Page 4764
1 Wednesday, 7 July 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning to everybody.
7 Mr. Karadzic, I take it that you have a team member to introduce
8 to us.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, thank you.
10 This is Mr. Aleksandar Vucic, my legal adviser, my associate,
11 because Mr. Robinson will be absent for a few days.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic. Welcome, Mr. Vucic.
13 There's a brief matter to deal with before we begin today's
14 business.
15 The Chamber has been informed that the Defence and the
16 Prosecution agreed that the document marked for identification as
17 MFI
18 reclassified as public documents. The Chamber, therefore, instructs the
19 Registry to reclassify these two documents as public.
20 Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
21 WITNESS: MOMCILO MANDIC [Resumed]
22 [The witness answered through interpreter]
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Good morning to all.
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
Page 4765
1 Q. [Interpretation] Minister, let us just establish a bit of a link.
2 Yesterday, we dealt with 30088, that's the 65 ter number, but now let's
3 call up 31839. That's the 65 ter number we want now.
4 Mr. Zepinic and I are conducting a conversation, and we are
5 discussing the implementation of the inter-party agreement. We are
6 saying that we're worried because behind our back, Serb cadres are being
7 manipulated, and he said that someone had made some proposal, and so on
8 and so forth.
9 So could you now please have a look at the next conversation.
10 I'm talking to Mr. Simovic, the deputy prime minister on the very next
11 day. He's the deputy prime minister, isn't he?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. He's not a member of the SDS
14 A. Right.
15 Q. He was an official of some sort in the previous system as well;
16 right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And he was expelled because of some mass arrests in Ilidza. Do
19 you remember when 250 Serbs were arrested in Ilidza?
20 A. Yes, and now he is the president of the Constitutional Court of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
22 Q. Ha-ha. He complained about something and then he was removed
23 from State Security; right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Very well. Now please have a look at page 1. See where it says
Page 4766
1 "Sorry"?
2 A. "I got a document here that I should sign for some Kezunovic."
3 Simovic: "All right."
4 Karadzic: "Do you know what this is all about?"
5 Simovic: "Well, you see --"
6 JUDGE KWON: Next page.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry, page 2 in English.
8 THE WITNESS: Simovic: "You see, I suggest perhaps maybe they
9 had certain consultations at the MUP. We urgently need to resolve the
10 issue of assistant minister for people's defence in the domain of
11 communications. We fear that, considering the way they do things, they
12 might impose someone. They will not impose a minister ..."
13 "Yes."
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in
15 Serbian. The first three, and then we're going to move on a bit lower.
16 THE WITNESS: "The minister of traffic and communications is from
17 HDZ."
18 "Yes."
19 "The assistant for communications in the MUP is from the SDA:"
20 Karadzic: "Excuse me, for a moment, Mr. Simovic. Just a minute."
21 There is a break, and then, "Hello," and then move on to where Karadzic
22 says: "Vito, yes, Vito."
23 THE INTERPRETER: [Interpretation] Interpreter's note: next page
24 in English, please.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Karadzic: "No. Vito just lied to
Page 4767
1 me ; right?"
2 Karadzic: "Devedlaka proposed Suka, and then the Romanija
3 people. That is not correct. It wasn't the Romanija people nor
4 Devedlaka. He was the worst man in Romanija, Suka; right?"
5 Karadzic: "Yes."
6 "For such a significant Serb position there. So what does he
7 want to do now. Profanity. Does he want to sell out Serbian positions?
8 I now caught him in this situation, that things are not the way he says
9 they are. Profanity. He is not entitled to privately appoint anyone.
10 He should call a Serbian board of experts and say, 'People, we have a
11 particular Serbian position. Who will be appointed to that position?'
12 I'm not running Serb politics off the top of my head. I call the elders
13 here, the Academy of Sciences
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have the next
15 page in Serbian. In English, this was page 3, probably.
16 Yes. So now could we have the next page in Serbian and the next
17 page in English.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right. Well, Simovic is
19 saying.
20 Miodrag Simovic here: "Fine. Here, I will let Vito sport
21 [as interpreted] propose, the one we agreed would start functioning as of
22 this morning. This is the first day and it is not functioning well. Let
23 them take it, let them agree among themselves and make a proposal to you.
24 The one they decide, propose ..."
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 4768
1 Q. Mr. Minister, on the basis of this, is it not clear that the
2 party is not insisting on making appointments, it is the Serb collegium
3 that is supposed to make appointments, so any kind of manipulation on the
4 part of the SDA is avoided?
5 A. Mr. President, so far in my testimony I've been saying that
6 personnel in the police were not appointed by the party, but by the
7 personnel people. First, it was Vito Zepinic, and after that I took upon
8 myself these personnel affairs for the Serbs.
9 Q. Can you imagine how many times we would be talking if the
10 inter-party agreement had been honoured?
11 A. Well, Mr. Tieger had two or three intercepts, conversations
12 between you and me. My mother called me at least five times to give jobs
13 to some people who were poor, who were from the neighbourhood, whom we
14 knew, et cetera, so there were no pressures from the party. We appointed
15 personnel on the basis of our own conscience and their qualifications.
16 There were some interventions coming from local level, either addressed
17 to me, or to you, or to Vito Zepinic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 5 in English.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. And towards the bottom of this page, well, yes, do you agree that
21 this has to do with some person called Kezunovic, who was a good
22 professional and who they want to move from the police to the Ministry of
23 Defence, and that we are suspicious; we think that they are doing that
24 because they don't want any Serbs to be in the Communications Department?
25 A. I know Kezunovic personally. He worked in the police force, in
Page 4769
1 the Communications Department, for many, many years. It was the SDA that
2 got the number-one post in communications, and this man was the
3 number-two person in that particular department.
4 Q. Is that the system of communications that was used in order to
5 wire-tap our conversations illegally?
6 A. The State Security had a separate system, and this is a different
7 one from the Public Security, from the MUP headquarters. Munir Alibabic,
8 with his associates, was the one who was illegally wire-tapping our
9 conversations from the Sarajevo Centre.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Is this page 5 in English?
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Could you please read this, at the bottom of this page, in
14 Serbian?
15 A. Radovan Karadzic: "Yes, a complete man, an expert, capable, and
16 they moved him. It is all I guarantee to you, that I am horrified with
17 what Vito is doing to us. Now, listen to me. It should not be done like
18 that, privately ... give positions of one's own accord. I asked 50
19 people for Simovic."
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in
21 Serbian.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Please go on.
24 A. "They said Simovic was excellent. Simovic would be deputy
25 prime minister. You are not my cousin, nor did I have any private
Page 4770
1 interest in appointing you. On the contrary, I saw for myself what kind
2 of person you were."
3 Simovic: "Fine, dear president. Here, let me inform you about
4 this too. I am glad, and I am glad that are you not upset, and there is
5 no need that they upset you in a totally inappropriate way."
6 Q. Further down, page 6 in English, and Karadzic is saying: "Well,
7 they're not here as a private affair."
8 A. Karadzic: "They're not here as a private affair. Serbian people
9 are sharing government with Croats and Muslims here. They were charged
10 with being in that government on behalf of the Serbian people. No one
11 can be in that government for their private interest."
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Could we have the next page in Serbian, and in English it's
14 page 7.
15 Q. I said if you could refer to that portion of what Simovic was
16 saying.
17 A. Simovic: "Gentlemen, ministers, I was very tolerant for two
18 months. The prosecution and my commission -- I listened to Jure --"
19 Q. Sorry, who is Jure?
20 A. Jure Pelivan was the then prime minister.
21 Q. A Croat; right?
22 A. Yes, yes, an ethnic Croat, yes:
23 "It was discussed for two months. No more giving way. I said,
24 if necessary, we would block the work of the personnel board and do
25 everything in order to sort this out properly, just to let you know."
Page 4771
1 Q. Thank you. Could you read on?
2 A. Karadzic: "We will help them get what is theirs, and that's it."
3 Q. Mr. Minister, thank you. You know, to a considerable extent, how
4 it was that I worked. The indictment portrays me as a very stern and
5 authoritarian person who was in charge, when I asked that
6 democratically-reached decisions be implemented. You're a man who
7 belonged to the administration. When democratic decisions are supposed
8 to be carried out, are they supposed to be carried out properly? Should
9 any impropriety be allowed, and should they be carried out
10 lackadaisically?
11 A. Mr. President, you always asked that the agreed concept of
12 government and state administration be fully implemented. You do react
13 sometimes. Sometimes you can be a bit rash, but there were no pressures
14 exerted to do anything that was not in line with the inter-party
15 agreement or based on law.
16 JUDGE KWON: Put a pause, please. Now you can put your question
17 again.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Is it not undeniable, Minister, that in 1990 I was not a
20 candidate for any particular position in government or Parliament?
21 A. I first heard of you in 1991, in the beginning of 1991. You were
22 not in a single organ of government in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 Q. Is it not undeniable that I did my job at the clinic all the way
24 up until the first barricades were set up in March 1991?
25 A. Yes. I went to your clinic at the School of Medicine
Page 4772
1 where you had your office.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Can this document be admitted?
4 JUDGE KWON: Shall we mark it for identification? Just a second.
5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
6 JUDGE KWON: I was told that this has been already marked for
7 identification as D281. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D181, could we have that, please.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Minister, I am trying to stick to a particular chronology to see
11 how we are getting closer to the war from the elections period so that
12 the participants, primarily the Trial Chamber, could see how political
13 life developed in Bosnia
14 that.
15 This is a document dated the 28th of August. Let me remind you.
16 Do you agree that July and August were characterised by the activities of
17 Filipovic, Zulfikarpasic, myself, Koljevic and Krajisnik, that is to say,
18 the MBO and the SDS
19 Muslims and the Serbs?
20 A. Yes. Mr. Zulfikarpasic, head of the MBO Party, represented the
21 Muslim people there.
22 Q. Thank you. Can you read the first paragraph here? Do you agree
23 that by then, there was a great deal of tension already? The war was on
24 in Croatia
25 right?
Page 4773
1 A. Yes, especially in the parts of the Krajina close to Croatia
2 Q. Were rumours rife already then, very dangerous rumours, and it
3 wasn't only rumours; there was already a process of illegal arming and
4 military organisation that was underway?
5 A. Well, the war gradually spilled over --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Mandic.
7 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
9 This is a duplicate of a 65 ter 14837, which does have a
10 translation, and that may be of assistance.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much. 14837.
12 MR. TIEGER: 14837.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for the record, this has been
14 admitted as Exhibit D264.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can we also see the English translation, just to jog our
17 memories.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. So the war was already going on in Croatia. It had already
20 spilled over to the peripheral areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 time, do we have quite a lot of refugees from Croatia?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Could you please be so kind as to read the first paragraph?
24 A. "I advise you herewith that I have reached an agreement with
25 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Party of Democratic Action, and
Page 4774
1 Mr. Stjepan Kljujic, president of the Croatian Democratic Union, that
2 these three political parties establish observer groups tasked with
3 monitoring all developments in their respective communities that affect
4 or may contribute to a deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and cause
5 conflict."
6 Q. The last sentence, please read the last sentence also.
7 A. "At the same time, in the co-ordination with the representatives
8 of the Party of Democratic Action, and the Croatian Democratic Union
9 your municipality or region, you are to advise the president of the
10 Municipal Assembly and the Public Security Station chief in your
11 municipality of the full composition of the observer group."
12 Q. In the last sentence of the second paragraph, do they say that
13 they should indicate any differences of opinions in the parties regarding
14 the said developments; is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Was this a measure calculated to objectivise the rumours and to
17 place under political control the developments in the field, always in
18 compliance with the state organs, the municipality president, and the
19 chief of the Public Security Station? Do you agree that that was a
20 measure that could have led to the preservation of peace?
21 A. Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers be so kind as not to
24 overlap.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you're advised again by the
Page 4775
1 interpreters not to overlap, so please bear that in mind, that since you
2 are speaking the same language, you should put a pause for the
3 interpreters to interpret what you're saying.
4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We'll do our best. I
6 forget myself.
7 Can we see D266, which has already been admitted.
8 And now, from August, we are moving on to September to see what
9 the SDA is doing at that same time.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. If you remember, Minister, in August the SDA sent a letter to the
12 effect that the Yugoslav People's Army was not allowed to inspect the
13 mobilisation cards. Do you agree that basically mobilisation had been
14 carried out through branches of the Ministry of Defence in the
15 municipalities, but overall the entire system of defence had been
16 subjected to the Federal Secretariat of National Defence, i.e., the JNA?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Later, we shall see that Mr. Izetbegovic, himself, admitted that
19 we had violated slightly, as he put it, some laws.
20 Do you see this document, and were you aware of this document at
21 the time of its issuance?
22 A. I cannot recall this document, Mr. President.
23 Q. Very well. Could you please read the first three paragraphs?
24 A. "The Party of Democratic Action, notice of full readiness of
25 communications and monitoring by the SDA.
Page 4776
1 "Since the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is increasing in
2 complexity by the hour, we have decided to declare full readiness of
3 communications and monitoring of all activities in the territory under
4 the control of the SDA.
5 "Hence, enclosed will you find a form which will give us
6 information enabling us to give instructions and co-ordinate activities
7 in the future.
8 "Under point 1, monitoring movements, a monitoring service is to
9 be organised throughout the entire municipality (inhabited by Muslims)
10 and all information is to be sent to a central desk in the municipality,
11 accessible 24 hours, from where information is to be forwarded every two
12 hours by telephone to the Sarajevo SDA switchboard."
13 And the telephone number is given.
14 Q. Can you please read also the next one.
15 A. "Under point 2, observation of features, information is to be
16 provided every 24 hours and as needed," something.
17 Q. "As necessary"?
18 A. Yes, "as necessary."
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see page 3 of
20 this document. Probably in the English it is page 2.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Are these now the points elaborated?
23 Can we see page 3 in English also?
24 Has the monitoring of movements of military convoys, of tanks, of
25 APCs, of railway traffic, military convoys, extraordinary trains, air
Page 4777
1 traffic, the observation of facilities of BRX [phoen], the security of
2 BRX, the strength of BRX, combat readiness, security, military
3 installations, locations, the activities of all these. Can you summarise
4 in order for me not to read it all out, what was to be monitored?
5 A. Practically everything. Everything that moved on the ground was
6 to be monitored.
7 Q. Was this an eminently illegal activity against one's own army, or
8 what precisely -- was any state organ entitled -- did any state organ,
9 not to mention party organ, let alone party organ, have the right to
10 undertake such monitoring?
11 A. Mr. President, this is evidently unlawful. It is a mono-party
12 exercise. It is unconstitutional, it is illegal.
13 Q. Thank you. This is an admitted document. I just wanted us to
14 remind ourselves of what the Party of Democratic Action was doing in
15 September. Although we did say that together -- but not these
16 activities, but the three parties should monitor jointly the activities
17 of this kind and take action, here the SDA is assuming upon itself the
18 monitoring of these activities following placing under surveillance its
19 own army, its own units, et cetera?
20 A. Yes.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can we see 65 ter 30216.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. This is my telephone conversation with the late
25 President Milosevic. I'm not sure of the date, but I'm sure it is
Page 4778
1 somewhere in the text. Possibly, this has been offered also by the OTP.
2 But, at any rate, it is the 9th of September, 1991.
3 The indictment actually likes this episode very much, whereby it
4 is to demonstrate how I co-operated with the army, with organs of Serbia
5 and Yugoslavia
6 Here, where he says: "Manista nijotisa" [phoen], can you start
7 from that point? It is, for instance, the 10th row -- line from the top,
8 when Karadzic says --
9 A. Yes. Karadzic: "Yes."
10 Milosevic: "We need more substantial forces so that -- to
11 resolve this situation. It is night-time, and helicoptering can be used,
12 but we'll see how to take care of this at dawn. Jovica just told me a
13 helicopter has been sent to pick this guy up."
14 "Nothing has been sent. That is the problem. I'm afraid that
15 the MUP, this Muslim part of the MUP, will turn him over to the Croatian
16 MUP, and that would mean war in BH. No one could stop it then."
17 Q. The two next ones, please.
18 A. "No one could stop it then?"
19 Radovan: "No one would be able to stop it then, but I'm not sure
20 if war suits Alija, because he wants to ..."
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Can we see the next page. In
22 English, it is also page 2, the next one.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Until that is done, do you remember the crisis around the illegal
25 arrest of Milan Martic in Otoka, near Krupa, on the Unani [phoen]
Page 4779
1 Bosanska Krupa, namely, of Martic and a number of JNA officers, on the
2 night of September, 1991?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Here we have shown and, if necessary, we can again see this
5 intercept, where I was called by Malko Koroman from Romanija at 2 a.m.
6 and he said that all of Romanija was unsettled because of the arrest that
7 the they had heard about, so people were actually anxious because -- do
8 you think that that was because this was an unlawful arrest, that of
9 Martic?
10 A. Yes. As far as I can remember, Mr. President, I and Avdo Hebib
11 went out in the field and dealt with that problem then, but there were
12 tensions on account of the arrest of a couple of officers. And
13 Milan Martic, who was at the time in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Krajina.
14 Q. Thank you. Can you now finish with this sentence, where it says:
15 "Here ...," at the top?
16 A. Radovan: "No, we are going to use this for political purposes
17 here today our meeting with Izetbegovic. Again, they are simply going
18 for a division of BH, and we are going to implement a regionalisation and
19 introduce our MUP wherever we are in power, because what they have done
20 is inadmissible. We won't believe these people gather spontaneously.
21 The SDA has both the power and influence there. However, if they -- if
22 the military does not send a helicopter or an APC there as soon as
23 possible to get the man out, then that will be a great danger because
24 this Milan
25 do not --"
Page 4780
1 Q. "Control"?
2 A. Yes, "control."
3 Q. And then go on, please, where I say: "This is impossible." It
4 is also page 2.
5 Radovan says -- that's the last third --
6 A. "But this is -- but this is -- I mean, it is unbelievable that we
7 do not at all know who of the BH MUP is in contact with the Ustashas and
8 Tudjman. Also, chaos in BH certainly suits Tudjman because he wants to
9 internationalise the conflict, and maybe this is true of Alija too."
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Can we have the next page in Serbian, actually, the two following
12 pages. And in English, it is page number 4.
13 Instead of "conflict," it should be said "chaos."
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Here, towards the bottom of the page, Radovan:
16 "Let them do this as soon as possible. We'll have a catastrophe
17 on our hands. That will be the spill-over -- the expansion of conflicts
18 in BH, and people from Romanija have informed me that they were preparing
19 to block Sarajevo
20 be a disaster. I'm going to call Izetbegovic now to tell him this. I'll
21 talk to you later, then."
22 "Okay."
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. At an Assembly session, if you recall, I spoke about how peace
25 was in our hands and chaos was not in our hands, but we were in the hands
Page 4781
1 of chaos. Can you contemplate that anyone would have been able to
2 control developments had they actually turned over Martic to the Croatian
3 authorities?
4 A. No, they wouldn't have been able to control developments.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can this document be admitted?
7 JUDGE KWON: Shall we mark it for identification, Mr. Karadzic?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, marked for identification,
9 yes, just like all other intercepts.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D365.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 30236.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. And until we see that document: Minister, this is my
14 conversation with Mrs. Plavsic. I don't know who called whom, but that
15 doesn't really matter. Towards the end, the English page 2 and the
16 Serbian 1, towards the bottom, Biljana says: "Davam kasim" [phoen]. Can
17 you go from there?
18 A. Biljana: "Let me tell you, Radovan, I'm very worried about the
19 situation at the SUP
20 Radovan: "Ah, what's the matter now?"
21 Biljana: "Well, I heard they -- they sacked Nedjo Vlaski, I mean
22 they scrapped his job, you know."
23 Radovan: "No, they can't, we can."
24 Q. Let us just clarify. Is SUP and MUP one and the same thing?
25 A. Yes.
Page 4782
1 Q. Biljana, as the president of the council for the protection of
2 the constitutional order, was this her field of activity, state security?
3 A. By virtue of her office, she was the superior of the entire MUP
4 and she controlled the legality of the work of the Ministry of the
5 Interior.
6 Q. Thank you. Can we now see the next page in Serbian? In English,
7 it is page number 3.
8 Can you see this passage where Biljana says: "Now I want it from
9 him in writing"?
10 A. Biljana: "Now I'm asking him to submit the report to me in
11 writing, but I would not wait for it because the situation is really
12 clear there. You should talk to Alija and say that."
13 Radovan: "We'll probably have it today."
14 Bijeljina: "We will."
15 Radovan: "Today we'll probably have these talks with them, and
16 I'll say no talks until ..."
17 Bijeljina: "That's right."
18 Radovan: "Until they appoint, at the SUP ..."
19 Biljana: "Until they stop deciding which Serb will work where."
20 Q. Is this all happening nine months after the formation of the
21 joint coalition government?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Can you go on from the words: "Correct, correct"?
24 A. Radovan: "Until they stop deciding ..."
25 Biljana: "We will separate a part of our SUP that's it. We'll
Page 4783
1 also carry out a cantonisation of the SUP. You should know we'll do
2 that."
3 Radovan: "We will do all that, we will do all that."
4 Biljana: "They should be told that in so many words. Let me
5 tell you, we have to be very energetic now and tread very energetically,
6 and this is the first and the right place, and they are playing games
7 with us."
8 Q. Is it the case that they were removing Serbs from strategic
9 positions? They had nothing personal against Major Vlaski; what mattered
10 was that there should be no Serbs in that service?
11 A. Politicians were deciding all this, and the people were just wait
12 to go see what was going to happen.
13 Q. But the politicians were responsible and accountable for their
14 people for their regularity of political activity?
15 A. Of course.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,
17 please.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, being marked for identification.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 18231, please. 18231.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. We're still in the month of September. This is a dispatch from
23 the chief of the Security Services Centre, Banja Luka, to the
24 Public Security Station, Prijedor. Do you see the date, 19 September
25 1991, and the document? Please look at it, and you can even read the
Page 4784
1 first passage.
2 A. Well, the chief of the CSB
3 chief of the Public Security Station in Prijedor that five persons of
4 Muslim ethnicity should be assigned to the SJB Sanski Most.
5 Q. It says, actually:
6 "I have been informed by MUP dispatch number ... that the
7 following persons have been assigned to the Prijedor SJB."
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And here we have the names of five policemen. It's not a long
10 document. Can you read it, please?
11 A. All of it, you mean?
12 Q. This Ilijas Aliskovic, concerning this passage where it begins
13 with: "Other workers ..."
14 A. "With regard to the other workers, for whom I have not provided a
15 recommendation for employment to the MUP of the SR BH and for whom
16 security vetting has not been completed, who are not covered by the
17 current number of police staffing specification posts in Prijedor SJB,
18 and whom I have not even informed I received reports that they have begun
19 to work at your Public Security Station despite the fact that they are
20 not covered by the number of police staffing specification posts. I
21 hereby ask you to inform me with whom it had been agreed that the number
22 of posts in accordance with the Prijedor SJB staffing specification was
23 exceeded, and the reason why.
24 "I do not approve of these workers continuing to work in your
25 Public Security Station, and I have informed the republic minister
Page 4785
1 accordingly. I hereby ask that in all future cases, you consult me when
2 proposing candidates for employment, because personnel policy is the
3 business of the chief of the centre."
4 Q. Do I understand this correctly, that in this case, unlawfully and
5 bypassing the usual procedures and vetting procedures, people were
6 employed with the Prijedor Public Security Station without the knowledge
7 of the chief and unlawfully?
8 A. As I read this dispatch, Mr. President, the chief of the centre
9 is basically protesting with the chief of the Prijedor SJB because the
10 centre is their superior, and yet they had been circumvented in hiring.
11 That is contrary to the laws of the Socialist Republic
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he demands that this practice stop.
13 Q. There are three points here. It was done without the knowledge
14 of the chief of the centre, and bypassing the procedure, plus the number
15 of posts was exceeded?
16 A. Yes, it's all stated in the dispatch.
17 Q. Is that consistent with your knowledge about the illegal action
18 of the SDA in restructuring the MUP in favour of the SDA?
19 A. From what I know, that September they began with creating a
20 Muslim army within the Ministry of the Police.
21 Q. Do you remember that the decision to establish the
22 Patriotic League was made on the 31st of March that year?
23 A. I know it was made in 1991, but I don't know when.
24 Q. Do you agree that they still recognise wartime service to their
25 members as of the 30th of April, 1991?
Page 4786
1 A. Yes. And from what I know, the Muslims had the largest army in
2 Europe
3 active personnel in NATO forces. They had 20 -- 200.000 registered
4 members, and the federal budget cannot support it. They are in huge
5 problems.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D367, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1893, please. I hope it has a
10 translation. This is a record, minutes from the session of the
11 Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
12 September 1991.
13 This is not the right document. 1D1893.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. The minister of the interior was present, Mr. Delimustafic, and I
16 believe you know about this meeting. Could you please look at the
17 document? Izetbegovic, Blaskic, Kljujic, Boric, and Ganic all attended.
18 And as guests, Doko, Delimustafic, and others. They also invited
19 non-members to attend?
20 A. Yes, that was customary when they had specific topics on the
21 agenda.
22 Q. Can you read the agenda?
23 A. "Report of Presidency members Biljana Plavsic, Ejub Ganic, and
24 Franjo Boric, on the talks in the General Staff of the SFRY armed
25 forces."
Page 4787
1 Q. In the next passage, we see that on 20th September, 1991, and in
2 accordance with the conclusions of the Presidency of 19 September 1991
3 can we now see the next page in Serbian -- these three members of the
4 Presidency went to the General Staff of the JNA for talks. It says --
5 and I apologise to the interpreters. In English, we need the next page.
6 A. Item 1:
7 "Municipal assemblies may, if the situation so requires, and with
8 the consent of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, carry out a
9 partial mobilisation of regional units of the Territorial Defence in
10 their territory. Military authorities will be asked to issue the
11 required equipment and weapons to these units."
12 Q. Can you read paragraph 3, where it says Biljana Plavsic did not
13 agree with paragraphs 1 and 2? Do you agree that if the Serbian members
14 disagree, and Koljevic seems to have not been present, this disagreement
15 has the force of veto in such serious matters?
16 A. The principle in accordance with which the Presidency worked,
17 especially in matters crucial to the republic, was consensus.
18 Decision-making with agreement of all the members of the Presidency.
19 Q. In this paragraph 2, does it now become clear that Serbian young
20 men in the JNA were under the command of JNA officers, as recruits, as
21 conscripts, whereas the Territorial Defence was at the disposal of
22 presidents of municipal assemblies? Do you agree with that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Do you remember that according to the Law on National Defence and
25 Social Self-Protection, just like the president of the Presidency was
Page 4788
1 president of the Council for National Defence, in the same way every
2 municipal president was the president of the Municipal Council for
3 Defence?
4 A. Yes, that's in accordance with the law.
5 Q. And every municipal president was thereby at the head of the
6 local Territorial Defence unit, of course, under the superior command of
7 the JNA?
8 A. Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted now?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D368, Your Honour.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01403, please.
13 While we're waiting: This is again dated 21 September 1991
14 It's a document from me, from the Serbian Democratic Party, instructions
15 to all municipal boards of the Serbian Democratic Party. I hope it has a
16 translation. No, there isn't.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Could you please read this for the record as a translation?
19 A. "Instructions to all municipal boards of the SDA --"
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. TIEGER: It's not long, but it still may be helpful to note
22 this is a duplicate of 00956, which does have a translation.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I thank the
24 Prosecution.
25 Can we have that translation displayed?
Page 4789
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Would you please continue?
3 A. "The wartime forces of the police are currently being mobilised.
4 There are rumours that up to 100 per cent of the forces are being
5 mobilised, although the bodies at the republic level can mobilise only
6 50 per cent of the forces. There are also rumours that only Muslims are
7 being called up, or that Serbs do not respond to the call-up, which would
8 result in the creation of a Muslim police force and would create
9 conditions for a civil war.
10 "Please follow closely the developments in this respect.
11 "The instruction is that Serbs are to report to the reserve
12 police force.
13 "Keep us informed."
14 Q. Was I rather modest -- was it an understatement when I said this
15 was a rumour and guess-work?
16 A. Well, rumours are -- is information about events that are not
17 necessarily true. But you must have had information and reports.
18 Q. Was this, indeed, a dangerous -- a flammable situation, because
19 could the Serbs have been concerned because the potential enemy for these
20 people could only have been Serbs?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is this consistent with what they decided that they -- in the
23 Presidency, with which Biljana Plavsic disagreed?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Were these reports basically true? To what extent were they
Page 4790
1 true?
2 A. The MUP would have had such reports, and they were, for the most
3 part, true.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D369, Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1894, please.
8 Could we zoom in? I don't know if we have a translation. I
9 believe we do.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I'll tell you about the signature. It's the minister of the
12 interior, Alija Delimustafic, 26 September 1991. Could you read the
13 first half of the first paragraph?
14 A. "Pursuant to an order of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic
15 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, reserve forces of the police have been activated,
16 and accordingly police work is being carried out under special
17 circumstances.
18 "Pursuant to Article 63 of the Law on Internal Affairs, members
19 of the police force are considered as authorised officials while engaged
20 in performing the duties of public and state security. Under the said
21 provision, reserve police officers have the same rights, obligations and
22 responsibilities as active-duty police officers. However, it has been
23 noted that reserve police officers do not always act in accordance with
24 the law, the rules of performing public security duties and the mandatory
25 instruction, on the rules of conduct and internal relations among
Page 4791
1 authorised official personnel of the organs of the interior."
2 Q. In view of the fact that all this was happening over a certain
3 time, does this also following from the activities of the Presidency of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, against which the Serbian side voted?
5 A. Yes, this was supposed to be decided by consensus. Biljana did
6 not agree with that decision.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can this document be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D370, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1909, could we have that
12 document, please.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. While we're waiting for it, Minister, may I ask you or may I
15 remind you that we had not taken the Ministry of the Interior. I'm
16 referring to the Serb people of Bosnia-Herzegovina that were represented
17 at the time by the SDS
18 party too; right?
19 A. Right.
20 Q. The one-third of power had to be in the hands of the Serbs;
21 right?
22 A. On the basis of the coalition agreement that you had signed.
23 Q. But also on the basis of the Constitution of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina
25 A. Yes.
Page 4792
1 Q. Since we were not given -- or, rather, we didn't really ask for
2 it, the minister of the interior, that is --
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
4 Mr. Tieger, you have another number for this?
5 MR. TIEGER: The translation for this document should be with
6 18243.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. Let's pull it up.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. While we're waiting for that, let me ask you, Mr. Minister:
10 Since we were not given the top positions, and they sabotaged the
11 appointment of our people to the number-two and number-three posts, does
12 this document show that the link between these two ministries of force
13 proved to be very dangerous? Let me relieve you for a while and let me
14 read the first paragraph.
15 The Presidency of Bosnia
16 the members and so on, and then the text. I mean, it even goes to the
17 General Staff and the Federal Secretariat. That's the Federal Ministry
18 of Defence in Yugoslavia
19 "The Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 at its session held on the 23rd of September, 1991, adopted a conclusion
21 allowing the Ministry of the Interior to engage upon issues issued by the
22 minister, additional police reservists from the contingent of undeployed
23 military conscripts registered with municipal secretariats for national
24 defence."
25 Does this mean that the ministry -- or, rather, that the
Page 4793
1 Presidency is taking over military conscripts and turning them into
2 potential policemen?
3 A. Mr. President, that was the creation of a Muslim army in the
4 territory of the former Yugoslavia
5 the Ministry of Police.
6 Q. Thank you. In this connection, the Ministry of Defence sent a
7 dispatch -- there is a mistake in the translation. They'll probably
8 change this during the course of the night, but the witness said that
9 that was the beginning of the creation of a Muslim army in the territory
10 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the Ministry of the Interior.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: That is exactly what we
12 said.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Isn't that right, through this joint organ a mono-ethnic army was
15 being created of one people?
16 A. That's what I said.
17 Q. Not through the military police, but through the Ministry of the
18 Civilian Police?
19 A. I said through the Ministry of the Police.
20 JUDGE KWON: And the interpreters confirmed what you said.
21 But, Mr. Mandic, can you take a look at the last page of this
22 document? Are you a member of -- were you a member of the Presidency,
23 Mr. Mandic?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: Why did you sign this document?
Page 4794
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I please see the first page
2 again?
3 Because, Your Honours, the Ministry of Police, where I was
4 assistant minister, was being manned unlawfully. I was in charge of the
5 legality and legitimacy of the work of that ministry. There were certain
6 conditions under which the reserve police force could be called up; that
7 is, imminent threat of war, major natural disasters, and everything else
8 that would disrupt normal life in a country.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance? Perhaps
10 confusion is being created here because it says the Presidency, the
11 government, et cetera.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Minister, am I right that as assistant minister, you are sending
14 this to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina? This is not a document to
15 the Presidency. This is a document of the ministry that is being sent to
16 these addressees?
17 A. Then there is a misunderstanding, then I did not understand
18 His Honour's question properly, because I sent this document to all the
19 state organs that were in charge, pointing out that this was illegal,
20 that the reserve police force was being called up in an irregular way. I
21 did not understand this. The question that was put to me was why I was
22 sending this document, although I was not a member of the Presidency
23 myself.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Now it's clear to me.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 4795
1 Q. In this connection, the Ministry of National Defence submitted to
2 the municipal secretariats for national defence an instructive dispatch.
3 That's the republican ministry of Bosnia; right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. An instructive dispatch ordering them to compile lists of all
6 registered, undeployed military conscripts and forward them to the
7 responsible Public Security Station, and so on and so forth.
8 May I remind you or may I ask you, Mr. Minister: Do you recall
9 that throughout that year in particular, ever since the war broke out in
10 Croatia
11 from responding to JNA call-up?
12 A. Yes. May I just explain this document a bit?
13 All military conscripts are being called up here, and that is not
14 in accordance with the law; that is to say, all military-aged men who had
15 done their military service between ages 20 and 50, they were supposed to
16 report to the closest police station to be issued with weapons and
17 uniforms and be placed at the disposal of the police. There was nothing
18 extraordinary going on. There wasn't an earthquake, a flood, or anything
19 else that would jeopardise the normal life of a particular republic, this
20 one. So there was no legal grounds for calling these people up.
21 In this letter, I make all state organs aware of this; not only
22 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Yugoslavia
23 Q. Thank you. I would like to go back to this particular term used
24 here, "undeployed." Since the Muslim and Croat leaderships in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina practically forbade the members of these ethnic
Page 4796
1 communities or peoples to respond to JNA call-up, and since the Serb side
2 had to respond to a greater extent because the JNA was being unmanned,
3 who would then be these undisposed military conscripts that the
4 Presidency is speaking of? Who would they be, in terms of ethnicity?
5 A. Let's explain this a bit, Mr. President.
6 There was a war going on in the Republic of Croatia
7 Croatian people and the Serb people. Intentionally or unintentionally -
8 in my view, intentionally - this war was being transferred to other parts
9 of Yugoslavia
10 state. A certain climate was being created that reflected what was
11 happening in Croatia
12 own army in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, that was being carried out by
13 the Muslim side and the Croat side. The Croats, of course, were linked
14 to Zagreb
15 the Serbs in Croatia
16 own state independent of the Serbs and Croats. We are going to see all
17 of that later, of course.
18 Q. Although you confirmed that yesterday as well, does this show
19 that the undisposed conscripts are Muslims and Croats, whereas the Serbs
20 are in the JNA?
21 A. Yes, yes, not to complicate matters further.
22 Q. And these undeployed Muslim and Croat military conscripts are now
23 unlawfully being called up into the police that is not run by the JNA but
24 by the Muslim-Croat coalition in part of the authorities of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina?
Page 4797
1 A. When Mr. Tieger was putting questions to me about 1991 and the
2 beginning of 1992, we saw that one of the bosses in the Serb police, in
3 his letter, pointed out that military deserters who were ethnic Croats
4 and Muslims were being admitted into the police, and that was a problem
5 that was hindering the work of the police more and more, having
6 culminated at a certain point.
7 Q. I would like to read a certain part from the one-but-last page.
8 You say here:
9 "Because of the aforementioned, we ask the Presidency of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina to re-examine their request for an additional increase
11 in the reserve police force, or, rather, to see whether it is necessary
12 to increase the reserve police force in relation to the number that was
13 established in the decision of --"
14 Perhaps the next page in Serbian now and the last page in
15 English:
16 " ... decision of the Government of the Socialist Republic of
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1988, and to explicitly forbid the manning of
18 the reserve police force by certain individuals that haven't been cleared
19 beforehand, and that such persons should be disarmed and demobilised from
20 the reserve police force."
21 Was this your attempt to have things become regular and lawful
22 once again?
23 A. I tried to explain that a few moments ago when His Honour put his
24 question.
25 These were unlawful decisions of state organs that were not in
Page 4798
1 charge of that particular matter. That is to say, apart from the
2 personnel levels envisaged by law, police stations were being manned in
3 an unlawful manner. People were being given uniforms and weapons
4 en masse. These were people from other republics. Also, these were
5 people who had deserted from the active-duty army. That was the problem
6 that the police was facing in its work. They had no security clearance,
7 they were simply unknown. There were persons from Serbia, from the
8 district of Raska, there were persons from Croatia, there were persons
9 who had lived abroad in various European states, Arab states, and very
10 often we came across persons who barely spoke Serbo-Croat, the then
11 official language, who did not know -- or, rather, who could not find
12 their way in Bosnian towns because they simply were not familiar with the
13 area. That created fear and a lack of confidence within the Ministry of
14 Police, itself. It culminated when Mirsad Srebrenkovic came instead of
15 Hilmo Selimovic.
16 I would like to inform the Trial Chamber of the following:
17 Hilmo Selimovic was assistant minister for personnel affairs. He was a
18 member of the Muslim people, an eminent person from Sarajevo. He was
19 replaced overnight, dismissed for no reason whatsoever. There was no due
20 process applied, and Srebrenkovic, who was a citizen of Croatia
21 appointed. He was working at the Mesihat of the Grand Mosque in Zagreb
22 in Croatia
23 background. He had a degree in Theology from the University of Cairo.
24 Can you imagine how astonished we were when a hodja from a mosque came to
25 be appointed assistant minister for personnel affairs? At this moment,
Page 4799
1 Your Honours, I can say that he went back again to the Mesihat of the
2 Grand Mosque in Zagreb. I mentioned that in the Stanisic trial. We
3 long-standing policemen, who were basically atheist, we grew up in a
4 socialist society, we did not really pay much attention to religious
5 affairs and religious services, we go to a colleague's office who had
6 replaced yet another Muslim in the very same position, and there he was
7 praying. Can you imagine how astonished I was and how confused I was?
8 At that moment -- from that moment onwards from September or, rather,
9 October, hundreds of people came to certain police stations in the
10 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Overnight, people were being admitted,
11 the kind of persons I spoke of a moment ago. For instance, in the center
12 of Sarajevo, in the municipality of Stari Grad, the Old Town, which
13 normally has about 80 employees, in the beginning of 1992 or, rather, at
14 the end of 1991 there were 600 persons who were admitted to the reserve
15 police force of Stari Grad, under the leadership of Dahic [phoen], Ismet,
16 on the basis of decisions made by this hodja who works at that mosque in
17 Zagreb to this day.
18 I really do not think this requires any further comment. That is
19 my personal view.
20 Your Honours, we had good co-operation with colleagues who were
21 ethnic Croats and Muslims.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Mandic. I thank you for your kind
23 and detailed explanation, but please bear also in mind that Mr. Karadzic
24 has only a limited time, so please be brief.
25 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, let's continue -- it's time -- I note the
Page 4800
1 time. We'll have a break for 20 minutes.
2 --- Recess taken at 10.19 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 10.42 a.m.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
6 [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted, please?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D371, Your Honours.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Q. Let me ask you this, Mr. Minister: These people, these
11 foreigners, criminals, et cetera, who couldn't speak good Serbo-Croat,
12 who were admitted to the MUP in contravention of regular procedure, did
13 they have all the powers that a regular policeman has; an ID, uniform,
14 armaments, et cetera?
15 A. They were admitted to the reserve police force according to the
16 Law on the Interior. They had all the powers, as stated by
17 Mr. Alija Delimustafic, as all other policemen.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D2047.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. And while we wait, I'm going to ask you this: This is a
21 conversation between you and me on the 26th of September. We seem to be
22 having some difficulty leaving September behind us. It was a very
23 intensive month, in terms of developments. There were quite a few
24 developments. Let me ask you this: Am I right when I say over a year
25 prior to the outbreak of the war, there was a crisis in Visegrad?
Page 4801
1 A. Yes. I believe the name of the person Musanovic stands out.
2 Q. Do you remember that the monument to Ivo Andric, the sole
3 literary Nobel laureate that we ever had, was raised to the ground?
4 A. Yes, I remember that. And, by the way, he was a Croat by
5 nationality, but his monument was torn down in Visegrad.
6 Q. I believe that he was a Catholic, but a Serb.
7 A. Excuse me. Sorry. He was a Catholic, but he introduced himself
8 as a Serb.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go down a bit? Do we have
10 translation for this now?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. So we are talking on the 26th of September. I'm asking you,
13 "What are you doing?" You say: "I'm having a meeting." And I say:
14 "Okay, you have your people. It seems that things have started
15 up there in Visegrad. There are criminal complaints -- there is an
16 avalanche of criminal complaints. Come, put your act together, a status
17 being introduced."
18 You say: "Yes, yes." And then I say: "No, this is not in the
19 Serbian land, so I can see that Zupljanin has sent a very fair report
20 from Krajina where the Serbs are doing stupid thing." He said, "So there
21 is no --"
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: If we go to 30284, we'll have a translation.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for the record, this is MFI D207.
Page 4802
1 JUDGE KWON: This is the one already used by you, Mr. Karadzic,
2 and tendered.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it seems so. But as this is a
4 direct conversation between me and Mr. Mandic, can we see the second page
5 now, please, in the Serbian.
6 It is evident that I am commending the fact that Zupljanin is
7 also referring to Serbian folly.
8 Q. And on the second page, what do you say?
9 A. Mandic: "President, we have to establish the rule of law. We
10 can't do otherwise. I have talked to these people from Visegrad, these
11 people of mine."
12 Q. Go on.
13 A. Karadzic: "Yes."
14 Mandic: "And I agree with them that all criminal complaints,
15 et cetera, Rato Runjevac [phoen] and his deputies think Nozica came to
16 see me today."
17 For the benefit of the Trial Chamber, Rato Runjevac was the
18 prosecutor, chief prosecutor in Sarajevo
19 deputy, and now she's actually a Defence counsel here at The Hague
20 Karadzic: "Uh-huh."
21 Mandic: "So we have agreed with the prosecutors to elevate this
22 to a higher prosecutorial level for this person to be extracted from
23 Visegrad and for legal proceedings to be instituted against him. This
24 cannot remain the way it is because this will cause blood among the
25 people there. There will be a conflict between the Muslims and the
Page 4803
1 Serbs, and then what will happen?"
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please slow down.
3 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your question, and slow down for
4 the benefit of the interpreters.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I should like to draw your attention to here where I say "Jeste,
7 Alija Izetbegovic." But before that, I should like to clarify this:
8 Izetbegovic and I received people from Visegrad, Serbs and Muslims, in
9 order to diffuse -- ease the situation, and this is what I said about it.
10 You can read it. Alija Izetbegovic says --
11 A. I'm waiting for the translation.
12 Radovan: "Yes. Alija Izetbegovic is saying -- he's asking that
13 Fikret of his --
14 Q. Can we have the next page in English, too, please?
15 A. Well, "Fikret," he says, "if the Serbs run down into Sjemce, into
16 town to take revenge and to kill Muslims, will they pick out good Muslims
17 from the bad? No, they won't," he says, "they will take one after
18 another. Well, then do not let an idiot estrange you from the Serbs,
19 because then the Serbs will come and will not select who to beat, but
20 will come across someone who is innocent."
21 Mandic: "Well, Mr. President, here I am, working all day on
22 this, and Visegrad and Mostar and the information about the war and
23 everything else."
24 Q. Thank you. Yes, you also say you want to be an artisan, a
25 craftsman, an objective person, and to follow the regulations; nothing
Page 4804
1 else?
2 A. Radovan Karadzic: "I'm telling you now ..."
3 Momcilo Mandic: "I want to be a craftsman, an objective person,
4 and to abide by regulations, nothing else."
5 Karadzic: "It will only be good when this -- we will have to,
6 however, this unfortunate Simovic is also working 15 or 16 hours. You
7 have to work hard until the situation is sorted out."
8 Mandic: "That is no problem at all."
9 Q. Thank you. Let us now refresh our memories a bit. Do you recall
10 that some extremists in Visegrad terrorised Serbs, stopped pilgrims going
11 to Ostrog [phoen] monasteries, pulled out the beard of a priest, tore
12 down the monument to Ivo Andric, and set up barricades intercepting the
13 JNA column and sending it back to Serbia
14 although it was the regular army of that country?
15 A. Mr. President, that was a long time ago. I know that there were
16 incidents, that a group of Muslim lads tore down the monument of the
17 Nobel laureate monument of Ivo Andric. I know there were excesses based
18 on nationalist feelings, and we, together with the Sarajevo region, tried
19 to identify the perpetrators to have them prosecuted, to have the
20 Prosecutor Rato Tunjevac [phoen] with his associates undertake the
21 necessary measures and institute the regular criminal proceedings. I
22 cannot remember every detail, in fact.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 As this has been admitted for identification, there is no need to
25 tender it.
Page 4805
1 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure I have a trace of this intercept having
2 been tendered before. D207 seems to be the different one. I have to
3 check with the Court Deputy.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it has not, then I will move
5 that it be so admitted.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Mandic, can you confirm the accuracy of this
7 conversation you had with Mr. Karadzic at the time?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE KWON: I don't think this has been tendered before.
10 Yes. This 65 ter 30284 has never been tendered, so, as such,
11 we'll admit it, because as one of the interlocutors, Mr. Mandic confirmed
12 the accuracy of the conversation.
13 But on a related note, Mr. Karadzic, you've tendered many
14 intercepts in which you were one of the interlocutors. If you agree with
15 their accuracy, we can admit them without having to mark them for
16 identification, can't we? One may argue that by adducing them, you are
17 actually adopting them, and also, furthermore, one may argue that they
18 are helpful to your case. What do you think about this observation?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, in my introductory
20 remarks I said that we were being wire-tapped unlawfully, but this is a
21 source of extensive information and it shows how much effort we invested
22 in order for things to be regular. The principle -- the
23 contention/objection of the Defence is that they have had no right to do
24 so, but I have not yet come across an intercept that I would consider
25 forged. These that we have offered are authentic, and I remember these
Page 4806
1 problems and these talks. Perhaps we can leave this for later to
2 reconsider, but I do think that you will be admitting them, or that is
3 why I am tending them, just in case.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, we'll come to a more comprehensive
5 analysis to this issue -- we'll come to this issue in a more
6 comprehensive way, but do you like to make any observation on this issue,
7 since I raised it, albeit briefly?
8 MR. TIEGER: The same observations that occurred to us,
9 Your Honour, and with respect to those -- yes, to both the intercepts
10 that have been tendered to date and the general reflection on the
11 intercepts to be tendered in future.
12 JUDGE KWON: I take it there are several categories of intercepts
13 you will tender -- you have tendered or you will tender in the future in
14 this case.
15 MR. TIEGER: I understand the Defence position about the
16 legality. I think that's been addressed. I think once we have crossed
17 that Rubicon, the intercepts should be admitted.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll come to that issue later on.
19 But, in any event, this intercept has been admitted, in light of
20 the -- Mr. Mandic's confirmation. So we'll give the exhibit number.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As D372, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. My principle objection
24 is that they did not have the right to do that, but the Defence reserves
25 the right -- if we should come across a document that can be considered
Page 4807
1 to have been edited by Munir Alibabic, then we reserve the right to
2 either ask for a recording, an audio-recording, or to be given the
3 opportunity to check it.
4 Can we see 1D2023.
5 JUDGE KWON: But can I confirm, Mr. Karadzic, before you move on,
6 there has been no such documents so far that have been tendered or used?
7 That's what you said?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have not noticed that anything
9 has been doctored or forged so far. I have not followed it very closely,
10 but I have not noticed any distorted or doctored recordings so far. But
11 that needs to be checked.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We do not have a Serbian version
14 here, unless the OTP has one. So it is 1D20 -- and so on. This is from
15 the 4th of November, Mr. Minister, and it is also one of your documents.
16 And you say -- I'm going to read it in English:
17 [In English] "Simultaneously, with a significant increase of the
18 total number of crimes in our republic in the recent months, an increase
19 was recorded in the number of crimes which, given the targets,
20 implementation methods, extreme brazeness and aggression of the
21 perpetrators, in their entirety represent increased social threat with
22 various dire consequences."
23 Can we see page 3.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. On pages 2 and 3, and this is your report to the all chiefs, and
Page 4808
1 you enumerate on page 2 --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Here's a hard-copy version of the B/C/S, if that's
4 needed by the witness.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if you can carry on with the English
6 translation, I will let the witness take a look in B/C/S, without having
7 to put it on the ELMO. That may be speedier, but I leave it to you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That would be fine.
9 I'm reading in English:
10 [In English] "Below is an outline of only a few examples of such
11 successful operative work done recently. Identification of the
12 perpetrators of aggravated vulgarity committed at the petrol pump in
13 Ripac, near Bihac, when the petrol pump workers were killed.
14 Identification of the mother of a young man, attacked and killed while he
15 was together with his girlfriend in a parked car at the [indiscernible],
16 very short near Tuzla
17 THE INTERPRETER: We do not have the right page in English.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]:
19 [In English] " ... near Bratunac and the identification of its
20 perpetrators. The solving of a multiple crime of violent behaviour,
21 causing public danger, et cetera, in Visegrad, and the taking of legal
22 action against its group of perpetrators."
23 [Interpretation] You see all the things you enumerate; the murder
24 of a JNA officer, a JNA reservists in Banja Luka, and so on and so forth.
25 That's page 3 in English. The entire document is available.
Page 4809
1 Q. Can we see that in this interim report, you also mentioned this
2 example from Visegrad to illustrate the massive incidents of crime? Does
3 this fall within your regular duties?
4 A. Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have, and we will still
6 remain in September, 1D1892.
7 Can the previous document be admitted?
8 JUDGE KWON: This is Mr. Mandic's document?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the last page? Well,
10 that's a document written and signed by Mr. Mandic.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D373, Your Honours.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Tieger.
15 JUDGE KWON: If Mr. Usher could deliver that.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. May I briefly interpret this document? At the top, we see that
18 on the 9th of September, through the Ministry of Information of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina - look at this document - Serbian senior employees of
20 the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina put out a public communique about their
21 discontent, and the irregularities, and cases of unlawful behaviour that
22 have been noticed. Legal provisions are being violated, those that
23 govern the conduct of security services, such as bypassing the deputy
24 minister, the scrapping of the post of the deputy under-secretary for
25 state security, inconsistent and irregular personnel policy wherein
Page 4810
1 Serbian employees are replaced by obedient Serbs, which is particularly
2 grave in the Security Service, the hiring of a large number of persons
3 who have criminal records and who are currently under criminal
4 proceedings, issuing of orders without the knowledge of the minister or
5 his deputy, the creation of an anti-army atmosphere as reflected in the
6 written order of the MUP, for the police to be involved in taking over
7 the military records from the JNA, and issuing official IDs to people who
8 are not employed by the MUP.
9 Is this an authentic communique, press release, made by Serbs in
10 the senior posts of the joint police force?
11 A. Yes. While I was at the head of this collegium, we made this
12 public, all these illegal actions and irregularities.
13 Q. Let me ask you: You resorted to this move after writing to the
14 Presidency, the minister, the Defence Ministry of Yugoslavia, et cetera.
15 You resorted to making public all the information about irregularities
16 and unlawful conduct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you follow the press? Do you know that two Sharia policemen
19 were caught these days in Sarajevo
20 installations and facilities?
21 A. I read about this terrorist act in Bugojno involving the murder
22 of some policemen. I didn't read about what you're saying.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll bring a document showing what
24 the president of the Ministerial Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina stated
25 about this, and this is how far things went -- have gone since 1991.
Page 4811
1 Can this document be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to, we'll mark it for
3 identification.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01362, please. I believe we've
6 seen this document before.
7 This an audio-recording of the session of the Presidency of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prime minister with the highest-ranking
9 personnel of the Defence Secretariat of Yugoslavia and the General Staff
10 of the JNA, including Kadijevic and all the other personalities.
11 On page 5 -- can we see a passage on page 5. I will try to
12 summarise this.
13 There was one person here, Mr. Donia, who said that the presence
14 of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina resulted in rising tensions. However,
15 here Alija Izetbegovic says that they will try hard to avoid any problems
16 that the army had in Croatia
17 the presence of a large number of illegally-armed people.
18 Now, can we see page 42. This one is marked "35." We need
19 page 42.
20 This is page 42. This is what Mrs. Plavsic says. She complains
21 about big problems, and she says:
22 "You have heard about some of these problems, but I believe we
23 have to go to the very sources, and don't be afraid that I'll be talking
24 for a long time when I say, 'Go back to the source.' The source of
25 everything is that the highest state organs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Page 4812
1 circumventing, to put it mildly, federal provisions, especially federal
2 provisions concerning the JNA."
3 And this is a very good reading, these minutes.
4 We need the next page, 43.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you recall that the Federal Secretariat of Defence and the
7 General Staff attended this meeting in Sarajevo?
8 A. I know they came for a visit. I don't know exactly when, but it
9 was in the autumn of 1991, Mr. President, to be briefed at the Ministry
10 of Police.
11 Q. It says here:
12 "Concerning the Crisis Staff," Mrs. Plavsic talking. This is the
13 15th of October, after the enactment of the illegal decision on
14 independence. They receive General Kadijevic and his associates from the
15 General Staff. And she says:
16 "As far as the Crisis Staff is concerned, on which I used to be,"
17 it was formed by the Presidency, "as far as the Crisis Staff is
18 concerned, the one on which I used to be at the beginning and that had
19 been created by the Presidency, with the idea that the Crisis Staff
20 should deal with the problem of refugees that we have in this republic,
21 and trying to create a more or less normal life for them, and providing
22 for the good functioning of roads, the Crisis Staff," and I believe also
23 General Vukosavljevic realised this, "the Crisis Staff of the Presidency
24 assumed also certain powers that rightfully belonged to the Council for
25 National Defence. And when I realised that the Crisis Staff was
Page 4813
1 discussing these problems, I resigned from it. The Crisis Staff should
2 really deal with the problems that are outside of the field of work of a
3 federal institution called the JNA."
4 Now we need page 44.
5 Question to you, Minister. Were you aware that Mrs. Plavsic had
6 resigned from the Crisis Staff because she objected to its conduct? It
7 was a crisis staff originally created by the Presidency?
8 A. I believe she also froze her membership in the Presidency.
9 Q. On page 44, this is Mr. Izetbegovic talking. He's not best
10 pleased, but Mrs. Plavsic said what she said, and he says:
11 "We are fully aware that by proclaiming the independence and
12 neutrality of BH, we maybe violated some laws, but there are laws and
13 laws. We are also aware that there are certain things that could be
14 violations of federal legislation."
15 Was the Presidency able to see, from your writings, that these
16 laws were being breached?
17 A. If you mean the dispatch that has been admitted, yes, I did state
18 everything very clearly.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think we need not quote any more
20 from this document. This is from the Council of National Security. It
21 may have been tendered before, but I don't know if it has been admitted
22 or marked.
23 JUDGE KWON: You refer to this document as Presidency sessions?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: I am not sure what the status of this document is,
Page 4814
1 but I remember, having heard once from Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, that she would
2 check into the matter of whether the Prosecution has it in the house, and
3 also afterwards Ms. Edgerton reported there was none. When this was put
4 to Mr. Donia, he raised the question why he should be shown this excerpt,
5 while there should be a more authentic document, but I don't think the
6 Prosecution has the entire Presidency minutes or something like that.
7 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I think that's an accurate recollection and
8 recounting of the information available about this document thus far and
9 the discussions that took place about it.
10 JUDGE KWON: So shall we mark this for identification, pending
11 translation, Mr. Tieger?
12 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. And in addition, we will -- I
13 mean, once translated, of course, we want to look at the extent to which
14 it appears to be intact, excerpted, and that -- the source of the
15 extraction of whatever excerpts might exist. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Give me a minute.
17 So shall we -- with that caveat, we'll mark it for
18 identification.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I don't think
21 these are excerpts. It's the entire transcript of that meeting, which
22 was extremely important, because the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
23 and the Defence Ministry came to that meeting with the Presidency of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But we are at your disposal for any check you wish
25 to run. It's a very well-known meeting.
Page 4815
1 1D41, please. We'll deal with it very briefly.
2 This is 10 days before that meeting. Mrs. Plavsic addressed the
3 public by speaking to this newspaper, "Politika," of the 4th of October.
4 She repeated everything she had said to Izetbegovic. She says: "Imagine
5 this situation."
6 "Imagine -- can you imagine this situation? The National Defence
7 Council is not functioning. The Crisis Staff has taken it all over."
8 And a bit below, she says that:
9 "It was left to a basically informal group to deal with major
10 problems. The SDA believed that the Crisis Staff had been created in
11 order to bypass the Serbian representatives, Mrs. Plavsic and
12 Mr. Koljevic, in major decision-making."
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Is that correct? Do you agree with this judgement by the Serbian
15 members of the Presidency?
16 A. Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can this be admitted? Just for the record, the title is "The BH
19 Crisis Staff Meddling in Other People's Affairs":
20 "Dr. Biljana Plavsic does not wish to participate in the work of
21 the Crisis Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and so on.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll mark it for identification.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
Page 4816
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 65 ter 30341, please. It is quite possible that it has already
3 been admitted into evidence as a P document. Am I right? Has this been
4 tendered already by the OTP? No? All right.
5 So we have identified it. It is our conversation -- it's a
6 conversation between you and me on the 13th of October, two days before
7 that well-known Assembly session when the Muslims and Croats passed the
8 declaration on sovereignty.
9 Can we have a look at the second page, please, both in Serbian
10 and in English.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. In the meantime, let me ask you, Mr. Mandic: As a lawyer, do you
13 agree that the Constitution can be amended only as envisaged in the
14 Constitution, itself, in a constitutional manner?
15 A. Of course.
16 Q. Do you agree that in all our Constitutions, in order to amend the
17 Constitution, a two-thirds majority was required, at a minimum, in the
18 Assembly?
19 A. Yes. That's what the Constitution says.
20 Q. Thank you. Could I please ask you to read this:
21 "No, no, that is, I mean ..."
22 That part.
23 A. Radovan: "No, no, well -- I mean, there is chaos. Besides, he's
24 trying something there now, but he will not tell me that they are
25 preparing a transfer for Draskovic, and we had agreed previously that
Page 4817
1 there would be no chance of a transfer of any Serb without the consent
2 of ..."
3 Momo: "Mr. President, that is not all right. Cedo Kljajic will
4 go to the Police Department, and he will be replaced by that person for
5 public, for this ... that's okay, President."
6 Karadzic, Radovan: "Wait. That cannot be done without our
7 agreement and our consent. That is unacceptable as a method, and
8 tomorrow members of Parliament will ask me for answers concerning this
9 situation. This is intolerable, simply intolerable, to have any
10 personnel changes take place without our knowledge and our consent,
11 because that is a mechanism which they used to manipulate us, and Serb
12 members of Parliament are fed up with all these attempts to proclaim
13 independence. Alija Izetbegovic admitted to us ..."
14 Q. Momo says: "I heard."
15 And I go on: "... that this sovereignty means independence."
16 Do you agree that this is nine and a half months -- almost 10
17 months from the time when the coalition government was established?
18 Nevertheless, there was no implementation of the electoral results and
19 the inter-party agreement, and it has to do with important, sensitive
20 positions in the police that they are illegally being -- that they are
21 illegally turning into a party army?
22 A. Yes.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Could this be admitted?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
Page 4818
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D377, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 1D2026, please, could we have that now.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] This is one of your documents
5 again, Mr. Minister, 1D2026.
6 Does the OTP have this in Serbian? Well, probably.
7 MR. TIEGER: Almost, by definition, in light of the nature of the
8 document.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It has an ERN number.
10 In the meantime, let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be lowered a bit so that
12 we identify a translation mistake? No, no, actually, we'd like to have
13 the beginning of the page. We'd like to have a look at the heading.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Minister, do you agree that "SR BH," on the 28th of December,
16 does not mean the Serbian Republic
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. Yes, yes, mistranslation, Your Honour. Socialist Republic
19 Serbian Republic
20 Q. Just so we know. It's a tiny mistake, but it may be important.
21 You are sending this to all security service centres, public security
22 stations, and the Sarajevo MUP. It has a position that is a bit
23 different; right? So you say that --
24 A. I do apologise. May I have the B/C/S? Can I have a copy from
25 Mr. Tieger so that I can follow?
Page 4819
1 JUDGE KWON: It's coming. You're hearing the printer working.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Let me just have a look, and I'm going to return it intact.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Please look at it. I'm going to read it out in the English
6 language:
7 [In English] "Number 02/0-12248 of 19th of December, 1992 [sic],
8 and dispatch number 08/4-2687 of 27th of December, 1991.
9 "In our dispatches numbered and dated as above, we informed you
10 that the minister of the interior had issued an order prohibiting MUP
11 managerial or supervisory officers from signing formal decisions
12 pertaining to employment issued [sic] (admission, posting, retirement,
13 and so on), and ordered the reconsideration of all formal decisions
14 issued in this sphere since September the 1st, 1991, and at the same time
15 halted all payments based on these decisions. The minister of the
16 interior also ordered that all measures be taken to call to account any
17 officers who violated this order."
18 [Interpretation] A bit further down:
19 [In English] "Any action aimed at implementing these decisions
20 constitutes a criminal offence."
21 [Interpretation] Page 2 now:
22 [In English] "... constitutes a criminal offence."
23 [Interpretation] In the beginning, it says:
24 [In English] "... and Assistant Minister Mirsad Srebrenkovic are
25 taking measures contrary to the order of the minister and are also
Page 4820
1 instigating others to commit unlawful acts."
2 [Interpretation] And now some articles were violated:
3 [In English] "The deputy minister shall render decisions on the
4 rights, duties, and responsibilities of employees of O -- Ministry of the
5 Interior. Accordingly, the minister and the legal rights -- has the
6 legal rights to render decisions on employment rights, including by means
7 of an order, which in this case shall have the force of a regulation and
8 not an administrative enactment, and which shall be applicable generally
9 for all employees in the MUP."
10 [Interpretation] Can you tell us, what compelled you to send
11 this? This was sent on what occasion?
12 A. When Mr. Mirsad Srebrenkovic was appointed instead of
13 Hilmo Selimovic as minister of personal affairs - that is what I talked
14 about before the break, that this was a religious teacher from the Zagreb
15 mosque - the man created chaos in personnel affairs in the police. At
16 meetings of the professional collegium attended by the minister, we said
17 what was going on. And when Mr. Delimustafic, the minister, realised
18 that the man had made hundreds and even thousands of decisions that were
19 unlawful concerning individuals that I already spoken of, not to repeat
20 myself, he issued an order to annul all of those decisions that were
21 illegal or unlawful. The assistant minister spoke against his own
22 compatriot. He said that the minister's order is wrong and that he was
23 right in the first place, and that all these persons who are unlawfully
24 employed could remain within the police force.
25 Q. Are you trying to say that this Mr. Srebrenkovic derogated the
Page 4821
1 minister's order; right?
2 A. Precisely, that's what I was trying to explain, that he opposed
3 the dispatch sent by the minister, and he said that the minister was not
4 right. He said that he was right.
5 Q. And thousands of these unlawfully-admitted policemen stayed on
6 with their weapons, IDs, and powers?
7 A. My interpretation of it is that in the leadership of the SDA, it
8 was this right-wing fundamentalist wing that prevailed, and they annulled
9 the decision of the minister, who was an ethnic Muslim and who realised
10 how terribly unlawful the personnel policy in the police force was. He
11 publicly opposed his superior officer, and all of us present here know
12 what subordination means in the Ministry of Police, where the number-one
13 man is an institution, per se, with a wide spectrum of powers.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Can this be admitted?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D378, Your Honour.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume that the
19 Translation Service is going to change this mistranslation of the
20 document.
21 1D2895, could we have that document, please.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I return this to
23 Mr. Tieger?
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 4822
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1895, that is another document of
2 yours dated the 9th of January, 1992. It is sent to the Federal
3 Secretariat of National Defence. We can't see it yet. It's also sent to
4 the General Staff and to General Veselinovic, the head of the Military
5 Secret Service or, rather, the Military Intelligence Service, then the
6 Federal Secretariat of the Interior, to the president of the Presidency
7 of Bosnia
8 read it out. We can see all the addressees here.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You call this document "Obavijest," "Notification." Could you
11 please read the first paragraph? Could I please ask you to read the
12 first paragraph?
13 A. Yes, yes.
14 "Subject: Notification.
15 "Recently, on several occasions, I have pointed to the overtly
16 partisan conduct of the former assistant for the police and now adviser
17 to the minister of the interior, Mr. Avdo Hebib, whose conduct causes
18 ethnic -- inter-ethnic hatred and distrust throughout the republic,
19 thereby threatening peace in the republic."
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't have to read all of it.
21 Could we have the next page in Serbian?
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Could I ask you to tell us a bit more about what it was that
24 compelled you to send this notification, which is rather alarming and
25 dramatic, to all of these addressees?
Page 4823
1 A. Well, Mr. Avdo Hebib, when the multi-ethnic or multi-party MUP
2 was being established, he was -- he held the post of assistant minister.
3 That was very important. It concerned 10.000 policemen in uniform.
4 There was a change, and he became an adviser. However, he started
5 operating in a partisan fashion in the police, and he started arming the
6 reserve police force, and, against the law and against the staffing
7 system, he started handing out weapons without the knowledge of the
8 police and without the knowledge of persons who were in charge of that
9 particular matter.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in
11 English so that the participants can follow all of this.
12 The transcript does not reflect that at first he was assistant
13 minister for the police; that is to say, that he was the main person as
14 far as the police was concerned. After the minister, he was the first
15 person.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's what I said.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Please go on.
19 A. Mr. Avdo Hebib is a psychologist by training. In the socialist
20 system, he worked in the infirmary of the Republican Ministry of the
21 Interior. The authorities expelled him then, because when he tested Serb
22 candidates, he did not give them positive evaluation. He eliminated them
23 in that way, and he prevented them from joining the police force.
24 At one point in time, Dusko Zgonjanin, the Republican chief of
25 police suspended him and expelled him. When Veljko Kadijevic resigned as
Page 4824
1 commander-in-chief of the Army of Yugoslavia, and when Blagoje Adzic
2 replaced him, he called up the entire reserve police force in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in Sarajevo, although he was just an
4 adviser then. He did that along political party lines. I know what the
5 reason was for him to do that, but I believe that it is not relevant to
6 these proceedings. If you suggest, I may tell the Trial Chamber.
7 Q. That number, those thousands of military conscripts, undeployed
8 military conscripts that the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 unlawfully transferring to the police, that is to say, they were stealing
10 them away from the JNA and transferring them to the police, were they
11 supposed to be re-subordinated to Avdo Hebib?
12 A. Avdo Hebib was creating a parallel armed force in the police.
13 Q. From the police and from the reservists that were being
14 re-subordinated to the police?
15 A. Yes, the reservists also, the police in general, and everybody
16 that had served their military service, those who were reservists in the
17 army and were of Muslim ethnicity.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 I move to tender this.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D379, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Can we have 65 ter 5842.
24 While we wait, let me tell you we shall see on the cover page
25 this is the "Official Gazette" of the Serbian people in
Page 4825
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 1, issued on the 15th of January, 1992, and it
2 contains decisions. On the first page, it is the decision of the
3 establishment of the Assembly of the Serbian People, as well as the first
4 documents that the Assembly of the Serbian People adopted.
5 Can we now have 324007324. That is the ERN number. That is the
6 penultimate page -- actually, two pages from the end of the Serbian
7 version. Please scroll up in the Serbian version so that we can see the
8 ERN number.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I know that you did not deal in politics much, but do you
11 remember that at the political level, parallel with what was happening
12 criminally in the state organs, primarily in the MUP, do you recall that
13 on the political plane the Serbian side demanded that the illegal
14 decisions be rescinded, and after a couple of days it made its own moves,
15 establishing the Assembly first and subsequently the Republika Srpska,
16 et cetera? Do you see that this is a decision on the establishment of
17 the Ministerial Council of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia
18 and Herzegovina
19 JUDGE KWON: At what page should we look to in English; 23?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not have it in English.
21 Ministerial Council, but the previous one in English. No, in fact, it is
22 okay. Actually, can we see the next page -- or, rather, let's have this
23 one.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you see, Mr. Minister, that this is a decision -- a published
Page 4826
1 decision on the establishment and election of the Ministerial Council of
2 the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and can you
3 see that Dr. Miodrag Simovic was elected its president and that the
4 members listed here are, in fact, representatives of the Serbian people
5 in the joint government?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Do you remember that all of these actions of ours had been
8 provoked by the unlawful behaviour of the Croat-Muslim coalition and that
9 we always gave them some 10 or 15 days to re-institute legality and
10 constitutionality?
11 A. Could you please rephrase your question? I'm not quite clear on
12 what you are asking.
13 Q. On the 14th and the 15th, we had a Joint Assembly session. We
14 vetoed the adoption of the memorandum or declaration of independence, but
15 they disregarded our veto. We walked out, and they took that decision.
16 We asked, publicly and officially, for them to annul that decision, and
17 then on the 24th of October we established the Assembly of the Serbian
18 People; is that right?
19 A. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. President, at that time there
20 were frequently instances of out-voting by the majority of the MPs in the
21 Joint Assembly as well as by members of the Cabinet in the government.
22 So after this, the decision was taken to establish a Serbian assembly and
23 to form a ministerial council comprising personnel from the joint
24 government that had been functioning in Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 Q. Do you agree that that was a direct response to the violation of
Page 4827
1 our constitutional rights?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you see -- or, rather, do you agree with me that
4 the Serbs, both MPs and Cabinet members, continued to work in joint
5 organs and that this was a preparation -- or, rather, a response to the
6 unlawfulness that obtained, and that the Ministerial Council comprised
7 people who were in the Cabinet anyway?
8 A. In the decision to set up the Assembly of the Serbian People, it
9 is stated that all the MPs will remain working in the Joint Assembly of
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 3 in the Serbian
12 version.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you see, in the bottom left corner:
15 "Decision on the status of officials, leadership, workers,
16 officials, and other officials in republican state organs, where it is
17 confirmed that they will remain in --"
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. So that we can follow as well in
19 English, probably page 6 in English.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, that is it.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. So it is stated there that these organs -- or, rather, these
23 people who form these organs shall continue to work normally, and these
24 organs shall remain as a correctional agent of the unlawfulness that
25 obtained?
Page 4828
1 A. This is a decision -- about a decision of the Assembly of the
2 Serbian people that all the MPs should remain working in the
3 Joint Assembly, all the government members in the joint government, and
4 other officials in the other joint bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina
5 That was an Assembly decision, and this is the decision.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 32400 --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, sorry. Could the speaker please repeat
8 the number. That was too fast.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat the number again.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] ERN number in the Serbian
11 0044-7324. And if I can be of assistance, it says:
12 "Decision on the establishment and election of the Ministerial
13 Council of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina
14 On the top, it says "page 10," if that is of any help, "page 10,"
15 in the Serbian variant. That is 4. We need page 10. Where it says
16 "page 4" in the heading, it should be page 10 in the Serbian version.
17 Thank you, that's it.
18 Now, if you can find the appropriate page, the corresponding page
19 in English.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Do you agree that inter alia, Mr. Vito Zepinic also accepted to
22 be the minister of the interior in the Ministerial Council? That will be
23 the next column in this page. You can see it now?
24 JUDGE KWON: 24 in English.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that Vitomir Zepinic was the
Page 4829
1 first Serbian minister for the police.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 May this be admitted?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it has been admitted as
5 Exhibit D296.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. It has been admitted.
7 Can we now see -- we are already into 1992, Mr. Minister. I'm
8 not asking you many questions about the political subjects and
9 developments.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you recall that the Assembly sessions of the Assembly of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina were transmitted live on Bosnian-Herzegovinian TV?
13 A. Yes, and that was customary at the time.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 65 ter 00377.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you remember that in Zenica -- I saw this in "Oslobodjenje"
17 the end of February. Slobodanka Hrvacanin was protesting because a Serb
18 had never been appointed to his proper place which rightly belonged to
19 him in the MUP. So this was some 14 or 15 months after the setting up of
20 the government. Do you recall that?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Here, we have a letter by the Serbian Democratic Party. It has a
23 number, it bears a date. It says here -- or, rather, can you read this
24 first part?
25 A. "Personnel Matters"? That:
Page 4830
1 "1. All decisions on the employment of about 1.400 people in the
2 MUP of the SR BH who are not within the staffing scheme plan are to be
3 annulled." Secondly: "All managers, managerial and other staff who do
4 not meet the requirements of the Law on Government and the Rules on
5 Internal Structure and Staffing Scheme in the MUP or the SR BH are to be
6 relieved of their duties (i.e., those who do not have appropriate
7 degrees, who have a criminal record, et cetera. )
8 "3. A citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Muslim nationality is
9 to be appointed deputy minister of the interior for personnel. During
10 his appointment, the legal procedure is to be respected, consent of the
11 governing parties."
12 Q. Thank you. Was this item adopted because this Srebrenkovic was a
13 Muslim but not a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
14 A. He was not a national of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a citizen. He was a
15 citizen of Croatia
16 Q. Thank you. Can you read on until point 4?
17 A. "Personnel of Serbian ethnicity are to be appointed to posts that
18 belong to them (chiefs of public security in Zenica, Livno, and Mostar,
19 commanders in Visegrad, Bratunac, Srebrenica, Stari Grad,
20 Bosanski Petrovac, and Breza, chief of traffic police in Jajce,
21 et cetera.)"
22 Q. Does this mean that 14 months after the establishment of the
23 joint government, the Serbs did not get any influential offices and a
24 fair share in the police in the majority of the Bosnian municipalities in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina?
Page 4831
1 A. Yes. For instance, in the Stari Grad municipality, which is at
2 the very heart of Sarajevo
3 commander of the police force appointed of Serbian ethnicity.
4 Q. Once we had occasion to see here that there were a couple of
5 these municipalities, for instance, the number of Serbs in Sokolac would
6 be managed by a like number of Muslims in Pale, and we had this system
7 you should employ a like number of our people or we shall have your
8 people dismissed?
9 A. My personal experience was a clash with Malko Koroman from the
10 Pale municipality, also a municipality in the city, because these people
11 in Pale would not appoint a Muslim as commander of the police, because in
12 the adjacent -- the adjacent Stari Grad municipality wouldn't do so for
13 or with a Serb. It was an eye for an eye, quid pro quo, and in fact I
14 and Malko Koroman had a falling-out because I asked him -- Malko Koroman,
15 and I ordered him, actually, that he should not be looking to others who
16 were acting in contravention of the law and in contravention of the
17 inter-party agreement, but that he should take proper action,
18 nevertheless.
19 Q. But it is out of doubt that this -- out of doubt that this is
20 associated with a reciprocal treatment in the adjacent Stari Grad
21 municipality?
22 A. Yes. I tried to point out to him that he should not look to the
23 other municipality to see what they are doing, but that he, himself, had
24 to abide by the law. But I couldn't persuade Mr. Koroman that that was a
25 proper course of action.
Page 4832
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Could we have the next page, please, in both languages.
3 "Organisational Matters." Can we see the next page in English.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Could you please read out these two paragraphs?
6 A. "Organisational matters."
7 "1. The Security Services Centre to be set up in Trebinje
8 urgently.
9 "2. The State Security Sector of the CSB in Sarajevo
10 brought up to strength, and the legality of the operation of this sector
11 is to be examined, especially the illegal use of the methods of equipment
12 of this service against officials of Serb ethnicity (secret surveillance,
13 wire-tapping, photographing and search of apartments and official
14 premises). In view of this, we demand that Munir Alibabic, Sarajevo
15 State Security Sector head, be removed from office for putting this
16 service at the disposal of the SDA."
17 Q. The next one?
18 A. Roman numeral III
19 "I hereby authorise and order Mr. Momcilo Mandic, assistant in
20 the MUP of BH, to participate in solving personnel and organisational
21 matters in the MUP of BH on behalf of the Serbian Democratic Party."
22 Q. Can we now see page 1? Do you agree, Minister, that on the 1st
23 and 2nd of March, barricades were put up, and we'll be discussing it in
24 your examination, you gave a series of interviews, one of which deserves
25 our attention?
Page 4833
1 A. This letter is dated 6 February. It's the culmination of rifts
2 and disagreements in the Ministry of Police.
3 Q. Now, read the passage before "Personnel Matters." I wrote this
4 on the basis of what?
5 A. On the 6th of February:
6 "Pursuant to the conclusions adopted by the Presidency of the
7 Socialist Republic
8 relating to the necessary personnel and organisational changes in the
9 MUP, we demand:"
10 Q. Do you agree that the proper date is 6 March, not 6 February?
11 A. Yes. This must be a typo.
12 Q. Do you remember that on the 2nd of February, Mr. Dukic attended
13 this session of the Presidency, where his demands were accepted; namely,
14 to disband the Crisis Staff, to implement the inter-party agreements, and
15 that happened on the 2nd of March? 1st March, barricades; 2nd March,
16 barricades torn down, and Dukic attended this session of the Presidency
17 which accepted the demands of the Serbian Democratic Party to correct --
18 to redress the irregularities that led to the erection of barricades?
19 A. If I remember well, the immediate reason for putting up the
20 barricades was the killing of that member of the Serbian wedding party in
21 Bascarsija, and that happened on the 29th of February. I remember that
22 well because it was a leap year. You were travelling somewhere in
23 Europe
24 Q. If you call Belgrade Europe, then I was.
25 A. Well, that's to the best of my recollection, whereas Rajko Dukic
Page 4834
1 had taken over -- in fact, the staff, headed by Muhamed Cengic, deputy
2 prime minister, negotiated, of course, with great assistance from the
3 Serbian members of the Ministry of Police, trying to preserve safety and
4 prevent incidents when armed masses take to the streets.
5 Q. Do you agree that it was on the basis of these conclusions of
6 that session of the Presidency that I sent out this letter, asking that
7 qualified people, including you and others who were not SDS members,
8 asking that the inter-party agreement be implemented and that all
9 irregularities in the joint MUP be stopped?
10 A. Yes, that was one of -- a series of efforts to ensure legality in
11 the work of the police. And I believe that the Presidency, headed by
12 Mr. Izetbegovic, had embraced all these positions.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted before the
14 break, with the proviso that the actual date is the 6th of March, because
15 it refers to events from the 2nd of March?
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. This will be admitted. But it just
17 disappeared from the transcript. What was the date on which Mr. Dukic
18 attended this session of Presidency? Line 5 of the previous page, you
19 asked about on 2nd of --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it was on the 2nd of March,
21 1992.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 The exhibit number will be ...?
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit D380.
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for half --
Page 4835
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may add, that will be a
2 separate point. This is a very important meeting, and I will lead
3 evidence about that.
4 --- Recess taken at 12.06 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Has this document been admitted? I think it has.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask for 65 ter 30593. I
11 believe the Prosecution also has the translation. Yes, we have a
12 translation.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Now, Minister, you see this is the 10th of February. I'm talking
15 to Mr. Zepinic, Dr. Zepinic, as my secretary calls him. Can you read the
16 words: "Aha, Vito," please?
17 A. "Aha, Vito, please. With us, we are suffering the consequences
18 now in Bratunac of not having appointed a Serb as militia commander, over
19 there they are establishing the border-line facing Serbia and setting
20 barricades up."
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in
22 English -- in Serbian.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Read this part where they talk about a barrier, setting up a
25 barrier, somewhere in the middle.
Page 4836
1 A. Karadzic speaking:
2 "They're creating barriers, not letting Serbs from Serbia
3 in. They don't let anyone get out. That bridge is in the Serbian part
4 of the centre. I'll call now."
5 Karadzic says: "It's in the Serbian part of down-town. We are
6 insisting, anyway, that Bratunac be --"
7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not find this passage.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
9 Q. Do you agree that beginning with Ottoman times, there was always
10 a Serbian neighbourhood down-town and a Muslim neighbourhood down-town,
11 and they were like two separate areas?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you remember that the Serbian one was called Taslihan, and
14 there was a cafe called Europa?
15 A. Yes, I learned that.
16 Q. And where the church was and the brewery that was called
17 Latinluk?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And the Turkish area of down-town was called Bascarsija, which is
20 a Turkish name?
21 A. Right.
22 Q. And in Brco, to this day there is a Serbian down-town, and when
23 the Ottoman Turks invaded, that remained intact, whereas the other
24 neighbourhoods were given different names?
25 A. Well, we were under Ottoman rule for 500 years, and that area was
Page 4837
1 mostly inhabited by Serbs. The centers of various places were divided
2 into Serbian and Turkish areas.
3 Q. The municipality called Centar, has this Serbian neighbourhood,
4 all the way up to Kosevo, the Old Town
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And Stari Grad also has this old town inhabited by Serbs?
7 A. Well, in Sarajevo
8 Turks, before them, were tradesmen, and they held the center of populated
9 areas, whereas the Serbs were on the periphery.
10 Q. You mean the Serbs that did not convert to Islam, because the
11 Muslims are mostly Serbs who converted to Islam; you know that?
12 A. Well, I learnt about it.
13 Q. Now let us explain to the Trial Chamber what we really meant when
14 we referred to Serbian municipalities. Do you remember that because of
15 all these problems in the functioning of the political system, we
16 proposed, and the proposal was accepted by the other two sides in the
17 negotiations, and agreements had been reached, in all places where it was
18 not possible to do otherwise, the municipalities would be divided into
19 Serbian areas; the Serbian center and the Serbian villages in the
20 municipality would be a Serbian municipality, whereas the Muslim centers
21 and the Muslim villages would be the Muslim municipality?
22 A. Was that during the Lisbon
23 Q. The Lisbon Conference was still ongoing.
24 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.
25 Q. Do you agree that at that time, it was not a condition or a
Page 4838
1 requirement to ensure territorial continuity?
2 A. I do.
3 Q. And it was envisaged that in all places where one community had a
4 number of 20.000 or 30.000, the members, they were allowed to create
5 their own canton or their own municipality?
6 A. I can't say positively, but I know negotiations were going on at
7 the Lisbon Conference, and that was dealt with in the Lisbon Agreement,
8 but I don't know the details.
9 Q. But this concept of dividing an existing municipality into two or
10 three different municipalities is familiar to you?
11 A. Yes, I know that it was suggested.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document MFI'd?
13 JUDGE KWON: Just in case, Mr. Mandic, do you recognise -- no,
14 you haven't heard this tape. Very well. We'll mark it for
15 identification.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's necessary to identify the
18 voice of Mr. Zepinic, we can do that. But since this is only to be
19 MFI
20 Now, 65 ter 05413. I believe that was tendered by the
21 Prosecution, it has been admitted. Is it right that this is a P exhibit
22 now?
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit P1083.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 4839
1 Q. Minister, this is already 11 February 1992, 14 months -- rather,
2 16 months after the elections, and 14 months after the creation of the
3 first joint democratic government in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And instead of
4 getting solved, problems only multiplied; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Is this meeting, in fact, the result of these multiplying
7 problems that had come to completely paralyse the state machinery and
8 legal conduct in Bosnia
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Where was this meeting held?
11 A. In the Banja Luka, at the Bosna Hotel, at the hotel's restaurant.
12 Q. So it was not a secret location?
13 A. We were served by waiters of all ethnicities. You know that
14 Bosnia
15 secrets. And as I confirmed in the Stanisic/Zupljanin case, when asked
16 by Ms. Korner, the minister of the police was notified of this meeting
17 and these minutes, among other people, of course.
18 Q. Since you discussed part of this document with Mr. Tieger, I'd
19 like to draw your attention to something Mr. Stanisic said. The passage
20 begins with "the SR BH MUP."
21 A. "The SR BH MUP is being divided by the Muslims, not the Serbs,
22 contrary to what the public is being told. Since the SDA Party, for
23 example, there are 1.000 men in the Stari Grad police reserve, of whom
24 only about 30 are Serbs, and these barely have uniforms, in contrast to
25 the others who are armed with the most modern weapons."
Page 4840
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in
2 Serbian, and let the English page remain.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, Minister, who convened this meeting?
5 A. I did.
6 Q. Apart from Mr. Zepinic, who nobody had any confidence in anymore,
7 was this meeting attended by all the senior Serbs in the police?
8 A. All Serbs, both in the Public Security and in the State Security
9 Sector, although truth to tell, not all the Serbs who were supposed to be
10 appointed to the State Security Sector had been appointed. There were
11 few Serbs in the State Security.
12 Q. Do you mean to say they were not appointed because of that
13 sabotage against the appointment of Serbs to the positions due to them?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Were any of these people members of the Serbian Democratic Party?
16 A. As far as I know, none of those present was a member of the SDS,
17 and they were mainly people with long years of service on the police
18 force.
19 Q. You mean to say they worked in the police even under the previous
20 system, but they were so loyal that they continued in the police in the
21 Serbian republic later?
22 A. Yes, they were career policemen, people who graduated majoring in
23 humanities or had degrees in law and who were dedicated to their jobs.
24 Q. I meant to ask: Did they work also under the one-party system
25 before?
Page 4841
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. But nobody could say that they were ideological zealots; they
3 were men of their own trade, professionals?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And that was the basis for keeping them on the police force,
6 because the SDS
7 transforming them into party-run services?
8 A. Under the Law on State Administration prevailing in 1992, people
9 employed in state administration and the judiciary were not politically
10 active and did not have any party affiliation.
11 Q. How did you come to convene this meeting? Whose idea was it?
12 A. Well, you can summarise all the evidence I gave today about these
13 problems that cropped up. It was mainly calls from police chiefs on
14 local level. They experienced a lot of problems, and they called for an
15 effort to solve them, to deal with them. And that's how this meeting was
16 organised. I invited all the experienced staff from the lines -- ranks
17 of Serbs.
18 Q. You mean to say that you were exploring every possibility to
19 restore legal and lawful and regular conduct in the joint police, and all
20 these efforts had come to not before you convened this meeting?
21 A. Yes. I think it's obvious, Mr. President.
22 Q. You discussed this with Mr. Tieger, but I just want to say that
23 at the bottom of the page, Cedo Kljajic says that Senad Rekic and
24 Avdo Hebib are circumventing him and going on field missions without his
25 knowledge, et cetera.
Page 4842
1 Next page, please.
2 Kljajic says:
3 "We Serbs are the only ones who are operating lawfully, as
4 opposed to the HDZ and the SDA. How else would it be possible to buy
5 several thousand Motorolas without any one of them having been stored in
6 the MUP depot? I categorically state that the SDA and the SDS cannot
7 work in the same MUP, and if Nenad Radovic's proposal is not implemented
8 within seven days, I will resign."
9 And so forth and so on.
10 Andrija Bjelosevic says one of the police stations in the Doboj
11 CSB
12 "Since a truck with the weapons for the SDA has been seized in
13 retaliation for that, the MUP had not been sending us weapons at all, but
14 only sending weapons to police stations where Muslims live. We have also
15 received complaints against Deputy Minister Vitomir Zepinic who signs
16 decisions on the informant of Muslims in Doboj but will not sign for
17 Serbs."
18 I do apologise to the interpreters, but I hope they have this on
19 the screen, the document, that's why I'm rushing this way.
20 Could I have the next page, please.
21 Can you read what Stanko Stojanovic says? "DB Gorazde"; right?
22 He never had any contact with the Serb Democratic Party. Can you read
23 what he says?
24 A. Stanko Stojanovic: "It is my opinion that we are late, in terms
25 of organisation. Gorazde talks to Hebib and Pusin every day, and they
Page 4843
1 get instructions. The SDA has its check-points where they seize goods.
2 Their warehouses are full, and they are announcing that they will blow up
3 the bridges on the Drina River
4 groups which will first attack the Serbian population. Their attack will
5 surprise us unless we organise the Serbian MUP as soon as possible."
6 Q. Do you agree that this is one of the most moderate members of
7 State Security? Ideologically, he is totally uncommitted. He is a pure
8 professional, not any kind of Serb extremist, and do you agree that this
9 assessment of his is a dramatic one?
10 A. Yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move on to the conclusions,
12 page 6 in Serbian. It's probably 5 in English.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. So, Minister, although we are negotiating with Cutileiro at the
15 time, we had not been given approval to establish our own MUP. That was
16 the 22nd of February. Is the a Serbian collegium of the MUP being
17 established here or a Serb MUP? That is point number 1.
18 A. A Serbian collegium is being established here attached to the MUP
19 of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 Q. Thank you. And what was adopted here were 19 conclusions that
21 are supposed to help attain constitutionality and legality in the work of
22 the police in the republic. Also, this is signed.
23 Did you show this to Minister Delimustafic or did someone else
24 familiarise him with it?
25 A. First of all, with regard to this meeting, there was a public
Page 4844
1 invitation, as it were. Of course, I contacted my colleagues every day,
2 ethnic Croats and Muslims. We talked about these problems. I invited
3 Mr. Delimustafic to attend this meeting in Banja Luka, where problems
4 were represented from the local level by Serb officials in certain
5 regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, Delimustafic was either busy
6 or did not want to come. I cannot recall now.
7 When we returned, I reported to him about the meeting and the
8 conclusions, and we agreed to do our very best to prevent a break-up in
9 the MUP. Rather, we should decide what should be done at policy-making
10 level, what the Lisbon Agreement would amount to and negotiations in
11 Sarajevo
12 made by policy-makers.
13 Q. Thank you. This is a document that was admitted as a P document.
14 Minister, if we look at these 19 conclusions, is there anything
15 that is unjustified or illegal?
16 A. I believe that there is no such thing.
17 Q. Did anyone challenge this from the point of view of
18 constitutionality and legality?
19 A. Some people were not interested in this, especially not
20 Assistant Minister Srebrenkovic. They had their own mission, and they
21 were out to accomplish it. So I think that this was a plea that no one
22 responded to.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 10724 now, please.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this has been admitted as
25 Exhibit P1112.
Page 4845
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Q. Minister, is this your telegram that pertains to this meeting?
4 Could you read it out to us or could you tell us what the essence is?
5 A. After this meeting, I returned on the 12th to Sarajevo, probably.
6 I had a meeting with Minister Delimustafic on the 13th. I sent a
7 dispatch, and I said that:
8 "On the basis of the conclusions reached at the meeting in
9 Banja Luka on the 11th of February, 1992, please set up and have a
10 meeting with all senior officials of the MUP of the Socialist Republic
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina in your area and report to me accordingly."
12 That is to say, it was not a secret meeting. After that, I gave
13 this order, or, rather, I asked that all senior personnel be informed
14 about this of all ethnic backgrounds, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, in order
15 to place relations on a sound basis.
16 Q. Thank you. That's precisely what I want to do ask you about. It
17 doesn't say here that Serb representatives should be informed; rather,
18 what it says here is that all senior-level personnel should be informed?
19 A. Mr. President, we just wanted to work in a lawful manner and to
20 observe regulations that were in force, nothing more than that. There
21 was no reason for us to inform some and not others.
22 Q. Thank you. Can we know whether this telegram was sent along
23 regular channels in police communications or were some secret channels
24 reported to?
25 A. Do you see number 02 up here? That is my department. That is
Page 4846
1 the number of my department. And there is the number of the dispatch;
2 that is to say, it is being centre to the Centre of Communications, and
3 the employees who are there are sending it further on to the addressees.
4 Q. Thank you. Since this has already been admitted -- so this was
5 archived; right? It was probably from the archives, isn't it?
6 A. Well, all the mentioned centres received this, and of course it
7 was in MUP headquarters as well, because 02 was my department, and the
8 Police Administration was 01, and so on.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Could we now have 1D1899.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Minister, in English, there is this phrase "kick him up," and
13 I'll tell you what that means. Was this appointment of Mico Stanisic
14 something like that? How do you see it?
15 A. After this meeting, the reaction was that Mico Stanisic, who was
16 until then the chief of the Sarajevo
17 the Sarajevo
18 Office of the Minister of the Interior, an adviser for state security
19 affairs.
20 Q. Could we scroll up a bit?
21 What did that mean? Was this a proper promotion or was this done
22 in order to remove him from Sarajevo
23 A. Up until then, Mico Stanisic was in the town of Sarajevo, itself.
24 He was invited to the minister's office to be an adviser to the minister,
25 or, rather, to Brano Kvesic. Of course, advisers are people who are not
Page 4847
1 in charge of operations, who do not have resources. They have nothing.
2 Instead of him, Kemal Sabovic was appointed. I think he was an ethnic
3 Muslim, as far as I can remember.
4 Q. So this was a position that belonged to the Serbs. So a Serb was
5 ostensibly promoted to a higher post, but instead of him, a non-Serb was
6 appointed to the original position?
7 A. Yes, as far as I can remember.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.
9 This is probably way too fast.
10 Can this be admitted into evidence?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Kemal Sabovic, is that the Muslim in question?
13 A. Yes, to the best of my recollection.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into
15 evidence?
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. I think we have a hard copy --
18 this appears to be a duplicate of 17184. I'm checking it against the
19 screen, and most of what I see appears to match.
20 JUDGE KWON: Could we confirm with the witness?
21 MR. TIEGER: And here's a hard copy of the document as well.
22 JUDGE KWON: Can you put it on the ELMO?
23 Yes, I think the number matches. The date is also consistent.
24 Yes, we'll admit this document.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D382, Your Honours.
Page 4848
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we have 1896, please. Could we have that in e-court.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Minister, do you recall that in the previous document, one of
5 the Serbs mentioned that thousands of Motorolas were purchased and that
6 not a single one of them entered MUP warehouses and storage facilities,
7 or, rather, was not recorded at all?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now we are going to see what happened on the 27th of February,
10 1992. Kemal Sabovic or Kemal Sabovic, who you mentioned, who replaced
11 Mico Stanisic -- did with a number of those Motorolas. Can you read that
12 and explain it to us?
13 A. "Official Note, compiled at the Ministry of the Interior of the
14 SR BH, in connection with taking over hand-held radio sets, Motorola
15 MX-330."
16 "On the 27th of February, 1991, in the Ministry of the Interior
17 of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the presence of
18 Kemal Sabovic, chief of the MUP police, hand-held Motorola radios were
19 handed over, MX-330, to a representative of the Party of Democratic
20 Action, Selver Mahmutovic," and then his ID number and so on and so
21 forth.
22 And then the actual numbers are referred to; that is to say,
23 which hand-held radios, and which type, and so on and so forth.
24 Q. I believe that Motorolas are well known, but would you tell the
25 participants in these proceedings what a Motorola is and what this is all
Page 4849
1 about?
2 A. These are wireless hand-held radios that are used by the police
3 and the military for communication, for wireless communication on special
4 channels.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can this document be admitted into evidence?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D383, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 18927, please. Could we
10 have that now, and we're probably going to need the assistance of the OTP
11 in this respect, or the witness, too, yes, certainly, the witness. The
12 witness will certainly be in a position to tell us what he knows.
13 18267 is the 65 ter number. No, it's not this document.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Do you see here that this is some information that is a state
16 secret, strictly confidential? Can you read this out?
17 A. "State Secret, strictly confidential, filed in three copies.
18 "Information on abuse, illegal action, and manipulation by
19 personnel of the SDA and the HDZ in the State Security Service of the MUP
20 of the SR BH, through personnel policy, new organisation and staffing
21 systems, and the one-sided application of methods, and resources in the
22 work of the service in the interests of the coalition Yoke between the
23 SDA and the HDZ, to the detriment of the Serb people, and the policy of
24 the SDS
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see the bottom
Page 4850
1 of the page? Can we see the time?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "March 1992."
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Is there a translation of this document, by any chance? Can we
5 establish that? No. All right.
6 Can we have the next page, please.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. As far as I can see, you are familiar with the phenomena referred
9 to in this information, and you have talked to us about them already. Do
10 you know about the document, itself?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. Thank you. I should just like us to read some things which are
13 of the essence. For instance, the SDB is the secret police, in current
14 conditions it should have to be equally in the service of the parties in
15 power. However, this service has so far been only serving the SDA and
16 the HDZ for the following reasons:
17 "From the time of the multi-party elections to date, the
18 personnel policy in the State Security Service of the MUP of the SR BH,
19 on behalf of the SDS
20 Hilmo Selimovic, Asim Dautbasic, Munir Alibabic, and Branko Kvesic."
21 Am I right when I say this is the self-same Munir or
22 Munja Alibabic who was prohibited from working in the police for life?
23 A. At the proposal of Ms. Carla Del Ponte, this was issued, this
24 prohibition, by the representative of the OHR in Sarajevo.
25 Q. Is any of these people a Serb?
Page 4851
1 A. No.
2 Q. Thank you. And now they describe here all the things which had
3 been done. The SDS
4 department which objectively were of peripheral importance in relation to
5 the other operational administrations.
6 Then, in the next paragraph, a bit down:
7 "The disobedient Serbs -- scores should be settled with
8 disobedient Serbs (disobedient without choosing the means),
9 Radomir Ninkovic, Dusan Neskovic, Nedjo Vlaski, Zoran Renovica,
10 Tomo Puhalac, and others."
11 What happened to these people? How were scores settled with
12 them?
13 A. They were dismissed from work.
14 Q. Thank you. When drawing up a new organisational layout and
15 staffing scheme of the SDB in March 1991, as Asim Dautbasic,
16 Munir Alibabic, and Branko Kvesic, instead of the office of deputy under
17 secretary for the State Security Service, which according to the
18 inter-party agreement was due to the SDS (pushed through to
19 less-important assistance posts). In this way, the SDS lost man number
20 two in the SDB service. The first one was to be held by a Croat, which
21 was to organise, plan, and co-ordinate all activities of the operational
22 complement of the service."
23 Can I jog your memory or check this: When these officers were
24 being signed, we were told the minister should be a Muslim, but all the
25 operational officers should be -- should go to the others, to the Serbs,
Page 4852
1 and was this the way it was supposed to have been?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Here we see that this operational office, in charge of the
4 operational segment, was to have been through the position of the deputy?
5 A. Yes. As far as the operational activities are concerned in SDB,
6 the post of assistant of deputy is much more important than any other
7 place.
8 Q. Thank you. And they abolished specifically that position so that
9 no Serb would be in that important position?
10 A. Yes. Major Vlaski, to the best of my recollection, was to have
11 been that person. But he never worked anywhere, as far as I can
12 remember.
13 Q. Thank you. Now we have an entire list of instances of abuses
14 from March 1991; namely, two months after the election of the coalition
15 government, machinations had already begun whereby the Serb people were
16 dis-enfranchised, and their power that was due to them was taken away
17 from them in this way; is that right?
18 A. As far as the State Security Service is concerned, never were all
19 the senior posts filled in that service.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to page 3, the
21 third page of this document. It is 7760, the number on the top.
22 This is what it says:
23 "In such a constellation of relations in the State Security
24 Service in the past period, emphasis in the work of the service was
25 placed almost exclusively on operational research and the documenting of
Page 4853
1 activities within the SDS
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Meaning that the entire -- the concern of the SDB was to monitor
4 the activities of the SDS
5 A. To monitor the activities of one of the parties in power, yes.
6 Q. Thank you. And towards the bottom, they say:
7 "From May 1992, the telephone was wire-tapped in the SDS Deputy's
8 Club which was often used by Radovan Karadzic, who they monitored under
9 the pseudonym 'Doctor,' and Vojislav Maksimovic, whose house number was
10 also placed under surveillance."
11 Do you remember that Vojislav Maksimovic initially was a
12 non-party person and the president of the Serbian MPs' caucus, of the
13 Serbian Deputy Club in the Assembly?
14 A. Vojislav Maksimovic is a university professor, and he was the
15 president of the Deputy's Club in the joint Parliament. You liked these
16 professors, President.
17 Q. Yes, that is an objection in keeping with what Bismark had said;
18 12 professors and the fatherland is lost. Bismark did not like them all
19 that much.
20 Mr. Minister, what was necessary for the telephone of the
21 Deputy's Club and the private telephone of the president of the Deputy's
22 Club to be wire-tapped, whether that party be in the opposition or in
23 power?
24 A. I know what is required for approval to wire-tap the telephone of
25 an ordinary citizen. What was required was a decision by the competent
Page 4854
1 judge of the District Court in the area, and he should have committed
2 some crime against -- one of the more serious crimes against the state.
3 At that time, we did not have crimes of terrorism and crimes of
4 the kind that are now happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there were
5 crimes against the state system, against the people and country,
6 et cetera. That was as far as ordinary citizens were concerned. But to
7 listen in on the telephone of an MP or an official in the government, I
8 don't even know there was legal provision for that at all. There was no
9 legal possibility.
10 Q. Would it have been necessary for his immunity to have been
11 waived, lifted, in Assembly?
12 A. Yes, that is another thing. If there was a pre-trial procedure
13 and then a criminal procedure instituted against such a person, and the
14 prosecutor placed such a request before the judge in question, then the
15 Parliament would lift the immunity of the MP in question, or of another
16 official, which I actually tried to explain to Their Honours yesterday.
17 Namely, in the case of the president of the Ilidza municipality, we had a
18 similar situation, and only then can such measures be applied.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Can we now see the next page.
21 Let's see. Here we have the names of all the people they
22 wire-tapped; Koljevic, Krajisnik, Milorad Ekmecic.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you agree that Milorad Ekmecic is one of the most imminent,
25 one of the most prominent historians of the former Yugoslavia and a
Page 4855
1 member of the Academy of Sciences
2 Sciences of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of many academies in the world?
3 A. One of the most imminent historians, not only in the former
4 Yugoslavia
5 Q. Thank you. So they listen in to Mico Stanisic, the president of
6 the Ilijas municipality, the chief of the Nova Sarajevo Public Security
7 Station, and they say:
8 "In addition to the existing listening points, they also set up a
9 new one at Zlatiste --
10 A. Yes, that's on the way to Trebevic.
11 Q. -- where only Muslim activists of the SDA work,
12 Behmen Arnautovic, Skalonja, and others. All the material from these
13 check-points and written materials are directly brought to Munir Alibabic
14 and, through Dautbasic, Kvesic, Hebib and Delimustafic, are directly
15 submitted to the leaders of the SDA and the HDZ."
16 Was that so?
17 A. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. It goes on to say -- to describe what the illegal activities of
19 the SDA in 1991. The service came by verified data on the illegal
20 imports of weapons for the SDA through the Libyan Consulate, and this job
21 directly involved, on behalf of the SDA, Naim Kadic, a colleague of mine,
22 by the way, Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, and Alija Delimustafic, and they go on
23 to refer to the countries through which the arms were imported; Austria
24 Hungary
25 but let us look at the following two pages, so the next one and the fifth
Page 4856
1 page of this document.
2 Is this, what I have just read, consistent with what you know?
3 A. It is consistent with what I know and it is consistent with the
4 truth, because we do have all these conversations of Munir Alibabic.
5 Q. "In order to overcome the problems and strike a balance in the
6 service of the MUP of the BH regarding the SDA and the HDZ, we propose
7 the following:"
8 And then they have a list of measures:
9 "Immediately take measures to replace inadequate Serbian
10 personnel in the MUP."
11 Then the personnel have to be professional, not discredited, and
12 uncompromisingly ready to fight for the Serbian people, but within the
13 constitutional and legal regulations.
14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters do not have the text on their
15 screen.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. They also are asking for immediate appointment of deputy chief in
18 the Sarajevo Sector, which office initially was agreed to belong to the
19 SDS
20 Mr. Minister, did these proposals and the people who proposed
21 them instill hope that there would be no war in March?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. For had they known that there would be war, would they be
24 proposing these measures?
25 A. No.
Page 4857
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can this document be admitted?
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Mandic, you said you knew this document. Tell
4 us -- if you could tell us what document it is about. Whose document?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is a report of certain
6 officials of Serb ethnicity of the State Security Service; a report by.
7 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That will be marked for identification.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
9 JUDGE KWON: I forgot to ask you, Mr. Mandic, whether you saw
10 this document at the time.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot recall when it was that I
12 saw it first, but I was familiar with it. I'm certain of that, because I
13 was in charge of all the personnel. I was the focal point of all
14 developments in the police then. Namely, I cannot remember the specific
15 time, but I certainly knew before the war of these positions and these
16 conclusions, and the attempts to appoint in the State Security Service
17 Serbian personnel, but that did not happen in -- did not happen for a
18 whole year.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we have 10 more minutes for today, but
20 the Chamber has allowed you 20 minutes for your cross-examination for
21 this witness, Mr. Mandic. I'm sorry, 20 hours, I should have said, 20
22 hours. Not 20 minutes, of course. And you have spent so far a bit more
23 than six hours, almost one-third of it, albeit under the control of the
24 Chamber. It is for you how to use those 20 hours, but speaking for
25 myself, I'm of the impression that you are concentrating somewhat on
Page 4858
1 narrow issues. So I would like you to move on to more relevant issues
2 tomorrow.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] By your leave, Excellency, to me,
4 as a Freudian psychologist, this Freudian slip of yours tells me that you
5 are quite conscious of the fact that 20 hours is not enough for me, and I
6 do hope that you will treat me generously in that respect.
7 As regards the presentation -- as regards the presentation, I
8 should like to say this: If I have been indicted of a joint criminal
9 enterprise, I do agree that there was a joint criminal enterprise, but
10 not on the Serbian side. We have to show what it was that we had been
11 confronted with, what the challenges were, what the threat was to the
12 survival of Serbs, and we shall prove that what had been envisaged was
13 that there should be no Serbs in Bosnia, and you will see that. How else
14 could I do that but through a man who was not an SDS member, but who was
15 a professional, who was a judge, who was a policeman, who was in the very
16 center of developments? We have to put together this picture. What had
17 led to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who wanted that war, and what
18 the conditions were. I know that you want me to paint this in wider
19 strokes, but here we have a person who, himself, with a heavy heart,
20 wrote certain documents, addressing very relevant addressees in Bosnia
21 and Herzegovina
22 is why I believe that we should look at all these documents and put
23 together this picture from the smaller tiles in the mosaic. All this
24 actually led to the creation of an unlawful army in the Croat-Muslim
25 section of the MUP.
Page 4859
1 JUDGE KWON: Let's not waste time anymore, but please bear that
2 in mind, the Chamber will consider how efficiently you have spent your
3 time when there is a request for you for additional time.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: And, Dr. Karadzic, as a Freudian, you'll no
6 doubt recall when considering the issue of relevancy, that the first
7 serious academic paper that Dr. Sigmund Freud ever wrote was about the
8 gonads of eels.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You are quite right, but we'll go
10 on.
11 Can we have 1D1210. These are minutes from the session which we
12 referred to previously of the 2nd of March, 1992. I believe that we had
13 played a magnetophone, a tape-recorder recording, but these are minutes
14 which are a bit more succinct, not verbatim, but just reflect the essence
15 of the conclusions reached at that session.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Can I ask you to read not the heading, but the -- what is this
18 about?
19 A. I only have the minutes.
20 Q. Yes, minutes.
21 A. "Minutes of the 56th Session of the Presidency of the
22 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on the 2nd of March,
23 1992.
24 "Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 number and date:
Page 4860
1 "The session was held in two parts. The first part of the
2 session began at 11.00 a.m.
3 Q. Thank you. And the second part?
4 A. The second part of the session began at 1830 hours.
5 Q. Thank you. Can we see from here that Alija Izetbegovic was
6 present, who was in the chair, and also Biljana Plavsic, Franjo Boras,
7 and Ejub Ganic, the secretaries, the prime minister, the
8 deputy prime ministers, namely, the prime minister, Jure Pelivan, and
9 Muhamed Cengic, Alija Delimustafic, and Vitomir Zepinic, his deputy, and
10 commander of the Military District Kukanjac, and the commander of the
11 Republican Territorial Defence Staff?
12 Can we go to page 2 in the Serbian? And in English, we still
13 have it on the screen.
14 So in the second part, after their meeting:
15 "In the second part, also participated the president of the
16 Crisis Staff of the Serbian Democratic Party [indiscernible]
17 Rajko Dukic ..."
18 Do you remember, Mr. Minister, that all of Croatia had a crisis
19 staff in every single municipality from the very beginning of 1992?
20 A. Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia
21 Q. Croatia
22 A. I don't know.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you know when the SDA started to set up its crisis staffs
Page 4861
1 throughout Bosnia
2 right?
3 A. Yes, we have been there. We have gone through that.
4 Q. Do you believe that the Presidency, I believe, set up its
5 Crisis Staff on the 20th of September, and Biljana Plavsic was against it
6 and later Nikola Koljevic, who was not at the meeting?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you see -- do we see that this meeting was organised in
9 connection with this agenda?
10 Can we see English page 2, the next one.
11 And Fikret Abdic, Nikola Koljevic and Stjepan Kljujic are absent,
12 and the agenda was to consider the situation following the blockade of
13 Sarajevo
14 Herzegovina
15 A. Yes. That was because of the murder of a wedding party member in
16 1992 in Bascarsija.
17 Q. Thank you. Here, we see in bold face, the Presidency stating:
18 "Namely, in addition to that situation --"
19 Aha, no, item 1:
20 "The president has condemned the tragic incident which happened
21 on the 29th of February this year in the old part of Sarajevo, as well as
22 any other act of violence."
23 And it demands that measures be taken and that the perpetrators
24 be brought to justice.
25 In the beginning of your testimony, you told us that you knew
Page 4862
1 where this perpetrator -- where this killer of the wedding party guest
2 was, but there was no way you could get to him and arrest him?
3 A. This hapless event which happened near the old church, which was
4 built in 1200 and something and is one of the oldest edifices or places
5 of worship in Sarajevo
6 because he was brandishing a Serbian flag. The wedding party was
7 proceeding on foot towards the church. As is Christian, or, rather,
8 Orthodox custom, wedding parties, when they go to church, are unarmed.
9 They cannot -- may not carry arms. Asim Delalic killed a man just for
10 carrying a Serbian flag in Bascarsija. Immediately, we found out who the
11 perpetrator and who the co-perpetrator was, but --
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: That's it for today, because there's another trial,
14 so we have to conclude here today.
15 I note this document has been admitted as Exhibit D214, being
16 marked for identification, the reason being because there was no full
17 translation?
18 MR. TIEGER: It's clearly excerpted portions, and that, I think,
19 was the source of the concern and issue.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I say this is not a transcript.
21 These are minutes. I'm not sure what was offered, the transcript or the
22 minutes, but I should like it to be translated in total because it is
23 very instructive, because at this meeting the Presidency accepted its own
24 mistakes and concluded that they should be rectified. On the basis of
25 these minutes, I sent a document for appointments to be made in the
Page 4863
1 police. In other words, they are connected. I should like to ask that
2 the entire document be translated, please.
3 JUDGE KWON: It was put to Mr. Colm Doyle, who couldn't confirm
4 the content of it. But having heard the evidence who confirmed the
5 content of it, we'll still keep the status pending translation.
6 We'll resume again tomorrow at 9.00.
7 [The witness stands down]
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
9 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day of July,
10 2010, at 9.00 a.m.
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