1 Monday, 13 December 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Good morning, Mr. Svraka.
8 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
9 JUDGE KWON: Did we get the interpretation? Well, in any event,
10 let's start.
11 Good morning, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honours.
13 WITNESS: ISMET SVRAKA
14 [Witness answered through interpretation]
15 Examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff
16 Q. Good morning, Mr. Svraka. Can you hear me, Mr. Svraka?
17 A. I can.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot hear the
20 JUDGE KWON: Are the microphones switched on?
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
22 Q. Mr. Svraka, perhaps you can lean a bit more closer to the
23 microphones. Yes, thank you.
24 I would ask that a particular sequence from Exhibit P1450 be
1 And before we do so: Mr. Svraka, did you have an opportunity to
2 watch video footage when you came here to The Hague to prepare for the
4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter cannot understand the speaker.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Is that for Markale? I don't know.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
7 Q. Sir, can you repeat your answer, the beginning? The interpreters
8 could not hear what you said in the beginning. And my question was: Did
9 you see video footage?
10 A. Not as a private person; only in court, when they showed me the
11 massacre. I saw it here in court. As a private individual, I didn't
12 watch any of that, and I don't know what you mean.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Okay.
14 We will play now the sequence starting at 00:54 to the minute
16 would then ask you questions.
17 Can we please play.
18 [Video-clip played]
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
20 Q. Mr. Svraka, what do we see here? What location do we see?
21 A. This is in front of the market, in front of the entrance into the
23 Q. And when you look at this particular photo, do you recognise the
24 scene or any person in that scene?
25 A. I think -- I'm not sure. I think I'm the person here in white.
1 I can't see. I don't know. It's as if I were sitting there in a white
2 jacket, something like that.
3 Q. Do you recall what you did when you were hit by the blast?
4 A. I do.
5 Q. Yes. And can you tell us?
6 A. I was standing with colleagues from work. We were smoking
7 cigarettes, and I heard an explosion. I fell on the ground. First, I
8 sort of thought -- what went through my mind was, I'm wounded. And then
9 I touched my face with my hands, and I thought, My head is still there.
10 Judges, maybe this sounds incredible, but I did not see anything
11 when I opened my eyes. I started breathing, and I thought, Well, I can
12 breathe. I tried to move my legs. I couldn't move them.
13 And that was it, until they threw me into the back of a car. And
14 then I opened my eyes. I held on to the front seat. I saw the driver
15 walking around the car, and he said, Don't worry, Grampa. I was a Grampa
16 even then. I had a six-month-old grandchild who got killed.
17 I asked the driver where we were going, what hospital. There
18 were two hospitals, the then Military Hospital and the Kosevo Centre. I
19 had worked in Kosevo for 10 years, and they told me to go to Kosevo. The
20 driver went with me.
21 When I entered Kosevo, I was half conscious and half in shock.
22 When I entered Kosevo, there's like a tunnel, like a passageway. I
23 personally worked in that tunnel before. I saw the nurses holding two
24 bottles. Now, what was that, was it blood or whatever the name of the
25 other thing is? I saw a doctor walking among the people there. There
1 were lots of dead and wounded. I heard the doctor saying, It's
2 impossible to work this way. Try to get some order here.
3 Twice, I said to the nurses or doctors, whatever, I said, I'm
4 cold, I'm cold. I heard scissors cutting my trousers on the right side.
5 I didn't see who was doing that. I woke up in the Intensive Care
6 Department. There were tiles all the way up to the ceiling. That was
7 upstairs. I saw wounded persons, sick persons, all over the place. No
8 one was crying, nothing. Later on, I just saw that they were plugged in
9 to electricity, because when there would be a power cut, I saw that
10 everybody would get all worked up, and they tried to somehow get them
11 back to the electric current.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Mr. Svraka.
13 Can we now proceed with the video.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
16 Q. When we stop here briefly, do you recall in which car you were
17 transported? Do you have any memory of that?
18 A. I don't know. In a Golf, that's what I said in some statement,
19 but I couldn't see anything until I got into the car, and I'm not a
20 driver myself. I know that I was in the car by myself and that they sort
21 of put me in this way [indicates]. I was lying on the right-hand side,
22 and I leaned on the front seat with my left hand. What car it was, I
23 really cannot say for sure.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we proceed, please, with the video.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Now stop.
2 Q. Mr. Svraka, this door that we see here, what kind of door is it?
3 What does it lead into?
4 A. It should be the door leading to the shopping centre. The street
5 was called Vase Miskina before. There are steps there, this is a tram
6 line. I'm somewhere around here, about two metres away from the door. I
7 was standing there with my colleagues. And that's where the main road
8 was and the main market, and you can always find something there. People
9 were buying and selling. You could always get something to survive
10 there. There was no transportation. You always had to walk. If people
11 had a bicycle, then that would be the best kind of transportation.
12 Q. And you say you were at the door, near the door. Were you to the
13 left or to the right of the door, when you look at this photo?
14 A. Viewed from here, to the left of the door. There's sort of
15 something here.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, thank you.
17 That's sufficient from this video. And, Your Honours, it's
18 already an exhibit, so we don't need to do anything about it.
19 Your Honours, that concludes the examination-in-chief. There are
20 no further exhibits.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 Mr. Karadzic, it's now for you to cross-examine Mr. Svraka.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Good morning to all.
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Good morning, Mr. Svraka.
3 A. Good morning.
4 Q. First of all, I would like to pay my respects to you, in view of
5 everything that you have lived through. Therefore, I'm not going to put
6 many questions to you, just a few.
7 Tell me, were you under work obligation all the time or were you
8 a member of a war unit for a while?
9 A. Work obligation started perhaps a month or two after the war
10 broke out. I did not spend a single hour in the army. I was under work
11 obligation all the time, and I also went digging. When there was this
12 work obligation, they'd come and they'd say -- well, I mean, as for among
13 the people who stayed at the company, say five people would have to go
14 and dig canals, trenches, whatever. That would be it.
15 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the interpretation. That's why I'm
17 Tell me where di you live at the time, what was your address?
18 A. Same place. However, the street changed. Ragibinda [phoen] 70,
19 Buvljakov Potok, that was my address then. The municipality was
21 Q. Thank you. Where did you go to dig trenches?
22 A. At Zuc, for the most part. I also went to Igman for 20 days. I
23 was at Igman, and then I came back and I was off for 10 days. During
24 those 10 days, I went to the market. That was the last time I walked,
25 ever. We were digging above Grbavica, Stup, Zuc, I mean all of that. I
1 remember I would come to this Orahov Brijeg, as it was called. I think
2 that that is the farthest point I got to from my own home.
3 Q. Thank you. Was it better or easier to be in these work platoons
4 and to be under work obligation or was it easier to go to the front-line?
5 Did people prefer work obligation? That's what I mean.
6 A. As soon as the shooting started, I reported to the local commune,
7 and I asked to be deployed somewhere, because if you were not deployed
8 anywhere, you didn't dare walk about town. This is exactly what they
9 said to me: Grampa, we don't have enough weapons even for young men, let
10 alone for you. They wrote up some kind of document for me, saying that I
11 could move about freely, because at first, in the company, no one really
12 went to work for the first 10 or 20 days. We didn't dare to because of
13 the snipers.
14 Afterwards, we, the elderly, usually -- well, the company was in
15 Pofalici, in a high-rise building near Grbavica, and we started getting
16 water out of the basements. There were about 500 workers there at the
17 time. We went there to repair roofs, and then -- actually, I was working
18 on a construction site, as it were, and a courier came and said, Five men
19 have to go tonight, and you choose who it's going to be. We did it in
20 alphabetical order. Five men were selected, and my next-door neighbour
21 was told that he should go and I did not go, and another colleague said
22 he -- I don't know, he worked with trucks, he did something, and he said,
23 Is there anyone to replace me, And I'll replace that person some other
24 time. And I said, I will go -- I will go to replace you. He's my
25 neighbour. Because when you go to dig trenches, then you go together,
1 and on your way back, whatever. And then I sort of thought, I prefer
2 going with a neighbour. If something happens, he will help him and I
3 will help me, and I was with him throughout work obligation. And the
4 third day, when I woke up in hospital, shelling could be heard in
5 Jahorinski Potok. That's what people were saying, too. I knew that area
6 because I built two-weekend cottages there. I was a mason, so I did some
7 private work of my own almost every weekend.
8 Q. When you spoke about Jahorinski Potok, you were talking about the
9 NATO bombing of the Serb positions after that shell?
10 A. Yes, yes, that could be heard in the hospital. I heard someone
11 say, They've started bombing them. That's what was heard in Kosevo.
12 Q. Thank you. Those documents stating that you could move about
13 freely or that you were engaged somewhere, did that help you move about
14 more freely in town?
15 A. Beforehand, if you went to town, some people from the army would
16 just come and pick you up on the street and they take you out to dig, and
17 people at your home wouldn't know where you were and what happened to
18 you. And I was in this work unit, work obligation. The company was
19 called Herzegovina
20 hanging out in the street. So, yes, I could move about freely in town.
21 Q. Thank you. Tell me, was that the first time that you were in
22 Markale or did you go to the same place often?
23 A. Markale is an area where I passed through very often. I had a
24 sister who lived in the Old City
25 metres where I lived, and then I'd collect some vegetables or fruit, and
1 then I'd take that to my sister who lived in town. I mostly went to Zuc
2 to get timber, because timber saved me during the war. I could get food
3 and oil for it. I waited to get salt for ages once, so I didn't want to
4 go to town very often. I was supposed to mail a letter to my brother in
6 neighbour actually never went. And I gave my brother the letter to read
7 only when he returned much later.
8 Q. Thank you. How far away from you was this explosion? So you
9 were between the explosion and the door, right, or something like that?
10 A. Three or four metres, it wasn't further than that, on my
11 right-hand side. It is marked to this day. I never passed there by car
12 to this day without saying, That is my shell. That's what I call it.
13 Three or four metres, not more than that.
14 Two of my colleagues were standing there with me. We were
15 standing by this place, and we were all smoking cigarettes. They were
16 facing the facade, the wall of the shopping centre, whereas I was facing
17 them. Probably -- I don't know. As I said, I didn't see anything, but
18 probably because of the detonation, they probably hit the walls, their
19 heads hit the walls, and I fell on the pavement.
20 This is being repeated every year in world news and BH news,
21 every year on the day when that massacre occurred, so I see it.
22 In hospital, I heard that those two colleagues got killed. One
23 of them was a colleague from my brigade. I thought that we were in the
24 same brigade, because the army also had a brigade at the construction
25 site, also a brigadier there. A colleague from a brigade, he was
1 actually an unskilled worker, but I was a master craftsman. And, anyway,
2 this colleague got killed too.
3 Q. Thank you. But you were closer to the point of explosion than
4 you were -- than they were; it seems that way?
5 A. Half a metre, perhaps half a metre closer to the shell. I don't
6 know, so just think of what the distance is. I mean, all of us were
7 standing within a single square metre, all three of us.
8 Q. Tell me, did you hear something before the explosion, itself?
9 A. I didn't hear anything. I just heard the explosion. And before
10 that, we were talking. One of them was looking for flour. The other one
11 was selling jam, or honey, or whatever it was. We were smoking
12 cigarettes. We hadn't smoked, say, more than half a cigarette. I didn't
13 hear anything before the explosion, except for the conversation that the
14 three of us were involved in.
15 Q. Thank you. There were four shells about 300 or 400 metres away
16 from you. Did you hear them?
17 A. No. I heard one shell. I fell. After that, I don't know. I
18 don't know when the rest fell. I think that was the first one, because
19 usually there is commotion after the first shell falls, and people seek
20 shelter somewhere. I didn't hear anything.
21 Q. Thank you. Tell us, please, where were you hit by shrapnel? How
22 far did the shrapnel go?
23 A. I didn't feel anything until the men came there to bandage me.
24 The left leg was amputated above the knee. The right leg, I mean, that,
25 they cleaned it for a month. It's like cleaning a ham. They cut a
1 piece, and then if it's not good, then they go on cutting, and that went
2 on for a month. My right ankle was wounded, and two of my toes were
3 removed. And then underneath the foot, practically, my foot was almost
4 cut off, but then they managed to sew that up.
5 When I first woke up in Kosevo, when they asked me, How are you
6 doing, Grampa, does it hurt, and I said, I have a stomachache, that was a
7 bit funny. One leg was missing, the other one was bandaged, and I'm
8 saying I have a stomachache. They touched it. It started swelling.
9 They didn't even see that I was hit by shrapnel in the abdominal area,
10 too. Then they may have sewed that up too. But my stomach started
11 swelling up. They took me for surgery. They brought me some shrapnel
12 like half a cube of sugar. I kept it for a year or two. I don't even
13 know how it got mislaid after that. I was wounded in the stomach. Seven
14 days later -- oh, yes, it was Milosevic who did the operation. I can't
15 remember his first name.
16 They came a week later, and I again said that I felt pain in my
17 stomach. I guess the tube got stuck or something. The doctor took the
18 tube out, and a litre of blood sputtered all over the doctor, and he
19 said, Oh, we'll have to clean him again. Then again I had to be operated
21 While I was at surgery, whatever it was called -- I know it was
22 called surgery, the Surgical Department, that's where I was first. And
23 after that, I was transferred to this place called Abdominal Surgery,
24 that's what they call it. And then I had these medical persons coming
25 from the Orthopaedics Department, and they wanted to bandage my leg, and
1 that wasn't enough material. And then from Abdominal Surgery, I was
2 transferred to Orthopaedics.
3 The doctor who cut off my leg, who performed the first surgery,
4 Gavranka Petanovic [phoen] was his name, and he kept saying that I have a
5 nice name. Only later on, I heard that his name was Ismet, so that gave
6 me a bit more strength. I have some shrapnel here in my head as well.
7 About three years ago they took an X-ray, and they said, You're doing
8 fine Grampa, don't worry.
9 And then here in the stomach -- I listened to the doctor, and he
10 said, I should have taken away half of his intestines. How much he did
11 get out, I don't know. I just know that I have stomach trouble to this
12 day. I mean, I have to eat more often, but, well, I don't know, it
13 bothers me if I eat, I don't feel very well.
14 That's what I have to say about my wounding.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Once again, I
16 would like to pay my respects to you, in view of everything that you've
17 been through.
18 I have concluded.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic, and thank you, Mr. Svraka.
20 Do you have any re-direct examination, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour, nothing arises.
22 JUDGE KWON: Then that concludes your evidence, Mr. Svraka. On
23 behalf of the Trial Chamber and this Tribunal, I would like to thank you
24 for your coming to The Hague
25 please have a safe journey back to home.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
2 I would kindly ask you to invite me again when Mladic is here.
3 If that's the last thing I do, I would like to come here and see him in
4 court, brought before justice.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too.
7 May I now go home? It's over?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, yes.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Goodbye. Goodbye, everyone.
10 [The witness withdrew]
11 JUDGE KWON: If you could tell us who the next witness is.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the next witness is Mr. Hamill.
13 And I hope he's already in the building, because we, of course, thought
14 it would take -- Mr. Karadzic would have an hour. So I hope he's already
15 in the building.
16 Perhaps we can make a short break, because --
17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we break for five minutes?
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, please. Thank you.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
20 We'll break for five minutes. We'll resume at 20 to 10.00.
21 --- Break taken at 9.32 a.m.
22 [The witness entered court]
23 --- On resuming at 9.44 a.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Good morning, Mr. Hamill.
25 Could you kindly take the solemn declaration.
1 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
2 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
3 WITNESS: JOHN HAMILL
4 JUDGE KWON: Please make yourself comfortable.
5 Ms. Edgerton.
6 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
7 Examination by Ms. Edgerton:
8 Q. Mr. Hamill, could you actually, please, tell us your full name,
9 and give us your rank, in fact?
10 A. My name is John Hamill. I'm a lieutenant-colonel in the Irish
11 Army, in the Artillery Corps.
12 Q. And, in fact, this is also not your first appearance before a
13 Chamber of this Tribunal. You've given evidence on two previous
14 occasions; correct?
15 A. That is correct. I gave evidence in two cases, the Galic case
16 and the Kordic/Cerkez case.
17 Q. Now, in preparation for your testimony here today, have you had a
18 chance to review the transcript of your evidence in the Galic case and
19 the exhibits that were discussed during the course of that evidence?
20 A. I have.
21 Q. As a result of that review, did you have any additions, or
22 corrections, or clarifications you felt you needed to make?
23 A. I don't believe so, no.
24 JUDGE KWON: Probably, you might have been told, but, Mr. Hamill,
25 because you and Ms. Edgerton speak the same language, which should be
1 translated into French as well as B/C/S, if you could put a pause between
2 the question and answer. Thank you very much.
3 MS. EDGERTON:
4 Q. Now, if today I was to ask you the same questions that you were
5 asked during the course of your Galic testimony, would your answers also
6 be the same?
7 A. They would.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
9 Then, please, Your Honours, could I have the transcript of
10 Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill's evidence in the Galic case, which is 65 ter
11 10336, entered as the next Prosecution exhibit?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1994, Your Honours.
14 MS. EDGERTON: I'll now read a summary of that written evidence.
15 Lieutenant-Colonel John Hamill served in Sarajevo as a
16 United Nations Military Observer from May to July 1993. During this
17 period, he was deployed in areas both north and south of the city,
18 working exclusively in Sarajevo Romanija Corps or SRK-held territory.
19 His duties and functions at that time included monitoring weapons use and
20 deployment, as well as carrying out a liaison function at SRK Command.
21 The witness observed that the SRK used their artillery -- pardon
22 me, their artillery in a militarily non-conventional way, in the sense
23 that they very rarely moved. He recalls that not a day passed without a
24 shooting or shelling. On one particular day, UN observers counted 3.610
25 outgoing shells from VRS positions over a 12-hour period.
1 The witness described the use of sniping as an instrument of
2 terror. In his view, there was sufficient control by the political and
3 military authorities to have stopped sniping if they wished.
4 In his capacity as liaison officer at Lukavica,
5 Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill frequently protested to SRK officials over
6 incidents of shelling and sniping as reported from his UNMO colleagues.
7 He observed that SRK
8 relevant brigade commanders concerning certain incidents.
9 In February 1994, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill returned to Sarajevo
10 as technical adviser to a United Nations team tasked with investigating
11 the shelling at Markale Market. He drafted the report on the
12 investigation and collated the related annexures. During the course of
13 the team's investigations, the witness had occasion to speak with the
14 Bosnian Serb Army's designated liaison for the team, Colonel Cvjetkovic,
15 whom he understood to be the commander of the SRK Artillery Regiment. In
16 the course of this interview, Colonel Cvjetkovic said that in the
17 previous year, they had fired 30.000 to 40.000 rounds into the city, and
18 asked Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill why they were so concerned about one
19 round when they had fired so many.
20 The UN team came to the conclusion that the explosion of 5
21 February 1994 was caused by a conventional, factory-produced
22 120-millimetre high-explosive mortar bomb which detonated upon impact
23 with the ground, fired from the north-north-east. Six potential firing
24 locations along that axis were identified, two on the ABiH or Army of
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina side and four on Bosnian Serb-held territory.
1 This witness also examined two shell craters in Dobrinja in 2001.
2 Those related to the shelling of a football-match in the area on 1 June
3 1993. On the basis of his investigations, he concluded that rounds were
4 fired from the area of Toplik, an SRK heavy weapons location where the
5 witness, himself, had been posted during his tour in the city.
6 And that concludes the summary of the written evidence.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 MS. EDGERTON:
9 Q. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, I have just a few questions in relation
10 to the written evidence that was filed and which we've spoken about, just
11 some areas of clarification, and I'll go through those now.
12 First, in that written evidence, at pages 6063, 6218, 6230 and
13 6231, you referred to a band of irregulars, which you described as
14 so-called Chetniks led by one Vasilije Vidovic, known as Vasko. You said
15 he regularly impeded UNMO movement in areas across the city, and you said
16 further, based on what you were told by your interpreter at the time,
17 Vasko was under control of a General Josipovic, who commanded various
18 brigades on the north part of the city.
19 You said, in particular at page 6218 and 6219, that the object of
20 his band was to spread terror throughout the area and prevent entry into
21 specified areas to the north and east of Sarajevo. And also at
22 page 6219, you noted that you were of the view that they were used --
23 that band was used as a tool by authorities to conduct operations which
24 could be disowned; in other words, black operations.
25 So, in fact, you had a lot of information about this band of
1 Chetniks, and I'm wondering, other than information you received from
2 your interpreter at the time, what you base this on. Could you explain
3 this to us?
4 A. Certainly. Our teams in the north part of the city had a lot of
5 trouble from this particular band, and as I say, so-called Chetniks.
6 They were impeded from entering various parts of our area of operations
7 around Vogosca, Rajlovac, Radava, and further east. This was done
8 particularly towards the end of June and the beginning of and middle of
9 July 1993, when teams were specifically stopped by him. His band was
10 quite small, but travelled widely within areas controlled by four or five
11 different VRS brigades. Therefore, they clearly had freedom of movement
12 in that area. They stopped UNMOs, they threatened UNMOs. On more than
13 one occasion, they opened fire in the direction of UNMOs. And as I say,
14 my understanding was that he was under control of a General Josipovic,
15 who apparently had responsibility for the brigades to the north of the
16 city. I personally never met General Josipovic, nor saw him.
17 Q. Did you ever meet this Vasko?
18 A. I met Vasko on a number of occasion. Mr. Vidovic stopped a
19 patrol that I was on when I was trying to get to that part of the city on
20 the 20th of July, 1993, and attempted to place explosives on my vehicle.
21 When he was persuaded not to so do, he instructed us to leave the area
22 and not come back. However, we had business to do in the Poljine area
23 north of the city, so we went to that area by a different route. And
24 there, Mr. Vidovic arrived with his team and opened fire as they drove
25 into the farmyard where we were operating at the time.
1 So, yes, I have had occasion to actually meet Mr. Vidovic.
2 Q. Did anything happen after they opened fire?
3 A. They placed my colleague and myself against a wall for execution.
4 However, our interpreter very bravely, and subsequently he received a
5 force commander's commendation for it, spoke on a very serious basis,
6 clearly, with Mr. Vidovic, who decided then to take us to the brigade
7 headquarters in Vogosca for execution in front of the brigade commander.
8 On the way there, I surreptitiously notified our headquarters
9 that this was happening, and when we got to Vogosca, after some time we
10 were released by the brigade commander. Clearly, we were not executed.
11 Q. Did you, following your release, inform anyone within the SRK
12 structures as to what had happened?
13 A. We certainly did. We spoke to the brigade headquarters and also
14 to the SRK
15 had, of course, taken our equipment when he had captured us. This proved
16 to be fruitless in the end. He had taken a vehicle, he had taken
17 flak-jackets, helmets, ID cards, various other items.
18 Q. Now, just moving further in your evidence to pages 6138 and 6163,
19 you specifically recalled a day - and I mentioned it in the summary of
20 that evidence - when UNMOs recorded 3.610 rounds in a 12-hour period
21 outgoing from the Bosnian Serb side. Now, it's not clear, and perhaps
22 you recall. Was this outgoing from the north or south side of the city?
23 A. This was all outgoing from the north side of the city, and it
24 took place on the 22nd of July, 1993, which was two days after the events
25 which I've just related in relation to Mr. Vidovic. And it was only
1 afterwards that I put together the two pieces of information; that he was
2 attempting to keep UNMOs out of that part of the city, where the
3 artillery was based, and the shelling which took place shortly
4 afterwards, because clearly it took a great deal of time to assemble the
5 ammunition and prepare the fire plans for that day. So from my
6 professional experience now, I would say that they were preparing that
7 attack well in advance.
8 Q. Thank you. I would now like to turn to a document you referred
9 to in your Galic testimony. It has the -- it's been exhibited here as
10 P1441. It's a 64-page document that perhaps has some pages out of order,
11 and I thought you might be able to assist the Trial Chamber in their
12 consideration of this document.
13 And, Your Honours, given that there may be some pages out of
14 order, with everyone's permission I propose to provide
15 Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill with a hard copy of this as well. May I?
16 JUDGE KWON: By all means.
17 I take it there's no opposition from the Defence, either.
18 Yes, please.
19 MS. EDGERTON:
20 Q. Could you just take a moment, Lieutenant-Colonel, to flip through
21 that document.
22 And have you had an opportunity to review this document also in
23 preparation for your testimony today?
24 A. I have.
25 Q. Do you recognise the document at all?
1 A. I do.
2 Q. And what is it?
3 A. This is a complete report on the explosion into the market
4 place -- bombing of Markale of the 5th of February, 1994.
5 Q. And who wrote that complete report?
6 A. The essence of the report was actually drafted by myself and
7 confirmed by the other members of the team. This was for the actual
8 report. Now, there are other documents also attached which I was not
9 responsible for, which were, for example, the daily situational report
10 for Sector Sarajevo, and parts of the actual analysis which were done by
11 our adjutant chef.
12 Q. And I wonder, Lieutenant-Colonel, if you could, referring to the
13 numbers stamped at the top right corner of each page, explain to the
14 Trial Chamber how they should understand this document and how it's
15 structured. For example, you referred to the essence of the report, and
16 the actual report. Where might we find that in this range of pages?
17 A. The essence of the report starts at 1024713, goes through 14, 15,
18 16, and then the annexures to that start, obviously, at 17, and so on and
19 so forth. It gives a list of witnesses. It does the technical analysis
20 in Annex C. It gives the methodology. It gives those who conducted the
21 individual analyses, and when they did, and what the results were. It
22 talks about the findings in relation to the weapon, to the bearing, to
23 the angle of descent. It gives conclusions, which were quite sparse, in
24 actual fact. And then it goes into the individual reports of different
25 analysts, members of the team, including myself, which we'll find at
1 1024729. Other annexes include diagrams and drawings of the area where
2 the bomb exploded in Markale, and firing tables which were used to
3 determine the possible ranges, and I have to emphasise that it's possible
4 ranges to where the weapon was fired from. It gives a summary of the
5 testimony of general witness as opposed to technical witnesses. And, in
6 effect, that's really it.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
8 And I wonder now if we might be able to turn to e-court and the
9 version of the document in front of you on the screen, because I'd like
10 to ask you one question in relation to e-court page 9, paragraph 4.
11 Q. And just so you can refer to the document in front of you, it has
12 the "R1024713" number which you referred to just a couple of seconds ago
13 at page 21, line 9.
14 Do you see paragraph 4 in front of you?
15 A. I do.
16 Q. Now, I note that paragraph 4 says:
17 "Liaison officers from the parties were permitted to maintain
18 contact with the investigation team, but not to participate in the
20 What was the rationale behind not permitting representatives of
21 the warring factions to participate?
22 A. Very simply put, this was a United Nations investigation. This
23 was not an investigation being conducted by the authorities of either the
24 Republika Srpska, Bosnia
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so it would not have been appropriate to have had
1 members from the warring factions on that team. They were permitted to
2 maintain contact with the investigation team for reasons of transparency
3 and openness, and clearly it was not in the United Nations' interest to
4 have hidden goings on, as it were. It was in the UN's interest that this
5 investigation should be seen by both sides to be open, fair, transparent
6 and legitimate.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
8 If we could go to another document now, please, 65 ter 10053,
9 page 2. And that will not be given to you in hard copy. It should
10 appear on the screen in front of you.
11 Could you please go over to page 2 in the B/C/S version. Make it
12 page 3, I think, in the B/C/S version. Thank you.
13 Q. Have you also, Lieutenant-Colonel, seen this document in
14 preparation for your testimony today?
15 A. Yes, I have.
16 Q. Do you recognise it, then?
17 A. I do.
18 Q. And what is it?
19 A. It is the statement which I made on the 18th of September, 2001
20 following an investigation that I conducted at the behest of the Tribunal
21 on explosions which took place in Dobrinja in May 1993.
22 Q. Now, I actually just have one question in relation to this
23 statement, and it arises from something that appears in paragraph 2, the
24 last sentence. You note there -- or paragraph 2 reads that the prismatic
25 compass you used to take bearings was calibrated to match the map. First
1 of all, could you explain to us what a prismatic compass is and then how
2 you calibrated the compass to match the map?
3 A. A prismatic compass is just a very rugged compass which is used
4 by artillery officers to take bearings; that is, to find the direction
5 from one place, where you're standing, to another place. It had to be
6 calibrated because there are always variations within compasses. And in
7 order to calibrate it, you need to find two locations which you know on
8 the map, and, therefore, you match, as it were, the compass to the map;
9 not the map to the compass, but the compass to the map. So I calibrated
10 it in order that the bearings that I took on the ground would be
11 relatable to the bearings on the map.
12 Compass bearings are inherently tricky. They are inherently
13 inaccurate because of the construction of the compass and also possibly
14 because of the composition of the area in which the bearings are being
15 taken. There may be steel or iron, for example, located close which
16 would put a compass off. So it's important that the compass should be
17 calibrated so that an accurate bearing is taken.
18 Q. And just to take a back, then, from this to the investigation you
19 conducted in February 1994, did you similarly calibrate the compass
20 during the course of that earlier investigation?
21 A. Yes, I did.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you very much.
23 I have no further questions, Your Honours. And I would at this
24 point like to ask that the associated exhibits for
25 Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill, which have not otherwise been admitted into
1 evidence, be marked as Prosecution exhibits, and I could go through those
2 at this moment or deal with them with my colleagues, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: The only exhibit that has been admitted seems to be
4 General Rose's book. Is there anything else?
5 MS. EDGERTON: Following General Rose's book, there's P1440,
6 which, on the original notification which was filed some time ago, Your
7 Honours, is listed as 65 ter 09623.
8 JUDGE KWON: Was that also admitted? Thank you.
9 MS. EDGERTON: And then, of course, as I've indicated, P1441.
10 JUDGE KWON: P1441 is the 9630?
11 MS. EDGERTON: Correct, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MS. EDGERTON: And, of course, before I sit down, I would ask
14 that this statement that Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill has just spoken about
15 be tendered as a Prosecution exhibit.
16 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we do that. We'll admit it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1995, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just one final clarification.
19 The last item, which bears the 65 ter number 19537, you tendered
20 it as a kind of courtesy because it was discussed during the
21 cross-examination. The witness confirmed that he heard such rumours, but
22 he said the content of this document is utter nonsense. So on what basis
23 can you admit? This is an article. It was sort of an interview
24 appearing in the news media, and to which the witness said the content of
25 which is nonsense. So --
1 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. And, indeed, Your Honour, my apologies. It
2 was listed there as a courtesy as part of the total number of exhibits
3 dealt with during his earlier testimony, but that's not one I would be
4 seeking to tender.
5 JUDGE KWON: It is not our practice to admit a third person's
6 interview appearing in the news media. So following that practice, we
7 are not minded to admit that one. More than that, the witness confirmed
8 that he the heard rumours, and he gave his observation in his testimony,
9 so there's no need to admit it.
10 So excluding that, and the other associated exhibits will be
11 admitted and given numbers in due course by the Court Deputy.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Now, Mr. Karadzic, would you start your cross-examination.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Good morning, Mr. -- Dr. Hamill.
18 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.
19 Q. At the outset, I would like to express my gratitude that you --
20 that you have agreed to meet with the Defence team.
21 Everything is turned on on my side. Are you receiving
23 A. [In English] Yes, I am.
24 Q. I wish to say thank you for meeting with the Defence team and
25 enabling us to shed light on certain concepts which, in turn, will enable
1 this examination to run smoothly.
2 Let me ask you: Is it true that whenever something happened,
3 like sniping or artillery incidents or shelling, you were informed by the
4 BH side by radio, and then you were able to intervene with the Serbian
6 A. That is not strictly correct. We were generally informed by our
7 own headquarters, which was the United Nations headquarters based in the
8 PTT building in Sarajevo
9 informed by our own people.
10 Q. I'm sorry. You are correct, of course. I had, in fact, said you
11 were informed by the Papa side. And to make it clear what "Papa" means,
12 that means your crews, your teams, on the Muslim side?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. Thank you. Then you were able to contact the liaison officer of
15 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and demand a cease-fire?
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. There were times when liaison officers tried to obtain a
18 cease-fire and succeeded, and sometimes they refused, explaining that
19 they were returning fire in response to prior attacks by the other side;
20 is that correct?
21 A. Yes, that is correct.
22 Q. Thank you. However, regarding the incident of the 1st of June,
23 1993, involving a football game, you had not received any request from
24 the Papa side for the VRS attack to stop; is that right?
25 A. I'm not aware that such a thing did or did not happen. At the
1 time that this attack occurred, I was actually well to the east of the
2 city in the general area of Mokro, so I was not aware precisely what was
3 happening inside in Dobrinja or other parts of the city. It may have
4 been that there were contacts made or there may not have been. I do not
6 Q. Thank you. In the case of this incident, there was no mixed
7 investigation commission set up for this incident in Dobrinja, because
8 those mixed commissions were formed for the first time to deal with the
9 Markale incident; right?
10 A. There were no mixed commissions at any stage anywhere that I'm
11 aware of, including the investigation into Markale I of the 5th of
12 February of 1994. There were investigations conducted by UNMOs or by
13 other parts of the United Nations organisation into incidents which
14 occurred throughout the four years of the hostilities in that general
15 area, but I'm not aware of any mixed commissions which took in personnel
16 from the warring parties.
17 In the case of the Markale explosion, due to the high profile of
18 the event, a decision was made far above my pay level that there should
19 be contact and liaison with the warring parties. This is not a mixed
20 commission. This was a UN investigation.
21 In relation to the Dobrinja episode, it was just one more in a
22 series of attacks in the Sarajevo
23 was no requirement that I'm aware of for a special investigation into
25 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the 26th of March, 2002, at the Galic
1 trial on page 6764:
2 "To the best of my knowledge, no mixed commission was set up at
3 that time for either of these incidents."
4 [In English] "The first such comission that I remember
5 specifically was that which occurred after the Markale shelling on the
6 5th of February, 1994."
7 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I'm really sorry, but in the
8 transcript that I have from the Galic case, there is no page 6764, and I
9 wonder if I could just ask Dr. Karadzic to have another look for the page
11 THE ACCUSED: 6164. I apologise. Probably I was misunderstood.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: It could be 65 ter 10336, and the page 107.
14 [Interpretation] Could we call that up in e-court, page 7. Line
15 9 begins the answer.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Do you recall, Lieutenant-Colonel, that the Serbian side always
18 insisted they wanted to take part in investigations, and that they would
19 not recognise the results unless the Serbian experts were involved?
20 A. No, I do not remember that.
21 Q. Do you agree that in Dobrinja and in Markale, in all these
22 incidents where you conducted your investigation, the Muslim side also
23 conducted its own investigation, and the Serbian side was the only one
24 that was not involved and did not have any investigation?
25 A. I'm aware that in the case of the Markale incident, the
1 Presidency side certainly conducted an investigation. I am not aware
2 whether or not the Serb side conducted an investigation.
3 Q. Thank you. Since you investigated two craters in Dobrinja, shown
4 to you by Ismet Fazlic -- in fact, you looked at these two craters after
5 the war, and they were shown to you by Mr. Ismet Fazlic, who was an
6 eye-witness and, I believe, also organiser and referee at the
7 football-match. Is that right?
8 A. Yes, I investigated those craters in 2001, which was several
9 years after the explosions in case, obviously. And it was Mr. Fazlic who
10 showed us where the shell -- where the bombs exploded or the shells
12 Q. The crater was filled with a red substance, like plastic, to
13 cover it?
14 A. Not specifically to cover it. It was filled with a red
15 substance -- the individual marks were filled with a red substance, which
16 was plasticised, which preserved, largely, the craters intact. And the
17 investigation I conducted was on the basis that the marks were kept
18 intact by this red substance. This was the case with one of the two
19 locations. It was not the case with the other. It was not possible to
20 be very specific with the second crater, but it was possible to be fairly
21 specific with the first one.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Could we look at 65 ter 10053. 10053, page 3.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. It says:
1 "The craters are old, and both are filled for protection with a
2 red substance. However, this has a certain impact on the craters."
3 I suppose there was no unauthorised -- there was no unauthorised
4 tampering with the crater, and the red substance is the only
6 "Crater 1 is better preserved than Crater 2. The interventions
7 were such that it was not possible to determine at this time whether the
8 craters were made by a gun or a mortar."
9 Is that correct?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Thank you. Do we agree that the filling of the crater with the
12 red substance affected the reliability or, rather, the usability of the
13 craters to determine the origin and the type of weapon?
14 A. No, we don't. On the contrary, I would say that the filling of
15 the marks with the plasticised substance preserved it over a period of
16 eight years and enabled me to do a reasonable job of determining from
17 where and what type of weapon was used.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Again, I was led to ask this
19 question by something you said in the Galic trial, page 59 in the
20 previous document, as the transcript of 25 March 2002. Page 59, bottom
21 of the page.
22 [In English] "Q. Now, you said in respect to the analysis that
23 you did on the 18th of June last year -- 18th of September last year, I
24 beg your pardon --
25 "A. Yes.
1 "Q. -- the craters you saw were probably from a gun.
2 "A. Yes. A howitzer.
3 "Q. And also possibly from a medium-calibre mortar?
4 "A. That is a possibility, yes."
6 "You must bear in mind that the craters had been filed with this
7 red plastic substance, so it was not possible to determine exactly the
8 conditions --"
9 JUDGE KWON: Next page.
10 THE ACCUSED: Next page.
11 "... the condition they were in when they were fresh."
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Is that right?
14 A. Yes, it is. Yes, it is.
15 Q. You did not have the elements to determine with certainty
16 whether, apart from filling with red substance, there were any other
17 interventions on the craters?
18 A. When I examined the area, it was clear that the surrounding
19 substrate was untouched for a very, very long period of time. It was
20 quite clear that the marks which were on the substrate were practically
21 unchanged over that period. And as I said, the red plasticised substance
22 had the -- had actually preserved the craters in the condition in which
23 they were originally, it would appear to me. I saw no evidence that
24 there had been any changes made to the concrete in the area.
25 Q. Thank you. But neither did you have evidence there had been no
1 tampering before the filling with the red substance?
2 A. No. But it would have been very difficult to have tampered with
3 the area in such a way that it didn't show.
4 Q. Did they inform you when they had filled the craters with this
5 red substance?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Do you agree that you have told us that the best time for
8 examining an incident is the moment after the incident?
9 A. Yes, certainly.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if it is convenient, it's time to take
11 a break.
12 We'll break for 30 minutes, and we'll resume at 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. In view of the fact that an investigation ideally should be
18 conducted the moment after the incident, do you agree that the site, the
19 crime scene, can be altered either artificially or naturally due to the
20 passage of time?
21 A. It is quite clear that a crime scene can be altered either
22 artificially or naturally due to the passage of time, because clearly in
23 a situation like this, which is open to the elements, there will be a
24 certain amount of wear, particularly given the Bosnian weather, which
25 involves a lot of snow, frost, ice, and so on, which certainly will
1 damage surfaces which are left untreated. But as I indicated, the fact
2 that the red plasticised substance had, at some stage relatively early
3 on, been placed on the markings, they were fairly well preserved.
4 And, further, I have seen photographs which purport to be those
5 craters in their original condition, taken almost immediately after the
6 incident in question, and the marks bear a striking resemblance to those
7 which are still there to this day. I can, in fact, see no inconsistency
8 between them.
9 Q. Thank you. I only wanted to establish whether it would have been
10 important to determine when that red substance was poured onto the
11 traces, but fine.
12 In view of all this, it was made impossible to determine the
13 origin of the projectile and the type of weapon that fired it. It was
14 impossible to determine whether it was a cannon or a mortar; correct?
15 A. It was not impossible to determine the origin of the projectile.
16 It was very, very possible to determine the direction from which the
17 round arrived in on the ground. It was very clear, it was very obvious,
18 and there is no ambiguity about it. It came, as I said in the report,
19 from a specific direction.
20 As to whether it was a mortar bomb or a shell from a gun or a
21 howitzer, it is much more difficult. My personal view is that it was a
22 medium -- or a light- to medium-type shell. It may have been a medium
23 mortar, as I indicated, but my belief is that it was from a shell from
24 around 105 to 130 millimetres, looking at the effect on the ground. And
25 also looking at the original photograph, it seems to be quite clear to
1 me, if not to others, that it was from a gun or a howitzer, which is, in
2 effect, the same thing.
3 Q. Do you agree that the trajectory of a projectile from a gun or a
4 howitzer, that is to say, artillery weapon, is different from a
5 trajectory of a projectile fired by a mortar, and that to determine the
6 direction and especially the distance, it would be crucial to determine
7 the type of weapon?
8 A. Firstly, it is simply not possible to determine the distance that
9 the round has been fired from. That is simply impossible. It cannot be
10 done in the case of any weapon, regardless of what you might hear.
11 However, it is certainly possible to determine, normally, whether
12 it was a gun/howitzer or a mortar. There is a difference in the
13 trajectory between a gun and a mortar, clearly. A mortar is fired at an
14 angle above 45 degrees. A gun is, effectively, a flat trajectory weapon
15 which may be fired at maybe 10, maybe 20 degrees elevation, so it's a
16 round coming in flat. However, a howitzer, which has most of the
17 characteristics of a gun, can also be fired at a high angle there, which
18 means at above 45 degrees, so, in effect, a howitzer round can come in on
19 the same trajectory as a mortar bomb. The howitzer can also be fired
20 flat, like a gun. What this means is that a mortar or a howitzer round
21 can come in from behind high cover, whereas a gun cannot.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Could we call up in e-court P1053.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You are aware that the French investigating team conducted an
1 investigation and provided their findings; right?
2 A. This appears to be a Canadian Forces Military Police
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 9 of this document.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. There is one thing that I find confusing. Could you focus on
7 Crater 1 and Crater 2. We can all read these:
8 [In English] "Splinter pattern indicates mortar, minimum calibre
9 81, bearing to original fire, 143 degrees," that makes 2.500 mils.
10 "Due to the macadam, there is no fuse furrow, so that angle of
11 descent and range cannot be determined."
12 [Interpretation] With the second crater, everything is the same,
13 except that the degree is 138, which makes 2.420 mils. Thus, these
14 UNPROFOR investigators found that it was a mortar of at least
15 81-millimetre calibre; correct?
16 A. That is what it says, yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can we now see page 57 of this document. And I advise the
19 parties to look at other conclusions as well.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. This is part of the investigating material of the UNPROFOR based
22 on the information received from Din ko Bakal from the Dobrinja Brigade
23 Staff. Can we see -- yes, we can see it now:
24 [In English] "I was about 60 to 70 metres from the place where
25 the shell landed. That happened about 10.25 to 10.30 a.m. I was in the
1 apartment at the first floor, from where I was able to see the playground
2 very well. When I heard the detonations, I thought these were mortar
3 shells with 82 calibre. However, later we found parts of a mortar shell,
4 and they were 60 millimetres calibre."
5 [Interpretation] Do you agree that this becomes more and more
6 muddled? Based on the fragments that were collected, it seems to be a
7 round of 63 millimetres?
8 A. No, I don't agree that it's more and more muddled. You must
9 remember, Dr. Karadzic, that there was an awful lot of mortar bombs of
10 all descriptions being fired at the Dobrinja area during the period from
11 April 1992 up until the end of May 1993 and onwards, so it's quite
12 possible that there were bits of 60-millimetre mortar bombs lying around.
13 Again, my opinion, as I said earlier on, is that it was actually a shell,
14 perhaps 122 millimetres, from a howitzer, not from a mortar. I may be
15 wrong on that, but you asked for my professional opinion, and that's what
16 it is.
17 Q. Do you agree that a mortar of 63 millimetres is practically
18 considered small arms? It can be carried on your person and it can be
19 fired from anywhere?
20 A. I could not possibly consider a mortar of 60 millimetres, not 63,
21 to be small arms. Small arms consist of rifles, pistols, submachine guns
22 and the like. But, yes, a 60-millimetre mortar can be carried on a
23 person, is designed to be carried by a person, and can be fired by one
24 individual. I wouldn't like to carry it too far, though.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 In the transcript, it's recorded that I said "small arms." I
2 said "some sort of personal weapon." That's not what I said. Perhaps
3 that caused the confusion.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. So a 60-millimetre mortar would be about 50 centimetres, half a
6 metre, that is, in length; right?
7 A. A little bit more.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 6 of the
9 same document.
10 Para 14:
11 "Around 0945 hours on the 4th of July, 1993, a copy of the map of
12 Dobrinja was received from UNPROFOR officials, a copy of which is
13 attached as Annex 1. The map shows that the soccer game was held in a
14 location surrounded on three sides by buildings (west, east, and south)."
15 And it was open only facing north:
16 "In addition, it was explained that there are Bosnian mortars
17 located outside the hospital approximately 500 metres from the soccer
18 location. However, these were not observed during this visit to
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Correct?
22 A. I am not aware whether that is correct or not. However, what
23 I can say is that it is irrelevant if there were buildings on three
24 sides, four sides, or no sides, because the reality is that a mortar bomb
25 or a howitzer shell comes in normally at a steep angle of descent.
1 Therefore, it can be used to go behind buildings.
2 In relation to Bosnian mortars located, I'm not aware where the
3 hospital is, nor am I aware whether or not there were mortars there.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 65 ter 10053. 10053.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. On page 3, you provided information to the OTP in 2001, where it
8 "Crater 2 is not so well preserved."
9 The most one can say, looking at that crater, in view of its
10 shape, is that the shell seems to have been fired from the same direction
11 as the shell that created Crater 1?
12 A. That is correct.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I would like to go back to the
14 previous document, P1053, and to look at the same paragraphs where the
15 UNPROFOR team made conclusions about Crater 1 and Crater 2. That's
16 page 9.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. So we see what their conclusions are with regard to the azimuth,
19 and also they say that the angle of descent could not have been
21 Please look further down. Look at the conclusions. Paragraph 2:
22 "The minimum angle of descent for 81-millimetre, 120-millimetre
23 mortars is 45.71 degrees. At that angle, the minimum range is 1.120
24 metres for 81-millimetre mortar and 1.340 metres for 120-millimetre
1 So their conclusion is that the shells only could have been fired
2 from the Serbian side, that that is indicated by both bearings.
3 "At the minimum range, the mortars were 300 metres south of
4 Lukavica Barracks."
5 First of all, I would like to ask you the following: On the
6 basis of what did this French investigator determine the minimum angle of
7 descent -- Canadian, rather? That's what you said.
8 A. I believe he was Canadian. Certainly the military police
9 investigation were Canadians. Whether or not they were United Nations, I
10 do not know.
11 What I would say is that in order to determine minimum angles of
12 descent, you have to look at the range tables for the specific weapon.
13 Now, the general weapon in use in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in most of
14 Eastern and -- Eastern Europe, would be the 82-millimetre weapon, which
15 is produced by the former Soviets. The 81-millimetre weapon tends to be
16 a Western weapon, often French made. Similarly, the 120-millimetre
17 mortar tends to be a Western weapon, and the former Soviet equipment is
18 122 millimetres. So there is a difference.
19 You have to examine the specific range tables, and this is one of
20 the problems that we have seen in a number of investigations, that
21 incorrect range tables were used to calculate possible ranges for
22 different incidents.
23 In this case, again, as I said, I am not convinced that it
24 actually was a mortar. The angle of descent -- the minimum angle of
25 descent indicates that it could have been a mortar, but, equally, that it
1 could be a howitzer. I have no argument with that.
2 In terms of the bearing to the origin of fire, you'll note that
3 the team in question came up, apparently, with two different bearings,
4 one of 2420 mils and one of 2500 mils, which would indicate the two
5 weapons fired at some distance from each other.
6 As I said, in my investigation, I found that I had a fairly
7 specific bearing for the first crater, but for the second crater, it was
8 more indeterminate, but that it was generally from the same direction.
9 This would -- this would agree with my findings. I had not seen this
10 particular report before I conducted my analysis.
11 Q. Thank you. So let us now clarify matters. The minimum angle is
12 what the investigators have stated here. What is the maximum angle, on
13 the assumption that it is a mortar?
14 A. It depends very much on what type of mortar it is. It depends
15 very much on the charge used. The maximum would be where you use the
16 maximum number of supplementary charges.
17 If I could explain to the Court that a mortar bomb is not fired
18 with a fixed [Realtime transcript read in error "mixed"] amount of
19 charge. There is a basic charge, a primer, which is the minimum charge,
20 and then horseshoes or little sashays are added to the base of the bomb
21 to increase the range so that if a bomb is fired, for example, at an
22 angle of 70 degrees elevation, there could be a very wide variation in
23 the range, because depending on the number of sashays or horseshoes
24 attached, the round will go up a certain distance into the air before it,
25 as it were, turns over and begins to fall, so the more charges there are
1 on it, the further it will go.
2 At 45 degrees, 45 degrees is the maximum range for any specific
3 charge. So at 45 degrees on maximum charge, you have maximum range for
4 any particular mortar, and what that is depends very much on the weapon,
5 itself, and the type of bomb which is used in it.
6 In other words, I cannot say, in this particular case, without
7 range tables and without knowing specifically what weapon and what
8 charges were used. Neither can anybody else.
9 Q. Thank you. I'm afraid that the transcript says "does not fire,"
10 whereas you said "does fire."
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Is that right? Please have a look at the transcript, line six:
13 [In English] "The maximum --"
14 A. In line 8 --
15 Q. "... was not fired" --
16 A. Sorry. In line 8, if I could change that, please. It's not
17 fired with a fixed amount of charge, not "mixed." The first word on line
18 8 should be "fixed."
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can we simplify things a bit? Do you agree --
23 JUDGE KWON: Can I ask you again, Mr. Hamill, to put a pause
24 between the question and answer. And if you could slow down a little bit
25 more, for the benefit of the court reporters and interpreters, when you
1 speak. Thank you.
2 THE WITNESS: I apologise, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: No, it's not something you have to apologise at all.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: Can I just interject to clear up another, as it
6 were, variable.
7 As I understand it, Colonel Hamill, even two identical mortars,
8 fired with the same amount of charge and fired at the same angle, may
9 result in a different impact point, even if fired at the same time,
10 because of variations in the quality of the explosive mix, and also one
11 mortar may have been fired many more times than the other mortar and the
12 barrel may have been worn and the velocity of discharge may be reduced?
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour is quite correct in that. But,
14 equally, it is possible to fire two rounds from the same tube within
15 seconds of each other and have the rounds come down quite a distance away
16 because of the fact that mortars are inherently an inaccurate weapon.
17 There is a lot of variation even within the one weapon, in terms of
18 firing. So you have what's called a beaten zone for the impacts from a
19 specific mortar, and this tends to be an ellipse with a very long
20 longitudinal pattern and a much less wide area. So it's like -- almost
21 like an oval, and rounds can fall up to 10, 15, 20 metres away from each
22 other within that area.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Sorry, Dr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: The French translation has only now been completed.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Colonel Hamill, we see here, theoretically, a minimum angle of
3 41.71 degrees. Do you agree that a maximum angle would be around 86
5 A. In practical terms, probably. Theoretically, it is possible to
6 fire a mortar at 90 degrees, but that would be extremely dangerous to the
8 You must also bear in mind, Dr. Karadzic, that a mortar bomb,
9 when it lands, has a fairly wide area of destruction, as it were, so that
10 it's not wise to fire too close to yourself, in case you get damaged.
11 In the case of our 120-millimetre bomb, for example, the danger
12 radius - radius, not diametre - is considered to be 500 metres. In the
13 case of our 81-millimetre mortar, the danger radius is considered to be
14 250 metres.
15 Q. Thank you. The real angle of descent was not determined here. A
16 theoretical one was provided of 45.71 degrees. That is theory, and also
17 if we take into account the buildings around the field and the maximum
18 angle is 86 degrees. Do you agree that if the maximum angle is bigger
19 and if it inclines towards 86 degrees, it speaks of the range from which
20 the mortar was fired?
21 A. I have already indicated to you that I do not agree that this was
22 a mortar. If it was, however, it was fired from whatever angle, it
23 doesn't really matter, because it's clear that whatever angle it was
24 fired from would clear the buildings in Grbavica. So I'm afraid your
25 question doesn't really make any sense to me.
1 Q. Let us please establish something now. The actually-established
2 angle, does it speak of the range involved or not?
3 A. There is no actually-established angle that I'm aware of. There
4 is a minimum angle of descent of 45 -- 40.5 degrees, which was measured
5 between the crater and the roof of the buildings in the appropriate
7 Q. Since an angle was not actually established in real terms, why
8 would I not say that it's 84, for instance? Where would it have been
9 fired from if the angle of descent were 84?
10 A. I have no answer to that, as I don't have the range tables for
11 the weapon in question.
12 Q. But on the basis of your experience, do you know that if the
13 angle is obtuse, and you even said this today, it is probable that it
14 would have been fired from a longer range? Analogously, the range would
15 have to be shorter if the angle is bigger; right?
16 A. The higher the angle, the shorter the range in every case, and
17 that goes for mortars and howitzers fired at high angle. It does not
18 apply to guns, where the opposite effect occurs.
19 Q. Thank you. When we met up on the 12th of January this year, you
20 said that the daily reports of the Lima
21 about the activity of the team on that day, and you said that you had not
22 been shown reports for that particular day. That goes for the Lima
23 team; right?
24 A. Insofar as my memory is accurate, that is correct.
25 Q. Thank you. Did they tell you that the Bosnian investigators
1 first carried out an investigation regarding this incident two and a half
2 years after the incident actually occurred, that is to say, on the 21st
3 of November, 1995, and that was done upon a request from this Tribunal,
4 The Hague
5 A. Nobody told me that, no.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 09970; in e-court,
7 I mean.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. As for the previous question, while we are still waiting for this
10 document: Colonel, how do people decide on a minimum angle, rather than
11 a maximum angle? In other words, does this indicate a bit of a need to
12 lengthen, as it were, the range towards the Serbian positions?
13 A. In general terms, when a crater analysis is being done
14 particularly on mortars -- on mortar bombs, there is what's called a fuse
15 tunnel, which is when the round hits the ground, particularly if the
16 ground is hard, the explosion drives the fuse of the weapon directly
17 forward. This creates a tunnel in which one can insert a stick, for
18 example, and measure the angle of descent. I understand that that was
19 not possible in this particular case.
20 Q. Thank you. Could you please focus on the first page. This is a
21 document of the Muslim --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
23 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
24 MS. EDGERTON: It's P1699.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was established here -- or,
2 rather, no, we can see the cover page here.
3 And can we now have a look at page 3 of this document. Let's see
4 if the English version is also page 3. In Serbian, it is 3.
5 Yes, this is a record on this investigation two and a half years
6 after the incident.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Now, could you please look at paragraph 4.
9 [No interpretation]
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot find that
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you see this part?
14 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters couldn't find that passage and
15 couldn't interpret that part. Could you indicate where we can find that?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're going to get to it now,
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. When this investigation was carried out by the Muslim
20 investigators, the scene was shown to them by Refik Sokolar. According
21 to the statement of this witness, and that is what was established during
22 the investigation, itself, one projectile fell on the parking-lot, on the
23 tarmac, and the other one fell on the soil surface next to the
24 parking-lot. Is that what you were told as well, that one fell on the
25 tarmac and the other one fell on soil, all on the parking-lot?
1 A. At this stage, I am not sure, to be quite honest. My memory
2 would tell me that both fell on tarmac, but that may not be accurate.
3 Q. Paragraph 4 says:
4 "According to Witness Refik Sokolar ..."
5 And so on and so forth. That is paragraph 4 in the Serbian
6 version. And in the last paragraph in the Serbian version, it says that
7 they didn't even look at the other one because two and a half years had
8 elapsed and some plants were growing there, these two and a half years
10 In English, it is actually the next page. Sorry. Actually, it's
11 the last page, according to the -- it's the last paragraph here and then
12 the next page in English, and we keep the same page in Serbian.
13 So this investigation team that worked in 1995 - it's an
14 investigation team of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina - says explicitly
15 that the second shell did not fall on the tarmac, but, rather, it hit the
16 ground, the soil, and they did not even investigate any further because
17 there were some plants growing there by then.
18 Can you see that part?
19 A. No.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now we'll try to find it in
21 English. In Serbian, it's the last paragraph.
22 MS. EDGERTON: It's on the next page in English.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I see it now.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Q. Did you see this other crater?
1 A. Not that I recall.
2 Q. Nevertheless, you do speak of a second crater and the probability
3 of the shell having been fired from the same direction?
4 A. That is correct. That is what I saw, that is what I recorded.
5 Q. So you concluded that only on the basis of one crater. How did
6 you make any conclusions on the basis of a second crater that you never
8 A. I did see two craters in that place at that time. I examined
9 them both. One was quite clear. The second was more indistinct. The
10 first one gave me a specific bearing. The second one looked very much to
11 be as if it was coming from pretty much the same direction. No further
12 can I say.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you have any explanation, then, how come, in 1995,
14 there was only one crater in the tarmac, and in 2001, there were two?
15 A. [Microphone not activated]
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Can we now have a look at page 6 of this document.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
20 MS. EDGERTON: The witness's answer is missing in the transcript.
21 He said, No, actually.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. The microphone was not activated.
23 But can you confirm that you said, No, Mr. Hamill?
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I said, No.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Can I draw your attention to this photograph number 3, and may I
3 inform you that this photograph comes from this investigation material of
4 the Bosnian Muslim police. The 21st of November, 1995, is the date.
5 Can you observe between the -- the contrast between the damaged
6 surface and the undamaged surface? You see that this looks as if it
7 happened only on the previous day. Can you agree with that, that there
8 is a great deal of contrast?
9 A. I cannot comment on whether it looks like it was done the
10 previous day or not. It certainly looks in very good condition.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you remember whether this was one of the craters
12 that you were shown during your investigation?
13 A. I cannot say, because when I looked at the craters, as I said,
14 they were filled with a red plasticised substance which preserved the
15 general outlines of the crater but not necessarily every single detail.
16 I would also say that given that a lot of time had passed, that there
17 were certainly some erasure of detail, by effects of weather, by effects
18 of human traffic, by whatever effects, just natural erosion, so I cannot
19 say whether or not this is the same crater that I examined some years
21 Q. Do you agree that this first crown forms an almost perfect
23 A. The inner crater is a perfect circle, almost, yes.
24 Q. Would that be consistent with a bigger or a smaller angle of
25 descent, this perfect circle?
1 A. This, in my view, would be from a higher angle of descent.
2 Q. Thank you. Are you aware that after the incident, the UNPROFOR
3 also carried out an investigation and said in their report that two
4 shells landed on a hard surface, or macadam, as they called it?
5 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have a reference for that, please?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's this previous document,
10 P1053. That's where that paragraph is. I didn't want to repeat it.
11 That's Crater 1 and Crater 2, P1053. If necessary, we can call it up
13 JUDGE KWON: Are you satisfied, Ms. Edgerton, or do we have to
14 look at it?
15 MS. EDGERTON: Actually, not quite, Your Honours. And I'm
16 struggling to find the reference, because I understand that document to
17 say that one fell in the play area and one fell on the perimeter, which
18 is somewhat different than two shells landing on a hard surface.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's see the document, then,
20 Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 9. P1053, page 9.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Please pay attention where it says that the shells landed on
24 macadam and there is no fuse furrow that's -- therefore, the angle of
25 descent and range could not be determined; is that right?
1 A. That is correct, and that accords with my report, in which I
2 state that both rounds fell on hard ground. And it seems to contradict
3 the report you mentioned conducted by the personnel from the Presidency
4 some time later. I would also draw your attention to the fact that this
5 was conducted within five weeks of the event.
6 Q. That is right. First, we have five weeks, then two and a half
7 years, and then yours was six and a half years ago, wasn't it, from 1993
8 to 2001?
9 A. That is correct. Yes, that is correct.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 11383 is the next 65 ter that we
11 need. No, sorry, that's the same thing, except it's 65 ter. It's the
12 same document. We don't need to call the other one up.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
14 Q. And, again, they determined 2400 mils and 500 mils. Do you agree
15 that the UNPROFOR investigators determined a minimum angle of descent
16 based on the height of the nearest building in the direction from which
17 the shell came?
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the number, please.
19 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters didn't get the number.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2569.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I was looking at page 51, line 25. I
22 don't think we have the right number of mils, either.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I thought the interpreters referred to those
24 numbers. Could you check that the number of mils were correctly
25 represented in the transcript?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Concerning one shell, the UNPROFOR
2 determined 2400 mils, and the other one, 2.500. That was in the previous
3 document we showed. One was not 2400, but 2.420, and the other one was
4 2500. It's from P1053, the document produced by the UNPROFOR.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Are you familiar with this image, Lieutenant-Colonel?
7 A. Firstly, in relation to your first question, we've already
8 established what the mils were and the minimum angle of descent. I think
9 that goes back quite a number of pages.
10 In relation to this image, it looks to me like a scene from
12 Q. Do you agree that this is the playground in question, and the
13 parking-lot is to the right of the playground, so we can't see it in this
15 A. Again, I neither agree nor disagree. Given, as you mentioned,
16 that my investigation took place about nine years ago, my memory would
17 not retain such detail. But it certainly looks, generally, as if it
18 could be that area.
19 Q. Thank you. We show this photograph mainly to show the height of
20 these buildings. Do you remember that from three sides, south, east, and
21 west, the buildings were approximately this height?
22 A. Certainly. Certainly, yes.
23 Q. Do you agree that the angle of descent depends, in a certain
24 measure, from the height of these buildings and the distance between the
25 buildings and the point of impact?
1 A. Certainly. Pythagorus proved that a very long time ago.
2 Q. Thank you. On the basis of those two craters that you were
3 shown, you established that the direction was 2200 mils, plus/minus 50,
4 and that made you determine that the direction was Toplik?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that there were certain traces of
7 shrapnel in the shape of fins, and that that made you think it was a gun,
8 not a howitzer?
9 A. No, that is not correct. The wings -- there were wings, not
10 fins, on the ground at the time, and that made me think that it was a gun
11 or howitzer, not a mortar. A gun and a howitzer, in effect, fires the
12 same shell, or at least the same type of shell, so the effect on the
13 ground would be pretty similar. A mortar bomb is very different in its
14 construction, and, as a result, would have a different impact on the
15 ground, and this would be very apparent in a fresh crater. It would not
16 be so apparent in an old crater. And the longer time went on, clearly,
17 the more degraded a crater will get and the less it will retain the
18 qualities that it would have had originally.
19 Q. Thank you. I did, in fact, say exactly what you said. If we
20 just changed "the shape of fins" in the record to "the shape of wings,"
21 your answer could have been, It's correct. I did say "wings." That was
22 interpreted to you as "fins." That caused the confusion.
23 Let's see all the conclusions and determinations that were made
24 in relation to these craters.
25 First of all, in the investigation of the Muslim team, photograph
1 number 3, do you see those wings? You remember it, a perfect circle, a
2 high angle of descent, or perhaps you were shown a different crater?
3 A. I could see the wings. Perhaps you mightn't, not being a
4 professional artillery officer, but I could.
5 Q. Thank you. Now let us see. The UNPROFOR determined 2.420 and
6 2.500 mils. The Bosnian investigators determined that the shell came
7 from south-east, that is to say, 100 [as interpreted] degrees from the
8 azimuth, that is, from the north. That would be 1.955 mils, wouldn't it?
9 A. No. What you must remember is that a mil is an artificial
10 construction, and those of us who have been trained, as I have, will use
11 6.400 mils in a circle, for ease of calculation. Clearly, one-quarter is
12 1.600, one-eighth is 800, and so on. However, other establishments use a
13 different number of mils, some could use 6.000, some use 6.230, which is
14 more accurate in the sense of it relates to Pi, in actual fact, and the
15 subtention of difference at distance, so I cannot say that it would be
17 From my perspective and in my training, 100 degrees would be
18 1.788, approximately. But, again, you have to examine: What do we mean
19 by the azimuth? And, again, where I look at it from is I look at grid
20 north, not magnetic north and not true north. We use a grid on a map so
21 that everybody is playing on the same field, as it were. So I cannot
22 compare, specifically, without knowing where those investigators were
23 coming from, firstly, how many mils they have in a circle and, secondly,
24 what north they were using and from what map. I was using the standard
25 map that we had in UNPROFOR, which was gridded on a UTM system. What
1 they were using, I don't know. But the likelihood is that it was
2 probably somewhere in the same general area.
3 Q. Thank you. They wrote that it was 110 degrees from the north to
4 the south-east. If 100 were 1700 mils, then 110 degrees would be, as
5 they concluded, 1.955 mils. Obviously, they were using similar
6 parameters to yours. It's not 100, so it's not 1700 mils; it's, instead,
7 110 degrees, so it's 1955. You determined that it was up to 2.350, and
8 the UNPROFOR decided it was 2.420 and 2.500.
9 Do you see that nothing is consistent here with anything else?
10 If it's easier for you, we can call up 65 ter 9970.
11 A. Going back to line 20 in page 54, I presume it is, the
12 translation said "100 degrees." That is from the north, that would be
13 1955. So it is clear that there was a slight error in the transcript.
14 1.955 is, more or less, something in the region of 110 degrees, from my
15 perspective as well, yes.
16 In relation to 1.955, in relation to 2.400, it actually isn't a
17 huge amount. It sounds large, but it's not. 1 mil at 1.000 metres
18 subtends 1 metre, so it isn't a huge amount. If the range was, say,
19 3.000, then 1 mil makes a difference of 3 metres, that's all. Forty mils
20 makes a difference of 120 metres at 3.000.
21 What I'm getting at here is that, as Judge Morrison said earlier
22 on, weapons can be fired on the same bearing at the same angle, and due
23 to slight differences in the composition of the explosive charge, in the
24 air temperature, in the wind direction and speed, in charge temperature
25 and so on, a round will not fall, necessarily, in the same place.
1 Lightning doesn't hit twice, as they say. It is not going to fall into
2 the same hole. So this variation, while apparently large, is not perhaps
3 as large as you might think. They're all pretty much in the same area;
4 that is, somewhere in east of south-east.
5 Q. Thank you. But do you agree that the confrontation lines were
6 close to one another and that they were at a distance from this place
7 of -- how much? What is the information that you were given? How far
8 were the confrontation lines?
9 A. The confrontation lines were fairly close in that area, and, in
10 fact, they were within, I suppose, 50 to 100 metres of each other, I
11 would say. It was one block of buildings to the next in Dobrinja.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that from this pitch to the
13 confrontation lines, the distance was about 300 metres?
14 A. Probably. Sorry, to the armija line. Clearly, the VRS line was
15 further away.
16 Q. Thank you. What is the minimum distance from which one can fire
17 an 82-millimetre mortar with a zero charge, let's say?
18 If it would be of assistance, I can put up firing tables on the
19 screen. 1D2262.
20 In other words, do you agree that with a zero charge, the minimum
21 distance from which an 82-millimetre mortar can be fired is about 80
23 A. It can be, yes.
24 Q. Here is the table, if you need it, but I believe you know it by
25 heart, and you have confirmed that. Is it helpful?
1 A. Yes. At charge zero, clearly it's 80 metres is the minimum.
2 Q. And the angle of descent would then be around 85 degrees;
4 A. The angle of ascent is certainly 85 degrees. I don't see an
5 angle of descent.
6 Q. Is that the fourth column? Sorry, column 9, that's the angle of
8 A. Yes, I see it now. It's "1421."
9 Q. Would you take a look at this line, "300 metres"? What would the
10 angle of descent be then?
11 A. It is somewhat obscured by the letter -- or by the number "0,"
12 but it looks as though it's "12" something "2."
13 Q. Thank you. But, in any case, you do agree that if the angle were
14 around 85 degrees, then the pattern of the traces would be close to a
15 perfect circle?
16 A. They would still have the characteristics of a mortar bomb
17 explosion, which they don't appear to have.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Sorry, Your Honour.
19 Just on the transcript, line 24, page 57, I thought I heard the
20 interpreter say "85 degrees," instead of "125 degrees ," but I could be
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is correct. We were about to
24 correct that ourselves.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So the maximum angle of descent is about 86 degrees. The maximum
2 degree is achieved from a minimum distance; is that true,
3 Lieutenant-Colonel? The smaller the distance, the bigger the angle?
4 That's what you told us today .
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Thank you. And the bigger the angle, then the pattern of
7 fragment traces is closer to a perfect circle. That's what the first
8 column shows us?
9 A. In the case of a shell, yes, that is correct. In the case of
10 a mortar bomb, you would have a serious undercut on the front of the
11 crater and you would have a line almost perpendicular -- in fact,
12 perpendicular to the incoming angle, and I didn't see those on this
13 particular photograph.
14 Q. Do you want to see that photograph again, photo number 3?
15 A. If you wish to see it, fine.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 09970, that's 65 ter.
17 JUDGE KWON: Can I remind you, Mr. Karadzic, that this document
18 we just saw, in relation to the table of charges, was marked for
19 identification until we are satisfied as to the origin of it, so it's
20 still pending.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's part of the manual, the
22 official JNA manual.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we know that. It's for you to up-load that and
24 inform the Chamber to that effect.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Can we see page 6.
2 JUDGE KWON: And also we need the translation, of course.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document that we called up has
4 one. But if you mean the translation of the table, we'll provide one.
5 The upper photograph, number 3, please. The previous page.
6 We see number 3.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. This first crown, Lieutenant-Colonel, does it form an almost
9 perfect circle?
10 A. Yes, it does so appear.
11 Q. Would these be traces of a mortar or a howitzer?
12 A. Clearly, I would like to actually see the crater physically. But
13 judging from the photograph, it looks to me as if it is from a shell;
14 that is, from a howitzer or from a gun. Probably a howitzer.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 A. Could I also say I have no idea of the scale of the photograph.
17 Q. Well, I hope that this measuring stick actually serves for
18 measurement and the dividers are at intervals of a metre, that that's
19 what the investigating team used.
20 Tell us, please, whether the range can be approximately
21 determined if we know the calibre of the shell from the moment when we
22 hear the explosion and from the moment we hear the firing.
23 A. There are possibilities, using sound-ranging equipment, to
24 determine the origin of a shell. There was not such equipment available
25 to us in Sector Sarajevo at that time.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, for instance, if eye-witnesses first
2 heard the sound of firing and then the explosion, we could -- on the
3 basis of what we know about the speed of sound, we could come to a
4 conclusion regarding the range?
5 A. If the eye-witnesses were present and saw the explosion, and were
6 close enough to it and heard the sound of the firing after that, and
7 could work out in their heads at that stage the distance involved, then
8 certainly you could work out the range, yes. It would be inexact, but it
9 would give an approximation.
10 Q. So the time between the firing and the explosion or impact would
11 be of certain significance, wouldn't it?
12 A. Yes, it would.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you know that two eye-witnesses heard the sound of
15 A. No.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Again, could we have a reference for that, please?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll provide the statements of
20 these witnesses. I was just interested in the opinion of the
21 lieutenant-colonel about that particular matter, and I was interested in
22 hearing whether he had been informed about everything, whether he had
23 received all information which was indispensable for him to make
24 conclusions. We are going to supply the witness statements.
25 JUDGE KWON: I'll leave it at that.
1 We can carry on. Yes.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Do you know that Mr. Richard Higgs, a Prosecution expert, visited
4 this location somewhat after you did, the 12th of February, 2002?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Well, in that sense, you wouldn't know about his findings, would
8 A. Certainly not.
9 Q. Thank you. So if it's of any assistance -- actually, 65 ter
10 10083 would be the number. Can we call that up, page 8.
11 Mr. Higgs says:
12 "At the request of the International Tribunal, I visited the
13 location with Mr. Chester Stamp and I examined two craters, the two
14 craters concerned. Both craters are filled with a red substance, which
15 makes an analysis impossible now. However, a sufficient part of the
16 calibre has still been preserved, and certain findings can be made."
17 Have you found that somewhere on page 8?
18 JUDGE KWON: Are we seeing the correct page?
19 THE ACCUSED: I'm not sure, in English, whether it is 8 or --
20 JUDGE KWON: It's probably page 7.
21 THE ACCUSED: C.
22 [Interpretation] "At the request of the International Tribunal,"
23 that's what it says in Serbian, and it's on the top of the page in
24 Serbian. It's page number 7 in English:
25 [In English] "At the request of the Tribunal, I visited ..."
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Colonel, do you know that Mr. Higgs also included that this was
3 a mortar shell? UNPROFOR investigators, in P0 -- or P1053, came to the
4 conclusion that it was a mortar shell. The Muslim police investigators
5 came to the conclusion that it was a mortar shell. Your position is that
6 it is more probable that it is a gun or howitzer. Do you have any
7 explanation for such discrepancies?
8 A. The explanation I would give you is that a considerable period of
9 time elapsed before I conducted my investigation, but regardless of
10 whether it was a gun or a mortar, the direction of fire was clear.
11 Q. Do you know that if you look at any directions, the two armies
12 are facing each other at the lines?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In order to ascertain responsibility, would it be necessary to
15 pin-point the range, to determine the range?
16 A. It would be useful.
17 Q. Thank you. As for the Markale incident, you came somewhat later,
18 didn't you, some six or seven days after the incident; right?
19 A. Yes. The incident took place on the 5th of February, and I first
20 saw it on the 10th of February, 1994.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that you said to us, and when you
22 testified in the case of General Galic, that whoever was firing would
23 have to be very lucky to hit a place like the Markale Market is with a
24 single shell?
25 JUDGE KWON: Reference?
1 MS. EDGERTON: Please.
2 THE WITNESS: I remember --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that the
4 lieutenant-colonel could confirm that even without the transcript. The
5 26th of March, 2002, is the date of the transcript. 6218 is the page.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can confirm that, in the sense that if they
7 were intending to hit the Markale Market, to fire one round and get what
8 we call a target round from a mortar, from a 120-millimetre mortar, from
9 a distance would be amazing, good luck for the gunner, and horrendous bad
10 luck for those who were standing where the round went off, because to hit
11 a target from a mortar takes a lot of effort, you need a lot of
12 preparatory information on possibly firing, and you need to fire very,
13 very specifically on data that has been acquired normally from adjusting
14 rounds. That was one round that was fired on that day that we are aware
15 of in that general area, and for it to be a target round was absolutely
16 amazing, if Markale was the target.
17 Line 1, "for it to be a target round," yeah, okay.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can we briefly look at 65 ter 10336, and then in that document,
20 page 161. 10336 is the number, and 161 is the page number.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. That is precisely what you were speaking of. You had certain
23 reservations, in view of the intentions, or, rather, you thought that
24 whoever was firing had not intended to fire on Markale; right?
25 A. I didn't mean that; specifically, if he, who was firing, intended
1 to hit Markale, he was extremely lucky, from his perspective. What I
2 said was that -- what I intended was that it may not have been directly
3 at Markale, but it was certainly in the general area of the center of
5 JUDGE MORRISON: Tell me, if I can just extrapolate from that,
6 what you're saying is this: that for a round to have landed where it did,
7 it must have been, as a matter of common sense, fired in that general
8 direction, but where it exactly landed was a matter of chance, given that
9 there was only one shot and no ranging fire beforehand?
10 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honour.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I clarify that.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. A great deal of luck and also an absence of willingness to hit
14 precisely that point where the shell had landed; right?
15 A. Wrong. I am not saying there was an absence of willingness to
16 hit precisely that point where the shell had landed. I do not know where
17 it was -- at which point it was aimed, but it was certainly aimed at an
18 area full of civilians in the center of Sarajevo. It hit an area which
19 was crowded with civilians. Whether by chance or design, I do not know.
20 Q. Thank you. You were a technical adviser in this case, and during
21 the mandate of the investigation team, investigations complemented the
22 previous investigations that had been carried out by the UN; right?
23 A. I would suggest that the investigation that we conducted
24 superseded the previous investigations that had been carried out by the
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's time to have a break.
2 We'll have a break for half an hour and then resume at 1.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So you received an assignment from the United Nations to carry
9 out this subsequent examination, using the relevant physical evidence and
10 findings, to determine responsibility for this incident; right?
11 A. You attempt to determine responsibility, yes.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 May I call up in e-court the previous document, 11036, pages --
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Is it true that the traces you found were tiny and not usable for
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Is it true that Mirza Jamakovic offered fragments to you, and you
19 refused them because there was no proof they originated from the site?
20 A. I'm not aware that a Mirza Jamakovic offered fragments to us, but
21 we were certainly offered fragments by the Presidency side liaison
22 officer, and we refused them, yes.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 37 in this document, please,
24 65 ter 10336. That's the transcript from 2002, page 37 in the
25 transcript -- that's to say in the document, but in the transcript, it's
1 6094, straddling 6095.
2 Beginning with line 18, somebody asks whether Jamakovic -- in
3 fact, you say that somebody contacted you, and you were offered
4 fragments, but your team refused them.
5 Can we see the next page.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. We can see that here, and you said you had no evidence that they
9 originate from the scene. The determination was somehow made of the
10 direction from which the shells could have come, and you established
11 there were six possible places in that direction from which the shell
12 could have been fired. Two of them were closer on Muslim territory, and
13 four of them were more distant on Serb territory. Correct?
14 Can we see, in the same document, page 135. In the document
15 itself, it's 135, and in the transcript, it's 6192.
16 Is it true you determined there were six possible places from
17 which the shell could have been fired?
18 A. Yes, of course.
19 Q. You also established that it was more likely to have been fired
20 from a position closer to Markale?
21 A. I did not.
22 Q. It's towards the bottom of the previous page or the top of this
24 Could we see the previous page.
25 The next page, then, please.
1 The bottom of this page, your answer is, in line 23:
2 [In English] "The probability would be slightly higher the nearer
3 the target is to the weapon. But not much. You're looking at
4 approximately equal times of flight because ..."
5 And so on and so on.
6 A. Yeah, I see that, but you're misreading it, I'm afraid. This has
7 nothing whatsoever to do with the probability that the round was fired
8 from a closer position. It is in relation to the probability that a
9 target round would be achieved earlier from a closer position, because
10 clearly the bomb hasn't as far to travel, is not likely to be deflected
11 by wind, is -- generally, it's going to have a smaller pattern on the
12 ground. So if it is going to be a target round, it's clearly going to be
13 easier from a shorter range, but that has nothing to do with the
14 probability that the round was actually fired from any one of the six
15 positions. The probability was equal from all of them, technically.
16 Q. [Interpretation] But in case this place was deliberately
17 targeted, you are assigning a higher likelihood to positions that are
18 nearer? Regarding the intention to hit that place, if such an intent
19 exists, it's more likely to achieve that goal from a nearer position than
20 from a more distant one. That's what you said?
21 A. In one sense, yes. But you were connecting two items which don't
22 belong together. You're connecting technical accuracy with intent, and I
23 am not doing that.
24 Q. I'm just following up on what you said, that if the intent
25 existed, it must have been pure luck to hit the target, the desired
1 target, with just one projectile. But let's move on.
2 You said that possible ranging in and adjusting the aim would
3 have had any value within two hours only, and if two hours had passed,
4 then these same parameters would no longer apply?
5 A. Again, that is correct, we do accept that targets which are
6 adjusted have a two-hour validity. Now, this obviously changes in
7 relation to conditions at a specific time in a specific place, but we
8 accept, from our technical point of view, that two hours is the window of
9 opportunity, if you could put it that way.
10 But going back to what you said earlier on about the beaten zone,
11 it is a fact that the beaten zone, as we call it, in other words, where
12 the mortar bomb lands, is smaller if the range is smaller. The further
13 out you go, Your Honours, clearly, the bigger the discrepancy is going to
14 be, because the round will be affected by more factors, but that does not
15 mean anything in relation to intent. That is purely a technical issue.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, then, that ranging in months beforehand
17 would have been pointless; right?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. Do you agree that ranging in from a different location would be
20 useless for a third location, as it were? So if a weapon is at one
21 location, ranging in for a different location is pointless?
22 A. It is possible to use adjusted fire data from a different
23 location, providing certain parameters are met. These would include the
24 fact that it's pointing generally in the same direction and it's within a
25 reasonable distance and within our two-hour time-frame. But with
1 mortars, it is more difficult than it is with guns to transfer this data
2 because of the inherent inaccuracy of a non-rifled barrel, which is what
3 most mortars have, they have non-rifled barrels. It is possible, in
4 limited circumstances, to use data.
5 Q. Thank you. However, ranging in, say, from Lukavica would not
6 have been useful for a weapon from the north-east, so from the
7 north-east, Mirkovci, where they say that this shell came from; do you
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. At the point of impact, there was a tunnel, and there
11 was the stabiliser, the tail-fin, right, that was sticking out of the
12 ground? Actually, finding the direction using a compass is possible, but
13 that is not a fully accurate method because it was done a week after the
14 explosion; right?
15 A. I disagree. It was accurate, because the fuse tunnel was
16 still -- in effect, still intact. The mortar area, the markings on the
17 ground, were intact. There was a continuity of evidence for the full
18 week between the shelling on the 5th and the time we arrived and did our
19 crater analysis on the 11th. So the continuity of evidence gave us the
20 opportunity to do an accurate check on where the round was fired from, in
21 general terms.
22 Q. You're not talking about distance; right?
23 A. I am not talking about distance. I am talking about bearing or
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Colonel Hamill, I know it's going back a little
1 bit, and it's probably very self-evident, but it seems to me important
2 that it's in evidence. One of the things that's going to affect a mortar
3 round, particularly if it's fired at a trajectory that sends it higher
4 rather than lower, is going to be the wind. Now, I understand, and
5 perhaps you can confirm from your experience, that the higher the mortar
6 round goes, the more it's going to be -- and the longer it's in flight,
7 the more the prevailing wind is going to affect it, and that upper winds
8 can be stronger and, indeed, blowing in a different direction than winds
9 that are observable at ground level. Is that a correct analysis?
10 THE WITNESS: That is precisely correct, again, Your Honour.
11 Thank you for the clarification. It is clear that the higher up the
12 round goes, it goes from a greater distance. Therefore, it passes
13 through different envelopes of air, as it were, in which wind speeds and
14 directions cannot be determined from the ground without the use of, for
15 example, weather balloons. So as it goes up, it can change direction
16 right or left, forward or backwards. It can be retarded or it can be
17 advanced, in a sense, as it goes through the air.
18 JUDGE MORRISON: And, therefore, the only way to predict where a
19 round is going to fall is by observing --
20 THE WITNESS: A previously --
21 JUDGE MORRISON: -- previous ranging rounds, and even then it's a
23 THE WITNESS: Particularly so with mortars, it is a guesstimate,
24 with guns which are much more accurate due to the design of the weapon
25 and due to the design of the shell, which fits into the barrel much more
1 closely than it does with a mortar bomb, then you have a lot more
2 accuracy. This is why guns are more accurate and why mortars are
3 considered to be area-suppressing weapons as opposed to targeting
4 weapons. That is the case. You have to adjust the fire, and you must
5 adjust within a short space of time, and it takes some time -- normally,
6 it can take three or five or more rounds to adjust on to a target which
7 you want to hit subsequently.
8 JUDGE MORRISON: And earlier you mentioned that mortars were, by
9 and large, non-rifled weapons, although I think some rifled mortars do
10 exist, and "rifling" is the grooves in the barrel which spin a projectile
11 in order to counteract external forces and to make the -- ballistically
12 make the round more accurate. But this is likely to have been fired from
13 a non-rifled barrel, and, therefore, even more subject to the vagaries of
14 external forces?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was. This was a thin-stabilised round as
16 opposed to a spin-stabilised round. Guns fire spin-stabilised rounds.
17 As you mentioned, the rifling in the barrel spins the shell to give it
18 its direction. Now, that brings in its own effects. It normally spins
19 it slightly to the right.
20 With mortars, with the tail-fin which they have, it is the
21 tail-fin which gives it the stabilisation, which stops it from
22 wobbling -- literally, wobbling in the air and which keeps it in its
23 direction. However, it doesn't stop it entirely from wandering and it
24 will wander. And this is why, as I say, the mortar is a more inherently
25 inaccurate weapon than a gun. There are, certainly, rifled mortars, but
1 in my experience, there weren't any in that area at that time.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Then I'm going to skip that part, because it was clarified and
4 explained so well.
5 Can we now have page 27 in this document.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Please focus on line 11:
8 [In English] "Now, on page 3 of that document, item 17, there is
9 a finding in respect to culpability. The last three lines read: 'There
10 is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other
11 fired the mortar bomb. The mortar bomb in question could have been fired
12 from either side.'
13 Was that your finding?"
14 [Interpretation] And now your answer:
15 "That was our finding. That is an accurate assessment."
16 Is that right?
17 A. [Interpretation] That's right.
18 Q. Thank you. I don't want to discuss angles anymore, because these
19 are final conclusions. Also, there were traces indicating that the
20 crater had been tampered with between the two analyses, and that that
21 also impeded measurements; right?
22 A. [In English] I would not say that the crater was tampered with,
23 per se. What happened was that one team withdrew the tail-fin, which
24 certainly changed slightly the crater, and particularly the fuse tunnel.
25 It was not tampering; it was an attempt to do a crater analysis and find
1 out from where the round had come. So my understanding was that UNPROFOR
2 had, in effect, secured the market area from a few minutes after the
3 round fell until our team arrived on site. It was on that basis that we
4 conducted our investigation and made our findings of fact, not
6 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that when we met during that
7 interview, you confirmed to us that you never saw any wounded or dead
8 people from Markale 1994?
9 A. Yes, I so confirm.
10 Q. We agreed, didn't we, that such a large number of wounded and
11 killed persons in such a small area was something which you also found to
12 be suspicious a bit; right?
13 A. I certainly made some speculations as we were having our
14 discussions. That is not the same as stating facts.
15 Q. Thank you. May I ask you, Colonel, whether you knew what the
16 deployment was of Muslim forces within the city, itself, as well as where
17 their headquarters were and the deployment of their mortars, guns and
19 A. I had no knowledge, personally, of the deployment of their
20 mortars, guns, and tanks at any specific time. In relation to the
21 deployment of the armija forces within the city, I was aware, in general
22 terms, of where they were. I certainly knew where their headquarters
23 was. I knew the barracks they were located in. But specific individual
24 items did not stay in place for very long, if you're referring to, for
25 example, mortars, guns, and tanks.
1 Q. In contrast to the Serbs, as you confirmed through your
2 observations, the Muslim Army often changed their positions. They had
3 mortars either on trucks or they changed their positions, as such. You
4 observed that the Serbs mostly had stationary weapons, they did not move
5 them; right?
6 A. In general times -- in general terms, the VRS did not move their
7 heavy weapons. They kept them in situ, which made it very easy to keep
8 an eye on them.
9 Q. Thank you. In the southern part of Sarajevo, you saw Serb
10 artillery positions. When the Serbs wanted to fire their mortars or use
11 their other artillery pieces, they informed the monitors of their
12 intention, they would mention what their targets would be, and they asked
13 whether the monitors wanted to observe that; right?
14 A. That certainly happened on many occasions.
15 Q. So in that sense, the Army of Republika Srpska was not firing
16 without the knowledge of the UN observers, but the observers could not
17 always verify whether that was the target that the Serbs had notified
18 them of; right?
19 A. It was not always the case that the VRS fired with the knowledge
20 of UN observers, because we didn't always have observers present. We
21 certainly didn't have observers present in a lot of the firing positions
22 that the VRS had either south or north of the city. On occasions, we
23 were asked to send observers so that we could examine the firing and
24 confirm the firing. This was normally done when the VRS was responding
25 to an attack by the armija. On occasions, because of the small number of
1 observers that we had, firing was conducted that we had not prior
2 information on. At one stage, south of the city, I had a total of five
3 observers for a city the size of Sarajevo
4 possible, physically, to cover every VRS position.
5 Q. Thank you. How many observers did you have altogether on the
6 Serb side, how many such locations?
7 A. We had a number of different locations, and I could go through
8 them, but give or take, say, about -- about eight, approximately eight
9 positions in the summer of 1993, each of which should have had a minimum
10 of two observers and possibly up to a maximum of about five.
11 Now, given that situations changed on a daily basis in relation
12 to not just Sarajevo
14 continually moving. Observers had a need to have leave, there was
15 illness, so on a daily basis the situation changed.
16 Q. Thank you. And am I right if I say that you had three or four
17 times more observers on Serb territory in Sarajevo than in Muslim
18 territory? On the Serb territory, you had up to 11 observers, and on
19 Muslim territory, you had 3, right, and this includes the northern part
20 of the front?
21 A. That is incorrect. We had five teams on the Papa side and we
22 had, as I said, about eight teams or nine teams, something like that, on
23 the Lima
24 ours, but you must bear in mind that they were covering a much smaller
25 area. They were compacted within the city and they were spread
1 throughout it from the west to the east, so they covered, certainly, less
2 area than our teams on the outside did.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we have page 622 -- actually, it is page 6222 in the
5 transcript, and we'll see what document it is. Or within the document,
6 itself, 165 of the document, itself.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. May I draw your attention to 15, 16, and 17, those lines of your
10 [In English] "But would always claim, of course, that it was a
11 military target, and there would be no way of verifying what was on the
12 other side."
13 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Serbs, who are notified
14 that there would be fire on a certain target, are unable to check with
15 their colleagues from the other side?
16 A. Sorry. Are you referring to the UNMOs who are working on the
17 Lukavica side?
18 Q. This is your response, beginning with 11:
19 [In English] "So they told us what they were firing at. They
20 told us perhaps it was in response to an attack on certain positions or
21 certain villages or areas. Invariably, the firers would tell the team
22 which would be supervising them, as it were, which would be monitoring
23 team that they were firing at -- what they were firing at. But would
24 always claim, of course, that it was a military target, and there would
25 be no way of verifying what was on the other side."
1 [Interpretation] Do you accept that the Serbs thought that you
2 were able to check it with your colleagues on the Papa side?
3 A. I neither accept nor reject that fact.
4 It is just in line 21, you say:
5 "Do you agree that the Serbs who were notified that there would
6 be fire on a certain target ..."
7 This is why I asked were you referring to the UNMOs who were
8 working on the VRS side, but I certainly stand by the fact, as stated in
9 the previous case at lines 11 to 17.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 It's not correctly interpreted in line 21. It's correct on
12 page 77.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. So the Serbs would notify something. They would say they would
15 be shooting at such and such military target for such and such a reason.
16 My assumption is that they were unable to know that you had no way of
17 checking whether that was, indeed, the target.
18 In July 1993, you heard about attacks on the UN humanitarian
19 convoy from Hrasnica and Igman, a territory that was under the control of
20 the BH Army, and that resulted in civilian casualties.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MS. EDGERTON: I was just wondering if there was actually a
24 question after the first paragraph at page 78, lines 21 to 24.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I received the answer, that
1 the lieutenant-colonel could not either confirm nor deny what the Serbs
2 knew, and my theory is that the Serbs were unable to know that the UN
3 observers were unable to verify their assertions.
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I may --
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE WITNESS: -- interject, please.
7 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes, by all means.
8 THE WITNESS: Just as an explanation of the way we worked at the
9 time, in order to clarify the matter for the Court, the observers on the
10 Papa side, the Presidency side, and there were observers on the Lima
11 side, the Lukavica headquarters of the VRS, and we had two types of
12 reports. We had shootreps and increps. A shootrep was when we were --
13 when the people alongside whom we were working, whether they were VRS or
14 armija, were firing. An increp was an incoming, it was an incident
15 report of firing coming in.
16 Now, my teams on the VRS side reported shootreps of items going
17 out and we reported increps of items coming in, explosions within our
18 area. Similarly, the Papa side did exactly the same thing, and on a
19 daily basis this was correlated into a report by Sector Sarajevo
20 headquarters. So you had, perhaps, any correlation being done at that
21 level. From our perspective, we were too busy reporting these incidents
22 and conducting our patrols and interviewing people and attempting to
23 implement cease-fires to do the processing of the information, as such,
24 but I'm sure it was done at a higher level than ours. And certainly
25 every increp and every shootrep that was sent in went to both sides and
1 went to the headquarters, and, again, on a daily basis formed part of our
2 daily situation report from Sector Sarajevo both to BiH Command and on to
3 UNPROFOR HQ. So there is the possibility of correlating rounds minute by
4 minute from where they were fired to where they landed where it was
6 But, again, Your Honours, I must emphasise that our numbers were
7 small and we did not always either hear or see shootings or shellings
8 going on or incoming explosions or attacks. We did not always see it.
9 I hope this is of some benefit to the Court.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Hamill.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Q. But, in any case, you had observers on the Serb side, and you had
13 more of them on the Serb side than on the Papa side? At least you had
14 more stations, if not more staff?
15 A. Yes, we did.
16 Q. Thank you. In your statement from December 1995, given from 13
17 through 15 December 1995
18 their artillery, would inform the observers of their intentions. That's
19 the reference to the statement, and the other references are to your
20 earlier testimony. Do you remember saying that in your statement?
21 A. Yes, I certainly do, but I think I qualified it by saying that
22 that was certainly the case in Lima
23 everywhere. On the northern side of the city, the VRS was much more
24 secretive than the brigades on the south side, where we seemed to have a
25 better rapport, if you will. In the north, we had huge problems getting
1 information from the brigades. We also had problems in freedom of
2 movement in the northern sector.
3 Q. Your colleagues on Muslim territory have testified here and said,
4 again, that they had considerable restrictions of movement. Did you know
6 A. Anecdotally, yes. But from personal experience, clearly not.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can we see page 119 from the previous document, where we can see
9 references to this attack from Hrasnica and Dobrinja against the
10 humanitarian convoy and civilian targets. The question is in line 7, and
11 you answer in line 18.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you see the page? You say you heard of an incident -- of
14 these incidents, that there have been shootings from the Muslim side in
15 Hrasnica and Dobrinja, causing civilian casualties; is that correct?
16 A. It says "Hrasnica and Igman." And, yes, I heard of the incident,
17 but as I say there on line 18, I had no personal knowledge of it. It
18 allegedly happened before my time in Sarajevo
19 Q. Thank you. In this case -- in fact, that's your statement from
20 1995. You said you never eye-witnessed the deliberate attack on civilian
21 targets during your tenure in Lima
22 combat activity between the two sides, and there were cases when the VRS
23 shelled Hrasnica and Mount Igman
24 Bosnian-Herzegovinian Army from their territory.
25 [In English] Witness statement December 13 to 15, 1995, page 3.
1 [Interpretation] Do you remember saying that?
2 A. I certainly said it. It was true.
3 Q. Thank you. While you were staying in Lukavica, you experienced
4 fire coming from the city; correct?
5 A. Yes. We experienced both mortar fire and sniper fire.
6 Q. Thank you. And you had a good relationship with the populous and
7 the Army of Republika Srpska members with whom you had contact in that
8 area of Sarajevo
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. Thank you. Also, you established that the Army of Bosnia and
12 the locality of Kosevo Hospital
13 A. So I was told. I never personally saw it.
14 Q. Thank you. On 26th May 1993
15 of Hrasnica and Igman, a civilian area in Serb territory, with
16 82-millimetre mortars at 10.58. They fired 13 rounds, as well as
17 infantry fire, while the VRS responded at 11.40 with 10 shells. We can
18 take a look at that. It's your statement from December 5, on page 4. Do
19 you recall saying that?
20 A. I don't recall saying it specifically, but I'm not surprised. I
21 could well have said it because such events certainly occurred around
22 that time. I cannot now state specifically it was the 26th of May, but
23 it was within a day or two of that, so it is probably correct.
24 Q. Thank you. On 19 July 1993
25 major attack against Ilidza -- against the Ilidza and Igman Brigades of
1 the VRS, and the VRS responded. Commander Cojic of the Igman Brigade of
2 the VRS re-took Igman from the BH Army in a counter-offensive, and the
3 United Nations forced a cease-fire and started patrolling that area;
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. At that point, as soon as the UN withdrew from danger, Igman
7 started changing hands? Do you recall saying that when you were
8 testifying in the Galic case - on page 612 [as interpreted] - at one
9 point the United Nations withdrew, and Mount Igman -- or at least that
10 part of Mount Igman
11 A. That did happen, yes. The UNPROFOR troops withdrew from certain
12 positions. There was an agreement between armija, VRS, and the UN that
13 no positions would change. However, the armija did occupy positions that
14 the UN had previously been in. They moved forward, in other words.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. That's page 155 in the
16 previous document, dated 26 March 2002
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Do you remember a major crisis occurred in the relationship
19 between the VRS and the UNPROFOR because the BH Army made an unauthorised
20 entry into the territory that the Serbs had handed over to the UNPROFOR?
21 A. Yes, I do so remember.
22 Q. On the 5th of December, 1993, you went to Kiseljak to attend a
23 conference, and then you moved to the Papa side. You saw the
24 Kosevo Hospital
25 You also saw a hole in a wall over 1 metre in diametre, forming almost a
1 perfect circle. Do you remember that?
2 A. That is almost correct. I didn't see any nurses or a doctor
3 killed. I was informed, when we were there, that there had been those
4 casualties when the building was hit by a shell, but that had happened
5 some time before and I don't know when. I did see the hole in the wall.
6 It was a large one, and it was almost a perfect circle. So, yes, that
7 part is correct.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 128 of this document, please,
9 to see your conclusion to the effect that according to the position of
10 the hole and its orientation, your conclusion was that it was more likely
11 to have been caused by fire from the city -- from the Muslim side than
12 from the VRS.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was my conclusion.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Q. In our discussion, we have agreed that during your briefings, you
16 had been warned that Muslim forces in town could very well have placed
17 dead bodies in crime scenes and such things; that kind of warning was
18 present among UN staff?
19 A. Yes, it was.
20 Q. One shelling incident involving Kosevo Hospital
21 originated from a Muslim Army tank positioned north of the hospital;
23 A. That was my conclusion, yes.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 A. But, of course, I didn't use the expression "a Muslim Army tank."
1 I don't use that kind of expression.
2 Q. Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whatever, that's what you call
3 it. But we, too, are Bosnians, and we get angry that this attribute,
4 "Bosnian," is being monopolised. We Serbs and Croats are also Bosnians.
5 However, did you --
6 A. And Montenegrins as well, no doubt.
7 Q. Yes. Yes, thank you.
8 A. [No interpretation]
9 Q. Do you agree that it was your view that the Muslim side, or
10 Bosnian side, if you wish, took political advantage of incidents and that
11 these incidents frequently occurred at the same time as various
12 international conferences were convened?
13 A. That was certainly my view, my opinion, yes. But it was my
14 personal opinion, as such, not a UN position.
15 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, we may need to complete the
16 transcript, in terms of your answer which was not translated because of
17 the overlapping. Probably you answered in B/C/S, but which was not
18 caught by the court reporter. Could you repeat it?
19 THE WITNESS: I also suggested, Your Honour, that Montenegrins
20 might also wish to be considered as Bosnians in this particular case.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 THE WITNESS: But not all, of course.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
24 MS. EDGERTON: It was only with regard to the transcript,
25 Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. Furthermore, you saw for yourself that the VRS was made up of
5 soldiers who virtually lived on the front-line, or very close to the
6 front-line, rather than in barracks, as a professional army would. It
7 was a popular army made up of locals who lived there; correct?
8 A. That was absolutely, without a doubt, true. The vast majority of
9 people that I met in the VRS in the SRK
10 living in Kasindol and Gornji Kotorac, in Vojkovici. Many of them had
11 come from the center of the city, from Skenderija, from Novo Sarajevo,
12 from other places, and as refuges. They were locals, in the main. There
13 were, of course, a sprinkling of people from other parts, Serbia
15 Q. Thank you. Although you did not know the precise deployment of
16 these units within Sarajevo
17 headquarters and firing positions, you agreed that these were legitimate
18 military targets; correct?
19 A. Within a war, there are such a thing as legitimate military
20 targets, and they are military units and installations, yes.
21 Q. Thank you. You are fully aware of the disproportion, in terms of
22 the number of soldiers, and you noted that the VRS used its artillery
23 efficiently in order to repel and offset this advantage on the BH Army
24 side, in terms of numbers?
25 A. Yes, it was quite clear that the number of soldiers on the armija
1 side was much greater, in infantry terms, than the number of soldiers on
2 the VRS side, so the VRS used their artillery as what we call a force
3 multiplier. In other words, they used their artillery to offset the fact
4 and overcome the fact that they were inferior in actual numbers of
6 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that there were attacks -- infantry
7 attacks by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Lukavica-Pale road,
8 and that many persons got killed there? 130 soldiers, those were the
9 figures. Do you remember these losses?
10 A. I remember, specifically at the end of May 1993, there was such
11 an attack uphill against the road running from Lukavica to Pale, and I
12 remember hearing from the Presidency side, from our UNMOs on the
13 Presidency side, that in excess of 100 soldiers were killed from the
14 armija, as opposed to, if memory serves me right, about 3 soldiers from
15 the VRS, who were in prepared positions on the hillside looking down on
16 these troops who were attempting to assault them with absolutely no
17 covering fire and no preparatory bombardment.
18 Q. Thank you. Also, you could have observed that the Serb side did
19 not control, for example, all of Ilidza or all of Vogosca, but only the
20 Serb areas? For example, Hrasnica is the Muslim part of Ilidza, and
21 Hrasnica was under Muslim control; right?
22 A. My understanding was that places like Hrasnica and Ilidza were
23 mixed before the war. I did not see them like that. Certainly, there
24 was a huge amount of population movement, so that by the time I got
25 there, Hrasnica was exclusively manned by Bosnian Muslims, and Ilidza was
1 divided between the Serb and Croat population and the Muslim population.
2 Q. Thank you. During the interview, when we met up, you agreed that
3 lines went through the city, itself, and that the line was basically
4 divided during the course of the war, and these lines were stable during
5 your tour there, they didn't change very much; right?
6 A. That is correct. The lines were effectively static during my
7 period. And in the former Yugoslavia
8 there was very little change in the Sarajevo
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Colonel, I sincerely thank you for
10 meeting with the Defence and for testifying here.
11 I would like to conclude at this point.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.
13 Ms. Edgerton, do you have re-examination?
14 MS. EDGERTON: Only one very small point, Your Honours, and that
15 comes from transcript line -- or page 85, lines 22 to 23.
16 Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
17 Q. And there, Lieutenant-Colonel, Dr. Karadzic asked you the
19 "Although you did not know the whether precise deployment -- did
20 not know the precise deployment of these units within Sarajevo
21 ABiH units or their staffs or their headquarters and firing positions,
22 you agreed that these were legitimate military targets; correct?"
23 And your response was:
24 "Within a war, there are such a thing as legitimate military
25 targets, and they are military units and installations, yes."
1 Do you remember that question and answer that was just a few
2 moments ago?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. I was just a little bit confused, because I have always
5 understood that the definition of "military targets" depends on a number
6 of factors. Did you mean, actually, to define "military objects" rather
7 than "military targets"?
8 A. They are military objects. I didn't want to expand too much.
9 But military targets are objects which, in effect, give an advantage to
10 one side or the other by way of physical or moral cybernetic advantage.
11 So a military target is, of course, much larger in scope than just units
12 and headquarters.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
14 Nothing further, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
16 Thank you. That concludes your evidence,
17 Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill. I thank you, on behalf of the Chamber and the
18 Tribunal, for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you are free to
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
21 [The witness withdrew]
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?
23 We would like to tender the pages that -- oh, now I hear that the
24 entire document has been admitted, so I don't have to tender individual
25 pages. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Well, is it practicable to go into the next witness
2 or shall we adjourn for today?
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I actually have to say that the
4 next witness, Mr. Begic, was not able to leave Bosnia, due to weather
5 conditions, and, therefore, he is not available today. And we -- I have
6 spoken to Mr. Robinson, and it is my understanding that Dr. Karadzic
7 agrees to have Mr. Bell as the next witness, and I think it's much more
8 practical to have him start tomorrow morning instead of now.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 Then probably that's it for today.
11 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
13 If I could just take a moment to make an objection for the record
14 concerning Mr. Bell's testimony, if you would allow that.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 MR. ROBINSON: As you know, we have previously objected to the
17 testimony of war correspondents and received a very negative reaction
18 from the Chamber on that. But, nevertheless, because we do think that it
19 may be an issue on appeal, we would like to move to exclude Mr. Bell's
20 testimony since he is a retired war correspondent, and it remains our
21 position that he is not capable of waiving the war correspondent
22 privilege, so for the record I make that motion.
23 Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: But you know the Chamber's position.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Very clearly, yes.
1 JUDGE KWON: Negative, albeit correct.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
3 JUDGE KWON: Can I take this opportunity to raise this:
4 Probably parties are aware of the recent development, in terms of
5 amendment of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; in particular,
6 regarding the judicial notice of authenticity of the documentary
7 evidence. So if the parties want to make a further submission on that
8 issue, that will be allowed.
9 By the end of this week, is it practicable? I don't think it's
10 practicable to make a ruling on that issue before the recess, but I would
11 appreciate if we could have that submission, well, at least before the
12 beginning of the next year. That should be possible.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
15 Are you referring to the current motion that's pending regarding
16 the intercepted conversations?
17 JUDGE KWON: That's correct. You'll have some time to respond to
18 the Prosecution -- a week to respond to the Prosecution's submission, if
19 at all.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Very well.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.09 p.m.
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day of
25 December, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.