100622ED

Page 4026

1 May I ask for 65 ter 30723 to be called up in e-court.

2 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

3 Q. [Interpretation] While we're waiting for that, may I inform you,

4 General, that this is an intercept of a conversation between

5 Professor Koljevic and Miljenko Karisik, the chief of our Special Police

6 Brigade. So it's the 30th of April, 1992.

7 Professor Koljevic is calling from Lisbon. Please cast a glance

8 at what he said.

9 Can we please move on to page 2 in English. It's the same page

10 in Serbian. Actually, sorry, I beg your pardon.

11 You can see here that it's impossible to communicate by telephone

12 between Sarajevo and Pale. Mr. Karisik is at Vraca. That is where the

13 headquarters of the Serb MUP is, and he cannot reach Pale by telephone.

14 Professor Koljevic is putting questions from Lisbon and providing certain

15 instructions.

16 Can we move on to page 2, please. Second page, please.

17 At the top, you can see that, in English, that they cannot reach

18 783. That is the code for Pale. And this young men says that they are

19 having problems too, that Pale seems to be cut off. And it was the

20 Muslim side that had cut off Pale. You see here towards the bottom that

21 they are discussing who it is who is actually shooting on the 30th of

22 April. And as you can see, they are firing at the army at Zlatiste, and

23 Koljevic is calling for restraint on our side. It had been agreed with

24 Colm Doyle that European Community Monitors be positioned near all our

25 artillery pieces so that they would be in a position to report who it was

Page 4027

1 that was doing the shooting.

2 You see here it says:

3 "Yes, they shoot from Hum and Zlatiste."

4 [In English] "They shoot from the direction of Sirokaca and

5 Zlatiste."

6 [Interpretation] Do you know that Sirokaca and Zlatiste are in

7 the hills on the slopes of Mount Trebevic?

8 A. No, I didn't know that, Mr. Karadzic.

9 Q. If you were to be observing fire from Zlatiste and Sirokaca that

10 is falling on Serb neighbourhoods in town, would your conclusion be that

11 it is Serbs that are firing at the Serbs in town?

12 A. As I indicated yesterday, I have a very limited knowledge of the

13 geography of Sarajevo and these places. They mean absolutely nothing to

14 me.

15 Q. General, you came here to testify. I am asking you the

16 following: When shells fall on Sarajevo from the hills around Sarajevo,

17 does it go without saying, as far as you're concerned, that it's the

18 Serbs who are doing the shooting?

19 A. I would say, yeah, on most occasions I would think that if

20 shelling is coming from outside the city, it would be -- it would

21 certainly be originating from Serb positions.

22 Q. You see, that is totally wrong. You know where Hum is? It is to

23 the north of Sarajevo. We saw it here on a photograph. And Zlatiste and

24 Sirokaca is to the south of Sarajevo, on the slopes of Trebevic, so they

25 are firing from the hills, shells are falling on Sarajevo, and the Serbs

Page 4028

1 are being blamed for it; right?

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the witness has answered that

3 question. As he clearly indicated, he has a very limited knowledge of

4 the geography of Sarajevo. That's what we heard from the witness. Let's

5 move on. I don't think there's any point of asking him about geography

6 any further.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, ethnic deployment and

8 geography are two very important things, as far as -- where the shells

9 are coming from and where they're falling. They are falling on Serb

10 neighbourhoods, and yet the Serbs are being blamed for those shells. So

11 why is this witness here? All right, I understand. Thank you.

12 Can we have the next page in English.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Can I draw your attention to what Koljevic is saying here:

15 [In English] "We have made an arrangement with Doyle that he

16 should bring those observers. Let them be taken where our artillery is

17 and let that artillery be withdrawn. We cannot start the conference here

18 without this done. This has been set as a condition."

19 [Interpretation] Do you know that Muslims often put various

20 conditions forth in order for the conference to continue, or, rather,

21 that this showed that it was not in their interest to have the conference

22 continue?

23 A. Mr. Karadzic, I don't know which conference we're talking about.

24 And any conference in April of 1992, I would have had limited knowledge

25 or interest in.

Page 4029

1 Q. However, as for the time when you were part of the conference,

2 were the Muslims putting various obstacles in the path of the conference

3 and various preconditions, and was it not obvious that it was not in

4 their interest for the conference to continue?

5 A. If we're talking about 1993, yes, there were many occasions where

6 each side participating in the negotiations placed preconditions on the

7 continuation or some subsequent action being able to take place. But in

8 all honesty, it was not just the Muslims who did this, but all of the

9 parties involved.

10 Q. However, do you remember that all our positions were based on the

11 unconditioned continuation of the conference? Give us one single example

12 of a situation when the Serbs said, We are not going to go to the

13 conference unless such and such a thing is done.

14 A. At the present moment, I can't give you an example, Mr. Karadzic.

15 But I can say that it is my general recollection that both sides or all

16 sides participated and drove pretty hard bargains in the negotiating

17 process, and from time to time refused to progress with the conference at

18 all. Minor problems were sorted out.

19 Q. However, the Serbs did not do that. You're not going to find any

20 such example, General; isn't that right?

21 A. It's true, I can't give you a specific example right now.

22 Q. Thank you. I would like to direct your attention to what

23 Koljevic is saying. Well, that's what the document says:

24 [In English] "Mobilisation cannot start until the artillery which

25 is threatening the city is removed."

Page 4030

1 [Interpretation] Further down, it says:

2 [In English] "There should be no shells falling on the city

3 anymore, and we cannot prove this came from Hum. You know that."

4 [Interpretation] Then further down:

5 [In English] "We can only take them there and tell them, 'These

6 here are our artillery pieces.'

7 "That is it. So I'd like to ask you to make sure that this is

8 done, and let them go to some artillery positions.

9 "Our positions."

10 [Interpretation] So do you see that we are trying to bring the

11 observers and monitors in to monitor our artillery pieces in order to be

12 in a position to report that we are not the ones who are firing?

13 A. That's certainly what this document says, but I have no knowledge

14 of the tactical situation there. On the 30th of April, I, in fact, left

15 the city to go to Jerusalem. This would seem to be a more appropriate

16 question to be asking Mr. Doyle.

17 Q. However, we didn't have enough time for Mr. Doyle. But let me

18 say this: It is clear from this conversation that the Muslims are firing

19 from the hills on the north and the south, and that they are putting

20 forth preconditions; namely, that the conference cannot continue until

21 the Serbs stop firing, but it's actually the Muslims who are doing the

22 shooting.

23 Can I now have page 3, please. The next page in English, please.

24 You see here that they are unable to reach Pale from Sarajevo.

25 They cut them off. That means that it was the Muslims that cut off the

Page 4031

1 telephone lines with Pale. And Koljevic says that it's very important

2 that the white ones, that is to say, the monitors - they wore white

3 suits - that they come to the spot and they see that we are not the ones

4 who are shooting.

5 Did you know anything about these ploys, that the Muslims were

6 actually firing and accusing the Serbs of having fired?

7 A. No, I didn't.

8 Q. Were there any conversations amongst you, the representatives of

9 the international community, if I can put it that way, that one had to

10 exercise caution because different games are being played, and different

11 tricks too?

12 A. Mr. Karadzic, I return to my evidence of yesterday that the

13 events that were taking place in Sarajevo were not in the -- within the

14 mandate of UNPROFOR and, quite rightly, belonged to the ECMM. And I

15 believe that Mr. Doyle was one of the prominent leaders of the ECMM in

16 Sarajevo.

17 Once again, I can't talk about events that occurred when I was

18 not there, and I certainly can't relate a written document to a tactical

19 situation of which I've got no knowledge.

20 Q. General, your statement is full of positions of this kind. You

21 are referring to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia where you had never

22 been. You easily resort to saying that it was the Serbs who were firing

23 and that things like that were happening. We'll deal with that tomorrow.

24 Can this document be admitted?

25 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the witness has confirmed any part of

Page 4032

1 it. There's no basis on the part of the Chamber to admit this.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, his entire statement

3 shouldn't be admitted into evidence, Your Excellency. Then I suggest

4 that all of that be taken out because it's useless.

5 Can we have 0010 -- 01110 -- 1D01110?

6 General, in --

7 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

8 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I note in this document that the

10 Karadzic translation is incomplete. And when comparing it against a CLSS

11 translation, it seems to be inaccurate.

12 JUDGE KWON: Do you mean that you have a CLSS translation?

13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, a CLSS translation exists.

14 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we use it?

15 MS. SUTHERLAND: But we would need to put it on ELMO. It's

16 printing right now.

17 JUDGE KWON: Is it not in the e-court yet?

18 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour, it's not part of the Rule

19 65 ter exhibits.

20 JUDGE KWON: You have no objection to using the CLSS translation,

21 Mr. Karadzic?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely not, and I'm very

23 thankful that it exists. But we, of course, can't translate the

24 documents in their entirety, just the passages that are of interest to

25 us, because we don't have the resources to do that.

Page 4033

1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I note it is a draft CLSS

2 translation.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd be grateful if they could

4 point out what it is that is wrong in our Serbian translation. Perhaps

5 the Prosecution can point that out to us.

6 And may we now have 1D01110 brought up, please?

7 JUDGE KWON: So we can have that Serbian version in e-court while

8 we have the translation on the ELMO.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Now, General, do you agree that this is a daily report dealing

11 with daily events that the minister of the interior is informing us about

12 on the 2nd of May, 1992, Mico Stanisic?

13 A. I can confirm that's what the document says. But I've not seen a

14 previous example so I can't confirm that that's, in fact, you know, what

15 you say it is.

16 Q. In paragraph 40 of your statement, you say that after your

17 return, you were informed about the events that took place in your

18 absence; right?

19 A. I was briefed on them, yes; in particular, upon the ambushing of

20 the JNA convoy.

21 Q. Now, this is a report -- a daily report for the 2nd of May, 1992,

22 so let's see what it says, what this report from the Ministry of the

23 Interior and minister of the interior says. It says that "over the past

24 24 hours," or at 2430 hours, there was an unprovoked attack on the Serbs

25 of Sarajevo by the Green Berets.

Page 4034

1 Did you know of the existence of the Green Berets at all?

2 A. I'm aware the military forces of the Bosnian Presidency were

3 called the Green Berets by the Serb forces.

4 Q. And did those forces refer to themselves by that name?

5 A. Not that I'm aware of.

6 Q. Do you know that one of the main streets in Sarajevo is called

7 the Green Berets Street?

8 A. No, I don't.

9 Q. Well, a witness said here that the Green Berets were something

10 that the Serbs had imagined, it was a fantasy of the Serbs. Do you

11 consider that to be true, too?

12 A. I can't comment on that, Mr. Karadzic.

13 Q. Thank you. Well, let's have a look at what the minister is

14 reporting on; that there was a perfidious attack by the Green Berets from

15 the direction of Visoko at the villages of Vela and Zenik. Now, General,

16 you mentioned Visoko. Do you remember passing by a Serbian checkpoint

17 between Visoko and Ilijas in a village called Cakarcici [phoen]?

18 A. No. Once again, I refer to my statement, that I had limited

19 knowledge of the geography of Sarajevo. I'm aware broadly where Visoko

20 is, though, but certainly not those villages mentioned in this report.

21 Q. Thank you. So the all-out attack with heavy weapons and snipers,

22 so that means they attacked Vraca, the seat of the Serbian MUP. The

23 attack lasted several hours, and hundreds of mortar shells were fired,

24 damaging the buildings and several houses in Dobojska Street, some of

25 which caught fire. And then again at around 1500 hours, there was a

Page 4035

1 heavy artillery attack from infantry and sniper weapons, the same from

2 the direction of Grbavica, Hrasno, and Pofalici neighbourhoods, and the

3 Jajce Barracks. Do you know that the Jajce Barracks were up on a hill

4 above Sarajevo?

5 A. I know two barracks were on a hill overlooking Sarajevo. One

6 which was formerly the headquarters of the 2nd Military District. I

7 can't recall its name. And the other barracks was down closer to the

8 Tito Barracks, and that was one of the barracks I was involved in

9 evacuating.

10 Q. So you don't know that there was a Jajce Barracks above

11 Bascarsija up on the hill?

12 A. Once again, Mr. Karadzic, I have limited geographic knowledge of

13 the city.

14 Q. Thank you. So you see here "Hrasno." That's at an elevation,

15 and so is Pofalici and the Jajce Barracks. So if they're dropping from

16 Hum, Zlatiste, Sirokaca, Jajce, Hrasno, and so on and so forth, do you

17 understand, General, that they were all hills under Muslim control and

18 that they were firing on Serb suburbs?

19 A. No, I don't understand.

20 Q. Did anybody tell you that in the night between the 1st and 2nd of

21 May, that is to say, before the killing of the security detail at the

22 military hospital, that this attack took place on the Serbian MUP, and

23 hundreds of mortar shells fell on our ministry building? Were you

24 briefed about that or did that come under the general heading of the town

25 was shelled?

Page 4036

1 A. The latter part of your answer. There was so much activity

2 taking place at that time that a particular attack in one part of the

3 city was reported basically as just part of the general calamity of what

4 was occurring.

5 Once again, I've got to say that UNPROFOR's footprint in the city

6 was quite small. We had very limited capacity to investigate what was

7 going on, and this was the responsibility of the ECMM.

8 I would again point out to you that between the 30th of May -- or

9 on the 30th of April and the 13th of May, I was not in the city.

10 Q. General, let me ask you this now: If this were contained in a

11 report, hundreds of mortar shells fell on the city, if it was that phrase

12 that appeared, would you understand it that it was the Serbs doing the

13 shooting?

14 JUDGE KWON: That's not for the witness to answer that question.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Can this document be admitted?

17 JUDGE KWON: Likewise, there's no basis for us to admit this.

18 The witness has confirmed nothing about this.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 May we have 1D01111. Four 1s, please, 01111.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Again, Your Honour, this is another translation

23 which we have a CLSS draft translation for. The difference between the

24 Karadzic Defence translation and the CLSS translation, some nuances in

25 words, but the difference being in the very first sentence, it simply

Page 4037

1 lacks the words "last night's attack" -- the words "by members" are

2 missing from the Karadzic Defence translation, and there's also three

3 errors in relation to the names of the people that are listed. So if you

4 wish to use the CLSS draft translation, we have that.

5 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

6 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, it could be put on ELMO.

7 JUDGE KWON: With the understanding that the English translation

8 will be replaced to this document.

9 And one further question is: Are those translations the ones

10 that have been pre-existing or the ones that have been newly translated

11 by the CLSS?

12 MS. SUTHERLAND: Pre-existing, yes, Your Honour. The same for

13 the last document and this document.

14 JUDGE KWON: So you found those pre-existing translated

15 documents?

16 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, yes.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's put it on the ELMO. Let's hope it

18 will be working again.

19 General, in the meantime while we're waiting for that machine to

20 be working again: One of the things we discussed in your absence,

21 General, was the scheduling today. We'll sit until 12.30 today, and then

22 we'll adjourn for today and we'll sit again tomorrow morning.

23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, if I can just make the point that

25 if Mr. Karadzic is going to read the translation, that he reads it

Page 4038

1 correctly. He said a moment ago to the last document that hundreds of

2 mortar shells were being fired. In fact, the translation says "a

3 hundred." I mean, it's quibbling, but I would ask that he read the

4 translation properly.

5 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed with the B/C/S. Yes.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe I said "a hundred."

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

8 Q. General, this is another daily report for the 3rd of May, so --

9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Why don't we give the English

10 translation to the witness for his convenience. It will be easier for

11 him to follow.

12 Let's proceed.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have our translation into

14 English so that we can see what is wrong, what they say is wrong. So may

15 we have our translation called up on e-court, please.

16 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed. [Overlapping speakers]

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, you said yesterday that you believed that the Muslims

19 had several mortars, 82-millimetre ones; right?

20 A. If I said that, it's perhaps a little inaccurate. I had a small

21 quantity. I would think if they had 20 or 30, that would be the limit.

22 Q. Well, do you claim that they didn't have any 120-millimetre ones?

23 A. I did see -- now, I can't recall ever seeing a 120-millimetre

24 mortar.

25 Q. And do you believe their sources, that in Sarajevo, itself, they

Page 4039

1 produced 80.000 shells for the 120-millimetre?

2 A. It's the first time I've heard that, Mr. Karadzic.

3 Q. We'll bring the book in tomorrow, their source.

4 Now, would you focus on the last paragraph, please. It says:

5 "According to detailed information that is in the possession of

6 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of BiH, the

7 victims of the 120-millimetre mortar attack carried out by the so-called

8 TO BAH and other paramilitary formations against the area of

9 Vraca-Sarajevo are as follows:"

10 And then they listed several killed, the rest were injured.

11 Do you know where Vraca is, General?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Let me help you out. Vraca is a hill above Grbavica. So

14 Grbavica and Vraca are mostly inhabited by Serbs, and Vraca is almost a

15 100 per cent Serbian area.

16 So do you see between the 2nd and 3rd of May, 1992, there was a

17 heavy mortar attack, using 120-millimetre mortars, against this Serb

18 settlement and that this many people were injured and killed?

19 A. That's what this document says, but I was not in the city and I

20 was not briefed on this.

21 Q. But in paragraph 40, you say that upon your return, you were

22 briefed on the situation, and this is a drastic event. Did the ECMM give

23 you the possibility of learning about this?

24 A. No. I should take a moment to tell you exactly what happened

25 when I returned to the city on the 13th of May.

Page 4040

1 When I returned to the city on the 13th of May, I returned to the

2 office for a short period of time and spoke with General MacKenzie. He,

3 at that time, was preoccupied with the after-events of the evacuation of

4 the first JNA Barracks, including the kidnapping of President Izetbegovic,

5 so his briefing was necessarily broad and he hit the highlights. I also

6 spoke with my UNMO headquarters staff, and they briefed me, in broad

7 terms, what had happened in Sarajevo to the effect that there had been

8 continued conflict, that there had been some fighting around the hill you

9 call Hum, and then they briefed me on what my military observers had been

10 doing in the UNPAs in Croatia.

11 On the 14th of May, there was very heavy fighting, where nobody

12 could leave their accommodation.

13 On the 15th of May, when I was able to get into the headquarters,

14 once again there was very limited staff there because the fighting was

15 continuing.

16 On the 16th and 17th of May, the headquarters left. So there was

17 limited opportunity for people to be sitting down and briefing anybody in

18 detail about events for which we had no operational responsibility.

19 So I'd like to give you that rather lengthy explanation to

20 explain why I've not got a detailed knowledge of what happened while I

21 was away. It's pointless asking me about these matters.

22 Q. Thank you. Then let's look at a document before the 14th, just

23 one. There are many of them, but we'll look at just one.

24 But let me ask the Trial Chamber whether this can be admitted

25 first.

Page 4041

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's a waste of time.

2 General Wilson's clearly said he has limited knowledge. Unless you move

3 on to relevant issues to which the general can give relevant answers,

4 we'll find that you are wasting your time.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then I'll leave this

6 document of the 6th of May and move on to a document of the 14th of May.

7 30753 is the number.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Now, I'm sure you know Mrs. Plavsic, member of the Presidency of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice-president of Republika Srpska; right?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. This is a telephone conversation between Mrs. Plavsic and

13 Mico Stanisic, taking place on the 14th of May, 1992. Now, did you know

14 that Mrs. Plavsic, right up until the 22nd of May, lived in Sarajevo,

15 right up at the separation line?

16 A. Yes, I did. We had cause to send some of our troops around to

17 her house.

18 Q. Thank you. And most probably they had to drive her to your

19 headquarters for negotiations; right?

20 A. On occasions. Also, she co-opted us once to attempt to evacuate

21 her mother from the city.

22 Q. Probably her mother or brother and sister-in-law. Anyway, take a

23 look at this. Somewhere in the middle, Biljana Plavsic says:

24 [In English] "Let me tell you fire must cease at 1400 hours

25 sharp."

Page 4042

1 [Interpretation] And then a little lower down:

2 [In English] "Fire must cease at 1400 sharp. They too will. The

3 Presidency too has decided that it should stop at 1400 hours so that we

4 can go to UNPROFOR headquarter for negotiations."

5 [Interpretation] And she's talking to somebody called Milos. And

6 then the minister becomes included in the conversation. Mico Stanisic

7 says: "Good afternoon, how are you," and so on. And we can see that

8 Mrs. Plavsic even believes that she never actually met the minister, and

9 says: "Have we ever met before," and so on. And then she says:

10 [In English] "Mico, please, there should be negotiations at 1400

11 hours."

12 [Interpretation] So they were probably the negotiations that you

13 attended; right?

14 A. No. On the 14th of May, I was in my apartment and couldn't leave

15 it because of the fighting.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to the next page,

17 please.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

19 Q. Here, we see what it says -- Biljana Plavsic says:

20 [In English] "There is a five-day cease-fire there."

21 [No interpretation]:

22 [In English] "They were the first to open fire this morning."

23 Mr. Stanisic: "They are still attacking here."

24 So this exchange between the two -- :

25 [In English] "This MacKenzie called me and said the Presidency

Page 4043

1 had said they would cease fire at 1400 hours sharp, but we also have to

2 cease-fire at ..."

3 [Interpretation] And so on.

4 Later on, Mico Stanisic:

5 [In English] "But if there is an attack there as intensive as the

6 one now is, people will have to defend themselves and everything else.

7 Let them reduce the intensity of their attack. Just reduce the intensity

8 and we'll stop immediately."

9 [Interpretation] Do you see that the minister is asking them to

10 reduce and says, We'll stop?

11 A. That's what the document says, Mr. Karadzic.

12 Q. Further down:

13 [In English] "It will not be of you -- be us who cause a problem,

14 but they have given their assurances before and still 100 soldiers got

15 killed down there around the headquarter."

16 [Interpretation] And so on.

17 Therefore, General -- and I recommend this intercept to everybody

18 to take a look. And on the 14th of May, early in the morning, you say in

19 paragraph 41 that serious fighting, including widespread use of heavy

20 weapons, broke out early in the morning and lasted all day. The

21 hostilities certainly occurred in the immediate area of Dobrinja where "I

22 was located in my apartment," et cetera, et cetera.

23 Now, do you see that on that same day, the Muslims were attacking

24 and that our people were asking for them to reduce that so that we could

25 stop?

Page 4044

1 A. What I saw on that day from my apartment, in fact, was the Serbs

2 were attacking the immediate vicinity that I was in and that the very

3 limited Presidency forces who were there, a ragtag group of young men

4 with rifles, there by a policeman, they appeared to be mounting a rather

5 unprofessional defence of the area. I can only say what I saw,

6 Mr. Karadzic. But in the case of Dobrinja, where I was, when I was able

7 to occasionally look out the window, the attacking was actually being

8 done by the Serbs.

9 JUDGE KWON: Could you give us the time-frame again, General,

10 when you saw that fighting?

11 THE WITNESS: This was the 14th of May.

12 JUDGE KWON: The time of the day.

13 THE WITNESS: Morning, late morning, afternoon. Very heavy

14 fighting. I spent most of the day, actually, in my bathroom, lying on

15 the floor, because of the shrapnel and the rounds that were coming in --

16 into the apartment. But if I crawled out and looked out the window,

17 which I did from time to time, I could see what was happening. And this

18 attack went on most of the day, including a very heavy artillery attack

19 which destroyed the Rainbow Hotel, which was the accommodation for the UN

20 forces in UNPROFOR. It was a deliberate attack against that building.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

22 Mr. Karadzic.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. And how did you know who the Serbs were and who the Muslims were?

25 A. The Muslims were generally people running around in civilian

Page 4045

1 clothes with rifles. The Serbs were the people in uniforms, with

2 helmets, supported by tanks.

3 Q. Uh-huh, I see. And you know -- knew which part was Serb and

4 which part was Muslim; right?

5 A. One side was attacking the other. By observation, I believe one

6 group to be Serb, the other group to be Muslim. I was actually able to

7 talk with the Presidency forces who were actually in the stairwell of my

8 building. I chatted with them for half an hour to ask them what was going

9 on. They told me that they were defending the area. They told me there

10 were Presidency forces. I saw who was attacking them. They were Serbs in

11 JNA-type uniforms. They were well organised. It was a good infantry

12 attack, one that required training. I suspect it may have even been JNA.

13 Q. General, do you mean to say that Mrs. Plavsic and the minister

14 here are not telling the truth? It's not a press statement; it's a

15 conversation that they weren't aware was being tapped.

16 A. The conversation in this -- recorded in this intercept,

17 Mr. Karadzic, is a sad commentary, really, on the many hundreds of

18 cease-fires which were negotiated in the former Yugoslavia from 1991

19 through until at least the end of 1993, that I'm aware of, that were not

20 respected by one side or the other. When the parties decided they

21 seriously wanted to implement a cease-fire, they could do it. But for

22 the most part, they didn't respect them.

23 Q. That's not what I'm asking you, General. What I'm asking you is

24 this: Do you believe that these people are speaking sincerely here, a

25 member of the Presidency calling up the minister of the interior, and

Page 4046

1 they don't know each other, she can't remember whether they'd ever met,

2 and they're saying what was taken on as the responsibility, to stop at

3 1400 hours? Is this a lie or is this authentic?

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's not for the witness to guess.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Q. General, you asked a member of the Green Berets or

7 Patriotic League, you say, the Presidency forces, as you said -- or,

8 rather, you asked them, but did you ask any Serb who was doing the

9 attacking and who was on the defence?

10 A. No. They were firing at me, Mr. Karadzic. They were not looking

11 for a conversation.

12 Q. Do you mean to say that the Serbs were firing on you and the

13 Muslims weren't?

14 A. Yes, I do mean to say that, Mr. Karadzic.

15 Q. Do you consider yourself, General, to be a well-informed person

16 and impartial person and an impartial observer?

17 A. I do consider myself sincerely to be impartial, as much as one

18 can be. Everybody has prejudices, but in this case I tried very hard, as

19 a professional, to be impartial.

20 Q. Now, of all these prejudices that you have, could you quote one

21 that you have vis-a-vis the Serbs? Don't you see that you do have a

22 prejudice against the Serbs?

23 A. I can assure you, Mr. Karadzic, I don't have a prejudice against

24 the Serbs. I have great sympathy for all the people of the former

25 Yugoslavia. In my dealings with them, they're very nice people.

Page 4047

1 Unfortunately, they were involved in bad politics, led by bad

2 politicians.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please tender this into

4 evidence?

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE KWON: The general knew nothing about this conversation,

7 the content of this document. We will not admit this. Will you use

8 it --

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Could we please have 65 ter 30759. The general doesn't know

11 anything about what the Defence is putting to him, and we will see, from

12 other sources, that he actually claims to know so much.

13 So can we now please have this?

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. This is a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and some people

16 from Nedzarici. Do you know where Nedzarici is?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Well, so Nedzarici is really close to Dobrinja, just one street

19 apart, so let us see what they say.

20 I'm in Belgrade, as you can see from Ambassador Zimmerman's book,

21 and I am calling the local Territorial Defence people from Belgrade to

22 talk to them.

23 So, General, do you see that Rade reports to me here? I'm asking

24 him:

25 "Can you tell me what is the situation down there?"

Page 4048

1 He says:

2 "Well, it's more or less okay. There's some shooting here at and

3 at Mojmilo."

4 And I'm asking: "Who's shooting?"

5 And he says:

6 "Well, they're shooting a little bit, they're responding, and we

7 are doing that too."

8 And then I say:

9 "Okay, make sure that we are not shooting."

10 And he says:

11 "Okay. Should I relay that?"

12 And I say:

13 "Relay to everyone that it should be ceased."

14 And he says:

15 "Well, yes, I'm going to do that."

16 And then I said:

17 "You should call Biljana or somebody else before you start

18 shooting so that she can inform UNPROFOR," and so on."

19 So, General, were you aware of the fact that we always asked the

20 Serbs to take fire for an hour or so and then to call UNPROFOR before

21 responding?

22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second before you answer, General.

23 Ms. Sutherland.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour. This intercept seems to

25 be undated, so I don't know what date Mr. Karadzic is putting on -- when

Page 4049

1 he was in Belgrade.

2 JUDGE KWON: It says "sometime in May."

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is a date, the 14th. We know

4 that this is the 14th. It's your document, it's a Prosecution document.

5 MS. SUTHERLAND: I understand it says "May," Your Honour, but

6 it's unclear as to what date in May, both on the B/C/S transcript and on

7 the English transcript.

8 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow your point. So, Ms. Sutherland, that

9 the foundation of the question is somewhat incorrect, that's your

10 position?

11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Well, it may or may not be that the witness is

12 aware as opposed to what the date is.

13 JUDGE KWON: So with that caveat, let's hear what the general can

14 answer to this question.

15 THE WITNESS: My answer is that I was not aware that there had

16 been a directive issued by the Serb authorities that Serb forces should

17 suffer an hour's firing upon them before they took any action and

18 reported to UNPROFOR. And, quite frankly, I think it's an unrealistic

19 directive that anybody would subject their forces to this sort of action.

20 I don't believe it.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. And do you know that before responding, we always informed

23 UNPROFOR, telling them that we were forced to respond?

24 A. No, I don't believe that, Mr. Karadzic.

25 Q. Well, this was confirmed here by a UN observer. He said that we

Page 4050

1 had always informed them before responding. A witness confirmed that

2 here in court.

3 And do you see down here, on page 2, Karadzic says:

4 "Inform him that he should stop and that we do not fire before we

5 are directly threatened"?

6 A. No, I don't see --

7 Q. It's in page 2 in the Serbian version, at the bottom of page 2.

8 Can we please have a look at that.

9 Here you can see that I'm asking him to cease fire immediately,

10 he should stop immediately.

11 Can we please look at the next page in English? Well, yeah, it

12 says here -- what line is it?

13 [In English] "Tell him to stop, and we are not shooting until we

14 are under an extreme threat."

15 [Interpretation] Does that mean that we should take -- that they

16 should take fire for as long as they can and only then respond?

17 A. I've got no idea what that means.

18 Q. Well, General, you're a soldier. Until we are under extreme

19 threat, the kind of fire that causes casualties, and that we should

20 respond only when we start taking casualties. This is what it means,

21 doesn't it?

22 A. If a politician said to me that as a soldier, then I would

23 politely try and disagree and ignore it anyway. And I'm sure you must

24 have had difficulty with your own generals if they were the sort of

25 directives they were issuing. It's quite unrealistic to expect soldiers

Page 4051

1 in combat to lie down and take fire upon themselves meekly until they

2 start taking casualties. As a broad response, it's very unrealistic.

3 Nobody is going to do that, Mr. Karadzic. I'm sure your generals would

4 have told you that.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I agree that I often made

6 unrealistic demands to our officers and that we often clashed.

7 So I would like to tender this document into evidence.

8 JUDGE KWON: The general knew nothing about this, Mr. Karadzic.

9 Ask some questions which the general can answer.

10 Now move on to really relevant questions.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Well, General, was there a way for you to see who started the

13 fight and who was firing from what side?

14 A. In what time-frame, please, Mr. Karadzic?

15 Q. Well, the time-frame is your stay there, the 13th of May until

16 the 24th of June.

17 A. Well, our standard operating procedure as military observers was

18 that you only verified information that you actually observed yourself.

19 If you received reports about something that happened, you had to somehow

20 or other support that with evidence from another source. And even when

21 you did that, you reported the fact that you had not seen it, so you

22 couldn't confirm it, but it was based on reports from X or Y.

23 So the short answer to your question is: In May of 1992, in

24 Sarajevo, we had a very limited footprint on the ground. A lot of the

25 information coming to us was from your liaison officer actually located

Page 4052

1 in the PTT, and similarly from the Presidency forces. We only ventured

2 out into the city when we had actual missions to do. It was not a place

3 to touristically drive around, enjoying yourself.

4 Q. Should I take it, then, that once the fighting started, you had

5 no way of knowing who actually started the fight?

6 A. That's very true. We had to listen to what both sides said

7 and --

8 Q. Thank you.

9 A. -- inevitably each side would say, We didn't start it; the other

10 side did. That was the standard reply in the former Yugoslavia about

11 almost every incident.

12 Q. Thank you. And do you know that General Mladic made efforts to

13 prevent casualties among innocent people, including young soldiers, and

14 that he issued instructions to that effect to his people in the field, on

15 the ground?

16 A. No, I'm not aware of that. Quite to the contrary, he seemed to

17 take a lot of actions that resulted in the death of a lot of people,

18 Mr. Karadzic.

19 Q. Well, what appeared to you is why we have such problems, because

20 your impressions are presented here as evidence, and it's not evidence.

21 Could we please look at 65 ter 30793.

22 JUDGE KWON: No speech, Mr. Karadzic. Ask your question.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at this

24 document. This is the well-known intercept of Mladic's conversation with

25 an unidentified male on the ground. The date is the 25th of May, 1992.

Page 4053

1 And, well, here we have the document. He says:

2 "What is going on in Sarajevo?"

3 And he is warning them that they should be persistent in

4 observation, that observers should be posted, that they should be well

5 rested, and the moment the first bullet is fired at

6 Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks or "Marsal Tito" Barracks, and if a single soldier

7 is wounded either at the front or in the barracks, "I will retaliate

8 against the town."

9 So what you said a little while ago, that a general will not take

10 fire, but will respond.

11 Can we please look at the next page.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, while we're waiting for page 2 to appear: Did you take

14 Mladic's words as his intention to retaliate against civilians?

15 A. Yes. When I spoke to him on the 25th of May at a meeting I had

16 with him and Mrs. Plavsic, he said if the barracks were not evacuated

17 within three days, he would level the city. The city had a lot of

18 civilians in it. If he's going to level the city, he's going to cause a

19 lot of civilian casualties. That's exactly what I understood his threat

20 was. As it turned out, he carried out that threat. On the night of the

21 28th of May, three days later, the barracks had not been evacuated. He

22 unleashed on the city a most horrendous attack which he personally

23 directed. Now, he issued this warning in the presence of Mrs. Plavsic.

24 She didn't contradict anything he said. I assume the position that

25 General Mladic gave to me was that of General Mladic and the political

Page 4054

1 leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. I took it very seriously. I reported

2 back to General Nambiar this conversation, and I passed it on to the

3 Presidency as a warning, as requested by General Mladic.

4 Q. So you say, yourself, that General Mladic is asking for this to

5 be relayed to the Presidency. Does he want to fire on the city or does

6 he actually want to avoid having to do that?

7 A. He wants the barracks evacuated. And if the barracks aren't

8 evacuated within three days -- I'm talking about the meeting on the 25th

9 of May, not this document. If the barracks are not evacuated, he's going

10 to attack the city. He's going to level the city, as he puts it.

11 Q. I'm asking you: Did Mladic wish to fire or did he wish not to

12 fire? Did he ask you to relay his warning to the Presidency precisely in

13 order to avoid having to shoot at them; yes or no? Did he ask you to

14 relay to the Presidency this warning of his?

15 A. I can't speculate what motivated General Mladic, but I can say

16 that I did pass the message to the Presidency, as requested by him.

17 Q. How come that you don't know what drove General Mladic, after the

18 2nd and the 3rd and the 15th of May in Sarajevo and in Tuzla

19 respectively? The butchery of the soldiers as they were pulling out, was

20 this reason enough for a general? Would you, yourself, say, well, this

21 should not be repeated?

22 A. I can't comment on what motivates General Mladic, Mr. Karadzic.

23 Q. And would you -- after three massacres, would you have warned the

24 Presidency not to let that happen again? Would you, as a general, try to

25 protect your troops by warning the Presidency that this should not happen

Page 4055

1 again?

2 A. I can't really put myself in General Mladic's position,

3 Mr. Karadzic.

4 Q. Well, put yourself in your position. If you had three massacres

5 after assurances were made for a safe withdrawal, what would you say to

6 the Presidency if you had two more barracks that had to be evacuated?

7 Would you have warned them or would you have pussy-footed with them?

8 JUDGE KWON: It is not required -- the witness isn't required to

9 speculate, Mr. Karadzic. Move on to your next question.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at page 3 of

11 this document so that we can see what Mladic says to this guy who is in

12 the field. It's page 3 in the English version and page 2 in the Serbian

13 version. We're on the right page in the Serbian version.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. You can see in the English:

16 [In English] "You can endure more than they can."

17 [Interpretation] So he's encouraging this man who is in the

18 blockaded barracks, the Jusuf Dzonlic and the "Marsal Tito" Barracks, the

19 people there are encircled, and he's encouraging this man, telling him,

20 You can endure much more than they can. And then he goes on to say:

21 "I don't want to kill the people. I don't want to destroy the

22 city. I don't want the innocents to suffer. Those who want to fight,

23 let them remain in Sarajevo. Let them allow the army to pull out. Let

24 them pull out the civilians. And if they want to fight, we will fight.

25 It's better to fight somewhere in the hills than in the city."

Page 4056

1 Is this more than clear indication that Mladic wants to avoid

2 firing on the city, itself?

3 A. That's what the document says. But on the same day, I met

4 General Mladic, and he made it quite clear to me that it was his clear

5 intent to attack the city if the barracks were not evacuated. I took his

6 threat very seriously, to the extent that I formally reported it to my

7 superior in General Nambiar. Words are cheap, Mr. Karadzic. It's what

8 you do.

9 Q. General, do you see where he says here:

10 "The people have to live somewhere. We do not want to fight."

11 Do you see that in this document?

12 A. I do see that, Mr. Karadzic.

13 Q. Well, General, if you have to relay a message to the Presidency,

14 do you feel it is realistic to relay a harsh message or a mild message,

15 in light of the three massacres that had already happened?

16 A. I relayed the message that General Mladic asked me to relay, and

17 that is that if the barracks were not evacuated within three days, he

18 would level the city. That's the message I relayed.

19 Q. But you agree that when you send a message of this sort, it needs

20 to be harsh, harsher than -- well, far harsher than what you actually

21 mean? We see a difference between what he's telling his soldier on the

22 ground and what he tells you. He says to those people on the ground,

23 Peace, and he is telling you that there would be retaliation?

24 A. You're asking me to speculate on the intent of his conversation

25 with his men in the barracks. Clearly, these people are under great

Page 4057

1 pressure, and he's trying to raise their morale, saying, It will be all

2 right, I'll look after you. That's what he's saying.

3 Q. Fair enough. But you do admit that he is telling this man who is

4 on the ground that he doesn't want to fire on the city?

5 A. That's what the document says, Mr. Karadzic. I again say --

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

7 document into evidence.

8 JUDGE KWON: This is already included in the associated exhibit

9 of this witness --

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, it was --

11 JUDGE KWON: -- and it was marked for identification as

12 Exhibit P1041.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Can we please look at 30824, 65 ter 30824, please. And I would

15 like to ask the Registrar to check whether this has been admitted

16 already.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Do you know who Mr. Baros is? He was a colonel and perhaps even

19 a general.

20 A. No, I don't.

21 Q. You mention him in your reports. He participated in the talks

22 regarding the withdrawal from the "Marsal Tito" Barracks.

23 A. I thought his name was Bebeska [phoen].

24 Q. And to your knowledge, how did -- how was the Jusuf Dzonlic

25 Barracks evacuated?

Page 4058

1 A. I'm sorry. Which barracks, Mr. Karadzic?

2 Q. Jusuf Dzonlic. It was evacuated before the "Marsal Tito" Barracks.

3 A. If it's the one I think it is, it was a very small barracks

4 containing only a small number of troops high up on a hill; is that

5 correct?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. I personally attended the evacuation of that barracks. It was

8 done by vehicles. The vehicles were pre-loaded by the occupants of the

9 barracks, and some UN vehicles, which I was a passenger in one, escorted

10 them safely out of the city. There was some minor problem leaving the

11 barracks, where the crowd wanted to pull one of the drivers out of the

12 cabin and do whatever with him then, but I interceded [Realtime

13 transcript read in error "was seated"] and we were able to leave safely.

14 It was quite a well-conducted operation, I thought.

15 Q. Well, that would be Viktor Bubanj. But Jusuf Dzonlic came under

16 heavy attack, and you mentioned it yesterday, because the column took a

17 turn somewhere?

18 A. That was -- I thought that was after "Marsal Tito" Barracks.

19 Q. Let us look at this intercept, sir.

20 So he first speaks with Potpara, and Potpara reports to him that

21 everything is quiet, so Mladic wants to know what the situation is like

22 in the barracks. And he says it's quiet, and he says: "Be extremely

23 cautious." And then he says:

24 "They want to provoke us into firing on the city by attacking the

25 barracks."

Page 4059

1 And then if we move on to the next page in the English language:

2 "Tell the people so that they are aware of it."

3 That's what Mladic says:

4 "Be very cautious," Mladic says.

5 And then in the end, he talks to Baros. He says:

6 "Is this Baros?"

7 We need the next page in English.

8 JUDGE MORRISON: Sorry, Dr. Karadzic. Just to note a mistake in

9 the transcript. It's at 38.5. The general said that he interceded, and

10 it's been transposed as "I was seated." It doesn't make any sense. He's

11 talking about where he interceded with the crowd that was trying to pull

12 the driver out of the car. It needs correcting.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Q. So you can see that he now gets Baros on the line, and a little

17 bit further down Mladic says:

18 [In English] "You have heart problems? You'd better take some

19 more rest."

20 [Interpretation] And then he wants to know whether this is Baros,

21 and then we follow their conversation.

22 Baros was the commander of the "Marsal Tito" Barracks, was he not?

23 A. I don't know.

24 Q. You note that he attended a meeting, but let us move on.

25 Could we please have the next page both in English and in

Page 4060

1 Serbian. The next page in English:

2 [In English] "Get ready. Do not let them humiliate you, as they

3 did with Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks."

4 [Interpretation] Further down:

5 [In English] "We left all the heavy weapons for them there, and

6 despite of that, they attacked the column and they would massacre all of

7 you. Don't worry, all of you will get out. Just hang on there, there

8 will be no problem."

9 [Interpretation] So the column from the Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks

10 had come under attack despite the fact that all the heavy weapons had

11 been left there. Did you know that all the heavy weapons had been left

12 behind in all the barracks?

13 A. That was the agreement that was negotiated with the Presidency.

14 Yes, I'm aware that that was one of the conditions of the evacuation of

15 the barracks.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. In this intercept they

17 say those who have peace will have it. There was a mass attack on the

18 next page. I recommend that all the parties should read it. Thank you

19 very much.

20 I would like to tender this into evidence. It speaks about the

21 events that the general here had participated in.

22 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this has been marked as MFI D207.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at the next

Page 4061

1 page in English. I would just like to go through one more thing, one

2 passage, one response by Mladic. We should go one page further down in

3 English. The next page, the next page in English.

4 Well, it seems that we need the next page again in the English

5 language.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. You see what he says here:

8 "I share the same opinion. We think in the same way. If they

9 want peace, they will have it. I ordered, as soon as I came last

10 night ... it was an all-out attack against the units and you. There was

11 shooting, and somehow I managed to calm down the people here, to put

12 everything under control, to stop the fire. As for what they are

13 producing now, they probably have pantomime performers, some good

14 imitators who are able to imitate our voices properly. I mean your

15 voice, my voice, and anyone's voice."

16 So on the 29th, he's -- Mladic is telling his officer that on the

17 28th somebody broadcast a recording of his voice, and he claims it is an

18 imitator. So he goes on to say they are making a circus of it and they

19 are deluding their people and it is not true that they gave such orders.

20 Did you know that Mladic made this claim, that the Muslims are, among

21 other things, imitating his voice?

22 A. No, I didn't.

23 Q. And here he goes on to say:

24 "Pass this information on to every single soldier. Do not mess

25 around in any circumstances. Do not risk your lives, because nobody has

Page 4062

1 a life in reserve. We will not shell the town unless they violate the

2 agreement, unless they put you in danger. But have you to be very

3 careful. Do not trust them even one bit."

4 So General Mladic is talking to his people on the ground in

5 peaceful terms, and he wants you to relay a very harsh message to the

6 Presidency. Do you see this as a logical behaviour on the part of an

7 officer whose soldiers are at risk?

8 A. What -- can I ask what date this intercept is, please,

9 Mr. Karadzic?

10 JUDGE KWON: I remember 29th of --

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 29th.

12 THE WITNESS: Once again, I can read what it says here. I didn't

13 participate in this conversation. But the denial here of

14 Radovan Karadzic -- or of General Mladic is surprising, because when the

15 tape was played, it was played in Serbo-Croat, and two JNA officers

16 independently said it was Mladic directing the fire of artillery. It was

17 a tape produced by the Presidency forces, but two JNA officers said that

18 that was Mladic. So I don't know why he's saying this to the troops in

19 his barracks. In short, it's a lie, Dr. Karadzic.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Did Mladic say that publicly or is that what he's telling his

22 people on the ground? He didn't say it to the media. That's what he

23 said to his own people so that they would know the truth. Why would he

24 lie to his own people? Did you ever see Mladic saying that in public,

25 that his voice was being imitated?

Page 4063

1 A. No, I didn't.

2 Q. That's right, because he never said that in public. If he said

3 that for the media, then you could have had that kind of suspicion.

4 However, do you know that Mladic had clashed with these two JNA

5 officers because they had brought rifles to the Muslim side?

6 A. I'm aware that General Mladic's position on the evacuation of the

7 barracks is that no weapons should be handed over. The reality is that

8 it was General Panic, General Mladic's superior officer, who ordered him

9 in the end to get on with the job and hand over the weapons. Mladic said

10 to me, quite clearly and firmly, that I should clearly understand that it

11 was not him handing over the weapons, it was the JNA. He didn't want to

12 be associated with the act of handing over the weapons.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll have a break.

14 But before that, did you say that General Mladic was talking to

15 his people in this intercept?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Mladic, on two occasions,

17 that is to say, this one and the previous one, he was talking to people

18 who were encircled. They were JNA, but Mladic was no longer JNA after

19 the 20th of May, that is, so that is to say a week before this. He is

20 giving them encouragement, and he considers it to be his duty to help

21 them be evacuated without a massacre. We cannot understand Mladic

22 without looking at the context. He is -- thank you.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. And these two generals, do you agree that they had clashed with

25 Mladic and that at that point of time they were not Mladic's superiors?

Page 4073

1 Presidency, it may well have been raised by them when Mr. Thornberry and

2 I visited them for negotiations in the period after the 2nd of June. My

3 recollection is broadly that they would have protested and highlighted

4 this attack. It was -- even in Sarajevo at the time, with limited media

5 people present, it was given great coverage around the city and played on

6 the television for hours on end, just kept repeating the same images. So

7 it was quite well known within the city and I'm sure would have been

8 discussed with both sides.

9 As I said earlier, I've included this incident in my statement

10 simply to illustrate the fact that all -- that there was no clear good

11 guys and bad guys in the events in the former Yugoslavia.

12 Q. And did you know that the media were at the site of the explosion

13 beforehand? That was broadcast all over the place, that they were ready?

14 A. Yes, I'm aware of that allegation, yes.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you recall, General, that I had asked for the

16 demilitarisation of Sarajevo?

17 A. I'm aware that you'd asked for that on a number of occasions.

18 The first time you asked for that I can't put a date on.

19 Q. Do you agree and do you recall that I had said that the Serb

20 neighbourhoods in Sarajevo were attacked every night by the Green Berets?

21 A. I can't recall a specific incident, but I believe it's highly

22 likely that you did raise that on many occasions.

23 Q. Do you remember why the United Nations did not succeed in

24 carrying out a demilitarisation, why? Who was it that prevented that

25 from taking place?

Page 4074

1 A. I would say it was both sides, Mr. Karadzic. In the context of

2 the opening of the Sarajevo Airport, it was suggested by the

3 United Nations that weapons be withdrawn from around the airport and also

4 from 30 kilometres from the city, which was a measure which was

5 vigorously opposed by you and your military adviser. That's part of the

6 demilitarisation process, that you had a very strong position on that you

7 would not accept. My recollection is that you wanted the city to be

8 passed to the control of the UN with a green line drawn somewhere in the

9 city which would segregate Serb areas from other ethnic areas of the

10 city. I don't believe a map was ever produced during those negotiations,

11 nor was there a discussion of any suburbs. Your basic position during

12 those negotiations was that you were not prepared to take the first step

13 in demilitarisation, which would have been the withdrawal of heavy

14 weapons from the vicinity of Sarajevo. It was the Serb position.

15 Q. And do you remember, General, that we had more weapons and they

16 had more infantry? That's right, isn't it?

17 A. I don't know that's true. Certainly, you had more heavy weapons.

18 I don't know with any accuracy what the relative infantry strengths were.

19 I wouldn't be surprised if there was a marginal majority in favour of the

20 Presidency forces of infantry.

21 JUDGE KWON: The translation of -- or the court report does not

22 reflect what Mr. Karadzic asked to the witness. As I remember, his

23 question is that the Serbs had more weapons, while the other side had

24 more infantry.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right. I was just going to

Page 4075

1 intervene. Thank you.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. So we agree that the Serbs had more weapons, and I say that the

4 Muslims had more infantry. Do you remember me saying that that strikes a

5 strategic balance?

6 A. No, I don't.

7 Q. But if I tell you now that it does strike a strategic balance,

8 would you, as a general, accept doing away with your element of strategic

9 balance and the other side not?

10 A. It's not a board game, Mr. Karadzic. That's -- what we're

11 talking about here is perhaps tactical balance rather than strategic

12 balance. It depends very much upon the circumstances. Some elements of

13 military power are employable in some situations and not in others. For

14 example, fighting in an urban area is best done by infantry. Fighting in

15 open country is best done by armour. Employment of heavy weapons in an

16 urban context is very difficult because of the collateral damage. You

17 cannot simply say left and right, therefore there's balance.

18 Q. But, General, do you know that even a partial acceptance of

19 measures on the part of only one side would give the other side the

20 advantage; yes or no? Just give us a yes-or-no answer. Would -- if the

21 Serb weapons were done away with, would it give the advantage to the

22 opposite side?

23 A. I don't understand what measures you're referring to.

24 Q. Well, if the Serbs were to remove, and there are three times less

25 of them, three times less infantry, if they were to remove the heavy

Page 4076

1 weapons and the Muslims were to do nothing at all, would that give the

2 opposite side the advantage?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. Now, would you take a look at paragraph 3. Read out

5 paragraph 3, please.

6 A. "Mr. Karadzic referred first in general to the situation of the

7 Serbs in Sarajevo who are in control of areas in the suburbs and parts of

8 the city and who are attacked practically every night by the

9 Green Berets. He indicated the Serb forces are inexperienced and

10 self-organised. That Mladic does not have all under his command, but

11 that they are trying to bring them under control. He added that because

12 of the their inexperience, they overreacted to attacks. He indicated

13 that they were willing to remove artillery from the hills if attacks on

14 the suburbs stopped."

15 This document, I assume, is, because you have not introduced it,

16 is a report of General Morillon's discussions the 30th of May.

17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, this was -- this is Exhibit P1036.

18 It came in as an associated exhibit.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you.

20 What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. General, as a soldier, how long would you need -- how much time

23 would you need from the Territorial Defence and organised groups to turn

24 those into an efficacious army?

25 A. That's impossible to speculate. I mean, I don't know the details

Page 4077

1 of armaments levels, of training, deployment, what the operational

2 expectations are. Mr. Karadzic, it's impossible to give an accurate

3 answer to that. It would take some length of time, depending on how

4 complex the problems were. It takes about two years to produce a

5 reasonably good soldier of intense training.

6 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to paragraph 4 now. May I ask you to

7 read it out, please?

8 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it's necessary. We have it before us.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's all read it,

10 then.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Does it say there that:

13 "Karadzic went on to say that they," the Serbs, "would like to

14 demilitarise Sarajevo, under United Nations supervision, with only police

15 forces to remain to maintain law and order, Serb police in

16 Serbian-controlled parts and Muslim police in Muslim areas"?

17 Is that right?

18 A. That's what it says, Mr. Karadzic.

19 Q. Why was that not accepted? Do you have any idea?

20 A. I have a very good idea, Mr. Karadzic.

21 Q. Will you tell it to us?

22 A. Because of our experience in the Croatian UN-protected areas,

23 where the military forces who were fighting there, when it came time for

24 them to withdraw under the agreements accepted by all parties, these

25 military groups suddenly turned into policemen. So what had happened, an

Page 4078

1 army had been converted into a police force. In effect, there was no

2 demilitarisation of the UNPAs, other than the concentration of heavy

3 weapons. So the UN, with that experience so recently found in Croatia,

4 would be very suspicious of any suggestion that this should be repeated

5 again in another situation.

6 Q. And do you know what the Muslim motive was to oppose the

7 demilitarisation of Sarajevo?

8 A. I can't speculate on that.

9 Q. And if I tell you that the first motive -- the prime motive was

10 to gain control of the whole city and the second motive was Sarajevo was

11 an important joker or trump card in gaining international sympathies and

12 international military intervention, would that sound familiar to you?

13 A. I can't speculate on that, Mr. Karadzic. I don't know what

14 motivated their actions.

15 Q. Is the Muslim side aware of what Karadzic proposed in

16 negotiations with Nambiar?

17 A. They would have been made aware of that when Mr. Thornberry

18 arrived in Sarajevo on the 2nd of June, several days after this meeting

19 here, and proceeded to negotiate the opening of the airport. This would

20 have been one of the matters discussed with both sides, in fact.

21 Q. But as a military man, as a soldier, can you tell us whether

22 Sarajevo would have been calmer, even on the assumption, for example,

23 that somebody were to change clothes into a police force, if what

24 Karadzic proposed had actually been acted upon?

25 A. It may well have been calmer, but would not necessarily have

Page 4079

1 changed the actual security situation.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we turn to the next

3 page, please.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. And I'd like to draw your attention to paragraph 6 there, where

6 he says:

7 [In English] "He felt that the Bosnian Serbs were in a no-win

8 situation to be blamed or to be defeated."

9 [Interpretation] They were in a no-win situation. And then lower

10 down, paragraph 7, General Morillon asks whether we can--

11 [In English] "And it would be their interest to show their

12 goodwill by stopping it, by stopping shelling. He asked Karadzic whether

13 he was in a position to do so."

14 [Interpretation] Number 8 says:

15 [In English] "Karadzic replied in the affirmative. Mr. Koljevic

16 qualified this by saying that they thought they could persuade the people

17 on the ground to stop the shelling."

18 [Interpretation] Doesn't that tell you that it was still a

19 question of self-organised groups?

20 A. I acknowledged in my statement, Mr. Karadzic, that at the very

21 beginning of the conflict, that I understood that there were groups who

22 were not necessarily fully under control of General Mladic, and I

23 accepted the fact that it was taking him some time to get control of

24 them. But that does not include artillery resources. We're talking here

25 about village militias. He would have had, my belief, a very firm

Page 4080

1 control over heavy weapons and their firing into the city. These were

2 weapons that were passed to him by the JNA. And, indeed, by the 30th of

3 May, in my assessment, were still being fired by the JNA, because they

4 would not have left behind their troops in the barracks. The JNA would

5 not have fully withdrawn until all of their troops were out of the

6 barracks.

7 Also, my observations later in May were that the nature of the

8 fighting was being carried out by highly competent military people who I

9 also suspect were remaining JNA people.

10 Q. Well, those are all assumptions, General, sir. We heard from

11 another witness here, also a soldier, that there was a shortage of

12 capable officer cadres and especially specialists in weapons, and so on,

13 marksmen and so on. Now, do you say that the Territorial Defence did not

14 have access to heavy weapons?

15 A. I don't know what the territorial force had access to. I'm

16 simply saying that heavy weapons would have been a very high priority for

17 General Mladic to gain and remain control of -- in control of.

18 Q. And I put it to you, General, and I tell you that we have heard

19 evidence here whereby a territorial unit took from a company from their

20 Territorial Defence stock even Howitzers. Now, do you know how the

21 system of the Territorial Defence functioned and the system of total

22 national defence and social self-protection in Yugoslavia, for example;

23 do you know how that worked?

24 A. Broadly I do, yes.

25 Q. And do you know the doctrine, as it was called, of an armed

Page 4081

1 people? Have you heard of that doctrine?

2 A. I've not heard of that specific description.

3 Q. And if I tell you that the Territorial Defence existed -- a unit

4 of the Territorial Defence existed in every enterprise, every company,

5 and that they had their weapons depots and commands, and everybody was

6 duty-bound to defend his country once it was threatened, once it was in

7 danger, does that sound something that you are familiar with and had

8 heard about?

9 A. Yes, I am familiar with that, and I believe that to be true.

10 Q. Therefore, the Territorial Defence had access to heavy weaponry

11 as well. And, as you say, the village -- how did you put it -- village

12 paramilitary groups, that was the territory Defence of each and every

13 village, each local commune. They had access to light and heavy weapons

14 alike. Do you accept that now if I tell you that?

15 A. I can't confirm that. If you say that to be true, then so be it.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we take a look at

17 the next page of this document now, please.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Paragraph 14:

20 [In English] "If and when we get confirmation from Mr. Karadzic

21 that he will be able to deliver on stopping the bombardment, we will get

22 in touch with President Izetbegovic to proceed with the other aspects."

23 [No interpretation]:

24 [In English] "... just been advised by Karadzic's assistant that

25 they could not make Sarajevo because of weather, but by phone Mladic had

Page 4082

1 indicated that bombardment would stop. We will see how things are ..."

2 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. That was paragraph 15.

3 So what Mladic controlled, that would cease. And from the

4 previous paragraph, we see Koljevic saying that, We'll try and convince

5 people on the ground not to shoot.

6 Do you know, General, that, for example, in Nedzarici, a purely

7 Serbian settlement, it was attacked on a daily basis and that nobody had

8 the right to tell them, Stop shooting, don't shoot?

9 A. It doesn't surprise me that Nedzarici was attacked on a daily

10 basis.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. This document has

12 already been admitted, it's an exhibit, so we can move on.

13 May we have 65 ter 01078 called up next. It is possible that

14 that is also an exhibit under a P number.

15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that's Exhibit P1039.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Did you attend this meeting, General, on the 3rd of June at the

19 airport in Sarajevo?

20 A. Yes, I did. It wasn't at the airport at Sarajevo. It was held,

21 actually, in Lukavica Barracks, but it was about the airport. That's why

22 the subject reads that way.

23 Q. Yes, yes, I apologise. You're quite right.

24 May we now have the next page displayed.

25 Or just a moment, let's stay with page 1. Can we go back to

Page 4083

1 page 1:

2 [In English] "The basic issue, of course, remains who will

3 politically control the airport which would be under UN control. The

4 answer of the Serbs is that they will. We have suggested that they think

5 again."

6 [Interpretation] Now, on the next page, paragraph 2, the

7 Presidency stressed the urgency. Do you see paragraph 2?

8 A. I do.

9 Q. And this man, Mr. Somun, was a little more extreme than

10 we believed at first; right?

11 A. I don't know what you mean by that question. I didn't have a

12 view whether he was extreme, or moderate, or conservative.

13 Q. [No interpretation]:

14 [In English] "We said that the suffering of the people had become

15 a worldwide scandal and that so far as we knew, there was no prospect of

16 it being solved by magic or external military intervention."

17 [Interpretation] What made you mention military intervention

18 there?

19 A. I think following the bread line attack of the 27th of May, there

20 had been extensive coverage in the international community, and there was

21 some discussion in the international community that military intervention

22 was an option. And I can't say it with certainty, but I suspect that

23 this had been passed to the Serb leadership in some of their various

24 negotiations. And certainly I believe it was a hope, I would say, of the

25 Presidency at that time that there would be an intervention, and it was

Page 4084

1 one of the considerations that they had to take into account in their

2 negotiations and in developing a strategy and a policy.

3 Q. Thank you. So may we conclude that the Presidency, as you call

4 it, although it was the Muslim government because we were the Presidency

5 too, Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic being members of the Presidency,

6 that the Muslim government -- it didn't suit the Muslim government for

7 things to run smoothly, because if things ran smoothly following Serb

8 proposals, there would be no intervention; right?

9 A. I can't confirm that.

10 Q. But the United Nations confirmed that the Muslims hampered the

11 taking over of the airport. Are you aware of that?

12 A. No, I'm not aware of that.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now, may we turn to

14 page 3, please. Paragraph 4:

15 [In English] "Izetbegovic showed us the destruction brought on

16 the Presidency, shelled most nights. (It does not seem to have a single

17 piece of glass left undamaged). He ended by saying that he did not

18 believe there could be an agreement; the reopening of the airport could

19 come about only by foreign military intervention."

20 [Interpretation] Do you see that he would welcome military

21 intervention and that, therefore, it was logical that he would make it

22 difficult for a take-over of the airport?

23 A. This cable, drafted by Mr. Thornberry, signed by me, and going up

24 our chain of command, is a record of the negotiating positions of the two

25 parties, and you'll be aware, Mr. Karadzic, that in negotiations people

Page 4085

1 adopt and abandon various negotiating positions during that process.

2 This is a record of the first day of negotiations, so it's defining, if

3 you wish, the opening positions. What is stated in this cable and the

4 reality can be quite different. The airport was opened. Both sides did

5 agree to it in the end.

6 In regards to the first part of your question, I'm sure the

7 Presidency would have welcomed a foreign intervention. It would have

8 certainly assisted their position.

9 Q. Thank you. I have every respect for your understanding of

10 negotiating tactics whereby extremist views are put on the table straight

11 away and then that they relent later on, but why do you take that -- do

12 you not take that into account when Mladic is giving a message, that it

13 is an extremist one, but in reality different?

14 A. My experience with General Mladic was that he generally carried

15 out his threats, he generally did what he said he would do. Therefore, I

16 gave serious consideration to what he was saying and believed him, he

17 would carry out his threat. And as it turned out, he did.

18 Q. Well, it didn't turn out that that's what he did, General. But,

19 of course, he tried to be convincing. Otherwise, you would have seen

20 through it and there would have been no result.

21 But can we have 65 ter 01555 next, please. Possibly that is a P

22 number and a Prosecution exhibit too.

23 THE REGISTRAR: That's Exhibit P1045.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4086

1 Q. This is the following day, discussions -- airport talks of the

2 4th of June. Did you attend that meeting, General?

3 A. Yes, I did, Mr. Karadzic.

4 Q. Thank you. Well, we can look through the whole document, but

5 let's focus on paragraph 2 now. Let's see what Karadzic says there:

6 [In English] "The afternoon began with us summarising to them

7 some ideas on an airport regime. Karadzic interrupted at one point to

8 say that this was a Muslim position, and all argued that the withdrawal

9 of heavy weapons would tilt the balance in Sarajevo to the Muslim side to

10 such an extent that Serbs would be butchered or have to flee."

11 [Interpretation] Do you see, General, that our position was quite

12 clear; with the removal of the only Serb advantage would lead to our

13 catastrophe?

14 A. Yes, Mr. Karadzic, we quite clearly understood the Serb position

15 in this regard and the reason for that, and that's why the regime that

16 was proposed actually left the Serb artillery in position, within range

17 of the airport, but monitored by UN observers, who would report if those

18 weapons engaged the airport. That was the regime. It left your weapons

19 and your tactical advantage in place, but enabled the airport to be

20 opened with some confidence.

21 Q. Thank you. So you agree that the only reason -- our only reason

22 not to remove the weapons around Sarajevo was precisely this fear of a

23 massacre or the expulsion of Serbs from the places they lived in, or,

24 rather, a disruption of the balance?

25 A. I can't speculate on what motivated your position.

Page 4087

1 Q. Let's look at number 3 now. Karadzic, somewhat in the middle,

2 and Plavsic, on the somewhat less ideological, somewhat more humanitarian

3 wing -- that was paragraph 2. And now number 3:

4 [In English] "They explained that Karadzic's position in Lisbon

5 had been taken in the context of the UN taking over supervision of the

6 whole city; i.e., superintending a green line between two communities,

7 each with its own police. Only in such context of physical

8 disengagement, they said, did withdrawal of heavy weaponry to a distance

9 from Sarajevo make sense."

10 [Interpretation] So why, in your opinion, was the whole of

11 Sarajevo not demilitarised? You referred to the zones, but here there

12 would be complete management and control by the UN over Sarajevo, and do

13 you remember that I proposed that Sarajevo would be declared an open

14 city?

15 A. Yes, I do remember that, Mr. Karadzic, but there are a number of

16 proposals contained in this. The proposal that there be a green line

17 created with police forces, as you call them, maintaining security there

18 was not acceptable to the Presidency. It was not acceptable under any

19 circumstances. Another element of a demilitarisation, that is, the

20 withdrawal of heavy weapons, was not acceptable to you.

21 The whole proposal at that time was not worth pursuing. Neither

22 side would give it serious consideration. What our focus was was opening

23 the airport and proposing to you and to the Presidency a regime that was

24 acceptable to both sides.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now move two

Page 4088

1 pages forward, please, the third page from this one. It should be our

2 063971, just one more page. The next page in the English language,

3 please.

4 So number 1:

5 [In English] "The proposed demilitarisation elements of the plan

6 leave the Serbian people in the area of Sarajevo vulnerable to the B-H

7 forces and might cause the flight of thousands of Serbs from this area."

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. So these are the key points in the Serb response. And number 3

10 says:

11 [In English] "The concept of demilitarising the area will be

12 accepted only if the entire city is demilitarised and police forces from

13 both sides secure the areas beyond the fire lines."

14 [Interpretation] And then on the next page, the Serb alternative

15 plan:

16 [In English] "They propose the following alternative plan:

17 "The sides should announce and honour a cease-fire in Sarajevo

18 and stop all combat activities in the area, including certain corridors."

19 [Interpretation] General, sir, what more could we have done

20 without destroying the Serb community in Sarajevo? We proposed actively

21 and accepted other people's proposals if they were consistent with our

22 survival. Did we not do that?

23 A. This document records once again a bargaining position within the

24 context of the overall negotiations. It's simply a record of where

25 you -- your preferred position at that point in time during the

Page 4089

1 negotiations.

2 Q. But is this not a position that makes it possible to establish

3 peace in Sarajevo?

4 A. Point number 1 is, of course, part of any sensible plan for the

5 opening of the airport, and, indeed, language very similar to that was

6 included in the final agreement which both sides agreed to, and took some

7 time to implement because we couldn't get 48 hours of cease-fire between

8 the signing of the agreement on, I think, the 5th of June and the 24th of

9 June, when I left. Neither party seemed to be able to discipline their

10 forces to impose an agreed cease-fire.

11 But this document here is a bargaining position, Mr. Karadzic.

12 Whether it reflects the final outcome -- what you signed in the end was

13 another document. That's what you agreed to. These are simply

14 bargaining positions.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please look at

16 1D1318. 1D1318.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, do you know that the European Community made a lot of

19 effort to keep Izetbegovic on the track at the conference?

20 A. Which conference are we talking about, Mr. Karadzic?

21 Q. The Carrington Conference, the peace conference that was led by

22 Ambassador Cutileiro for Bosnia.

23 A. The answer to your first question, then, is no.

24 Q. Well, here we have a telegram. The date is the same. We are

25 discussing the airport issue, and I report to Ambassador Cutileiro that

Page 4090

1 Mr. Izetbegovic responded in the negative to Mr. Carrington's letter

2 about the Bosnia Conference:

3 "He explicitly said in the --"

4 [In English] " ... and that he does not want any conference about

5 the constituent units."

6 [Interpretation] And then I go on to report to him that despite

7 the goodwill we showed in our readiness to open the airport

8 unconditionally:

9 [In English] "We were blackmailed with the lives of JNA families

10 to leave the heavy arms in the barracks "Marsal Tito". This same evening,

11 the Muslim side has started shelling of Serbian residential areas of

12 Sarajevo.

13 "We hope that you can still mediate and bring the Muslim side to

14 the conference."

15 [Interpretation] And so on.

16 Now, General, sir, were you aware of the fact that we were

17 shelled, that the Serb parts of the city were shelled that very night

18 between the 4th and 5th of June?

19 A. It wouldn't surprise me. Many parts of the city were shelled on

20 the night of the 5th of June, Mr. Karadzic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender

22 this document into evidence.

23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.

Page 4091

1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D333, Your Honours.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 65 ter 08496,

3 please.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. General, in your opinion, who actually started the offensive in

6 the second week of June, on the 7th of June and on?

7 A. It's not clear who started the fighting. I assume you're talking

8 about the fighting around Dobrinja and around the airport.

9 Q. Yes, around Dobrinja, the airport, in Hadzici, Pazaric, and so

10 on. Do you know that Hadzici is also a part of Sarajevo?

11 A. No, I don't know the geography of that area.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not the correct document.

13 There has been a mistake, apparently. 08496, 08496. It might be our

14 mistake. Just a moment, but --

15 MS. SUTHERLAND: 08496 is P00999.

16 JUDGE KWON: He said there seems to be a mistake on his part, so

17 check it out.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you agree, General, that the city of Sarajevo consisted of 10

20 municipalities?

21 A. I don't know, Mr. Karadzic.

22 Q. And if I were to put it to you that one of the Sarajevo

23 municipalities with a pronounced Serb majority, Ilijas, was shelled on a

24 daily basis and that, proportionately speaking, the largest number of

25 people were killed, civilians and soldiers alike, would you agree with

Page 4092

1 that?

2 A. Many parts of the city were shelled on a daily basis. It could

3 well be that Ilidza was part of them.

4 Q. And did you ever notice in any of the reports that Ilijas was

5 highlighted as a place where many civilians were killed, with a large

6 number of civilian casualties?

7 A. There was no UN presence there or, to my knowledge, international

8 presence there after about the 17th of May until the 24th of June, when I

9 left the city, so we wouldn't have known what was happening there.

10 Q. Thank you. But we published and sent protests, and we published

11 in our media the reports about the suffering of the people in Ilijas.

12 Ilijas begins at a place where you were stopped between Visoko and

13 Sarajevo. That's where Ilijas is, between Visoko and Sarajevo, and it's

14 a purely Serb village, Cekrcici, that had an enormous number of

15 casualties. How come that you did not read the reports in our media

16 about the suffering of the Serbs that were published by the Serb side in

17 their media?

18 A. I have no recollection of that incident or that series of

19 incidents.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please look at

21 65 ter 11708. Now that's the correct number.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this is Exhibit P998.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Now, General, please look at number 1. So the Command of the

Page 4093

1 Sarajevo Romanija Corps sent those instructions for further activities to

2 the commander, and the first paragraph reads that:

3 "The enemy commenced a general offensive engaging its forces on

4 the following axes: Zenica-Visoko-Ilijas-Blazuj," and so on. It's

5 probably -- its intentions are to deblock Sarajevo and so on.

6 Do you remember who was blamed for the fighting around Dobrinja

7 from the 7th until the 15th of June?

8 A. No, at my knowledge nobody was blamed. I said that both sides

9 had some tactical interest in securing that area. It was hard to say who

10 initiated the firing. But I said on balance it was my judgement that I

11 thought it was the Serbs, but I don't know that it was ever published or

12 that the Serbs were criticised for that particular tactical action.

13 Q. Let me remind you that I was under an enormous pressure to put a

14 stop of fighting around Nedzarici and Dobrinja and so on, and you will

15 see now that this had actually been initiated by the other side. In the

16 first passage we can see that the enemy started, and because this is a

17 commander of a Serb unit, it's the Muslims who are the enemy. And then

18 in paragraph 4, he says:

19 "I have decided to mount an active and persistent defence to

20 maintain the lines that have been reached ..."

21 Does this sound like an order to attack?

22 A. At the same time on the 7th [Realtime transcript read in error

23 "17th"] of June, the Presidency representatives were saying to us that

24 this offensive action had been initiated by the Serbs. Two sides of the

25 same story, Mr. Karadzic, was a very familiar problem for the UN serving

Page 4094

1 in the former Yugoslavia. Unless you actually witnessed it yourself, we

2 have hard evidence, it's impossible to make a determination as to who was

3 responsible for what. Both sides have a different story.

4 Q. Yet this is not a public document. This is a strictly

5 confidential document. This is what it says there, "The Sarajevo

6 Romanija Corps, Strictly Confidential." And here it says "the extreme

7 defence," and the objective is to maintain security for the aircraft,

8 bringing food and medical supplies to the population living in the

9 broader airport area. So this is not a press release, this was not a

10 report to you. The commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps issues

11 instructions to his subordinate commands as to what they are to do; to

12 defend themselves and to ensure the security of the aircraft. And we

13 will see what the Presidency, itself, was doing on the 17th, on the same

14 day.

15 Can we please look at the last page of this document.

16 It says here in the second paragraph of paragraph 6:

17 "Ill-treatment of unarmed civilian population is strongly

18 prohibited, and prisoners are to be treated in the spirit of the Geneva

19 Conventions.

20 "The use of one combat set of ammunition and half -- 0.5 p/r," I

21 don't know what it means, but this is what he approved for consumption,

22 reminding his units that the civilian population must be treated with

23 respect.

24 And since this document was received, let us look at this

25 document that will tell us what happened on the 17th at the session of

Page 4095

1 the Presidency. They tell you one thing, and yet we can see that the

2 Presidency was doing something completely different.

3 Can we please look at D192. D192, it's a Defence exhibit.

4 JUDGE KWON: You didn't ask a question about this document. You

5 just read out the passages and just going into another document. What is

6 your point of reading it? What is your question?

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

8 Q. The question is the following: General, do you agree that these

9 are defensive measures that the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps

10 took on the 17th of June, 1992?

11 A. I agree that he has written that. But whether that happened, I

12 have no way of knowing.

13 JUDGE KWON: Then, Mr. Karadzic, is this document dated 7th of

14 June?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 7th, for the forthcoming period.

16 The Muslim offensive had already started, and then he actually defines or

17 instructs as to what they have to do in the forthcoming period.

18 This document has already been admitted. And can we then look at

19 D192, the minutes -- the transcript of the tapes of the session of the

20 Croatian Muslim Presidency of the 17th of June that you mentioned a

21 little while ago. Let us look at the reports that Halilovic gives to his

22 Presidency.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Do you know who Halilovic is?

25 A. Yes, I do.

Page 4096

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 2? I mean

2 in the Serbo-Croatian, because the English page is okay. Mr. Izetbegovic

3 says here:

4 "If the airport does not open, the other side should be to blame,

5 not us. Then we will have a chance to have it opened by force. Surely,

6 that is 90 per cent certain that if he comes back now and says the Serbs

7 will not respect something that is reasonable, which is necessary for the

8 airport to be opened, or fails to accept the conditions generally, in

9 that case there would probably be a resolution which would accomplish

10 that by force."

11 And then further down, he says:

12 "This is what I would like to propose, and then let us see

13 whether we should -- whether we all agree that we should open the

14 airport. Of course, this restricts our army's operations to an extent,

15 but as they say, it's better to have a bird in the hand than in the bush.

16 We'll see what happens."

17 Q. Do you see the logic driving Mr. Izetbegovic here, to accomplish

18 the opening of the airport by force by any means necessary, or a foreign

19 intervention, in other words.

20 A. I can see what's written there, Mr. Karadzic --

21 Q. And then further down, Ljubic says:

22 "Our hands tied in terms of engaging in penetration."

23 And then Izetbegovic says: "A little bit."

24 Is that correct?

25 A. That's how it reads.

Page 4097

1 Q. And would that be consistent with what they were telling you?

2 A. From the 11th of May -- from the 11th of June, when

3 General MacKenzie arrived in the village in Sarajevo, he and

4 Lieutenant-General Richard Gray conducted the detailed negotiations with

5 both parties for the implementation of the plan. They would be competent

6 to comment on this. I am not.

7 Q. But you said that on the 17th of June, the Presidency informed

8 you that the Serbs were causing problems, and here you can see that they

9 are causing problems. So what they're saying here in secret, is it any

10 different from what they are telling you publicly, openly?

11 A. I'm not having discussions with the Presidency on the 17th of

12 June. I don't know what they're saying. This is the first time I've

13 seen a record of this. The negotiations for the implementation of the

14 airport plan were carried out by General MacKenzie and his staff, not by

15 me. I was deliberately distanced from it because the actual disposition

16 of weapons, which was the military observer interest, was to be on a very

17 restricted basis. Two or three people were to know about it, and I was

18 not one of those to know what the detailed disposition of heavy weapons

19 was to be. This was agreed with General Mladic and also with the

20 Presidency military forces. So I had no knowledge of these negotiations,

21 Mr. Karadzic.

22 Q. A little while ago, you said that on the 17th of June, the

23 Presidency had informed you that the Serbs were causing problems and that

24 you believed them, and yet you do not believe a secret document issued by

25 the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps which was not for public

Page 4098

1 consumption, it was meant for his subordinate commands. You, yourself,

2 mentioned the 17th of June and the Presidency 10 minutes ago.

3 A. I think I was talking about the 7th of June, Mr. Karadzic, not

4 the 17th.

5 Q. Page 73 of the transcript, I heard you say "the 17th."

6 A. Then an error on my part, and my apologies. I thought the

7 conversation then was about the 7th of June.

8 JUDGE KWON: Let us check it out.

9 Well, your answer is there on -- it's about the fighting around

10 Nedzarici. Oh, yes, we can see it.

11 Can we locate page 72 and 73?

12 "On the same time on the 17th of June, the Presidency

13 representative were saying to us the same that they had been initiated by

14 the Serbs."

15 Yes, we are coming there. The question appears on line 21, and

16 then your answer starts on line 4 of page 73.

17 Yes, we can stop -- no, no. Yes, we can stop here.

18 THE WITNESS: It's an error on my part. It's the 7th of June.

19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. And do you remember that on the 15th of June, cease-fire was

22 established, and that the Serb side announced a unilateral cease-fire on

23 the 15th of June, 1992?

24 A. There were a number of cease-fires which were negotiated in the

25 period the 5th of June to the 24th of June, while I was still residing in

Page 4099

1 Sarajevo, and, to my knowledge, none of them held. And on each occasion,

2 each party would blame the other.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let us look at page 138

4 of this document. I don't know the page in e-court, but it says "138" at

5 the bottom, the Serb version. That's the Serb version 138.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Here, General, General Halilovic reports to his Presidency what

8 they are doing to the Serbs. The whole document is very interesting, and

9 I will go through just two or three short passages with you.

10 In this document, General Halilovic reports that Milinklatska

11 Street was on fire - that's a Serb street - that Trapare Street is on

12 fire. It's a Serb hamlet north east of Dobrinja, up the hill. And here

13 on page 138, he says that:

14 "In the forthcoming stage of the 10 or 15 days --"

15 It's the next page in the English version:

16 "In the forthcoming stage, 10 to 15 days, the

17 Territorial Defence --"

18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic.

19 Yes, Mr. Sutherland.

20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Sorry for interrupting, Your Honour, but

21 Mr. Karadzic said, I think, when he was introducing D192 to the witness,

22 that this was a transcript of the session of the Presidency. In fact,

23 I think this is again just excerpts from this book by Cosic, or Tosic, or

24 somebody.

25 JUDGE KWON: We haven't the full translation of it, so it is

Page 4100

1 being marked for identification at this moment.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, I think we do have a full

3 translation. No, not a full translation.

4 JUDGE KWON: My memory is this has been marked for

5 identification. I think a foundation has been introduced briefly to the

6 witness, but it should have been done in more detail.

7 Let's proceed.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Well, here in the English version, it says "Page 12." Just for

10 your information, the minutes of the Presidency sessions gathered by this

11 man, the fact that he gathered them, it does not change anything. The

12 Prosecution has already established the accuracy of the transcripts.

13 Here, at page 12, he says:

14 "In the subsequent stage, the next 10 to 15 days, the

15 Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will carry

16 out the following activities:

17 "In the region of Sarajevo --" or, rather, "in the co-ordinated

18 action with the TO and HVO, with the active -- will continue the active

19 operations in the Neretva River valley," and so on.

20 And then about Sarajevo, it says:

21 "In the region of Sarajevo, the city of Sarajevo will be defended

22 and action within the city and outside it will be directed at unblocking

23 it in the direction of: Novi Grad, Ilidza, Blazuj, Kiseljak,

24 Centar-Vogosca, Ilijas, Visoko, and in the region of Gorazde unblock the

25 road ..."

Page 4101

1 So you can see what they're planning, and yet there is a

2 cease-fire in force at the time.

3 And then if we move on to the next page --

4 JUDGE KWON: What is your question?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the general was in contact

6 with the Presidency, and this is what was happening on the 17th of June

7 in the Presidency, while we are under pressure to stop defending

8 ourselves in the Dobrinja, Nedzarici, and so on areas.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. So did you know about this double game on their part?

11 A. Mr. Karadzic, on the 17th of June there was fighting all over the

12 city, many different parts. It was -- the operational activity was at a

13 very high tempo. There was a lot of artillery being fired in the city, a

14 lot of infantry fighting. It's difficult to believe they can all be

15 attributed to one side.

16 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to draw your attention to the next two

17 paragraphs. Izetbegovic asks:

18 "When the engagement of the opposing forces is summed up, how

19 much is that, those that are in the vicinity of Sarajevo and practically

20 surrounding the city ? How many of them are there?"

21 And he goes on to say:

22 "There are about 6.000 in the city of Sarajevo, more specifically

23 those that are surrounding the city."

24 Now, do you see that they're talking about an encirclement, the

25 surrounding of the city, and not the siege of the city? Do you note

Page 4102

1 that?

2 A. No, I don't. You'll need to give me time.

3 Q. [In English] "There are around 6.000 in the city of Sarajevo,

4 more specifically those that are surrounding the city," or encircling.

5 [Interpretation] Perhaps a better translation would be

6 "encircling the city."

7 [In English] "According to our estimate --"

8 [Interpretation] And in Izetbegovic's question, it says:

9 [In English] "... of Sarajevo and practically surrounding the

10 city."

11 [Interpretation] So it's about men, a realistic assessment of

12 about 80.000 on the territory of B and H:

13 "However, for the city of Sarajevo to completely conquer, much

14 stronger forces are required than those that the Serbs have.

15 Objectively, they cannot accomplish that in the near future unless some

16 radical turning point occurs. However, they will still attempt to

17 accomplish this goal, and the goal is to divide the city of Sarajevo and

18 merge the part from Rajlovac over Stup and Lukavica with Pale. For that

19 goal, objectively they need to have certain forces at their disposal, but

20 in that case their defence would become weaker in other areas, so that is

21 not realistic either ."

22 Now, how many forces did the Muslims have to those 6.000 Serbs?

23 A. I don't know with any accuracy. I had estimated that there were

24 probably about 15.000. That was my --

25 Q. Yes, you mentioned that. You mentioned the figure of about

Page 4103

1 15.000, and that you said that mostly they were police; right?

2 A. Initially, they were police, and then they were expanded by

3 people being, I guess, recruited into the army. I think the limitation

4 on their numbers, Dr. Karadzic, is not so much the available manpower in

5 the city, but the number of weapons they had.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm noting the time. It's time to

7 adjourn for today, and then you will have -- you have spent so far about

8 five hours and forty minutes, and you will have about a session -- the

9 first session tomorrow to conclude your cross-examination.

10 Before we adjourn today, now that we'll have the witness KDZ-185,

11 there's a motion pending in respect to the addition of certain documents

12 to the Prosecution's 65 ter list which relates to five documents, one of

13 which is statement and four of them probably photos, so can I hear a

14 response from Defence tomorrow, Mr. Robinson?

15 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, we don't have any objection to that,

16 Mr. President.

17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Then that's granted, Mr. Tieger.

18 Tomorrow, 9.00.

19 [The witness stands down]

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.34 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day of

22 June, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.