Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7506

 1                           Friday, 8 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we'll conclude the evidence of General

 7     today, so leave at the end at least 20 minutes or half an hour for the

 8     Prosecution for its re-direct examination.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Excuse me.

11             Mr. Harvey.

12             MR. HARVEY:  May I just very briefly introduce

13     Ms. Jovana Paredes, who is assisting me today and is one of my legal

14     assistants and will be here throughout the afternoon.  I have to bow out

15     after the session and Ms. Vukajlovic will be taking my place.

16             Thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber was so informed.  Thank you for the

18     introduction.  Welcome.

19             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  We

21     will do our best to finish the most important things we have to deal with

22     with Sir Michael Rose.

23                           WITNESS:  MICHAEL ROSE [Resumed]

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

25        Q.   [Interpretation] General, do you agree that in 1984 [as

Page 7507

 1     interpreted] after the incidents with NATO, the attitude of Serb soldiers

 2     and civilian authorities remained correct and fair nevertheless towards

 3     the United Nations?

 4        A.   My recall is that the Bosnian Serb side became increasingly

 5     difficult after the summer of 1994, and in no way complied with the

 6     agreement for full and free movement of convoys.

 7             Sir, could I have the screen on the left with the --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  By all means.

 9             THE WITNESS:  -- transcript.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Our usher will help you.

11             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   In your book on page 161, you confirm that the Bosnian Serbs had

14     not intended to take Gorazde.  That is also confirmed by that

15     conversation of mine that Mladic recorded in his diary, that we had taken

16     more than we had intended to and that our objective was to make it

17     impossible for attacks from -- to take place from Gorazde.  Now I'm

18     referring to the difficulties between UNPROFOR and the Serb army -- or

19     rather, the Serb side after the bombing in Gorazde.  Do you agree that

20     despite the reasons and irrespective of the reasons in the crisis

21     involved, the attitude towards your soldiers remained fair and correct,

22     nevertheless?

23        A.   No, I do not agree there.

24        Q.   Very well.  Let us see now what you stated in your statement of

25     the 24th of May, 1995, on page 7.  1044-297 is the ERN number:

Page 7508

 1             [In English] "As a result of the air-strikes, UN troops were

 2     detained for symbolic rather than malicious reasons" --

 3             [Interpretation] And it says that you were not concerned about

 4     their safety.  Here's the statement:

 5             [In English] "Those UN troops were detained for symbolic rather

 6     than malicious reasons during times" --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Excuse me.

 8             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  So the General can orient himself, that's also

10     contained at paragraph 90 of his written evidence that has been

11     submitted.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Very kind of you, Ms. Edgerton.

13             Please continue.

14             THE ACCUSED:  "During the times of Karadzic, the BSA computer

15     overloaded and froze.  It took times to re-boot the system.  I was never

16     worried at any stage of the personal safety of each detainee but so that

17     this whole process could unveil the peace process and success to date.

18     We still remained partial and had not been defeated by General Mladic

19     because we were not at war with him."

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, yesterday you said that your bombing, or rather, the

22     NATO bombing at your request was not full scale, rather, it was symbolic.

23     And then you say that the Serb army responded to that symbolic bombing by

24     symbolically keeping the soldiers --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Your last quote, your last sentence should read:

Page 7509

 1     "We still remained impartial," instead of "partial."

 2             Continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  [In English] "We still remained impartial."

 4     [Interpretation] That's what I read.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:

 6        Q.   General, in your view, this was a symbolic bombing and the

 7     response, in your view, again was symbolically detaining UN troops.  Is

 8     that not your very own sentence?

 9        A.   I never used the word "symbolic," to the best of my memory

10     relating to the air-strikes by NATO.  I was accused many times in the

11     media of only using pin-prick attacks, not strategic-level bombing.  But

12     I didn't use the word "symbolic" myself.  With regards to the paragraph

13     you've just read out, that's what I felt at the time, that the Bosnian

14     Serb side had an interest in maintaining the presence of UNPROFOR in that

15     country.  Their own people, 600.000 of them, were being fed by the

16     United Nations' aid.  And therefore, although they presumably felt they

17     had to be seen to be doing something in response to the air-strikes

18     against them by NATO, which involved the taking of hostages, I did not

19     think in the long term those hostages would come to any harm.  And,

20     indeed, they were usually released soon after they were taken without any

21     harm or without any detriment to their equipment or themselves.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I simplified matters when I said that the bombing was

23     symbolic, but you had certainly said that that level of bombing would not

24     have turned you into our enemies.  And that's what I meant.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have 65 ter --

Page 7510

 1             THE WITNESS:  That is correct.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- 7575 is the 65 ter number I'd

 3     like to have now, please.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  General, because of overlapping, your answer to the

 5     accused's statement was not recorded.  Could you repeat it kindly.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Sir, I was replying that -- my reply was:  That was

 7     correct, replying to the point made by Dr. Karadzic, that the level of

 8     bombing did not turn us into the enemies of the Bosnian Serbs.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, that's not it -- oh, yes, it

11     is.  This is probably the translation.  Yes.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

13        Q.   This is the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska reporting

14     to myself and to the chief of Main Staff and the commands of all corps on

15     the 17th of April, that is to say a week after the bombing in Gorazde.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3.  I believe it

17     should be page 3 in English as well.  It is paragraph 3, the situation in

18     the territory.  It's the last page actually.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   So the first week of our discontent, discontent with the bombing

21     that is.  This is what the General Staff and General Milovanovic are

22     saying.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the last page,

24     paragraph 3.  Now we have the transcript.  Can we have that same document

25     but just the last page?

Page 7511

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Could you bear with us.  The usher's computer has

 3     some technical difficulty.  It will be coming soon.

 4             So while we are waiting for the document, you can put your

 5     question, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, as you will see, paragraph 3 says that

 8     General Milovanovic is reporting to the effect that the army had visited

 9     all of these UNPROFOR and UN personnel to see how they were being

10     treated, and the conclusion was that their treatment was excellent and

11     fair and --

12             JUDGE KWON:  [Previous translation continues]... page 4.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 4 in English, paragraph 3, the

14     first sentence refers to that.  Yes.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Now, do you recall that there was a blockade of UNPROFOR and the

17     military observers in the Ilijas Brigade?  Do you remember why that

18     happened -- or rather, first of all, do you remember that the Army of

19     Republika Srpska visited all of your soldiers and was assured that they

20     were all well?

21        A.   Well, they were in the hands of the Bosnian Serb army, so it was

22     not surprising they were being visited.  They should not have been taken

23     hostage in the first place.

24        Q.   Well, the difference is a conceptual one.  We did not think that

25     this was a minor bombing; we thought that this was a major bombing, but

Page 7512

 1     never mind.  Look at paragraph 3, there was this crisis with regard to

 2     the Ilijas Brigade.  We remembered that during the interview, too.  Do

 3     you recall that there was this misunderstanding in relation to Cekrcici,

 4     was it within the 20-kilometre zone or not?

 5        A.   I remember there was some debate, but the details of that I don't

 6     recall.

 7        Q.   But you did confirm that in your view the centre of the exclusion

 8     zone, that circle, was by the circle in Marin Dvor, remember?

 9        A.   I think that was the first epicentre of the 20-kilometre circle.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at paragraph 4 now, at 1600 hours -- or

11     actually 1610.  A message was intercepted that aircraft are expected in

12     the area of Gorazde after 1700 hours.

13             Do you agree, General, that the Serb army was under terrible

14     pressure due to this possible bombing and that it significantly affected

15     our relations?

16        A.   I think it was inevitable that the bombing was going to have a

17     detrimental effect on the relationships between the UNPROFOR and the

18     Bosnian Serb side.  That is true.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D706, Your Honours.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, we're dealing with Gorazde now and we'll go on.  6852 is

25     the 65 ter number I'd like to have now.

Page 7513

 1             Do you remember the demilitarised zone of 3 kilometres, do you

 2     remember the establishment of that zone that ended this crisis around

 3     Gorazde?

 4        A.   I remember that well.

 5        Q.   Do you remember that I had accepted that, I had even proposed it

 6     and agreed upon it with Mr. Akashi?

 7        A.   I think that matches with the facts as I recall them, yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please cast a glance at this.  This is a

 9     telegram from General de Lapresle to Mr. Akashi.  It's on the 21st of

10     May, 1995.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the second

12     page now.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, we see here that this pertains to that part of the

15     exclusion zone that is to the east of the Drina River.  This relates to

16     the agreement that was signed by Milovanovic and Delic on some other

17     piece of paper; however, you were there in the capacity of a witness.  We

18     can see that down here, can we not?

19        A.   I can, yes.  I signed as a witness, but I notice that

20     General Delic hadn't signed it because I think we took the document on to

21     General Delic after this.  And whether he signed it or not, I can't

22     remember.  I suspect he did not.

23        Q.   Yes, precisely, that is a fact.  However, there used to be this

24     custom of the Serb and the Muslim side signing the same document on

25     different copies, though.  However, you do recall that Delic didn't want

Page 7514

 1     to sign it at all.  Look at 3:

 2             [In English] "The BiH commander commits himself not to undertake

 3     any offensive action.  The only armed personnel in the shaded area on the

 4     attached map will be those of UNPROFOR."

 5             [Interpretation] Do you recall, General, that it was only the

 6     Serb side that was demilitarised, only the Serb side of that zone, that

 7     is to say the Serb villages on the eastern bank of the river?

 8        A.   I think that was the case, yes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 4 so that the

10     participants can cast a glance at the map.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Is this the map attached to this agreement, General?

13        A.   I think it is, yes.

14        Q.   What about the shaded area, is it under Serb control?

15        A.   Well, I guess there was nothing within the 3-kilometre circle

16     that was by then under Serb control because they had withdrawn their

17     troops from that circle.

18        Q.   However, did they withdraw from this shaded territory?  Before

19     the withdrawal was this Serb-held territory?

20        A.   I think it probably was, although the exact details of the final

21     positions I cannot remember.  But it looks as though that is the case.

22        Q.   Do you agree, General, that the unshaded part of the circle that

23     was under the control of the Muslim army had not been demilitarised in

24     any way?

25        A.   It's true to say I think that the Bosnian Serb forces did not

Page 7515

 1     demilitarise in that 3-kilometre circle, yes.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Bosnian Serb forces or Bosnian --

 3             THE WITNESS:  Bosnian state forces, the national forces.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Bosnian state forces.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank You, Excellency.  This is

 6     exactly what I wanted to ask for a clarification.

 7             Can this document be admitted?

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  This document has been admitted as Exhibit P1664.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             1D2549 is the next document.  Can we also have the English

12     version.  I'm sure we have it.  Yes.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you agree, General, sir, that this is a report on a

15     conversation between General Van Baal and General Milovanovic which took

16     place on the 22nd of May, 1994?

17             Maybe I can draw your attention to the heading.  This is an

18     intercept which was taken by the Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina, State Security Service.  In other words, the secret service

20     of the Muslim part of Bosnia; right?

21        A.   Clearly I can't comment on this document with any accuracy and I

22     don't think I can make a contribution in terms of advancing the knowledge

23     of this Court.  But it sounds as though that sort of conversation could

24     have taken place.  Certainly it's an incomplete version, I suspect, of

25     what happened.  But the person obviously to ask is General Van Baal if he

Page 7516

 1     appears as a witness.  He was one-half of that conversation; I was not.

 2     What is certain is that the Bosnian Serb side did not withdraw all their

 3     forces from the 3-kilometre circle to start with, but dressed them either

 4     as civilians or as policemen and kept them in the zone.  And only after

 5     pressure from UNPROFOR were they finally withdrawn - the date I can't

 6     remember.  And I think that is reflected in this intercept.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  This document is of three pages.  Would you like to

 8     see them all before --

 9             THE WITNESS:  That would be helpful --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             Why don't we let General go through them.  We can collapse the

12     B/C/S for the moment.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   If you agree with me, you can see that Milovanovic is surprised

15     because the Serbs and UNPROFOR had signed at the highest level and the

16     Muslims didn't.  And here it is requested even from the policemen to

17     leave after the heavy weaponry had left.  So we were requested to do even

18     more than we subscribed to, and the Muslims on the other hand did not

19     have to do anything at all.  Do you see what Milovanovic says:

20             [In English] "I have nothing to add for the moment.  When the

21     Muslims put their signature to that document I will react that very

22     moment immediately.  I cannot establish a cease-fire unilaterally before

23     that time, before the document is signed by the Muslim side.  While we

24     establish the cease-fire from our side, the Muslims opened fire ..."

25             [Interpretation] And so on.  Do you agree with me that in this

Page 7517

 1     case, as in many other cases, the Muslim side tried to gain an advantage

 2     from our mutual agreements?

 3        A.   Well, as we discussed previously, Dr. Karadzic, the status of the

 4     Bosnian state forces were differently from those of the Bosnian Serb

 5     forces, in that the Bosnian state was recognised by the United Nations as

 6     a member state and therefore they had every right to keep their armed

 7     forces on their sovereign territory, whether it was an enclave or not.

 8     And I guess that's why General Delic refused to sign that document.  It

 9     would have been helpful if he had done so and they had withdrawn their

10     forces from the perspective of peacekeeping, but obviously their national

11     considerations of sovereignty persuaded them otherwise.

12        Q.   General, sir, who was it who told you and when that the Serb side

13     was not an equal party to the conflict?

14        A.   I was never informed in those terms, but it was evident and

15     self-evident from the United Nations Security Council Resolutions which

16     had recognised the state of Bosnia.  Indeed at the time I seem to

17     remember we were not permitted to use the two words "Republika Srpska,"

18     in case we gave an informal recognition to that entity.

19        Q.   However, General, sir, we were Bosnians as well.  We constituted

20     the majority of the power and over 60 per cent of the territory.  Never

21     mind that.

22             Some of our misunderstandings may have originated from the

23     understanding that the Bosnian government was legitimate and that the

24     Bosnian state was legitimate, whereas on the other hand the Serbs were

25     not legitimate; right?

Page 7518

 1        A.   Well, that may well have been the case, yes.  There were two very

 2     different positions there:  That of the Bosnian Serbs and that of the

 3     United Nations.

 4        Q.   Then it becomes much clearer why we suffered as we did and why we

 5     had so many misunderstandings.  General, sir, you see that you are wrong

 6     and finally we did get the status of an equal side.  We will have another

 7     witness who will talk about that in greater detail.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can the Court please

 9     produce 1D2537.  Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, sir, can I draw your attention to the title:

12             [In English] "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of

13     12th of August, 1949 ..."

14             [Interpretation] Now let's look at paragraphs 1 and 3.  In

15     paragraph 1 it says:

16             "It is prohibited for the parties to the conflict to extend their

17     military operations to zones on which they have conferred by agreement

18     the status of demilitarised zone, if such extension is contrary to the

19     terms of this agreement."

20             And now paragraph 3:

21             [In English] "The subject of such an agreement shall normally be

22     any zone which fulfils the following conditions:

23             "(a) all combatants as well as mobile weapons and mobile military

24     equipment must have been evacuated:

25             "(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations

Page 7519

 1     or establishments:

 2             "(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities

 3     or by the population:  And:

 4             "(d) any activity linked to the military effort must have been

 5     ceased."

 6             [Interpretation] I'm sure that you knew all of that, General;

 7     right?

 8        A.   Well, I was certainly aware of The Hague protocols and the Geneva

 9     Convention, but not in any great detail.  I was working at the time from

10     the United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the safe

11     areas, and those were 824 and 836 which did not call on the Bosnian

12     government forces to demilitarise those areas.

13        Q.   However, this was implied in our agreements that we signed for

14     Zepa and Srebrenica, and they refused to sign anything else; right?  Only

15     the borders of Zepa and Srebrenica were defined and the Muslim side never

16     subscribed to any agreements about any other protected areas; right?

17        A.   Dr. Karadzic, this was before my time.  I inherited a situation

18     in 1994 which I could read about and indeed could talk about with my

19     interpreter who was present at the time, but whatever information I may

20     contribute now would be second-hand and not valuable.

21        Q.   However, you were briefed about what you were going to inherit,

22     and you inherited only agreements about Zepa and Srebrenica; you did not

23     inherit any other agreements because there were none?

24        A.   I certainly knew of the agreement relating to Srebrenica and

25     Zepa, but I was by then conforming to the requirements of the Security

Page 7520

 1     Council Resolution 824 and 836 which in a way had superseded what may or

 2     may not have been agreed by General Morillon and General Mladic at the

 3     time.  Certainly the Bosnian government forces did not demilitarise and

 4     hand in other than useless weapons in the case of Srebrenica.  That was

 5     the situation I'd inherited.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page, please.

 7     Next page.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General, there is a maxim from the Roman law, lex specialis

10     derogat lege generalis, are you saying that Security Council Resolution

11     could derogate the protocols of the Geneva Conventions or did it have to

12     comply and conform with those conventions?

13        A.   The Security Council Resolution was passed, those two resolutions

14     were passed in response to a particular set of circumstances on the

15     ground and may not have related precisely to the terms of the Geneva

16     Protocols or The Hague Convention -- the Geneva Convention or The Hague

17     Protocols or whichever way around that is expressed.  This was a specific

18     set of resolutions to deal with a specific matter, and the conditions

19     that prevailed on the ground may not have been within the orbit of the

20     protocols and conventions.

21        Q.   Were they legal or political documents in that case?

22        A.   You're asking me questions, Dr. Karadzic, I'm not competent to

23     answer.  I merely know that I was applying the two resolutions there, 824

24     and 836, with regards to the antecedence and whether they were conforming

25     or not to the conventions and protocols of The Hague and Geneva is

Page 7521

 1     something that an international lawyer would have to make judgement on,

 2     not me.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Since the sanctions were applied, the resolutions had

 4     to be legal rather than political documents.  If sanctions were applied

 5     and if air-strikes were applied based on a political act, then the world

 6     is going in a very wrong direction.

 7             In any case, General, could you please look at bullet point 7:

 8             [In English] "If one of the Parties to the conflict commits a

 9     material breach of the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 6, the other Party

10     shall be released from its obligations under the agreement conferring

11     upon the zone the status of demilitarised zone.  In such an eventuality,

12     the zone loses its status but shall continue to enjoy the protection

13     provided by the other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of

14     international law applicable to the armed conflict."

15             [Interpretation] Party that violates an agreement also deals --

16     does away with the status of a protected zone.  Wouldn't that be the

17     interpretation of this paragraph?

18        A.   Well, as I said, I can't make any comment on the legal aspects of

19     the Security Council Resolutions that I was supporting --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the General hasn't come to testify as

21     an expert in legal matters.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can this be admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it is necessary to admit this kind of

25     legal document.  We can refer to the protocols of Geneva Conventions at

Page 7522

 1     any time.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, sir, in regard to His Excellency Judge Kwon's

 5     intervention, let me be clear what direction I can take from now on.

 6     Yesterday you said you can't talk about the political aspects of the

 7     crisis; today we hear that you're not familiar with the legal aspects of

 8     the whole matter.  Will you agree with me that we should reduce your

 9     testimony in terms of legal and political implications and merely stick

10     to the facts?

11        A.   Well, I think your presumptions are probably wrong.  I mean, it

12     would be helpful just to stick to facts, I agree; but your presumption

13     that I wasn't aware or refused to discuss political or legal aspects is

14     not right.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, not only is it not right, but

16     numerous questions you asked and the General answered pertain to matters

17     which were both political and military, and indeed as a result of that

18     had legal elements to them.  So your presumption is not only not right,

19     it's patently wrong.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case, I will have to go

21     through the transcript of the examination-in-chief because there the

22     first part of the sentence is usually correct because it pertains to

23     facts and the second part of the sentence contains political views.

24     That's why I'm suggesting that we should reduce the testimony, but if we

25     can't do that then I shall continue, I shall proceed.

Page 7523

 1             P984 is an exhibit that has been admitted.  Can we see it.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   General, sir, these are the resolutions -- actually, this is

 4     Resolution 824.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the second page.  We

 6     don't need the Serbian version unless the interpreters need it.  Can we

 7     go to page 2.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Sir, could you please look at paragraph 3:

10             [In English] "Declares that the capital city of the Republic of

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in

12     particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, as well as

13     Srebrenica, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas by all

14     the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any

15     other hostile acts ..."

16             [Interpretation] Do you agree with me that this pertains to both

17     sides or would you say that this pertains only to the Serb side?

18        A.   Well, quite clearly it pertains to both sides because it uses the

19     word "all parties concerned."

20        Q.   Thank you.  This has been admitted, so I don't have to -- thank

21     you.

22             Here in your book on page 139 in e-court you say:

23             [In English] "While we contemplated our next move, Churkin called

24     from Pale with the news that the Serbs were prepared to help the fighting

25     withdraw to a distance of 3 kilometres from the centre of town, establish

Page 7524

 1     a 20-kilometre total exclusion zone around Gorazde, and release all the

 2     hostages.  They also wished to return to the conference table and

 3     re-start the peace process.  This was extraordinary news coming as it did

 4     at the moment of complete collapse of -- by their adversaries."

 5             [Interpretation] And then the next paragraph:

 6             [In English] "When we conveyed the news of the Serb offer to the

 7     Presidency, Izetbegovic and Salajdzic accused Akashi of having failed in

 8     his mission."

 9             [Interpretation] When Serbs offered peace, Salajdzic and

10     Izetbegovic were angry and they were angry because fighting had not

11     continued; right?

12        A.   Well, why they were angry or not I can't say.  My impression at

13     the time is that they were angry because the United Nations refused to

14     call for heavier air-strikes by NATO than the United Nations thought

15     appropriate.  Both President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Salajdzic

16     expected at that point NATO to bring about the military defeat of the

17     Bosnian Serbs by bombing, and that's something which the United Nations

18     wouldn't sign up to.  That was my impression.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Correct.  You are saying that the extraordinary news

20     was met with anger in the Bosnian Presidency.  Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will tender this for admission

22     once we tendered the whole book.

23             And now 1D110, can we have that.  1D00110, 110.  Thank you.  This

24     is the document.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 7525

 1        Q.   Let's look at the document which was issued on the 1st of June,

 2     1994, after all of our talks, after the 3-kilometre zone was defined as

 3     well as the exclusion zone of 20 kilometres.  And now

 4     Enver Hadzihasanovic, the minister of defence, writes to the president of

 5     the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We will see that on the second

 6     page.  He says:

 7             "In the desire to launch activities in order to alleviate the

 8     situation in the Drina valley and to create the necessary preconditions

 9     for the long-term resolution to this complex problem, we hereby propose

10     under 1:

11             "Urgently implement the organisation of the 8th Corps, involve

12     units in Srebrenica, Zepa, and the OG Pazaric."

13             And then there are staff proposals, who the commanders are going

14     to be.  And then at the bottom it says:

15             "The appointed commander should lead a group of officers to

16     Gorazde and a unit that would have to consist of at least 200

17     well-equipped soldiers."

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Bullet point 4:

21             "Major financial assistance should be approved and they should be

22     taught to use UNPROFOR as suppliers.

23             "A special helicopter transport should be organised to deliver

24     materiel and technical equipment especially for anti-armour combat."

25             General, sir, Alija Izetbegovic at the bottom writes:

Page 7526

 1             "I agree for the most with everything including bullet point 2."

 2             Do you agree that these preparations and activities on the part

 3     of our Muslim adversaries were not in agreement with our efforts to

 4     implement the agreement on demilitarisation and the exclusion zone?

 5        A.   Well, obviously the attempt by the Bosnian state forces to re-arm

 6     and re-equip their troops in Gorazde, particularly if they had a

 7     subsequent intention of opening up combat operations, again was unhelpful

 8     to the peace process.  That's absolutely true.  But I think an awful lot

 9     of that is wishful thinking on the part of the Bosnian state forces

10     because of course there's no way that the UN helicopters were ever going

11     to carry military equipment for them.  And indeed on one occasion when we

12     discovered they were trying to smuggle satellite communications, we

13     destroyed it.

14        Q.   Thank you.  You can see under 4 they are hoping that they will

15     train men in Gorazde to use UNPROFOR for supplies.  I'm again saying and

16     I'm not asserting that the higher commands were aware of that, but

17     Muslims certainly knew that the troops in Gorazde should be trained,

18     should be thought how to get closer to UNPROFOR troops and how to get

19     supplies.  Would you have been cross had you seen this in your day during

20     your tour?

21        A.   Well, any attempt by the troops of the warring parties to use UN

22     equipment or use their positions to prosecute further their war would, of

23     course, be something we would not have accepted.

24        Q.   Do you agree that this increased Serbian suspicions about those

25     links between the Muslim troops and UNPROFOR troops at lower levels, that

Page 7527

 1     this increased our suspicions and level of caution on our side?

 2        A.   Well, I can't really make any useful comment on what motivated

 3     the Bosnian Serb side any more than I can what motivated the Bosnian

 4     government side, other than supposition on our part.  Because, as I say,

 5     we were not in a position to gather intelligence about what your

 6     motivations may have been.

 7        Q.   Well, I'm just trying to make a distinction between certain

 8     things.  I'm trying to see whether the Serbs were genuinely against the

 9     United Nations, or were they actually right to harbour suspicions and

10     fear, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations said?  Because the

11     Muslim side drew benefits from their co-operation with the UN.  This is

12     important to demonstrate the motives on the side of the Serbs, were the

13     Serbs against UNPROFOR or was there just an attempt to fight against the

14     Muslims?  I'm sure that you would have been angry if you'd seen this, but

15     let me tell you the Serbs were angry as well.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I think you exhausted that issue.

17     Move on to your next question and refrain from making a speech.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can the document be

19     admitted.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification pending

21     translation.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As D707.

23             JUDGE KWON:  There's one document you didn't tender, it is the

24     intercept we saw before.  You are not minded to tender that, intercept

25     between Mr. Van Baal and Milovanovic?

Page 7528

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gladly.  It's going to be easier

 2     when Van Baal comes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We'll leave it then.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, even if the Muslim had not demilitarised their part of

 6     the circle, 3 kilometres, and we did have to demilitarised, do you agree

 7     that it is impermissible for them to further reinforce those 3 kilometres

 8     of theirs with such actions, reinforcements by way of equipment and

 9     personnel?  What were the Serbs supposed to do, were they just supposed

10     to watch all of that happening?

11        A.   We're talking about a hypothetical situation, which is again, as

12     I say, not useful to comment on.

13        Q.   Thank you.  However, certainly you would understand that we have

14     the right to defend ourselves if they attack us, yes or no?

15        A.   You can't answer a question like that yes or no without knowing

16     the circumstances in which you were being attacked.  If you had

17     launched - and I'm talking hypothetically - an attack against Gorazde,

18     the enclave, and the Bosnian state forces had responded, that would be

19     legitimate.

20        Q.   And if they attack us from Gorazde, is our defence encounter an

21     offensive legitimate?

22        A.   The view of the United Nations at the time was that we were

23     trying to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict and that we

24     regretted any attack that was made against side against another,

25     particularly when civilian casualties were the result of those attacks,

Page 7529

 1     or because of the increased level of conflict it was impossible to

 2     deliver humanitarian aid to the people who needed it.  We condemned all

 3     attacks.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2476, could we have that, please.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   In the meantime, General, that was no response to my question.

 7     Does that mean that governments have the right to beat their citizens and

 8     to kill an entire ethnic community just because they are recognised as

 9     such, although we are an unavoidable part of that government, that state,

10     as a matter of fact.  Were the United Nations tolerating Muslim attacks

11     against us and on the other hand they were not tolerant of us and were

12     highly critical of us?

13        A.   Well, the first part of your question is straying into

14     international law again, which I already said I'm not competent to

15     comment upon; the second part I've already answered.  We condemned all

16     attacks, particularly when civilian communities were being endangered by

17     those attacks.  We were working, particularly in 1994, the middle of

18     1994, a period you're discussing at the moment, with the hopes to

19     bringing about a permanent cessation of hostilities in Bosnia during that

20     time.  And it is a matter of great regret that the possibilities for

21     peace that were worked so hard for by the United Nations were abandoned

22     by both parties to the conflict at the beginning of 1995.

23        Q.   If this is it, can we have -- oh, I'm not sure this is it -- oh,

24     yes, it is, yes, yes.  Can we have the next page, please.

25             General, sir, may I draw your attention to this telegram of

Page 7530

 1     yours, forwarding General Mladic's letter to UNPROFOR, the command in

 2     Sarajevo, and to you as commander and your associates, because we see

 3     that this is in the plural, it says "gentlemen."  General Mladic is

 4     informing you in this letter that:

 5             "...  according to the regulations of the Geneva Convention of

 6     1949" and the additional protocols we saw a few moments ago there cannot

 7     be any military installations or important industrial plants or

 8     factories, and so on and so forth, in safe areas.  He is informing you of

 9     the fact that there is an ammunition factory in Gorazde called Pobeda and

10     that it is within the 3-kilometre zone.  Also that there are many people

11     who are employed there and that the power-supply ensured by the UN, by

12     way of generators, is used to manufacture ammunition.  That is what the

13     first paragraph says.  Can you see that yourself?

14        A.   Well, I can see the allegation, but of course I don't agree with

15     it in any way at all.

16        Q.   Did the factory called Pobeda exist in Gorazde?

17        A.   There certainly was an old ammunition factory there; whether it

18     was operating or not, I have no idea at all.  I very much doubt it, given

19     the circumstances.

20        Q.   Old or not old, General, it manufactured brand new ammunition.

21     If you were not aware of that, your colleague General Mladic informed you

22     about that, that that was the case; and that those generators they had

23     been asking you for are generators they do not use for civilians, but

24     rather for manufacturing ammunition that is to be used against us.  That

25     is quite clear from this letter and in the third paragraph he asks you to

Page 7531

 1     deal with this urgently and to take efficient indispensable measures to

 2     resolve the situation.  Do you recall this letter?  And on the basis of

 3     this letter, did you check whether the factory was actually operating?

 4        A.   I'm sure General Mladic received an appropriate reply from

 5     Mr. Akashi.  I actually can't remember receiving this letter.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, this

 8     document?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D708.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, sir, what I am trying to say to you here and to all the

13     participants is that whenever the suspicions of the Serb army proved to

14     be true -- I mean, we did not mind having generators brought in to help

15     civilians.  But if generators are used in order to have this kind of

16     factory operate in a safe area that is supposed to be demilitarised and

17     Mladic ascertained that, don't you understand that our objections and our

18     restrictions were not on account of the UN but on account of abusing the

19     UN, that is to say that is what our adversaries did.  Don't you

20     understand that?

21        A.   The UN would never have permitted its humanitarian aid to be used

22     to further the military effort no matter whether it was helping with

23     generators or in any other form.  Aid was aid.

24        Q.   Could they have been doing that without your permission?

25        A.   The United Nations deployments to Gorazde were not in the form of

Page 7532

 1     an army of occupation where we were able to go around and make searches.

 2     It's possible, of course, they were running their factories and making

 3     their ammunition, but as I said I think it's extremely unlikely.  It's

 4     equally possible that when we gave you fuel to clear the roads on the

 5     Bosnian Serb side for the delivery of humanitarian aid, some of that fuel

 6     went to your tanks or artillery and some of it went to running your own

 7     routes for military purposes not for humanitarian aid.  But as I say, we

 8     don't know whether that was the case.  The allegations were frequently

 9     made by the Bosnian government that the fuel we had given you was used

10     for that.  So it becomes fruitless getting involved and I'm merely giving

11     this as an example of bandying accusations backwards and forwards when

12     the United Nations were working in extremely difficult circumstances

13     trying to bring about a cessation of hostilities, meanwhile supplying aid

14     to the people of that country, 600.000 of whom were Serbs.  We acted in

15     an impartial and proper manner, and to suggest otherwise is to make the

16     sacrifices of those people who died during the United Nations

17     peacekeeping mission unworthy, and that is not the right thing to do.

18        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  For your information, we gave Croats

19     electricity for crude oil.  There were 600.000 Serbs in Croatia.  All

20     right.  That's just something that I'd like you to know.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D258.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you agree that in Croatia there were 600.000 Serbs and in

24     Bosnia about 1.5 or 1.6 million?

25        A.   I guess that was roughly the population distribution, yes.  Of

Page 7533

 1     course it was very difficult to know what the population distribution was

 2     after the start of the war.  That may have been the case at the start of

 3     the war, but it probably wasn't the case by the time I got there in 1994.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, that's not this

 5     document.  1D2518.  Perhaps I misspoke a moment ago, 1D2518.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Now we are turning to the situation around Bihac, General.  This

 8     document pertains to Bihac.  Do you agree or do you recall, rather, that

 9     the Muslim 5th Corps carried out a major offensive against the Serbs out

10     of Bihac, out of Bihac which was a safe area, they attacked the Serb

11     populated areas in Krajina?  You do know that, don't you?  It's not

12     written here, but I mean I'm asking you whether you remember that.  First

13     of all, do you remember that the 5th Corps had almost reached

14     Bosanski Petrovac and that they seized vast parts of the territory there?

15        A.   I cannot remember precisely the sequence of events, although I

16     remember the fighting around Gorazde extremely well.  And I don't -- am

17     not quite sure where this document comes from and what its status is.

18        Q.   This is a document of the United States government and it is

19     permissible to use it in this court.  Number 1 reads:

20             [In English] "UN official blames Muslims for Bihac clashes."

21             [No interpretation]

22             [In English] "Alan Roberts, UN protection forces spokesman for

23     Sector South said at today's regular news conference in Knin that the

24     present clashes in the Bihac region are a consequence of attacks launched

25     by the Muslim army's 5th Corps on Serb positions in the areas of Bosanska

Page 7534

 1     Otoka and Bosanska Krupa.  Therefore, Roberts said this does not

 2     constitute an act of aggression on the part of Republika Srpska army.

 3     Alan Roberts denied information that members of the Serb army of Krajina

 4     have been shelling Bihac."

 5             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.  We can all read this,

 6     can we not.  General, don't you see --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  It's an excerpt from "Tanjug" report, isn't it?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But it is an excerpt from a

 9     "Tanjug" report related to a conference that is authentic.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton --

11             THE WITNESS:  I can't remember this.  Sorry, I can't remember

12     this document and I certainly can't remember the incident or the press

13     conference referred to.  I suspect that it came from Croatia press

14     conference, not from the Bosnian press conference because I don't think

15     Roberts was one of mine.  I think he worked for the Croatian UN mission,

16     not from the Bosnian UN mission.  Knin was outside of my area of

17     responsibility.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Well, look at the next paragraph.  On the right it says:

21             [In English] "UNPROFOR spokesman Claire Grimes ruled out UN

22     military action to help the fighting in Bihac pocket."

23             [Interpretation] Two paragraphs down:

24             [In English] "Fighting is concentrated on the confrontation line.

25     It is not targeting Bihac town which is the safe area."

Page 7535

 1             [Interpretation] And two paragraphs further down:

 2             [In English] "On Saturday, UN Bosnia commander,

 3     Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose warned the Serbs to halt their attack

 4     on Bihac town or face action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation."

 5             [Interpretation] Well, General, sir, when the units of the 5th

 6     Corps advanced towards Banja Luka capturing large portions of Serb

 7     territory, torching Serb villages, no one threatened them.  How could

 8     they accuse you of being a pro-Serb officer when you never threatened

 9     them, only us.  Look at this particular case.

10        A.   Well, I can't answer that question.

11        Q.   But don't you remember what it says here that you threatened the

12     Serbs to stop otherwise that you would call in NATO?

13        A.   Well, I remember that very well.  I thought you were referring to

14     why I was being called pro-Serb.  As I say, I don't have any reply to

15     that, but I can reply that I do remember indeed warning the Bosnian Serb

16     forces not to continue their attack on the town of Bihac.  That is

17     correct.  Whatever may have pervade that attack of course was not saying

18     which the UN had become involved in at that point.  What we did become

19     involved in was the attack against the safe area of Bihac.  There were

20     many battles going on around Bosnia which we had no knowledge of during

21     1994.

22        Q.   Do you remember your warning issued to the Muslims not to leave

23     Bihac and not to attack the Serbs?  Was there any warning of that kind?

24        A.   We would certainly have stated our reservations about the

25     launching of attacks from the safe areas to the Presidency, and I'm sure

Page 7536

 1     we did that on many an occasion.  Our correspondence with

 2     General Dudakovic on the ground was patchy to say the least, he being in

 3     command of the 5th Corps.

 4        Q.   Is it possible, General, that the Muslim side had misinformed you

 5     to the effect that we are bombing the town?  We were actually

 6     legitimately in pursuit of the 5th Corps, whereas they are misinforming

 7     you that we were attacking the city.  Was this possible or plausible?

 8        A.   Well, it's certainly possible that they had attacked out of Bihac

 9     with the 5th Corps against our warnings and that you had counter-attacked

10     and were -- had driven them back into Bihac and were now involved in

11     shelling Bihac.  That is probably what happened, but that didn't prevent

12     our -- us from exercising our responsibility towards deterring attacks

13     against safe areas, warning you to desist and to cease those shelling

14     attacks.  And that's why we called in NATO.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there's no objection from you,

18     Ms. Edgerton?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Then it will be admitted.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D709.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, some UN representatives confirmed here that certain

25     national battalions had an unprincipled stance, a biassed one, in favour

Page 7537

 1     of one particular side, specifically the Muslim side.  Does your

 2     knowledge correspond to that?

 3        A.   Not at all.  We had accusations from both sides.  The Bosnian

 4     government side continually accused the Russians of siding with the Serbs

 5     and they -- vice versa, you accused the Muslim forces within the

 6     United Nations of siding with the Bosnia government side.  It was an

 7     argument we were used to and got rather bored with by the middle of 1994.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2517, please.

10     1D2517.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Just briefly, let us have a look at this letter that was sent to

13     you, or rather, to Ambassador Akashi, de Lapresle, and you yourself.  You

14     see here that General Milovanovic is complaining to you, saying that the

15     Bangladesh Battalion is interfering in the war on the Muslim side,

16     they're arming the Muslims and providing them with information that they

17     gather as they gain insight into our situation.  Do you remember that

18     crisis with regard to the interference of the Bangladesh Battalion?  Do

19     you remember that this offensive of the 5th Corps took place after the

20     Bangladesh Battalion arrived in Bihac?

21        A.   Well, I certainly remember the fighting in Bihac happening whilst

22     the Bangladesh Battalion was there, but I refute any allegation that they

23     were supporting the Bosnian state side.  They were lightly equipped, very

24     lightly equipped, battalion.  The weather wasn't particularly good, and I

25     doubt if they'd had any capability in terms of being able to assist the

Page 7538

 1     Bosnian government forces even if they'd wished to.  I certainly had no

 2     reports from the military observers there on the ground of anything of

 3     that nature.

 4        Q.   And is it correct that because of these suspicions and these

 5     reports, you transferred them from the Bihac pocket to Pleso, the Zagreb

 6     airport or somewhere else?

 7        A.   Well, that certainly didn't happen in my time.

 8        Q.   All right.  Let's look at the last paragraph:

 9             [In English] "With respect to the aforementioned, we request that

10     you urgently apply pressure on the Muslims in order that they both cease

11     offensive activities, in particular those against civilian settlements,

12     and withdraw to the positions as they were on 23rd of October, 1994.

13     Otherwise, we will be compelled to retaliate towards the area we have

14     been attacked from."

15             [Interpretation] General Milovanovic is quite legitimately

16     providing information to the effect that we have been attacked and that a

17     UN battalion or the Bangladesh Battalion is interfering and that if you

18     do not stop them from attacking Serb territories we would react

19     ourselves.  Do you recall this letter?

20        A.   I don't specifically, no.

21        Q.   And did you do anything in relation to this request of

22     General Milovanovic's?

23        A.   As I've explained, Dr. Karadzic, we spent an enormous amount of

24     time trying to reduce the level of conflict when there were letters like

25     this received.  We certainly would have taken the allegation up with the

Page 7539

 1     Bosnian government side, and if we had had evidence that they were

 2     launching assaults, we would have counselled them strongly not to say to

 3     do in the midst of what was supposed to be a peace process.  That

 4     happened in June and it happened subsequently in and around Bihac.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  But they could fully envisage what would

 6     happen if we would launch a counter-offensive.  You would attack them

 7     with sharp words and us with sharp bombs; right?

 8        A.   I suppose you could put it like that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D710, Your Honours.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would this be the right time for

14     the break or do we have another ten minutes?

15             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for 25 minutes.  We'll resume at

16     4.00.

17                           --- Recess taken at 3.37 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 4.03 p.m.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Have any of the documents been unadmitted?  No.

22             Can the Court please produce 1D2536.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, do you remember that during that crisis and during any

25     crisis there was an intense correspondence between yourselves and us,

Page 7540

 1     between your generals and our generals, between me, Akashi, and

 2     de Lapresle and so on and so forth.  Do you remember that?

 3        A.   I do.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  This one of the letters dated 17 November, my letter

 5     to General de Lapresle and the UNMO at Pale forwarded that letter.  Could

 6     you please cast a glance at the letter and the letter was written at the

 7     peak of the crisis.  In this letter, do I inform General de Lapresle that

 8     I understand his concern but also do I point to the fact that our

 9     counter-offensive was preceded by a major offensive by the Muslim forces

10     against us and that we believed that UNPROFOR is responsible for the

11     current events because --

12             [In English] "We simply cannot allow the Muslims to create a

13     strong hold in 'safe areas' and use them as spring boards for staging

14     attacks against us under the cover of UN and NATO.  A 'safe area' is

15     presumably supposed to benefit civilians, it is not supposed to be

16     bristling with armed soldiers."

17             [Interpretation] And further on I continue to say:

18             [In English] "It is not our intention to make the civilians in

19     the Bihac pocket suffer.  We are merely exercising our legitimate right

20     to self-defense, and we shall be pursuing every armed Muslim.  If this

21     means entering the 'safe area' in order to disarm the Muslims, then so be

22     it.  Given the fact that UNPROFOR did not or could not demilitarise the

23     pocket, it seems that we have to do it ourselves.  But I wish to assure

24     you that unarmed civilians or, for that matter, UNPROFOR positions in

25     that area, are certainly not our target."

Page 7541

 1             [Interpretation] Is this a legitimate position, General?

 2        A.   Well, it's certainly not a position that I would agree with

 3     because I don't believe you should be attacking into the safe areas no

 4     matter what the provocations may be.  We were trying to bring about peace

 5     at that time in any offensive and whatever excuse was regrettable.

 6        Q.   Just a while ago I asked you whether you allow for the

 7     possibility that you were disinformed by the Muslim government.  We were

 8     pursuing the 5th Corps and they informed you that we were actually

 9     attacking the town; right?  Was that a possibility?

10        A.   I understand that is your position, yes.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

12             Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D711, Your Honours.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   So you didn't know about any manipulations or disinformation or

17     misinformation, or perhaps you did know that they misinformed you and

18     that's how they provoked NATO into acting against us; which is true?

19        A.   The only actions taken by NATO as a result of requests by the

20     United Nations came about from direct observation by the United Nations

21     military observers on the ground.  We did not respond to the Bosnian

22     government's request for air-strikes against the Bosnian Serbs on any

23     occasion.

24        Q.   Thank you.  My question was this:  Is it possible that you did

25     not receive proper information, that you were misinformed?  If you think

Page 7542

 1     that you have answered, then we can move on.  Let me repeat:  Is it

 2     possible that you were misinformed?  Is it possible that the Muslim

 3     government fed you erroneous information?

 4        A.   We were being fed erroneous information by all parties to the

 5     conflict, but that did not necessarily mean we acted upon this

 6     information.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2520, can the Court produce the

 9     document.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   While we're waiting for it, does Colonel Daniell ring any bells?

12        A.   Of course.  He was my Chief of Staff in the second half of my

13     time in Bosnia.

14        Q.   This is his unclassified fax message to the main UNPROFOR staff

15     in Zagreb dated 25 November 1994.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have the following

17     page.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you confirm that this is a fax that was sent on the 24th of --

20     25th of November?

21        A.   Can I correct something I said.  He was my military assistant not

22     my Chief of Staff during the second period.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             THE WITNESS:  I shall look at the document.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 7543

 1        Q.   If I'm not mistaken, this fax describes the contents of your

 2     meetings with the Serbian and Muslim sides.  The Serb side was

 3     represented by Koljevic, Tolimir, and Zametica; the Muslim side was

 4     represented by Salajdzic, Muratovic; and on your side, Rose, Andreev, and

 5     Gobillard.  Let's look at paragraph 4:

 6             [In English] "Two points to note:  A, Heavy disinformation

 7     throughout the meeting about the shelling of Bihac and Serb attacks.

 8     Subsequently proved false, the BiH are firing heavy weapons out of the

 9     town centre and now (1630) we learn that the Serbs are responding.  Many

10     calls from Ganic to attack with air-strikes.  It is possible that the

11     meeting has been arranged to buy time to allow the Serbs to attack Bihac

12     the darkness tonight."

13             [Interpretation] And can we go on to the following page where it

14     says:

15             [In English] "UNPROFOR are reaching a point of decision over the

16     use of NATO air in support of the mission."

17             [Interpretation] And we will see further on:

18             [In English] "... destruction of SAM sites and EW facilities" --

19             JUDGE KWON:  We all can read, Mr. Karadzic.  What is your

20     question?

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   The question is this, General, sir:  Do you see that amongst your

23     ranks, there was full awareness that you were being disinformed, that

24     fire was opened on us, and when we responded, NATO air-strikes were being

25     called for and prepared?

Page 7544

 1        A.   I can see that that letter was an accurate reflection of what we

 2     thought at the time, but I don't think it accurately reflects what you

 3     just said.

 4        Q.   Well, it says here that UNPROFOR will be at war if attacks are

 5     launched and destruction from -- and so on and so forth:

 6             [In English] "UNPROFOR would be at war.  This position has been

 7     discussed and they are as one about it."

 8             [Interpretation] A full agreement that if you open fire, you will

 9     be at war with us, right?

10        A.   What we're referring to is going for higher-level targets, which

11     is, as I've explained in the past to you, we were not prepared to do

12     because it was not compatible with the peacekeeping mission that we had

13     been given by the Security Council.  NATO was keen on widening the number

14     of targets, the level of targets; we refused to do so, in spite of the

15     fact that the Bosnian Serb side by then were firing SAM 2 intermediate

16     and high-level missiles at the NATO aircraft.

17        Q.   One such installation was damaged by NATO and heavy artillery

18     fire was opened on Mount Grmec, Petrovac and Kljuc.  Although we had

19     managed to reduce casualty through resourcefulness and other means.

20             General, how did you call for those attacks?  Who was it who you

21     communicated with in NATO?

22        A.   The procedures by which air-strikes were called from NATO was

23     quite complex, but in simplified terms it consisted of me requesting the

24     air-strikes, they had to be agreed I think in Zagreb, NATO would then

25     respond.  And the actual targeting of the NATO aircraft was done by UN

Page 7545

 1     soldiers on the ground.  There was one category of use of force by NATO

 2     which did not involve the UN, and that is if the united -- if NATO

 3     aircraft felt that they were under any threat from our intermediate and

 4     high-level missiles as a result of being acquired by Serb radars, they

 5     had the right to fire at those radars and anti-aircraft sites without

 6     reference to the UN.  The use of force at that point of course being one

 7     of self-defence.

 8        Q.   And what about any other forms?

 9        A.   They were the only categories for the use of NATO in support of

10     the UN.

11        Q.   But that happened without your agreement and without you calling

12     for them, but those that you called for, could you describe the route

13     which you had to take from the moment you called for air-strikes to the

14     moment air-strikes were approved.  Who was you -- that you had to talk

15     to?  How did that transpire?

16        A.   I just explained it to you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I wonder, Mr. Karadzic, how these lines of questions

18     are relevant to your case, your indictment.  Bear that in mind, and we

19     have only limited time and I would like you to prioritise your questions.

20             Move on to your next topic, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can this document be admitted and let me explain why this is

23     important.  This is important because we are going to ask documents from

24     NATO, all the documents that pertain to us and attacks against us,

25     because we have to shed light on the circumstances --

Page 7546

 1             JUDGE KWON:  You have time -- you will have time to make your

 2     submission, but not now.

 3             We'll admit this.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D712.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, sir, if I'd known that you would not know enough about

 8     the beginning of attacks from Bihac and how much territory they had

 9     previously taken from us, I would bring you American maps which show you

10     the situation day-in/day-out.  However, do you accept that our

11     counter-attack was preceded by a large-scale attack from Bihac against

12     the Serbian Krajina, the Krajina of Bosnian Serbs, as described in this

13     correspondence?

14        A.   I haven't seen the correspondence you're referring to.

15        Q.   My letter to de Lapresle and Milovanovic's letters to you, and so

16     on and so forth.  The entire correspondence in which we are warning you

17     that we were being attacked and that we would launch a counter-offensive.

18     I just showed you all those a while ago.

19        A.   As I've said once before, I have no recall as to what the

20     sequence of events were in the period leading up to the Bosnian Serb

21     attack on Bihac.  It could be as you said, that you were responding to a

22     counter-attack; equally, it could be that you just attacked into the

23     enclave for other reasons.  We did not have military observers in a

24     position to give us a blow-by-blow account of every single conflict that

25     was happening in Bosnia at the time.

Page 7547

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And now let's go back to the total exclusion zone in

 2     the Sarajevo sector.  Do you remember, General, that we had requested a

 3     proper definition of heavy artillery and that it was concluded that

 4     everything beyond a certain number of millimetres, which was 12.7

 5     millimetres, fell under heavy artillery and should be withdrawn from the

 6     20-kilometre zone?

 7        A.   That sounds about right.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce

10     65 ter 1252 if it's not already in evidence as a Prosecution exhibit.

11     Yes, that's the document.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Could I please ask you to cast a glance at the document and

14     especially at paragraph 3.  Everybody can see everything, but paragraph 3

15     is particularly important:

16             [In English] "We then met at the Presidency with Izetbegovic and

17     Salajdzic, who said that they were willing to sign a cease-fire on

18     condition that the Serb artillery moved out of range of Sarajevo and was

19     also placed under the control of UNPROFOR."

20             [Interpretation] Right?

21        A.   That is right.  I remember that.

22        Q.   Do you remember that we disputed over the term or the difference

23     between term "monitoring" and "control"?  We thought that monitoring was

24     acceptable, whereas the Muslim side demanded that only the Serb weaponry

25     be controlled.  Am I right?  Was that how things transpired?

Page 7548

 1        A.   I remember a general discussion on the distinction between

 2     monitoring and control, but that's all.

 3        Q.   And do you remember what it says here in paragraph 3 and that was

 4     that the Muslim side requested that only Serb weapons be controlled and

 5     they didn't offer for their weapons to be controlled in turn?

 6        A.   I think that was their position, yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the last page of this

 9     document.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Please look at the elements.  It is a list of elements:

12             "Effective control by UNPROFOR of certain key positions in and

13     around Sarajevo.

14             "On-site monitoring by UNPROFOR of all artillery, heavy mortars,

15     and everything above 12.7 millimetres ...

16             [In English] "The non-use of Sarajevo as a base from which to

17     launch any attacks.

18             "The freezing of the strength and movements of existing forces in

19     and around Sarajevo."

20             [Interpretation] Was that a fair concept, General?

21        A.   Well, it looks as though this was a draft of a document which I

22     think I possibly have seen in the past, yes.

23        Q.   Do you remember that the Serb side agreed to that?

24        A.   You certainly agreed to put your weapons under some form of UN

25     control and to withdraw the rest from outside the 20-kilometre circle,

Page 7549

 1     yes, that is so.  Of course the fact that you failed to comply in every

 2     case with that obligation didn't surprise us either.

 3        Q.   We'll come to that.  You just tell us now whether the Muslim side

 4     agreed to that draft of yours?

 5        A.   I cannot remember what the agreement with the Bosnian government

 6     side was without having reminder from a document or doing further

 7     research, but the general position was that they certainly agreed to stop

 8     use of their heavy weapons and stop troop movements and stop attacking

 9     from within Sarajevo.  That was the general position which I think they

10     agreed.  They certainly didn't put their weapons under UN control in the

11     way that the Bosnian Serb weapons were put under control.  I think there

12     was some symbolic gesture in one of the barracks where some weapons were

13     produced, but certainly by no means did that constitute the handing-in of

14     their weapons to the UN.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D713.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can the Court please

20     produce 1D02458.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Does the name Major Annink ring a bell?

23        A.   Well, it's not a name I've seen or heard of for 14 years, but I

24     think it probably does ring a bell.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 7550

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page of this

 2     document?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  What's the first page of this document?  Which is

 4     missing?  It starts with page 3.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It starts with paragraph 3, but

 6     that's the way we received it from the OTP.  It must be part of a larger

 7     UN document.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's move on.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I would now like to draw your attention to this paragraph further

11     down:

12             [In English] "To a question on the whereabouts of the Bosnian

13     soldiers who were moving from Dobrinja towards Ilidza this morning

14     Major Annink said they were with the troops and they entered the tunnel

15     and possibly came out.

16             "He further said that the 60-millimetre mortars, which the BiH

17     soldiers were carrying, could be easily strapped on the back and it was

18     very easy to carry those weapons."

19             [Interpretation] Further on he explains that he believes this was

20     not a violation of the total exclusion zone and that it's only mortars

21     over 80 millimetres -- or rather, that everything beyond 12.7 millimetres

22     is forbidden.  Actually, do you remember that Muslim soldiers violated

23     the agreement in this way as well?

24        A.   Certainly the Bosnian state side forces did not comply with the

25     agreement to cease firing from Sarajevo outwards immediately.  And of

Page 7551

 1     course there were violations that occurred throughout the summer, but the

 2     general position was that one of reasonable calm which enabled us to

 3     start restoring utilities and run convoys in and out.  There were

 4     violations on both sides, you're correct.

 5        Q.   We will see who was the first to violate the agreement because I

 6     guess that matters, but we'll deal with that later.  I'm just saying that

 7     Major Annink is giving a very creative interpretation of the agreement

 8     and that 80 millimetres does not seem to be more than 12.7 millimetres

 9     from his point of view.  Basically he is justifying this carrying of

10     60-millimetre mortars strapped to soldiers' backs and -- well, it is an

11     infantry weapon, but still it can be used for shooting, but don't you

12     agree that this is a very creative interpretation and an incorrect one at

13     that?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, General.

15             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I was wondering when we were going to get to the

17     question, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             THE WITNESS:  I don't have in front of me the details as to what

20     calibres of different weapons systems were part of the agreement to

21     withdraw heavy weapons, and of course an 81-millimetre mortar probably

22     was, a 60-millimetre mortar may not have been.  I don't have any memory

23     recall of that.  I do remember that 12.7 cannons were the limit.  And

24     Major Annink, if I remember, was a press relations officer who was

25     fielding questions from the press and this is a summary of the press

Page 7552

 1     conference which he had in Sarajevo.  And I suspect that his position

 2     about the difference between a 60-millimetre mortar and an 81-millimetre

 3     mortar probably did reflect the agreement that had been made.  I can't

 4     say one way or the other.

 5        Q.   [No interpretation]:

 6             [In English] "A journalist expressed his wonder that how was a

 7     12.7-millimetre anti-aircraft gun regarded as a violation and not a

 8     60-millimetre mortar."

 9             [Interpretation] That's the point, just that.

10             General, you do accept that Muslim weapons were being viewed

11     differently; right?

12        A.   Well, I guess the agreement was sort of supposed to apply both

13     ways, and as I say, I can't remember what the discussion on the

14     millimetrage of the weapons had to be withdrawn was.  So I can't make any

15     further contribution.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this been admitted?  Does it

18     have a number?

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D714, Your Honours.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  It has a first page actually, Your Honours, which

22     my colleague Mr. Reid has been able to locate.

23             JUDGE KWON:  That could be added to this one.

24                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

25             JUDGE KWON:  I'm also advised that this must be a seven-page

Page 7553

 1     document?

 2                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  We've only been able to come up with five so far,

 4     so that's one more than previously --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this as it is, and then if the -- we'll

 6     add those two pages and see what we can do else other than that.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The Defence is very

 8     interested in what those two pages say.  Perhaps it's something related

 9     to Rule 68.

10             1D2450, could we have that document now, please.  1D2450.  I

11     believe we don't have the Serbian version.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, can you recognise this?  This is a press release.  It's

14     press releases and summaries of UNPROFOR, right?

15        A.   That is so.

16        Q.   The 15th of February, 1994; is that right?

17        A.   That's the date on the top.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we then have page 3 from here I

19     mean, three pages further on.  It's the second page of the document.

20     Could you zoom in a bit, the top part.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Now, General, can you see this?  There is this meeting,

23     Mr. Akashi, General Rose met with Admiral Boorda, Commander-in-Chief of

24     Allied Forces Southern Europe at Pleso airport.

25             "The purpose of the meeting was to promote closer co-ordination

Page 7554

 1     between UNPROFOR and NATO in relation to the possible use of air power in

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in particular in the Sarajevo area."

 3             Both Mr. Akashi and Admiral Boorda emphasised that if NATO used

 4     air power at the request of the UN, it would be done in an impartial

 5     manner, in an impartial way, and would be directed at any party violating

 6     the cease-fire.

 7             Do you remember that?

 8        A.   I remember that well.

 9        Q.   How many times did the Muslim side violate the cease-fire?

10     According to your very own texts, many more times than the Serb side;

11     right?

12        A.   If you're referring to the summer of 1994, I think that probably

13     would be an accurate assessment.  But again, I don't have the figures in

14     front of me.  What I do know is that the major breakdown of that

15     agreement which occurred in September of 1994 was the result of the

16     actions of the Bosnian government side.

17        Q.   Thank you.  This is what you said:

18             [In English] "General Rose told journalists that many of the

19     cease-fire violations that had taken place on Saturday night had been

20     committed by the Bosnian Presidency Forces and not by the Bosnian Serb

21     army."

22             [Interpretation] How many times were the Muslim forces bombed by

23     NATO?

24        A.   Again, to reply to your question I would have to put the question

25     into context.  When Admiral Boorda and Mr. Akashi met at Pleso airport

Page 7555

 1     and had this discussion, NATO position, as you can see, is that they

 2     would respond to violations on either side as a result of requests from

 3     United Nations.

 4             In fact, we didn't expect the cease-fire to be immediate, a

 5     hundred per cent successful, and we expected some untidy results between

 6     the signing of the cease-fire and the stopping of the firing around

 7     Sarajevo; and that's exactly what happened.

 8             By the end of that summer General Boorda -- Admiral Boorda had

 9     been replaced by Admiral Smith.  It was clear that NATO had changed its

10     position in terms of the use of force against all parties who violated,

11     in particular their own ultimatum for the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.

12     And from that moment on, NATO took sides and, regrettably, that finally

13     dragged the United Nations protection forces on the ground into being

14     seen as being partial by the Bosnian Serb side.  That is what happened.

15             So to discuss who was firing at who in February and why NATO

16     didn't respond would require a different reply from me to what happened

17     in the end of the summer.

18        Q.   Did I understand you correctly when you say here in the

19     transcript partial by the Bosnian -- [In English] Had they been in favour

20     of Bosnian Serb side or against Bosnian Serb side?  Maybe my English

21     knowledge is not --

22        A.   I'll just read what is written.

23             Yes, the Bosnian Serb side started to see the UN as being

24     partial.  It ceased to regard them as being impartial; i.e., you started

25     to believe that we were now siding with the Bosnian government side as a

Page 7556

 1     result of the failure by NATO to act impartially.  Does that make sense?

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Quite.  Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D715.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D02451.  1D02451.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   May I remind you that this is a telegram dated the 20th of

 9     February, 1994, 1756 to Annan, Stoltenberg, Rose, from Mr. Akashi - so to

10     all three sides.  Mr. Akashi is describing a meeting with Karadzic and

11     with Izetbegovic.  So please focus on the paragraph entitled:  Meeting

12     with Karadzic in Pale on the 19th of February:

13             [In English] "Regarding the definition of UNPROFOR 'control' of

14     re-grouped weapons, Dr. Karadzic raised no objection to our definition,

15     although he emphasised their right to self-defence, therefore the right

16     of regaining their weapons in the event of attacks from the Muslim side."

17             [Interpretation] Do you remember that Mr. Akashi informed you

18     about this by way of this letter?

19        A.   I do.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Paragraph 3:

24             [In English] "Dr. Karadzic also reiterated that UNPROFOR elements

25     should be deployed on all sites, and should have complete freedom of

Page 7557

 1     movement in the entire zone, as agreed to previously."

 2             [Interpretation] You remember this as well, don't you?

 3        A.   Mm-hmm, I do.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now 3:

 5             [In English] "Dr. Karadzic also expressed his eagerness to open

 6     direct routes into and around Sarajevo" --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  No, paragraph 3 we should remain on the previous

 8     page in the middle.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, that's right.  It's the

10     same page.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   So we can see what it is that I had proposed.  I had proposed

13     that joint check-points be established, that is to say UNPROFOR and the

14     Bosnian Serb army and on the other side the Bosnian army and UNPROFOR.

15     Do you remember that too?

16        A.   I do, yes.

17        Q.   Now let us see what was recorded from the meeting with

18     Mr. Izetbegovic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page now.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Paragraph 6 -- or rather 7:

22             [In English] "Despite all our efforts, I have observed the

23     continuing tendency by the Bosnian side to feed and encourage the

24     'incident hungry' press in Sarajevo."

25             [Interpretation] So even from Ambassador Akashi's level it was

Page 7558

 1     noted that the Muslim side is creating events, as it were, in order to

 2     feed the media in Sarajevo; right?

 3        A.   Well, I can see it was written there and I agree with it.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D716.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General, sir, you also agreed -- or rather, it went without

10     saying that if we were attacked we had the right to get our weapons back

11     from those collection points; right?

12        A.   I don't think we ever agreed that, no.  And in fact, when you did

13     come and seize some weapons from one of the collecting points, in

14     particular a T-55 tank, we called on NATO air-strikes in order to get

15     that tank returned, which it duly was.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2481.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you remember, General, that Muslims fired from outside the

20     20-kilometre zone at Serbs within the 20-kilometre zone?  They were

21     firing from the centre of town itself and also from Central Bosnia, like

22     Visoko and so on.

23        A.   I can see it was written there, yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  This is a telegram sent by Ambassador Akashi to

25     Secretary Annan, Gharekhan, Stoltenberg, and this is what paragraph 2

Page 7559

 1     says -- have all the participants read this, actually?  Can we move on to

 2     the second page.  Then we're going to have a look at the map to see how

 3     things stand there.  Can we move on to the second page.

 4             Now let us look at 3:

 5             [In English] "The Protocol to the Sarajevo WCP Agreement on 14th

 6     of February ... (attached) recognises the BSA's legitimate right to

 7     self-defence.  If the BSA comes under more pressure from the BiH, their

 8     demand to have access to their weapons could become a more pressing

 9     reality, under the Protocol referred to above."

10             [Interpretation] You see that there was a protocol after all and

11     that it codified our right to take our weapons if we were attacked;

12     right?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So can we now have --

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Actually, is that the way it was, General?  Is it not clearly

16     stated here that the United Nations were aware of the fact that we had

17     this right to self-defence too?

18        A.   Well, reading that paragraph I -- it doesn't alter my view that

19     the -- at the time the UN position certainly in Sarajevo was that we had

20     weapons collected up in weapon collecting points to prevent any further

21     firing on Sarajevo, and that if those weapons were withdrawn from those

22     sides we would respond accordingly.  This discussion between Mr. Akashi

23     and his senior advisors and bosses in New York is something I was not

24     privy to.

25        Q.   Thank you.  However, now we are discussing exceptions, or rather,

Page 7560

 1     situations in which we were allowed to take our weapons back and defend

 2     ourselves.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move two pages on to see the

 4     protocol that was signed.  One more page.  Those are signatures, my own

 5     and Mr. Akashi's.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   And this is the content of the protocol.  I would like to draw

 8     your attention to paragraph 1, please:

 9             [In English] "In the event that UNPROFOR withdraws for any reason

10     from mutually-agreed sides of the re-grouping of heavy weapons without

11     the agreement of the BSA or that it withdraws from its interposition

12     areas between the Serb and Muslim lines, the BSA reserves the right to

13     re-deploy its weapons and increase troop levels on the front lines, while

14     in event of a Muslim attack on the Serbs which UNPROFOR is not able

15     either prevent or stop immediately, the BSA reserves the right to

16     implement adequate measures of self-determination -- self-defence."

17             Self-determination will come yet.

18        A.   I can see that is a statement of the Bosnian Serb position as

19     reflected by Mr. Akashi in this summary of the meeting.

20        Q.   [Interpretation] This is not a position.  This is the protocol.

21     This is the most important point in the protocol that was signed by

22     Mr. Akashi and myself.  This is not my own one-sided statement.  This is

23     something that the United Nations and I agreed upon.

24        A.   I think that it says quite clearly in paragraph 1:  "In the event

25     that UNPROFOR withdraws ...," of course we had no intention of

Page 7561

 1     withdrawing at the time.

 2        Q.   But it also says if a Muslim attack takes place, one that you

 3     will not or cannot prevent, that we have the right to organise our own

 4     self-defence; isn't that right?  That's the second part of this

 5     paragraph.

 6        A.   But, as I say, it's a hypothetical situation that's being agreed

 7     here because the United Nations had no intention of withdrawing from

 8     either Sarajevo or the weapon collecting points.  Obviously if we abandon

 9     those weapons then you would have the right to get them back, presumably.

10        Q.   I'm referring to another possibility here, namely that you had

11     not left; rather, we had been attacked by the Muslims.  So would you

12     agree that this is a basis, a legal basis, for our right to take back the

13     weapons that we had handed over to you for your supervision?  It's not

14     your withdrawal that we're talking about here.  We're talking about this

15     other option, if the Muslims attack.  Was this not something that both

16     Akashi and I had signed up to?

17        A.   Looking at the document, it looks as if the - and this is my

18     interpretation now - is that if the pressures on the Bosnian Serb side

19     required you to reinforce your positions outside Sarajevo somewhere else,

20     then possibly you might have been allowed to take the weapons that were

21     in the weapon collecting point and redeploy them elsewhere in Bosnia.

22     But I can't say that that is exactly how I understood it at the time.

23        Q.   I think that all the participants can see, General, that this

24     only refers to the total exclusion zone in Sarajevo.  If we are attacked

25     in Sarajevo, we can defend ourselves in Sarajevo.  Why would we defend

Page 7562

 1     ourselves in Bijeljina if we were attacked in Sarajevo?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D717, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 13636.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, are you familiar with this map and this circle?

 8        A.   Well, apart from the fact that it's not one of a UN maps and that

 9     I think you may have shown it to me the other day, it reflects the

10     original UN map with which I am familiar, showing the original position

11     of the epicentre of the 20-kilometre circle.

12        Q.   And that's the centre by the church at Marin Dvor; right?

13        A.   That's, I think, correct.

14        Q.   Do you remember, General, that you protested - and we saw a

15     document just a while ago - and you said that beyond that circle the

16     Muslim forces had not been demilitarised, or in other words that they did

17     not have an exclusion zone and that they fired at Ilijas in the very

18     north of the map and that they also opened fire on the Serbs within the

19     zone?

20        A.   I certainly remember firing at Ilijas, yes.  Where the fire came

21     from, I don't know, either from within or from without the 20-kilometre

22     circle.

23        Q.   Could I ask you to be assisted by the usher --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, do we not have a picture of this of

25     better quality?  This seems to be a scanned one of map 25 of the Sarajevo

Page 7563

 1     binder.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  We'll check, Your Honour, but I'm inclined to

 3     think of this one probably not.  We have pictures of other maps depicting

 4     the same area of better quality and enlarged, but not of this one.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  If you're happy to go on with this picture, please

 6     do so.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if it were better, it would

 8     be better.  But what is important is this total exclusion zone, a

 9     20-kilometre-wide circle.  If this map has been admitted, we can move on.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  I note it is map 25 or page 25 of the

11     Sarajevo-specific court binder.

12             We will admit this.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D718, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Could the Court please produce 65 ter 6863, 65 ter 6863.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   With your permission, I would like to simplify things.  This is

18     General de Lapresle's telegram sent to Secretary Annan and Stoltenberg in

19     Geneva about heavy weapons exclusion zone violation, where it says under

20     1:

21             "The daily situation report says that there was the heaviest

22     fighting since February ..."

23             And it goes on to say:

24             [In English] "...  approximately 300 mortar rounds and 6.000

25     small arms.  The attack was initiated by BH Army and was supported by

Page 7564

 1     mortars firing from residential areas within the city limits centred ..."

 2             [Interpretation] And then:

 3             [In English] "The BH assaulted the Sharpstone feature ..."

 4             [Interpretation] This Sharpstone feature is something that we

 5     will deal with with other witnesses.

 6             [In English] "The BiH also launched a feint in the Jewish

 7     cemetery.  Unconfirmed reports from the BSA liaison officer said the BSA

 8     lost ground in the Sharpstone area and suffered two dead and five

 9     wounded.  These initial attacks were followed by a restrained BSA

10     response using heavy weapons."

11             [Interpretation] Do you agree, General, that this was something

12     that fell through as a Muslim attack unfolded against Serb positions?

13     This is something that you mentioned yourself in September?

14        A.   Yes, I remember the day very well indeed, and I think initially

15     the Serb responses were moderate.

16        Q.   It says here that at first there was a lot of restraint.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page and

18     see what you're talking about.  You're talking about the Serb responses.

19             [In English] "The BSA responded, targeting the Zetra stadium ...

20     the Presidency, the area north of the cathedral and Sedrenik.  The

21     commander -- BH command called on both sides to immediately cease all

22     military actions or he would be obliged to take all appropriate measures

23     to protect the civilian population of Sarajevo, including air-strikes."

24             [Interpretation] Do you remember that you resorted to those

25     arguments?

Page 7565

 1        A.   I do, indeed.

 2        Q.   Look at the second sentence in paragraph 2 where it says that the

 3     BiH side initiated the attack and that the VRS response was both

 4     defensive and restrained and that in that situation we did not withdraw

 5     our weapons from the collection points.  Is that so?

 6        A.   Well, you're asking me to agree with something I wrote.  Of

 7     course it's true.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the assessment part.

10             MR. KARADZIC:

11        Q.   [In English] "This may have been in retaliation for the

12     Serbs cutting off utilities in Sarajevo.  It is also apparent with

13     President Izetbegovic visiting New York on the 18th that it was an

14     attempt by the BH to elicit a strong response from the BSA.  The BiH may

15     have hoped that the BSA would withdraw heavy weapons from the weapon

16     collection points and that NATO would respond with air-strikes."

17             [Interpretation] Further on:

18             [In English] "With Haiti dominating US and international news,

19     the BiH wished to both move Sarajevo back onto the front page as well as

20     once again paint the Bosnian Serb army as aggressors ..." and so on and

21     so on.

22             [Interpretation] Do you see the hardships we suffered?  We didn't

23     have a choice.  We were not allowed to defend because there were the

24     media, there was NATO, everybody was waiting for us.  You yourself said

25     that we were under a lot of pressure by NATO and the media; right?

Page 7566

 1        A.   Well, I certainly can't reply to your comment because of course

 2     it's a description of your own motivations and position at the time.  All

 3     I could do was report what I saw certainly around me on the ground, and

 4     it's -- my thoughts in this letter are ones which I still hold today.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  We can see that you noticed, or, rather, you believed

 6     that the Muslims were moving around with mortars, they fired at Serbs,

 7     and that you had an impression that the VRS was using more weapons than

 8     they did.  And under (b):

 9             "Making it more difficult for the Army of Republika Srpska or

10     indeed NATO to pin-point the weapons and to retaliate against them."

11             And (c):

12             "By confusing the areas the shelling came from, encourage

13     indiscriminate and multi-targeting by the BSA [In English] With resultant

14     civilian casualties."

15             [Interpretation] This is a very clever perception on your part,

16     General, and I would like to thank you of that.

17             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   The question is this:  Was that a clever perception?

20             And the next question:  Why were we bombed on the 22nd of

21     September, three days thereafter?

22        A.   I can't remember why the NATO air-strikes were called in

23     September, but I guess it was because you had moved some heavy weapons

24     out of the weapon collecting point.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

Page 7567

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, this document's already an exhibit

 2     and it's been re-read almost in totality into the record all over again.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I was about to point out that.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  That was Exhibit P1673.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  It was already an exhibit.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The following one has not been

 7     admitted, it's 65 ter 19266, 19266 from UNMO Pale, a letter that was

 8     forwarded by them and originally drafted by General Milovanovic.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This was sent to the UNPROFOR command and look at the first

11     paragraph.  It says here that:

12             "On the 22nd of September ...  between 1840 and 1910 hours NATO

13     aircraft launched a brutal attack against" us "in the region of the

14     village of Dobrosevici" inhabited mostly by civilian population.  You can

15     all read that this happened after Muslim forces organised armed attacks

16     over several days from the part of city of Sarajevo under Muslim forces

17     control against the 20-kilometre zone around Sarajevo.

18             You can see the entire text, General.  And at the bottom it says:

19             [In English] "Having estimated the situation which has arisen,

20     particularly bombing the Serb civilian population, the UNPROFOR command's

21     giving help and support to the Muslim side, we inform you that, until

22     further notice, we are unable to approve and insure the UN peace forces

23     activities on the territory of the Republic of Srpska."

24             [Interpretation] General, whatever actions were undertaken by the

25     VRS in their relations with UNPROFOR, there were good reasons.  In

Page 7568

 1     September on 22nd of September, there was a prevalent opinion that we

 2     didn't have weapons, that we were restrained in our responses and

 3     actions, and still we were bombarded on the 22nd of September.  An order

 4     came from the United Nations and a person is in the field from the

 5     United Nations, a gunner was already there.

 6        A.   In war things are very fast-moving, Dr. Karadzic, and what may

 7     have been the case on the 22nd of September when I wrote that analysis,

 8     the situation changed dramatically after you took a tank from a weapon

 9     collecting point and also opened fire, if I remember right, on a French

10     vehicle with that tank.  At that point the dynamic changed and

11     air-strikes were inevitable.

12        Q.   Here we don't see any information about that.  That may have been

13     an incident that involved the French later on.  But, General, prior to

14     that all the time the Muslims violated the provisions of the total

15     exclusion zone.  They launched fierce attacks against us.  Nobody

16     reacted.  And then when we seize a piece of weaponry, we were bombed.

17     Pursuant to the protocol, we had the right to defend ourselves.  That

18     right was something that the United Nations signed up to; right?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the topic of our trial is not why NATO

20     bombed.  Use your time efficiently.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not putting NATO on trial.

22     That's not my intention.  What I'm trying to prove is that our

23     relationship with UNPROFOR is not an ill-will without any motives, but

24     rather that there were good reasons for our suspicions, for our cautions,

25     and -- towards the United Nations because those same United Nations

Page 7569

 1     commanded bombardment in our territory and they even had gunners on the

 2     ground.  But let's leave it at that.

 3             Can the document be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D719.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D02463 is the next document I

 7     would like to call up.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   This is a telegram sent by Mr. Akashi to Gharekhan, Stoltenberg,

10     relative to General Delic's visit to New York.  If you look at the third

11     paragraph and you will see that during the visit General Delic stated

12     that UNPROFOR had disarmed Muslim Bosnian forces in the safe areas and

13     therefore has a moral obligation to protect them, which was not correct,

14     as you know, right?  You did not disarm anybody, did you?

15        A.   I think we've already discussed that when the agreement was made

16     regarding Srebrenica and Zepa, the United Nations Security Council

17     Resolutions hadn't yet come into effect and that a local agreement was

18     made between the two sides to disarm the -- for the one side to withdraw,

19     for the other side to disarm.  And of course the Bosnian government side

20     in Srebrenica chose to only hand in useless weapons and kept control of

21     their own useful weapons and returned over the next few months to their

22     policy of attacking from within the enclave the Serbs who surrounded

23     them.  That is true.  But of course the passing or the accepting of

24     United Nations Security Council Resolutions did not, as we've discussed,

25     call on the Bosnian government forces in the enclaves to disarm.  So

Page 7570

 1     there were two slightly different situations prevailing.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Here Mr. Akashi disputes General Delic's positions

 3     and he says:

 4             [In English] "In view of estimated strength of BH forces in

 5     pockets," and so on and so on, "we believe that neither Srebrenica nor

 6     Zepa are fully demilitarised."

 7             [Interpretation] And that's very much in keeping what we have

 8     just heard from you.  Can we go to the following page.

 9             The last paragraph says that:

10             "Finally Bosnia-Herzegovina commander reported that relations

11     with the Bosnian side on the whole remained good.  [In English] There

12     are, however, significant restrictions on UNPROFOR freedom of movement

13     along the confrontation line from Visoko to Breza and east of Tuzla.  In

14     addition, a CanBat 2 observation post was directly targeted by the BiH on

15     15th of September and 16th of September, despite strong protests to the

16     Presidency as well as to General Delic."

17             [Interpretation] Do you remember that the restrictions on your

18     movements applied in the Muslim territory and that the Canadian

19     observation post was fired at on the 15th and 16th September?

20        A.   I don't remember those particular incidents, but I can repeat

21     what I've already said, and that is that the United Nations protection

22     force and the aid convoys came under repeated obstruction and from time

23     to time attacked by all three warring parties.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

Page 7571

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D720.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it the time for our next break

 4     or shall I move on to the topic of the demilitarised zone on Mount Igman?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break now for 25 minutes.  We'll resume

 6     at quarter to 6.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 5.20 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 5.46 p.m.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just before we continue, I wanted to confirm with

10     you, Mr. Tieger, that the order of witnesses hasn't been changed in

11     relation to the upcoming two witnesses?

12             MR. TIEGER:  That is correct, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Conclude your cross-examination by 6.30, please.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Could the Court please produce 1D02466.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Until then, General, let me ask you, do you know that my

21     vice-presidents, Professor Plavsic and Professor Koljevic, were also

22     vice-presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Joint Presidency of the

23     state?

24        A.   Well, I've certainly met them both.

25        Q.   But do you know that from 1990 to 1992 were members of the

Page 7572

 1     Joint Presidency?  Not of Republika Srpska but of the entire state of

 2     Bosnia.

 3        A.   That's a statement, Dr. Karadzic, or a question?

 4        Q.   A question.  My question is this:  Did you know that they were

 5     members of the Joint Presidency before they left it when the war broke

 6     out?

 7        A.   I may have known that at the time.  I certainly have no memory of

 8     it now.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  When I'm saying that we were equal parties, I'm

10     corroborating this with the fact that they were members of the

11     Joint Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Please pay attention to this

12     telegram sent by His Excellency Mr. Akashi to Annan, Gharekhan, Goulding,

13     and Stoltenberg.  In the first paragraph the first sentence says this:

14             [In English] "It has been apparent in the last few days that the

15     Bosnian government is deliberately creating obstacles to the withdrawal

16     of its troops from Mount Igman and the re-establishment of the integrity

17     of the demilitarised zone."

18             [Interpretation] Could you tell the Trial Chamber in the shortest

19     possible terms what was the story of Igman or would you like me to give

20     you statements or assertions and ask you what you think about them and

21     state your opinion with regard to all of my assertions?

22        A.   [No verbal response]

23        Q.   Is it true that the Serbian army took Mount Igman and

24     Mount Bjelasnica in August 1993?

25        A.   Yes, that was true.

Page 7573

 1        Q.   Is it true that that was considered the full encirclement of

 2     Sarajevo and that we were given an ultimatum to withdraw?

 3        A.   That is correct.

 4        Q.   Is it correct that before that and after that the Muslim forces

 5     from Sarajevo and into Sarajevo -- or rather, that they could enter and

 6     leave Sarajevo either via Igman or through the tunnel?

 7        A.   There was a route which lay down Mount Igman and then the second

 8     part of the route was under the airport through the tunnel or around the

 9     end of the airfield at the opposite end from Lukavica.  But they had to

10     come down Mount Igman if all other routes were blocked to get into

11     Sarajevo.  But of course the military convoys or military movements were

12     not permitted by the UN.  These were civilian convoys.  I should make

13     that clear.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that we did withdraw and that we handed

15     over the zone on Mount Igman to the United Nations and then that zone was

16     declared a demilitarised zone on Igman pursuant to an agreement?

17        A.   That is true.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 4 in this

19     document.  Page 4, the same document.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Is this a copy of the agreement on the setting up of -- or

22     rather, on the withdrawal of the forces from Mount Igman and Bjelasnica

23     signed by Stjepan Siber on behalf of the Muslim army and Milovanovic on

24     behalf of the Serb army and witnessed by Brigadier Vere Hayes?

25        A.   That is true, that is the document.

Page 7574

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go back to the first page.

 2             Is it correct that the United Nations managed to secure that area

 3     as a demilitarised zone, at least for a while?

 4        A.   The ultimatum to demilitarise the zone came from NATO not from

 5     the UN, but it was supported by the UN on the ground, that's correct.

 6        Q.   And is it correct that the VRS handed the zone over to the

 7     United Nations, to UNPROFOR, and not to either NATO or the Muslim army?

 8        A.   That's correct.

 9        Q.   Is it correct that the Muslims abused the agreement.  They took

10     the zone and passed by the undefended area and killed our medical

11     personnel, 16 men and four women?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   And after that did that lead to a Crisis Staff because they

14     didn't want to abandon the demilitarised zone for a long time?

15        A.   The Bosnian Serb forces you're referring to or the Bosnian state

16     forces, the Bosnian government forces?

17        Q.   The forces of the Bosnian Serbs withdrew and handed the

18     demilitarised zone over to the United Nations, and after that the Muslim

19     forces re-took that area and they didn't want to withdraw; is that

20     correct?

21        A.   They intruded into that area.  They didn't re-take the whole

22     area.  They moved -- they advanced into the area.  They were stopped from

23     any further advance by the UN, but they refused to withdraw.  They were

24     stationed at that point inside the military zone, that is correct.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can I draw your attention to --

Page 7575

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Did you say inside the --

 2             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, demilitarised zone I should have said or

 3     probably swallowed my prefix.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   We saw the first sentence and can we now look at the last

 7     sentence of the first paragraph:

 8             [In English] "The letter from Ambassador Sacirbey now appears to

 9     confirm the increasing suspicion that the government in fact is trying

10     through all possible means to go back on its commitment to re-establish

11     the integrity of the demilitarised zone."

12             [Interpretation] In other words, they didn't want for the

13     demilitarisation to take effect; right?  And can you also look at the

14     first two sentences in paragraph 2.  Again they speak about the same

15     agreement that we have already shown.  Do you remember all that?

16        A.   I remember it well.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   This is what we can read in paragraph 3:

21             " ...  in May 1994 UNPROFOR HQ showed that the BiH side had

22     infiltrated and started setting up positions on Mount Igman in violation

23     of the agreement" --

24             JUDGE KWON:  That's all repetition of what the witness has

25     already confirmed.  I don't think you need to read out all those

Page 7576

 1     statements while complaining about --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  -- shortage of time.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Can we then see

 5     paragraph 6 which says that there were 1.000 shells fired.  And then the

 6     next page.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   In a nutshell, General, do you remember that the United Nations

 9     had major problems in securing the withdrawal of the Muslim forces from

10     the demilitarised zone on Mount Igman and that that was also why our

11     relations intensified even further or were aggravated even further?

12        A.   That's true.

13        Q.   Well, you see on that same page under 6, the end of paragraph 6,

14     that outside of the exclusion zone BiH forces are firing on the Serbs

15     within the exclusion zone [as interpreted].  We've already spoken about

16     that.  In other words, there were no exclusion zones in Visoko and Breza,

17     they opened and fired on us from Central Bosnia.

18             In other words, do you remember, General, that some elements of

19     their forces remained even after you had left Bosnia?  Is it true that

20     for a long, long time -- or rather, that it took a long, long time for

21     the status of a demilitarised zone to be reinstated?

22        A.   I don't know when that happened or if indeed it happened because

23     I left at the end of January 1994 -- 1995, and of course it was still an

24     ongoing problem at the time I left.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I think the transcript should read differently.  The

Page 7577

 1     transcript says the BiH forces are firing on the Serbs within the

 2     exclusion zone, I think that should be the other way around.

 3             But, General, could you explain to me what the last sentence of

 4     that paragraph means.  However, this is a situation which is not within

 5     either UNPROFOR or NATO's mandate to control?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Well, if I remember, sir, the Cemerska plateau

 7     where this fighting was taking place was to the south-west, I think, of

 8     Mount Igman and it was not an area which we had any observation of or

 9     control over.  So what was happening there we couldn't give a clear view

10     of.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   With all due respect, General, Mount Cemersko is a bit to the

14     north of Vogosca within the 20-kilometre exclusion zone and it is being

15     fired at out from outside the zone, from Breza and Visoko.  We can look

16     at the map and show Mount Cemersko there.  Do you remember that it's

17     between Vogosca and Ilijas?

18        A.   Well I stand corrected in that case.  I always thought it was

19     referring to some fighting which broke out in the autumn south-west of

20     Sarajevo and Mount Igman, but clearly you're referring to the fighting by

21     Ilijas and Vogosca.

22        Q.   Yes, paragraph 7 says that they were throwing mines into the

23     total exclusion zone at Serb positions.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page now,

25     please.  It has to do with your letter to Ganic.  That's not it.  Just a

Page 7578

 1     moment.  It might be one page further.  Yes, one page further, please.

 2     No.  I'll try to find the ERN number now.  I'm going to read it and we're

 3     going to put it on the ELMO.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Do you remember, General, that on the 16th of October you wrote a

 6     letter to Ganic and a copy was sent to Izetbegovic.  It says:

 7             [In English] "I want to record my deep concern that the

 8     government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet withdrawn its troops

 9     from the position of Mount Igman, especially in the area the west of

10     Krupac in accordance with the 14th of August agreement."

11             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.  I'm going to hand the

12     letter over to you now:

13             [In English] "My troops are placed on Mount Igman at the request

14     of your government.  If you are unable to sustain the agreement with

15     regard to your own troops' disposition, I will have to reconsider whether

16     the forces under my command should remain on Mount Igman ..." and so on.

17        A.   I do remember writing a letter like that.

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you.  If this letter is not

19     part of this document under this number in e-court, then I'm going to

20     ask -- I mean if it's not part of any Prosecution exhibit, could I tender

21     it now?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  I can't answer immediately as to whether it's part

24     of any Prosecution exhibit, but I certainly have no objection to the

25     document.

Page 7579

 1             JUDGE KWON:  And we'll give it a number and sort it out later on.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Fine.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I haven't seen a copy of the document, so I can't

 4     ascertain whether it's genuine or not.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, take a look, please.

 6             THE WITNESS:  [Overlapping speakers] ... a description --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we put it on the ELMO.

 8             THE WITNESS:  That is definitely my letter.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

10             We'll admit it.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D721, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have 1D02468.

13     Actually, the previous document --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, and you are minded to tender the previous

15     document, Mr. Akashi's letter, 1D2466?  That will be admitted as

16     Exhibit D722.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are quite a few documents

18     there and I thought that this letter of General Rose's was included as

19     well; however, we have tendered it now.  This is a rather complex

20     document.  There are quite a few documents related to the same thing.

21     You can see in e-court how many pages there are.  It's an original

22     United Nations document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Is that a question?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no.  I just wanted to be fair

25     to the Prosecutors.  It's not just the first page.  There are several

Page 7580

 1     documents.  All of them are originals -- I mean under the same number,

 2     they're being tendered under the same number.

 3             1D02468, can we have that now, please.  Yes, we have it.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, do you recognise this memorandum dated the 29th of

 6     October that pertains to the Bosnian Muslim violation of the

 7     demilitarised zone?  This is a summary.

 8        A.   I don't remember seeing this before, but I probably did see it.

 9     If I saw more of it, I might be able to have a better recall.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11        A.   [Previous translation continues]...

12        Q.   On the first page it says -- on the first page it says:

13             [In English] "General Rose will send a letter to the President on

14     the 30th of October detailing the events in this summary and expressing

15     his displeasure with the BiH action.  The use of close air support will

16     be mentioned in both the communication and the letter from General Rose.

17     Appropriate measures will be taken by the Sector during this event."

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see page 9 of this

19     document.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   It's a press release.  Let us see why there was a reference to

22     close air support.  Let us see whether conditions had been created.

23     Please have a look at this:

24             [In English] "Despite the agreements concluded on August 1993

25     regarding the DMZ on Mount Igman and assurances given by

Page 7581

 1     President Izetbegovic to order troops to evacuate that area, B&H forces

 2     have commenced this morning at 6.30 an offensive against Bosnian Serbs.

 3     Starting from DMZ, south of Javorak, the Bosnians used heavy weapons" --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Again, Mr. Karadzic, we can read it, as can General.

 5     Can you put your question.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Could you please then have a look at this document, General.  Had

 9     conditions been created to call NATO in, in order to discipline the

10     Muslim forces?

11        A.   They certainly had, yes.

12        Q.   Did NATO attack?  Did NATO attack them and stop them?

13        A.   I've already explained that by then NATO had -- policies had

14     changed and they were not prepared to use any force at all against the

15     Bosnian government forces, even though they were in direct violation of

16     what was in fact a NATO ultimatum, not a UN ultimatum.  That is the case

17     as it -- as it unfolded at that time.  And I was certainly advised by

18     NATO that only a request or any request to use air-strikes against the

19     Bosnian government forces would be denied.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D723, Your Honours.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   So much for equality, equality of rights, equality of the two

Page 7582

 1     sides.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2478, can we have that, please.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  No comment, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I withdraw the comment.  1D2478,

 5     can we have that, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Is this UNMO Pale sending a letter to the command in Pale,

 8     attention General Rose?  It's a protest of the Main Staff of the Army of

 9     Republika Srpska, the 7th of December, 1994; isn't that right?

10        A.   Well, I can see that signal was sent by you to Mr. Akashi, yes.

11        Q.   Headquarters in Sarajevo and to you too.  Can you see, General,

12     that the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska is providing

13     information, or rather, lodging a protest primarily because of the attack

14     or attacks launched by the Republic of Croatia in the western part of

15     Republika Srpska?

16        A.   I can see the signal you sent, yes, sir.

17        Q.   You see that it concerns hospitals, schools, places of worship,

18     residential areas, that all of them had been bombed.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, did you know about this?  Did NATO and the UN do

22     something about stopping the regular forces of Croatia in this campaign

23     against the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24        A.   Well, I certainly can't remember discussing this incident with

25     Mr. Akashi and what action he took.  I don't know.  We didn't have troops

Page 7583

 1     deployed in that area, so any information would have come from one of the

 2     two sides in the conflict.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I'd submit this is irrelevant.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Agreed.

 6             What is your question in relation to this document, Mr. Karadzic?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my question is whether it was

 8     only the Muslims who were under protection or did this pertain to Croats

 9     too?  Could anybody attack and hunt down the Serbs unpunished?  Is this

10     information to the effect that we're being attacked by Croatia --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you have 15 minutes; otherwise, I take

12     it you've exhausted all your questions.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document being admitted?

14     The letter was received by the General and it shows the situation that we

15     were in, Excellency, that's my point, the situation we were in.  When we

16     are defending ourselves, we get bombed; and when everybody attacks us,

17     nothing.

18             JUDGE KWON:  No comment, Mr. Karadzic.

19             This will be admitted.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D724, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now please have in

22     e-court - we haven't got much time for documents anymore - could we have

23     General Rose's book in e-court.  It is number 1D1037.  However, it's

24     probably under a different number of the OTP as a Prosecution exhibit.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that book, pages of the book are

Page 7584

 1     admitted under Exhibit D162.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   General, may I remind you, the late Eve-Anne Prentice in the case

 4     against President Milosevic, she testified and said that Sarajevo was a

 5     divided city, not a city under siege because the line went through single

 6     apartment buildings as well.  Would you agree with that?

 7        A.   Well, I don't know who this person is and what they said, but

 8     I'll agree that the line of conflict went through buildings, yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have page 53 and 54, the bottom of 53 and the

10     top of 54, in which you say in a spirited way how the journalists had

11     confused Sarajevo and Baghdad.  It's got to be somewhere around there.

12        A.   I can see it Mr. Arnett's report when he was working for CNN, I

13     think you're referring to.

14             JUDGE KWON:  53 in hard copy you mean, Mr. Karadzic?  Page 53?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it should be 53.

16             THE WITNESS:  Bottom of 53, last line.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Not in e-court.

18             THE ACCUSED:  Yeah, since there is no such thing as a tidy end --

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   So it's from there up until "leave Bosnia" on the other page.  So

21     I would like to tender those two pages.  And then 54 and 55 where you say

22     what Muhamed Sacirbey said at the UN about what was going on in Sarajevo.

23     He's saying all of that from sunny Miami, whereas from your own window

24     you can see that things are actually different, right?

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 7585

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So 53, 54, and 55.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   We now have page 161.

 5             In the book itself, 161.  General, I would like to draw your

 6     attention to the following paragraph:

 7             [In English] On the 10th of August, a Bosnian army T-55 tank" --

 8             [Interpretation] It should be 161.

 9        A.   I can see --

10        Q.   Yes, yes, Serbian tanks.  So you saw for yourself that a tank was

11     leaving the tunnel and firing and then a 120-millimetre mortar fired at

12     the Serbs from the Kosevo Hospital compound and you asked for support --

13             JUDGE KWON:  I think we dealt with it.  Did you say "Serbian

14     tanks," Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, no, August 10th.  It refers

16     to a Muslim tank that was leaving the tunnel and firing and there's this

17     mortar that was firing at the Serbs from the Kosevo Hospital compound.

18     Thank you.  So page 161.  Now 163, two ahead.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation.

20        Q.   Your observation is:  In mid-August the Bosnians were bombing

21     Ilijas that was on the outskirts and within the zone -- so we would like

22     to tender this page as well.  Could we now have the following pages -- or

23     actually, can we deal with your assistance with pages 170 through 174.

24     It is about the letter written by Admiral Smith to General de Lapresle.

25     Pages 170 through 174.

Page 7586

 1             It starts with "on the 11th of September ..."

 2             Have we found it?  So it's 170 through 174.  It must be down

 3     towards the bottom.  Do you agree that this is your description of the

 4     situation, or rather, of an attempt made by NATO to take-over the powers

 5     of the United Nations in order to be able to act more freely; right?

 6     Page 170.

 7             [In English] "At the meeting I dismissed the idea that UNPROFOR

 8     had gone soft on the Serbs or was allowing a reimposition of the Siege of

 9     Sarajevo as nonsense.  The Serbs had not halted the delivery of aid into

10     Sarajevo, although the recent offensives by the Bosnian army had caused

11     the Serbs to deny the passage of commercial traffic into the city."

12        A.   I'm at a loss to know what question I'm answering here.

13     Obviously this -- if you're reading accurately from my book, that's what

14     I wrote at the time and that's what I still believe.  NATO had ceased to

15     be impartial by then, by the autumn of 1994.  We've discussed that.

16        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am going to tender these three or

21     four pages or five from 170 through 174.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   That is a part of your book that will assist us in shedding light

24     on the situation as it was.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to page 180.

Page 7587

 1     180:

 2             [In English] "The 22nd of September, Karadzic had told

 3     Sergio de Mello that the partiality of the UN was no longer tolerable.

 4     He agreed that the demilitarisation of Sarajevo was an attractive idea

 5     that should be persuade, although this was dependant upon the Muslims

 6     agreeing on total cessation of hostilities in Bosnian."

 7             [Interpretation] Do you confirm that?

 8        A.   I do.

 9        Q.   Thank you. [Microphone not activated]

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone please.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   On page 188:

13             [In English] "I had wondered many times about the extent of

14     Izetbegovic's complicity in the profiteering that arose through his

15     army's control of the tunnel ...," and so on.

16             [Interpretation] Until this part:

17             [In English] "...  I believe he knew exactly what was going on in

18     Bosnia, and was personally responsible for the decision to keep his

19     forces inside the demilitarised zone on Mount Igman."

20             [Interpretation] That was also your position, wasn't it?

21        A.   It was.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 191 and 192.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   191 and 192:

Page 7588

 1             [In English] "On my return, there was a foreign office telegram

 2     waiting for me telling me that Muhamed Sacirbey, the Bosnian

 3     representative ..."

 4             [No interpretation]

 5             [In English] "... in the UN in New York, had delivered a protest

 6     against my demand that Bosnian army should withdraw ...," and so on and

 7     so on.

 8             [Interpretation] And now let us look at all of it.  Let's just go

 9     through it:

10             [In English] "The Bosnians hurled grenades down the slope at the

11     French and fired rockets at their vehicle fortunately without causing

12     serious injury.  By dawn, Gobillard had driven the Bosnians out of the

13     demilitarised zone with the exception of one small isolated person ..."

14             [Interpretation] All the way up to here:

15             [In English] "The next day, Major Indjic ..."

16             [No interpretation]

17             [In English] "... when I told this to Gus [phoen] for the first

18     time during my tour, he looked slightly thoughtful."

19             [Interpretation] So they were firing when General Gobillard was

20     moving them from the demilitarised zone, they were firing at the French,

21     weren't they?

22        A.   They were.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I take it that your position is that

24     you will be tendering this book in pieces?  Just parts -- only those

25     parts you referred to will be tendered?

Page 7589

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not only today but also yesterday

 2     and the day before yesterday.  But I know that the book has been

 3     tendered, but only the pages thereof have been tendered and not the

 4     entire book.  The entire book would be too much for the record.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, do you take any position as to the

 6     book?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  I actually have no objection to the book coming

 8     in.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will be benefitted in terms of full

10     understanding if we have it in its entirety.

11             So you don't have to refer to it in every part, but you can make

12     submission later on.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we see another

14     document, the last document, which has been admitted already.  I would

15     just like to remind the General of something.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, you agree that a cease-fire is very much dependent on

18     both sides; right?

19        A.   Of course.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just to make it clear, so we admit the book in its

21     entirety.  The number was already given, Exhibit D162.

22             Yes, you -- is that your last question, Mr. Karadzic?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  65 ter 6667 is the next

24     document I would like to call.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 7590

 1        Q.   My thesis, General, is this:  When both sides honoured a

 2     cease-fire, the cease-fire held.  When the Muslims were interested in a

 3     cease-fire, that cease-fire held.  I would like to remind you of a

 4     situation when that football game was played.  I supported that because

 5     Sarajevo was my club as well.  I would like to read the sentence starting

 6     with "Moreover":

 7             "Moreover, the further normalisation of life in Sarajevo is in

 8     our interest ..."

 9             General, did you believe and did you see in many documents that

10     our interest was the normalisation of life in Sarajevo, not only because

11     of the 70.000 Serbs, but also because of the Muslims?  If you don't

12     believe that, then you have to believe that we suffered from a lot of

13     pressures.  Sarajevo all of a sudden was in the spotlight on the front

14     pages of all the media?

15        A.   I agree that your strategic interests in 1994 was to halt the

16     fighting, have a cease-fire, and in your terms trade the land which you

17     agreed to give up.

18        Q.   Thank you, and thank you for coming here to testify.  Thank you

19     for having met with the Defence and I would like to thank you for your

20     patience during the cross-examination.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Before you begin, Ms. Edgerton, the Chamber has some

22     questions for the witness.

23             Judge Baird.

24                           Questioned by the Court:

25             JUDGE BAIRD:  General, in the proceedings of the 6th of

Page 7591

 1     October - and this is at page 7333 of the LiveNote transcript - you

 2     stated that what happened on Mount Igman was that the Bosnian government

 3     forces started to launch attacks across Mount Igman to the demilitarised

 4     zone at the Serb positions on the other side, and NATO who was

 5     responsible for enforcing the demilitarisation of that area had failed to

 6     take action against the government forces.  And this is in spite of the

 7     fact that you protested to the Bosnian government that they should desist

 8     in doing this.  They continued to do so.  And when you asked NATO to take

 9     action, they refused.

10             Now, would you say, General, that NATO's refusal to take action

11     would have emboldened the Bosnian government to continue in that way?

12        A.   It certainly would have done so and indeed it did so.

13             JUDGE BAIRD:  It did so.  Thank you.

14             Now, just page 763 [sic] of the LiveNote transcript, General.

15     Dr. Karadzic referred you to a UN report of the 7th of February, 1994,

16     where it was stated:

17             "The media reported General Rose's statement that it was not

18     known who fired as the shell had first hit some stalls and changed its

19     trajectory."

20             And he had asked you whether you had known more than you do now.

21     Now, your answer was, amongst other things, that if it was your major

22     statement to the press about the market-place bombing, then it was an

23     incomplete report of your statement because you went on to state that it

24     was not possible to say specifically who had fired the bomb, but in your

25     opinion it was most likely to have been fired by the Serbs because of the

Page 7592

 1     events two days before.

 2             Now, can you tell us, General, whether at any time you had said

 3     that the shell had first hit some stalls and changed its trajectory, any

 4     time at all?

 5        A.   I could have done so, but I can't remember making that statement.

 6     Certainly I was briefed to that effect by the initial inspection team

 7     that went to the site.  But I may have referred to that in a press

 8     statement or even in a written statement somewhere.

 9             JUDGE BAIRD:  One last question, General, and I shan't detain you

10     further.  At page 7367, in respect of that very bombing, Dr. Karadzic

11     stated that from the first moment onwards, the Serb side was clearly

12     stating that they requested an investigation.  They wanted proper insight

13     and they wanted to participate in the investigation.  He then asked:

14             "Was the Serb side allowed to do that?"

15             And you answered that:

16             "The team that was formed did not include the Serb side," and you

17     had no memory or recall as to why that was the case.  The second team was

18     put together in Zagreb by Mr. Akashi.  Why it was decided that there

19     should not be a representative from the Bosnian Serb side you had no

20     idea.

21             Now, General, would you say then that from the outset that

22     investigative team, as it was constituted, lacked balance?

23        A.   I think it was balanced in that it had neither Bosnian government

24     side nor Bosnian Serb side representation on it, if my memory is right.

25             JUDGE BAIRD:  I see, so neither side was represented?

Page 7593

 1        A.   That is my memory of it.

 2             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you very much indeed.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             Before I begin, just two small administrative things.  We've

 6     replaced the map, 65 ter number 13636 with a better version and it's been

 7     uploaded in e-court.  And yesterday at T7442, there was discussion about

 8     the translation of D690, and CLSS translation of that document for this

 9     exhibit's now been uploaded.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, excuse me, Mr. President, just on one other

13     administrative note, I just wanted to indicate that there were a number

14     of documents that we didn't get to with the examination of General Rose

15     that we'll be moving to admit through the bar table.  I just wanted to

16     make that clear now so no one's surprised when that comes.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Yes.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

20                           Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

21        Q.   General, to go back through the evidence that you've given over

22     the course of the last few days, I'd like to touch on something you

23     mentioned with regard to sniping and it was at page 7293, line 25, to

24     7294, line 4, of the transcript.  There you were asked a question by

25     Dr. Karadzic about the interview you had had at the jail, and the

Page 7594

 1     question read:

 2             "You confirmed that the United Nations could not determine

 3     unequivocally and with precision from where sniper fire had come because

 4     there weren't any proper investigations that would have established that

 5     beyond a reasonable doubt."

 6             And your answer was:

 7             "That's so."

 8             Now, what I'd like to know, General, is whether you see any

 9     contradiction between this evidence that you'd given and that which we

10     find in paragraph 217 of your written evidence, your statement, which

11     talks about the overall responsibility for the greater proportion of the

12     sniping incidents on the civilian population of Sarajevo.

13        A.   Sector Sarajevo were the organ which was the French Brigade

14     deployed in Sarajevo was the body responsible for reporting sniping

15     incidents as well as the United Nations military observers.  But the

16     coverage was very sparse.  The best way of knowing what the level of

17     sniping was came from the casualties lists, and that was the basis on

18     which I said the majority of the sniping had been from the Serb side to

19     the Bosnian government side across the line.  And that was the impression

20     which I think was universally held.  Now, of course the argument could

21     have been produced that we didn't know what the casualty lists on the

22     other side were, although we did have UNMOs there.  But I think the

23     general view was the correct one.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, to move on to go back to the subject of Gorazde

25     and a question you were asked at the outset of today.  Dr. Karadzic told

Page 7595

 1     you today that in your book on page 161 you confirmed that the Bosnian

 2     Serbs had not intended to take Gorazde, and he also asserted to you

 3     today - and this is on page 2, lines 12 to 15 - that there was no

 4     intention to take Gorazde and said that that was confirmed by that

 5     conversation of mine that Mladic recorded in his diary that we'd taken

 6     more than we had intended to and that our objective was that -- was to

 7     make it impossible for attacks from Gorazde.

 8             Do you remember that question?

 9        A.   I do.

10        Q.   Now, at the time of writing your book you had no access to a

11     number of the documents you reviewed prior to giving evidence here, did

12     you?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   And therefore, you had no information about any of the intentions

15     as reflected in those documents?

16        A.   None at all.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we look at 65 ter 08224, please.

18             Thank you.

19        Q.   This is a document, General, from the VRS Main Staff to the

20     Herzegovina Corps and the command of the Visegrad Tactical Group, and

21     it's dated from 12 April 1994.  And it notes that the president believes,

22     as of the next day, 13 April, that they'd have three days to resolve the

23     issue of Gorazde before a cessation of hostilities would be signed.  In

24     the last paragraph it's noted that the president insists and orders that

25     the maximum use be made of this intervening period and that as much as

Page 7596

 1     possible be done in the sector of Gorazde in the given conditions.

 2             Let me know when you've had a chance to look --

 3        A.   I've read that, yeah.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Does this document appear to reflect information that

 5     you didn't have at the time of writing your book as regards the objective

 6     of the attack on Gorazde?

 7        A.   Certainly when I wrote the book I didn't have the benefit of

 8     having seen this document and the interpretation I put upon it is that

 9     the Bosnian Serb side wanted to maximise their military advantage in the

10     intervening three days that they felt that they had.

11        Q.   And from this document do you infer anything as regards the

12     effective control of the president?

13        A.   Well, I guess it was absolute.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have that as the next Prosecution

15     exhibit, please.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may state something.

18             JUDGE KWON:  No, not at this time.

19             In relation to this document, Mr. Karadzic?  Yes, what is it?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not denying the document, but

21     that document was at the witness's disposal, at the OTP's disposal during

22     the examination-in-chief.  I would like to be able to say a couple of

23     sentences about this document.

24             JUDGE KWON:  [Previous translation continues]...

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the end of course, but I also

Page 7597

 1     think that this document should have been and could have been presented

 2     to the witness during the examination-in-chief.  That's why I think I

 3     should be able to discuss this document with the witness at the end.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this document, but I was wondering

 5     whether your last question was in the remit of re-direct.  Let's move on.

 6     We'll admit this.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Understood, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1684, Your Honours.

10             MS. EDGERTON:

11        Q.   Now, on the subject of convoys at page 7434, lines 9 to 22,

12     Dr. Karadzic put to you that the main reasons why convoys were being

13     delayed were misunderstandings of different types.  And you replied that

14     there was an undue bureaucratic level that was employed against the

15     running of convoys.  And I think you were asked similar questions and

16     gave similar answers throughout the course of your testimony; is that

17     correct?

18        A.   That is correct.

19        Q.   In this regard, I wonder if we could see 65 ter 22978.

20             General, this is a document entitled BH command movsit as of

21     232359 B August 1994.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Could you just pull back, please, a little bit on

23     the document so the General can see this whole first page.

24        Q.   Have you seen documents like this before during the course of

25     your work with UNPROFOR, General?

Page 7598

 1        A.   I'd certainly been shown documents like this when the blocking of

 2     convoys was being discussed and we were developing policies as to how to

 3     deal with it, yes.

 4        Q.   I wonder then if -- well, perhaps I could ask you this.  So, do

 5     you recall who prepares these documents then?

 6        A.   Well, this would have been done as a result of an amalgam of

 7     information that was coming in from both the UNHCR and from the military

 8     commands and probably being brought together by the Chief of Staff of

 9     Bosnian command.

10        Q.   I'd like to take us then straight away over to the last page of

11     this document, page 7.  Point number 7 bears the heading:  Summary of

12     convoy requests for 24 August 1994.  And I wonder if under point D you

13     could have a look at the list of refusals given by the Bosnian Serb

14     headquarters.

15        A.   Those remarks match very much the sort of bureaucratic

16     obstructions that were placed in our way.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit,

19     please, Your Honours?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1685, Your Honours.

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   Now, at page 7457, line 18, to 7459, line 1, you were taken to a

24     letter of Dr. Karadzic's to Mr. Akashi dated 23 March 1994, touching on

25     the topic of the Tuzla airport.  And in referring to this document,

Page 7599

 1     Dr. Karadzic put to you the proposition that the Bosnian Serbs were never

 2     opposed to humanitarian aid even in situations when they were exposed to

 3     danger.  You were asked whether their fears were legitimate.  And your

 4     response was that this was a position in theory, but in practice it was

 5     the Serb side that did most of the blocking of the aid convoys.  Do you

 6     remember that?

 7        A.   I do remember making that remark.

 8        Q.   Do you have a view as to whether these restrictions, convoy

 9     restrictions, based on security concerns, articulated security concerns,

10     on the part of the Bosnian Serbs were justified?

11        A.   On occasions they may have been, but generally speaking the

12     blocking of the convoys was done for other reasons, strategic reasons, in

13     order to either lever the Bosnian government into a position or the

14     United Nations forces.

15        Q.   To your knowledge, was this view that you've just expressed

16     shared by other UN officials with whom you were engaged?

17        A.   It was the universal view.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we see, please, 65 ter 22981 in that regard.

19             Thank you.

20        Q.   Here we see, General, a letter from Mr. Akashi to Dr. Karadzic

21     dated 30 July 1994 reporting on, among other things, confiscation of

22     sleeping bags, glue for shoe repair, and the damage to 500 bags of wheat,

23     noting that he cannot accept explanations that this was necessary for

24     security reasons.  Please have a look at the document and let us know

25     when you're done.

Page 7600

 1        A.   I've read it.

 2        Q.   Is this -- when you noted that colleagues within the

 3     United Nations held this view as universal, is this an example of one of

 4     those instances?

 5        A.   It was typical of the sort of thing that was happening all the

 6     time.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit,

 9     please, Your Honours?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P1686.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

13        Q.   Now, yesterday at page 7455, lines 3 to 20, Dr. Karadzic showed

14     you a document which he said was written to Ambassador Akashi or to

15     Mr. Akashi a day after you took up your duties.  And he quoted a passage

16     from this document.  It refer -- it was a letter.  Referring to a meeting

17     (redacted), just before you arrived on the

18     ground, where he offered to widen the land corridor for the flow of

19     humanitarian aid from Belgrade to Tuzla.  And he asked you whether you

20     agreed that this was a fair humanitarian offer, and you agreed.  Do you

21     remember that?

22        A.   I do.

23        Q.   To put -- I'd like to put that letter in context, and to do so

24     I'd like to call up the actual notes of that meeting but due to the

25     (redacted)

Page 7601

 1     document not be broadcast.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  We'll do so.

 3             Private session.

 4                           [Private session]

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 7602

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17                           [Open session]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are now in open session, Ms. Edgerton.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   At page -- oh, I've done my number thing again.  I think it's

21     7562, line 24, to 7564, line 5, Dr. Karadzic put to you a copy of a

22     letter he wrote to Mr. Akashi on 24 June 1992 in response to Mr. Akashi's

23     letter dated the previous day.  And that letter -- in that letter,

24     Dr. Karadzic noted:

25             "UNPROFOR forces take little notice of the agreed procedure, for

Page 7603

 1     example, undeclared goods and equipment and display unacceptable

 2     behaviour as if they're an army of occupation."

 3             And he asked Mr. Akashi to use his influence to change the UN's

 4     manner of action.  Do you remember seeing that document?

 5        A.   I think I do, yes.

 6        Q.   I'd like to show you now Mr. Akashi's letter to Dr. Karadzic of

 7     23 June 1994.  It's 65 ter number 22976.

 8             And just to further refresh your memory with regards to your

 9     previous evidence, you indicated that had you seen the document you would

10     have taken grave exception to it and Akashi would have done the same.

11     There was no case ever of the United Nations allowing its positions to be

12     used by any of the warring parties to prosecute the war.

13             Now you see Dr. Akashi's letter and I'd like to direct your

14     attention in particular to the last paragraph of this document, but

15     please let us know when you've had a look through it.

16        A.   I've read it, yes.

17        Q.   Now, this last paragraph in particular cites unacceptable delays

18     imposed on the movement of UN convoys and restrictions on the days when

19     such convoys move.  Now, did the document shown to you by Dr. Karadzic

20     address to your recall in any regard Mr. Akashi's concerns as regards

21     freedom of movement?

22        A.   I don't think they did.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we tender this as the next Prosecution

25     exhibit, please?

Page 7604

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  P1688, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  How much longer do you have, Ms. Edgerton?

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  I could try for five minutes or less, Your Honour.

 5     I'll move with alacrity.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We have to rise before five, so could you do your

 7     best.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  All right.

 9        Q.   At 7489, line 16, to 7490, line 9, Dr. Karadzic showed you a

10     letter he wrote to Mr. Akashi on 5 September responding to one he had

11     received where Dr. Karadzic said Mr. Akashi mentioned some parts of his

12     speech out of context.  Now, I'd like to show you the extract which

13     provoked Mr. Akashi's correspondence to Dr. Karadzic.  It's 65 ter 10707.

14     It's a letter to Mr. Akashi from Viktor Andreev.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we go to the second page, please.

16        Q.   This letter, General, attached a statement -- this letter

17     attached an extract of a speech from Dr. Karadzic directing it to

18     Mr. Akashi's attention and it contains the following reference.  I think

19     if you look down to the second indented paragraph on this page you would

20     see it.  It reads:

21             "Nobody in the world has expected nor protested against economic

22     sanctions that Yugoslavia imposed on the RS.  Therefore, we will impose

23     sanctions against Muslims so toughly that a bird could not pass through.

24     These sanctions will last until the world do not force Yugoslavia to lift

25     the sanctions against the RS ..."

Page 7605

 1             And my question to you is:  In terms of freedom of movement from

 2     this period of time, September 1994 until the end of your tour, did you

 3     see any manifestations of this increased control like this on the ground?

 4        A.   Well, the situation steadily deteriorated throughout the autumn

 5     of 1994.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit,

 7     Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  P1689, Your Honours.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  That's -- concludes the re-examination,

11     Your Honours.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, excuse me, I note we're quick to leave.

13     I was going to ask for a redaction.  I can do that if it's possible to do

14     so after we're adjourned or go quickly into private session and give the

15     specific citation.  Whatever the Court wishes.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think you can handle that outside the courtroom.

17             Mr. Karadzic, we have to rise.  You can make submissions on

18     Monday.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to put a single

20     question to the General, a very brief question.

21             JUDGE KWON:  About the document?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In relation to that document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  About your effective control?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Then we'll allow you just one question briefly.

Page 7606

 1                           Further cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] General, sir, effective control of the

 3     Secretary-General over the United Nations forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 4     was that a tactical, operational, or strategic level?

 5        A.   It would have been exercised at the strategic level.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 8             That concludes your evidence, General, Sir Michael.  I'd like to

 9     thank you on behalf of the Bench and Tribunal for coming to The Hague to

10     give it and to assist the Tribunal.  Now you are free to go.

11             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

12             JUDGE KWON:  We'll resume Monday at 9.00.

13                           [The witness withdrew]

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.06 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 11th day of

16                           October, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.