Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10743

 1                           Wednesday, 26 January 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning everyone.  Good morning, Mr. Robinson.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Good morning, Mr. President.  May I introduce to

 8     you Jade Werkmeister, who is from the University of Melbourne in

 9     Australia, who is joining us this morning.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             If the witness could take the solemn declaration, please.

12             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

13     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

14                           WITNESS:  MARCUS HELGERS

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Helgers.

16             Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you, Your Honour.

18                           Examination by Ms. Sutherland:

19        Q.   Good morning.  Can you please state your full name.

20        A.   My full name is Marcus Martinus Emanuel Helgers.

21        Q.   And in 1995 you held the rank of captain in the Dutch air force;

22     is that correct?

23        A.   That is correct, ma'am.

24        Q.   As we discussed, part of your evidence in this case will be

25     submitted in writing, and we first need to deal with the formalities

Page 10744

 1     associated with that submission.

 2        A.   Mm-hmm.

 3        Q.   You provided a signed statement to members of the Office of the

 4     Prosecutor in August 1995; is that correct?

 5        A.   That is correct, ma'am.

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If I could have 65 ter number 22677 on the

 7     screen, please.

 8        Q.   Mr. Helgers, is that your statement at the bottom of the page 1?

 9        A.   That's my signature.

10        Q.   Oh, thank you.  Sorry.  Is it right that you've had an

11     opportunity to review this statement?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   And there's one correction and a couple of clarifications that

14     you wish to make.

15        A.   Yes, indeed, as I've made them in your presence last Monday.

16        Q.   In the fourth paragraph on page 4.

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could go to page 4, Mr. Registrar.

18        Q.   The reference to the 16th of June, 1995, should read 18 June 1995

19     as is stated in the paragraph above?

20        A.   That's correct.

21        Q.   With respect to the clarifications in the first paragraph on

22     page 3, there's a reference to Major Westlund being forced to contact

23     UN headquarters Sarajevo?

24        A.   Mm-hmm.  Mm-hmm.

25        Q.   And you wish to state that you no longer remember and therefore

Page 10745

 1     cannot be sure whether he did that contact from Jahorina or from Pale; is

 2     that right?

 3        A.   That's correct.

 4        Q.   And in the second paragraph on page 3, there's a reference to

 5     being taken from a point at Jahorina a distance of 5, 6, or 700 metres to

 6     the radar station.  You wish to clarify that you cannot be sure of the

 7     distance in metres but that it took you approximately 15 minutes walking

 8     in the snow?

 9        A.   That's correct.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters kindly ask that Ms. Sutherland

11     slow down a bit, please.

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:  My apologies to the interpreter.

13        Q.   With that correction and the clarifications, do you confirm that

14     the statement is accurate?

15        A.   The statement is accurate with the clarifications.

16        Q.   If I were to ask you today about the same series of events, would

17     you provide the same information to the Trial Chamber?

18        A.   Yes, with one remark:  That it has been 16 years ago, so it might

19     be that some small details I do not recall as clearly as I did 16 years

20     ago.

21             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I seek to tender 65 ter 22677 into

22     evidence.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  It is admitted.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2117, Your Honours.

25             MS. SUTHERLAND:  With Your Honours' leave, I will now read a

Page 10746

 1     summary of the witness's written evidence.

 2             In 1995, in April, Marcus Helgers was a captain in the Dutch

 3     air force stationed near Kasindo, south of Sarajevo, as a United Nations

 4     Military Observer, that is, an UNMO.  On the 26th of May, 1995, the

 5     witness together with five other UNMOs deployed to the same observation

 6     post, were ceased by armed soldiers and driven to a guard post in

 7     Grbavica.  There they were forced to change into civilian clothes.  The

 8     six UNMOs were then driven to the police station in Pale, then to a

 9     cafe bar in Pale, and subsequently taken to the Jahorina radar station

10     where he was held by the Bosnian Serb forces for 20 days.  While being

11     held, the witness received threats on his life.  At one point, the

12     deputy team leader of the six UNMOs was forced to contact UNMO

13     headquarters in Sarajevo and tell them that the VRS would kill some of

14     them if NATO continued with air-strikes.

15             Early the following morning, 27 May 1995, the witness was taken

16     with another UNMO to the roof of the tower near the main radar dome where

17     he was held for approximately two hours.  UNMOs were taken to the tower

18     in shifts of two men for approximately two hours each.  After being held

19     at Jahorina radar station for 20 days, he was then taken with two UNMOs

20     to a military police station in Pale and then to the military barracks at

21     Koran-Pale where they were detained for a further four days.

22             Their release from Pale on 18 June 1995 was overseen by

23     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic.  Mr. Koljevic spoke to the military observers

24     on that day and also Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic spoke.  Indjic then signed

25     a document handing them over to the security forces.  The UNMOs were then

Page 10747

 1     driven by bus to Pale where they met with the "security chief of

 2     Milosevic."  They were taken to Zvornik and then on to Novi Sad.

 3             The following day, 19 June 1995, the witness was taken from

 4     Novi Sad to Belgrade airport where he flew to Zagreb.

 5             That concludes the summary, Your Honour.  I would now like to

 6     clarify a few details and ask some specific questions about the witness's

 7     evidence.

 8        Q.   Mr. Helgers, what date were you first deployed in Bosnia?

 9        A.   I -- I entered the mission in Zagreb on the 26th of April.  I was

10     flown to Sarajevo around or on the 1st of May.

11        Q.   Where were you assigned?

12        A.   I was to be stationed at the enclave of Zepa, but due to the fact

13     that at that moment it was not possible to -- to deploy me in that area,

14     I was temporarily assigned to the UNMO station in Kasindo.

15        Q.   How many were in your team and if you recall what nationalities?

16        A.   The team leader was Spanish, the deputy team leader was Swedish

17     and the total amount of people they changed.  At the moment, on 26th,

18     when I was taken hostage, we were six.

19        Q.   And what were your duties?

20        A.   Our duties was to -- to monitor the cease-fire, monitor the

21     weapon collection points, to report on any shelling coming in or going

22     out and generally investigate any reports about shooting incidents.

23        Q.   Were you armed?

24        A.   We were not armed.

25        Q.   At some point was your freedom of movement restricted?

Page 10748

 1        A.   Almost constantly during the period, so the fact is we did very

 2     little patrolling because, virtually from day one, there were very severe

 3     movement restrictions.

 4        Q.   On page 2 of your statement, you state that on the 26th of May,

 5     the deputy to the local battalion commander --

 6        A.   Mm-hmm.

 7        Q.   -- came to the observation post at around 1330 hours?

 8        A.   That's correct.

 9        Q.   Do you recall what he said?

10        A.   He said that there had been some air-strikes and that we were

11     given house arrests and that we were to stay in the -- in the office.

12        Q.   You also said on that page that he came back at around

13     1500 hours.

14        A.   Mm-hmm.

15        Q.   What, if anything, do you recall him saying when he came back the

16     second time?

17        A.   I have to make one clarification.  I'm not completely sure if it

18     was a deputy commander or a security officer.  I do know what he said

19     quite clearly because that's engraved in my memory.  He said there had

20     been more -- more strikes, and that we were having house arrests and that

21     we should not go outside, and that if we were to go outside, we would be

22     shot.

23        Q.   From there you were taken by two armed soldiers to a guard post

24     at Grbavica.  That's on page 2.

25        A.   That was later.  It was at around 4.00 or something later.

Page 10749

 1        Q.   Did these soldiers identify themselves?

 2        A.   No.  However, they were dressed in partial uniforms and -- well,

 3     sufficiently to identify them as Bosnian Serb soldiers.

 4        Q.   Can you briefly describe for the Chamber what occurred there.

 5        A.   At the moment that I was taken hostage or --

 6        Q.   When you were at the guard post at Grbavica.

 7        A.   Well, we were put in a, well, in a basement at the -- the command

 8     post was a basement of an apartment block.  We were put there under guard

 9     and then -- it was command post.  People started making phone calls.  I

10     don't know any Serbian-Croatian.  However, I could hear that it was about

11     us and about uniforms.  Then we were forced to take off all of our

12     uniforms and we were forced to take on civilian clothes.  In my case a

13     training suit that I bought in Zagreb, and the other colleagues, whatever

14     private clothes they had, except Major Bello Abdul Razak from Nigeria.

15     He did not have any civilian clothes.  He was forced to put on a former

16     Yugoslav Army uniform.

17        Q.   What did you think was going to happen to you at that time?

18        A.   Because I was quite afraid, worried to be sure, we were very

19     close to the confrontation line and the thought had occurred to me was

20     that since it was very irregular being taken off -- that we had to take

21     off our uniform, that we were going to be sent over the confrontation

22     line, presumably to be shot by the opposing party.

23        Q.   I want to move now to a time after you arrived in Pale from

24     Grbavica.

25        A.   Mm-hmm.

Page 10750

 1        Q.   You stated on page 2 of your statement that when you were taken

 2     to Pale, that you met some UNMOs from the 7 Lima team who had been

 3     captured earlier.

 4        A.   Mm-hmm.

 5        Q.   You also said there was a young Bosnian Serb soldier who spoke

 6     good English.

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Do you recall what that Bosnian Serb soldier said?

 9        A.   Very clearly.  He said that we were hostages for the

10     Bosnian Serbs, that we were going to be station -- brought to Jahorina

11     radar station where we were going to be used as human shields.  He

12     further told us that if there was any air-strike by NATO, one of us would

13     be shot, and that if there was an air-strike at the radar station and any

14     of us were to survive, we would all be shot.

15        Q.   When you said that you were going to be taken to Jahorina and

16     used as human shields, what did you understand this to be mean?

17        A.   For me it was quite clear that we were going to be placed at the

18     station so that if a NATO air attack were to take place, we would be hit,

19     too, and furthermore, as he stated, that if there was an air-strike at

20     another location in Bosnia on Bosnia Serb troops, or forces, or units,

21     that one of us would be shot.  And anyway, if there was an attack on

22     radio station and we were to be survive, we would all be executed

23     afterwards.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel make a pause after the witness

25     has answered.  Thank you.

Page 10751

 1             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 2        Q.   You mentioned in your statement that you were then taken in a

 3     vehicle and up to Jahorina.

 4        A.   Mm-hmm.

 5        Q.   You have mentioned in your statement that a number of you were

 6     mistreated in the vehicle.

 7        A.   Mm-hmm.  Yes.

 8        Q.   And then you had to walk a certain distance.  Were any of you

 9     mistreated along the way?

10        A.   In the -- when -- at the foot of the radio station was a sort of

11     hotel where I was told it had been used for -- for Olympic Games earlier.

12     We were handed over from the regular car.  We were into a military bus,

13     small bus, by -- and we were guarded by -- transferred to the guard of

14     three Bosnian Serb guards.  One of them was quite drunk.  The other one

15     was not sober.  You could see it in their behaviour.  You could smell it

16     on them.  And the driver was at least more or less sober, I think.  In

17     the car they started asking questions, and when Major Bello Abdul Razak

18     from Nigeria, when he didn't answer quickly enough, they hit him with the

19     butt of a Kalashnikov rifle in his head from behind.  And later on,

20     Major Westlund, from Sweden, he -- because he didn't answer correctly or

21     quickly enough he was also butted, but in the shoulder.  Later on when we

22     left the car and had to walk to the radar station, we were kicked a few

23     times, but not very extremely hard, just to force us along.

24        Q.   You said that when you got there you were taken to the barracks

25     and taken to a room.

Page 10752

 1        A.   Mm-hmm.

 2        Q.   And the next morning, this is on page 3, that is the 27th of May,

 3     1995, the two of you were taken to a tower 15 metres from the main radar

 4     dome.  Can you just describe the -- the area?

 5        A.   Okay.  It was -- it was a mountain top, quite high.  I do

 6     remember very clearly that when we came -- as I told you, we had to walk

 7     the last part.  The area was largely covered with snow, not completely.

 8     In fact, when we left 20 days later, it was still some patches of snow

 9     left.

10             The radar station at the bottom, about 200 metres below the domes

11     themselves, there was sort of barracks which was used as sleeping area,

12     command post, I don't know exactly.  Then there was a winding road up --

13     upwards towards the radar itself.  There were two domes, big, white,

14     multi-facetted domes, a big one and a small one.  There was an entrance

15     to the area just below the main -- the main radar dome in which we were

16     forced to enter, and we were taken to the first room on the right side.

17             What I do remember quite clearly is that there was also sort of

18     guard tower about 15 metres' distance from the main dome, and when we

19     were taken to -- to the radar and put in -- sort of in -- under the main

20     radar dome, afterwards at -- two of us at a turn were taken outside and

21     put on -- in my case on the top of the radar -- of the guard tower, which

22     is very close to the main radar dome.

23        Q.   On page 3 you said that Pale Television arrived with some UNMOs

24     for filming.

25        A.   Mm-hmm.

Page 10753

 1        Q.   Did you see these UNMOs?

 2        A.   I did not see these UNMOs because at that time I was underground,

 3     under the radar dome, and two other colleagues at that time at the watch

 4     tower, they were taken in and they told me they had seen Pale TV arrive

 5     with some -- some uniformed UNMOs.

 6        Q.   I now want you to view a brief video-clip.

 7        A.   Mm-hmm.

 8             MS. SUTHERLAND:  The first part of the clip is 65 ter number

 9     40202D.

10                           [Video-clip played]

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Pause there.

12        Q.   Do you recognise anything in that shot?  We've paused at 40:57.

13     We started the clip at 40:43 for the record.

14        A.   Well, it was this radar dome or one -- well, the almost identical

15     twin of it.

16             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could play it again -- continue.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Sutherland, can I intervene.  Is it your plan to

19     do without transcript, without those being read out?

20             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.  It's the visual that I want

21     the witness to look at.

22             If we could continue, and if we could pause it at 41:40, please.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:

25        Q.   Do you recognise who is in that shot?

Page 10754

 1        A.   Yes, it's a Brazilian UNMO named Harley or Harvey.  I recall him

 2     very clearly because I met him later on in Pale when the UNMOs were

 3     collected for later release.

 4        Q.   And is Harley his first or last name, do you know?

 5        A.   As far as I know it's his last name but I'm not sure.  I knew him

 6     as Harley or Harvey.

 7             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could continue, please.

 8                           [Video-clip played]

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we can pause at 42:49, please.

10                           [Video-clip played]

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:

12        Q.   Do you recognise the gentleman in that shot?

13        A.   Well, he's Polish, but I don't, I don't recall him.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we can continue and then pause at 43:06.

16                           [Video-clip played]

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:

18        Q.   What, if anything, do you recognise in that shot?

19        A.   Well, as I told you, that's the radar dome.  It's the one I was

20     held at or, well, its twin.  What you can also see, I think, in the

21     background are the snow patches that I was mentioning earlier.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could play again and pause at 43:14,

23     please.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             THE WITNESS:  That's -- that's the smaller dome I was telling you

Page 10755

 1     about.  There was a bigger dome and there was a smaller dome.

 2             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could continue, please.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 7        Q.   Thank you.  The next clip I wish to show you is 65 ter 40202F,

 8     please.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             MS. SUTHERLAND:  And if we could pause it there, please.  That's

11     paused at 44:01.

12        Q.   Do you recognise who is in that shot?

13        A.   Yes, that's my colleague, Dutch UNMO.  Captain Wilko Ramarkus

14     [phoen] from the Dutch air force.

15        Q.   And what was Ramarkus chained to, do you know?

16        A.   He told me he had been chained to a Bosnian Serb aircraft shelter

17     in or near Banja Luka.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I seek to tender both of those

20     clips.  The first clip will be shown with another witness on Friday, and

21     at that point we will be using the transcript.

22             JUDGE KWON:  You are tendering the entire video-clip or the

23     D part refers to the part you've shown -- you have shown today.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes.  I want to tender both clips, the clip

25     of -- at the dome and the clip of the Dutch UNMO that we can see on the

Page 10756

 1     screen now.  That's 40202D and 40202F.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And we don't need the time clip because only that

 3     part will be tendered.  That's my understanding.  Is my understanding

 4     correct?

 5             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Both will be admitted.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibits P2143 and P2144, respectively,

 8     Your Honours.

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:

10        Q.   Mr. Helgers, in your statement at page 3, you said that you were

11     held at Jahorina for 20 days, and the room where you were held in, how

12     far was this from the radar tower?  You may have mentioned it earlier

13     this morning?

14        A.   That depends on how you -- if you had to walk it, it goes maybe

15     40, 50 metres, but it was -- the radar dome, as you could see, was on the

16     top and below it there was an entrance into -- to the area.  I didn't see

17     the complete area, of course, because we were taken on the inside in the

18     first door on the right.  Walking distance would have been less than

19     50 metres.  I mean, horizontal or vertical distance would have been

20     20 metres, 25, 30 maybe.

21        Q.   Who appeared to you to be in charge at the radar station?

22        A.   There was a sublieutenant who was in charge.  His name was

23     Trafkovic.  We met him on the 26th, in the evening, when we arrived at

24     the barracks at the foot of the -- of the radar domes, and he warned us

25     at that time, please, that he was very sorry about the situation, that he

Page 10757

 1     warned us not to try to escape especially since the area around the radar

 2     station was mined.  And later on, I don't recall which day, we were taken

 3     downstairs to the barracks at the foot of the radar station, radar dome,

 4     where we met with him.  He asked us how we were doing and I remember

 5     playing two games of chess with him.

 6        Q.   And did -- what, if anything, did he say to you about your

 7     detention?

 8        A.   He stated that, as I told you, he was sorry about the situation

 9     and he hoped the situation would be resolved and that we would be

10     released quickly.  Also, what I remember from the first day, that we had

11     been taken as an order from -- from the Bosnian Serb president.

12        Q.   And that was something that he told you on the first day?

13        A.   Yes, in the evening.  I want to rephrase that.  I don't recall

14     exactly he said Bosnian Serb president or Bosnian Serb command.

15        Q.   You stated on page 3 that on the 14th of June, three of you were

16     taken from the Jahorina radar station.  Who took you, and where did you

17     go?

18        A.   The 13th you mean?  The 13th of June.

19        Q.   Yes.  Yes.

20        A.   Okay.  The three of us which were left at that time, we were

21     taken to a -- well, it looks to be a sort of hotel complex where we met

22     Captain Manzoor, who was one of the members our team which together --

23     he, together with Major Westlund, had been separated from us quite

24     quickly after the event, and I was given to understand that he had

25     been -- been used as a human shield at the control centre for the radar

Page 10758

 1     station.  And after we collected Captain Manzoor we were driven to Pale,

 2     where we met the other UNMOs.

 3        Q.   And on page 3 of your statement you say on Tuesday, the

 4     13th of June, 1995, Major --

 5        A.   Wojtasiak.

 6        Q.   -- Wojtasiak was released.

 7        A.   Mm-hmm.

 8        Q.   And the following day --

 9        A.   Yes, so it must have been the 14th.

10        Q.   -- the 14th, the remaining three of you were taken to the hotel

11     complex?

12        A.   Mm-hmm.  Yes, so it must have been 14th.

13        Q.   You said Captain Vojvodic was in charge at the barracks.  How did

14     you know his name?

15        A.   Well, he gave his name, and some of the other UNMOs who had been

16     longer in -- in -- in the barracks, they had given his name too.

17        Q.   Now, on page 4 of your statement you describe the events on

18     Sunday, the 18th of June, 1995, as to how you came to be released --

19        A.   Mm-hmm.

20        Q.   -- from Bosnia when you met Koljevic and Lieutenant-Colonel

21     Indjic.

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   So I won't go into that now.  I'd like you to look at a map,

24     65 ter 23076.  This is a map which -- the map that will appear on the

25     screen has been prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor using

Page 10759

 1     65 ter 19082 as the base map.  Overlaid on this map are the different

 2     locations in Bosnia where you were held during the period 26 May 1995 to

 3     19 June.

 4        A.   Mm-hmm.  Mm-hmm.

 5        Q.   You had an opportunity to review this map --

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   -- in preparation of your testimony?

 8        A.   Yes, I did.

 9        Q.   Does this map accurately reflect your movements during the period

10     you were held by the Bosnian Serb forces?

11        A.   It does.

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I tender this map for admission.

13             JUDGE KWON:  That is admitted.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2145, Your Honours.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:

16        Q.   And we can see the -- Kasindo marked with a -- with a black dot

17     and then to Grbavica, over to Pale, down to Jahorina radar station, back

18     to Pale, and then you were taken over to -- in the direction of --

19        A.   Novi Sad.

20        Q.   Novi Sad.  Thank you.  I've finished with that map.  There are a

21     number of documents I wish to show and I want to ask you whether certain

22     aspects of these documents are consistent with your experiences.

23        A.   Mm-hmm.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If I could have 65 ter 09404 on the screen,

25     please.

Page 10760

 1        Q.   This is a Main Staff document from the Army of Republika Srpska,

 2     dated the 26th of May, 1995.  There are a number of targets listed there,

 3     alleged NATO targets.  Are these targets consistent with where you and

 4     other UNMOs were subsequently held as hostages?

 5        A.   Just for myself, I was held at the radar station, and I know

 6     about my -- my colleague Rabakus [phoen] because he was held at an

 7     air base.  Two of my colleagues from the same team, Major Westlund and

 8     Captain Manzoor, were taken to a command post or radar control post, as I

 9     told you before, so that it is consistent.

10             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I seek to tender this document into

11     evidence.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It will be admitted.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2146, Your Honours.

14             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If the next document could be brought up,

15     65 ter 09172.

16        Q.   Again, this is a Main Staff Army of Republika Srpska document,

17     dated the 27th of May, 1995, which discusses the VRS assessment of where

18     NATO will concentrate their operations, ammunition dumps, fire positions

19     of anti-aircraft defence equipment, artillery, armoured mechanism units

20     and command posts.  Again, are these areas consistent with where you and

21     other UNMOs were placed at that time?

22        A.   As I told you, I don't know the exact locations of where all the

23     UNMOs were placed, but as far as my recollection is and my personal

24     experience, we were placed at military strategic or vital locations.

25        Q.   And I think at the time this -- this document was received you

Page 10761

 1     were, in fact, at the radar station; is that right?

 2        A.   On the 27th, I was already on the radar station.  As I told you,

 3     I was taken very early on 27th in the morning from the barracks at the

 4     foot of the radio station towards the radio station itself.

 5             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I seek to tender this into

 6     evidence.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Let the record reflect we're

 8     being very generous at this point but we don't object.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, we'll admit this.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2147, Your Honours.

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If I could have Exhibit P00893 on the screen,

12     please.

13        Q.   We see this is dated the 17th of June, 1995.  It's an order from

14     the president of the republic, Dr. Karadzic, regarding the release of the

15     remaining UNPROFOR and military observers.

16        A.   Mm-hmm.

17        Q.   First, you can confirm that you were released on the

18     18th of June, at least from Bosnia?

19        A.   That's correct.

20        Q.   And in the second paragraph, it -- or order number -- point

21     number 2, it refers to the return of personal weapons to UNPROFOR and

22     military observers.

23        A.   Mm-hmm.

24        Q.   You testified earlier that UNMOs were unarmed?

25        A.   I did not have any weapon bigger than probably a pocket knife,

Page 10762

 1     which was taken from me, and as to the return of personal effects, my

 2     personal effects were, well, confiscated when I was taken hostage and I

 3     never got them back.

 4        Q.   Finally, Mr. Helgers, what impact, if any, has the period that

 5     you were held by the Bosnian Serb forces had upon you?

 6        A.   At the moment of the -- of the -- of the -- the events, that was

 7     quite stressful, and my reaction was that -- was that I put off my

 8     emotion, more or less, till arriving on the -- I think it was the 19th in

 9     Zagreb, when I entered the mess I had the shakes for about two minutes.

10     After which I had -- well, all my muscles hurt for about a week.

11     Afterwards I had some sleepless nights about two months later.  Then I

12     did not have any problems until about 2000 -- 2000, 2001 -- 2001, in

13     fact, when I became quite stressed, recurrences of the events,

14     sleeplessness, irritation, lessened performance, and I was later

15     diagnosed by Dutch military that I had post-traumatic stress disorder.

16     I've been treated for that quite successfully, I think.  I had some small

17     recurrences later but they are minor.

18             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you.  That concludes my

19     examination-in-chief, Your Honour.  The 65 ter number listed as the first

20     additional exhibit in the 92 ter notification is technically an

21     associated exhibit because it was referred to in the statement.  However,

22     I don't seek to tender that document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Thank you, Ms. Sutherland.

24             Now, Mr. Karadzic, it's for you to cross-examine Mr. Helgers.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning,

Page 10763

 1     Your Excellencies.  Good morning to everybody.

 2                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 3        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Helgers.  First of all, I

 4     would like to thank you for having met with the Defence.  I hope this

 5     will help us in our effort to be very precise and very expeditious.  I

 6     would like to thank you for your kindness in that respect.

 7             You are a captain in the Dutch air force.  Am I right?

 8        A.   At the moment of my -- my taking hostage, I was a captain in the

 9     air force.  At the moment I'm a major in the Dutch Marechaussee, which is

10     a gendarmerie force.

11        Q.   Thank you.  What was your task?  What was your mission at your

12     observation post in Kasindo?

13        A.   As I stated earlier towards the Prosecution, my task were -- our

14     task, our tasks were to observe the cease-fire, monitor the weapon

15     collection points, and report on any incoming or outgoing shelling, and

16     investigate shooting reports.

17        Q.   Thank you.  While you were there for a month prior to the event

18     in question, did you have good relations with the Serbian officers and

19     the local population?  What was your relationship with them?

20        A.   The -- I did not meet any special hostility.  Having said that, I

21     must note that my contacts with Serbian military and Serbian civilians

22     were very limited due to restriction of movement.  Furthermore, I was not

23     team leader or deputy team leader in charge of negotiations or dealing

24     with Serbian authorities, police, anyway, or military, sorry.  And

25     furthermore, I was placed at the Kasindo station temporarily because I

Page 10764

 1     was -- they planned for me to go to Zepa at a later state.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that there was a major Muslim offensive

 3     ongoing, an offensive which was launched on the 1st of May and

 4     intensified after the 15th of May?

 5        A.   I do remember that there have been some very -- very -- well,

 6     quite intense shelling during a few days during my stay in Kasindo.  When

 7     I came in Sarajevo it was quite quiet, and afterwards it heated up quite

 8     quickly, yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement, on page 2 you say that on that

10     day, around 1330 hours, Serbian soldiers came, and the local commander

11     told you about NATO air-strikes, and that for your own safety you were

12     supposed to stay in house arrest where you would be guarded.  Is that

13     correct?

14        A.   The deputy commander, as I recall, to be quite clear, I had not

15     met him before he was pointed out to me by colleagues as being the deputy

16     commander.  He stated that there had been some air-strikes and that

17     indeed we were to stay at the -- at our office.

18        Q.   Thank you.  An hour and a half later he arrived, and his attitude

19     towards you was somewhat different.  In other words, something had

20     happened during that period which changed his attitude towards you.  When

21     he arrived, he told you that there had been some more air-strikes; right?

22        A.   I've read that in my statement, so that must be correct.  It is

23     consistent with what I remember.  One -- one remark:  As I told you this

24     morning -- or I told the Prosecution this morning, I think it was the

25     intelligence chief of -- of the unit, of the security chief, he was very

Page 10765

 1     unfriendly.  He told us that -- that's from further incidents.  It might

 2     have been the air-strikes.  I don't exactly recall at this time.  And he

 3     told us very clearly that we were to stay inside.  We were under house

 4     arrest.  We were to be guarded, and if we were to go outside we would be

 5     shot.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And then you were at Grbavica, and you changed your

 7     clothes.  There is a fact on the one hand, and there is your

 8     understanding of the fact on the other.  Do you accept the possibility

 9     that during your transport to Pale, you might have been faced with the

10     hostility or attacks on the part of civilians or renegades or any other

11     individuals who might have been angry as a result of those air-strikes,

12     and that the fact that you had to change your clothes was just a measure

13     to protect you from any such hostilities coming from the -- from such

14     individuals?

15        A.   I can only state that any comment about that would be, well,

16     speculation of my side.  As I told you before, the -- the reactions of --

17     of the few Bosnian Serb people I met had been correct.  In fact, our

18     landlord was quite upset when we were taken.  About the -- being forced

19     to -- to take off our military clothes, that was clearly for me, although

20     I don't understand Serbo-Croatian, on orders.  There were a lot of phone

21     calls about that.  And in my opinion, it is totally inconsistent with

22     Geneva law or any other law about conduct in war.

23        Q.   Thank you.  It would have been even more against the

24     Geneva Conventions if somebody had noticed your white clothes during your

25     journey and if they had opened -- opened fire at you.  Do you agree with

Page 10766

 1     me?

 2        A.   I was not wearing white clothes.  I was wearing Dutch military

 3     uniform with the UN distinctive markings on it.  And as I told you

 4     before, I don't have any reason to -- to expect -- suspect that.  So it

 5     would be speculation.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  At that moment, you were told, and you mentioned the

 7     president or the command earlier on, and during our interview you told us

 8     that the local commander at Mount Jahorina, or even before that, told you

 9     that you were a prisoner of war, and that resulted from the fact that the

10     previous night the president of the republic had stated on TV that

11     UNPROFOR members were prisoners of war taken by the Serb army; right?

12        A.   The facts -- well, the statement that we were prisoners of war

13     was mentioned several times during the period I was taken hostage.  To

14     me, in fact, I had quite some discussions with the guard at the radar

15     station because, in my opinion, we were hostages because we were not

16     being accorded the treatment due to prisoners of war in

17     Geneva Conventions, like being used as a human shield, having to take off

18     our uniforms, being denied protective measures, et cetera, being denied

19     access to the Red Cross.

20             There was quite a discussion about that, but in my opinion, the

21     guards were told -- and I said they told me and us we were to be

22     prisoners of war, yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.  During our conversation, we agreed that nobody had

24     told you that you would be released if the air-strikes stopped; right?

25        A.   That's correct.  It was never specifically mentioned.  Several

Page 10767

 1     times we mentioned that there were negotiations ongoing, and as I said

 2     before, several people, they stated that they hoped the situation would

 3     be resolved quickly.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that after 16 hours you were

 5     suspected of having co-operated with NATO?  Allegedly, UNPROFOR staff

 6     played the role of forward air controllers which selected targets and

 7     aimed at those targets with lasers.  I'm not asking you whether you

 8     actually did that.  I'm asking you whether those who had captured you

 9     suspected you of such doings?

10        A.   With the 16 hours I presume you mean on the 26th, after 16 hours

11     when we were taken hostage.  I don't know the exact time and date, but I

12     do recall that several times it has been -- we were accused or

13     accusations were being brought up that UNMOs had, in fact, operated as

14     forward air controllers.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Did your affiliation to the air force of the

16     Dutch military support their suspicions?

17        A.   Not especially by me, because in my group of UNMOs, there was,

18     for instance, also a Polish fighter pilot, or former fighter pilot.  I

19     can only state that I had never been involved nor had any training in

20     forward air controlling and I never had any equipment.  I never saw of my

21     colleagues being involved in that.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I'm not accusing you.  I'm just asking you whether

23     such suspicions were every brought up, whether those who had captured you

24     ever accused you of such things?

25        A.   As I stated before, yes, the accusation has come up several

Page 10768

 1     times.

 2        Q.   Thank you very much.  I would like to thank you once again for

 3     having met up with the Defence and for having come to testify here, and

 4     this brings my cross-examination to an end.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Sutherland, do you have any re-examination?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Just one question, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please carry on.

 8                           Re-examination by Ms. Sutherland:

 9        Q.   Mr. Helgers, at page 21 of the transcript today, Mr. Karadzic

10     told you that there was a major Muslim offensive launched on the

11     1st of May and it intensified on the 15th of May, and you said, yes,

12     there was intense shelling.

13        A.   Mm-hmm.

14        Q.   Can you just describe what you witnessed as far as outgoing and

15     incoming shells or other fire was concerned in relation to that period?

16        A.   Yes.  In general there were almost daily, once or twice there was

17     shelling from the Serb side.  There was a hilltop quite close to our

18     radar station -- to our observation post, towards the city, and very

19     rarely have I witnessed impacts into our area of responsibility of -- of

20     any form of shelling other than small-arms fire.

21             There was one period, I don't know -- recall the exact dates,

22     when there was very intense shelling, but most of that time we did report

23     incoming and outgoing shelling which was more incoming than more

24     outgoing, of course, but we were in shelters at that time because

25     situation was quite dangerous.

Page 10769

 1        Q.   And just to be clear, when you say that very rarely have you

 2     witness the impacts into our area of responsibility, any form of shelling

 3     other than small-arms fire, which side would that have been from?

 4        A.   I do remember three mortar grenades -- well, in fact, I saw them.

 5     I heard them and saw them exploding in the area of one of the nearby Serb

 6     barracks.  That's three shells I recall very clearly, because that was at

 7     the start of one of the major shelling -- well, exchanges in that period.

 8        Q.   And so --

 9        A.   Most -- most shelling, I mean, obviously in this case, was going

10     outside from our area towards Sarajevo, the Bosniak-held area.

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you.  I have no further questions.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Major Helgers.  That concludes your

13     evidence.  On behalf of the Tribunal I thank you for your coming to the

14     Tribunal to give it.

15             THE WITNESS:  It was my pleasure, sir.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Now you are free to go.

17             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

18                           [The witness withdrew]

19             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, Ms. Edgerton will be leading the

20     next witness.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  And I seek your leave to -- to --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  -- leave.

25             JUDGE KWON:  While we are bringing in the next witness, shall we

Page 10770

 1     go into private session briefly.

 2              [Private session] [Confidentiality partially lifted by order of Chamber]

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, if we could stay in

23     private session for one other matter.  We're wondering about whether

24     we're likely to see Mr. Zecevic testifying next week because it's a big

25     witness and that requires a lot of preparation, and I know you've issued

Page 10771

1     a subpoena, but I was wondering if there was any likelihood that he would

 2     testify next week or whether his testimony will take place at some other

 3     time.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I take the -- whether or not he should testify via

 5     videolink hasn't been decided yet.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, and we would really like to be

 7     heard on that with that witness because we feel very strongly about that.

 8     But apart from that, since there's so much uncertainty, we would wonder

 9     if the Prosecutor or the Chamber has any information as to whether it's

10     likely that this witness will actually be testifying next week.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Can you help us, Mr. Tieger, in that regard?

12             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not aware of any departure from the

13     anticipated -- that is, any deviation from the intentions of the subpoena

14     and the selected dates, but I can -- as always, I'm happy to check

15     quickly and see if there's more current information.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I would recommend you to do that.  In

17     particular, given that the setting up the videolink would require a

18     substantial amount of time.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.  I've just been informed there is no change

20     that we're aware of, and we're moving forward accordingly.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Are you not minded to provide with

22     the -- provide the Chamber with the medical documents?  I'll check into

23     that.  I'm not clear about it.  I'll come back to it if necessary.

24   (redacted)

25                           [Open session]

Page 10772

 1             JUDGE KWON:  We are now in open session.  Is it okay?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I'll wait for an opportunity and respond to the

 3     Court in private session.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we do that.  Let's go back to private

 5     session briefly again.

 6        [Private session] [Confidentiality partially lifted by order of Chamber]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I just wanted to clarify there was no intention to

 9     signal any departure from the intention to submit medical documentation

10     if possible, and we have been in contact with the witness.  I believe he

11     had informally received the -- the subpoena and that the anticipated

12     provision or at least the potential provision of such documentation was

13     anticipated after that receipt.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, before we go into public session

16     again, I would like to -- we really strongly oppose to the videolink for

17     this particular witness and would much prefer that he -- his testimony be

18     postponed until the time that he's able to come to The Hague and give his

19     testimony given the importance of his testimony, but I won't argue that

20     point now, but I would like to have the opportunity after the medical

21     information is submitted.  It seems like it's being treated almost like

22     something that's automatic and we really don't want to --

23             JUDGE KWON:  No, it will not be decided automatically.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay.  Thank you very much.

25   (redacted)

Page 10773

 1   (redacted)

 2                           [Open session]

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, if we're in open session and on the

 4     topic of videolink, I note that we received yesterday a motion for

 5     videolink for Witness KDZ041, and I would like indicate to the Chamber

 6     that we don't oppose that motion.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8                           [The witness entered court]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We appreciate your co-operation, and that motion is

10     granted.

11             Good morning, Mr. Riley.

12             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

13             JUDGE KWON:  If you could take the solemn declaration, please.

14             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

15     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16                           WITNESS:  JONATHON RILEY

17             JUDGE KWON:  Please be seated.

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  Thank you.  Good morning, Your Honours.

21                           Examination by Ms. Edgerton:

22        Q.   General Riley, first of all, could you give us your full name,

23     please?

24        A.   Jonathon Peter Riley.

25        Q.   Now, General Riley, do you remember giving a statement to the

Page 10774

 1     Office of the Prosecutor for this Tribunal back in April 1996 in relation

 2     to your observations and experiences as commander of the -- of a

 3     BritBat unit for UNPROFOR in 1995?

 4        A.   I do, and that took place in the barracks at Chepstow in

 5     Great Britain.

 6        Q.   Did you review that statement prior to your testimony here today?

 7        A.   I did.

 8        Q.   And if you were asked the same questions today which gave rise to

 9     the answers set out in that statement, would you give the same answers?

10        A.   I would.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Then, Your Honours, could I ask that the statement

12     of General Riley, which is 65 ter 22685, from 15 April 1996, be marked as

13     a Prosecution exhibit, please.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That will be done.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P2148.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll now read a summary, then, of the written

17     evidence in P2148.

18             General Jonathon Riley commanded the 1st Battalion of the

19     Royal Welsh Fusiliers during their -- pardon me, during their deployment

20     to Gorazde from February to August 1995 as part of UNPROFOR's

21     peacekeeping mission.  Their mission was to monitor and preserve the

22     integrity of the Gorazde total exclusion zone as well as to monitor and

23     report on the implementation of the 31 December 1994 cessation of

24     hostilities agreement by both sides.

25             Additionally, the BritBat unit in Gorazde was to support the safe

Page 10775

 1     delivery of humanitarian aid into the area.  The battalion deployed

 2     three companies, two of which were located along the east and west banks

 3     of the Drina River in interpositioned observation posts and check-points

 4     along the confrontation line.

 5             Following NATO air-strikes on 25 and 26 May, relations with the

 6     Bosnian Serb forces in the immediate area deteriorated to the point where

 7     contact almost ceased.  The single exception was that the witness

 8     received a radio message from the local commander, Radomir Furtula,

 9     saying that he had been ordered by General Mladic that if NATO attacked

10     the Serbs again, he was to shell the BritBat camp as Britain was a NATO

11     country.

12             During the morning of 28 May 1995, the witness was contacted via

13     Motorola by Furtula's interpreter asking him to attend what was described

14     as an important meeting at check-point 6 at 2.00 p.m.  Aware that the

15     hostage-taking had started in Sarajevo, the witness declined.  At around

16     2.00 p.m., he was informed that three of his observation posts on the

17     west bank of the Drina had been invaded by large numbers of heavily armed

18     Bosnian Serb soldiers and their crews were captured.  Soon after,

19     observation posts on the east bank of the Drina were attacked.  Two

20     withdrew under fire.  The crew of a further third was captured.  In

21     total, 33 British United Nations peacekeepers were taken hostage.

22             I'll just now, if I may, proceed with a few questions for

23     General Riley.

24        Q.   And perhaps, General, we could begin by having you give us an

25     update on your military service since your tour in Bosnia in 1995.

Page 10776

 1        A.   Certainly.  In 1996, I was promoted to Colonel and appointed as

 2     the Chief of Staff of the 1st Armoured Division.  I returned to

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina with NATO in 1998 as the deputy commander of division,

 4     and I remained there, in Banja Luka, until October of 1999.  The

 5     following year I was appointed as the force commander -- the British

 6     force commander in Sierra Leone, where I remained until 2001.  For a

 7     period then I was the director of studies at the Joint Services

 8     Staff College.  In 2003, I went to Iraq where I held two appointments for

 9     two years.  The second appointment, I was the divisional commander in

10     southern Iraq.  I then moved as the senior British officer in

11     United States central command for two years.  In late 2007, I went to

12     Afghanistan as the deputy commanding general of all NATO troops, and I

13     remained there until the beginning of 2009.  Since June 2009, I've held

14     my current appointor as director general and master of the

15     Royal Armouries.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now, to go back to the statement that you gave in

17     1996, I'd just like to ask you a couple of brief questions.  During your

18     tour in Gorazde, did you become familiar with the Bosnian Serb military

19     units immediately surrounding the enclave?

20        A.   I did.  There were elements of three army corps of the

21     Bosnian Serb Army.  There was a single brigade of the Drina Corps based

22     in the Serb municipality of Gorazde.  To the north of the enclave there

23     were three brigades of the Romanija Sarajevo Corps with whom we had

24     little contact except for one of those brigades whose territory was --

25     was passed through by our line of supply.  And on other bank of the

Page 10777

 1     Drina River there were three brigades of Hercegovina Corps with whom we

 2     had only contact with one brigade, the Rudo Brigade.  These were all

 3     light mountain brigades.

 4        Q.   When you say on the other bank of the Drina River, which bank are

 5     you referring to, the east or the west bank?

 6        A.   I'm talking about on the -- the -- I'm so sorry.  The

 7     Romanija Sarajevo Corps and the Drina Corps were located on the bank of

 8     the Drina on -- which was on the same side as the mountain of Sjenokos,

 9     which I think is the west bank, and the Hercegovina Corps on the other

10     side.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just two small questions drawn from your written

12     evidence.

13             On page 3, in the last paragraph on page 3, you indicated you had

14     been informed in advance of the air-strikes that occurred in late

15     May 1995.  Do you by any chance recall, and I recognise this is far away

16     in time, but do you recall how far in advance that might have been?

17        A.   It was no more than 24 hours.

18        Q.   And a further question on page 5, the very last paragraph on

19     page 5 you state:  "I learned that Mladic had come to visit early on,"

20     and then continued to describe some information related to that visit.

21     And I wonder if you could date that approximately in time for us.

22        A.   I believe that it was on or about the 2nd of June.

23        Q.   Now, I'd like to move to a number of documents relating to the

24     period that your written evidence dwells upon, but before doing that, I'd

25     just like to remind you that in your written evidence you noted that

Page 10778

 1     immediately following the air-strikes at Pale on 25 and 26 May 1995,

 2     relations with the Serb side deteriorated to the point where contact

 3     almost ceased.  Do you remember that?

 4        A.   I do.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Then perhaps we could see 65 ter 20055, which is a

 7     document from General Zivanovic of the Drina Corps command, dated

 8     25 May 1995.

 9        Q.   Do you see a translation of that document in English on the

10     screen in front you, General?

11        A.   I do.

12        Q.   Now, this document, which is an order to the commands of all

13     Drina Corps units, reads, among other things, at paragraph 3 as follows:

14             "Prevent all movement of UNPROFOR vehicles and of all other

15     international organisations, whether individual or in convoy, and in case

16     of their appearance in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps,

17     immediately block them and inform the corps command which will issue

18     further orders."

19             Now, looking at the -- first of all, do you find this order

20     coincident in time with the reference I've just made to your written --

21     to your written statement, to your written evidence, where you say that

22     the Serb side deteriorated -- relations with the Serb side deteriorated

23     to the point where contact almost ceased?

24        A.   Indeed, and it's the same day.  So the order was implemented

25     clearly immediately.

Page 10779

 1        Q.   From what you've said, then, I take it you find that this order

 2     is consistent with the situation at the time as you experienced it.

 3        A.   It is exactly the experience that I -- that we had.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit,

 6     please, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2149.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:

10        Q.   Now, relating to the hostage-taking of members of your battalion,

11     I'd like to know, as battalion commander, did you, following their

12     release, receive any information on their experiences?

13        A.   I did.  They were all interviewed following their release, and

14     their experiences were captured.  They were all asked to fill in

15     questionnaires about their own particular experience, and I received

16     copies of those questionnaires and a summary of findings.  And much later

17     on, I was able to meet them all, collectively and individually, at

18     Bugojno in Central Bosnia.

19        Q.   When you met them did you then discuss what they had experienced

20     during their capture?

21        A.   I did.  I discussed matters with the one officer, the sergeant,

22     and the junior NCOs and more senior soldiers to get an idea of how they'd

23     been treated.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you just mentioned that they had all been asked

25     to fill in questionnaires, and you received copies of those

Page 10780

 1     questionnaires.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I ask in that regard for 65 ter 19311,

 3     page 2, please.  Now go over to page 3, please.

 4        Q.   Now, when you referred to questionnaires, are these the sort of

 5     questionnaires that you were referring to?

 6        A.   Yes.  This, of course, is before the days of the internet, and

 7     these reached me by fax.

 8        Q.   This is a questionnaire filled in by a Corporal Storey.  Was he

 9     one of the BritBat members who had been detained?

10        A.   He was indeed.

11        Q.   Do you recall what type of information was contained in these

12     questionnaires?

13        A.   It was a full summary as they recalled it of events from the

14     moment of confrontation until the moment of release.  So it would have

15     contained what they saw of the events around their capture, what

16     subsequently happened to them, how they were treated, and where they were

17     taken, what they were told, and then the circumstances surrounding their

18     release.

19        Q.   And where did you learn that they had been taken?

20        A.   I'm sorry, do you mean by that where they were taken and

21     physically placed themselves, or where was I when I learned?

22        Q.   Sorry.  You indicated in your evidence that some of the -- among

23     the information contained in these questionnaires was information as to

24     where they had been taken.

25        A.   Indeed.  They were all asked, as far as possible, to identify the

Page 10781

 1     locations to which they had been taken, and this information was

 2     summarised on a report by the debriefing team, and I recall seeing a map

 3     which gave -- which gave an outline of where they had all been dropped

 4     off.  In addition, when I talked the matter over with the officer who had

 5     been taken, he had, as far as possible, taken measures to pair up

 6     young soldiers with more experienced soldiers or non-commissioned

 7     officers and had then tried to remember where each of them was dropped.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could we move on now, given that answer, to

 9     65 ter 19301, please.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  And I'm not seeking to tender the document on the

11     screen.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   Now, you just mentioned a report by a debriefing team, and the

15     document you have on the screen in front of you is entitled "Final

16     Debriefing Report - Gorazde Hostages," dated 3 July 1995.  That is a

17     UK document.  Is this the type of debriefing report you were referring

18     to?

19        A.   Yes, this is the one, and this summarises the information that

20     the debriefing team had assembled having interviewed all the hostages.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we move over to the next page of this

22     document, please, to give the witness a chance to review it more fully.

23        Q.   Now, in this paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, and down to 16 of this

24     document, General, we see drop points for the witnesses from Rogatica, to

25     Sokolac, Knezina, Vlasenica, Milici, and Bratunac.

Page 10782

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  And if we could go back over to page 1 of the

 2     document for the moment.

 3        Q.   Paragraph 6 of this document notes:

 4             "The hostages were taken from the northern -- taken from the

 5     northern OPs were dropped off and detained at various locations in small

 6     groups of varying numbers on a northerly route which extended from

 7     Visegrad to Zvornik, while the hostages taken from OP2 were all taken to

 8     the same location in Bileca."

 9             Now, that's a lot of locations, General, but I wonder if, based

10     on your tour in Bosnia, you have some familiarity with those locations

11     and are able to identify the expanse of territory they represent?

12        A.   Indeed.  This represents almost the entire Drina valley on

13     Bosnian territory, from Bileca, which, if my memory is correct, is in

14     Herzegovina, all the way up to Zvornik, which is on the frontier between

15     Bosnia and Serbia.  So it's a stretch of between 80 and a hundred miles.

16        Q.   Now --

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I have this document, please, Your Honours,

18     as the next Prosecution exhibit.

19             JUDGE KWON:  There is no opposition from the Defence?  Yes, as a

20     contemporaneous report we can admit it.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2150, Your Honours.

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   I'd like to go on now, very briefly, to something that's already

24     been exhibited.  P2137, which is an order from the VRS Main Staff to

25     General Milovanovic, numbered 03/4-1037, dated 27 May 1995, on the

Page 10783

 1     reception and deployment of UNPROFOR members in the corps' area of

 2     responsibility.

 3             Now, General, have you seen this document in preparation for your

 4     testimony here today?

 5        A.   I have.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Then could I ask that we move over to point 5 on

 8     this document, which is in the next page in both languages.

 9        Q.   Now, point 5 of this document directs, among other things, the

10     command of the Drina Corps to place captured UNPROFOR troops and members

11     of the other humanitarian organisations at the installations in its area

12     of responsibility.

13             Just a quick question in this regard.  Is this also consistent

14     with the experiences as you understood them of your peacekeepers who had

15     been taken hostage?

16        A.   Yes, it is, and when I compare this document with the debriefing

17     report and the experiences of those who were captured, it's a clear

18     indication that this -- that this activity was being ordered and

19     co-ordinated at a high level, because we're looking at a distribution of

20     hostages across at least -- at least three, if not four, army corps

21     throughout that area.  And since corps commanders do not normally give

22     orders to each other, that order has clearly come from the next level up,

23     which is the General Staff.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we go, please, over to 65 ter 03903, which

25     is an order dated 27 May 1995, from the Drina Corps command to all units,

Page 10784

 1     specifically referring to the order we've just looked at, P2137.

 2        Q.   Now, General, have you had a chance to see this document in

 3     preparation for your testimony here today?

 4        A.   I have.

 5        Q.   Now, point 1 of this document orders the command of the

 6     5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade to capture and disarm UN members who

 7     were blocked in the Sjenokos sector, confiscate their vehicles and use

 8     them as their combat hardware, and store personal weapons until further

 9     notice.  That's point 1 and 2, actually.

10             Does this order correspond with what happened to your OPs on

11     Sjenokos as you noted in your written evidence?

12        A.   Indeed.  And to enlarge a little on this, it corresponds with the

13     accounts that we were able to pick up by radio from the OPs that were

14     being surrounded at the time, and with what emerged in their debriefing,

15     which we've already covered.  I later saw some of the vehicles, I saw one

16     personally which had been painted in Bosnian Serb camouflage and

17     modified, and I saw another on film being used at Srebrenica.

18             We later, about a year later, in fact, recovered the captured

19     vehicles and the belongings of the soldiers, their helmets, their body

20     armour, their weapons, and they were returned to the unit.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, if it is convenient, is it okay to

22     have a break now?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, I'm sorry, Your Honour.  I lost track.

24             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, not at all.  We'll break and we'll have a

25     break until 11.00.

Page 10785

 1                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.  Please continue.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Just if I could introduce to you

 7     Sarah Jane Dobson, from the University of Queensland in Australia, who is

 8     assisting us.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Welcome on board.  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I wonder if we could

11     have that document that we left dealing with, the 65 ter number 03903,

12     back up on the screen, please.  Great.  No.  Not so great.  Could we see

13     an English version eventually.  Thank you very much.

14        Q.   General, just to finish with this document, I'd like you, please,

15     to have a look at point 3 of this Drina Corps command order which directs

16     the command of the 5th Military Police Battalion to take over the

17     captured UNPROFOR members and relocate them, and just by way of summary,

18     relocate them individually, in groups of two, and in one case a group of

19     four, to depots, corps and firing positions of corps and brigade

20     artillery groups and command posts.

21             Now, once again, does this order correspond with the experiences

22     of your peacekeepers who had been taken hostage as you understood them

23     and had reported to you?

24        A.   Yes, indeed.  They, as far as possible, recorded their

25     experiences in the debriefing reports and reported that they had been

Page 10786

 1     placed in military installations where they were in no doubt that they

 2     were being used as human shields, which as members of a UN force with a

 3     mandate which had been put in place by the United Nations, I believe to

 4     have been highly improper, and indeed, were they prisoners of war, it

 5     would have been against the terms of the Geneva Conventions.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, could I have this document, 03903,

 7     as a Prosecution exhibit, please.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted, yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2151, Your Honours.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  And I'd just like to pull up one final document,

11     please, 65 ter number 16505, which is a situation report from the

12     VRS Main Staff, dated 28 May 1995.

13        Q.   And is this, General, another document that you've looked at in

14     preparation for your testimony here today?

15        A.   It is.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we then move, please, over to, I think, page

17     6 of the English translation of this document, and as I recall, page 3 of

18     the original version of this document.  And I may have spoken in error as

19     regards the original version.  If you could keep going.  We'll look for

20     Roman numeral II, and I think it might be page 4 in the original version.

21     And I'm incorrect in that regard.  If we could go back a bit, please.

22             Sorry, that was my mistake, because I was looking for a

23     Roman numeral, but in fact, on the original version it's the second

24     paragraph from the bottom of the page.

25        Q.   But focusing for our purposes right now on the English

Page 10787

 1     translation, the last sentence in this paragraph that's headed "Situation

 2     on the Ground" reads:

 3             "During the day, the Drina Corps captured 27 members of UN forces

 4     (Englishmen) and 4 armoured vehicles."

 5             Now, could I just ask you, your statement notes -- or in your

 6     written evidence you refer to the capture of 33 members of UN forces.  Do

 7     you see a discrepancy in this document, and if so, could you explain it?

 8        A.   Yes, I see two discrepancies.  The first is that they are

 9     described as Englishmen whereas, in fact, they were Welsh, and doubtless

10     they were very offended at being so described.  That is understandable.

11     The other discrepancy, which is really what you refer to, is the

12     difference between the 33 who were captured and the 27 noted here.  I

13     believe the difference relates to six soldiers who were injured when

14     vehicles rolled off mountain roads, and these six soldiers were taken to

15     hospital, and that accounts for the difference.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I wonder if this might be the next Prosecution

18     exhibit, please?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I was told that it is already in

22     evidence.  Could you give the -- could the Court Deputy give the number

23     of the exhibit.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  That's P2138.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  My apologies, Your Honour.  Things are just moving

Page 10788

 1     so fast I wasn't able to keep up.

 2             Perhaps we could move to actually one further and final document,

 3     65 ter 13392, that I don't believe has been put before the Court as yet.

 4     Could we have an English version, please.

 5             65 ter 13392 is an order from the VRS Main Staff, dated

 6     2 June 1995, on the release of members of UNPROFOR.

 7             Are you having difficulty locating the translation?  Can you try

 8     under 65 ter 13569.  I think we're -- oh, thank you.

 9        Q.   Now, General, is this another document you've looked at in

10     preparation for your testimony here today?

11        A.   It is.

12        Q.   Now, you having spoken about the six soldiers who were injured

13     when their vehicle rolled off mountain roads, I'd like to take you to

14     paragraph 2 of this document, which is on the next page in English.

15             This document, at paragraph 2, orders the Drina Corps command to

16     release six detained UNPROFOR members who were being treated at the

17     hospital of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, and I wonder

18     if you see any relationship between this document and the six injured

19     soldiers you were just discussing.

20        A.   I do.  I was made aware that the soldiers had been injured

21     through radio conversations with a Serb army liaison officer who was

22     located with the brigade headquarters in the Serb municipality of

23     Gorazde, and he told me that the soldiers had been injured and had been

24     taken to hospital and would be cared for.  And I asked that since they

25     were injured, that they should be released as soon as possible, and I

Page 10789

 1     later learned that they had been released, and I believe these to be the

 2     same men.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I tender this, please, as a Prosecution

 5     exhibit.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2152, Your Honours.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I have no further questions of

 9     General Riley in chief.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

15        A.   Good morning, Dr. Karadzic.

16        Q.   Thank you for having met with the Defence.  Our meeting will

17     certainly help us to be more efficient and to shed more light on many

18     things.

19             First of all, I would like to tell you that I'm very pleased with

20     your book the "White Dragon," in which you described the tour of the

21     Welsh Royal Fusiliers in Gorazde.  I'm sorry I did not read it before our

22     interview.  With your permission, I'm going to be using it during the

23     cross-examination.  I have to say that you are an excellent writer and

24     that in very few words you have said so much, and once again I would like

25     to thank you for this excellent book.

Page 10790

 1             General, I would like to show you the last document again.  It's

 2     13569.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  I would like to call it up in

 4     e-court for the benefit of the witness.  Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   General, I have recalled the document just to clarify certain

 7     terminology.  Here you say UNPROFOR members who were taken prisoner.

 8             In our language, when you say "prisoner," that means that the

 9     person was arrested, and when you say "detainee," that's a prisoner of

10     war, although this "war" bit is implied rather than actually uttered.

11             Do you agree with me?  In your mind is there a distinction

12     between a prisoner and a prisoner of war or a detainee?

13        A.   A prisoner of war, as I would understand it, would be somebody

14     who was taken captive from an opposing force, and since we were members

15     of an international force not opposed to either side, I do not believe

16     that members of my battalion could have been taken prisoner of war.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I just need to clarify the terminology, and the

18     interpreters can confirm for the Trial Chamber that a prisoner is

19     somebody who was arrested for a crime committed in civilian life, whereas

20     a prisoner of war is a result of war.

21             And now, Witness, I would like to see not if General Zivanovic is

22     right or not, but let's see how the Drina Corps perceives you, not you

23     personally but NATO and UNPROFOR.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up P2149 to

25     illustrate that.  The document has just been admitted.

Page 10791

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   I would like to draw your attention to the part which starts with

 3     the words "NATO aircraft," where it says that on the 25th of May, 1995,

 4     in the afternoon, NATO aircraft, which are a part of UNPROFOR, conducted

 5     operations against facilities of the Army of Republika Srpska.  And then

 6     a description follows, and now it says the Army of Republika Srpska

 7     responded by conducting operations against selected targets.  However,

 8     Muslim forces in co-operation with UNPROFOR are expected to continue

 9     operations against military targets in Republika Srpska in order to raise

10     the level of combat readiness in units to the highest level and to

11     successfully repel attacks and so on and so forth.

12             Do you see that the commander of the Drina Corps actually sees a

13     complete unity or a complete alliance between UNPROFOR, NATO, and Muslim

14     rebels?

15        A.   The commander of that corps may choose to present matters in that

16     way, but that is not, in fact, a reflection of the true situation.  NATO

17     aircraft were not part of UNPROFOR.  They were acting in support of

18     UNPROFOR.  And to my knowledge, there was never any occasion, certainly

19     in the area that I was deployed, where our forces would have fought

20     alongside either the Bosnian Muslim government forces or any other force.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I'm not questioning the accuracy of this.  This is

22     just the perception of the Serbian Army.  Do you know that on the 27th,

23     UNPROFOR sent a report, maybe it was on the 28th, and in that report it

24     stated that the Muslim army started exploiting the results of NATO

25     air-strikes?

Page 10792

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have a reference for that?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Could you give the reference, Mr. Karadzic,

 5     for that statement.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was a report or a telegram sent

 7     on the 28th of May.  I believe that the telegram has already been

 8     admitted.  We had it displayed earlier on, and in that telegram it says

 9     that the Muslim forces -- maybe by the end we will be able to locate the

10     document, but in any case, it has already been shown in this courtroom.

11     UNPROFOR reported from the ground and said that the Muslim forces had

12     started exploiting the results of NATO air-strikes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, when asked by the Prosecution, you are

14     expected to give the reference to that document instead of making a

15     lengthy statement on your own.

16             I take it you do not have the reference with you at this moment.

17     Then I think you can rephrase the question.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Are you aware of the fact, did you know, General, that the Muslim

21     side had celebrated NATO air-strikes on Serb positions and hailed them,

22     as a matter of fact, and that they launched activities in order to make

23     the most of the results of those air-strikes?

24        A.   Since no NATO air-strikes had taken place in or around Gorazde

25     within my area of responsibility, I'm not aware of any such activity.

Page 10793

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can I draw your attention to your statement?  You

 2     were familiar with the situation in Gorazde as it was in 1994, and you

 3     speak about that in the fourth paragraph of your statement; right?

 4        A.   Is it possible to see the statement on the screen, please?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  If we can print out the statement of the witness,

 6     why don't we give them in hard copy, but in the meantime, we can upload

 7     his statement.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's the statement.  We need

 9     page 2.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   It says here:  "In the spring of 1994."  You said that there had

12     been fierce battles around the city between Muslim and Serb forces, and

13     that --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we collapse the Serbian version and zoom

15     in to the English version.  Yes.  I think it will be more convenient for

16     the witness.

17             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  And, Mr. Karadzic, you have no problem because you

19     have it with you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   You were informed -- or, rather, you knew where you were headed

23     for, and you knew that there had been fierce battles around the city

24     after the first round of air-strikes; right?

25        A.   I had been briefed during our preparation for the tour, and

Page 10794

 1     conversations with people on both sides around the area informed me that

 2     that had been the case.  I could see physical evidence of fighting, but

 3     clearly, I was not there on the ground and cannot verify any details

 4     personally.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  On page 3 in the same statement, I hope you have it

 6     in hard copy, you say that in 1995, in the month of May, when you were

 7     already there, you had received information from various sources, and you

 8     will find it in the fourth paragraph of your statement.

 9              [Previous translation continues] ... "[In English] May was a

10     busy month."

11             [Interpretation] Which showed that the legal of troops in that

12     area on both sides was more or less equal.  Is that right?

13        A.   I believe so.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday during our conversation, we arrived at the

15     conclusion -- or, rather, it was your conclusion that there were about

16     5 to 6.000 troops in the 81st Division in Gorazde; right?

17        A.   No.  We believe that there was somewhere between 8 and

18     11.000 soldiers in the 81st Division, of whom the divisional commander

19     had weapons for about 6.500.  That was our assessment.

20        Q.   Thank you.  If you take into account the fact that they operated

21     in shifts, it would be fair to conclude that each soldier was equipped

22     with arms when they were actually on duty.

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Was the 81st Division divided into brigades,

25     companies, and lower-ranked units?

Page 10795

 1        A.   As far as we could understand, the division was divided into

 2     five light brigades which were assigned to ground-holding in various

 3     sectors, and they had one manoeuvre brigade called the Manevarska

 4     Brigade.  Within each brigade there would usually be at least three

 5     battalions which would be divided into three or four companies.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  They also had their separate staffs as well as

 7     logistics bases, staff units, and so on and so forth; right?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   In view of the size of the enclave, do you believe that that was

10     a rather dense level of militarisation in that enclave?

11        A.   I believe that it -- the defenders had mobilised all the

12     resources that they could, as any prudent military commander would in

13     order to assure the defence of their territory.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Well, I had in mind the size of the area and the

15     number of 11.000 troops.  I would say that they were quite densely

16     deployed, that the area was quite heavily militarised; right?

17        A.   As you yourself just said, they operated in shifts, so that the

18     maximum that might be on duty at any one time would be considerably less

19     than that, 6.500.  And given the size of the enclave, no, I do not

20     believe that that is an overly dense deployment.  When I made an

21     assessment of what we needed should the UN or even NATO have to defend

22     this area rather than deter, I came to the view that it would require at

23     least one division with supporting troops from corps level, which would

24     be, if anything, more than the Bosnian side had deployed.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Well, let's not speculate.  I'm not a soldier.  Am I

Page 10796

 1     right in saying defenders need few troops than are needed by those who

 2     attack the area, as it were?

 3        A.   I'm sorry, I don't understand the question.

 4        Q.   If one side were to defend itself and the other side to attack

 5     the area, would you say that those who attacked the area would need more

 6     troops than the defenders?

 7        A.   Thank you.  Yes, I understand now.  It is usually considered that

 8     if the troops are equipped to an equal level, a defender -- I'm sorry, an

 9     attacker would be wise to muster at least 3:1 in terms of superiority.

10     However, the attacker has the ability to concentrate force against one

11     particular point if he has a force ratio which is in overall terms

12     inferior.  He is able to achieve a local superiority.  And of course, in

13     the case of Gorazde, the 81st Division had very little in the way of

14     heavy weapons, such as mortars, artillery and tanks, and I believe that

15     the Serb side held an extreme superiority in those heavy weapons which

16     would serve to build up the required superiority.

17        Q.   Thank you.  But even what they had in terms of heavy weapons and

18     mortars, they certainly didn't keep that on the front line

19     [indiscernible] kept it behind the lines in the enclave.

20        A.   Many of the heavy weapons that I observed on the Bosnian side

21     were mortars, which have a limited range of only up to 5 kilometres.  I

22     only saw one or two field artillery pieces and I only ever saw one tank.

23     So some of them would have been behind the front line.  The smaller

24     mortars would have been very close.

25        Q.   Thank you.  On page 3 you say -- or, rather, during our interview

Page 10797

 1     you agreed, and you also mentioned it in the book, that Serbs were around

 2     12.500 in Gorazde and that they had been driven out of their own

 3     neighbourhoods as well as the suburbs on the right bank of the

 4     Drina River; correct?

 5        A.   I was told that by people from both communities, and since the

 6     account was much the same from both communities, I believed it.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  You also observed that they only escaped across the

 8     confrontation line, and outside the confrontation line there were Serb

 9     villages who received these refugees, and these refugees continued to

10     fight around Gorazde.  Is that so?

11        A.   I believe that to be the case.  And inside the enclave, there

12     were also large numbers of refugees from the other community who in the

13     same way resisted.

14        Q.   Thank you.  On page 3, we're again on page 3, last paragraph,

15     says that you had been warned in advance about NATO air-strikes which

16     occurred in the end of May, and you made sure that in the period before

17     the air-strikes your liaison officer did not cross the confrontation

18     line; is that correct?

19        A.   Correct.  As I answered earlier, the warning about air-strikes

20     was no more than 24 hours ahead of the event.

21        Q.   Thank you.  On page 5, you say that the situation -- that's

22     paragraph 4.  You say that on the 29th of May, 30th, 31st, and

23     1st of June, the situation deteriorated because of heavy fighting all

24     around you; correct?

25        A.   Correct.

Page 10798

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Further down on page 6, you say that the Serb side

 2     attacked the Hercegovina Corps on the right bank, trying to take that

 3     area on the right-hand side and east of the Drina River, and that you

 4     helped them.

 5             [Previous translation continues] ... "[In English] I think it is

 6     no exaggeration to say that our defence of the east bank until the

 7     Muslims could mobilise and secure Mala Biserna," the hill, right, on the

 8     right bank?

 9        A.   It is an important hill, the position of which dominates the

10     town, the safe area and total exclusion zone.  I considered it vital

11     ground to be held, and if it was not held by me or by the defenders, then

12     the safe area was no longer safe and that I would be failing in my

13     mission if that was not the case.

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             "[In English] It is not an exaggeration that this action has

16     saved the town.  Had we been pushed off, the Serbs could have destroyed

17     Gorazde with fire."

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.  That's still some kind of

20     speculation.  Do you know that it was very difficult to stop Serbs

21     50 metres from their own homes, from freeing them?  Do you know that

22     these situations were very emotionally charged?

23        A.   As the commander responsible for deterring attacks on the safe

24     area and for maintaining the total exclusion zone, I'm afraid I had not

25     the luxury of emotion.  I was given a mission which I was obliged to

Page 10799

 1     fulfil to the best of my ability.  And on that day, it was clear to me

 2     that my soldiers were being attacked very heavily by the

 3     Hercegovina Corps side, and having formed the professional view that the

 4     Mala Biserna feature was vital to the security of the safe area, I could

 5     do nothing else but to defend it.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And you believe that it was your mandate to repel

 7     Serb attacks against Gorazde; correct?

 8        A.   What my mission said was to deter attacks on the safe area.  My

 9     rules of engagement allowed me to use lethal force if I was attacked to

10     defend myself and our mission, which is what, in fact, happened.

11        Q.   Now, General, there is a misunderstanding there between the

12     UNPROFOR and the Serb side in Bosnia.  To defend oneself and one's

13     mission are two different things.

14             Do you remember that General Mladic always used to say, "If my

15     soldiers shoot at you, feel free to return fire"?  Do you recall that?

16        A.   I do not recall that.

17        Q.   On the other hand, we seemed to agree yesterday that you were

18     neither able to nor did you prevent the Muslim division from attacking

19     Serbian villages around Gorazde; correct?

20        A.   I'm not sure that we did agree that.  During the period of time

21     up until this episode began in May, I was not aware that there had been

22     any Bosnian government forces, Muslim forces, attacks from out of the

23     enclave.  Had I known of any, I would have done my best to prevent them.

24             The attacks that took place in this area were counter-attacks,

25     and they all took place after the total exclusion zone had been violated

Page 10800

 1     by the attacks of the Serb side on the 28th of May.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Then we will have to present a number, a great number

 3     of documents where the Serb side claims and proves that those were, in

 4     fact, Serb counter-attacks in response to attacks from the enclave.  But

 5     you couldn't, nor did you ever prevent such attacks from the enclave.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  That was an unnecessary statement on your part.

 7     Please refrain from making such statements.  I will indicate whenever you

 8     make them.  Please carry on.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   But the fact remains that in all that time you were there, you

11     never prevented any action by the 81st Division against Serb settlements.

12        A.   I'm not sure that that is a fact, and therefore it does not

13     remain, as I've said before.  Until the 28th of May, I know of no attack

14     that took place by the 81st Division out of the enclave, and therefore

15     there was nothing for me to prevent.  Had I become aware of any event,

16     and I believe I would, then I would have done my best to prevent it.

17        Q.   Thank you.  You say on page 6 that during your tenure there, that

18     the Royal Wales Battalion escorted about 78 convoys into Gorazde and it

19     fought 60 separate combat incidents; is that correct?

20        A.   I believe so.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Is it the case, then, in the light of the fact that

22     NATO was making air-strikes at the invitation of the UNPROFOR commander,

23     that we can view this paragraph written by Zivanovic where he says that

24     his corps was attacked by the joint forces of NATO and the Muslim forces?

25     Perhaps not in so many words.  Perhaps it was phrased differently.

Page 10801

 1        A.   That was certainly not the case in my area of responsibility,

 2     which is the only area on which I'm able to comment.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  And, Your Honour, if I may, that question is --

 4     actually, I wasn't quite quick enough.  It's assuming facts not in

 5     evidence, in my submission.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Now the issue's moot in light of the witness's

 7     answer.

 8             Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I'd like now to shed some light on the structure of the UNPROFOR

11     forces in Gorazde, namely the British Battalion.  Were there any

12     SAS members in that BritBat?

13        A.   Yes, there were.  There were a total of eight divided into

14     two teams of four.

15        Q.   Thank you.  On page 6 we saw there were about 60 separate combat

16     incidents.  Did you also have any combat incidents against the

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina army?

18        A.   You mean the Bosnian government Muslim forces.

19        Q.   Yes.

20        A.   Yes.  On at least two occasions.  On one occasion, a convoy of

21     vehicles was fired on by the Bosnian side in the area of Osojnica bridge.

22     This was in late April.  And towards the very end of my mission, when the

23     British government had announced that at the termination of our tour of

24     duty we would not be replaced, and during the initial period of

25     withdrawal, we were attacked in some force by elements of the

Page 10802

 1     Bosnian government army.  I do not believe this to have been an official

 2     policy, I believe it to have been a local initiative, but the attack did

 3     take place.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  In the same paragraph, the fifth paragraph on page 6,

 5     you say that on August 28, news came that NATO had begun air-strikes --

 6     no.  In fact, they withdrew on the 28th of August, but you received news,

 7     and you say:

 8             "[In English] This had the potential to attract Serb reprisal in

 9     response.  Had this occurred, we would have been stranded in Gorazde.

10     Additionally, we had been warned we were facing a serious attack by

11     BH renegades who were redoubling their efforts to foil our retreat.  We

12     had been guaranteed the assistance of General Mladic in a meeting he had

13     with General Smith and myself.  Mladic was true to his word.  Despite

14     fierce Muslim attack aim at blocking our movement, we were able to

15     extract from Gorazde and out through Serbian territory without a loss of

16     a single life."

17             [Interpretation] Is all this correct?

18        A.   Yes, there are two issues there, I think.  The first is that we

19     were aware, as we began the final phase of our withdrawal, that we faced

20     the likelihood of another Bosnian side renegade attack.  In the first

21     attack we had killed some of their soldiers, and we knew that their

22     families, in particular, wanted revenge, and for that reason I did not

23     wish to get embroiled in a large battle and wished to disengage and leave

24     the area in accordance with my orders.

25             We also knew that there had been an incident in Sarajevo, but I

Page 10803

 1     did not know the details, and I did not know that the -- that there were

 2     NATO air-strikes at that point, because those air-strikes did not take

 3     place until after we had arrived in Belgrade, in Beograd.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  With your leave, we will go through your book to

 5     identify these various incidents.

 6             Did the Royal Welsh Fusiliers co-ordinate with the Muslim army to

 7     secure UNPROFOR members on the right bank so that Serbs do not capture

 8     them?  Did you have that kind of co-operation with them?

 9        A.   No, we did not co-operate with them.  We held liaison with them,

10     as indeed we had liaison with the Serb side.  But as a UN force, we were

11     there to -- in support of the UN mandated mission and not to fight

12     alongside or co-ordinate with either of the factions.

13        Q.   But still, you secured the right bank for them, preventing Serbs

14     from freeing their own homes.  Were they grateful to you for keeping the

15     right bank safe for them when they were unable to resist?

16        A.   The defence of the right bank was nothing to do with preventing

17     Serbs from freeing their homes, as you put it.  It was everything to do

18     with deterring attacks on the safe area, with responding to a violent

19     attack mounted on my force there, and preserving the total exclusion

20     zone.

21             I did not have the force available and the weaponry available to

22     hold that ground, which I've already described as vital, for an extended

23     period, and I knew that the only people who could defend it was the

24     Bosnian Army, and therefore I had a responsibility to defend it as long

25     as I could and then let that force from the Bosnian Army assume the

Page 10804

 1     defence.  It is, after all, the responsibility -- the first

 2     responsibility of any government to defend its own people, and you know

 3     that, and that's what I had to do.  It was all to do with the safe area

 4     and the security of the civilian population in that safe area.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  Did you know almost all the Serbs out of

 6     those 12.500 who stayed in Gorazde -- you probably know how many stayed

 7     behind, and you probably knew them all.

 8        A.   I was aware of 11 ethnic Serb people in the enclave, and I didn't

 9     know them.  There may have been more, but I was only aware of 11.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Out of these eight SAS members, were there any

11     forward air controllers?

12        A.   Yes, there were.  Both of the two teams of four contained two men

13     who were trained as forward air controllers.

14        Q.   Thank you.  May I now call up 1D3036.  That's your book that I

15     can only praise, and I feel there are not enough compliments.  Is this

16     the cover page?

17        A.   Yes, it is.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The page numbering is different in

19     e-court, so I kindly ask for everyone's indulgence while I find the page

20     number.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, do you by any chance have a hard copy

22     of the book?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

24             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Let's proceed with the e-court.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 8 of the book, and it could

Page 10805

 1     be 4 or 5 in e-court.  Pages 8 and 9.  Can we turn to those pages.

 2     That's the right page.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 4        Q.   In paragraph 2, you say that the -- that a 500-strong UN garrison

 5     lay some 80 miles from the nearest UN troops, and that UN garrison was

 6     maintained there with the consent of both Bosnian and Serbs, something

 7     not always understood at home.  In Britain, the nature of these relations

 8     were not sufficiently understood in Britain.  And because of the need to

 9     maintain consent for its presence, its convoys are liable for inspection

10     by the Serbs on their route.

11        A.   Correct.

12        Q.   Then you say that many convoys have indeed passed.

13             Do you agree that your presence there had the consent of both

14     sides?

15        A.   Yes, I do.

16        Q.   And I suppose you agree that under international law, we were

17     entitled to set conditions under which aid would pass to the other side

18     through our territory.

19        A.   If that was agreed with the UN, that is so.  Consent from both

20     sides, however, is rarely an absolute, in my experience.  It is a

21     relative.  It varies from time to time, depending on the circumstances,

22     and it varies at different levels of a command.  At your level, I'm in no

23     doubt that you had reached agreement and consented to the force.  That

24     did not mean that all of your subordinates necessarily agreed with that

25     and would do anything other than make it difficult for these supply

Page 10806

 1     convoys to pass.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now see page 11.  And I believe you will agree

 3     that soldiers frequently object to the decisions of politicians in -- in

 4     military matters.  Isn't that the case in all armies?

 5        A.   They may not like it, but in every army that I've served in,

 6     orders are orders, and the political element has primacy, and soldiers do

 7     as they're instructed by their political masters or they cease to be

 8     soldiers.

 9        Q.   I would like to draw your attention to the right-hand side,

10     page 11, the second paragraph which starts with "On April 16th."  And now

11     in this paragraph you were saying that Srebrenica was declared a UN safe

12     area.

13             "[In English] ... was not matched by resources for their defence,

14     nor was the disarmament plan ever poorly implemented -- properly

15     implemented."

16             [Interpretation] Do you remember that when it comes to Gorazde,

17     no agreement was ever reached on the boundaries of the safe area, nor was

18     the area every properly demilitarised?

19        A.   To deal with the disarmament and demilitarisation aspect first,

20     as I understand it, the area was not determined or described as a safe

21     haven, because the conditions for being a safe haven are a guarantee of

22     complete security in return for total demilitarisation.  The area was

23     designated as a safe area.  There was indeed no geographical description

24     of that.  I was never able to get any description, and nor was

25     General Smith.  His guidance to me was what I went on and his guidance to

Page 10807

 1     me was that the purpose of the safe area was to protect the civilian

 2     population so far as it is possible to do so in a war.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go to the following two pages, 12 and 13.  I

 4     would like to draw your attention to page 13, the last paragraph thereof.

 5             "[In English] Then came the real business.  If any further Muslim

 6     fire took place, this would be the signal for the Serbs to fire on the

 7     town."

 8             [Interpretation] You knew that fire was opened from within the

 9     town and that Serbs returned fire.

10        A.   I think as my account there makes plain, we were quite sure that

11     fire had not been opened from the town, that none of our observation

12     posts or liaison teams had heard any such fire at all.

13        Q.   However, the paragraph says differently; right?

14        A.   No, I don't think it does.  I think what it reports is an

15     exchange of views between me and the Serb side in which an accusation was

16     made from the Serb side that fire had been opened from inside the town.

17     I did not believe that to have been the case, and I made it clear that it

18     had been wrong for the Bosnian side to use me, the UN force, as a shield

19     from which to launch aggression, and I formed the view that this

20     accusation was a false one and was going to form the basis of a

21     justification for the shelling of the safe area.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we go to page 16.  One

23     more, please.  Yes.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   You remember Podkovacev Dol as a locality.  I would like to draw

Page 10808

 1     your attention to this:

 2             "[In English] The patrol had been out for two days.  Based on an

 3     abandoned house in the village Podkovacev Dol and was actually packing

 4     its kits ready to leave when a sniper fired at the sentry.  The sentry at

 5     once returned the fire in response.  A number of Serb positions opened up

 6     with heavy MG fires.  So heavy was the fire that the house began to

 7     disintegrate.  The patrol commander ... Nightingale deployed the whole

 8     patrol to suppress the hostile fire ..."

 9             [Interpretation] And then on the following page.  Whose sniper

10     was it that provoked that response on your behalf?

11             JUDGE KWON:  We should remain on that page.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we should remain on that page,

13     page 17.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, was it ever established whose sniper provoked your

16     response to which the Serbs opened fire from heavy artillery?

17        A.   You'd have to question Lieutenant Nightingale or one of the

18     soldiers who was actually present since I am -- since I am summarising

19     their account.  They, however, were very clear that the fire had come

20     from the Serb side of the confrontation line.

21        Q.   With all due respect, General, if that had come from the Serb

22     side, why didn't they start with the heavy artillery fire?  Were the two

23     lines close to each other in that area?

24        A.   Well, since neither of us was present, I don't think that we can

25     accurately engage in a reconstruction of this engagement.

Page 10809

 1        Q.   Thank you.  On page 17 you say this:

 2             "[In English] I can only guess that Hugh Nightingale's patrol

 3     must have killed some Serbs."

 4             [Interpretation] However, let's agree that we cannot establish

 5     that.  It seems to me, however, that the Serb side was taken by surprise

 6     when you opened fire at them, that the sniper hadn't been theirs and

 7     that's why they responded so fiercely.

 8             And now, General, on page 17, where it says after about an hour

 9     reinforcements arrived, along with the company commander, Major Philip

10     Jones.  And then the crisis escalated, and you tried to exchange messages

11     with the Serb side.  Do you remember that?

12        A.   Yes, I do.  I remember contacting the liaison officer in the

13     brigade headquarters in the Serb municipality of Gorazde and asking him

14     to relay the message to the brigade commander concerned, who was in a

15     different corps, telling him that there was an engagement in progress

16     with the UN force and that it should cease.  And the message I got back

17     was that the brigade commander concerned knew that it was the UN force

18     and did not care and would not stop the engagement.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Obviously they did kill some Serbs, and that's why

20     the whole thing continued.

21             General, did it ever happen that your troops found themselves

22     among the Muslim troops on the front lines?

23        A.   Not -- no.  When we patrolled, we patrolled between the lines.

24     The observation posts were between the lines, and to reach the

25     observation posts we would merely pass through either the Bosnian lines

Page 10810

 1     or indeed the Serb lines.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  As I indicated, Mr. Karadzic, I have to intervene

 3     this time again.  You made a statement which is unanswered by the

 4     witness.

 5             General, the witness said -- the accused said, "Obviously they

 6     did kill some Serbs, and that's why the whole thing continued."

 7             Do you have any comment on that?

 8             THE WITNESS:  As I said in the account which is written there,

 9     what I said was I can only guess that.  So it was -- I was trying to

10     rationalise why the next patrol should have come under such heavy fire

11     immediately, and I can only believe that the previous engagement resulted

12     in a death on the Serb side and that, therefore, they wished to take

13     revenge.  But that is a guess.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I would like us to

16     look at pages 24 and 25.  Yes, that's the page.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Please pay attention to the passage under the asterisks.

19             "[In English] Just on the southern side of Gorazde is a village

20     called Vitkovici."

21             [Interpretation] And now you continue to explain that many

22     Muslims live there, there were both soldiers and civilians, and that one

23     of the largest schools in the district was there.  Just across the Drina

24     were the Serb lines, which overlooked the village, and in many cases

25     occupied by soldiers who had lived in Vitkovici but were forced to leave.

Page 10811

 1     And you continue to say:

 2             "[In English] It is a place where feelings run high."

 3        A.   That is correct.

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] This is what I meant when I spoke about

 5     emotions.  I did not have in mind the professionals of the

 6     Welsh Fusiliers.  Do you agree with me that it was difficult to manage

 7     and control people who could see their houses across the confrontation

 8     line, and you did notice that feelings run high over there?

 9        A.   Feelings may have run high, but international law prevents

10     attacks on -- I'm sorry, prohibits attacks by military forces on

11     civilians, and if any soldiers were attacking civilians, which was the

12     case here, then the military commanders on the spot should have taken

13     steps to prevent it by removing, perhaps, the soldiers whose feelings

14     were running high and replacing them with others who could be more

15     dispassionate.  I do not accept that any amount of emotion justifies the

16     action that was being taken in that village.

17        Q.   We agree, General, but do you also agree that soldiers, both on

18     the Muslim and Serb sides, that they had been civilians only until

19     yesterday and that they simply wanted to defend their houses?  They were

20     not professional troops.  And you will agree that there is a big

21     difference between professionals and former civilians?

22        A.   I do not believe that the law would make such a distinction.  If

23     somebody is wearing a uniform and under military discipline, they're

24     subject to military law.  And everybody, whether they're a military

25     person or civilian, is surely subject to international law and bound to

Page 10812

 1     obey -- and bound to obey it, just as in this case.

 2        Q.   General, with all due respect, I'm not trying to justify

 3     anything.  I'm just trying to understand or make both of us understand

 4     what kind of troops there were on both sides.  Were they professionals or

 5     former civilians who fought for their houses?  Did you encounter

 6     situations where people fought in civilian clothes, not in uniforms?

 7        A.   I sometimes saw a mixture of military and civilian clothes, but I

 8     do not recall seeing in the Gorazde area anybody in the line on either

 9     side who was wearing only civilian clothes.

10             I should qualify that.  I shouldn't say that I never saw anybody

11     armed on either side who was in civilian clothes.  I did see working

12     parties digging trenches on both sides wearing civilian clothes, but they

13     were unarmed.

14        Q.   And now can we look at page 38 -- or, rather, pages 38 and 39 in

15     your book.  The end of the passage which starts with:  "Because of the

16     fuel situation ..."

17             "[In English] Because of the fuel situation, resupply of the OPs

18     and change all the -- of personnel had to be done on foot by the -- and

19     the Serbs have taken to engage patrols with small-arm fire.  This is

20     unlikely to be a co-ordinated policy.  More likely is that usual mix of

21     indiscipline, drink, and boredom."

22        A.   And what is your question?

23        Q.   [Interpretation] I was waiting for the interpretation.  That's

24     why I paused.  My question is this:  Does this reflect the truth, and

25     does this corroborate the fact that the troops were not professional

Page 10813

 1     troops but, rather, civilian reservists?

 2        A.   It -- it probably does and I would agree with you that far, but

 3     if you are suggesting that that makes it somehow acceptable, then we must

 4     disagree, and I would have said in this case it was the responsibility of

 5     the many professional officers that I knew to be with the Serb forces to

 6     have prevented it.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  As I said, General, this is not to justify things but

 8     an attempt to understand the whole situation, and I see that you also

 9     noticed that those were just localised incidents and not something that

10     had come as a co-ordinated policy from a central level.

11        A.   At this stage, which is April, yes, I would agree with that.

12        Q.   And now can we go to page 41.  On the 14th of May, 1995, you say

13     this:

14              [Previous translation continues] ... "[In English] ... that the

15     Croatian attack caused strong feelings among the Serbs where Slavonia was

16     a designated UN protected area, and the Serbs' anger was caused by the

17     failure of the United Nations as they see it to deter or prevent the

18     attack.  The Croatian -- Croatian use of the air-strikes caused special

19     anger, and the Serbs pointed out that if they had used aircraft, NATO

20     would have been quick to respond.  Clearly the Serbs see a parallel

21     between impasse in Croatia and the east Bosnia enclaves and perceive the

22     UN to be acting in a way which is not impartial.  One can see the Serb

23     point of view, and it -- it has merit.  The answer are, of course, that

24     the UN mandate is quite different in Croatia from that in east Bosnia and

25     that the UN is not in former Yugoslavia to enforce anything."

Page 10814

 1             [Interpretation] Do you agree, General, as a good writer and as a

 2     good general, that there are no minor injustices as opposed to major

 3     injustices, that each injustice is actually a major one, and that the

 4     Serbs believed that they were subject to a major injustice only two weeks

 5     after the fall of Western Slavonia; right?

 6        A.   As I said in that account, I can understand the Serb point of

 7     view, and I would go with you on the point that you -- that all sides in

 8     a dispute have a right to the -- the same sort of response provided that

 9     the legal mandate is the same, and indeed that any injustice seems like a

10     major injustice when you are upon the receiving end of it.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And now can we go to pages 44 and 45.  The last

12     paragraph on the left-hand side, page 44.

13              [Previous translation continues] ... "[In English] As the

14     vehicle drove under the old railway bridge at Osanice, the Serbs opened

15     fire from bunker position on high ground across the Drina.  Many rounds

16     struck at Saxons, so the vehicle commanders closed down their hatches and

17     returned the fire.  Moments later, the Muslims joined in and fired a

18     rocket-propelled RPG-7 grenade at the first Saxon.  This fortunately

19     missed and it exploded on the road some 15 metres from in front of the

20     vehicle.  The commander, Lieutenant Llewellyn, and his second in command,

21     Corporal Parry, then had the difficult task of suppressing the hostile

22     fire, while also using their vehicle to shield the unarmoured police

23     Land Rover from the heavy fighting -- heavy weight of incoming fire."

24             [Interpretation] And then the next paragraph:

25             "[In English] It is always regrettable when soldiers on

Page 10815

 1     peacekeeping duty have to engage either side, but when an outrageous and

 2     unprovoked attack like this is made, there can be no alternative but to

 3     respond in a robust and professional manner.  The actions of the patrol

 4     were of the highest order and made possible the safe extractions of the

 5     civilian police from one of the most hazardous places in Bosnia.  It is

 6     also clear that the -- this attack was co-ordinated and planned by the

 7     Serbs and probably had the sanction of at least a brigade commander.  The

 8     action by the Muslims, whom we are here to assist and at whose request

 9     this action was carried out, was nothing short of disgraceful."

10             [Interpretation] General, you were helping the civilian police

11     here, and you saved them from the action of -- of the police; right?

12        A.   This -- first of all, could I point out that this is an account

13     written by Major Richard Westley and not by me, and secondly, that the

14     escort was being provided to the United Nations civilian police and not

15     the Bosnian civil police.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the Bosnian police or the Muslim

17     police, rather, actually was the cause of most harm for the civilians,

18     the Serb civilians who had fled Gorazde and that the police always

19     engaged in combat, that the police was part of the armed forces?

20        A.   I'm sorry, you've -- you've presented me with an account by

21     another officer of a particular episode which involves the UN civil

22     police and not the Bosnian civil police, so I'm unclear as to why you're

23     asking me now about the Bosnian police who were not involved in this

24     incident.

25        Q.   But it doesn't say here that it was the UN civil police.  Were

Page 10816

 1     there any UN civil police in Gorazde at all?

 2        A.   If you'd go, please, to the third line of the first paragraph of

 3     that -- of that account, "Attack on Osanice," you will see that it says:

 4             "On May the 17th, B Company was asked to escort a UN civilian

 5     police vehicle from Gorazde to Osanice."

 6        Q.   Yes.  Thank you, yes.  Now I see it.  And do you know that the

 7     Bosnian police engaged in combat and that it was actually the Muslim

 8     police that had chased Serbs out of Gorazde?

 9        A.   Since that took place before my presence on the ground, I can

10     neither confirm or deny that.

11        Q.   And now can we go to the following page.  Your soldiers were

12     injured because the vehicle actually swerved off the road; right?

13             "[In English] The captured soldiers were not threatened and --"

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Are we on the correct page?

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Yes, the left-hand side, in the middle, it says:

17             "[In English] The captured soldiers were not threatened and were

18     allowed to collect their equipment before being taken and escorted to the

19     Serb headquarter in Visegrad.  En route, one of the Saxon vehicles slid

20     out of the road, injuring six British and one Serb soldier."

21             [Interpretation] Is that correct?  Was that the cause of injury;

22     right?

23        A.   Yes.  Yes, it was.  That was my understanding at the time, and it

24     was confirmed in the debriefing reports of the soldiers concerned

25     afterwards.

Page 10817

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I note the time.  It's time to take a

 3     break.  How much longer do you have after the break?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And how much time have I used so

 5     far?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I haven't checked it yet.  In any event, then we'll

 7     have a break for half an hour and resume at 1.00.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I won't use all that.

 9                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, if I could --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  -- introduce to the Chamber Amina Noor, who is a

14     student at the University of Amsterdam.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Welcome.

16             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, I was told that you have spent so far

17     an hour and 20 minutes.  You will have about 40 minutes to conclude your

18     cross-examination.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I believe I'll manage

20     even earlier and then it's my treat to the Prosecution.  I'll give them a

21     couple of minutes from my time.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   General, would you kindly look at the next page on the screen,

24     the page on the right, number 47, where you talk about 33 fusiliers who

25     were taken captive [In English] not hostage.  [Interpretation] That's

Page 10818

 1     what we say, captive, not hostage.

 2             And you say there were no victims, no one injured apart from the

 3     six who got injured in a car accident.

 4              "[In English] The next few days we were able to keep a rough

 5     track on them through the Serb liaison officer until, after five days,

 6     the first 11 were released.  I spoke to them once they had reached Split,

 7     and all confirmed that they had been treated correctly, well looked

 8     after, and not threatened.  Those injured in the vehicle accident

 9     received proper medical care.  I have been informed this morning that a

10     further 17 have been released, and I hope to speak to them shortly.  I am

11     quite certain the remaining five are in no danger and that they will

12     be -- they will in due course be freed."

13             [Interpretation] Is that so?

14        A.   Yes, that is quite so.

15        Q.   And it follows from the book that you were fairly certain that

16     your men were in no danger at all; correct?

17        A.   I have never had any issue with the way that they were treated,

18     and I never had any reason to suppose that they would be harmed by the

19     Serb soldiers who held them captive.

20        Q.   Thank you.  [In English] I'm afraid I've lost some pages.  I ask

21     you for the indulgence, a few seconds.

22                           [Defence confer]

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I've found it.  The

24     book's excellent, but it's not very well bound, so I'm losing pages all

25     the time.

Page 10819

 1             Can we now see page 67, please, 66 and 67.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Now, you say here that you were confident that:

 4             "[In English] ... the business of our withdrawal was soon

 5     settled.  The Serbs would assist us to withdraw via Belgrade.

 6     General Mladic gave the orders at once and appointed a liaison officer,

 7     asking of us only that we remove all the weapons and vehicles which had

 8     been brought in since the arrival of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment in

 9     April 1994.  To this readily agreed since it was in any case our

10     intention.  We then adjourned for some Serb hospitality, a magnificent

11     lunch and so --" no problem, "and to date, Mladic has been true to his

12     words."

13             [Interpretation] Now the next example.

14             "[In English] I was less certain about the reaction of Muslim

15     side and, indeed, no sooner had the first convoy of loaders arrived to

16     begin the removal of heavy plants and vehicles, when obstruction began.

17     Muslim government ministers even went so far as to suggest publicly that

18     the British Battalion on which the enclave has depended for every

19     mouthful of food during the past year and a half would only be allowed to

20     leave if all the vehicles and weapons, the property of our government no

21     less, were placed in a weapons control point."

22             [Interpretation] Now let me not read this whole paragraph.

23             You had problems with the Muslim side that demanded your

24     equipment and the property of your government to be left behind; right?

25        A.   That's what they demanded.

Page 10820

 1        Q.   Do you remember that the Army of Republika Srpska continually

 2     asked that the UNPROFOR refrain from bringing in too many vehicles, too

 3     much ammunition and fuel into the enclave precisely because we feared

 4     that, and eventually our fears materialised?  That's what happened.

 5        A.   I recall always being under restriction for the amount of supply

 6     as I could get to keep my operations going.

 7        Q.   Yes, but doesn't this paragraph clearly show that the

 8     Serbian Army's fears that Muslims might abuse your equipment were

 9     justified?

10        A.   I think that it does not justify interfering with necessary

11     supply to a UN force, even though I would accept that they were fearful

12     that equipment could be stolen and misused.

13        Q.   Did something similar happen also to the Ukrainian Battalion?

14     Their equipment was taken over by the Muslims and turned against the

15     Serbs?

16        A.   That is indeed the case.  The Ukrainians allowed themselves to be

17     surrounded and disarmed, and their vehicles and weapons were indeed taken

18     by the Muslim side, something which I was very angry about, as the force

19     commander, but was unable to reverse.  And I was determined, absolutely

20     determined, that that was not going to happen again.

21        Q.   Thank you.  You say here that the Serb liaison officer asked you

22     by radio if you needed any assistance, and you thought it was a joke, but

23     do you accept that from his point of view it was serious and honest?

24        A.   Yes.  I -- what the account says was not that I thought it was a

25     joke, because I was quite sure that he was serious, but it was black

Page 10821

 1     comedy, indeed, that after the hostage-taking and the fighting that had

 2     gone on earlier that I should -- I should go so far as to ask one faction

 3     to join with me in fighting another.  I was not there to do that, and the

 4     last thing I wanted was to be the catalyst for more fighting.  So I

 5     replied that it would be best if the Serb side remained out of this

 6     particular affair.

 7        Q.   On page 65 -- if we can see that page.  That's the page on the

 8     right.  Could you please look at the last two paragraphs.

 9             "Actually, this incident is in keeping with the attitude being

10     displayed by the Bosnian Muslims towards the UN all over the country.

11     [In English] Convoys obstructed, even those carrying aid.  Bases blocked,

12     soldiers threatened.  Here in Gorazde we have experienced all sort of

13     harassment.  Not from the Serbs but from the people who depended on us to

14     risk our lives, breaching the Serbs' mine fields every time a UNHCR

15     convoy comes in.  This is conveniently overlooked.  But this is nothing

16     when compared to the continued harassment of the Ukrainians."

17             [Interpretation] And then the last sentence.

18             "[In English] It gives some idea, I think, of the almost

19     intractable problems which have to be solved every day in the face of

20     unbelievable ingratitude and deceit."

21             [Interpretation] Now, is that the painful part of your experience

22     of that departure from Gorazde?

23        A.   It's one of many painful memories of a painful time, and as I

24     think the account makes clear, I was extremely angry, and indeed, I think

25     everybody was, at the attitude of the Bosnian side in return for what we

Page 10822

 1     had -- what our country and the UN had done.  I can only believe that

 2     they felt in some way that they were being abandoned and that this policy

 3     might help to change the situation to their advantage, but it was, in my

 4     view, a very misguided way to proceed.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can we agree that all these members of the

 6     Royal Welsh Fusiliers who had been captured were at that time in active

 7     service?

 8        A.   I'm sorry, I don't quite understand what you mean.  All the

 9     soldiers who were captured during the hostage-taking episode in May or --

10     or are we talking about something else?

11        Q.   I mean everything that you just said except the reference to

12     "hostage."  Were all your men at that point in active service?

13        A.   Yes, they were all regular soldiers, professionals.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did any of your soldiers who had been taken

15     prisoner -- did Karl Roberts, in fact, tell you that during his detention

16     he had been informed by the Serbs that he was a prisoner of war?

17        A.   He did report that he was a prisoner of war.  That does not make

18     him so.

19        Q.   All right, but it's not in dispute that he had been informed by

20     the Serbs that he had the status of prisoner of war; right?

21        A.   The fact that he was told that is not in dispute.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, General.  I hope we will not be seeing

23     each other in the next war, because there will be no next war.  It was a

24     pleasure to talk to you.  Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have finished, Your Excellencies.

Page 10823

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             Ms. Edgerton, do you have re-examination?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Just on one small point, if I may.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

 5                           Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

 6        Q.   General, at page 68 of the transcript of today's proceedings, do

 7     you recall discussing your patrols engaging with Bosnian Serb forces in

 8     small-arms fire exchanges and Dr. Karadzic saying the following:

 9             "General, this is not to justify things but an attempt to

10     understand the whole situation, and I see that you also noticed that

11     those were just localised incidents and not something that had come as a

12     co-ordinated policy from central level."

13             And your answer was:

14             "At this stage, which is April, I would agree with that."

15             Do you remember giving that evidence?

16        A.   I do.

17        Q.   Did the situation you were discussing then change after April?

18        A.   Yes, during the hostage-taking that took place in May, it was

19     clear from the sequence of events and the reports that I received

20     afterwards and what we have seen subsequently from what happened to those

21     people who were captured, that that aggression must have been

22     co-ordinated at a higher level and was not simply a localised incident.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Nothing further, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

25             One thing I wanted to clarify with you, Mr. Karadzic, is that is

Page 10824

 1     it your intention not to tender those parts put to the witness from the

 2     book authored by the witness?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, and thank you for

 4     reminding me.  I would rather like to tender these passages, and if the

 5     Trial Chamber doesn't mind, perhaps we could tender the whole book, but

 6     at least those pages that I read from.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, I'd object to the whole book, Your Honour,

 9     but no objection with respect to those pages.  I just wanted to note that

10     pages 38 and 39 don't have any date reference on them, and perhaps it

11     might be useful to all of us if we could get a couple of pages further

12     than that that might indicate the date of that page or that entry.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I take it that could be arranged outside the

14     courtroom.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  I think so. Page 24 and 25, and I think page 15 as

16     well.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  There is no position from the Defence

18     on -- so that will be done.  So that will be given the next Defence

19     exhibit number.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D678.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Well, that concludes your evidence,

22     General Riley.  I thank you on behalf of the Tribunal and the Bench for

23     coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go and please have a

24     safe journey back home.

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, sir.

Page 10825

 1                           [The witness withdrew]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Tieger, where are we in terms of witness

 3     scheduling?

 4             MR. TIEGER:  We have no witness available for the remainder of

 5     the day, Your Honour, and in fact, the next witness will not be ready to

 6     proceed until Friday morning.  That's a consequence, as the Court I'm

 7     sure is aware, of the fact that KDZ200 fell ill and was unable to

 8     testify, and in addition to the pace, rather unprecedented, of the

 9     proceedings which could not be anticipated, and it was too late to

10     accelerate the testimony of any additional witness.

11             Before we adjourn, however, I would like to move into private

12     session to continue a discussion raised earlier also in private session.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Let's deal with the scheduling issue first.  You

14     referred to two circumstances.  I have -- were you not put on notice as

15     to those such circumstances in advance?

16             MR. TIEGER:  No.  I would say at best the Prosecution was advised

17     of the possibility that there could be some acceleration of the pace, but

18     indeed, to the extent that would have been a meaningful signal, and I

19     would say for purposes of witness rescheduling, something as tentative as

20     the communication we received late last week could not be held to do so,

21     that was largely contradicted by another signal we had during the course

22     of -- of a witness interview when the scheduling anticipated for the

23     first two witnesses by the Prosecution earlier was confirmed by the

24     Defence.  So I think it would be an error to suggest that we were put on

25     notice that the pace of the proceedings as we've experienced it this week

Page 10826

 1     was going to happen.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We were concerned about the fact that we lost about

 4     an hour and today -- another hour today, and we are losing about

 5     five hours tomorrow.  The Chamber understands the difficulties inherent

 6     in the process of scheduling witnesses, and there are, of course,

 7     particular circumstances this week which resulted in such a loss.

 8     However, can I emphasise at this moment that it is the Prosecution's

 9     responsibility to ensure that there are sufficient witnesses here so that

10     we do not have such unanticipated breaks, taking into account all of the

11     information available concerning the expected time for cross-examination.

12             So I wanted to give you notice in advance that in the future,

13     should we find ourselves in a position where we cannot sit because of the

14     absence of witnesses, without good cause, there may be situations in

15     which the Chamber will ask the Registry to count some or all the time

16     lost against the Prosecution's overall time allocation of 300 hours.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, if I may, I certainly understand that

18     as a note of general concern on the part of the Court.  I can advise the

19     Court that it doesn't, as a general principle, alert the Prosecution to

20     anything it wasn't aware of and hasn't focused on diligently since the

21     commencement of these proceedings.  I hope it's no more than a note of

22     general concern about time lost and not a reflection of this particular

23     incident, because the unanticipated loss of time in this instance was the

24     result of wholly unanticipated factors that were outside, clearly outside

25     the Prosecution's control.  So I didn't understand the Court to be

Page 10827

 1     suggesting otherwise.  Just a reminder that everyone's concerned about

 2     time and everyone should do their utmost to ensure that we use our time

 3     as efficiently as possible.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Your understanding is correct.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we go into private session?  Just a second.

 7     Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a second.  Could I add

 9     something?  The interviews I had with these witnesses helped me to

10     shorten my examination, and I believe part of the problem lies therein,

11     part of the problem we have with the surplus of time.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll go into private session briefly.

13                           [Private session]

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 10828











11  Pages 10828-10829 redacted. Private session.















Page 10830

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11                           [Open session]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Unless there are other matters to be raised, the

13     hearing is now adjourned.  We will resume on Friday at 9.00.

14             And one further notice:  I think that should be -- should have

15     been arranged, but that can be arranged.  On Monday next week, I'm giving

16     you prior notice, we will be sitting from 2.30 to 6.30.  And on Tuesday,

17     we will be sitting at the regular time, from 9.00 to quarter to 2.00, on

18     Tuesday.

19             MR. KARADZIC:  For me, regular is afternoon.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We will rise.  The hearing is now adjourned.

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.36 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 28th day

23                           of January, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.