, you know, the

21 extent to which Mr. Donia's work has been incorporated in the indictment.

22 We are on the eve of the new year. We're dealing with the 21st and 22nd

23 of December. While we're talking, 1D855, I'd like to have of that called

24 up so Mr. Donia can see how extensive this activity was. We've dealt

25 with Variant A and B and then comes the establishment of

Page 3625

1 Republika Srpska, then our participation in the work of the parliament on

2 the 24th and 25th of January, yet another attempt to save Bosnia, and

3 then the international conference, the Carrington-Cutileiro Conference

4 and then we are getting close to March, the armed attack against

5 Bosanski Brod, the 18th of March, there was the agreement. And then on

6 the 25th of March, they give up on the agreement. And then comes the 1st

7 of April, from the 1st until the 5th of April, there is the crisis in

8 Bijeljina, the crisis in Kupres, and so on and so forth. So from this

9 sequence of events that Mr. Donia has been speaking about, in a very

10 arbitrary way in my opinion, I am brought into a situation whereby I have

11 to extend my defence activities. After that, we have to do with the

12 roots of the activity of the peoples Assembly. Mr. Donia wrote an entire

13 paper on that. And finally we come to Sarajevo.

14 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will confer.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE KWON: With the indulgence of the interpreters, we'll go

17 till 2.00, if it is okay with the doctor again. And then, Mr. Karadzic,

18 you will have two sessions tomorrow. That's the ruling, and you should

19 plan your cross-examination to be able to conclude by the end of second

20 session tomorrow.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Donia, I would like to draw your attention to this report of

23 Memic, Senaid, son of Hasan who armed Muslims in the area of Sarajevo.

24 This is his statement. The first paragraph, the underlined bit.

25 Actually we can look at the hole thing. In the period from September

Page 3626

1 1991 up to my arrest, I had, for the purposes of the SDA in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandzak, purchased, imported and distributed

3 around 5.000 automatic rifles and rifles of various types and around

4 1.400.000 bullets. I had done all of that in co-operation with SDA

5 activists on the ground, as ordered by certain leaders of the SDA. My

6 closest ties in this job were with Hasan Cengic, who is otherwise a

7 technical secretary of the SDA. All leaders of the political life of the

8 SDA were aware of my dealings such as Alija Izetbegovic, Omer Behmen,

9 Rusmir Mahmutcehajic and others as well as certain officials of the MUP

10 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the MUP minister, Alija Delimustafic; deputy staff

11 minister, Mirsad Srebrenikovic; Jusuf Pusina; Bakir Alispahic;

12 Kemal Sabuvic [phoen]; Momir Alibabic, as well as some SJB operatives

13 throughout Bosnia. You see that only this one person brought in 5.000

14 rifles and one and a half million bullets.

15 A. I'd like to see the nature of this document further. I'm afraid

16 I don't see whether it's signed, whether it's -- what its origin is.

17 Q. Well, sir, this is a police telegram. They are -- it was

18 handwritten, and this -- and we have that. This is a telegram whereby

19 the regional police station is providing information about this. They

20 actually copied his statement, and we actually have that in --

21 handwritten as it is.

22 JUDGE KWON: Can you give the foundation as to this document, the

23 context in which this Mr. Memic --

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 4 so that

25 Mr. Donia can see that this is a statement of Senaid Memic, an arrested

Page 3627

1 person who made a statement to police organs. And this is the form of

2 telegram that the police use. It's done using their own machinery. Not

3 anybody can do that. Can we go to the end of this handwritten document.

4 I think that it is signed on each page. I think that his signature is on

5 each and every page.

6 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

7 MS. EDGERTON: Just related to what Mr. Karadzic said, which

8 police body? I see no indication.

9 JUDGE KWON: No.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the 14th of April, 1992, war

11 activities are underway and this is the police in Ilidza, I assume. If

12 we can have the last page, then we're going to see his signature.

13 JUDGE KWON: We are seeing the last page, but --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down so we see his

15 signature?

16 JUDGE KWON: That's the bottom part, as far as -- but what's the

17 point. What is your question? Put it to the witness.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Have you heard of Senad Sahinpasic whom we did mention during

20 your cross?

21 A. Yes, without knowing much of anything about him.

22 Q. Could we have page 2 in English. See, here on page 2 it says

23 that: "I know that in addition to myself, Senad Sahinpasic,

24 Alija Delimustafic's partner, procured weapons for the SDA," and so on

25 and so forth.

Page 3628

1 So do you think -- or, rather, did you know that this activity

2 was going on in the area of Sarajevo in this way?

3 A. I -- I see no basis for affirming anything in this document. I

4 don't see its origin. I don't know -- the signature that you're talking

5 about doesn't seem to appear. I'm not even sure if it did come from the

6 police station in Ilidza what the -- who controlled that police station

7 as of the 14th of April, whether it was the SDS or whether it was the

8 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 Q. Well, sir, the SDS did not have its own police stations. The

10 police station is a police station. The top people of that police

11 station were not SDS members. Haven't we established that?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

15 JUDGE KWON: No.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. 1D77 then, please.

17 This is a document that we have already shown, but we did not tender it.

18 This is a Muslim document, a Muslim document from 1993. Can we have the

19 next page now, please.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. The last paragraph says:

22 "However, from the very beginning, major influence in Foca was

23 exercised by Senad Sahinpasic, Saja, and Halid Cengic, who are related

24 to," et cetera, et cetera. Yes, yes we can keep the English where it is.

25 This document speaks of their procurement of weapons and also the fact

Page 3629

1 that they sold 5.200 rifles in Foca at a price of about 1.200 Deutschmark

2 each.

3 Are you doubting that as well?

4 A. Less so.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into

7 evidence? We've already shown it, but we haven't tendered it yet.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

9 MS. EDGERTON: I don't think there's any foundation based on

10 Dr. Donia's answer for the admission of this document, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: The answer, "less so."

12 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Donia, what do you mean by "less so"?

13 THE WITNESS: I mean I doubt it less so. It appears to be a

14 genuine product of the security services of the Republic of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm just having -- not surveyed the whole document,

16 I can't really comment on it. I note, for example, at the very bottom of

17 this page there's a statement that in April 1992 the Chetniks attacked

18 Foca in the empty-handed and disorganised Muslim people had no choice but

19 to leave their homes and wander. That to me is a kind of a -- such a

20 vague statement as to have no -- no value in a document like that. First

21 of all, it's highly tendentious and very vague. So I would want to look

22 at the whole thing before I, let's say, affirmed anything that's stated

23 here as -- as likely to be the case.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will admit this document.

Page 3630

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. My position, Mr. Donia, was that you --

3 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has given its ruling. We'll admit it.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D299, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE KWON: Your last question for today, Mr. Karadzic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D184. Could I call that up,

7 please?

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. While we're waiting for that document, Mr. Donia, as for the Serb

10 National Council founded before the elections, you said that it hadn't

11 done much, that somehow they were in abeyance. Do you know that it is

12 now a legal obligation for every ethnic community to have their own

13 National Council?

14 A. You mean in Bosnia today?

15 Q. In Serbia. In Serbia. But I believe that that will be the case

16 in Bosnia too. That is a recommendation of the European Union.

17 A. Well, it's -- I think it's a recommendation of the European Union

18 or one of several things that the European Union kind of sets out as a --

19 as a standard, but I'm not aware of -- I'm just not aware of a

20 requirement that every body have its national defence -- or I'm sorry,

21 National Council. The National Council we're talking about you

22 proclaimed in Banja Luka, I think on October 12th or something like that

23 of 1991, and you were the -- the SDS was the only party that established

24 such a council prior to the election, and it was, I think, viewed as an

25 act of bad faith to do that unilaterally, but at the same time for

Page 3631

1 whatever reason it never did much. It never took on a life of its own

2 and seemed to be a body that you sort of mentioned from time to time,

3 perhaps held in abeyance, but didn't really ever assume any functions.

4 Q. Thank you. My point, Mr. Donia, is that all our bodies that were

5 being established were being established in case we have to use them.

6 For a long time they were on standby, as it were. So do you see this

7 document dated the 17 of January? Do you agree that we continued to take

8 part in the political life of Bosnia?

9 A. Do I agree that you continued to take part in the political life

10 in Bosnia? Yes, I do.

11 Q. Thank you. Yes. You read our language. This is a press

12 conference that was attended by Professor Plavsic and Professor Koljevic,

13 and can't you see that we are saying not partition but transformation of

14 Bosnia?

15 A. Yes. In fact, transformation of Bosnia was kind of a -- I would

16 say a buzzword, frequently used slogan which was essentially a way of

17 saying the division of Bosnia into three separate sovereign polities. It

18 was the knew programme that I see you having espoused in the aftermath of

19 the events of the 15th of October, 1991.

20 This is from "Politika," so would I not put a whole lot of

21 credence in -- in what's here, but usually at such press conferences the

22 quotations are accurate, so I would not [overlapping speakers].

23 Q. You, Mr. Donia, would not believe the Serbs anything, but I'm

24 asking you, isn't what is written here is not partition but

25 transformation and also the fact that we advocated Bosnia as a

Page 3632

1 Switzerland? Are you aware of that?

2 A. Yes, I am, and I don't believe it's correct for you to say that I

3 wouldn't believe anything Serbs said. I believe a lot of things that

4 Serbs said, including some things that you say. I don't believe

5 everything that you say, but I do accept at face value many things that

6 you say, and I also believe what people in -- the Serbs and the

7 non-nationalist parties say from time to time but not exclusively. I

8 don't -- I don't accept that I'm just not prepared to believe anything

9 you say.

10 JUDGE KWON: That's it for today. Mr. Karadzic, bear that in

11 mind, that you will have only two sessions tomorrow and a further

12 extension will not be allowed. We will admit this document. We'll mark

13 it for identification, D300 MFI.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry about that. I'll do my

15 best, but I will consider the situation to be that this witness had not

16 been fully cross-examined.

17 JUDGE KWON: Tomorrow we are sitting in the afternoon, 2.15.

18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.02 p.m.,

19 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day

20 of January, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.