1 Wednesday, 9 June 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Welcome back,
6 Mr. Robinson.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, if I
8 could just take a minute before we start. I want to advise you that I'm
9 very happy to be back here from the ICTR in Arusha where I arrived this
10 morning, but yesterday when I was in court the Chamber indicated that
11 they were going to initiate contempt proceedings against me because I
12 declined to proceed in the trial yesterday after the arrest of one of my
13 colleagues in Rwanda
14 I took the position that I couldn't represent my client because I am
15 presenting the very same defence that he's accused of, pushing in his
16 case, and now he's in gaol. In any event, the Chamber will eventually
17 litigate that with me and I'm confident that I did the right thing and
18 that I'll prevail in the end, but I wanted to inform you of that
19 immediately and if you want to see the pleadings and the transcripts, I'm
20 happy to provide all of that to you. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for the information.
22 Judge Morrison.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Robinson, I'm sorry to hear of your
24 predicament without commenting upon it in any other way. Does that
25 affect your position here?
1 MR. ROBINSON: I don't think so, Judge Morrison. Hopefully I'll
2 be entitled to the presumption of innocence.
3 JUDGE MORRISON: For myself, I don't see how it will affect you
4 here. I think you've done exactly the right thing in bringing it to the
5 Tribunal's attention in the way that you have and in the time that you
6 have, which is a great credit to you.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.
8 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, let me associate myself with the
9 views of Judge Morrison in this respect.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you very much, Judge Baird.
11 JUDGE KWON: And I was advised that Mr. Karadzic has something to
12 raise with the Chamber.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning to everyone. Would I
14 like to say that I'm doing everything in my power to ensure that this be
15 an example of the way a trial should be conducted. Now, the skill with
16 which one needs to answer questions and to focus on certain issues is
17 something I'm gaining, getting better at from one hour to the next. So
18 what I want to say is as far as my intentions go, they are sincere to
19 make this an exemplary trial. However, when we look at the witnesses who
20 testified so far, they all avoided being sincere and impartial. However,
21 this witness in particular, what he did is -- affects the whole of the
22 joint criminal enterprise question and the entire indictment, and I would
23 like to request that I be given more time, because we haven't even
24 touched upon certain matters. We've come -- we've arrived at the
25 foundation of the Serbian Assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means
1 that we're going to have throw light on the conduct and mind set of
2 Radovan Karadzic first of all, and then his conduct and behaviour, and
3 then the conduct of the whole SDS party and other Serbian parties faced
4 with the challenge before us by the SDA party. So when I speak about the
5 Muslim side, I'm not speaking about the Muslim people as a whole or even
6 the whole of the SDA party but just the core according to Zulfikarpasic.
7 So Variants A and B and the January attempt to save Bosnia and preserve
8 peace, the March Cutileiro conference, and then we have -- well, we
9 haven't even touched upon the question of the roots of responsibility in
10 the words of the deputies and Karadzic in the Assembly. So we have to
11 throw light and elucidate that whole situation, and then we come to the
12 whole question of Sarajevo
13 So it was a real surprise when I heard that I won't even have 20
14 of the 40 hours that I had initially asked for. So I do wish to
15 apologise for my lack of experience, but I am gaining that experience and
16 becoming more efficacious in my cross-examination. But this is that kind
17 of witness. He is expanding on the subjects and areas and bringing me
18 into a situation whereby I have to deal with the new elements he brought
19 up. So I have to struggle and show that with a he's saying is not
20 correct. There's nothing that this witness has not touched upon. So I
21 had to take that up. He goes into all the words and sentences stated by
22 people, which are not really relevant because they don't exist in any
23 document, but he is accusing me of things on that basis, and I'm afraid
24 that the Trial Chamber will not be able to understand the mind-set of
25 Radovan Karadzic or his conducts or indeed the entire crisis unless this
1 witness is kept here at our disposal so that we can challenge everything
2 he has designed and redesigned and reshaped to suit him and which we have
3 to deal with.
4 So I do take on board all your criticisms about my
5 cross-examination techniques, but there is no lawyer in the world that
6 can know the facts as I know them. I know exactly what happened there,
7 and I know exactly where his report is erroneous, and, in fact, his books
8 differ from his expert report. There's more truth in the books he wrote
9 than in the report he wrote for the OTP.
10 So that is what I wanted to say, and I'd like to you to believe
11 me when I say that I have every good intention but that it is necessary
12 for me to clear up all the topics that this witness has raised, because
13 they can all be important when it comes to judgement day.
14 JUDGE KWON: While you have so many important and relevant issues
15 you just referred to, you wasted your time for the first few days
16 concentrating on only marginally relevant issues, making open-ended
17 questions, making comments without adhering to our advice. But having
18 observed your conduct of your cross-examination yesterday, we are
19 convinced that you are able to ask the relevant questions in an efficient
20 way, complying with the guidance given by the Chamber. So we are
21 confident you can conduct your cross-examination in such a manner, so we
22 are confident you will be able to finish your cross-examination in a --
23 in not so long a period of time.
24 So please concentrate your -- on conducting your
25 cross-examination on relevant questions, and if you do not waste your
1 time and you are concentrating on relevant issues and then at the end of
2 the day if you have still remaining legitimate issues, the Chamber will
3 consider the situation again. That does not mean that you are at liberty
4 to ask any questions.
5 That said, let's bring in the witness.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, simply as an addendum to that
7 which the President has said and as the President has said, it's
8 perfectly apparent that your technique has improved considerably; but if
9 you concentrate purely on those matters which pertain to the indictment,
10 which is really what is the concern of the Tribunal, I think you will
11 find that even though you've talked about a number issues you'll find
12 that what really matters, certainly as far as the Tribunal is concerned,
13 are those matters which are directly related to the indictment. As far
14 as any other peripheral and historic matters are concerned, you'll be
15 free to deal with those, of course, yourself in due course, and as far as
16 the written material is concerned, that's a matter for the Court to draw
17 inferences from in any event. So it's -- even if there are matters which
18 you feel that you ought to put to Dr. Donia but don't, don't think that's
19 the end of the matter, because you won't be precluded from raising those
20 issues in due course in any event.
21 [The witness takes the stand]
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Judge Morrison.
23 Mr. Karadzic.
24 Good morning, Doctor.
25 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
1 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
2 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue.
3 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Dr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Once again, good morning to
5 everybody. And may I have 65 ter 11452 on e-court, please.
6 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
7 Q. [Interpretation] And while we're waiting for that to come up, let
8 me ask you, Mr. Donia, do you know of a document -- well, do you know
9 what the Serbs are proposing and proposed in a document that was
10 officially published in the summer of 1991?
11 A. I don't know what you're referring to, no.
12 Q. It's a document in which the Serbian Democratic Party and
13 associated other parties, and there are several of them, parliamentary
14 ones as well, are proposing how the Yugoslav crisis should be resolved.
15 It's is very important document by which the Serbs legitimised, if I can
16 put it that way, their position and announced their position and
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm told that document hasn't been
19 uploaded in the e-court. Yes, Ms. Edgerton. Good morning to you.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Good morning, Your Honour. And if I could for the
21 record note that my senior trial attorney, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff has joined
22 us today, please.
23 Could I suggest that we turn to 65 ter 00942, and I think
24 Dr. Karadzic will find there the document he's requested.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Here we have it, Dr. Donia. We have a publication in two
3 languages in July, published and distributed already in July, what the
4 Serbs propose, and the views of the Serbian Democratic Party, and of
5 course those who supported us as well, about a solution to the Yugoslav,
6 and by the same token the Bosnian and Herzegovinian crisis. Are you
7 aware and familiar with this document?
8 A. Now that I look at it, yes, I have seen it before. I seem -- I
9 recall that it was associated with or came out of the meeting of the 12th
10 of July, the St. Peter and Paul's Day meeting, but that may be wrong.
11 But I do recognise the document.
12 Q. Thank you. I don't think it was linked to any meeting but
13 negotiations. And can we see the next page, please. Into the text.
14 These are all the title pages, but into the text. And the English
15 version, please. May we have the English version.
16 Can you read this, Professor Donia?
17 A. Yes. Give me some time and I'll be glad to.
18 Q. If you want me to, I can read it out, but we don't have the
19 English version.
20 JUDGE KWON: No, I think the English version seems to be at the
21 end of the document. I'm checking.
22 MS. EDGERTON: The document is in two languages itself. That's
23 why there's no independent translation.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Can we take a look at page 8 in e-court.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the introduction. May we
1 move on and see what the Serb side proposed. The signatories are
2 Radovan Karadzic and the president of the deputies' club,
3 Professor Maksimovic.
4 Now, let's see what the initial positions are of the Serb side
5 with respect to a resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the place of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia
7 Take a look at that last page in the chapter positions:
8 "[In English] It is therefore necessary for all Yugoslav
9 institutions, the Presidency, the Assembly and the government to function
10 because final agreement on the democratic organisation or relations in
12 [Interpretation] And so be and so forth. Now, may we turn to the
13 next page, please.
14 Number 2:
15 "[In English] The original sovereignty belongs unquestionably to
16 the citizens and peoples. The citizens and peoples realise their
17 sovereignty partly in their respective republics which are regulated by
18 the republican constitutions and partly in the federal state which is
19 regulated by the federal constitution."
20 [Interpretation] So that I don't have to read it all out, can I
21 draw your attention to this document, take a look at it -- or, rather,
22 perhaps you could take a look at this during our first break, and I
23 recommend this document to the Trial Chamber because it was one of the
24 more important documents, official proposals, for a solution to the
25 crisis, and I'm afraid that without this document and, in fact, I'm very
1 surprised that you haven't received this document because without it you
2 cannot understand the Serb positions.
3 Now, shall I tender it into evidence later once Dr. Donia has had
4 a chance to look through the document or should I do that now?
5 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Dr. Karadzic?
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Well, Dr. Donia, do you consider this to be an important
8 document, the substance of which must have been taken into consideration
9 when you wrote your expert report.
10 A. Just from what I have seen so far, I don't see anything striking
11 about it. I don't see a significant change from the party's previous
12 position. I think the -- I would again suggest that the context in which
13 it was issued probably was important and perhaps called for a restatement
14 of some of these views, and that context was, of course, that the
15 Federal Presidency had refused to confirm Mr. Mesic in the position of
16 president of the Presidency on May 15th, and so the Presidency was in
17 effect deadlocked at the time that the independence declarations were
18 issued by Slovenia
19 that was followed by the ten-day war in Slovenia and the agreement
20 reached at Brioni which specified, among other things, that Mr. Mesic
21 would be installed in that -- in that post.
22 Now, I assume that all that required some restatement here of the
23 principles of what the -- what the party wanted, but as I say, don't
24 see -- I don't see anything striking about this relative to some of the
25 earlier positions of the party.
1 Q. But, Mr. Donia, do you agree that this is a document in which the
2 party's going public as a Serb proposal? Would that be right?
3 A. I'm not -- I don't know who -- who signed it or who prepared it,
4 so I don't see -- again, I don't see anything here that would have been
5 in the public domain for the first time, but I have not had a chance to
6 review the entire document, so I wouldn't want to say that definitively.
7 JUDGE KWON: Can we go to the last page.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. You have the members of the Presidency signed there,
10 Professor Plavsic, Professor Koljevic, party President Karadzic, and
11 President of the Serbian members of parliament club,
12 Professor Maksimovic. So there you have the party and the top
13 representatives, Serb representatives, in the government bodies. This is
14 an official platform for a solution to the crisis, and I think that it
15 merits a place in your report, at least as a mention, as an aside, if
16 nothing more.
17 A. Well, I did not -- I have reviewed this document previously but
18 didn't feel that it brought anything riveting to -- to change the
20 Q. Take a look at this paragraph:
21 "[In English] Cantonal territories are not all embracing for
22 there are also enclaves and separate local communities surrounded by a
23 territory to which they do not belong. This is especially frequent in
24 the boundary regions of the French and German speaking cantons. This
25 principle is particularly applicable to the ethnically analogous areas in
2 [Interpretation] Do you remember that we proposed that -- or,
3 rather that, we supported a proposal coming from Croatia that wherever
4 the conditions existed, cantons should be founded and that they did not
5 have to have any territorial links?
6 A. I'm not certain at what level -- that proposal was certainly
7 floating around and was favourably -- the SDS was favourably disposed to
8 it. I don't know that it ever reached the level of an agreement with
9 anyone, Croats or anyone else, or whether it was advanced in specific
10 negotiations. It -- very familiar and really fully consistent with --
11 with where the party was at that point in time in -- in supporting what I
12 call the -- the municipal strategy.
13 Q. Do you remember that we put this paper aside because the MBO came
14 out with a propose that will there should be no regionalisation and that
15 Bosnian should remain in Yugoslavia
16 agreement, July, August 1991. Yes or no?
17 A. I hear a couple questions there. I don't know that you set this
18 proposal aside. I didn't see it retracted. Certainly events with --
19 with the proposals made by Messrs. Filipovic and Zulfikarpasic, it was to
20 be sure superseded in many respects, probably more than anything else put
21 at a second priority position, but I don't know that it was ever set
23 Q. Thank you. You see, I claim and put it to you that this proposal
24 kept the peace in Yugoslavia
25 that the next proposal that came from Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic to give
1 up on the creation of cantons, to abolish that idea on the basis of the
2 Serbian-Muslim agreement, also preserved the peace in Yugoslavia and
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they are two possibilities both of which the
4 Serbs accepted. One they proposed, the other they accepted. Yes or no?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D288.
11 JUDGE KWON: Can we have the date when this was published.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the beginning of July 1991,
13 before the negotiations on the historical Serb-Muslim agreement started.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have 65 ter
16 30249, please. 65 ter 30249, and this is the 19th of September, a
17 conversation between Karadzic and Dr. Vukic, who was in Banja Luka
18 in the Banja Luka Krajina or Bosnian Krajina he was the head of the SDS
20 May we look at page 2 of that, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Let me remind you Krajina itself alone proclaimed itself to be an
23 autonomous region after Izetbegovic rejected the Serb-Muslim peace
24 agreement. Now let's see what it says here.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Second page in English, please.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Dr. Vuk says:
3 "[In English] However, it goes on --"
4 [Interpretation] And he says that they proclaimed the region and
5 so on, and so this can go.
6 And then Karadzic says: "[In English] All right.
7 [Interpretation] All right. [In English] Well --"
8 And then he says:
9 "No referendum is needed for that. It is in accordance with what
10 we are agreeing upon with Izetbegovic, only that Izetbegovic we are
11 afraid that they want to cheat us on us because Izetbegovic is saying
12 one thing and Silajdzic in The Hague
13 that is why you did the right thing to proclaim it, and that is why I did
14 not resist it. However, we shall sit and make a deal with them to what
15 the Muslims have a right to in the Serb regions and what the Serbs have a
16 right to in the Muslim regions, but we shall agree on everything."
17 Dr. Donia, don't you see that I did not initiate this but I did
18 not oppose the proclamation of the Autonomous Region of the Krajina, and
19 I confirm that we were negotiating such matters with Izetbegovic?
20 A. Well, I think the history of the Serbian autonomous regions would
21 say otherwise. The Serbian Democratic Party made the decision to
22 proclaim these regions in early September and over the next month and a
23 half they were, in fact, proclaimed more or less one by one. In -- I
24 think on the 16th, if I'm not mistaken, 16th of September, the community
25 of municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina effectively transformed itself
1 into this -- what's frequently called the ARK, the autonomous region of
2 Krajina, which gave it a slightly different title than the other SAOs and
3 in a sense made it first among equals.
4 This appeared to me to be in conjunction with the overall effort
5 to proclaim these SAOs on a large part of Bosnian territory.
6 Q. I'm asking you about this answer. Can one not see on the basis
7 of this answer that they had proclaimed it? I did not initiate it. I
8 simply didn't resist it.
9 Second question: Do you not see here that what is envisaged is
10 the existence of minorities and the regulation of their rights?
11 A. That -- you're asking about the sentence, "That is why you did
12 right to proclaim it. That is why I did not resist it"? Yes, it says
13 that. So, true. My understanding of the development was somewhat
14 different from what you state here, but certainly you did explain it in
15 those terms here. And you hope to make a deal about regions with
16 Muslims, and that's, I think, also clear from the -- from the text here.
17 Q. Thank you. You, yourself, had confirmed that I fought a fierce
18 battle with the regions, telling them to wait and to be behave in
19 accordance with the negotiations. The initiatives were theirs, but I was
20 trying to put a brake on them as it were.
21 A. I think on this question you have to be very careful about what
22 time you're talking about. I think you fought a fierce battle with the
23 people in the ARK
24 they proclaimed the union of the two Krajinas, and then that issue kind
25 of receded for a while as other events took centre stage, and it really
1 was not again until the -- I think the events in December of 1991 when
2 the question arose of the character of the Serbian state that was about
3 to be proclaimed, should include in the view the people in the Krajina,
4 an autonomous or even separate polity for the Krajina. So I view this
5 struggle that you had with the people in Krajina as probably the biggest
6 challenge that you faced in unifying the party, but it was intermittent,
7 and at this particular time I don't view it as -- my own research
8 wouldn't suggest that it was a particularly acute issue.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Do you agree that in the first sentence we quoted I'm saying they
13 should not call a referendum because that is in accordance with what we
14 are negotiating with Izetbegovic; right?
15 A. Yes. I believe you also told someone else, about this time, that
16 you didn't think you'd get the -- you'd win a referendum in the
17 Bosnian Krajina. So, yes, I agree. You were trying to avoid a
18 referendum going forward in the Bosnian Krajina on this issue.
19 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D289, Your Honour.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We do have a translation,
22 Excellency. Oh, I see. Because it's an intercept. I agree. Very well.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Dr. Donia, do you agree that I had said we cannot count on being
25 able to get a two-thirds majority of the referendum and that is why we
1 cannot win at a referendum?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And do you remember that I said that that pertained to all of
4 Krajina, because in Cazinska Krajina, in Bihac there are 300.000 Muslims
5 and the Serb population in Krajina is about 5- or 600.000.
6 A. I don't recall what the unit of analysis was that you were
7 talking about. I don't recall it from memory. It was in another
8 telephone intercept, and I don't recall the specific number of
9 municipalities or area that you were speaking of.
10 Q. Thank you. May I remind you that we objected to the SDA that
11 constitutional decisions cannot be made by a simple majority. Everything
12 that had to do with the constitution required a two-thirds majority
13 because that was prescribed by the constitution; isn't that right?
14 A. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
15 MS. EDGERTON: That was comment, with respect, Your Honour, and I
16 also suggest that as soon as I took to my feet, Dr. Karadzic concluded
17 his comment with the question, "Isn't that right."
18 JUDGE KWON: I understood that to be the question. But be
19 careful, Mr. Karadzic. There's no need on your part to remind the
20 witness of something. You can ask questions.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. If I could also observe. It
22 might be better for the Prosecution to wait until he has completed his
23 question before making an objection, because I think it's very fair to
24 ask a question at the end of the sentence rather as well as --
25 JUDGE KWON: Let's not waste time.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. I understand that you're not a constitutional expert, but you do
6 recall that that was our position. That's why I asked you whether you
7 recall that our position was that constitutional matters had to be
8 resolved on the basis of the constitution, that is to say about a
9 two-third majority.
10 A. Not always, and I think depended on the particular body that you
11 were -- you were dealing with at the time. Clearly you did not have that
12 position in Municipal Assemblies where in many cases the votes to join
13 the community of municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina were by simple
14 majority votes or in some cases even contested. When the other parties
15 raised the objection that those votes should be by two-thirds vote, the
16 SDS delegates rejected that position and voted them into the ZOBK by
17 simple majority.
18 Now, that's one example of a body that the two-thirds rule was
19 not insisted on, in fact, was resisted by the SDS. I would certainly
20 agree that you felt that way about issues voted upon in the -- in the
21 Assembly, in the parliament of Bosnia
22 Q. Thank you. Am I right when I say that when a change in the
23 association of municipalities takes place it does not mean a change in
24 the constitution? It is simply a change by law and that requires simply
25 a simple majority.
1 A. Well, of course, you always had an opinion on what was
2 constitutional and what was not constitutional, and you may have felt
3 that this was just a matter of law, but the situation in which I just
4 cited, the representatives of the HDZ and SDA felt that it was a matter
5 of constitutional procedure. So you had one view of that, and the
6 members of the other parties had a different view of it.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 07288 in
9 e-court, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. We are going to cast a brief glance, so there is an English
12 translation. Could I have page 34 in English. These are stenographic
13 notes from the Assembly meeting that you mentioned on the 12th of July,
14 1991. The second page in Serbian, please. Page 27, actually, in
15 Serbian, and 34 in English. Twenty-seven in Serbian, and 34 in English.
16 We need the next page in Serbian. This is 26, and we need 27.
17 This is my response to Dr. Vukic that pertains precisely to this
18 issue. I would like to draw your attention to my words:
19 "Those who will attend our afternoon session will be able to hear
20 a part of last year's report in which we presented a general objection to
21 the regionalisation and territorialisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina after
22 the war which had been carried out consistent to the detriment of the
23 Serbian people. Thus the idea of the re-regionalisation of
25 "Has been present from the very outset among the founders and creators of
1 the SDS ideas -- founders and creators of the SDS ideas from the very
2 start, and the Main Board has always taken that into account and members
3 of the Main Board and then regions."
4 Page 35 in English:
5 "The regions that we envisage, that we proclaimed as communities
6 and municipalities within the framework of the BiH constitution, are not
7 socio-political communities yet at this point in time. In order for them
8 to become that we have to go through the BiH Assembly so that there is a
9 law that says that such and such a region is not only a community of
10 municipalities but a socio-political community with all the elements
11 after full political life."
12 Dr. Donia, can we not see on the basis of this that they are
13 irrelevant, these associations of municipalities, but in the Assembly
14 if -- or, rather if they become regions, then in the Assembly we have to
15 ensure on the basis of a law that these regions have a political life.
16 A. Yes. I regard this passage as actually part of the evidence for
17 the process that was going on in the aftermath of the proclamation of the
18 union of the two Krajinas, which roil your own sense of what should be
19 done and resulted in a strong effort by the party to make sure that that
20 actually was not carried out. And I take it what you're taking here is
21 that it is time to put this whole issue of regionalisation under the Main
22 Board as it was originally, that basically the ideas for regionalisation,
23 the proposals for regionalisation came from the Main Board of the party,
24 or, at the very least, members of the Main Board of the party. And it
25 was now important to, in a sense, re-centralise the party -- party's
1 control over this process and make sure that it proceeded in a way that
2 was consistent with the party's overall objectives.
3 I think it's -- I'm a little bit puzzled by the references to the
4 Bosnian Assembly, because as you cited yesterday, the Bosnian Assembly
5 had already passed a recommendation that the formation of the community
6 of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina not go forward. So the Assembly had
7 already staked out its position on this, and of course that
8 recommendation did nothing to deter the process that moved forward of
9 creating the ZOBK.
10 Q. Yesterday we established that that was the recommendation that
11 was there, not to give up on it but to wait until the Yugoslav crisis is
12 resolved. However, we see here that it does not have much importance,
13 and it doesn't really have any powers. However, for the region to start
14 life of its own we intend to deal with it through the Assembly of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina so that it is regulated by law, not by constitution
16 but by law; isn't that right?
17 A. I'm sorry, I'd have to hear that question again. I wasn't clear
18 what you were asking.
19 Q. You see what I said, and, on the basis of that, it means that
20 associations of municipalities have not become socio-political
21 communities. They do not have powers of their own. They cannot pass
22 regulations, and they cannot function as a municipality can function. So
23 a municipality is more important than an association of municipalities.
24 Are we trying to deal with this through a parliamentary procedure, not to
25 change the constitution but to change the law. Can you not see that that
1 is our intention, to have regions legalised by passing relevant laws
2 through the Assembly; right?
3 A. Yes. From this it would suggest that your view was that raising
4 the status of a community of municipalities to the highest level of an
5 organisation, socio-political community, could be done simply by a law in
6 the Assembly. Yeah, that's your view expressed here.
7 Q. Thank you. Can we have page 36 in English. I have before me the
8 recommendation that we saw yesterday. It says it is recommended that
9 they stop all decisions concerning regionalisation while negotiations are
10 underway on the constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia. 6225 that's what we
11 adopted yesterday. So it is not declared unlawful. The political
12 recommendation is that we have a standstill before the political crisis
13 is resolved.
14 It should be page 29 in Serbian, I think.
15 And you see my words here again:
16 "We will not create. We will not create anything that is in the
17 constitution for as long as the constitution exists."
18 That is imprecise, and then I say further on:
19 "However, everything we have done so far we have done within the
20 framework of the constitution of BiH and Yugoslavia."
21 If someone violates the constitutions of BiH and Yugoslavia then
22 we no longer have any obligations towards the constitution and then we
23 are going to do what Mr. Vukic and Mr. Kupresanin have announced. So
24 others have -- another party has to violate the BiH constitution to try
25 to affect the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if they do so then we
1 will prepare a democratic response of the Serbian people on all lies and
2 in every respect. Can you not see that I am advocating observance of the
3 constitution for as long as it exists?
4 A. I think you're saying here that you're arrogating unto yourself
5 the decision about whether any particular act is unconstitutional, and
6 should you deem an act to be unconstitutional, then all bets are off and
7 the party can go and organise whatever it wants to in response. That's
8 again -- the interpretation of constitutionality here you place wholly in
9 your hands with this statement, and given that proviso, I agree with what
10 you've just formulated, that actions won't be taken until someone else
11 violates the constitution first, and that was very consistent with your
12 position at that time and even earlier in the party.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
15 JUDGE KWON: I note it already has been admitted as Exhibit D273.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's possible. Thank you.
17 30243. Can we have that, please. That's the 65 ter number.
18 65 ter 30243. The date is the 18th of September, so all of this is
19 September. The beginning of the second half of September.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. So this is a conversation between Karadzic and Brdjanin, Brdjanin
22 and Karadzic. So can we see the next page.
23 So they have proclaimed the Autonomous Region of the Krajina, and
24 now they are discussing the referendum, and I'm saying:
25 "All right. Look. You don't need any kind of referendum. All
1 of your decisions are lawful."
2 And he says, "Oh, really."
3 And then the next sentence or rather, paragraph:
4 "Well, yes, why would you expose yourself to some kind of risks
5 and expenses? I am negotiating with Alija. All of that is in accordance
6 with this. Now it is a question of whether they're going to be called
7 Serb or whether they were not -- will not be called Serb." It's the
8 second page in English as well. "Whether they will be called Serb or
9 whether they will not be called Serb." Sorry. The third page in
10 English. Is it? The third. Yes.
11 "[In English] Yes, why would you expose --"
12 [Interpretation] And now the next page.
13 "[In English] Serbian will not be called Serbian."
14 [Interpretation] Now on the next page:
15 "Whether they will be called Serb or whether they will not be
16 called Serb, will there be any exaggerations or not. Where will the
17 borders run of one and where will the borders of the other run?"
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm not sure the doctor is able
19 follow. Let's locate the relevant page first.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The bottom of the second page in
21 English and then it continues on the third page.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I see the passage.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. I'm saying:
25 "All right. Listen, you don't need any referendum. All of your
1 decisions are legal," and then I say, "But I am negotiating with Alija.
2 All of that is in keeping with this. The question remains whether they
3 will be called Serbian or whether they will not be called Serbian,
4 whether they -- whether anyone will push matters too far or not, where
5 the borders of one or the other will run."
6 The next page in English then:
7 "How much of the legislative power will belong to the region?
8 How much to the republic? How much to the joint state? I mean
9 everything he talked about on television last night has fallen through.
10 Yesterday after the news programme we talked and reached an agreement,
11 that is in keeping with our agreement. Regionalisation is on and the
12 reason is our side is going faster is that your Silajdzic is acting
13 differently in Europe
14 So I'm trying to dissuade the people of Krajina. It is
15 unnecessary, because talks are being held with Izetbegovic. They are
16 underway. However, Silajdzic is saying something completely different in
18 Silajdzic and Izetbegovic were in the same party. Remember that.
19 A. I'm wondering what the question was.
20 Q. The question was whether Silajdzic and Izetbegovic were in the
21 same party at the time.
22 A. Yes, they were both in the SDA.
23 Q. Thank you. Can one see on the basis of this that Izetbegovic is
24 negotiating one thing with us and Silajdzic is saying completely
25 different at the conference in The Hague?
1 A. I don't view this -- I don't view your representation here as --
2 as authoritative on the positions that Mr. Silajdzic and Mr. Izetbegovic
3 were taking at the time, and the -- the suggestion here that they were
4 somehow clambering on board with the idea of regionalisation in
5 particular the formation of the SAOs seems to me to be completely wrong.
6 The -- I know that at some point the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at
7 least its majority, over two-thirds majority, denounced the formation of
8 the SAOs, and I believe the government did as well in a Resolution. So
9 it was the position of the SD -- yeah, of the SDA and the HDZ at that
10 time in -- they were completely opposed to this measure. There may have
11 been some talks going on, but, certainly at the time we're talking about,
12 they were condemning it rather than looking to resolve the -- whatever
13 conflict might exist about the specific nature of them.
14 Q. Please have a look at this sentence:
15 "Last night," that is to say Izetbegovic and I, "were on the news
16 programme the previous evening. Yesterday after the news programme we
17 talked and we reached an agreement. That is in accordance with our
18 agreement. Regionalisation is underway."
19 So, Mr. Donia, are you trying to say that I'm lying, that I am
20 telling Brdjanin a lie, that I had agreed with Izetbegovic that
21 regionalisation should go on?
22 A. I think it's very possible, yes.
23 Q. Thank you very much. Can we have this document admitted for
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D290, Your Honours. I apologise, MFI
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. May we now have 1D1422 next, please. There should be an English
5 translation. There it is. Now let's have a look and see which party is
6 preparing. Well, they made the proclamation, and they say:
7 "Looking at the report on the needs and possibilities of the
8 territorial organisation of Banja Luka municipality and the founding of
9 Banja Luka-Stari Grad municipality is adopted in its entirety the SDA,
10 HDZ, SDS, SDP and Liberal Party of Banja Luka at a meeting held on the
11 24th of October, 1991, issues the following proclamation: The analysis
12 of the needs and possibility for the territorial organisation of Banja
13 Luka municipality and the founding of Banja Luka-Stari Grad, Old Town
14 municipality, is adopted in its entirety, and a transformation of the
15 present municipality of Banja Luka and the six municipalities is proposed
16 as follows:" And then it goes on to enumerate the municipalities.
17 Do you see that the question of territorial reorganisation for
18 the municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina is being considered at all
19 levels without necessarily thinking about secession from Yugoslavia?
20 A. Could we go to the second page of this document?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please. By all means. I see no signature
23 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE KWON: In B/C/S.
25 THE WITNESS: Right. This is a -- actually, we referred to this
1 briefly yesterday. This is a proposal, and it's in the form that is --
2 was often submitted for consideration by a legislative body, prepared by
3 one of the parties, and usually that -- the party that prepared the
4 proposal would have its name first and then space would be left for the
5 presidents of the parties to sign if, indeed, an agreement was reached.
6 This was the -- indeed the propose of the SDA to break up this large
7 Banja Luka municipality into five units and providing very specific
8 boundaries of it. I can tell you from press reports that this died a
9 sudden death shortly after it was proposed and was rolled out with great
10 fanfare by a spokesman for the SDA I believe sometime in late September,
11 maybe as late as November of 1991, and then won the support of no one
12 else, and it appeared that even the central party of the SDA in Sarajevo
13 distanced itself from it.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Well, many proposals fell through, Mr. Donia. Do you agree that
16 the events put lots of proposals to one side? There might have been
17 proposals, but the developments pushed them to one side; isn't that
19 A. I couldn't agree more, and so many of the proposals that you have
20 been showing to me in the last several days died a similar death. They
21 failed to reach the level of agreement necessary to be formally adopted
22 and fell by the wayside.
23 Q. But you're not challenging the fact that they were conducting
24 negotiations and that the process was ongoing; right?
25 A. I would agree that negotiations were ongoing again perhaps
1 intermittently but throughout the period we're considering here, that is,
2 at least up until, say, the 24th of October.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, do you see here in the Serbian version, I don't
4 know whether you can see that in the English, that citizens are called in
5 all municipalities, villages, and so on, to state their views about the
6 founding of each of these municipalities. So the local communes were the
7 basic unit to decide which municipality they would belong to; right?
8 A. Yes. The SDA terminology was most frequently to use "citizens"
9 and that was their proposal here, that citizens vote.
10 Q. Thank you. I'd like to tender this document now and call up
11 document 1421 next, please.
12 JUDGE KWON: That will be Exhibit D291.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. 1D1421 next, please. And here we have the statutory decision of
15 a group of citizens of the local communes of Banja Luka, Hiseta, Majdan,
16 Gornji Seher, et cetera. The meeting of the citizens of the local
17 communes and then the communes are enumerated and they're mostly Muslim
18 populated local communes?
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Can you set -- establish the date
20 first. Is it November, Doctor?
21 THE WITNESS: I believe it to be November, yes.
22 JUDGE KWON: Continue, Mr. Karadzic.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. So this is a continuation of the previous document, the previous
25 action that was taken. These local communes did as was proposed and
1 brought in a statutory decision on the organisation of the
2 Stari Grad-Banja Luka municipal Assembly and the founding. Article 1,
3 the municipality of Stari Grad-Banja Luka is a basic democratic,
4 socio-political community of equal citizens, nations, and nationalities
5 living in it.
6 And can we look at the last page now, please. Last page in
7 English, please, as well. Last page in the English. The penultimate,
8 before this diagram. It's a diagram of the local communes but that's the
9 one we need and Article 21:
10 "This decision enters into force on the date of its adoption."
11 And it was signed by the president of the working Presidency,
12 Dr. Sead Hadzagic, and you know what our circumstances were like, and you
13 can judge by the name and say that it's a Muslim; right?
14 A. I think your representation about the nature of this document
15 is -- is false. This was a draft of a resolution that would have been
16 adopted by the individual municipal or local Assemblies had it, in fact,
17 passed the Banja Luka Assembly. This was very common at the time. The
18 same thing was done, actually, in the formation of the ZOBK where there
19 was a boilerplate resolution put together for the local communes to use
20 in actually declaring themselves a member of the ZOBK. This is
21 essentially the same thing in an individual copy. It is not signed by
22 Dr. Hadzagic. It is type script and it would not have been signed
23 without having actually been enacted through the actions of the bodies
25 Q. May we have the first page displayed again, please, and you'll
1 see that that's not the case. Here it says at a meeting of the 17th of
2 November 1991 the following statutory decision was taken. So what was up
3 to the local communes they did. They fulfilled their obligation. They
4 passed the statutory decision to form an Assembly like that. So from
5 there point of view they did everything they needed to do and then
6 further procedure was necessary in the municipality. So this is a
7 decision. The decision was made on the 17th of November. It's a final
8 decision following recommendations from the previous document.
9 Does it say, Has taken the following decision? And does it refer
10 to the document, the previous document I mean.
11 A. Well, I think without a -- without a signature and without actual
12 publication in the Official Gazette, this does not represent evidence of
13 what you have you've said it is, that the action is actually even taken.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D292.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D1419 next, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This is a document dated the 12th of November, Studeni. The SDA
21 document was the 17th. Here we have the 12th of November, and they are
22 conclusions from a joint meeting of the Herzegovina regional community
23 and the Travnik regional community organised by the HDZ, the Croatian
24 Democratic Union
25 populated by Croats. Two regions meeting. And the first sentence says:
1 On the 12th of November, Studeni, the Croatian town for November 1991, a
2 working meeting was held, attended by the presidents of the Crisis Staffs
3 of the Herzegovina
4 Staffs of the Travnik regional community was held and the following
5 conclusions were reached.
6 Did you know about this document?
7 A. Yes, do I.
8 Q. And did you also know that already at that time they had Crisis
10 A. I think these were formed within a few days prior to this, but
11 did I know that there were Crisis Staffs at the time that these
12 declarations were actually issued, yes, I did.
13 Q. Did the Serbs have Crisis Staffs at that same time?
14 A. I don't know.
15 Q. Thank you. May we now see -- well, let's look at the conclusions
16 and start off with the sentence that reads in Busovaca it was unanimously
17 decided that the Croatia
18 joint active policy which should lead to the realisation of our
19 centuries-old dream of a joint Croatian state. For this historical goal
20 to become a reality soon these two regional communities request the
21 commencement of activities to formulate an issue, legal and political
22 documents, the proclamation of a Croatian Banovina in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
23 a referendum on -- I can't see that word, that next word. On -- on
24 accession to the Republic of Croatia
25 conclusion was reached?
1 A. Yes. This is kind of standard fare, I think. It's the origins
2 or the beginning of a split within the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which
3 one group, which was more under President Tudjman's sponsorship, declared
4 these regions within Bosnia
5 response to your declaration of the Serbian autonomous regions and
6 referred to them as HAOs, Croatian autonomous regions. And, in fact, at
7 the end of the day they declared, I think, on the 19th of November, the
8 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, which I'm sure you have a document on
9 coming up here, and attempted to delineate territorially their claims to
10 this autonomous area of Bosnia
12 Q. Do you mean to say that the Croats were afraid of Serb hegemony
13 and did this because of the Serbs and not because of the Muslims and
14 Muslim hegemony; is that what you're trying to say?
15 A. Well, I think that the wing of the party that was closest to
16 Tudjman was worried about you getting too far ahead of them in staking
17 out territorial claims in Bosnia
18 basically they were working to be sure that their claims were taken note
19 of very shortly after your own claims were staked out in the formation of
20 the SAOs. I think the primary purpose of both was to marginalise or
21 eliminate -- reduce to the lowest -- least area possible that area which
22 would be subject to Muslim territorial claims should they seek to advance
24 Q. May we now turn to the next page of this document, please. And
25 while we're waiting for that, let me ask you this, Dr. Donia: You talk
1 about two wings of the HDZ. When did the HDZ divide and separate into
2 two parts, parties?
3 A. I did not speak of two wings of the party. I said it was a split
4 within the party, a split on viewpoints, and never did formally divide.
5 In early February 1992, the leadership of Stjepan Kljujic was --
6 Stjepan Kljujic and his immediate followers were purged at a meeting of
7 the HDZ. I believe it was in Grude or Siroki Brijeg. And that
8 represented the kind of final triumph of this separatist wing within the
9 party. But in the meantime, until that happened, there were people of
10 differing views inhabiting the same party and having some pretty serious
11 disputes about which approach to take. Also note, however, that when
12 this announcement of Herceg-Bosna was made, it was made without the prior
13 knowledge of Mr. Kljujic who was president of the party. He was holding
14 a press conference in Sarajevo
15 proclamation and did his best to disguise the fact that it was a complete
16 surprise to him and, in fact, ended up sort of tepidly endorsing the
18 Q. Thank you. I'd like to draw the participants' attention to
19 points (b) and (c) of item 3. Launch political and legal actions on the
20 democratic scene and internationally and (c) preparing better military
21 for clashes with all those forces which will try to stop this inevitable
22 process in the establishment of free Croatian state.
23 That then is the 12th of November.
24 When was the decision taken to form Republika Srpska? Do you
25 remember that? Do you agree that it was the 9th of January, 1992?
1 A. I think the name Republika Srpska was adopted in August of 1992.
2 The republic of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina was proclaimed
3 on January 9.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
7 JUDGE KWON: What is your question about clause (b) and (c)? You
8 just read out without posing a question.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well I think I did ask a question.
10 Dr. Donia answered and said that he knew about this document knew about
11 this process. Now, his interpretation is one I don't agree with but
12 never mind. He knows it was a process and that this line or stream
13 within the HDZ prevailed and that Kljujic lost. So the question was, in
14 fact, was this process -- or, rather, did Dr. Donia take into account
15 this process that happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina among the Croatian
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. I think it's described in not great
18 detail but in a paragraph or two in my -- one of the reports that has
19 been submitted for this case.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. With the question and answer we'll have
21 a break for 20 minutes. Before that we'll admit this one.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit D293.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.22 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 10.45 a.m.
25 JUDGE KWON: Before you begin, Mr. Karadzic, Judge Baird has
1 something to say to you.
2 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Karadzic, before we continue with your
3 cross-examination, may I say something here. I fully agree with the
4 comments of my colleagues that your cross-examination yesterday was
5 clearly in keeping with the guidelines the Chamber gave you sometime
6 earlier. Your technique and the quality of your cross-examination
7 yesterday left nothing to be desired, but today you seem to be reverting
8 back to the original situation where your questions don't appear to be
9 impacting, generally speaking, on the indictment.
10 Now, be it admitted that the Chamber is not aware of the details
11 of your defence, you alone would know what you want to explore and what
12 you want to establish, and, indeed, I just said that this morning you are
13 making some progress. I mean, there's no two ways about that. But it
14 would be good if you could continue in the vein that you adopted
15 yesterday in your cross-examination: Succinct questions, pertinent
16 questions, no comment.
17 Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I'll
19 do my utmost to follow those guidelines.
20 May I now call up on e-court --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the microphones be switched off, please,
22 that aren't in use. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- 11365, next document, please.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you agree that the Serb side saw the Assembly, the Assembly
1 meeting of the 14th and 15th of October very dramatically, 1991?
2 A. Yes, I think actually all sides did.
3 Q. I'm not -- 11306 is the correct document number. I don't know if
4 I misspoke earlier on. That's not the document, so may we have 11306,
6 Dr. Donia, these are notes from the council of the
7 Serbian Democratic Party, but before that let me ask you a question. Do
8 you remember that the council was first established as a council for
9 inter-party co-operation?
10 A. Headed by Professor Koljevic, I believe, yes.
11 Q. And that there were some prominent people, members of it, who
12 weren't members of the SDS to begin with; right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And also that Mrs. Plavsic, Professor Plavsic, as a member of the
15 council was nominated although she was a party member, but she was
17 A. I wasn't aware of that. I note that at this meeting there were a
18 number of party members there, too, so it wasn't clear to me at the
19 meeting that we're talking about who was actually on the council and who
20 was not.
21 JUDGE KWON: Is that the document you're going to tender?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: It says Exhibit -- no, no.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the 65 ter number is 00962.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
1 MS. EDGERTON: I was standing up for two reasons, Your Honour.
2 Exactly that which my friend has indicated, and this is not a document
3 we've been notified on.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do believe that Dr. Donia
5 mentions this document somewhere in his report, to the best of my
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. But let me ask you: Are you familiar with these minutes from the
9 party council session?
10 JUDGE KWON: Whether or not Dr. Donia mentioned on this document
11 is a separate matter from the fact that you have to inform the other
12 party of the documents you're going to use during your cross-examination.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes I agree, but unfortunately we
14 don't have an enough members on our team, but may we continue.
15 THE WITNESS: Your question was, I believe, am I familiar with
16 the document, and yes I am.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. Here the president of the council was Professor
19 Slavko Leovac, a member of the academy.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. I'd like to draw your attention, and everybody else's, to what
22 Mr. Najdavov says -- Najdanovic. The Muslims are in hurry to adopt the
23 declaration because of The Hague
24 because of the strong pressure by the Croatian leadership which wants to
25 reduce the pressure of the army on Croatia
2 Do you remember that Stjepan Mesic, who was at the time -- well,
3 he wasn't president of Croatia
4 that the war would spill over from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina
5 A. I don't remember the specific verb he used, whether it would or
6 might or there existed a possibility of. I certainly remember he made
7 some -- raised the possibility that war would spill from Croatia
9 Q. Thank you. Now, would you -- I'd like to draw your attention to
10 the third sentence from the reply made by academician Milorad Ekmecic,
11 who was one of the most respected and prominent of our historians; right?
12 A. Certainly, yes.
13 Q. Thank you. And what he proposes here is this: Therefore, we
14 should continue our contacts with the leadership of the Croatian
15 Democratic Union
16 political solution. The Serbs have created regions which are not
17 interconnected, and these regions must not be allowed to establish their
18 governments which would not be interconnected.
19 May we turn to the next page, please, so that we can go through
20 the whole document first and then I'll come to my questions. Well, in
21 English it was actually the first page. So page 2 for the Serbian but
22 back to page 1 for the English. Back to page one for the English,
24 Do you remember that Todor Dutina, who at that time was in the
25 Reformist Party of Ante Markovic went on to make the next statement and
1 Kecmanovic too. Do you recall that?
2 A. Do you recall what, his statement or -- or --
3 Q. That he was a reformist at the time. He became an SDS party
4 member only during the war.
5 A. I don't -- I didn't know prior to now what his party affiliation
6 was at the time of this meeting, no.
7 Q. Thank you. Let's see what Mr. Dutina proposes. You know, that
8 Dutina was otherwise a writer. He was also Bosnian's ambassador after
9 the war; right?
10 A. I didn't know that.
11 Q. Number 1 it says:
12 "Issue a proclamation addressed to the Party of Democratic
13 Action, the Croatian Democratic Union (the leadership) asking them to
14 withdraw within seven days from the decision they have adopted, otherwise
15 the Serbian Democratic Party will instruct its members to leave the
16 existing government institutions and begin creating parallel ones. "
17 Now, I'm sure you know that frequently when there is a
18 parliamentary crisis the people would leave the various government
19 institutions. Do you agree?
20 A. Not always. Sometimes they stayed in government institutions.
21 Sometimes some people left and others stayed. I wouldn't make that a
22 general conclusion, no.
23 Q. Thank you. Now let's see what Professor Koljevic has to say.
24 With the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Union, we
25 can do nothing -- nothing can be done legally. And let's see what Mitar
1 Miljanovic goes on to say. He says the strategic goal of those
2 confronting us is the creation of autonomy followed by republic and
3 ultimately a Jamahirija. And Velibor Ostojic says the party policy, up
4 to now, was suited to peacetime conditions. And may we turn to what
5 Mr. Karadzic says.
6 JUDGE KWON: Having heard from the witness that he knows about
7 this document, I don't see much of the point of reading out all those
8 quotes, you can put your case in a succinct manner to the witness and
9 then you can decide what to do afterward.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Do you remember and do you agree that we published in the papers,
13 proclaimed and sent officially to the Party of Democratic Action and the
14 HDZ a request for them to repeal their decision, withdraw their decision
15 that we considered to be unlawful and unconstitutional, and that we
16 waited for them to do that until the 24th of October?
17 A. I think the -- this -- this dead-line was, in fact, seven days,
18 but the dead-line was to expire, as I recall, at 5.00 p.m. on the 24th of
19 October, just an hour before you had scheduled the meeting of the --
20 first meeting of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
23 evidence now.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D294.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D1411 next, please.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I don't know if it's been translated, but you speak our language,
4 so just take a brief look at what it says and we can see that it was
5 published in the media, and you're quite right, the dead-line was from
6 the 15th to the 25th of October. Does it say here request for --
7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Also not notified to the Prosecution, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: I note it's now being repeated.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, our team members who will no
11 longer be paid are now looking for work. Quite literally. In the
12 literal sense, they're looking for work, so we're facing difficulties,
13 but I think we did send this by e-mail.
14 JUDGE KWON: That is beside the point. You do your best to
15 inform the Prosecution of the documents in the future. Let's move on.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Now let's see. You said that the dead-line was until 1700 hours;
20 A. Yes. It appears I was correct.
21 Q. Do you want me to read out the first sentence? Journalists
22 requested that Dr. Karadzic should more closely explain his statement
23 whereby a constitutional order should be established in BiH by 1700
24 hours. We said that publicly. They violated the constitution in a
25 brutal manner, and they proclaimed the Assembly session at an illegal
2 Now, do you remember that we questioned the right for the
3 vice-president of the Assembly to be able to call an Assembly session?
4 Do you remember that?
5 A. Yes, I do. This, I take it, is from the SDS party newspaper; is
6 that correct? From "Javnost"?
7 Q. No, this is "Politika."
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. Can we have the top now? Can we have the very top of the page?
10 Let me read the title and what it says. It says, "Request to
11 annul unlawful decisions." Isn't that right? You speak our language.
12 You can understand this.
13 A. That's what the headline says, yes.
14 Q. Well, now let's see what it says underneath:
15 "If this is not done by the set time, and if constitutional order
16 is not established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, an Assembly of the Serb people
17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be proclaimed consisting of its legitimate
18 representatives"; is that correct?
19 A. I think you just read it, yes.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
22 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D295, Your Honour.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01362, please. 1D01362. It
25 hasn't been translated. We do not see that there is a translation, but
1 this is a session of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the
2 15th of October. That is to say, immediately after the Assembly meeting,
3 the meeting of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 Page 31, please. Can we have page 43, actually. It says page 43
5 at the bottom. Yes.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Dr. Donia, I would like to draw your attention to what it was
8 that Professor Plavsic said. She says that the police is checking
9 military transports, that they're working unlawfully. And now what does
10 it say here?
11 As for the Crisis Staff on which I was at first, the one that had
12 been established by the Presidency, in the belief that the Crisis Staff
13 would deal with the problem of refugees that we have in the republic and
14 in order to allow these people to have at least a semblance of a normal
15 life, and so on and so forth, and then part of the Presidency took over
16 some of the authority that is otherwise vested in the council for the
17 constitutional order. And then I saw that the Crisis Staff was debating
18 such issues, and then I resigned from that Crisis Staff, and --
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether Dr. Donia has been following.
20 I think it should show the upper part.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's around the 20th line here. It
22 has to do with the Crisis Staff.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. You see that, Dr. Donia? In the middle of the first paragraph?
25 JUDGE KWON: And what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. I just want to say this: The Crisis Staff should really deal
3 with the problems that are outside the scope of a federal institutional
4 that is called the JNA.
5 Do you see now that this crisis in the Presidency had been a
6 protracted one and that the Serb representatives were protesting strongly
7 against unlawful conduct?
8 A. Dr. Karadzic, I'm going to question the authenticity of this
9 document. It is actually a publication that was put together from a
10 publication, and you haven't showed me the title page or the source, put
11 together by a group of people around Miroslav Tudjman, and it was noted
12 in the preparation of this that it was subject to editing and,
13 furthermore, subject to the use of headlines and highlighting to make the
14 specific didactic points involved in the text that was presented.
15 It's -- since these clearly are transcripts that are available,
16 I'm wondering why I'm not looking at an actual document rather than a
17 possibly edited version of the -- of the transcript of the Presidency.
18 I see what you've just read and note that you have read it, but I
19 don't know that I can go any further than that.
20 Q. I believe that the distinguished Ms. Edgerton had confirmed on
21 earlier occasions the authenticity of these transcripts. These are tape
22 recordings, and they were not edited in any way.
23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. I recall that we had this
25 situation already at an earlier stage with another witness, and on this
1 occasion we double checked with the Presidency minutes and found that the
2 document and the parts that were in this book were correct. So my
3 proposal would also be to again check -- double-check it. We will
4 probably be able to find this very session and then see whether it's
5 correct or not.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
7 THE WITNESS: You know, I find it irregular that I'm being shown
8 a document for which there is a more authentic, genuine source and not
9 the actual authoritative version which is obviously available to both
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can we have the next page, please, and we see towards the
14 bottom -- actually can we scroll down so that Dr. Donia can see that this
15 is Mr. Izetbegovic's reply.
16 Now let us move on to the next page. Somewhere around the third
17 of the page. The third. I think that it's in bold anyway. Actually,
18 the sentence before that.
19 We are fully aware of the fact that by declaring the neutrality
20 of Bosnia-Herzegovina we may have indirectly violated some laws.
21 However, at this point in time everything is a bit fluid. There are laws
22 and there are laws.
23 Do you see that Mr. Izetbegovic thought that there were laws that
24 didn't have to be observed?
25 A. No.
1 Q. So what does it mean when he says that there are laws and there
2 are laws? And he says, "We may have violated some laws indirectly."
3 A. I don't accept that as an authoritative statement that he did.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Scroll down a bit. A bit further
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. "We are aware that there are certain things there that constitute
8 a violation of certain federal laws," do you see that sentence? "We are
9 aware of the fact that there are some things there that constitute a
10 violation of some federal laws," do you see that sentence?
11 A. I don't, I'm afraid.
12 Q. Let's follow it. One, two -- line six from the bottom.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, can I suggest to you that you just
14 leave this matter aside and then given Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's comment that
15 she would double-check the authenticity or correctness of this quote. So
16 wait until she comes back to it and then proceed to another topic first.
17 Or you can bring up the real transcript of this.
18 Let's move on to another topic for the time being.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Just for the very end, were you aware of the fact that
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina or some of its institutions were violating laws?
23 A. Again, that's a matter of interpreting not only laws but the
24 constitution, and the constitution court certainly ruled that certain
25 bodies were violating laws and, in fact, certain bodies were illegal,
1 including the SAOs and the Croatian associations that were created on the
2 12th and 19th of November, and that the SDS rejected the suggestion of
3 referring the question that was debated on the 15th of October to the
4 constitutional court. So I again will say the determination of what was
5 legal and what was illegal was very much in the eyes of the beholder.
6 That split took place more or less along party lines, and there was
7 almost a unanimous reluctance to refer matters in contest to the
8 appropriate courts.
9 Q. Thank you. Can we go back to 11306 for a moment. That is 294.
10 Actually, our document that was admitted.
11 Do you agree that Petko Cancar was president of the Chamber of
12 Municipalities, one of the two Chambers in the Assembly of
14 A. I don't know -- I didn't know that.
15 Q. Now let us see page SA 40-- actually, it's page 3 in this
16 document. 1D8294, actually. D294. That's it.
17 Let, let me inform you while we're waiting for it, as for these
18 notebooks on -- concerning this council held on the 15th of October,
19 Petko Cancar says, "The president of the constitutional court stated
20 today that the decision taken by the Assembly does not cause any legal
22 Page 3. Let us go to page 3 of this document. Page 3. Perhaps
23 it's different in English. The third page of the document. Page 2 in
24 English. Can we have page 2 in English. Thank you.
25 We see it here, Cancar, in English. It is the last quarter of
1 the page or the third:
2 "[In English] Today the constitutional court stated that the
3 decision adopted by the Assembly did not have any legal effect."
4 Did you see that the president of the constitutional court said
5 that this was an unlawful decision taken by the Assembly, but the SDA
6 continued as if it had been a legally valid decision.
7 A. You're citing here a statement by an SDS leader about another
8 statement that he alleges was made by the president of the constitutional
9 court. He's not citing a decision of the constitutional court itself.
10 And, in fact, the -- there was a proposal in one of the negotiating
11 sessions during the time of this dead-line that you put on the talks of
12 the 24th, between the 15th and the 24th, to submit the entire issue to
13 the constitutional court. The SDS rejected that suggestion, and on the
14 grounds that they didn't trust the composition of the constitutional
15 court to come up with the decision that they made. So I don't
16 necessarily disbelieve that he said that, but I think that this is not an
17 adequate statement of the fact, claim, that the constitutional basis for
18 the decision was -- was invalid.
19 I think in general this -- to save a lot of time, this is -- this
20 is a meeting at which a lot of different viewpoints were put forward, and
21 they were aired very openly, very democratically, if you will, on the
22 part of the members of the council, and so you can find here a lot of
23 very differing ideas. There weren't sharp disagreements about what to do
24 next. I think there was general agreement on this idea of a seven day or
25 ten day hiatus to allow the negotiations to go forward. I'm not
1 contesting that at all. And then there were some suggestions about
2 intensifying regionalisation.
3 So this is what I see as the first, sort of the beginning of the
4 extended planning process that was set off in the immediate aftermath of
5 the events of the 15th of October, the planning process that you and the
6 SDS went forward with, and it's -- it's a very open discussion of the
7 options that are available.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I said I was wondering about the
9 relevance of your line of questioning, in particular how they are
10 impinging upon the indictment. Do not take it for granted that your time
11 for cross-examination will be extended.
12 As you suggested, there are a lot of further issues which are
13 very important and relevant to your case. For example, Variant A or B.
14 Bear that in mind and please continue.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I just wanted us to see
16 that the president of the constitutional court had actually made such a
17 statement but that the SDA nevertheless continued with this kind of
18 activity. Thank you. This has already been admitted. Can we now have
19 00972. That's the 65 ter number.
20 JUDGE KWON: That was yet again unnecessary comment from you.
21 THE REGISTRAR: This has been admitted as Exhibit P958,
22 Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. I believe, Mr. Donia, that you have referred to this speech of
1 mine that relates to the plebiscite. The Assembly of the Serb people had
2 already been established on the 25th; right?
3 A. 24th, I believe.
4 Q. Possibly. Possibly. Yes, but it was published on the 25th.
5 So we established that to this day the Assembly consists of 83
6 MPs, and in addition to the SDS, there was the Serb Renewal Movement in
7 this Assembly, then the Reformists, the Socialists -- or, rather, the
8 Communists, and one member who came from the ranks of the Liberals;
10 A. Yes. I -- I believe there were -- it's four or five delegates.
11 The original Assembly had 11 members of the Reformist Party and 11
12 members of the Social Democratic Party in the Council of Citizens, and I
13 believe a few of those Serbs who were in those parties joined the
14 Assembly, joined the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 24th.
15 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that at the time a decision was
16 passed to organise a plebiscite of the Serb people to see whether the
17 Serb people actually supported our policy of remaining in Yugoslavia
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Do you remember, Dr. Donia -- I'm sure that you are more familiar
20 with this particular field than I am, and that is American history, and
21 that is that President Lincoln started a war against the south because
22 they wanted to change the nature of the American federation?
23 A. That's false.
24 JUDGE KWON: I don't see the relevance of the question.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance is in the following
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Do you remember, Dr. Donia, that part of Virginia had refused,
4 refused to join the confederacy and that they stayed with the union, and
5 that is the present-day state of West Virginia?
6 A. I'd love to talk about the American civil war forever. I think
7 it's very interesting. But I don't believe that what you have just
8 characterised as a -- changing the state of the federation is an accurate
9 representation of the -- of the condition in the American -- in the
10 American state as of -- in the United States as of 1861.
11 Q. [Microphone not activated]
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 JUDGE KWON: Microphone. Mr. Karadzic, turn your microphone on.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. But you are not disputing that the war started because the south
16 wanted a confederacy? The southern states, rather.
17 A. Yes, I would dispute that. It was a factor but certainly not the
18 only factor in a very complex situation that included issues about
19 admission of new states to the union, the issue of slavery and states'
20 rights, a number of things that I just don't see happening here. Perhaps
21 you do, but I don't see the -- I don't see the riveting parallel that
22 would lead me to conclude what you have, evidently.
23 Q. Do you remember that Virginia
24 West Virginia was created during the course of the war?
25 A. I don't remember when West Virginia was created. Approximately
1 at that time, yes.
2 Q. May I just remind you, the western part of Virginia refused to
3 join the confederacy. They stayed within the union. Do you think that
4 this west part of Virginia
5 confederacy, or, rather, they had voted for the union and they stayed in
6 the union; isn't that right?
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, said I was wondering the relevance of
8 the questions, but you still continue that line of questions, ignoring
9 the advice from the Bench.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I'm sorry. This is a
11 flagrant precedent but let's move on. Can we have page 8 in this
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Can you see this here? "What is important for us is that the
15 plebiscite goes off with dignity and good spirits the way Serbs can do
16 it, like gentlemen," et cetera? And towards -- and further down:
17 "Be on best terms with your Muslim and Croatian neighbours. Just
18 like that, that's no problems for you, no problems for us either. We are
19 just expressing our will. Everything will be fine, no conflict anywhere
20 whatsoever. There can be no shooting. I -- I don't know who gave those
21 weapons to Serbs, but -- oh, go ahead, shoot. Oh, no, you are shooting.
22 You are shooting. That's what I'm saying. You are shooting. See,
23 there's no discipline. This morning at Pale, I said that I would want
24 Serbs to be meek like Muslims or Croats."
25 And then further down it says:
1 "Serbs don't trust a leader until they have weighed him
2 carefully, and then they watch him to see if he would do something wrong
3 or betray them."
4 So I'm talking about the plebiscite. I'm asking that there be no
5 shooting. I'm asking for a good life together with Muslim and Croatian
6 neighbours. The plebiscite is just an expression of one's will, not
7 entering a conflict; right?
8 A. I think there are about six or seven statements that preceded
9 your question "Right," and I'd have to go back over them one by one to
10 affirm them or deny them.
11 I -- I love this paragraph, because it -- it must have been fun
12 to give that talk. I didn't know any of these people except
13 Professor Koljevic, and I just can't imagine urging this crowd, be sure
14 you don't drink and be monks at your job. It was obvious that you were
15 worried that some sort of unrest might break out and that you were intent
16 on making sure that this happened without incidents as logically you
17 should have, so that the results would be more likely to be accepted as
18 valid by other Bosnian and by the international community.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted. Oh,
21 it has already been admitted. Thank you. Can we have 65 ter 5842.
22 This is the Official Gazette of the Serbian people in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 1. So we started issuing our own
24 Official Gazettes -- has that come up on our screens? Yes, it has. I
25 need the first page. Page 1, please. 7315 are the last digits, whereas
1 the last digits are 7321 here. So six pages on, please. Or, rather, six
2 pages back.
3 JUDGE KWON: I was told that the e-court has only two pages.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, what's the second page then?
5 Let's have a look at that. This is the whole of that Official Gazette.
6 So can we put it on the overhead projector, page 1 on the overhead
7 projector, please.
8 It's the decision on the founding of the Assembly of the Serb
9 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that decision was published. Now I'd
10 like us to focus on paragraph III, which says why it was formed in the
11 first place, and what its aims are.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Are you familiar with the decision, Dr. Donia?
14 A. Yes, I am. I'm familiar with the parallel Official Gazette that
15 you formed, I guess believing it to be the equivalent of the legal
16 Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I -- can I
17 ask if this decision was also published in the Official Gazette of
19 Q. Well, we considered the -- that the Official Gazette of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not exist, was no longer in existence, because the
21 state was abolished.
22 A. So you believe that the --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Constitution, the constitution. Interpreter's
24 correction, the constitution was abolished.
25 THE WITNESS: Okay. So this is, indeed, a parallel document to
1 the official legal gazette of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Look at item number III:
4 "The Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina shall
5 consider and decide upon all issues which relate to the realisation of
6 the equality of the Serbian people with the other nations and
7 nationalities living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the protection of the
8 interests of the Serbian people if those interests were to come under
9 threat by decisions of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic
11 Now, does this remind you of what the council of Chambers should
12 have been doing or the council for national equality, for instance?
13 A. Well it reminds me what the Bosnian Serb Assembly was doing which
14 was arrogating unto itself the role of a sole spokesman for the Serb
15 people in these matters.
16 Q. Do you see lower down it says that Serbian deputies would
17 continue the work in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the working
18 bodies to which they were elected, et cetera, et cetera. That's in
19 paragraph 4. Now do you see that the role the Serbian people there is a
20 corrective role against the unconstitutional decisions of the joint
22 A. Yes, again it arrogates to the promulgator of this decision, the
23 right or the judgement of what was constitutional and what was not.
24 Q. Yes. Well, now I have to ask you this: How did Badinter come to
25 the make the decision that Yugoslavia
1 want to expand the topic. Let me tender this document into evidence
2 first, please.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification pending
5 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D296, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. But I'm not sure you, Doctor, have
7 answered to the question of the accused: How did Badinter come to the --
8 come to make the decision that Yugoslavia
9 THE WITNESS: You're correct, Your Honour, I have not. The --
10 what's called the Badinter Commission was, in fact, the Arbitration
11 Commission of the European Community, and it was assigned the task by the
12 European Community ministers of assessing the applications for
13 independence of any of those republics of Yugoslavia that wish to apply
14 for recognition. This body took on this task in December of 1991,
15 deliberated, issued a couple of different statements, the most -- the two
16 most significant of which were a statement of principles whereby they
17 intended to apply the basic principles of human rights and international
18 law to the situation in both the former Yugoslavia -- or the Yugoslavia
19 and the Soviet Union, which was also at that time in turmoil with some of
20 the -- or with the various republics separating from one another, and
21 then subsequently issued a finding citing the various principles and
22 criteria that had been outlined previously based on applications from the
23 various republics.
24 Of the republics -- of the six republics, four ended up applying
25 for recognition. Croatia
2 applications was a little bit different, but in the case of Slovenia
4 January, 1992
5 provision for Bosnia-Herzegovina was that the will of the people of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina to opt for independence had not been sufficiently
7 established, and, in fact, cited as evidence of the fact that it had not
8 been sufficiently established, the meeting of the Assembly of the Serb
9 people, the Bosnian Serb Assembly, on the 24th of October. And to remedy
10 that prescribed that Bosnia-Herzegovina should hold a referendum on the
11 question of whether the populous sought independence -- sought
12 recognition, I'm sorry, sought recognition as an independent republic at
13 some future time.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the order and sequence of events
15 was different? The Badinter Arbitration Commission was supposed to
16 propose a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, what it did was it proposed
17 that Yugoslavia
18 A. No, that's not at all the case. That's wrong.
19 Q. Do you recall that the sentence that was uttered was "Yugoslavia
20 ceased to exist," that that was the sentence that was remembered?
21 A. The memorable sentence was that Yugoslavia was in a process of
22 disillusion. It wasn't that it cease to exist.
23 Q. Very well. Process of disillusion. But a year before that,
24 Gianni De Michelis said Yugoslavia
25 that the death of Yugoslavia
2 A. I don't know that to be the case and I don't have any document in
3 front of me to suggest that that was the case.
4 Q. Very well. I'm going to present the Badinter findings in due
5 course. I didn't think we would need that, but we might.
6 Now, do you agree that it was stated that the republics who
7 wanted to, after the Badinter Commission, that is, that was the
8 conclusion of the ministers of the European Community, that by 21st of
9 December, I think it was, that the republics should tender their request
10 for recognition of independence; is that right?
11 A. Yes. Tender their request for recognition by the EC.
12 Q. And is it also true and correct that before the Badinter decision
13 was made only two republics, Slovenia
14 request, and they held their referendums; right?
15 A. Well, the requests, I think, did come in -- the formal requests
16 came in subsequent to the Badinter Commission inviting them. There is,
17 of course, a whole history prior to that going back to June 25th, 1991,
18 when Slovenia
19 interventions of the EC and negotiations which led to the deferral of the
20 effectiveness of those proclamations for three months until October 18,
21 1991. So certainly one could say that the -- the process of moving
22 toward independence was very well advanced prior to the
23 Badinter Commission's solicitation of requests. But it did, in fact,
24 invite all republics to respond and, in fact, to comment on its
25 procedures. And Serbia
1 both the standards that were to be used and the specific decisions that
2 that the Badinter Commission reached.
3 Q. Thank you. I'd like to tender the previous document as a whole,
4 the Official Gazette, Official Gazette number 1. May it be given a
5 number. I'm sure it exists somewhere. It must exist.
6 JUDGE KWON: Are we talking about Exhibit D296? It has been
7 admitted in its entirety. It's admitted, but -- yes, it's admitted.
8 Being marked for identification.
9 MS. EDGERTON: And in the interim, Your Honour, while we're back
10 on the subject, we have been able to locate a translation which hasn't
11 been uploaded in e-court yet, but perhaps we could sort that out at the
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now may we have
15 65 ter 225 next, please.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Donia, we're now going to move on to the document with
18 Variants A and B, the well-known document that's been exploited so many
19 times. And while we're waiting for that to come up, let me ask you this:
20 Do you remember that the government, on the 20 -- or, rather the 19th of
21 December, I think it was, the BH government, with opposition from the
22 Serb ministers, asked nonetheless that the European Community launch
23 proceedings -- or, rather, called for independence for Bosnia and
25 A. Not exactly. It was the case that both the Presidency and the
1 government, that is the Council of Ministers, appealed in response to the
2 invitation of the European Community appealed for recognition of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a -- as an independent republic.
4 Q. Do you remember that we had three comments and criticisms to
5 make? First of all, that the Assembly should do that, not the government
6 or Presidency; and secondly that neither the government nor the
7 Presidency could reach that decision by out-voting the Serb members
8 because it was an important subject matter which required a consensus.
9 A. Yes, your position basically shifted from wanting a two-thirds
10 vote to wanting consensus.
11 Q. Well, we asked for a consensus in the government and Presidency,
12 but a two-thirds majority in the Assembly; right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, do you remember that the Serb ministers left the
15 government -- or, rather, left the government session and made a public
16 announcement saying that Serb rights had been violated and that of those
17 ministers only one of them was an SDS member?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Thank you. Now, do you remember that on the 21st of December
20 held an Assembly session, an Assembly of the Serb people, and called for
21 those decision to be withdrawn?
22 A. You're referring now to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Assembly
23 of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 21st of December.
25 Q. And you will remember that we said that if that wasn't withdrawn
1 by Christmas or whatever that we would set up our own unit in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?
3 A. It was a little bit more specific than that. I think you -- the
4 SDS or the delegates to the -- what I call Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to
5 make preparations for the proclamation of a separate state, separate
6 Bosnian Serb state and indicated your intent to proclaim that state if
7 the HDZ and the SDA didn't change their behaviour.
8 Q. Thank you. I'd like to draw everybody's attention to the title
9 page of this document.
10 Do you see there, Dr. Donia that, it says that the Serbian
11 Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Main Board, and that there's no
12 reference number or the usual attributes that attend documents that have
13 been adopted?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Are you aware of our position -- or, rather, what we stated, that
16 we received this document from well-intentioned pensioned officers after
17 they and we proclaimed that their flats should be marked with respect to
18 a tax against their apartments?
19 A. I'm aware of your contention, yes.
20 Q. Have you come across a single document stating that this document
21 was discussed and adopted by the organs of the Serbian Democratic Party?
22 A. A lot of documentary evidence that it was forwarded to local
23 Municipal Boards by the -- by the Main Board, and this from a variety of
24 different municipalities. I think if your question more narrowly is have
25 I seen a document that is, you know, stamped and signed from the party of
1 the Main Board, the answer's no, I've not. And, in fact, the document
2 internally has a certain inconsistency, because on the front page it
3 says, "Main Board," and the last page it's signed as "Crisis Staff of the
4 Main Board."
5 Q. Thank you. May we have page 2 of the Serbian, and it's still on
6 page 1 in the English, so that we can look at the first paragraph:
7 "Because there is reasonable grounds for suspicion that certain
8 forces are working persistently, thoroughly, and in an organised way to
9 take Bosnia-Herzegovina and then also the Serb people out of Yugoslavia
10 by force, we hereby issue these instructions detailing the common tasks,
11 measures," et cetera.
12 Do you see that? And may we turn to page 2 in the English as
13 well now, please.
14 Thank you. I claim, and we stated this straight away, that this
15 was supplied by that group of well-intentioned officers and many of them
16 were alive in 1941, and that we -- we gave this to people, or, rather, we
17 told people to take note of this and act accordingly should they see fit.
18 A. What's the question?
19 Q. The question is: Do you agree that once we received this at the
20 Main Board session, that we distributed it without a discussion?
21 A. I don't know. I wasn't -- I have not seen any documentation on
22 that Main Board session that would lead me to either agree or disagree
23 with that.
24 Q. Thank you. All our documentation stayed behind, because we
25 didn't expect a war. And you know that all our documents were seized.
1 That's right, isn't it?
2 A. No. Not all your documents were seized, no.
3 Q. Well, what wasn't seized then by the Serbian Democratic Party --
4 of the Serbian Democratic Party?
5 A. Well, I don't know. You do. I don't. Clearly there were a lot
6 of things that were not seized because some of them were kept by you and
7 other people in the party over the years.
8 Q. May we now turn to page 4279, or, rather, page 5 of this same
9 document to look at item 8. In English it's probably page 4.
10 JUDGE KWON: I think it should be the previous page in English.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. It's the next page in Serbian and the previous page in English.
14 And would you look at item 8 in English. And it will come up in
15 the Serbian on page 5. Next page in the Serbian, please.
16 The recommendation made here in point 7 is:
17 "To prevent uncontrolled shipment of deficient products, raw
18 materials, and manufacturing components, step up information -- or,
19 rather, place under control existing commodity reserves," et cetera.
20 And in point 8:
21 "Step up, or, rather, ensure respect for national and other
22 rights of the members of all nations and nationalities and their
23 engagement in the organs of power of authority that the Serbian Assembly
24 will establish in the municipality."
25 Do you agree that this piece of paper is a recommendation for
1 action in a situation of crisis?
2 JUDGE KWON: I am not sure whether you read out the item 8 which
3 is consistent with the English translation we have.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. It wasn't that. Where it
5 says "Variant B." Before we come to chapter Variant B, that item 8. I
6 think it might be page 4 of the English translation.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we're on page 4. Could you help us locate the
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then it must be page 3. That's it.
10 Paragraph 7, they're telling us to prevent uncontrolled distribution of
11 food and other deficient commodities, stop smuggling and so on, and then
12 point 8 it says:
13 "When taking all these measures [In English] make sure that
14 national and other rights of members of all nations are respected and
15 that they are later engaged in government organs established by the
16 Assembly of Serbian Republic
17 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this document was a
18 recommendation for action in extreme situations of crisis where there
19 would be no central power and authority?
20 A. No. I would agree with the first part of that formulation. It
21 certainly is a document that directs activities to be undertaken in a
22 situation of crisis.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If this was page 6 of the English,
25 6 of 10 pages, then I think we need to turn to page 8 of 10. And it's
1 also page 8 of the Serbian. Or maybe it's page 9 of 10 in the English.
2 Probably page 9 in English.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. In the previous paragraph, Mr. Donia, do we see that the rights
5 of others are to be respected and that they also be included in the
6 organs of power and authority as soon as the situation allows for that?
7 A. I didn't think it said quite that. I think it said after --
8 again, you're asking me about something that's no longer in front of me,
9 so -- I'm perfectly willing to go back to it, but you've moved on to
10 something else here, so I can't attest to what it -- what it said in the
11 previous section.
12 Q. I'm sorry. Can we go back to point 8 on page 6 in English. Page
13 6 in English. So let us see what is envisaged. Can you have a look at
14 it now?
15 "[In English] When taking all these measures," [Interpretation]
16 measures had already been listed, "[In English] Make sure that national
17 and other rights of members of all nations are respected and that they
18 are later engaged in government organs established by the Assembly of
19 Serbian people in the municipality."
20 A. Yeah. I think the sequence here is revealing. That is, these
21 measures are to be undertaken first while fully respecting the rights of
22 members of other nations and then later, not specified when or under what
23 conditions they are to be engaged in government organs established by the
24 Assembly of the Serbian people. So it is clear that this is something
25 that will take place at the sufferance of the Assembly of the Serbian
1 people which had been established a month before. Two months before, I'm
3 Q. [Interpretation] However, there is a reference here to Municipal
4 Assemblies, Serb Municipal Assemblies; right?
5 A. Yes. I'm sorry, the -- and some of those had indeed -- those
6 were to be established under the terms of the instructions. So I erred
7 in assuming that was the central Assembly of Republika Srpska, but, in
8 fact, it is the newly created parallel Assemblies of the Serb peoples
9 that would be created under the terms of the instruction that will then
10 decide when and if others would be engaged in units of government.
11 Q. Were they supposed to decide or is the recommendation that they
12 should join in? [In English] "Make sure they are later engaged."
13 A. "Make sure that "-- this is in the English and I'd have to go to
14 the Serbian to be absolutely certain, but "make sure that national and
15 other rights are respected and that they are later engaged ..."
16 So, yes, it's a statement of -- at some unspecified later time,
17 the members of these other nations would be engaged in an unspecified way
18 in unspecified government organs established by the Serb municipality.
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm noting the time. We will have a break for half
20 an hour.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Just a couple of matters that arose from the last
25 session, Your Honour, if I may. The first is with respect to the
1 document which bore the 65 ter number 1D01362, and we -- that was
2 mentioned at pages 41 and 42 of today's transcript. This document is
3 what -- Dr. Karadzic described this document as a session of the
4 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on the 15th of October. It, in
5 fact, appears on the basis of the translation of the heading to have been
6 a meeting between the president and members of the socialist Republic of
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency and the socialist Republic of Bosnia
8 and Herzegovina
9 SSNO and the SFRJ armed forces HQ, and we do not have that document in
10 house, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 MS. EDGERTON: The second item is with respect to 65 ter 05842,
13 which was admitted in full as D296. That has now been up loaded in full
14 in e-court in English and in the original language.
15 JUDGE KWON: And you have no objection to admission of it in its
17 MS. EDGERTON: None at all.
18 JUDGE KWON: Then it's admitted. And taking this opportunity,
19 whether you are in a position to answer questions -- questionnaire
20 provided to the accused some time ago.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, Your Honour. That -- we've been looking at
22 those proposed facts in detail and note, Your Honours, that much of those
23 proposed facts are indeed irrelevant on the basis of Your Honour's --
24 this Chamber's own ruling of 13 April 2010 in regard to the -- from the
25 decision on the Prosecution's motion for admission of the evidence of
1 KDZ172, in particular, paragraph 19 of that decision.
2 There are some matters that may be relevant that we're looking at
3 in more detail, and we'll be able to respond in writing on those,
4 Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I ask for the
8 document to be returned, 225? That's the 65 ter number.
9 Q. In order to get to the war as soon as possible, Mr. Donia, I'm
10 going to try to put questions that are as short as possible. Do you
11 remember that the Serb side had proposed that wherever there was a
12 concentration of one or the other people or nation within a municipality
13 that they actually could establish a municipality of their own?
14 A. I'm not aware of any formal proposal to that degree. It was
15 certainly inherent in some of the party's programme and policies, but I
16 don't -- couldn't identify a specific document or demand that says that.
17 Q. And do you remember that we had proposed that Sarajevo be
18 reorganised like Brussels
19 just like municipalities in Brussels
20 A. Yes. That was my understanding of the way that you ultimately
21 did organise the Serb municipalities in Sarajevo in January/February
23 Q. Thank you. Now, do you see what is meant by this, namely that
24 they would take part in this life when there is a Serb municipality,
25 meaning that there might be a Croat municipality as well or a Muslim
2 A. No, I don't interpret this instruction to be -- to say that at
4 Q. I'm not talking about the instruction. I'm just talking about
5 that sentence, namely that they would take part in the political life of
6 the municipality once it is established. Is the reference being made to
7 a Serb municipality?
8 A. I believe it is. I'm -- again, it's not in front of me here,
9 so ...
10 Q. And do you know -- I'm sure that you did that --
11 JUDGE KWON: Page 6 of the English.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 Mr. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Yes, paragraph number 8. The last sentence in paragraph number
16 A. Yes. I think -- as I said earlier, this clearly establishes that
17 the government organs concerned have to be established by the Assembly of
18 the Serb people. So any such organisations or organs would be created or
19 not by the -- the Assembly of the Serb people, and at some unspecified
20 future time those of other nations might enter into those government
21 organs. It doesn't, for example, say the members of other nations have
22 the right to establish their own organs within a declared Serb
23 municipality. It simply says the government organs established by the
24 Assembly of the Serb people in that municipality will be open at some
25 future time to participation by those of other nationalities.
1 Q. And do you know that in practically all municipalities there were
2 negotiations to the effect that each community would establish its own
3 municipality. In Sanski Most, for instance, in Vlasenica and Bratunac.
4 Actually, in Vlasenica and Bratunac that had already been established.
5 And in Ilidza it had almost been accomplished, too, that is to say to
6 establish a Serbo-Muslim municipality wherever possible?
7 A. The only situations that I know of like that, and I would be open
8 to knowing of other ones, were those negotiations undertaken essentially
9 at the point of a gun starting in early April 1992, usually with an
10 ultimatum of some sort issued by the SDS just prior to the actual
11 takeover and ethnic cleansing of the municipality concerned.
12 Q. Well, you cannot put it that way, Mr. Donia. Let's actually
13 finish with this document.
14 Can you find in the document any measure that is offensive -- or,
15 rather, are they all defensive, protective?
16 A. Offensive -- you're making the distinction between offence in the
17 sense of advancing and taking something as opposed to defensive which is
18 just to protect what one already has? Is that the distinction you want
19 to make here?
20 Q. Yes, yes, yes. Yes, for instance. However, does it have to do
21 with the defence of the Serb people, or does it have to do with conquests
22 of any kind? Is there anything offensive in this paper?
23 A. Yes, it is offensive to me, and in various ways it specifies that
24 the representatives of the Serb Democratic Party or other organs
25 established by them take from the existing institutions of the
1 municipality control over raw materials, commodities, and various
2 procedures. They essentially seize parts or functions, take over
3 functions that would have been previously exercised by the government of
4 the municipality.
5 Number 6:
6 "Take over the staff, buildings and equipment of security
7 services centres and place them at the disposal of the newly established
8 organs ... "
9 That's seizure. That's a seizure of power. It's an offensive
10 act not a defensive preservation of the -- what you're characterising
11 here as the Serbian people.
12 Q. Do you know that in these negotiations on the establishment of
13 two or more municipalities in previously existing municipalities it had
14 been envisaged for the other side to do the same thing, to establish
15 their own police station and their own organs? Yes or no?
16 A. As I said, I'm not aware of any -- I'm not aware of any
17 negotiations of that character beforehand. Would I think it likely that
18 some did and some were undertaken, but I don't really know of any, so I
19 can't really answer your question.
20 Q. And do you remember when one says the Serb municipality of
21 Sanski Most, it means that there is also a Muslim municipality of
22 Sanski Most?
23 A. Well, that's your characterisation of it. Anything that's not
24 Serb is automatically part of a different nation's property, and you
25 don't seem to recognise that there was something called the common life
1 that was shared by various -- all -- all peoples or peoples in that
2 particular municipality, and that presupposition is critical to your
3 argument about the right of the Serb people or the right of the SDS in
4 the name of the Serb people to seize these -- these assets. You
5 presuppose that the only way this can be dealt with is through division
6 or separation of economic resources, of means of production, of goods and
7 services, of governmental institutions. It goes right to your assumption
8 that all possession must be ethnic in character and that you have the
9 right to act on behalf of the Serb people.
10 Q. Thank you. I've been waiting for the interpretation. D85, D85
11 temporarily. That has already been admitted. D85. English page 4, the
12 last paragraph. You will see what kind of recommendation this was and
13 with cases it actually referred to.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D85. That is a document that has
15 already been admitted. Page 4, the last paragraph in the English
16 version. In Serbian it's page 3. In English it's page 4.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Here it is in English:
19 "[In English] On the basis of the discussion."
20 JUDGE KWON: Is it page 4?
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In English, page 4, the last
23 paragraph. And in Serbian, page 3.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [In English]
25 Q. "On the basis of the discussion, the president formulated two
1 amendments to the recommendation.
2 "It is recommended that the SDS, Serbian Democratic Party
3 deputies clubs in the municipality Assemblies in B and H where decisions
4 against Serbian interests are imposed through out-voting ..."
5 [Interpretation] So where decisions are detrimental or were
6 detrimental because they were imposed through out-voting.
7 "[In English] The decision of the Serb Democratic Party deputies
8 clubs to transform themselves into Assemblies of Serbian people in ..."
9 [Interpretation] Could we have the next page now, please:
10 "[In English] Municipality," I suppose.
11 [Interpretation] The next page, please:
12 "[In English] In B and H shall be verified by the Assembly of the
13 Serbian people ..."
14 [Interpretation] Mr. Donia, the recommendation for establishing
15 new municipalities was amended by either myself or Krajisnik, I'm not
16 sure who it was. Namely that this should be done only in municipalities
17 where decisions are being imposed on the Serb people by way of
18 out-voting, decisions that are detrimental to the Serb people. And in
19 the Municipal Assembly or parliament then the MPs would form a separate
20 municipality and Assembly and then they would form their communities of
21 municipalities; isn't that right?
22 A. The -- this is this very, I think, pivotal third session at which
23 the proposal initially made by Mr. Krajisnik and endorsed by you was
24 to -- language to the effect that it was required that the SDS delegates
25 in most municipalities inhabited by Serbs form these separate Serb
1 associations or municipalities, Assemblies, if you will. And that
2 resolution passed with one dissenting vote, after which there was an
3 extensive discussion by various delegates in which you participated and
4 Mr. Krajisnik participated in which it became clear that many delegates
5 felt this was an ill-advised measure to take in some municipalities,
6 because it would destroy the co-operation, such as it was then, under the
7 terms of the inter-party agreements and make -- convey the impression
8 that the SDS would invite formation of separate municipalities by -- by
9 other national groups, and it was after this extensive discussion that
10 the amendments came forth, and I also don't remember exactly who proposed
11 these, but it was eventually passed owing to the objections of these
12 various delegates in such a way that it was made voluntary. And, in
13 fact, the -- I think the cover sheet that was to be distributed to the
14 municipalities was to specify that it would be a voluntary action. And
15 the judgement in this situation, the judgement of whether the interests
16 of the Serbian people had been violated, whether there was out-voting,
17 would, of course, rest in the hands of the local SDS or even the republic
18 SDS officials, and then on that basis they would decide whether to
19 proceed and form a Serbian Municipal Assembly.
20 Q. Dr. Donia, do you agree that we should look at the results, the
21 products of every Assembly, the documents that are adopted rather than
22 the discussion that take place while the Assembly is in session? Don't
23 you see that this decision or recommendation was improved by way of these
24 amendments and that it pertained to those municipalities where solutions
25 were imposed by way of out-voting the Serb delegates? This is a good
1 example showing that one should look at decisions reached by Assemblies
2 rather than the debates that take place beforehand. Do you agree?
3 A. Partially. I think one should look at the decisions that were
4 preached at various Assembly sessions. I think they tell a very
5 interesting but incomplete story of the direction in which the party
6 policy was moving. I think one also should look at the debates, and, in
7 fact, that's the source of the richness of these transcripts, and I think
8 they're going to be used because of their richness by you, and as well
9 they are rich in terms of the kind of things that I investigate. So I
10 don't agree that we should just look at decisions. I would think we
11 should look at the way in which decisions were reached and also what --
12 what happened afterwards, and I think that your own dissatisfaction with
13 the decisions reached at this -- the voluntary nature of these things is
14 a direct source of the nature of the document, the A/B document that
15 we've been looking at.
16 Q. And where was it that you found that I was dissatisfied with this
17 decision? Let not waste any time. Just indicate it to us. Where is
19 A. Well, I can't, sitting here, go through the whole Assembly
20 session. I think your -- your dissatisfaction with it was -- was
21 expressed during the course of the debate about it when you defended the
22 notion that it was important to establish these, and in your subsequent
23 conversation with Mr. Krajisnik that evening.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This has already been admitted, but
1 now could I have a new document, 1D01405. 010415. It hasn't been
2 translated. It is hand written.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. I hope that you will be able to read this in Cyrillic. This is
5 an agreement between the two peoples, the SDA and the SDS. I mean, they
6 represent the two peoples. That's what I'm saying. On the basis of a
7 principled agreement between the representatives of the SDA and the SDS
8 and the representatives of the two municipalities on the partition of the
9 municipality of Bratunac into two Assemblies, the Serb and the Muslim
10 Assembly, reached on the 5th of April, 1992. The representatives of the
11 two parties in power, that is to say the SDA and the SDS, met up on the
12 8th of April, 1992, and reached --
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
14 MS. EDGERTON: I'm really sorry. 65 ter 00739, with the
15 translation available.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. That is excellent.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. And then further on before we get it, it says that:
20 "The representatives of both peoples accepted reality, that the
21 partition of the municipalities was inevitable and could be carried out
22 in a peaceful and democratic way."
23 Then number 2: "The establishment of a Serbian public security
24 station in that Bratunac and the partition of the existing public
25 security station is the first step in that direction.
1 "3. We should also try to explain these agreements.
2 "5. The people who have moved out of our areas should be invited
3 back and the schools should re-open.
4 "7. The relocation and demobilisation of military and other
5 armed formations in the area of municipalities should begin immediately.
6 "9. To make it impossible for any kind of paramilitary and
7 military formations to come to this area and that both peoples should
8 resist aggression if they feel --"
9 JUDGE KWON: Slow down. Slow down, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. "11. To involve equal numbers of Serb and Muslim policemen, that
12 they should be engaged.
13 "12. That both public security stations should guarantee peace
14 and safety to the citizens.
15 "13. Plans and tasks of both chiefs should be co-ordinated and
16 joint on-site investigations should be conducted.
17 "14." -- or, "15. Disputes and problems should be resolved in
18 a peaceful and democratic way."
19 And my question is: Do you see, Mr. Donia, that this is one --
20 that this is a municipality which -- or one of the municipalities which,
21 at the beginning of the war, endeavoured to reorganise one joint
22 municipality in two municipalities, and this happened in Vlasenica so
23 those two agreements were reached; right?
24 A. I'd like to see the signatures.
25 Q. I don't have them here, but we have statement by Rabija Subic.
1 Do you know who she was, Rabija Subic?
2 A. Yes, she was an extreme nationalist spokesperson for pretty much
3 everything you believed in. And spoke on a number of occasions to the
4 Bosnian Serb Assembly. She was, I think, the head of a small party which
5 was called the Serbian Socialist Party or something like that. Yugoslav
6 Socialist Party in Bosnia
7 This document bears all the earmarks of an agreement dictated by
8 one side. It is in Cyrillic, which would only be used by a Serb, at a
9 fraught time in this municipality and cannot possibly have been agreed to
10 on a voluntary basis by the people that you said agreed to it. I think
11 it's a good example of what I just cited, these last-minute talks held at
12 the point of a gun, usually with an ultimatum attached as the SDS was
13 preparing to take -- assume full power in the municipality.
14 Q. And how do you think that 30 per cent Serbs can force 70 per cent
15 Muslims in Bratunac to do this job?
16 A. We are talking Bratunac; right? Not Vlasenica. I think somebody
17 mentioned Vlasenica earlier. They had the backing of the JNA. They had
18 paramilitaries available to them. It was, as I say, at the point of a
19 gun, and I think subsequent events in Bratunac in the period after this
20 supposed agreement bear that out, and I don't -- it's not my -- my role
21 to go into what those were, but I think it also makes all the more empty
22 and all the more just -- it makes it into a mere gesture these statements
23 about the rights of other peoples in the course of the Serb seizure of
25 Q. Mr. Donia, I am deeply dissatisfied with the breath of your
1 explanations. Do you know that throughout Bosnia there was this process
2 of agreement and negotiating between Muslims and Serbs to reorganise the
3 municipalities into two municipalities, ethnic ones? Yes or no?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Very well. Now, I put this to you, I put it to you that what was
6 envisaged was that in that kind of Serb municipality there would also be
7 Muslims and that they would be included into the political life of the
8 Serb municipality. Yes or no?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, do you know that a similar agreement was reached
11 at -- well, in Vlasenica first and then at Ilidza later on, and that the
12 process of negotiation had progressed in Sanski Most, Kljujic, and other
14 A. No.
15 Q. But you must have known that, Mr. Donia, because they're facts,
16 and we'll show that. We'll show that they're facts. And if you don't
17 know about them then you didn't do your job.
18 A. I'd love to see the documents that -- that show that.
19 Q. You'll see them. You'll see proof and evidence, but I'd like to
20 tender this document first.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
22 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
23 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D297, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we briefly go back to 65 ter
1 225 to finish our discussions on that document and then we can move on.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Do you agree that whoever wrote this, the document was
4 distributed on the 19th of December, 1991, after the government of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina had asked for recognition of independence?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. Now, do you see anywhere there that any kind of
8 aggressive or offensive action is anticipated vis-a-vis others outside
9 the realm of the protection of the Serbian people?
10 A. Well, as I indicated, in expressing its intent to take over the
11 functions and resources of the existing municipalities, yes, it does
12 express a hostile intent towards the property and -- of others and the
13 functions being exercised by others in the municipality, and those others
14 would necessarily have involved those members of other peoples and
15 probably some Serbs as well.
16 Q. So you're going back to the thesis that there wasn't a plan and
17 intention and programme and platform and the realisation on the formation
18 of Serb municipalities, because we're dealing with Serb resources in
19 those municipalities.
20 A. Well, I think you kind of define Serb resources the way you chose
21 to. You certainly define Serb land in a way that was convenient to
22 justify the seizure of land and expansion of authority at the municipal
23 level right from about this time into really at least the summer of 1992.
24 Q. Mr. Donia, this seems to be a criticism rather than an answer.
25 Based on international pact on human rights, who do resources belong to,
1 the people that live there or to somebody else?
2 A. I'm sorry. I'd have to look at the specific provision you have
3 in mind to -- to give you an answer to that. I wouldn't say it belongs
4 to somebody else, but exactly how it's formulated I'm not sure.
5 Q. Well, you must have known that. If you hold it against us that
6 we said that the Serb power and authority and the Serb portion of the
7 municipalities would manage its resources, then you must know that this
8 is net based on the international pact and covenant on human rights. It
9 is an important article, resources and natural wealth belong to the
10 nation living on the land. That's what it says in the international
12 Now, can you give another example which this group of officers of
13 an offensive action, that this group of officers envisaged? And please
14 understand that we're talking about the Serb part of each municipality.
15 A. I'm not too sure what you mean by "Serb part of each
16 municipality." The municipality was an administrative unit that didn't
17 distinguish between people on the basis of their ethnicity and didn't
18 distinguish between pieces of land on the basis of the ethnicity of who
19 owned it. So that remains to me to be clarified before I could really
20 answer that part of your question.
21 We can go through the document if you wish, and I can point out
22 those passages which, to me, indicate an aggressive or intent to seize or
23 to -- to contemplate or prepare for the seizure of commonly held assets.
24 I would be glad to do that. I see only, you know, the first page in
25 front of me here, which is really the title page and the preamble which,
1 in my mind, is the only thing that probably wasn't written by military
2 officers, the rest of it being very military in its -- in its structure
3 and composition.
4 Q. Thank you. May we turn to the second page.
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Ms. Edgerton, do you have the hard
6 copy of this one?
7 MS. EDGERTON: Not immediately but shortly.
8 JUDGE KWON: That can be handed over to -- to the witness.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Donia, where did you see state property at that point in
11 time? Did state property exist at all at that point in time?
12 A. Yes, it did exist, and so did -- so did social property. And
13 as -- we talked about this last week, probably about 53 per cent of the
14 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina made up socially-owned land, and so
15 private property, privately held land, was, in fact, a minority of the
16 total territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of sometime in the very late
18 Q. Very well. While we're waiting for that document to come up, may
19 we -- or, rather, may we now have another document on our screens,
20 1D1170. May we have that called up.
21 And let's have a look, Mr. Donia, what is going on parallelly to
22 the Serb actions, what the other side is doing.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon, 107 is the
24 correct number. 1D107. 1D107.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In the Serbian version we see that it is a decision on promoting
2 to the rank of brigadier-general of the army of -- the Republic of Bosnia
3 [indiscernible] for Sefer Halilovic, signed by Alija Izetbegovic; right?
4 A. I -- I can't -- I see a B/C/S document here dated 26 April 1994
5 and an English translation dated 8 April 1994.
6 Q. On the 8th of April, 1994, is his statement, his request. The
7 decision came after that, on the 26th of April. But this is on the 8th
8 of April, 1994. Sefer Halilovic is requesting that his status be
9 resolved. That's the subject of this document: "[In English] Request to
10 resolve status."
11 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, Mr. Karadzic. In the B/C/S,
12 Alija Izetbegovic signed the document, but in the English document we
13 only see the name of Sefer Halilovic. So I take it those two are
14 different documents.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps I could assist, Your Honour. If we go to
16 page 2 in the B/C/S version, I think you'll see the same content in
17 English and B/C/S.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's page 2 of the Serbian. The
19 first page is Izetbegovic's title -- decision pertaining to Halilovic's
20 request, and the right-hand side is Halilovic's request two weeks before
21 the decision.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Now, do you see in paragraph 1:
24 "[In English] As an active serviceman."
25 [Interpretation] "As an active serviceman of the former JNA,
1 Yugoslav People's Army, seeing what was going to happen I left that army,
2 and in September 1991, applied myself with total commitment to the
3 function of organising preparations for the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina
4 from the aggression I anticipated."
5 Do you see that paragraph?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. Thank you. Now, in the next paragraph after the word "Corps":
8 "[In English] Corps I drew up a proposal. [Interpretation] I
9 drew up a proposal for organising the Patriotic League for the Sarajevo
10 region and the regional staff of the Patriotic League and a plan of
11 defence for the Sarajevo
12 in Hrasnica, when I informed him of what had been done up until then and
13 proposed a way of organising the Muslim people and other citizens of the
14 republic," et cetera, et cetera, "and a strategy," et cetera. And the
15 last paragraph in Serbian, probably English too, it reads:
16 "After that," that's right: "After that, I set out to realise
17 the plan that had been accepted in organising the Main Staff of the
18 Patriotic League of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 regional
19 military staffs, 19 municipal military staffs of the Patriotic League,
20 and a large number of manoeuvre area and logistical units."
21 Now, do you know what in the meantime was being done by the SDA?
22 A. Meantime of what?
23 Q. Well, at the same time. You know, what the Serbs were doing at
24 the time: Exclusively political moves they were making. Now, did you
25 know what the other side was doing and forcing the Serbs to react and
1 take political steps? They were provoking the Serb side.
2 A. I don't share the premise of your question that the Serbs at that
3 time were only doing political moves. I think that the SDS was busy
4 arming its -- its people and becoming essentially a paramilitary unto
5 itself, and all sorts of things were going on to make sure that the SDS
6 had the co-operation and support of the JNA in pursuing whatever course
7 it might choose to take after the fall of 1991.
8 This account squares very well with my own understanding of the
9 growth of the Patriotic League, which was a really skeletal organisation
10 until at least this September 1991 date when the war in Croatia
11 alienated a lot of the non-Serb officers of the JNA and caused them to
12 leave the JNA and join various other bodies that were organising at the
13 time. So --
14 Q. Professor, I'm not interested in your interpretation of this.
15 I'm just interested in facts. Do you want to say that in September 1991,
16 the Serbian Democratic Party was in favour of the disintegration of
18 fact that the SDS supported the JNA?
19 A. I did not make that statement and don't believe that that was the
20 case. I think the -- the coming together of the SDS and the JNA or what
21 really proved to be a very close working alliance was just getting
22 started in the early couple of weeks of -- of September 1991, and they
23 grew closer but somewhat erratically in the months after that. There
24 clearly were some efforts on the part of the JNA to distribute arms to
25 members of the SDS prior to that, but in terms of the kind of top-level
1 co-operative relationship that -- that started about this same time.
2 Q. We'll come to the question of the JNA. What I'm asking you now
3 is this: You noticed and said yourself that the Serbian Democratic Party
4 claimed that all its moves were in response to the moves made by the
5 other side; right? Like moves on a chessboard.
6 A. Not exactly. I just referenced your statement, and you made it,
7 I think, twice later in the war to the effect that you basically timed
8 your actions to wait for a measure taken by Mr. Izetbegovic before taking
9 that action. I would be glad to look at those specific quotes that I
10 referenced if you'd like. I don't know exactly the number in my report,
11 but that's what I referenced. That's what I believed to be the case.
12 Q. I asked you whether you knew of our position. Were you aware of
13 our position that our moves were provoked by the moves and steps taken by
14 the other side? I asked you that on day one, and you said, Yes. And I
15 asked you why you hadn't studied the moves of the other side, and now I'm
16 putting one of these other moves to you. You thought that we didn't know
17 what Halilovic was doing; right?
18 A. I thought -- I'm sorry. I thought that you didn't know what
19 Halilovic was doing? I don't know.
20 Q. The interpretation wasn't the right one there. Let me put it in
21 simpler terms. Mr. Donia, you said -- you agreed that the Patriotic
22 League was founded on the 31st of March, 1991; right?
23 A. Yes, I have, yes.
24 Q. That the committee for the protection of the Muslim peoples had
25 already been constituted and -- with some 500 members and held a meeting
1 in June 1991; right?
2 A. June 10th, yes.
3 Q. And that in September 1991, the Crisis Staff was established in
4 the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 A. I've written of that, yes.
6 Q. And now I'm putting it to you that Halilovic, Sefer Halilovic
7 left the JNA and already as in -- already in September of 1991 had --
8 that 98 municipalities had military staffs, 9 regional staffs, 98
9 municipal staffs, and a large number of manoeuvre logistical units and
10 units in the rear. Was that also a SDA activity then?
11 A. Was it a SDA -- no, it was a Patriotic League activity,
12 recognising that the Patriotic League was formed and certainly operated
13 under the general guidance of the -- of the SDA. I don't think he says
14 here that there were 98 municipal military staffs in September. I think
15 he says that he began realising that plan in September, which again would
16 be pretty much according to my understanding of it, this, if you will,
17 embryonic organisation, didn't really take form until September when the
18 war in Croatia
19 until probably the first of the year that you could speak of a
20 significant force, first of 1992, in a wide variety of municipalities.
21 Q. And did you come across a document confirming that part of the
22 Patriotic League, a part of the leadership of the Patriotic League asked
23 to go to war straight away against Yugoslavia
24 A. No.
25 Q. We'll be showing the document in due course. Mr. Donia, up until
1 the beginning of the war -- their document, the SDA documents. It says,
2 up to the beginning of the war, they had military staffs in 103
3 municipalities. But let's stay with the 98 municipalities. In those 98
4 municipalities, were there any Serbs living there?
5 A. If there were 98, there certainly were Serbs living in some of
6 those municipalities, yes.
7 Q. In most of these municipalities, in fact; right? Except for
8 Cazin and Velika Kladusa; right?
9 A. I think that's -- yes.
10 Q. Therefore, at least 90 per cent of the municipalities. Well, the
11 Serbs watched what Halilovic was doing, organising a secret army,
12 assisted by the Muslim section of MUP, and you considered that the Serbs
13 steps were not conditioned and provoked by this unlawful and illegal and
14 dangerous steps taken by the Party of Democratic Action; right?
15 A. I wouldn't share your characterisation of it, no.
16 Q. So you think that this wasn't dangerous, that it wasn't dangerous
17 to be building up an army is? Who was this army supposed to fight
18 against in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
19 A. Well, there's two questions there. It -- it could have been
20 dangerous, indeed. It was actually the -- it was -- it was not a huge
21 secret. It was a -- something the -- the meeting of June 10th was well
22 covered in the press. Everybody knew about this defence council for the
23 protection of the Muslim peoples, and this specific preparations and
24 arming certainly did go on outside of, let's say, the public -- public
25 eye, but the general movement was -- was well known at the time, and it's
1 well known that you were and the SDS were keeping very careful
2 surveillance of these activities, pretty much knew exactly what was going
3 on. In fact, maintained a very active network of informants and people
4 in these various municipalities and at the republic level who -- who were
5 informing you about this.
6 Q. Right. Now, do you know when it was that we -- well, you saw the
7 letter that we showed earlier on. When did we send this demand for
8 events to be monitored and reported on? That was also the end of
9 September 1991; right?
10 A. I don't recall the date.
11 Q. Do you agree that at this time the Serbs still did not have any
12 Crisis Staffs?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Well, what Crisis Staffs did the Serbs have at that point in
16 A. You asked me if I agreed that they didn't have any, and I can't
17 agree that they didn't because I've answered your question several times
18 now that I don't know.
19 Q. Oh, you don't know. Right. So how can you confirm that the SDS
20 itself became a paramilitary formation?
21 A. Well, the various arming activities that took place in the --
22 starting about May of 1991, put hands in the very -- or arms in the hands
23 of various local SDS committees. There's a rich gathering of
24 documentation that attests to that, including meetings that members of
25 the SDS had with the officials of the government in Belgrade, a letter
1 from a colonel in the JNA. In fact, the very colonel who was with
2 Mr. Milan Martic when he was detained on the 8th of September, 1991,
3 discussing the distribution of arms in Bosnia. I consider that very well
4 established. And the recipients of those arms were SDS members and SDS
5 local units.
6 Q. You have no proof of that, Mr. Donia. But let me ask you
7 something: Do you know of the doctrine and law -- actually, the doctrine
8 is the armed people, and the law has to do with the armed people and all
9 national defence. Do you know of that? Yes or no?
10 A. Are you speaking of People's Defence?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. Okay. There was a poor translation, so I just wanted to clarify
14 Yes, I do know of the -- let's say theory or doctrine of
15 People's Defence and know that there was a rather elaborate code of laws
16 about the People's Defence, that it was in existence in 1990.
17 Q. Do you know -- do you know that reservists would always and
18 invariably take their equipment and uniforms home? They would take them
19 out for exercises, training, and bring them back home.
20 A. I think some of them. I don't think they brought their bazookas
21 home and didn't take their tanks home, but at least in the realm of small
22 arms I think that was a common practice for everybody who was in the
23 People's Defence force.
24 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Now I'm going to put something to you.
25 The Serb Democratic Party, all the way up until the end while there was
1 peace, supported the JNA and sent reservists on the ready to respond as
2 soon as they were called up by the JNA. Yes or no?
3 A. I think all three parts of your proposition are the case.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please,
6 to see what the scope of the further activities of Mr. Sefer Halilovic
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you agree that these were secret activities of his, that he
10 had concealed them from the army?
11 A. I haven't had a chance to read the document, and I can't answer
12 the question until I do.
13 Q. Look at this part:
14 "From the beginning of December 1991 up until the end of March
15 1992, five or six times I stayed in all regional municipal staffs of the
16 Patriotic League and in several units of the Patriotic League throughout
17 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina
18 papers, other people's papers, lest I be discovered."
19 Did you see he did that secretly and with false documents?
20 A. That's the suggestion in this document, yes. I'm just
21 remembering that he was looking for a promotion here and certainly wanted
22 to optimise his own achievements in order to get that promotion.
23 Q. You think that he could have deceived Izetbegovic? You think
24 that he could have said this without actually having done it? You don't
25 think that Izetbegovic would have known?
1 A. Not necessarily. Not if the -- what's doing here is just a bit
2 of exaggeration and not -- not making it up. And I -- clearly he's not
3 making it up out of whole cloth, but I wouldn't -- having been a party
4 myself to some efforts to gain promotions for myself and other people in
5 a military organisation, a little exaggeration isn't -- isn't out of the
7 Q. Thank you. Even with exaggerations this, nevertheless, did cause
8 fear among the Serb people. Your answer is going to be "not
10 A. Well, if you ask me a question, I'll try and come up with an
12 Q. Is it your understanding that that vast activity, even if there
13 was a bit of exaggeration involved, did lead to fear amongst the Serbs in
14 these 98 municipalities?
15 A. It -- it could have, yes.
16 Q. Now, do you have a somewhat different view of Variant A and
17 Variant B now?
18 A. No.
19 Q. The Serbs were not supposed to take any measures of caution and
20 defence and protection? No?
21 A. Well, I think the A/B document really outlines a series of
22 offensive aggressive actions to seize power and resources in the
23 municipalities, and the defensive component is -- is certainly there, but
24 probably not a -- an appropriate response to what we're looking at here.
25 I think the -- my view of the A/B document remains the same, that it was
1 a critical part but only a part of an extended planning process which
2 brought the SDS and its affiliated Serb nationalist organisations to a
3 state of high readiness to seize power.
4 Q. And after this that you had seen, Mr. Donia, you think that the
5 Serbs on the 19th of December, even if -- well, I'm sorry that the SDS
6 had not formed that. We're not smart enough to have done that. This has
7 to do with a military smartness. You are trying to say that after all of
8 this secret military activity on the part of the SDA the Serb people were
9 supposed to wait for the Almighty to save them and not to carry out any
10 kind of self defence. Is that what you're trying to say?
11 A. I don't believe this was an appropriate response to what was
12 going on. You know, I think looking at this document, we really don't
13 have a very good sense of how active and widespread these activities
14 were, and so it's really not possible to say. You had a much better
15 sense of that, I think, with your ability to weigh these things. You had
16 a better sense of that than I would sitting here today. The -- as I say,
17 the fact that the Patriotic League was organised, the fact that it was
18 gaining strength and units and spreading activities starting in September
19 of 1991, I don't -- not only do I not contest that, I've described it in
20 some of my writings.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can these two
22 documents, actually paper A and B, and this one, can they be admitted.
23 Oh, A and B have been admitted. So can this paper be admitted, the one
24 that we just had on our screens now. 107.
25 JUDGE KWON: What is the exhibit number of 225, Variant A and B?
1 Is that the exhibit number? Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: P0005. Maybe I've missed one zero, but --
3 JUDGE KWON: P5. And I take it there's no objection in admitting
4 this Halilovic promotion document.
5 MS. EDGERTON: No. No, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: The first page of the B/C/S hasn't been translated.
7 Would you like to insert that as well?
8 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Izetbegovic's decision, yes. So we'll mark it for
10 identification pending --
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it has been translated,
12 Excellency. 1D108. That's a separate document. This is a decision in
13 relation to that request.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but we'd like to see that decision as well,
15 because it's there in B/C/S. So we'll mark it for identification pending
16 the translation of the first page of the B/C/S.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D298.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm noting the time. What subject
19 matters are there that remain to be cross-examined?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, believe me, you know, the
21 extent to which Mr. Donia's work has been incorporated in the indictment.
22 We are on the eve of the new year. We're dealing with the 21st and 22nd
23 of December. While we're talking, 1D855, I'd like to have of that called
24 up so Mr. Donia can see how extensive this activity was. We've dealt
25 with Variant A and B and then comes the establishment of
1 Republika Srpska, then our participation in the work of the parliament on
2 the 24th and 25th of January, yet another attempt to save Bosnia
3 then the international conference, the Carrington-Cutileiro Conference
4 and then we are getting close to March, the armed attack against
5 Bosanski Brod, the 18th of March, there was the agreement. And then on
6 the 25th of March, they give up on the agreement. And then comes the 1st
7 of April, from the 1st until the 5th of April, there is the crisis in
8 Bijeljina, the crisis in Kupres, and so on and so forth. So from this
9 sequence of events that Mr. Donia has been speaking about, in a very
10 arbitrary way in my opinion, I am brought into a situation whereby I have
11 to extend my defence activities. After that, we have to do with the
12 roots of the activity of the peoples Assembly. Mr. Donia wrote an entire
13 paper on that. And finally we come to Sarajevo.
14 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will confer.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE KWON: With the indulgence of the interpreters, we'll go
17 till 2.00, if it is okay with the doctor again. And then, Mr. Karadzic,
18 you will have two sessions tomorrow. That's the ruling, and you should
19 plan your cross-examination to be able to conclude by the end of second
20 session tomorrow.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Donia, I would like to draw your attention to this report of
23 Memic, Senaid, son of Hasan who armed Muslims in the area of Sarajevo
24 This is his statement. The first paragraph, the underlined bit.
25 Actually we can look at the hole thing. In the period from September
1 1991 up to my arrest, I had, for the purposes of the SDA in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandzak, purchased, imported and distributed
3 around 5.000 automatic rifles and rifles of various types and around
4 1.400.000 bullets. I had done all of that in co-operation with SDA
5 activists on the ground, as ordered by certain leaders of the SDA. My
6 closest ties in this job were with Hasan Cengic, who is otherwise a
7 technical secretary of the SDA. All leaders of the political life of the
8 SDA were aware of my dealings such as Alija Izetbegovic, Omer Behmen,
9 Rusmir Mahmutcehajic and others as well as certain officials of the MUP
10 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the MUP minister, Alija Delimustafic; deputy staff
11 minister, Mirsad Srebrenikovic; Jusuf Pusina; Bakir Alispahic;
12 Kemal Sabuvic [phoen]; Momir Alibabic, as well as some SJB operatives
13 throughout Bosnia
14 rifles and one and a half million bullets.
15 A. I'd like to see the nature of this document further. I'm afraid
16 I don't see whether it's signed, whether it's -- what its origin is.
17 Q. Well, sir, this is a police telegram. They are -- it was
18 handwritten, and this -- and we have that. This is a telegram whereby
19 the regional police station is providing information about this. They
20 actually copied his statement, and we actually have that in --
21 handwritten as it is.
22 JUDGE KWON: Can you give the foundation as to this document, the
23 context in which this Mr. Memic --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 4 so that
25 Mr. Donia can see that this is a statement of Senaid Memic, an arrested
1 person who made a statement to police organs. And this is the form of
2 telegram that the police use. It's done using their own machinery. Not
3 anybody can do that. Can we go to the end of this handwritten document.
4 I think that it is signed on each page. I think that his signature is on
5 each and every page.
6 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Just related to what Mr. Karadzic said, which
8 police body? I see no indication.
9 JUDGE KWON: No.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the 14th of April, 1992, war
11 activities are underway and this is the police in Ilidza, I assume. If
12 we can have the last page, then we're going to see his signature.
13 JUDGE KWON: We are seeing the last page, but --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down so we see his
16 JUDGE KWON: That's the bottom part, as far as -- but what's the
17 point. What is your question? Put it to the witness.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Have you heard of Senad Sahinpasic whom we did mention during
20 your cross?
21 A. Yes, without knowing much of anything about him.
22 Q. Could we have page 2 in English. See, here on page 2 it says
23 that: "I know that in addition to myself, Senad Sahinpasic,
24 Alija Delimustafic's partner, procured weapons for the SDA," and so on
25 and so forth.
1 So do you think -- or, rather, did you know that this activity
2 was going on in the area of Sarajevo
3 A. I -- I see no basis for affirming anything in this document. I
4 don't see its origin. I don't know -- the signature that you're talking
5 about doesn't seem to appear. I'm not even sure if it did come from the
6 police station in Ilidza what the -- who controlled that police station
7 as of the 14th of April, whether it was the SDS or whether it was the
8 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 Q. Well, sir, the SDS did not have its own police stations. The
10 police station is a police station. The top people of that police
11 station were not SDS members. Haven't we established that?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
15 JUDGE KWON: No.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. 1D77 then, please.
17 This is a document that we have already shown, but we did not tender it.
18 This is a Muslim document, a Muslim document from 1993. Can we have the
19 next page now, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. The last paragraph says:
22 "However, from the very beginning, major influence in Foca was
23 exercised by Senad Sahinpasic, Saja, and Halid Cengic, who are related
24 to," et cetera, et cetera. Yes, yes we can keep the English where it is.
25 This document speaks of their procurement of weapons and also the fact
1 that they sold 5.200 rifles in Foca at a price of about 1.200 Deutschmark
3 Are you doubting that as well?
4 A. Less so.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into
7 evidence? We've already shown it, but we haven't tendered it yet.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: I don't think there's any foundation based on
10 Dr. Donia's answer for the admission of this document, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: The answer, "less so."
12 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Donia, what do you mean by "less so"?
13 THE WITNESS: I mean I doubt it less so. It appears to be a
14 genuine product of the security services of the Republic of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm just having -- not surveyed the whole document,
16 I can't really comment on it. I note, for example, at the very bottom of
17 this page there's a statement that in April 1992 the Chetniks attacked
18 Foca in the empty-handed and disorganised Muslim people had no choice but
19 to leave their homes and wander. That to me is a kind of a -- such a
20 vague statement as to have no -- no value in a document like that. First
21 of all, it's highly tendentious and very vague. So I would want to look
22 at the whole thing before I, let's say, affirmed anything that's stated
23 here as -- as likely to be the case.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will admit this document.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. My position, Mr. Donia, was that you --
3 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has given its ruling. We'll admit it.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D299, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE KWON: Your last question for today, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D184. Could I call that up,
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. While we're waiting for that document, Mr. Donia, as for the Serb
10 National Council founded before the elections, you said that it hadn't
11 done much, that somehow they were in abeyance. Do you know that it is
12 now a legal obligation for every ethnic community to have their own
13 National Council?
14 A. You mean in Bosnia
15 Q. In Serbia
16 in Bosnia
17 A. Well, it's -- I think it's a recommendation of the European Union
18 or one of several things that the European Union kind of sets out as a --
19 as a standard, but I'm not aware of -- I'm just not aware of a
20 requirement that every body have its national defence -- or I'm sorry,
21 National Council. The National Council we're talking about you
22 proclaimed in Banja Luka, I think on October 12th or something like that
23 of 1991, and you were the -- the SDS was the only party that established
24 such a council prior to the election, and it was, I think, viewed as an
25 act of bad faith to do that unilaterally, but at the same time for
1 whatever reason it never did much. It never took on a life of its own
2 and seemed to be a body that you sort of mentioned from time to time,
3 perhaps held in abeyance, but didn't really ever assume any functions.
4 Q. Thank you. My point, Mr. Donia, is that all our bodies that were
5 being established were being established in case we have to use them.
6 For a long time they were on standby, as it were. So do you see this
7 document dated the 17 of January? Do you agree that we continued to take
8 part in the political life of Bosnia
9 A. Do I agree that you continued to take part in the political life
10 in Bosnia
11 Q. Thank you. Yes. You read our language. This is a press
12 conference that was attended by Professor Plavsic and Professor Koljevic,
13 and can't you see that we are saying not partition but transformation of
15 A. Yes. In fact, transformation of Bosnia was kind of a -- I would
16 say a buzzword, frequently used slogan which was essentially a way of
17 saying the division of Bosnia
18 was the knew programme that I see you having espoused in the aftermath of
19 the events of the 15th of October, 1991.
20 This is from "Politika," so would I not put a whole lot of
21 credence in -- in what's here, but usually at such press conferences the
22 quotations are accurate, so I would not [overlapping speakers].
23 Q. You, Mr. Donia, would not believe the Serbs anything, but I'm
24 asking you, isn't what is written here is not partition but
25 transformation and also the fact that we advocated Bosnia as a
2 A. Yes, I am, and I don't believe it's correct for you to say that I
3 wouldn't believe anything Serbs said. I believe a lot of things that
4 Serbs said, including some things that you say. I don't believe
5 everything that you say, but I do accept at face value many things that
6 you say, and I also believe what people in -- the Serbs and the
7 non-nationalist parties say from time to time but not exclusively. I
8 don't -- I don't accept that I'm just not prepared to believe anything
9 you say.
10 JUDGE KWON: That's it for today. Mr. Karadzic, bear that in
11 mind, that you will have only two sessions tomorrow and a further
12 extension will not be allowed. We will admit this document. We'll mark
13 it for identification, D300 MFI.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry about that. I'll do my
15 best, but I will consider the situation to be that this witness had not
16 been fully cross-examined.
17 JUDGE KWON: Tomorrow we are sitting in the afternoon, 2.15.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.02 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day
20 of January, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.