1 Tuesday, 18 January 2011
2 [Closed session]
11 Pages 10412-10438 redacted. Closed session.
9 [Open session]
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're now in open session.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 If the witness could kindly take the solemn declaration.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I shall
14 tell the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth.
15 WITNESS: KDZ304
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
18 Mr. Tieger and Mr. Hayden, I wanted to let you know that
19 Judge Antonetti and his Chamber has kindly agreed to postpone their
20 sitting to 4.00. So, if possible, we may be able to sit until 3.30, but
21 we will see how we can organise our sitting today.
22 Yes, Mr. Hayden.
23 MR. HAYDEN: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning.
24 Examination by Mr. Hayden:
25 Q. Good morning, Mr. Witness.
1 Let me first deal with the submission of your written evidence.
2 MR. HAYDEN: And, Mr. Registrar, if I can ask for 65 ter 90211,
4 Q. Mr. Witness, what will come up on the screen in front of you is a
5 statement. If you can begin by confirming that that is your name on the
6 cover sheet.
7 MR. HAYDEN: And if we cannot broadcast this document.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I confirm that.
9 MR. HAYDEN:
10 Q. Mr. Witness, you provided a formal statement to the Office of the
11 Prosecutor in 2007, and you have testified twice before this Tribunal.
12 And what this document on the screen in front of you represents is an
13 amalgamation of extracts from your prior testimonies. Have you had a
14 chance to review this document?
15 A. Do you mean my previous statements, which I do not see on the
16 screen; is that right?
17 Q. I'm referring to the document we see on the screen in front of
18 you. I believe you have a hard copy of this document before you that was
19 provided to you on your arrival in The Hague. Can you confirm you've had
20 a chance to review that document?
21 A. Yes, I confirm that. I have reviewed it.
22 Q. I believe there is one clarification you wish to make.
23 MR. HAYDEN: And if we can move into private session -- I
24 apologise, we can do this in public session.
25 If we can turn to page 9 of the English and page 11 of the French
2 Q. There is a discussion here concerning events at Lukavica at the
3 end of May 1992 and the detention of UNPROFOR personnel. In the first
4 paragraph discussing these events, you state that this occurred on the
5 22nd of May, 1995, and, in the second paragraph, the 27th of May, 1995,
6 which you describe as the day -- the same day as the aerial attacks.
7 Now, by way of clarification, can you tell us what aerial attacks you are
8 referring to here?
9 A. Yes, it is the 27th of May and not the 22nd of May. This is
10 undoubtedly a mistake on my part, and I apologise for this.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden, just a second.
12 Can we go into private session briefly.
13 [Private session]
22 [Open session]
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
24 MR. HAYDEN:
25 Q. And just to further clarify that point: The aerial attacks you
1 are referring to in the statement, who was conducting these aerial
3 A. These were French aeroplanes operating as part of the
4 United Nations' mandate.
5 Q. Thank you for that clarification. Aside from that, can you
6 otherwise confirm that the statement is accurate, and that if you were
7 asked the same questions on the same topics today, your answers would be
8 the same?
9 A. Yes, Mr. Prosecutor, I would make the same statements, using the
10 same words, certainly.
11 MR. HAYDEN: I ask that this statement be admitted into evidence,
12 under seal.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2106, under seal, Your Honours.
15 MR. HAYDEN: I'll now read a brief summary of that statement.
16 Witness KDZ304 served with UNPROFOR in Sector Sarajevo in 1995.
17 He observed a constant sniping and shelling directed at civilians during
18 the summer of 1995, until the cease-fire of 15 September.
19 During this period, UNPROFOR operated a serious anti-sniping
20 operation to protect civilians from SRK snipers. UNPROFOR snipers
21 responded to sniping activity. Armoured vehicles were placed to protect
22 dangerous junctions, and fixed protective screens were erected in known
24 In the summer of 1995, the SRK fired powerful improvised rockets
25 into Sarajevo
1 the SRK
2 such rockets.
3 UNPROFOR routinely protested to brigade and corps commanders
4 following sniping and shelling incidents, including specific protests
5 concerning the use of these improvised rockets.
6 By mid-1995, Sarajevo
7 increasingly tense and anxious as a result of the blockade and the random
8 shelling. UNPROFOR decided to open up the Mount Igman
9 the town of Sarajevo
10 and to resupply UNPROFOR units had not been effective due to blockages at
11 Bosnian Serb check-points.
12 Mr. Witness, I'd like to briefly explore your military background
13 and experience, and ask that we move into private session.
14 [Private session]
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
17 MR. HAYDEN:
18 Q. Mr. Witness, as we've just heard in the summary, you discussed
19 the fact that in the summer of 1995, SRK forces used improvised rockets
20 or Krema rockets in Sarajevo
21 you give this title to?
22 A. These were rockets that were being used with multiple
23 rocket-launchers and probably assembled, and these were make-shift
24 devices that were provided by the Bosnian Serb forces in Sarajevo. These
25 weapons could carry a high -- could carry a high explosive charge, but
1 were not very precise, because these were ballistic rockets with no
2 guiding systems. This comment is due to our observations and to
3 information provided to us by some officers who belonged to the Ilidza
4 Brigade of the RSK. These people gave us this information during this
5 period. These same officers also mentioned that the nickname given to
6 these rockets was "Krema," the nickname given by the Bosnian Serbs.
7 MR. HAYDEN: If we can move into private session again and ask
8 for 19722.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
10 [Private session]
11 Pages 10446-10452 redacted. Private session.
2 [Open session]
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in public session, Mr. Hayden.
4 MR. HAYDEN:
5 Q. Mr. Witness, you discuss at length in your statement how you came
6 to the conclusion that the SRK
7 large-calibre fire. For example, on page 8 of the English statement,
8 page 10 of the French, you provide some specific examples of the
9 observations that led you to this conclusion.
10 MR. HAYDEN: If I can ask for 65 ter 15353, please.
11 Q. Again, what you'll see on the screen in front of you is an order
12 from General Milosevic entitled "Consumption of Artillery Ammunition."
13 And if we look down at the order, it states, among other things, that:
14 "Large-calibre weapons," and it lists examples of those weapons
15 as being mortars, artillery pieces, tanks, et cetera, "are to be used for
16 striking cost-effective targets with mandatory observation of hits."
17 It goes on to say that targeting from artillery pieces must be
18 approved by the brigade commander. It orders that daily consumption of
19 artillery ammunition is to be included in reports, along with which
20 targets were fired upon, upon whose orders, and what the effects of the
21 targeting were.
22 This order is dated 22nd of May, 1995, while you were in
24 statement as regards General Milosevic's control of medium- and
25 large-calibre fire?
1 A. This document, which once again I was not aware of, confirms
2 entirely our assessment. I would also like to add that we were aware
3 that the SRK
4 they were actually not used. The weapons that were used were
5 122-millimetre guns, as well as 105-millimetre guns of T-54 tanks, as
6 well as 120 millimetres and 82 millimetres, as well as mountain guns of
7 176 and anti-aircraft of 88 millimetres. I would also like to add that
8 some brigades were using 30-millimetre rapid-fire guns against our
10 So this is basically a list of weapons that were used by
11 Bosnian Serb forces during this period, and it was obvious that this
12 large unit was faced with supply issues, be it for spare parts or for
13 munition, and this is the reason why the use of ammunition had to be
14 measured and controlled.
15 Q. And just to confirm, Mr. Witness: Your reference to medium- and
16 large-calibre artillery or weapons refers to the list you've now just
17 given the Trial Chamber, that type of weapon?
18 A. Yes, that is correct, Mr. Prosecutor.
19 MR. HAYDEN: I ask for the document on our screen to be admitted
20 into evidence.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2110, Your Honours.
23 MR. HAYDEN: That concludes my direct examination, Mr. President.
24 At this stage, I ask for the remaining documents from the
25 witness's statement to be admitted into evidence.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Except for those that are already admitted,
2 they will be admitted and given a number in due course. Thank you.
3 MR. HAYDEN: Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Today, we're sitting until 3.30 as follows: This
5 session will be sitting until 10 past 12.00, and then we'll have a break
6 of 50 minutes until 1.00, and then we'll have a third session of
7 90 minutes to 2.30, after which we will have a short break of 20 minutes
8 and then a last session of 40 minutes, which means the accused will have
9 three hours to cross-examine this witness. I thank the Seselj Chamber
10 and the staff, as well as interpreters, court deputies, and Defence and
11 everybody, to kindly agree to this suggestion in order to accommodate the
12 specific situation surrounding this witness.
13 Mr. Karadzic.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness.
16 Are you receiving the interpretation of my words? I said, "Good
17 morning, Witness."
18 A. I heard correctly, Mr. President.
19 Q. I would like to ask you something with regard to the last
20 document that we saw. The mere fact that the document was issued towards
21 the end of the war, does it not prove that there was fire which was not
22 under control, and General Milosevic wanted to return everything to be
23 under control? Do you agree with me?
24 A. Mr. President, I believe that there might be a mistake. Any
25 professional knows that a commander of a large unit will define the level
1 of freedom that is given to his subordinate commanders, when it comes to
2 the use of the main weapons at hand. This level of freedom or room to
3 manoeuvre depends on the assessment of the situation, on the assessment
4 of the strength of its forces, as well as the situation of the opponent.
5 Q. Thank you. I believe that it is a fortunate development to have
6 you here, because you can help us to shed light on some things
7 surrounding Sarajevo
8 I would like to jog your memory about your consolidated
9 statement. I'm referring to page 7, where you say this:
10 [In English] "The SRK, Sarajevsko Romanijski Korpus, was
11 responsible for a triangular zone outside Sarajevo in Central Bosnia."
12 [Interpretation] Do you have that statement in front of you, sir?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
14 MR. HAYDEN: I believe the witness does have the statement, but
15 only in the French version.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P2106 is the number that was given
17 to that document when it was admitted. If the gentleman has it in front
18 of him, we don't have to call it up on the screen.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. You say:
21 [In English] "the headquarters was in Pale, and the forward
22 command post was in Lukavica, where I went quite often. The SRK had 11
23 brigades deployed within and outside the exclusion zone. They were
24 mainly territorial units."
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
1 Mr. Witness, did you find that passage? It's the part related to
2 command and control in the SRK
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, I did find this
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Q. Then I will kindly ask you to look at the following paragraph,
7 which speaks about the brigade, and it says that the SRK had between
8 13.000 and 15.000 soldiers, mostly reservists locally recruited in
10 very commonplace in the Yugoslav military system.
11 Do you agree with me that the 13.000 to 15.000 troops of the
12 Sarajevo Romanija Corps manned a defence line facing the city and another
13 one facing Central Bosnia
14 total length of the front-line during your tour of duty was about
15 240 kilometres altogether?
16 A. Mr. President, I shall only answer the part dealing with
17 Bosnian Serb forces that were part of my area of responsibility.
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
6 Shall we go into private session briefly.
7 [Private session]
13 [Open session]
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Q. And now I have to ask you to excuse me for addressing you as
16 "Witness." This is part of your protection measures. It's not a sign of
17 my disrespect.
18 Do you agree with me that on the Serb side in Sarajevo, as
19 United Nations forces, you had a Russian battalion deployed there? From
20 them, you could receive information about the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
21 Do you agree with that?
22 A. Yes, I confirm that, Dr. Karadzic. We did have, under our
23 orders, a Russian battalion which was deployed in the Bosnian Serb area.
24 Let me remind you that there was also a Ukrainian battalion which was in
25 charge of the Zepa enclave, and an Egyptian battalion as well.
1 Q. Thank you. I would like to draw your attention to what you had
2 on the side of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army. If I am right, in the
3 city, itself, you had as many five battalions. Am I right in thinking
4 that over there, you could have an even better insight into the
5 deployment of forces and the fire-power of those forces in the city?
6 A. That is an inaccurate statement, since in the town of Sarajevo
7 there were only three battalions; one Egyptian battalion to the west of
8 the town, a French battalion in the Austrian part of the town and
9 Novo Sarajevo, and a battalion which was deployed in the area of the
10 airport. That was three battalions in total.
11 Q. In your statement, your consolidated statement, on page 4 you say
13 [In English] "The 2nd French Battalion, also stationed at the
14 airport, controlled the western part of the city, Dobrinja, Ilidza,
15 Butmir. The 5th French Battalion was deployed at Mount Igman
16 monitored the demilitarisation zone. The 4th French Battalion was
17 deployed at Skenderija, in the Muslim part of the city. The Egyptians
18 were stationed at the Bistrik Barracks and were in charge of the
19 Old Town
20 city and also detached to reduced company to Zepa. The Russian battalion
21 was in the Serbian part of the city in Grbavica, and its command post was
22 in the former JNA Barracks."
23 [Interpretation] Is this a good reflection of what you stated?
24 A. I confirmed what I stated, and I would like to remind you that on
25 the Bosnian side of the town, there were those three battalions that you
1 have just mentioned. The 4th Russian Battalion was stationed in the Serb
2 area of the town.
3 Q. Thank you. Allow me the right to count. There is the
4 2nd French, the 5th French, the 4th French, the Ukrainian and the
5 Egyptian Battalions. The grand total is five, so I'm confused.
6 In any case, you had a bigger presence in the Muslim part of the
7 city than in the Serb part of the city; right?
8 A. I do confirm that the agreements, as approved by both parties
9 before my arrival, of course, wanted the UN forces to be deployed in the
10 Bosnian Muslim side rather than in the Bosnian Serb side. This was
11 undoubtedly regrettable, but that's how things were.
12 Q. Thank you. I asked several witnesses to mark the positions of
13 Muslim forces, primarily of Muslim forces. However, I was not successful
14 in that, because nobody was aware of the entire picture. So now we have
15 a good opportunity to present a 3-D depiction which we will not tender
16 into evidence at this moment. However, we will kindly ask you not to
17 draw or mark, but just either confirm or deny the way the positions of
18 the Muslim 3rd Corps are depicted in the 3-D representation.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before that, can we have P5892 [as
20 interpreted] in e-court.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. And when I mention the way I address you, I would prefer to
23 address you by your rank, but addressing you just by "Witness" is more
24 appropriate to the situation.
25 JUDGE KWON: Can you give the number again, Mr. Karadzic?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P892. The document has been
2 admitted as a Prosecution document.
3 This was on the 24th of June. David Harland and Philip Corwin --
4 actually, Harland sent this to Corwin.
5 Can we go to page 4. Page 4 -- no, I apologise. Page 3, I need
6 page 3.
7 Can you zoom in on the second paragraph: "On Sunday, the
8 18th of June ..."
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Witness, please look at the paragraph and tell us whether the
11 paragraph confirms that in February 1994, there was still weapons in the
12 total exclusion zone? Do you see that paragraph:
13 [In English] "The Serbs are believed to have about 500 heavy
14 weapons within 20 kilometres of Sarajevo
15 have about 100 to 150. It seems that most of these weapons are now being
16 deployed for action."
17 [Interpretation] First of all, do you agree with me that those
18 500 heavy weapons had to face other territories of Bosnia within the
19 20 kilometres of Sarajevo
20 Muslims had deployed 100 to 150 artillery weapons in the 20-kilometre
21 exclusion zone?
22 A. Would it be possible, Your Honour, to look at the date again of
23 this document? The first page, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: It is just stated as 24th of June, 1995.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the very paragraph says that
1 the UNPROFOR had withdrawn on the 18th of June from those positions; I
2 mean, those collections of weapons.
3 JUDGE KWON: Let us go back to page 3.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll answer the two questions put
5 by the Defence.
6 I would like, first of all, to specify that Philip Corwin is not
7 a general. He was a civil servant of the United Nations. The written
8 statement drafted by him, which I have before me, ascertains, quite
9 rightly so, (redacted)
17 Q. Thank you, Witness. However, I didn't say Corwin was a general.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
19 Yes, Mr. Hayden.
20 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. President, I believe the paragraph, from
21 lines 12 to 22, should be redacted, or at least parts therein.
22 JUDGE KWON: Can we go into private session.
23 [Private session]
8 [Open session]
9 JUDGE KWON: It says it was drafted by Mr. Harland, not
10 Mr. Corwin. Its drafter is Mr. David Harland. It was from Mr. Harland
11 to Philip Corwin.
12 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I just want to say that I hadn't said Corwin was a general.
15 Perhaps the interpreters are having problems with the speed.
16 Do you agree, Witness, that this report says that 100 to
17 150 artillery weapons of the 1st Muslim Corps had been seized from the
18 collection points where they had been supposed to be supervised by the
19 UNPROFOR? Regardless of what your information was, their information is
20 here that 100 to 150 artillery weapons were seized and deployed
21 elsewhere, ready for action?
22 A. I read that 100 to 150 weapons, according to the drafter,
23 Mr. Harland, were in the area of the 1st ABiH Corps. It was clear, and
24 this is something we knew, that the Bosnian Muslim forces had artillery
25 pieces. Generally, these were medium-calibre pieces of artillery. These
1 were deployed and concealed inside the town. It was clear to me, when I
2 arrived, that some of these pieces had not been collected and put in the
3 weapons collection point. I have no reason to believe and I have no
4 reason to understand, on looking at this document, that the pieces of
5 artillery had been taken out of these WCPs. They existed.
6 I would like to repeat that according to our estimates, there
7 were, on the Bosnian Muslim side, fewer weapons than what is stated here.
8 That is how I construe this text, and that is my assessment of it at the
10 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Witness. I'll try, because my time is
11 limited, to put questions that can be answered with a yes or no, or at
12 least where answers can be briefer.
13 In regard with the deployment of forces in Sarajevo, let me draw
14 your attention to page 35, paragraph 3, of your consolidated statement in
15 English, where you say in one --
16 [In English] "What I would say, Your Honour, is that the military
17 activities in Sarajevo
18 population and for both the warring parties. Troops were deployed and
19 weapons were deployed in the middle of areas where people lived. This
20 was just as true of the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 [Interpretation] It was your answer, wasn't it?
22 A. Yes. The troops of both warring factions were deployed in urban
23 areas, highly urban areas.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, I will appreciate if all parties could bear with
25 me, especially you, the witness, for this presentation of the disposition
1 of personnel and weapons in the city of Sarajevo.
2 Each such map is a work in progress and it's not definitive, but
3 this one takes into account and is based on documents that have been
4 tendered and, in some cases, are still pending. Now to see the
5 deployment of the forces of the 12th Division of the 1st Corps of the
6 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the city, itself.
7 Do you remember, Witness, that there was the 101st Brigade and it
8 had the following area of responsibility? We'll see it now. The thicker
9 line is the line of separation, and the thinner line is the confrontation
10 line with the other warring party. Do you remember that this was the
11 area of responsibility of the 101st Brigade?
12 A. I can confirm the presence of Bosnian Muslim units in this
13 sector. I don't really remember where the limits between the brigades
14 were. This map seems consistent.
15 Q. Thank you. We can see, outside the zone, Dobrinja, and this is
16 Hrasno Brdo in the part of Sarajevo
17 responsibility, there's also the TV building and the PTT. Let's now see
18 the deployment of the artillery of this brigade.
19 This doesn't mean, of course, there was only one mortar. This is
20 just the icon for "mortar." All these were batteries.
21 Were you aware that these guns and mortars and these rocket
22 positions were in the possession of this brigade?
23 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Witness: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
24 MR. HAYDEN: A preliminary question about this presentation is
25 the sources underlying or source underlying where Mr. Karadzic is placing
1 the artillery pieces and other weapons.
2 JUDGE KWON: Can we hear from you, Mr. Karadzic, on this?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely.
4 We have documents to prove everything. I don't have to tender
5 them now. Many of them have been already admitted, by the way. I'm just
6 trying to take advantage of this opportunity, because we have such a
7 qualified witness who can confirm or deny what this map shows. And in
8 good time, we can show the documents, or we can show some of them now.
9 Many of them are in evidence, and others are going to be tendered.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you do not answer the question put by
11 Mr. Hayden. What is your base of this information? You compiled this
12 information through what?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here, the first document is the
14 working map of the chief of staff of the 12th Division,
15 Colonel Rizvo Pleh. The second document is the order for defence by the
16 commander of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the
17 order to attack by the deputy commander of the 1st Division, et cetera.
18 The latter is already up-loaded in e-court.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
20 MR. HAYDEN: As a start, we would need this to be in English to
21 be able to follow.
22 Secondly, I don't see any reference to an exhibit or
23 65 ter number. I do notice a 1D number. Maybe that's the document
24 they're referring to. But, again, very difficult to follow this.
25 I think there are many problems here, but one that immediately comes to
1 mind is the temporal nature of any of these sources underlying where the
2 artillery's position is. Is the source dated from this witness's
3 time-period or is it prior to that?
4 JUDGE KWON: Let us leave it, and let us see whether the witness
5 would be able to answer these questions.
6 So what was your question, Mr. Karadzic?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Before asking a question, I would like to say that the
9 Prosecution is close to their last witness on Sarajevo. This map is
10 certainly corroborated by documents, and there will be more corroborating
11 documents before we are finished.
12 JUDGE KWON: Put your question to the witness.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you agree and did you know, although they hid their weapons
15 from you, that this brigade had at their disposal this kind of power in
16 their area of responsibility?
21 The second preliminary remark I would like to make is that, of
22 course, and this is something that I have told many times in my
23 consolidated statement, at the time - I am referring to the period in
24 April, May and June - the Bosnian Muslim side, and the Bosnian Serb side
25 likewise, were obstructing our operations and our investigations and
1 standing in the way of our observations, which did not make our life very
3 Third remark. This brigade, which was manning a fairly large
4 area - this is something I would like to point out - was in a sector
5 which was not the most inhabited sector of Sarajevo, and they had -- and
6 this is in line with our estimates of the weapons that the 12th Division
7 had. Well, this brigade had approximately five to ten mortar shells,
8 82-millimetre mortar shells, which are weapons, medium-calibre weapons.
9 Their range is extremely limited. It is three kilometres. And the
10 impact of these is not great at all. From a professional standpoint,
11 this brigade was not very well equipped, in artillery terms.
12 These are the comments I would like to provide the Defence with
13 on the basis of the map I see for the first time before me.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask for a map showing the
15 disposition of all brigades in Sarajevo
16 firing power and see what can be confirmed and what cannot.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. What I'm trying to say, Witness, is that I agree, and we have
19 documents showing, that Muslims hid their weapons from you. We have
20 Muslim documents showing that. Of course, Serbs also hid certain things
21 from you. We will now see the disposition of all brigades.
22 For now, I'd just like to hear you say whether you deny that this
23 brigade existed and that it had its area of responsibility here. These
24 are armoured units, observation points, and staff units of this brigade.
25 Let's now see the 102nd Brigade.
1 Do we agree -- do you remember, Witness, that the 102nd Brigade
2 was deployed next to the 101st Brigade at Stupsko Brdo, they held
3 Nedzarici? Do you remember that the 102nd Brigade was there?
4 A. I can, indeed, confirm that there was a Bosnian Muslim unit in
5 that area. I do not recall the number of that brigade.
6 Q. Let us now show all their assets. These are command posts.
7 Can we see now their artillery. Armoured mechanised units now.
8 Firing points. These are machine-guns. Their bases, logistical bases
9 and observation points, and sniping emplacements.
10 And then this Sultan Fatih unit was deployed partly in Dobrinja
11 and partly here.
12 Let's now look at the 105th Brigade. Do you remember that such a
13 brigade existed and that it occupied the northern part of Sarajevo, that
14 was its area of responsibility?
15 Can we see their area of responsibility.
16 Do you agree it was the area of responsibility of the
17 105th Brigade? The thick line is the line of separation from the Serbs,
18 and the thin line is their line of contact with neighbouring brigades?
19 A. Once again, Dr. Karadzic, I can recall that there was a
20 Bosnian Muslim unit in that area. I don't recall the number. I'm not
21 even sure I ever knew the number.
22 Q. Do you recall that here in the middle, towards the top, there was
23 a hill called "Grdonj," somewhere here? No, that's Spicasta Stijena,
24 often mentioned. Let's see what they had. Do you remember their command
25 posts came close to the center of the city, now artillery, their firing
1 points, their logistical bases, and their observation points? Leave all
2 their assets on the map.
3 Can you put the cursor on these observation points? That's
4 Grdonj Hill. That's a hill 906 metres high. That's its altitude. This
5 is Sedrenik, the site of many incidents, and the observation point is on
6 the top of the Grdonj Hill, controlled by the Bosnian Army.
7 Do you remember that to the west of this brigade, there was the
8 111th Brigade? And now we will see its area of responsibility.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, are you giving evidence? Ask a
10 question to the witness.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the witness confirmed that
12 one brigade was deployed there. He doesn't remember the number, but he
13 confirms that the area was covered by one brigade. Now, I'm asking him
14 if he remembers that there was another brigade to the west of here called
15 the 111th, and it covered this area.
16 JUDGE KWON: Remember, Mr. Karadzic, your statement does not
17 constitute evidence at all, so be efficient.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you remember, Witness, that this area as well was covered by
20 one of the brigades? And I'm trying to refresh your memory by saying it
21 was the 111th. We can show immediately their command posts, their
22 fire-power, and their staff units.
23 May I ask the AV to show -- to point to the firing point in
24 Velesici. That's the Hum Hill. A rather well-known TV relay was there.
25 Do you remember that, Witness?
1 Do you remember Hum? There was a major TV relay there, and do
2 you agree that it was non-stop under the control of the ABiH, the --
3 A. Dr. Karadzic, I can confirm that this position, as the previous
4 one, was under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces. And, in fact,
5 during the time when I arrived with my units, this was an area that could
6 not be accessed by the members of the UN forces, whether they were
7 observers or civilian staff.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, what place do you refer to as "the
9 previous one"?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Dr. Karadzic showed a
11 position. It was an elevation which was controlling the access to the
12 north of Sarajevo
13 102nd Brigade from the Bosnian Muslim forces, and it was an observation
14 post that was very favourable and that was under the control of the
15 1st Corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And during the spring of 1995, the
16 representatives of the UN did not have access to this area. The Bosnian
17 Muslims did not allow them to access this area.
18 JUDGE KWON: Is that the area under the so-called
19 Spicasta Stijena?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We saw it before. It was close to
21 Grdonj Hill. But this is another hill called Hum, with a major TV relay.
22 We can see it now in 3-D.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
24 MR. HAYDEN: This discussion reminds us that this transcript is
25 going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible to follow, unless we
1 take screen shots.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Unless this material is in evidence, it's very
3 difficult to follow unless the Defence produces each still which was
4 confirmed by the witness. But I take it some part of the shots were
5 picked up by the Audio/Video Unit, so we'll see how we can manage.
6 At the same time, I was wondering why the Defence was not able to
7 produce this aid in one of the working languages of the Tribunal.
8 But, in any event, it's time to take a break. We'll break for
9 50 minutes --
10 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry, Mr. President.
11 Just before the break: The Prosecution hasn't been provided with
12 a copy of this presentation, and we would like one, please.
13 JUDGE KWON: Well, that's pitiful.
14 We'll break until 1.00.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in public session.
19 I understand that there's a matter to be raised on the part of
20 the Defence.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, only last night
22 did I receive a document, and I became aware of it this morning, that the
23 Prosecution will use a document with the witness, 65 ter 2309, which is
24 not to be broadcast. Can it be admitted without the translation? If
25 not, then we should use the fact that the witness is still here, and
1 maybe we can call him back in the morning in order to have the document
2 admitted. The 65 ter number is 2375, and it deals with the termination
3 of his employment and the statements of reason as to why he no longer
4 works for the institution.
5 JUDGE KWON: Could you tell us more, in detail, about what that
6 document is about? Can we see that document, first of all?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
8 It's 23079 in e-court, and there is an English translation. And
9 I think to discuss that issue, it would be better to go into
10 closed session or private session so that the identity isn't revealed.
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We go into private session.
12 [Private session]
11 Pages 10474-10476 redacted. Private session.
4 [Open session]
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Karadzic, please continue your
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can we go back briefly to the deployment image. Can we go back
9 to the previous document. Thank you.
10 This is the 111th Brigade. And can we now see the 102nd Brigade,
11 which is the brigade on the western flank of the 111th Brigade. Can we
12 see its area of responsibility.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you agree that this is Brijesce hill, your radar was on
15 Sokolje? Was this the area of responsibility of the 112th Brigade? Even
16 if you don't know its number, I'm sure that you are aware of its
18 A. I can confirm that the unit was deployed in this area of the
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 And now can we see the command posts and the artillery. These
22 are the battalion command posts. Can we see the artillery.
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
24 Have you been provided with this material?
25 MR. HAYDEN: We still haven't been provided with a copy,
1 Mr. President. I did broach this subject with the Defence over the
2 break. I was informed that we wouldn't receive a copy until it had been
3 completed. Apparently, it's incomplete. I request that a copy of both
4 this version and we'd like a copy once it's completed, but that hasn't
5 been forthcoming yet.
6 I also note that I don't think we've addressed the issue of
7 capturing this for the purpose of the record or the transcript. I'm not
8 sure it's appropriate to rely on the A/V footage to follow the
9 transcript. That's going to be very problematic down the road.
10 JUDGE KWON: I see the point of using this apparatus.
11 Mr. Karadzic, unless it's been up-loaded, we have difficulty following
12 the evidence of this witness later on, without the aid of using --
13 without the ability of using this - how can I say it? - regime later on.
14 And how can we guarantee that this map or this image can be later on
15 changed if you are not providing this to the opposing party? So I think
16 you ought to provide -- disclose this material to the OTP immediately,
17 and then on that basis we shall continue.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You're right, Your Excellency, in
19 terms of this witness. This is the situation that this witness can see,
20 and this depicts only those positions that are corroborated by documents,
21 and there can be only more tools and weaponry once we check the
22 documents. We will do our best to provide the Prosecution with all the
23 frames, and we will try to make sure that the frames are tendered with
24 this witness. And as we go on, as we advance in this exercise, we will
25 show advanced versions with other witnesses.
1 JUDGE KWON: Why do you have difficulty providing this programme,
2 itself, to the Prosecution, instead of frames?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, absolutely, but the way I
4 understood you is that for the record, we have to have all the frames in
5 order to make this witness's testimony easier to follow, to make it
6 understandable for the Trial Chamber.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we have both problems.
8 Let's continue.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can we now see the slopes of Mount Trebevic.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. That was the 115th Brigade. It had been the
13 10th Mountain Brigade, but you were not there at the time. Let's look at
14 the observation posts of the armoured unit, and we also see tank posts.
15 You were aware of these tanks on Brijesce and Sokolje. Your
16 radar was here. It had been hit from the Serb side because Muslims
17 brought their mortars to a 30-metre distance from your radar. I don't
18 know whether you were there, but I'm asking whether you were aware of
19 that incident.
20 A. I assume that the Defence is talking about fire from the Serb
21 side that happened in July 1995 or during the course of July 1995. Could
22 this be confirmed?
23 Q. Yes, yes. Then Colonel Sidorenko [phoen] protested with the
24 Muslims and demanded for their mortars to be moved away from your radar;
1 A. I could come back on the date or the month of July 1995, which
2 was an important period of time, but I would like to point out to
3 Dr. Karadzic that at this position there was no radar equipment. We had
4 observers that were specialised in aircraft guiding.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, can I draw your attention to the fact
6 that while you are talking about 115th Brigade, this programme does not
7 show it. It's still on the 102nd Brigade.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. We are moving on to the
9 115th Brigade. We wanted to complete the facilities of the 102nd.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Witness, we see part of the city center and the slopes of
12 Mount Trebevic
13 you remember that a brigade took those positions? At the beginning of
14 the war, it was called the 10th Mountain Brigade. Its commander was a
15 criminal, Musan Topalovic, Caco. However, during your time, it was
16 renamed to the 115th Brigade; can you confirm that?
17 A. I will make the same statement. I cannot recall the number of
18 the various brigades. A Bosnian Muslim unit was in the area, that is
20 Q. Thank you. I believe that your Egyptian battalion was deployed
21 in the same area.
22 Can we see the command posts of that brigade?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
24 MR. HAYDEN: I understood we were going to try to capture, before
25 the image changed, each time. If that's the way we're going to proceed,
1 then we should capture that before more markings are brought up on the
3 JUDGE KWON: Capturing by video?
4 MR. HAYDEN: Are we -- I understood it to be capturing a screen
5 shot, if that's possible. I'm not sure. A video is going to be very
6 difficult to follow subsequently. Maybe a screen shot is a better way to
8 JUDGE KWON: I wonder whether -- can you confirm, Mr. Karadzic,
9 whether it's possible to capture a frame from that computer?
10 I didn't see the nodding of Mr. Sladojevic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know whether there are
12 technical capabilities to preserve every frame. It would be good, if it
13 was possible, but I don't know whether it is technically possible to do
14 in this programme, in this system. This is Sanction, is it not?
15 JUDGE KWON: At this moment, unless there's another possibility,
16 we'll rely on screen shots captured by the video. That's the
17 understanding, but we'll proceed.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can we now see the artillery belonging to the 115th Brigade, also
20 the logistics base.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The area of responsibility of this brigade goes from the
23 Miljacka River
24 remember that its eastern neighbour was the 152nd Brigade, which held
25 part of the old city and the rear?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see the area of
2 responsibility of the 152nd Brigade for the benefit of the witness.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you remember that that was also a separation line, this thick
5 separation line, and that the area here was also held by a brigade which
6 called itself the 152nd Brigade? Was this under the control of the
7 Muslim army? You may not be aware of the name of the brigade.
8 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Witness: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
9 MR. HAYDEN: Is Mr. Karadzic going to let the witness answer the
10 questions he's posing or just run a commentary here?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was just about to point out that point.
12 Having heard the witness, that all he can confirm is the
13 existence of some Muslim troops in that area, what's the point of going
14 into detail? You are not giving evidence, and I wonder whether it's an
15 efficient way of using your time. But what is your question about this?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a very rare witness, a very
17 competent witness who was aware of the deployment of troops. We had
18 documents proving where some artillery positions were. I would like to
19 ask him whether this was under the control of the BiH Army, whether these
20 were the separation lines, and whether those areas were controlled by
21 separate brigades. We have documents that prove that, but the word of
22 this witness will be valuable for the Trial Chamber because it will prove
23 that the city was militarised.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you agree that this red zone was also under the control of the
1 BiH Army, that there was a brigade there, and that the name of that
2 brigade was 152nd? Maybe you didn't know the name or the number of the
4 A. Dr. Karadzic, indeed, in the Old Town
5 unit. As for the delineation between the various units that are marked
6 on the map, they are more or less accurate, save for a few details. And
7 as for the confrontation line, I would say that it is depicted in a
8 rather generous manner. To be more accurate, I'm talking about that the
9 western confrontation line, I believe that the confrontation line there
10 was closer to the hills. But apart from this detail, I would agree with
11 you that the built-up areas of Sarajevo
12 total, six or seven brigades of the Bosnian Muslim army, and they all
13 belonged to the 1st ABiH Corps, and they were subordinated to a division.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at this
15 brigade's artillery, where its command posts were and where its bases
17 And can we now move on to the 155th.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you remember that Dobrinja, the settlement Dobrinja, near the
20 airport, had its own brigade?
21 A. I have to say that I was not aware that there was an independent
22 unit, of course, and there were Bosnian Muslim forces in Dobrinja.
23 Whether it was an independent unit or not, I do not know.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the command posts of
25 that brigade, as well as its artillery, as well as staff attached to
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. You see that in a small area of Dobrinja, Izet Hadzic was in
4 command of the 155th Brigade. We have Muslim documents that prove that.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see the HVO in the
6 center of the city and sharpshooters' positions. This is very important,
7 and those places appear in many of the witness's testimonies.
8 JUDGE KWON: I'd intervene, Mr. Karadzic.
9 Take a look at the transcript from line 2 on. You mentioned
10 about command post, artillery, staff, and you didn't ask a question about
11 that to the witness. It's all a waste of time. It's not a proper use of
12 time. The witness -- what the witness could confirm was the existence of
13 Muslim units, and you should move on. You spent almost two hours by now.
14 Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Let us please look at the HVO unit in the center of the city,
17 because that was the greatest concentration.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you remember the HVO had this area of responsibility around
20 the Holiday Inn Hotel, around Marin Dvor? Do you remember that?
21 A. I can only confirm again that there were units in the city
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 May I ask that the command posts be shown of the HVO, and then
25 the bases, observation points. Thank you.
1 Can we now show the MUP, the Ministry of the Interior.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Sniping is a very important matter in this case. From the
4 UNPROFOR documents and documents from the Muslim side, we found out that
5 sniping was the responsibility of the police, not any brigade in the
6 center of the city. Did you know that, that Muslim snipers belonged
7 mostly to the police, although the army had its own?
8 A. I assume that the Defence is talking about snipers, and the
9 Bosnian Muslim snipers. Is that right?
10 Q. Yes, yes.
11 A. I confirm a statement which is included in my written statement.
12 The military of the 1st ABiH undoubtedly had snipers, because on several
13 occasions I was able to notice some of them leaving or entering the
14 Main Staff of the corps.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can we see the police stations in the center of the city and then
17 the sniping positions held by the police.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. And perhaps you did not have insight into what the police was
20 doing. These are police stations --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
22 Yes, Mr. Hayden.
23 MR. HAYDEN: I know this observation was made at the start of the
24 use of this presentation, but I just underscore that the positions being
25 put to the witness, and Mr. Karadzic keeps referring to, We have
1 documents, well, we haven't been made aware of what documents he's
2 talking about. They haven't been disclosed to us, nor is it clear from
3 this map. I just wanted to make that clear on the record again.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That's why I pointed out several times it may
5 be a useless exercise.
6 Move on, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the Prosecution certainly has
8 them. We've already looked at documents here where Rasim Delic informs
9 the UNPROFOR that his forces were not the ones sniping from the building
10 of the Executive Council, that it was the forces of the police. The
11 Prosecution is aware of these documents.
12 Can we now see the sniping positions held by the MUP in the
13 center of the city. And if we can zoom in a bit to see the Holiday Inn.
14 A bit more.
15 Can you now show us the building of the Executive Council and the
16 building of the Parliament mentioned by this witness.
17 Here is the Faculty of Sciences and Mathematics. There is a
18 sniping position there.
19 Let's go to the east.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
21 MR. HAYDEN: Can I have a reference, please, for the mentioning
22 of the Executive Council and the building of Parliament by this witness?
23 I don't know whether he mentioned it in the context of sniping, but
24 Mr. Karadzic said he's mentioned it somewhere.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It's almost impossible, Mr. Karadzic, for us
1 to follow.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, in his statement, this
3 witness mentioned the Parliament, in connection with sniping by Muslim
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Is that so, Witness?
7 A. Dr. Karadzic, I don't think I mentioned the Parliament in my
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at this.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Is this Marin Dvor and the Vrbanja Bridge
12 Holiday Inn is there, can you agree to that?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we can zoom in a bit. Could you
14 place the cursor on the "S," the Parliament?
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. It says: "The building of the Parliament reconstruction." Let's
17 show the technical school, the Holiday Inn, and now we'll find the place
18 that you mentioned, the Parliament.
19 Are you familiar with this area in the center of the town around
20 the Holiday Inn, the museum, the building of the Government and the
21 Parliament? The so-called Sniper Alley is located between these
22 buildings, and you mention it.
23 A. Your Honour, I confirm that I know this area, doubtless less well
24 than the Defence.
25 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry, Mr. President.
1 Again, can we have a reference for where the witness mentions
2 this? I'm not doubting he mentioned it in his statement. I just don't
3 know which mention Mr. Karadzic is referring to.
4 JUDGE KWON: We will be able to follow where the witness has
5 referred to by the reference to Holiday Inn, museum, government building
6 and Parliament. On that basis, let's proceed. But that question could
7 be put without this programme at all.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sure it's there, but I don't
9 have enough time. But if the witness confirms that he knows that area,
10 and that there, between the building of the Parliament and the
11 Holiday Inn, there was the Sniper Alley, and that many sniping incidents
12 happened there, I'll be satisfied. I am torn between the requirements of
13 the Prosecution to give them exact references in the witness statement
14 and the pressure of time. I'm really between a rock and a hard place.
15 We will try to show, using documents, that these were sniping positions
16 of the Muslims.
17 Can we see a broader picture now. I'm not going to show the
18 forces on Mount Igman
19 take a look at Sarajevo
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. And let me ask you, Witness, about the deployment of these
22 forces. Did you see or hear or know about fire from these medium or
23 heavy calibres from the center of the town against Serbian positions?
24 A. I saw combat actions conducted by units made up of the 1st Corps,
25 including in the area of Hadzici and Stup, as well as in the south, in
1 the area of Debelo Brdo. In these two areas in the month of May 1995,
2 the Bosnian Muslim forces did, in fact, use medium-calibre weapons they
3 had at their disposal, essentially mortar shells, and these were
4 associated with artillery or combined with artillery attacks in order to
5 enlarge the area that was under their control.
6 Regarding this particular issue, I confirm that medium-calibre
7 weapons were being used during that same period. Under other
8 circumstances, I never noticed or never realised that the Muslim forces
9 were using medium-calibre weapons, save for one case when a mortar shell
10 was -- came out of a tunnel in the west of Sarajevo. This was in
11 September, after the agreements. This order was given, and a few shots
12 were fired. This was -- weapon was then seized by my units.
13 Those are the only two cases that I confirm that the
14 Bosnian Muslim forces, as far as I know, used medium-calibre weapons in
16 Q. Thank you. Now, because my time is short, I have to move to the
17 subject of fighting in the city. And I would like to draw your attention
18 to page 10 of your consolidated statement, paragraph 1, where you repeat
19 the three objectives: First, demoralisation of the civilian population
20 by terror to destroy the morale of the BH Army; the second, to impose a
21 blockade, total blockade, on Sarajevo
22 to maintain the high morale of own troops by intimidating the UNPROFOR
23 and civilian personnel.
24 Is it your vision or did you perhaps see a strategic document of
25 the Army of Republika Srpska setting these objectives?
1 A. Dr. Karadzic, let me repeat. It was a matter of assessing the
2 situation. This is what we were doing at the time. We were assessing
3 the strategy and the operations of the VRS.
4 On this topic, I would like to specify that the third issue
5 didn't have to do with maintaining morale, but had to do with, as far as
6 we were concerned, to keep exerting a moral influence and have the higher
7 ground over UNPROFOR and the civilian population.
8 Q. Thank you. We probably have an interpretation problem there.
9 Now, Witness, do you agree that the Serbian side did not have any
10 intention of expanding its zone in the city and did not mount any
11 offensives to conquer new territory in the city?
12 A. That could be said this way. Insofar as for the RSK, it was
13 important to regain control of those territories that had been lost after
14 the attacks by the Bosnian Muslims. I would like to specify on this
15 topic that a statement was made on the 18th of May, 1995, and reported to
16 me. This statement was made by an officer of the Main Staff of the
17 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Commander Indic, who responded to my demands. I
18 wanted the shots fired by the Bosnian Serbs in Debelo Brdo and in the
19 Jewish cemetery to cease. These were targeting the UN forces directly
20 and led to unacceptable collateral damage. This was disproportionate and
21 had an effect on the civilian population on the Bosnian Muslim side in
22 this sector. The answer I got, and I quote, We shall not stop so long as
23 we have not regained control of all the territory that has been lost, end
24 of quote.
25 Q. Thank you. You describe, yourself, how the Muslim army made some
1 gains on the road leading from Lukavica to Pale, and that the Serbian
2 side, in its counter-offensive, regained these positions. Is that the
3 case you're talking about?
4 A. That is a valid interpretation.
5 Q. Thank you. As for the blockade of the city, do you agree that
6 the Muslim army was able to rotate its units in the tunnel, that it
7 freely rotated its units inside the tunnel and across the runway of the
9 A. The tunnel did exist, of course. I cannot deny the fact that
10 some men, civilian or military, used it both ways. However, what cannot
11 be ascertained, because this is false, is the idea that the units were
12 being -- there was a change-over of the units. This is something that
13 could not have occurred for the simple fact that the number of men or
14 equipment that could be moved through this tunnel at one point in time
15 did not allow for that. In other words, the units of the 1st Corps that
16 were in Sarajevo
17 and most of them remained there for the entire duration of the war.
18 Q. Thank you. The third objective, attacks on the United Nations.
19 My case, Witness, is that our fire on UN forces resulted mainly from the
20 fact that the Muslims used UN installations in many places, on
21 Debelo Brdo and the PTT building, for instance, taking cover behind US
22 [as interpreted] positions and using UN forces in this way. Our fire was
23 actually targeting them. Were there, indeed, such positions, locations,
24 where you were placed in jeopardy by the proximity of Muslim artillery?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Thank you. We already have documents about that.
2 Now, the issue of terrorising the population is something that
3 the Defence has to strenuously resist. Do you know, first of all, that
4 there were 15.000 to 20.000 Serbs in Sarajevo, to start with the simple
5 questions? The figures are wrong. Between 60.000 and 70.000 Serbs in
7 A. Yes, there were Serbs. I do not have the figure of the Serbian
8 population. One of my friends, who is an artist who has sculpted many
9 things and painted many things for the former Yugoslavia, did not wish to
10 leave the town. He is a Serb, and he was -- felt a great deal of anxiety
11 about this entire situation at the time.
12 Q. On page 10, paragraph 2 of your statement, you say that the
13 sniping and random artillery fire against the town, potentially against
14 civilians, was a common occurrence -- a daily occurrence in May and
15 June 1992. And you also say that you have no specific documents or
16 details, but that the number of civilian casualties was on the rise
17 between March and June 1992.
18 First of all, let me ask you: Do you know of a single Serbian
19 offensive that was not a counter-offensive in the Sarajevo area? First
20 of all, did the Serbs ever carry out an offensive?
21 A. You have not put the question adequately. I shall attempt to
22 answer your statement, taking one question one by one.
23 We did not have the figures of the losses caused to the civilian
24 population in Sarajevo
25 the Bosnian Muslim side were obstructing the observations of our teams,
1 the UNMOs. However, I can say that if, in March 1995, we counted on the
2 basis of what we saw in one week three people killed and six people
3 wounded, this figure at the end of July had reached twenty-seven killed
4 and ninety-seven people injured on the Bosnian Muslim side at the time.
5 These are partial figures, once again, based on our observations. You
6 cannot deny the fact that this terror campaign was on the increase. This
7 occurred on a regular basis in places which were necessarily a place of
8 passage for the civilians in the city center, and this could have nothing
9 to do with military operations on the Bosnian Muslim side in no
10 circumstance whatsoever.
11 This is what I can contribute by way of a precision to what you
12 have stated, Dr. Karadzic.
13 Q. Let us look at what you say in your statement, page 35,
14 paragraph 3:
15 [In English] "What I would say, Your Honour, is that the military
16 activities in Sarajevo
17 population and for both the warring parties. Troops were deployed and
18 weapons were deployed in the middle of areas where people lived. This
19 was just as true for the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
20 [Interpretation] From this presentation, and we will confirm
21 everything with documents from the United Nations and the Muslim army,
22 this confirms, that part of your statement on page 35, that the military
23 structure is intermingled with the civilian population, including in the
24 center of the city on the Muslim side.
25 Do you still stand by what you said in paragraph 3 of this
2 A. Your Honour, I cannot find this statement in the document I have
3 in French. The spirit of this statement is correct, and I vouch for
5 JUDGE KWON: It's a page before dealing with impartiality of
6 UNPROFOR, but this passage has been dealt with already. You asked a
7 question about this passage, and the witness confirmed.
8 Yes, Mr. Hayden, was that your point?
9 MR. HAYDEN: That was my first observation, asked and answered.
10 And the second is, if we are going to discuss this further, it's page 47
11 of the French version.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 I wanted to repeat this paragraph because it confirms that other
14 presentation, and it also proves that the fire on the city --
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can I ask you, Witness --
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please refrain from making a
18 statement. It's useless.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Let me ask you, Witness: Bearing in mind what you stated and
22 what we know about the intermingled character of the military
23 installations and the civilian population, can we claim that a certain
24 incident of fire against a part of town is random if we don't know what
25 is located there?
1 A. My answer is that, as a professional, when one has a doubt as to
2 the quality or the reality of an objective in a built-up area, in an
3 urban area, you try to avoid to open fire without any distinction. And I
4 believe, and if I recollect correctly, this was in the spirit of an order
5 from General Milosevic, who was asking -- and, in fact, we saw this order
6 before. As I was saying, this order was asking the brigade commanders to
7 spare artillery fired and that all those types of fire had to be
8 observed. So if the Defence states that one could open fire on the city
9 without knowing what was going on, there is something abnormal about the
10 way the operation was conducted.
11 Q. With all due respect, I didn't mean to say that the Serb side
12 didn't know what was going on. However, if there is an observer -- if
13 one observes and says that the fire is random, without knowing where
14 shells are falling, then it wouldn't be a good estimate. What if there
15 is a mobile mortar there or if there is a staff there? We have seen that
16 the city was full of such things. That's what I'm talking about. Is it
17 important to know what is located in the targeted area?
18 Let's look at page 14, paragraph 3, where you explain in your
19 answer that fire was exchanged all the time and that the BiH Army tried
20 to break through into the area around Sarajevo by launching a large
21 number of attacks around the city, targeting the Serbian lines there.
22 Did you find that passage, paragraph 3, in English, on page 14?
23 And here, towards the end, it also refers to sharpshooters who
24 opened fire on the other side, and you say --
25 MR. HAYDEN: That's page 18 of the French version.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. You provide a picture of heavy fighting, heavy urban fighting; is
3 that correct?
4 A. Yes, I can see my statement, and it does refer precisely to this
5 period of time. And it was an example -- it was a reaction of Serb
6 forces in the area that was mentioned, namely, Debelo Brdo and the
7 Jewish cemetery, in this area where Bosnian Serb forces held very
8 favourable positions because they were located above Bosnian Muslim
9 forces as well as above the center of the town. And, therefore, it would
10 have been possible to halt an attack by means that would have been better
11 controlled than those that were used at the time by Bosnian Serb units.
12 So this is one of the examples that I can give you to explain how we came
13 to our assessment.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 1D2985 is the following document I would like to call up.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. While we are waiting, Witness, you say that from mid-May, there
18 was heavy fighting going on, and that between March and the end of June,
19 there were lots of casualties. Does this overlap with a major Muslim
20 offensive which was launched in mid-May and ended towards the end of
22 A. Indeed, there was a major offensive that was launched by the
23 1st Bosnian Muslim Corps which, indeed, started around the 15th of May
24 and was concluded around the 8th or the 10th of June.
25 Q. Thank you. The actors are the same. David Harland writes to
1 Philip Corwin.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we zoom in on the document. We
3 only have the English version.
4 And here it says that:
5 "The Bosnian army has launched a major offensive around Sarajevo
6 "UNPROFOR seems to be powerless to stop that --"
7 Can the document please be zoomed in, can it be enlarged?
8 The hostage crisis has been resolved around the 13th of May.
9 The Serbs are still holding 26. "The humanitarian situation in the
10 city," and so on and so forth.
11 Can we go to the following page, to the top, where it says that
12 Bosnian forces had similar gains, a Serb counter-attack was awaited at
13 the time, and so on and so forth.
14 And now the next page, please.
15 This is the elaboration of all the bullet points. It says here
16 UNPROFOR is unable to stop the rapid deterioration of the military
17 situation, and the total exclusion zone has collapsed completely.
18 Further on, it says that the hostage crisis has been resolved, more or
20 And can we move on to the following page.
21 The following page, where there is a reference to the
22 humanitarian situation. And the penultimate page describes the course of
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Witness, I'm asking you this: Is this correct? In mid-May, a
1 major Muslim offensive was launched. Towards the end of May, on the
2 27th of May, Muslims shelled Serb positions. The Muslim army started
3 exploiting, according to your own documents, UN documents, they started
4 exploiting the advantage that they gained by NATO shelling of Serbian
5 positions. We also have a hostage crisis. And before the end of June,
6 the Muslim offensive has virtually collapsed. Is all that true?
7 A. The answer is, No. Dr. Karadzic, you cannot draw a link between
8 air-strikes triggered by the force commander of the UN with its French
9 aircraft, on the one side, and the attacks of the 1st Corps of the ABiH,
10 on the other side. These are events that happened at the same time, but
11 one shouldn't draw a link between those two, first of all, for a very
12 simple reason. The Bosnian Muslim offensive had already started as early
13 as mid-May.
14 Q. You're right there. However, the United Nations got involved and
15 ordered NATO to bomb the Serb positions, and used their own artillery.
16 Is it true that at that time, your own troops, UN troops, opened fire
17 from their artillery, and that NATO bombarded us on behalf of NATO, and
18 that your estimate on the 26th of March was that the Muslims started
19 exploiting the advantages that they had gained as a result of NATO
21 A. Very briefly, I'm going to tell you how the two concurring
22 operations unfolded. This is the way we assessed the attack of the --
23 coming from the 1st Bosnian Muslim Corps, and this is deriving from the
24 fact that the population in Sarajevo
25 the feeling that the Bosnian Muslim leaders could only come up with a
1 solution by their own means. This is an assessment, as I say.
2 Also, since January 1995, all access roads that had been
3 recognised through agreements approved by Bosnian Serbs' authorities
4 during the previous year, all access roads, as I was saying, could no
5 longer be used. No supply, no equipment, could enter the city by road or
6 by air, actually.
10 As for the reaction now, you mentioned artillery fire and you
11 mentioned air-strikes. At that time, I would like to point out that
12 there was no artillery fire. There were two air-strikes which were
13 supposed to be to send out a signal to stop this systematic blockade, and
14 I hope that you will agree with me that there were two very different
15 operations, and you cannot associate what the Bosnian Muslim side was
16 doing, on the one hand, and what the United Nations were doing, on the
17 other hand.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
19 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. President, a redaction is needed at line 6 of
20 page 88, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Q. We don't have time to show you some other documents that have
24 already been admitted, so we'll use another opportunity to do that.
25 Witness, let me ask you this: In the middle of the offensive
1 during which Muslims wanted to lift the blockade of Sarajevo, although
3 opened, did NATO launch air-strikes, strategic air-strikes, and were we
4 being punished for taking weapons from collections under UNPROFOR's
6 A. First of all, I should like to remind you, Dr. Karadzic, that
7 blue routes had been closed since March. Should I also remind everyone
8 of the theft of arms and equipment carried out by Bosnian Serb units
9 within the control points during that period? And I'm talking about
10 March and April of that year. That was for one.
11 Secondly, those warning strikes were carried out without any link
12 to the hostage incidents. Hostages only started to be taken during the
13 27th or the 28th of that month, if I'm not mistaken.
14 Q. Thank you. However, did NATO air-strikes start even before that?
15 Just yes or no, please.
16 A. No.
17 Q. Thank you. I am afraid that your memory fails you, but we have
18 proof to that effect.
19 Tell me, when did UN artillery open fire on Serbs, if not in May?
20 A. The first artillery shots took place during the month of June,
21 and those were mortar shells from a battery of mortars that was
22 air-lifted to Mount Igman
23 10th or the 12th of June, but I'm not sure of the date. Thereafter,
24 several days unfolded before orders were given to this battery to open
25 fire. Perhaps I'll have the opportunity to give more details about the
1 conditions for those fires to be effected.
2 Q. Thank you. Just one more question. Were you familiar with the
3 protocol that we signed for the control of heavy weaponry?
4 Bullet point 1 in that protocol gave us the right to seize arms if we had
5 come under attack?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Let me inform you. General Rose told me verbally, and that also
8 made part of the protocol signed by Generals Mladic and Rose, that nobody
9 would ever prevent us from taking our heavy artillery back on two
10 conditions; if the United Nations could not prevent attack or if they
11 could not stop an attack that had been launched. We came under
12 air-strikes, although both conditions had been fulfilled. Were you aware
13 of those conditions?
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
15 MR. HAYDEN: Can we have a reference for the protocol that
16 Mr. Karadzic is referring to?
17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we bring up that protocol, Mr. Karadzic, in
18 order to be precise?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The problem is time. The protocol
20 has been admitted. It was discussed with General Rose, and General Rose
21 confirmed all that. Let's try and find it, but it will take time. Time
22 is the issue here.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And while we are searching for the document: Witness, you said
25 that -- let's look, for example, at page 31, paragraph 3 from the top of
1 the page, where you confirm your estimate that the forces of the
2 1st Corps of the BiH Army -- you talk about those forces, and you say
3 that those forces were responsible for the defence of the city of
5 world. (redacted)
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, let's call up the document,
13 but let's not broadcast it.
14 Can the previous document be admitted?
15 17 June, that was disclosed to me yesterday evening also.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
17 MR. HAYDEN: We need a redaction at line 6 of page 91 just
18 because he links it to the 65 ter number, which has become a public
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's not broadcast
22 this, in that case.
23 And, please, can we look at -- no, that's not the document.
24 65 ter 11337.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that's Exhibit P2115.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's not broadcast the document.
2 Let's not read the names, either.
11 The document has been admitted for that matter.
12 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer: Mr. Hayden.
13 MR. HAYDEN: Out of an abundance of caution, I know Mr. Karadzic
14 is trying to not reveal the identity here, but the coyness by which he is
15 referring to the two participants makes it a little bit obvious. I think
16 we should go into private session to discuss this document and redact the
17 discussion we've had since the 65 ter number was mentioned in the
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll do that. Let's go into private session.
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 10504-10507 redacted. Private session.
14 [Open session]
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I still haven't finished with
16 the sniping issue, and I haven't touched upon Markale or the
17 investigations carried out by the UN.
18 I want to show this here, because this is the only witness with
19 whom I can do that, a video where a representative of the UN presented
20 some of his opinions, and, finally, the issue of hostage-taking. We're
21 really pressed for time. I'm grateful to the witness that he is so
22 exhaustive in his answers, but, on the other hand, it takes up time. It
23 would be best if the witness could continue tomorrow. Then we could deal
24 with all of this. Otherwise, it would be a shame to miss the
25 opportunity, when we have such a good witness.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, earlier on we limited the time for
2 cross-examination by the accused to three hours. He has spent two hours
3 by now, so he will have further an hour, if he wishes to use to the full
4 extent of what has been allowed. So after the break, we'll have only
5 30 minutes, given the situation, so I have to explore with you whether it
6 would be possible at all to continue your cross-examination tomorrow for
7 half an hour.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I am, of course, at
9 the disposal of the Bench.
10 JUDGE KWON: I appreciate it very much.
11 We'll have a break for 20 minutes.
12 --- Recess taken at 2.39 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 3.02 p.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: Before I went out of the courtroom before the
15 recess, I was corrected by the Court Deputy that you had spent two hours
16 and ten minutes, Mr. Karadzic.
17 Let's continue your cross-examination.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Witness, in order to understand how great an importance the
20 Defence attaches to your testimony, I'll let you know that we had asked
21 for 18 hours to cross-examine you. Even if we had been allowed 15 hours,
22 we would have been satisfied to hear every word you can say, but we
23 can -- we have to make do.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just see, briefly, D717 so
25 that the witness can see that protocol that guaranteed to us that we
1 would be entitled to get our weapons back if attacked.
2 That's not it, I'm afraid. Let's try the next page.
3 Is this D717? Page 4.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Point 1:
6 [In English] "In the event that UNPROFOR withdraws, for any
7 reason, from mutually-agreed sites for the regrouping of heavy weapons
8 without the agreement of the BSA, or that it withdraws from its
9 interposition areas between the Serb and Muslim lines, the BSA reserves
10 the right to redeploy its weapons and increase troop levels on the
11 front-lines, while in event of a Muslim attack on the Serbs, which
12 UNPROFOR is not able to either prevent or stop immediately, the BSA
13 reserves the right to implement adequate measures for self-defence."
14 [Interpretation] Do you agree that nobody had the right to
15 bombard us after that Muslim offensive that lasted 14 days in May and
16 another 2, 3 days in August, in any case, intensively several hours,
17 before we took our weapons back and tried to defend ourselves?
18 A. Dr. Karadzic, I believe you are confusing the events that took
19 place in May and in August. These are two different things.
20 I would simply like to make the following remark: Neither of the
21 parties were entitled to block the blue axis and to prohibit traffic on
22 those roads.
23 Q. According to international documents, we had every right,
24 Witness, to prescribe the conditions under which others would be moving
25 across our territory. We had every right. But in May, the UNPROFOR, via
1 NATO, bombed us after we had been attacked by the Muslims as of 15 May,
2 and in August the UNPROFOR used also its artillery, along with the
3 air-strikes, because - I don't know - we did not return four artillery
4 weapons, although we had the right to keep them. That's just for your
5 information. But what I have to move on to now is the issue of sniping
6 in Sarajevo
7 We can remove this document.
8 You did not have quite a clear picture of command and control in
9 the Sarajevo Corps, right, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
10 A. I provided the assessment we had made of the RSK to the Chamber.
11 Q. Here on page 8 in English, paragraph 3, you say:
12 "I do not have precise information about ..."
13 [In English] " ... the manner in which orders and reports were
14 transmitted within the SRK
15 [Interpretation] And you also confirm that you did not see a
16 single order by any commanding officer in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
17 issued to subordinate units; correct?
18 A. I did not have any written order in my possession at that time,
19 and the contrary would have been surprising.
20 Q. Thank you. Your associate notified of an informal conversation
21 with an officer from the Ilidza Brigade - that's on the record
22 today - where that collocutor dared to speculate on the intentions of the
23 Sarajevo Romanija Corps vis-a-vis the city. Now, a liaison officer
24 chatting with your (redacted) is not a proper basis for making
25 far-reaching conclusions, I don't think. Do you agree that this would be
1 information better provided by higher-ranking strategic commanders?
2 A. The conversation that you are talking about is a conversation
3 between officers, and this would happen frequently between the two
4 belligerent parties. (redacted)
6 very difficult to be in contact with high-level representatives of the
8 know whether they were applying orders that they had received from
9 civilian authorities, and I'm talking about Bosnian Serb authorities.
10 Perhaps those would have banned any contact between civil servants or
11 military officers and foreign representatives. And I obtained this
12 information through the civilian press, but I also got confirmation
13 through Mr. Indic.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
15 MR. HAYDEN: I think we need a redaction at line 24 of page 100,
16 reference (redacted)
17 JUDGE KWON: Okay, thank you.
18 MR. HAYDEN: And I apologise, Mr. President, but I've
19 inadvertently disclosed the same again, so that's going to have to be
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. I really find that every word you say is precious, but we don't
24 have time for long answers.
25 You say, on page 9, paragraph 2:
1 "I never saw any written orders.
2 [In English] "Given the rigidity of the chain of command and the
3 structure, Dragomir Milosevic, in my opinion, is entirely responsible for
4 what happened."
5 [Interpretation] You reached that conclusion taking into account
6 the rigidity of the chain of command and its structures, but do you know
7 that in the former Yugoslavia
8 didn't have howitzers? They were entitled to have those weapons
9 according to the Law on All People's Defence?
10 A. Dr. Karadzic, you only confirm what I've been repeating for
11 several hours; namely, that the SRK
12 locally recruited, that is. Those people were used to find armed depots
13 in city hall places or school buildings. Those people had nationalist
14 views, strong ones to boot, and they were strictly controlled by
15 professional officers coming from the former JNA.
16 Q. Thank you. But do you agree that these weapons that they
17 retrieved from all sorts of basements were not under anyone's control?
18 If somebody found a weapon, they would not report it to the corps, would
20 A. The Defence seems to forget that people coming from the former
21 JNA were in charge of those weapons, and they would distribute them, and
22 they would be in charge of controlling those weapons as well.
23 Q. Thank you. I cannot go further into that, but the
24 Territorial Defence was subordinated to the JNA, although it had full
25 control of the weapons.
1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed the page of the record
2 in the Milosevic -- the General Milosevic case.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. You confirmed that you had not seen a single order from the
5 Sarajevo Romanija Corps to target civilians?
6 A. I can confirm this.
7 Q. Thank you. Then we don't have to look for the reference. It's
9 However, on page 10 of that statement of yours, it so happens
10 that you said that sniping by the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had the
11 objective of terrorising and demoralising civilians, and you mention a
12 woman who lived in the PTT building, and that on the way home she was
13 wounded. It's page 10 in English. And you say that you were able to see
14 the psychological impact this had.
15 And then you mention, in the same paragraph, that
16 Corporal Hardouin was killed on the 15th or 16th of April. Were you
17 there on those dates?
18 MR. HAYDEN: It's page 13 of the French.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that.
20 I'm going to answer your questions, Dr. Karadzic.
21 I was doing a recce operation on the 15th or 16th of April, when
22 Captain Hardouin was shot during the course of his mission. The
23 objective of the mission was to put protection containers that would work
24 as shields along Sniper Alley; in the vicinity of the museum, if I
25 remember correctly. We carried out an investigation, if I remember
1 correctly, but it was difficult for the Bosnian Muslim side. There was a
2 lot of delay in getting information, as it was impossible to obtain
3 information from the Bosnian Serb side. Therefore, this investigation
4 led to no conclusive statement, and we could not determine whether the
5 Serb side had done any opposition.
6 As for your other comments, I have given some examples, including
7 this unfortunate cleaning woman, and this shows that we [as interpreted]
8 were targeting defenceless civilians that could not be construed in any
9 way as military objectives.
10 Q. We agree about that. Every death is tragic, especially the death
11 of a civilian. But, sir, without a ballistic analysis and a criminal
12 investigation, can anyone conclude who fired and from where, especially
13 since all the buildings on the Muslim side were full of snipers who were
14 shooting at their own people?
15 A. Except that in the case of Corporal Hardouin, I don't quite see
16 why the Bosnian Muslim side would open fire on military staff, whatever
17 the reasons may be. And as for this unfortunate cleaning lady, the
18 information that we obtained, and there were not a lot, but it showed
19 that the fire was coming from the Serb lines. This is the conclusion
20 that we came to. But given the circumstances, we did not have a police
21 report that would have been in charge of the investigation, but I'm sure
22 you understand the circumstances of this investigation.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 May I call up 65 ter 16863 to see the first page. And in French,
25 the fourth page, and the sixth page in English.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 MR. HAYDEN: Just a small clarification.
3 I'm not sure if it's an interpretation-related issue, but at line
4 2 of page 104, the witness is recorded as saying:
5 "We were targeting defenceless civilians."
6 Just clarify that's what he meant.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was wondering that as well.
8 Did you hear that comment, Mr. Witness?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, but I don't quite know
10 what you're referring to.
11 JUDGE KWON: In answer to the question, you answered this way.
12 I'll read out the passage, which is line 1 to 4 on page 104:
13 "As for your -- as for your other comments, I have given some
14 examples, including this unfortunate cleaning woman, and this shows that
15 we were targeting defenceless civilians that could not be construed in
16 any way as military objectives."
17 So did you say "we were targeting"?
18 Unfortunately, it disappeared from the monitor. There's no way
19 to scroll back with your monitor.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: It should read "one
21 was targeting."
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My apologies. Perhaps I didn't
23 express myself correctly.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, the interpreters have kindly clarified
25 the question. We can proceed.
1 Mr. Karadzic, we have only four minutes to get out of this
2 courtroom today.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we now see the French version, page 4, and page 6 in English.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you see the date of this document? It's Sector Sarajevo,
7 23rd September 1994
8 [In English] "Sixth time of return to battalion, 1915.
10 "According to a Bosniak woman, who spoke good French, the shot
11 fired at 1500 hours came from a Bosnian building opposite to the
12 PTT building. Not possible to speak to the victim."
13 [Interpretation] It is our case that the targeting of foreigners
14 - and Serbs would be very reluctant to shoot at French people - had the
15 purpose of casting blame on the Serbs and causing an international
16 intervention. Do you agree that along the sniper alleys, there were
17 sniper emplacements of the Bosnian Army; in fact, more of them were
18 controlled by the police than the army?
19 A. I cannot answer this question related to September 1994, as I was
20 not in Sarajevo
21 observe during my tour of duties. So I do not know whether this should
22 be said in private session, but during the time I was in Sarajevo, we
23 knew that the Bosnian Muslim side had positions on the front-line.
24 However, we have not observed any shot from this side against the
25 civilian population or against the UN forces in this area.
1 Q. Thank you. We will continue along these lines tomorrow.
2 On page 16, paragraph 1, you conclude that --
3 JUDGE KWON: We should rise here for today.
4 And I was advised that since the witness has some other
5 commitment which is very important, the hearing tomorrow with respect to
6 this witness should be completed within the time planned. So you will
7 have exactly half an hour tomorrow morning.
8 And Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Just to note, Your Honour, that I will need a very
10 brief opportunity to correct the record with respect to certain
11 information -- certain details of information I provided in
12 closed session, but I see no reason that can't be done tomorrow.
13 JUDGE KWON: Let's do it tomorrow.
14 So the hearing is now adjourned. We will resume tomorrow morning
15 at 9.00.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.30 p.m.
18 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 19th day of
19 January, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.