100621IT

Page 3908

1 [The witness entered court]

2 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, General.

3 If you could take the solemn declaration, please.

4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

5 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

6 WITNESS: JOHN WILSON

7 JUDGE KWON: Please make yourself comfortable.

8 Ms. Sutherland.

9 Examination by Ms. Sutherland:

10 Q. Good morning. Please state your full name. Good morning.

11 Please state your full name.

12 A. I am John Brian Wilson.

13 Q. And you're a retired brigadier general in the Australian Armed

14 Forces?

15 A. Yes, I am.

16 Q. You testified previously in the Krajisnik case on the 17th and

17 18th of May, 2005, and in the Perisic case on the 3rd of November, 2008;

18 is that correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Subsequent to that testimony, a statement was taken from you

21 which amalgamated evidence from your previous testimony and statements,

22 with some additional observations as well as references to certain

23 documents; is that right?

24 A. That's correct.

25 MS. SUTHERLAND: With Your Honours' leave, I'll proceed with the

Page 3909

1 requirements of Rule 92 ter.

2 Q. On the 26th of March, 2009, you signed an amalgamated witness

3 statement, making handwritten corrections to paragraphs 49 and 81.

4 And if I could ask for 65 ter 22293 to be brought up on the

5 screen, please, Mr. Registrar.

6 Is that your signature at the bottom of page 1?

7 A. Yes, it is.

8 MS. SUTHERLAND: And could you please go to page 2?

9 Q. Is that your initial at the bottom of the page?

10 A. Yes, it is.

11 Q. And did you initial each page?

12 A. I did.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Can you go to page 37, the last page, please,

14 Mr. Registrar.

15 Q. And that's your signature there under the witness acknowledgment?

16 A. Yes, it is.

17 Q. Have you had an opportunity to review the statement that you

18 signed on the 26th of March, 2009, and the exhibits referred to therein?

19 A. I have.

20 Q. Are there two corrections you wish to make?

21 A. Yes, there are.

22 Q. Is the first one a typographical error?

23 If we could go to page 18 of the statement, please.

24 Concerning the date in the first sentence of paragraph 76, the

25 "29th of May, 1995," should read "29th of May, 1992"?

Page 3910

1 A. That's correct.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we could go to page 23 of the document,

3 Mr. Registrar.

4 Q. The second correction you wish to make was in relation to

5 paragraph 91. The first sentence, the words "the same day" should read

6 "the next day"?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. With these corrections, do you confirm that your amalgamated

9 statement accurately reflects your evidence and that you would provide

10 the same answers to questions if you were asked, under oath, about these

11 topics today?

12 A. I do.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, at this time I seek to have the

14 amalgamated witness statement 65 ter 22293 admitted into evidence.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P1029.

17 MS. SUTHERLAND: With Your Honour's leave, I'll now read a brief

18 summary of the witness's evidence.

19 The witness, General John Wilson, is a retired career military

20 officer from the Australian armed forces, with 34 years of service.

21 During his career, he held numerous command positions in the Australian

22 Army. He was deployed to Vietnam and Malaysia. He participated in

23 United Nations missions in Lebanon and Jerusalem.

24 General Wilson was seconded to the UN to serve in the former

25 Yugoslavia during 1992 and 1993 in a number of posts. In January and

Page 3911

1 February 1992, as the senior military liaison officer to the

2 United Nations Military Liaison Mission to the former Yugoslavia, he was

3 involved in negotiations regarding the deployment of UNPROFOR to the

4 former Yugoslavia. From March 1992, he was the chief of the

5 United Nations Military Observers, a subordinate part of the UNPROFOR

6 mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that capacity, he was involved in

7 various high-level negotiations with political and military

8 representatives of the warring factions, including negotiations to

9 evacuate JNA barracks in Sarajevo, negotiations to open the airport in

10 Sarajevo, negotiations to evacuate the JNA from Dubrovnik, and

11 negotiations to implement the no-fly zone over Bosnia. In December 1992,

12 General Wilson became the military adviser to Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and

13 the late ambassador -- and then later Ambassador Stoltenberg at the

14 international Conference for the former Yugoslavia, where he also served

15 as the UNPROFOR liaison officer to the conference. He remained in those

16 positions until December 1993.

17 General Wilson's written evidence describes the deployment of the

18 United Nations Military Observers in Bosnia and the work they and he

19 performed, observations relating to the shelling and sniping of civilians

20 in Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces, descriptions of reports he received

21 about ethnic cleansing in Eastern Bosnia, descriptions of negotiations in

22 which he participated, and interactions he had with representatives of

23 the various parties engaged in the conflict, including the accused

24 Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, Biljana Plavsic,

25 Slobodan Milosevic, and General Zivota Panic. He will discuss some of

Page 3912

1 these aspects in his oral testimony today.

2 General Wilson's written evidence describes complaints that

3 Lord Owen made directly to Bosnian Serb representatives during peace

4 negotiations about ethnic cleansing and military observations directed

5 against the civilian population. General Wilson recalls that

6 Dr. Karadzic's reaction was generally a restatement of the need to defend

7 the Serb people and the need for a Serb republic.

8 That concludes the brief summary of the witness's evidence.

9 Your Honour, before I proceed with examination, I seek leave to

10 add an exhibit to the Prosecution's 65 ter exhibit list. It's

11 65 ter 22854. This document is a protest letter dated the 2nd of June,

12 1992, from Sefer Halilovic, addressed to UNPROFOR, for the attention of

13 Colonel Wilson, as he then was. This document is relevant to notice and

14 crimes alleged in the Prijedor municipality. The document was identified

15 during a review of an additional ISU search relating to the witness. It

16 was disclosed to the accused as soon as it came to our attention. It was

17 disclosed on the 15th of June, 2010.

18 JUDGE KWON: Was it one of the items subject to the 18th of June

19 filing?

20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, it's listed as an additional

21 exhibit, the third-to-last -- the third-to-last exhibit on the 92 ter

22 notification.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

24 Mr. Robinson.

25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honour. We're going to object to that.

Page 3913

1 We're having a lot of problems with late disclosure with respect to this

2 witness and an absence of showing why this couldn't have been disclosed

3 to us earlier. We object.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, the Chamber is not satisfied why

6 this document could not have been disclosed to the accused earlier, and,

7 as such, we are not giving leave to this document to be added to the

8 65 ter list.

9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. General Wilson, you were chief of the United Nations Military

11 Observers from the 8th of March, 1992, until the 15th of November, 1992.

12 Can you briefly explain for the Trial Chamber the UNMO's -- United

13 Nations Military Observers' mandate in Bosnia?

14 A. There were approximately 75 military observers when UNPROFOR was

15 first established. Their mission was to deploy to two areas within

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they were the Bihac area and the Mostar area.

17 And the reason for that was, under the Vance Plan, which is the basis for

18 UNPROFOR's deployment, there was some concern that there was growing

19 ethnic tension in those areas and there was a need to monitor what was

20 happening there; hence, the deployment of the military observers.

21 Now -- I'm sorry, if I can continue.

22 Q. Sorry.

23 A. It's important to realise at this stage that UNPROFOR, when it

24 deployed in March 1992, had no operational role and focus in Bosnia

25 whatsoever. It was deploying because of the conflict in Croatia, and

Page 3914

1 it's only with the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina that a

2 mandate emerged for UNPROFOR, and that became then the focus, really, of

3 most of UNPROFOR's operations for the next year or so or two years that I

4 was there.

5 The military observers, as part of UNPROFOR, received a number of

6 mandate enhancements during 1992, and eventually there were some 350 to

7 400 military observers as part of my group deployed mainly throughout

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but still approximately 60 in the UNPAs in Croatia.

9 Q. Can you describe briefly their duties and responsibilities?

10 A. There were two types of military observers. Some were under the

11 direct command of sector commanders and some were under my direct

12 command. That defined their reporting channels. But, in essence, they

13 were there to facilitate communication between the parties, to acquire

14 information and report that back to the UN, and to lend their good

15 officers to perform any tasks that might assist the parties in resolving

16 the conflict; for example, exchanges of bodies or escorting and arranging

17 of humanitarian relief.

18 Q. At paragraph 56 of your statement -- maybe, Your Honour, can the

19 witness have a copy of his statement in front of him?

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

21 MS. SUTHERLAND: That's Exhibit P1029.

22 Q. You describe there your personal observations of shelling and

23 sniping within the city of Sarajevo as heavy, intense, and widespread.

24 How did you have an opportunity to observe this?

25 A. I was actually living outside of the PTT building initially,

Page 3915

1 living in two apartments, so I was able to observe, I guess, a domestic

2 existence within UNPROFOR, certainly for the first month that I was down

3 there. In addition to that, I was residing later in the PTT and working

4 from there, and it was a building which afforded a broad observation of

5 that area of Sarajevo, so you were able to see and hear a great deal of

6 what was happening in that part of Sarajevo.

7 I have to say that in March, April, and May of 1992, Sarajevo was

8 not a place that you wandered around idly out of tourist interest. It

9 was a very dangerous place, and one only travelled when it was absolutely

10 necessary. So the majority of my observations were confined to the city

11 centre and to the area around the PTT, Dobrinja, Nedarici, and perhaps

12 the airport.

13 Q. And can you give a brief description of what you observed?

14 A. Well, for the whole period I was there from the 22nd of March to

15 the 24th of June, with one short 10-day break, I observed that the city

16 was subjected to almost constant artillery fire. There was widespread

17 sniping. There was fighting going on in selected areas of the city,

18 heavy fighting. But I would say that a lot of the military activity

19 was -- a lot of the artillery fire and mortar fire was randomly

20 distributed around the city, and there were very few areas which escaped

21 at least some damage from this activity.

22 Q. I'd like to focus your attention on the latter part of

23 paragraph 56 of your statement, where it reads:

24 "On most days, for the six weeks I was in Sarajevo, artillery

25 fire was very heavy and directed virtually at the whole city, so it was

Page 3916

1 widespread. The attacks were intense. On some days, it would last 16

2 hours."

3 Are you able to comment on which force was involved in the

4 artillery fired that was directed at the whole city?

5 A. I am able to comment, and the answer is that the fire was

6 directed and produced almost exclusively by the Serb forces who were

7 investing the city. Presidency forces had very little in the way of

8 heavy armaments, so any artillery or mortar fire coming into the city was

9 virtually all initiated by the Serbs.

10 Q. Turning to paragraph -

11 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, General. What do you mean by "Presidency

12 forces"?

13 THE WITNESS: I'm referring to the combined forces of the Muslim

14 and Croat forces who were residing within the city and who were

15 attempting to defend the city, and who were commanded by the government

16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by President Izetbegovic.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

18 THE WITNESS: Though I must say there were also significant

19 members of Serb fighters fighting within that organisation also.

20 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.

21 MS. SUTHERLAND:

22 Q. Turning to paragraph 57 of your statement, you say that:

23 "I have been involved in conventional military operations as a

24 soldier, and I have never seen such weight of fire used, and particularly

25 not against civilian targets."

Page 3917

1 Can you describe your points of comparison?

2 A. Your Honours, as a young officer, I deployed to Vietnam for

3 12 months and fought there as an infantry officer. Certainly, in

4 comparison there and also in my later experience in Southern Lebanon,

5 when that area was occupied by Israeli forces, what I was able to observe

6 in Beirut, once again when I was with the UN, none of those experiences

7 came close to the intensity of the fighting that took place in Sarajevo

8 in the six weeks or so that I was there in early 1992.

9 I have to say that the way that artillery, mortars, and other

10 heavy weapons were directed into the city impressed me as being random,

11 widespread, and inappropriate.

12 Q. To be clear, what forces were engaged in the weight of fire that

13 you've referred to?

14 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, Ms. Sutherland. Before you go on, can I

15 read that sentence again?

16 You read 57, para 57, didn't you?

17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes.

18 JUDGE KWON: If I read it again:

19 "I have been involved in conventional military operations as a

20 soldier, and I had never seen such weight of fire used, and particularly

21 not against civilian targets."

22 Does that read well, General?

23 THE WITNESS: That's how it reads, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 MS. SUTHERLAND:

Page 3918

1 Q. So, General, to be clear, what forces were engaged in the weight

2 of fire that you refer to in that paragraph?

3 A. The overwhelming weight of fire was produced by the Serb forces

4 investing the city.

5 Q. You mentioned in paragraph 83 of the statement that you recalled

6 the period between 14 May and late June as being one of constant daily

7 heavy bombardments, with only brief respites. Do you recall any times

8 where the Serb forces attacked -- where the Serb forces' attacks on

9 Sarajevo were particularly heavy?

10 A. I remember the period from the 14th of May, three or four days,

11 in which there was heavy fighting in the vicinity of the PTT, Dobrinja,

12 Ilidza, that area that I was able to observe more closely, but also I was

13 generally aware of the noise of battle taking place in other parts of the

14 city. And then in the period of late May, there was very heavy fighting

15 taking place in the area of Grubaca [phoen], I think it's pronounced.

16 It's in the vicinity of the "Marsal Tito" Barracks. And that lasted,

17 really, until early June. And then there was a third series of heavy

18 fighting which was initiated or commenced immediately after the airport

19 agreement was signed or the day after the airport agreement was signed,

20 and that continued from the 6th of June until I left the city on the 24th

21 of June, with very little respite. The fighting was almost continuous

22 from the 14th of May until the 24th of June. There was the odd day of

23 respite. And on some occasions, there was absolute adherence to a

24 cease-fire so that something of mutual interest to the parties could take

25 place. For example, the evacuation of the Tito Barracks, the JNA forces

Page 3919

1 there, was affected under absolute quiet.

2 Q. General, if we could just go to the sentence that we referred to

3 in paragraph 57 that His Honour Judge Kwon drew your attention to. It's

4 perhaps the double negative.

5 Was the weight of fire used against civilian targets?

6 A. The weight of fire in Sarajevo against civilian targets was at a

7 scale that I'd not experienced anywhere else in my operational

8 experience.

9 Q. Where was the Bosnian Serb military barracks located?

10 A. There were a number, Counsel. I'm not sure which one you're

11 referring to.

12 Q. Where did you have your meetings with General Mladic?

13 A. All my meetings with General Mladic were at the Lukavica JNA

14 barracks.

15 Q. Was your travel in and around Sarajevo restricted in any way?

16 A. We were only -- from the 14th of May until the 24th of June, we

17 were only able to sensibly travel around the city in armoured vehicles.

18 And then on approximately 70 to 80 per cent of occasions, we would draw

19 fire from one or other of the parties. It would not be fair to accuse

20 any one party of attacking the UN. It was our belief that all parties

21 were actively engaged in the activity.

22 Q. And what, if anything, did you do about the firing on the UN

23 vehicles?

24 A. We had -- or I had arranged, very early in my stay there, after

25 the 14th of May, arranged for each of the parties to have a liaison

Page 3920

1 officer reside in our headquarters in the PTT to facilitate

2 communications, and we were able to use these liaison officers to protest

3 these attacks against UN forces. Also, after one particularly heavy

4 attack, I suspended UN operations for 24 hours and informed the parties

5 unless they could guarantee the safety of my forces, we would not be

6 resuming operations to assist them in their concerns. I also reported

7 formally these attacks to my superior officer, General Nambiar, who was

8 then located in Belgrade.

9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I please have 65 ter 31753 on

10 the screen.

11 Q. General, do you recognise this document?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. What is it?

14 A. It's a intercept communication between Colonel Cadjo, who was the

15 JNA liaison officer located in the PTT, and he's talking to

16 General Mladic about me travelling from the PTT to Lukavica for a meeting

17 with Mrs. Plavsic, and he's asking for safe -- my safe passage in the

18 armoured vehicles I was travelling in.

19 Q. And does he give --

20 A. He gives them assurance that we would be allowed to proceed

21 safely.

22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, pursuant to earlier rulings in

23 relation to intercepts, I'd ask that this be marked for identification.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

25 THE REGISTRAR: MFI P1030, Your Honours.

Page 3921

1 JUDGE KWON: Did you know personally Colonel Cadjo at the time?

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did, Your Honour. He spent perhaps a week

3 or so residing in the PTT with us, and he was actively participating in

4 the negotiations for the withdrawal of the JNA from the barracks in

5 Sarajevo. He also acted as an interpreter for the UN, between the UN and

6 the JNA. I think he may have had previous UN experience himself. He was

7 quite a professional officer and tried to do the best he could.

8 JUDGE KWON: Was his name Cadjo or Cadjo.

9 THE WITNESS: C-a-d-j-o or something like that. I'm not sure,

10 Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 Ms. Sutherland.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND:

14 Q. If we can return to your statement at paragraph 73, you describe

15 a meeting between General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic on the -- I'm sorry.

16 Before we leave this intercept, the date of the intercept in the B/C/S

17 version is the 25th of May, 1992; is that correct?

18 A. That's what it says on the Bosnian Serb translation or statement.

19 Q. Thank you. So in paragraph 73, you describe a meeting that you

20 had with General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic on the 25th of May, 1992, where

21 General Mladic made a threat that if JNA personnel from Sarajevo barracks

22 were not evacuated within three days, General Mladic would engage the

23 city with heavy artillery fire?

24 A. Yes, that was the substance of the meeting, and I reported that

25 to my superiors in Belgrade. I also passed that information on to the

Page 3922

1 Presidency, through their liaison officer in the PTT.

2 Q. Do you recall what Mrs. Plavsic's response was?

3 A. She supported that position. She certainly didn't contradict

4 anything that General Mladic said. She was also anxious to see -- the

5 problem of the JNA being evacuated from the Sarajevo barracks, she wanted

6 to see it resolved as quickly as possible too. It seemed to me that with

7 the chief Serb military officer and a member of the Presidency passing

8 that information formally to me and asking me to relay that to other

9 parties, that it was a formal position of the Serb political leadership.

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I can just correct myself, I referred to

11 paragraph 73. In fact, it's paragraph 72 and 73 of the statement.

12 Q. General, in paragraph 76, you refer to shelling by Serb

13 territorial forces on the night of the 28th of May, 1992. Do you recall

14 the shelling? And if so, can you please describe its intensity?

15 A. The shelling took place in the evening of the 28th of May, from

16 approximately at 5.00 in the evening until about 1.00 the next morning.

17 It was particularly heavy even by Sarajevo standards. It was widespread.

18 It did not appear to be related to any conflict on the front-line. It

19 was in-depth and scattered around the city, although there appeared to be

20 particular emphasis on directing fire into the city centre. But even

21 around the PTT building there was a lot of artillery fire, mortar fire,

22 during that evening.

23 Q. And at the time of the shelling on the 28th, had the barracks

24 been evacuated?

25 A. No, the "Marsal Tito" Barracks were still occupied by the JNA. The

Page 3923

1 negotiations were not progressing very satisfactorily because

2 General Mladic was reluctant to meet Presidency demands to hand over a

3 quantity of small arms as part of the price of facilitating the release

4 of the JNA forces. He had a very firm position that that should not take

5 place, and this was, in effect, stalling the agreement to achieve the

6 evacuation.

7 Q. In paragraph 76 of your statement, you mention a meeting you

8 attended the next day, the 29th of May, 1992, with General Boskovic,

9 Colonel Cadjo, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic. What did

10 General Boskovic tell you in relation to the attack the night before?

11 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.

12 Before we -- before he answers that, I would like to just express

13 some concern by the way this statement is being used by this witness.

14 I think that it is not proper for the witness to be referring to his

15 written statement unless he needs to to refresh his memory, but each

16 question is directing him to the paragraph of the statement, he's then

17 looking at it and giving his answer, and I don't think that's a proper

18 way to proceed. So I think that we ought to proceed in the way in which

19 he answers the questions -- I think the reference to the statement is

20 helpful for the rest of us to follow, but he shouldn't be reviewing the

21 statement prior to giving the answer unless he needs to to refresh his

22 recollection. Thank you.

23 JUDGE KWON: General, if you can answer without referring to your

24 statement, that's possible. But if you need to, you can do so with our

25 leave.

Page 3924

1 THE WITNESS: I'll try and do that, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.

3 Let's proceed. Can you answer the question?

4 MS. SUTHERLAND:

5 Q. So what did General Boskovic tell you in relation to the attack

6 on the night of the 28th of May?

7 A. Well, that meeting was particularly notable, in that the

8 representatives from the Presidency brought to the meeting a tape of a

9 radio intercept of General Mladic directing the fire of his artillery

10 units the previous night, the night of the 28th. The tape was in

11 Serbo-Croat, so -- and I don't speak that language, so I don't know what

12 the exact contents of the tape were, other than what both parties, both

13 the Presidency and the JNA representatives, had told me. They told me

14 that it was Mladic directing fire against various parts of the city.

15 They intimated that there was no need for that sort of fire. They

16 thought that he was acting irresponsibly and that he was out of control.

17 They did not support his actions. General Boskovic apologised to me for

18 the behaviour of General Mladic and made it quite clear that the JNA did

19 not support these actions. It was quite clear to me that all members at

20 that meeting thought the shelling of the night before was quite

21 extraordinary and unacceptable.

22 Q. In paragraph 77, you mention a meeting with Mladic which occurred

23 on the following day, the 30th of May, 1992, wherein you conveyed the

24 Secretary-General's appeal to Mladic?

25 A. Yes, I had a meeting with General Mladic on that day. It was

Page 3925

1 part, I believe, of a multi-pronged effort to impress upon the Bosnian

2 Serbs the necessity to moderate their behaviour in regard to their

3 activity against Sarajevo.

4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I have 65 ter 09574 on the

5 screen, please.

6 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is kindly invited to sit closer to

7 the microphone.

8 MS. SUTHERLAND:

9 Q. Before that document comes up, what -- so the Secretary-General's

10 appeal to Mladic was to do what, in particular?

11 A. It was to moderate or to lessen the attacks against the city. It

12 called for restraint and was, I believe, followed up by a

13 Security Council resolution which called for an opening of the Sarajevo

14 Airport for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and demilitarisation of

15 parts of Sarajevo.

16 Q. Do you recognise the document that's on the screen?

17 A. I do. It's a -- sorry.

18 JUDGE KWON: I should tell, for the record, Ms. Sutherland, it's

19 9574, the 65 ter number.

20 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour. That's what I thought

21 I'd said.

22 THE WITNESS: I don't think this is a document that I recognise.

23 This is not a document that I've seen before.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND:

25 Q. How did General Mladic respond when you spoke with him?

Page 3926

1 A. General Mladic was once again simply saying that this was simply

2 defending the Serb people, defending themselves against attack, and that

3 it was important to have the release of the JNA from the barracks. He

4 was -- as I understand it, at this meeting he was unaware or was not

5 prepared to acknowledge the fact that Mr. Karadzic may have made an

6 agreement to allow humanitarian aid to come in through a UN-controlled

7 airport in Sarajevo.

8 Q. Do you know whether there was -- whether the Secretary-General

9 ever issued a press release in relation to his appeal?

10 A. No, I can't confirm that.

11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I have 65 ter 06219 on the

12 screen.

13 Q. General, do you recognise that document?

14 A. I do recognise it. That's the resolution I was referring to

15 which had motivated the meetings on the 30th of May.

16 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to page 2 of that document.

17 Q. If I can draw your attention to the paragraph starting:

18 "Deeply concerned that those UNPROFOR personnel remaining in

19 Sarajevo have been subjected to deliberate mortar and small-arms

20 fire ..."

21 Is this consistent to what you had reported to your superiors?

22 A. Yes. As I indicated earlier, I had reported formally on my

23 command net to General Nambiar about the number of attacks that had been

24 directed against UN forces moving about the city, and this is a

25 reflection of the concern that he and UN New York felt about those

Page 3927

1 attacks.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1031, Your Honours.

5 MS. SUTHERLAND:

6 Q. General, I wish to turn to the topic of detention facilities

7 which is detailed in paragraphs 101 to 104 of your statement. In

8 paragraph 101, you stated that there were reports at the time that each

9 side was running their own detention camps. How did you receive this

10 information?

11 A. I received that information from both parties, alleging

12 activities by the other party, and also formally in writing from the

13 Presidency, in the form of a list and a formal protest from

14 Mr. Halilovic, who was then the Presidency defence minister.

15 Q. You also state, in paragraph 101, that during the airport

16 negotiations, you raised allegations of large-scale detention of

17 civilians with Biljana Plavsic and that Radovan Karadzic was present

18 during this conversation. That's noted in paragraph 102. What

19 information did you provide to them about the allegations that you'd

20 received?

21 A. I'd received an allegation from the Presidency representatives

22 that there was a tunnel somewhere to the south of Sarajevo which was

23 being used to hold a large number of non-Serb people, many of them women

24 and children, and the Presidency were concerned about the safety of these

25 people. And I had asked Mrs. Plavsic if this was true, and her response

Page 3928

1 was that, yes, it was, and that there were a number of detention camps,

2 but they simply held males of military age who were being taken out of

3 the -- out of circulation so they couldn't join the fighting. She said

4 that they were well treated and if I wished, I could go to the site and

5 visit that tunnel location at a later date.

6 I have to say that I followed up on that offer to go and visit

7 those people or to visit that site. However, when we were finally given

8 approval, we were told that it was some considerable distance out of

9 Sarajevo, that our safety could not be assured. Also, because it was out

10 of our UN communications range and there was no possibility of being able

11 to assist any of my troops who were sent there, that there were plenty of

12 other activities for us to be involved in, in the end I did not send a

13 party down to visit that camp or that detention centre.

14 Q. If I can turn now to the airport negotiations.

15 In paragraph 90 of your statement, you stated that the airport

16 agreement was signed on the 5th of June, 1992. Who signed the agreement

17 for the Bosnian Serbs?

18 A. Mr. Karadzic signed.

19 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, if I could have Rule 65 ter 08640

20 on the screen, please.

21 Q. Do you recognise this document?

22 A. I do. It's a document jointly drafted between myself and

23 Mr. Thornberry, the chief political officer of UNPROFOR.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we can just go to the second page. And

25 the last page.

Page 3929

1 I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE KWON: This is the only original one? English is the

3 original?

4 MS. SUTHERLAND:

5 Q. General?

6 A. Yes, it was all done in English. We had very limited interpreter

7 capability at that time.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.

9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1032, Your Honours.

10 MS. SUTHERLAND:

11 Q. And can you just explain to the Chamber, the fact that it has

12 Mr. Karadzic's signature on this document and Cedric Thornberry's

13 signature, but not the Bosnian government representative's signature, why

14 is that?

15 A. The Bosnian government's position, both in 1992 and 1993, was

16 that they would not meet directly with the Serb leadership. They

17 wouldn't be in the same room, they wouldn't sign the same document. So

18 it was necessary to use shuttle diplomacy and also to get them to sign

19 separate copies of the same document.

20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you. That document can be taken off the

21 screen.

22 Q. You have also mentioned, at corrected paragraph 91 of your

23 statement, that there was heavy shelling on the 6th of June, the day

24 after the airport agreement was signed. Can you briefly describe the

25 nature of this fighting?

Page 3930

1 A. The fighting was mainly concentrated around the airport,

2 Dobrinja, Nedzarici, that sort of area. It was very heavy fighting,

3 involving extensive use of artillery. By the sound of it, a lot of

4 infantry soldiers were involved. It appeared to be both sides attempting

5 to gain tactical advantage of ground which overlooked and perhaps

6 controlled the airport, now that it had been agreed that the airport

7 would pass to the control of the UN. That fighting continued more or

8 less unabated until the 24th of June, when I left the city. It was

9 General MacKenzie's position that before the airport agreement could be

10 implemented, there needed to be a period of 48 hours where the

11 cease-fire, which had been agreed by both parties, actually came into

12 effect. He was never successful in achieving that at least before the

13 24th of June.

14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I have 65 ter 10601 on the

15 screen, please.

16 Q. General Wilson, you authenticate this document, in paragraph 60

17 of your statement, as being authored by you. I'd like to direct your

18 attention to paragraph 9.

19 If we could go to the next page, please.

20 Note 9 says:

21 "Today there has been very heavy fighting in Sarajevo and the CMO

22 estimates significant loss of life."

23 If we could just go back to the first page, I'm sorry, so we can

24 see the date of this document.

25 This is dated the 8th of June, 1992. So what did you mean in

Page 3931

1 that paragraph 9 by "significant loss of life"?

2 A. Firstly, if I can explain that this is a cable sent back to my

3 national authorities. I was required to do that on a weekly basis. It's

4 an administrative report which allows them to assess the security

5 situation there and the sensibility of leaving me there in UN service.

6 And I'm stating there that on the 8th of June, three days after the

7 airport agreement, there had been particularly heavy fighting around

8 Sarajevo, so heavy as to give me the impression there had to be

9 significant loss of life.

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P1033.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Registrar, can I have 65 ter 10603 on the

14 screen, please.

15 Q. General, again do you recognise this document?

16 A. It's another weekly sitrep dated the 23rd of June back to my

17 national authorities.

18 Q. And this is referred to in paragraph 60 of your statement.

19 If we can go to paragraph numbered 1, and this is dated the 23rd

20 of June, 1992; is that right?

21 A. It is.

22 Q. "This past week has been marked by heavy fighting in Sarajevo.

23 Serb forces have continued to shell the city and, in particular, have

24 initiated a concentrated attack to capture the suburb of Dobrinja,

25 adjacent to the airport. The attack has been supported by artillery and

Page 3932

1 tanks. A mortar attack on a crowded old city street on the 22nd of June,

2 1992, resulted in 14 dead and 35 wounded."

3 Again, who was responsible for this concentrated attack?

4 A. You need to be more specific, counsellor. Which particular

5 attack are we talking about, the mortar attack, or are we talking about

6 the shelling of the city, or are we talking about --

7 Q. I'm sorry, in relation to the concentrated attack on the suburb

8 of Dobrinja.

9 A. That's hard to say exactly. It was my belief at the time that

10 the Serb forces were trying to clean out any Presidency forces that might

11 be in the vicinity of the airport so that they would be able to influence

12 the security and the tactical situation around the airport. However, you

13 could also say that the fighting may have been initiated by the

14 Presidency forces, who were attempting to achieve the same aim. It's

15 impossible to say who was responsible for the attack. Both of them

16 certainly participated most vigorously. But the great majority of

17 fire-power is in favour of the Serb forces.

18 Q. And do you recall now, in relation to the mortar attack on the

19 old city street, who was responsible for that attack?

20 A. This attack took place in the context of continued Serb mortar

21 fire into the city, Serb artillery fire into the city. I'm unaware of

22 whether a formal investigation was ever conducted into that unfortunate

23 incident and whether any attribution was made.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

Page 3933

1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1034, Your Honours.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: And that document can be removed from the

3 screen.

4 Q. General, in your statement, at paragraph 43, you state that from

5 what you observed, the Presidency forces were armed only with small arms,

6 and, in paragraph 50, that the Presidency troops did not have a great

7 number of weapons. You have talked a little about it already, but can

8 you describe the disparity in terms of the calibre of weapons, the heavy

9 weapons between the Presidency forces and the Bosnian Serb forces?

10 A. The Presidency forces had only a small number of mortars, very

11 few artillery pieces, two or three tanks, to the best of my knowledge at

12 this time. The Serb forces investing the city, on the other hand, had a

13 large number of heavy weapons, many different varieties. My estimate

14 would be they had at least 200 barrels of mortars and artillery which

15 they could use against the city. We're talking about maybe a dozen heavy

16 weapons on the part of the Presidency forces, and 200 or more with the

17 Serbs, in my estimate.

18 Q. And, finally, in your professional opinion, were the Bosnian Serb

19 responses to threats posed by the BiH government forces proportionate?

20 A. They were, in my belief, disproportionate, widespread, and

21 inappropriate.

22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, that completes my

23 examination-in-chief.

24 I seek to tender into evidence all of the remaining associated

25 exhibits listed in Appendix A to the Rule 92 notification.

Page 3934

1 JUDGE KWON: By way of example, some of them -- at least one of

2 them had been already admitted.

3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, that's the --

4 JUDGE KWON: The last item.

5 MS. SUTHERLAND: The report, the analysis of the combat readiness

6 and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992. That's

7 Exhibit D325, so I don't seek to have that admitted.

8 JUDGE KWON: Are there any objections, Mr. Robinson?

9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.

10 With respect to the documents described in paragraph 79 through

11 82 of the statement, which is 65 ter 09573 and 01072, these are documents

12 that didn't involve the witness. But on paragraph 81, he commented by

13 saying that:

14 "I can state they appear to be typical UNPROFOR documents that

15 are consistent with events of that time."

16 They involve meetings at which he was not present, and we don't

17 think that those are appropriately admitted through this witness, nor do

18 they form an integral part of his evidence.

19 JUDGE KWON: But he referred to those documents in his statement,

20 didn't he?

21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, he referred to the documents in his

22 statement, but the only comment he had about them was that they appear to

23 be typical UNPROFOR documents and are consistent with the events of that

24 time. So you can take any witness and show him materials which he didn't

25 participate and had no personal knowledge, and he could say that's

Page 3935

1 consistent and that's a typical UNPROFOR document, but that doesn't make

2 the documents admissible, in my view.

3 In particular, he was talking about a meeting with

4 President Milosevic, where he wasn't present, and then another meeting

5 with Dr. Karadzic, where he wasn't present. And I simply don't think

6 there's a sufficient link between his testimony and knowledge and these

7 pieces of evidence that these should be admitted through his testimony.

8 JUDGE KWON: Then would you like the witness to go through those

9 two documents and then testify as to what he knows about those to

10 documents?

11 MR. ROBINSON: If he knows something more than what he's stated

12 in his statement, then maybe that would be useful for the Prosecution.

13 But if all he could say is there were typical UNPROFOR documents and

14 they're consistent with his opinion at the time, I don't think that's

15 relevant and doesn't add anything for the Chamber.

16 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, do you have any observations?

17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I can call the witness -- the

18 documents up and discuss them with the witness.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's do that, then.

20 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter 09573 on the screen,

21 please.

22 Q. Before that comes onto the screen: General, when you had your

23 meeting with General Mladic on the 30th of May, 1992, were you aware --

24 or was any other meeting going on with other leaders in relation to the

25 attacks on the city of Sarajevo in the days surrounding the 30th of May,

Page 3936

1 1992?

2 A. On the 30th of May, I was unaware of any other meetings taking

3 place on this matter. Subsequently, I became aware of them, because

4 Mr. Thornberry, when he arrived in Sarajevo on the 2nd of June, gave me

5 the background to the negotiations to which we were about to undertake

6 and the fact that there had been other meetings taking place in the past

7 few days. So in saying that I was familiar with this sort of document

8 that was shown to me by you, counsellor, I was aware of the general

9 content of them, but not the detail.

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, has this -- in my view, a

11 sufficient nexus has been shown.

12 JUDGE KWON: The witness is aware of the situation, the content

13 is consistent with his knowledge, and he was aware of the document. We

14 admit it.

15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1035, Your Honour.

17 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if I could have Rule 65 ter 01072 on the

18 screen, please.

19 Q. This is referred to in your statement at paragraph 80, General.

20 Are you able to give the Court any more insight into this document and

21 any knowledge that you may have had in relation to this meeting?

22 A. Can we screen down a bit more, please?

23 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if we could go to the next page.

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, it's a document I've previously been shown,

25 and it's -- once again, it's a report on the negotiations that

Page 3937

1 General Morillon was conducting. And, once again, I was briefed on the

2 general nature of these negotiations by Cedric Thornberry when he came

3 down so I could effectively participate in the negotiations for the

4 opening up of the airport.

5 MS. SUTHERLAND: I seek to tender that document, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1036, Your Honours.

8 JUDGE KWON: So that concludes your examination-in-chief,

9 Ms. Sutherland?

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: The other associated exhibit will be admitted, and

12 the Registrar, in due course, will assign the exhibit numbers and

13 circulate them to the parties.

14 Judge Morrison has a question for you, General, before

15 Mr. Karadzic starts his cross-examination.

16 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. No doubt, Dr. Karadzic may raise the same

17 question, but I just want to make sure it's answered before I forget it.

18 General, in respect of what you call the Presidency forces, you

19 said earlier in your testimony that they had maybe a dozen or so heavy

20 weapons. Were those weapons that you saw, yourself?

21 THE WITNESS: I did see some of those weapons later when they

22 were brought under observation of UNPROFOR as part of the

23 demilitarisation of the airport, but I'm really referring to my

24 observation of outgoing fire from the city which you could hear, and it

25 was very limited. You can hear the primary noise of a weapon being fired

Page 3938

1 out of the city, and there was very little evidence of that. I did see

2 there was a mortar position established near the PTT building one time by

3 the Presidency forces, who were using us as cover. I did see a mobile

4 mortar once. When I was visiting the Presidency, once I heard mortar

5 fire being fired out from the vicinity of there, but it was not a great

6 weight of fire, and that's why I say their capacity was very limited.

7 JUDGE MORRISON: You mention mortars. Could you assess the

8 calibre of the mortar?

9 THE WITNESS: I'm assuming they'd be 82-millimetre mortars.

10 JUDGE MORRISON: And any long-barrelled artillery?

11 THE WITNESS: I believe they had a few pieces of long-barrelled

12 artillery.

13 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you very much.

14 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, shall we take the break now?

15 We'll have a break for half an hour.

16 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I take it that you can start.

19 Yes, Mr. Robinson.

20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Excuse me, Mr. President.

21 After I addressed you this morning, I uncovered yet another

22 disclosure violation of the material that Mr. Reid was kind enough to

23 send me by e-mail, and this is an October 11th, 2008, report of interview

24 with this witness that is clearly 66(A)(2) material which, by order of

25 the Trial Chamber, had to be disclosed to us by the 7th of May, 2009.

Page 3939

1 And we just received it -- I actually just received it this morning, but

2 it was apparently included in a CD that was given over on the 17th of

3 June to Dr. Karadzic. And so I think now we have three specific

4 violations of disclosure rules with respect to this witness. I would ask

5 that you make a ruling as to each of them and then give us some remedy.

6 Thank you.

7 JUDGE KWON: I was provided with the copy of that disclosure

8 batch, but could you identify what number it is, the statement?

9 MR. ROBINSON: It's included in Batch 287. There's two documents

10 in that. This is an information report. The ERN number is 0642-9017.

11 It's a three-page document dated the 11th of October, 2008.

12 JUDGE KWON: I was referring to 66(A)(2) material, the interview.

13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's what I've just -- that's exactly what

14 I've just described to you as the -- that 66(A)(2) material is in

15 Batch 287. It's an OTP information report dated the 11th of October,

16 2008, and it bears the ERN number that I've just read.

17 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, I couldn't find it. Do you have the

18 document with you?

19 MR. ROBINSON: I have it electronically. I could send it to you,

20 to Ram.

21 JUDGE KWON: Disclosure Batch 287. I was looking at Disclosure

22 Batch 289, I'm sorry.

23 MR. ROBINSON: I haven't even had a chance to look at 289 yet. I

24 note there's four items that are authored by the witness, but I haven't

25 had a chance to look at that yet. I'm now referring to this item that's

Page 3940

1 in batch 287.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I have a copy --

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Do you have the explanation, Ms. Sutherland?

4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, I do, Your Honour.

5 It's unfortunate that this information report wasn't disclosed to

6 the accused earlier. However, the date of the information report is

7 subsequent to the information report being taken in October 2008. A

8 consolidated statement was taken from the witness in March 2009. The

9 information report that Mr. Robinson is referring to is contained on the

10 cover page of Mr. Wilson's statement, which is now P01029, and it's also

11 mentioned in paragraph 1 of that consolidated statement.

12 Paragraph 2 of his consolidated statement states that the

13 statement is a consolidation of the previous testimony and statements, as

14 well as additional observation and references. So the information that's

15 contained in the information report of October 2008 is, in fact, included

16 in another form in the consolidated statement which was taken from the

17 witness in 2009. So in my submission, the accused suffers no prejudice

18 from the non-disclosure or the late disclosure of the information report.

19 If Your Honour would like to see the information report, I have

20 it here, and a copy of the correspondence.

21 Your Honour, can I just add that we have put into train two

22 additional mechanisms, also following on from Your Honours' decision last

23 week, in order to capture any outstanding Rule 66(A)(2) materials in

24 relation to any of the forthcoming witnesses. Two separate but related

25 mechanisms have been put into place.

Page 3941

1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.

2 Mr. Robinson and Mr. Karadzic, while we understand your concerns,

3 and the Chamber is also concerned about the late disclosure, but with

4 respect to this time, I don't think the disclosure of additional

5 documents would be such that would require the accused to postpone his

6 cross-examination at all. So the Chamber is of the opinion that the

7 accused can start his cross-examination now, and we can see, at the end

8 of his cross-examination, whether he needs additional time because of

9 this late disclosure.

10 That said, we'll start. Mr. Karadzic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning to everybody.

12 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning to you, General Wilson.

14 First of all, I'd like to express my gratitude to you for having

15 been so kind as to receive my dear pro bono associate,

16 Professor Kevin Heller, and to co-operate with the Defence, which

17 is certainly of assistance to us, and it is to your credit. So thank you

18 for that.

19 Now, General, sir, you were, well, as a colonel, in Sarajevo

20 during a very important time; isn't that right?

21 A. Certainly, a very interesting time, Mr. Karadzic.

22 Q. Thank you. Do you agree with me when I say that those first two

23 years, especially 1992, that that was the most intensive year in terms of

24 the number of events that took place?

25 A. Mr. Karadzic, I was only in Bosnia in 1992 and associated with

Page 3942

1 the problem of the former Yugoslavia in 1993. What happened after that,

2 I don't know, so I can't make that value judgement.

3 Q. Thank you. Today, you were among the first witnesses to talk

4 about the very heavy fighting and difficult fighting. Do you agree that

5 for heavy fighting to take place, you need two sides?

6 A. Yes, you do need two sides to have heavy fighting.

7 Q. Thank you. And would you also agree that apart from the forces

8 which the Muslim side had in town, that part of the 1st Corps was at

9 Mount Igman and in the surrounding parts of Sarajevo as well?

10 A. I don't know what the 1st Corps is, Mr. Karadzic.

11 Q. Well, do you know that the Muslim forces in Sarajevo were called

12 the 1st Corps?

13 A. No, I didn't know that.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, you saw something of the weapons before they

15 came under the control of UNPROFOR, and you also saw some after UNPROFOR

16 took control. Is it possible that there were weapons which you did not

17 see?

18 A. Yes, of course. The agreement -- the airport agreement was that

19 heavy weapons within range of the airport needed to be placed under

20 UNPROFOR control or observation, so it's quite possible that both parties

21 had weapons of different varieties outside range and they would not be

22 subject to the agreed regime.

23 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the fact that the Muslims in town had

24 mortars, I assume static ones, and you also mentioned having seen and

25 heard of mortars placed on trucks, flatbed trucks; is that correct? That

Page 3943

1 is to say, that at Serb positions and in the Serbian parts of town, they

2 opened fire from mortars placed on trucks?

3 A. In your question, you say that mortars are, by nature, static.

4 In fact, by nature, they're highly mobile. That's their great asset.

5 They can be moved quickly. So I can't say I ever saw any static mortars.

6 I did see mortars in different places and assumed they were being moved

7 about. And, yes, I did -- once a mortar mounted on the back of a truck,

8 I observed that from the PTT, I observed it fire two or three rounds, and

9 I saw the weight of fire that the Serb forces fired in response. That

10 fire was indiscriminate and disproportionate.

11 Q. Thank you. You confirmed, yourself, that the Muslim forces used

12 the presence or, rather, the installations and facilities of the

13 United Nations as a mask for opening fire; isn't that right?

14 A. That's correct. And when we raised our objections with the

15 appropriate authorities, those weapons were removed from the vicinity of

16 the PTT.

17 Q. And if I put it to you that this happened in 1993 and 1994 and

18 1995, would you accept that, that this would be repeated? They were

19 removed, but then they were positioned close to you afterwards?

20 A. I have no knowledge of what happened in 1994 or 1995, nor any

21 means of finding out. And I was well placed within the United Nations

22 reporting chain in 1993 to receive and be made aware of such reports, and

23 I have no recollection of a repeat of the Presidency forces placing

24 weaponry under the cover of the PTT building.

25 Q. Thank you. Do you know that they positioned their weapons near

Page 3944

1 the radar and other UN installations, and that the UN officers had to

2 protest because of that and to demand that they be moved to a distance of

3 at least 500 metres away?

4 A. No, I'm unaware of that, Mr. Karadzic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have now called up on

6 e-court 1D01275, please. It's a document dated the 28th of August, 1992.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Do you know Mr. Hosen? Is he familiar to you?

9 A. No, I have no recollection of Mr. Hosen. It's got

10 "General Hosen" on the Serbian version.

11 Q. And what about General Siber; do you know him?

12 A. I have a vague recollection of Mr. Siber. Perhaps a member of

13 the Presidency forces.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, would you take a look at the contents of this

15 document in translation and tell me whether it corresponds to this

16 distance of 500 metres, or, rather, that General Hosen is demanding and

17 asking for co-operation and understanding that this be carried out? Is

18 that consistent with what you know about the positioning of those

19 artillery weapons close to your installations, artillery pieces?

20 A. The document certainly refers to the placing of weapons within

21 500 metres, but I'm unaware, sir, of this particular incident.

22 Q. And does that conform with what you know about the situation and

23 with what you said in connection with the PTT building?

24 A. Well, I already indicated to you, Mr. Karadzic, I'm unaware of

25 the situation, so I can't really comment upon it. I can simply confirm

Page 3945

1 that in 1992, there was an incident where the Presidency forces placed

2 a mortar position under cover of the PTT. They fired from there. When

3 we raised our objection with the relevant Presidency forces, they could

4 see that this was inappropriate action on behalf of -- on part of their

5 forces, and they effected the removal of it. We're talking about two

6 different incidents, one I have absolutely no knowledge of.

7 Q. Would you agree that Nedzarici is a purely Serb settlement?

8 A. I'm unaware of the ethnic distribution within Sarajevo.

9 Q. You lived near Nedzarici, opposite Nedzarici, in fact; is that

10 right?

11 A. Yes, I did live in Nedzarici, but I didn't ask people what

12 ethnic -- of what ethnicity they were.

13 Q. But you do agree, don't you, that it was the Serbs who controlled

14 Nedzarici?

15 A. At what point of time are we talking about? I mean, the

16 possession of parts of Sarajevo changed from time to time. If you can

17 state a time-frame, I can give an opinion.

18 Q. But Nedzarici, from start -- from the beginning to the end, were

19 under Serb control, because it's a Serb settlement and it was held by the

20 inhabitants of Nedzarici, themselves. Do you agree with that?

21 A. I was unaware that it was a Serb settlement. And my

22 understanding was that the settlement of Nedzarici and, indeed, Dobrinja

23 was contested by both parties, and the confrontation line changed over

24 time in that area. It was one of the heavily contested parts of

25 Sarajevo, particularly in the period May/June of 1992.

Page 3946

1 Q. Thank you. Now, if we look at what it says here:

2 "Today, some three French soldiers were seriously wounded in

3 Nedzarici."

4 Is it reasonable to understand that somebody shot at Nedzarici,

5 as a Serb suburb, and that the French soldiers were wounded there?

6 A. Mr. Karadzic, I can't speculate what happened there because I

7 simply was not there. I have no recollection of this incident, nor am I

8 able to recall any reports about it. Perhaps it satisfies you for me to

9 say that there were many of these types of incident involving all three

10 parties during 1992 and, indeed, 1993.

11 Q. Thank you. However, you weren't in other places in town either,

12 whereas you say you know that there was shooting, and you even think that

13 they were civilians targets that were targeted. Now, do you think that

14 the Nedzarici settlement was a civilian target?

15 A. Nedzarici was -- in my belief, was a -- yeah, an urban area

16 consisting of apartment blocks where people resided and continued to

17 reside during 1992. There was fighting in the area, and both sides were

18 involved.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this

20 document now, please.

21 JUDGE KWON: Having looked at the document, General, do you now

22 remember General Hosen?

23 THE WITNESS: No, I don't, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.

25 MS. SUTHERLAND: We would object, Your Honour. There's no nexus

Page 3947

1 being shown to this document.

2 JUDGE KWON: The General didn't confirm anything about this

3 document, he's not aware of this document, so we'll not admit it.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But it says here -- well,

5 General Hosen mentions the incident. It says:

6 [In English] "Three days ago, some relation of 200 metres

7 distance from our facilities --"

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we gave our ruling, and you'll have

9 another opportunity to tender this document.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Then next time, before your ruling, I shall ask for the floor.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Now, did you know that the Muslim side used other facilities too

14 in order to make the Serb side respond, such as hospitals, for example?

15 A. You'll need to clarify the question for me, Mr. Karadzic. I'm

16 unclear as to what you mean by "used other facilities."

17 Q. Well, you confirmed yourself that during your visit to the

18 Presidency, there was fire coming from the vicinity of the Presidency

19 building; right?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. And if I tell you that that happened, for the most part, when

22 some high-ranking guests came to visit the Presidency to provoke a Serb

23 response, does that sound reasonable to you?

24 A. Yes, it does sound reasonable to me. And it was also very

25 successful, because it inevitably resulted in some response; heavy fire

Page 3948

1 from the Serb forces.

2 Q. So do you agree, and you mentioned this yourself, that the

3 mortars, placed on trucks, also provoked -- or, rather, fired at civilian

4 targets, because after the firing the truck was removed and then you

5 would have the Serb response, and it would appear that there were no

6 artillery pieces or weapons in the area when that response came?

7 A. It would not have been possible for me to know what the target of

8 outgoing Presidency mortar fire was because it was outside the city. I

9 could perhaps hear the primary sound of the round being fired, but I'd be

10 unaware of the target that it was actually hitting.

11 The second part of your question infers that it was done

12 deliberately to draw fire into civilian areas. I don't know what the

13 motive was of the Presidency forces. The reality is it did draw

14 disproportionate and widespread response from the Serb forces.

15 Q. Do you know that UNPROFOR was concerned because of the

16 positioning of Muslim artillery in the vicinity of the hospital, for

17 example, and that they protested?

18 A. Yes, I am generally aware of that.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 1D1854 called up on

20 e-court, please. I think that you've all received it. It was announced.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Would you take a look at this document now, please. It's a

23 letter from General Morillon to Mr. Izetbegovic, the president of the

24 Presidency or rump Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, the contents,

25 are they familiar to you, and does it comply with what you know about

Page 3949

1 shooting at sensitive targets close to?

2 May we take a look at the whole document? Could the general be

3 allowed to see the whole document? Thank you.

4 A. I have not seen this document before, and I would have no need to

5 see it in my position then in Geneva. However, it seems consistent with

6 some of the oral reports I received out of Sarajevo that this type of

7 activity took place from time to time. And --

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this

9 document.

10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. General, please continue.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

12 And it does address an issue that was of concern to the UN, not

13 only in Sarajevo but in other places, that mortar positions were set up

14 by Presidency forces in areas prohibited under the Geneva Conventions.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Q. Now, do you remember whether you were aware of the fact -- well,

17 is this document admitted into evidence? Let me ask that first, please.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D328, Your Honour.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Q. Now, do you remember that you were conscious of the fact that the

22 Muslim side hoped there would be military -- international military

23 intervention, and do you agree that things like this could cause and

24 bring about a military intervention in their opinion?

25 A. I can't say what the wishes and hopes of the Presidency may have

Page 3950

1 been in regard to international intervention, whether it be military or

2 otherwise. Certainly, there was a -- in May and June of 1992, there was

3 a hope and a wish that the media attention that was given to the tragic

4 events in Sarajevo would engender some international support and sympathy

5 for the Presidency.

6 Now, the issue here about placing weapons in an inappropriate

7 place or having roving mortars around the city ignores the fact that the

8 response that these provoked was entirely disproportionate. You might

9 have two rounds of mortar fire being directed out of the city, and there

10 would be 200 rounds of heavy-calibre artillery fired in response,

11 covering a large area. So it's important to understand that while

12 provocative conduct had been perhaps perpetrated by one side, the

13 response was entirely disproportionate to the threat that was engendered

14 by this activity.

15 Q. Well, the answer was a bit lengthier than I had expected, but

16 therefore the redirect is going to be shorter. So thank you, General.

17 When somebody declares war on you, is it legitimate to win?

18 A. One, of course, hopes to win, but it's legitimate to fight.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Can we have 1D1852, please.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. While we're waiting for that, tell me, General, what is the point

23 of a proportionate response? I'm not a soldier; I am -- actually, I

24 don't know anything about military institutions. But what is the point

25 of a proportionate response? Is it to keep the conflict going forever or

Page 3951

1 what?

2 A. Proportionate response is in the context of the

3 Geneva Conventions. If you're going to fire into an area and cause

4 collateral damage or civilian casualties, you have to be absolutely

5 certain that the amount of force and the type of force you're using is

6 proportionate to the threat and that it is also appropriate for those

7 particular circumstances. For example, there are other more accurate

8 means of fire that could have removed that threat of a roving mortar.

9 Anti-aircraft weapons used in a direct ground role are highly accurate,

10 and with the observation allowed to the Serb forces in the high ground

11 overlooking Sarajevo, it would have been possible to use similar-type

12 weapons which are highly accurate to engage specific targets.

13 The other issue here, as a soldier, in my experience, if you are

14 going to be involved in conflict where there is a risk of collateral

15 damage or civilian casualties, then you would have with you a military

16 lawyer who is an expert in the Conventions and who would provide advice

17 to you on whether a target should be engaged and with what type of fire.

18 Whether the Serb forces took this precaution, I don't know. The evidence

19 is that they didn't.

20 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you from where you were observing these

21 incidents, this fire from the PTT building; right?

22 A. You could look out the window in some incidents. Otherwise, the

23 roof afforded quite a broad view of the terrain and the city around the

24 PTT, certainly more than a kilometre in each direction.

25 Q. How far away is the PTT building from the center of the city, if

Page 3952

1 we take Skenderija and the Hygiene Institute and perhaps Marin Dvor to be

2 the center?

3 A. Mr. Karadzic, I don't have a detailed knowledge of Sarajevo, as I

4 indicated to you. I was there for some six weeks. We only ventured

5 outside the PTT on specific missions because of the security threat. I'm

6 more aware of the area around the PTT. I travelled often to the city. I

7 don't know exactly how far it is; some kilometres, certainly more than

8 you could observe from the PTT. If you're -- I simply do not have such a

9 detailed knowledge of the city that I can talk about specific suburbs.

10 Q. Thank you. Did you know what the deployment was of the Muslim

11 forces in town, itself?

12 A. No, I didn't. My belief at the time was they had such few forces

13 and, in particular, such few weapons that any military forces they had

14 would have needed to have been deployed on the confrontation line, that

15 they wouldn't have had spare forces to deploy in depth to thicken up

16 their defence. So my assumption was, other than some troops who may have

17 been resting or the odd logistic facility, all of their military forces

18 would have been deployed on the confrontation line.

19 Q. And if I tell you that only within the town itself they had two

20 or three times more soldiers than the Serbs did, would you accept that?

21 A. No, I find that hard to believe.

22 Q. All right. Do you agree that mortars and artillery were not kept

23 at the confrontation line, but further back?

24 A. By their nature, mortar and artillery are deployed in depth

25 behind the confrontation line.

Page 3953

1 Q. That's what you say of tanks as well; right?

2 A. Not necessarily. Tanks are a direct-fire weapon which need to

3 actually observe the target. And to fire directly, they can't fire over

4 buildings or over physical features, so they are quite often deployed

5 well forward or immediately behind the confrontation line.

6 Q. Could you please have a look at this document? At the time, you

7 were working for the conference as an adviser to the mediators; right?

8 A. In April 1993, yes.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down a bit? Can we

10 have a look at the lower part of paragraph 2?

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General Mladic says:

13 [In English] "Importantly he stated during the discussions, that

14 the solution to the Serbian situation would be a political and not a

15 military one."

16 [Interpretation] Do you remember that Mladic was in favour of a

17 political solution for Srebrenica rather than a military one?

18 A. Can we scroll to the top of that document again, please?

19 When I look at this document, I can't recall that particular

20 meeting in Sarajevo, and I believe that this is a report passed to me, as

21 the UNPROFOR liaison officer in Geneva, and that I am then passing this

22 information from Geneva to Vance and Owen, who were then located in

23 New York. In summary, I was not at that meeting. I am simply passing

24 information.

25 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that we had stopped our

Page 3954

1 counter-offensive near Srebrenica and that that year we did not enter

2 Srebrenica at all?

3 A. I'm only vaguely aware of that, Mr. Karadzic.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 2, please, page 2

6 of this document, paragraph number 4.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Could I please ask you to read the beginning of paragraph 4?

9 A. "The force commander also believes that yesterday's --"

10 Do you want me to read aloud or --

11 "... yesterday's shelling of Srebrenica and Sarajevo were

12 provoked by the Muslim forces."

13 Q. Could you please read on, if that's not a problem?

14 A. Of course:

15 "Given the apparent Muslim determination to ensure that the

16 cease-fire is not effective and to maintain Srebrenica in the world

17 headlines, it is hard to see how the force commander can successfully

18 bring the two sides together. The force commander has, at his level,

19 brought all appropriate pressure to bear on the Serb side, and has at

20 least been able to extricate a commitment for participation in military

21 talks. President Izetbegovic is apparently absent in Saudi Arabia and

22 has not, therefore, been able to bring his influence to bear on his

23 military commander. The president's co-operation cannot, however, be

24 expected unless some pressure is brought to bear."

25 Q. The last sentence:

Page 3955

1 [In English] "The president's co-operation cannot, however, be

2 expected unless some pressure is brought to bear."

3 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this report also speaks of the

4 fact that pressure is being brought to bear only against the Serb side

5 and that nothing can be achieved if pressure is not exerted on the Muslim

6 side as well?

7 A. Mr. Karadzic, the whole point of this cable is to co-opt

8 Mr. Vance and Lord Owen into putting pressure on the Muslim side, to get

9 some agreement. That's the whole point of it, to bring pressure to bear

10 on the other party.

11 Q. Thank you. Was there any such pressure while you were in Bosnia

12 in 1992 and 1993? And while you were part of the conference, was there

13 equal pressure brought to bear against the Muslim side as well?

14 A. That's a very broad question. You'd need to be time specific.

15 My involvement in negotiating with senior political and military

16 leadership in 1992 was mainly in the period of May/June, and then

17 subsequently over Dubrovnik and the no-fly zone. And then, of course, in

18 1993 I was an observer in Geneva of the negotiations there, and I'm aware

19 that pressure was brought at the conference, internationally and in every

20 other way, on all three participants in the conflict in Yugoslavia to

21 come to some sort of agreement. It was not just the Serbs who were being

22 pressured, but also the Croats and the Presidency of Bosnia.

23 Q. Thank you. Is this in line with what you had also noted; namely,

24 that the Muslim side is committed to ensuring that Srebrenica is in the

25 headlines?

Page 3956

1 A. I'm not sure what that question means, Mr. Karadzic. Could you

2 rephrase it, please?

3 Q. Well, today you confirmed that they were interested in shooting

4 near the hospital and other facilities of yours so that they would win

5 sympathy and so that they would be on the front pages of world media.

6 Also, it says here in this document that cease-fires do not go on because

7 the Muslim side wants to be in the world headlines; right?

8 A. I don't know why the Muslim forces placed firing units near the

9 hospital or other facilities, as you allege. I can't look into their

10 motivation, whether it was to gain media attention or some tactical

11 advantage. It's impossible to sensibly comment upon that.

12 And with regard to cease-fires, I have to say that you can't

13 blame any particular side in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia for

14 breaking cease-fires. All three parties did it with gay abandon for the

15 two years that I was associated with the conflict there.

16 Q. Thank you. We'll get to that, because the United Nations

17 actually came to some different information. I'm interested in the

18 following now: Does this telegram confirm that their interest was, as

19 stated in paragraph 4, to remain in world headlines; Right?

20 A. That was the force commander's opinion, having met -- as a result

21 of that meeting, and I am simply passing that view on to the co-chairmen

22 in New York.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 Can this document be admitted?

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but I was told that the previous document,

Page 3957

1 1D1854, which was admitted as D328, was identical to the last page of

2 Exhibit D99, so instead we'll use that number to this document. So this

3 document will be admitted as Exhibit D328 instead.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that that is not

5 correct. So far, we haven't shown Morillon's document. Oh, yes, that

6 does seem to be the case, actually. Thank you.

7 1D946, could we have that, please. I believe that there is a

8 translation of this document, so could we please have the English version

9 as well. Yes.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Could you please have a look at this document? I don't think

12 it's necessary for us to read it. This is a special combat report for

13 the 28th of July, 1993. The Command of Tactical Group Vogosca is

14 providing information to their superior commands as to what is happening.

15 Could you please cast a glance at this?

16 They say here that Miladin Cukovic, a well-known physician was

17 killed. All of Sarajevo knew him. Is this event consistent with what we

18 had discussed a moment ago?

19 A. I'm unaware of this incident, Mr. Karadzic.

20 Q. However, as something that had happened, as a phenomenon, does it

21 correspond to what you know had been going on?

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we do not need the speculation on the

23 part of the witness or his opinion. He said he didn't know about this

24 incident. Let's move on to your next topic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 3958

1 Then you're not going to admit this at all, if I understand

2 things correctly.

3 JUDGE KWON: I take it it has already been admitted. No, I was

4 confused with your numbering. You are correct.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Q. General, for starters, can we try to deal with things a bit more

7 concisely? Let us see what you could have known in Sarajevo. Could you

8 have known of certain things happening on both sides?

9 A. In July 1993, I received operational reports from UNPROFOR on

10 daily activities. I was also privy to all sensitive traffic, that's

11 message traffic, between New York and Zagreb or UNPROFOR headquarters,

12 and most of the higher-level sensitive reporting within UNPROFOR. This

13 sort of incident would have probably been mentioned in the daily

14 operational report, but I have no recollection of it.

15 Q. That means that it would have been mentioned in the reports if

16 the reports were objective; right?

17 A. Well, there's a supposition there that the reports weren't

18 objective. The operational reports, in my view, were objective.

19 Q. Let us go back to that period, though. You came in the beginning

20 of March 1992; right?

21 A. Correct -- January 1992.

22 Q. Right, January. That's even better. Now, General, are you aware

23 of what had happened in that period of time up until the 24th of June,

24 when you left?

25 A. In what regard, Mr. Karadzic?

Page 3959

1 Q. For example, did you know that there was a conference on

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina that was underway?

3 A. Yes. I believe it was done under the auspices of the

4 European Union.

5 Q. That's right, that's right, it was the European Community at the

6 time. Do you know what was happening in the Neretva River Valley at the

7 time? Do you know that Serbs were the victims down there and that they

8 fled from the Neretva Valley?

9 A. Are we talking about January 1992?

10 Q. No, no. February, March, up to April.

11 A. My understanding of the movement of ethnic communities within

12 Bosnia was that in March/April it was the Muslims who were being cleaned

13 out of Northern Bosnia. I'm unaware that any Muslim activity took place

14 in the -- you said the Neretva Valley, to clear out ethnic Serbs. I'm

15 just unaware of that.

16 Q. All right. Do you know that 44.000 Serbs lived in the

17 Neretva Valley, Mostar included?

18 A. No.

19 Q. And do you know that almost all of them were expelled and that

20 they all went to Nevesinje and other Serb areas, the so-called

21 High Herzegovina?

22 A. No, I'm unaware of that.

23 Q. Do you know that before April, Serbs had fled from Livno, most of

24 the Serbs had fled from Livno?

25 A. No, I'm not.

Page 3960

1 Q. Do you know which armed incidents had occurred before the war

2 broke out? We're talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3 A. Despite your plea for brevity, I have to now say that prior to

4 the 8th of March, 1992, the focus of my military liaison mission was on

5 Croatia and the UN -- what became the UNPAs. I was not even vaguely

6 aware of what was happening down in Bosnia. In March, when I deployed

7 to -- or by the time I deployed to Sarajevo on the 22nd of March, it was

8 clear that there were ethnic tensions across Northern Bosnia.

9 Now, the directive that had been issued to the military

10 observers, as part of UNPROFOR, as I'd indicated earlier in my evidence,

11 was that they would deploy to the Bihac and the Mostar areas, which were

12 areas that had been noted as being particularly sensitive to -- or there

13 was potential for ethnic tension there, so I'm broadly aware that there

14 was some problems down in Mostar. And we did, in fact, during late

15 March, early April deploy observers down there for a short period, but

16 the fighting was so intense that we actually had to withdraw them after

17 only seven days or ten days, something like that. We actually had a

18 couple of our observers wounded, and they were unable to perform their

19 duties. So they were withdrawn for safety reasons.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Can we please look at 1D1308.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. And while we're waiting for it to appear on the screens: Since

24 you were in Croatia until the 8th of March, are you aware of the fact

25 that on the 3rd of March, the army moved from Croatia to Bosanski Brod,

Page 3961

1 killing some Serbs there?

2 A. Which army are we talking about?

3 Q. Well, I believe those were the Zengas, the National Guard Corps,

4 or other irregulars that existed in Croatia.

5 A. No, I'm unaware of that activity.

6 Q. Did you obtain your information only from your observers, and are

7 you aware only of the events that occurred in the areas that they

8 covered, or did you have other sources too?

9 A. We had a broad range of sources; media, other agencies operating

10 in the area, other elements of UNPROFOR, the local population. Each of

11 the parties would like to tell us what the other party was doing. There

12 were a broad range of sources of information available, Mr. Karadzic.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, can we please look at this document? This is a

14 letter sent by the late Professor Koljevic, who was a member of the

15 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and later on of Republika Srpska,

16 and he also became at one point the vice-president of Republika Srpska.

17 This is a letter penned by Professor Koljevic, addressed to

18 Ambassador Cutileiro. Could you please have a look at this letter?

19 Do you know that at that time, and at least from the 22nd of

20 February, we had already agreed on a declaration or a statement regarding

21 the principles for the solution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

22 which later became what is known as the Lisbon Agreement?

23 A. No, Mr. Karadzic, I had no knowledge of the politics or events in

24 Bosnia prior to about the 22nd of March, when my UNPROFOR -- my Military

25 Observers' headquarters was deployed to Sarajevo, and I was not involved

Page 3962

1 in any of the negotiations between UNPROFOR and any of the parties until

2 the departure of UNPROFOR headquarters on about the 16th and 17th of May.

3 And I was certainly not in the information loop for whatever the

4 negotiators from the European Union may have been doing.

5 Q. But you did obtain some information. You knew where you were

6 going and you knew what was going on in that country to which you were

7 being sent; is that right?

8 A. Mr. Karadzic, it's very sad to admit, but I was not aware, nor do

9 I think the force commander, General Nambiar, was aware, nor the chief

10 political officer, Mr. Thornberry, were fully aware of what was about to

11 happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The focus of UNPROFOR, when it deployed to

12 the former Yugoslavia, was on Croatia, with the exception of the military

13 observers who were deployed to Bihac and Mostar. That's the sad reality

14 of how the international community saw the situation prior to March 1992.

15 Q. But this is the 4th or the 5th of April, 1992, the 4th or the 5th

16 of April, and you can see that there are 2500 Serb refugees from Kupres,

17 and the events in Bijeljina had already happened, as had those in

18 Bosanski Brod. And Professor Koljevic is trying, in the face of all

19 those conflicts so that this is what he says:

20 "Despite the unfortunate conflicts, we would like to have some

21 peace -- to see a peaceful solution for the warring factions."

22 Do you see that? It's in the first sentence.

23 A. Yes, I can see that. And in April 1992, there was some limited

24 fighting taking place in Sarajevo, and it was broadly known that there

25 was ethnic cleansing taking place and that there was quite serious

Page 3963

1 conflict outside Sarajevo. But these were emerging events, as far as

2 UNPROFOR was concerned. UNPROFOR was suddenly having to negotiate with

3 members of the Bosnian political leadership, and I include Serb, Croats,

4 and Muslim parties in that, while the focus was meant to be on deploying

5 a force of 25.000 people to the UNPAs in Croatia. They were not in any

6 way involved in the political negotiations being run by the

7 European Union. I can't comment any more on this document --

8 Q. And do you see here that Professor Koljevic reminds -- or,

9 rather, informs Ambassador Cutileiro that the Muslim side has taken

10 measures to establish its own Territorial Defence, which has nothing to

11 do with the Yugoslav People's Army, and it was an unlegal

12 [as interpreted] move?

13 A. I'm not what you -- what you mean by an illegal move.

14 Q. Do you know that the Territorial Defence was subordinate to the

15 Yugoslav People's Army?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Well, you see here that Professor Koljevic says that the Muslim

18 side, the Muslim side, despite the fact that there are three constituent

19 peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you can see here in the penultimate

20 paragraph it says that they are trying to organise a nucleus of a new

21 Bosnian army while waiting for the recognition?

22 A. I can see it's written there under sub-point 3, in that

23 paragraph. Yes, I can see that.

24 Q. And do you see that Professor Koljevic is concerned that the

25 Serbs would not join the new force and that this was the situation?

Page 3964

1 A. I can see that Mr. Koljevic is trying to communicate that, yes.

2 But I'm not sure of the relevance of this.

3 Q. Well, the relevance is in the fact that you had come to the

4 country as a military expert, as a military observer, and these are

5 military activities, eminently so. Were you aware of those military

6 activities, and did you understand that these were, in effect,

7 preparations for a war?

8 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'll restate my evidence from earlier that

9 UNPROFOR's mandate, in March, April, and May of 1992, was in Croatia,

10 that the headquarters was simply located in Sarajevo. The only people

11 who had a mission at all in Bosnia were my military observers. It was

12 not the business of the force commander to involve himself in these

13 matters. UNPROFOR did not get a mandate in Bosnia until the airport

14 agreement was effected. Prior to that, the military observers would

15 deploy people in Bihac and Mostar. What was happening in Sarajevo was

16 something that was imposed upon the force commander and his officers, and

17 they were trying to get some sort of understanding of what was happening.

18 They were unaware of the detail of what the three parties were doing,

19 whether they were raising forces or not.

20 I have said in my statement that I had received reports primarily

21 from Croatian military sources that the Serb authorities in Bosnia, in

22 January of 1992, were disarming the Muslims and arming the Serb elements

23 in Northern Bosnia, and I covered that in my statement. That was just

24 information we'd received, and that was, in part, confirmed by JNA

25 command, that this was happening. It seems to me that the only concrete

Page 3965

1 evidence that I have that people had been making military preparations

2 and raising military forces were the Serb side. I saw no evidence that

3 the Bosnian Presidency forces were ready for conflict in January or May

4 of 1992. I'd say clearly they were not ready. They were under armed,

5 they were disorganised. It was not until sometime late in May that I

6 actually met somebody who could call himself the minister of defence, and

7 that was Mr. Doko. They were clearly unprepared.

8 Q. Well, General, sir, does that mean that you are not here to

9 testify about anything that happened before June 1992? Does that mean

10 that your knowledge is not accurate? Well, you have testified about many

11 events here, after all.

12 A. I am testifying about events which I knew about. There are many

13 things that happened that I didn't know about. And I'm saying to you, in

14 regard to this exhibit that you have here, that I was totally unfamiliar

15 with any political negotiations which were taking place between the

16 European Union and the political parties in Bosnia.

17 Q. Thank you. And do you know that Jerko Doko became the defence

18 minister in January 1991, not in June 1992?

19 A. No, I was unaware of that.

20 Q. And do you know that the leadership of the Patriotic League

21 wanted the war against Serbs and the JNA in the summer of 1991 in order

22 to assist the Croats by doing that?

23 A. That's the first time I've heard of the Patriotic League.

24 Q. So you do not know that up until January of 1992, in 103

25 municipalities there were staffs and brigades of the Patriotic League,

Page 3966

1 the Muslim illegal army?

2 A. No, I was not aware of that.

3 Q. And you do not know that the Muslim forces in Sarajevo were

4 called the 1st Corps and that it consisted of three divisions, the 12th,

5 the 14th, and the 16th?

6 A. No, I didn't know that.

7 Q. And, General, do you know that there were some 15 brigades in the

8 town itself, in the town of Sarajevo itself, and that they had their

9 headquarters and their logistics bases and their artillery and tank and

10 mortar positions, and they actually constituted more than 300 legitimate

11 targets in the city of Sarajevo itself?

12 A. No, I was unaware of the detail of that.

13 JUDGE KWON: What time-frame are we talking about, Mr. Karadzic,

14 in your last question?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Right from the beginning of the

16 war.

17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The witness has answered the question.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 Q. But did you have any suspicions or any inkling of the fact that

20 the Croatian side might have been misinforming you about the acts of

21 the -- actions of the Serb side?

22 A. Mr. Karadzic, the nature of working in the former Yugoslavia,

23 that one was very cautious about believing anything that anybody said to

24 you, and that you would always try and find supporting evidence for what

25 somebody had said, and that you would rarely take on face value what was

Page 3967

1 said to you.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is going to be the fate of

4 this document that we have on our screens now, Your Honour?

5 JUDGE KWON: We'll not admit it.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 Q. Now I would like to turn your attention to paragraph 95 of your

8 amalgamated statement, which pertains to your trip to Eastern Bosnia,

9 from Belgrade, Zagreb, and then through Bijeljina.

10 En route from Belgrade to Zagreb, did you pass through Bijeljina?

11 A. I believe so, although I don't have a detailed knowledge of the

12 geography of the area. We travelled on the most direct route from

13 Belgrade to Sarajevo, and it was through the Bijeljina area. Whether it

14 went through the center of the town, I can't say.

15 Q. Yes. But here it says "Belgrade to Zagreb," which means that you

16 must have taken the motorway and you did not pass through Bijeljina?

17 A. Then that's an error that I hadn't picked up in my statement. It

18 should read "Belgrade to Sarajevo."

19 Q. Thank you. Do you see what you say here regarding Bijeljina,

20 that you saw -- perhaps we can see it on our screens, or I think all of

21 the parties have a hard copy. So it's paragraph 95. You say that you

22 saw some damage in Bijeljina. The suggestion in the report was that the

23 JNA would provide perimeter security, whilst the paramilitaries would go

24 in and commit crimes and initiate ethnic cleansing. There were also

25 reports that the paramilitaries would commit demonstration killings and

Page 3968

1 rapes; as examples, two villages: That they would meet --

2 [In English] "That they would meet the same fate unless they

3 left. Arkan and his men were mentioned in some of the reports."

4 [Interpretation] Is this, in your opinion, an accurate report?

5 Is this something that we should really trust? Is this based on your

6 knowledge or is this just an impression that you based on something?

7 A. On the physical observations around Bijeljina, they came from me.

8 I was physically there. I saw the war damage. I saw the militias

9 controlling movement. I saw the barracks. I saw houses which had been

10 destroyed, burnt, blown up. They're my physical observations.

11 Now, in regard to the reports, there were a large number of

12 reports coming into UNPROFOR in -- particularly in April of 1992 from the

13 ECMM, from various humanitarian agencies, from journalists who were able

14 to travel through Bosnia quite widely and successfully, from the

15 Presidency. A broad range of reports were coming in which corroborated

16 each other in some way or other, which said that ethnic cleansing had

17 been taking place in Northern Bosnia. And the reports also suggested the

18 means by which this was achieved, and this is recorded in that paragraph.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the accused, please.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. And do you know whether the ECMM had its people there? Did they

22 have their people up there?

23 A. I don't know the detailed deployment of the ECMM. They had, my

24 understanding, people who certainly moved through that area regularly.

25 Whether they were permanently assigned there, I don't know, but we had

Page 3969

1 the benefit of daily exchange of information with the ECMM, and also

2 formally, on a weekly basis, I would meet with their senior management

3 for an exchange of information.

4 Q. Do you have any accurate official report about what had happened

5 in Bijeljina?

6 A. No, I don't keep reports, Mr. Karadzic, and I didn't raise

7 reports. I'm simply relating my recollection of written reports which

8 were being passed around within UNPROFOR headquarters during my time

9 there. As I said, I had a privileged position within the headquarters

10 that I had access to the most sensitive information. I was regularly

11 involved in small groups that made major decisions, and I had the

12 confidence of the force commander, so I was well informed. I'm simply

13 reporting my recollection of the type of information that was flowing

14 around UNPROFOR headquarters at that time in April 1992.

15 Q. Well, but if you were, indeed, kept well informed, and we will

16 have some use for your knowledge, but from what you say in paragraph 95,

17 I think that the only thing that we should take into account is that when

18 you were in Bijeljina, you saw some evidence of past fighting. Is that

19 right? All the rest is just impressions, things that you heard, but you

20 don't have any reports to that effect and you don't have any direct

21 knowledge of those events; is that right?

22 A. It's up to the Court, Mr. Karadzic, to take note of what they

23 wish, but I'm simply giving you the two types of information that I'm

24 recording. Paragraph 1 is actual physical observation. The other is a

25 summation of my observation of information that was flowing through the

Page 3970

1 headquarters. Now, I did not have a physical possession of reports, nor

2 would I expect to have them.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Can we please look at 1D01247.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General, do you understand that in matters of criminal law, we

7 cannot rely on impressions, but we can only rely on very specific

8 knowledge and evidence? Is that not so?

9 JUDGE KWON: It's not for the witness to answer the question.

10 Let's move on.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I merely wanted to explain to the

12 general why I am belabouring this point. I don't want him to take it

13 amiss.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. So could you please look at paragraph 3 of this document? And if

16 there's no translation, let me just tell you that this is the Command of

17 the 17th Corps, so this is still the JNA, and this is the daily

18 operational report sent to the command of the 2nd Military District in

19 Sarajevo. It's signed by General Jankovic. I think it's the 17th Corps.

20 It's the JNA corps from Tuzla.

21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Excuse me. We have a duplicate of 65 ter 07089.

22 If we could call up the translation, please, Defence exhibit --

23 JUDGE KWON: Give the number again, please.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: 07089, D239. Yes, D239.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 3971

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Could you please look at the entire document? Well, I would

4 recommend that we should all look at it, but item 3, in particular, is of

5 interest to us. It concerns the events on the 3rd of April.

6 Do you know that Korace is a Muslim village and that they

7 opened fire on the JNA?

8 A. No to both of those questions.

9 Q. Thank you. Can we please look at the next passage here. The

10 commander of the Operational Group 1 -- and can we all look at the end of

11 this passage, where it says:

12 "One of our soldiers was killed."

13 And then could you please look at paragraph 4, where it says, in

14 the second sentence:

15 "In Bijeljina, the situation is calmer a little bit, but there is

16 general chaos, anarchy, and panic in the town."

17 The exact number of those killed is unknown. The situation is

18 out of control, while parties leaders are incapable of ensuring peace and

19 preventing the anarchical behaviour of individuals and groups. Is that

20 what it says? Is this what General Jankovic says in his report?

21 A. That's what the translation says, yes.

22 Q. Now, if we go back to what you said in paragraph 95 of your

23 statement, somebody suggested to you, through their reports, that the

24 paramilitaries are working in collusion with the JNA, the JNA was

25 providing security while the paramilitaries were going in to kill and

Page 3972

1 rape people; is that so?

2 A. That's what I've testified, yes.

3 Q. So you still maintain what you said there, that your statement is

4 reliable?

5 A. It is, but I don't think it should be applied to every situation

6 where there was ethnic cleansing. I'm not suggesting that this happened

7 in every village where ethnic cleansing took place. Simply, the threat

8 and the knowledge of what had happened in the area and other places is

9 enough to move people on. The report that I have noted in my evidence --

10 or the reports came from a wide variety of people, enough for me to

11 believe it to be true, so from several different sources.

12 Q. Thank you. Were any of those sources Serb?

13 A. Not to my knowledge.

14 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at the next page in the English

15 version where it says:

16 "The leaders -- the leaders of national parties are conducting

17 intensive preparations for new conflicts, weapons are being publicly

18 handed out to members of the SDA in many places. At 1500 hours on the

19 3rd of April, weapons were handed out to SDA members near the mosque in

20 the village of Ciljuge, the municipality of Zivinice, and the move is

21 planned towards Bijeljina with this manpower on the 3rd and 4th of

22 April."

23 Did you have any knowledge of what the other parties were doing,

24 apart from the Serbs, that is?

25 A. No, no, I didn't. I've related what I know about the activities

Page 3973

1 in Northern Bosnia in my evidence. I can't add to that.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we scroll down a

3 little bit, because I would like the general to look at paragraph 9,

4 forecasts offered by General Jankovic.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. So do you see here where he says:

7 "An even more difficult situation and combat activities are to be

8 expected in the coming period, especial until Bijeljina and along the

9 Bosanski Brod and Derventa line. It's possible that roadblocks will be

10 set up and that there would be provocations in the next zone."

11 JUDGE KWON: We lost the English translation. Yes, next page.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Yes, "... in the rest of the zone, including armed inter-ethnic

14 conflicts as well as attacks on the corps units."

15 Who was supposed to carry out this kind of combat activities in

16 the Bijeljina-Bosanski Brod-Derventa axis, General?

17 A. Which combat activities are we talking about, please,

18 Mr. Karadzic?

19 Q. Well, we see here that General Jankovic - I think he's

20 deceased - he is making some forecasts about what he expects to happen,

21 and he reports to his superior command that combat is expected in

22 Bijeljina and along the Bosanski Brod-Derventa axis. So who was supposed

23 to carry out those activities? Who was supposed to attack the units of

24 his corps in this area, the Bosanski Brod-Derventa axis? And there were

25 observers posted in Northern Bosnia at the time.

Page 3974

1 A. There were no UN observers posted there on the 3rd of April.

2 I can assure you of that, Mr. Karadzic. And I can't get inside the late

3 general's head. I don't know why he would be forecasting that. And you

4 obviously can't ask him, but I certainly can't comment on that.

5 Q. General, there were European Community monitors there, and if I

6 were to ask you now this: On the 3rd of March, the Croatian Army moved

7 into Bosanski Brod to kill Serbs. On the 26th of March, it crossed

8 and -- or, rather, on the 25th of March, it killed a father and a son

9 also crossing the river. And on the 26th of March, it went into the

10 village of Sijekovac, killing all the Serbs and all their cattle in the

11 village. If I were to tell you all that, whom does General Jankovic see

12 as the potential force that was to launch those military operations,

13 those combat activities in that area?

14 A. You would have to ask General Jankovic, if you could. I don't

15 know what he foresees.

16 Q. And if I tell you that they were the regular forces of Croatia

17 and the local Muslim paramilitaries, what would you have to say to that?

18 A. Well, I have no knowledge of the events up there, other than the

19 broad reports that there is inter-ethnic conflict going on, and the net

20 result of all that is that large numbers of Muslim refugees are being

21 produced. That's the substance of the evidence. The detail of what

22 happened in a particular village, there were, I suggest, hundreds of

23 villages at this time, Mr. Karadzic, that this sort of thing was going on

24 around the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only in -- just there in

25 Northern Bosnia, but in many parts. I've given evidence that I had -- on

Page 3975

1 the 4th of April, I had left Sarajevo and driven through Bosnia to

2 Zagreb, and on the way I saw -- and on the way back I saw evidence of

3 fighting between the communities. It was widespread.

4 The particular paragraph you're referring to is are summation of

5 reports I had received about ethnic cleansing in Northern Bosnia.

6 Q. And who was cleansed at that time? At that time, who was

7 cleansed; that is to say, before April the 6th, the 10th, and so on? Who

8 was cleansed at that time? And if I put it to you that it was only the

9 Serbs who were cleansed and it was only the Serbs who were killed, what

10 would you say to that?

11 A. Well, I think the two conflicts are related, Mr. Karadzic. There

12 are a lot of Serb refugees produced by the conflict in Croatia, and they

13 had been forced into Bosnia and into Serbia. So there were Serb refugees

14 from that conflict. There were, as I say, reports that I had received

15 and been privy to suggesting that there was an orchestrated and

16 deliberate campaign to clear Muslim people out of Northern Bosnia, in

17 particular. And, of course, there's the conflict going down in Mostar at

18 that time which was primarily between the Croats and the Muslims. This

19 was quite a complex situation.

20 In paragraph 95, I'm talking about a specific area and a specific

21 time-frame, but much of that observation applies to all of Bosnia, and

22 there's no doubt that there were some Muslim refugees produced by the

23 conflict in Bosnia. However, it was a stated position of the Presidency

24 leadership that their desire, and they said this during 1993, during the

25 negotiations in Sarajevo, their desire was to see a community that was

Page 3976

1 fully integrated and could live together. They never provided any

2 evidence to me that their view was that the Serbs and the Muslims

3 couldn't live together. The political leadership was that they wished to

4 retain the political form of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if it is convenient, we'll have a

6 break now for an hour.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,

8 because it's about Bijeljina and refers to the same things that the

9 general has been talking about?

10 JUDGE KWON: This has been already admitted through Mr. Colm --

11 I'm sorry, Mr. Colm Doyle.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D239, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break and resume at half past 1.00.

14 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

15 --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

17 MR. KARADZIC: Thank you.

18 Q. [Interpretation] General, did you know in what suburbs and

19 neighbourhoods of Sarajevo -- what suburbs and neighbourhoods of Sarajevo

20 were inhabited predominantly by Serbs?

21 A. No, I have no detailed knowledge of the ethnic distribution

22 within Sarajevo at all.

23 Q. And did you know what neighbourhoods were held by Serbs?

24 A. No, because I don't know all of the suburbs.

25 Q. And do you agree, then, that it is quite difficult to say who's

Page 3977

1 firing on whom if you don't know who is holding what areas?

2 A. I agree it's difficult, but you can observe and you can listen.

3 You know the general area. By the weight of fire, you can -- when you

4 know the distribution of forces, you can determine who is making the

5 major effort. There are a variety of ways of determining what's

6 happening without, necessarily, close observation.

7 Q. Well, but if the shells are falling on a neighbourhood, why is it

8 then irrelevant whether this is a Serb or a Muslim neighbourhood?

9 A. I don't see the ethnic make-up of the neighbourhoods got terribly

10 much to do with it. The fact is that artillery -- heavy weapons fire is

11 being directed into an area occupied by civilians. That's the

12 significance of it, not their ethnicity.

13 Q. But are you trying to say that the Serbs would target Serb

14 neighbourhoods?

15 A. I've already indicated I don't know which were Serb

16 neighbourhoods and which were not. I am saying that the Serbs were

17 firing heavy weapons, large quantities of it, into the urban areas of

18 Sarajevo.

19 Q. And how do you know those were Serbs?

20 A. Because it was a heavy weight of fire and only the Serb forces at

21 that time could produce that weight of fire.

22 Q. Are you trying to say that the Muslims did not have any Howitzers

23 in the city?

24 A. No, I'm not.

25 Q. Well, if they had Howitzers in the city, could they not have

Page 3978

1 opened such heavy fire, this kind of weight of fire, themselves?

2 A. No, they did not have enough barrels or weapons, if you wish, to

3 produce the weight of fire that I was able to observe.

4 Q. I can see from your statement that you toured the Serb positions.

5 Did you tour the Muslim positions too?

6 A. I'm not sure which positions we're talking about here and at what

7 time.

8 Q. Well, right from the beginning, the front-lines in Sarajevo were

9 set up. Did you tour those, and were you aware of where the Muslim

10 positions were?

11 A. No, I did not tour the front-lines. I crossed the front-lines on

12 occasions, but I did not tour them. And I had a general idea of where

13 the front-lines were, and, of course, these changed from time to time

14 depending upon the fighting.

15 Q. But would you agree that it was only at Otes and at Zlatiste that

16 the front-lines shifted and that everywhere else for the most part the

17 front-lines remained the same?

18 A. No, you'll have to repeat that question, please.

19 Q. If I were to put it to you that the front-line in the city at the

20 beginning was 42 kilometres' long and that the Muslims extended it to 46

21 kilometres, so by 22 kilometres, would you agree that those lines were

22 relatively stable?

23 A. Your mathematics is out there, I think, Mr. Karadzic.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Forty-six

25 kilometres.

Page 3979

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it's an interpretation

2 problem, not 46, but 64, 64.

3 Q. It's their data, the Muslim data. We can go into that tomorrow,

4 if you wish. So they extended the front-line by 22 kilometres. If we're

5 talking about urban warfare, would that be a relatively large expansion?

6 A. If I may return to your first question, I'm assuming you're

7 talking about in the period May/June, which is substantially when I'm

8 providing evidence on. No, I didn't know the length of the confrontation

9 line. As I'd indicated to you, I had a general idea. I'm also aware

10 that the line changed from time to time, so it is quite possible that the

11 confrontation line got longer.

12 Q. Did you cross the front-line anywhere in the city itself, in the

13 valley?

14 A. There were two crossing points that I was associated with. Well,

15 three. There was a movement route to Lukavica via the airport. There

16 was one which went past Nedzarici and Dobrinja. And there was a third

17 one which was opened in early -- in early June. Grabaca [phoen], I think

18 it's pronounced. Prior to that, when moving from Belgrade or Zagreb, we

19 entered the city from somewhere near Vogosca, I think. They were the

20 crossing points that I was familiar with.

21 Q. General, at those crossing points, how far apart were the

22 confrontation lines?

23 A. They were very close, some less than 100 metres.

24 Q. Thank you. And do you know who held the positions around the

25 hills around Sarajevo?

Page 3980

1 A. It depends at what time -- time-frame we're talking about. But a

2 general answer is the high ground was held by the Serb forces and the

3 urban area was held by the Presidency forces.

4 Q. And if I were to tell you that there were Muslim positions on one

5 hill and Serb positions on another hill, and that that was the situation

6 right from the start until the very end, what would you say to that?

7 A. It depends which hills. But I've already indicated to you I

8 don't have a detailed knowledge of where the confrontation lines were,

9 just a broad indication, a general idea of where they were.

10 Q. Do you recall the Hum Hill? There was a major TV relay station

11 there.

12 A. I'm aware of a hill which had a large TV tower on it, but I

13 didn't know what its name was.

14 Q. Do you agree that it was held by the Muslims throughout the war?

15 A. I don't know who held the hill.

16 Q. And if I were to tell you that the Hum Hill, its slopes go down

17 to the Velesice area and that there were Muslim artillery weapons

18 deployed all along that ridge, what would you say to that?

19 A. I have no knowledge of the geography of that area.

20 Q. Thank you. When you say "the Serb forces around Sarajevo," what

21 do you mean when you say that, when you say "the Serb forces"?

22 A. I mean forces who identified themselves as being Serb, who were

23 responsible to General Mladic, and who acknowledged the -- you as his

24 political boss.

25 Q. And do you make any distinction between those troops of the

Page 3981

1 Republika Srpska Army and the Yugoslav People's Army?

2 A. There was some overlap there, I understand, Mr. Karadzic. I was

3 never entirely convinced that the Yugoslav People's Army had totally

4 withdrawn from the conflict in Bosnia. There's lots of evidence to

5 suggest that the level of sophistication, the competence of the forces

6 deployed, the ability to sustain, logistically and in every other way,

7 quite complex operations, suggested to me that there was an organisation

8 that was supporting the Serb forces in Bosnia. There was not simply a

9 force which had emerged from local militias in the period March/April.

10 It was a highly-sophisticated military machine.

11 Q. Well, General, it is precisely because such facile opinions that

12 were put forward that sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia in late May

13 1992. Do you know that the Yugoslav People's Army had already withdrawn

14 by the 20th of May, 1992, and that only those elements that had been

15 blocked in the barracks remained?

16 A. Mr. Karadzic, I find it very hard to believe that any general

17 would leave the field of battle and leave his troops behind in the

18 barracks without leaving some elements there to be able to support them

19 and to do something about it. I cannot believe that the leadership of

20 the JNA would leave behind young cadets and families in the barracks

21 while they scurried back to Serbia. It's beyond my comprehension that

22 any general would do that to his troops.

23 Whenever the JNA may have withdrawn their ground forces, it's my

24 firm belief it was certainly not before all the barracks were evacuated

25 sometime in early June; certainly not the 20th of May.

Page 3982

1 Q. Well, you said yourself that the only JNA presence had been with

2 General Boskovic, who had been in conflict with General Mladic because he

3 had brought with him 60.000 rifles to hand over to the Muslims; is that

4 not what you said, yourself?

5 A. I never said that General Boskovic was --

6 Q. 6.000, 6.000.

7 A. Yes. I never said that General Boskovic was the only JNA

8 presence. He was accompanied by other JNA officers, including the

9 commander of the JNA at one point, General Panic. I've certainly never

10 said that.

11 Q. Well, they had come in from Belgrade. They had not been

12 stationed in Sarajevo. So would you agree that the Republika Srpska Army

13 started to exist on the 20th of May? The decision was taken on the 12th

14 of May, but it came into existence on the 20th of May; yes or no?

15 A. No.

16 Q. And when did the Republika Srpska Army come into existence, then?

17 A. General Mladic turned up in the Sarajevo area around about the

18 20th of May, and he claimed to be the commander of the Bosnian Serb army

19 about that time. But I'm unaware of any declaration, signed documents,

20 or pronouncements about armies being raised on any particular dates. I'm

21 assuming the presence or the arrival of General Mladic in the Sarajevo

22 area marked some sort of evidence that there was then a local Serb army.

23 Q. General, sir, there are many things that you don't know, and it

24 is clear here that the Republika Srpska Army was created pursuant to a

25 decision taken by the Republika Srpska Assembly on the 12th of May, but

Page 3983

1 the decision was to come into effect on the day when the JNA pulled out,

2 and that is the 20th of May. So from the 1st of April until the 20th of

3 May, do you draw a distinction between the self-organised

4 Territorial Defence forces and the Yugoslav People's Army?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Thank you. General, let us look at what we wanted to do and what

7 you attributed to us.

8 Can we please look at 65 ter 30655.

9 Do you know that the conflict in Bijeljina happened on the 1st

10 and the 2nd of April?

11 A. You showed me an earlier document/report from the JNA general

12 reporting on the period about the 3rd of April. That's all I know about

13 the detail on that.

14 Q. And do you know that the conflict was initiated by the Muslim

15 extremists by throwing hand-grenades on a Serb cafe?

16 A. No, I don't.

17 Q. And do you know that quite a few Serbs were among those killed in

18 the incident?

19 A. No, I don't.

20 Q. Let's look at this document. It's a conversation between

21 Radovan Karadzic and the late Professor Koljevic on the 4th of April,

22 1992. General, did you know that Alija Izetbegovic declared a general

23 mobilisation on the 4th of April, 1992? You were there at the time.

24 A. Yes, but I couldn't put a date on such an event. But I would

25 believe that to be true.

Page 3984

1 Q. Could I please direct your attention to page 2 of this document.

2 We've looked at page 1, so can we now move on to page 2? Karadzic says:

3 "What's happened at the Presidency?"

4 And Professor Koljevic then goes on to recount that they were

5 demanding the mobilisation of the Territorial Defence, and, well, as you

6 can see yourself, he says -- well, Karadzic says:

7 "Did he give up after the Serb representatives opposed the

8 motion?" And Koljevic said: "No, no, it's been decided."

9 And then further down:

10 [In English] "But I told him that this is our proof the fact that

11 they are drawing the weapons first is no peaceful move."

12 [No interpretation]:

13 [In English] "Or they will stop political fights so that we can

14 fight for peace together or we shall continue the political fight."

15 [Interpretation] General, sir, do you see that the Serb members,

16 Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic, opposed the proposal that the people

17 should be mobilised, that there should be a general mobilisation?

18 A. I can see what's written in this translated document. Yes, I can

19 see that.

20 Q. You said that you were aware of the general mobilisation. Can

21 you see now that it was on the 4th of April?

22 A. No, no, I can't.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 1 so

24 that the general can see the date.

25 This is a conversation between myself and Professor Koljevic

Page 3985

1 which occurred after the Presidency session, so he's telling me what

2 happened at the Presidency session on the 4th of April. This was

3 recorded by the Muslim police. They intercepted it.

4 Can we please admit -- have this admitted into evidence? As an

5 MFI, of course, like all the other intercepts.

6 JUDGE KWON: Did the general agree on anything in relation to the

7 document?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he agreed -- he said that he

9 was aware that there was a general mobilisation. He didn't know the

10 date, but now he knows the date.

11 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.

12 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

14 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D329, Your Honours.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, is it customary to recognise a country at the time when

17 it declares general mobilisation?

18 A. Mr. Karadzic, I was a soldier, not a politician or a diplomat. I

19 can't answer that.

20 Q. Thank you. But did you know at the time that the Serbs were in

21 favour of a political solution and peace and that this mobilisation had

22 been characterised as a call to war?

23 A. No, I didn't understand that to be the position.

24 Q. You did not know that at the time; is that so?

25 A. My understanding at the time, Mr. Karadzic, was that there was a

Page 3986

1 vote taken, and that was against the objection and boycotted by the

2 Serbs, as to whether Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain part of the former

3 Yugoslavia, and that it was certainly the position of the Presidency of

4 Bosnia that they wanted a separate state from that of the former

5 Yugoslavia. And this was opposed by the Serbs. That's my understanding

6 of the position.

7 Q. Well, we have a problem with your understanding. Did you know

8 that we made a concession and that we recognised that there was -- that

9 Bosnia was an independent state, and that that was, in fact, the very

10 essence of the Lisbon Agreement?

11 A. No, I didn't know that.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please look at

13 65 ter 30651, please. This is yet another conversation dated the 4th of

14 April between Jovan Tintor and Momcilo Krajisnik. And let me give you

15 some more information.

16 Q. Tintor was in Vogosca. Do you know where Vogosca is?

17 A. I know approximately where it is.

18 Q. It's to the north of Sarajevo. You have to go across the Zuc,

19 Mount Zuc.

20 A. I don't know Mount Zuc.

21 Q. Thank you. So:

22 [In English] "I hear you've been informed. Rajko has told me

23 about part -- that part. They are getting ready up there. Reportedly,

24 they are on the move already."

25 [Interpretation] And Krajisnik asks:

Page 3987

1 [In English] "Who is on the move?"

2 "Tintor: Well, the Muslims from Kobilja Glava."

3 [No Interpretation]

4 [In English] And then:

5 "They are on their way towards Grbavica, toward us. Zuc, and the

6 situation is intense. I think a conflict will break out up there."

7 [Interpretation] Now we have to move on the next page in the

8 English, and probably the Serbian too. In the Serbian version, it

9 says -- it's on the first page:

10 "It is my duty to notify you."

11 So could you please look at what Krajisnik is saying here:

12 [In English] "We need to try everything to calm the situation

13 down."

14 [Interpretation] And then he goes on to say:

15 [In English] "That's the most important thing. Finally, the

16 people do need to organise themselves, but in no circumstances should we

17 look for trouble. It is very important to keep peace, you know."

18 [Interpretation] Do you know that Serbs really wanted to have

19 peace and that they did not favour any violent or armed solution to the

20 situation, least of all in Sarajevo, where they faced difficulties

21 because they inhabited only some of the neighbourhoods of the city?

22 A. No, I didn't know that.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to have

24 this document admitted into evidence.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 3988

1 Q. Did you know that a part of Vogosca is inhabited by Muslims and

2 that that's a part that the Serbs never controlled, and that included

3 Kobilja Glava, the area from which they attacked Vogosca?

4 A. No.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender that document,

6 please.

7 JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, I have difficulty why this

8 should be admitted in relation to this witness, who said anything -- who

9 didn't say anything about this. I'll confer with my colleagues.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be allowed to say, it's

11 very important to me to hear what the witness does not know, because

12 there's some things he knows very well and that he can testify about very

13 well and other things his impression, and he gained the impression that

14 the Serbs were in favour of war and that it was the Serbs who generated

15 the crisis in Sarajevo. And this is proof and evidence to the contrary,

16 that that's not the case.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE KWON: The witness did not say a word about this intercept.

19 You'll have an opportunity to adduce this intercept into evidence, and

20 the witness's denial remains in the transcript. So we'll not admit it.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 Q. Now, in paragraph 49 of your statement, you said:

23 [In English] "Targets hit by Serb forces included most of the

24 major buildings in the city. There did not appear to be any

25 restraint ..."

Page 3989

1 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

2 Now, do you mean to say that the Serbs, for no reason at all,

3 shot at the large buildings and major buildings of Sarajevo, major

4 buildings, important buildings in Sarajevo?

5 A. It depends on the time-frame we're talking about, Mr. Karadzic.

6 Q. Well, let's start with the 5th of April, then.

7 A. The 5th of April, I was not in Sarajevo. I was in transit to

8 Zagreb and the UNPAs.

9 Q. Very well. Now, do you think that those buildings were not

10 legitimate targets?

11 A. I can't comment on the 5th of April, whether they were not -- I

12 was not in the city. I did not see the damage inflicted on that

13 particular date.

14 Q. Well, when did you see it? When did you see what it says there

15 in paragraph 49 of your statement?

16 A. Collectively, I saw it over a period from May -- from May 13, May

17 14, through until about September of 1993, because I continued to visit

18 Sarajevo after I left there on the 24th of June. I visited in various

19 other capacities and I saw the progressive damage to the city, and I

20 could see buildings that were quite clearly office buildings or

21 residential buildings that over time had sustained significant damage.

22 Q. May I help you out there? You're talking about the government

23 building at Marin Dvor; right?

24 A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm talking about the whole of Sarajevo that I was

25 able to observe, and in earlier evidence I've indicated the limit of my

Page 3990

1 movement around Sarajevo. But the areas that I saw progressively over

2 time sustained significant damage from artillery fire. Some of it I

3 physically witnessed, I was there at the time. Other damage occurred

4 while I was not there. But by September 1993, there had been significant

5 damage done to buildings that had no apparent military value.

6 Q. Tell me, please, what do you understand when you say "major

7 buildings"? What does that mean to you?

8 A. I'm talking about a 10-, 15-storey apartment block, major

9 commercial buildings, various other government-type buildings which are

10 located in the centre of the city, including the library, the Presidency.

11 A whole range of facilities.

12 Q. And which residential building can you point to and say was

13 destroyed?

14 A. Well, there are a number of accommodation buildings in the

15 immediate vicinity of the PTT that were damaged. I saw them burning in

16 mid-May, for example.

17 Q. General, sir, we're now going to take a look at document 1D1093.

18 And while we're waiting for that to come up on our screens, let me tell

19 you that on the 4th of April -- between the 4th of April and the 5th of

20 April, in the morning, all the tall buildings in Sarajevo were taken over

21 by the Green Berets, all the roofs of the higher buildings were taken

22 over by the Green Berets, and there was shooting throughout the night,

23 and a Serb policeman was killed - his name was Petrovic, the late

24 Petrovic - while he was on duty at the police station. Did you know

25 about that?

Page 3991

1 A. Mr. Karadzic, I've already said in my evidence I left Sarajevo on

2 the 4th of April to go to visit my military observers and the UNPAs. I

3 was gone for several days, so, no, I was unaware of what happened in

4 Sarajevo on the night of the 4th of April or the 5th of April.

5 Q. But, General, in other situations you tell us about things you

6 heard. Did you not hear what happened on the 4th of April in the evening

7 in Sarajevo? Did nobody tell you about that?

8 A. Not that I recall.

9 Q. Well, I'm going to tell you now so that you can see how things

10 stood.

11 Look at this document now, please. It's an official note and

12 announcement of the police for the 4th of April, 1992, at around 2300

13 hours. It says that intensive preparations were underway by the Muslim

14 part of the former Ministry of Internal Affairs for the blocking and

15 overtaking of the Ministry of Internal Affairs building as well as the

16 Krtelji landmark in which the special unit was stationed.

17 And then a little further down, it says:

18 "In this action, the Green Berets appropriated all the weapons

19 and equipment and handed them out to Muslim citizens. At the same time,

20 the Green Berets, along with the active and reserve police formations of

21 Muslim nationality, took control of all the vital facilities in the city

22 of Sarajevo. In the close vicinity of Marin Dvor, roughly 300 members of

23 the Green Beret controlled that area and occasionally entered the Public

24 Security Station," et cetera, et cetera.

25 Now, do you think that once they had taken control of those

Page 3992

1 facilities, they let go of them? Would that be military logic, if they

2 had taken control of these facilities, not to hold on to them throughout,

3 or is it logical that they would just leave them?

4 A. I don't know, Mr. Karadzic, whether they did seize the specific

5 facilities that you've nominated or that's contained in this document

6 here. But if you want me to comment on the sensibility of giving them

7 up, I agree that if you're starting a war or you're involved in a war,

8 and you seize an objective of some value, then you're not going to give

9 it up.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'd like to tender this

11 document into evidence now, please.

12 JUDGE KWON: I will not admit it. The general didn't confirm

13 anything about this.

14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I'd also note that the Prosecution

15 was not advised that this would be used. So in future, could that be

16 done, please?

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the problem is that the

19 Prosecution witnesses tend to expand on the field of their testimony, and

20 that then requires me to come forward with new documents.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Anyway, General, you mentioned Dobrinja. You said that you knew

23 about Dobrinja and what was happening there; is that right?

24 A. That depends on what time-frame we're talking, Mr. Karadzic.

25 Q. Well, from the 5th of April until, let's say, the 22nd of May.

Page 3993

1 A. Yes, I'm broadly aware what was happening in that area in that

2 time-frame.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have 1D1100

4 called up on e-court, please.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. This, once again, is an official note, and it says:

7 "By way of operative activities, on the 22nd of May, 1992, we

8 discovered that in Zikica Jovanovic Spanac Street, in Dobrinja," the

9 following numbers of the street, "that large concentrations were

10 discovered at the Green Berets, that they were located there, and that

11 two members of the Green Berets are located on each floor in order to

12 prevent the movement and communication between the residents, and that

13 three or four guards were stationed in front of each entrance ..."

14 And further down, it says:

15 "In the aforementioned street, the Green Berets are concentrating

16 strong forces. They're well armed with automatic rifles, machine-gun

17 snipers, hand grenades," and so on and so forth.

18 Now, did you know that Dobrinja was full of Green Berets?

19 A. No, I didn't.

20 Q. Do you deny it? Do you deny what it says in this document, then?

21 A. No, but your question was: Was Dobrinja full of Green Berets? I

22 would agree if you were to suggest that there were some Presidency forces

23 in there. But whether you describe it as full, I would say, no, it's not

24 full of Presidency forces, or Green Berets, as you call them.

25 Q. All right. So you agree that the Green Berets did seize Dobrinja

Page 3994

1 and controlled it; right?

2 A. I don't believe they controlled it. On the 14th of May, the day

3 after I arrived back in Sarajevo, there was a round of very heavy

4 fighting which started then and went through until early June, and I was

5 at that stage living in an area overlooking the Rainbow Hotel, which I

6 believe to be Dobrinja. And I observed the fighting that was taking

7 place in that area on the 14th, and that fighting continued through to

8 certainly the 22nd of May, to my knowledge. And I would say that the

9 Presidency forces did not dominate the area. That was a contested area,

10 and there was very heavy fighting in there, all the way through to the

11 24th of June, when I left. The detail of what happened there after the

12 24th of June, I don't know.

13 Q. And do you agree that the Serbs retained control over the airport

14 settlement linked to Dobrinja and certain sections of Dobrinja, but that

15 most of Dobrinja was controlled by the Muslim army?

16 A. I have no detailed knowledge of where the confrontation line was.

17 I would confirm my earlier statement that Dobrinja was a disputed area.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I tender this document

19 into evidence now.

20 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.

21 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D330, Your Honours.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, do you know that I always did my best to avoid any kind

Page 3995

1 of dangerous situations, as far as the civilians were concerned, and any

2 suffering on the part of the civilians in Sarajevo?

3 A. No, I didn't.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have 30662

5 next, please.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. And do you consider that I did not invest any such effort, or,

8 rather, did you believe that I did not do my best to save and look after

9 the civilians? You believe the reverse? That's what I mean to ask.

10 A. Mr. Karadzic, I have two comments upon this. The first is that

11 on many occasions when the issue of the conduct of the war, the treatment

12 of civilians, et cetera, was raised with you, the way that your military

13 forces were being employed, for example, the way the city was being

14 shelled, your standard response was that you were either being provoked

15 or you were doing this for the defence of the Serb people. You didn't

16 deny the fact that these events were happening, and you didn't, on many

17 occasions, make any effort to stop that activity.

18 My second comment is that on a number of occasions, you were

19 asked to use your influence to make something happen to improve the lot

20 of civilians, and I remember a number of occasions in Geneva where you

21 were able to turn electricity on, or water supplies on, or stop a

22 military activity, so my answer is that from time to time you did

23 demonstrate a willingness and a desire to look after the welfare of the

24 civilian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But as a general rule, your

25 response was that you were conducting operations for the defence of the

Page 3996

1 Serb people and the creation of the Serb republic.

2 Q. Very well, General. You must know this: What were the goals of

3 the Muslim army in Sarajevo and what were the Serb goals? Or let me help

4 you out here. Did the Serbs have any ambitions of controlling the whole

5 of Sarajevo?

6 A. I have no way of answering either of those questions. I have no

7 intimate knowledge of the strategic aims of either party or the way that

8 those aims may have been derived and agreed.

9 Q. And if I tell you that the Muslims did have ambitions to take the

10 whole of Sarajevo under their control, what would you have to say to

11 that?

12 A. I would say that the Serb -- the Bosnia Presidency position about

13 the whole of Bosnia, as I expressed it, was that it ought to be one

14 community with all ethnic communities living in harmony.

15 Q. And if I tell you, General, that it was exclusively the Muslim

16 forces that launched offensives in Sarajevo, who then was on the defence

17 and who then was on the attack? And if I put it to you that it was their

18 ambition to take control of every Serb settlement, and our intentions to

19 preserve those settlements, what would you say?

20 A. It's a very complex question, Mr. Karadzic.

21 Q. The simple question is: Who did the attacking and who defended

22 themselves? Do you know who launched the operation in Sarajevo to begin

23 with?

24 A. With absolute certainty, no, I don't. But my professional

25 opinion is that both sides were responsible for launching offensive

Page 3997

1 operations.

2 Q. Well, what would the purpose be of our offensive actions? Where

3 was it that we launched an offensive action? Give me an example, if you

4 can.

5 A. There's two parts to that question. I have no idea why you would

6 want to launch offensive actions. That's entirely up to the political

7 and military leadership of the Serbs. The second part is: If I should

8 give an example, then I would say the fighting around Grbavica in late

9 May was certainly an example of where the Serb forces had launched an

10 attack against the city, involved very heavy fighting over some number of

11 days.

12 Q. Are you talking about Ilidza or what? What are you talking

13 about? Are you talking about the hotel at Ilidza called Toplica? Is

14 that what you mean?

15 A. No, I'm talking about Grabaca. I think it's spelled

16 G-R-A-B-A-C-A; something like that. It's in the vicinity of the

17 "Marsal Tito" barracks.

18 Q. Well, General, who lived at Grbavica and controlled it? Is it a

19 Serb settlement, under Serb control?

20 A. I've already indicated to you, Mr. Karadzic, I have no knowledge

21 of the ethnic composition of the city or distribution in the city.

22 Q. But do you know that the Serbs controlled Grbavica from the

23 beginning to the end?

24 A. I thought it was a disputed area.

25 Q. Well, it's disputed because they were attacking us. Had they not

Page 3998

1 been attacking us, it wouldn't have been disputed. You have to ask

2 yourself who was doing the defending and who was doing the attacking at

3 Grbavica, and throughout the war the Muslims tried to take control of

4 Grbavica. They did their best and failed until the Dayton Accords handed

5 it over to them. So are you aware that you cannot speak in generalised

6 terms and say somebody attacking somebody somewhere? We have to know

7 who's doing what and that what Mladic says and what Plavsic said, we were

8 defending Serb settlements and Serb areas, General.

9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could Mr. Karadzic put a question and not a

11 comment, please.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Well, I did ask a question, here it is: Do you know where it was

14 that we defended ourselves? If there was fighting at Grbavica, why would

15 we have attacked ourselves at Grbavica?

16 A. My understanding, Mr. Karadzic, at that time Grbavica was

17 important for the security of the "Marsal Tito" Barracks. My assessment at

18 that time was that General Mladic was trying to perhaps be able to

19 relieve the forces -- the JNA forces in the barracks without the need for

20 negotiation, and that was a Serb assault in that area to effect that.

21 That is my belief, and that's what I've said in evidence.

22 Q. Well, General Mladic was in Knin, when the borders were erected

23 and the front-lines in Sarajevo. Do you understand that the front-line

24 in Sarajevo was set up by the local population to defend their

25 settlements?

Page 3999

1 A. I'm aware of comments at the time that barricades were erected

2 within Sarajevo by - my understanding was - the Serb people to protect

3 themselves. That was the --

4 Q. I'm not talking about the barricades in March. I'm talking about

5 the front-line that was established on the 5th of April. Do you know

6 that on the 5th of April, the local population established the front-line

7 and that it had no assistance whatsoever from the JNA?

8 A. I've already indicated to you, Mr. Karadzic, I wasn't there on

9 the 5th of April, so I don't know what happened. It was not reported to

10 me, what happened.

11 Q. And when did you go back to Sarajevo?

12 A. Without referring to my notes, I don't know exactly, but I would

13 say about the 9th or 10th of April.

14 Q. On the 9th or 10th of April, when you arrived, did you find that

15 the city was divided by the confrontation lines?

16 A. I found that there was -- when I re-entered the city, that there

17 was occasional rifle fire about the area. It was reported to me by my UN

18 colleagues that there had been some fighting within the city, that there

19 was -- or there were barricades being put up, that it was very tense.

20 About this time, there was also the talk about the vote that was going on

21 about the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the former Yugoslavia.

22 Q. When was the voting, General? Why wasn't it on the 28th of April

23 and 1st of March? I mean the 28th of February and the 1st of March. Was

24 the referendum on the 28th of February and the 1st of March, and were the

25 barricades erected on the 1st and 2nd of March? Now, we're talking about

Page 4000

1 the beginning of the war. The war broke out on the 5th or 6th of April.

2 Now, on the 10th of April did you come across a divided city, divided by

3 confrontation lines; yes or no?

4 A. Well, there are a number of questions. To the last part of your

5 question, when I returned to the city there were some parts of the city

6 that were affected by -- particularly affected by this erection of

7 barricades and some talk about an ethnic division taking place. It was

8 also very difficult at that time to -- and it was beginning to be

9 dangerous to drive around the city. The JNA were essentially confined to

10 their barracks. They couldn't really move out of there. They were

11 surrounded, barricaded in. That's what I found.

12 In regard to the -- you asked me for dates on, whether it was the

13 28th of February or the 1st of March, I already indicated in my evidence

14 that we didn't physically arrive in Bosnia until the 22nd of March, that

15 it was the 8th of March that I went to New York to receive briefings for

16 UNPROFOR. What was happening prior to the 8th of March, I was totally

17 focused on what was happening in the UNPAs in Croatia, and I had

18 absolutely no knowledge of what was happening in Bosnia at that time. So

19 I can't confirm the dates for you, Mr. Karadzic.

20 Q. General, you mentioned the voting. The voting wasn't in April;

21 it was in February. So I am interested in what you saw, not your

22 understanding of matters. I respect those, but in criminal law they

23 cannot be of assistance. So tell us, please, do you remember or did you

24 know about the settlement called Pofalici? Have you heard of Pofalici?

25 A. Vaguely.

Page 4001

1 Q. Do you know that it was a predominantly Serb settlement where, on

2 the 15th of May, the Muslims killed more than 200 Serbs before your very

3 eyes?

4 A. I'm sorry, Mr. Karadzic, but nobody killed hundreds of people

5 before my very eyes at any time while I was there. It may be a figure of

6 speech, but I didn't witness that sort of behaviour.

7 Q. Well, I didn't mean you, personally. I apologise. I meant in

8 the eyes of the international community, in the presence of the

9 international community which was present in Sarajevo and receiving

10 information only from the Muslim side that was educating it and leading

11 it astray. So a dramatic event of this kind, was it noted by the

12 international community?

13 A. I've got no idea what the international community notes,

14 Mr. Karadzic, then or now.

15 Q. Did you include it in any of your reports, that there was this

16 slaughter of Serbs in Pofalici that had taken place?

17 A. The date again, please, Mr. Karadzic.

18 Q. The 15th of May. They kept attacking them, but they finished

19 them off on the 15th of May.

20 A. Well, firstly, I was unaware that that settlement was Serb, as

21 indeed I've said several times. I don't know what the ethnic

22 distribution was within Sarajevo and the surrounds.

23 On the 15th of May, it was not within my mandate to be reporting

24 on what was happening in Sarajevo. That would have been, if anybody, the

25 force commander and the people working directly for him. My interest --

Page 4002

1 my responsibility on the 15th of May was two groups of military observers

2 in Bihac and Mostar and those military observers who were still in the

3 UNPAs. What was happening in Sarajevo was of intimate and personal

4 interest to me, but not of any formal responsibility, so, no, I did not

5 report that incident.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Do we have this

7 document on the screen, the one I requested? I think so. Yes.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Could I please ask you -- well, first of all, let us look at the

10 date. It's the 13th of April, a conversation between Radovan Karadzic

11 and Danilo Veselinovic. Can we please look at the very end, where

12 Veselinovic says: "We have just been running around."

13 Let me just tell you this. Veselinovic lived in Nedzarici, a

14 100 per cent Serb settlement, low-rise buildings there, one, two, three

15 stories, and it was protected by its inhabitants throughout the war,

16 defended by them. Let us look at what Mr. Veselinovic is saying:

17 [In English] "We have just been running around, and I shot a

18 sniper. He started shooting at my windows."

19 [Interpretation] There's a curse here.

20 And you can see it goes on to say, well, I ask and what was it

21 all about, and then he says, Well, from Vojnicko Polje, that's

22 the high rise buildings behind that settlement. Can we please move on to

23 the next page. They were shooting from those buildings at his windows.

24 And then Veselinovic, the third line, goes on to say:

25 [In English] "We now have this under control and are ready to

Page 4003

1 attack that one up there to Dobrinja."

2 [Interpretation] And here he asks if they are allowed to blow up

3 the depot and the headquarters of the Green Beret. You can see here.

4 Well, I don't have to read that. And then I inquire as to what is going

5 on there in the gym, in the sports hall, and he says that the looted

6 items are stored there, items looted from Serb apartments, and that this

7 is where they store their ammunition and weapons.

8 And then further down the page -- can we please scroll the

9 English version up a little bit. I say:

10 "It is very important that there should be no people there and

11 that no civilians should be killed."

12 And then we have to move on to the next page in the English

13 language.

14 We can see here I ask:

15 "Who holds the airport, the army?"

16 And he says: "The army."

17 "And Dobrinja?"

18 And he says:

19 "Dobrinja has been cleansed now. Our people started from there,

20 they are fleeing from there."

21 So you can see that this is the situation.

22 We can now move on to the next page in English.

23 So did you know that on the 13th of April, there was such fierce

24 fighting around Nedzarici, General?

25 A. I wouldn't describe the activity at that time as fierce. I would

Page 4004

1 say certainly there was some shooting going on, some exchanges of fire.

2 Until I left Sarajevo on the 30th of April, I was able to see, for 13

3 days, there was sporadic military activity, I would describe it as,

4 rather than intense military activity.

5 Q. Thank you. Well, and if I never boasted to you that I didn't --

6 that I cared about civilians, does that mean that I didn't care about

7 civilians?

8 A. I note your comment in this translated document, Dr. Karadzic,

9 that you were asked to minimise casualties.

10 Q. Thank you. Do you see here I was asking whether the clinical

11 centre had also been taken, and he says: "Yes"? Do you see that part?

12 A. No, I don't.

13 Q. In the middle:

14 [In English] "They do screw us around, believe or not. That is

15 the atmosphere here. If they do not recall those snipers by tonight, if

16 they shoot people tonight, they will kill them all, believe me."

17 [Interpretation] And he is informing me that somehow the Muslims

18 should withdraw the sniper shooters. Otherwise, there's going to be a

19 conflict that will get out of control.

20 And further down, it says:

21 "They should be informed about it."

22 He is asking me to inform the Muslim side in some way to stop

23 killing the inhabitants of Nedzarici. Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, I do. I've got to say, Mr. Karadzic, that sniper fire in

25 that area was at that time was quite common. In fact, I enjoyed the

Page 4005

1 benefit of a sniper used to fire into my bedroom at that time, too, so

2 I'm fully familiar with what the situation was there and the fact that

3 all sides were involved in sniping. This is my belief, that the person

4 firing for my bedroom window was a Serb.

5 Q. You have no proof of that, General; right? That is what you

6 think, but you have no proof?

7 A. It's coming from -- the fire was coming from an area which the

8 local residents told me was a Serb area.

9 Q. And now all of a sudden you do know where Serbs live; right?

10 A. In that particular area, yes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

12 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D331, Your Honours.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01270, could we have that,

15 please?

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. You say, General, that they did not have any heavy weaponry, and

18 now we are going to see what it was that happened before the 19th of

19 April; specifically, during the night between the 18th and the 19th, and

20 the 17th and the 18th, so that is to say those nights. This is a letter

21 that is written by the commander of the military district,

22 General Kukanjac, to Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. You can see that for

23 yourself. There's no need for me to read it out. He says to him,

24 Mr. President, your Green Berets, in the course of the night between the

25 17th and 18th of April, carried out an attack on the factory in Vogosca.

Page 4006

1 Pretis is a military factory. It belong to the JNA; right? So you are

2 familiar with the results of that attack. They stole over 100 Golf

3 vehicles, and they stole some weaponry as well. And during the night

4 between the 18th and the 19th in Konjic, they blocked everything. All

5 telephones were cut off from military facilities. The Green Berets

6 occupied the military equipment factory Igman, and they took everything

7 that they needed. They never let that military industry get out of their

8 hands ever after that. And then also it says that the fate of

9 Major Ranko Kuljanin is unknown. It says:

10 "Mr. President, cease all attacks on military facilities; return

11 regular work to the factory; order the unblocking of military facilities,

12 Ljuta and Celebic. And if you do not do this, heavy consequences will

13 follow and you will be held responsible."

14 Can we have the next page, please? In English, it's still fine.

15 That will do:

16 "Do not forget we signed the peace agreement on the 12th of

17 April, 1992."

18 Do you remember that Ambassador Cutileiro and Mr. Vance were in

19 Sarajevo at the time?

20 A. Mr. Karadzic, I don't remember an agreement being signed on the

21 12th of April. And as I indicated to you before, I had no operational

22 responsibility for what was happening in Sarajevo prior to the 13th of

23 May.

24 Q. But that was in the media. It was a generally-known thing.

25 Mr. Vance was there and Ambassador Cutileiro, and a cease-fire agreement

Page 4007

1 was signed on the 12th of April. And do you remember that on the 12th of

2 April, after the cease-fire agreement was signed, the Muslim side issued

3 an order to blockade JNA barracks and obstruct roads and seize weapons?

4 A. No, I don't recall the peace agreement being signed on the 12th

5 of April. And I can't put a specific time-frame on the blockading of the

6 JNA, but I agree it was about that time.

7 Q. Thank you. That's what's written here:

8 "Mr. President, do not forget that we have signed a cease

9 agreement on the 12th of April, 1992, and on that very same day your

10 directive was issued declaring war on the JNA, and, of course, against

11 Serbs and other innocent citizens."

12 Also it says:

13 "Say that publicly, that you wish a war. And if you don't want a

14 war, then deny that by doing what needs to be done."

15 That was drastic, 4th of April mobilisation. And then between

16 the 4th and 5th, the Green Berets took control of Sarajevo, and then

17 there's a cease-fire on the 12th of April. And on the 12th of April,

18 there is a directive to launch a war.

19 Did you know about these crucial, important events, crucial for

20 the situation in Bosnia?

21 A. No.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be

23 admitted into evidence? The general does know that the cease-fire

24 agreement was signed at the time.

25 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland?

Page 4008

1 THE WITNESS: Excuse me.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, General.

3 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know the cease-fire agreement was

4 signed on the 12th of April, sir.

5 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, he hasn't spoken to anything in

6 this document that I'm aware of.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General, do you agree that certain military facilities were taken

9 here and that obviously weapons had been taken out of there?

10 A. No, I don't know that, Mr. Karadzic.

11 JUDGE KWON: So it will not be admitted, along the same lines --

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Did you ever meet General Kukanjac, sir?

14 A. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Karadzic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 30714, can we have

16 that, please?

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. And in the meantime, General, do you know that out of 13

19 cease-fire violations, according to UN findings, 12 were committed by the

20 Muslim side in Sarajevo? We're talking about Sarajevo, as such.

21 A. Which 13 violations? There were thousands of violations,

22 Mr. Karadzic. Which ones are we talking about?

23 Q. The first 13 cease-fire agreements that had been signed in

24 Sarajevo. Out of 13, 12 had been violated by the Muslim side. The

25 United Nations registered that and reported about that. Were you aware

Page 4009

1 of that?

2 A. I'm unaware of such a report or, indeed, those statistics.

3 Q. I would like to draw your attention to this intercept of the 23rd

4 April. It is Radovan Karadzic and Radovan Pejic who are talking. Pejic

5 worked for the police then. Now, I called him, and he's answering the

6 phone, and I am asking him what the situation is like over there. And he

7 says that it is peaceful. And I repeat that, and he says:

8 [In English] "Except for the facts that we are in position

9 because there are some indications that they keep getting organised down

10 there in Grbavica."

11 [Interpretation] Next page, please, in English.

12 Further on, he says that there were attacks during the previous

13 night:

14 [In English] " We are ready so that we can defend ourselves in

15 case they attack us again."

16 [Interpretation] Now, Grbavica, there is fighting around

17 Grbavica, and Karadzic says:

18 [In English] "Ah-hah, all right. We should sign the cease-fire

19 today, and therefore we should not -- we must not initiate any attack,

20 and they should not do so either."

21 [No interpretation]

22 [In English] "Mr. President, we are not leaving this position."

23 [No interpretation]

24 [In English] "Have you suffered any damage?"

25 [Interpretation] He said:

Page 4010

1 [In English] "Yesterday, our premises -- yesterday and the day

2 before yesterday."

3 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

4 The last page now:

5 [In English] "We have no guarantees except for people who were

6 killed in the engagement in Ilidza."

7 [Interpretation] General, do you see that the Serbs are defending

8 themselves and they are bracing themselves for an attack?

9 A. I simply read this document. I have no understanding of the

10 background to it or the circumstances, so it's just prose to me. I can't

11 read anything into it, Mr. Karadzic.

12 Q. Thank you. This is the 23rd of April. Do you know that on the

13 22nd of April, I made an offer to stop the conflict?

14 A. No, I didn't, Mr. Karadzic.

15 Q. Thank you. You are referring to an intensive conflict that

16 started on the 14th of May. Do you know, General, that it's not that

17 that conflict came out of the blue; all of this was by way of preparation

18 for what had happened and what you had witnessed?

19 A. I can only observe what happened on the 14th of May. I was

20 unaware at the time of the causes or the justification.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be

22 admitted?

23 JUDGE KWON: Next time. We'll not admit this intercept through

24 this witness, who confirmed nothing about it.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4011

1 Q. Do you know, General, where I was on the 14th and 15th of May?

2 A. I have no idea, Mr. Karadzic.

3 Q. Do you accept that I was with Ambassador Zimmerman, the US

4 ambassador, and that he actually wrote about that in his memoirs, in his

5 book?

6 A. If you say so, Mr. Karadzic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D57, could we have that, please.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. And do you know that towards the end of April, we attended

10 negotiations in Brussels?

11 A. No, I don't.

12 Q. Do you know what happened in Sarajevo on the 2nd and 3rd of May?

13 A. I left Sarajevo on the 30th of April to return to Jerusalem,

14 where my wife had been left behind in January, when I deployed to

15 Croatia. I went back to help her pack up and return to Australia. I

16 arrived back in Sarajevo on the 13th of May, so I have no idea what

17 happened between the 30th of April and the 13th of May.

18 Q. Had anyone told you about Dobrovoljacka, the massacre at

19 Dobrovoljacka Street, and the day before that the massacre of the

20 security detail of the military hospital?

21 A. I was aware of a firing upon the evacuation, the first JNA

22 barracks which I think you're referring to. I was certainly briefed on

23 that when I returned to Sarajevo on the 13th of May. I'm unaware of any

24 security detachment at a hospital being also killed --

25 Q. The 2nd of May, General, the security detail of the military

Page 4012

1 hospital went to the JNA centre to defend some young men. They were

2 killed, burned, and the commander, Lazarevic, committed suicide. You

3 didn't know about that?

4 A. This is the first I've heard of it.

5 Q. General, obviously the Muslims were informing you and they

6 omitted to tell you about this major crime of theirs. How is it possible

7 that you don't know about all of this? It wasn't that there was shooting

8 at the convoy on the 3rd of May. The column had been cut, and people

9 were killed and taken prisoner. That was only 10 days before --

10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland, did you rise?

11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Again, Your Honour, a comment, not question.

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, make your question simple and direct.

13 You are prone to making lengthy comments, and you formulate your question

14 in such a lengthy way.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd like to ask the general

16 how it is possible that he was not informed in detail about a major

17 crime, about the killing of such a large number of soldiers, after an

18 evacuation had been agreed upon.

19 THE WITNESS: I'd restate, Dr. Karadzic, that I was not there

20 during these events, and that when I returned on the 13th of May, I was

21 debriefed on what had happened and the events that flowed from that

22 unfortunate incident. Once again, I have to restate, Dr. Karadzic, that

23 my operational focus was not on Sarajevo or, indeed, not on most of

24 Bosnia at that time. It was not my -- it was not my responsibility to

25 pursue these matters. These were matters that were being specifically

Page 4013

1 addressed by General MacKenzie, to a lesser extent General Morillon, and

2 General Nambiar and Mr. Thornberry. They were the people intimately

3 involved in this. When I was -- my first working day was the 14th of

4 May. Virtually nobody came to work that day because the fighting that

5 was going on in the city. It wasn't not until the 15th of May that I was

6 actually able to get into the PTT, because I was stuck in my apartment in

7 Dobrinja. And when the UN staff were able to return to the headquarters,

8 they did it basically to pack up and to move to Sarajevo -- move to

9 Belgrade. I was debriefed and I was generally aware of it, but it was

10 not my responsibility to be intimately involved in it. And there were

11 many other things happening at that time also.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Well, all right. But as a human being, you should have been

14 aware of that.

15 Let me ask you the following, General: Do you know what happened

16 on the 15th of May in Tuzla?

17 A. No, I don't, Mr. Karadzic.

18 Q. Do you know that over there, there was also a JNA column whose

19 evacuation had been agreed upon, was totally destroyed, torched, they

20 were fired at from surrounding skyscrapers?

21 A. I do have a recollection of that, Mr. Karadzic.

22 Q. General, since you sometimes testify about things that you did

23 not see personally, I ask you sometimes about other things that have to

24 do with the Serb side and you say that you weren't there and that you

25 therefore don't know. As for Mladic's message regarding the evacuation,

Page 4014

1 do you see it in a different light now, knowing that on the 2nd, 3rd, and

2 15th of May, although evacuations had been agreed, soldiers of the JNA

3 had been trapped and killed?

4 A. Yes, I'm aware that that happened. That was part of my briefing

5 when I arrived back from my leave. I'm aware of that. And I thought at

6 the time it was a senseless loss of life. It was a demonstration of the

7 failure of all parties in the conflict, in my experience, who failed to

8 honour agreements. There were any number of cease-fires, Mr. Karadzic,

9 that people signed up for and agreed to and never honoured. There are

10 many declarations of support that never materialised.

11 Q. However, General, withdrawal had been agreed, and the army did

12 agree, and that is what one side did. And the other side was attacked in

13 a bloodthirsty manner. So it's not that there were mutual violations

14 coming from both sides. What could the other side do? General MacKenzie

15 supervised the withdrawal, and that's what was happening. Are you trying

16 to say that the Serb side did something wrong there?

17 A. Mr. Karadzic, I was not there at the time. I've told you that.

18 But I can tell you this: that I was responsible for the evacuation of the

19 next three barracks, and they were, with one exception, executed in a

20 very professional manner, and that there was no repetition of these

21 events partly because of the care taken by my staff and myself to make

22 sure that there were good and solid agreements.

23 The one incident, a barracks, the name I can't recall, became

24 Canadian Bear Camp, was evacuated against our specific advice. Too late

25 in the day, at twilight, they start packing up and moving. The person

Page 4015

1 who was leading the convoy out on the agreed route decided that he was

2 going to vary the route because he didn't trust the agreed plan, so he

3 took the convoy along another route. And, of course, they bumped into a

4 position unknown of nationality and there was an exchange of fire. There

5 was some 30 people lost through that. You might call that the fog of

6 war. But I have to say, Mr. Karadzic, that the UN did take great care in

7 trying to formulate sensible plans, and that it's in my experience in the

8 conflict that all parties violated agreements from time to time.

9 Q. Could I please ask you to have a look at this document? This is

10 the second directive to attack the JNA. The first one was earlier on,

11 and this one on the 29th of April. General, this is the basis for what

12 happened on the 2nd, 3rd, and 15th of May in Tuzla; isn't that right?

13 A. I've not seen this document before, and I don't -- [Overlapping

14 speakers].

15 Q. However, you saw what happened on the basis of this document.

16 This is the foundation for what happened, what followed. That is what

17 happened. The 2nd and 3rd and 15th of May were inevitable, unavoidable,

18 after this kind of document was issued; right?

19 A. No, I can't agree.

20 Q. This is an aggressive document. Does this document order an

21 attack against the JNA?

22 A. My reading of this document, and in particular paragraph 3, says

23 that they are to prevent unannounced movements of people leaving

24 barracks. It doesn't say that, to attack. Military documentation is

25 usually very specific. I can't comment on people who were trained by the

Page 4016

1 JNA. But certainly in my military experience, it's quite specific, what

2 you're authorised to do and what you're not. There are things called the

3 rules of engagement. I don't see anything in this document that says

4 they are to be attacked. It says they are to be prevented, and there are

5 many ways of doing that without firing.

6 Q. What about number 4? Look at number 4, General:

7 "Hurriedly plan and begin combat operations in the whole

8 territory of Republic of BH and co-ordinate them with the

9 Territorial Defence staffs of regions, district and with the Republic of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina."

11 Is this not an order to attack?

12 A. It's an order for combat operations in the whole of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not necessarily JNA convoys.

14 Q. Who would be the enemy, then?

15 A. I have no idea. The drafter of this document would know that,

16 perhaps the recipient.

17 Q. Well, you could guess too, you could venture a guess.

18 Can we just have 1414, just one more document.

19 Let us see what the minister of the interior, the Muslim minister

20 of the interior, is saying to his Presidency, what they had done on the

21 basis of this directive. This is the 6th of May, the session of the

22 Muslim Presidency. There are some Croats and Serbs there who were not

23 asked anything, and -- actually, what about the other document; can it be

24 admitted?

25 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland?

Page 4017

1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Just a moment, Your Honour.

2 [Prosecution counsel confer]

3 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D332, Your Honours.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is it, the 6th of May, 1992,

7 the session of the Presidency.

8 Can we have 271 in Serbian, and now let's see which page it is in

9 English. It could be the next page in English.

10 Now we have two pages in Serbian. It should have been the next

11 page in English.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Have a look at this. Mr. Delimustafic. Do you know the name of

14 Mr. Alija Delimustafic, the minister of the interior?

15 A. No, I don't.

16 Q. Let us see, in relation to the previous document, what

17 Delimustafic is saying in relation to that document:

18 "Both we and his ministry made mistakes. Like what Bakir did or

19 Avdo Hebib, when he ordered the war to start, people to open fire, occupy

20 the barracks. He sent the order to all centres without my knowledge. He

21 declared war. I told him to issue a statement to observe the proper

22 form. He never came to see me again, he doesn't speak to me."

23 Izetbegovic says: "Who did that?"

24 And Delimustafic says: "Avdo Hebib."

25 Izetbegovic: "What did he do?"

Page 4018

1 Delimustafic: "He declared war on the army."

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour, can we know the

3 provenance -- the source of this document?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The distinguished Ms. Sutherland

5 was not here, but several times we identified this same compilation of

6 Tomo Simic, documents of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was

7 all right every time.

8 The session of the 17th of June has already been admitted into

9 evidence, and we're going to show it to the general tomorrow. This is a

10 compilation of documents of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 Tomo Simic had just collected it, compiled it, but everything is

12 authentic.

13 Now, let's see what else he says.

14 Izetbegovic: "What did he do?"

15 Delimustafic: "He declared war on the army. Four points.

16 Signed the dispatch."

17 Izetbegovic: "In which capacity?"

18 Kljujic, Stjepan, realises that it is very dangerous. And he

19 says:

20 "We have finished the recording. Don't record this."

21 Izetbegovic: "What does Avdo have --"

22 Delimustafic: "Copied it and sent to all centres in the

23 republic."

24 Izetbegovic: "Fine, so Avdo gave support only as a technical

25 figure."

Page 4019

1 Delimustafic: "Officially. Signed it and said: kill, steal,

2 attack barracks, item 4."

3 And Kljujic says: "Let's not talk about that now, please. We

4 can't deal with everything tonight," et cetera.

5 See, general, this Muslim minister of the interior realised that

6 war had been declared on the JNA.

7 A. I can't comment on that, Dr. Karadzic. I mean, I don't know the

8 events of what happened in April, the detail of it. I can't sensibly

9 comment on that.

10 Q. But, General, you're testifying about all sorts of other things,

11 but do you see what the basis of it all is and how the war actually

12 started, and who caused the war and led the war and declared the war? Do

13 you see that from this? If you didn't know then, do you realise that

14 now? But why didn't you know about it then?

15 A. If you're testing my English comprehension, I can read the

16 document, I think, successfully, but I can't comment on the background or

17 the accuracy of what's in there, or the likelihood of it being true.

18 JUDGE KWON: That will be it for today, Mr. Karadzic.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. All I want to do is test to see, General, whether you are able to

21 testify about the things that you are testifying about.

22 A. Well, I can't testify about this particular aspect then,

23 Mr. Karadzic.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

25 It's linked to the one before, and that's the basis and groundwork for