Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4864

 1                           Thursday, 8 July 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning to everybody.

 6             I was informed, Mr. Karadzic, that you have something to raise in

 7     the absence of the witness.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning to everyone.

 9             We were thinking it would be better to do this without the

10     witness so that what I'm going to present to the Trial Chamber in no way

11     affects his evidence.

12             Why did we ask for 40 hours?  In other words, why do we believe

13     that this is one of the key witnesses?  If we miss this opportunity to

14     confront the witness and the opportunity for all of us in this courtroom

15     to learn something about the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we may

16     perhaps never have another witness who will be able to present this to us

17     from such close quarters.  This man was in charge of crime prevention,

18     prosecution, and bringing to justice all criminals in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19     He was right at the source.  He was able to know about everything that

20     was going on in the country, and he knew it.  That's how things worked in

21     Republika Srpska, where he was also a justice minister.  And the last

22     stage, the prosecution of crimes, was in his jurisdiction, as was the

23     establishment of the judicial system and so on.

24             I would recommend to your attention from the pre-trial brief,

25     paragraphs from 109 to 117 inclusive, referring only to what the

Page 4865

 1     Prosecution believes to be the gist of the joint criminal enterprise as

 2     regarding the MUP, and only regarding the MUP.  In these eight or nine

 3     paragraphs, it says:

 4             [In English] "The MUP played a significant role in establishing

 5     and maintaining Bosnian Serb authority over the territory and

 6     implementing the common criminal purpose."

 7             [Interpretation] And so on.  In 110:

 8             [In English] "Prior to its division, Karadzic contemplated the

 9     division of the MUP as an essential complement of the division of B and H

10     and the realisation of the final goal to break off with Muslims and

11     Croats forever."

12             [Interpretation] 111, the last one, paragraph 2:

13             [In English] "The minister of justice was responsible for

14     implementing the decision, and he took immediate steps toward its

15     implementation."

16             [Interpretation] 112 is also important and implies that we are in

17     some sort of joint enterprise.  113 says:

18             [In English] "When a high level Serb member of the BH MUP

19     resisted the division of the MUP, he was summoned to a meeting with

20     Karadzic, Krajisnik, Stanisic, Mandic, and others, and attacked for

21     failing to support the division of the MUP.  He tendered his

22     resignation."

23             [Interpretation] 114:

24             [In English] "Stanisic and Mandic who reported directly to

25     Karadzic and Krajisnik, as explained above, played a critical role in the

Page 4866

 1     organised detention and expulsion of Muslims and Croats," and so on and

 2     so on.

 3             [Interpretation] This is only regarding the MUP.

 4             Regarding paramilitary and volunteer units, between which the

 5     Prosecution puts a sign of equality, which is far from the truth, far

 6     from reality.  There are also allegations in paragraphs 3 to 6 and

 7     another paragraph in the pre-trial brief, and in Count 3, sniping isn't

 8     Sarajevo, one count involving Srebrenica, and so on.

 9             Who will present to us the essence which the Defence claims is

10     diametrically opposite to what is written in the indictment and that some

11     Prosecution experts and witnesses present here, and even mislead the

12     Prosecution into believing things to be completely different than they

13     were?

14             This witness was a participant and witness to everything that

15     happened from the first multi-party elections to the end of 1992.  You

16     were able to see how I speak to several major protagonists within one

17     day, trying to preserve the peace.  The Prosecution is trying to say I'm

18     setting the stage for war, but, in fact, I'm trying to preserve peace.

19     That's what you can see in these intercepts.

20             Throughout 1991 and 1992, which this witness can speak about,

21     there were so many critical events in one day that I really have to ask

22     for your patience to put this jigsaw puzzle together, because if we miss

23     a piece, you won't be able to understand the whole picture.  And that is

24     the gist of this process, as a whole.  That's why I believe that, for

25     instance, this first part about the division of the MUP is crucial.  It

Page 4867

 1     goes in parallel with the peace conference.  We are doing our best to

 2     avoid any deterioration -- any further deterioration of the political

 3     situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while facing a conspiracy involving

 4     all the state organs in which Muslims and Croats, but primarily Muslims,

 5     hold two-thirds of the power.

 6             All this is about the pre-war period, and we are getting close to

 7     April and the outbreak of the war, and we will then be able to present to

 8     the Trial Chamber every last detail of what was going on, what was

 9     inevitable, what our choices were, what we could have done, and what we

10     actually did.  That is why I believe this is probably the key witness.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I do not disagree at all that this

12     witness is a very important witness.  The point I raised yesterday was

13     that whether you could have been more efficient in putting questions,

14     whether you should have -- whether you had to spend all six hours in

15     order to deal with those personnel issues.

16             We are not trying to -- we are not trying to publish a white book

17     on the history of the BiH.  This is a criminal trial which deals with the

18     charges against you.  Please bear that in mind, and then be as efficient

19     as possible, and please concentrate on the events which covers the

20     indictment.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  And I would add, Dr. Karadzic, that we will take

22     what you've just said into account when considering the submission that

23     you make which I anticipate is, although you didn't say so, what, in

24     effect, you're asking for is an extension of the 20 hours suggested.  As

25     we've said all along, those figures are not set in stone.  They are

Page 4868

 1     dependent upon what happens on a day-to-day basis.  And if the

 2     Trial Chamber is of the view that your submission has merit, then it will

 3     be reflected in any decision that's made.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.

 5             I wonder about one other thing.  Since this witness has been

 6     accepted as a Court witness, could the Defence possibly offer another set

 7     of exhibits so that the witness can only identify them, without going

 8     through each and every one of them in detail, as they reflect some

 9     typical phenomena?

10             JUDGE KWON:  So could you put them in writing in the very

11     immediate future so that we can hear from the Prosecution?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  That should include the portions you want to tender

14     amongst the transcript of his evidence in Stanisic and Zupljanin.  Thank

15     you.

16             And if I can take this opportunity to hear from Mr. Tieger that

17     we couldn't deal with, we were short of time two days ago, about your

18     suggestion to tender all the Assembly minutes.  I asked you where we

19     were.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Well, Your Honour, I think we're prepared simply to

21     engage in the logistics of marking and admitting those.  We have

22     submitted to the Defence, to the Registry, and to the Court Officers the

23     list of Assembly sessions that were referenced in the Donia reports.  I

24     anticipated that once we found the first opportunity to do that, the

25     Registrar could just go down the list and, as we have done for, for

Page 4869

 1     example, associated exhibits, just give them numbers and they are

 2     admitted.

 3             So it was my understanding that only -- that barring any issue

 4     with the Court, only the technical logistics of giving the Assembly

 5     sessions numbers and having them formally admitted remained.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  But at the end of the day, we are going with them

 7     all, aren't we?  You're not going to use them, all of them?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, yeah, I'm sure that in -- well, a couple of

 9     issues surrounding those.

10             First of all, the Court will recall Mr. Robinson's suggestion

11     earlier that among the official documents that should be admitted in

12     their entirety, we could begin with the Assembly sessions.  That was a

13     suggestion with which the Prosecution agreed.

14             In this particular case, the issue arose about the

15     contextualisation of the references in the Donia report.  The Prosecution

16     indicated that it anticipated that that problem would be resolved by the

17     admission of the Assembly sessions referenced in the reports, in their

18     entirety.  Mr. Robinson was in agreement.  I understand Dr. Karadzic is

19     as well.  So the Court may well be right that -- well, the Court is,

20     I think, correct that over time, one way or another, all the Assembly

21     sessions will be admitted.  But this seemed to be an appropriate moment

22     for the admission of those Assembly sessions referenced in the Donia

23     report, for the reasons I just mentioned.

24             JUDGE KWON:  So to be clear, that your intention is to tender

25     those Assembly session minutes or transcripts that haven't been tendered

Page 4870

 1     yet?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Correct, and there are -- among the Assembly

 3     sessions that were referenced in Dr. Donia's reports are Assembly

 4     sessions that have already been admitted.  Those were indicated expressly

 5     in the chart provided by the Prosecution, so we indicated the sessions,

 6     referenced in their entirety, and then also highlighted specifically

 7     those which had already been admitted so there wouldn't be confusion

 8     about that.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  The whole point behind this is just convenience, in

10     terms of conduct of trial, without going into the practice of tendering

11     them, admitting them separately --

12             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  -- in light of the fact that they are going to be

14     used in the future in one way or another?

15             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Your Honour.  And with respect to

16     that over-arching principle, we could move forward to admit all of the

17     Assembly sessions, which was essentially a joint request by the

18     Prosecution and Defence.  In this particular instance, it just

19     encompasses those Assembly sessions specifically referenced in the Donia

20     reports, so it's a sub-set of the entirety of the Assembly sessions.  But

21     I take the Court's point.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any observation on this?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, as you have said,

24     Your Excellency, I believe that at the end of the day, everything will be

25     admitted in one way or another.  I do not overestimate the words of the

Page 4871

 1     MPs, because the main enactments are the Constitution, the laws,

 2     et cetera, but I don't mind them being admitted.

 3             Part of this material is complementary between the Prosecution

 4     and the Defence, and some of it is in favour of one side or another.  So

 5     what they do not tender, we will.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I will come back to that issue later on.

 7             Yes, let's bring in the witness.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, one small scheduling issue I wanted to

 9     raise with the Court.

10             It would be extremely helpful for the Prosecution, in terms of

11     scheduling, if the Court could provide an indication of the time it will

12     allot for the cross-examination of Mr. Mandilovic.  I mention that for

13     obvious reasons, the normal scheduling issues, but also because in light

14     of the convergence of the upcoming summer recess and the fact that one of

15     the remaining witnesses before then is locked into particular dates,

16     there is a serious risk that one of the witnesses will have to actually

17     travel back and forth three times for this same appearance.  I'm

18     confident that's something the Court wants to avoid, even if it means the

19     possibility that we'll have some hours that are left open because there's

20     an unexpected opening in the schedule.  We simply don't want to oblige

21     the witness to do that, and I'm sure the Court shares that concern.  But

22     it would help us to know the likelihood of that risk if the Court could

23     advise us of how much time it will allot for the cross-examination of

24     Mr. Mandilovic.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Is Mr. Mandilovic the one who we'll hear after

Page 4872

 1     Mr. Mandic?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  And have we received the estimate from the Defence

 4     yet?  I don't remember we received their estimate.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't believe we've had the time.

 6             Just a moment.  I don't think -- I'm not sure we sent it.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  I'm virtually certain that's the case, and I think

 8     the request was for 14 hours.  But I'll double-check on that right now.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll double-check as well.

10             Let's bring in the witness.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, 14 hours, that's correct.

12                           [The witness takes the stand]

13                           WITNESS:  MOMCILO MANDIC [Resumed]

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning to you, Mr. Mandic.

16             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

17             [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE KWON:  We had certain matters to deal with in the absence

19     of yourself, so we'll begin today.

20             Mr. Karadzic.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Minister.

23        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

24        Q.   We are drawing close to the key events in April, and we have to

25     build up the story brick by brick.

Page 4873

 1             Can I call up in e-court 65 ter 6585, unless it already has a P

 2     number.  6585.

 3             While we're waiting, Mr. Mandic, let me refresh your memory.

 4             If you'll recall, towards the end of 1991 and early 1992,

 5     Ambassador Wijnaendts and later Lord Carrington and Cutileiro came to our

 6     country, and the peace conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina began within the

 7     framework of the broader Conference on Yugoslavia?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   If you remember, on the 23rd of February, we reached the first

10     agreement ever, at least the outlines of an agreement that was supposed

11     to be further developed, and that is this Statement of Principles.  We've

12     got it on the screen now.  This is the foundation of the solution to the

13     crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina to this day.

14             We need English page 5 -- English page 2 and Serbian 3.  In fact,

15     the Serbian starting with the bottom of page 2 and then going on to

16     page 3.  Serbian 3, English 2.

17             This passage is the about the jurisdiction of the constituent

18     units of the complex Bosnian state, and in paragraph 2, may I draw your

19     attention to this passage that concerns the Assembly and the government,

20     and all the provisions about the jurisdictions of the constituent units.

21        A.   Should I read it?

22        Q.   Everyone can read for themselves.  But towards the bottom of this

23     paragraph, we see an enumeration "culture," but towards the bottom,

24     "forestry, social welfare, police security," et cetera.

25             Has it remained in effect to this day that constituent units will

Page 4874

 1     govern police affairs independently, but supervised by a unified policy?

 2        A.   That was so stipulated in the Dayton Accords and now in the

 3     Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that constituent units have their own

 4     governments.

 5        Q.   Do you remember that various possibilities for these divisions of

 6     competencies were discussed during the peace conferences, but it was

 7     never in question that the police would be within the jurisdiction of the

 8     entities?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   I see that I am being too fast.  I have to be more careful.

11             So this is the first brick in that edifice that was adopted and

12     later only further developed.  Do you remember it was the position of the

13     Serbian, the Croat, but also the Muslim side was that things that have

14     once been agreed upon not be discussed anymore, but, rather, that we

15     should move on?

16        A.   Yes, that was reported by the media, and that's the information

17     we got in the Ministry of the Police.

18        Q.   Do you remember that it was only in 1993, since there were

19     certain inconsistencies in comparison with what had been agreed already,

20     the principle was introduced in 1993 by Stoltenberg that nothing is

21     agreed until everything is agreed?

22        A.   I don't recall that.  I wasn't in Bosnia then.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Can this document be admitted?

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this has been admitted as

Page 4875

 1     Exhibit P798.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, can I raise one minor matter?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  If the accused could advise us if he's using a

 6     document that's not on the list of the 1200 documents he notified us that

 7     he would be using.  I understand that happens.  I'm not suggesting

 8     there's any prejudice in the use of this particular document.  But it

 9     does save us the trouble of looking through the entirety of the list as

10     soon as he announces it.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.

12             Mr. Karadzic, you must have heard it.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  I would just like to say that

14     this was adopted on the 23rd of February.  However, it is identical to

15     what it was that was adopted in March, as the final version.  So nothing

16     was changed in this version until the 18th of March.  And this is a

17     document that was admitted as a P exhibit.

18             JUDGE KWON:  No, that is not the issue, Mr. Karadzic.  It's your

19     notice to the other side as to the documents which you are going to use

20     during your cross-examination.  You should advise the Prosecution as to

21     the document if there's any changes or any additions to those documents.

22             Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  If we look at things

24     that way, perhaps it would be a good idea to admit this part under the

25     date of the 23rd of February.

Page 4876

 1                           [Defence counsel confer]

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             Could we now have 1D1210, please.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   While we're waiting for that, Minister, I would like to remind

 6     you of the fact that these are minutes from the Presidency session, a

 7     session of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina, held on the 2nd of March, and it had to do with the

 9     killing of a member of this wedding party and the crisis that emerged.

10             Let us just look at this first page, and then let's move on to

11     page 3.  In English, we can keep the same page.

12             As opposed to a transcript of the entire session, this is a

13     record, and that reflects only the essence.  We are now interested only

14     in number 2, where it says that the tragedy and general situation in

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Kupres, Travnik, Zivinice, is a direct

16     reflection of the unresolved relations within the MUP.

17             Could we have the next page in English.  The Serbian and English,

18     yes.  A bit further up.  The previous page in Serbian, please:

19             "In accordance with agreements, it is requested that within 24

20     hours a personnel transformation be carried out of the MUP of Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina in accordance with agreements reached by the three leading

22     political parties right after the republican elections."

23             Minister, does this mean the Presidency, 14 months after the

24     coalition government was established, and 16 or 17 months after the

25     elections, ultimately accepted the fact that the coalition agreement

Page 4877

 1     regarding the MUP had not been carried out and that it had to be adopted

 2     urgently now and enforced within 24 hours?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   This was an integral part of the requests of the SDS.  Also, the

 5     implication here is that the tragic situation in the republic is a

 6     consequence of the lack of order among the state organs caused by the

 7     non-implementation of agreements in structuring the MUP.  Can you remind

 8     us what it was that happened in Kupres, Travnik, Zivinice, and I think in

 9     the Neretva River Valley as well at that point in time in March?

10        A.   At that time in different parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina in those

11     areas you referred to, and it culminated in Sarajevo, there were

12     inter-ethnic tensions, or, rather, the inter-party agreement was not

13     observed at these particular localities regarding the appointment of MUP

14     officials to those positions that belonged to the Serb Democratic Party

15     according to the inter-party agreement, or, rather, the representatives

16     of the Serb people.

17             I think I spoke yesterday about the killing of the father of the

18     bridegroom because he was carrying a Serb flag in Bascarsija.  We, from

19     the Crime Prevention Service that I headed, knew who the perpetrator was,

20     Delalic, Rasim, and that he was in a house at Bistrik.  However, we were

21     not in a position to arrest him or to take any measures because the

22     Patriotic League and the reserve police force were guarding him.  The

23     reserve police from Stari Grad Police Station, headed by Dahic, Ismet, at

24     that point they had between 600 and 1.000 men.  Of course, all of them

25     were ethnic Muslims, and that was a major problem.

Page 4878

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Let me move on from this decision of the Presidency:

 2             "During the day, the perpetrators of the heinous crime in front

 3     of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Bascarsija and Sarajevo be arrested

 4     during the course of the day.

 5             "Concerning the fact that the Serb people have been experiencing

 6     a lengthy informational blockade and pressure, to conduct an urgent

 7     division of the television and radio as well as to stop broadcasting

 8     Yutel until the talks about the constitutional arrangement of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina are over."

10             I would just like to look at number 6 on this page.  I think it

11     has to be somewhere around there in English as well:

12             "To immediately dissolve the Crisis Staff of the Presidency of

13     the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Ejub Ganic, as an

14     unconstitutional organ, to urgently disarm the paramilitary formations of

15     the Green Berets that are publicly operating in Sarajevo, protecting,

16     inter alia, criminals who are perpetrators of crimes."

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  It is not the right page

18     in English.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear

21     Mr. Karadzic's question.  So speaking too fast.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can we have the next page, please.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  The interpreters noted that they

25     didn't hear your question.

Page 4879

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   My question was whether what is written here, does that actually

 3     pertain to what the witness has said, that the perpetrator of that crime,

 4     the fact that one member of the wedding party was killed and another

 5     wounded, and were they under the -- the perpetrators under the protection

 6     of the Green Berets?

 7        A.   Yes, under their protection.  And, of course, those who were

 8     protecting him were from among the ranks of the Muslim people.

 9        Q.   The witness also said, yes, the Green Berets and the reserve

10     police force, they were both protecting this witness.  So you are

11     speaking about this unlawfully-increased reserve force to a level of 600

12     to 1.000 men in Stari Grad; right?

13        A.   Yes.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  That both speakers are

15     overlapping and speaking at a pace that is too fast for court reporting

16     and for interpretation.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Did you note the interpreter's note in the

18     transcript, Mr. Karadzic?  Both speakers are overlapping and speaking at

19     a pace that is too fast for court reporting and for interpretation.

20     Please bear that in mind; Mr. Mandic as well.  Put a pause before you

21     start answering the question, after Mr. Karadzic puts a question.

22             Let's continue.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             I do apologise to the interpreters.  However, obviously that is

Page 4880

 1     why parts are not recorded.  I would just like to summarise the witness's

 2     answer so that he can say yes or no to this.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   So this is it:  This paragraph in the request that was accepted

 5     by the Presidency implies that the Green Berets should be disarmed

 6     straight away.  They were operating in public in Sarajevo, and criminals

 7     are under their protection, criminals who had perpetrated crimes.  And I

 8     asked whether that implies that the murder of the member of that wedding

 9     party was also being protected by the Green Berets, and your answer was

10     that, indeed, he was under the protection of the Green Berets, but also

11     under the protection of the reserve police force of Stari Grad that was

12     illegally increased to a level of 600 men.  Did I summarise this

13     properly?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please, in Serbian, and

17     I believe that it would be the same in English.  Not that far away in the

18     Serbian version.  Yes, that's it, thank you.  I believe it's the next

19     page in English.  No, it's the same page.  Right, let's keep this English

20     page.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Look at the first highlighted sentence:

25             "Bearing all of this in mind, the requests presented by the

Page 4881

 1     Crisis Staff of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina were

 2     accepted, and the following was agreed upon unanimously:"

 3             And so on and so forth.  And then the first bold passage says

 4     that:

 5             "This does not prejudge in any way how Bosnia-Herzegovina will be

 6     organised.  That is discussed under the auspices of the

 7     European Community.  These talks should be urgently continued, and the

 8     results have to take into account the interests of all three peoples as

 9     well as other citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

10             Does the Presidency unanimously accept or adopt the

11     recommendations of the SDS, and is it not stated that the ultimate

12     solution would be found at the conference?

13        A.   Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Can we have the last highlighted sentence:

16             "To carry out as briefly as possible an agreement on the

17     reorganisation of the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina and resolve personnel

18     matters."

19             In English, it may be the last sentence.  Can we scroll up?  Oh,

20     yes, right, that's it, yes:  "To implement an agreement ..."

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Does that pertain to the resolution of these personnel problems

23     that had accumulated, and the fact that they were not being resolved

24     actually led to the culmination of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 4882

 1        Q.   And:

 2             "To implement the agreement on the reorganisation of the MUP ..."

 3             That is stated on the 2nd of March, so that's after the 23rd of

 4     February; right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Can this be admitted into evidence, unless it hasn't been

 8     admitted already?  I think that the actual record was not admitted, but

 9     the transcript was.

10             JUDGE KWON:  The e-court says it has been admitted as D214, but I

11     note -- is it correct?

12                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

13             JUDGE KWON:  MFI, yes, because we do not have the full

14     translation of this document.  That's the status, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Was this a relevant decision for all of you in the MUP, a

18     relevant decision of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

19        A.   It was a relevant decision for the entire state, or, rather, then

20     the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and all of its institutions.

21        Q.   Was this also a pretext for you to become involved and to bring

22     the barricade crisis to an end without dramaticising it?

23        A.   When Mr. Tieger asked me about this, or Ms. Korner - I really

24     cannot recall now - I noted that Serb personnel, of course in agreement

25     with all others in the MUP, played a major role during these 48 hours of

Page 4883

 1     the blockade of Sarajevo in order to prevent anything from happening to

 2     the population; that is to say, not to have looting, killing, fighting,

 3     and so on.  It seems to me that I played a major role, myself, together

 4     with my co-workers.  We kept these barricades under control.  We tried to

 5     alleviate tensions so that there wouldn't be even more of a rebellion and

 6     more destruction of property.

 7             In certain parts of town, there were counter-barricades, at

 8     Bistrik, Kosevsko Brdo, so a great danger was looming over Sarajevo.  It

 9     could have been turned into a Beirut, as we had put it then.  However,

10     thanks to the member of the police, the Ministry of the Interior, all of

11     this was over without a single incident.

12             Munir Alibabic, of course -- or, rather, the State Security

13     Service of the Sarajevo Centre, turned it in the opposite direction, and

14     they said that Momcilo Mandic, with his co-workers, had organised these

15     barricades and kept them under his control.

16             All of us present here know that if there is a football game,

17     there can be trouble, let alone when thousands and thousands of people go

18     out into the streets and block a city with a population of about 500.000.

19     There are documents attesting to this, that nothing bad happened and that

20     all of this was brought to a peaceful end.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can I establish that you gave quite a few interviews,

22     and can we say that none of these interviews were made under oath, and

23     none of them were given to you for authentication, and that most of them

24     were distorted by the journalists in the said newspapers, themselves,

25     like the man who broke up the barricades, and so on and so forth?

Page 4884

 1        A.   Believe me, Mr. President, as for all of these interviews that

 2     were shown to me, these are unknown newspapers or newspapers from the

 3     federation, and they kept copying an interview I gave to Serbian

 4     Television and then they edited it in different ways, in agreement with

 5     the State Security of Sarajevo.  I can give answers in all of these

 6     respects now.  Some of these things never happened that way, but I can

 7     answer all those questions now, if you wish to put them.

 8        Q.   Can we then say that one of your interviews, which we have not

 9     notified the other side about, but we will do so next week, where you

10     speak about the war --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Sorry, the interpreter did not understand

12     Mr. Karadzic's question.  Could he please repeat it?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Mandic.  The interpreters did not

14     understand your question, Mr. Karadzic.  Could you repeat it?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to elicit an answer to this:

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   If we bear in mind the fact there were distortions and changes to

18     those interviews, and some were indeed fabricated, in respect of these

19     topics, can we say that your position, which you aired -- which you

20     stated on television, was accurate, whereas all other topics should be

21     dismissed or, rather, reported positions of yours should be dismissed as

22     incorrect?  Is that so?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

24             MR. TIEGER:  I mean, I appreciate that that may be a question

25     that can be left to the witness, but it seems so abstract and broad, as

Page 4885

 1     framed, that it's untethered to any particular documentation, it may not

 2     be of assistance.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Have we seen this TV interviews or the other

 4     interviews?  But let us see whether Mr. Mandic can deal with this.

 5             Can you answer the question, Mr. Mandic?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not, of course, remember all

 7     those interviews.  I've seen some of them on Serbian Television and

 8     presented some by Mr. Tieger and Ms. Korner.  The essence is true, of

 9     course, adapted to the current circumstances and the political situation

10     at the time I was granting the interview.

11             As regards all the other interviews and the newspaper articles, I

12     would have to see them to say whether they were distorted, whether they

13     had been produced in security services, or whether field data had been

14     gathered and then articles created on that basis, which is done by these

15     services, as a rule.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Mandic.

17             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             I hope that next week we will see or read the transcript, but

20     it's still not in e-court and we still have not put the other side on

21     notice.  But we will then be able to see what exactly was the position of

22     Mr. Mandic, said to a camera -- in front of a camera in 1993.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1992 -- 1994.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D2020.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4886

 1        Q.   This is an official report and your cover letter to the

 2     prime minister -- from the prime minister to the president of the Council

 3     for the Constitutional Order and to the minister and the deputy minister

 4     of the interior.  This is in English.  We do not have the Serbian

 5     version.  I believe that the other side does.  This is your cover letter,

 6     along with a report concerning developments in Sarajevo between the 1st

 7     and 5th of March, 1992, and obviously this pertains to this incident that

 8     we are now talking about, the murder of a wedding party member, and

 9     barricades and counter-barricades.

10             Do you recall having sent such a report?

11        A.   Yes.  I had to do it in the line of duty.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that courtesy of the OTP,

13     we are now getting the Serbian version.  Thank you.  So could you please

14     look at it, whereas the other participants can use the English version.

15             Can we have the next page, please, of the English version.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   That was your cover letter, and this is the report, itself.  Do

18     you recognise this report?

19        A.   Now I see it after 18 years.

20        Q.   This is a report from your department, from your administration

21     at the MUP; right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And the report concerns the event which took place on the 1st of

24     March at 1530, when the parking space in Danila Ilica Street,

25     Nikola Gardovic was killed, and it goes on to say the criminal complaint

Page 4887

 1     was filed.  I'm reading the English.  I'm translating as I go along.

 2     That the -- it says "senior," but probably it should be the District

 3     Public Prosecutors Office, filed a criminal report against Ramiz Delalic

 4     and Suad Sabovic, and then it states their addresses and so on and so

 5     forth, and further states that at approximately 2400 hours on the 1st of

 6     March, 1992, in Bratstva Jedinstva Street, barricades were erected and

 7     that is when the only death occurred, namely, a person was wounded

 8     fatally and died -- we can perhaps scroll this up a bit more, please, to

 9     see what it says further.

10             Then you say on the 2nd of March, on Mount Trebevic in

11     Stari Grad, another murder was committed, and this is a 100 per cent

12     Muslim settlement, right, a Muslim neighbourhood?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   So you are reporting on all the incidents which had taken place

15     from the 1st to the 5th of March; right?

16        A.   Yes, immediately after the setting up of the barricades and after

17     that, because the barricades stood there for 48 hours and were dismantled

18     on the 2nd of March.  But this is until the 5th of March.  There are also

19     some other incidents that I reported to the competent state institutions.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page?  We are

21     not going to read it.  I should just like the parties to see it, to see

22     what it is about.  The next page in English, please.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Here, I should just like to read this -- could you scroll it up a

25     bit, please:

Page 4888

 1             [In English] "That 20 people received gun-shot wounds.  Some were

 2     admitted to Kosevo Hospital for treatment, while others were discharged

 3     after receiving medical assistance.  The following persons sustained

 4     bodily injuries."

 5             [Interpretation] And here we have a list of the wounded.

 6             Can we see the next page, please.

 7             So this is the routine-type report, sent to the most important

 8     addresses in the republic, because it was a dramatic event and one that

 9     had political implications; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Can this document be admitted, please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D385, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   We shall just cast a short glance on a document dated the 5th of

18     March, Serbian police from Stari Grad municipality, sent to the ministry

19     and to the Security Services Centre in Sarajevo, one letter.  It is

20     1D1357.  We shall not dwell on it at length.  We should just like you to

21     corroborate or prove to us the content, the essence of this document.

22             1D1357, and we have the translation, too.

23             Until we see it, Mr. Minister, can I ask you this:  Are those

24     days considered to have been extremely dramatic, in terms of the

25     developments which occurred, which unfolded, and that all the public was

Page 4889

 1     apprehensive of what the future held in store.

 2        A.   This is a letter by members of the Police Station of Stari Grad

 3     of Serbian ethnicity who had worked in that particular station for many

 4     years, where they specifically spell out the problems that they have

 5     encountered, and they are listed here, let me not read them, which -- and

 6     they were common knowledge at the time, at least as far as Stari Grad is

 7     concerned.

 8        Q.   Was that a pretext for procedures in the Stari Grad, Sokolac, and

 9     Pale Public Stations, without any justification?  Did they say in

10     these --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  I'm sorry, the interpreter did not get the

12     meaning of the question again.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat the question again?

14     The interpreters missed that part.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Was this event -- this was the culmination of developments and of

17     the disenfranchisement.  Was this event -- were these developments a

18     pretext for the procedures of the late Cvijetic and Sokolac and the MUP

19     of Pale; namely, the colleague that had been nominated by the Party of

20     Democratic Action to the police or appointed there?

21        A.   As a response to these developments in the centre of Sarajevo,

22     Zoran Cvijetic, who was the chief for the police in Sokolac, which is in

23     an adjacent municipality, dismissed from work all Muslim members on the

24     police force, whereas Malko Koroman would not allow my order to be

25     implemented to the effect that the commander, who had already been

Page 4890

 1     elected or nominated of Muslim ethnicity, should be appointed to his

 2     post, and at that time there was a conflict, even a physical clash,

 3     between me and Malko Koroman.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Can this document be admitted?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D386, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             Can we see 1D1884 in e-court, 1D1884.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Until we see that, allow me to describe to you what it is that we

12     will be looking at.  This is a letter by the chief of the Public Security

13     Station in Bratunac, Senad Hodzic.  As far as I can recall, in Bratunac

14     they had not had a Serb as the commander of the police station, because

15     the chief was a Muslim; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes.  I remember that they had problems regarding that particular

17     appointment, that of the commander.

18        Q.   But Senad Hodzic obviously was politically sensitive enough,

19     because he says:

20             "By the dispatch of the MUP of the 4th of March, a 100 per cent

21     increase in the reserve police force was ordered.

22             "In keeping with that, in a letter to the Bratunac Municipal

23     Secretariat of National Defence, we ask for a list of the necessary free

24     military conscripts according to local communes, respecting the ethnic

25     structure.

Page 4891

 1             "After we had received the list and started making the requisite

 2     checks, we obtained information that the list included a certain number

 3     of Muslim military conscripts who had spent time in Croatia on a part of

 4     the training courses within the MUP of Croatia.  We do not know on whose

 5     orders or recommendation, but it is believed that Serbian citizens do not

 6     have enough trust in such future members of the reserve police force."

 7             First question:  We saw, Mr. Minister, that on the 2nd of March

 8     the Presidency adopted all the SDS laws aimed at resolving the crisis,

 9     and on the 4th of March it sent an order for the reserve police force to

10     be increased by 100 per cent by taking over unassigned conscripts; is

11     that correct?

12        A.   Could you please bear with me for a minute.

13             When Their Honours asked me a couple of days ago, I believe, how

14     we learned about those people who came from Croatia, or the illegal

15     manning of the force, one of the ways in which we received such --

16     obtained such information was this:  Namely, chiefs of the police,

17     irrespective of ethnicity, would inform the centre or the headquarters of

18     the Ministry of the Police about these developments, and we knew that

19     people were coming in an inappropriate number and in contravention to the

20     approved staffing scheme and the approved numbers, that they were being

21     armed, they were being given uniforms, and that an army was being

22     created, actually, in the lap, under the wings of the police.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did you notice that this was actually two days after

24     the apparently-reached agreement in the Presidency of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina?

Page 4892

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Do you agree with me that this policeman, Hodzic, Senad, is

 3     actually acknowledging the fact that Serbian people did not trust enough

 4     such potential members of the police reserve force who had been in

 5     Croatia, and it is not known at whose orders and at whose recommendation?

 6        A.   Yes.  Let us not repeat ourselves.  Yes.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can this document be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D387, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 65 ter 18271.  I don't

12     know if it's an exhibit, a P exhibit.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   The previous one was of the 16th of March, and this letter of

15     yours is dated 18 March, also a telegram.  Can you interpret this for us?

16        A.   It's to all security centres and to the SUP of Sarajevo, to the

17     secretary.  It came out of my administration, and it's my dispatch:

18             "On 13 March 1992, by dispatch 10-26,

19     Deputy Minister Dr. Vitomir Zepinic, without the knowledge and approval

20     of this administration, requested information about armaments, munitions,

21     money, and vehicles that had been seized, which were submitted to the MUP

22     for further action.  He made this request without authorisation.

23             "I hereby notify you that the deputy minister abused his office

24     of deputy minister, circumventing this administration and putting

25     pressure on certain senior employees of the CSB which I believe to be

Page 4893

 1     inappropriate, and it is in contravention of the rules of the service.

 2             "At the same time, I hereby notify you that you may not provide

 3     any MUP information regarding the Criminal Prevention Services."

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe we have a translation

 5     under --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter didn't hear the number.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- 1D01 to 18.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Tell me, was this quite an unusual step by the deputy minister,

10     which indicates that something unusual is happening with weapons,

11     munitions, money, with the police bypassing all normal channels?

12        A.   This letter speaks about unlawful conduct on the part of

13     Deputy Minister Zepinic, because it is only the Crime Prevention Service

14     that is in charge of this, and it can be supervised only by the minister

15     or someone authorised in writing by the minister.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             I believe we have received the translation.  It's 1D2018, so that

18     all parties can see the translation as well, and then we can perhaps have

19     this document admitted.  Could we?

20             JUDGE KWON:  I note the 65 ter number of this is 1D1218, and it

21     has been marked for identification as Exhibit D197.  But having heard the

22     author's confirmation now, I think we can admit this document, unless it

23     is objected to.

24             Yes, it will be admitted now.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't recall that the Defence has

Page 4894

 1     used this document before, but never mind.  In any case, it's been

 2     admitted now.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  E-court says that you used this document with

 4     Mr. van Lynden on 20th of May.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I think the confusion was that the

 6     first document called up for translation was not related to this

 7     particular B/C/S document.  The document we have on screen now is -- I

 8     don't know what the confusion was in the numbers.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Well, this is a totally different one.

10                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

11             JUDGE KWON:  My apologies.  This is a totally different document.

12     We need to admit it separately.  So the document we are dealing with is

13     65 ter 18271.  That will be admitted.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D388, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can we briefly look at 65 ter 1492.  1492.  There is an English

17     version as well.  Can we see page 2, and English page 2.

18             Under D, we see "Constituent Units," and under number 2, towards

19     the bottom:

20             [In English] "Police trade and other constituents units may

21     establish and maintain relations and links with the other republics," and

22     so on.

23             [Interpretation] This is a fundamental principle for the future

24     structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed here, and we see that constituent

25     units have the right to their own police force.

Page 4895

 1             Can we see the next page.  Next page, please.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Can I draw your attention to number 4, towards the top:

 5             "Members of the nations who would be in a minority in a

 6     particular constituent unit would receive protection similar to that in

 7     Article 2(3) of the draft convention."

 8             Does this mean, Minister, that it was envisaged that every

 9     constituent unit have minorities as well, and that there was no transfer

10     or exchange of population planned?

11        A.   Yes, it does.

12        Q.   This document is an exhibit.  There's no need to go further into

13     it, but let me ask you this:  In my understanding, the entire indictment

14     against me hangs upon a thread, and that thread is the allegation that we

15     intended to get rid of Muslims and Croats from territories that

16     Bosnian Serbs laid rights upon, and these rights were not so

17     questionable.  Even the European Union accepted them.  But when we speak

18     about the separation of Muslims and Croats, is it really the case that

19     that implies throwing them out of Republika Srpska?

20        A.   No, I have never been aware of any such views before the war.

21     These are the views of European mediators, diplomats, who were

22     negotiating with leaders of ruling national parties in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Bosnia-Herzegovina was Yugoslavia, in a nutshell.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall -- and we'll probably deal with this

25     next week, but let me just remind you.  On the 12th of May, you were

Page 4896

 1     sworn in as a minister in Banja Luka, minister of justice?

 2        A.   Yes, as the minister of justice of Republika Srpska.

 3        Q.   On the 13th of May, did you attend a ceremony in the

 4     Police Academy of Banja Luka?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Next week, we will deal with it in greater detail, but I'm glad

 7     you confirmed you attended that ceremony.  We will show it later.

 8             This has been admitted into evidence already.

 9             Can I now ask for 65 ter 01016.

10             Minister, this is also your document, in which you referred to

11     the document that was passed on the 23rd of February and 18th of March.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, excuse me.  I just rise for a

13     housekeeping matter.

14             The accused referred to the fact that the previous document had

15     been admitted, but there was no reference to the exhibit number, which

16     might be helpful in the transcript, which I believe is P782.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  This document being referred to by the accused is

19     Exhibit P1116, Your Honours.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21        Q.   Minister, this is a rather well-known dispatch in which you

22     notify about the decisions of the Assembly of the Serbian People.  And in

23     line two, it says -- I'll read the first sentence:

24             "At its meeting held on 27 March 1992, the Assembly of the

25     Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the

Page 4897

 1     political orientation of the Serbian people and the Sarajevo Agreement,

 2     promulgated the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina."

 4             This reference to the Sarajevo Agreement, is it a reference to

 5     the agreements with the European Union, led by Cutileiro and

 6     Lord Carrington?

 7        A.   The mediators were Jose Cutileiro, a Portuguese diplomat, and

 8     Lord Carrington, a UK diplomat.  And what we were looking at before were

 9     the basic principles to be developed later, and they were known as the

10     Lisbon Agreement and the Sarajevo Agreement, the fundamental principles

11     of the organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And this dispatch, among

12     other things, was in keeping with those agreements that had been reached

13     with the help of European mediators.

14        Q.   I don't know the exact page, but will you probably remember, in

15     the trial of Mr. Krajisnik, the Prosecution asked you whether you were

16     aware that you had started a civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina by this

17     telegram, and you answered that you were acting in keeping with the

18     decisions of the Assembly and the Council for National Defence.

19             Let me ask you, was the Council for National Defence established

20     as an advisory body of the Assembly of the Serbian People on the 27th of

21     March, 1992?

22        A.   I don't know, Mr. President.

23        Q.   Well, that is not in dispute.  We have it in transcripts.  But

24     what was said at the Presidency about the crisis in Kupres, and you

25     mentioned a multi-ethnic delegation going to Kupres and Zivinice,

Page 4898

 1     et cetera, do you remember that Croatian paramilitaries entered

 2     Bosanski Brod on the 3rd of March and perpetrated crimes against Serbs?

 3        A.   I remember events in Bosanski Brod, but I also remember Kupres,

 4     because I believe I went there with one of my colleagues.  We went out

 5     into the field.

 6        Q.   I suppose this document is in evidence.  We've heard the number.

 7     And towards the bottom, it says:

 8             "The contents of this dispatch needs to be notified to all

 9     employees of the MUP of the SR BH for the purposes of subjective and

10     timely information and to avoid possible incidents and other undesirable

11     consequences."

12             Does that include Croats and Muslims working in the MUP?

13        A.   It is self-explanatory.  Everything is well explained.  What the

14     legal basis is, the organisation involved, et cetera, it is mentioned

15     expressly.  And there is also a supplement to this dispatch, sent the

16     following day, in consultation with my other colleagues from the joint

17     MUP, where we sent a dispatch to inform that pending the resolution of

18     the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least as far as the

19     police is concerned, we will have joint training and education, joint

20     disposal of all materiel and equipment, and all services related to the

21     police.

22        Q.   We have that document.  Let me just remind you about one other

23     thing.

24             Do you recall that on 25 March a paramilitary unit from Croatia

25     made an incursion and killed a father and son at a petrol station at

Page 4899

 1     Bosanski Brod?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Do you remember that on the 26th of March, that same crowd,

 4     unchecked by anyone, went on to the nearby village of Sijekovac and

 5     killed everything and everyone there, including the livestock?

 6        A.   That was one in a series of events that were gaining momentum in

 7     the war-affected areas, because neighbouring Croatia was at war, and the

 8     war was spilling over with ever greater force across the Una and

 9     Drina River into Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This is just one example, and

10     there are more of them.  Such incidents were becoming more and more

11     frequent.

12        Q.   Do you remember that this crowd was not stopped by anyone; not by

13     the police, because they didn't have enough men, allegedly, nor the army,

14     nor the paramilitary units, because they didn't exist at the time, and

15     they were able to go on unchecked as far as they pleased?

16        A.   At that time, Bosnia and Herzegovina was wallowing in these

17     problems that we are discussing now, and an armed, irregular unit from

18     Croatia came in and perpetrated a massacre in Sijekovac.  They killed a

19     father and son at the petrol station and then went back -- came back

20     after that incident.  Bosnia and Herzegovina was undefended.  It was part

21     of Yugoslavia, but defended by no one.  Croats and Muslims did not want

22     an army.  Serbs wanted to stay in Yugoslavia.  Everyone want to do go

23     their own way.

24        Q.   The transcript says that Croats and Muslims did not want an army,

25     but the truth is they did not trust the army?

Page 4900

 1        A.   Yes, they didn't trust the army, and there was no one to defend

 2     the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was still at that time part

 3     of Yugoslavia.

 4        Q.   We have a document, minutes of the Assembly session of the 27

 5     March, when we established this National Defence Council.  Do you recall

 6     that Muslims formed the National Defence Council, at least, on the 10th

 7     or 11th of June, 1991?

 8        A.   Yes.  We've been through this before.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  If it is convenient, we'll have a break,

10     Mr. Karadzic, for half an hour.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Can I briefly ask for a document in e-court, 1D2022.  Could the

16     Serbian version please be given to the witness.  And in e-court, we're

17     going to see the translation.  That's it.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   May I inform you, Minister, that this is another one of your

20     documents.  The date is the 26th of March, 1992, that is to say, the day

21     when a massacre occurred in Sijekovac.  You are trying -- actually, a

22     multi-ethnic delegation is going to Kupres in order to defuse the crisis

23     in the relationship between the Serbs and Croats, as is stated here, in

24     your municipality.

25             Do you remember the document?  Do you remember going there?

Page 4901

 1        A.   Yes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page,

 3     please, in English.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   This is your signature.  Can you just tell us whether you managed

 6     to have the tensions eased during this meeting and avoid a conflict?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   However, already on the 3rd of April, there was a major clash

 9     there between paramilitary formations of the Croats, on the one hand,

10     and, on the other side, the Yugoslav People's Army; right?

11        A.   Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can this document be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  It was addressed to who, Mr. Mandic?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was sent to the chief of police

16     in the place that we were supposed to go to.  A delegation had been

17     announced from the police headquarters, and the actual names of the

18     members of the delegation were listed.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I was asking to what SJB it was addressed.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Public Security Station, Kupres;

21     that is, to the chief of police in the town that we were supposed to go

22     to.  So it's basically the local police.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             It is admitted.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D389, Your Honours.

Page 4902

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             1D1889, please.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This is your telegram, dated the 1st of April, 1992, and it

 5     represents continuity, in view of the previous telegram.  Do you remember

 6     this?

 7        A.   This is a joint dispatch of members of the collegium of the

 8     minister of police of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 9        Q.   As we can see here from the first sentence, it is based on the

10     Sarajevo Agreement on the possible future organisation of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?

12        A.   Yes.  Everyone attended, all assistant ministers and the deputy,

13     except for Minister Delimustafic, himself.

14        Q.   Mr. Zepinic was present as well; right?

15        A.   When I say "everybody," I mean all of those who were in the

16     professional collegium of the minister.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to recommend the entire document to the

18     participants in these proceedings.  These are agreements that are being

19     reached at political level among the three ethnic communities and under

20     the chairmanship of the European Community, or, rather, with the

21     mediation of Carrington and Cutileiro; right?

22        A.   Yes.  Yes, this was an agreement among all the participants in

23     this meeting.  I remember very well that we greeted each other and that

24     Brano Kvesic and Bruno Stojic went to Herzegovina as representatives of

25     the Croat people in the joint MUP.

Page 4903

 1        Q.   They went to work on the basis of this agreement; right?

 2        A.   Yes, yes.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Does this document envisage what it is that remains

 4     shared at the level of the republic, as far as police work is concerned?

 5        A.   I cannot see the second page in B/C/S, but I do know that we

 6     agreed that education, material and financial operations, joint services,

 7     should remain shared until the political status of Bosnia-Herzegovina is

 8     fully resolved; that is to say, until the principles that we discussed a

 9     moment ago are adopted.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I ask for the lower part of the

11     Serbian page and probably page 2 in English.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes, I forgot to mention that

13     it was agreed that education, schooling, should be shared or joint.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   So legislation, policy, education, and other things, whereas the

16     executive will belong to the constituent units, as envisaged in the

17     agreement?

18        A.   On the basis of the Cutileiro Agreement, President, that is to

19     say, the Sarajevo and Lisbon Agreement, that was the basis upon which

20     this law was passed, and I sent this dispatch on the basis of that.  All

21     of us agreed here that we should work on the basis of these standards

22     until the way in which the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are to

23     be established is finally agreed.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             Can we scroll up in Serbian so that we see who it was that signed

Page 4904

 1     this and on behalf of who this was sent.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Does this mean it was the collegium of the MUP of the

 4     Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 5        A.   Yes, and all the persons who attended the meeting are listed

 6     here.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can this document be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D390, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask for 10835, please.

12     That's the 65 ter number.

13             MR. KARADZIC:

14        Q.   This is a telegram that is basically simultaneous.  Actually, the

15     31st of March is the date on this document, whereas your document is the

16     1st of April, but they do have some kind of correlation.  It was signed

17     by the minister of the interior, who is disassociating himself in this

18     telegram from the agreement that all of you had reached at that collegium

19     meeting referred to in the previous document.  Do you recall this

20     document.

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Actually, he is disassociating himself from the dispatch that you

23     sent on the 31st of March, not from this that occurred on the 1st of

24     April; right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 4905

 1        Q.   If I remind you that our constant objection was during the

 2     negotiations that the Muslim side is operating along a double track, that

 3     Izetbegovic is saying one thing to me and that Silajdzic is saying

 4     something different in Europe and in Brussels, does that seem to you as

 5     part of this double-track operation under pressure exerted by the SDA?

 6        A.   The minister had to write this under the pressure exerted on him

 7     by his party.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Was Mr. Delimustafic a witness in the proceedings

 9     against you, where you were acquitted?  You were charged with having

10     committed war crimes.

11        A.   Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,

13     unless the OTP had already tendered it?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Was it not already admitted, by its number, D390?

15     It's your exhibit.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry.  What's the number of that?

18             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 10835.  The current document has been

19     admitted as Exhibit P1117, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much, a P exhibit.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can we now have 1D1908.  We are going to focus on part of the

23     testimony of Mr. Delimustafic's testimony under oath in Bosnia.  I

24     actually missed this.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4906

 1        Q.   Were you acquitted of having committed war crimes before a court

 2     in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   As far as I can see, on the basis of this, there seem to be some

 5     foreign judges, and I believe that that is why you were acquitted.  What

 6     do you think?

 7        A.   There were two people from this court, Mr. --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  It's not for the witness.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree.  This was just an

10     observation I made in passing.  It can be struck from the record.  It

11     actually reflects our domestic situation.  We are not happy with the

12     Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13             Page 7 --

14             JUDGE KWON:  An unnecessary comment, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I withdrew the comment.

16     That's the point.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Page 7.  In response to the question put by Defence counsel --

19     page 6 in English, actually.  Serbian, 7, and it's page 6 in English.

20     That's it.

21             Counsel Serdarevic, he's a Muslim, isn't he?

22        A.   Yes, and a friend of mine.

23        Q.   He is asking Mr. Delimustafic:

24             "During the night between the 1st and 2nd of March, in relation

25     to the barricades, after the killing of a wedding party member at

Page 4907

 1     Bascarsija, could you tell us what the minister of the interior did to

 2     resolve the barricades issue?"

 3             And Mr. Delimustafic says:

 4             "Well, our duty was to unblock the city, and as Momo was the

 5     assistant minister, the collegium concluded that he should go there and

 6     try to have the barricades removed."

 7             Counsel:  "Do you want to say -- could you say who erected the

 8     barricades?"

 9             And Delimustafic says --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Are we looking at the proper page?

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the second half of the page --

13     [In English] Could answer, Serdarevic, Counsel Serdarevic.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, continue.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16        Q.   Then Serdarevic says:

17             "Do you want to say -- could you say who erected the barricades?"

18             And Mr. Delimustafic says:

19             "Well, the people dissatisfied with the killing of the wedding

20     party member."

21             Is this confirmation of the reasons why the barricades were

22     erected, and did it come from the top level of the Ministry of the

23     Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Is the killing of the wedding party

24     member that caused the erection of the barricades?

25        A.   As far as I am concerned, Mr. President, I believe that that

Page 4908

 1     is --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  I was wondering where this process of referring to

 4     witness testimony in Mr. Mandic's case was going, but it appears to be an

 5     attempt to corroborate the witness's testimony with the testimony of

 6     witnesses in the previous case.  We've had previous discussions about the

 7     meaning of statements and the use of -- the difference between

 8     contemporaneous documentation or statements produced for purposes of

 9     legal proceedings generally, statements produced for purposes of these

10     particular legal proceedings, and maybe in between those, statements

11     produced for legal proceedings very closely related to these proceedings.

12     I raise that to seek some guidance on that, because it's clear that both

13     parties may find themselves interested in various aspects of testimony

14     related to cases undertaken by Bosnian authorities on related or

15     overlapping matters.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not quite sure whether I'm following you.  You

17     are objecting to putting these questions to the witness by the accused,

18     Mr. Tieger?

19             MR. TIEGER:  I wasn't precluding all aspects or all conceivable

20     references to such testimony, although I couldn't think of one off-hand

21     that might fall properly within the guide-lines, as I understood them.

22     But now it seems to be that we're trying to -- that there's an effort

23     made to take testimony given in previous cases and introduce it into this

24     case, and I would have thought that given the nature of the guide-lines,

25     given the nature of the 92 bis, 92 ter, 92 quater process, that that sort

Page 4909

 1     of importation for that sort of purpose is not what the Court envisioned.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger, it seems to me the problem is this:

 3     that it's a reference to a case which has been the subject of a final

 4     determination, but it is impossible, by the very nature of such

 5     litigation, to determine which evidence was accepted and which evidence

 6     wasn't.  Ergo, we would simply going down the road of satellite

 7     litigation, where it could not be proved, one way or another, whether the

 8     matters that have been referred to have been accepted or not accepted,

 9     and this Court would not be in a position to accept or not to accept that

10     testimony.  The fact that it's repeated in this Tribunal theoretically

11     brings it into the ambit of the determination, but I think you're right;

12     if one party goes down that road, then both parties are entitled to go

13     down that road, and I repeat what I said a few days ago.  The effect

14     would be satellite litigation, which would add weeks, if not months, to

15     the proceedings.

16             That's an observation rather than a ruling, but I know that

17     Dr. Karadzic has heard what I said.

18             JUDGE KWON:  If I can get further clarification, Mr. Tieger.

19             You referred to our guide-lines.  Is it not related to the

20     admission of documents or evidence?

21             MR. TIEGER:  Well, in that connection, what I had in mind at that

22     particular moment was the fact that we have had some difficulty with the

23     issues surrounding the admissibility and the timing of the admissibility

24     of documents -- of official documents contemporaneously produced by, for

25     example, the Bosnian Serb political and military authorities.  Now,

Page 4910

 1     that -- and as a general matter, we've distinguished that from witness

 2     testimony which has been subject to the guide-lines provided within the

 3     Rules of Procedure and Evidence of this Tribunal and have been treated

 4     quite separately.  And I say that because the admissibility and weight

 5     factors surrounding contemporaneous documents produced at the time not

 6     for litigation, I think, is clearly -- clearly presents more direct,

 7     simpler issues, and there's no dispute, I think, about the broad

 8     admissibility of those factors.  And, in fact, the parties have been

 9     consistently or largely united in their views that those documents are

10     admitted.

11             So I use this as a point of contrast to something like this,

12     where we're now on the verge of re-litigating or contemplating the

13     re-litigation of entirely separate cases, and I think the Rules envision

14     that, for the most part, parties can call witnesses, rather than attempt

15     to import litigation -- extracts of litigation in previous proceedings

16     where those contemplated witnesses have provided testimony.  Otherwise,

17     we -- in many instances, there wouldn't have been no need for the

18     elaboration preparation of 92 ter packages and the presence of those

19     witnesses here in court.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Speaking for myself, Mr. Tieger, you could rise when

21     Mr. Karadzic was about to tender this transcript as evidence, but he was

22     putting the question to the witness, who was there, hearing that

23     evidence, Mr. Delimustafic's evidence.  So speaking for myself, I see no

24     problem putting that question at this moment.

25             Mr. Karadzic, do you have anything to say?

Page 4911

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency.

 2             With all due respect to the other side, my distinguished

 3     colleague, I should like to thank the OTP because they disclosed this

 4     document according to Rule 68 in Batch 214 and recommended to the Defence

 5     to use it.

 6             On the other hand, Prosecution witnesses here have contended that

 7     the barricades were erected as our response to the referendum, although

 8     this was an all-Bosnia referendum, and this was not the case.  There were

 9     no barricades elsewhere; only in Sarajevo.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it's proper to discuss in detail in

11     the presence of the witness.  We'll confer.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber wanted to deliberate on this matter

14     further, so I would advise you to skip to another matter, leaving this

15     matter -- deferring this matter to next week.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence has nothing against

17     that; namely, if what is relevant is in the transcript, for this not to

18     be admitted.

19             Shall I continue?

20             JUDGE KWON:  So move on to another topic or another document.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22        Q.   Let me just conclude, Mr. Minister.  This is confirmation that

23     Mr. Delimustafic contested, under pressure -- all right, all right, very

24     well.

25             Can we now see 65 ter 05422.  We'll go over this one very briefly

Page 4912

 1     just to see the further implementation in the police of this.  This is

 2     the Centre of Security Services in Banja Luka.  It is forwarding this

 3     same telegram, dated the 1st, to Bosanski Brod, Srpska Krupa, Drvar,

 4     Glamoc, Bosansko Grahovo, Kupres, Donji Vakuf, Serbian Station, et

 5     cetera, Boskoski Petrovac, also.

 6             Does this correspond to what was sent from the headquarters?

 7        A.   Yes, and the chief of the Security Centre acted on instructions

 8     from that dispatch from the 31st of March, 1992.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Can this document be admitted?

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Was this a customary method of dealing with such things?

13        A.   Yes.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D391, Your Honour.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   It says here:

18             "The transformation of the Centre of Security Services, it has

19     been concluded, has not been done on a mono-national basis, and we shall

20     not allow the one party taking of facilities and equipment.  The workers

21     shall voluntarily opt, provided that under the new Law on the Interior,

22     everybody has been given the opportunity to remain working at the posts

23     at which they were when the transformation was undertaken."

24             Mr. Minister, you were quite well versed in the goings-on in the

25     judiciary, et cetera, when, for instance, the Serbian municipality of

Page 4913

 1     Krupa and the Muslim municipality of Krupa were to merge.  We can see, on

 2     the basis of this document, that the police stations will not necessarily

 3     be mono-national?

 4        A.   This is according to the Law on Internal Affairs, and according

 5     to my dispatch, and according to the Constitution of the

 6     Republika Srpska, where it is stated that whosoever wished to remain

 7     working in that centre could do so.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And this reflected, in a proportionate way, the share

 9     of that respective people in the Serbian municipality?

10        A.   Yes, in the place concerned where a municipality or a police

11     station was to be set up.

12        Q.   The rest of the police of Muslim ethnicity who lived in a

13     newly-formed Muslim municipality were supposed to join their

14     newly-established police station; right?

15        A.   This is in the realm of probability.  I cannot say anything

16     specific.  Probably.  People actually go to work where they are assigned

17     to go.

18        Q.   Were there any tensions or was there potential for tensions?  If,

19     in those times, a purely Muslim patrol would go to a Serbian village or

20     neighbourhood, and vice versa, was that a quite risky exercise?

21        A.   Yes.  At that time, yes.

22        Q.   Do you remember that in some municipalities, even in the absence

23     of a political recommendation, I think in Ilidza, Tomo Kovac and his

24     colleague from Hrasnica agreed informally that that Muslim policemen

25     should be sent to Hrasnica and Serbian policemen to the Serbian part of

Page 4914

 1     the municipality?

 2        A.   As there were inter-ethnic tensions, yes.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Can this document be admitted?  It has been admitted.  All right,

 5     thank you.

 6             Can we now see 1D1907.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Do you remember, Mr. Minister, that the Presidency of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina, on the 4th of April, without the consent of the Serbian

10     representative, Professor Koljevic and Professoresse [as interpreted]

11     Plavsic, had adopted a decision on general mobilisation?

12        A.   Yes, and this so-called rump Presidency without the Serbian

13     representatives sat daily from the 4th until the 8th of April, when the

14     independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was proclaimed on the basis of the

15     recognition of it by the European Union on the 6th of April.

16        Q.   Do you remember, Mr. Minister, that the Presidency undertook upon

17     itself that the referendum results would not prejudge the political order

18     and system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that that had been concluded

19     and accepted on the 2nd of March at a session together with Mr. Dukic?

20        A.   Yes, we had occasion to see that today.

21        Q.   And do you remember that since the decisions of the people --

22     that the people's decision at the referendum was never verified at the

23     session of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as required under the

24     Constitution?

25        A.   Under the Constitution, to change the social order of the

Page 4915

 1     republic, two-thirds of the population should have voted in favour of

 2     that.  That is 66 point something per cent.  According to the results

 3     published by the two sides, the out-turn at the referendum had been

 4     64 per cent of the population, so that that legal provision was not met

 5     and the referendum could, therefore, not have been constitutionally

 6     legal, even though one constituent people completely disregarded the

 7     referendum.

 8        Q.   So the two-thirds requirement was not met for the referendum.

 9     But do you agree that in any scenario, it should have been verified, I

10     mean, the results of the referendum should have been verified at the

11     Assembly session by the Assembly and proclaimed by also a two-thirds

12     majority of all the MPs?

13        A.   Yes, that is a constitutional category.

14        Q.   Do you agree that that could not have been adopted in the

15     Assembly because of the 86 Serbs -- at least 83 of the Serb MPs in the

16     Assembly would have voted against, and maybe more?

17        A.   Mr. President, I don't know what would have happened had that

18     been the case, but I do know that it had not been tabled on the agenda of

19     the Assembly for verification and that the Assembly did not function, in

20     fact, at that time at all.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can we see the second page now.  In English, too, please.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Can you interpret for us or read these points out for us of the

25     decision of the 4th of April, namely?

Page 4916

 1        A.   "The Presidency of the SR BH, at its session held today on the

 2     4th of April, 1992, bearing in mind the complexity of the political and

 3     security situation in the republic, concluded:

 4             "1.  That in keeping with the decision of the SR BH Presidency of

 5     the 3rd of April, 1992, and its own assessment, a mobilisation be carried

 6     out of the territorial defence units of all the municipalities and the

 7     city of Sarajevo in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

 8     including communications units.

 9             "2.  That it will demand from the responsible organs of the

10     Yugoslav People's Army that the weapons, military equipment and other

11     materiel and technical equipment that were entrusted to them for

12     safekeeping be returned to territorial defence units - municipal and

13     district BH TO staffs.

14             "3.  That a mobilisation be carried out of the entire reserve

15     force of the SR BH police, in keeping with the earlier decisions of the

16     Presidency and Government of the SR BH."

17        Q.   Thank you.  I hope the parties can see the rest.  Let's just

18     remind ourselves.  The entire Territorial Defence is raised, mobilised.

19     Do you remember that according to our Law on All People's Defence and

20     People's Self-Protection, it is the president of the municipality who

21     commands the Territorial Defence?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   At the level of the republic, it's the Council of National

24     Defence?

25        A.   Yes, that's according to that law we cited.

Page 4917

 1        Q.   Do you remember that before this mobilisation, an unlawful

 2     increase was made to the reserve police force, up to 100 per cent, up to

 3     600, by taking over the unassigned military conscripts, Croats and

 4     Muslims, who had not responded to JNA mobilisation call?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Bearing in mind that Sefer Halilovic, up to this date, had

 7     already created 103 municipal staffs and 9 regional staffs, with over

 8     100.000 or 150.000 members of the Patriotic League, plus various

 9     paramilitary formations, Green Berets and such, is this really, by now, a

10     respectable military force with close to 300.000 men?

11        A.   Sefer Halilovic, an active-duty JNA officer, in the summer of

12     1991 began to establish and established paramilitary formations called

13     the Patriotic League.

14        Q.   In this decision, they didn't state it, but do you remember that

15     the Serbian part of the Presidency disputed this mobilisation?

16        A.   I believe that the Serbian members of the Presidency did not

17     participate in these conclusions.  And what they may have disputed later,

18     I don't know.

19        Q.   In your view, as the boss of all crime prevention services in all

20     of Bosnia, was this a frightening decision for the entire Serbian people?

21     In addition to being illegal, in addition to the Serbian veto, was it

22     really frightening in its scope and implications?

23        A.   I can't find the right words to explain this now, but it was

24     obvious that Bosnia and Herzegovina was collapsing as a result of all

25     these events, and there was no understanding to be found between members

Page 4918

 1     of the government and the Presidency.  And under partisan pressure and by

 2     importing people from other countries, they tore up the MUP.  And I mean

 3     the Party of Democratic Action did it, not my dispatch or all the other

 4     things quoted here.

 5        Q.   Who was the supposed enemy of this major force?

 6        A.   The Serbs, Mr. President.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can this document be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D392, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 1D1914.  It's minutes of

12     this protracted Presidency session from April 4 to 8.  We also have a

13     translation.

14             The 4th, 5th, 6th, and the 8th of April, the Presidency sat.

15     Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic were absent, and on the agenda, we

16     see the first fight and the political insecurity situation.

17             Can we move to page 2 in both version.

18             We've heard all this before.  The Civilian Protection and the

19     entire police force are being mobilised and activated.

20             Can we see page 3 in English and page 4 in Serbian.

21             This would be from the session of the 8th of April.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   On the 8th of April, the Presidency held the fourth round of its

24     session, considering the difficult political and security situation,

25     before adopting the following decisions.

Page 4919

 1             And we can move to page 4 in English.

 2             And here we see the proclamation of imminent threat of war.  The

 3     republic was renamed from "Socialist Republic" into just "Republic."  The

 4     hitherto Republic Staff of Territorial Defence is abolished, and the

 5     Staff of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina is established.

 6     This is a total break with all the institutions that had existed until

 7     then?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 5 in Serbian.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   They decide that the use of the Territorial Defence would be a

12     matter for the Presidency of the republic to decide.  The Ministry of

13     Defence would, through the Staff of Territorial Defence, command and

14     control TO units.  And further below, it says the Presidency relieved

15     from duty commander of the republic and Territorial Defence Staff of BH

16     and the chief of the Republic Territorial Defence Staff,

17     Drago Vukosavljevic, a Serb, and Fikret Jahic, a Muslim, respectively,

18     and instead they appointed Colonel Hasan Efendic, commander of the

19     Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

20     Colonel Stjepan Siber, chief of Staff of the Territorial Defence.

21             Do you remember that Hasan Efendic became the commander, the top

22     position, in the Territorial Defence Staff?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Do you remember that four days later, the same Hasan Efendic

25     issued a directive to mount obstacles put, put up hindrances, and

Page 4920

 1     otherwise harass the JNA Army in the entire territory?

 2        A.   Hasan Efendic proclaimed the JNA to be an enemy of Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina.  He issued an order to mount obstacles on the roads, to

 4     seize JNA weapons, and all the rest that followed.

 5        Q.   Do you agree that this moment marked the collapse -- the complete

 6     breakdown of the system in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 7        A.   Destruction had started before, and this was just the final

 8     moment of collapse.

 9        Q.   We've seen a document before in which your then

10     Minister Delimustafic voices his critique at the session of the

11     Presidency and says, What are you doing?  You proclaimed war on the JNA.

12     That's what he had to say about these instructions issued by

13     Hasan Efendic to undertake military action against the JNA, which at that

14     moment was still the military -- the legal military force in Bosnia and

15     Herzegovina?

16        A.   Yes, in all the barracks and garrisons throughout the republic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D393, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 65 ter 05878.

21     05878.  We believe it has a translation.  It's a Prosecution document.

22             This is a communique of the National Defence Council, which is an

23     advisory body to the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina, and this National Security Council has been in existence for

25     seven days at that time.

Page 4921

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can you read the first paragraph?

 3        A.   "Public Announcement":

 4             "The rump Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, operating without

 5     any representatives of the Serbian people, has issued highly

 6     irresponsible and illegal instructions regarding the activation of

 7     Territorial Defence and people's self-organisation, and the activation of

 8     Civilian Protection and reserve police."

 9        Q.   Go on?

10        A.   "With this move, the rump Presidency --"

11             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not find this.

12        A.   "The Presidency has acknowledged the collapse of the

13     constitutional and legal order, as well as that of legal authorities and

14     has thus instigated chaos, violence and civil war.

15             "The Serbian National Defence Council appeals to the people to

16     ignore this --"

17             JUDGE KWON:  Next page.  Please go on, Mr. Mandic.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The Serbian National Security

19     Council hereby calls upon the people to disregard this ill-advised appeal

20     of the rump BH Presidency and do everything in its power to avoid civil

21     war and the suffering of the people."

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Could you finish, please?

24        A.   "The Serb National Defence Council hereby orders that should any

25     Territorial Defence, Civilian Protection or reserve police units in any

Page 4922

 1     area respond to this invitation of the Presidency, crisis staffs in those

 2     areas should be activated and the Serbian people's Territorial Defence,

 3     Civilian Protection and reserve police mobilised, primarily for the

 4     purpose of maintaining the order, peace, and safety of civilians of all

 5     nationalities.

 6             "President of the council, Dr. Radovan Karadzic."

 7        Q.   Do you agree that they had activated their own crisis staffs

 8     already in the summer of 1992 -- sorry, summer of 1991, and the Serbs did

 9     that only just before the outbreak of the war?

10        A.   Under the control of Sefer Halilovic and the Patriotic League,

11     staffs had already been created in municipalities.

12        Q.   If this document is true and the admission of Sefer Halilovic is

13     true, that there were staffs and units already created in 110

14     municipalities, would that mean that they were not created only in Croat

15     municipalities?

16        A.   I don't know.

17        Q.   Do you agree that in these 103 municipalities, there was a

18     significant share of the Serbian population, and in 40 of them there was

19     even an absolute Serbian majority?

20        A.   I cannot be positive about any numbers or municipalities with a

21     majority Serbian population, but I know that quite a few of the 109 had a

22     majority Serbian population, such as in Eastern Herzegovina, a part of

23     Posavina, the Krajina.

24        Q.   Do you agree that in all these activities to establish an illegal

25     army, the local Serbian population could see exactly what it was all

Page 4923

 1     about?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D394, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 1D170.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   You adopted into evidence the request of Sefer Halilovic to be

 9     promoted, where he says that already in September 1991, he had already

10     created 98 of these staffs, and now we see what this plan of preparations

11     and organisation of the Patriotic League for the defence of the sovereign

12     Republic of BH looks like.

13             Just read the sub-headlines.  Do we have a translation?

14        A.   I have it in B/C/S.

15        Q.   Just read the headings.

16        A.   "Preparation and Organisation of the Patriotic League to Defend

17     the Sovereign Republic of BH."  Heading 1:  "Main Political Staff of the

18     Patriotic League."  "Composition."  "Task."  "Regional/Political Staff of

19     the Patriotic League."

20        Q.   Can we scroll down?

21        A.   "Municipal/Political Staff of the Patriotic League."  "Main

22     Military Staff of the Patriotic League, BH."

23        Q.   Next page, please.  Just the headings.

24        A.   I've already read this.  We need the rest of the page.

25        Q.   Can we then see page 3.  No, these are military staffs.  You were

Page 4924

 1     reading about the political staffs, but I can do it instead of you.

 2     "Regional Military Staff" and "Municipal Military Staff."  So they had a

 3     political line and a military line.

 4             Can you read about the tasks?

 5        A.   "The Task of Sector Units."  "Tasks of Manoeuvring Units."

 6     "Tasks of Logistical Units."

 7        Q.   The last page, please.  Just the underlined bit.

 8        A.   "At the level of municipalities, establish municipal logistical

 9     bases," and the same on the regional level.

10        Q.   Was this a criminal activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time?

11        A.   It was a paramilitary formation, it was the establishment of a

12     para-army.

13        Q.   Were you, in the police, aware of this activity?

14        A.   Yes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can this document be admitted for identification?

17             JUDGE KWON:  We'll do so.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D395, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             1D1093, please, could we have that.  1D1093.  Could we just see

21     the number?  Yes, well, that's it, right.  Now we have the translation,

22     too.  Could we please have page 2 in Serbian.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Minister, is this an announcement of the Serbian minister --

25     rather, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serb Republic of Bosnia

Page 4925

 1     and Herzegovina, Sarajevo?  The date is the 5th of April, 1992?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Please, can you read this out:

 4             "In light of the events of last night and today, in Sarajevo, the

 5     Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina is issuing the following announcement ..."

 7             This has to do with mobilisation, or, rather, what happened in

 8     Sarajevo immediately on the evening of the 4th after the mobilisation had

 9     been declared; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11             "Announcement."

12             "On the 4th of April, 1992, at around 2300 hours, intensive

13     preparations were commenced by the Muslim part of the former Ministry of

14     Internal Affairs for the blocking and overtaking of the Ministry of

15     Internal Affairs building, as well as the Krtelji landmark, where the

16     special unit were stationed.  Following the forced taking of the ministry

17     building and the expulsion of ministry employees of Serb nationality or

18     ethnicity, an intense attack was carried out on the Krtelji landmark, via

19     a runway of the Sarajevo Airport, which had already been taken by the

20     aforementioned units and the so-called Green Berets."

21        Q.   Thank you.  I hope that we can skip part of it.  Everyone can

22     rea, I hope.  Can you then go on from this action?  Actually,

23     Novo Sarajevo, what happened in Novo Sarajevo?

24        A.   Is it the same page?

25        Q.   Yes, the same paragraph:  "Somewhat later, around 1.00, to be

Page 4926

 1     more precise ..."

 2        A.   "Sometime later, at around 1.00, a classical terrorist attack was

 3     carried out by the so-called Green Berets, in which the Public Security

 4     Station of Novo Sarajevo was taken.  During that attack, police officer

 5     Pero Petrovic was killed, while two other police officers on duty were

 6     disarmed and taken prisoner.  In this operation, the Green Berets, the

 7     complete arsenal of weapons and equipment were taken and distributed to

 8     citizens of Muslim ethnicity.  Simultaneously, the Green Berets, along

 9     with the active and reserve police formations of Muslim ethnicity, had

10     usurped practically all vital facilities in the city of Sarajevo."

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree, Minister, that that night, a few hours

12     after general mobilisation was declared, the Green Berets carried out

13     this terror in Sarajevo and that there was practically not a single

14     building left that they had not taken with their sniper shooters?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to ask you the following -- actually,

17     can this document be admitted?

18             I would like to ask you about what happened with the special unit

19     that, in accordance with the current process of agreement-reaching and

20     the establishment of the two police forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina --

21     actually, it was divided on the basis of this agreement on the 4th of

22     April into two police units -- police forces, rather.

23             Can this document be admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D396, Your Honour.

Page 4927

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Am I right, Mr. Minister, if I say that in the special unit, and

 3     it was used unlawfully, and Delimustafic speaks about that during his

 4     testimony in Sarajevo, weren't there objections in this regard throughout

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  So am I right when I say that on the 4th of April,

 6     in the evening, they reached an agreement and parted in a friendly way,

 7     they embraced and kissed, and they said, You take this much equipment,

 8     we'll take that much, and so on and so forth?

 9        A.   That was preceded by the nucleus of the collegium of the minister

10     at the base of the special unit in Krtelji, attended by Vito Zepinic,

11     Jusuf Pusina, and Bruno Stojic.  We know that the commander of the

12     special unit was Dragan Vikic, a very honest and capable policeman, a

13     Croat, and it was agreed then, and on orders issued by the minister, that

14     the Serb part of the unit be relocated to the special unit facility that

15     was at the school in Vrace, the so-called F facility, whereas the second

16     part of the special unit, consisting of Muslims and Croats, should go to

17     the police centre at Bjelave.  That was the order of Minister

18     Delimustafic that was carried out by these three assistant ministers, and

19     that is when this peaceful parting took place among people who had

20     already clashed.

21             On that occasion, the members of the special unit, who had been

22     trained for anti-terrorist activity, hostage crises, dealing with natural

23     disasters, et cetera, left that facility carrying their personal weapons

24     only.

25        Q.   What was expected --

Page 4928

 1        A.   Sorry, Mr. President.  That is what was confirmed by

 2     Mr. Delimustafic when he testified in my case.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did the SDA try to undermine this agreement on the

 4     peaceful split of the special unit, and did they try to talk the Serbian

 5     members to stay on?

 6        A.   Attempts were made through Mr. Zepinic to recruit - let me

 7     think - Miodrag Repija and Dragimir Maric.  They offered apartments to

 8     them if they were to stay on, but that was after the agreement was

 9     reached and after the meeting took place.

10        Q.   Next week, we are going to present some documents that speak

11     about these attempts.

12             Do we agree that on the next day, the police, the Serb police --

13     actually, the Serb part of the special unit, when they were moving into

14     the premises provided to them, came across an ambush, and two Serb

15     policemen got killed on that occasion?

16        A.   The members of the special unit parted on the 4th of April.

17     Facility F, that was the headquarters of the special unit, had not been

18     used for several years, and it had been agreed that it would be cleaned

19     and that the members of the special units would then enter before the

20     political disagreements were resolved.  They spent that night at the

21     facility in Blazuj.  I think that it belonged to the UPI economic

22     organisation.  When it was reported that the facility had been prepared

23     for taking these people in, they went there, carrying their own weapons.

24     And in front of this facility, they were met by 170 men in trenches.

25     They were armed, and they opened fire at them.  On that occasion, two

Page 4929

 1     Serbs were killed, Pupic and Lizdek.  They were members of the special

 2     unit.  Three were wounded, Jevic, Dusko, and Repija, Miodrag, and I don't

 3     know the name of the third one.  And eight civilians got killed, too, who

 4     lived nearby.  They were killed in their apartments; also a man who had a

 5     kiosk there.  On that occasion, of course, there weren't any casualties

 6     on the side of those who had staged the ambush.

 7        Q.   That Serb special unit, was it intended in the first place for

 8     anti-sabotage activities, natural disasters, and so on?  Was the Serb

 9     part supposed to be in Serb neighbourhoods, and the Muslim part in Muslim

10     neighbourhoods, in order to avoid any tension?

11        A.   That's the agreement that was agreed upon -- that was reached

12     only recently.

13        Q.   Did the Serb specials managed to overcome and -- these 170

14     trained men and also save the lives of the cadets without having any

15     casualties?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Some mention has been made of some assistance that came from a

18     tank unit of the JNA in Lukavica.  Do you remember that that tank unit at

19     that point in time was commanded by Colonel Enver Hadzihasanovic, later

20     an officer of the Muslim Army?

21        A.   I know with certainty that the armed members of the paramilitary

22     formations, the Patriotic League and the Green Berets, moved from the

23     Vrace monument into a new clash with the Serb specials and the police

24     that had already been stationed there at the school.  Then, at the

25     request -- the public call made by Mr. Izetbegovic, the army went out to

Page 4930

 1     separate the two sides.  Had that not been done, there would have been an

 2     armed conflict of an even larger scale and there would have been more

 3     casualties.  The army did not fire a single bullet.  They went out, they

 4     separated the warring parties -- or, actually, not warring parties.  The

 5     war had not started yet.  The two parties in this conflict.  And then

 6     these men withdrew, at the request of Avdo Hebib, not to clash with the

 7     army and the Serb police, and they returned, via Kovaci, down there to

 8     Grbavica, to the centre of Sarajevo.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Can we now have in e-court 1D1906.

11             While we're waiting for that -- well, yes, we have the first page

12     here.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Minister, let me familiarise you with this.  This is a document

15     of the minister of defence of the Army of the Republic of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  On the 5th of April, before the recognition of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina, he took over powers that were somewhat more extensive

18     than those envisaged by law, since defence fell under the jurisdiction of

19     the federal state?

20        A.   Yes, defence fell under the jurisdiction of the federal state.

21        Q.   Here it is, then.  He is writing to all the presidents of

22     municipalities, of executive councils, municipal secretariats for

23     national defence, town secretariats for national defence, assistant

24     minister for national defence in the district, and the commander of the

25     Republican Territorial Defence Staff.  He says here on the first page:

Page 4931

 1             "Assess the need to mobilise certain units of the

 2     Territorial Defence."

 3             Can we now move on to the next page in Serbian.  English, too,

 4     actually, next page.

 5             I'm afraid that you cannot see these conclusions, so I'll read it

 6     out, and the English is quite legible:

 7             "1.  The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina calls on all

 8     citizens, as well as state organs and political parties, to focus all

 9     their efforts on maintaining peace," et cetera.

10             Then paragraph 2:

11             "The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina charges the BH Ministry

12     of National Defence to immediately provide expert assistance to those

13     municipalities which assess that there is a need for mobilisation and to

14     secure the materiel and technical equipment required," et cetera,

15     et cetera.

16             Perhaps you cannot see this in the Serbian version, but then it

17     also says:

18             "Appropriate weapons to units of the Territorial Defence that are

19     indispensable."

20             That is what is supposed to be secured, that is.

21             So the minister of defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina is being

22     charged to provide necessary weapons and equipment to units of the

23     Territorial Defence that is indispensable for ensuring public law and

24     order and securing vital facilities, and instructing and co-ordinating

25     compulsory activities of the subjects of the Territorial Defence, and so

Page 4932

 1     on and so forth.

 2             Next page, please.

 3             Have you heard of this?  Did you know about this telegram, sent

 4     by Minister Jerko Doko, that was actually an instruction for the melding

 5     of the police and the Territorial Defence?

 6        A.   No, Mr. President, I was not aware of this letter.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Does this look like a take-over of the powers of the

 8     federal state?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   This melding or merging of the Territorial Defence, what does it

11     look like to you?  Does it look like a public and open establishment of

12     an armed force of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, apart from the

13     Patriotic League and other paramilitaries?  Now the joint armed units are

14     becoming the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

15        A.   This meant placing under a single command all the armed forces

16     that were in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17        Q.   Although you're not familiar with this document, you are familiar

18     with the phenomenon, itself; right?

19        A.   Well, we saw that on the basis of the previous documents and

20     communications.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that sometime on the 15th of April,

22     they established this Territorial Defence officially, and somewhat later

23     they declared this to be the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?

24        A.   The Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 4933

 1             Can this document be admitted?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D397, Your Honours.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Can we now see 1D18888 in e-court, please.  1D1888.

 6             This is a telegram.  I don't know whether we have the

 7     translation.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Would you tell the Chamber and the parties what this is about?

10        A.   This is a telegram by the chief of the centre in Doboj, the chief

11     of the Security Services in Doboj, Andrija Bjelosevic, and he says:

12             "As chief of the Security Services in Doboj, I have to draw your

13     attention to the fact that measures of preparedness of the first and

14     second degree are to be taken upon the proclamation of extraordinary

15     circumstances, i.e., those from the third degree upon the proclamation of

16     war, state of war, which is in the competence of the Presidency of the

17     SFRY according to the valid regulations.

18             "In addition to that, by your document DT number 08147 of the 2nd

19     of November, 1990, the MUP receives and passes on the ordered measures of

20     alert, but does not issue any orders to that effect, itself."

21        Q.   Would you like to explain to us what was this chief from Doboj

22     writing to the MUP and to the federal SUP?  What were the illegalities he

23     had noticed?  What was he talking about?

24        A.   The proclamation of the first- and second-level measures, and he

25     insisted on the MUP only being empowered to transmit orders, rather to

Page 4934

 1     issue them, themselves; that they had arrogated upon themselves some

 2     powers which were within the competence of the federal state.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  This is the 6th of April.  So after having received

 4     all these measures that had been taken by Doko and by the government and

 5     by the rump Presidency, he observed these illegal practices and informed

 6     thereon the MUP and the federal secretariat; is that right?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             Can this document be admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D398, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it is possible for me to clarify

13     one document before the break.  This is a document I would like to call,

14     it is 1D855.  We ought to have the translation.  We probably do so if we

15     could see both versions, the Serbian and the English.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Minister, this is from your jurisdiction.  1D855 is the

18     number.  This is from within your sphere of competence.  This is general

19     crime.  This is the examination of Senad Memic, Senad Memic, born in

20     1953, and the interrogation took place on the 14th of April, 1992.

21             Are you aware of this arrest and this interrogation?

22        A.   Aren't these those lads who were captured -- who were arrested on

23     Mount Igman or Trebevic?

24        Q.   You can see, in the first paragraph they were arms dealers who

25     had distributed around 5.000 automatic rifles, and so on.  Do you see

Page 4935

 1     this first paragraph?

 2        A.   I do not have that.

 3        Q.   You do not have, in the Serbian version:  "In the period from

 4     September ..."

 5        A.   Uh-huh.

 6        Q.   Would you please read this document and then tell us what it is

 7     about?  They refer to the Muslim part of the MUP, Jusuf Pusina,

 8     Bakir Alispahic, Kemal Sabovic, Mirsad Srebrenkovic.  Kemal Sabovic who

 9     replaced Stanisic, who had been removed; then Alibabic --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Before we get into this document, I want to raise an

12     objection to it.  I'll start with the simplest one, the document --

13             JUDGE KWON:  I wanted to ask the accused as to its foundation.

14     That's the concern?

15             MR. TIEGER:  That's the first one, Your Honour, yes.

16             JUDGE KWON:  We don't see the author, and we have no clue what

17     this is about, so could you clarify that first, Mr. Karadzic?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   Mr. Minister, was this a customary dispatch in communication in

20     the MUP, in the police of Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Was this a standard

21     telex by which such communication was carried out?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  I think the accused is focusing on the previous

24     telex by Mr. Bjelosevic.  The concern at the moment was the document

25     currently on screen.

Page 4936

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, this is also

 2     pertinent to this.  This is a standard-model document, so I would like to

 3     know whether the minister recognises this standard form of communication.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Let's see whether Mr. Mandic can answer that

 5     question.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a statement taken from this

 7     person by the authorised official in the police.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  How can we know this, seeing this document,

 9     Mr. Mandic?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was in this way that policemen

11     took statements from any interrogated persons.  You will see that it

12     bears a signature.  I don't see it now, but it is certainly there.  In

13     the right corner is the signature of the authorised policeman, police

14     official, and in the left corner, of the person who gave the statement.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Collapse the English for the moment and let's see

16     the entire document, first page.  Can we see the entire document in one

17     page, without zooming in, whether there's any signature.  And can we go

18     to the --

19             THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Can we go to the last page of this document.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the handwriting of the

22     arrested Senad Memic.  This is his statement, in his own hand.  It was

23     forwarded by telefax.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Does this one have a signature,

25     Mr. President, the handwritten one?  It has to have a signature.

Page 4937

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see page 4 of this.

 2             Can you tell us whether it has some signature, Mr. Mandic?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not see a signature on this

 4     page.  There has to be more text, I expect.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There have to be many more pages,

 6     many more handwritten pages, because in the telex there are two and a

 7     half typewritten pages.  So if we could look through the handwritten

 8     statement, we would -- we could find the signature.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  This is only 10 pages, so we can start from that

10     first page and we can go through until page 10.

11             Take a brief look, Mr. Mandic.

12             No, we start from page 1, and show page 2, page 3, page 4, and

13     continue until page 10.

14             This is the last page of the typed version.  I see no name.

15             And we'll continue to the handwritten part.  It continues in that

16     way.

17             Now, you have seen the entire document, so what can you tell us

18     about this document, Mr. Mandic?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up the last page to

20     see the end of it.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the B/C/S, can we see the end of

22     the page, scroll it up.  A bit more, a bit more, please.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We just want it scrolled up -- or,

24     rather, down.  We want to see the end of the page.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I think this is the whole document, as we have it.

Page 4938

 1     And I also have to note that page 8 and 9 in the handwritten part are

 2     missing.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It seems to me, Your Honours, that

 4     this is not the complete document.  Evidently, the handwritten statement

 5     of one Memic from Hrasnica was typewritten, but it should have had -- the

 6     handwritten statement should bear the signature of the person giving, and

 7     the statement and the typewritten version should have the signature of

 8     the person who typed it.  So it does seem to me that this document is

 9     incomplete.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We shall try to search the EDS to

11     have it completed, and for the time being I can and shall withdraw it.

12             Is it, Your Honours, time for our break?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll have a break for an hour.

14                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 1.34 p.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Over the break, Mr. Tieger and Mr. Karadzic, the

17     Chamber had the opportunity to discuss the issue regarding the

18     transcript, in the Bosnian part.  According to the guide-line we gave,

19     the Chamber will not admit the transcript of the other tribunal or in

20     foreign countries, but the Chamber sees no problem putting the question

21     to the witness, who was there at the time.  So we'll allow you to

22     continue putting your question.

23             Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  It is quite acceptable

25     to the Defence.

Page 4939

 1             Can we call up, please, 1D1908, to jog Mr. Mandic's memory, very

 2     briefly.  Just a few questions.  Page 7 in Serbian; page 6 in English.

 3             MR. KARADZIC [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   These are the pages.  We've discussed this.  Defence Counsel

 5     Serdarevic asks about the barricades after the killing of the member of

 6     the wedding party in Bascarsija, and Mr. Delimustafic says it was our

 7     duty to deblock the town and that you were sent on behalf of the ministry

 8     to get them to do this.  And Mr. Serdarevic says:

 9             "Would you tell us who had set up the barricades?"

10             And Mr. Delimustafic says:

11             "Well, these people who were dissatisfied about this killing of

12     the member of the wedding party."

13             And then he says:  "It was the Serbs."

14        A.   Yes, and I was sent by the collegium of the ministry to inspect

15     these barricades to avoid a major disturbance of law and order, because

16     Mr. Delimustafic had ordered this.

17        Q.   Did it ever cross our minds that the barricades had been set up

18     because of the referendum, or were they set up because of that killing of

19     the member of the wedding party?

20        A.   There was no doubt in anyone's mind that it was all done over the

21     killing of the bride's father in Bascarsija.

22        Q.   Do you remember that the killer was treated as a hero and that he

23     appeared very soon on television to explain why he had killed that member

24     of the wedding party?

25        A.   Yes, he was invited to a TV show.

Page 4940

 1        Q.   The parties can read this, but this is the passage that I wanted

 2     to go on the record.

 3             Serbian page 8 now, and English page 7.

 4             The question was:

 5             "As far as Vraca is concerned, Mr. Minister, did you know that

 6     the Serb part of the special unit would go to the F building at Vraca?"

 7             And Delimustafic's answer was:

 8             "Well, Vito informed us at the collegium, since he had been a

 9     couple of times at meetings at Krtelji, where the unit's base was, that

10     they had agreed to split up peacefully, and that the Serb part of this

11     unit would move to Vraca."

12             And then your question:

13             "Do you know that two Serb special policemen were killed and

14     three wounded at Vraca?  Were you informed about it?"

15             Mr. Delimustafic says:

16             "I think so.  I think I heard that it had happened."

17             Then the next question:

18             "Do you know that none of the students or the personnel was

19     either wounded or hurt during that conflict ..."

20             And Delimustafic says:  "I do."

21             And then the Accused Mandic says:

22             "If we had stayed together, you had worked in the police force

23     for a long time, we co-operated, and I assumed the office at your and

24     Vito Zepinic's proposal, I mean, you proposed it to the SDS ..."

25             And Delimustafic corrects you and say:  "To Rajko Dukic."

Page 4941

 1             And then the question goes on:

 2             "If we had stayed together, whom would you have considered as

 3     responsible for the conflict at Vraca?  Who placed -- provoked the

 4     conflict without your approval?"

 5             And then we have his answer on Serbian page 9 and English

 6     page 7 -- English page 8.

 7             You ask:

 8             "Mr. Delimustafic, the special unit had gone out to carry out

 9     several operations.  There was dissatisfaction in those Serb villages.

10     Vito Zepinic co-ordinated them.  They split up following an agreement.

11     They went to their F building.  The conflict erupted and the killing of

12     two special policemen and the wounding of three ensued.  There were no

13     wounded, nothing, on the other side."

14             "Who do you hold responsible for the killings at Vraca?"

15             And then it goes on somewhere.  The Accused Mandic says:

16             "I will rephrase the question.  Mr. Delimustafic, do you know --

17     do you have any information that I, as your assistant at that moment, was

18     involved in any way in the conflict at Vraca?"

19             And Delimustafic answers:

20             "I do not have such information, but by virtue of his office, the

21     director of the school and member of the collegium, Balic, was

22     responsible for everything that was going on at Vraca."

23             Is that how it went?

24        A.   Yes, because the indictment alleged that I was responsible for

25     the conflict at Vraca - that's the allegation of the prosecution of

Page 4942

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina - and Mr. Delimustafic claimed that Mr. Balic, the

 2     director of the centre, without the knowledge of the Presidency or the

 3     Ministerial Collegium, had armed the men and prepared the defence to

 4     attack the Serbian police, who were just going into their own building,

 5     according to a prior agreement.

 6        Q.   Can you tell us who exactly was at the Vraca School at that

 7     moment?

 8        A.   It was over the weekend, the second day of the Bajram holiday.

 9     Four hundred students were supposed to go home on leave.  Those were

10     young men between 15 and 18 years old.  Director Balic had forbidden them

11     to take this home leave.  There were 180 trainees of that police

12     course -- sorry, 170, and these trainees were the men who had come from

13     Croatia or from Draska [phoen] area in Serbia who had gone through

14     military training already, they were trained.  And there were some

15     instructors, mainly Muslim, because it was the weekend.

16        Q.   Do you have an explanation why he had forbidden those students to

17     take home leave on their holiday?

18        A.   There were hostages in this conflict between Serb members of the

19     special unit and those trainees who had ambushed them.  They had locked

20     them up downstairs and held them as hostages.

21        Q.   Whom exactly did Director Balic arm?

22        A.   There was a letter, and a commission had been set up.  It was

23     discussed in the Bruno Stojic case.  Just before that event, the school

24     had received three and a half million rounds, 7.62 millimetres, 600

25     rifles, and around 10 M-84 machine-guns, and I can tell you positively

Page 4943

 1     that these are not things that you need for training.  And I ask

 2     Delimustafic to set up a commission to see why so many trainees had been

 3     sent to Vraca, to that school, and why this equipment was sent.

 4        Q.   Did he give weapons to all these trainees?  Whom did he arm?

 5        A.   I said already trainees of all ethnicity were locked up there as

 6     hostages.  And as for the defence of the school, aimed to protect the

 7     Serb special unit members from entering the school, that was provided by

 8     100-something Muslim -- exclusively Muslim trainees.

 9        Q.   And how many members of the special unit were there who came to

10     that school?

11        A.   Thirty-five.

12        Q.   Minister, was the media reporting correct that there was shooting

13     also from Sandzak private houses behind Vraca?

14        A.   The men who had been killed, and I have the medical documentation

15     in my file in Sarajevo, were shot in the back of the head from a place

16     called Sanac [phoen], populated mainly by people who had come from Serbia

17     but were of Muslim ethnicity.

18        Q.   Would you agree that Vraca is an almost 100 per cent Serb

19     settlement and Sanac is an irregular settlement behind Vraca?

20        A.   It was between Grbavica and that training centre, which is spread

21     over a large area, and that settlement is closer to Lukavica and

22     Trebevic; I mean Vraca.  Vraca is a mainly Serbian settlement.

23        Q.   We still need this page.  Mr. Delimustafic says that he has no

24     such information that you were involved, and then Judge Jukic says:

25             "Who was able to move this special unit?  Would the assistant

Page 4944

 1     minister be authorised ..."

 2             And he probably means you when he says "assistant minister"?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And then Mr. Delimustafic says:  "No."

 5             And the judge asks:

 6             "Who was authorised, who had the authority?"

 7             And Mr. Delimustafic says:

 8             "The Presidency and the government had the authority.  Following

 9     an agreement it was the Presidency and the government and the Ministerial

10     Collegium."

11             Is this Judge Jukic a Croat?

12             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, first of all, I think that's

13     irrelevant, and I hope it begins to highlight the problem with the path

14     we've moved down.  And with all respect, it's difficult to glean the

15     distinction between reading it into the record and admitting it, and

16     I think both are inappropriate, and continue to maintain that objection.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I find, Mr. Karadzic, your question as to the

18     ethnicity of the judge irrelevant.  What is your next question?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then we can disregard this,

20     although none of this is irrelevant.

21             The judge asks:

22             "Did the accused, as assistant minister, have the authority to

23     activate that unit?"

24             And Delimustafic says:  "No."

25             And now we will abide by Mr. Tieger's objection, and I would like

Page 4945

 1     page 15 in Serbian, page 15 in English.  Just one more passage and I'll

 2     be done with the document.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Judge Rodrigues is asking a question here.  I'll -- first of all,

 5     explain who Judge Rodrigues is and read this question and answer.

 6        A.   Judge Rodrigues is one of the ICTY Judges, one of two ICTY Judges

 7     who was assistant --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Not relevant.  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, first of all, I don't think

10     this is the right page in English.  It could be the next one, then.  I

11     have it noted down as page 13, but, in any case, it's the next page in

12     English.  And we don't have the right page in Serbian.  It should be 15.

13             Your Excellency, with all due respect, I believe this goes to the

14     credit of Judge Jukic and the foreign judges as well.  That tribunal has

15     foreigners on its staff, and it acquitted this witness.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Is that your question, Mr. Karadzic?

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Is that so, Witness?

19             JUDGE KWON:  No, that's not a proper question.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to ask --

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE KWON:  It doesn't matter who the judge is.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24        Q.   Could you interpret this question by Judge Rodrigues, that begins

25     with the words:  "All right, one more question ..."?

Page 4946

 1        A.   Judge Rodrigues:  "All right, another question.  At one moment,

 2     you said that if the collegium decided so and if the assistant minister

 3     was authorised by the collegium, he had the authority to act on your

 4     behalf.  Do you remember if Vitomir Zepinic was in charge of all matters

 5     related to the division of the special unit?"

 6             And Delimustafic answers:  "Well, I think so."

 7             Judge Rodrigues says:

 8             "Okay.  You heard or were informed of the events in the school in

 9     Vraca.  Were you informed of these events?"

10             Delimustafic says:  "Well, I was."

11             Judge Rodrigues says:  "Who informed you?"

12             And Delimustafic answers:  "Vitomir Zepinic."

13        Q.   In the rest of this text, it is established that you were not a

14     member of the SDS, that you were proposed to the SDS by Vitomir Zepinic,

15     and even Delimustafic, to Rajko Dukic --

16             JUDGE KWON:  That's another statement of yours.  Just put your

17     question.  What is your question to the witness?

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Does this testimony -- or was it established in those proceedings

21     that you were not a member of the SDS, that Delimustafic and Rajko

22     [as interpreted] Zepinic had proposed you to the SDS, and that you acted

23     on the instructions of the collegium?

24        A.   I've already answered that, and I can only repeat, Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

Page 4947

 1             MR. TIEGER:  And I've made it clear I think that there is some

 2     objection to the limited practice that the Court indicated it would

 3     permit, but now the accused is straying beyond that, seeking

 4     broad-based -- alleged broad-based determinations by this Court.  I hope

 5     it illustrates some of the problems associated with this particular

 6     practice, beyond the factors I raised earlier which involve the

 7     circumvention of 92 ter and so on.  But this is not even within the

 8     limited exception that the Court announced it would permit the accused in

 9     asking -- in reading some of the questions posed to Mr. Delimustafic.

10     Now, he's seeking conclusions about what the Court overall determined,

11     and I hope we won't be going down that path.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I agree with you, as far as the last question is

13     concerned, but I'd like to hear what Judge Robinson [sic] has to say.

14     Sorry, Morrison.  I apologise.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Illustrates the dangers of identification

16     evidence, if nothing else.

17             For myself, I agree with you, Mr. Tieger.  Dr. Karadzic, it's one

18     thing to ask a question related to a document.  It's another thing to

19     read the document out wholesale, ask the witness to adopt it, and then,

20     furthermore, ask them to draw conclusions based upon what other people

21     thought, or might have thought, or might have said, or might have

22     accepted.  Apart from anything else, it's not evidence that we could

23     conceivably take into account in determining the truth of the matter.  So

24     apart from any procedural defect, it's wasting your time.

25             JUDGE BAIRD:  Dr. Karadzic, the evidence in the previous trial

Page 4948

 1     isn't evidence before us, and the fact that it has been read into the

 2     record does not make it evidence.  This is an important thing.  It

 3     doesn't make it evidence.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Let's proceed.

 5             Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             I apologise, I do apologise.  I was under the impression or I was

 8     labouring under the misconception that I was a fast learner, but

 9     obviously I'm not.

10             Can we now see 1D1373.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Minister, we mentioned the first directive of Hasan Efendic,

13     issued on the 12th of April, 1992, immediately after the signing of the

14     cease-fire -- of the armistice between the three parties.  And

15     Ambassador Cutileiro, this is his second directive.

16             Do we have a translation?  No.

17             Well, look at this.  This is from the 29th of April.  You don't

18     have to read it out in extenso.  Just tell us what it is all about.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, this is a duplicate of 21000, which

21     has a translation.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Yes, we have it.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Can you briefly inform us what this document is about?

Page 4949

 1        A.   This is an order by the commander of the Territorial Defence

 2     Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which he asks that all the barracks of

 3     the Yugoslav People's Army be blocked and that no materiel or personnel

 4     can leave them; also, that all roads leading to Serbia or other

 5     territories should be blocked and in order to prevent the pullout of the

 6     army from the barracks and from specific places.

 7             Under 4, combat activities should be launched, attacks on members

 8     of the Yugoslav People's Army.  In other words, a war should be started.

 9        Q.   Does it say "throughout the territory of the Republic of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina"?

11        A.   You are perhaps not concentrated enough.  That's exactly what I

12     said in my first sentence, "throughout the territory of the Republic of

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina."

14        Q.   Thank you.  That is in paragraph 4?

15        A.   Yes.  In my answer, I immediately said, right at the outset,

16     "throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Can this document be admitted?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Just a technical question.  Why do we have two

20     sets of documents in this English translation?  Maybe just duplicates.

21             Yes, that will be admitted.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D399, Your Honours.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Can we have 1D56 now, 1D56, to see what action was taken by the

25     Ministry of the Interior, according to this order of the

Page 4950

 1     Territorial Defence Staff.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Can you interpret for us briefly what this telegram is?

 4        A.   This is practically a reproduced order.  The one that we saw a

 5     while ago, it is exactly the same order sent to the Centre of Security,

 6     to the SUP of Sarajevo, and to Public Security Services.  So all the

 7     three orders that Hasan Efendic had sent to Territorial Defence units are

 8     now being sent by the minister, with the minister's signature, to the

 9     police.  They are exactly the same orders.  Let me not repeat.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Was in this way actually the police subsumed under

11     the Territorial Defence Staff, placed under its control, in joint

12     operations against the JNA?

13        A.   All armed forces united in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I am

14     referring, on the one hand, to the police, the reserve police force, and

15     the regular police, and, on the other hand, the paramilitary units, the

16     Patriotic League, and the Green Berets, which I have already said a

17     couple of hours ago, I believe.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             Can this document be admitted?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D400.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're going to take a look at

23     another two documents, only, in connection with this topic, and then we

24     should move on to a different topic.

25             Can we now see 1D58, please.  Can you zoom in on it, please.  I

Page 4951

 1     don't know whether we have the Serbian version.  If the other side does

 2     not, then we probably don't have it either.

 3             Let me then summarise it.  In English:

 4             [In English] "... main governing body of Islamic Association of

 5     Croatia and Slovenia, Zagreb," and so on and so on.  "Acknowledgment of

 6     money received."

 7             Text:  "We, members of the Emergency Commission on behalf of the

 8     Muslims of the Republic of Croatia for the assistance of the Republic of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, hereby certify that we have received from the

10     Honourable Kemal Seraj Eddine [phoen] and Dr. Fatih El Hassenein [phoen],

11     the amount of US $300.000, commanded [sic] for the purchase of weapons to

12     be dispatched to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13             "The weapons will be purchased through the Finance Ministry of

14     the Croatian Defence Ministry which had entered into agreement with the

15     Bosnian government to that effect."

16             Receipt verified by Sheik Shrowki Omar Yelshinsen [phoen].

17             [Interpretation] Let us see the date.  It's the 4th of April,

18     1992 -- actually, it is the 29th of April, 1992.  It is -- on the

19     right-hand side, do you see it?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Is this proof that the Islamic Community of Slovenia and Croatia,

22     through Fatih El Hassanein, and others from Arab countries, procured

23     weapons for Bosnia-Herzegovina in this early stage of the war?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Mr. Tieger?

25             MR. TIEGER:  I think this is calling for, I assume not on its

Page 4952

 1     face, request for information that this witness might possess, but, in

 2     fact, requests this witness offer or some sort of assessment about a

 3     document that he may never and presumably did not see before, and about

 4     which I have some objections anyway.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Without speculating on this matter, can you say what

 6     this document is or do you know, Mr. Mandic?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is true, Your Honours, this is

 8     the first time I see this document, but I now - and I also said so

 9     yesterday - through the Mesihat, the mosques in Zagreb, in Croatia,

10     procured weapons for the Bosnian Muslims and then shared training for

11     Bosnian Muslims in both Croatia and in Arabic countries.  I've already

12     spoken about this.

13             JUDGE KWON:  But have you no clue whether this is a genuine

14     document or not?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see for the first time.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  For the Bosnian

17     Muslims, the Bosnian Muslims.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Karadzic, what is your next question.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect for

20     distinguished Mr. Tieger, my question was:

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Was Mr. Srebrenkovic, who was imposed on you instead of

23     Selimovic, the personnel officer, did he come from this Islamic

24     Community?

25        A.   He was working in the Mesihat of this Islamic Community then, and

Page 4953

 1     he is working there now.

 2        Q.   And this document, the heading of which says "The Mesihat of the

 3     Islamic Community," is that association?

 4        A.   Yes, that is the religious community that I was testifying to in

 5     my statement yesterday.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have this

 7     document admitted?  There will be a lot more to be said about the relief

 8     organisation and El Hassanein, and all the other aid and relief

 9     organisations that actually procured weapons.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Well, Your Honour, there's nothing about the

12     document that -- there's no stamp, there's no -- we don't have the

13     original to compare the translation to, so it's difficult for us in any

14     way to assess its authenticity.  So without more information, it's,

15     I think --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification, until we are

17     satisfied as to its foundation?

18             MR. TIEGER:  I have no objection to that, and I accept the

19     possibility that further information may be adduced during the course of

20     the case.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger, generally, it doesn't seem to me

22     that there's likely to be much dispute as to the fact that weapons were

23     purchased and distributed to, for wont of a better expression, Muslim

24     forces.  Isn't this something that could be the subject of agreement?

25             MR. TIEGER:  Well, first of all, Your Honour, I agree that on its

Page 4954

 1     face, it seems that this is a matter that shouldn't be consuming as much

 2     court time as it is.  So under -- while -- based on that, I would be

 3     inclined to agree I have found, over time, that efforts to reach such

 4     agreements founder on a number of particulars.  We're happy to consider

 5     ways in which this issue can be short-cut in some manner and consume less

 6     court time.  And, you're right, the extent to which this issue is in

 7     controversy is considerably less than would appear to be, based on the

 8     amount of time we seem to be spending on it.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I ask to zoom out of this document

11     so that we can see the number under which this document came to be

12     included in the file.  As a matter of fact, it is at part of a police

13     investigation on arms smuggling.  You can see that.  We can see the

14     number under which this document was filed.  We found it here, in fact.

15     We didn't bring it here ourselves.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, but you are not giving evidence, and

17     the witness has no clue as to that idea.

18             So we'll mark it for identification.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D401, Your Honour.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should just like to remind you

21     that the date is the same as the one given by Hasan Efendic.

22             With the leave and understanding of Mr. Tieger, can I offer a

23     document that we have -- that is connected to this one and to the persons

24     referred to by Mr. Mandic?  But it would have to be placed on the ELMO.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's see what it is.

Page 4955

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a document of the

 2     Crisis Staff of the Islamic Community of Croatia and Slovenia, of the

 3     10th of April; the Crisis Staff.

 4             I believe that the witness cannot be aware of every single

 5     document, but he can be aware of practices, of developments.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   I can read it, or can you read it, please?

 8        A.   "Crisis Staff of the Islamic Community of Croatia and Slovenia,

 9     Zagreb10th April 1992."

10             "Receipt, whereby I confirm that I, Djevdad Tinic [phoen] from

11     Zagreb, have taken over from the Crisis Staff of the Islamic Community

12     the following:

13             "Automatic rifle, five pieces.

14             "Sniper rifle, Stajer, 35.

15             "Sniper rifle, Brno, no bullets.

16             "Sniper rifle, Brno, no bullets.

17             "Ammunition, 320 rounds ..."

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we just scroll it a

19     bit up so that we can see the signatures and the persons who feature in

20     this document, or, rather, in this transaction.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can you read their names out?

23        A.   "Goods taken over by Djevdad Tinic.

24             "Goods taken over by Mirsad Srebrenkovic.

25             "Goods handed over by Sefko Omerbasic."

Page 4956

 1        Q.   Have you heard of this Sefko Omerbasic?

 2        A.   Yes, and this Mirsad Srebrenkovic, he is our own personnel

 3     officer from the police.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Is there a date on this document?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is the 10th of April,

 7     Your Honours.  It is in the top left corner.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the document is

 9     self-explanatory.  Can you accept that?

10             JUDGE KWON:  I noted the ERN number of this document.  Can you

11     scroll down to see the bottom of the page?  Is that an ERN number?

12             MR. TIEGER:  It is, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  What would you say to this document, Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:  The ERN number is far from dispositive, although it

15     might give us an opportunity to independently identify the provenance of

16     the document.  But I wasn't going to object, irrespective of the presence

17     of the ERN number or not.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That will be marked for identification.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D402, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Just one more document from this phase and this topic.

22             Can we have 1D1414.

23             [In English] The ERN there is 1414.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Minister, let me ask you:  All of these orders and these

Page 4957

 1     actions, primarily of Hasan Efendic, and then taken over from the MUP and

 2     so on and so forth, naturally resulted in what happened on the 2nd and

 3     3rd of May in Sarajevo, when the army was slaughtered, soldiers who were

 4     withdrawing from Sarajevo who were slaughtered?

 5        A.   To the best of my knowledge, inter alia, the answer is, Yes.

 6     However, the order to fire, or, rather, to use all available fire-arms

 7     against the convoy that was moving down Dobrovoljacka Street, from the

 8     Bistrik neighbourhood towards Grbavica and Vraca, was issued by

 9     Ejub Ganic.  I heard it myself.  That is when about 20 young men, age 19

10     to 21, were killed.  They were military conscripts, doing their regular

11     military service.  They worked at the command and the communications

12     centre there, and they were going home unarmed.

13        Q.   This evacuation of the Command of the 4th Military District, had

14     that been agreed upon with Izetbegovic and General MacKenzie, UNPROFOR

15     commander for Sarajevo?

16        A.   That was an agreement between Mr. Izetbegovic and MacKenzie and

17     the commander of that district, Milutin Kukanjac.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             271 in Serbian, please, and in English let's try to find our way.

20     I hope that we manage to find our way in English as well.  Perhaps it

21     might be the next page in English.

22             What we have here is 257 and then 271.  Yes, this is 271, and in

23     English it's the last page.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Minister, you see Delimustafic here, who received that

Page 4958

 1     telegram and had to forward it, but he has his own opinion in that

 2     regard.  Can you read out what Mr. Delimustafic is saying to the

 3     Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what is highlighted here?

 4        A.   Mr. Delimustafic says that Avdo Hebib sent this identical order

 5     on his behalf, unauthorised, and that is what had been done by

 6     Hasan Efendic.  You see what he says here:

 7             "Without me knowing about it, he declared war."

 8             Delimustafic says that he asked Avdo Hebib to make a statement in

 9     this regard.

10        Q.   Could you please read all of this out to us?

11        A.   Delimustafic:  "Both we and his ministry made mistakes, like what

12     Bakir did or like Avdo Hebib, what he did, when he ordered the war to

13     start, people to open fire, occupy barracks.  He sent an order to all

14     centres without my knowledge.  He declared war.  I told him to make a

15     statement in order to observe proper form.  He never came to see me

16     again.  He doesn't speak to me anymore."

17             Izetbegovic is asking Delimustafic:  "Who did that?"

18             Delimustafic:  "Avdo Hebib."

19             Izetbegovic is asking:  "What did he do?"

20             Delimustafic:  "He declared war on the army.  Four points.

21     Signed the dispatch."

22             Izetbegovic:  "In what capacity?"

23             Kljujic:  "We have finished the recording.  Don't record this."

24        Q.   Thank you.  Is it clear here that Mr. Delimustafic is distancing

25     himself from what Avdo Hebib did, and he characterises what he did as a

Page 4959

 1     declaration of war on the Yugoslav People's Army?

 2        A.   Delimustafic is distancing himself from those communications that

 3     had his name as the name of the signatory, and he says that Avdo Hebib

 4     sent this without him knowing about it.  So he's distancing himself from

 5     that.

 6        Q.   Does he consider that order to be a declaration of war on the

 7     army and this shooting a result of that order?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Will this document be admitted?  This is a recording of that

11     session on the 6th of May, 1992, after that massacre on

12     Dobrovoljacka Street, or do you just want to have this portion?  Whatever

13     you would prefer.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:  I think we've addressed concerns about this

16     particular document in another context.  It remains the same.  Again,

17     it's represented as a tape-recording, but I understand it to be excerpts

18     from various documents assembled by one person, in particular, whom

19     Mr. Karadzic has asserted is extracting what that person considers to be

20     the essence, I think the quote was, of the particular document.  So

21     concerns arise in that respect.  It may be that the underlying document

22     or the underlying meeting is one for which we have either transcripts or

23     minutes in house and can be compared, and we'd like to do that.

24             Beyond that, I'd simply note that my understanding of the

25     questions and answers with respect to this witness was to present him

Page 4960

 1     with a document and ask him to interpret what he saw, with the exception

 2     of whatever additional insights he might be able to provide with respect

 3     to Mr. Delimustafic.  But for the most part, it was simply directing his

 4     attention to portions of the document and asking him to interpret a

 5     document I gather he hadn't seen before.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Two questions, Mr. Tieger.

 7             The witness's testimony is that what is stated here is consistent

 8     with his knowledge, isn't it?

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I didn't actually hear that question, Your Honour.

10     I heard questions related to the text of the -- that appeared on the

11     screen and the question of whether or not that represented whatever the

12     particular conclusion presented to the witness was, by doing this --

13     well, let's see the question.

14             "You see what he says here," and yeah, there's a statement, and

15     the question is:

16             "By that statement, does he consider that to be," X, Y, or Z,

17     which is consistent with what the witness -- what the declarant said in

18     the text, itself, so I think it's -- it seems to be limited to the

19     interpretation of the document and a recitation of what's in the

20     document.

21             Again, we may find that this document presents no problems

22     because we can compare it to what's available, that is, these extracted

23     portions, to what exists in its entirety.

24             JUDGE KWON:  And the second question is to confirm whether or not

25     you have the underlying document for this in house.

Page 4961

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, I raised that as a theoretical possibility, and

 2     I just received a note indicating we do have official minutes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  So your suggestion would be to mark it

 4     for identification, given that we don't have the full translation of this

 5     document?

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, I think the -- two issues, the full translation

 7     of the document and the full document.  The accused is aware of our

 8     position with respect to official documents, so I think he can be

 9     reasonably assured that the delay in admission, if that's -- or the

10     marking for identification at this point is not a particular obstacle.

11     The concern is both the translation and the completeness of the document.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Could you let the Chamber know as to your position

13     as soon as possible.

14             With that understanding, we'll mark this for identification.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D403, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to say something, Mr. Mandic?

17             Mr. Karadzic.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   It seems to me, Minister, that we've clarified what you knew all

20     along, also in terms of your own participation as assistant minister.

21             Now I'd like to move on to a different topic, a different set of

22     questions, and this topic has to do with the conduct of the Serbs when

23     the social, political, and state system collapsed.

24             Could we now have 1D1904, please, in e-court.

25             This is what I'd like to ask you:  Could you tell the

Page 4962

 1     Trial Chamber a bit about our legal system and the system of our state

 2     administration?  Actually, it is well known, and I think you mentioned

 3     that somewhere, that Serb tradition is one of autonomy.  Wherever Serbs

 4     are, they create mini-states out of their municipalities.  Do you

 5     remember that before Nemanja established the first state, that the

 6     so-called Pronija [phoen] existed and that every one of these localities

 7     was a state in its own right?

 8        A.   I learned that in history.  I know about that.  I read about it,

 9     Mr. President.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Did our system contribute to the autonomy of these

11     municipalities, our system that was called "self-management socialism"?

12        A.   I could not respond to that question.

13        Q.   Thank you.  But you did confirm that the president of the

14     municipality was also the president of the Defence Council of that

15     municipality and the commander of the territorial unit, and probably

16     Civilian Protection as well; that is to say, all of these defence

17     potentials of the municipality; right?

18        A.   That's the way it is on the basis of the Law on

19     Territorial Defences and the Law on Local Government.  That is what the

20     laws say.  This is what the positive regulations say, those that were in

21     force at the time, as far as local government is concerned and as far as

22     defence is concerned.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that in this period of time - we have

24     before us the document dated the 15th of April - there were no telephone

25     connections in Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Also, speaking in geographical terms,

Page 4963

 1     it was hard to get from Location A to Location B?

 2        A.   I spoke about that, and it was a well-known fact at the time that

 3     at one moment all telecommunications broke down, the road system

 4     collapsed, all communications that function in normal times, in regular

 5     times, if I can put it that way.  I really don't know what to call this.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree with the usual definition that a civil

 7     war is a struggle between interest groups or between and among interest

 8     groups within a single nation or a single people?

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry.

10             JUDGE KWON:  It's not for the witness, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, but he will certainly be

12     in a position to say this -- I was actually just trying to lay a

13     foundation for this question.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

15        Q.   Mr. Minister, our civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was it

16     different from these wars where ideological parties are struggling?  Is

17     this a civil war where citizens are fighting citizens, and the

18     differences among them are ethnic or religious, if they're all Serbs, as

19     Lord Owen says, all Serbs of Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic faith,

20     respectively?  Wasn't this a civil war, and wasn't everyone afraid of

21     everyone, and wasn't everyone in a position to be attacked by anyone

22     else?

23        A.   I know what the definition of a civil war is.  However, I claim

24     before this honourable Trial Chamber that everyone was fighting against

25     everyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 4964

 1        Q.   Were formations fighting or were unorganised individuals and

 2     groups fighting as well?

 3        A.   Organised and unorganised groups were fighting.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I don't want to defend the president of any

 5     municipality, but would you agree that in this situation, when the common

 6     state was collapsing, the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that point

 7     in time did not have a state organisation?

 8        A.   Could you rephrase that question a bit so that it's somewhat

 9     clearer?

10        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, I will.  Do you agree, for instance, that

11     Republika Srpska was declared -- promulgated on the 9th of January, but

12     that it did not have any organs and it did not start functioning all the

13     way up until the 27th of March?

14        A.   Yes.  Laws were passed, different documents.  A ministerial

15     council was appointed.  But life went on, and I think that we were all

16     hoping that the common state would continue to exist, or, rather, that

17     through the Lisbon Agreement and the Sarajevo Agreement, the leading

18     people in the parties would reach agreement and that there would not be a

19     war.  I think that almost all people in Bosnia and Herzegovina were

20     hoping for that and thought that that would be the case, as I did, for

21     instance.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that in the system of state

23     administration, everything collapsed except for municipal-level

24     government at that point in time?

25        A.   Yes, yes, everything collapsed at the level of the republic, the

Page 4965

 1     Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, everything, all institutions.

 2        Q.   Do you agree that in that situation, the presidents of

 3     municipalities had an enormous responsibility for the functioning of the

 4     municipality, for security, for conflicts?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Do you agree, Minister, that in the elections in 1990, forces

 7     that were in opposition for 45 years came to power, and that they did not

 8     have any experience in running a country?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Do you agree that that was the reason why I had advocated that

11     state services should not be changed after every round of elections, and

12     that that is why the Serb Democratic Party gave power to professionals,

13     who did not belong to the political party involved, in the judiciary, the

14     police, and so on?

15        A.   I know that was your position in regards the police,

16     Mr. President.  I was not aware of the reason why you believed that.  I

17     wasn't aware of it right until this very instant.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in view of the chaos that started, please cast a

19     glance at this document, dated the 15th of April.  That is probably one

20     of the first orders -- actually, it's the 10th order, I think, of the

21     minister of the interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina, Mr. Stanisic.

23             Could you please interpret for us what this order represents?

24        A.   "Order":

25             "Persons committing seizure, looting, appropriation of other

Page 4966

 1     people's property and missing property, and other unauthorised acts in

 2     order to achieve unlawful gain, are to be identified and subjected to the

 3     most rigorous responsibility, including arrest and detention.

 4             "Mico Stanisic."

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Was this order dictated by virtue of the fact that

 6     there was looting going on, and as does happen in cases of civil war?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             Can this document be admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D404, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 148.  65 ter 148, please.

13             These are minutes of the extended session of the

14     National Security Council.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   First of all, I should like to ask you about a linguistic

17     implication.  When we say that there is an open-ended and extended

18     meeting of a body, does it mean that the body, as such, is expanded,

19     extended, or that the session is attended by more people?

20        A.   That means that, to a certain meeting, a number of persons have

21     been invited who are not regular members of the body in question.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can we see the last page, please.  Can we see item 16, point 16,

24     in both Serbian and English.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4967

 1        Q.   Can you tell us what item 16 means?

 2        A.   Item 16:

 3             "It was decided to set up a commission for the establishment of

 4     war crimes.

 5             "Sarajevo, the 16th of April.

 6             "President of the council, Dr. Radovan Karadzic."

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can this document be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D405, Your Honour.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Minister, let me ask you something about another institute

13     which has been misrepresented to the OTP by somebody here.

14             Do you remember that an institute, or whatever we called it, was

15     set up, an institution to document crimes committed against Serbs in

16     Bosnia and Herzegovina in primarily what now is the Federation of Bosnia

17     and Herzegovina?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Through some witnesses and in the pre-trial brief, as well as in

20     the indictment, it has been stated that that documentation centre had, in

21     fact, been an investigation body tasked with investigating, in the

22     criminal/legal sense, crimes against Serbs only.  Do you agree that such

23     a body would have to be headed by a jurist, by a judge by experience?

24        A.   Yes, I do.

25        Q.   Do you agree that a director of that institute was the eminent

Page 4968

 1     writer and minister of information, Mr. Miroslav Toholj?

 2        A.   First and foremost, that institution -- that institute did not

 3     undertake any such investigations.  And, secondly, I know personally

 4     Mr. Toholj.  He's a literary figure.  He's a writer.

 5        Q.   Yes, a very eminent and good writer.  Do you agree that the

 6     investigation of the criminal and legal aspects of crimes continued to be

 7     carried out by the state organs and the structures in the Ministry of the

 8     Interior and the Ministry of Justice?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Do you agree that the body which was headed by this writer, who

11     had graduated literature and not law, actually served for the gathering

12     of documentation in the sense of documentary evidence, not in terms of

13     legal and criminal procedures?

14        A.   I claimed that that institute had nothing whatsoever to do with

15     any investigations in the criminal/legal sense.  Their task was to gather

16     documentation -- to document what was being -- what was happening in

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.  It was not in charge of any on-site

18     investigations or any investigative measures of that type.  That was done

19     by the investigation organs of the police, of the military police and of

20     the civilian police, that were being set up at the time for specifically

21     that purpose.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Do you perhaps happen to know that the source of

23     information for the institute, at the helm of which was Mr. Toholj, were

24     the refugees from that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was not under the

25     control of the Serbian side?

Page 4969

 1        A.   I believe that this institute came by its information in a number

 2     of ways.  This was just one way in which it obtained information as to

 3     what was happening to the Serbian people who lived in territories and had

 4     fled from territories that were under the control of the Muslims, i.e.,

 5     the adversary at that moment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Just another question in this regard.

 7             Do you happen to know that the documentation of this centre

 8     served as the basis for a book in two volumes, which is called "The Black

 9     Book," which documents precisely what you have been talking about?

10        A.   I know that such a book was published.  I don't know what its

11     title is, however.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can we now see 65 152 -- 65 ter, that is, 152.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Until we see that, Mr. Minister, let me ask you this:  What could

16     a municipal president or the local police do in these first days, when,

17     in the course of a conflict, members of the adversary were taken captive

18     who had participated in the conflict?  In your view, were there any mass

19     and organised executions then or were these people held and detained

20     somewhere?

21        A.   I don't know -- I don't know about that, Mr. President.

22        Q.   You don't know that there were executions?

23        A.   I don't know that there were executions, nor do I know what the

24     municipal authorities did in the field.  You know that all the

25     communications were down and that, at the outset of the war, I was in the

Page 4970

 1     District Court down there in Lukavica or at the headquarters of the

 2     government in Pale, at the Hotel Bistrica, so that I was not familiar

 3     with those events, with the goings-on.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I should like us to broach the subject of these

 5     provisional detentions.  But before that, let me ask you this:  Do you

 6     agree with the generally-known fact that the Yugoslav People's Army in

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina was the legitimate military force there until the

 8     19th of May, 1991?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that the rebellions, the revolts, the

11     local conflicts, in other words, at that time were mainly of a character

12     of attacks, first and foremost, against the JNA and then against Serbian

13     civilians?

14        A.   At that time, those were considered criminal attacks on the army

15     of a state, and it was considered one of the more serious crimes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  If I tell you that the Yugoslav People's Army

17     captured its adversaries in several waves, the first wave was after

18     Hasan Efendic's instructions of the 12th of April - the second wave

19     followed the directive of Hasan Efendic of the 29th of April, and the

20     third wave ensued after the 20th of May, when the JNA withdrew or had

21     withdrawn - does this ring a bell?

22        A.   No, Mr. President, I was not aware of these arrests and mutual

23     taking of captives by the Territorial Defence or by the regular Yugoslav

24     Army force.

25        Q.   Thank you.  But were you later able to perceive these waves?  Let

Page 4971

 1     me remind you.  Samac is not in my indictment, but Mr. Tihic testified in

 2     another case and said that he had been a captive, and it turned out that

 3     he had been captured by the JNA, and that 8 per cent of the Muslims in

 4     Samac had revolted against the JNA and had lost the battle and were taken

 5     prisoner.

 6             Did you later realise that these three waves of violence which

 7     had broken out had been directly provoked by the orders of Hasan Efendic?

 8        A.   I'm not aware of that, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can we then take a look at these minutes from the

10     session of the National Security Council and the Government of the

11     Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 27th of April.

12             First of all, Mr. Minister, I should like to ask you this:  We

13     always are dealing with the session of the National Security Council and

14     the government.  Could, at that time, the Assembly convene, the Assembly

15     of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and did it convene, in

16     fact?

17        A.   No, it was unable to convene the Assembly, that is, because all

18     the communications had been severed, and all of Bosnia and Herzegovina

19     had been disconnected.  We know that the Krajina had been cut off and in

20     an encirclement.  We know of the case of the babies that died in

21     Banja Luka on that account.  So that Bosnia and Herzegovina at a certain

22     point was intersected in this way by different compartmentalised on

23     account -- as a consequence of these orders.  Its roads, its tunnels, its

24     rivers had been intersected and blocked in certain ways.  So one could

25     not pass from city to city, from village to village, from region to

Page 4972

 1     region.  All life had died down.  The entire republic had been under

 2     blockade.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that on the 12th of May -- or until the

 4     12th of May, not even the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been

 5     completely established?

 6        A.   To my knowledge, i.e., my recollection, at that session in

 7     Banja Luka you were elected a member of the Presidency and the president

 8     of the Presidency.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you accept what I am going to tell you right now:

10     The government is an executive organ, but it does not have behind it

11     either the Assembly or the Presidency?  The National Security Council is

12     a body of the Assembly which does not have executive functions, and the

13     government, which does have executive functions, often sit together so

14     that the government would have a backing and would have some support when

15     it proposes its decisions to the Assembly for endorsement?  Do you agree

16     that that was the reason why these two bodies convened and met together?

17        A.   At this time, the government was composed of the rump

18     Ministerial Council which had been elected in January 1992, because some

19     of the people failed to show up for work in the Ministerial Council.  And

20     as far as I know, the government was completed only in June or perhaps

21     even later in 1992, in terms of all the governmental departments.

22     Movement was limited, movement of the people who were at Pale or in

23     Eastern Sarajevo or at Lukavica, because all the roads had been blocked,

24     and there was practically -- there was virtually no communication between

25     different areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina at all.  So just those people

Page 4973

 1     who had already left Sarajevo could meet up there at Pale and were able

 2     to communicate, in a way.  And it seems to me, actually, to go through

 3     the motions of government, feign the government exercise, because there

 4     was no government, to speak of.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that there were not enough telephone

 6     lines at Pale, and Pale, being a small, mountainous place, did not have

 7     any infrastructure, to speak of, that could meet the requirements of the

 8     newly-appointed officials of the rump Ministerial Council, et cetera?

 9        A.   Pale did not have any infrastructure, to speak of.  We had

10     nothing; they had nothing.  We didn't have paper.  We didn't have any

11     vehicles.  We would take some village roads to the headquarters of the

12     government at Jahorina through Vrdinici [phoen] were and the like.

13        Q.   Please focus on this portion, where it is stated:

14             "The reserve militia, the reserve --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Where is that?  The interpreter is asking.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Salaries of the reserve police

17     should be equivalent those of the regular police, and also the

18     Territorial Defence and the newly-established municipalities, with those

19     of the Territorial Defence members under the command of the Yugoslav

20     People's Army.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Two questions emanating from this paragraph.  Is it clear from it

23     that at that moment, and that was the end of April, we considered our

24     territorial defence a part of the single defensive system of Yugoslavia

25     under the command of the JNA?

Page 4974

 1        A.   This meeting took place in April, and the JNA withdrawal

 2     agreement from Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed towards the end of May.

 3     So the answer, yes, is, Yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  They refer to newly-established municipalities in

 5     this paragraph.  Do you recall that the newly-set-up municipalities

 6     referred to two developments, two kinds of practices?  The first one was

 7     the transformation of former municipalities into Serbian and Muslim ones,

 8     and the second was Serbian remnants of municipalities, which remained

 9     under Serb control, where also tried to become part of the state

10     organisation?  As an example, Mostar remained under the control of Muslim

11     and Croat forces, but Zijem [phoen] and Serbian villages around Mostar

12     formed a Serbian municipality.  Perkovici was part of Stoce [phoen], but

13     it was a Serbian place, so they formed their own municipalities,

14     et cetera.

15             Does this newly-established -- the reference to newly-established

16     municipalities in this paragraph, does it refer to that?

17        A.   Yes.  If that is what you mean, yes, and Drenovci and some other

18     inhabited places as well.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Your last question.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Minister, that the newly-established

22     municipalities were even more deficient, in terms of infrastructure and

23     capable personnel, in order to be a rubber stamp of the state authorities

24     and the state branches, even if there had been communication?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 4975

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can this document be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D406, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, I'm returning to your submission

 6     concerning the Bosnian Serb Assembly records which you wish to have in

 7     evidence.

 8             We understand that the accused wishes to have these records in

 9     evidence also, so in the course of these proceedings, as I indicated,

10     it's probable that various portions of this record will be put to

11     different witnesses.  And we understand that you wish to have them

12     admitted now, in their entirety, in the interests of efficiency.

13             In the table, you provided to us some of the listed -- some of

14     the listed Assembly records are said to have been referenced in Mr.

15      Donia's expert reports, but not all of them.  So some of them have

16     already been admitted into evidence.  So rather than limit ourselves to

17     those sessions actually connected in some way to Mr. Donia and his

18     reports, the Chamber considers that it would be in the interest of

19     justice for it to deal with all the Assembly sessions which the parties

20     wish to have admitted into evidence now.

21             Therefore, for that reason, we would ask the Prosecution to make

22     a written motion setting out a list of all the Assembly sessions not yet

23     admitted which it wishes to tender into evidence.  This will essentially

24     be a Bar table motion.  It should be treated as such by the Prosecution.

25     The accused will then have the opportunity to state whether it objects to

Page 4976

 1     any of the records being offered, and the Chamber will then rule on the

 2     matter.

 3             At the same time, I would also ask you, Mr. Tieger, to provide to

 4     the Chamber all of the offered Assembly records, including those already

 5     admitted, in a hard book or a booklet or a binder so that we have them

 6     all together in a collection for ease of reference.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Understood, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.

 9             So we'll adjourn today and for the week, Mr. Mandic.  I hope you

10     have a safe journey back home, but please make sure that you return to

11     the Tribunal on Tuesday, when we resume, at 2.15, and not to discuss with

12     anybody else about your evidence.

13             Have a nice week.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you will just give

15     me one minute.

16             Over the weekend, I shall be travelling home.  Can you tell me

17     approximately how long my further testimony will take when I return from

18     Belgrade so that I know, for the sake of my family and my work, so that I

19     could plan ahead, please?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just speaking for myself, I think your testimony

21     will be concluded either Thursday or Friday, but depending upon further

22     changes.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

24                           [The witness stands down]

25                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.04 p.m.,

Page 4977

 1                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 13th day of July,

 2                           2010, at 2.15 p.m.