Page 7411
1 Thursday, 7 October 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.24 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon.
7 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President, and good afternoon.
9 I'll be very brief. I wanted to raise one quick matter,
10 reflected in the Trial Chamber's decision of the 29th of September
11 regarding the materials seized from the Bukanjac [phoen] premises,
12 including the DVDs and the hard-drive materials.
13 As the OTP indicated in its submission of the 20th of September,
14 the review and indexing of the hard-drive materials, in contrast to the
15 DVD
16 the confidential annex. The bulk of those materials will be disclosed
17 early next week, and the remainder of the materials the week following.
18 I simply raise that because we noted that the Trial Chamber's decision
19 appeared to reflect a misapprehension that the hard-drive materials, in
20 addition to the DVD
21 I wanted to clarify that.
22 Thank you, Mr. President.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, Mr. President, that was also my
24 misapprehension. I'm hearing for the first time today that there are
25 undisclosed materials from that January 2010 -- or December 2009 search,
Page 7412
1 and that may cause us to seek another suspension of the proceedings if a
2 first glance of that undisclosed material indicates that it's anything
3 like the material that has been disclosed to us. So I also want to put
4 that on record at this point, and we'll simply await the material to see
5 what has to be done next.
6 MR. TIEGER: Well, if I may, Mr. President, and no point in any
7 extended discussion or argument now, but the submission makes clear, as I
8 noted, what the status was with respect to the hard-drive materials.
9 JUDGE KWON: Your submission is well noted. We'll see what we
10 need to do.
11 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, let's continue your cross-examination.
12 WITNESS: MICHAEL ROSE [Resumed]
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
14 Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Good afternoon, General. Do you agree with me that UNPROFOR
18 faced a lot of difficulty due to the undefined status of the protected
19 area, the fact that the demilitarisation process was not resolved, and,
20 generally speaking, with the situation in which they didn't know how to
21 treat such zones?
22 A. There were certainly difficulties with the lack of definition of
23 the boundaries and the fact that one of the parties to the conflict had
24 not demilitarised the safe areas.
25 Q. And it would be the Muslim side, of course, that had its troops
Page 7413
1 in the zones; right?
2 A. I think we discussed that previously, and the status was
3 different for the Bosnian Government side than it was for the Bosnian
4 Serb side.
5 Q. Well, we refuse to accept that, General. Before the conflict and
6 during the conflict, we fought and finally achieved an equal status. Who
7 was it who suggested to you that we should be treated as rebels or, in
8 other words, in any way different than the Muslim government?
9 A. The Bosnian nation was a recognised member of the United Nations.
10 The Republika Srpska had not yet been recognised by any entity at all,
11 other than the Serb side.
12 Q. With all due respect, General, Caligula proclaimed his horse as
13 senator, but he wasn't a senator. Over 70 per cent of the territory was
14 in our hands. What did we care that nobody recognised us? We were part
15 of that Bosnia
16 don't mean you, personally, but a large majority of the international
17 community treated us as rebels, as an illegal entity, and that's why
18 we're all here today. Right?
19 A. As I said before, the United Nations Protection Force were acting
20 as mediators in a conflict which they were trying to bring to an end
21 through peaceful means, and their approach to the three warring parties
22 was impartial, although, of course, they didn't remain neutral in terms
23 of the final outcome.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 1D291 is the next document I would like to call, and you will see
Page 7414
1 how the Serbs and Croats perceived that matter at the time. And I'm
2 talking about a majority of the population, the Christian part of the
3 population composed of Croats and Serbs who made up over 50 per cent, and
4 well over the 70 per cent of the territory belonged to those two peoples.
5 And according to the International Pact on Human Rights, the resources in
6 a territory belong to the people who resided in the territory.
7 Here, General, Kresimir Zubak and Nikola Koljevic on the 10th of
8 February, 1994
9 point 6. That's the only one. They achieved an agreement on the nature
10 of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
11 [In English] "An absolute majority of the population on the
12 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina opt for peace and ask the Muslim
13 people to agree with this decision."
14 [Interpretation] Therefore, it would be much easier for all of
15 us -- it would have been easier if the international community had
16 treated us as one of the three sides and not as rebels, and the OTP has
17 incriminated even the setting up of our parties.
18 Can this be admitted, Your Excellency?
19 JUDGE KWON: What is your question?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The general has already answered
21 the question and said that we were treated as three equal sides, and you
22 can see here that all the three equal sides, the Serbs and the Croats,
23 constituted a majority. Look at bullet point 3:
24 [In English] "The so-called Presidency and Government of Bosnia
25 and Herzegovina
Page 7415
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, this is not a forum for you to make a
2 speech. Ask a question to the witness.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, sir, do you know that the Presidency of Yugoslavia that
5 was left by Croats and Serbs was often referred to as a rump presidency?
6 A. No, I did not.
7 Q. However, if that is correct, by the analogy, would the Muslim
8 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina also be rightly called a rump
9 presidency? Look at bullet point 3, where the Croatian and Serbian
10 representatives denied the Presidency the right to represent the Croatian
11 and Serbian people. It is not even a rump presidency; it is just a
12 presidency constituted of the representatives of only one ethnic group.
13 Right?
14 A. As I've explained, Dr. Karadzic, as an officer of the United
15 Nations, I could only work within the rules that had been laid down by
16 the United Nations for that mission.
17 Q. I'm not attacking you. I'm just asking you to either agree with
18 me or deny the fact that there were three equal sides and that the three
19 sides constituted Bosnia
20 It was not like they were Bosnia
21 JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered that question. I
22 will tell you to move on to your next question.
23 Ms. Edgerton, do you object to the admission of this document?
24 I'm not sure whether this is signed or not, Mr. Karadzic, before it is to
25 be admitted at all.
Page 7416
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, there was an
2 agreement about that document. However, Mr. Tudjman did not want the
3 document to be signed. There may even be a signed version, but Tudjman
4 asked for the document not to be publicised; therefore, not to be signed.
5 He just wanted the Muslims to be orally informed about its contents.
6 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, we know absolutely nothing about this
8 document and the provenance, its authenticity. I'd object to it.
9 JUDGE KWON: We'll wait for another witness to admit this. So
10 we'll not admit this at this time, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Can we then call 65 ter 10689.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, in view of the fact that you didn't know -- or, rather,
15 you did not have the boundaries for the protected zones, you didn't have
16 the agreement on the contents of the Gorazde zone, would you perhaps
17 agree with me that there was no legal grounds to call for NATO
18 air-strikes?
19 A. No, I would not agree with you. The United Nations Security
20 Council resolution was quite plain, that is, 824 and 836, that the United
21 Nations should use all means possible to deter attacks against the
22 enclaves.
23 Q. However, if you didn't know what the enclave was, how did you
24 know that it came under attack? You didn't have boundaries. The zone
25 was not demilitarised. How were you able to know when the boundaries of
Page 7417
1 the enclave were over-stepped if there were no boundaries at all, to
2 speak of?
3 A. It was self-evident when the civilian populations in these
4 enclaves came into danger, either from the point of view of their own
5 lives or their property. That was the moment at which the United Nations
6 decided to take action.
7 Q. Do you agree with me that the side that had brought the civilians
8 in danger should be bombed? Yes or no. And then later we will show who
9 it was who actually brought them into a dangerous position.
10 A. Certainly, those who were shelling the civilian populations were
11 liable -- in those enclaves were liable to have action taken against them
12 under the United Nations Security Council resolutions.
13 Q. Is it correct that you exerted a certain caution because the NATO
14 commands, and especially Admiral Smith and Admiral Burda, were prone to
15 be trigger-happy, as it were, and that you tried hard to avert the NATO
16 actions?
17 A. We saw the use of NATO air-strikes as a measure of last resort.
18 We did not see ourselves as part of the conflict between the warring
19 parties. And as long as the conflict was not endangering the lives or
20 the property of the civilians within the safe areas, then we took no
21 action, other than to report it.
22 Q. I'm not complaining against the United Nations. Were the United
23 Nations afraid of the over-zealousness of NATO commanders to open fire on
24 Serbs?
25 A. There was a continual debate between the United Nations and NATO
Page 7418
1 about the level of force to be used, and the United Nations never changed
2 their position that they could not embark on war-fighting levels of
3 force. They had to restrict themselves to those that were compatible
4 with a peacekeeping mission.
5 Q. Very well. You are avoiding to tell me what the NATO position
6 was, but we'll come to that with the help of documents.
7 Look at this document. Is this a telegram sent by your assistant
8 for Civilian Affairs, Viktor Andreev, to Ambassador Akashi? And the date
9 of the document is 14 April 1994
10 apologise. That was in the middle of the crisis, eight days after the
11 bombardment. Could you please say your answer for the record?
12 A. The question?
13 Q. Is this a telegram, dated 18 April, sent by Andreev to Akashi
14 A. It certainly is. I can't see, incidentally, the bottom of that
15 document, but I recognise the top half of it, certainly.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the second page. We
17 can't see the whole document at a time, although we would like to draw
18 everybody's attention to the entire document.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Let's look at bullet point 10, first of all:
21 [In English] "The council must clarify the concept of the safe
22 area --"
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
24 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Well, we could actually have the document made
Page 7419
1 just a little bit smaller so we could all see the whole document on one
2 page.
3 JUDGE KWON: I thought he was referring to three pages. Yes,
4 let's move on.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it does have three pages.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Can I draw your attention to paragraph 10:
8 [In English] "The council must clarify the concept of the safe
9 areas as soon as possible. Until now, they have never been
10 geographically defined, and it has never been clear how UNPROFOR was
11 meant to deter attacks on them, or whether, indeed, UNPROFOR should have
12 tolerated their use by the Bosnian Army for military purposes. If the
13 council decided to continue with the concept, it must be willing to give
14 the resources and the political commitment necessary to do so.
15 Otherwise, we invite conflict with the Serbs for the benefit -- for no
16 benefit to anyone."
17 [Interpretation] So the 10th of April bombing had to happen in
18 order for this telegram to be sent. It says here, We don't know what a
19 protected zone is, and if this continues, we will have a conflict with
20 the Serbs on our hands; right?
21 A. You must understand, Dr. Karadzic, that the United Nations and
22 NATO were moving into new territory when it came to the employment of
23 NATO air-strikes on a peacekeeping mission. This had never happened
24 before, and the United Nations Security Council resolutions that were
25 passed reflect very much the ongoing debate about what the levels of
Page 7420
1 force should be used in a peacekeeping mission. On the ground, we were
2 quite clear that they could not go beyond what we deemed to be
3 appropriate to a peacekeeping mission, and that was the minimum use of
4 force to achieve a specific aim, whether that be to deter attacks against
5 a safe area, or to enforce the passage of a convoy, or to defend the
6 lives and property of the UN peacekeepers, themselves.
7 What you're seeing in this telegram is an element to debate as
8 the two organisations were moving into new territory.
9 Q. Objection, General. Was an additional purpose of the attack, and
10 that was to save the army from defeat? After having attacked us, when we
11 engaged in a counter-attack, you came in -- or, rather, NATO came in to
12 save it. But look at bullet point eight, please:
13 [In English] "The question of air power must be treated with the
14 utmost gravity. As the Serbs showed this week, they are prepared to run
15 the risk of escalation. If the international community is not similarly
16 committed, it should realise that limited close air support will engage
17 the Serbs, provoking a back-lash against the UN personnel on the ground."
18 A. Clearly, that was one of the possibilities that had to be
19 considered, particularly as our main job was to deliver humanitarian aid
20 to the people who needed it, some 2.7 million people in Bosnia at that
21 time, including 600.000 Serbs. And had the Serb side, who, as we've
22 already explained, dominated most of the territory and, therefore, most
23 of the routes used for the delivery of humanitarian aid, blocked all
24 those with military force, there was little that the United Nations, as
25 peacekeepers, could do to deliver that aid. Therefore, the use of force
Page 7421
1 and the levels of the use of force were under continual scrutiny and
2 debate, as you well know.
3 Q. [Interpretation] General, bullet point 10 shows that there are no
4 grounds to aid the BiH army, because that would, indeed, have been aid
5 administered to the army and a signal to the BH Army to abuse the
6 protected zone. But when you're talking about the blockade of roads,
7 let's look at the following page and see what the cause is and what the
8 consequences were. Let's see whether the Serbs deserved to be attacked
9 because they had blocked the roads, or was it the other way around? Did
10 perhaps the Serbs block the roads because of the attack?
11 Let's look at bullet point 11:
12 [In English] "... the Serbs --"
13 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me. Could you read the English part again?
14 If you change your language from Serbian to English, you need to wait.
15 THE ACCUSED: I see.
16 Point 11:
17 "UNPROFOR's mandate has pushed it into low-level conflict with
18 the Serbs. As a result, Sarajevo
19 is blockaded, its airport is closed, food stocks are declining. Our
20 mandate must either be one within which we are able to have a
21 co-operative relationship with the Serbs, or it must be one in which we
22 have the force to impose our will. It cannot be, as it is now, somewhere
23 in between."
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. I would like us to determine whether the Serbs were evil and
Page 7422
1 that's why blocked the roads with no reason at all, or whether the
2 blocking of the roads and the harsh letter by General Milovanovic were
3 all provoked by something. Were we provoked into acting the way we did
4 or did we do all those things out of the blue?
5 Bullet point 11 shows that the cause was pushing UNPROFOR into a
6 low intensity conflict with the Serbs, and the consequence was the
7 intensification of the situation and the tensions with the Serbs. And if
8 we add to that, General, that we had a reason to doubt the sincerity of
9 the lower levels of command and that they were smuggling weapons and fuel
10 to the Muslims, then you can obviously see why we thought that the United
11 Nations were working to our detriment.
12 A. Until the NATO bombing --
13 JUDGE KWON: Excuse -- please carry on.
14 THE WITNESS: Until the NATO bombing, the blocking of the routes
15 by the Serb side was both systematic and frequent, but not complete.
16 After the bombing and air-strikes took place, for a period of time the
17 blocking of the roads was 100 per cent throughout the country.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document --
20 JUDGE KWON: -- the last question of yours was rather a
21 statement. In the future, I may cut off you in the middle. Just refrain
22 from making a speech.
23 We'll admit this.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D687, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 7423
1 Can the Court please produce D143, just to show you, General, the
2 reasons that existed before the bombing for controls and blockades. The
3 document number is D143.
4 Please do not think that I am attacking either you, or the United
5 Nations, or Great Britain, or any of the higher commands. However, this
6 doesn't change the fact that we had good reasons, and you will see them
7 in the document. And we're waiting for the document to be displayed on
8 the screen.
9 Here you have it. "Movement by convoys, teams and individuals
10 from UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations." Everybody please look at
11 how convoys moved and how many convoys there were, and how were checks
12 and controls carried out.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Is there a date to this document so that we can
14 have it in some measure of context?
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is an overview for the year
17 1994. In the document, we will see this is an overview for the year
18 1994, segregated by month. In paragraph 1, it says in the course of
19 1994, convoys passed every day.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, for seven or eight months --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Can we see page 5. Page 5. It says
23 it's a table reflecting the year of 1994.
24 Is it fine, Ms. Edgerton, now?
25 MS. EDGERTON: On the question of the timing, yes. I have no
Page 7424
1 idea what the source of the document is, though, by who it might have
2 been generated.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll see.
4 Let's carry on, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go back to the first page,
6 and let's look how things were.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Just one corps, the Drina Corps, is sending its report in the
9 first part, and they are reporting about the movement of humanitarian aid
10 and UNPROFOR across its territory. And it says in the first paragraph:
11 "They moved about on a daily basis during 1994 using the
12 following roads:"
13 And then the following passage:
14 "The entry and exit of convoys was controlled at seven
15 check-points ..."
16 And those check-points are then listed. And then:
17 "Entry controls and inspection of persons, weapons, vehicles,
18 loads and documentation are conducted at check-points by members of the
19 civilian police and by teams generally made up of personnel who have been
20 working at this task since August 1993 ...," and so on and so forth.
21 "... who have attained sufficient experience ..."
22 And so on and so forth.
23 Can we go on to the following page. Bullet point C, I believe
24 you will see it:
25 "Behaviour and abuse of mandate by UNPROFOR and humanitarian
Page 7425
1 organisations."
2 Here you have it. Let's go to the third paragraph immediately:
3 "In 1994, as previously, checks mostly revealed the following
4 attempts at abuse:
5 "Transport of goods which are not permitted at all in UNPROFOR
6 convoys;
7 "Transport of goods which do not constitute humanitarian aid - in
8 convoys of humanitarian organisations;
9 "Transport of goods in quantities greater than those permitted."
10 And then the last paragraph on the same page:
11 "Understandably, most cases of attempted smuggling of goods were
12 in the convoys for Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, which had the least
13 opportunity to obtain goods outside of humanitarian goods. The following
14 goods were mostly smuggled: Video cameras, photographic cameras, films,
15 weapons, radio sets, satellite equipment --"
16 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the next page in English.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is the following page. It
18 starts with: "Understandably, in most cases ..."
19 And that's on the top of that page, "smuggling" -- or "smuggled,"
20 actually. We can see what things were smuggled: antennas, signal
21 devices, optical devices, night vision apparatus, Motorolas, various
22 parts for devices, antifreeze, chemical manure, oxygen cylinders,
23 flak-jackets, helmets, sleeping bags, military apparel and -- can we have
24 the following page in the Serbian language -- and different food stuffs.
25 Yes, that's it.
Page 7426
1 I'll skip one part:
2 "There's no doubt that there would have been very few attempts to
3 smuggle non-permitted goods if these had been confiscated permanently at
4 the check-points, because temporary confiscation merely enforces delay
5 and leaves the actors the hope that they will succeed in getting them to
6 their destination at the next attempt ...."
7 Which means that the goods were temporarily seized, and when the
8 convoy returned, they were returned to them:
9 "When representatives of UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations
10 complained about the procedure of the organs at the check-points --"
11 JUDGE KWON: Now that we've read that paragraph, come to your
12 question.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, despite the fact that you brought a lot of peace to the
15 theatre of war, and especially in Sarajevo, you pacified it, would you
16 agree that those were the reasons why Serbs had to be cautious with
17 regard to the convoys? And since we were three times under-powered,
18 there was an imminent danger that we would finally be defeated because
19 our enemy was helped in this particular way?
20 A. Well, first, I would absolutely deny that the United Nations
21 facilitated or, indeed, took part in the smuggling of any weapons or
22 other military equipment to the other side.
23 Secondly, all three parties to the conflict had signed, when the
24 United Nations Protection Force first deployed into Bosnia, an agreement
25 that there would be free movement of all convoys. The performance on the
Page 7427
1 ground by the three warring parties fell far short of that, particularly
2 the blocking of convoys by the Serb side. For example, in February 1994,
3 looking at the World Health Organisation figures, less than 50 per cent
4 of goods were delivered to the people who needed it, and, of course,
5 without that, they were suffering greatly, without that aid.
6 Q. General, how could the Muslims block that when Serbs and Croats
7 were around them? They could have only got all of that from the
8 territory held by Serbs and Croats. That is why you proportionately had
9 more problems with the Serbs, because it was only through Serb-held
10 territory that you could have supplied humanitarian aid to the Muslims;
11 right?
12 A. I've already explained that because the Serbs controlled
13 70 per cent of the territory of the country in 1994, it was inevitable
14 that most of the routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid ran through
15 territory controlled by the Bosnian Serb side. That is correct.
16 Q. Just one more question. You see what my point is, General. This
17 shows that the Serbs had reason to thoroughly check the convoys because
18 there was the danger of their defeat, because in some convoys -- I mean,
19 I'm not accusing the UN or command, but from somewhere goods were
20 smuggled that presented a danger to us, and they were a danger to us.
21 Was this done only because Serbs were evil, as such, or were they afraid
22 of being defeated?
23 A. All I can say -- I have no idea what the motivation may have
24 been, but all I can say is that the majority of the blocking of the
25 convoys, for the reasons we've already discussed, came from the Serb
Page 7428
1 side.
2 JUDGE KWON: General, whether you can remember the degree of that
3 control over a convoy varied, depending upon the content of it, i.e.,
4 whether it's an UNPROFOR convoy or it was a humanitarian convoy?
5 THE WITNESS: Sir, most of the convoys through the Serb side were
6 escorted by the UNPROFOR. There were two parts to the mission. UNHCR
7 provided the lorries, the drivers, and the goods, in terms of
8 humanitarian aid, and the United Nations Protection Force escorted them
9 where it was decided that escorts were required. On some occasions, they
10 ran without escorts. On other occasions, they needed the UN to help them
11 move their convoys, both from the point of view of control and also to
12 deter any blocking.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 THE WITNESS: The second category of convoy, of course, was the
15 military convoys which UNPROFOR ran in order to supply their own forces
16 in the enclaves, and, of course, Sarajevo
17 JUDGE KWON: So if it was a military convoy, a different rule
18 must have been applied?
19 THE WITNESS: Clearly, we didn't have participation from UNHCR on
20 those convoys; we merely ran them ourselves. But they were equally
21 subject to the inspection and control procedures by the warring parties.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 This document has already been admitted, so now we're going to
Page 7429
1 ask for 1D1692.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. But you do agree, don't you, General, that you, yourself, said in
4 your book that the Serbs took their time as they were conducting the
5 checks, but the flow of humanitarian aid went on, and the interruptions
6 were never such that they required NATO intervention. There is a
7 sentence to that effect in your book; right?
8 A. Well, you'd have to remind me as to what that sentence was. But
9 it is certainly the case that the UN managed to maintain a level of flow
10 of humanitarian aid throughout the war, in spite of all the difficulties
11 that were placed in front of it.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Have we got the document? Yes.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Now, "Activities of UNPROFOR," that's what it says down here. Do
16 we have a translation? No, we do not have a translation:
17 "3. Situation in the territory.
18 "A. Activities of UNPROFOR."
19 And then the first bullet point says: "Military observers," and
20 then the second one: "Convoy Premijer-Urgence passed through the airport
21 from Igman towards Sarajevo
22 and according to the first information we received, in addition to food,
23 they transported ammunition as well. Details are being checked."
24 Do you remember that that happened several times at the airport,
25 that goods were found of this nature that were being sent to our enemies?
Page 7430
1 A. No, I do not.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Let us look at paragraph 10 down there:
5 "From the check-point MC Betanija, UNPROFOR withdrew their forces
6 for reasons unknown."
7 And then it says:
8 "Around 2030 hours on the 8th of April, a humanitarian aid convoy
9 was checked that was being sent to the city of Sarajevo, seven trucks and
10 one jeep. A large quantity of ammunition for a Browning and sanitary
11 material was found, and that was not on the list of goods that were being
12 transported. All of the vehicles were seized, and the goods were stored
13 at the warehouse of the Ilidza Brigade, and the persons involved, drivers
14 and escorts, were sent to the Command of the SRK for further
15 examination."
16 This is a regular report for the 8th of April, and it shows
17 clearly that ammunition was found for a Browning that would have killed
18 our soldiers. Were you aware of that?
19 A. I have absolutely no knowledge of any such incident taking place.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Obviously, our PR people didn't
21 manage to get this through to the media. However, this is a regular
22 report.
23 So can it be admitted? And let's move on.
24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Only on the basis of its authenticity.
Page 7431
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: The authenticity of this document is not disputed,
3 and it covers the issue which is relevant to one of the topics the
4 witness has dealt with. So on that basis, we'll admit it. But we'll
5 mark it for identification, pending translation.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 P1859 [as interpreted], I'd like to have that document called up
9 now so the general can see it. P859. This is a telegram.
10 Can we see it? No, we cannot. Oh, yes, we can now.
11 P859, fine. That's the 26th of July, 1994, and it says here
12 "Message."
13 [In English] "The Bosnian Serbs have announced that they are
14 denouncing part of the agreement of freedom of movement for the Sarajevo
15 area of 17 March 1994
16 route that links Sarajevo
17 be those which cross the airport (Dobrinja-Butmir and Lukeska-Ilidza).
18 The Bratstvo-Jedinstvo Bridge and the route Sarajevo-Visoko (via Vogosca)
19 will remain open."
20 [Interpretation] Later on, it says:
21 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic yesterday wanted to speak to HCR
22 convey this message to him personally. Finally, I was called and was
23 handed the attached letter. This is the only non-Serb-controlled route
24 between Sarajevo
25 "The Serbs give four reasons for breaking with the freedom of
Page 7432
1 movement agreement of 17th March:
2 "1. The smuggling of weapons;
3 "2. Sniper activities;
4 "3. Prisoner exchange; and
5 "4. Cease-fire violation."
6 Can we have the second page.
7 The second page is an addendum to the telegram. It's my letter
8 sent to Sergio de Mello and to Viktor Andreev. You see all the things
9 that I say in that letter, and the last sentence reads.
10 "Humanitarian convoys are free to utilize the earlier routes
11 across our territory."
12 [Interpretation] However, these routes where the smuggling had
13 taken place were closed.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Do you agree, General, that this was not done without a reason?
16 Very specific reasons were mentioned, as a matter of fact.
17 A. I certainly remember you raising those issues with us.
18 Q. However, do you agree that we only closed those routes where
19 smuggled goods had been seized, and that the other routes remained
20 opened?
21 A. I don't agree, because I can't know what your motivation was.
22 Our general view was that the Bosnian Serb side were using the closure of
23 routes as a means of levering the Bosnian Government into accepting peace
24 on their terms, and they would use all sorts of reasons for closing these
25 routes, including the ones that you outlined in your letter.
Page 7433
1 Q. Please have a look at this letter. It says this very clearly.
2 It's only the routes where we caught the smugglers are being closed:
3 [In English] "Of course humanitarian convoys are free to utilise
4 the earlier routes across our territory."
5 [Interpretation] General, this is not pressure against the Muslim
6 side in order to achieve something, politically speaking, although the
7 international community had imposed sanctions on the Serbs, and that was
8 pressure. However, we did not close all routes. We only closed those
9 routes where there had been smuggling. That is quite clear. The
10 telegram and the letter state that very clearly, that the routes via the
11 airport are being closed, because that's where the smuggling had taken
12 place, whereas the route via Vogosca remained open; right?
13 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
14 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, again Dr. Karadzic is arguing with
15 General Rose, which he has been doing since we began this session.
16 JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered the question,
17 unless you have something to add to that. But please move on,
18 Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Since this has already been admitted, now I'd like to ask for
21 9117. That's the 65 ter number of the document I'd like to see now. Let
22 us see what happened in February, what you've been saying. 559117 [as
23 interpreted].
24 I don't know whether we have a translation. I'm going to tell
25 what this document is. It's the Main Staff of the Army of
Page 7434
1 Republika Srpska writing to the commands of all corps. This is an order
2 of Milovanovic, the chief of staff, and I'm just going to read
3 paragraph 3 to you. You can see the rest:
4 "All check-points should be reinforced with select personnel that
5 will display a higher level of professional kindness, co-operativeness,
6 and simplify procedures involved when examining convoys. Avoid conflict
7 situations and notify the Operative Centre of the Main Staff of the Army
8 of Republika Srpska by telephone if any occur."
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Do you remember, General, that the main cause of
11 misunderstandings at check-points were misunderstandings? Either goods
12 appeared that were not on the lists, or persons who were not on the
13 lists, or even extra trucks would appear, two or three extra trucks? Do
14 you remember that that was the main reason why convoys were being
15 detained?
16 A. Well, certainly I remember that there was an undue bureaucratic
17 level that was employed against us, or employed -- more accurately, put
18 -- against the running of the convoys. As I say, all sorts of reasons
19 were employed, including the failure to comply 100 per cent to the
20 checklist or the manifest on a particular vehicle. That is certainly the
21 case.
22 Q. General, a soldier of yours who receives information to the
23 effect that a convoy is going to appear at his check-point, does he have
24 relative freedom to let something pass that had not been declared or does
25 he have to ask you for extra permission?
Page 7435
1 A. You, sir, or one of your representatives had already signed a
2 document agreeing to the full and free running of convoys, which, of
3 course, should not have included inspections. But by the time I arrived
4 in 1994, that practice had already started, regrettably, and continued,
5 in spite of efforts to stop it. In theory, those convoys should have run
6 without being stopped or checked at all.
7 Q. No, General, we never accepted running convoys unchecked. That
8 can only happen in an occupied country. Where you came, with our
9 consent, we had the right to see whether what is contained is what you
10 had declared. If that is not the case and if you are helping our
11 enemies, then it is our right to check that. Would you allow that kind
12 of thing to happen in your own country, to let someone drive something
13 around without any checks?
14 A. All I can say, there was an agreement. Because, of course, the
15 populations of all three sides were suffering from the conflict, an
16 agreement had been signed before I arrived in Bosnia; I think in 1992.
17 Certainly I can remember seeing that document, saying that all parties to
18 the conflict agreed to the free running of humanitarian aid convoys.
19 Sadly, that was not to be.
20 Q. Do you think that free running of convoys excludes the right to
21 checks?
22 A. I believe it should do. But by the time I arrived, as I say,
23 that certainly wasn't the case, and it was impossible, therefore, to go
24 back to the status quo ante, which should have been the case.
25 Q. General, no one can pass through a war zone without any checks.
Page 7436
1 You know that full well. We had the right to inspect this, and we did
2 so.
3 Look at this sentence:
4 "In depth, we should have forces that can prevent the forceful
5 entry of UNPROFOR."
6 You were there with our consent and with certain regulations
7 involved. You were not an occupying army, and you did not aspire to be
8 one; right?
9 A. The status of the United Nations was that it was a peacekeeping
10 mission, facilitating the humanitarian -- the delivery of humanitarian
11 aid with the consent of the warring parties. That was its status.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Look at the last sentence and let's
13 be done with this document. General Milovanovic is issuing the following
14 order:
15 "All planned and approved convoys should be allowed to cross the
16 territory of Republika Srpska once they are inspected."
17 So he says that it should be done simply, professionally, with
18 appropriate kindness. So all planned and approved convoys. There was a
19 procedure involved once all the goods contained in the said convoys had
20 been inspected.
21 Can this be admitted?
22 MS. EDGERTON: Was there a question?
23 JUDGE KWON: So what was your question?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question is whether the general
25 knows that we had the right to inspection and that our commands had
Page 7437
1 ordered professional, speedy, and proper checks. So there is no doubt
2 that there should have been checks. There should have been checks. So
3 what General Milovanovic is writing here is what the Serbian Army
4 actually did.
5 The general had said that in February we had prevented convoys
6 from passing through, and this is a document from February showing that
7 we were not preventing the convoys from running in any way, but we just
8 wanted to have proper checks and to have them inspected.
9 JUDGE KWON: All repetition. I think the general has answered
10 all those questions.
11 We'll mark for identification this document, pending translation.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can we have 13354, 65 ter number. 13354, that's a document --
15 yes, this is the translation.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. This is a document that was in force when you arrived. It had
18 been issued a month prior to your arrival. So this is a document that
19 was issued by the president of the republic. Yours truly, that is. So
20 this is what it says:
21 "With a view to securing normal functioning of humanitarian
22 organisations --"
23 Sorry, let me just say something else before that. It's sent to
24 the Government of Republika Srpska, the Supreme Headquarters of the Army
25 of Republika Srpska, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health,
Page 7438
1 and the Government Co-ordination Body for Co-operation with UNPROFOR and
2 International Organisations.
3 So this is what the first paragraph says:
4 "With the aim of securing normal functioning of humanitarian
5 organisations, it is necessary that you provide undisturbed passage of
6 all convoys of the humanitarian aid going along the roads and corridors
7 of Republic of Srpska
8 International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins Sans Frontieres,
9 Handicap-International, the World Health Organisation, the International
10 Committee of Salvation."
11 Were these organisations present, and did you know that we had
12 authorised their presence, as such?
13 A. I'm well aware that those organisations were present in Bosnia
14 and they were there with the agreement of the warring parties; that is
15 correct.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have a look at
17 the next page of this presidential document. Yes, the second paragraph
18 here.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. After opinion was obtained, the committee gives its consent for
21 the movement of convoys, and all persons manning check-points have to
22 abide by this, et cetera, et cetera. Do you remember that
23 Professor Koljevic, one of the top officials of Republika Srpska, the
24 vice-president of the republic, headed the committee for humanitarian
25 issues, or, rather, for co-operation with you and humanitarian
Page 7439
1 organisations?
2 A. I certainly remember Professor Koljevic.
3 JUDGE KWON: Do we have the second page of this document in
4 English? What we have is only one page. I just noted -- let's carry on.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure where that part is.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. "As for checking the contents of the convoy --" that's the second
8 paragraph in Serbian -- "and its vehicles shall be carried out by joint
9 military and police patrols when entering Republika Srpska, and from the
10 point where they're unloaded or where they're crossing the territory or
11 other parts of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, convoys shall be
12 escorted by police patrols. What is prohibited is stopping convoys and
13 re-inspecting them, and especially the unauthorised seizure of goods that
14 had already undergone appropriate procedures."
15 I don't have to read out the whole thing:
16 "Once consent is received for the passage of convoys through the
17 territory of Republika Srpska, all concerned have to unequivocally
18 observe the regulations involved, and they should abide by these
19 instructions with a view to enriching co-operation with humanitarian
20 organisations and all other protagonists of humanitarian aid in order to
21 enhance the reputation of Republika Srpska at humanitarian level."
22 My question, General: There's so many convoys, and some parts of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina could receive this humanitarian aid only through
24 Serb-held territory. Why -- why is it being repeated time and again that
25 convoys were stopped when a vast majority of them managed to get through?
Page 7440
1 A. The flow of convoys, as I've already said, was intermittent and
2 not -- did not in any way achieve the targets or goals set by the World
3 Health Organisation. The management of the convoys on the United Nations
4 Protection Force side was done between the UNHCR and the chief of staff
5 of the United Nations Protection Force; first of all, Brigadier
6 General Ramsey, and Brigadier General van Bos [phoen] and
7 Brigadier General Brinkman. They would come and brief me when there were
8 major hold-ups or obstructions taking place. I did not have a detailed
9 knowledge of every single convoy running in Bosnia throughout 1994, and
10 therefore I suggest that your question would be better posed in detail to
11 them, rather than to me, assuming they appear here as witnesses. I can
12 only cover the general position, and that is that, because of
13 obstructions, the delivery of aid did not achieve its targets,
14 particularly at the start of 1994. There were periods when we were able
15 to do so, but there were many periods when we could not.
16 Q. Apologies. Please continue.
17 A. I remember one particular incident, if it's of any use to you,
18 in, I think, January, when a convoy was blocked coming in from Kiseljak.
19 We summoned NATO air-strikes, and the Serb block withdrew before the NATO
20 air-strikes were used. That was the sort of thing we were having to do
21 to run convoys. On another occasion, we employed Danish Leopard tanks to
22 engage Bosnian Serb tanks in order to facilitate the passage of a convoy
23 bearing refugees from Zvornik. They were extreme examples which I was
24 aware of, but the daily routine running of convoys was not my business.
25 It was the chief of staff of UNPROFOR's business.
Page 7441
1 Q. And thank you. Let me just say this: I'm going to share a
2 statement with you, and then we'll compare percentages. I'm saying that
3 3 to 5 per cent of convoys, at the most, faced any difficulties, and what
4 would you say? What was the percentage, in your view?
5 A. I think it's a question that is meaningless, because if the
6 United Nations Protection Force was having to employ force or threaten
7 the use of force and was having to deal with obstructive bureaucratic
8 procedures in order to ensure the passage of convoys, then one could not
9 say other than the United Nations was continually facing difficulties.
10 It may have achieved more than 50 per cent of its targets by the time the
11 year ended, but, of course, that includes periods when there was, for
12 example, into Sarajevo
13 Sarajevo
14 overall tonnages and figures. So if you approached it from a statistical
15 point of view, it is meaningless saying it's this percentage or that
16 percentage. All I know - and this is using World Health Organisation
17 figures - is that because of the obstructions mainly from the Serb side,
18 it was not possible to achieve the targets that had been set for the
19 United Nations.
20 Q. General, just one more question with this regard. When it comes
21 to the situation in the theatre of war, combats, or cease-fires, did all
22 that have any impact on the passage of the convoys?
23 A. Of course, if a high level of conflict was taking place along a
24 certain part of the front-line, then it would not be possible to run
25 convoys across the routes that lay in that part of the line.
Page 7442
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can this document be admitted?
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification, pending -- until
4 the time we get the full translation.
5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
6 JUDGE KWON: I was advised it is being up-loaded.
7 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
8 MS. EDGERTON: If I can just add to that, Your Honour.
9 The original of this document is -- because I think the one you
10 see before you has been taken from a book, the original of this document
11 has otherwise been contained at 1D00276, and there is a Defence team
12 translation that's complete of that one. And the translation that was
13 accompanying the one that's on the screen in front of you comes from a
14 book, and, to be quite honest, neither English translation is consistent.
15 JUDGE KWON: But all the translation will be checked by the CLSS
16 later on. On that basis, we'll admit that.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D690, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D02444 is the next document I
19 would like to bring up. This is a daily report dated 31st January -- or,
20 rather, 30 January 1994
21 And the report was sent after our meeting. 1D0 -- yes, that's it.
22 Can this be zoomed in. I don't believe that we have a Serbian
23 translation:
24 [In English] "I express my gratitude to President Karadzic for
25 his help and co-operation of ensuring unhindered deliveries of
Page 7443
1 humanitarian aid by land corridors passing across this territory.
2 British General Michael Rose -- Major Michael Rose, the newly-appointed
3 UNPROFOR commander ... said after his meeting today with Radovan
4 Karadzic ..."
5 And so on.
6 [Interpretation] But look at the bottom of the page. I am saying
7 my impression is --
8 [In English] "... that regardless of where they come from,
9 high-ranking officers are the ones least prejudiced. Such was the case
10 with all former UNPROFOR commanders, and so it is with General Rose who
11 is willing to examine the situation as a whole and take an unbiased
12 stand, which the United Nations personifies. We have always been
13 satisfied with the UN high commands and have never had any objections to
14 their works, the Srpska Republika president said."
15 [Interpretation] Here you can see that we -- or that I exculpated
16 higher commands and that we say to the general public that they should be
17 respected.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you remember that on several occasions we issued public
20 positive statements about UNPROFOR in order to have common citizens
21 receive them with a lot of understanding and extend welcome to them?
22 A. I don't remember you issuing particular statements, and I
23 certainly cannot remember, looking at that document, expressing
24 satisfaction about the safe passage of convoys across Serb territory.
25 Q. And in the following paragraph, you say -- and let me not read
Page 7444
1 for everybody. Everybody can read it for themselves. You express your
2 satisfaction with the passage of a convoy through the Serbian territory
3 and a lower intensity of military operations or reduced volume of
4 military operations. And it is obvious that you could see a link between
5 the reduced volume of military operations and the increased level -- or,
6 rather, number of the humanitarian convoy passages. That's what you just
7 said a little while ago. If there is a higher intensity of fighting,
8 there are fewer conveys, and vice versa. Do you see the passage?
9 A. I can -- I can agree that if there's a higher level of conflict,
10 then there would be a lower level of the delivery of humanitarian aid.
11 That's entirely logical. But as I say, I cannot remember ever making a
12 statement expressing satisfaction with the safe passage of convoys,
13 particularly, when I check the table for January, we were running just
14 over half only of the convoys required, so it was most unlikely I would
15 have made a statement of satisfaction. I can't see who else was at the
16 meeting, but had it been a member of the United Nations High Commission
17 for Refugees present, or even Sergio Viera de Mello who previously worked
18 for the UNHCR, he would certainly have made me withdraw that statement,
19 given the reality on the ground.
20 Q. General, I'm sure that I didn't write this. And further on, it
21 says that I said that in a discussion with General Rose, we tackled our
22 different issues, some of them being incidents and provocations of Muslim
23 forces with regard to NATO, and that we also agreed that every incident
24 should be investigated. And then on the following page, your words are
25 quoted.
Page 7445
1 Can we go to the following page, to page 2.
2 In quotation, we can see your words:
3 [In English] "'The protection of humanitarian aid routes is
4 within the mandate of the peace forces, and we are aware of the
5 difficulties and traps which can present themselves, but we will conduct
6 an investigation in every case, and I therefore stress the importance of
7 the deliveries of humanitarian aid across these areas,' ..."
8 [Interpretation] You were aware at the time that what was going
9 on was a civil war, and you were aware of all of the difficulties and
10 traps?
11 A. I was, indeed.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Can the document be admitted?
14 JUDGE KWON: You said this is a daily report. I take it it is
15 one of the news agencies' report, "Tanjug."
16 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
17 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
18 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D691, Your Honours.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D02443 is the next document I
21 would like to call up. 1D02443. Do you remember --
22 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient, shall we take a break?
23 We'll have a break for 25 minutes. We'll resume at five past
24 4.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 3.42 p.m.
Page 7446
1 --- On resuming at 4.10 p.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. Do you agree with me, General, that the 16 years that have lapsed
5 have had an impact and that we need documents in order to jog our memory
6 of all those events; right?
7 A. Certainly; one's memory starts to fade, and documents are of a
8 help.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask the Court to produce
10 P1485, which is Mladic's diary. I would like to ask for English page 90
11 and the Serbian typed page 91.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Just a while ago, General, we saw a "Tanjug" report from our
14 press conference after the meeting. We obviously appeared before the
15 journalists after that meeting, you and I, and here we have your
16 conversation with General Mladic.
17 Can we also see the Serbian typed version, page 91. Not
18 handwritten version, typed version, if that helps.
19 In any case, we can use the English version, and this is what
20 Mladic wrote down. We have both versions now. Mladic says:
21 "I am glad that convoys are going through without problems."
22 This is, according to Mladic, what you said:
23 "We have problems, maybe we will have, but it is best that
24 convoys go.
25 "Life in Sarajevo
Page 7447
1 You express your regret, and you say that:
2 "It is regrettable that journalists are attacking only the
3 Serbian side, and the Serbs are not the only ones to blame."
4 In this conversation, reference is made to the convoy, and at
5 that moment you were satisfied with the passage of convoys; right? And
6 the convoys are mentioned both in the conversation with Mladic as well as
7 in the conversation with me that we saw a while ago.
8 A. Well, I can't remember making these comments at all.
9 Q. And that's why we have mementos. This is General Mladic's
10 memento. He said that you had said this. And then you went on to say
11 that:
12 "People in New York
13 UN forces, which is not true."
14 In this case, "you" is actually us, the Serbs. This is
15 apparently what you said to General Mladic on that same day. I
16 understand that a lot has been forgotten. However, it seems to me -- or,
17 rather, I'm even convinced that at that time, you were happier with all
18 that than you are today.
19 Do you agree that both in "Tanjug"'s report about our meeting, as
20 well as in Mladic's notes about your meeting, we can see that you were
21 rather satisfied both with the convoys and the pacification of the
22 situation in Sarajevo
23 A. Well, clearly that was the interpretation you put into whatever
24 remarks you chose to record. Whether that was the case or not, it would
25 be impossible to say today. I would have to get a copy of the record of
Page 7448
1 the meeting that was always kept by the civil adviser of every discussion
2 we had to see whether his notes matched those of yours or General Mladic.
3 But at the moment, it's impossible to say one way or the other.
4 Q. Can we get the record made by your civilian administration? Why
5 shouldn't we be able to see for ourselves? But as far as this document
6 is concerned, these are General Mladic's notes, and the previous document
7 was a report from our press conference, after our meeting. I'm not the
8 author of any of them. And this document is self-explanatory. These are
9 your words, both in the newspapers and in Mladic's diary. On the same
10 day, you spoke along the same lines to the both of us; right?
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, there's no point of repeating the same
12 question. You made the point, and the general has answered his answer.
13 Let's move on.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to correct the
15 general and say that neither were my notes -- neither the news report nor
16 Mladic's diary.
17 Can this be admitted? I believe that we have to admit parts of
18 Mladic's diary because not the entire document has been admitted. I
19 don't know what the procedure is with the diary parts that we are
20 tendering for admission.
21 JUDGE KWON: I'm concerned you have been already exhausted. We
22 admit it in its entirety.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 1P -- or, rather, the same document, English page 109, and the
25 Serbian 110, again the typed version. Page 110 and 111. Let's start
Page 7449
1 with 110. I'm talking about the same document. Can the Court please
2 produce that. This is 15 days later, General.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. On the 15th of February, a meeting with General Cot and
5 General Rose, and again these are Mladic's notes. He had met up with
6 Generals Cot and Rose.
7 Let's look at the page. A meeting with General Cot, and
8 General Cot says, I've planned a meeting.
9 Can we move on to the following page in the English version as
10 well as in the Serbian version.
11 And he says that he had planned a meeting with General Delic and
12 that he had met Ganic, and he had told me that General Delic was in
13 Central Bosnia
14 as saying this:
15 "Since we met General Milovanovic, we have had full
16 co-operation."
17 And then he goes -- or, rather, you go on to say:
18 "There's no difference between us and NATO. There will be no
19 air-strikes before I order them."
20 And then you suggest a visit to the weapons collections, and you
21 are asking for guarantees for all weapons to be under control.
22 Do you remember that meeting which was attended by you and
23 General Cot? That meeting was with General Mladic. Do you remember that
24 meeting?
25 A. I remember the meeting. And I repeat that I have no record in
Page 7450
1 front of me of the meeting taken by the civil adviser, so I can't make
2 any comment as to the accuracy of your account of the meeting. I'm not
3 saying it's inaccurate, I'm merely saying I can't make a comment on it.
4 It's certainly selective in what is written down. It's certainly not
5 comprehensive, your note. For example, it doesn't say that
6 General Mladic flew into a rage and stated that no one can threaten a
7 Serb and live, which is a note that I took from the meeting. That's not
8 included in these notes, so it is selective.
9 Q. Have you kept any notes from that meeting? Do you have any notes
10 of that meeting?
11 A. I don't have notes, but the United Nations certainly kept a
12 record of all the meetings that we had.
13 Q. We'll find something about that meeting, sir.
14 65 ter 318 is the next document I would like the Court to
15 produce.
16 General, in Britain
17 Britain
18 the Falkland Islands, and I congratulate you on that. But I would also
19 say that even small nations have the right, they are entitled to keep
20 their dignity. Do you agree with me?
21 A. I'm not sure which part of the statement you want me to agree
22 with. Nations under the United Nations Charter 7 -- under United Nations
23 Charter Article 7 -- Charter 7, have the right to self-defence. That's
24 certain.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 12318, please. This is not the
Page 7451
1 document that I had called up.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. My question was this: You said that General Mladic had told you
4 that nobody had the right to threaten the Serbs. Would you not agree
5 that nobody has the right to threaten anybody?
6 JUDGE KWON: Just move on to your next question.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. 10785, my mistake, I
8 apologise. 65 ter 10785.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Please look at paragraph 2. This is a telegram sent by
11 Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan, or, rather, from Ambassador de Mello to Akashi
12 copied to Annan. Paragraph 2:
13 [In English] "Humanitarian convoys, Rose said, should be allowed
14 to move freely after agreed clearance procedure - including routes - has
15 been complied with."
16 [Interpretation] The first sentence says that a clearance
17 procedure was agreed, agreed clearance procedure, and that it had to be
18 complied with.
19 Further on, it says -- just a moment. Bear with me, please. You
20 can see the entire paragraph, but look at this:
21 "Later with Mladic --"
22 [In English] "-- Rose again expressed satisfaction at the general
23 improvement in terms of convoy movements and hoped this would be
24 maintained. Procedural requirements should not become bureaucratic
25 harassment."
Page 7452
1 [Interpretation] In other words, the procedure did not mean
2 hindrance.
3 [In English] "Serbs must respect you. Not one finger will be
4 raised against the UN. Not one UNPROFOR soldier has died on the
5 Republika Srpska territory. His side had had some problems with members
6 of humanitarian organisations. UNPROFOR convoys would have no problems,
7 other than weather. Some equipment (detectors) could, however, be
8 provided to speed up clearance procedures."
9 [Interpretation] Do you see that even Ambassador de Mello, may
10 God rest his soul, reported exactly in the same way as "Tanjug" reported
11 and in the same way as Mladic had noted it down in his diary?
12 A. Certainly, elements of what was reported in the first and second
13 documents you showed me are borne out by Mr. de Mello's record of the
14 meeting. And my own memory suggests that Mr. de Mello's record there is
15 accurate, so far as I remember. It's certainly not comprehensive, but
16 it's accurate.
17 Q. Thank you. And now, General, you will see that Mladic was true
18 to his word.
19 Let's look at 1D02443. We will come back to this document, and
20 we will tender it for admission later. And now I would like the Court to
21 produce 1D02443.
22 Yes, that's the document.
23 Can I draw your attention to the third bullet point, where it
24 says:
25 [In English] "...have arrested three persons for firing on UN
Page 7453
1 aircraft near Sarajevo
2 of a further five."
3 [Interpretation] That was in January 1994. There had been an
4 incident, and Serbs arrested and issued warrants for the arrest of
5 others.
6 And look at the last paragraph here:
7 [In English] "The air-lift continues. Three UNPROFOR and 20
8 UNHCR flights landed at the airport yesterday. Following up last week's
9 incidents of small-arms fire against flights into Sarajevo, the BH -- BSA
10 have arrested three men and have issued warrants for the arrest of a
11 further five."
12 [Interpretation] This is your press release, or, rather,
13 UNPROFOR's daily press release for that particular day.
14 Do you remember this particular incident or --
15 A. I was not in the country at the time. I took over on the 30th of
16 January, if I remember right, or shortly before that.
17 Q. But do you see that this is consistent with Mladic's position --
18 A. [Previous translation continues] ... very much so. I arrived on
19 the 23rd of January, so I was in the country at the time, but I don't
20 remember that incident.
21 Q. Is this consistent with Mladic's position, which was that the
22 United Nations will come in no harm's way, that nobody will as much as
23 raise a finger against them?
24 A. Well, that certainly seems to be what he said at the time. The
25 fact that the performance on the ground subsequently didn't match up to
Page 7454
1 that promise is an extremely regrettable thing from all perspectives.
2 Q. General, sir, if we expand this, or if you expand this, we're
3 going to have to seek proof. And we see here that if you don't do
4 anything, the Serbs don't do anything against you, so we see here that it
5 is the perpetrators that are being punished.
6 Can this document be admitted?
7 MS. EDGERTON: It's not complete, Your Honour. That's a
8 multi-page document.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't mind having all of it
10 admitted.
11 JUDGE KWON: So do we have the entire part -- all parts of this
12 document? Do we need to mark it for identification, pending until the
13 time we get all of it?
14 MS. EDGERTON: Please.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll do that.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D692.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Q. General, did you know that we had offered the doubling of the
19 capacities of land corridors between Belgrade
20 offered that the Banja Luka Airport
21 purposes?
22 A. I don't have any particular memory of that proposal or those
23 proposals.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D2535.
25 1D2535. It's a letter of mine, actually, written to Ambassador Akashi a
Page 7455
1 day after you took up your duties.
2 Here's the letter:
3 [In English] "My meeting with Miss Sadako Ogata on 19th of
4 January, I offered to widen the land corridor for the flow of
5 humanitarian aid from Belgrade
6 would be doubled. Not only would aid be expanded but I also promised to
7 facilitate its flow through the proposed Belgrade-Tuzla land corridor.
8 This would accordingly obviate any need for the opening of Tuzla Airport
9 The Serbian side has legitimate fears that the Muslims wish to smuggle
10 arms through Tuzla Airport
11 provoke incidents such as shooting down the aircraft, for which they
12 would blame the Serbs.
13 Ms. Ogata has accepted our offer regarding the expansion of the
14 Belgrade-Tuzla route. Once the peace agreement is concluded, the airport
15 at Tuzla
16 the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."
17 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this is a fair humanitarian
18 offer?
19 A. It certainly seems to be an offer which I think Mr. Akashi at the
20 time progressed. Why it never happened, I don't know.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we'll see whether it ever
22 happened.
23 But can this be admitted now?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D693, Your Honours.
Page 7456
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 6842. 6842
2 is the 65 ter number.
3 Let us look at the first page and identify what this is all
4 about, and then let's move on to the second page.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this has been admitted as
6 Exhibit P1650.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So much the better.
9 Let's move on to the second page.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, let us focus on paragraph 6 "Tuzla Airport
12 [In English] "Rose commended Karadzic's decision to double
13 quantities of assistance flowing by road, which, if implemented, would
14 reduce the urgency to use the airfield for humanitarian purposes.
15 However, the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security
16 Council (which Karadzic had 'read very carefully') made no secret about
17 the imperative need for UNPROFOR to reopen that airport, while taking
18 Bosnian Serb legitimate concerns into account."
19 [Interpretation] This telegram shows that you fully took part in
20 this and that you supported my offer.
21 Now you see paragraph 7. You see this telegram of the UN, dated
22 the 31st of January:
23 [In English] "Karadzic said it would be very difficult for him to
24 agree. He was certain that 'Muslims' intended to shoot down the UN
25 aircraft (he recalled the Italian plane crash, saying, 'They shoot it
Page 7457
1 down and we got the no-fly zone') so as to put the blame on the Serbs."
2 [Interpretation] Do you now remember that you were fully aware of
3 this?
4 A. I think you're referring to the meeting on the 30th of January,
5 when the subject of the opening of the airfield was raised by Mr. Akashi,
6 and I do remember the discussions which surrounded that proposal.
7 Q. I don't know whether Mr. Akashi was there. This seems to have
8 been a meeting between you and me.
9 Actually, do you know these people, Yolanda Auger, who is writing
10 from Zagreb
11 Do you know these UN officials?
12 A. No, I didn't. And I may have conflated a subsequent discussion I
13 had with Mr. Akashi about the opening of the airfield. Certainly, I
14 remember him raising it with you on a subsequent occasion, if it
15 wasn't -- as it looks as though it wasn't on the 30th of January.
16 Q. The entire document is most interesting. Since it's been
17 admitted, we can move on.
18 1D2532, can we have that now, please. It's a letter of mine to
19 His Excellency Mr. Akashi on the 23rd of April, 1994. It relates to the
20 Tuzla
21 the second paragraph, it says:
22 "He demonstrated enormous understanding and flexibility by
23 agreeing that the Tuzla
24 against our better judgement. However, as in the case of Sarajevo
25 Airport, we decided to accommodate the demands on us in the interests of
Page 7458
1 bringing humanitarian aid to civilians, even though, as you know well,
2 such aid is also being used by the Muslim military and sustains their war
3 efforts against us. I reiterate on this occasion that the modalities of
4 reopening the Tuzla Airport
5 agreed with President Yeltsin's emissary."
6 I don't have to read all of it:
7 [In English] "Any forceful scenario for starting the aid flights
8 will, of course, reveal that the international community is not
9 interested in negotiations and agreements, and that the Muslims are
10 dictating to the Serbs side through the UN and others."
11 [Interpretation] So, General, sir, do you not see that we were
12 never opposed to humanitarian aid, even in situations when it exposed us
13 to danger? Our fears were legitimate, weren't they, as stated by the
14 Secretary-General of the UN in the previous document?
15 A. Well, certainly in a matter -- in the matter of theory, you were
16 not opposed to the delivery of humanitarian aid. But, of course, in
17 practice, as I've explained previously, it was the Serb side that did
18 most of the blocking of the aid convoys. As a matter of point of
19 accuracy, I notice your letter's dated the 23rd of April, but actually
20 there's a time stamp on the letter from the UN Communications Centre
21 which is dated the 23rd of March. I guess your letter should have read
22 "23rd March."
23 Q. Possibly, because I'm referring to the letter of His Excellency
24 Mr. Akashi, dated the 21st of March. I certainly would not have waited
25 for over a month to reply. I assume that these numbers are more correct,
Page 7459
1 after all. But basically it's one-and-the-same thing.
2 General, since you're saying that, I have to go back to something
3 else. What is the percentage of convoys that did not pass through? But
4 never mind, General.
5 Do you agree with the Secretary-General when he says that our
6 concerns were legitimate? I have to present this to the Trial Chamber.
7 Were we evil, just like that, for no reason whatsoever, or were we
8 cautious, as regards humanitarian aid, so that we would not endanger
9 ourselves?
10 A. Well, clearly, you were right to be nervous about the possibility
11 that humanitarian aid could be used to smuggle weapons to the opposing
12 side in the conflict.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. You will see, General,
14 that the Tuzla Airport
15 Can this letter be admitted?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D694, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D346, can we have that, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, once again I would like to ask you to take into account
21 the fact that I'm not accusing any nation or any higher command or
22 civilian structure of the UN. However, from this document, you will see
23 proof coming from the Muslim side showing that convoys are being abused.
24 So this is the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina --
25 JUDGE KWON: Without your opposing to his making comments?
Page 7460
1 MS. EDGERTON: Actually, no, Your Honour. This is at least the
2 fourth document this afternoon that we've received no notification on, so
3 I thought by this time it might be worth rising to make that point.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I have difficulty following the last three
5 documents from his list of documents to be used with this witness. So
6 what happened, Mr. Karadzic?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that we had shown it a long
8 time ago. I think that it had been displayed a long time ago. But,
9 nevertheless, we do apologise, we ask for your understanding, because in
10 their statements, witnesses often expand the subject involved and then we
11 have to deal with it. Also, we are very flexible when the Prosecution
12 brings documents out of the blue.
13 This document dates back to the time just prior to your arrival,
14 the 24th of December, 1993. It's the Muslim command and their military
15 security.
16 Could we have page 3 of this document.
17 JUDGE KWON: I will tell you to be more cautious when you are
18 going to use the document for which we don't have a translation. You
19 should understand the difficulty of the Prosecution to deal with such
20 matters.
21 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Well, in fact, Your Honour, this is a violation of
23 the guide-lines, and it's repeated, and I have particular concern with
24 these multi-page documents in languages that we don't understand, that
25 the witness doesn't understand, where provisions are frequently -- or
Page 7461
1 passages are frequently extracted from those documents and put to
2 witnesses without having the context of the documents explained or
3 properly articulated.
4 JUDGE KWON: That noted, why don't we get on with the evidence.
5 So bear that in mind, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 The entire document is going to be quite interesting, once we
8 have it translated. But as for this witness, it is only one paragraph
9 that we would like to deal with:
10 "Sector of the Military Security Service of the 1st Corps learned
11 over the past few days that at the PTT building -- PTT engineering
12 building, because of the Christmas holidays, UNPF members have relaxed
13 highly, so they focus very little on their regular tasks."
14 Now, look at this:
15 "In addition to that, because the aggressor has refused to allow
16 logistic convoys for the UNPF into town, there is a considerable shortage
17 of food and oil. Since your oil is not getting in, and that is why the
18 Bosnian Muslim Army doesn't have any oil."
19 See, this is evidence, General. This is proof that we allowed
20 you to import oil for yourselves, and you gave it to them.
21 THE WITNESS: Under no circumstances did the United Nations ever
22 give oil to the -- or fuel to the military forces of the Bosnian
23 Government. There was a certain amount of stealing of fuel that took
24 place, and in some cases, regrettably, a number of soldiers individually
25 sold fuel from their lorries to all three sides, depending on who was
Page 7462
1 offering the most money. But it was neither systematic nor deliberate, a
2 matter of policy of the UN, to sell fuel to any side, combat forces. All
3 fuel that was passed across was for humanitarian purposes, in principle.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before this document was shown, I
5 said that I'm not attacking higher commands. But it's all the same, as
6 far as we're concerned, how they got this fuel and how they waged war
7 against us. From our point of view, it's one-and-the-same thing, who
8 sold fuel or whatever, but the fact remains that the more fuel you get
9 into a particular zone, our army is suspicious that that fuel will end up
10 in Muslim tanks or APCs.
11 Can this document please be admitted?
12 THE WITNESS: The quantities of fuel that were stolen from the
13 United Nations or illegally sold by individual soldiers would have been
14 very small and, I suspect, would have more likely gone to civilians
15 rather than the military.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, marked for
17 identification.
18 JUDGE KWON: You'll have another opportunity to tender this,
19 Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I would like us to note for the
21 record that the general rejected the possibility of having -- the higher
22 commands have done this, and also he said that it was soldiers at lower
23 levels that sold this.
24 1D02538 [as interpreted], can we have that, please. 1D02528.
25 The original is in English, so it's going to be easier for us. Yes.
Page 7463
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you agree, General -- or, rather, would you agree to have a
3 look at this letter? I wrote to Mr. Akashi on the 24th of June. I thank
4 him for his letter dated the 23rd of June, that is to say, the previous
5 day. And in that letter, he describes the increased difficulties that
6 UNPROFOR BH Command is experiencing with regard to freedom of movement
7 and communication. And then I say:
8 [In English] "Put current methods into some perspective."
9 [Interpretation] Further down, I say:
10 [In English] "I remind you that the recent Geneva Agreement has
11 provided for a cessation of hostilities and exchange of prisoners. The
12 Muslims are completely ignoring their signature over this agreement."
13 [Interpretation] And then a bit further down:
14 [In English] "UNPROFOR forces take little notice of the agreed
15 procedure (for example, undeclared goods and equipment) and display
16 unacceptable behaviour, as if they are an army of occupation. That is
17 even worse -- what is even worse, UNPROFOR is allowing the Muslims to use
18 its observation posts, and there have been many occasions when the blue
19 helmets have used artillery to fire at Serb positions."
20 [Interpretation] Further on, I ask his Excellency, Mr. Akashi, to
21 bring his own influence -- or, rather, to change the manner of action
22 that would actually enhance the Serbs' trust of UNPROFOR.
23 Do you remember this document, General?
24 A. I've never seen it before. And I would have taken grave
25 exception to it, had I seen it, and I'm sure that Mr. Akashi would have
Page 7464
1 done the same. There was no case ever of the United Nations allowing its
2 positions to be used by any of the warring parties to prosecute the war,
3 nor, indeed, did the United Nations fire artillery at anybody, other than
4 those people who were trying to obstruct the passage of convoys or in
5 self-defence.
6 Q. Is it possible that you did not know absolutely everything that
7 was going on, General?
8 A. Of course.
9 Q. And that there may have been violations or abuses that you have
10 not been aware of?
11 A. Not at the level you suggest in this letter to Mr. Akashi.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to draw your attention
13 to this sentence:
14 [In English] "But I shall do everything in my power to remove an
15 obstacle to the freedom of movement ..."
16 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth:
17 [In English] "Equally, as we are in a very delicate phase, I
18 would like you to ask to try to ensure that no unnecessary problems are
19 being created by UNPROFOR."
20 [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted? And then let's
21 move on to another exhibit.
22 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, what was your question in respect
23 to the last quotation? I mean, this is a self-serving statement. What
24 was your question to the general?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was whether it was
Page 7465
1 possible that the general, Sir Michael Rose, did not know everything that
2 was referred to in this letter. I am writing to General Rose's boss,
3 because a day before that Mr. Akashi had written to me about
4 difficulties. My question was: Does this letter not show that we have a
5 problem with UNPROFOR? General Rose allowed for the possibility of him
6 not knowing about each and every incident, although he thought that he
7 had to know about major incidents.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: That seems to be a complete non-sequitur, and
9 you're far better employed by moving on to something that the general can
10 answer.
11 JUDGE KWON: You just read out the last paragraph of this
12 document without asking a question to the witness. That's a totally
13 unnecessary waste of time.
14 Let's move on.
15 We'll admit this.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 I thought that that was the question. I thought --
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Well, did you see that I made efforts to make it easier for
20 UNPROFOR to move about? And you commended me on that note several times,
21 General.
22 A. Where exactly did I commend you?
23 Q. Well, you'll see. There are quite a few documents in which you
24 expressed your gratitude for my co-operation; for example, this document
25 that we saw a few moments ago, 65 ter 6842. It's a Prosecution exhibit,
Page 7466
1 actually:
2 "In Tuzla Rose commended Karadzic's decision to ..."
3 And so on.
4 [Interpretation] And then --
5 JUDGE KWON: It was referring to the minutes of the Pale meeting.
6 So why don't we move on?
7 Have we given the number for this?
8 THE REGISTRAR: No, Your Honour. That will be Exhibit D695.
9 That's 1D2528.
10 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 1D02471, can we have that, please. 1D02471. It's an UNPROFOR
13 document dated the 8th of November, 1994.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Do you think, General, that although you were not aware of this,
16 there wasn't any abuse of UN equipment and insignia by the Muslim Army?
17 This may jog your memory: A few moments ago, you said that you think
18 that that was not the case, but see here, you did know about it.
19 If I have to read it, all right, I will, only part of the first
20 paragraph:
21 [In English] "The BiH have been observed in Sector North-East
22 using UN patches and UN coloured headgear. They have also been observed
23 using white coloured vehicles, and on one occasion, on September 13th,
24 1994, the vehicle being used was a weapons carrier. This incident was
25 formally protested by Lieutenant General Rose, and photographic evidence
Page 7467
1 was produced for this protest."
2 [Interpretation] This is what you caught, and I'm sure there was
3 a lot of those things that you didn't manage to catch.
4 A. I think you're confusing two issues. One was the wearing of
5 uniforms or passing off by the Bosnian Government forces as UN. And
6 certainly, as you observed from that letter, we've noticed this happened
7 from time to time and entered protests. That is not the same as saying
8 that the UN allowed the Bosnian Government forces to use their positions
9 or, indeed, that the UN, themselves, fired their artillery, the inference
10 being that we were fighting on behalf of the Bosnian Government forces.
11 Completely false suggestion. It was an illegal act by the Bosnian
12 Government forces to pass themselves off as the UN, and it stopped
13 whenever we protested.
14 Q. Again, that was important for you. But for us, it wasn't
15 important who's shooting us if somebody opened fire from a white vehicle
16 and shot our soldier.
17 Mr. Thomas testified here and said that he had to come closer to
18 a distance of three metres to establish that those were not French
19 soldiers, but, rather, Muslim soldiers masked as French soldiers.
20 General, what I'm trying to present to the Trial Chamber is that
21 our concerns and caution were justified; not by the behaviour of higher
22 commands, but by the conduct of soldiers on the enemy side who pretended
23 to be UN soldiers, wearing UN uniforms and patches. Do you appreciate
24 that? Do you understand me?
25 A. I think I've already said once before that I can understand that,
Page 7468
1 as one side or party to the conflict, you wouldn't want these prefaces to
2 happen. That is understood.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can this document be admitted, if it is not in evidence already?
5 JUDGE KWON: It will be done.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D696, Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce
8 1D02529.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. If I may remind you, this is my letter dated 22nd June.
11 Obviously, I wrote to Ambassador Akashi on the 22nd of June. He replied
12 on the 23rd, and then I wrote back on the 24th; three days in a row. And
13 you see what I'm writing?
14 "May I draw your attention to a matter of utmost importance,
15 which requires your urgent attention. Over the past few days, Muslim
16 forces in the Tuzla
17 and giving them UN markings. These vehicles, so painted and marked, have
18 been used for the transport of troops, weapons, ammunition and equipment
19 to the front-lines. Our soldiers on the first lines of defence have
20 clearly observed Muslim soldiers as they got off these vehicles, taking
21 off their weapons and equipment. Thanks only to the maximum restraint
22 exercised by our officers, Serb soldiers have not yet shot at the Muslims
23 operating under UN cover."
24 I don't want to go on reading everything else. And the last
25 sentence:
Page 7469
1 [In English] "If nothing is done, we cannot be held responsible
2 for any mistakes and the consequences thereof."
3 [Interpretation] It didn't happen just once. The Muslim side
4 often resorted to those kinds of behaviour, and approached our lines, or
5 carried out manoeuvres or different actions right before our eyes, and we
6 had to engage in a guessing game as to whether that was them or UN
7 soldiers.
8 Would you agree with me that that was just one of the reasons
9 that made us be more cautious and step up our controls and checks?
10 MS. EDGERTON: Could I ask for a reformulation, Your Honour?
11 This is a compound question.
12 JUDGE KWON: I think the general can deal with it.
13 THE WITNESS: As you know, the procedures were quite clear,
14 Dr. Karadzic, about the movement of convoys. Notification was given
15 24/48 hours ahead, giving the routes and timings. No other movements
16 took place without that notification, other than myself, for example,
17 that had the need to visit units without warning. But even then, we
18 tried to pass the message if we were crossing on your side. I agree that
19 you had to be careful that the vehicles that you saw painted in white
20 were not the Bosnian Army, who'd camouflaged themselves to look like UN.
21 That is so.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Can the document be admitted?
24 JUDGE KWON: One part of the question might have been this:
25 whether this instance had anything to do with tightening the control over
Page 7470
1 convoys at all.
2 THE WITNESS: It would have not excused the stopping of convoys,
3 the searching of the convoys, because, of course, you knew that -- when
4 we were coming and along which routes we were coming. And, therefore,
5 other movements which were not to do with us, clearly, you had a right to
6 stop and inspect. But as I said earlier, us having gained clearance for
7 the passage of a convoy from you, there was no need after that for you to
8 stop and inspect. And when I say "inspect," I don't mean just asking for
9 the driver for his identity card to make sure he was a genuine United
10 Nations driver; I mean getting in the back of the vehicle and inspecting,
11 at an unnecessary and absurd level, all the items within that vehicle
12 against a manifest which may have been made up, as I say, some 24 or 48
13 hours before. That it was not compatible and could not be excused by
14 your need to be careful about the passing off, by the Bosnian Government
15 forces, of themselves as UN.
16 JUDGE KWON: The document will be admitted as Exhibit D697.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General, sir, do you agree with me that the procedure envisaged
19 not only the reading of declarations, but also the inspection, so as to
20 make sure that the declarations matched the contents of the convoys;
21 right? Can you say yes or no?
22 A. I've already said that I did not think that was compatible with
23 the agreement that had been made that we should have full and free
24 movement across the territories. Notification of the passage of a convoy
25 and the number of vehicles was sufficient, in my estimation. And it was
Page 7471
1 regrettable, as I said already, to me that by the time I arrived, a
2 practice had been embarked upon where parties to the conflict were
3 permitted to go and search vehicles. In my view, and it still remains,
4 that is wrong.
5 Q. Well, General, all of the documents show that we did not have to
6 trust you; not you, personally, but your soldiers. Declarations were
7 produced to show what was supposed to be in the lorries, and then lorries
8 would be opened to see whether the contents of the lorries matched the
9 declarations.
10 Do you agree that a passage through a country at war allows
11 somebody who has proved something to inspect whether the lorry contained
12 only what was approved and nothing else? Why was that a problem if
13 nothing was being smuggled?
14 A. I think we've already answered that question, Dr. Karadzic.
15 Q. Thank you. General, do you remember where Sepak is and where
16 Karakaj is, both on the Drina
17 A. I have no idea.
18 Q. Karakaj is close to Zvornik, and Sepak is down the stream. Do
19 you agree that if a license is issued for Sepak, a convoy should not
20 appear at Karakaj, because the crew at Karakaj didn't have a clue that a
21 convoy might be arriving there?
22 A. Well, without knowing the details, I would agree that a UN
23 humanitarian aid convoy should follow the route that had been agreed
24 previously with the warring parties. That is obvious, from the point of
25 view of security and other aspects.
Page 7472
1 Q. We're going to show two more documents about this topic. And do
2 you agree that if a declaration says there would be 10 lorries and 11
3 appear, that a soldier in charge should not let any of them through until
4 he receives his orders, a new approval for their passage?
5 A. Well, that seems common sense. But, of course, there are
6 telephones and communications available, and it would not take long to
7 get permission to add one more vehicle to a convoy if that had become
8 necessary. But as I say, I was not responsible for the detailed running
9 of convoys; the chiefs of staff of the UN Protection Force were doing
10 that. And detailed questions of this nature should be directed at them,
11 presuming they appear as witnesses, because I can't make detailed
12 comment.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can the Court please produce 1D00277. We have a draft
15 translation done by my team. Therefore, we have an English version as
16 well.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is a letter of mine to the MUP of Republika Srpska; in other
19 words, the Ministry of the Interior. We can all see both the Serbian and
20 English versions. The date is 7 August 1994. And in this letter, I
21 issue an order to all MUP organs and all centres of Public and State
22 Security, police stations, check-points, and so on and so forth, which
23 are in direct contact with UNPROFOR and the UNHCR, should try to enhance
24 their relations with those and any other international organisations.
25 And in the following passage, I say that:
Page 7473
1 "Irrespective of frequent cases of abuse and dishonest activities
2 by these organisations, by which they're putting themselves on the side
3 of our enemies, and thus they lose the symbols of neutrality, we must
4 keep improving communications with these organisations ..."
5 And then I say:
6 "When abuses and machinations are detected and corrected
7 according to the rules, and report the cases to the authorise organs of
8 UNPROFOR and UNHCR and organise meetings to shed light on those
9 incidents."
10 General, do you see that we are not actually suspicious of the
11 highest level? What we are saying here is that the higher levels of
12 UNPROFOR and the UNHCR should be notified as to what their soldiers may
13 be engaged in in the field?
14 A. If the question is should, if you find an infraction in the
15 running of convoys, the UNHCR or the UN Protection Force be informed,
16 well, that is so. In regards to this -- the text of this particular
17 letter, I endorse what you say, in terms of the need to -- at that time
18 to improve the relationships between the two sides, i.e., the UN side and
19 the Bosnian Serb side. I suppose your view, in effect, in regards to
20 this instance.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can it be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D698, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce
Page 7474
1 1D2495.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I'm repeating, General, I'm not accusing anybody, I'm just trying
4 to explain the motives for caution on the Serbian side. This is the long
5 and the short of it.
6 You see that Ambassador Akashi wrote to Annan on the 22nd of
7 July, 1994, about the Iranian flight to Zagreb:
8 [In English] "As you indicate, it is not within our mandate to
9 monitor the arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia. We are, therefore,
10 not in a position to have our personnel inspect these planes to verify
11 that their cargo is of humanitarian goods."
12 [Interpretation] And a bit further down in the second paragraph:
13 [In English] "United Nations military observers at Pleso Airport
14 monitoring the enforcement of the no-fly zone, they have been asked to
15 report if they should observe anything which could indicate a violation
16 of the arms embargo by this flight."
17 [Interpretation] You see, General, sir, that Mr. Annan, Mr.
18 Gharekhan, Mr. Stoltenberg were informed by Mr. Akashi that there was,
19 indeed, correspondence relative to the landing of this Iranian aircraft
20 at Pleso Airport
21 A. I certainly knew there were Iranian aircraft landing at Zagreb
22 Airport. I saw them myself. I was also aware that some correspondence
23 had taken place at the time about this. But I think, as I explained
24 earlier on, we were not in a position to observe whether the embargo was
25 being broken. That was the responsibility of NATO and the European
Page 7475
1 Union, not the United Nations, as Mr. Akashi says in this letter.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Can this be admitted as well?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D699, Your Honours.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Can I remind you that in your book, on page 292, as well as in
8 the statement provided on the 13th of January, 2009, on page 42, you
9 stated that despite the arms embargo, weapons were flowing into
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and President Clinton's decision not to impose an
11 embargo on arms gave a new meaning -- or, rather, gave a new sense of
12 urgency to the Serbs. This is your statement, dated 13 January 2009,
13 page 42, paragraph 170, as well as a passage in your book "Fighting For
14 Peace," page 292. At that time, you showed full understanding for us,
15 General; right?
16 A. I can't quite see the paragraph you're referring to on page 42 of
17 the hard-back version of the book.
18 JUDGE KWON: Page 42 of your statement; page 292 of the book.
19 It's paragraph 170.
20 THE WITNESS: 170. Thank you, sir.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The statement will be enough,
22 paragraph 170. I may have quoted a wrong page for the book, because I
23 don't know what edition has been taken into account.
24 THE WITNESS: And your question, Dr. Karadzic?
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 7476
1 Q. Do you agree that at that time you understood our concerns about
2 the illegal arming of the Muslim side?
3 A. At the time, of course, we had no knowledge whether the arms
4 embargo was being broken or not. Specific incidents did not get reported
5 to us. There was a suspicion this was happening because, as I explained
6 before, the Bosnian Government forces started to appear in new uniforms.
7 And when General Mladic challenged General Clark, at a meeting in
8 Gornji Vakuf, that the American uniforms were beginning to appear, and no
9 doubt other items of military equipment, General Clark did not deny it.
10 However, as I also have explained, the United Nations' principal
11 job was the delivery of humanitarian aid. We had no
12 intelligence-gathering capability, and so the suspicion remained
13 suspicion. Post facto, of course, 15, 16 years on, it appears that there
14 was an active programme to break that arms embargo by different countries
15 around the world.
16 Q. Do you agree, General, sir, that from Pleso Airport
17 armament -- those weapons had to pass through a corridor to the Muslim
18 territory, that some vehicles had to be used to haul those weapons to
19 them?
20 A. I'm not sure where you're inferring these weapons are going to.
21 They're going from Zagreb Airport
22 to Sarajevo
23 by then Croatia
24 didn't quite get the point of your question.
25 Q. Well, I'm referring -- or, rather, the purpose of my question,
Page 7477
1 General, sir, is to show to this Trial Chamber why we were cautious about
2 the convoys, what caused that caution. It was not any ill will on the
3 Serb side, but the fact that new uniforms, new explosives, new weapons,
4 were arriving, and we didn't know how. We knew that aircraft were
5 landing in Zagreb
6 convoys, and that was the reason for our concern, and not our ill will
7 against either UNPROFOR or any humanitarian organisations.
8 Do you agree that those weapons had to travel by land and go
9 through certain corridors in order to reach the Muslims?
10 A. Well, it was certainly not being transported through the officers
11 or the transports of the United Nations elements deployed. Of course,
12 there was a perfectly good sea route and land route through Croatia
13 where the last link occurred, I don't know.
14 JUDGE KWON: Time to have a break, Mr. Karadzic, unless you
15 have --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay, okay.
17 JUDGE KWON: You said you would come back to the document 10785,
18 which is de Mello's cable to Mr. Akashi. Take a look during the break.
19 We'll have a break for 25 minutes, and we'll resume at 10 to
20 6.00.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 --- Recess taken at 5.26 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 5.57 p.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 7478
1 I would actually like us to clarify the question of time now. I
2 asked for 30 hours with this witness, who's a participant and a very
3 important one, at that. I got only 10 hours. Even with the best efforts
4 to be made by the Defence, there is no way that we can treat all the
5 subjects that the Prosecution dealt with with this witness, or the
6 documents that are relevant as far as this witness is concerned, so would
7 you please reconsider? I do understand that sometimes I make a comment
8 or two and that I waste a little bit of time that way, but you will see,
9 yourselves, from the transcript that that is minor.
10 If the assertions made by this witness stand, they are
11 conditioned by something else now and they're somewhat different from
12 what they were at the time. Therefore, the Defence cannot believe that
13 they have successfully completed their work here if we do not have enough
14 time to deal with.
15 I believe that we will complete our examination of this witness
16 by Monday, especially if the Prosecution doesn't need too much time. We
17 will make every effort to do so.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, do you have any observation?
20 MS. EDGERTON: Actually, Your Honour, I think Dr. Karadzic has
21 made a rather disingenuous characterisation of his cross-examination.
22 It's been filled with argument. Whole documents have been read into
23 evidence, documents that, in fact, sometimes replicate passages of the
24 witness's statement, and I wouldn't think an extension of time would be
25 appropriate.
Page 7479
1 JUDGE KWON: How long do you expect your re-examination to be?
2 MS. EDGERTON: At this stage, 20 minutes, at the outside,
3 Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: Can I confirm with you, just to be correct, the
5 order of witnesses as it stands now? Do we need to go into private
6 session?
7 MS. EDGERTON: Not if we use the KDZ numbers, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The next witness will be ...?
9 MS. EDGERTON: KDZ369 will be the next witness.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before the decision, if I may --
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry I interrupted
13 Ms. Edgerton.
14 Before the decision, if I may, I would like to remind you of all
15 the things we still have to deal with with this witness. It's the total
16 exclusion zone that we have to deal with, then the demilitarised zone at
17 Igman, Bihac, which was brought into the picture against our will, and
18 then we have to finish Gorazde and ethnic cleansing. These are major
19 topics, and we certainly need two days for that.
20 JUDGE KWON: My question was rather -- concerned about the fact
21 whether we have a witness who should testify on specific dates.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for just a moment.
23 Yes, we have one, but he -- and that's KDZ280. But according to
24 the calender, I think he would not be implicated until the week after
25 next.
Page 7480
1 JUDGE KWON: I was referring to KDZ310, who was subject to court
2 order.
3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I think -- first of all, I think that's
4 a fair question. I would ask, and I've just sent an e-mail to that
5 effect, to determine whether or not that is, if not technically the case,
6 and I believe in one sense it is, to be the case de facto, and any
7 movement would create a problem.
8 I might add that I had the same concern for other witnesses
9 who -- for whom a similar problem may arise for various other scheduling
10 reasons that were not necessarily brought to the Court's attention by way
11 of specific scheduling, but may have been brought about by virtue of
12 repeated scheduling of that witness or because of the witness's
13 particular circumstances that happened to work out for this particular
14 arrangement, but will be extremely disruptive if altered. So if the
15 Court will give us a moment to check on that, I think we'll be able to
16 provide you with a much more accurate answer.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber is of the view that you
20 should be able to finish your cross-examination by the end of tomorrow.
21 So you will have time, for the purpose of the cross-examination of this
22 witness, until the end of tomorrow.
23 Let's bring in the witness.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we would like to tender 65 ter
25 10785.
Page 7481
1 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as Exhibit D700.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour, Exhibit D700.
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 JUDGE KWON: I apologise for your inconvenience. It is our
5 practice to deal with the matters related to the witness in the absence
6 of the witness.
7 During your absence, we told the accused to finish his
8 cross-examination by the end of tomorrow.
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
10 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Can I ask for document 1D00278 in e-court.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. While we're waiting for it, General, I would like to put
15 something to you, or, rather, to the Trial Chamber, first and foremost,
16 our efforts for the humanitarian aid and everything else to flow
17 unhindered, without us suffering any kind of damage, military damage,
18 that is, and without having the other side gain an advantage.
19 Or, actually, would you agree that if warring parties agree to
20 something, not a single one of these warring parties should gain any
21 advantage from that kind of agreement? What do you say to that?
22 A. Well, it's a hypothetical question. I'd have to have a specific
23 case that you would quote that I could refer to.
24 Q. Thank you. I meant whether it was legitimate to make sure that
25 the other side does not gain an advantage on the basis of the goodwill
Page 7482
1 expressed by the first side. If you couldn't glean that much, let's deal
2 with the document.
3 This is my letter from the 17th of August. Do you remember that
4 in August there was that letter of mine about improvement of relations
5 with UNPROFOR, and a few other letters? And now we see the 17th of
6 August. This is an order of mine. It is being sent to
7 Professor Koljevic, as the person chairing the body for co-operation,
8 also to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, the Ministry of
9 Internal Affairs, and the Co-ordination Committee for Humanitarian Aid.
10 Do you agree that this document is being sent to the aforementioned
11 persons?
12 A. I guess it is, yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at the first order:
14 "Convoys and official personnel of humanitarian organisations may
15 move in the territory of Republika Srpska only with authorisation of the
16 Co-ordination Committee of the Government for Humanitarian Relief of
17 Republika Srpska.
18 "The head of the State Committee for Co-operation with UNPROFOR
19 shall pass a regulation for a method of issuing permits for the movement
20 of convoys and officials of international humanitarian organisations in
21 the territory of Republika Srpska."
22 Do you agree that this is a rather high level? The
23 vice-president of the republic heads the team that is supposed to
24 co-ordinate co-operation with you with regard to humanitarian issues?
25 A. I was aware that Mr. Koljevic was the person on the Bosnian Serb
Page 7483
1 side with whom we dealt on the passage of convoys. That is so.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I have the second page in
3 Serbian. For the time being, the English is all right. It's the third
4 paragraph.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Paragraph 3 in Serbian and in English:
7 "From the check-point, according to the estimate of the
8 authorised public safety official, to the place of unloading or passing
9 to a territory of other parts of the former BiH, the convoy shall be
10 escorted by a police patrol."
11 It should say "patrol," actually. That's the word that should be
12 used, "patrol," rather than "escort." So all humanitarian activities in
13 the territory of Republika Srpska should be carried out in accordance
14 with International Humanitarian Law.
15 Do you agree, General, that, as you had put it yourself, I had
16 1.600 kilometres of a front-line?
17 A. I think we discussed that, yes.
18 Q. Do you agree that I was very busy with political negotiations
19 with the entire international community?
20 A. I assume that was the case.
21 Q. If you know Serbs well enough, you will agree that it's very hard
22 to reach concord among Serbs within the country among 60 municipalities
23 so that everything can work properly. In spite of all this hard work,
24 would you agree that the highest authorities of Republika Srpska are
25 making every effort to improve co-operation with UNPROFOR, especially
Page 7484
1 with regard to humanitarian issues? Regardless of the results, to the
2 best of your knowledge, were efforts being made?
3 A. I think you have to set your question in context, Dr. Karadzic.
4 At the start of my period in Bosnia
5 my comments, was clearly not too bad. Following the agreement to
6 withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo
7 beginning of February, the flow of aid improved immensely across Bosnian
8 Serb territory, until the attack was launched into Gorazde and the
9 subsequent air-strikes that took place as a result of that attack. There
10 was then a complete halting of all the aid. Fortunately, we were able,
11 through discussion, to restore that aid, and between April and September
12 of that year the flow of aid continued more or less unblocked, certainly
13 into Sarajevo
14 Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, although that did occur from time to time.
15 We had enforced the passage of a convoy to Maglaj another enclave, and
16 the convoys in and out of Bihac remained patchy, but did flow.
17 Following the attack by the Bosnian Government forces against the
18 Bosnian Serb side in Sarajevo
19 September, then the aid flow started to be interrupted by the Bosnian
20 Serb side, and it wasn't until January of that next year that we came to
21 a final agreement on the passage of -- uninterrupted passage of aid into
22 Sarajevo
23 So the situation came and went with regard to the flow of
24 humanitarian aid. The end result of all our efforts to deliver aid to
25 the people who needed it in Bosnia
Page 7485
1 objectives of the World Health Organisation. That is the general picture
2 which you can set in context any period of time you like, and you will
3 see whether the aid was flowing at that particular moment in time or not.
4 In August, there was quite good flow of aid, particularly after
5 the sniper agreement, I seem to remember.
6 Q. Thank you. General, if you remember, it was your very own
7 estimate that that period had a significant decline in the number of
8 casualties as well; right?
9 A. There was a considerable reduction in the number of casualties in
10 the war in Bosnia
11 Q. Would you agree, then, General, that in a conflict, there are two
12 parties, and that both should agree to have peace established, or,
13 rather, that the behaviour of one side considerably depends on the
14 behaviour of the other side too?
15 A. Inevitably so.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Can we have this document admitted?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D701, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE KWON: General, you stated these are dealt with by the
21 chiefs of staff, but can you see the para 1? Para 1 says --
22 THE WITNESS: Not at the moment.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be coming.
24 Para 1 seems to refer to two entities, one being the
25 Co-ordination Committee of the Government for Humanitarian Relief, the
Page 7486
1 other being State Committee for Co-operation with UNPROFOR. Do you
2 remember such entities?
3 THE WITNESS: No, I don't, sir. I mean, maybe the chiefs of
4 staff knew the distinction, but I certainly did not.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can we have 1D02453. 1D02453. Yes, we have it in English. I
9 believe we don't have it in Serbian.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. As you can see, this is a document --
12 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
14 MS. EDGERTON: I don't think this document should be broadcast.
15 Could I just have your indulgence for a moment?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 MS. EDGERTON: I was just looking at the provider, Your Honour.
18 Your indulgence, please.
19 Until I'm certain, and out of an abundance of caution, do you
20 think we could possibly deal with this document in private session,
21 please, Your Honour?
22 JUDGE KWON: What we are seeing now in Serbian seems to be a
23 document originating from Republika Srpska.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the previous document.
25 This is the previous document. It's the Serbian version. The other
Page 7487
1 document was removed from the screen. I am sorry, there is no reference
2 to Rule 70, and that's why I simply asked for it.
3 JUDGE KWON: So we shall go into private session, Ms. Edgerton,
4 or is it safe, unless we are broadcasting this document?
5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
6 JUDGE KWON: I was advised we can go without broadcasting this
7 document.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Perfect, thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: But I leave it in your hands because I'm not aware
10 of the situation.
11 MS. EDGERTON: It's just been confirmed to me it's definitely a
12 document we should deal with in private session, actually, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We go into private session.
14 [Private session]
15 (redacted)
16 (redacted)
17 (redacted)
18 (redacted)
19 (redacted)
20 (redacted)
21 (redacted)
22 (redacted)
23 (redacted)
24 (redacted)
25 (redacted)
Page 7488
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 Page 7488 redacted. Private session.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Page 7489
1 (redacted)
2 (redacted)
3 (redacted)
4 (redacted)
5 (redacted)
6 (redacted)
7 (redacted)
8 (redacted)
9 (redacted)
10 (redacted)
11 (redacted)
12 (redacted)
13 [Open session]
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Continue, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D02527.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. As we can see, this is my letter to His Excellency Mr. Akashi on
18 the 5th of September, in response to his letter of the 3rd of September.
19 He mentions parts of some speech of mine out of context, and then I say:
20 [In English] "We do not, at present, intend to impose any
21 sanctions against the Muslims. A decision to introduce such sanctions,
22 moreover, would not affect normal humanitarian aid provided that the
23 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not blocking humanitarian aid destined
24 for the Republic of Srpska
25 [Interpretation] And then further down:
Page 7490
1 [In English] "Since Yugoslavia is imposing economic sanctions
2 against us, we feel entitled to continue commercial sanctions against
3 Muslims. As you know, however, this policy does not cover gas, water,
4 and electricity supplies to the Muslims. You are, of course, aware that
5 the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo
6 of events in the relations between Yugoslavia
7 This being the case, they should not complain if, given the genocidal
8 sanctions against us, we impose some limited sanctions on them. I am
9 sure, Excellency, that you can see our point of view?"
10 [Interpretation] Do you agree, General, that we were under
11 sanctions imposed by the entire world, and from the 4th of August
12 onwards, under sanctions imposed by Yugoslavia as well?
13 A. I had some vague knowledge that sanctions had been imposed, but I
14 was focused on what was happening in Bosnia, not outside Bosnia
15 Q. But you do recall that those sanctions were imposed upon us to
16 force us to accept the contact group plan; right?
17 A. I certainly wouldn't be able to comment on that.
18 Q. Thank you. However, we can see, both from the previous document
19 and from this document, that we make a distinction between commercial
20 convoys that may be subject to sanctions, although we had not decided to
21 do that, and humanitarian convoys that are not subject to any sanctions;
22 am I right?
23 A. That appears so from your letter to Mr. Akashi.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can it be admitted?
Page 7491
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D703, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce
4 1D0245 [as interpreted]. 02459, 1D02459.
5 This is a summary of a meeting with me at Pale on the 19th of
6 August, 1994
7 [In English] "Together with DFC General Crabbe, HCA
8 General Rose, CAC
9 in Pale at 12.30. Also present from the Serb side were Generals Mladic
10 and Tolimir, Koljevic, Krajisnik and Buha."
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Do you recall that, or do you have anything about that in your
13 notes, or do you still recollect that meeting?
14 A. I don't recollect it, but I can remind myself by reading the
15 letter or the document on the screen and the extract from my book.
16 Q. If needed -- actually, we will go swiftly through the document.
17 You can see, for example, in paragraph 4, that Karadzic
18 completely agreed with the necessity of a diplomatic alternative with
19 regard to the contact group plan. And then, paragraph 6, with regards to
20 relations with UNPROFOR, Dr. Karadzic said that the Serb side fully
21 appreciated the United Nations efforts, although their presence had saved
22 the Muslims from complete defeat.
23 [In English] "The Serb objective was, he said, to separate the
24 societies in which -- in B and H, much like had happened in Scandinavia
25 in 1905, and between India
Page 7492
1 was the intention of his side to become 'good neighbours' and while the
2 Bosnian Serbs ..."
3 [Interpretation] Next page:
4 [In English] "... were not planning to take any new
5 territory ..."
6 [Interpretation] And so on. And further on we talk about the
7 total exclusion zone.
8 Can we go one page ahead.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, the general asked for an opportunity
10 to review the document and the excerpt from his book. I just wonder why
11 he shouldn't be allowed to have that opportunity, rather than to have us
12 hear passages of this document read into the record again.
13 JUDGE KWON: General, have you done with the second page?
14 THE WITNESS: I've read them all now, thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to see the third page? I think it's a
16 four-page document.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is exactly what I wanted
18 us to do, to go swiftly through the document. And if the general needs
19 to take some time to read the document -- it says here:
20 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic further stated that the roads had not
21 been closed to humanitarian aid --"
22 JUDGE KWON: No, you don't have to read that.
23 Let us know when you've done with that.
24 THE WITNESS: I've done with it -- [Overlapping speakers]
25 JUDGE KWON: Okay. What is your question? What is your
Page 7493
1 question, Mr. Karadzic?
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Do you remember that on that occasion I stated that humanitarian
4 convoys, as it says here, were not closed, that all that was closed were
5 opportunities for the black market to thrive and for weapons to be
6 brought in? Perhaps you can see that sentence, and do you agree with me?
7 A. I can't see the sentence. Which one is it? Which paragraph?
8 JUDGE KWON: Third line from --
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The third line from the top of the
10 page.
11 THE WITNESS: It would be the third line from the bottom of
12 paragraph 11, would it? That's the one I've got on the screen.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The third line from the very top of
14 the page. The sentence starts with: "Dr. Karadzic further stated ..."
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you remember and do you agree that our position was that the
17 only restrictions applied to the black market and weapons, and that we
18 subscribed to anything else?
19 A. I think at that time the humanitarian aid convoys were flowing,
20 yes.
21 Q. Thank you. Let's look at bullet point E in the 12th paragraph.
22 Can we scroll up the page a little.
23 Would you please look at bullet point E, and everybody can read
24 for themselves, so as to prevent me from reading it aloud.
25 This is about human rights in Banja Luka/Bijeljina, and it says
Page 7494
1 here that:
2 "Dr. Karadzic shared your concerns over the abuse of human rights
3 and that the authorities were trying to control extremists in those
4 areas. In Bijeljina, the authorities intended to soon replace the chief
5 of police as the level of security he was providing to the population was
6 unsatisfactory."
7 I also said that Bijeljina was the 'Hong Kong' of the Serb
8 republic, and so on and so forth.
9 "In some cases, some residents had voluntarily asked to leave for
10 Tuzla
11 expelled."
12 [Interpretation] Do you remember, General, sir, when it came to
13 refugees, that refugees enjoyed one kind of benefits and social
14 contributions, and when people voluntarily crossed over, they did not
15 enjoy those same benefits?
16 A. I don't think the United Nations distinguished between refugees
17 and voluntary refugees, if that's how you would describe them. People
18 who were in need were in need. Whatever their antecedence were didn't
19 concern the United Nations. And as you'll remember, the United Nations
20 Protection Force had no representatives in Banja Luka or in the
21 neighbouring regions, and these reports came from UNHCR observations, not
22 from the protection force.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Can we go to the next page.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 7495
1 Q. At the very bottom of that page were some other concerns of ours
2 mentioned:
3 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic's response was that while UNPROFOR was
4 welcome to stay, the international community's attempt to scare them with
5 threats of its withdrawal would not work, stating that, 'We would not
6 object to your departure. We would divide Bosnia into two with the
7 Croats, and there would be no Muslim state' ..."
8 [Interpretation] There's a threat of ours. And then it goes on
9 to say:
10 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic asked if this was what the
11 international community really wanted. He said that while the Muslim
12 people were for peace, their leaders were not, and if their offensives
13 continued, the Serbs would launch a counter-offensive 'and humiliate
14 them.' Both Karadzic and Mladic warned against UNPROFOR leaving weapons
15 for the Bosnian side if it withdrew. I told them that we had no
16 intention of doing this, and disassociated the force from remarks made by
17 certain troop-contributing nations, i.e., Malaysia, in this vein."
18 [Interpretation] Do you remember that some battalions [Realtime
19 transcript read in error "Italians"] coming from some contributing
20 nations did not behave fairly and that they expressed their friendship by
21 helping the Muslim side, by even giving them weapons?
22 A. No, I have no knowledge, and I refute the allegation that the --
23 any United Nations element was giving weapons to the Bosnian Government
24 forces. I think you're referring in this -- or Mr. Akashi is referring
25 in this to an unfortunate statement made by one of the Malaysian press
Page 7496
1 offices, for which I think he was duly reprimanded, but I don't remember
2 the detail.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can the document be admitted?
5 JUDGE KWON: To be clear: General, is this the document authored
6 by Mr. Akashi?
7 THE WITNESS: I think it's a document authored by Mr. Akashi, but
8 I'd have to scroll back to the start, sir, to see that. But it certainly
9 would have been the result of him asking his secretary to put this
10 memorandum together.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 That will be admitted ...?
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D704.
14 MS. EDGERTON: In fact, in paragraph 142 of the general's
15 statement, he refers to a meeting on this date involving Mr. Akashi,
16 Mr. de Mello, General Crabbe and himself, so I would think that the
17 general's conclusion is entirely accurate.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 And line 21 of page 84 should refer to "internationals" instead
20 of "Italians." That could be checked out.
21 THE INTERPRETER: The word was "battalions," Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 Please continue.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Has this been given a number?
Page 7497
1 Can the Court please produce 65 ter 11048.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Do you remember, General, sir -- I checked, and indeed the chief
4 of police in Bijeljina had been removed. Do you remember that I orally
5 reported to you about that because the level of security was not
6 satisfactory in Bijeljina, people did not feel safe there?
7 A. As I said, I had no knowledge of what was happening in an area
8 where we didn't have any United Nations representation from the
9 Protection Force side, so I can't make comment on that.
10 Q. Thank you. Here we have another telegram sent by
11 Ambassador Akashi to Annan, Gharekhan and Stoltenberg in Geneva. If we
12 have agreed on that, can we now go to page 3.
13 This is a report on a meeting between General Lapresle and
14 Ambassador Akashi with me at Pale. Let's look at paragraph 10:
15 [In English] "In response to my request that the ICRC be allowed
16 to evacuate Muslims from Prijedor, Dr. Karadzic said that the situation
17 in Prijedor was an unfortunate development for the Serbs. While he
18 accepted that the situation could have been predicted (he noted that
19 civilians in the town had, at the beginning of the war, slaughtered each
20 other), he maintained that the present situation had been prompted by a
21 Muslim massacre of six Serb policemen from the town. Currently,
22 additional forces had been sent to the town to stabilise the situation,
23 and he had initially agreed to the ICRC request to evacuate individuals
24 who feared for their lives, based on the belief that the numbers
25 concerned were minimum. However ..."
Page 7498
1 [Interpretation] Next page:
2 [In English] "... the ICRC --" next page, please: "... had
3 indicated they intended to evacuate 80 truckloads of people at one go and
4 this was unacceptable. He had no objection to them evacuating up to five
5 trucks of people a day (approximately 100 people), as this would allow
6 those left behind to reconsider their situation in light of the
7 stabilised conditions in the town."
8 [Interpretation] Therefore, do you remember, General, sir, that
9 at that time the International Red Cross put a lot of pressure on me, and
10 you can see that they even resorted -- or, rather, they asked
11 General Lapresle and Akashi
12 them to take people from Banja Luka and Prijedor to third countries, and
13 here a reference is made to Prijedor, although I believe that that should
14 not be done? And if, indeed, that had to be done, it had to be done
15 gradually so as to show people that there was no reason at all for them
16 to leave?
17 A. No, I wasn't party to that discussion and have no record of it.
18 And as I've already said, we didn't have people deployed on that side of
19 Bosnia
20 Q. I respect that, General, sir. But you did say after 1994, and
21 especially after the Markale incident and other such incidents, the Serbs
22 had stepped up their ethnic cleansing in Bosnian Krajina. However, my
23 thesis is this: The International Red Cross had invested a lot of effort
24 to take away a huge number of Muslims and Croats from that same Krajina,
25 whereas I, myself, was greatly opposed to that. I have a lot of evidence
Page 7499
1 to prove that, and one piece of evidence is this meeting between
2 General Lapresle and Akashi
3 whether you were misinformed, whether you thought that that evacuation
4 actually -- what was an evacuation was about ethnic cleansing.
5 A. I think you would have to point out where I allegedly said that
6 after the bombing in the market-place, the Serbs had stopped their ethnic
7 cleansing in Bosnian Krajina, because, of course, that was not within my
8 area of responsibility. And as regards the rest of your comment, I can't
9 make a comment because, as I've said, I was not party to that discussion.
10 Q. Thank you. It was just an off remark in the
11 examination-in-chief, but it may be detrimental to the Defence, and
12 that's why we have to deal with the issue.
13 Could you please look at paragraph 12 and see what it says there:
14 [In English] "Turning them to the issue of ethnic cleansing and
15 the violation of human rights in Banja Luka and the need to halt this
16 practice, I suggested that I visit the area towards the end of next week.
17 I further requested the UNPROFOR --"
18 JUDGE KWON: What's the point, Mr. Karadzic, of going further,
19 after having heard from the witness here, that he's not aware of this
20 document?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I believe that the document
22 will jog the general's memory, because both Lapresle and -- as the chief
23 commander, and Akashi
24 situation and deploy UN troops in Banja Luka. But one thing is certain,
25 and I'm sure that General Rose is familiar with that, if we move on to
Page 7500
1 paragraph 16, which is on the following page -- I'm moving through the
2 document very slowly, and you will see that there is a reason for that.
3 In paragraph 16, please.
4 You see that General De Lapresle briefed Karadzic about the use
5 of close air support to defend UNPROFOR troops under attack, and
6 requested the VRS Army co-operation, ensuring that there were no actions
7 that could lead to its use:
8 "Dr. Karadzic said that the VRS had no intention of attacking
9 UNPROFOR troops and that the unfortunate incident surrounding the Maglaj
10 convoy was an aberration and that that would be dealt with."
11 And now, sir, you see here:
12 [In English] "I emphasise the distinction between close air
13 support as an act of self-defence and air-strikes as an offensive or
14 punitive action."
15 [Interpretation] This was something that I wanted to present to
16 the witness when we were talking about the attacks primarily against
17 Gorazde and later on when the general had already left, and it was then
18 explained to me that close air support was something that was a defence
19 mechanism, something to defend UNPROFOR troops, and we always gave you
20 the right to shoot if you were attacked; whereas, by contrast,
21 air-strikes are punitive and offensive measures.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Right?
24 A. Well, that was clearly the view of the author of this document,
25 but certainly it wasn't my view. And I think I explained it, at a
Page 7501
1 technical level, the difference. The subject of close air support or the
2 expression "close air support" covers the general support which ground
3 troops can expect from the air. Air-strikes are a specific use. The
4 offensive or defensive element in that technical analysis is not there.
5 It could be used either way.
6 Q. Thank you. However, on the 7th of April, Mr. Akashi informed me
7 that there was a difference, and you know that Mladic always said, If our
8 troops attack you, shoot, nobody will hold it against you. Mr. Akashi,
9 in the presence of General De Lapresle, said that close air support was,
10 as it says here, self-defence and that air-strikes are an offensive or
11 punitive measure. Did you call for a close air support or air-strikes in
12 Gorazde?
13 A. Well, as I've explained to you, the presence of the NATO aircraft
14 over Bosnia
15 air-strikes on the tanks and artillery that were attacking Gorazde. Now,
16 you can decide whether that was defensive or offensive. In my book, it
17 was a defensive action taken under the United Nations Security Council
18 Resolution 824 and 836.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Can we go to the following page.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. But General, sir, you did not come under attack in Gorazde. It
23 was two forces that were fighting in Gorazde, and NATO put itself on one
24 side. That was the Serb perception, that NATO sided with one of those
25 two warring parties.
Page 7502
1 Can we go to the following page:
2 [In English] "In terms of punitive and offensive action --"
3 [Interpretation] Please, paragraph 20:
4 [In English] "On Gorazde, he expressed concern that the reports
5 of the UNMOs in the pocket did not tally with the Presidency reports of
6 mass destruction and killing and requested clarification on this
7 discrepancy. He also said that it was time for the Security Council to
8 take more decisive action on the opening of Tuzla Airport
9 humanitarian flights."
10 [Interpretation] That was part of that meeting with Izetbegovic.
11 Do you see how the situation developed? And we're talking about the 7th
12 of April here.
13 A. I remember reasonably well how the situation developed because,
14 of course, that was the time at which we were having to deal with the
15 Bosnian Serb side to try and deter them from attacking any further into
16 the enclave of Gorazde. At the same time, we were having to reassure the
17 Bosnian Government side, in particular Mr. Silajdzic and President
18 Izetbegovic, that the casualties rates which they were describing were
19 nowhere near the truth.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Can the document be admitted ?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, may I just make one submission in
24 this regard.
25 This is a document that could very easily have been dealt with by
Page 7503
1 way of written motion. It's of that category of document. But we've
2 spent some time now with the general repeatedly having to affirm that he
3 can't comment on this document, rather than actually get to the point.
4 It seems to me there could be a more efficient way of spending the time
5 that we have here, but we have no objection to the document going in.
6 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D705.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more document about that
9 same topic. I believe we have time, a short passage.
10 65 ter 8 --
11 JUDGE KWON: I was about to say that I agree with Ms. Edgerton's
12 observation. And in such circumstances, you can't complain about
13 shortage of time. Bear that in mind.
14 We have only two minutes.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 8025.
16 With all due respect, Your Excellency, we have a problem with the
17 general's memory. I would like to jog the general's memory about what he
18 said during his chief examination, and the difference between that and
19 what he wrote in his documents at the time, and I can't do it in writing.
20 The Trial Chamber will then have an opportunity to contrast the two and
21 maybe render a decision at my detriment, perhaps.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, sir, this is the 11th of April, 1994, sent to the
24 president of Republika Srpska, the chief of staff, and so on and so
25 forth, and that was sent by the Main Staff of the Army of
Page 7504
1 Republika Srpska, signed by Manojlo Milovanovic.
2 Can we please see the third page of the same document, the
3 paragraph that concerns Gorazde. Page 3, Article A, bullet point 2 "The
4 Herzegovina
5 "Throughout the day in the general area of Gorazde, the NATO air
6 forces carried out a reconnaissance and engaged in provocations by
7 launching mock attacks on VRS units. Between 1500 hours and 1545 hours,
8 while the Muslim forces were conducting a synchronised attack on the left
9 bank of the River Drina, the enemy attacked units of the Herzegovina
10 Corps, killing three (one officer - physician) and nine wounded soldiers.
11 Two medical vehicles, one PAT," and so on and so forth, "were destroyed."
12 Do you agree, General, sir, that the Serbian perception of this
13 co-operation between NATO aviation and the Muslim infantry must have
14 looked terrifying?
15 A. There was no co-operation at all between the Bosnian Government
16 forces and NATO, and any interpretation on your side that that was the
17 case was wrong.
18 Q. However, the Muslim infantry exploited the effects of NATO
19 air-strikes. They launched simultaneous attacks while we were being
20 stricken by the NATO aviation, while our facilities were being pounded.
21 Can this document be admitted?
22 JUDGE KWON: Was that a question, Mr. Karadzic?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I would like the general
24 to -- I'm not saying that the United Nations had anything to do with
25 that. It was NATO that attacked us, and the Muslim side exploited the
Page 7505
1 results of that attack and launched their infantry attack.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. And that's what I'm asking you, General, sir. I'm not saying
4 that that was the case. I'm not saying that you approved that or not. I
5 am
6 A. That may well have been so, but it certainly wasn't the result of
7 any co-ordination between NATO and the Bosnian Government forces.
8 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no objection to the admission of
9 this document.
10 MS. EDGERTON: It's already an exhibit, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1662, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, once you've heard the answer from the
14 witness, just move on to your next question without making any
15 statements.
16 We'll resume tomorrow at 2.15.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.
19 to be reconvened on Friday, the 8th day of October,
20 2010, at 2.15 p.m.
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