Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4021

 1                           Tuesday, 22 June 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody.

 6             There are a couple of matters to raise before we start our

 7     business today.  The first matter concerns the Prosecution motion to add

 8     certain documents to its 65 ter list, which also relates to the order of

 9     witnesses with respect to KDZ-88.

10             So the Chamber is of the view that while the threshold for

11     addition to the exhibit is certainly low, but given that we haven't

12     received the translation of that document, we have a very minimal basis

13     upon which we can draw any conclusions at the moment.  So for that

14     reason, the Chamber is of the view that it will not be able to decide the

15     matter until it has reviewed the details of the diary itself.

16             So in light of this situation -- yes, Mr. Tieger, do you have any

17     observation?

18             MR. TIEGER:  Just one, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Would it be helpful to the Court, and I don't

21     know -- we've disclosed -- let me step back.  We have disclosed, as I

22     mentioned the other day, to the accused those portions of the exhibit

23     that have been translated, and those are considerable.  I also mentioned

24     that with respect to the witness the Court just mentioned, the

25     translations have been received and disclosed; that is, with respect to

Page 4022

 1     those portions that are relevant.  So perhaps it would be of assistance

 2     to the Court, if it hasn't received those translations yet, to get those

 3     forthwith.  So while the entirety of the exhibit has not been translated,

 4     considerable portions have, and as I mentioned, particularly those

 5     portions relevant to the upcoming witness.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber has considered that submission from the

 7     Prosecution.  However, the Chamber does not agree with you, Mr. Tieger,

 8     that your submission that would be okay to proceed with the KDZ-88

 9     because the accused has the particular portions of the diaries that the

10     Prosecution considers correspond to the witness.  The thing may be that

11     the accused needs to rely on other parts to ask further questions, and so

12     I don't think it's realistic, in this situation, to call the witness

13     before the recess.  The Chamber is now requiring you to call him after

14     the recess.

15             As for the response from the accused, while the accused does not

16     need to have undertaken an extensive analysis of the diaries in order to

17     respond to its request for the addition to the Rule 65 ter list, but

18     given the Chamber hasn't received any translation, so it will be

19     appropriate for the accused to respond by the end of the first week,

20     i.e., the Friday, 9th of July.  So that's the first ruling of today.

21             And the second matter relates to the scheduling, in particular

22     tomorrow's hearing.  Considering the accused has complained that he

23     hasn't enough time to prepare for this witness, given the latest

24     disclosure and given that he has spent about three hours and the

25     remaining time for his cross-examination is about four hours, so if we

Page 4023

 1     sit until end of today, he will exhaust most of his time, so my

 2     suggestion is to sit three hours, just two sessions today, and leaving

 3     the remainder of the day for his preparation, and sit some time tomorrow

 4     morning.  So it's up to the accused.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.  That is

 6     acceptable, as far as I'm concerned.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Then we'll sit two sessions, 9.00 until 12.30 today.

 8             That said, let's bring in the witness.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Just one small point of clarification.  I'm not

12     seeking to revisit the Court's ruling, but I wanted to make sure it

13     wasn't predicated on any misunderstanding.

14             When I spoke of the fact that the translations are complete

15     and have been disclosed relevant to the upcoming witness, it doesn't mean

16     simply those particular portions in which the witness maybe mentioned or

17     reflecting meetings which he attended, but the entirety of the period

18     during which he was present and about which he'll be testifying.  I mean,

19     there's a long, long period of time encompassed by those translations,

20     running many, many months.  So the portions of the diary that aren't

21     translated represent -- excuse me.  The portions of the exhibit that

22     we're talking about now that aren't translated represent periods of time

23     years later, for example, not the period of time in question.  So I

24     didn't -- to the extent there was a risk of any misunderstanding in that

25     respect, I wanted to make sure that that was as clear as possible.

Page 4024

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it was clear, Mr. Tieger.

 2             The point I raised is that as a matter of practicality, the

 3     Chamber is unable to give its ruling until it has received and reviewed

 4     the translation of a document which is of 3.000 pages.  And given that

 5     the completion of that translation will not be ready until the first week

 6     of July, or which is not clear at this moment, and I'm not sure whether

 7     the Chamber can make its ruling before the witness is coming, and that

 8     until that time, the Prosecution cannot rely on that document, i.e.,

 9     until leave is granted to add to its list that document.  So that was the

10     crux of our decision.

11             MR. TIEGER:  I wonder if it wouldn't be possible to consider,

12     Your Honour, the tendering, rather than the document in its entirety,

13     those portions, the individual note-books relevant to the particular

14     witness and that have been translated, which is another option, it seems

15     to me.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think that's a matter of a separate motion from

17     yourself.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  It may be if --

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll consider that.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

22             If we could just have some clarity as to the identity of the next

23     witness.  There had been some question -- or we had a communication that

24     another witness might be substituted ahead of Mr. Mandic, and we would

25     like to know who to prepare for next.  So if we could have some

Page 4025

 1     clarification of that, that would be helpful to us as we go forward.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  That's news to me -- to us.  We haven't heard about

 3     any such information.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  We received a letter last week to that effect.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             Mr. Tieger.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.

 8             In anticipation of the -- because of the uncertainties associated

 9     with the process we're engaged in now, we -- and in the interest of using

10     our courtroom time as effectively as possible, we spoke with the Defence

11     about the possibility of another witness in case there was a disruption

12     in the schedule that wasn't anticipated.  We are trying to obtain as much

13     current information about next week's schedule as possible, and as I say,

14     we've spoken with the Defence about that.  We're looking for the most

15     current update this morning, which we hope will resolve any uncertainties

16     about next week's schedule.

17                           [The witness entered court]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             Good morning, General.

20             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We had some certain matters -- administrative

22     matters to deal with.

23             So, Mr. Karadzic, let's start.

24                           WITNESS:  JOHN WILSON [Resumed]

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning to all.

Page 4026

 1             May I ask for 65 ter 30723 to be called up in e-court.

 2                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

 3        Q.   [Interpretation] While we're waiting for that, may I inform you,

 4     General, that this is an intercept of a conversation between

 5     Professor Koljevic and Miljenko Karisik, the chief of our Special Police

 6     Brigade.  So it's the 30th of April, 1992.

 7             Professor Koljevic is calling from Lisbon.  Please cast a glance

 8     at what he said.

 9             Can we please move on to page 2 in English.  It's the same page

10     in Serbian.  Actually, sorry, I beg your pardon.

11             You can see here that it's impossible to communicate by telephone

12     between Sarajevo and Pale.  Mr. Karisik is at Vraca.  That is where the

13     headquarters of the Serb MUP is, and he cannot reach Pale by telephone.

14     Professor Koljevic is putting questions from Lisbon and providing certain

15     instructions.

16             Can we move on to page 2, please.  Second page, please.

17             At the top, you can see that, in English, that they cannot reach

18     783.  That is the code for Pale.  And this young men says that they are

19     having problems too, that Pale seems to be cut off.  And it was the

20     Muslim side that had cut off Pale.  You see here towards the bottom that

21     they are discussing who it is who is actually shooting on the 30th of

22     April.  And as you can see, they are firing at the army at Zlatiste, and

23     Koljevic is calling for restraint on our side.  It had been agreed with

24     Colm Doyle that European Community Monitors be positioned near all our

25     artillery pieces so that they would be in a position to report who it was

Page 4027

 1     that was doing the shooting.

 2             You see here it says:

 3             "Yes, they shoot from Hum and Zlatiste."

 4             [In English] "They shoot from the direction of Sirokaca and

 5     Zlatiste."

 6             [Interpretation] Do you know that Sirokaca and Zlatiste are in

 7     the hills on the slopes of Mount Trebevic?

 8        A.   No, I didn't know that, Mr. Karadzic.

 9        Q.   If you were to be observing fire from Zlatiste and Sirokaca that

10     is falling on Serb neighbourhoods in town, would your conclusion be that

11     it is Serbs that are firing at the Serbs in town?

12        A.   As I indicated yesterday, I have a very limited knowledge of the

13     geography of Sarajevo and these places.  They mean absolutely nothing to

14     me.

15        Q.   General, you came here to testify.  I am asking you the

16     following:  When shells fall on Sarajevo from the hills around Sarajevo,

17     does it go without saying, as far as you're concerned, that it's the

18     Serbs who are doing the shooting?

19        A.   I would say, yeah, on most occasions I would think that if

20     shelling is coming from outside the city, it would be -- it would

21     certainly be originating from Serb positions.

22        Q.   You see, that is totally wrong.  You know where Hum is?  It is to

23     the north of Sarajevo.  We saw it here on a photograph.  And Zlatiste and

24     Sirokaca is to the south of Sarajevo, on the slopes of Trebevic, so they

25     are firing from the hills, shells are falling on Sarajevo, and the Serbs

Page 4028

 1     are being blamed for it; right?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the witness has answered that

 3     question.  As he clearly indicated, he has a very limited knowledge of

 4     the geography of Sarajevo.  That's what we heard from the witness.  Let's

 5     move on.  I don't think there's any point of asking him about geography

 6     any further.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, ethnic deployment and

 8     geography are two very important things, as far as -- where the shells

 9     are coming from and where they're falling.  They are falling on Serb

10     neighbourhoods, and yet the Serbs are being blamed for those shells.  So

11     why is this witness here?  All right, I understand.  Thank you.

12             Can we have the next page in English.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Can I draw your attention to what Koljevic is saying here:

15             [In English] "We have made an arrangement with Doyle that he

16     should bring those observers.  Let them be taken where our artillery is

17     and let that artillery be withdrawn.  We cannot start the conference here

18     without this done.  This has been set as a condition."

19             [Interpretation] Do you know that Muslims often put various

20     conditions forth in order for the conference to continue, or, rather,

21     that this showed that it was not in their interest to have the conference

22     continue?

23        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I don't know which conference we're talking about.

24     And any conference in April of 1992, I would have had limited knowledge

25     or interest in.

Page 4029

 1        Q.   However, as for the time when you were part of the conference,

 2     were the Muslims putting various obstacles in the path of the conference

 3     and various preconditions, and was it not obvious that it was not in

 4     their interest for the conference to continue?

 5        A.   If we're talking about 1993, yes, there were many occasions where

 6     each side participating in the negotiations placed preconditions on the

 7     continuation or some subsequent action being able to take place.  But in

 8     all honesty, it was not just the Muslims who did this, but all of the

 9     parties involved.

10        Q.   However, do you remember that all our positions were based on the

11     unconditioned continuation of the conference?  Give us one single example

12     of a situation when the Serbs said, We are not going to go to the

13     conference unless such and such a thing is done.

14        A.   At the present moment, I can't give you an example, Mr. Karadzic.

15     But I can say that it is my general recollection that both sides or all

16     sides participated and drove pretty hard bargains in the negotiating

17     process, and from time to time refused to progress with the conference at

18     all.  Minor problems were sorted out.

19        Q.   However, the Serbs did not do that.  You're not going to find any

20     such example, General; isn't that right?

21        A.   It's true, I can't give you a specific example right now.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to direct your attention to what

23     Koljevic is saying.  Well, that's what the document says:

24             [In English] "Mobilisation cannot start until the artillery which

25     is threatening the city is removed."

Page 4030

 1             [Interpretation] Further down, it says:

 2             [In English] "There should be no shells falling on the city

 3     anymore, and we cannot prove this came from Hum.  You know that."

 4             [Interpretation] Then further down:

 5             [In English] "We can only take them there and tell them, 'These

 6     here are our artillery pieces.'

 7             "That is it.  So I'd like to ask you to make sure that this is

 8     done, and let them go to some artillery positions.

 9             "Our positions."

10             [Interpretation] So do you see that we are trying to bring the

11     observers and monitors in to monitor our artillery pieces in order to be

12     in a position to report that we are not the ones who are firing?

13        A.   That's certainly what this document says, but I have no knowledge

14     of the tactical situation there.  On the 30th of April, I, in fact, left

15     the city to go to Jerusalem.  This would seem to be a more appropriate

16     question to be asking Mr. Doyle.

17        Q.   However, we didn't have enough time for Mr. Doyle.  But let me

18     say this:  It is clear from this conversation that the Muslims are firing

19     from the hills on the north and the south, and that they are putting

20     forth preconditions; namely, that the conference cannot continue until

21     the Serbs stop firing, but it's actually the Muslims who are doing the

22     shooting.

23             Can I now have page 3, please.  The next page in English, please.

24             You see here that they are unable to reach Pale from Sarajevo.

25     They cut them off.  That means that it was the Muslims that cut off the

Page 4031

 1     telephone lines with Pale.  And Koljevic says that it's very important

 2     that the white ones, that is to say, the monitors - they wore white

 3     suits - that they come to the spot and they see that we are not the ones

 4     who are shooting.

 5             Did you know anything about these ploys, that the Muslims were

 6     actually firing and accusing the Serbs of having fired?

 7        A.   No, I didn't.

 8        Q.   Were there any conversations amongst you, the representatives of

 9     the international community, if I can put it that way, that one had to

10     exercise caution because different games are being played, and different

11     tricks too?

12        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I return to my evidence of yesterday that the

13     events that were taking place in Sarajevo were not in the -- within the

14     mandate of UNPROFOR and, quite rightly, belonged to the ECMM.  And I

15     believe that Mr. Doyle was one of the prominent leaders of the ECMM in

16     Sarajevo.

17             Once again, I can't talk about events that occurred when I was

18     not there, and I certainly can't relate a written document to a tactical

19     situation of which I've got no knowledge.

20        Q.   General, your statement is full of positions of this kind.  You

21     are referring to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia where you had never

22     been.  You easily resort to saying that it was the Serbs who were firing

23     and that things like that were happening.  We'll deal with that tomorrow.

24             Can this document be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think the witness has confirmed any part of

Page 4032

 1     it.  There's no basis on the part of the Chamber to admit this.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, his entire statement

 3     shouldn't be admitted into evidence, Your Excellency.  Then I suggest

 4     that all of that be taken out because it's useless.

 5             Can we have 0010 -- 01110 -- 1D01110?

 6             General, in --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 8             Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I note in this document that the

10     Karadzic translation is incomplete.  And when comparing it against a CLSS

11     translation, it seems to be inaccurate.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Do you mean that you have a CLSS translation?

13             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, a CLSS translation exists.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we use it?

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  But we would need to put it on ELMO.  It's

16     printing right now.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Is it not in the e-court yet?

18             MS. SUTHERLAND:  No, Your Honour, it's not part of the Rule

19     65 ter exhibits.

20             JUDGE KWON:  You have no objection to using the CLSS translation,

21     Mr. Karadzic?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely not, and I'm very

23     thankful that it exists.  But we, of course, can't translate the

24     documents in their entirety, just the passages that are of interest to

25     us, because we don't have the resources to do that.

Page 4033

 1             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I note it is a draft CLSS

 2     translation.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd be grateful if they could

 4     point out what it is that is wrong in our Serbian translation.  Perhaps

 5     the Prosecution can point that out to us.

 6             And may we now have 1D01110 brought up, please?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So we can have that Serbian version in e-court while

 8     we have the translation on the ELMO.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Now, General, do you agree that this is a daily report dealing

11     with daily events that the minister of the interior is informing us about

12     on the 2nd of May, 1992, Mico Stanisic?

13        A.   I can confirm that's what the document says.  But I've not seen a

14     previous example so I can't confirm that that's, in fact, you know, what

15     you say it is.

16        Q.   In paragraph 40 of your statement, you say that after your

17     return, you were informed about the events that took place in your

18     absence; right?

19        A.   I was briefed on them, yes; in particular, upon the ambushing of

20     the JNA convoy.

21        Q.   Now, this is a report -- a daily report for the 2nd of May, 1992,

22     so let's see what it says, what this report from the Ministry of the

23     Interior and minister of the interior says.  It says that "over the past

24     24 hours," or at 2430 hours, there was an unprovoked attack on the Serbs

25     of Sarajevo by the Green Berets.

Page 4034

 1             Did you know of the existence of the Green Berets at all?

 2        A.   I'm aware the military forces of the Bosnian Presidency were

 3     called the Green Berets by the Serb forces.

 4        Q.   And did those forces refer to themselves by that name?

 5        A.   Not that I'm aware of.

 6        Q.   Do you know that one of the main streets in Sarajevo is called

 7     the Green Berets Street?

 8        A.   No, I don't.

 9        Q.   Well, a witness said here that the Green Berets were something

10     that the Serbs had imagined, it was a fantasy of the Serbs.  Do you

11     consider that to be true, too?

12        A.   I can't comment on that, Mr. Karadzic.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Well, let's have a look at what the minister is

14     reporting on; that there was a perfidious attack by the Green Berets from

15     the direction of Visoko at the villages of Vela and Zenik.  Now, General,

16     you mentioned Visoko.  Do you remember passing by a Serbian checkpoint

17     between Visoko and Ilijas in a village called Cakarcici [phoen]?

18        A.   No.  Once again, I refer to my statement, that I had limited

19     knowledge of the geography of Sarajevo.  I'm aware broadly where Visoko

20     is, though, but certainly not those villages mentioned in this report.

21        Q.   Thank you.  So the all-out attack with heavy weapons and snipers,

22     so that means they attacked Vraca, the seat of the Serbian MUP.  The

23     attack lasted several hours, and hundreds of mortar shells were fired,

24     damaging the buildings and several houses in Dobojska Street, some of

25     which caught fire.  And then again at around 1500 hours, there was a

Page 4035

 1     heavy artillery attack from infantry and sniper weapons, the same from

 2     the direction of Grbavica, Hrasno, and Pofalici neighbourhoods, and the

 3     Jajce Barracks.  Do you know that the Jajce Barracks were up on a hill

 4     above Sarajevo?

 5        A.   I know two barracks were on a hill overlooking Sarajevo.  One

 6     which was formerly the headquarters of the 2nd Military District.  I

 7     can't recall its name.  And the other barracks was down closer to the

 8     Tito Barracks, and that was one of the barracks I was involved in

 9     evacuating.

10        Q.   So you don't know that there was a Jajce Barracks above

11     Bascarsija up on the hill?

12        A.   Once again, Mr. Karadzic, I have limited geographic knowledge of

13     the city.

14        Q.   Thank you.  So you see here "Hrasno."  That's at an elevation,

15     and so is Pofalici and the Jajce Barracks.  So if they're dropping from

16     Hum, Zlatiste, Sirokaca, Jajce, Hrasno, and so on and so forth, do you

17     understand, General, that they were all hills under Muslim control and

18     that they were firing on Serb suburbs?

19        A.   No, I don't understand.

20        Q.   Did anybody tell you that in the night between the 1st and 2nd of

21     May, that is to say, before the killing of the security detail at the

22     military hospital, that this attack took place on the Serbian MUP, and

23     hundreds of mortar shells fell on our ministry building?  Were you

24     briefed about that or did that come under the general heading of the town

25     was shelled?

Page 4036

 1        A.   The latter part of your answer.  There was so much activity

 2     taking place at that time that a particular attack in one part of the

 3     city was reported basically as just part of the general calamity of what

 4     was occurring.

 5             Once again, I've got to say that UNPROFOR's footprint in the city

 6     was quite small.  We had very limited capacity to investigate what was

 7     going on, and this was the responsibility of the ECMM.

 8             I would again point out to you that between the 30th of May -- or

 9     on the 30th of April and the 13th of May, I was not in the city.

10        Q.   General, let me ask you this now:  If this were contained in a

11     report, hundreds of mortar shells fell on the city, if it was that phrase

12     that appeared, would you understand it that it was the Serbs doing the

13     shooting?

14             JUDGE KWON:  That's not for the witness to answer that question.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can this document be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Likewise, there's no basis for us to admit this.

18     The witness has confirmed nothing about this.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             May we have 1D01111.  Four 1s, please, 01111.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Again, Your Honour, this is another translation

23     which we have a CLSS draft translation for.  The difference between the

24     Karadzic Defence translation and the CLSS translation, some nuances in

25     words, but the difference being in the very first sentence, it simply

Page 4037

 1     lacks the words "last night's attack" -- the words "by members" are

 2     missing from the Karadzic Defence translation, and there's also three

 3     errors in relation to the names of the people that are listed.  So if you

 4     wish to use the CLSS draft translation, we have that.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, it could be put on ELMO.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  With the understanding that the English translation

 8     will be replaced to this document.

 9             And one further question is:  Are those translations the ones

10     that have been pre-existing or the ones that have been newly translated

11     by the CLSS?

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Pre-existing, yes, Your Honour.  The same for

13     the last document and this document.

14             JUDGE KWON:  So you found those pre-existing translated

15     documents?

16             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, yes.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Let's put it on the ELMO.  Let's hope it

18     will be working again.

19             General, in the meantime while we're waiting for that machine to

20     be working again:  One of the things we discussed in your absence,

21     General, was the scheduling today.  We'll sit until 12.30 today, and then

22     we'll adjourn for today and we'll sit again tomorrow morning.

23             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, if I can just make the point that

25     if Mr. Karadzic is going to read the translation, that he reads it

Page 4038

 1     correctly.  He said a moment ago to the last document that hundreds of

 2     mortar shells were being fired.  In fact, the translation says "a

 3     hundred."  I mean, it's quibbling, but I would ask that he read the

 4     translation properly.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Let's proceed with the B/C/S.  Yes.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe I said "a hundred."

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 8        Q.   General, this is another daily report for the 3rd of May, so --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Why don't we give the English

10     translation to the witness for his convenience.  It will be easier for

11     him to follow.

12             Let's proceed.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have our translation into

14     English so that we can see what is wrong, what they say is wrong.  So may

15     we have our translation called up on e-court, please.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Let's proceed.  [Overlapping speakers]

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General, you said yesterday that you believed that the Muslims

19     had several mortars, 82-millimetre ones; right?

20        A.   If I said that, it's perhaps a little inaccurate.  I had a small

21     quantity.  I would think if they had 20 or 30, that would be the limit.

22        Q.   Well, do you claim that they didn't have any 120-millimetre ones?

23        A.   I did see -- now, I can't recall ever seeing a 120-millimetre

24     mortar.

25        Q.   And do you believe their sources, that in Sarajevo, itself, they

Page 4039

 1     produced 80.000 shells for the 120-millimetre?

 2        A.   It's the first time I've heard that, Mr. Karadzic.

 3        Q.   We'll bring the book in tomorrow, their source.

 4             Now, would you focus on the last paragraph, please.  It says:

 5             "According to detailed information that is in the possession of

 6     the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of BiH, the

 7     victims of the 120-millimetre mortar attack carried out by the so-called

 8     TO BAH and other paramilitary formations against the area of

 9     Vraca-Sarajevo are as follows:"

10             And then they listed several killed, the rest were injured.

11             Do you know where Vraca is, General?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Let me help you out.  Vraca is a hill above Grbavica.  So

14     Grbavica and Vraca are mostly inhabited by Serbs, and Vraca is almost a

15     100 per cent Serbian area.

16             So do you see between the 2nd and 3rd of May, 1992, there was a

17     heavy mortar attack, using 120-millimetre mortars, against this Serb

18     settlement and that this many people were injured and killed?

19        A.   That's what this document says, but I was not in the city and I

20     was not briefed on this.

21        Q.   But in paragraph 40, you say that upon your return, you were

22     briefed on the situation, and this is a drastic event.  Did the ECMM give

23     you the possibility of learning about this?

24        A.   No.  I should take a moment to tell you exactly what happened

25     when I returned to the city on the 13th of May.

Page 4040

 1             When I returned to the city on the 13th of May, I returned to the

 2     office for a short period of time and spoke with General MacKenzie.  He,

 3     at that time, was preoccupied with the after-events of the evacuation of

 4    the first JNA Barracks, including the kidnapping of President Izetbegovic,

 5     so his briefing was necessarily broad and he hit the highlights.  I also

 6     spoke with my UNMO headquarters staff, and they briefed me, in broad

 7     terms, what had happened in Sarajevo to the effect that there had been

 8     continued conflict, that there had been some fighting around the hill you

 9     call Hum, and then they briefed me on what my military observers had been

10     doing in the UNPAs in Croatia.

11             On the 14th of May, there was very heavy fighting, where nobody

12     could leave their accommodation.

13             On the 15th of May, when I was able to get into the headquarters,

14     once again there was very limited staff there because the fighting was

15     continuing.

16             On the 16th and 17th of May, the headquarters left.  So there was

17     limited opportunity for people to be sitting down and briefing anybody in

18     detail about events for which we had no operational responsibility.

19             So I'd like to give you that rather lengthy explanation to

20     explain why I've not got a detailed knowledge of what happened while I

21     was away.  It's pointless asking me about these matters.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Then let's look at a document before the 14th, just

23     one.  There are many of them, but we'll look at just one.

24             But let me ask the Trial Chamber whether this can be admitted

25     first.

Page 4041

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's a waste of time.

 2     General Wilson's clearly said he has limited knowledge.  Unless you move

 3     on to relevant issues to which the general can give relevant answers,

 4     we'll find that you are wasting your time.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Then I'll leave this

 6     document of the 6th of May and move on to a document of the 14th of May.

 7     30753 is the number.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Now, I'm sure you know Mrs. Plavsic, member of the Presidency of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice-president of Republika Srpska; right?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12        Q.   This is a telephone conversation between Mrs. Plavsic and

13     Mico Stanisic, taking place on the 14th of May, 1992.  Now, did you know

14     that Mrs. Plavsic, right up until the 22nd of May, lived in Sarajevo,

15     right up at the separation line?

16        A.   Yes, I did.  We had cause to send some of our troops around to

17     her house.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And most probably they had to drive her to your

19     headquarters for negotiations; right?

20        A.   On occasions.  Also, she co-opted us once to attempt to evacuate

21     her mother from the city.

22        Q.   Probably her mother or brother and sister-in-law.  Anyway, take a

23     look at this.  Somewhere in the middle, Biljana Plavsic says:

24             [In English] "Let me tell you fire must cease at 1400 hours

25     sharp."

Page 4042

 1             [Interpretation] And then a little lower down:

 2             [In English] "Fire must cease at 1400 sharp.  They too will.  The

 3     Presidency too has decided that it should stop at 1400 hours so that we

 4     can go to UNPROFOR headquarter for negotiations."

 5             [Interpretation] And she's talking to somebody called Milos.  And

 6     then the minister becomes included in the conversation.  Mico Stanisic

 7     says:  "Good afternoon, how are you," and so on.  And we can see that

 8     Mrs. Plavsic even believes that she never actually met the minister, and

 9     says:  "Have we ever met before," and so on.  And then she says:

10             [In English] "Mico, please, there should be negotiations at 1400

11     hours."

12             [Interpretation] So they were probably the negotiations that you

13     attended; right?

14        A.   No.  On the 14th of May, I was in my apartment and couldn't leave

15     it because of the fighting.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to the next page,

17     please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

19        Q.   Here, we see what it says -- Biljana Plavsic says:

20             [In English] "There is a five-day cease-fire there."

21             [No interpretation]:

22             [In English] "They were the first to open fire this morning."

23             Mr. Stanisic:  "They are still attacking here."

24             So this exchange between the two -- :

25             [In English] "This MacKenzie called me and said the Presidency

Page 4043

 1     had said they would cease fire at 1400 hours sharp, but we also have to

 2     cease-fire at ..."

 3             [Interpretation] And so on.

 4             Later on, Mico Stanisic:

 5             [In English] "But if there is an attack there as intensive as the

 6     one now is, people will have to defend themselves and everything else.

 7     Let them reduce the intensity of their attack.  Just reduce the intensity

 8     and we'll stop immediately."

 9             [Interpretation] Do you see that the minister is asking them to

10     reduce and says, We'll stop?

11        A.   That's what the document says, Mr. Karadzic.

12        Q.   Further down:

13             [In English] "It will not be of you -- be us who cause a problem,

14     but they have given their assurances before and still 100 soldiers got

15     killed down there around the headquarter."

16             [Interpretation] And so on.

17             Therefore, General -- and I recommend this intercept to everybody

18     to take a look.  And on the 14th of May, early in the morning, you say in

19     paragraph 41 that serious fighting, including widespread use of heavy

20     weapons, broke out early in the morning and lasted all day.  The

21     hostilities certainly occurred in the immediate area of Dobrinja where "I

22     was located in my apartment," et cetera, et cetera.

23             Now, do you see that on that same day, the Muslims were attacking

24     and that our people were asking for them to reduce that so that we could

25     stop?

Page 4044

 1        A.   What I saw on that day from my apartment, in fact, was the Serbs

 2     were attacking the immediate vicinity that I was in and that the very

 3     limited Presidency forces who were there, a ragtag group of young men

 4     with rifles, there by a policeman, they appeared to be mounting a rather

 5     unprofessional defence of the area.  I can only say what I saw,

 6     Mr. Karadzic.  But in the case of Dobrinja, where I was, when I was able

 7     to occasionally look out the window, the attacking was actually being

 8     done by the Serbs.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give us the time-frame again, General,

10     when you saw that fighting?

11             THE WITNESS:  This was the 14th of May.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The time of the day.

13             THE WITNESS:  Morning, late morning, afternoon.  Very heavy

14     fighting.  I spent most of the day, actually, in my bathroom, lying on

15     the floor, because of the shrapnel and the rounds that were coming in --

16     into the apartment.  But if I crawled out and looked out the window,

17     which I did from time to time, I could see what was happening.  And this

18     attack went on most of the day, including a very heavy artillery attack

19     which destroyed the Rainbow Hotel, which was the accommodation for the UN

20     forces in UNPROFOR.  It was a deliberate attack against that building.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

22             Mr. Karadzic.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And how did you know who the Serbs were and who the Muslims were?

25        A.   The Muslims were generally people running around in civilian

Page 4045

 1     clothes with rifles.  The Serbs were the people in uniforms, with

 2     helmets, supported by tanks.

 3        Q.   Uh-huh, I see.  And you know -- knew which part was Serb and

 4     which part was Muslim; right?

 5        A.   One side was attacking the other.  By observation, I believe one

 6     group to be Serb, the other group to be Muslim.  I was actually able to

 7     talk with the Presidency forces who were actually in the stairwell of my

 8    building.  I chatted with them for half an hour to ask them what was going

 9     on.  They told me that they were defending the area.  They told me there

10    were Presidency forces.  I saw who was attacking them.  They were Serbs in

11     JNA-type uniforms.  They were well organised.  It was a good infantry

12     attack, one that required training.  I suspect it may have even been JNA.

13        Q.   General, do you mean to say that Mrs. Plavsic and the minister

14     here are not telling the truth?  It's not a press statement; it's a

15     conversation that they weren't aware was being tapped.

16        A.   The conversation in this -- recorded in this intercept,

17     Mr. Karadzic, is a sad commentary, really, on the many hundreds of

18     cease-fires which were negotiated in the former Yugoslavia from 1991

19     through until at least the end of 1993, that I'm aware of, that were not

20     respected by one side or the other.  When the parties decided they

21     seriously wanted to implement a cease-fire, they could do it.  But for

22     the most part, they didn't respect them.

23        Q.   That's not what I'm asking you, General.  What I'm asking you is

24     this:  Do you believe that these people are speaking sincerely here, a

25     member of the Presidency calling up the minister of the interior, and

Page 4046

 1     they don't know each other, she can't remember whether they'd ever met,

 2     and they're saying what was taken on as the responsibility, to stop at

 3     1400 hours?  Is this a lie or is this authentic?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's not for the witness to guess.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6        Q.   General, you asked a member of the Green Berets or

 7     Patriotic League, you say, the Presidency forces, as you said -- or,

 8     rather, you asked them, but did you ask any Serb who was doing the

 9     attacking and who was on the defence?

10        A.   No.  They were firing at me, Mr. Karadzic.  They were not looking

11     for a conversation.

12        Q.   Do you mean to say that the Serbs were firing on you and the

13     Muslims weren't?

14        A.   Yes, I do mean to say that, Mr. Karadzic.

15        Q.   Do you consider yourself, General, to be a well-informed person

16     and impartial person and an impartial observer?

17        A.   I do consider myself sincerely to be impartial, as much as one

18     can be.  Everybody has prejudices, but in this case I tried very hard, as

19     a professional, to be impartial.

20        Q.   Now, of all these prejudices that you have, could you quote one

21     that you have vis-a-vis the Serbs?  Don't you see that you do have a

22     prejudice against the Serbs?

23        A.   I can assure you, Mr. Karadzic, I don't have a prejudice against

24     the Serbs.  I have great sympathy for all the people of the former

25     Yugoslavia.  In my dealings with them, they're very nice people.

Page 4047

 1     Unfortunately, they were involved in bad politics, led by bad

 2     politicians.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please tender this into

 4     evidence?

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The general knew nothing about this conversation,

 7     the content of this document.  We will not admit this.  Will you use

 8     it --

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Could we please have 65 ter 30759.  The general doesn't know

11     anything about what the Defence is putting to him, and we will see, from

12     other sources, that he actually claims to know so much.

13             So can we now please have this?

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and some people

16     from Nedzarici.  Do you know where Nedzarici is?

17        A.   Yes, I do.

18        Q.   Well, so Nedzarici is really close to Dobrinja, just one street

19     apart, so let us see what they say.

20             I'm in Belgrade, as you can see from Ambassador Zimmerman's book,

21     and I am calling the local Territorial Defence people from Belgrade to

22     talk to them.

23             So, General, do you see that Rade reports to me here?  I'm asking

24     him:

25             "Can you tell me what is the situation down there?"

Page 4048

 1             He says:

 2             "Well, it's more or less okay.  There's some shooting here at and

 3     at Mojmilo."

 4             And I'm asking:  "Who's shooting?"

 5             And he says:

 6             "Well, they're shooting a little bit, they're responding, and we

 7     are doing that too."

 8             And then I say:

 9             "Okay, make sure that we are not shooting."

10             And he says:

11             "Okay.  Should I relay that?"

12             And I say:

13             "Relay to everyone that it should be ceased."

14             And he says:

15             "Well, yes, I'm going to do that."

16             And then I said:

17             "You should call Biljana or somebody else before you start

18     shooting so that she can inform UNPROFOR," and so on."

19             So, General, were you aware of the fact that we always asked the

20     Serbs to take fire for an hour or so and then to call UNPROFOR before

21     responding?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second before you answer, General.

23             Ms. Sutherland.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  This intercept seems to

25     be undated, so I don't know what date Mr. Karadzic is putting on -- when

Page 4049

 1     he was in Belgrade.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  It says "sometime in May."

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is a date, the 14th.  We know

 4     that this is the 14th.  It's your document, it's a Prosecution document.

 5             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I understand it says "May," Your Honour, but

 6     it's unclear as to what date in May, both on the B/C/S transcript and on

 7     the English transcript.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow your point.  So, Ms. Sutherland, that

 9     the foundation of the question is somewhat incorrect, that's your

10     position?

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Well, it may or may not be that the witness is

12     aware as opposed to what the date is.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So with that caveat, let's hear what the general can

14     answer to this question.

15             THE WITNESS:  My answer is that I was not aware that there had

16     been a directive issued by the Serb authorities that Serb forces should

17     suffer an hour's firing upon them before they took any action and

18     reported to UNPROFOR.  And, quite frankly, I think it's an unrealistic

19     directive that anybody would subject their forces to this sort of action.

20     I don't believe it.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   And do you know that before responding, we always informed

23     UNPROFOR, telling them that we were forced to respond?

24        A.   No, I don't believe that, Mr. Karadzic.

25        Q.   Well, this was confirmed here by a UN observer.  He said that we

Page 4050

 1     had always informed them before responding.  A witness confirmed that

 2     here in court.

 3             And do you see down here, on page 2, Karadzic says:

 4             "Inform him that he should stop and that we do not fire before we

 5     are directly threatened"?

 6        A.   No, I don't see --

 7        Q.   It's in page 2 in the Serbian version, at the bottom of page 2.

 8     Can we please have a look at that.

 9             Here you can see that I'm asking him to cease fire immediately,

10     he should stop immediately.

11             Can we please look at the next page in English?  Well, yeah, it

12     says here -- what line is it?

13             [In English] "Tell him to stop, and we are not shooting until we

14     are under an extreme threat."

15             [Interpretation] Does that mean that we should take -- that they

16     should take fire for as long as they can and only then respond?

17        A.   I've got no idea what that means.

18        Q.   Well, General, you're a soldier.  Until we are under extreme

19     threat, the kind of fire that causes casualties, and that we should

20     respond only when we start taking casualties.  This is what it means,

21     doesn't it?

22        A.   If a politician said to me that as a soldier, then I would

23     politely try and disagree and ignore it anyway.  And I'm sure you must

24     have had difficulty with your own generals if they were the sort of

25     directives they were issuing.  It's quite unrealistic to expect soldiers

Page 4051

 1     in combat to lie down and take fire upon themselves meekly until they

 2     start taking casualties.  As a broad response, it's very unrealistic.

 3     Nobody is going to do that, Mr. Karadzic.  I'm sure your generals would

 4     have told you that.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I agree that I often made

 6     unrealistic demands to our officers and that we often clashed.

 7             So I would like to tender this document into evidence.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  The general knew nothing about this, Mr. Karadzic.

 9     Ask some questions which the general can answer.

10             Now move on to really relevant questions.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Well, General, was there a way for you to see who started the

13     fight and who was firing from what side?

14        A.   In what time-frame, please, Mr. Karadzic?

15        Q.   Well, the time-frame is your stay there, the 13th of May until

16     the 24th of June.

17        A.   Well, our standard operating procedure as military observers was

18     that you only verified information that you actually observed yourself.

19     If you received reports about something that happened, you had to somehow

20     or other support that with evidence from another source.  And even when

21     you did that, you reported the fact that you had not seen it, so you

22     couldn't confirm it, but it was based on reports from X or Y.

23             So the short answer to your question is:  In May of 1992, in

24     Sarajevo, we had a very limited footprint on the ground.  A lot of the

25     information coming to us was from your liaison officer actually located

Page 4052

 1     in the PTT, and similarly from the Presidency forces.  We only ventured

 2     out into the city when we had actual missions to do.  It was not a place

 3     to touristically drive around, enjoying yourself.

 4        Q.   Should I take it, then, that once the fighting started, you had

 5     no way of knowing who actually started the fight?

 6        A.   That's very true.  We had to listen to what both sides said

 7     and --

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9        A.   -- inevitably each side would say, We didn't start it; the other

10     side did.  That was the standard reply in the former Yugoslavia about

11     almost every incident.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know that General Mladic made efforts to

13     prevent casualties among innocent people, including young soldiers, and

14     that he issued instructions to that effect to his people in the field, on

15     the ground?

16        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.  Quite to the contrary, he seemed to

17     take a lot of actions that resulted in the death of a lot of people,

18     Mr. Karadzic.

19        Q.   Well, what appeared to you is why we have such problems, because

20     your impressions are presented here as evidence, and it's not evidence.

21             Could we please look at 65 ter 30793.

22             JUDGE KWON:  No speech, Mr. Karadzic.  Ask your question.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at this

24     document.  This is the well-known intercept of Mladic's conversation with

25     an unidentified male on the ground.  The date is the 25th of May, 1992.

Page 4053

 1     And, well, here we have the document.  He says:

 2             "What is going on in Sarajevo?"

 3             And he is warning them that they should be persistent in

 4     observation, that observers should be posted, that they should be well

 5     rested, and the moment the first bullet is fired at

 6     Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks or "Marsal Tito" Barracks, and if a single soldier

 7     is wounded either at the front or in the barracks, "I will retaliate

 8     against the town."

 9             So what you said a little while ago, that a general will not take

10     fire, but will respond.

11             Can we please look at the next page.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, while we're waiting for page 2 to appear:  Did you take

14     Mladic's words as his intention to retaliate against civilians?

15        A.   Yes.  When I spoke to him on the 25th of May at a meeting I had

16     with him and Mrs. Plavsic, he said if the barracks were not evacuated

17     within three days, he would level the city.  The city had a lot of

18     civilians in it.  If he's going to level the city, he's going to cause a

19     lot of civilian casualties.  That's exactly what I understood his threat

20     was.  As it turned out, he carried out that threat.  On the night of the

21     28th of May, three days later, the barracks had not been evacuated.  He

22     unleashed on the city a most horrendous attack which he personally

23     directed.  Now, he issued this warning in the presence of Mrs. Plavsic.

24     She didn't contradict anything he said.  I assume the position that

25     General Mladic gave to me was that of General Mladic and the political

Page 4054

 1     leadership of the Bosnian Serbs.  I took it very seriously.  I reported

 2     back to General Nambiar this conversation, and I passed it on to the

 3     Presidency as a warning, as requested by General Mladic.

 4        Q.   So you say, yourself, that General Mladic is asking for this to

 5     be relayed to the Presidency.  Does he want to fire on the city or does

 6     he actually want to avoid having to do that?

 7        A.   He wants the barracks evacuated.  And if the barracks aren't

 8     evacuated within three days -- I'm talking about the meeting on the 25th

 9     of May, not this document.  If the barracks are not evacuated, he's going

10     to attack the city.  He's going to level the city, as he puts it.

11        Q.   I'm asking you:  Did Mladic wish to fire or did he wish not to

12     fire?  Did he ask you to relay his warning to the Presidency precisely in

13     order to avoid having to shoot at them; yes or no?  Did he ask you to

14     relay to the Presidency this warning of his?

15        A.   I can't speculate what motivated General Mladic, but I can say

16     that I did pass the message to the Presidency, as requested by him.

17        Q.   How come that you don't know what drove General Mladic, after the

18     2nd and the 3rd and the 15th of May in Sarajevo and in Tuzla

19     respectively?  The butchery of the soldiers as they were pulling out, was

20     this reason enough for a general?  Would you, yourself, say, well, this

21     should not be repeated?

22        A.   I can't comment on what motivates General Mladic, Mr. Karadzic.

23        Q.   And would you -- after three massacres, would you have warned the

24     Presidency not to let that happen again?  Would you, as a general, try to

25     protect your troops by warning the Presidency that this should not happen

Page 4055

 1     again?

 2        A.   I can't really put myself in General Mladic's position,

 3     Mr. Karadzic.

 4        Q.   Well, put yourself in your position.  If you had three massacres

 5     after assurances were made for a safe withdrawal, what would you say to

 6     the Presidency if you had two more barracks that had to be evacuated?

 7     Would you have warned them or would you have pussy-footed with them?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  It is not required -- the witness isn't required to

 9     speculate, Mr. Karadzic.  Move on to your next question.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at page 3 of

11     this document so that we can see what Mladic says to this guy who is in

12     the field.  It's page 3 in the English version and page 2 in the Serbian

13     version.  We're on the right page in the Serbian version.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   You can see in the English:

16             [In English] "You can endure more than they can."

17             [Interpretation] So he's encouraging this man who is in the

18     blockaded barracks, the Jusuf Dzonlic and the "Marsal Tito" Barracks, the

19     people there are encircled, and he's encouraging this man, telling him,

20     You can endure much more than they can.  And then he goes on to say:

21             "I don't want to kill the people.  I don't want to destroy the

22     city.  I don't want the innocents to suffer.  Those who want to fight,

23     let them remain in Sarajevo.  Let them allow the army to pull out.  Let

24     them pull out the civilians.  And if they want to fight, we will fight.

25     It's better to fight somewhere in the hills than in the city."

Page 4056

 1             Is this more than clear indication that Mladic wants to avoid

 2     firing on the city, itself?

 3        A.   That's what the document says.  But on the same day, I met

 4     General Mladic, and he made it quite clear to me that it was his clear

 5     intent to attack the city if the barracks were not evacuated.  I took his

 6     threat very seriously, to the extent that I formally reported it to my

 7     superior in General Nambiar.  Words are cheap, Mr. Karadzic.  It's what

 8     you do.

 9        Q.   General, do you see where he says here:

10             "The people have to live somewhere.  We do not want to fight."

11             Do you see that in this document?

12        A.   I do see that, Mr. Karadzic.

13        Q.   Well, General, if you have to relay a message to the Presidency,

14     do you feel it is realistic to relay a harsh message or a mild message,

15     in light of the three massacres that had already happened?

16        A.   I relayed the message that General Mladic asked me to relay, and

17     that is that if the barracks were not evacuated within three days, he

18     would level the city.  That's the message I relayed.

19        Q.   But you agree that when you send a message of this sort, it needs

20     to be harsh, harsher than -- well, far harsher than what you actually

21     mean?  We see a difference between what he's telling his soldier on the

22     ground and what he tells you.  He says to those people on the ground,

23     Peace, and he is telling you that there would be retaliation?

24        A.   You're asking me to speculate on the intent of his conversation

25     with his men in the barracks.  Clearly, these people are under great

Page 4057

 1     pressure, and he's trying to raise their morale, saying, It will be all

 2     right, I'll look after you.  That's what he's saying.

 3        Q.   Fair enough.  But you do admit that he is telling this man who is

 4     on the ground that he doesn't want to fire on the city?

 5        A.   That's what the document says, Mr. Karadzic.  I again say --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 7     document into evidence.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  This is already included in the associated exhibit

 9     of this witness --

10             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour, it was --

11             JUDGE KWON:  -- and it was marked for identification as

12     Exhibit P1041.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Can we please look at 30824, 65 ter 30824, please.  And I would

15     like to ask the Registrar to check whether this has been admitted

16     already.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you know who Mr. Baros is?  He was a colonel and perhaps even

19     a general.

20        A.   No, I don't.

21        Q.   You mention him in your reports.  He participated in the talks

22     regarding the withdrawal from the "Marsal Tito" Barracks.

23        A.   I thought his name was Bebeska [phoen].

24        Q.   And to your knowledge, how did -- how was the Jusuf Dzonlic

25     Barracks evacuated?

Page 4058

 1        A.   I'm sorry.  Which barracks, Mr. Karadzic?

 2      Q.   Jusuf Dzonlic.  It was evacuated before the "Marsal Tito" Barracks.

 3        A.   If it's the one I think it is, it was a very small barracks

 4     containing only a small number of troops high up on a hill; is that

 5     correct?

 6        Q.   Yes.

 7        A.   I personally attended the evacuation of that barracks.  It was

 8     done by vehicles.  The vehicles were pre-loaded by the occupants of the

 9     barracks, and some UN vehicles, which I was a passenger in one, escorted

10     them safely out of the city.  There was some minor problem leaving the

11     barracks, where the crowd wanted to pull one of the drivers out of the

12     cabin and do whatever with him then, but I interceded [Realtime

13     transcript read in error "was seated"] and we were able to leave safely.

14     It was quite a well-conducted operation, I thought.

15        Q.   Well, that would be Viktor Bubanj.  But Jusuf Dzonlic came under

16     heavy attack, and you mentioned it yesterday, because the column took a

17     turn somewhere?

18        A.   That was -- I thought that was after "Marsal Tito" Barracks.

19        Q.   Let us look at this intercept, sir.

20             So he first speaks with Potpara, and Potpara reports to him that

21     everything is quiet, so Mladic wants to know what the situation is like

22     in the barracks.  And he says it's quiet, and he says:  "Be extremely

23     cautious."  And then he says:

24             "They want to provoke us into firing on the city by attacking the

25     barracks."

Page 4059

 1             And then if we move on to the next page in the English language:

 2             "Tell the people so that they are aware of it."

 3             That's what Mladic says:

 4             "Be very cautious," Mladic says.

 5             And then in the end, he talks to Baros.  He says:

 6             "Is this Baros?"

 7             We need the next page in English.

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Sorry, Dr. Karadzic.  Just to note a mistake in

 9     the transcript.  It's at 38.5.  The general said that he interceded, and

10     it's been transposed as "I was seated."  It doesn't make any sense.  He's

11     talking about where he interceded with the crowd that was trying to pull

12     the driver out of the car.  It needs correcting.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16        Q.   So you can see that he now gets Baros on the line, and a little

17     bit further down Mladic says:

18             [In English] "You have heart problems?  You'd better take some

19     more rest."

20             [Interpretation] And then he wants to know whether this is Baros,

21     and then we follow their conversation.

22            Baros was the commander of the "Marsal Tito" Barracks, was he not?

23        A.   I don't know.

24        Q.   You note that he attended a meeting, but let us move on.

25             Could we please have the next page both in English and in

Page 4060

 1     Serbian.  The next page in English:

 2             [In English] "Get ready.  Do not let them humiliate you, as they

 3     did with Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks."

 4             [Interpretation] Further down:

 5             [In English] "We left all the heavy weapons for them there, and

 6     despite of that, they attacked the column and they would massacre all of

 7     you.  Don't worry, all of you will get out.  Just hang on there, there

 8     will be no problem."

 9             [Interpretation] So the column from the Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks

10     had come under attack despite the fact that all the heavy weapons had

11     been left there.  Did you know that all the heavy weapons had been left

12     behind in all the barracks?

13        A.   That was the agreement that was negotiated with the Presidency.

14     Yes, I'm aware that that was one of the conditions of the evacuation of

15     the barracks.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  In this intercept they

17     say those who have peace will have it.  There was a mass attack on the

18     next page.  I recommend that all the parties should read it.  Thank you

19     very much.

20             I would like to tender this into evidence.  It speaks about the

21     events that the general here had participated in.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, this has been marked as MFI D207.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at the next

Page 4061

 1     page in English.  I would just like to go through one more thing, one

 2     passage, one response by Mladic.  We should go one page further down in

 3     English.  The next page, the next page in English.

 4             Well, it seems that we need the next page again in the English

 5     language.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   You see what he says here:

 8             "I share the same opinion.  We think in the same way.  If they

 9     want peace, they will have it.  I ordered, as soon as I came last

10     night ... it was an all-out attack against the units and you.  There was

11     shooting, and somehow I managed to calm down the people here, to put

12     everything under control, to stop the fire.  As for what they are

13     producing now, they probably have pantomime performers, some good

14     imitators who are able to imitate our voices properly.  I mean your

15     voice, my voice, and anyone's voice."

16             So on the 29th, he's -- Mladic is telling his officer that on the

17     28th somebody broadcast a recording of his voice, and he claims it is an

18     imitator.  So he goes on to say they are making a circus of it and they

19     are deluding their people and it is not true that they gave such orders.

20     Did you know that Mladic made this claim, that the Muslims are, among

21     other things, imitating his voice?

22        A.   No, I didn't.

23        Q.   And here he goes on to say:

24             "Pass this information on to every single soldier.  Do not mess

25     around in any circumstances.  Do not risk your lives, because nobody has

Page 4062

 1     a life in reserve.  We will not shell the town unless they violate the

 2     agreement, unless they put you in danger.  But have you to be very

 3     careful.  Do not trust them even one bit."

 4             So General Mladic is talking to his people on the ground in

 5     peaceful terms, and he wants you to relay a very harsh message to the

 6     Presidency.  Do you see this as a logical behaviour on the part of an

 7     officer whose soldiers are at risk?

 8        A.   What -- can I ask what date this intercept is, please,

 9     Mr. Karadzic?

10             JUDGE KWON:  I remember 29th of --

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 29th.

12             THE WITNESS:  Once again, I can read what it says here.  I didn't

13     participate in this conversation.  But the denial here of

14     Radovan Karadzic -- or of General Mladic is surprising, because when the

15     tape was played, it was played in Serbo-Croat, and two JNA officers

16     independently said it was Mladic directing the fire of artillery.  It was

17     a tape produced by the Presidency forces, but two JNA officers said that

18     that was Mladic.  So I don't know why he's saying this to the troops in

19     his barracks.  In short, it's a lie, Dr. Karadzic.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Did Mladic say that publicly or is that what he's telling his

22     people on the ground?  He didn't say it to the media.  That's what he

23     said to his own people so that they would know the truth.  Why would he

24     lie to his own people?  Did you ever see Mladic saying that in public,

25     that his voice was being imitated?

Page 4063

 1        A.   No, I didn't.

 2        Q.   That's right, because he never said that in public.  If he said

 3     that for the media, then you could have had that kind of suspicion.

 4             However, do you know that Mladic had clashed with these two JNA

 5     officers because they had brought rifles to the Muslim side?

 6        A.   I'm aware that General Mladic's position on the evacuation of the

 7     barracks is that no weapons should be handed over.  The reality is that

 8     it was General Panic, General Mladic's superior officer, who ordered him

 9     in the end to get on with the job and hand over the weapons.  Mladic said

10     to me, quite clearly and firmly, that I should clearly understand that it

11     was not him handing over the weapons, it was the JNA.  He didn't want to

12     be associated with the act of handing over the weapons.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we'll have a break.

14             But before that, did you say that General Mladic was talking to

15     his people in this intercept?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Mladic, on two occasions,

17     that is to say, this one and the previous one, he was talking to people

18     who were encircled.  They were JNA, but Mladic was no longer JNA after

19     the 20th of May, that is, so that is to say a week before this.  He is

20     giving them encouragement, and he considers it to be his duty to help

21     them be evacuated without a massacre.  We cannot understand Mladic

22     without looking at the context.  He is -- thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And these two generals, do you agree that they had clashed with

25     Mladic and that at that point of time they were not Mladic's superiors?

Page 4064

 1        A.   Which two generals, please, Mr. Karadzic?

 2        Q.   Oh, all right.  You remember Boskovic?  Boskovic brought 6.000

 3     rifles, and Mladic is distancing himself from that; right?

 4        A.   Yes, I do remember that.

 5        Q.   Was Mladic subordinated to Panic at that point in time?

 6        A.   Yes, I believe firmly so.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for half an hour.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What about this document?  Oh, oh,

10     it's been admitted already.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16             I wanted to update the Court on the status of some developments

17     in the witness scheduling issue, some of which were alluded to earlier

18     today.

19             First, we did notify -- oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour.  And we need

20     to move into private session to address those issues.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

22                           [Private session]

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4065











11  Pages 4065-4066 redacted. Private session.















Page 4067

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25                           [Open session]

Page 4068

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are now in open session.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay.

 3             Mr. President, we haven't provided the time estimate for this

 4     witness yet, and we'll do that by e-mail within -- by the end of the day

 5     today.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I hope that will be a reasonable one.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we get someone who really knows

 8     what it was that was going on in Sarajevo, then we are going to require

 9     time.

10                           [The witness takes the stand]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13        Q.   General, could you please have a look at paragraph 61, or perhaps

14     you can remember without even looking at it.  It speaks of the shelling

15     of the bread line, and you say:

16             [In English] "Another attack on civilians, admittedly a

17     horrendous one, and I assumed the Serbs to be responsible.  I presumed

18     this because attack on civilians by the Serbs were occurring at that

19     stage on an almost daily basis."

20             [Interpretation] Is that what you said?

21        A.   That's what's written, yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can we then have a look at paragraph 62.  You are

23     talking to General Mladic, and Mladic is telling you that:

24             [In English] "Mladic, he stated that the Serbs had not been

25     responsible for the bread line attack and that the Presidency had

Page 4069

 1     perpetrated this incident -- the incident.  His body language was such

 2     that I attributed some credence to his statement.  Radovan Karadzic and

 3     Biljana Plavsic were also part of this conversation and also denied the

 4     Serb responsibility -- that Serbs were responsible."

 5             [Interpretation] On what day did you talk to Mladic and me and

 6     Biljana?

 7        A.   I believe that was during the airport negotiations which started

 8     on or about the 2nd of June.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Let's look at 63 now.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I was advised -- I was advised there

11     has been no French translation for one of my colleagues.  I haven't heard

12     any French.

13             Let's continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Should I repeat something?  No?

15             JUDGE KWON:  You can continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17        Q.   Let us look at paragraph 63, then, where you say:

18             [In English] "A technical investigation was conducted by French

19     soldiers at the site of the shelling after the arrival of

20     General MacKenzie in Sarajevo.  I believe that the investigation involved

21     crater analysis.  The result of the investigations were inconclusive, in

22     that whilst a round could have come from a Serb position, there were also

23     Muslim positions in the range of fire, and therefore firing from one of

24     those positions could not be ruled out."

25             [Interpretation] Why, then, did you decide to say that it was the

Page 4070

 1     Serbs after all?

 2        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I don't believe I ever said it was the Serbs.  I

 3     said the conclusion that is meant to be drawn from those paragraphs is

 4     there is doubt about that particular incident, as to who perpetrated the

 5     attack.

 6        Q.   But in paragraph 61, you say:

 7             "And I assumed the Serbs to be responsible ."

 8        A.   Yes, I had at the time of the attack assumed that.  But when the

 9     investigation was subsequently conducted sometime after the 11th of June,

10     that corrected my assumption.  I'm saying here that there's some doubt,

11     that it could not be conclusively said that the Serbs carried out that

12     attack.  I don't know who carried out that attack.

13        Q.   But if you do not know, you decide that it's the Serbs; right?

14        A.   When the attack first took place, because it was such a regular

15     event at that time, I assumed, incorrectly perhaps, that it was the

16     Serbs.  Subsequent investigation threw some doubt upon that assumption.

17     I'm certainly owning up to that, and I guess if you are demonstrating

18     that I do have impartial views about what happened there.

19        Q.   But, General, there is no presumption of innocence for the Serbs;

20     right?  The Serbs are innocent only if it is proven to be the case that

21     it was the Muslims who had done something; right?

22        A.   I don't agree.

23        Q.   And if I tell you, General, that not a single one of these

24     well-known incidents that involved massive casualties was not committed

25     by the Serbs and that we have evidence to support that, what would you

Page 4071

 1     say to that?

 2        A.   I can't speculate on that, Mr. Karadzic, without the evidence.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Actually, we have to move into private session briefly.

 5             D230, please, could I have that in e-court.

 6             Private session briefly, please.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  We're still in open session.

 8                           [Private session]

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

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25   (redacted)

Page 4072

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17                           [Open session]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are now in open session, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have 01072.  That's

20     the 65 ter number.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   In the meantime:  Why did you not discuss that incident with

23     Mr. Izetbegovic and you did discuss it with us, didn't you?

24        A.   I was -- I discussed that incident with the Serb side because I

25     was attending other meetings with you at that time.  In terms of the

Page 4073

 1     Presidency, it may well have been raised by them when Mr. Thornberry and

 2     I visited them for negotiations in the period after the 2nd of June.  My

 3     recollection is broadly that they would have protested and highlighted

 4     this attack.  It was -- even in Sarajevo at the time, with limited media

 5     people present, it was given great coverage around the city and played on

 6     the television for hours on end, just kept repeating the same images.  So

 7     it was quite well known within the city and I'm sure would have been

 8     discussed with both sides.

 9             As I said earlier, I've included this incident in my statement

10     simply to illustrate the fact that all -- that there was no clear good

11     guys and bad guys in the events in the former Yugoslavia.

12        Q.   And did you know that the media were at the site of the explosion

13     beforehand?  That was broadcast all over the place, that they were ready?

14        A.   Yes, I'm aware of that allegation, yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall, General, that I had asked for the

16     demilitarisation of Sarajevo?

17        A.   I'm aware that you'd asked for that on a number of occasions.

18     The first time you asked for that I can't put a date on.

19        Q.   Do you agree and do you recall that I had said that the Serb

20     neighbourhoods in Sarajevo were attacked every night by the Green Berets?

21        A.   I can't recall a specific incident, but I believe it's highly

22     likely that you did raise that on many occasions.

23        Q.   Do you remember why the United Nations did not succeed in

24     carrying out a demilitarisation, why?  Who was it that prevented that

25     from taking place?

Page 4074

 1        A.   I would say it was both sides, Mr. Karadzic.  In the context of

 2     the opening of the Sarajevo Airport, it was suggested by the

 3     United Nations that weapons be withdrawn from around the airport and also

 4     from 30 kilometres from the city, which was a measure which was

 5     vigorously opposed by you and your military adviser.  That's part of the

 6     demilitarisation process, that you had a very strong position on that you

 7     would not accept.  My recollection is that you wanted the city to be

 8     passed to the control of the UN with a green line drawn somewhere in the

 9     city which would segregate Serb areas from other ethnic areas of the

10     city.  I don't believe a map was ever produced during those negotiations,

11     nor was there a discussion of any suburbs.  Your basic position during

12     those negotiations was that you were not prepared to take the first step

13     in demilitarisation, which would have been the withdrawal of heavy

14     weapons from the vicinity of Sarajevo.  It was the Serb position.

15        Q.   And do you remember, General, that we had more weapons and they

16     had more infantry?  That's right, isn't it?

17        A.   I don't know that's true.  Certainly, you had more heavy weapons.

18     I don't know with any accuracy what the relative infantry strengths were.

19     I wouldn't be surprised if there was a marginal majority in favour of the

20     Presidency forces of infantry.

21             JUDGE KWON:  The translation of -- or the court report does not

22     reflect what Mr. Karadzic asked to the witness.  As I remember, his

23     question is that the Serbs had more weapons, while the other side had

24     more infantry.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right.  I was just going to

Page 4075

 1     intervene.  Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   So we agree that the Serbs had more weapons, and I say that the

 4     Muslims had more infantry.  Do you remember me saying that that strikes a

 5     strategic balance?

 6        A.   No, I don't.

 7        Q.   But if I tell you now that it does strike a strategic balance,

 8     would you, as a general, accept doing away with your element of strategic

 9     balance and the other side not?

10        A.   It's not a board game, Mr. Karadzic.  That's -- what we're

11     talking about here is perhaps tactical balance rather than strategic

12     balance.  It depends very much upon the circumstances.  Some elements of

13     military power are employable in some situations and not in others.  For

14     example, fighting in an urban area is best done by infantry.  Fighting in

15     open country is best done by armour.  Employment of heavy weapons in an

16     urban context is very difficult because of the collateral damage.  You

17     cannot simply say left and right, therefore there's balance.

18        Q.   But, General, do you know that even a partial acceptance of

19     measures on the part of only one side would give the other side the

20     advantage; yes or no?  Just give us a yes-or-no answer.  Would -- if the

21     Serb weapons were done away with, would it give the advantage to the

22     opposite side?

23        A.   I don't understand what measures you're referring to.

24        Q.   Well, if the Serbs were to remove, and there are three times less

25     of them, three times less infantry, if they were to remove the heavy

Page 4076

 1     weapons and the Muslims were to do nothing at all, would that give the

 2     opposite side the advantage?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, would you take a look at paragraph 3.  Read out

 5     paragraph 3, please.

 6        A.   "Mr. Karadzic referred first in general to the situation of the

 7     Serbs in Sarajevo who are in control of areas in the suburbs and parts of

 8     the city and who are attacked practically every night by the

 9     Green Berets.  He indicated the Serb forces are inexperienced and

10     self-organised.  That Mladic does not have all under his command, but

11     that they are trying to bring them under control.  He added that because

12     of the their inexperience, they overreacted to attacks.  He indicated

13     that they were willing to remove artillery from the hills if attacks on

14     the suburbs stopped."

15             This document, I assume, is, because you have not introduced it,

16     is a report of General Morillon's discussions the 30th of May.

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, this was -- this is Exhibit P1036.

18     It came in as an associated exhibit.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you.

20             What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, as a soldier, how long would you need -- how much time

23     would you need from the Territorial Defence and organised groups to turn

24     those into an efficacious army?

25        A.   That's impossible to speculate.  I mean, I don't know the details

Page 4077

 1     of armaments levels, of training, deployment, what the operational

 2     expectations are.  Mr. Karadzic, it's impossible to give an accurate

 3     answer to that.  It would take some length of time, depending on how

 4     complex the problems were.  It takes about two years to produce a

 5     reasonably good soldier of intense training.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Let's move on to paragraph 4 now.  May I ask you to

 7     read it out, please?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it's necessary.  We have it before us.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Let's all read it,

10     then.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Does it say there that:

13             "Karadzic went on to say that they," the Serbs, "would like to

14     demilitarise Sarajevo, under United Nations supervision, with only police

15     forces to remain to maintain law and order, Serb police in

16     Serbian-controlled parts and Muslim police in Muslim areas"?

17             Is that right?

18        A.   That's what it says, Mr. Karadzic.

19        Q.   Why was that not accepted?  Do you have any idea?

20        A.   I have a very good idea, Mr. Karadzic.

21        Q.   Will you tell it to us?

22        A.   Because of our experience in the Croatian UN-protected areas,

23     where the military forces who were fighting there, when it came time for

24     them to withdraw under the agreements accepted by all parties, these

25     military groups suddenly turned into policemen.  So what had happened, an

Page 4078

 1     army had been converted into a police force.  In effect, there was no

 2     demilitarisation of the UNPAs, other than the concentration of heavy

 3     weapons.  So the UN, with that experience so recently found in Croatia,

 4     would be very suspicious of any suggestion that this should be repeated

 5     again in another situation.

 6        Q.   And do you know what the Muslim motive was to oppose the

 7     demilitarisation of Sarajevo?

 8        A.   I can't speculate on that.

 9        Q.   And if I tell you that the first motive -- the prime motive was

10     to gain control of the whole city and the second motive was Sarajevo was

11     an important joker or trump card in gaining international sympathies and

12     international military intervention, would that sound familiar to you?

13        A.   I can't speculate on that, Mr. Karadzic.  I don't know what

14     motivated their actions.

15        Q.   Is the Muslim side aware of what Karadzic proposed in

16     negotiations with Nambiar?

17        A.   They would have been made aware of that when Mr. Thornberry

18     arrived in Sarajevo on the 2nd of June, several days after this meeting

19     here, and proceeded to negotiate the opening of the airport.  This would

20     have been one of the matters discussed with both sides, in fact.

21        Q.   But as a military man, as a soldier, can you tell us whether

22     Sarajevo would have been calmer, even on the assumption, for example,

23     that somebody were to change clothes into a police force, if what

24     Karadzic proposed had actually been acted upon?

25        A.   It may well have been calmer, but would not necessarily have

Page 4079

 1     changed the actual security situation.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we turn to the next

 3     page, please.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And I'd like to draw your attention to paragraph 6 there, where

 6     he says:

 7             [In English] "He felt that the Bosnian Serbs were in a no-win

 8     situation to be blamed or to be defeated."

 9             [Interpretation] They were in a no-win situation.  And then lower

10     down, paragraph 7, General Morillon asks whether we can--

11             [In English] "And it would be their interest to show their

12     goodwill by stopping it, by stopping shelling.  He asked Karadzic whether

13     he was in a position to do so."

14             [Interpretation] Number 8 says:

15             [In English] "Karadzic replied in the affirmative.  Mr. Koljevic

16     qualified this by saying that they thought they could persuade the people

17     on the ground to stop the shelling."

18             [Interpretation] Doesn't that tell you that it was still a

19     question of self-organised groups?

20        A.   I acknowledged in my statement, Mr. Karadzic, that at the very

21     beginning of the conflict, that I understood that there were groups who

22     were not necessarily fully under control of General Mladic, and I

23     accepted the fact that it was taking him some time to get control of

24     them.  But that does not include artillery resources.  We're talking here

25     about village militias.  He would have had, my belief, a very firm

Page 4080

 1     control over heavy weapons and their firing into the city.  These were

 2     weapons that were passed to him by the JNA.  And, indeed, by the 30th of

 3     May, in my assessment, were still being fired by the JNA, because they

 4     would not have left behind their troops in the barracks.  The JNA would

 5     not have fully withdrawn until all of their troops were out of the

 6     barracks.

 7             Also, my observations later in May were that the nature of the

 8     fighting was being carried out by highly competent military people who I

 9     also suspect were remaining JNA people.

10        Q.   Well, those are all assumptions, General, sir.  We heard from

11     another witness here, also a soldier, that there was a shortage of

12     capable officer cadres and especially specialists in weapons, and so on,

13     marksmen and so on.  Now, do you say that the Territorial Defence did not

14     have access to heavy weapons?

15        A.   I don't know what the territorial force had access to.  I'm

16     simply saying that heavy weapons would have been a very high priority for

17     General Mladic to gain and remain control of -- in control of.

18        Q.   And I put it to you, General, and I tell you that we have heard

19     evidence here whereby a territorial unit took from a company from their

20     Territorial Defence stock even Howitzers.  Now, do you know how the

21     system of the Territorial Defence functioned and the system of total

22     national defence and social self-protection in Yugoslavia, for example;

23     do you know how that worked?

24        A.   Broadly I do, yes.

25        Q.   And do you know the doctrine, as it was called, of an armed

Page 4081

 1     people?  Have you heard of that doctrine?

 2        A.   I've not heard of that specific description.

 3        Q.   And if I tell you that the Territorial Defence existed -- a unit

 4     of the Territorial Defence existed in every enterprise, every company,

 5     and that they had their weapons depots and commands, and everybody was

 6     duty-bound to defend his country once it was threatened, once it was in

 7     danger, does that sound something that you are familiar with and had

 8     heard about?

 9        A.   Yes, I am familiar with that, and I believe that to be true.

10        Q.   Therefore, the Territorial Defence had access to heavy weaponry

11     as well.  And, as you say, the village -- how did you put it -- village

12     paramilitary groups, that was the territory Defence of each and every

13     village, each local commune.  They had access to light and heavy weapons

14     alike.  Do you accept that now if I tell you that?

15        A.   I can't confirm that.  If you say that to be true, then so be it.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we take a look at

17     the next page of this document now, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Paragraph 14:

20             [In English] "If and when we get confirmation from Mr. Karadzic

21     that he will be able to deliver on stopping the bombardment, we will get

22     in touch with President Izetbegovic to proceed with the other aspects."

23             [No interpretation]:

24             [In English] "... just been advised by Karadzic's assistant that

25     they could not make Sarajevo because of weather, but by phone Mladic had

Page 4082

 1     indicated that bombardment would stop.  We will see how things are ..."

 2             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.  That was paragraph 15.

 3             So what Mladic controlled, that would cease.  And from the

 4     previous paragraph, we see Koljevic saying that, We'll try and convince

 5     people on the ground not to shoot.

 6             Do you know, General, that, for example, in Nedzarici, a purely

 7     Serbian settlement, it was attacked on a daily basis and that nobody had

 8     the right to tell them, Stop shooting, don't shoot?

 9        A.   It doesn't surprise me that Nedzarici was attacked on a daily

10     basis.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  This document has

12     already been admitted, it's an exhibit, so we can move on.

13             May we have 65 ter 01078 called up next.  It is possible that

14     that is also an exhibit under a P number.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that's Exhibit P1039.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Did you attend this meeting, General, on the 3rd of June at the

19     airport in Sarajevo?

20        A.   Yes, I did.  It wasn't at the airport at Sarajevo.  It was held,

21     actually, in Lukavica Barracks, but it was about the airport.  That's why

22     the subject reads that way.

23        Q.   Yes, yes, I apologise.  You're quite right.

24             May we now have the next page displayed.

25             Or just a moment, let's stay with page 1.  Can we go back to

Page 4083

 1     page 1:

 2             [In English] "The basic issue, of course, remains who will

 3     politically control the airport which would be under UN control.  The

 4     answer of the Serbs is that they will.  We have suggested that they think

 5     again."

 6             [Interpretation] Now, on the next page, paragraph 2, the

 7     Presidency stressed the urgency.  Do you see paragraph 2?

 8        A.   I do.

 9        Q.   And this man, Mr. Somun, was a little more extreme than

10     we believed at first; right?

11        A.   I don't know what you mean by that question.  I didn't have a

12     view whether he was extreme, or moderate, or conservative.

13        Q.   [No interpretation]:

14             [In English] "We said that the suffering of the people had become

15     a worldwide scandal and that so far as we knew, there was no prospect of

16     it being solved by magic or external military intervention."

17             [Interpretation] What made you mention military intervention

18     there?

19        A.   I think following the bread line attack of the 27th of May, there

20     had been extensive coverage in the international community, and there was

21     some discussion in the international community that military intervention

22     was an option.  And I can't say it with certainty, but I suspect that

23     this had been passed to the Serb leadership in some of their various

24     negotiations.  And certainly I believe it was a hope, I would say, of the

25     Presidency at that time that there would be an intervention, and it was

Page 4084

 1     one of the considerations that they had to take into account in their

 2     negotiations and in developing a strategy and a policy.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  So may we conclude that the Presidency, as you call

 4     it, although it was the Muslim government because we were the Presidency

 5     too, Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic being members of the Presidency,

 6     that the Muslim government -- it didn't suit the Muslim government for

 7     things to run smoothly, because if things ran smoothly following Serb

 8     proposals, there would be no intervention; right?

 9        A.   I can't confirm that.

10        Q.   But the United Nations confirmed that the Muslims hampered the

11     taking over of the airport.  Are you aware of that?

12        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now, may we turn to

14     page 3, please.  Paragraph 4:

15             [In English] "Izetbegovic showed us the destruction brought on

16     the Presidency, shelled most nights. (It does not seem to have a single

17     piece of glass left undamaged).  He ended by saying that he did not

18     believe there could be an agreement; the reopening of the airport could

19     come about only by foreign military intervention."

20             [Interpretation] Do you see that he would welcome military

21     intervention and that, therefore, it was logical that he would make it

22     difficult for a take-over of the airport?

23        A.   This cable, drafted by Mr. Thornberry, signed by me, and going up

24     our chain of command, is a record of the negotiating positions of the two

25     parties, and you'll be aware, Mr. Karadzic, that in negotiations people

Page 4085

 1     adopt and abandon various negotiating positions during that process.

 2     This is a record of the first day of negotiations, so it's defining, if

 3     you wish, the opening positions.  What is stated in this cable and the

 4     reality can be quite different.  The airport was opened.  Both sides did

 5     agree to it in the end.

 6             In regards to the first part of your question, I'm sure the

 7     Presidency would have welcomed a foreign intervention.  It would have

 8     certainly assisted their position.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I have every respect for your understanding of

10     negotiating tactics whereby extremist views are put on the table straight

11     away and then that they relent later on, but why do you take that -- do

12     you not take that into account when Mladic is giving a message, that it

13     is an extremist one, but in reality different?

14        A.   My experience with General Mladic was that he generally carried

15     out his threats, he generally did what he said he would do.  Therefore, I

16     gave serious consideration to what he was saying and believed him, he

17     would carry out his threat.  And as it turned out, he did.

18        Q.   Well, it didn't turn out that that's what he did, General.  But,

19     of course, he tried to be convincing.  Otherwise, you would have seen

20     through it and there would have been no result.

21             But can we have 65 ter 01555 next, please.  Possibly that is a P

22     number and a Prosecution exhibit too.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  That's Exhibit P1045.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4086

 1        Q.   This is the following day, discussions -- airport talks of the

 2     4th of June.  Did you attend that meeting, General?

 3        A.   Yes, I did, Mr. Karadzic.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Well, we can look through the whole document, but

 5     let's focus on paragraph 2 now.  Let's see what Karadzic says there:

 6             [In English] "The afternoon began with us summarising to them

 7     some ideas on an airport regime.  Karadzic interrupted at one point to

 8     say that this was a Muslim position, and all argued that the withdrawal

 9     of heavy weapons would tilt the balance in Sarajevo to the Muslim side to

10     such an extent that Serbs would be butchered or have to flee."

11             [Interpretation] Do you see, General, that our position was quite

12     clear; with the removal of the only Serb advantage would lead to our

13     catastrophe?

14        A.   Yes, Mr. Karadzic, we quite clearly understood the Serb position

15     in this regard and the reason for that, and that's why the regime that

16     was proposed actually left the Serb artillery in position, within range

17     of the airport, but monitored by UN observers, who would report if those

18     weapons engaged the airport.  That was the regime.  It left your weapons

19     and your tactical advantage in place, but enabled the airport to be

20     opened with some confidence.

21        Q.   Thank you.  So you agree that the only reason -- our only reason

22     not to remove the weapons around Sarajevo was precisely this fear of a

23     massacre or the expulsion of Serbs from the places they lived in, or,

24     rather, a disruption of the balance?

25        A.   I can't speculate on what motivated your position.

Page 4087

 1        Q.   Let's look at number 3 now.  Karadzic, somewhat in the middle,

 2     and Plavsic, on the somewhat less ideological, somewhat more humanitarian

 3     wing -- that was paragraph 2.  And now number 3:

 4             [In English] "They explained that Karadzic's position in Lisbon

 5     had been taken in the context of the UN taking over supervision of the

 6     whole city; i.e., superintending a green line between two communities,

 7     each with its own police.  Only in such context of physical

 8     disengagement, they said, did withdrawal of heavy weaponry to a distance

 9     from Sarajevo make sense."

10             [Interpretation] So why, in your opinion, was the whole of

11     Sarajevo not demilitarised?  You referred to the zones, but here there

12     would be complete management and control by the UN over Sarajevo, and do

13     you remember that I proposed that Sarajevo would be declared an open

14     city?

15        A.   Yes, I do remember that, Mr. Karadzic, but there are a number of

16     proposals contained in this.  The proposal that there be a green line

17     created with police forces, as you call them, maintaining security there

18     was not acceptable to the Presidency.  It was not acceptable under any

19     circumstances.  Another element of a demilitarisation, that is, the

20     withdrawal of heavy weapons, was not acceptable to you.

21             The whole proposal at that time was not worth pursuing.  Neither

22     side would give it serious consideration.  What our focus was was opening

23     the airport and proposing to you and to the Presidency a regime that was

24     acceptable to both sides.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now move two

Page 4088

 1     pages forward, please, the third page from this one.  It should be our

 2     063971, just one more page.  The next page in the English language,

 3     please.

 4             So number 1:

 5             [In English] "The proposed demilitarisation elements of the plan

 6     leave the Serbian people in the area of Sarajevo vulnerable to the B-H

 7     forces and might cause the flight of thousands of Serbs from this area."

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   So these are the key points in the Serb response.  And number 3

10     says:

11             [In English] "The concept of demilitarising the area will be

12     accepted only if the entire city is demilitarised and police forces from

13     both sides secure the areas beyond the fire lines."

14             [Interpretation] And then on the next page, the Serb alternative

15     plan:

16             [In English] "They propose the following alternative plan:

17             "The sides should announce and honour a cease-fire in Sarajevo

18     and stop all combat activities in the area, including certain corridors."

19             [Interpretation] General, sir, what more could we have done

20     without destroying the Serb community in Sarajevo?  We proposed actively

21     and accepted other people's proposals if they were consistent with our

22     survival.  Did we not do that?

23        A.   This document records once again a bargaining position within the

24     context of the overall negotiations.  It's simply a record of where

25     you -- your preferred position at that point in time during the

Page 4089

 1     negotiations.

 2        Q.   But is this not a position that makes it possible to establish

 3     peace in Sarajevo?

 4        A.   Point number 1 is, of course, part of any sensible plan for the

 5     opening of the airport, and, indeed, language very similar to that was

 6     included in the final agreement which both sides agreed to, and took some

 7     time to implement because we couldn't get 48 hours of cease-fire between

 8     the signing of the agreement on, I think, the 5th of June and the 24th of

 9     June, when I left.  Neither party seemed to be able to discipline their

10     forces to impose an agreed cease-fire.

11             But this document here is a bargaining position, Mr. Karadzic.

12     Whether it reflects the final outcome -- what you signed in the end was

13     another document.  That's what you agreed to.  These are simply

14     bargaining positions.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we please look at

16     1D1318.  1D1318.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General, do you know that the European Community made a lot of

19     effort to keep Izetbegovic on the track at the conference?

20        A.   Which conference are we talking about, Mr. Karadzic?

21        Q.   The Carrington Conference, the peace conference that was led by

22     Ambassador Cutileiro for Bosnia.

23        A.   The answer to your first question, then, is no.

24        Q.   Well, here we have a telegram.  The date is the same.  We are

25     discussing the airport issue, and I report to Ambassador Cutileiro that

Page 4090

 1     Mr. Izetbegovic responded in the negative to Mr. Carrington's letter

 2     about the Bosnia Conference:

 3             "He explicitly said in the --"

 4             [In English] " ... and that he does not want any conference about

 5     the constituent units."

 6             [Interpretation] And then I go on to report to him that despite

 7     the goodwill we showed in our readiness to open the airport

 8     unconditionally:

 9             [In English] "We were blackmailed with the lives of JNA families

10    to leave the heavy arms in the barracks "Marsal Tito".  This same evening,

11     the Muslim side has started shelling of Serbian residential areas of

12     Sarajevo.

13             "We hope that you can still mediate and bring the Muslim side to

14     the conference."

15             [Interpretation] And so on.

16             Now, General, sir, were you aware of the fact that we were

17     shelled, that the Serb parts of the city were shelled that very night

18     between the 4th and 5th of June?

19        A.   It wouldn't surprise me.  Many parts of the city were shelled on

20     the night of the 5th of June, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to tender

22     this document into evidence.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Sutherland.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  No objection, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it will be admitted.

Page 4091

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D333, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 65 ter 08496,

 3     please.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, in your opinion, who actually started the offensive in

 6     the second week of June, on the 7th of June and on?

 7        A.   It's not clear who started the fighting.  I assume you're talking

 8     about the fighting around Dobrinja and around the airport.

 9        Q.   Yes, around Dobrinja, the airport, in Hadzici, Pazaric, and so

10     on.  Do you know that Hadzici is also a part of Sarajevo?

11        A.   No, I don't know the geography of that area.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not the correct document.

13     There has been a mistake, apparently.  08496, 08496.  It might be our

14     mistake.  Just a moment, but --

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  08496 is P00999.

16             JUDGE KWON:  He said there seems to be a mistake on his part, so

17     check it out.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you agree, General, that the city of Sarajevo consisted of 10

20     municipalities?

21        A.   I don't know, Mr. Karadzic.

22        Q.   And if I were to put it to you that one of the Sarajevo

23     municipalities with a pronounced Serb majority, Ilijas, was shelled on a

24     daily basis and that, proportionately speaking, the largest number of

25     people were killed, civilians and soldiers alike, would you agree with

Page 4092

 1     that?

 2        A.   Many parts of the city were shelled on a daily basis.  It could

 3     well be that Ilidza was part of them.

 4        Q.   And did you ever notice in any of the reports that Ilijas was

 5     highlighted as a place where many civilians were killed, with a large

 6     number of civilian casualties?

 7        A.   There was no UN presence there or, to my knowledge, international

 8     presence there after about the 17th of May until the 24th of June, when I

 9     left the city, so we wouldn't have known what was happening there.

10        Q.   Thank you.  But we published and sent protests, and we published

11     in our media the reports about the suffering of the people in Ilijas.

12     Ilijas begins at a place where you were stopped between Visoko and

13     Sarajevo.  That's where Ilijas is, between Visoko and Sarajevo, and it's

14     a purely Serb village, Cekrcici, that had an enormous number of

15     casualties.  How come that you did not read the reports in our media

16     about the suffering of the Serbs that were published by the Serb side in

17     their media?

18        A.   I have no recollection of that incident or that series of

19     incidents.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we please look at

21     65 ter 11708.  Now that's the correct number.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, this is Exhibit P998.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Now, General, please look at number 1.  So the Command of the

Page 4093

 1     Sarajevo Romanija Corps sent those instructions for further activities to

 2     the commander, and the first paragraph reads that:

 3             "The enemy commenced a general offensive engaging its forces on

 4     the following axes:  Zenica-Visoko-Ilijas-Blazuj," and so on.  It's

 5     probably -- its intentions are to deblock Sarajevo and so on.

 6             Do you remember who was blamed for the fighting around Dobrinja

 7     from the 7th until the 15th of June?

 8        A.   No, at my knowledge nobody was blamed.  I said that both sides

 9     had some tactical interest in securing that area.  It was hard to say who

10     initiated the firing.  But I said on balance it was my judgement that I

11     thought it was the Serbs, but I don't know that it was ever published or

12     that the Serbs were criticised for that particular tactical action.

13        Q.   Let me remind you that I was under an enormous pressure to put a

14     stop of fighting around Nedzarici and Dobrinja and so on, and you will

15     see now that this had actually been initiated by the other side.  In the

16     first passage we can see that the enemy started, and because this is a

17     commander of a Serb unit, it's the Muslims who are the enemy.  And then

18     in paragraph 4, he says:

19             "I have decided to mount an active and persistent defence to

20     maintain the lines that have been reached ..."

21             Does this sound like an order to attack?

22        A.   At the same time on the 7th [Realtime transcript read in error

23     "17th"] of June, the Presidency representatives were saying to us that

24     this offensive action had been initiated by the Serbs.  Two sides of the

25     same story, Mr. Karadzic, was a very familiar problem for the UN serving

Page 4094

 1     in the former Yugoslavia.  Unless you actually witnessed it yourself, we

 2     have hard evidence, it's impossible to make a determination as to who was

 3     responsible for what.  Both sides have a different story.

 4        Q.   Yet this is not a public document.  This is a strictly

 5     confidential document.  This is what it says there, "The Sarajevo

 6     Romanija Corps, Strictly Confidential."  And here it says "the extreme

 7     defence," and the objective is to maintain security for the aircraft,

 8     bringing food and medical supplies to the population living in the

 9     broader airport area.  So this is not a press release, this was not a

10     report to you.  The commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps issues

11     instructions to his subordinate commands as to what they are to do; to

12     defend themselves and to ensure the security of the aircraft.  And we

13     will see what the Presidency, itself, was doing on the 17th, on the same

14     day.

15             Can we please look at the last page of this document.

16             It says here in the second paragraph of paragraph 6:

17             "Ill-treatment of unarmed civilian population is strongly

18     prohibited, and prisoners are to be treated in the spirit of the Geneva

19     Conventions.

20             "The use of one combat set of ammunition and half -- 0.5 p/r," I

21     don't know what it means, but this is what he approved for consumption,

22     reminding his units that the civilian population must be treated with

23     respect.

24             And since this document was received, let us look at this

25     document that will tell us what happened on the 17th at the session of

Page 4095

 1     the Presidency.  They tell you one thing, and yet we can see that the

 2     Presidency was doing something completely different.

 3             Can we please look at D192.  D192, it's a Defence exhibit.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  You didn't ask a question about this document.  You

 5     just read out the passages and just going into another document.  What is

 6     your point of reading it?  What is your question?

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 8        Q.   The question is the following:  General, do you agree that these

 9     are defensive measures that the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps

10     took on the 17th of June, 1992?

11        A.   I agree that he has written that.  But whether that happened, I

12     have no way of knowing.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Then, Mr. Karadzic, is this document dated 7th of

14     June?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 7th, for the forthcoming period.

16     The Muslim offensive had already started, and then he actually defines or

17     instructs as to what they have to do in the forthcoming period.

18             This document has already been admitted.  And can we then look at

19     D192, the minutes -- the transcript of the tapes of the session of the

20     Croatian Muslim Presidency of the 17th of June that you mentioned a

21     little while ago.  Let us look at the reports that Halilovic gives to his

22     Presidency.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Do you know who Halilovic is?

25        A.   Yes, I do.

Page 4096

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 2?  I mean

 2     in the Serbo-Croatian, because the English page is okay.  Mr. Izetbegovic

 3     says here:

 4             "If the airport does not open, the other side should be to blame,

 5     not us.  Then we will have a chance to have it opened by force.  Surely,

 6     that is 90 per cent certain that if he comes back now and says the Serbs

 7     will not respect something that is reasonable, which is necessary for the

 8     airport to be opened, or fails to accept the conditions generally, in

 9     that case there would probably be a resolution which would accomplish

10     that by force."

11             And then further down, he says:

12             "This is what I would like to propose, and then let us see

13     whether we should -- whether we all agree that we should open the

14     airport.  Of course, this restricts our army's operations to an extent,

15     but as they say, it's better to have a bird in the hand than in the bush.

16     We'll see what happens."

17        Q.   Do you see the logic driving Mr. Izetbegovic here, to accomplish

18     the opening of the airport by force by any means necessary, or a foreign

19     intervention, in other words.

20        A.   I can see what's written there, Mr. Karadzic --

21        Q.   And then further down, Ljubic says:

22             "Our hands tied in terms of engaging in penetration."

23             And then Izetbegovic says:  "A little bit."

24             Is that correct?

25        A.   That's how it reads.

Page 4097

 1        Q.   And would that be consistent with what they were telling you?

 2        A.   From the 11th of May -- from the 11th of June, when

 3     General MacKenzie arrived in the village in Sarajevo, he and

 4     Lieutenant-General Richard Gray conducted the detailed negotiations with

 5     both parties for the implementation of the plan.  They would be competent

 6     to comment on this.  I am not.

 7        Q.   But you said that on the 17th of June, the Presidency informed

 8     you that the Serbs were causing problems, and here you can see that they

 9     are causing problems.  So what they're saying here in secret, is it any

10     different from what they are telling you publicly, openly?

11        A.   I'm not having discussions with the Presidency on the 17th of

12     June.  I don't know what they're saying.  This is the first time I've

13     seen a record of this.  The negotiations for the implementation of the

14     airport plan were carried out by General MacKenzie and his staff, not by

15     me.  I was deliberately distanced from it because the actual disposition

16     of weapons, which was the military observer interest, was to be on a very

17     restricted basis.  Two or three people were to know about it, and I was

18     not one of those to know what the detailed disposition of heavy weapons

19     was to be.  This was agreed with General Mladic and also with the

20     Presidency military forces.  So I had no knowledge of these negotiations,

21     Mr. Karadzic.

22        Q.   A little while ago, you said that on the 17th of June, the

23     Presidency had informed you that the Serbs were causing problems and that

24     you believed them, and yet you do not believe a secret document issued by

25     the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps which was not for public

Page 4098

 1     consumption, it was meant for his subordinate commands.  You, yourself,

 2     mentioned the 17th of June and the Presidency 10 minutes ago.

 3        A.   I think I was talking about the 7th of June, Mr. Karadzic, not

 4     the 17th.

 5        Q.   Page 73 of the transcript, I heard you say "the 17th."

 6        A.   Then an error on my part, and my apologies.  I thought the

 7     conversation then was about the 7th of June.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Let us check it out.

 9             Well, your answer is there on -- it's about the fighting around

10     Nedzarici.  Oh, yes, we can see it.

11             Can we locate page 72 and 73?

12             "On the same time on the 17th of June, the Presidency

13     representative were saying to us the same that they had been initiated by

14     the Serbs."

15             Yes, we are coming there.  The question appears on line 21, and

16     then your answer starts on line 4 of page 73.

17             Yes, we can stop -- no, no.  Yes, we can stop here.

18             THE WITNESS:  It's an error on my part.  It's the 7th of June.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   And do you remember that on the 15th of June, cease-fire was

22     established, and that the Serb side announced a unilateral cease-fire on

23     the 15th of June, 1992?

24        A.   There were a number of cease-fires which were negotiated in the

25     period the 5th of June to the 24th of June, while I was still residing in

Page 4099

 1     Sarajevo, and, to my knowledge, none of them held.  And on each occasion,

 2     each party would blame the other.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let us look at page 138

 4     of this document.  I don't know the page in e-court, but it says "138" at

 5     the bottom, the Serb version.  That's the Serb version 138.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Here, General, General Halilovic reports to his Presidency what

 8     they are doing to the Serbs.  The whole document is very interesting, and

 9     I will go through just two or three short passages with you.

10             In this document, General Halilovic reports that Milinklatska

11     Street was on fire - that's a Serb street - that Trapare Street is on

12     fire.  It's a Serb hamlet north east of Dobrinja, up the hill.  And here

13     on page 138, he says that:

14             "In the forthcoming stage of the 10 or 15 days --"

15             It's the next page in the English version:

16             "In the forthcoming stage, 10 to 15 days, the

17     Territorial Defence --"

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Karadzic.

19             Yes, Mr. Sutherland.

20             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Sorry for interrupting, Your Honour, but

21     Mr. Karadzic said, I think, when he was introducing D192 to the witness,

22     that this was a transcript of the session of the Presidency.  In fact,

23     I think this is again just excerpts from this book by Cosic, or Tosic, or

24     somebody.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We haven't the full translation of it, so it is

Page 4100

 1     being marked for identification at this moment.

 2             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour, I think we do have a full

 3     translation.  No, not a full translation.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  My memory is this has been marked for

 5     identification.  I think a foundation has been introduced briefly to the

 6     witness, but it should have been done in more detail.

 7             Let's proceed.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Well, here in the English version, it says "Page 12."  Just for

10     your information, the minutes of the Presidency sessions gathered by this

11     man, the fact that he gathered them, it does not change anything.  The

12     Prosecution has already established the accuracy of the transcripts.

13             Here, at page 12, he says:

14             "In the subsequent stage, the next 10 to 15 days, the

15     Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will carry

16     out the following activities:

17             "In the region of Sarajevo --" or, rather, "in the co-ordinated

18     action with the TO and HVO, with the active -- will continue the active

19     operations in the Neretva River valley," and so on.

20             And then about Sarajevo, it says:

21             "In the region of Sarajevo, the city of Sarajevo will be defended

22     and action within the city and outside it will be directed at unblocking

23     it in the direction of:  Novi Grad, Ilidza, Blazuj, Kiseljak,

24     Centar-Vogosca, Ilijas, Visoko, and in the region of Gorazde unblock the

25     road ..."

Page 4101

 1             So you can see what they're planning, and yet there is a

 2     cease-fire in force at the time.

 3             And then if we move on to the next page --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the general was in contact

 6     with the Presidency, and this is what was happening on the 17th of June

 7     in the Presidency, while we are under pressure to stop defending

 8     ourselves in the Dobrinja, Nedzarici, and so on areas.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   So did you know about this double game on their part?

11        A.   Mr. Karadzic, on the 17th of June there was fighting all over the

12     city, many different parts.  It was -- the operational activity was at a

13     very high tempo.  There was a lot of artillery being fired in the city, a

14     lot of infantry fighting.  It's difficult to believe they can all be

15     attributed to one side.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to draw your attention to the next two

17     paragraphs.  Izetbegovic asks:

18             "When the engagement of the opposing forces is summed up, how

19     much is that, those that are in the vicinity of Sarajevo and practically

20     surrounding the city ?  How many of them are there?"

21             And he goes on to say:

22             "There are about 6.000 in the city of Sarajevo, more specifically

23     those that are surrounding the city."

24             Now, do you see that they're talking about an encirclement, the

25     surrounding of the city, and not the siege of the city?  Do you note

Page 4102

 1     that?

 2        A.   No, I don't.  You'll need to give me time.

 3        Q.   [In English] "There are around 6.000 in the city of Sarajevo,

 4     more specifically those that are surrounding the city," or encircling.

 5             [Interpretation] Perhaps a better translation would be

 6     "encircling the city."

 7             [In English] "According to our estimate --"

 8             [Interpretation] And in Izetbegovic's question, it says:

 9             [In English] "... of Sarajevo and practically surrounding the

10     city."

11             [Interpretation] So it's about men, a realistic assessment of

12     about 80.000 on the territory of B and H:

13             "However, for the city of Sarajevo to completely conquer, much

14     stronger forces are required than those that the Serbs have.

15     Objectively, they cannot accomplish that in the near future unless some

16     radical turning point occurs.  However, they will still attempt to

17     accomplish this goal, and the goal is to divide the city of Sarajevo and

18     merge the part from Rajlovac over Stup and Lukavica with Pale.  For that

19     goal, objectively they need to have certain forces at their disposal, but

20     in that case their defence would become weaker in other areas, so that is

21     not realistic either ."

22             Now, how many forces did the Muslims have to those 6.000 Serbs?

23        A.   I don't know with any accuracy.  I had estimated that there were

24     probably about 15.000.  That was my --

25        Q.   Yes, you mentioned that.  You mentioned the figure of about

Page 4103

 1     15.000, and that you said that mostly they were police; right?

 2        A.   Initially, they were police, and then they were expanded by

 3     people being, I guess, recruited into the army.  I think the limitation

 4     on their numbers, Dr. Karadzic, is not so much the available manpower in

 5     the city, but the number of weapons they had.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm noting the time.  It's time to

 7     adjourn for today, and then you will have -- you have spent so far about

 8     five hours and forty minutes, and you will have about a session -- the

 9     first session tomorrow to conclude your cross-examination.

10             Before we adjourn today, now that we'll have the witness KDZ-185,

11     there's a motion pending in respect to the addition of certain documents

12     to the Prosecution's 65 ter list which relates to five documents, one of

13     which is statement and four of them probably photos, so can I hear a

14     response from Defence tomorrow, Mr. Robinson?

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Actually, we don't have any objection to that,

16     Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Then that's granted, Mr. Tieger.

18             Tomorrow, 9.00.

19                           [The witness stands down]

20                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.34 p.m.,

21                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day of

22                           June, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.