Page 8836
1 Tuesday, 2 November 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 Doctor, do you hear me?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hear you very well.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Good morning to you, Doctor.
9 WITNESS: YOUSSEF HAJIR [Resumed]
10 [Witness testified via videolink]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 [French interpretation on English channel]
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
14 JUDGE KWON: We are hearing the French translation.
15 Okay, let's continue.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I should like to go quickly over some matters that I believe can
20 be answered with a yes or no, to make things more efficient.
21 First of all, do you know that I issued a great number of orders
22 concerning the protection of civilians, the observation of International
23 Humanitarian Law, et cetera?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Thank you. Tell me, what was the population of Dobrinja?
Page 8837
1 A. Before the war, around 40.000. During the war, I believe it was
2 around 25.000. Nobody can give you a precise answer to that, but these
3 are approximate figures.
4 Q. Thank you. Did you go to attend meetings of the Command of the
5 155th Brigade?
6 A. Never. They never asked me, and I never went, nor was I part of
7 the command, finally.
8 Q. How about your deputy? He was commander of the Medical Service.
9 What was the name of that doctor, the deputy director?
10 A. Dr. Zlatko Kravic. First it was Dr. Radoncic, and then Zlatko
11 Kravic as chief of the Medical Section of the brigade.
12 Q. Was he invited to meetings of the command?
13 A. Honestly, I never asked him, and he never told me that he went to
14 such meetings.
15 Q. Thank you. Let me summarise, then.
16 You did not receive regular daily combat reports?
17 A. No.
18 Q. And you were not involved in the planning of operations, nor in
19 their later analysis?
20 A. I'm not a soldier, really, nor would I know how to analyse
21 military operations, nor would I know how to plan them. That's not my
22 job. I never wanted to interfere with jobs I know nothing about.
23 Q. Were you informed, officially or in any other way, of
24 developments in the theatre of war?
25 A. Sometimes somebody would drop by and tell us what's going on, but
Page 8838
1 nothing official.
2 Q. Thank you. Could you now take your amalgamated statement. I'll
3 try to go quickly over certain paragraphs.
4 In your book, you said you had 1200 or so surgeries and around
5 6.000 minor surgeries in the out-patient clinic, including 1.000-plus
6 peacetime injuries and around 5.000 wartime injuries. That is
7 approximately 6200 surgeries in total. Now, why do larger numbers appear
8 in your statement; 5.000 major surgeries and 16.000 patients in total?
9 A. You see, about exact numbers of injuries and surgeries, I don't
10 know those exact numbers, and nobody will ever know, because no precise
11 records were kept. We never wanted to waste time on that. I don't know
12 what happened to four or five protocols that went missing and we never
13 could trace, whether somebody stole them or whatever happened. All I had
14 was what I had to hand. As for the lost protocols, we tried to track
15 them down. We involved the police as well, but we never found them.
16 That's the reason for this confusion about numbers.
17 Q. Thank you. In fact, it appeared to me that in a population of
18 30.000, 16.000 would have gone through your clinic. Yesterday, you
19 mentioned that there were some people who passed through the tunnel and
20 got injured there. Was the frequency of passages through the tunnel so
21 high that you could get so many patients out of these people?
22 A. The tunnel was 120, 130 centimetres high and it was 800 metres
23 long. You could not stand up properly. You would hit iron beams. It
24 was simply that you had to go through that tunnel for such a long time,
25 maintaining a completely unnatural posture. You can imagine how many
Page 8839
1 people passed in both directions. Injuries were frequent.
2 Q. How many people went through?
3 A. Well, people went through to get to the other side to visit their
4 families, or to get groceries, to find food, to give their children --
5 there are so many reasons why people went to the tunnel. Nobody would do
6 it just like that, because it was dangerous. You never knew when you
7 would be hit by a shell while entering or leaving. Nobody went there on
8 a whim or for enjoyment. It was because of dire need.
9 Q. Thank you. Did entire units of the 1st Corps leave the city and
10 come back through that tunnel?
11 A. Honestly, I personally never saw anything like that. It's
12 possible, but I've never seen it.
13 Q. Where would they assemble if they had to go through the tunnel?
14 What would be the assembly point? Because they couldn't go all together.
15 They would have to go one by one; right?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. So first of all they would have to gather somewhere close to the
18 entrance to the tunnel?
19 A. If what you're saying is true, then that would be right. They
20 couldn't go in all at once.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D2686. I hope
22 you will see it in your e-court.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Have you ever heard of Nedzad Ajnadzic [Realtime transcript read
25 in error "Inadzic"]?
Page 8840
1 A. I believe Nenad Ajnadzic was commander of the 1st Corps. I'm not
2 sure.
3 Q. That's right. Could we now take a look at our electronic mail.
4 I believe we are now going to get this exhibit.
5 The record should be corrected. The name should be spelled as
6 A-J-nadzic, instead of I.
7 Could you now take a look at this text, where it says the tunnel
8 was dug out and its purpose was to provide a safe way for providing
9 logistical support to units in Sarajevo
10 free territory of the BH. That's the paragraph after the enumeration of
11 these systems.
12 A. I don't see it. It doesn't matter. In any case, it's possible.
13 Yes, the purpose of the tunnel was to make things easier, to make it
14 easier to get in and out, not only for civilians, but for soldiers, when
15 necessary.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, please.
17 Sorry, that's a different document.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. On this page, we see there were D and B structures connecting
20 Dobrinja and Butmir, passing through -- below the runway of the Sarajevo
21 Airport?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. The task was entrusted to the BH Army, the 1st Corps, and in the
24 beginning of 1993, in the greatest secrecy, they started digging the
25 tunnel?
Page 8841
1 A. Can I comment?
2 Q. Certainly.
3 A. Before digging the tunnel, you see, you cannot hermetically close
4 in 300.000 people in an area. If you had left the corridor open, you,
5 maybe half of the people would have left, because everybody had needs.
6 They had children to feed, they had families. Before the tunnel was dug
7 out, people simply ran across the runway. Many people were hurt by
8 sniper fire from the Serbian side, and if not from the Serbian side, then
9 by the French Battalion that was responsible for that runway. What do
10 you expect, if you close a person in their own home without letting them
11 walk, breathe? Really, Colleague Karadzic, it's not realistic to expect
12 that.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this page admitted so
14 I can call another one?
15 JUDGE KWON: What page is it, Mr. Karadzic; 257?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, and that's Exhibit 1D2686,
17 marked for identification.
18 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no objection from the Prosecution.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: No objection to it being marked for
20 identification, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be marked for identification.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Can we get 1D2687.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 8842
1 Q. Do you know, Dr. Hajir, that the Serbian side had offered
2 corridors for civilian traffic and commercial traffic, on the condition
3 that no military assets or forces be allowed to use these corridors?
4 A. This is the first I hear of it.
5 Q. I'm afraid they kept many things from you, or perhaps you were
6 too busy and were unable to find out.
7 A. That may well be, but somebody would have spoken up. You see,
8 people were coming and going all the time. People were passing through
9 hospital in great numbers. Somebody would have said something. I never
10 heard of anything like that, really.
11 Q. Could you take a look at this page 259, where it says:
12 "In the night, when the tunnel was completed, 600 soldiers, under
13 full equipment, passed through it immediately, and they went directly to
14 Mount Igman
15 same night, around five tons of military materiel and equipment was
16 delivered to Sarajevo
17 A. I can't see it, but what's your question?
18 Q. Is it consistent with what you said a moment ago, that the
19 through-put of this tunnel was very high, both for soldiers and
20 civilians?
21 A. Very possible.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted in the same number, and we'll
24 mark it for identification. It's a part of the same book, isn't it?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but it's just a different
Page 8843
1 page, 259. Also, 258 and 259 we can admit. Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. In paragraph 8 of your statement, you say that Dobrinja, in the
4 beginning, was not completely surrounded, and do you agree that, in view
5 of the tunnel, it was never completely encircled, just like Sarajevo
6 wasn't, because the traffic through the tunnel was quite substantial?
7 A. I mentioned the time when the war began. With the opening of the
8 tunnel, it was a little bit, but, you know, the capacity of the tunnel
9 and the possibility of allowing the traffic through was quite limited.
10 Q. Thank you. I wanted to ask you: For some of your assertions --
11 for all of your assertions, do you have proof or are these your
12 impressions? Very often, you, yourself, say that, It is my impression.
13 For example, in paragraph 14, the last sentence states that it was your
14 impression that the Serbs only wanted to kill, and that is one of the
15 reasons they did not take Dobrinja. Were they able to kill you easily at
16 the check-point at Vraca?
17 A. Yes, they could have. But then how to explain the sealing off of
18 the town, the hermetical closing off of the town, especially Dobrinja?
19 Dobrinja was a residential area. There were no factories, there was
20 nothing there. How can you fire? And you know that there are children
21 there, the elderly, women, who are defenceless. I had a child, seven or
22 eight years old, shot by a sniper directly in the heart. I mean, the
23 sniper could have seen that this was a child. I am speaking openly,
24 Colleague. These are facts that were happening that I could observe
25 around me, so these are not my impressions.
Page 8844
1 Q. All right. But do you know that the other side, the side of the
2 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or, actually, more the police, was also
3 active in sniper killings of Serbs and Muslims?
4 A. I know that there was several attempts to attack Nedzarici, not
5 for the purpose of occupation, but for the purpose of clearing those
6 sniper nests. This is from what I understood, as far as a number of
7 these actions that were not successful because of poor co-ordination.
8 You say, Organise this, Organise that. These few brigades that were on
9 the line were unable to co-ordinate and carry this out and to secure a
10 safer passage through Mojmilo or other parts of town.
11 Q. Do you agree that Nedzarici was a purely Serbian neighbourhood,
12 with private homes that were mostly -- that mostly had a ground floor and
13 first floor?
14 A. Yes. The majority, yes.
15 Q. Do you agree that this settlement was inferior in relation to
16 Vojnicko Polje, Alipasino Polje, where they had high-rise buildings of
17 some 10, 15 storeys?
18 A. Absolutely, yes, but that is proof that they did not want
19 Nedzarici, because they could have. It seems to me these two or three
20 brigades that were around could have taken Nedzarici. They just wanted
21 to get rid of the sniper nests that were constantly firing at people.
22 Well, at least, this is what I know. I'm telling you what I know.
23 Q. You agree, probably, that the Serbs could probably have captured
24 Dobrinja, but they didn't do that because there would have been many
25 civilian casualties; isn't that right?
Page 8845
1 A. Yes, with the military force that they had and three military
2 barracks, they could have easily taken it in the beginning, and there
3 wouldn't have been that many civilian casualties then.
4 Q. Thank you. I'm concerned with this first sentence from
5 paragraph 14, that:
6 "The Serbs were absolutely targeting civilians."
7 Is this an impression or are you able to give us some kind of
8 evidence for this assertion?
9 A. Yesterday, you showed a paper where you could see injured people.
10 They were all fighters. You didn't show all the papers that you had that
11 would show that there were tenfold more civilians. What can I say?
12 When you tried to save lives, for the most part, people are
13 coming -- actually, very few soldiers came, compared to the number of
14 civilians that came. And I'm telling you, because I know, I was there, I
15 could see what was happening. What would be my impression if the
16 situation that I had was like that?
17 Q. Thank you. And the next sentence says that:
18 "There were no military units there in the beginning, and there
19 was no organised army."
20 Is this the reason why you concluded that civilians were harmed,
21 rather than soldiers?
22 A. Absolutely, Mr. Karadzic. I am telling you, definitely, there
23 were none. Like you said, there was the Patriotic League, the 110th, the
24 140th. Believe me, I would have seen that, people would have told me.
25 There was nothing like that in Dobrinja. These were young men, 20 years
Page 8846
1 old, that would come, who were changing clothes and taking pistols and
2 rifles. They didn't have any heavy weapons. This is the kind of thing I
3 saw in Dobrinja. I'm not saying that there weren't heavier weapons in
4 other places, but there were some lighter weapons that were used among
5 protesters. There was multi-barrelled weapons. Perhaps I saw a tank --
6 I never saw a tank on this side. So this is mostly what I saw.
7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note we are having difficulty
8 understanding the witness.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I understand that you were busy, you were unable to see that. Do
11 you know how many fighters of the 155th Brigade, which existed before
12 August 1992 under a different name, how many fighters of the 155th
13 Brigade were wounded?
14 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Dr. Hajir: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Perhaps the witness's microphone needs to be
16 turned up, because the interpreters are having trouble understanding the
17 witness.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was just about to pay attention to that.
19 Could you, Dr. Hajir, speak to the microphone. Yes. A bit
20 closer, yes. And please put a pause between your answer -- between the
21 question and your answer, kindly.
22 Yes. Could you answer the question?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that I already answered. I
24 don't know.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 8847
1 Q. I'm afraid they didn't hear you. So it's not in dispute that the
2 brigade existed. Yesterday, we showed a document that in August, as
3 already finished, completed brigade, it became part of the 1st Corps, and
4 Muslim information indicates that the brigade had 5.000 fighters. How
5 many of these men or fighters in that brigade were killed and how many
6 were wounded?
7 A. I really couldn't tell you that. I really don't know. We never
8 did any kind of statistical calculations. You can see that all the
9 statistical data, the numbers are problematic, and there was much more,
10 in terms of numbers, than what is stated in books.
11 Q. Thank you. In the case of General Perisic, on the 29th of
12 January, 2009, on page 2998, you said that you didn't differentiate
13 between civilian and military casualties or patients; is that correct?
14 A. We never differentiated between people. People were there, and
15 they needed help if they were hurt, so we didn't make any distinctions.
16 If you make a difference on one side, then there will be a difference
17 made on the other side. One needs to treat everybody equally on all
18 sides. And I think that, in that sense, I acted properly.
19 Q. All right, thank you. I agree with you. It's a fact that many
20 fought in civilian clothing, as you, yourself, confirmed yesterday. Can
21 you please tell me, these 5.000 soldiers, how did they move around in
22 Dobrinja? There were four large battalions and there were two others,
23 one engineering one and another one, I don't what kind it was. How did
24 they move around and manoeuvre around Dobrinja, in such a small area?
25 They must have been very visible and something that would grab the
Page 8848
1 attention of the Serbian Army.
2 A. I never saw any gathering, moving around, and walking in
3 Dobrinja. I don't know of any barracks belonging to the Bosnian Army,
4 either. Things like that weren't there. They didn't gather at the
5 command, either. There were about one or two men at the command who were
6 guarding the commander, guards. As for the rest, I really don't know
7 where they were. Probably, everybody was at home, mostly. Those who
8 were coming from town later, I don't know where they were billeted. I
9 really don't know.
10 Q. If they were at their homes, does that mean that that was their
11 combat deployment or disposition, to be in their buildings?
12 A. Well, where would the people go? They couldn't walk around, they
13 couldn't go home. I mean, it doesn't mean that it was their wartime
14 disposition or assignment to stay at home.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I look at 1D1100 now, please,
16 so that you can see what that looked like on the 23rd of May, 1992,
17 precisely what you were saying, where all the fighters were assembled in
18 Dobrinja.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Were there any trenches or any roads that they could have used
21 otherwise? I mean, this is a major --
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry for interrupting, Your Honour, but can
24 Mr. Karadzic direct me to the exhibit which says there was 5.000 Muslims
25 in the 155th Mountain Brigade, please?
Page 8849
1 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber was discussing that.
2 But, Doctor, Mr. Karadzic put several questions to you on the
3 basis that there were 5.000 Muslim fighters in the region. Can you
4 confirm that?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely not. I really don't
6 know. I mean, if you count the auxiliary services, logistics, and
7 drivers, and whatnot, I still think that you wouldn't get 5.000. I don't
8 think so. Anyway, like I said, we never counted, nobody ever told me
9 anything like that, so I don't know the exact number. But I'm saying
10 that this number of 5.000 cannot be. It's too high a number for that
11 area.
12 JUDGE KWON: Can you give us a rough idea how many soldiers there
13 would be, roughly?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Whatever I were to tell you, it
15 wouldn't be the truth. It wouldn't even be close to the truth. I really
16 don't know.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. We agree that there were four battalions. Do you agree that a
21 battalion numbers between four to six companies?
22 A. Mr. Karadzic, I really don't know how many companies a battalion
23 should have. I really don't know. I'm not avoiding an answer. I'm just
24 telling you what I know. And what I know, I will gladly tell you. What
25 I don't know, I don't know. I thought that yesterday we had put a full
Page 8850
1 stop to that.
2 JUDGE KWON: You confirmed yesterday, did you not, that there
3 were four battalions?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He mentioned six battalions. What
5 I know, I think that there were four battalions. I don't know if there
6 were more. I never heard of that. I wasn't from where those battalions
7 were, and I don't know where they were, you know.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Mr. Karadzic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you agree, Dr. Hajir, that there was a command of the 155th
12 Brigade there with the HQ units, the commands of four battalions with
13 their staff units, and the commands of 15 to 17 companies with their
14 staff units?
15 A. Where? Are you thinking of Dobrinja?
16 Q. That's the 155th. It was deployed?
17 A. Yes, yes, that's correct, it did exist.
18 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at this document. We do have a
19 translation. This is an intelligence report of the 23rd of May, which
20 states that:
21 "Just in the Zikice Jovanovica Spanca Street at numbers," and it
22 gives the odd numbers here, also the even numbers - there are some 20
23 numbers, "that there were strong concentrations of Green Berets. On each
24 floor, there were two members of the Green Berets in order to prevent the
25 movement and communication between the residents."
Page 8851
1 And so on and so forth:
2 "About 40 per cent of the Serbian population moved out of those
3 buildings."
4 And so on. These are armed with automatic rifles, machine-guns,
5 snipers, hand-grenades, and they are being supplied with food every day.
6 Did they conceal so many things from you that you didn't know
7 this?
8 A. I am telling you -- I don't know how to convince you. This is
9 absolutely unknown to me. Perhaps I would have known more had I asked.
10 I really never wanted to ask where they were, who they were, what they
11 were doing. I was doing my job, the task that I set myself, and I did
12 that properly. As for how others were doing their job and what they did,
13 please don't ask me about that, because I know very, very little of
14 things that were going on around me.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I understand that.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Again, I'm sorry for interrupting.
18 It was my understanding that Mr. Karadzic called up 1D01101. Is
19 that the document we're supposed to be looking at, because I don't see
20 the information contained therein that he's been stating.
21 THE ACCUSED: No first was 1100, and next will be 1101.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted?
24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Sutherland.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, if I may, 1D1100 has been admitted
Page 8852
1 as Exhibit D330.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I didn't know it's
4 admitted.
5 Can we now see 1D1101. And also information as to its status; is
6 it already an exhibit? There it is.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Dr. Hajir, can you look at it? It's another intelligence report
9 of the 23rd of May. It says the Green Berets are stationed in the
10 elementary school Petar Dokic in Cengic Vila. And about Dobrinja, it
11 says:
12 "We also received intelligence that Osman Lunja and a certain
13 Prutinja harassed 29 Serbs from the Remzije Pehlimanovica Street. A
14 certain Serif, known as Kise, from Dobrinja, imprisoned 10 individuals,
15 10 Serbs, and was aided by a certain Haris ...," and they tortured the
16 prisoners as well:
17 "On that occasion, they singled out Milorad Djurdjevic just
18 because he was originally from Foca. They forced the prisoners to admit
19 they had been snipers, and they also inquired as to where prominent Serbs
20 were located."
21 Did you hear of this man Kise? He was notorious in Dobrinja.
22 A. I know this Kise, but I know nothing about this incident. This
23 Kise man is a braggart, arrogant, full of himself. He came by a few
24 times.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 8853
1 Can we have this admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: I don't see a basis to admit this, Mr. Karadzic.
3 The doctor knows Kise, but nothing else. I don't see the point of
4 putting this to the doctor.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, I understand. The
6 doctor, himself, said he didn't know about these things going on, so we
7 can try it with someone else.
8 Thank you, Dr. Hajir. We'll move on through your statement.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Could you help us remember how many of these incidents there were
11 involving several or more casualties? We know about one football-match,
12 and we know about the line of people queuing for humanitarian aid. How
13 many incidents were there where civilians were hurt in larger numbers,
14 let's say more than three or more than five?
15 A. You can see it in my book. As far as information reached me, I
16 describe very honestly every incident and how many people were hurt.
17 Whether seven or eight people were hurt in each one of them, I don't
18 really know, but it was really deliberate. People were targeted while
19 waiting for water, while queuing for humanitarian aid. Doesn't that tell
20 you anything? It's not only military targets; it was civilian targets,
21 no matter how wretched and miserable these people were, and you never
22 took the trouble to condemn such actions.
23 Q. I'm afraid you're not very well informed. I did condemn them,
24 and I asked for investigations. And we'll demonstrate, concerning a few
25 incidents, exactly who fired. But since you mentioned that a thousand
Page 8854
1 civilians were killed in Dobrinja, we have to identify in which incidents
2 this happened, how this happened. These had to be dramatic events if a
3 thousand civilians were killed over 1200 days, whereas there were whole
4 months passing without a single person killed.
5 So apart from the football-match and the queue for humanitarian
6 aid, which feature in my indictment, are there any more incidents
7 involving massive casualties that we can identify?
8 A. Mr. Karadzic, every day injured people came to the hospital.
9 After two
10 there was not a single day passing without at least 10 or 15 injured
11 people coming to be treated. I don't know what kind of military or
12 non-military events they got hurt in. These statistics are not reliable.
13 I'm just telling you that nobody really was concerned with numbers at
14 that time. I told you what our priorities were, to what extent we had
15 our hands full. One of these massacres, remember from my book, this
16 woman, Dr. Krlic, came to help out, and she found her son dead. He got
17 killed while helping an elderly woman carry water. How would you react
18 if that happened in the Serbian part of Sarajevo, in a Serbian area?
19 Q. I agree with you. Every death is a tragic event for that person
20 and for his or her family. But we have to deal with statistics here,
21 which you say are not reliable, so we have to take this number of 1.000
22 dead civilians as a very relative number?
23 A. It could be even more.
24 Q. Where would they be buried?
25 A. Mr. Karadzic, the parks were full of graves. There was one
Page 8855
1 graveyard in Dobrinja 3 that was so packed there was not an inch of land
2 to dig anymore. People buried bodies outside their homes, in their
3 yards, in their gardens. It's tragic when you pass through the street,
4 any street, and see all the places where people are buried.
5 Q. Thank you. We saw on that footage yesterday several graves along
6 the road. A thousand graves would be something like the
7 Arlington Cemetery
8 a photograph like that, showing at least 100, if not 1.000, graves? How
9 come there are no pictures showing large graveyards full of civilian
10 graves?
11 A. Now, how would I know that? I did not take any pictures. I
12 never even went out to look. But the number of dead is large. Some
13 people were just driving their dead away somewhere in the city. Some
14 families came belatedly to pick up the bodies and bury them.
15 If you're talking about pictures, there is a place close to C-4,
16 close to the occupied airport settlement, where there was a large
17 cemetery, for instance. Maybe Serbs took more pictures than we did.
18 Q. The Serbs would take that the airport neighbourhood was
19 liberated, whereas you say it was occupied?
20 A. No, I'm talking about C-4, which is close, next to the airport
21 neighbourhood. C-4, if you know where that is, comes before the airport
22 neighbourhood and then follows C-5. On one side, there is the Nedzarici
23 village, and on the other side, there are multi-storey buildings.
24 Q. Do you agree that we should take into account and acknowledge the
25 statistics kept by the BH Army, both in terms of the numbers of the 155th
Page 8856
1 Brigade and in terms of the number of "sahids"? That's what they called
2 martyrs, that's what they call their dead who got killed in the fighting,
3 as opposed to civilians?
4 A. Yes, if you use the term properly, but that term was also used
5 for civilians. We were forced to be there by violent means. We were
6 being shot at. And although in terms of religion, they cannot be really
7 considered as "sahids," martyrs, but they were still considered as such.
8 Q. But if the families received certificates of privatizations and
9 awards, and if they were granted amounts normally allocated to "sahid"
10 families, can we then take it that these people were fighters, rather
11 than civilians, because civilian families got smaller amounts?
12 A. You keep talking about rewards. Take me, for instance, the kind
13 of work that I did for all the people there, and you know what I got in
14 return? They closed my hospital. And they did give me the 6th of April
15 decoration, that's true. The Serbs gave it to me, but nothing more. I
16 just went back to the clinical centre to a position lower than I occupied
17 before. What kind of reward did I get? I'm just asking you because you
18 keep talking about these rewards. I, for instance, wasn't part of the
19 SDA. I wasn't part of any party. Maybe that's the reason, maybe that's
20 the general approach. I wouldn't know.
21 Q. Dr. Hajir, I believe your contribution is priceless, from a
22 humanitarian point of view, but I'm trying to establish here how many
23 dead were civilians and how many dead were soldiers. Do you know that
24 the state provided tombstones free of charge for "sahids," which they
25 didn't do for civilians?
Page 8857
1 A. I know that that was the case in Kovaci and in some other places,
2 they provided tombstones for people who got killed in the fighting.
3 Q. Do you know that the BH Army commissioned 40.000 aiming devices
4 for "sahids," and 39.000 were actually delivered?
5 A. No, I don't know that, really.
6 Q. You mentioned Zelimir Vidovic. I'm really sorry about him. He
7 was my football player. I was in Sarajevo
8 heard about Josip Bukal? He played for the Zeleznice Team.
9 A. Yes, we were friends. He came to see me more than once.
10 Q. Do you know that Josip Bukal, who, by the way, is a Croat,
11 rescued a large number of Serbs from Dobrinja, and these people owe him
12 their lives and are very grateful to him?
13 A. I really didn't hear about that. But all of us would save people
14 when we could, and I did when I could. I never refused anyone. I never
15 failed to do whatever I could for people. I believe that Bukal would do
16 the same, but I really, to tell the truth, didn't see that Serbs were in
17 danger. There was a discussion we had with the Serbs who were on the
18 staff. We were talking amongst us, and there were some people who were
19 unhappy about some incidents and quarrels internally, but it was all on
20 the verbal level. Take this Djurdjica Juric, who worked with us. Her
21 daughter was shot by a sniper from your side. She came there, and I
22 offered her an apartment close to the hospital so that she can be nearby.
23 She refused because she lived in another flat with her family. Her
24 father-in-law was killed outside his home. That's next to that school
25 which is half Serbian, half Muslim. I don't know the name of the school.
Page 8858
1 They lived very close by, in an apartment building. Bukal is a great
2 humanist, and I believe, easily, that he helped whenever he could.
3 I really didn't see that Serbs were in any danger. If I had seen
4 anything like it, I would have done all in my power to help them.
5 Q. I don't doubt that for a minute. And if you had been commander
6 of Dobrinja, it would have been much better.
7 But you say, in paragraph 42 of your statement, that there were
8 120 and more injured at the football-match. 130 to 140 persons injured.
9 A. Yeah, probably more than that.
10 Q. But in the Galic case, on page 1716, lines 17 to 24, you said
11 there were 35 soldiers injured and 55 civilians, and that 6 soldiers and
12 5 civilians got killed.
13 A. I'm sorry, I really don't remember.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you remember reprimanding or asking the commander
15 of the 155th Brigade why he had organised that football-match close to
16 the front-line?
17 A. It was a huge folly, and I told him so the same day. But he said
18 they wanted it. What could I do? I said, You were the commander, you
19 should have stopped it. There is just a line of buildings separating
20 that football pitch from the front-line, from the Serbian lines. He
21 should have been replaced, in fact, just before that, but he was,
22 instead, appointed commander -- re-appointed commander.
23 Q. In paragraphs 48 to 51 --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a moment.
25 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
Page 8859
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry.
2 The proposition that Mr. Karadzic just put to the witness that he
3 said in the Galic case on page 1716 that 35 soldiers were injured and --
4 35 soldiers were injured and 55 civilians, and that 6 soldiers and 5
5 civilians got killed, that's actually Ms. Filipovic reading out a
6 document, and I can't quite now work out which document it is, but it
7 wasn't the witness's answer.
8 JUDGE KWON: In any event, the witness said he didn't know.
9 Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. In paragraphs 48 through 51, you speak about problems with water.
12 Did you know that the government of the federation, that is, the Sarajevo
13 Muslim Croat government, created, deliberately, huge disruptions in water
14 supply?
15 A. I didn't know that. In fact, I don't know. But how would they
16 be able to do that? Why would they do that? Leaving people without
17 water is the same as killing them.
18 Q. Did you know that water supply depends on electricity supply, and
19 whenever the transformer station in Bacevo is hit, the water supply
20 stops?
21 A. You know, I never gave any thought to the routes of water supply.
22 Q. Did you know that we never closed the water from Jahorina, from
23 Bistrica, but we actually shared with Sarajevo, a little bit for Pale and
24 a little bit for Sarajevo
25 Bacevo, from the Bosna River
Page 8860
1 A. I didn't know that. Well, you can put yourself in my place. You
2 know, what would you think? There was constantly a shortage of water,
3 but we had water supplies. Mr. Dusko, who is a very good friend of
4 mine - he's deceased now - he obtained a 25.000-litre water cistern for
5 the needs of the hospital. We brought that to the shopping centre, and
6 we connected it to the water supply. So when the water was cut off, we
7 would have water. In the beginning, we would bring it in buckets from
8 the well. Later, we resolved it in this way. And what you are saying, I
9 really don't know. I would have liked -- I really would have liked -- I
10 even listened to "SRNA
11 front of your very eyes, they would turn 180 degrees around. Serbs, who
12 were leaving in order to be accepted wherever they were going, were
13 labelling and saying things because of political interest. Mr. Karadzic,
14 you have to differentiate between what is true and what isn't. There is
15 a significant difference.
16 I mean, there was a case that happened in front of my eyes, and
17 then in "SRNA
18 it would be against the Muslims. That's why I stopped listening.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you know that these 300.000 -- 350.000 citizens
20 from paragraph 50 included 50.000 to 70.000 Serbs?
21 A. I know that there was a large number of them, but I don't know
22 how many.
23 Q. And do you believe that we would have abused those 50.000 to
24 70.000 Serbs only to harm the rest of the population that was Muslim and
25 Croat? Would we have done something like that deliberately?
Page 8861
1 A. Practice indicates that you did. You were shooting. Do you know
2 how many Serbs were killed from these shells? I mean, my heart really
3 pains when I think of all the large number of Serbs and their families
4 that were casualties because of this, not just Muslim families. And I'm
5 saying this because I know. These were wonderful people who were full of
6 goodness.
7 Q. Thank you. And here, in paragraph 56, you talk about the suicide
8 rate. Is it correct that during your stay there, there were five to six
9 suicides?
10 A. There weren't more than that, at least not to my knowledge and
11 what was reported to the hospital.
12 Q. Do you know that, annually, the average rate of suicide is 15
13 applied to 100.000 citizens in Serbia
14 for Vojvodina, 2, and for Hungary
15 A. Mr. Karadzic, this figure is quite small. I spoke in -- I was
16 surprised, myself. I mean, there wasn't a significant suicide rate. I'm
17 also surprised. I think that the rate of suicides now is much higher
18 than it was during the war. I'm talking about Dobrinja, at least.
19 Q. All right, thank you. In paragraph 59, it happened that you say
20 that the Serbs were preventing civilians from leaving Sarajevo
21 know that Serbs always asked for free passage of civilians, and that the
22 Muslim side did not allow that? And there is evidence of that also with
23 the United Nations. Did you know this? Or perhaps you didn't know that,
24 but you said this?
25 A. Do you think if I had known that, I would have left my three
Page 8862
1 daughters and my wife in Sarajevo
2 possible, or anyone else in Republika Srpska, and I would have asked for
3 anything just to get them out of there. I spent many sleepless nights
4 because of them. And in spite of being tired and working hard, I had to
5 be thinking about my family. And had I been able to get those folks of
6 mine out, I would have done so to spare them the misery.
7 Q. Thank you. But this was a well-known fact. We were constantly
8 appealing, through General Morillon and others, and it was constantly in
9 the media. Mrs. Plavsic also was requesting freedom of movement, and we
10 also signed, in Geneva
11 allow civilians to leave the zone of combat, and we respected that. But
12 Mr. Izetbegovic said that he was not going to permit Sarajevo to empty
13 itself. I'm sorry you didn't know that, but it is a fact.
14 Here in paragraph 60 --
15 JUDGE KWON: Do not make speeches.
16 Dr. Hajir, do you agree?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, with what he said? Well, I
18 said I didn't know what he was saying, I don't know if I agree or not. I
19 was in the position that I was in. Thousands of people every day were
20 passing by. I mean, I don't know. I don't agree with that.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Q. In Article 60 -- I mean, in paragraph 60, you are thinking about
23 what the objective of the Serbs was. If I were to tell you that the
24 United Nations, and the witness confirmed that here, stated that the
25 objective of the Serbs was to keep the 1st Corps in Sarajevo until a
Page 8863
1 political solution was reached, does that then explain why the Serbs did
2 not capture specific neighbourhoods, such as Dobrinja, or Sarajevo
3 itself?
4 A. I don't think that -- I mean, they took whatever -- I'm sorry.
5 You are trying to approach and present this from your point of view, and
6 that is your side. I am trying to talk about things as an individual,
7 about things that I took part in and where I tried to help. So I really
8 cannot agree that that was so.
9 Q. Thank you. I am sorry about your heart attack, from Article 61,
10 but do you agree that in these more recent statements of yours, in a way,
11 the number of victims has grown, the number of operations, the number of
12 wounded? How did it happen that in later statements, and
13 Article 164 - this is more recent information dating from February of
14 this year - there is a kind of inflation of the number of victims? The
15 number of victims, the figures are bigger.
16 A. The war was at its most intense in 1993 and 1994, so even in the
17 summer of 1992, the numbers were not lower, either. But a higher
18 intensity of the war was then, so it's logical to expect a greater number
19 of victims as well.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Sutherland.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I think the witness has
22 misunderstood the question. But nothing has been inflated. This has all
23 been taken from prior testimony and/or prior statements of Dr. Hajir, the
24 information contained in the amalgamated witness statement.
25 JUDGE KWON: What paragraph was it?
Page 8864
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, Dr. Karadzic -- Mr. Karadzic is
2 just saying, generally, how come the figures are inflated now in the
3 amalgamated statement, taken in February 2010, as opposed to prior
4 statements and prior testimony. What I'm saying is there's no inflation
5 in this statement; all of the figures come from either prior testimony or
6 prior statements provided by the witness.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic referred to Article 164, which I
8 couldn't follow. What is it, Mr. Karadzic?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Generally speaking, this article
10 gave me some kind of cue, it prompted me, because this statement, new
11 information provided on the 25th of February, 2010, and then I remembered
12 that there were 35 and 55 wounded, 35 soldiers and 55 civilians, and that
13 there were 6 killed and 5 civilians killed in the football-match. Later,
14 it appears that there were 140 wounded and 14 killed, so I was just
15 interested how this --
16 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]... what we dealt
17 with minutes ago, when you clarified, Ms. Sutherland.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, none of the new information
19 provided by the witness on the 25th of February relates to figures of
20 people killed or wounded during the war. What Mr. Karadzic keeps
21 repeating about these 35 wounded or 55 wounded is a document that was put
22 to Dr. Hajir by the Defence counsel in the Galic case, and it was a
23 document, I think, that was actually signed by one of the military
24 commanders. But it wasn't anything that Dr. Hajir has ever said. And
25 his answer -- the question, a large portion of the document was read out,
Page 8865
1 and then the question was:
2 "Sir, you told us that Ismet Hadzic, after that event, would come
3 to the hospital?"
4 To which the witness replied: "Yes."
5 That's what he was replying yes to was the question that the
6 commander came to the hospital, not in relation to the number of dead and
7 wounded, because he said earlier in the transcript in Galic -- at
8 page 1708, it was put to him that roughly 140 people were admitted and
9 there were 13 or 14 people killed:
10 "Did you note --"
11 The question was:
12 "Did you note --" this is in cross-examination -- "for these
13 people, whether these were soldiers or civilians?
14 "A. To be quite honest, we never took note of whether a patient
15 was a military man, a civilian, or anything else. We didn't take note of
16 that."
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.
18 Mr. Karadzic, I think it's time for you to wrap up your
19 cross-examination.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I can have a little bit more
21 time, just a few more questions which could be answered with a yes or a
22 no. It would really be a pity not to complete this cross-examination.
23 There is a large number of statements. Many have now been relativised,
24 so I must ask the doctor if he knew about some crucial events.
25 JUDGE KWON: I didn't understand that. I think you can conclude
Page 8866
1 in 10 minutes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will try, and I'm going to ask
3 Dr. Hajir that we proceed with Yes or No whenever possible.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Did you know that Mr. Izetbegovic declared a general mobilisation
6 on the 4th of April, 1992
7 A. I cannot remember the date, but he did declare a general
8 mobilisation.
9 Q. Thank you. Did you know that Hasanefendic in April, on the 12th
10 of April and the 29th of April, on two occasions, thus ordered attacks on
11 the JNA, and the blocking of all barracks, and the barricading of all
12 roads?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Do you know, do you recall that on the 2nd of May, near the
15 Skenderija Bridge
16 They were on their way to evacuate soldiers from the JNA hall.
17 A. I saw that in the news, but I wasn't nearby.
18 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that on the 3rd of May in Dobrovoljacka
19 Street, there was a large massacre where half the JNA column -- of a half
20 a JNA column that was withdrawing?
21 A. I heard that there was an incident. I didn't hear of any
22 massacre. I wasn't there, so I didn't see it, I didn't -- I wasn't
23 there, so I really cannot give you any opinion on that.
24 Q. Thank you. Did you know that Alija Delimustafic, the minister of
25 internal affairs, already on the 4th or 5th of May, accused Avdo Hebib,
Page 8867
1 Ganic, Kljujic, and others of declaring war against the JNA and
2 initiating a war against the JNA?
3 A. I didn't really know. I didn't know about that, no.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now look at 1D13 -- I'm
5 sorry, first we will look at 1092.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Did you know about the abuses of ambulance vehicles, that the
8 army used ambulances in order to transport soldiers to positions, and so
9 on and so forth?
10 A. I really don't approve of that, and I never had any part in such
11 things. I don't even know if this happened. Our ambulances from
12 Dobrinja were never abused. They were always marked. They were always
13 shot at. There are big holes, small holes on the cars. Those vehicles
14 were marked. Never, ever did we ever abuse that. I don't know about
15 other such cases with ambulances.
16 Q. Thank you. I completely believe you, but this official note
17 states that in your neighbourhood, close to you in Ilidza, the
18 Green Berets, already on the 4th of May, 1992, abused vehicles marked as
19 ambulances with the red cross. They used them for combat purposes. Do
20 you see this official note?
21 A. Which one is it? Is it this one?
22 Q. There's a Serbian and an English version.
23 A. Yes, I see it.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that this could have made the transport
25 of your wounded to Sarajevo
Page 8868
1 beginning you easily made agreements with Serbian check-points? Later,
2 this was more difficult. Could such incidents have contributed to this
3 distrust?
4 A. Yes, of course they could have, but they could have also
5 inspected the cars, looked at the situation, and allowed the people
6 through, pursuant to the agreement. This co-operation was severed, to
7 the detriment of all of us, Serbs, Muslim, Croats, because those people
8 could have received better treatment, better care, in a more -- in a
9 better-equipped institution. So this was to the detriment of all of us.
10 There is the Geneva Conventions. They condemned such things, misuses of
11 medical vehicles and firing at such medical vehicles. However, these
12 medical -- these Geneva Conventions were not respected, neither from your
13 side and, I believe in certain cases, on the Muslim side too.
14 Unfortunately, things are like that.
15 May I comment, Mr. Karadzic? You have give some -- been given
16 some space. May I also get some moments to give you my impressions about
17 all of that?
18 Q. Well, I would rather for us to meet when I return. Impressions
19 don't help us much. We need information and knowledge here. I think
20 that this would be nice. Unfortunately, we don't have enough time.
21 Is it correct that your 30 to 40 employees, the hospital staff,
22 were members of the B and H Army?
23 A. Correct. There were 43, and that's why this misunderstanding
24 occurred. There were 43 members of the armed forces who were perhaps
25 given an assignment, but they didn't go anywhere. They continued working
Page 8869
1 in the hospital. But at one point, there were 158 staff. The number
2 fluctuated all the time. Some people came, some people went away.
3 People came from town to help out. Muslims and Serbs left the hospital
4 on their own errands. The number varied all the time. We received
5 everyone, however. And I don't see why something offered by the army
6 would be refused. In that general poverty and misery, if anything can be
7 received, then let it. But I wanted to register the hospital officially
8 so that people get at least an allowance from the Ministry of Health.
9 Q. Did you have a course of military surgery for your staff members?
10 A. You see, in Dobrinja, Kuzmanovic and many other Serbs, very nice
11 young men with whom I worked and met socially, Dr. Vranic organised, when
12 the war in Croatia
13 beginning we were laughing. Nobody believed we'd ever need it.
14 Interpersonal relations were still good among all ethnic communities.
15 But in my hospital, I had to start from scratch because 90 per cent of
16 staff were absent. First of all, I had to get hold of basic equipment.
17 The first surgery I did with Dr. Vranic lasted seven hours. Transport
18 was a problem. Blood transfusions were a problem. I had to send my
19 staff to the Institute for Transfusions to teach them the basics. We had
20 a crash course in emergency surgery. All sorts of things needed to be
21 done preliminarily before the hospital took off.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this page be admitted, please?
23 JUDGE KWON: Dr. Hajir, the document which is in front of you,
24 called a memo, says that the Green Berets were in possession of two vans
25 with Red Cross insignia on them. Did you know or hear such facts?
Page 8870
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Never. I neither approve, nor have
2 I ever heard of anything like that.
3 You see, there's one thing with Mr. Karadzic. He ascribes and
4 blames everything on Green Berets. There are --
5 JUDGE KWON: Doctor, you said, did you not, that this could have
6 contributed to distrust? Did you say that on a hypothetical basis?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What do you mean; those vehicles?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And in answering the question by the accused,
9 Dr. Karadzic, you confirmed that it might have contributed to distrust,
10 so I was wondering whether you confirm that such abuses of ambulances
11 really took place.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I did not confirm that, Judge.
13 I'm just speaking, in very general terms, about using humanitarian
14 vehicles for war purposes. I know nothing about this specific incident.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we don't see a basis to admit this
16 document. And I think it's time to conclude --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
18 JUDGE KWON: -- your cross-examination.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I ask one more question?
20 Can we see 1D135.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Dr. Hajir, you considered yourself, after November 1994, no
23 longer a member of the BH Army, that is, the 155th Brigade?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. But if you look at this document, they continue to consider you,
Page 8871
1 as of the 9th of June, 1995, a member of the brigade. And in this
2 report, concerning Operation Vranduk, involving the detachment called
3 El Mujahid, information is provided to the General Staff of the BH Army
4 about foreign nationals in Sarajevo
5 "Hasan Nemar, member of the 101st Brigade, Mustafa Bakou, member
6 of the 101 Brigade, Khachouf, Habib, member of the 152nd Brigade, and
7 Youssef Hajir, member of the 155th Brigade."
8 They don't say anything unkind about you, but they have nothing
9 good to say about the others. Do you know any of the people on that
10 list?
11 A. I still know Hasan and Mustafa, the first two on this list. The
12 first one is an agronomy engineer who used the plot of land between
13 Alipasino Polje and Cengic Vila. You know, there's a mosque there now
14 and a disco. That area used to be empty, and he used it as a vegetable
15 garden to feed people.
16 I know Mr. Bakou now, but I didn't know him during the war. I
17 didn't even know such a man existed. As for Mr. Khachouf, I don't know
18 him at all.
19 Now, that they considered me a member of the 155th Brigade in
20 1995, that's certainly a mistake. If I had been, I would be receiving a
21 larger pension. The truth is that I was not a member at that time. If I
22 had been, perhaps it would have been better for me, my pension would be
23 higher.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page to see the
25 signature and the reason why the El Mujahid Detachment got angry with the
Page 8872
1 BH Army.
2 If we could zoom in on the last-but-one paragraph.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. It says:
5 "The attitude of the El Mujahid Detachment towards the BH Army is
6 characterised by a general lack of trust, which dates back to the events
7 in autumn, 1992, when, in the course of capturing Cekrcici village, they
8 were wedged because the BH Army did not secure their flanks."
9 Do you know where Cekrcici is?
10 A. Yes. I passed by several times. I really don't know anyone from
11 the El Mujahid Detachment. I heard of their existence, but I really
12 don't know these people. I don't know what they did and how they worked.
13 I have no clue.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me thank you, Dr. Hajir, for
15 all that you've done as a doctor for Serbs, Muslims, and Croats alike,
16 and for your testimony as well.
17 May this document be admitted?
18 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
20 JUDGE KWON: Without having to have a break -- yes,
21 Ms. Sutherland.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry.
23 The Prosecution does have a translation of that that we can send
24 to the Defence to up-load into e-court. And I just note that in
25 Dr. Karadzic's question, he said:
Page 8873
1 "They don't say anything unkind about you, but they have nothing
2 good to say about the others."
3 In fact, after the four individuals are named, the sentence says:
4 "We reported on them already in our documents. The persons in
5 question lived in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina before the
6 aggression. We do not have at our disposal information on these persons
7 that is of interest, in terms of intelligence."
8 I think Dr. Karadzic was overstating what was, in fact, in the
9 document.
10 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no objection to admitting that.
11 We'll just admit it.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I -- may I just explain?
13 When I said, About you, They don't say anything about you, unkind
14 about you, I meant the four of them. But the other members of the
15 El Mujahid --
16 JUDGE KWON: It's not necessary.
17 Ms. Sutherland, do you have re-examination?
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: Sorry, Your Honour. I was --
19 JUDGE KWON: I asked whether you --
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour, I don't. I'm sorry, I was
21 discussing something with Mr. Reid, and I apologise.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 Dr. Hajir, that concludes your evidence. Thank you very much for
24 your taking time to give your testimony again to the Tribunal, and now
25 you are free to go.
Page 8874
1 [The witness withdrew]
2 JUDGE KWON: Well, unless there's other matters to raise, that
3 will be it for today, and we will resume tomorrow at 2.15.
4 The hearing is now adjourned.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 10.34 a.m.
6 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of
7 November, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.
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