Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8476

 1                           Thursday, 28 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody.

 7             I appreciate the Registry's assistance so that we can continue

 8     with the general's evidence today.

 9             Mr. Karadzic, please continue your cross-examination.

10                           WITNESS:  ADRIANUS VAN BAAL [Resumed]

11                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning to everyone.  Good

13     morning, General.

14                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you remember the crisis that we had in August --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear half of what

18     Mr. Karadzic said.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

20             Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your question.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Do you remember the crisis that we had in August

23     1993 [as interpreted], which resulted in the bombing by NATO?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Did you say "1993"?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think I said "1994."  That's what

Page 8477

 1     I had in mind.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  [Interpretation] I remember a situation in

 3     August 1994 in which NATO decided to conduct air-strikes.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And what was the reason for that decision?

 6        A.   The reason to decide -- to request this air-strike and to grant

 7     it was the removal of the heavy weapons from the weapon collection points

 8     by the BSA.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  At the time, the United Nations or the commanders in

10     the field had to summon NATO.  It could not have been only NATO's

11     decision; is that right?

12        A.   That's correct.  The request for air-strikes was strictly

13     regulated and extended from the requester to the headquarters of UNPROFOR

14     in Zagreb, which ultimately decided whether to transfer such a request to

15     NATO headquarters in Italy.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now we're going to look at a number of documents to

17     see how the crisis developed.

18             Can we look at 1D2666 in the e-court.

19             And while we're waiting:  General, sir, do you remember that you

20     had arrived precisely at the time when an agreement had been reached

21     which would have completely pacified Sarajevo and its environs?  And you

22     said yourself that the Serbs were in favour of the demilitarisation of

23     Sarajevo; is that correct?

24        A.   You're referring to an agreement?  I'm not sure exactly which

25     agreement you mean.  And the second part of your question concerns a

Page 8478

 1     political statement addressing the desire to demilitarise Sarajevo.  Now,

 2     could you be more specific in your first question?  Which agreement are

 3     you referring to?  And, second, I took note of your remark that the

 4     government of the Republika Srpska at the time desired a demilitarised

 5     zone, but I don't understand the reflection of the discussion at that

 6     time.

 7             I have a screen in front of me indicating that the trial started

 8     at 9.00 a.m. this morning, but I don't see any text on the screen in

 9     front of me.

10             Thank you.

11        Q.   As for the demilitarisation, I think you mentioned, in the

12     examination-in-chief and in your statements, that the Serbian side was in

13     favour of the demilitarisation of Sarajevo, but we will come to that.

14             Do you see before you in e-court a telegram by Ambassador Akashi

15     to Annan, Stoltenberg, and so on and so forth?  This is the first page.

16     Do you see that?

17        A.   Yes.  That's a message of the 8th of February, I suppose.  I

18     assume that's what you mean.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can we look at the next page, please.  Next page, please.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   So that I don't have to read, can you just please look at what

23     General Divjak, with full authority of the B and H Army and government,

24     his army and his government, agreed to as the principles?  And if I may

25     just draw your attention to Article E:

Page 8479

 1             "On-site monitoring of all BiH weapon system by UNPROFOR.

 2             "Sarajevo to become a UN-administered city for a minimum period

 3     of two years."

 4             And item A absolutely rules out military activities, particularly

 5     assaults or attacks.

 6             And can we look at the third page now, General, sir.

 7             Do you agree that this would have been a very good thing, had it

 8     been implemented?

 9        A.   I can confirm that.

10        Q.   Can you look at this page now, please, where Ambassador Akashi is

11     being informed by Michael Rose about his meeting with the Serbian side on

12     the same topic, and General Milovanovic confirmed that he had the full

13     authority from myself and General Mladic to accept these principles.  I

14     would like you to look at this list of principles.

15             Do you agree that this is also a significant step from the

16     Serbian side, including the withdrawal of the infantry one kilometre back

17     from the line of confrontation?  Would you agree that this was a decisive

18     step in the direction of pacifying the front in Sarajevo?

19        A.   That is correct.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  This is the 8th of

21     February.  If I may remind you, on the 5th of February -- actually, on

22     the 4th of February, there was an incident at Dobrinja, where children

23     were shelled; on the 5th of February, an incident occurred that bears the

24     name "Markale 2 --" actually, "Markale 1," and now we have the initiative

25     being launched to quieten the Sarajevo front.

Page 8480

 1             Can we admit this document, please?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, but we didn't need your submission before you

 3     tendered this document.  This will be admitted.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D830, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 21218,

 6     please.  21218.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  This is Exhibit P1642.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very nice.

 9        Q.   Can I ask you now to look at the second paragraph of item 1.  The

10     whole document can be looked at, but I would like to draw your attention

11     to the date.  This is two days later, after that agreement.  It's the

12     10th of February, 1994.  The Sarajevo Romanija Corps is beginning the

13     implementation of the concluded agreement.  The deputy commander,

14     Colonel, at the time, Dragomir Milosevic is implementing what

15     General Milovanovic accepted.

16             If I can draw your attention to the second paragraph of item 1,

17     where it says:

18             "Should the Muslim side fail to observe the cease-fire and the

19     VRS members are not directly threatened by the fire, do not return fire,

20     but make sure to report back to the Main Staff and officers for

21     co-operation with UNPROFOR."

22             And the paragraph-but-last states:

23             "Enable UN forces to visit our artillery combat positions, and if

24     they find it appropriate to certain positions --" something, "suggests,"

25     something like that, and so on and so forth.

Page 8481

 1             Do you remember that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps -- actually, you

 2     hadn't arrived yet.  This is something that you inherited.

 3        A.   The document that is being shown now is totally new to me.  I've

 4     never seen it before.  It does give a clear picture of how the orders

 5     within the BSA -- how they were executed.

 6             In that period, I was not present in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I only

 7     arrived on the 24th of February.  And looking back, the

 8     Total Exclusion Zone coming effectively into action is something which I

 9     only came to know after the fact, when I was present in the headquarters

10     from the 24th of February.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  These are steps in that

12     direction.  This is why I'm showing this document.

13             Can we tender this?  Oh, actually, it's been adopted -- admitted

14     already.  All right, very well.

15             Can we have 1D2502 now.  I'm afraid that there is no translation,

16     and if there isn't one -- oh, there is one.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  That's quite correct.  It will be on its way as

19     soon as possible.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we also look at -- can we also

21     have 1D2503, the translation for that.  If that can be prepared, please.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Can you now look at this document.  This is the 16th of February.

24     We're coming close to the time when the Total Exclusion Zone went into

25     force, and the Sarajevo Romanija Corps here is informing its Main Staff

Page 8482

 1     about the developments.

 2             If I can ask for this -- however, for you to look at:

 3             "However, the enemy, under the protection of the forces of the

 4     United Nations, deployed at check-points between our units and the Muslim

 5     ones is fortifying their positions and they are digging towards our

 6     positions by digging up roads at a distance of 50 to 150 metres at a

 7     favourable location.  They are building bunkers and placing infantry

 8     weapons.  They are making a departure point for an attack."

 9             Can we now look at the second paragraph of item 5, please:

10             [In English] "Please intervene ..."

11             [Interpretation] "Please, by means of this protest that we are

12     sending to the UNPROFOR, we kindly ask that you intervene for the

13     manoeuvring of the enemy to be halted, because in this way we will not be

14     able to keep to the signed cease-fire.  The soldiers of our -- the lives

15     of our soldiers are our primary concern."

16             Do you agree that the Muslim Army should not have been carrying

17     out actions like this once an agreement was signed?

18        A.   In any case, this is not in line with that which General Divjak

19     put in the hands of the BiH Command.  I'm not able to say whether this

20     actually reflects the situation on the ground.  The report would suggest

21     that what had been agreed by General Divjak wasn't executed.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The whole document is

23     interesting.  At the end, there's a conclusion, also some predictions,

24     but we don't have time.

25             Can we tender this document?

Page 8483

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  No objection.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have --

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Given the position of the Prosecution, we'll admit

 6     this.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D831, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D2503 now,

 9     please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   And you've already taken up your duties here and are in a

12     position to implement these agreements.  Can you please look to see this

13     is a regular combat report of the 3rd of March, describing the situation

14     up to 1700 hours on the 3rd of March.

15             Can we look at the item marked with the number 3 now, please.  It

16     should say "1503 to 1506 hours."  This is at the top of the page:

17             "At the time, a UN helicopter was circling over the Lukavica

18     Sector, the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and over the elements

19     of the disposition of the 1st Motorised Brigade.  The helicopter was not

20     announced, and it was not approved for the fly-over.  We did not open

21     fire.

22             "A UN team controlled the regrouping of artillery weapons (up to

23     20 kilometres) ..."

24             And so on and so forth.

25             Can we look at paragraph 5 now, please.

Page 8484

 1             Do you agree that in paragraph 5 it states that there was six

 2     killed and eight wounded after this agreement, and that the commander was

 3     having problems to maintain morale because lives were being lost during

 4     the cease-fire?

 5             And can we now look at the conclusions/predictions.  Can we

 6     scroll up the text a little bit, please.

 7             General Galic is informing here that violations of the cease-fire

 8     are continuing.  Do you see this report about the violations of the

 9     truce?

10             And can we have the last sentence.  A little bit down, please:

11             "And regardless of the agreement, the UNPROFOR Command has not

12     shown enough efficacy in its readiness to prevent the Muslims from

13     persistently violating the truce."

14             General, sir, is this proof that the truce was not respected by

15     the Muslim side and that we were losing up to six soldiers even in one

16     day, more than in times when there was no truce?

17        A.   The number of wounded and dead, I can neither deny nor confirm.

18     The 9th of February has been quoted.  What was the situation, and this

19     was the greatest concern of General Rose, is that from the time that I

20     arrived, from the 24th of February, in the mission area, that the

21     inter-positioning of UNPROFOR units at the confrontation line was a very

22     difficult matter, was proceeding with great difficulty.  It was not

23     possible to have Headquarters Sarajevo to take care that the Serbian and

24     Muslim lines was divided by the UNPROFOR units that could prevent

25     conflicts.  Despite all efforts, nothing managed to proceed successfully,

Page 8485

 1     particularly around the Jewish cemetery.  Again, trenches were dug at

 2     predicted positions also.  I do remember this from that time.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Can we have this document admitted into evidence?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D832.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have -- can we now have

 7     1D2667.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General, do you remember receiving from the Army of

10     Republika Srpska information and protests relating to all these things;

11     in other words, that General Milovanovic kept you apprised of what was

12     going on?

13        A.   It is correct that I did receive information from

14     General Milovanovic about conflicts around the confrontation area.

15        Q.   This is a telegram which pertains to your meeting with

16     General Milovanovic.  It's dated the 28th of March, 1994.

17             Can we please look at page 2 just to see what the topics

18     discussed were.  I'm not going to read it.  Let us just take a look at

19     it.

20             Can we now move to the next page, please.

21             Again, we have the agenda, and item number 3 speaks about

22     heli-flights.  There is mention there of an agreement of the 15th of

23     February concluded with General Rose and General Cot, the use of

24     humanitarian aid, helicopters for warring parties, misuse of helicopters,

25     B and H painting their helicopters white, helicopter flights for Casevac

Page 8486

 1     and Medivac is no problem.

 2             Do you recall that this agreement was reached between the two of

 3     you as a kind of achievement, in spite of all the prevailing problems at

 4     the time?

 5        A.   On a large number of areas, we were able to reach agreement in

 6     that period so that activities could take place for cessation of

 7     hostilities, or to promote such cessation, and to improve the

 8     humanitarian situation, that is correct.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that the Serbian side kept reporting

10     about the Muslim side painting their helicopters white in order to

11     mislead us?  That's under item 3, the penultimate sub-item.

12        A.   This was reported.  I received no confirmation of this, not even

13     when I once unexpectedly landed at a location where helicopters were

14     standing, BiH helicopters.  I did not see any white helicopters.  I could

15     not confirm this myself.  But what I can confirm is that in discussion on

16     the 27th of March, this was one of the subjects.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Can we now have the next page, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Here, one can see that you agreed to redeployment of two convoys

21     for Srebrenica and one for Zepa, UNMOs on BSA territory.  Also discussed

22     was connection between Srebrenica and Zepa, which should not have existed

23     according to the agreement.  And then below, incidents, a synchronised

24     action carried out on the 25th of March.  And then, again on the 25th of

25     March, the Dutch convoy passed, by force, from Srebrenica to Tuzla

Page 8487

 1     without our forces stopping them or opening fire.  And, finally,

 2     Milovanovic is reporting the cease-fire in Sarajevo is not being adhered

 3     to by the Muslims.  Do you remember that you two chiefs of staffs had

 4     discussed all these issues?

 5        A.   These incidents were reported by General Milovanovic on the 27th

 6     of March and reported to the staff, or in the staff, and reported also to

 7     General Rose at HQ, and they were all discussed.

 8        Q.   As well as about the failure by the Muslims to honour the

 9     agreement?

10        A.   From the time that the Total Exclusion Zone came into effect,

11     General Rose was very much occupied with making this a success, including

12     preventing incidents between the parties along the confrontation line.

13     This was only partially successful.  This also has to do with the

14     willingness of both parties to hold to the agreement.

15             General Milovanovic indicates here that the Muslims, in any case,

16     were not following the agreement.  And from the Bosnian side, they were

17     also claiming that Serbian units did not conform to the agreement.

18     However, this is not in this report of the discussions with

19     General Milovanovic, of course.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Can we have this document admitted?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D833, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now can we have 1D2511.  And I

25     believe there's a translation as well.

Page 8488

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can we agree -- yes, here we have the English translation now.

 3             Here, again, the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is

 4     sending a report to the Command of UNPROFOR or some kind of protest.  Can

 5     you please look at the first paragraph, which says:

 6             "Constant disrespect of cease-fire in the region of Sarajevo by

 7     Muslim extremists from the first day of the agreement ..."

 8             And so on and so forth.  Can you see that paragraph?  And below,

 9     listed are the most striking examples.  Everyone can see for themselves.

10             Do you agree that within a month, up until 21st of April, nothing

11     changed; the violations and provocations -- the violations of truce and

12     provocations continue?  Do you remember that the SRK regularly and

13     occasionally reported on truce violations and the impossibility of the

14     truce being sustainable?

15             I have seen you nodding, but you have to give me a verbal

16     response for the record, please.

17        A.   Once you've finished speaking, I'll give my answer.

18             The general picture, from the moment that I arrived in the

19     mission area, was that there was a great decrease in skirmishes and a

20     great decrease in firing and also in explosions.  Nevertheless, on a

21     smaller scale, also, there were many incidents - these were

22     reported - particularly through Sector Sarajevo, which was the first

23     responsible for this, and it would appear that there was reporting taking

24     place directly to Generals Rose and Soubirou.

25             This specific document, I do not remember, but there were

Page 8489

 1     repeatedly moments at which both sides reported that the other side was

 2     not respecting the agreement.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at the next page.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Can I please draw your attention to the paragraph which begins:

 6     "Since the activities ...," in which General Galic says that the Muslim

 7     side is taking advantage of the proximity of your troops and abusing it,

 8     and that not even the UN can prevent extremists.  This is not saying all

 9     the Muslims or the army, but they cannot prevent Muslim extremists in

10     pursuing their intentions.

11             Do you agree and do you know that the Muslim extremists, so to

12     speak, often took advantage of the presence of UN installations to fire

13     at the Serbs and provoke a response that would be a condemnation of the

14     Serbs?

15        A.   I can't substantiate that position with facts.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  There is sufficient

17     evidence of that.  But with the consent of the other side and the

18     Trial Chamber, I would like to offer many, many documents of this nature

19     through Bar Table.

20             Now, can we have this document admitted into evidence?  And the

21     submission relating to the inclusion of documents through Bar Table will

22     be provided in due course.

23             JUDGE KWON:  This will be admitted.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D834, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We are going to skip the documents

Page 8490

 1     that are going to be introduced through Bar Table.

 2             Could we now have document --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the number of

 4     the document.  Apologies from the interpreter.

 5             THE ACCUSED:  [No interpretation]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number, please.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2550.  And when it comes to the

 8     translation, we are relying on the other side.  It seems that we don't

 9     have this document translated.  In that case, allow me to summarise.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   This is a protest sent from the Main Staff of the VRS to the

12     UNPROFOR Command:

13             "Due to numerous violations of truce and the execution of

14     engineering works along separation lines ..."

15             And so on:

16             "... constant activities by the Muslim Army, which is

17     impermissible and incompatible with the agreement which had been in force

18     for several months."

19             Can we now look at the next page, please.

20             Here, again, General Milovanovic, whose name we can see at the

21     bottom, speaks specifically about the engineering works that can be

22     removed in a week's time, and that he is still hopeful that peace will

23     sustain, and he's asking UNPROFOR to undertake vigorous measures.

24             Do you understand -- do you remember receiving such protests?

25        A.   I don't remember this specific message.  But, in any case, I do

Page 8491

 1     know that this issue arrived regularly on the desk of General Rose.  And,

 2     as I said, he did his utmost to try, through inter-positioning, to have

 3     UNPROFOR figure in this, but he wasn't successful in all cases.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Can we have this admitted for identification, or marked for

 6     identification?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D835, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             We are now going to skip the whole month, and can we now look at

11     1D1770.  I'm afraid we don't have translation either for this document.

12             So a month later, during which violations occurred on a daily

13     basis, and reports about that were also submitted on a daily basis, but

14     we are going to offer this through a Bar Table.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Now, we are talking about the 6th of July.  The Command of the

17     Sarajevo Romanija Corps is sending a secret and confidential report to

18     the Main Staff, specifying which weapons are being used to violate the

19     truce.  They are listing infantry weapons, 120 mortar shells.  Under

20     number 2, it says:

21             "The fighters of the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade did not return

22     fire at the enemy, in compliance with the agreed truce, and the remaining

23     units did not respond to the enemy's provocations."

24             So we are suffering losses in human life, but also civilians are

25     being killed.

Page 8492

 1             Do you agree that the Muslim side should not have done what they

 2     were doing and that this constitutes a disrespect or disregard of the

 3     concluded agreement?

 4        A.   Retrospectively, neither I nor you are in a position to verify

 5     the truth of this document.  But if it's confirmed that 120-millimetre

 6     shells were used and that's a violation of the agreement that everything

 7     over 80 millimetres was regarded as a heavy weapon and should not be used

 8     and was to remain under the control of UNPROFOR, and all other subjects,

 9     I can't verify whether that's the case, and I don't want to hypothesise

10     about that either.

11             Your Honour, if you permit me, I'd like to make a remark about

12     this.  Regarding many of these messages, that it was clear that it was

13     virtually impossible to verify the accusations by the Serbs.  It would

14     have been tremendously helpful if freedom of movement and placing of

15     UNPROFOR units on the Serb side, such incidents could have been verified,

16     but that's a retrospective remark.  It didn't happen at the time, and we

17     have to live with that fact.  So there are major questions as to whether

18     these reports are true.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, well, let's say that newspaper reports or some protests

22     sent to you could be perhaps exaggerated, but this is a confidential

23     document, a confidential report sent by the Sarajevo Romanija Corps to

24     the Main Staff.  There is no reason for lying in this kind of document;

25     do you agree?  Do you believe that the SRK would send a false report to

Page 8493

 1     General Mladic?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  If you can answer that question.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't answer that question.  As I

 4     said earlier, because of the phenomenon that UNPROFOR had no deployments

 5     on Serb territory, it was virtually impossible for UNPROFOR to verify

 6     these incidents.  The veracity, I'll leave that up to the BSA.  But

 7     verifying the incidents and taking measures accordingly was impossible

 8     for UNPROFOR, and I deeply regret that that was the case.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10        Q.   Just one more question about this.  From your experience, do you

11     know that lower commands sent false reports to higher commands in the

12     BSA?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the witness has answered that

14     question.

15             We'll mark this for identification, pending translation.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D836, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Just a small observation:  From all the statements given by the

19     general, one may conclude that control and communication within the

20     Serbian Army was such that there was no room for false reports.

21             Can we now have 1D1792, please.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Your submission on statements may not be boring,

23     Mr. Karadzic, but it is not helpful.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   General, we are approaching a critical moment when NATO launched

Page 8494

 1     air-strikes on our forces.  I just wanted to show the development that

 2     preceded it, in which they were violating the truce and we were the ones

 3     who were punished.

 4             If there's no translation, allow me to read the first sentence

 5     only.  It's the 1st of August, 1994:

 6             "At 1345, the enemy launched a massive attack along the defence

 7     line at Nisic Plateau, focusing at the conjunction between the Kunosici

 8     village and Mendzeras Forest ..."

 9             And so on.

10             Do you remember that Ambassador Akashi's yesterday's document

11     warned that attacks by the Muslims within the 20-kilometre zone and the

12     Serbs outside the 20-kilometre zone can lead to the Serbs legitimately

13     taking or retrieving their weapons?

14        A.   Just to be on the safe side, I'd like to see the document again

15     to see whether that wording is combined with the incident to which you

16     were referring.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Attacks by Muslims

18     inside the 20-kilometre zone.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please start again your question.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I have to be careful for the

21     benefit of the interpreters.

22             Allow me to read the last sentence, which reads:

23             "We have started relocation of some of heavy weapons which are

24     under control of UNPROFOR as a result of an all-out attack on our defence

25     line."

Page 8495

 1             Can we accept -- have this document admitted, which proves that

 2     Akashi said that we were right?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  What was your question about this document?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to ask the general if

 5     he remembers that massive attacks were launched at our forces within the

 6     exclusion zones and that the attacks came from within and without the

 7     zone, itself; that is to say, from the city of Sarajevo and the areas of

 8     the 2nd and 3rd Corps, including Olovo, Visoko, and other places.  That

 9     was a prelude to the crisis which ended in air-strikes.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Do you remember that?

12        A.   Yes, I remember that tense situation.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Can we now have -- but before that, can we have this document

15     admitted, and can a number be given to it?  And then we'll move to the

16     next document.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will mark it for identification.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D837.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can we now have D717, please.  We showed this document yesterday.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   So, General, could you kindly read, specifically, item 2.  And

23     the last sentence states:

24             "BiH activities already prompted ..."

25             [In English] " ... the BSA to seek to withdraw their heavy

Page 8496

 1     weapons from the WCPs."

 2             [Interpretation] Do you remember this state, this situation?

 3        A.   Yes, I remember that.  Besides, this is a report from 16 August,

 4     so at that point the situation had been tense for some time.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that we had a right to that, to request

 6     weapons and to take our weapons which was placed at these collection

 7     points?

 8        A.   The agreement that you reached with Mr. Akashi provided for that

 9     opportunity.  The agreement that you reached with Mr. Akashi on 18

10     February 1994, if I'm correct.  It referred to an immediate attack by the

11     BiH.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can we look at the next page, please, so that we can look at the

14     paragraph marked with the number 3, which actually confirms what you said

15     in His Excellency's telegram.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   The first sentence says that the legitimate right to self-defence

18     is being recognised; is that correct?

19        A.   Item 3 refers, in fact, to the agreement of 14 February, in which

20     that is again confirmed.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then can we look at the next page.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   This is our agreement which, I think, is already something that

24     the parties are familiar with.

25             Can we now look at the protocol, which is a part of the

Page 8497

 1     agreement.

 2             Paragraph 1, if you agree, regulates completely our right to

 3     self-defence in the event of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR or in the event

 4     of the inability of UNPROFOR to prevent or stop immediately an attack

 5     that is underway.  The whole paragraph speaks about that.  Article 1 is

 6     the most important point in the Protocol, isn't it?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Let us zoom in further on para 1.

 8             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, this was all asked and answered

10     yesterday afternoon.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think this was put to the witness.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I see a reference to paragraph 3 at page 8473,

13     starting at lines 18.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the protocol was

15     insufficiently presented in the courtroom, so I wanted the parties to be

16     reminded, and that the general confirmed that this right of ours existed.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

18        Q.   Isn't that right, General, that this paragraph 1 confirms this

19     right that you also affirmed, and that there is no ambivalence there?

20        A.   The right to use heavy weapons, again, in the event of

21     self-defence is not contested.  What it was about is that UNPROFOR had

22     control of the heavy weapons and that assessing whether heavy weapons

23     should be released by UNPROFOR was a responsibility of UNPROFOR Command;

24     General Rose and General De Lapresle.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Lawyers would put it differently, that -- is that

Page 8498

 1     that right did not depend on UNPROFOR but on the situation in the field,

 2     but never mind.

 3             Can we now look at 1D1793, please.

 4             Did we request those weapons?  Do you recall that conditions were

 5     met, from this paragraph 1 or this Article 1, for us to take back those

 6     weapons?

 7        A.   I cannot remember clearly that request.  There was a discussion

 8     about it.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             If we don't have the translation for this document, will you

11     permit me just to read one sentence:

12             "In the area of responsibility ..."

13             This is this third paragraph.

14             "... ZO of the 1st Sarajevo Motorised Brigade, the enemy is

15     firing with small arms, particularly sniper fire, rifle grenades and

16     mortar shells at our positions and neighbourhoods in Grbavica and Vraca."

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you recall that your observers also reported observing mortar

19     shells and fire at Grbavica and Vraca?  Do you agree that Grbavica and

20     Vraca are in the center of Sarajevo, that these are Serbian settlements,

21     and that this report speaks about explosions or bombing or shelling of

22     those sections of the town?

23        A.   I can remember that under -- that there were skirmishes in

24     Grbavica and Vraca.  I would like to see reports to refresh my memory.  I

25     can't remember clearly all the reports that there were.  I think I could

Page 8499

 1     only give a positive answer if I were able to see the UNPROFOR reports.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  We will show that.  I just want to finish with this

 3     document.

 4             Can we look at the next page.

 5             The second paragraph of item 3, it says:

 6             "The request was sent to UNPROFOR to take weapons at the

 7     collection points of weapons in the north-western part of the corps area.

 8     The oral response was negative."

 9             So the basic right granted to us under the protocol from

10     Article 1.

11             Can we look at the next page so that we can just see what the

12     situation was and what were the losses inflicted on us.

13             Article 7, "Losses."  Four fighters killed, and among them two

14     members of the MUP, and so on and so forth.  And then down there, it

15     says:

16             "21 fighters and one civilian wounded."

17             General, sir, what were we supposed to wait for, in terms of

18     self-defence, when, on the 2nd of August -- actually, from the 14th of

19     February until the 2nd of August, the violations of the cease-fire did

20     not stop inflicting losses on the Serbian Army?  Would there be any

21     reason for anyone to stand that?

22        A.   Before being able to answer this question, I would need to see

23     the request again and the verified answer from HQ, who gave the answer

24     and what were the reasons given.

25        Q.   We will come to that.  The fact is that this refusal resulted in

Page 8500

 1     the bombing of the 5th of August.  Do you recall that the NATO forces

 2     bombed us on the 5th of August because of our attempts at self-defence

 3     with heavy weaponry?

 4        A.   Yes, that's correct.  There was a so-called Blue Sword operation

 5     by the NATO, an air attack, in order -- on Serbian unauthorised weapons

 6     systems within the exclusion zone.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can this document be tendered?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D838, Your Honours.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Do you recall that Muslim forces tried to exploit the results of

13     that bombing and that they continued with their firing on the Serbs?

14        A.   The attack executed on the Bosnian Serbian weapon systems had

15     various effects, and the message that Mr. Akashi sent and which has just

16     been shown, the 16th, refers to that.  It could have a consequence if the

17     parties were not to obey the agreements made.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Other than firing at the Serbs within the zone,

19     firing from outside the zone, do you recall that the Muslims used heavy

20     weaponry from within the exclusion zone itself, and that you were even

21     angry because of this?

22        A.   I wonder where you have the information that I was angry about

23     something.  What is important is that in that period, that is, around the

24     5th of August, it was clear that non-authorised weapons systems had been

25     taken from the weapon collection points by the BSA and were being used.

Page 8501

 1     A similar situation for the Muslim heavy weapons was not found by

 2     UNPROFOR.

 3        Q.   Was not found.

 4             Let's look at 1D2660, then, please.

 5             Had they managed to establish something like that, would the

 6     Muslims have been bombed, just as the Serbs were?  General, sir, would

 7     the Muslims have been bombed just like the Serbs were?

 8             We don't need two.  One is enough.

 9        A.   In principle, the total exclusion zone regime makes no

10     distinction between Muslim and Serbian units.  Therefore, it should, in

11     that case, have taken place in the same way.

12        Q.   I agree that it should be the case.  Were they punished for

13     violations of the Total Exclusion Zone?

14        A.   The incident being referred to is an incident.  As UNPROFOR, we

15     did not see the opportunity to localise -- we did not manage to actually

16     localise the weapons system and take the same measures as for

17     unauthorised weapons on the Serbian side.

18        Q.   Well, you can see here that you're not angry, but you are

19     disappointed.  You say, in paragraph 2, that it is very disappointing to

20     discover that especially the Muslims are trying to exploit what the NATO

21     forces did.  And in the first paragraph, 847-554 elevation is being

22     identified, the grid reference, meaning that that place could be observed

23     and bombed.  But we were not treated equally; is that right, General,

24     sir?

25        A.   Again, an attempt was made to actually identify the weapon

Page 8502

 1     system.  It was able to be established from where shooting took place,

 2     but the weapons systems were not found, and that can be seen from the

 3     last sentence, which emphasised that the mortar -- that the 2nd French

 4     Battalion --

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter couldn't hear clearly.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] ... should attempt to get it into

 7     their hands.  However, we did find the unauthorised weapons on the

 8     Serbian side.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I think the interpreter missed some part of your

10     answer, General, probably from "the 2nd French Battalion."  If you could

11     kindly repeat that part.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The weapons system was not found.

13     It was established, by analysing, from where the shooting came.  The

14     weapons system was not able to be attacked.  We did act positively,

15     though, in the sense that General Divjak was given the order to place the

16     mortar again under the authority of the 2nd French Battalion, which was

17     active in the Sarajevo area and was active at the weapons collection

18     point.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this tendered?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit this.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D839, Your Honours.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   If I may remind you, General, sir.  On the 13th, you also wrote

24     to Jovan Divjak, and in that letter, you were angry.  You said not even

25     24 hours passed.

Page 8503

 1             We showed those documents yesterday and admitted them.

 2             Then, again, you wrote to Divjak on the 15th, very angry, because

 3     there was firing at Serb settlements from within the exclusion zone.

 4             Now I would like us to look at 1D2653 now, please, where we can

 5     see all the objections you are voicing on account of the Muslim side.  I

 6     must say that at the time, you were completely aware of their violations.

 7             You are writing this.  We cannot see the date.  It says "August,"

 8     and you refer to your letter of the 6th of August.  You can see that in

 9     the paragraph marked with the number 1, regarding the deliberate

10     violations of the demilitarised zone on Igman, and you are informing him

11     again that their soldiers are continuing to violate the agreement, and

12     then you list all the violations.

13             Do you remember that Muslim forces passed through the zone we

14     handed over to you in 1993 in Igman and killed 20 medical workers in

15     their medical camp?  Do you remember that?

16        A.   The last incident you mentioned I do not remember.  I do remember

17     the letter about a great deal of infantry activity, and which were in

18     contradiction to agreements made, and this is why I used very sharp words

19     to protest.

20        Q.   Thank you, and you should be lauded for that.  But what about

21     NATO, that had more reason to punish the Muslims than the Serbs, but

22     failed to do that?  Would it not be necessary, then, to say that they

23     should have been treated the same?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  It's another comment, Your Honour.

Page 8504

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             I note the time.  It's time to have a break.

 3             We'll admit this.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D840, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  And we'll have a break for 20 minutes and resume at

 6     20 to 11.00.

 7             And you can consult the Court Deputy, how much time you will have

 8     after the break to conclude your cross-examination.

 9                           --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to inform the Chamber that

13     this is an exceptionally important witness and that we will not have

14     enough important relevant witnesses for the period dealing with Sarajevo.

15     We're going to have General Rose and some other witnesses from another

16     European country, but I was hoping that I would be given the whole day

17     today so that I could go through documents with this witness that are

18     exceptionally important, dealing with an exceptionally important

19     situation, leaving aside what pertains to Srebrenica, which will require

20     a slightly different approach.  But the time that has been given to me

21     until now, we only have 20 minutes left, and I cannot complete what I

22     intended to do in 20 minutes.

23             So I suggest that you grant me the remaining two sessions of

24     today, and I will do my best, if I can, to finish before that.  But I

25     really need this time.

Page 8505

 1             JUDGE KWON:  You could have been much more efficient yesterday.

 2     That's the Chamber's observation.  You'll have until the end of this

 3     session, i.e., until 12.00.  Do your best, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I accept that I could have

 5     been slightly more efficient, but not much more efficient.  Anyway, thank

 6     you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, sir, throughout this whole period you frequently warned

 9     both sides about the events that you were not satisfied with and which

10     constituted violations of the exclusion zone, other than the constant

11     problems of the Igman demilitarised zone, which the Muslims refused to

12     leave; is that correct?

13        A.   As an impartial organisation, we did, indeed, try to treat both

14     parties equally.  I think we succeeded in this, but this does not mean

15     that we always were effective.

16             UNPROFOR's mandate, referring now back to what you showed me

17     before the break, that we could use military means to fight with one or

18     other of the parties in order to force them to respect the agreement,

19     UNPROFOR could only work and only be effective with the agreement of both

20     parties and a willingness from both parties to, indeed, do what had been

21     agreed on.  If parties did not respect the agreement, we had to try to

22     convince them.  Military means were extremely limited, and this was an

23     obstacle the whole time to UNPROFOR.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             Can we have 1D2658.

Page 8506

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   But you will agree, General, sir, that until the actual use of

 3     force, if you were impartial, that the use of force was actually reserved

 4     only for use against the Serbs.  NATO never used force against the

 5     Muslims; is that correct?

 6        A.   In my time, talking about air-strikes, air-strikes were only

 7     performed against Serbian targets, that is true.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recognise this letter of yours?  It's true

 9     that you do mention both sides here, but this is your letter of the 27th

10     of June, protesting directly to General Delic; no longer addressed to

11     Divjak, but to Delic, General Delic.

12             Can we scroll down a little bit so that the general can look at

13     his signature.

14             General, sir, is this your signature?

15        A.   Yes.  This is my letter, also.

16        Q.   Do you recall that they would start the fighting in Maglaj and

17     that they were attacking us from Gorazde?

18        A.   I can neither confirm nor deny who began, but there were

19     skirmishes, with tragic results.  Yes, that is clear.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Can we tender this document?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D841, Your Honours.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Do you remember, General, sir, that reports pertaining to Gorazde

Page 8507

 1     about the shooting at the hospital and about 300 dead were exaggerated

 2     several times-fold, even 50 times-fold, and that this was something that

 3     the United Nations established when they went to Gorazde?

 4        A.   Apparently, we're going back in time now, the beginning of April,

 5     when a Serbian attack was launched from various directions on the safe

 6     area of Gorazde, and in that direct fire was involved, tanks shot on a

 7     hospital.  The number of dead and wounded is something I can say nothing

 8     about, whether to confirm or deny it.

 9        Q.   Do you recall that after UNPROFOR went into Gorazde, there was an

10     estimate that there was a lot of exaggeration, both in terms of the

11     damage and in terms of the casualties?

12        A.   UNHCR had a number of representatives in the enclave at the time

13     of the attack on the enclave.  They estimated the number of dead and

14     wounded.  General Rose had the impression that it might be exaggerated.

15     After the evacuation, it was established how many dead and wounded there

16     were.  I do not have the exact figures, but they can be found in the

17     UNPROFOR records.  It was possible later to determine how many there

18     were, and that was able to be established accurately later.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Would you like to look over for a few seconds, less

20     than a minute, in fact, of some footage from Gorazde?

21             Can I have 1D1408, from 14:5:33 to 14:6:43.  Can we play this

22     footage.  This was admitted during the testimony of General Rose, but I

23     would just like to refresh General Van Baal's memory, to remind him what

24     things looked like and what was the image of Serbs sent out into the

25     world that was actually quite erroneous.

Page 8508

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             "The Reporter:  ... instead of the hospital.  Only one shell had

 3     passed through the roof.  As he flew by helicopter into Gorazde following

 4     the fighting, Rose was asked about US satellite reports that nearly every

 5     house in Gorazde was damaged.

 6             "Yes, practically every house in Gorazde has been damaged, but

 7     the most of the damage to Gorazde was done in the fighting that had taken

 8     place some two years before when the Bosnian Government's forces drove

 9     the Serbs from this town.  And there were 12 and a half thousand Serbs at

10     that time living here, and they were all driven off.  The way to

11     distinguish a house that's been damaged by fighting, where a shell has

12     hit it, and a house that's been damaged by ethnic cleansing, is if it's

13     got not roof, no doors, no window frames and nothing in the house at all,

14     and there are burn marks on it and bullets sprayed around the walls, that

15     is a house that's been damaged by ethnic cleansing.  A house that has

16     been damaged by shelling, has a shell hole in it and there are still

17     people trying to live in that building with their furniture because

18     they've got nowhere else to go.  That is something that you can't see

19     from satellites.  And of course, at that time, the international image of

20     what had happened in Gorazde was very different from the reality.  What

21     was dangerous was that policies were going to be put together on both

22     sides of the Atlantic about what we should do in Gorazde, but these

23     policies had been put together on totally flawed information."

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Do you agree with this assessment of General Rose, i.e., that

Page 8509

 1     false information were the basis for taking a wrong attitude towards one

 2     of the parties to the conflict?

 3        A.   I agree with the military analysis made by General Rose.  Whether

 4     this led to a difference in insight in the different parties is something

 5     that I would doubt.  In any case, it made no difference to the

 6     impartiality of UNPROFOR.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can we now have 1D2452, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Do you agree, General, that you were quite successful in dealing

11     with the Serbian side?  Most of the things that you requested were

12     granted to you?

13        A.   As far as the general military situation is concerned, then 1994,

14     particularly when I was chief of staff of command in Bosnia, is the time

15     where relatively there was relative peace and security in Sarajevo and in

16     other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This is one point.

17             And the second point is that we were not successful in really

18     sustainably improving the humanitarian situation.

19             The third point is we did not succeed to bring the former parties

20     in conflict to the negotiating table and to attain a lasting peace.

21     There, we were not successful.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can we now have 1D2452.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   While we're waiting for this document:  General, somewhere here I

Page 8510

 1     have a document containing a joint assessment by UNPROFOR and UNHCR, in

 2     which it is said that the UNHCR is achieving 75 per cent of their

 3     targets.  Another document speaks about the humanitarian aid passing only

 4     through the Serbian territory, whereas all other routes are closed.  Do

 5     you remember that?

 6        A.   The date and content of the document is something I would really

 7     need to see.

 8             As I said in my preceding statement, UNHCR and other related

 9     organisations, in May and June, were succeed -- were able to succeed

10     100 per cent in their tasks in 1994.  That became less later on.  I

11     really need to see that document in order to say whether I had seen it

12     before and whether I could agree to its content.

13        Q.   Thank you.  We'll show some of these documents if we have time,

14     because some of them are already in evidence.

15             Now, can you please take a glance at this telegram sent by

16     His Excellency Akashi to Stoltenberg and Annan and others.  Would you

17     agree that this is a piece of information that relates to the meeting

18     with Dr. Karadzic and Izetbegovic?

19        A.   That is the title of the document.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Can we now look at page 2.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Here, we have a detailed account of the conversation with me that

24     Ambassador Akashi and the Generals Rose and Cot and others had with me.

25     And look at this page, and do you agree that this represents a very

Page 8511

 1     fruitful and serious meeting, and do you agree that Dr. Karadzic welcomed

 2     the assurance that UNPROFOR's actions would be dictated by Security

 3     Council, et cetera, rather than by some councils of various military

 4     alliances, and that Dr. Karadzic raised the question requesting

 5     specification of the calibres of the weapons to be withdrawn?  This is

 6     stated under sub-item B.  I asked whether we would be allowed --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I wonder how General Van Baal can be

 9     asked to interpret a meeting that he wasn't even at.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             Just put your question.  We can read the document, Mr. Karadzic.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13        Q.   General, was this meeting a basis for establishing or reaching at

14     least some improvement during 1994, while you were stationed there?

15        A.   Again, this document was drawn up after a meeting at which I was

16     not present and for which I had no responsibility.  I was not in the

17     mission area, I was not working as chief of staff of UNPROFOR at the

18     staff there.  This is clearly a document which then played an important

19     role in the actual execution of duties by UNPROFOR.  A number of

20     discussions took place with General Rose at the airport in order to bring

21     the parties in conflict together and to attain lasting peace.  In those

22     discussions, it became clear to me that particularly from the Serbian

23     side, Mladic particularly, that there was -- speaking about an overall

24     cease-fire in the whole area of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

25     demilitarisation of the safe zones.  This is what I picked up, looking --

Page 8512

 1     just scanning the documents very roughly.  But I think this document has

 2     a whole history behind it, and it really deserves to be studied properly

 3     before I give any further comment on it.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  But do you agree that at a political level, the

 5     political leader of the Serbian side and the political leadership of the

 6     UN have laid foundation for the conduct of both parties during 1994?  Do

 7     you agree that this was the basis for what you were doing in the course

 8     of that year?

 9        A.   I saw that in that area, after the Markale incident and the

10     involvement of NATO in the whole process, that there was a great

11     willingness from the Serbian side to come to a final solution under

12     certain [as interpreted] conditions.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please focus on sub-item B, item 4, and the

14     fears that Serbs expressed, in terms of danger deriving from the

15     exclusion zone, the number of the Muslim infantry, the possibility for

16     attacks, et cetera, and also item 5, the UN generals gave assurances that

17     our concerns would be taken into consideration.  Do you agree with this?

18        A.   In the end, this meeting contributed to ultimately bringing about

19     the agreement you reached on 18 February 1994, stipulating the rules of

20     play, such as considering implementation of a total exclusion zone.

21             Your Honour, might I also get back to a remark that does not

22     perfectly convey what I said.  That's at line 37/2, that:

23             "There was a great willingness from the Serbian side to come to a

24     final conclusion under their conditions."

25             Not "certain conditions," but "their conditions."

Page 8513

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Speaking of that, General, what would be unacceptable under such

 4     circumstances, in terms of conditions that are being mentioned here?  Do

 5     you know that we always maintained the position that a political solution

 6     would not recognise territories taken by force, and that fighting was

 7     unnecessary because a solution can be found through political means, and

 8     we never said that we intended to keep 70 per cent of Bosnia, if that is

 9     what your reference to freezing the lines means?

10        A.   What I meant by "their conditions" was explicitly the

11     demilitarisation of Sarajevo, in part, as well as the other safe areas,

12     and that was unacceptable to the other side.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Can we see the next page of this document.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Can you please look at item 6, in which General Rose assured me

17     that attacks by the Muslim side at Serbian positions would not be

18     permitted, and that it was also understood that the Serbs would be able

19     to retrieve their weapons, provided they're faced with a massive attack.

20     Do you agree that this is what is written under this item?

21        A.   I take note of the statement provided by General Rose here.

22        Q.   Do you recall that General Galic and Ambassador Akashi mentioned

23     massive attacks on the Serbs, particularly those launched from the

24     Total Exclusion Zone, from places such as Visoko, Olovo, et cetera?

25        A.   I assume that you're now getting back to documents showed

Page 8514

 1     previously, reporting that later in the year.  That's correct.

 2        Q.   You are right.  That happened in August.  Thank you.

 3             Can you please now look at item 8, in which I gave my approval

 4     for patrolling operations, and I suggested that UNPROFOR patrols be

 5     escorted by a liaison officer and an interpreter to enable the UNPROFOR

 6     troops to communicate with the local population, with a purpose of

 7     confidence-building measures.  Now, can you look at item 8 and tell me

 8     that what we proposed was a constructive and a fair offer?

 9        A.   This presentation did, indeed, help to carry out the regime of

10     the Total Exclusion Zone very quickly, so it was helpful.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Can we now look at the next page.  Just one moment.  I apologise.

13     Yes, next page, item 11.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   One can see here that the issue of regrouping of weapons is being

16     addressed, and that there are constant threats from NATO, coupled with

17     dead-lines being imposed, and a threat that air-strikes would be carried

18     out against the Serbian positions.  Ambassador Akashi here is in

19     concurrence with the Serbian side because he is also keen to see good

20     results achieved.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Is there a question?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I was wondering.  What is your question,

25     Mr. Karadzic?  I mean, you are still complaining about shortage of your

Page 8515

 1     time.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to ask the general if he

 3     agreed with the fact that Ambassador Akashi acknowledged our fears and

 4     that he accepted that everything must be done as soon as possible in

 5     order to preserve peace and avoid NATO threats.

 6             But can we look at the bottom of the page to see what Karadzic

 7     asked as an additional request.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Can you please look at that.  Can you tell me, is this a

10     legitimate request, under the circumstances that we are putting our heavy

11     weaponry under supervision, and at the same time our infantry numbers are

12     lower than those of our adversary?

13        A.   I see at the top of the page that Mr. Akashi urges rigid

14     inspections by UNPROFOR, because UNPROFOR had been blamed for being

15     fairly lax about its duties.  It was in the interests of the

16     international community to show that this was serious and that the number

17     of weapons systems, and the locations where those weapons were being kept

18     under supervision of UNPROFOR, that this number be minimised.

19             Next, there are a few preambles and finally some remarks, and I

20     would say that it was standard practice among both parties to associate

21     consequences and conditions -- linkaging with their willingness to

22     co-operate.  Linkaging was -- the moment they wanted to avoid committing

23     to something, they'd say, Yeah, but you're not meeting our agreements.

24     These boundary conditions basically have nothing to do with implementing

25     the Total Exclusion Zone and taking confidence-building measures, because

Page 8516

 1     then that list would have probably been twice the length for both sides.

 2        Q.   But do you agree, General, that this was not posed as a

 3     condition, but rather as a request, and that's what is written, and the

 4     request for the evacuation of Mount Igman derived from a very firm

 5     agreement --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter didn't hear the last part of

 7     the sentence.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Basically, justified complimentary

 9     remarks that Dr. Karadzic has raised in his statement, but, nonetheless,

10     divert our attention from the main issue at this meeting.

11             Mount Igman had been demilitarised, and there shouldn't have been

12     any Bosnian Muslim military.  And we did our best to reverse this time

13     and again, and several times the effort was not successful, but many

14     times it was.

15             The tunnel underneath the airport was one of the life-lines for

16     survival within Sarajevo for a long period, so that was one point for

17     which UNPROFOR would not take responsibility; namely, closing that

18     tunnel.  UNPROFOR would not be responsible for that.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  General, we never

20     disputed the right of civilian use of any road or tunnel, but we are

21     talking here about military use.  The rest deals with the conversation

22     with Mr. Izetbegovic, but I don't have time for that.

23             Can we admit this into evidence?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Don't make any statements, Mr. Karadzic.

25             I take it there's no opposition to the admission of this

Page 8517

 1     document, Ms. Edgerton?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Of course not, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D842, Your Honours.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   General, do you remember that you found yourself in a situation

 7     which was created after the Markale 1 incident of the alleged shelling

 8     incident of the 5th of February?

 9        A.   On 5 February, I wasn't in office, so I'll refrain from any

10     comment concerning the Markale incident, as such.

11        Q.   Thank you.  But did you talk about this with General Rose, and do

12     you agree that these actions, to a considerable extent, were conditioned

13     by this specific event?

14        A.   I think that this question is so general that I can't answer yes

15     or no.  It was clear that by imposing the Total Exclusion Zone on the

16     warring parties, the violence in and around Sarajevo declined visibly.

17     And, of course, there were all kinds of smaller incidents with

18     unfortunate consequences, both injured and dead, but far less than prior

19     to that time, and that's far more significant than the involvement of

20     NATO in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict from 5 February.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Did you discuss the Markale incident with

22     General Rose?

23        A.   Absolutely, as well as the investigation conducted and the

24     conclusion arising from it, which did not determine which of the warring

25     parties could have fired that grenade.

Page 8518

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can we have now Exhibit D162.  It's already in evidence.  It's

 3     General Rose's book.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   I would like you to look at one specific passage.  Did you hear

 6     that the initial investigation indicated that the shot came from the

 7     Muslim side and that General Rose issued a warning to the Muslim side?

 8             Once we get the book, it's page 65, last paragraph, in e-court.

 9        A.   I've read General Rose's book, and undoubtedly I've read this

10     page as well.

11        Q.   Do you now agree, General, that the Markale incident, instead of

12     aggravating the situation, actually calmed down the situation, and that

13     if it had been done by the Muslims, it was a sort of Pyrrhic victory?

14        A.   The NATO involvement and unilateral imposition of the

15     Total Exclusion Zone by NATO improved the situation, not the incident, as

16     such.

17        Q.   Thank you.  But look at this:

18             [In English] "The trajectory of the mortar bomb suggested that it

19     had been fired at extremely short range from either side of the line or

20     perhaps detonated in-situ."

21        A.   I'll leave the text in General Rose's book up to General Rose.

22     It's his reality after having left the mission responsibility for

23     UNPROFOR.  During my time, I did not see anything about these passages,

24     because they were published only later on, and I was not present at the

25     conversations he's quoting, so I have no opinion on that.

Page 8519

 1        Q.   Thank you.  The previous sentence:

 2             [In English] "I told him that the first UN examination of the

 3     bomb crater in Markale market-place indicated that the bomb had been

 4     fired from the Bosnian side of the battle lines."

 5             [Interpretation] And General Hajrulahovic was speechless and

 6     anxious.

 7             Now, General, can you recognise there was a pattern according to

 8     which the Muslims acted in order to lay blame on the Serbs, and they were

 9     quite successful in that oftentimes?

10        A.   I would like to stick to the facts, the facts which I came to

11     know are in a report.  The report did not establish -- was not able to

12     establish the -- whether the mortar grenade was fired from the Serbian or

13     the Bosnian side.  I don't want to speculate on this or try to work out

14     what the intentions could have been of either party.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can I now ask for 65 ter 2669 now.

17             And while we're waiting, we cannot deal much with Srebrenica.

18     1D2669.  I'm sorry, 1D2669.  1D2669.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Do you recall that the NIOD Dutch Institute made quite a

21     voluminous study of the Srebrenica events?

22        A.   Certainly.

23        Q.   The Defence is still not unable to -- has still not been able to

24     analyse everything from this study, but there are parts here that refer

25     to you.  I wanted to show that to you.

Page 8520

 1             So can we please look at page 6 of this document, towards the

 2     bottom of the page.

 3             May I please ask you to look at this marked paragraph.  Did they

 4     talk to you, and is it correct, what is stated here, both in reference to

 5     the existence of an intelligence service -- does the actual -- the entire

 6     paragraph comport with what you, yourself, know?

 7        A.   [Previous translation continues]... intelligence service.

 8     Neither did it have assets in order to gather intelligence.  The only

 9     possibility to gather intelligence was by the troops on the ground, and

10     in my staff we only had limited possibilities for collecting

11     intelligence.  We were largely reliant on information on the ground and

12     former combatants who could give us information, but this could usually

13     not be checked.

14             From a national point of view, there were various countries,

15     including England, for instance, which built up their own intelligence

16     service.  General Rose had a small group of people, a joint commission of

17     observers, it was called, sort of SAS background people, they were, and

18     from their national point of view, they were supplied information by

19     these people in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Netherlands didn't

20     have such -- such people and didn't have such possibilities for gathering

21     intelligence, apart from the channels which I have sketched for you just

22     now.

23             JUDGE KWON:  General, since you can read English, the

24     interpreters couldn't hear the first part of your answer because -- due

25     to some overlapping, but could you check whether some part is missing?

Page 8521

 1             THE WITNESS:  UNPROFOR didn't have its own intelligence service.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             THE WITNESS:  [No interpretation].  [In English] No, that's

 4     correct.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7        Q.   Did you say, in Dutch --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic be asked to repeat what he

 9     said?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your question?

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   They "waren bijna allen al vertrokken naar Holland," in Dutch.

13        A.   There was a small group of people available to General Rose who

14     could get intelligence.  Those people generally had an SAS background.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, this is what I was thinking

16     of.  Thank you.

17             Can we have the next page, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Can you please look at this part that is marked and interpret it

20     for us?

21        A.   Certainly, we saw many Americans appearing, including former

22     General Calvin, supreme allied commander, Europe, who was involved in the

23     build-up of the army for the Muslim-Croatian Federation.  My British

24     intelligence contacts told me that Americans -- all the Americans had a

25     CIA background.  Some of them were in civilian clothes, others in

Page 8522

 1     uniform.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  The general as well as we can read this document.

 3     Put your question, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   In your opinion, General, sir, was this situation that you

 6     described here grounds for concern on our part?  Do you suspect or do you

 7     believe that we also knew this?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  With respect, the general did not describe that

11     situation.  The general has not been asked whether this represents

12     anything he said.  In fact, we have no idea what the provenance of this

13     information is.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE KWON:  We agree.

16             Move on to your next question, Mr. Karadzic.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General, sir, is this something that arose from your interview

19     from -- with representatives of the NOID [as interpreted] Institute?

20        A.   That is correct.  It is paraphrased here.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And can I ask you to read the last sentence:

22     "According to Van Baal ..."

23        A.   The statement by Rose, this statement is said to be by him.  It's

24     quite a few years since I gave the interview -- I had the interview with

25     the NIOD, but I have no reason to assume that it is not as I said.

Page 8523

 1        Q.   According to information from you, General Rose said that he

 2     would agree with the bombing when the American troops are here on the

 3     ground, and then he said:

 4             "Then I will skip the dual key."

 5             Can you explain to us what this "dual key" is in this case?

 6        A.   In all cases, the agreement between NATO and the UN was that

 7     there would be two approvals along those lines for using air-strikes.  It

 8     would not be possible that the NATO would independently perform bombings.

 9     It was an authority of Mr. Akashi, and later, even, in 1995 of the

10     Secretary-General of the UN in New York and the highest NATO command.

11     That is a "dual key."  Literally, "two keys."

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can we look at page 9.

14        Q.   Can we ask you to look at this marked paragraph, where it says

15     that you suspected that American intelligence officers were operating in

16     Sarajevo and that there were many examples of this, because the American

17     Embassy was close by, and it says:

18             [In English] "'We suddenly saw a host of Americans appear,

19     including the former Saceur Galvin.'  According to Van Baal, Galvin had

20     apparently been hired to provide military advice.  The interpreter of

21     General Rose and General Smith, Milos Stankovic, refuted this.  According

22     to him, Galvin was in Bosnia on a reconnaissance."

23             [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

24        A.   This is a representation of my observations or remarks.  The

25     Washington Agreement between the Muslims and the Croats in

Page 8524

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina, by which the MKF was created, and which was a very

 2     serious activity in re-building up the Bosnian Army, this could be seen

 3     in the weapons they had, or equipment, in Sarajevo and also the materiel

 4     that was brought into Bosnia.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  So you were totally aware, then, that there was an

 6     embargo on the import of weapons to Bosnia and that the United Nations

 7     were fighting against that?  Actually, they knew that this was in place;

 8     right?

 9        A.   Yes, the Americans were very clear about that with their policy

10     of lift and strike -- lift the embargo and strike the Serbs.  UNPROFOR

11     did its very best to make clear that there were three parties in conflict

12     that had to come to the table, but the Washington Agreement only invited

13     two, with all -- to the table, with all of the consequences that we have

14     seen.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Here, you're talking about the infiltration of

16     intelligence officers as liaison officers in humanitarian operations, and

17     so on and so forth; then the presence of the CIA, who were employed in

18     various ways.  Are you familiar with the Dutch author --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not catch the name.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   -- who said that different organisations, including humanitarian

22     organisations, youth organisations, were massively infiltrated by various

23     kinds of intelligence officers, and that Sarajevo was a kind of cradle of

24     various intelligence services?

25        A.   I do not agree with this representation of facts.  UNPROFOR and

Page 8525

 1     UNHCR were neutral organisations.  They distanced themselves from

 2     intelligence organisations, and they were not infiltrated; I do not think

 3     so.  But there was an American contribution.  We were able to see that.

 4     The Americans did very clearly have -- try to have a relationship with

 5     UNPROFOR.  All other so-called infiltrations which have been claimed by

 6     journalists, I leave it to the journalists to bear responsibility for

 7     those claims.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  The next unmarked paragraph speaks specifically about

 9     the findings of the Dutch Institute, speaks about this infiltration.  Do

10     you agree that this was an additional reason for Serb caution in relation

11     to these numerous non-governmental organisations and news teams?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  As we go further and further, I find myself

15     wondering what the relevance of this whole line of questioning is, in

16     fact.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to respond, Mr. Karadzic?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very gladly.

19             First of all, the Serbian side was accused of acting, as it

20     states in my indictment in 11 counts, particularly in Count 11, in a

21     particular way.  I would like to show to the parties, to the

22     Trial Chamber, that the Serbian side had reasons for concern and for

23     caution because a vast organisation was working on the defeat of the

24     Serbian side, and this is evidence that we were fighting against an

25     immeasurably greater force than us.  And this fact, that those

Page 8526

 1     organisations were infiltrated, justifies our controls, inspections of

 2     convoys, and generally the caution in relation to the foreign presence at

 3     our lines and in our territory.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, I don't think there's any

 6     difficulty with relevance.  The concern of the Trial Chamber is whether

 7     or not this witness is going to be the witness who can best deal with the

 8     issues which you are raising.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect,

10     Your Excellency, words of this witness are being interpreted right here,

11     and his name is mentioned in this paragraph.  This is not a question of

12     Serbian paranoia.  This is a matter of the massive presence of

13     intelligence services, and those who were not favourable towards the

14     Serbian side, at that, and this is something that the witness noted at

15     that time.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  We can see what the witness noted, or we can see

17     what is reported.  I think the most efficient course, then, is simply ask

18     the general whether he can assist.

19             JUDGE KWON:  General, do you think you can answer that question?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If my name is linked to statements,

21     I bear responsibility for them.

22             The NIOD report was discussed in great detail.  Observations made

23     by the NIOD now, seven years later, looking back, establishing how

24     various countries set up intelligence organisations, well, that is

25     something that really I cannot comment on.

Page 8527

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  And just one further note, Your Honour.

 3             We don't agree that these extracts put to the general represent

 4     anything extracted from the NIOD report.  In fact, if you look further

 5     through this document, Your Honour, it appears it may refer to private

 6     interviews.  There's a large number of citations to confidential sources,

 7     confidential informants.  And, frankly, Your Honour, if it was something

 8     from the NIOD report, it wouldn't be in this language, in the first

 9     instance, in any regard.  So I just don't want the general to be under

10     any misapprehension that these represent citations from the NIOD report.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow.  Let me understand fully what you

13     just stated.

14             What is this?  You said this is not an extract or excerpt of the

15     NIOD report?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I think this comes from a book, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE KWON:  The NIOD book?

18             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.

22             Actually, I retrieved this.  This is directly from the NIOD

23     report.  If you look at the top of the document, there's a citation to

24     their web site, in which the report is published on the internet.  And

25     yesterday I went to that web site, and I looked at the different chapters

Page 8528

 1     and selected these ones in which General Van Baal has been quoted.  And

 2     that NIOD report is available on-line as well as in hard copy, and I can

 3     assure you that everything that's been exhibited in this document comes

 4     verbatim from the NIOD report.  And I think the general could confirm

 5     that, since he seems to be very familiar with that report.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We didn't hear at the outset this is a sort of

 7     excerpt from that NIOD report.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  The report, itself, is in several volumes,

 9     it's hundreds of pages, and so these are excerpts that pertain to this

10     particular subject that Dr. Karadzic wanted to question.  But if the

11     Chamber wishes, we could print out the entire report and we could --

12             JUDGE KWON:  And I remember the general confirmed the part in

13     which he was referred to, so we can safely move on.

14             You have 10 minutes, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 11, and then we

16     will complete this particular section.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Here, in paragraph 5, "UNPROFOR and DutchBat as a target for

19     communications intelligence."  And -- communication intelligence.  And

20     here, this part is where you are quoted as confirming that there was

21     bugging, and so on and so forth; that this could have done by the Bosnia

22     and Herzegovina Army.  Ah, yes, there was a joke made here.  General Rose

23     made a joke here and confirmed that they were bugged, and that this was

24     something that was accessible to the Bosnian side.

25        A.   This is a correct representation.

Page 8529

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can I tender these parts of the document that refer to the

 3     witness?  They are marked.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Given that the general has, without looking at

 6     what appears to be his transcripts of the original interviews, confirmed

 7     the accuracy of those excerpts, I would agree to those excerpts only.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit only those parts confirmed by the

 9     witness and which refers to the general's statement at the time; i.e.,

10     the highlighted part.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D843, Your Honours.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13        Q.   General, sir, I am now going to go back a little bit, about your

14     knowledge about the military installations in Sarajevo.

15             Is it correct that you said in one testimony that there was a

16     large number of military installations in Sarajevo, as well as mobile

17     targets such as military trucks, and so on and so forth?  If you want me

18     to remind you, you stated this in the Galic case on the 8th of July,

19     2002, on pages 11392 to 394.  If you can confirm this, we don't need to

20     call up the document.

21        A.   What I confirmed before does not need to be confirmed again.

22             A large number of barracks and military trucks which were hidden

23     or which were inside the barracks, these were seen.  Weapons systems were

24     not part of this, absolutely not.

25        Q.   But you also said that they successfully placed mortars, let's

Page 8530

 1     say, close to the airport or other installations, and even a tank close

 2     to the Kosevo Hospital; is that right?

 3        A.   Two incidents took place, they're in my statement; one was

 4     a mortar near the airport and one a tank near the Kosevo Hospital, that's

 5     correct.  As far as the weapon collection points are concerned, there was

 6     one at Tito Barracks, weapons under the control of the French.  And for

 7     UNPROFOR, there was a place under the tunnel near the Olympic Stadium

 8     where UNPROFOR had no access to this, and it was said that heavy weapons

 9     had been there.  I was not able to check and never had access to that

10     tunnel.

11        Q.   Thank you.  You heard rumours that explosives were being

12     manufactured near the Tito Barracks; is that correct?

13        A.   We investigated this, but we found nothing at all.

14        Q.   Do you know that at Bosnalijek factory near the tunnel in

15     Velesici, there was a production plant making explosives?

16        A.   I cannot confirm this.

17        Q.   Thank you.  You have confirmed that the majority of conflicts --

18     sparks and conflicts took place along the front-lines that went through

19     the city.  According to what you know, did these front-lines cross

20     through the city at several different locations?

21        A.   A recent map would be necessary from the period in order to show

22     where the confrontation line actually ran and whether it is the case that

23     it went through the city.  It was the fact that in the northern part, the

24     front-line was close to the houses and close to flat buildings.  That is

25     a point.

Page 8531

 1        Q.   Do you agree that this line crossed over the buildings in

 2     Dobrinja, and that at Grbavica you had a street or a river that was a

 3     separation line between the two parties?  Sometimes it was a street,

 4     sometimes a river.

 5        A.   That is correct.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  It's time for you to wrap up your cross-examination.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9        Q.   General, did you state that 99 per cent of the Serb heavy

10     weaponry was under UNPROFOR control and that it was out of action?

11        A.   99 per cent of the Serbian heavy weaponry were under the control

12     of UNPROFOR.  That is more than surveillance, more than supervision, and

13     they also were not -- most of them were not used.  They were

14     maintained -- it was trained with these, but they were, in general, not

15     used.  There were some exceptions during the period that I was chief of

16     staff, where some weapons systems were withdrawn from control by

17     UNPROFOR, and this was a violation of the Total Exclusion Zone regime,

18     for various reasons.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And the last topic, General, is as follows:  Do you

20     remember Silajdzic telling you that they were after a gold medal because

21     they managed to portray themselves as victims to win over the sympathy of

22     the international community and strong support of the USA, and that they

23     were after a gold medal?  Do you remember that?

24        A.   This is an almost correct representation of a private comment by

25     Mr. Silajdzic which he made to me.  It is not complete.  I refer you back

Page 8532

 1     to my earlier statement about this topic.

 2        Q.   Well, yes.  In your opinion, what he meant by saying that they

 3     were after a gold medal, was that an explanation why they refused to

 4     accept peace and that, instead, they wanted the whole of Bosnia, they

 5     wanted to be victorious in Bosnia?

 6        A.   I think it would be wise to pose the question to Mr. Silajdzic,

 7     himself.  I'm not going to speculate.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             Ms. Edgerton, how long would you need for your re-examination?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Five minutes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We started -- I think we can continue.  Let's do it

12     now.

13             Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

15                           Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

16        Q.   General, in your evidence yesterday, at page 8460, lines 13 to

17     17, you were asked:

18             "Is it true that the tram was running parallel with the

19     confrontation line and that it could have been hit from either side

20     during the exchange of fire between them, especially in the area of

21     Sniper Alley?"

22             Your reply was:

23             "Technically, it would have been possible to bring that about."

24             Do you remember that question and giving that answer?

25        A.   I gave that answer, and I remember it clearly.  It was correct.

Page 8533

 1        Q.   Now, first of all, when Dr. Karadzic referred to "either side" in

 2     his question, what did you understand him to be referring to?

 3        A.   Shooting at the trams from the BSA side or the Muslim side.

 4        Q.   And when you gave your answer, did you have in mind any types of

 5     situations in particular?

 6        A.   No, I gave an answer as I intended.  Technically, it was possible

 7     that Muslim military and Serbian military could shoot at the trams.  That

 8     was my answer to the question.

 9        Q.   Now, over the course of your tour in Sarajevo, did you ever

10     receive any reports or information to the effect that trams had been

11     fired on by forces on the Bosnian-held side of the confrontation line?

12        A.   I never saw a report which showed that it had been established

13     that a Bosnian military Muslim -- that a BiH military shot at the trams.

14     I've never seen such a report.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  That's the re-examination,

16     Your Honour.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE KWON:  General, I have three questions for you.

20                           Questioned by the Court:

21             JUDGE KWON:  I take it you have your statement in front of you.

22     The first question relates to para 48 of your amalgamated statement.  The

23     second part of that paragraph reads like this:

24             "I concluded that there was, indeed, a policy or a tactic

25     employed by both the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and the president side of

Page 8534

 1     using sniping as a means of repression and terror."

 2             I wonder whether you can expand on the tactics or policies

 3     adopted by the Bosnian side -- the president side of using sniping as a

 4     means of repression and terror.

 5        A.   Throughout the whole conflict, a large number of moments occurred

 6     in which there were casualties in Sarajevo because of sniping.  In my

 7     contacts, beginning with the first conversation with

 8     General Milovanovic --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  The date the interpreter missed.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] ... and the following discussions,

11     I became more and more convinced that what was happening on the ground

12     was, indeed, following on a command-and-control system from above and

13     could be influenced in that direction.  It had been -- they had tried

14     many times to tell me that they could not have influence on what happened

15     on the ground, but it became -- was shown -- demonstrated time and time

16     again that that control was there.  The direct influence being executed

17     was shown many, many times.

18             The arguments used in relation to this topic alarmed me.  I

19     realised that from 1994, when heavy weapons were no longer a way in which

20     the city of Sarajevo could stay in its former situation, that an

21     alternative, with small weapons at greater distance, in order to tell the

22     civilians that we can determine what happens in the city, became a

23     reality.

24             I became convinced in my discussions with General Milovanovic

25     that whatever he said was in harmony with what Mladic, his chief and the

Page 8535

 1     then president.  I concluded that politically and at the highest military

 2     level, and at the level of execution, there was a clear line about using

 3     snipers.

 4             The role -- I say there was a unilateral role played by the

 5     Serbs.  I deduced, from the context and the activities which were taking

 6     place, that this was the case.  I have not said anything about the

 7     situation on the Bosnian side.  I have no opinion on that.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

 9             My question was rather focused on the president side, because you

10     included the president side in this paragraph.

11        A.   Yes, and I deduced that primarily from my conversations with

12     Victor Andreev and Krajisnik and the vice-president.  If you probe more

13     specifically, I'm not referring to the former president of the

14     Republika Srpska, Mr. Karadzic, but Mr. Krajisnik.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I'll leave it there.

16             My second question relates to paragraphs from 22 to 26 or 7.

17     You'll remember that the Canadian Battalion -- Canadian forces were

18     surrounded by VRS members, and you telephoned Mr. Karadzic, and Karadzic

19     agreed to tell them to withdraw, and, actually, they did.  And you said

20     it's an example of the command and control of Mr. Karadzic over the VRS

21     members.  Do you remember that, General Van Baal?

22        A.   Yes, I remember that, yes.

23             JUDGE KWON:  But we also noted in your statement overnight that

24     you found that VRS members installed the remote-controlled mines, so my

25     question is that:  Despite the order of Mr. Karadzic to withdraw, they

Page 8536

 1     installed those mines, so can one not say whether it's an example of the

 2     fact that his orders were not respected by the VRS?

 3        A.   In the second situation -- first, let me state that I was unable

 4     to verify, regarding the situation in the evening and overnight, that the

 5     instructions went directly from Mr. Karadzic to the ground troops or who

 6     was the intermediary.  That's one point.

 7             The second thing, as we discussed the next day, that

 8     Mr. Karadzic, through General Galic, expressed tremendous dissatisfaction

 9     that the remote-controlled mines had been placed again underneath the

10     vehicles, and he promised that they would be removed.  So the second time

11     Karadzic told General Galic that the remote-controlled mines had to be

12     removed from under the vehicles, and within 20 minutes from the Serb side

13     and via my headquarters from Galic, we heard that that had, indeed,

14     happened.  So the remarks and instructions from Dr. Karadzic were being

15     directly carried out at that point.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, then I'll leave it there.

17             My last question is related to the notes you admitted to have

18     taken at the time.  It transpired during the cross-examination by

19     Mr. Karadzic's legal adviser, Mr. Robinson, that you indicated that you

20     had contemporaneous notes from your time in Sarajevo, and you reviewed

21     those notes prior to giving testimony in this case, and you, indeed,

22     refreshed your memory, thanks to those notes.  Since I note that the

23     motion was filed by the Defence, and probably the Prosecution will have

24     the opportunity to comment upon this, and then you were given the

25     opportunity to respond to this, but it is the Chamber's practice to leave

Page 8537

 1     it in the voluntary co-operation between the parties and witness, so can

 2     I ask you, again, whether you would be prepared to disclose those parts

 3     which was taken during your tour in Sarajevo, redacting all those

 4     unnecessary or irrelevant parts?  I remember you stated that -- I

 5     don't -- you didn't see any reason whatsoever to release them, but

 6     whether you are minded to reconsider your position.

 7        A.   I'll think about this, and I'll let you know, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  My last comment is that whether you would be

 9     prepared to copy those parts in particular that relate to your meeting

10     with General Milovanovic, when he alleged, say, that he would see to it

11     that trams would be targeted.  So we'll ask our Victims and Witness

12     Section to contact you after your testimony is over and whether -- I

13     would appreciate it very much if you let us know about your position.

14        A.   I'll let you know.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             That concludes your testimony, General Van Baal.  I thank you, on

17     behalf of the Bench and the Tribunal, for your coming to the Tribunal to

18     give it.  Now you're free to go.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We'll adjourn for half an hour.  No, we -- yes, we

21     need to adjourn for half an hour, and we'll begin next in -- resume at 10

22     minutes to 1.00.

23                           [The witness withdrew]

24                           --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.

Page 8538

 1                           [The witness entered court]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Before we proceed with the next witness's evidence,

 3     shall we go into private session to discuss one matter.

 4                           [Private session]

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 8539

 1                           [Open session]

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Mr. Miokovic.

 4             If you could kindly take the solemn declaration.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 6     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 7                           WITNESS:  DRAGAN MIOKOVIC

 8                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please be seated.

10             As discussed in our previous private session, given that the

11     witness consents to lifting the protective measures, i.e., pseudonym, the

12     Chamber grants the motion from the Defence to lift the protective

13     measures being limited to the use of pseudonym.

14             Yes, Mr. Gaynor.

15             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, I forgot to mention the Chamber also

17     consulted the three Judges involved in the previous proceedings.

18             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19                           Examination by Mr. Gaynor:

20        Q.   Witness, could you state your full name, please.

21        A.   My name is Dragan Miokovic.

22        Q.   You gave statements to the Office of the Prosecutor of this

23     Tribunal in November 1995 and February 1996; is that right?

24        A.   That's right, only I really cannot tell you the exact dates.  But

25     I did give those statements.

Page 8540

 1        Q.   You testified in the trials of Dragomir Milosevic and

 2     Momcilo Perisic; is that correct?

 3        A.   That's correct.

 4        Q.   On Tuesday, which was the 26th of October, you reviewed a copy of

 5     an amalgamated statement which contains relevant parts from your earlier

 6     statements and testimony; do you recall that?

 7        A.   Yes, I do.

 8        Q.   You had an opportunity to make one or two corrections to that; is

 9     that right?

10        A.   That's right.

11             MR. GAYNOR:  Could I ask for 65 ter 90198, please.

12        Q.   On the screen in front of you, Mr. Miokovic, do you see the first

13     page of your amalgamated statement?

14        A.   Yes, I see it.

15        Q.   I want to clarify just one point concerning the sequence of

16     events on the 8th of November, 1994.  And this is at page 3 of your

17     statement.  No need for you to review it, Mr. Miokovic.  But do you

18     recall that after you finished your on-site investigation after the first

19     shell had impacted, you waited at the site of the location, and -- do you

20     recall that?

21        A.   Yes, we were waiting at the site after we had completed the

22     on-site investigation.

23        Q.   You say in your statement that you finished your on-site

24     investigation at 4.55 p.m., and the second shell hit Livanjska Street at

25     5.25 p.m., just half an hour later.  Do you remember that?

Page 8541

 1        A.   Yes, I do.

 2        Q.   Could you just clarify at what time you left Livanjska Street

 3     after completing the investigation into the first impact?

 4        A.   Due to the fact that I wanted to wait for UNPROFOR members to

 5     arrive on the scene, as was the usual practice, and they were not coming,

 6     during which time the city was under heavy shelling, even the broader

 7     area, not only the place where I was, now my judgement was that I should

 8     wait for another 10 or 15 minutes, and after that I ordered all the

 9     evidence to be collected from the scene and that scene be abandoned.  So,

10     in hindsight, I think that this took place at around 10 past 5.00.

11             MR. GAYNOR:  Now, with that clarification, Your Honours, could I

12     ask that the statement be admitted?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1830, Your Honours.

15             MR. GAYNOR:  And I propose to read a brief summary of the

16     witness's evidence.

17             The witness was an investigator and an investigative team leader

18     for the CSB Sarajevo, and in that capacity participated in investigations

19     of shelling and sniping incidents in Sarajevo during the period 1992 to

20     1995.  He did not personally conduct crater analysis, nor did he

21     determine the calibre of projectiles.

22             Mr. Miokovic led an investigative team which investigated three

23     mortar shells which impacted on Livanjska Street on 8th November 1994.

24     The first impact, at Livanjska Street 26, killed a 15-year-old girl

25     instantly and wounded a 9-year-old boy, who later died of his injuries.

Page 8542

 1     Mr. Miokovic and his team inspected the impact crater, videotaped the

 2     incident site, and then withdrew, due to the risk of the location being

 3     hit again.  Less than 30 minutes after the team had withdrawn, two shells

 4     struck at Livanjska Street number 36.  The second shell killed a

 5     20-year-old woman.  The site was secured overnight for investigation on

 6     the following day.  The investigative team concluded that all three

 7     shells had been fired from Bosnian Serb-held positions.

 8             Mr. Miokovic also investigated two sniping incidents on 23rd

 9     November 1994.  In each incident, a tram moving from the old part of town

10     to the new part of town was struck by sniper fire.  The second tram was

11     struck about 15 minutes after the first.  In the first incident, two

12     passengers were injured.  In the second incident, one was killed and

13     three were injured.  The investigative team concluded that both trams had

14     been struck by fire coming from the direction of Grbavica, which was

15     under Bosnian Serb control.

16             Mr. Miokovic also investigated an incident on 3rd of March, 1995,

17     in which a tram was hit by automatic gun-fire, injuring several

18     passengers.  The gun-fire in this incident was also determined to have

19     come from the direction of Grbavica.

20             That concludes the summary.  I'd now like to ask you a very few

21     questions, Mr. Miokovic, to clarify a couple of points.

22        Q.   First, in your report concerning the first Livanjska Street

23     shell, which has been admitted, Your Honours, as P1704, your report

24     states that the investigating judge of the Sarajevo High Court,

25     Milorad Potparic, was immediately informed about the incident, and your

Page 8543

 1     report says that he authorised members of the centre to conduct the

 2     on-site investigation.

 3             You recall that report?

 4        A.   If we're talking about the first incident that happened on the

 5     8th of November, where, unfortunately, these two children were killed, I

 6     can confirm that, pursuant to the legal procedure, I immediately informed

 7     the investigating judge of all the facts that I established, and this

 8     investigating judge, Milorad Potparic, did not actually go to the scene,

 9     as he was obliged to do, sent me to -- he sent me to head the

10     investigation team on the scene on the 8th, and so that is what we did.

11     We went to the -- on scene to conduct an investigation without the

12     presence of the investigating judge.

13        Q.   Do you happen to know the ethnic background of Milorad Potparic?

14        A.   I know that he is an ethnic Serb.

15        Q.   What is your own ethnic background?

16        A.   I am an ethnic Serb.

17        Q.   How much of your life have you lived in Sarajevo?

18        A.   My parents are from Sarajevo.  I was born in Foca in 1958, where

19     they were employed at the time.  One and a half years after I was born,

20     they came back to Sarajevo.  And ever since that time, I have been living

21     in Sarajevo.

22        Q.   During the period of the siege of Sarajevo between 1992 and 1996,

23     did you have to leave Sarajevo at one stage?

24        A.   I was injured on the 2nd of June, 1992.  Since my condition was

25     getting worse, on the 7th of April, 1993, together with 11 wounded

Page 8544

 1     persons, I was evacuated to Germany, and I was in a clinic in a place

 2     called Boxtehude, very close to Hamburg.  I underwent two surgeries, and

 3     I was the only one of those 12 wounded to return to Sarajevo.  I returned

 4     on the 26th of June, 1993.  I wasn't in Sarajevo during that particular

 5     period of the siege.  For the rest of the time, I was in Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   Now, during the period that you were in Sarajevo for the siege,

 7     did you work for the RBiH MUP for the entirety of that period?

 8        A.   I have been a policeman from 1987, so I was a police officer when

 9     the war broke out.  But up until December 1993, I worked as an

10     investigator in a police station, and then in December -- early December

11     1993, I transferred to the Murder and Sexual Crimes Department of the

12     police in Sarajevo, and I have been performing those tasks ever since.

13        Q.   So it's right, is it, that from -- throughout the siege, you were

14     employed by the RBiH MUP; is that correct?

15        A.   Yes, that is correct.

16        Q.   Did you work with other police officers of different ethnic

17     backgrounds during that period?

18        A.   During that period at the CSB in Sarajevo, of course, if we're

19     talking about the 1992-1995 period, the bulk of my colleagues were

20     Bosniaks, Muslims.  This was not a completely ethnically-pure community,

21     but my colleagues of Serb or Croat ethnicity worked in different sectors

22     of the service, as we referred to them.

23        Q.   Could you tell the Court approximately how many sniping incidents

24     you participated in the investigation of?

25        A.   About 50 of such cases, approximately.

Page 8545

 1        Q.   And in respect of shelling incidents, the investigation of

 2     shelling incidents, how many of those incidents did you participate in

 3     the investigation of?

 4        A.   Also, not less than a hundred, roughly.

 5        Q.   Were you the team leader in the investigative teams in many of

 6     those incidents?

 7        A.   In view of the fact that I was assigned to this section for

 8     violent and sexual crimes, in each situation when I or any of my

 9     colleagues from that department went to the scene, and the investigating

10     judge was not heading the team, as a rule, the person from that

11     department would be the head of the team.  So in each situation where the

12     investigating judge was not present, I would be the team leader.

13        Q.   Now, during the course of your investigations during the period

14     1992 to 1995, did you encounter any credible information that

15     Bosnian Government forces were deliberately shelling or sniping the

16     civilian population?

17        A.   Never in any of the cases.  I did not see any concrete evidence

18     or operative indications, as we refer to them, nor was I in a situation

19     to have access to such information.

20        Q.   Could you explain what you mean when you say you were not in a

21     situation to have access to such information?

22        A.   I'm afraid that I didn't understand your last question.

23        Q.   Yes.  I'll repeat it for you.

24             In your previous answer, you said that you "did not see any

25     concrete evidence or operative indications, as we refer to them, nor was

Page 8546

 1     I in a situation to have access to such information."

 2             Could you clarify your answer a little bit to indicate what you

 3     meant?

 4        A.   When I say -- or, actually, when I said something about specific

 5     traces, concrete traces on the scene, never on any occasion did

 6     ballistics experts or criminal investigation technicians, who were always

 7     a part of my team, had any doubts that a sniper -- a bullet or that a

 8     shell had been fired from any other positions other than those which at

 9     that time were under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska.  When I

10     talked about operative intelligence or information, Sarajevo is not a

11     large town.  What I'm trying to say is that many people knew each other.

12     So there were never any rumours, any talks with people, people who were

13     in the armija and even, if you wish, people who were part of the

14     underground, did people who were carrying out regular police assignments

15     find out any information that these things were happening or that

16     anything ever was done in this context.

17             MR. GAYNOR:  Mr. President, that ends the direct examination.

18             I'd now like to deal with the associated exhibits, if I may.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             MR. GAYNOR:  Seven of the associated exhibits which are listed in

21     our filing have been admitted.  I've provided the exhibit numbers to the

22     Registrar.  I can read them into the record, if Your Honour wishes.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I counted six, but you say it's seven, so why

24     don't you name them.

25             MR. GAYNOR:  Certainly.

Page 8547

 1             65 ter 10439 is P1727.  65 ter 09699 is P1714.  65 ter 13330 is

 2     P467.  65 ter 10429 is P1701.  65 ter 09678 is P1704.  65 ter 10437 is

 3     D739.  Finally, 65 ter 13331 is P1706.  And I'd move for the admission of

 4     the remainder -- of the balance of the exhibits into evidence.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Any objections?  None.

 6             Yes, they will be admitted and given numbers by the Court Deputy,

 7     in writing, in due course.

 8             Yes, Mr. Gaynor.

 9             MR. GAYNOR:  Yes.  Just to clarify the associated exhibits, all

10     of those admitted previously under seal can be admitted publicly.  I just

11     want to clarify that.  We're not tendering anything under seal.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MR. GAYNOR:  And, finally, there's one subject I'd like to

14     clarify in private session concerning protective measures, please.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 8548

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6                           [Open session]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I saw you nodding, Mr. Miokovic.  We need your

 8     verbal answer too for our record.  So you agreed to only the protective

 9     measure of image distortion; nothing else?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was just waiting for you to

11     finish speaking, Your Honour.

12             Yes, I agreed to that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Miokovic.

14             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Good day, Mr. Miokovic.

19        A.   Good day.

20        Q.   I would ask you to help us to clarify your position.  Which

21     school did you complete?

22        A.   I am a criminologist by profession.  I completed the first level

23     of the Faculty of Criminology in Sarajevo.

24        Q.   Did you finish any police school before that?

25        A.   No, not any police school, but police courses and police

Page 8549

 1     training, a number of such trainings, yes.

 2        Q.   Can you help us, then?  After elementary school, what was your

 3     regular education?

 4        A.   I finished the First Gymnasium in Sarajevo, Prva Gimnazija, and

 5     after that the first two years of a university education.

 6        Q.   At which school?

 7        A.   At the Faculty of Criminology in Sarajevo.

 8        Q.   When was this faculty established?

 9        A.   I think -- I think in 1993 or 1994.

10        Q.   And how long is this education?

11        A.   The university education takes four years.  In order to achieve

12     the first degree of this higher education, you need two years.

13        Q.   So if you finished -- if you began your education at that school

14     in 1993, you completed the education in 1995; is that correct?

15        A.   I completed that degree -- that title of professional

16     qualification in 2005.

17        Q.   If I may, then, summarise:  From 1986, you were -- you had

18     completed the gymnasium and police training courses?

19        A.   I didn't finish police training courses.  After completing my

20     gymnasium, my secondary school, I worked on other jobs.  I didn't work in

21     the police.  In 1987, pursuant to the then legal procedure then in force,

22     I got a job in the police, and I got a job at the Public Security Station

23     Stari Grad, in the criminal police section, where I was working as an

24     investigator, which was quite legitimate.  And then while I was doing

25     that job, I completed a number of our own internal police courses about

Page 8550

 1     the way to conduct investigations, different ones that I was conducting

 2     at the time.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I have to summarise again.  So as somebody who had

 4     finished their high school education, you got a job at the police station

 5     as a criminal investigator, doing those kinds of jobs; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   After that, as you were working, you were continuing your

 8     training through internal Police Service courses; is that correct?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Then you enrolled at the Faculty of Criminology, which did not

11     exist before the war but was opened during the war in 1993?

12        A.   Please believe me that I'm not sure, but I know that I began to

13     work while the war was still going on.

14        Q.   And when did you enroll into this faculty?

15        A.   Two years before I completed it.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We will be making

17     breaks.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   So in 2003, you enrolled at university; is that correct?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   The time that we are talking about was -- up until that time, you

22     had completed, in terms of education, your high school and a number of

23     police training courses; is that correct?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   In 1993, were you a crime inspector in the Stari Grad

Page 8551

 1     municipality?

 2        A.   No, I wasn't.

 3        Q.   But you were from that year onwards; is that correct?

 4        A.   Until December 1993, I was working in Stari Grad.  In December

 5     1993, I was transferred to the Violent Crimes and Sexual Crimes at the

 6     Sarajevo CSB.

 7        Q.   And until December 1993, you were working on white-collar crimes;

 8     is that correct?

 9        A.   No, I was working on general crimes, which means thefts,

10     burglaries, break-ins, mostly crimes that had to do with property.  I

11     never worked on white-collar crime.

12        Q.   Oh, yes, you are right.  It says that here, "property crimes."

13     Do you remember when Nikola Gardovic was killed in Stari Grad on the 1st

14     of March, 1992?

15        A.   I remember that very well.

16        Q.   And did your station conduct the investigation?

17        A.   In view of the distribution of authority at the time and now

18     within the CSB in Sarajevo, crimes of murder, which this particular crime

19     was, were processed by colleagues from the Violent Crimes and Sexual

20     Crimes Department of the Sarajevo CSB, meaning that the local police

21     station only assisted their colleagues from the CSB who were actually

22     carrying out this task.  This also pertains to the subsequent

23     investigation procedures.

24        Q.   Thank you.  In order -- for the sake of the parties, would you

25     allow me to remind you that the killing of Nikola Gardovic is actually

Page 8552

 1     the killing of the bridegroom's father in a wedding procession near the

 2     Old Serbian Church on the 1st of March, which was then followed by the

 3     setting up of barricades?

 4        A.   The place where this incident occurred and the background of the

 5     victim is something that I can agree on.  As for the assessment whether

 6     this was something that prompted the erection of barricades in Sarajevo

 7     is a point for discussion, and it's something that I cannot agree with.

 8        Q.   Well, it's enough for the parties to know that the killing of

 9     Nikola Gardovic is actually the killing that is usually referred to as

10     the killing in the wedding procession; is that correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Since you moved to the Violent Crimes and Sexual Crimes

13     Department - I am reading on the second page of your statement - you

14     participated in 12 investigations against unidentified perpetrators, and

15     out of those 12, you managed to solve 10; is that correct?

16        A.   If all this that you said, you said using the plural, "we," as

17     the department, then that is correct.

18        Q.   And in how many of these investigations were you the lead

19     investigator?

20        A.   I really cannot recall that.  It's been a long time since then.

21     But I would like to say that in investigations of crimes, classic murders

22     at that time during the war, during the siege of Sarajevo, that we were

23     conducting, the main person in charge of the activity, the person who was

24     the team leader, would usually be the chief of that department.  The rest

25     of us, the members of the department, would be carrying out those

Page 8553

 1     assignments, but the co-ordination in that case was entrusted to the

 2     chief of the section.

 3        Q.   Did an investigating judge take part as well?

 4        A.   As a rule and, of course, always in compliance with the then Law

 5     on Criminal Procedure in force, and I want to make it quite clear, an

 6     investigating judge was involved, either directly or by delegating his

 7     responsibilities concerning certain aspects of his job to the chief of

 8     our department.

 9        Q.   What was the qualification of your chief of department?

10        A.   I really can't remember, but you can rest assured that this post

11     at that time could only be held by someone with a university degree.

12        Q.   And in most cases that was the university degree in law; is that

13     correct?

14        A.   I would not agree with you.  That was not always the case, not

15     always the Faculty of Law.

16        Q.   But the majority of cases?

17        A.   In the majority of cases, they had degrees in the faculties that

18     we call Social Sciences.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Out of the 10 investigations, how many of them ended

20     with a trial?  And I'm talking about 10 successful investigations of

21     unidentified perpetrators.

22        A.   In police jargon, a successfully completed investigation means to

23     bring the case to such a level that it can be forwarded to the Court.  So

24     out of the 10, all of them.

25        Q.   So how did these cases end before the Court?  How many of these

Page 8554

 1     investigations were confirmed by the Court and how many of them ended in

 2     a conviction?

 3        A.   After such a long time, I cannot remember which particular cases

 4     we are talking about.

 5             Secondly, according to the then and the present Law on Criminal

 6     Procedure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Court is not obliged to report back

 7     to the police about the results.  Therefore, there are no such records in

 8     the police that pertain to that period or to the present time.

 9        Q.   Are there any records kept about the degree of success of the

10     work done by the police?

11        A.   Of course, we have our internal police methods which we apply to

12     measure the degree of our success.

13        Q.   Does that include also bringing it to the trial?  Do you consider

14     a success a case that goes to the Court and ends with a successful

15     conviction?

16        A.   I would like to underline once again that, according to the law

17     in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Courts are completely independent.  We have no

18     way whatsoever of following what was going on.  We have no way of

19     following how many and what kind of judgements the Courts passed.  Of

20     course, I'm talking about the present.  If we are dealing with major

21     cases, such as homicide, of course we follow that.

22             Now, I can tell you that since 2003 up to date, 97 murders were

23     committed in the area of Sarajevo canton.  Ninety-four were solved, and

24     in three cases we only have indications as to the identity of the

25     perpetrators, and there is not sufficient evidence to pass it on to the

Page 8555

 1     Courts.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  When we talk about the crime of murder, is it

 3     important for the Court that the investigation was conducted by an

 4     investigating judge?

 5        A.   At that time, that was an investigating judge, and nowadays, it's

 6     a prosecutor.  So this is the basic statutory obligation for an

 7     investigation to be carried out by an investigating judge at that time

 8     and by a prosecutor nowadays.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sort of at a loss where we are heading.  When

10     are you going to come to the relevant issues in this case?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You will see, Your Excellency.  I

12     have finished with this part, but once we go to specific examples, you

13     will realise my intention.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Miokovic, you said, in your statement on page 2, that

16     according to some rough estimates, the events resulted in 11.000

17     civilians killed in the town of Sarajevo; is that correct?

18        A.   According to some estimates, and I say estimates made by the CSB

19     immediately after the war, we estimated, and I underscore "estimated,"

20     that the number of fatalities in Sarajevo who, at the time when they were

21     killed, had nothing to do with the front-line, that is to say, were not

22     directly involved in combat, was between 10.000 and 11.000.  Now, after

23     we investigated these things or after various government and

24     non-government agencies also investigated it, our estimate proved to be

25     right.

Page 8556

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I ask how long we are going to

 2     work today?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We have to finish -- we have to rise at quarter to

 4     2:00.  We have only 10 minutes left, and my understanding is that there's

 5     something to be raised by your legal adviser.

 6             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.

 8             Mr. President, if we could maybe deal with that at this time, and

 9     I don't -- perhaps since we have to leave at 1.45, if we could continue

10     the cross-examination tomorrow and I can address you at this time.  That

11     would be useful.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I take it that can be discussed in the

13     presence of the witness.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  It can be, although since --

15             JUDGE KWON:  It takes time, so why don't we proceed.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay, that would be fine.

17             So, Mr. President, I think -- I don't know if you've had a chance

18     to see, from a late filing --

19             JUDGE KWON:  I noted it has been filed.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay.  So you're aware that we filed our 26th

21     motion for a finding of a disclosure violation and for remedial measures,

22     and I just wanted to call the Chamber's attention to the fact that this

23     includes a request for an immediate adjournment or suspension of the

24     proceedings.  So I wanted to make you aware of that at the earliest

25     possible time.

Page 8557

 1             The disclosure violation is based upon 14.000 pages received by

 2     us concerning the hard-drive of the Pecanac apartment search, and we

 3     believe, from the very cursory review that we've been able to make of

 4     that material that, like the earlier DVD materials from that same search,

 5     it contains information that is necessary for use in cross-examination of

 6     ongoing witnesses as well as, unfortunately, some material which should

 7     have been used with prior witnesses.

 8             So I just wanted to -- I don't want to argue the motion, but I

 9     just wanted to make you aware --

10             JUDGE KWON:  It's filed, and we have it in front of us.

11             When do you think you can respond to this motion, Mr. Tieger?

12             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I understand, from the Court's inquiry, it

13     would appreciate the earliest possible response.  I can't give you a

14     specific projection at this moment, but we certainly have in mind the

15     Court's interest in a response as quickly as can be managed.  If the

16     Court would wish a preliminary or tentative estimate by the end of the

17     day, perhaps we can communicate through your legal officer, and the Court

18     can address tomorrow whether that projection is suitable.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, thank you.

20             Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22        Q.   Mr. Miokovic, how can you match this figure of 11.000 with the

23     information that 13.000 children were killed in Sarajevo?  This is an

24     official stance and declaration by the Muslim side.

25        A.   First of all, I don't know where you got this as official

Page 8558

 1     information.  Secondly, I don't know what the Muslim side is.  And,

 2     thirdly, in the estimates that we made, which amounted to 10.000 to

 3     11.000 killed people, our assessment was that between 1300 and 1400 of

 4     children under the age of 15 were included in that figure.

 5        Q.   Mr. Miokovic, would you be so kind --

 6        A.   I'm sorry.  I have some problems with my headphones.  I can't

 7     hear anything.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  If the usher would be kind enough to take a look

 9     into the witness's headphone.

10             Do you hear anything?

11             THE COURT USHER:  Yes.  There's a noise in the headphone.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Miokovic, do you hear me very well, without any

13     noise?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.  Yes, I can

15     hear you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Let's see whether --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was incomplete, so

18     I'll repeat it.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Mr. Miokovic, would you be so kind to tell us what you know about

21     the incidents in which large numbers of civilians were killed or were

22     casualties?  Can you enumerate these incidents?

23        A.   In Sarajevo?

24        Q.   Yes.

25        A.   Markale first time, Markale second time, Alekse Santica

Page 8559

 1     Elementary School, of course, Vase Miskin Street.  So these are the first

 2     ones that come into mind.

 3        Q.   How many people were killed on Vase Miskin Street?

 4        A.   Dr. Karadzic, I don't know exactly how many people were killed.

 5     But even if one person was killed, and at least 15 were killed --

 6        Q.   Yes, I agree in that respect, but we have to establish numbers to

 7     compare it with your 11.000.  How many people were killed in

 8     Alekse Santica School?

 9        A.   Of course, I don't know that either.  During 1.425 days of the

10     siege of Sarajevo, and that's an official figure, there were days when

11     UNPROFOR counted over 3.000 shells that landed in Sarajevo.  So on the

12     average, according to UNPROFOR, the number of shells during those 1.425

13     days was around 300.  So based on that, and due to the fact that Sarajevo

14     was under siege, it is true that the army was shooting at Sarajevo, the

15     army that you were the supreme commander of, and that such a huge number

16     of shells and other ammunition was fired at.  And this, unfortunately,

17     resulted in the death of 10.000 to 11.000 residents of Sarajevo.

18        Q.   Mr. Miokovic, I dispute this.  So if between eight to ten

19     civilians were killed on a daily basis, and we know that there was a huge

20     number of days in which nobody was killed, this then faces us with a

21     challenge of finding the days when these averages were reached, so when

22     exactly the civilians were killed en masse.  If you had 100 days without

23     a single civilian victim, then you have to have another day with 700

24     victims.  Can you give us the dates, as an investigator, and the

25     incidents in which huge numbers of civilians were killed?

Page 8560

 1        A.   I am quite sure that you have the capability to call someone who

 2     is an expert in statistics and who can corroborate your data.  You are

 3     entitled to that.  I would like to say that we made our estimates based

 4     on our police documentation, and these estimates, as I already said

 5     earlier, really coincide with the precisely-determined figures, and this

 6     is no secret any longer because it contains full names of the people who

 7     were killed during the siege of Sarajevo.  No matter how I would like to

 8     do that, I cannot give you a specific answer to your question.

 9        Q.   Can we get these official government materials that you're

10     talking about that can be checked?

11        A.   I am sure that your request is a legitimate one, but I think that

12     you are addressing it to the wrong person.

13        Q.   Mr. Miokovic, with all due respect, I know that I can ask someone

14     who is an expert in statistics.  But you have put forward the submission,

15     so how are we going to check this figure of 11.000 civilians?

16        A.   Mr. Karadzic, you can check it in any way you like.  In front of

17     you, you have a man who worked on about a hundred investigations, and in

18     the vast majority of these investigations, the outcome were multiple

19     fatalities.  That is all that I can tell you meritoriously with regard to

20     that issue.

21             JUDGE KWON:  That is it for today.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I just tell the Chamber that we

23     have at least four representative incidents that we have to cover with

24     this witness.  The Defence cannot relinquish its request, either, to

25     request the OTP to prove what is contained here and which we are going to

Page 8561

 1     try and to rebut.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Tomorrow, we'll sit in the morning, 9.00.

 3             We'll rise.

 4                           [The witness stands down]

 5                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

 6                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 29th day of

 7                           October, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.