Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11834

 1                           Tuesday, 15 February 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 6             Are there any matters to raise before we have evidence?

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Thank you and good morning.

 8             Mr. President, we would like to withdraw our request to have

 9     Exhibit MFI D1051 admitted, the statement of Senaid Memic.  We decided

10     that after the point raised by the Chamber, it's not in our interests to

11     ask that that statement be admitted at this time.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Secondly, we would like to discuss, before

14     General Smith comes in, the situation concerning Rule 70.  And I was

15     wondering if we might go into private session to do that.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, let's do that.

17     [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are now in private session.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we postponed as long as possible

20     the questions about the Vrbanja Bridge, that is the subject of the

21     Rule 70 condition.  And Mr. Tieger has informed me, and he can speak for

22     himself, that the UN has not yet made a final decision as to whether or

23     not they are going to insist upon that condition, but we feel this is a

24     matter that ought to be addressed in the way of somehow practice and

25     precedent of the Chamber, that when there's a Rule 70 condition, we

Page 11835

 1     think, first of all, there ought to be advance notice to the parties and

 2     the Chamber well before the witness testifies, that there is a Rule 70

 3     condition that is being asserted, so that we could try to clear all the

 4     problems in advance of the testimony of the witness, rather than having

 5     testimony in private session that may later be -- come into the public

 6     session, when there's no real interest in this testimony anymore.  So we

 7     would appreciate if the Chamber might consider making some kind of order

 8     to the Prosecution in the future that part of its notifications about the

 9     witnesses should include any Rule 70 conditions.

10             Secondly, with respect to this particular condition, we think

11     that it's advisable that the Chamber have the provider be more

12     accountable for conditions which seem, on their face, to be unreasonable,

13     in the sense that General Smith has given this very testimony in public

14     session in the Dragomir Milosevic case, and his testimony was admitted as

15     a public exhibit in the Momcilo Perisic case.  And so I would ask that

16     you order that there be an oral hearing on Friday, at 10.00, at which the

17     representative of the United Nations would appear before the Chamber to

18     explain why the need -- there is a need for the Rule 70 condition of

19     General Smith, and then you can decide afterwards whether the remedy of

20     excluding all or part of his testimony might be applicable.  But I think

21     it's necessary to have some accountability for these providers in

22     circumstances such as this, where the condition appears to be

23     unreasonable.

24             Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  You mean after we will have received all of

Page 11836

 1     General Smith's evidence?

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I don't propose holding up

 3     his evidence, but I would like to keep -- while the matter is still

 4     fresh, I'd like to keep some pressure so that the matter can be resolved

 5     by the end of the week.  Otherwise, it's liable to linger.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to respond, Mr. Tieger?

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour, briefly.

 8             With respect to Mr. Robinson's point that there ought to be

 9     advance notice to the parties, I trust that the Court will recall that

10     the genesis of this problem is that, notwithstanding the one-year advance

11     notice provided by the Prosecution to the Defence - I believe the Court

12     saw that notification - this matter was not raised until the witness came

13     to court.  Once it was raised by the Defence, the Prosecution acted with

14     the utmost alacrity to contact the UN, provide all the relevant

15     materials, stress the urgency, and push for reconsideration again, as we

16     had before.  But in light of these circumstances, with the utmost haste.

17     Unfortunately, three working days is insufficient to work through that

18     process, although we had hoped that the matter might be resolved today.

19     But to suggest that somehow there was no notice here, by posing this

20     proposed condition in this manner, I think, is quite unfair under the

21     circumstances.

22             Secondly, with respect to the proposed hearing, I think the Court

23     has already alluded to the Tribunal's jurisprudence on this matter, the

24     fact that the providers are not required to justify their conditions.

25             In any event, the reality of the situation, as I've advised the

Page 11837

 1     Court, is that the UN has been contacted.  I am optimistic that we will

 2     be hearing back shortly.  Everyone has moved forward on this, under these

 3     circumstances, with the utmost haste.  And to suggest that some further

 4     procedural developments and obligations are necessary here, I think, is

 5     unfounded and inappropriate, and the reality of the matter is this is a

 6     fairly commonplace situation, in terms of hearing a matter in private

 7     session.  We have reason to hope that we will, in short order, be able to

 8     transform that into public session, as I've advised Mr. Robinson.  In any

 9     event, even if not, it neither justifies the attention that this issue

10     has generated, nor any special hearing to address a matter that the

11     providers are not required to address or justify.

12             Thank you, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just one question for you.

14             You mentioned that there was one-year advance notice provided by

15     the Prosecution to the Defence in this regard.  So the Defence was

16     informed about that Rule 70 condition a year ago?

17             MR. TIEGER:  Correct.

18             JUDGE KWON:

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, maybe I'm obtuse, but when the

20     notice that we received in February of 2010 said that we were not to

21     disclose to anyone else paragraph 134 of the statement of Rupert Smith,

22     and that statement never was used, it was not an exhibit, a further

23     amalgamated statement was provided which didn't have any conditions.  All

24     of the underlying documents concerning this event were provided to us

25     without any Rule 70 conditions, and I never made the connection between

Page 11838

 1     the 2010 February restriction on one paragraph and a statement that was

 2     not going to be used to a condition based on the testimony of the -- the

 3     live testimony of the witness, and maybe that's my fault.  But if there

 4     is going to be notice, perhaps it could be a little bit more clear.

 5             Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I would expect the messages in the future to be a

 7     bit clearer between the parties, and --

 8             MR. TIEGER:  We will, as always, endeavour to make those messages

 9     as clear as possible.  However, as the Court is aware, that referred to a

10     specific paragraph.  It was the paragraph in the amalgamated statement.

11     We looked at it the other day.  We've gone through this discussion

12     before, and as the Court noted previously, Mr. Robinson's request is a

13     belated one.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             And as regards -- with respect to the hearing, you suggested that

16     at this moment we find it a bit premature and unnecessary to set a date

17     for hearing at this moment.

18             Having said that, we'll go back to open session.

19                           [Open session]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Just I wanted to raise two matters with the Court.

22             The first is that with respect to a matter the Court inquired

23     about yesterday, that is, the scheduling date for Mr. Banbury, we've

24     heard back, and the 15th of March is satisfactory.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 11839

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Secondly, in light of the current schedule and

 2     General Smith's return, it is clear that we will not get to the testimony

 3     of Mr. Music this week, so he will not be appearing this week.

 4             I may also note that depending on our schedule for the rest of

 5     the week, with the various uncertainties of which the Court is aware with

 6     certain -- the length of testimony and witnesses appearing, there is an

 7     issue about whether or not Mr. Mujkic will be testifying this week as

 8     well.

 9             So Mr. Music will not be appearing, and in light of the current

10     schedule or anticipated schedule, we'll have to see about Mr. Mujkic.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             There's one further matter to raise on the part of the Chamber.

13             The Chamber has been requested by the Defence to lift the

14     confidentiality of all the filings that pertain to Mr. Berko Zecevic, of

15     which the Prosecution is in agreement.  Mr. Zecevic is listed as a

16     witness for the Prosecution and is the subject of a subpoena issued by

17     this Chamber on 20th January 2011.  The Chamber subsequently issued an

18     order, in lieu of indictment, and warrant of arrest for Mr. Zecevic, in

19     light of his failure to give testimony on the date specified in the

20     subpoena.

21             The Chamber is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice

22     for the filings in relation to this matter to now be made public, and

23     we'll order the Registry to do so, with the exception of certain

24     supporting medical documentation which shall remain under seal.  The

25     Chamber will communicate to the Registry, via its Legal Officer, the

Page 11840

 1     precise documents which should now be reclassified as public documents.

 2             Let us bring in the witness.

 3             Just for your information, last evening -- yesterday, the Chamber

 4     already authorised the Tribunal's press office to confirm the existence

 5     of the order, in lieu of indictment, and the arrest warrant.

 6                           [The witness takes the stand]

 7                           WITNESS:  RUPERT SMITH [Resumed]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, General.

 9             We appreciate your kindness to come back to the Tribunal again.

10             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I hope we'll be able to finish your evidence during

12     the course of today, hopefully before 12.30, the second session.

13             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

15             Good morning to all.  Good morning, General.

16             Thank you, on behalf of the Defence again, for having coming

17     back.

18                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   I would like us to complete the topic that remained unfinished

21     last time.

22             Do you agree with the fact that President Milosevic, on the 4th

23     of August, 1994, severed all ties with us and imposed sanctions against

24     us on the Drina?

25        A.   I don't remember the details of that.  I remember that there was

Page 11841

 1     some public severance of relations in 1994.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this isolation was widely

 3     orchestrated and that certain representatives of the international

 4     community had insisted on it?

 5        A.   Again, my knowledge is based, at the time of 1994, on being in

 6     London.  And I remember the matter being discussed, but to the -- but the

 7     absolute details of it and the extent of the decisions made, as opposed

 8     to the conversations being held, I don't recall the details.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that President Carter partly broke

10     that isolation down by coming in December 1994?  After that, we concluded

11     the so-called Carter Cease-Fire, a four-month cease-fire, and in the

12     meantime you arrived in Bosnia?

13        A.   Yes, President Carter was there at the very end of 1994, and the

14     Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed thereafter.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that right after your arrival in

16     February 1995, at the initiative of Anthony Lake and Richard Holbrooke,

17     yet again the isolation of the leadership in Pale of Republika Srpska,

18     especially of Radovan Karadzic, was reinforced?

19        A.   No, I don't remember that specifically.  I can -- nor do I

20     remember the subject of isolation being a particular issue discussed with

21     me at all until sometime, I think, in March of 1995, or maybe it was

22     April.

23        Q.   Can you tell us what was communicated to you at that point in

24     time, what was the position to be taken vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs?

25        A.   It wasn't communicated to me as any instruction at all.  I had no

Page 11842

 1     direction, in terms of isolation, whatsoever, and nor did I act in that

 2     way.  I was aware that this was an idea that was being considered, as I

 3     said, in 1994, although exactly when that was being discussed, I can't

 4     recall.  And it became -- I became aware of it being discussed again.  It

 5     was discussed in my presence, rather than with me, as it were, as

 6     instructions to me or anything like that, probably in April - now I'm

 7     thinking about it more carefully - when the Contact Group or members of

 8     the Contact Group visited or tried to visit Sarajevo.  But this is

 9     supposition.  I have very little clear memory of that, if you like,

10     contextual discussion with me at that time.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that when you testified in

12     General Perisic's case, on page -- just a moment, please.  I beg your

13     pardon -- that you said that people did not know who was speaking on

14     behalf of the Bosnian Serbs?  Do you remember that?

15        A.   Yes, but I think --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

17             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  There was about to be a page reference, but I don't

20     believe I ever heard it.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the page number, Mr. Karadzic?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a moment.  I'll try to find it

23     now.  Just a moment.

24             This would be it.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11843

 1        Q.   You testified in the Perisic case, that is, on the 20th of May,

 2     2009, page 6386.  You said then --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Do you still remember the question?

 4             THE WITNESS:  I think it's a direct quote that I say I don't

 5     know, and I think this is a piece of evidence that's concerning March of

 6     1995 and a discussion with General Mladic.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I beg your pardon.  It wasn't March; it was August

10     of 1995, and a conversation with General Mladic.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Do you remember -- or, rather, can you tell us who

13     Aleksandar Ivanko was?

14        A.   Aleksandar Ivanko was one of my spokesmen.  He was the UN

15     spokesman, as opposed to the military spokesman.

16        Q.   Do you remember that in the summer of 1995, Mr. Ivanko said at a

17     press conference that the political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs does

18     not have sufficient influence on the ground and that they would not

19     communicate with them anymore, that they don't have leverage on the

20     events?  Do you remember that?

21        A.   I don't remember it specifically, no.  And when did he say it in

22     the summer?

23        Q.   Well, we looked for those conferences, but it was in the summer

24     of 1995.  And I believe that he had to have permission to state something

25     like that.  Right?

Page 11844

 1        A.   Not specifically, no.  I would want to know when in -- about what

 2     is he talking, to be more specific.

 3        Q.   Well, this will do.  If you don't know, you don't know.  We're

 4     going to get the document, itself.  However, according to my notes, this

 5     was in the summer of 1995.  It was a press conference when he stated that

 6     the United Nations would not have much to do with the political

 7     leadership.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, General:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Still trying to find the reference in the Perisic

10     testimony.  I've now scoured 6386 more than once, and there's -- that

11     reference doesn't appear there.  If the Defence could check that and

12     provide the correct page number, please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I hope the Defence would be able to give you a

14     reference later on.

15             In the meantime, let's continue.  Where are we?

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, do you remember that - actually, just a moment, please -

18     that this was a rather wide undertaking, to have the leadership isolated

19     and to stop ending communication with the leadership, and to find other

20     solutions through President Milosevic for resolving the situation in

21     Bosnia?

22        A.   I don't remember it like that, no.  From my point of view, in the

23     job I was doing in 1995, I was given no direction - in fact, on the

24     contrary, encouragement to deal with the Bosnian Serb leadership.  Being

25     on the military side, my emphasis lay with the military, but not

Page 11845

 1     exclusively.  And the moment my new Civil Affairs -- chief of

 2     Civil Affairs - I've forgotten his proper title, but he was called

 3     Mr. Pedaway [phoen] - arrived in August, he went straight up to Pale to

 4     talk to the leadership in that place.

 5             What I -- I entirely agree that outside of my little world, if

 6     you like, there was this policy of dealing with Mr. Milosevic.  To what

 7     extent that was, other than it had a label, in my mind, called

 8     "Isolation," I do not know to the degree to which it was being practiced

 9     to any great -- to any great degree.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I'll help you, so that we both jog our memory, with

11     Carl Bildt's book and Ambassador Holbrooke's book.  I'm sorry, that was

12     reference was -- it had to do with the Milosevic case, actually, the

13     Slobodan Milosevic case, October 2003.  And as for Dragomir Milosevic, on

14     the 27th of March, 2007.  It's an exhibit there, P344.

15             It says there that you said that you were trying to establish who

16     was speaking on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, since during June, July and

17     part of August:

18             [In English] "The senior level arrangements for the Bosnian Serbs

19     in Pale were under pressure.  The relations between Mladic and Karadzic

20     was unclear."

21             [Interpretation] Do you remember that?

22        A.   I don't remember that, and I'm not clear which of those two cases

23     you're quoting from.

24        Q.   Say from Milosevic, the 7th of March, 2007.  The page is 3334.

25     As for President Milosevic, statement paragraph 104.

Page 11846

 1             JUDGE KWON:  If you like to put the specific question, why don't

 2     you show the passage to the general, and let us see whether he confirms.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I just wanted to get a

 4     yes-or-no answer.  It's all the same.  I just wanted the general to give

 5     a yes-or-no answer.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Is it correct that in the summer of 1995, June, July and part of

 8     August, the general did not know who was speaking on behalf of the

 9     Bosnian Serbs, As he confirmed in his statement - just a moment, please -

10     when he testified in the case against President Milosevic and the case

11     against General Milosevic.  Can you remember that?  You said you were

12     confused by all this, Don't talk to this person, Don't talk to that

13     person, and, Milosevic was supposed to speak on behalf of us? ^

14             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.

17             First of all, I've been looking through the transcripts as we've

18     been speaking.  I didn't see any reference to the word "confused."

19             Secondly, I don't see, if the witness is being confronted with

20     his prior statement, why he has to remember it, why it can't be cited to

21     him properly and read to him in context.

22             So I've tracked down one of the references in the original

23     reference that Mr. Karadzic made in the Perisic case, and it's not quite

24     the same comment posed, and now I see, in the Dragomir Milosevic case,

25     what the witness talks about is also a bit different, in context, to

Page 11847

 1     what's being presented to him.  And if he's going to be asked about what

 2     he said and asked to comment on it, I think he should be given a fair

 3     opportunity to know what that is.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  By adding your statement or comments, you make your

 5     question very complicated.

 6             I think by now, General, I take it the General has understood the

 7     question.  I wonder whether you can answer the question?

 8             THE WITNESS:  I'm sure I would -- my memory is this: that I was

 9     always searching to understand who was speaking for the Bosnian Serbs.

10     There was this relationship between General Mladic and Dr. Karadzic, and

11     it -- there was -- I was trying to understand it, trying to understand

12     who was speaking for who and in what circumstances throughout that

13     summer, and I think those remarks and those statements are situated

14     within the context of that understanding as being discussed in those

15     cases.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17        Q.   Do you remember that at a meeting -- at two meetings that you

18     described, secret meetings, private, if I can call them that, that I said

19     to you that as regards matters pertaining to safe passage, convoys,

20     et cetera, that you should talk to my commanders; right?

21        A.   I seem to remember that was your -- what you told me to do, yes.

22        Q.   Do you remember that I was the political leader, the state leader

23     in the civilian sphere, and that I had to leave expert matters to my

24     army, as is done in any country?

25        A.   That was my understanding at the time, yes.

Page 11848

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that quite an effort was made to sow

 2     discord between the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and the military

 3     commands and that quite a bit was done in order to turn Mladic against

 4     us?  Milosevic worked on that, and all international factors as well.  Do

 5     you remember that?

 6        A.   No, I don't remember it as you describe it.  I remember there was

 7     discord.  I had no knowledge of the specific details, but as I think I've

 8     reported already, that one was clear that all was not always in

 9     agreement.  But I don't recall efforts to make it worse, certainly not by

10     UNPROFOR or the UN.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 1D3201.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   While I'm looking for that:  Can you tell us, General, what is

14     SEAD, what does that stand for?

15        A.   Suppression of Enemy Air Defences.

16        Q.   Do you remember --

17        A.   At least it did in 1995.

18        Q.   Do you remember that that was the basis for taking a position

19     vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs?

20        A.   No, I don't understand the question.  I certainly don't remember

21     it as a position.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 69.  It's

23     different in electronic form, but it's page 69 of this document.  I mean,

24     in the book itself, page 69.  Page 69 in the book, itself.  Yes.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11849

 1        Q.   [In English] "SEAD campaigns - suppression of enemy air defence -

 2     was necessary for a number of days and would preferably have to encompass

 3     the whole of Bosnia."

 4             [Interpretation] You can all have a look at this.  It is based on

 5     the guide-lines of the London Conference.

 6             General, who was this supposed enemy in Bosnia?

 7        A.   I'm just finishing reading.

 8             What is the -- is this prior the London Conference or after?

 9     What is the page -- can I see the page before?

10        Q.   Please, let us place this in context.  Who convened the

11     London Conference, and who are the participants?

12        A.   I'm still not clear if the decisions had been ...  This page 68

13     is about the London Conference?

14             JUDGE KWON:  If you see the next page, next paragraph on page 69,

15     it refers to "sometime in July."  Can we see the next page.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Without going back through all the pages,

17     this looks like a discussion of either what was going on in the

18     background of the London Conference or just prior to the

19     London Conference, but I'm not certain.

20             However, to answer the question:  The use of the phrase "SEAD,"

21     or the SEAD as it gets spelled, or pronounced, rather, is a way of

22     describing the precursor phase of an air action.  It -- you have to do

23     this before you can get in and attack the targets you've actually been

24     sent to attack, and so it this -- you might make a plan, and this

25     precursor phase would appear in it.  Whether you had decided to carry

Page 11850

 1     out -- execute the plan or not, you would still have worked out your

 2     suppression of air defences operation that would precede and be the

 3     necessary enabling objectives to carry out the actual act.  So if you

 4     were told to carry out a -- to make a plan to conduct such an air

 5     operation against whomsoever, you would have an SEAD phase in it of some

 6     description, and that would be why that was being discussed at that

 7     stage, I suspect.  And since these were all in defence of and to reimpose

 8     the exclusion zones around the enclaves, then the Bosnian Serbs would --

 9     the assumption would be that the Bosnian Serbs were attacking the --

10     those enclaves, and, therefore, it would be the air defences -- the

11     Bosnian Serb air defences that one was seeking to attack.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please look at page 67,

13     two pages back.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Would you be so kind to focus on this page, where there is an

16     explanation of the context of the London Conference, and could you tell

17     us who had convened the London Conference, and what was the subject to be

18     discussed, and what was the goal and the objective of the conference?

19        A.   As far as I'd be concerned, the London Conference was convened by

20     the United Kingdom, and the underpinning events that led to it was the

21     collapse of the Srebrenica pocket and all that followed thereafter.  And

22     the intention was that this was not to happen in Gorazde, in the first

23     instance, and this was where a British battalion was based.

24        Q.   Can you tell us -- do you remember, rather, what Operations

25     Plan 40104 was?  What did that refer to?

Page 11851

 1        A.   I don't remember what that plan was or whose it was.

 2        Q.   Well, let me remind you.

 3             On Wednesday, the 28th of June, the NATO Council in Brussels

 4     decided to officially approve Operations Plan 04104 [as interpreted],

 5     which envisaged mass ground invasion of Bosnia, allegedly to provide for

 6     the withdrawal of UN forces.  Did you know about that?  And also there's

 7     mention there of the recently Rapid Reaction Forces.  Do you remember

 8     that?

 9        A.   I can remember the Rapid Reaction Force, and I can remember that

10     there was a contingency plan, the details of which I did not know, held

11     by NATO for the extraction of UNPROFOR.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move back to page 64,

13     please, two pages back -- three pages back.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Look at the last sentence in paragraph 1:

16             [In English] "To use Mladic to undermine Karadzic was part of our

17     efforts.  And the Sarajevo leadership was aware of these intentions of

18     ours."

19             [Interpretation] Therefore, in co-operation with the Muslim

20     leadership, efforts were being made to turn Mladic against Karadzic.  Is

21     this what Ambassador Bildt is saying here?

22        A.   That's what he says there.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please now look at the last paragraph, which

24     refers to you and your future contacts with General Mladic.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, in relation to the last question and

Page 11852

 1     answer, you asked the general whether it is what is written there, and he

 2     confirmed.  It leads us nowhere, unless you hear his answers from the

 3     general, what Ambassador Bildt wrote in his book has nothing to do with

 4     this witness.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Smith attended meetings

 6     with President Milosevic, Carl Bildt and Mr. Holbrooke on occasion where

 7     they were working on bringing -- or toppling the authorities in Pale.

 8     These things were happening at the meetings with General Milosevic --

 9     with President Milosevic.  I don't know if the general paid attention to

10     that.  And he did confirm that he attended the meetings on the 14th and

11     15th of July.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Now, are you familiar or are you not familiar with these efforts

14     to turn the military leadership against the state leadership, General?

15        A.   I was not conscious that there was a deliberate process of

16     turning the Bosnian Serb military against the Bosnian Serb political

17     leadership.

18        Q.   Were you present in the meetings in which President Milosevic

19     made promises and made predictions of the demise of the authorities in

20     Pale?

21        A.   I don't remember that in the meetings that occurred that I was

22     there, when Mladic was there, and Ambassador Bildt and

23     President Milosevic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             Can we now move to page 81, please.

Page 11853

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can you please look from paragraph 2 downwards, where it says

 3     that during the Croatian offensive, he wanted to meet Milosevic, together

 4     with Pauline Neville-Jones, Alain Dejammet, and so on and so forth.  He

 5     was under pressure to say whether he could really deliver Pale.

 6             Now, look at the next passage.

 7             Do you remember that after the fall of Krajina -- do you see this

 8     passage where it says:

 9             [In English] "Pale was in a state of --"

10        A.   Yes, I do.

11        Q.   [Interpretation] Do you remember that at that time, President

12     Milosevic wrote a letter to President Izetbegovic and General Mladic:

13             [In English] "The letter was a double insult of Karadzic, first

14     by addressing Izetbegovic as President as president, and then by

15     addressing the letter to Mladic, rather than to him.  In Pale, it was

16     considered quite rightly that this was a plot designed to isolate,

17     marginalise and basically eliminate the existing Bosnian Serb

18     leadership."

19             [Interpretation] Did you, yourself, feel and did you know that

20     that was the attitude that was taken vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs?

21        A.   I don't remember it as starkly explained in the paragraph you've

22     asked me to read.  My own memory of that period is one in which I'm

23     conscious that the Bosnian Serbs are -- have now moved on to the back

24     foot because of the Croatian offensive and have a great deal of troubles

25     of their own.  And you've -- and we've already seen in evidence this

Page 11854

 1     meeting in Mrkonjic Grad, where I'm trying to find out what's happening

 2     and establish the degree of humanitarian aid and so forth that is

 3     required of UNPROFOR for the people expelled from the Krajinas.  I am not

 4     conscious of and have no part to play in any of this -- of the events

 5     that are described in that paragraph.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Can we look at the next page, please.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Will you please look at this page?  General, do you remember when

10     you speak about humanitarian needs, there were huge influx of refugees

11     coming into Krajina and Republika Srpska at the time?

12        A.   I think they were coming from the Krajinas, weren't they?  But,

13     yes, I remember there was a large refugee problem, in the thousands, of

14     people moving out of the Krajinas and into Bosnia-Herzegovina, some of

15     whom were moving on into Serbia.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Just a small suggestion.

17             It may be helpful in posing questions on this topic to

18     distinguish between the Croatian Krajina and the Bosnian Krajina.  That

19     may eliminate answers that appear to be -- well, to not make sense.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for this suggestion from

21     my learned friend Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   So we are talking about the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which

24     was part of the AVNOJ Croatia.  It came under attack in early August, and

25     there were hundreds of thousands of people expelled from there.  General,

Page 11855

 1     is that true?

 2        A.   I don't remember the total figure.  I think it was in excess of

 3     100.000 expelled.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can I draw your attention to the beginning, where it

 5     says that the success of this plot, as Mr. Bildt calls it, the plot to

 6     isolate and remove the Bosnian Serb leadership from power, so I'm talking

 7     about the 4th of August and the dismissal of Mladic.  Can you see this

 8     paragraph?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, if we are not

10     going to admit this into evidence, then I would like to read what is

11     written here.  If this is admissible, then I am reluctant to call

12     Mr. Bildt to come here and appear as a witness.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't you specifically put it to the witness.

14     If necessary, you can read out the relevant passage.  At this moment, I

15     haven't discussed it with my colleagues, but speaking for myself, I don't

16     think this is something admissible without having to hear from Mr. Bildt.

17             Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  I think that's -- the point has now been made, and

19     the game is now revealed.  It's an effort to circumvent the need to call

20     Mr. Bildt by reading out passages of his book, asking the witness to do

21     nothing more than to affirm that that's what's written there.  And as the

22     Court has previously noted, that's not an appropriate strategem.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, you are entitled to put questions, if necessary

24     reading out passages from the book.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 11856

 1             There's no game being played.  I am just trying to be as brief as

 2     possible.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Paragraph 2 reads.

 5             "Croat army made its pincer movement from both Croatia and Bosnia

 6     towards Knin.  Karadzic, on 4 August, summarily fired Mladic, accusing

 7     him both of failing to defend key Serb areas properly and of having had

 8     unauthorised contacts with Stoltenberg and myself.  Thus, Karadzic

 9     triggered an acute confrontation between the political and military

10     leadership in the most desperate of situations.  It seemed totally

11     irrational, and, after a week of turmoil, Karadzic had to retreat and

12     accept that Mladic would remain as the military commander."

13             [Interpretation] Do you recall this crisis?

14        A.   I cannot remember the specific thing of you writing a letter.  I

15     may never have known it had occurred.  I do remember there was reports of

16     this tension between the political and military leaderships, but this had

17     been going on during the summer, and I was continuing to try and

18     understand who was in charge of what and who was speaking for the Bosnian

19     Serbs.

20        Q.   Thank you.  That was a crucial event, and I am surprised that you

21     don't remember it.

22             There's reference here to my open letter to President Milosevic,

23     which is in the next passage, and it reads:

24             [In English] "Morale in the Republika Srpska was now at rock

25     bottom.  Eventually, more than 200.000 refugees would pass through

Page 11857

 1     Banja Luka and Brcko on their way to some sort of safety in Serbia, and

 2     there were rumours all over the place of secret deals, arrangements and

 3     plans giving up different territories.  Karadzic wrote a public letter

 4     accusing Milosevic of a betrayal of Serb interest."

 5             [Interpretation] What I'm asking you now, sir, is whether you

 6     were aware or whether you knew that a lot of things had been done behind

 7     my back, starting from the London Conference, while, on the other hand, I

 8     was requested to honour the agreements that I was not party to.

 9        A.   No, I wasn't aware of things in those terms.

10        Q.   Did you learn anything about that later?

11        A.   No, not in the way you posed that question.

12        Q.   Very well, thank you.  Sir, are you aware that the issue of

13     air-strikes against the Serbs was largely an issue that had to do with

14     internal political circumstances in NATO member countries and that it had

15     a lot to do with the credibility of the alliance, itself?

16        A.   I was not aware of that.  That was not -- and it isn't my

17     understanding at all.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, since this is not being

19     admitted, I would just like us to look at what Holbrooke says in his book

20     about this topic.  So he's talking about the credibility of NATO and the

21     need to launch air-strikes against the Serbs, and to flex the muscle,

22     because the credibility of NATO was at stake.  I'm going to read this:

23             [In English] "Bosnia will be the key test for American policy in

24     Europe.  We must, therefore, succeed in whether we attempt.  The

25     administration cannot afford to begin with either an international

Page 11858

 1     disaster or quagmire.  Despite the difficulties and risks involved, I

 2     believe that inaction or a continuation of the Bush policy in Bosnia by

 3     the Clinton Administration is the least desirable course.  Continued

 4     inaction carried long-term risk which could be disruptive to US-European

 5     relations, weaken NATO, increase tensions in Greece and Turkey, and cause

 6     havoc with Moscow."

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Sir, how were we to adjust our behaviour and conduct, because

 9     there was so many things against us and there was so many people pulling

10     strings?

11        A.   At the time, I -- I just don't know how to answer your question

12     against the purposes of this court.  I am sitting in my headquarters in

13     Sarajevo.  I am not an American, I am not part of the American

14     policy-making, and I'm certainly not the late Mr. Richard Holbrooke.  And

15     the actions of the Bosnian Serbs were theirs to choose.  It wasn't for me

16     to dictate them or -- mine was to react in the circumstances.

17        Q.   But, General, my question is:  Did air-strikes depend exclusively

18     on our conduct or did it have to do with something with internal policies

19     and the credibility of NATO?  I believe that there was a larger picture

20     there, it wasn't just the matter of a small Serbian nation of, actually,

21     1.5 million Bosnian Serbs.

22        A.   I cannot answer a question about your beliefs.

23        Q.   Did these factors play any roles?  You were the commander in

24     Bosnia.  Did you have an obligation to take that into account, because

25     you, yourself, said on several occasions that you had close ties with the

Page 11859

 1     NATO?

 2        A.   I did not have to take the making of policy and the decisions

 3     above me into account in the actions that I did.  I had to understand

 4     their background and so forth, perhaps.  But in these circumstances and

 5     that August, the decisions made in the London Conference had been made,

 6     they were quite clear, and I was confident that their import had been

 7     communicated to you, amongst others.

 8        Q.   General, in your talks with the key players, Annan;

 9     Admiral Smith, Leighton Smith; Akashi; Holbrooke and the others, was

10     there any indication that there is something larger and more important at

11     stake than the fate of the Bosnian Serbs?  Did you discuss any of these

12     matters?

13        A.   No.  The few discussions that occurred and were either to do, in

14     the case of Admiral Leighton Smith, with the contingency planning we were

15     conducting, and we've discussed already, I don't recall a conversation

16     with Mr. Akashi, although I'm sure one happened in that August.  And with

17     Holbrooke and his team, it was -- there were -- I think he visited

18     Sarajevo twice in that time, and they were -- I was given the most

19     general of indications of what his negotiations -- how his negotiations

20     were going.

21        Q.   Well, that's why it is so important to know who convened the

22     London Conference, who took part in it, and what was to be achieved by

23     the London Conference.  Can you tell us that?

24        A.   I've told you who convened it in -- that I think convened it, and

25     that was the United Kingdom government.  I think every single

Page 11860

 1     troop-contributing nation was present.  And as far as I was concerned, it

 2     was all to do with the establishing a -- this change in the exclusion

 3     zone and safe area regime, for want of a name for it, that the decision

 4     as to whether there had been an attack on a safe area was now to lie with

 5     the military and not with the political chain of command.  The keys to

 6     initiate air attacks were put in the hands of the military commanders,

 7     not the political -- the SRSG.  They, after May, had been held by the

 8     Secretary-General, himself, from the point of view of NATO -- I beg your

 9     pardon, from the point of view of the UN.  And the -- and the decision

10     was that if bombing was initiated, this, if I remember the words

11     correctly, would be continuous and disproportionate until the attack

12     stopped and the exclusion zones were re-established, or something to that

13     effect, and that these senior officers would be sent off to explain this

14     to the parties concerned.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you for this information as well, that a

16     disproportionate attack was decided on.

17             Do you agree that Lieutenant-Colonel --

18     Lieutenant General Michael Ryan set the targets for that bombing months

19     before a reason or pretext actually came up?  This is Holbrooke's book,

20     planned by Admiral Smith, page 103:

21             [In English] "... planned by Admiral Smith and his brilliant air

22     force commander, Lieutenant General Michael E. Ryan.  The targets had

23     been picked months in advance."

24             [Interpretation] Did you know that?

25        A.   I don't think they'd been picked.  They may have collected

Page 11861

 1     information, identified potential targets, but I don't think they'd been

 2     picked.

 3        Q.   General, sir, do we agree that one air-strike took place in the

 4     absence of General Janvier, another one in the absence of the

 5     Secretary-General, and it was Kofi Annan who played a significant role?

 6        A.   I don't know what you're talking about.  Which air-strike?

 7        Q.   Towards the end of May, the first one.  You said yourself, and

 8     you confirmed in your book, that General Janvier was on leave at the time

 9     when you availed yourself of the opportunity to turn the key, as it were,

10     in order to start the bombing.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, General:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I wanted to give as much latitude as possible, but

13     I think we've gone beyond the outskirts of relevance and are no longer

14     even remotely illuminating the issues in this case.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  How is this last question relevant to your

16     case, Mr. Karadzic?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, this has to do with

18     side-stepping the people of top responsibility, the first echelon.  And

19     it is the second echelon that makes the decisions, and we have testimony

20     to that effect in the book of the late Holbrooke, and it says here that

21     Annan got the job of Secretary-General because he supported the bombing.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Side-stepping that allegedly took place on the part

23     of NATO, or whatever country, is relevant to your case how?

24             Move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  And, incidentally, Dr. Karadzic, you refer to

Page 11862

 1     the testimony in the book of the late Richard Holbrooke.  What

 2     Mr. Holbrooke put in his book is not testimony, and it's certainly not

 3     testimony before this Court.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is testimony by a direct

 5     participant.  I believe that the relevance lies in the fact that there is

 6     nothing we could have done in order to affect the developments that were

 7     underway.  We were but a small toy in the hands of the big players.

 8             We have a witness here now who was on the ground and who was

 9     supposed to carry out, on the ground, something that had been planned at

10     much higher levels.  That is the relevance.

11             However, we're going to move on to another topic.

12             Can we just have 23210 for a moment -- 32390.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this is marked for identification

14     as MFI D987.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, please, would you focus on this conversation of mine

17     with General Milovanovic on the 25th of September, when that first

18     bombing took place.  And I'm going to read this out.

19             This is a copy of the conversation between Radovan Karadzic and

20     General Milovanovic, and then this is a convention --

21             "Akashi has been chasing me all day.  I didn't want to call him,

22     but now I manage."

23             It says:

24             "Please, can you, over the next few minutes, try to do something?

25     Is it so difficult to return those four weapons, some four weapons?

Page 11863

 1     Nikola is here as well.  I said many things to him.  He says that he was

 2     with Mladic and with you, that he was in contact with you and Mladic.

 3     Some of them, I don't know who exactly."

 4             And then Karadzic says:

 5             "Please, can you do something about this?  I said to him, after

 6     what happened in Western Slavonia, we are not going to honour resolutions

 7     and contracts ..."

 8             You can see this for yourself.  I don't have to read it out:

 9             "If you shoot, are you going to burn all bridges for future

10     co-operation.  We will have to treat you as the enemy.  That's what I

11     said on television last night as well.  I was pleading.  It's not a

12     question of hours, it's a question of minutes.  I said that in a few

13     minutes, I cannot even establish contact, let alone do something.  I said

14     that I don't even know where these four weapons are."

15             Do you see this entire conversation, General?

16        A.   Yes.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Your Honour.

18             I should just note on the record that I was following the

19     transcript and the exhibit at the same time, and there are quite a few

20     words or phrases or passages omitted in the description of what was in

21     the document.  So I just need to put that on the record so when someone

22     reading the transcript turns to the original document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We have this in evidence, and I take it the

24     general was able to read the passage in its entirety.

25             So what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

Page 11864

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] My question is the following:

 2        Q.   General, do you see that we were given minutes to do something,

 3     and in minutes I cannot even establish contact with my troops?  Do you

 4     agree with that?

 5        A.   No.  I announced what was required sometime before the bombing

 6     started, and I did it to Mladic and on the television, publicly.  I don't

 7     know -- I don't recall the time-frame, but it was certainly more than

 8     minutes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Since this document was just marked for identification, let's

11     move on to another topic, and then perhaps we can revisit this one.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, sir, did you have the approval of the Bosnian Serbs to

14     bomb their ammunition depots?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

16             Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry to interrupt.  Just a small clarification.

18             The document was introduced as being a conversation of the 25th

19     of September, according to the transcript.  The exhibit indicates the

20     25th of May.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did say the 25th of May, and I

22     mean the first air-strike.  You can also read it on the document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question; approval from the Bosnian

24     Serbs?  Was that a question, Mr. Karadzic?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I've moved on to a new topic,

Page 11865

 1     the topic of the mandates and the powers of the United Nations forces.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Now, the last time we discussed this issue, you agreed that the

 4     presence of the UN was there, that the UN was actually present on the

 5     ground with the approval of the local authorities, including the Bosnian

 6     Serbs.  Now, did you have the approval of the Bosnian Serbs for this

 7     NATO -- for this air-strike on the 1st of May?

 8        A.   No.  It wasn't done on the 1st of May, either.  It was the 25th,

 9     I think, or 26th.

10        Q.   Yes, we have a problem with interpretation.  I did not say on the

11     1st of May.  Rather, I said the first air-strike in May, at the end of

12     May.

13             Can we briefly see 917 -- 21984, 65 ter.

14             And let me ask you, General, sir, whether at this point in time

15     the United Nations actually stopped being impartial.

16        A.   I use the phrase something to that effect in this document, if I

17     recall it correctly.  The point I'm making is that we've now applied

18     force to one side which -- as a result of the exclusion zone/safe area

19     policy, and we cannot expect or have lost the consent of the Bosnian

20     Serbs.  And this is a phrase I think I use in that document.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just scroll this up a bit.

22     Let's see point 4(a).

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And let's see what you have to say there:

25             [In English] "UNPROFOR no longer have a peacekeeping relationship

Page 11866

 1     with the BSA."

 2             The Bosnian Serb Army; right?

 3             "(It has lost the consent of one of the parties)."

 4        A.   That's correct, that's what I wrote there.

 5        Q.   "UNPROFOR is very close to being an ally of the Bosnian

 6     government (it is very nearly no longer impartial)."

 7             In other words, you were fully aware that the Mogadishu line had

 8     been crossed?

 9        A.   That's for others to decide.  I think we're hovering on the edges

10     of it, but that's -- that was my thoughts at that time that night.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this the time for our break or

12     can we go on?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it's time to have a break.

14             How much longer do you have to conclude your cross-examination,

15     Mr. Karadzic?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would appreciate it if I can get

17     the entire session, the next session, but I will do my best to complete

18     it sooner.

19             JUDGE KWON:  You'll have an hour in the next session.

20             Yes, half an hour, and we'll resume at 11.00.

21                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25        Q.   Is it correct that the Muslim side violated provisions on the

Page 11867

 1     total exclusion zones; in other words, that it had weapons emplacements

 2     that were not at weapons collection points, but, rather, throughout town

 3     and in the Marsal Tito Barracks?

 4        A.   I believe they had some weapons outside the weapon collection

 5     points; that is to say, weapons that should have been in the weapon

 6     collection points that were outside the weapon collection points.  I

 7     don't think they were in Tito Barracks, but I believe there were some in

 8     town that were outside the weapon collection points.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Could we now briefly see 09782 on the 65 ter list.  09782,

11     please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can we agree that this is a telegram sent by Ambassador Akashi to

14     Kofi Annan?

15             And if we now can see paragraph 4, please.

16             The telegram is dated the 26th of May, 1995.

17             Paragraph 4, please.

18             I'd like to refer you to the portion where it says:

19     "General Smith is aware ..."

20             [In English] "... is aware that there are government weapons in

21     Sarajevo that are not in the Tito Barracks or collection point ..."

22             [Interpretation] That's the fourth line from the bottom.

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Were NATO air-strikes carried out because of these violations of

25     the total exclusion zones; in other words, were Bosnian Muslims bombed?

Page 11868

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   We have a testimonial to this in P2171, where General Janvier

 3     informs Kofi Annan, on the 7th of May, and says that the Army of Bosnia

 4     and Herzegovina had five heavy weapons within the total exclusion zone.

 5     Can you explain why the Muslim side did not receive the same treatment

 6     that the Serbs were put under?

 7        A.   Am I looking at the 2171 or is that just an extra bit of

 8     information?

 9        Q.   No.  This is telegram 09782, and I just quoted another document

10     that was already admitted - that's P2171 - and said that this information

11     about these five weapons was also something that Kofi Annan was informed

12     of therein, and all I want to know is why the Bosnian side was not

13     treated the same way as the Serbs.

14        A.   Because they were not using those weapons, as I recall it, at the

15     time.  And Akashi says in that telegram that they -- they are in

16     compliance with the warning thus far.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into

18     evidence, this Akashi telegram to Annan.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Has it not been admitted yet?  Yes, we'll admit it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1051, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at 1D2841, then.

22     2841, please.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   You will recall, General, sir, that in the first part of your

25     evidence, you said that you were able to observe -- well, actually, you

Page 11869

 1     were shown the daily expenditures of weapons, and I would like you now to

 2     take a look at this report dated the 31st of May, 1995.  The Bosnian

 3     Army, the 1st Corps Command, produced this document.  This is an interim

 4     report, and it discusses the 1st Corps together with special units of

 5     MUP, Bosna and Lasta, and it says that they have started with combat

 6     actions along such-and-such axis.

 7             And could we now just see the part of the document where the

 8     ammunition expenditures are shown?  Could we see the next page, please.

 9     Yes, the next page.

10             General, can you please look at this.  It says here that the

11     1st Corps had 2.055 explosions on that day alone where they were actually

12     opening fire on all Serb lines.  So just take a look at the heavy weapons

13     mentioned here:  Mortars, 60-millimetre mortars; 90-millimetre rockets.

14     Let's see what else we have here.  At the bottom, we can see a

15     67-millimetre cannon, another 70- and 100-millimetre cannon, and it says:

16             "In the course -- yesterday and today, a large quantity of

17     ammunition was expended, as well as mines and explosives."

18             Even after the warning that was issued, was this mass bombing

19     that was carried out by them, was that something that was -- that went by

20     unobserved?

21        A.   I don't think it was unobserved.  I'm not sure - I'm pretty

22     certain - that the 60-millimetre mortar wasn't classified as a heavy

23     weapon, and I'm not sure, either, that the 76-millimetre cannon was a

24     heavy weapon either, but there I may be incorrect.  The -- and I think

25     the date of this was after we'd stopped bombing, anyhow, because of the

Page 11870

 1     hostages.

 2        Q.   General, sir, perhaps we can take a look at the first page,

 3     because I am afraid that there is something that we can't see on this

 4     page.

 5             It says very clearly there 100 pieces of --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Mr. Karadzic is reading

 7     too fast.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you were reading too fast so that the

 9     interpreters were not able to catch up with you.  Could you repeat.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

11        Q.   Large-calibre explosions mentioned here, we have:  TMRKRMT, 500

12     pieces, bullet; 76 millimetres, P1, 30 pieces; bullets, 76-millimetre

13     ZIS, 30 pieces; 100-millimetre bullet, 30 pieces; 105-millimetre bullet,

14     30 pieces; 120-millimetre round, 50 pieces; 152-millimetre round or

15     bullet, 20 pieces; 60-millimetre mines, 400 pieces; 82-millimetre mines

16     or shells, 800 pieces; 120-millimetre shells, 150 pieces; 107-millimetre

17     rockets, 15 pieces; and 128-millimetre rockets, 10 pieces, which brings

18     us to a total of 2.055 explosions or detonations on that day, the 30th of

19     May, going on to the 31st.  And this report was prepared on the 31st of

20     May.  We saw that.  Correct?

21        A.   Yes, 31st.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Now, did you know that under the agreement, anything

23     above 20.7 millimetres [as interpreted] was actually prohibited within

24     the total exclusion zone, so anything that went over the 20.7 millimetres

25     [as interpreted]?  12.7-millimetre.  The transcript is not correct.

Page 11871

 1     12.7.

 2        A.   I'm -- my memory is that that is 12.7 for direct-fire weapons and

 3     in excess of 82-millimetre for mortars was the definitions, but that

 4     would have to be checked to be certain.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             I would like to tender this document.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I think there's -- it's close, Your Honour, but my

 9     primary concern is that we moved to the document quickly, and the witness

10     was advised that the document referred to explosions on a particular

11     date, and my recollection, from seeing the document as it moved through,

12     is that it referred to a request for supplemental information.  But --

13             JUDGE KWON:  We can read it.  With that caveat, shall we admit

14     it?

15             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1052, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now briefly see

19     1D372 [as interpreted], please.  1D3172.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

21        Q.   Please look at this document.  This is a letter sent to

22     General Mladic by you, and on the first page we see the definition of

23     heavy weapons.  And then the second bullet point:

24             [In English] "All guns, howitzers and mortars of calibre larger

25     than 12.7 millimetres."

Page 11872

 1             [Interpretation] Is that so, is that correct?

 2        A.   That's what's written there.  But it's dated, you said, in

 3     September?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Top of the page.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes, the 4th of September.  This is, if I recall

 6     the document, me telling Mladic what is to be removed from the Sarajevo

 7     exclusion zone after the bombing in September.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   But, General, you did not re-define the 1994 agreement.  All you

10     did here was to remind of what the definition of "heavy weapons" was.

11     And if you recall, it was then, too, that everything in excess of 12.7

12     was mentioned.  So this is -- you're just giving a definition here, not a

13     new proposal.

14        A.   I don't know that that's the case at all.  I think the situation

15     has changed materially by now.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             I would like to tender this document, please.

18             Before that, can we just see the last page to see that the

19     general signed this letter, in fact.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Can you confirm that this is your signature?

22        A.   Yes, it is.

23             JUDGE KWON:  This will be admitted.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1053, Your Honours.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11873

 1        Q.   Would you agree, General, that the NATO air-strikes of the

 2     ammunitions depot in Pale were not strictly a self-defence move?

 3        A.   They weren't self-defence.  They were to reimpose the exclusion

 4     zones.

 5        Q.   Very well.  Now, you were fully aware of the distinction.

 6             Can we now briefly see 1D03133.  1D03133.

 7             Air-strikes are strategic measures; correct?

 8             Here, we see before us a book by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the

 9     former Secretary-General of the United Nations.

10             Can we now see page 86, please.

11             So on page 86, we can see:

12             [In English] "Air-strikes and close air support was important."

13             [Interpretation] Can we find that part.

14             JUDGE KWON:  The penultimate paragraph, starting with:  "I asked

15     NATO ..."  Shall we zoom it further.

16             THE ACCUSED:  "I asked NATO to co-ordinate with me ...," and so

17     on.

18             [Interpretation] And then it goes on to say.

19             "... was limited, by resolution, to the protection of UN troops

20     under attack.  Air-strikes were a strategic matter, the use of which

21     would signal that the peacekeeping mission had given way to war by NATO

22     and by the United Nations against the targeted forces and their political

23     authorities."

24             [Interpretation] The United Nations -- NATO and the

25     United Nations were actually entering the war -- into war against one

Page 11874

 1     side?  Was that the case, as stated here by the Secretary-General?  Would

 2     you agree with this?

 3        A.   It's as he's written it.  I think we must be very careful in --

 4     to be clear as to what we mean by the words.  Some people use the word

 5     "air-strike" to describe any air attack, so if you were flying aeroplanes

 6     in close air support, they would carry out an air-strike.  In the sense

 7     that Boutros-Ghali has used it in this book, he is drawing a distinction

 8     between the exclusion zones, and air-strikes.  I deduce -- I haven't read

 9     the rest of the page to see it, but that's what I understand him to be --

10     connecting the air-strikes to the exclusion zones, and close air support

11     to the defence of a United Nations -- elements of a United Nations force.

12             And as you see in the document you've already shown me of my own

13     writing in May, I think that we get very close, indeed right on the

14     edges, of our position as peacekeepers when we start to use air-strikes

15     to impose the exclusion zone.

16        Q.   But, General, sir, a moment ago you agreed that the attack on the

17     ammunition depot was not just a matter of defence, but actually an

18     air-strike.  And I received the same answer from General Janvier and

19     Ambassador Akashi that these air-strikes were, in fact, a punishment, and

20     we've heard testimony about the same issue by General Rose here.  But the

21     point is this is actually moving from confrontation to conflict.

22             Did you, yourself, say that after these air-strikes, you actually

23     crossed the line from confrontation into conflict with one side?

24        A.   Yes.  When you're bombing someone, you're in conflict with them.

25        Q.   Thank you.  You repeated the same things in your conversation

Page 11875

 1     with General Mladic on the 28th of May, when you said that there were two

 2     types of close air support:

 3             [In English] "... as a means of air defence," [B/C/S spoken],

 4     "such as the two against the Bosnian Serbs last week ..."

 5             [Interpretation] And that you can order either of those types of

 6     close air support.  Do you recall this conversation?

 7        A.   Yes, and there were those two types of air-strikes, if you like

 8     to call them that.  Or let me put it another way.  There were two

 9     purposes for which you might use air-strikes; one was self-defence and

10     the other one was to do with the imposition of the safe areas and the

11     exclusion zones.

12        Q.   Well, General, sir, that doesn't apply to the exclusion zones

13     alone, but, rather, to accomplishing objectives that one of the sides is

14     not willing to agree to; in other words, to impose a solution on them.

15     Is that correct?

16        A.   That's what the exclusion zone -- if weapons were being taken out

17     of the weapon collection points or being used to shell the civilian

18     population, then the exclusion zone and safe area decisions were not

19     being carried out, and the -- we then had resource to air-strikes to

20     endeavour to reimpose them.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into

22     evidence, Your Excellency.

23             JUDGE KWON:  That page?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, perhaps the entire document

25     or just that page.  I leave it to the Trial Chamber.  I don't mean the

Page 11876

 1     entire book.  I mean the five or six pages that we've used.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, what is your observation?

 3             MR. TIEGER:  I think the operative language is "we've used."  I

 4     was only aware of, as the Court noted, that particular page.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit that page 86.  Yes, 86.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 1054, Your Honours.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

 8        Q.   General, sir, you were determined, in other words, to fight the

 9     Bosnian Serbs, correct, and that can explain why it was that the Muslim

10     side was not bombed?

11        A.   No, it's not correct.  I was determined to carry out my mandate,

12     which was to see that the safe areas and the exclusion zones were

13     established and maintained.  The -- since they were being broken by the

14     Bosnian Serbs, I set about to put them back -- get the situation back to

15     where I wanted it with the means I had available, which included bombing.

16     This I set out to do, and in May this failed to achieve its purpose.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A while ago, we saw which calibre

18     was used by the Muslims to fire at us from these zones, and you didn't

19     punish them for that.

20             Can we now please have Exhibit D1009, page 321.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   It says in your book:

23             [In English] "My force was composed in the main of

24     battalions from different nations ...," and so on and so on:

25             "As a result, no battalion could be manoeuvred as a whole, which

Page 11877

 1     meant the level of the fight I could have was, at the best, that of a

 2     reinforced company, subdivision or battalion.  However ..."

 3             [No interpretation]:

 4             "However, the opponent I ultimately came to fight, the Bosnian

 5     Serbs, who were operating in company and battalion groups ..."

 6             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

 7             So you were fully conscious of the fact that the Serbs were your

 8     adversary.  This is what is written in your book.  Is that correct?

 9        A.   I said "ultimately came to fight" or -- yes, I ultimately came to

10     fight.  That -- as I've tried to explain, my business was the delivery of

11     aid and the maintenance of the exclusion zones.  If I was prevented from

12     doing either of those things, then I had, under certain circumstances,

13     the resource to armed force, and that's what I applied.  And since you

14     were preventing me, you got fought.  When you stopped, I stopped.

15        Q.   Last time, General, you confirmed that in the first half of 1995

16     alone, the Muslims launched at least two major offensives from Sarajevo;

17     is that correct?

18        A.   I -- my memory is that they launched one out of Sarajevo, and

19     that was in June.  The other two that I confirmed were not out of

20     Sarajevo.  One was to the west and the other to the north-east.

21        Q.   Sir, on that occasion we showed you a document that an offensive

22     started on the 15th of May, and the document just admitted confirms that

23     on the 31st of May, the largest-calibre howitzers, 120-millimetre,

24     160-millimetre mortars, 100-millimetre guns were used to fire at us from

25     the exclusion zone.  Did that hamper your mandate?

Page 11878

 1        A.   The situation --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Excuse me.

 3             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Just a couple of points, Your Honour.

 5             I don't think that's a correct representation of what the

 6     document states.  I made that clarification earlier with respect to

 7     whether -- the distinction between firing at a particular time and

 8     requests for materiel.  And also there seems to be an assumption built

 9     into the question about where the forces were located.

10             THE WITNESS:  I just wanted to make the other point that I -- due

11     to your -- Bosnian Serbs' actions, I was in no position to act at all,

12     whatever I wanted to do, on the 31st of May.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Continue, Mr. Karadzic.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Were you able to do anything on the 15th of May, before we

16     committed any violations?

17        A.   I think you did commit violations, and I seem to recall that my

18     deputy over that period, since I was out of the country, I think, at that

19     time, protested on a number of occasions, and the fighting died down.

20        Q.   Sir, we have records of the consumption from the official Muslim

21     sources.  The document referred to by Mr. Tieger said that:

22             "Yesterday and today, the large quantity of ammunition and mines

23     and explosives were consumed by the 1st Corps in Sarajevo."

24             Therefore, there is no doubt that we were under constant attack.

25     So can you tell me who violated the truce?  Who violated the Carter

Page 11879

 1     Agreement, the Bosnian Serb side or the Muslim side?

 2        A.   I can't -- I couldn't tell you with any confidence who was the

 3     first side to start shooting at each other again after the

 4     Carter Agreement was signed.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I wanted to let you know that you have

 6     about half an hour to conclude.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, but I'm afraid this is

 8     really not sufficient.  However, let's move on.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

10        Q.   In your book, you said -- to be fully effective, let me remind

11     you it's page 348.

12             Can we please have this page on our screens:  "To be fully

13     effective ...," and then a little bit further on:

14             [In English] "... there is a need to select targets which will

15     affect the intentions of those one is opposed to, rather than necessarily

16     the specific incidents at hand.  To deal with the taking of a bridge in

17     one village, it is sometimes better not to attack the bridge, but to hit

18     a road in another village that is of greater significance to the

19     opponent."

20             [Interpretation] Was this logic of yours the underlying reason

21     for targeting an ammunition depot which was far away from the total

22     exclusion zone?

23        A.   Yes, it was.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And that was the first time that the punishment was

25     not effected against the weapon that was in breach, but rather against

Page 11880

 1     the side located at a considerable distance?

 2        A.   It was the -- the effect that I was after was to impress upon the

 3     leadership the need to take this decision, and the decision I wanted them

 4     to take, which was to remove the weapons from the exclusion zone.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that all those who were involved in

 6     air-strikes were combatants?

 7        A.   Those carrying out the air-strikes were combatants, yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that those who carried out

 9     reconnaissance of targets for -- on their behalf behind our lines, and

10     who guided them, as forward air controllers, were also in Pale and that

11     they aided these operations?

12        A.   No such people existed, as far as I am concerned.

13        Q.   Is it possible that you didn't know that?

14        A.   I do not think any such action was carried out.

15        Q.   Didn't you say, yourself, that you posted forward air controllers

16     within the safe zones and that even national contingents had their own

17     forward air controllers that were operating on a compatible basis with

18     NATO?

19        A.   The -- I did, but there were no forward air controllers involved

20     in the attacks in May.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  We don't have any more

22     time for this.  We're going to revisit this issue at a later stage.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Now, sir, did the Serbs ever give their consent for having these

25     elements, such as scouts and forward air controllers, present in that

Page 11881

 1     territory?

 2        A.   If you were referring to the forward air controllers that were

 3     forward in -- such as those in Srebrenica, I believe you knew that that's

 4     what they were -- that's who they were and what they were capable of.

 5        Q.   Sir, let's establish a distinction between the close air support

 6     and the attacks.  Did we give our approval to have scouts behind our

 7     lines who would be party to the air-strikes?

 8        A.   That is like asking me as to whether or not I stopped beating my

 9     wife, isn't it?  Can I have the question phrased so that I can answer it?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Before we continue:  General, you answered that at

11     the time, and we are talking about May, there were no forward air

12     controllers involved in the attacks in May, but there were air

13     controllers, but they were not involved in the attacks?

14             THE WITNESS:  There were forward air control parties in the

15     enclaves.  I think it was current Dutch ones in Srebrenica and a -- and,

16     from memory, a British one in Gorazde, but they were not involved in the

17     attacks of May, at the end of May.

18             JUDGE KWON:  What were they supposed to do?  What did they do?

19             THE WITNESS:  They were there in case they were -- close air

20     support was required in those eastern enclaves.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Did -- the UNPROFOR reports and other intelligence collected on

25     the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina were something that were accessible by

Page 11882

 1     NATO or were available to NATO?

 2        A.   I would like to differentiate between UNPROFOR reports and other

 3     intelligence.  UNPROFOR reports were almost certainly copied to NATO.  At

 4     what level and with what frequency, I cannot recall, but I'm confident it

 5     was happening.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  While you were in command of UNPROFOR, did your

 7     personnel have access to information on the ground collected by UNMOs,

 8     military observers?

 9        A.   As I think everyone knows, the UNMOs were not under my command.

10     But at my headquarters, I certainly would see the UNMOs reporting in my

11     headquarters.  I don't know how much -- how far down my chain of command

12     those reports went, but I would expect them to go down to the sector

13     headquarters for those operating within that sector.  To explain, the

14     Sector Sarajevo would have seen the UNMO reports that concern Sarajevo.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Was there any provision that prohibited your

16     personnel from sharing with NATO what was being received by UNPROFOR?

17     Did you have any such explicit prohibition not to share such things with

18     NATO?

19        A.   In my headquarters, I don't think so.  As I said right at the

20     beginning, there was a NATO liaison officer, and I think the general

21     reporting in the headquarters was shared.  Now, I can't speak for Zagreb

22     or any other headquarters.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can we agree that all the captured members of

24     UNPROFOR, captured in May by the Serbs, were active-duty personnel of the

25     United Nations at the time of their capture?

Page 11883

 1        A.   Yes, I think they were.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, when did you realise that the Serbs

 3     were intent on capturing UN members in the event of an attack in May?

 4     Did you know that before the very event took place?

 5        A.   The potential for such an event, yes, I -- that was anticipated.

 6     The nature of what happened, no.  And I realised it when I was rung up

 7     and told that an UNMO would have his throat cut if we didn't stop

 8     bombing.

 9        Q.   But, General, in our meeting of the 9th of May, and this is an

10     exhibit in evidence, your Colonel Baxter said he had intelligence that

11     BiH had begun an offensive to lift the siege of Sarajevo and that he

12     could not allow the UN to help them beat us if NATO was using against the

13     BSA, that our relationship would be -- disappear.

14             Do you remember that if you interfered and called upon NATO to

15     attack us, that that would mean the end of our relationships and that we

16     would become an enemy of yours?

17             If you need reminding, let's look at P2264, paragraph 3.

18             Do you remember this being recorded at this meeting of ours?

19        A.   I'd like to look at the document, please.  I don't think

20     Colonel Baxter spoke in that meeting.

21        Q.   This is what Mr. Baxter quoted as my words, that I said to you

22     that I had information that an offensive was in the offing and that, in

23     that event, we shall deem you our enemy:

24             [In English] "Our relationship would disappear and we would treat

25     you as the enemy."

Page 11884

 1             [Interpretation] In other words, I think it was made very clear

 2     to you that if we come under attack, you were no longer going to be our

 3     friends and impartial?

 4        A.   Could we turn the page over, please.

 5        Q.   With all due respect, I am using too much time on this.  This is

 6     your minutes of this meeting, and he says:

 7             [In English] "He did make a distinction between UNHCR and the

 8     ICRC and the UN, who he describes as the armed force of the

 9     Security Council."

10             [Interpretation] And it says:

11             [In English] "It is clear the BSA will continue to fight with BiH

12     and that if the NATO are drawn into the fight, the decision has been made

13     to treat UN and NATO as enemies."

14             [Interpretation] This was told you on the 9th of May from the

15     highest place in Republika Srpska, that if you start fighting us, this

16     will turn you into an enemy.

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Did the others, for example, Dr. Zametica and other

19     Serb leaders, inform you, before, during and after the attack, that that

20     was our position?

21             Can we have 65 ter 01343, from which we can see what Dr. Zametica

22     said publicly about this issue.  65 ter 01343:

23             [In English] "A statement made by Dr. Zametica at midnight last

24     night."

25             [Interpretation] That's item C.  We need the next page to see

Page 11885

 1     item C.

 2             It seems we need page 5.

 3             Here's the statement made by Dr. Zametica:

 4             [In English] "On several occasions ..."

 5             [Interpretation] I'll go directly to this portion:

 6             [In English] "At meetings here in Pale, we have said to UNPROFOR

 7     that should there be any air attacks anywhere in RS, we would treat the

 8     entire UNPROFOR, all personnel, as enemies."

 9             [Interpretation] Is that correct?

10        A.   That's what it says there, yeah.

11        Q.   Therefore, there was no doubt that that was the situation; that

12     if we were attacked, we would defend ourselves, and that an attack can

13     only come from an enemy, not from a friend.

14             Do you also know that Dr. Krajisnik said:

15             [In English] "The UN had taken the side of our enemy, and we had

16     to treat the UN accordingly"?

17             [Interpretation] Do you remember him saying that on the 26th of

18     May?  It's the same document that I am quoting, and it's on the next

19     page, line 5 or 6 from the top:

20             [In English] "It is incomprehensible ..."

21             [Interpretation] Can you see this?

22        A.   Yes, I see it.

23        Q.   [In English]  "It is incomprehensible that the UN ..."

24             [Interpretation] The last sentence:

25             [In English] "We have the right of defence, and we will use it."

Page 11886

 1             [Interpretation] Can we tender this document into evidence?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1055, Your Honours.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have now 1D -- actually,

 5     65 ter 11853.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Do you recall that at the very outset, the captured men, it was

 8     said that they were not hostages, but prisoners of war?  Now, you can see

 9     Reuters' report of the 1st of June, 1995:

10             [In English] "Karadzic's comment followed warnings to the Western

11     powers."

12             [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please, paragraph 3:

13             [In English] "He said that the detained UN personnel were

14     prisoners of war, not hostages."

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Turn on first the microphone.

17             Could you repeat.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Paragraph 3:

20             "He said the detained UN personnel were prisoners of war, not

21     hostages."

22             [Interpretation] And the next one:

23             [In English] "... they have to be regarded as prisoners of war

24     because they have the same commander as the one who ordered NATO

25     air-strike."

Page 11887

 1             [Interpretation] Were you aware of the fact that our position

 2     from the very beginning of bombing was that we were going to consider you

 3     as enemy, and that once the bombing started, we were going to capture

 4     enemy troops and treat them as prisoners of war?  Or to put it simply:

 5     Is that consistent with the position that I maintained the whole period?

 6        A.   You've got a number of questions there.

 7             As I've said to you, and I had heard you at the time, I was well

 8     aware that -- that the -- we were vulnerable to having the UN, first of

 9     all, being seen as your enemy; secondly, that we would have people taken

10     hostage.  Hostages had been taken before, after all.  What I saw happen

11     was a number of men being taken hostage, not prisoners of war.  I do not

12     consider a prisoner of war is someone who is chained to a gate, or

13     something like that, and having -- with threats that he'd have his throat

14     cut.  In my view, that is a hostage.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's a whole different issue that

16     we will revisit if there is any time left.

17             I would like to tender this document, please.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1056, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now briefly see 1D03132.

21     03132.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   This is an interview that I gave to an Italian news agency from

24     Milan, "Il Giornale," and:

25             [In English] "Why did the Serbs take the blue helmets hostage?"

Page 11888

 1             "Karadzic:  The UN leaders have turned the blue helmets into an

 2     active part of the clash.  What is more, Akashi cannot be neutral on the

 3     ground and our enemy in the air.  I'm talking about the dispatch of

 4     fighter bombers."

 5             [Interpretation] I speak here about my counterpart, Mr. Akashi,

 6     and I say the same things, and I said to him the same things that your

 7     counterpart, General Mladic, said to you; is that correct?  Was my

 8     counterpart Akashi and yours --

 9        A.   One could see it that way, yes.

10        Q.   And was this, what is stated here on the 23rd of July, consistent

11     with my position on this matter?

12        A.   We're talking about the first paragraph?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Probably the paragraph in the middle:

14             "Why did the Serbs take the Blue Helmets hostage?"

15             "The UN leaders have turned the Blue Helmets into an active

16     part ..."

17             THE WITNESS:  That follows on from your previous statements, yes.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             I would like to tender this.

20             And, Your Excellency, I would now urge you to allow me some more

21     time.  I would really appreciate that.  At least through the end of this

22     session, because I don't have enough time.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we'll give you 15 minutes, and please

25     choose the best topics to deal with during that period.

Page 11889

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So I would like to tender this

 2     document into evidence and also to add two additional pages from

 3     General Smith's book to it.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Italian news clipping will be admitted as

 5     Exhibit D1057, and, of course, the pages 321 and 348 will be added to the

 6     book.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now move into private

 8     session, please, because of the topic that I intend to broach?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Just a second.

10     [Private session]    [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can we agree, General, that in the fighting around Vrbanja Most

14     on the 27th of May, the UN captured some Serb soldiers that they only

15     released on the 17th of June, when we released the UNPROFOR members?

16        A.   I don't recall the date of the release, but I recall at least two

17     Serb soldiers being captured.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly see 1D3231, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

20        Q.   Is it true, General, that the deaths occurred when your forces

21     recaptured Vrbanja Bridge from the Serbs?  Is that correct?

22        A.   The deaths of whom?

23        Q.   Well, were two Serbs killed and four captured at Vrbanja Bridge?

24        A.   I don't recall the precise details.

25        Q.   Well, please take a look at your statement, paragraph 128.

Page 11890

1             On the --

 2             [In English] "On the 27th of May, Bosnian Serb troops disguised

 3     as French soldiers in UN blue helmets and French uniforms, seized a

 4     French position at Vrbanja Bridge in Sarajevo, killing two French

 5     soldiers and taking 11 prisoners.  The French counter-attacked and

 6     recaptured observation post, killing two Serb troops and taking four

 7     prisoners."

 8             [Interpretation] But this is not how things actually transpired,

 9     not in this order.

10             Let's take a look at page 4 here, paragraph 13:

11             [In English] "On 27 May 1995, the Serbs captured an UNPROFOR

12     observation post at the Vrbanja Bridge in Sarajevo, detaining some

13     United Nations soldiers.  The position was recaptured by UNPROFOR at the

14     cost of two dead and fourteen wounded.  There were also Serb casualties."

15             [Interpretation] In other words, when you recaptured

16     Vrbanja Bridge, you had two deaths and we had two deaths and four

17     wounded; correct?

18        A.   If that's what you -- you say so.  I --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             We would like to tender this into evidence.  This is a cable to

21     the UN.  Can we -- we'd like to tender it.  This is Akashi reporting to

22     the UN.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1058, perhaps under seal,

25     Your Honours.

Page 11891

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Can we not admit it publicly because we dealt with

 2     it in private session?

 3             MR. TIEGER:  I believe you're correct, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it publicly.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6        Q.   In other words, you considered these captured soldiers to be, in

 7     fact, prisoners of war; is that correct?

 8        A.   Whose captured soldiers?

 9        Q.   Serb soldiers, Serb soldiers who were captured by your soldiers

10     at Vrbanja Bridge.

11        A.   I gave instructions that they were to be treated as prisoners of

12     war.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D01314 -- 013134.

14     And I have to say that I'm under great pressure, in terms of time.

15     1D01314.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, it should be 1D03134.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 3134.

18             3134, yes, now I have it.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Is this a telegram compiled by you, General?

21        A.   It would seem so.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Please see item 4:

25             [In English] "The commanders should be the ones who

Page 11892

 1     negotiate ..."

 2             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.  And then number 5,

 3     5(A).  So they are de facto prisoners of war; is that right?

 4        A.   That's what I put, yes.

 5        Q.   "I'm clear in my own mind."

 6             So when you capture Serbs, they are prisoners of war.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 8     document, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Who are "they" that are referred in this document;

10     the Serb soldiers?

11             THE WITNESS:  I think I am referring to those we have captured.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             Yes, this will be Exhibit D1060.

14             MR. TIEGER:  And, Your Honour, this one should be under seal, at

15     least temporarily.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, yes.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you recall, General, that there were negotiations in order to

19     exchange these men, while we're still in private session?

20        A.   I do recall negotiations taking place, although I was not part of

21     them.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I should have said this was Exhibit D1059.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Can we now have 1D03135.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11893

 1        Q.   Is this a UN document, sir?  Please take a look at item 1:

 2             [In English] "UN has not the legal right to hold prisoners of

 3     war."

 4             [Interpretation] And then item 3:

 5             [In English] "If UN uses such detainees," and so on, "as

 6     bargaining chips ... UN is de facto accepting the rules of the hostage

 7     game set by the party."

 8             [Interpretation] And then item 4:

 9             [In English] "... FMEDO advised that the Serbian soldiers held by

10     UNPROFOR must be released immediately and unconditionally."

11             [Interpretation] Is it correct that the FMEDO advised that they

12     be immediately released?

13        A.   He may have done.

14        Q.   And this was two days before you wrote that they were, de facto,

15     prisoners of war?

16        A.   If the date -- yes, I think my document -- no, I don't -- was my

17     document the one you had earlier that -- dated the 30th?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE WITNESS:  It is, right.  Then it's two days before.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             I would like to tender this document.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Could you tell us what is an FMEDO?

23             THE WITNESS:  I don't remember.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             THE WITNESS:  And I'm pretty certain this isn't in my

Page 11894

 1     headquarters, either.  I think this is Zagreb, if only because it's

 2     addressed to the force commander.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             We'll admit it.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Under seal, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1060, under seal.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 9             With respect to "under seal," I don't understand how we can

10     receive documents with no Rule 70 conditions and then they are becoming

11     under seal.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We put it out of an abundance of caution, and

13     we'll deal with it after this has been concluded.  We'll revisit all the

14     transcript which was done in the private session and all the documents

15     put under seal.

16             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, you have more?  Go until the end of this

17     session.  There's only 10 minutes.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   Do you recall, General, sir, that these Serbs were released only

20     when UN members were released, which was on the 18th of June; in other

21     words, that they were exchanged?  Do you recall that?

22        A.   I think that was the case, yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now I would like to put a few questions to you about

24     Sarajevo.  And then, if we have some more time left, I will move on to

25     another topic, one final topic.

Page 11895

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 2             Do you like to discuss it in open session?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  My apologies.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We go back to open session.

 5                           [Open session]

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Can you recall, General, sir, whether the Muslims had ever asked

 8     for a cease-fire in the Sarajevo area?

 9        A.   I can't recall -- no, I can't recall a case in the time I was

10     commander of UNPROFOR.

11        Q.   Do you agree that in other areas, they did seek to have a

12     cease-fire in place; in Bihac, Gorazde, and so on?

13        A.   I can't immediately recall cases there either, cases in those

14     areas either.

15        Q.   Do you know of any case where we denied a Muslim offer to have a

16     cease-fire in place?

17        A.   As I said, I can't recall the Muslims asking for one.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember whether, while you were there, the

19     Serbs ever launched an offensive in the Sarajevo area with the objective

20     of capturing a Muslim portion of the town?

21        A.   In my time there, I don't -- I can recall attacks, but not -- not

22     in such a size and scale that they appeared to be wanting to take

23     territory.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that we declared unilateral

25     cease-fires on occasions of some religious holidays, but also outside of

Page 11896

 1     that, in Sarajevo, itself?  That's what I'm referring to.

 2        A.   They may have occurred.  I don't remember them in 1995.

 3        Q.   You confirmed that they launched offensives.  Do you remember,

 4     General, that Muslims took advantage and exploited the NATO air-strikes

 5     carried out in 1995, both in May and later on?

 6        A.   They did not take advantage, in my memory, at all.  They did not

 7     take advantage in May.  In September, or late August and September, they

 8     did not take advantage of the air-strikes in the vicinity of Sarajevo.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 1D3222, please, in

10     e-court.

11             And just can we admit -- or has this previous document been

12     admitted already?

13             All right, very well.  We have these two maps under the same

14     number.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, can you see here that the borders, HVO borders, and the

17     BH Army lines of October 1995 have been marked on this map, and can you

18     agree with me that the Serbs thereby lost a significant part of the

19     territory?

20        A.   Can we --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Zoom in to the legend so the general can see

22     that part.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   You can see where the VRS was and how it withdrew?

25        A.   This is over by Bihac, isn't it?  My memory of the map --

Page 11897

 1        Q.   Yes, that's correct.  That's in South-Western Bosnia, between

 2     Jajce and Donji Vakuf.  At Vlasic, as it were.

 3             Thank you.  Can we see the next page, please.

 4             Can you see, General, that this is to the south of Sarajevo, and

 5     it depicts the same period, October 1995, or, rather, January through

 6     October 1995, showing how Serb forces lost these villages at the foot of

 7     Bjelasnica, which had been in our hands and then we handed them over to

 8     UNPROFOR, and would you agree with me that this constitutes loss of

 9     territory?

10        A.   I'd certainly agree that the map shows that the Bosnian Serbs

11     moved further east, the -- and lost the ground that they were holding at

12     the beginning of the year.  In the period, moved further east by October

13     1995, that's what the map shows.  The -- yes, that's what the map shows.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             I would like to tender this document, these two pages, the two

16     maps.  Perhaps they can be admitted as one exhibit or two, whatever you

17     choose.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I think we heard about the origin of this map,

19     didn't we?

20             MR. TIEGER:  I was trying to refresh my recollection about that

21     earlier.  I can't bring it to mind, but if it's -- whatever the origin, I

22     gather it wasn't previously admitted, and I certainly don't see anything

23     about the question and answer, that is eliciting this witness's

24     map-reading skills, that would give rise to admission.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can assist.

Page 11898

 1             When we showed the first map in this series, it was clear that it

 2     was a map -- a CIA map, and we identified them then.  And I believe that

 3     one of those maps has been admitted, showing the offensive and

 4     counter-offensive near Bihac, and I believe this was a map depicting

 5     1994.  We used it with General Rose's testimony, I believe.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  General, could you agree that what is depicted on

 7     this map reflects the situation at the time; i.e., you said that Bosnian

 8     Serbs moved further east and lost the ground that they were holding at

 9     the time?

10             THE WITNESS:  In broad terms, I -- that happened by the end of

11     October.  I wouldn't want to be any more precise than that.  And that

12     would apply to both of those maps.

13             JUDGE KWON:  And with that, we'll admit this.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1061, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Now it's really time for you to conclude.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just two quick documents.

17             D929, D929, just to show you, General, a report of the 29th of

18     May, the UN report, and to show that the UN was aware that the Muslim

19     side was taking advantage of the situation.

20             Can we see the last page, "Assessment," please, or, rather, the

21     penultimate page, before last.

22             Can we see where it says "A4"?  Is that bottom of the page, it

23     says "A4."  These are tables and addresses that we see here.

24             Here we have it now:

25             [In English] "Assessment:  The ABiH are taking advantage of the

Page 11899

 1     BSA preoccupation with the UN and NATO to mount offensives in the

 2     Komusina and Ozren Salient.  It is thought that most of their assets are

 3     likely to be committed to these offensives, but future action with an

 4     objective of Donji Vakuf cannot be ruled out."

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Was it clear to the UN then that elsewhere in Bosnia, the Muslim

 7     side was taking advantage of the situation and exploiting the outcome of

 8     the bombing?

 9        A.   It's clear that that's the assessment of the headquarters of this

10     document, which I think is Sector South-West by the units that are in

11     it -- that are mentioned in it.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             And one final document, 65 ter 02278, please.

14             While we wait for it to come up, I have to say that we haven't

15     even touched on the issue of weapons smuggling and many other areas, such

16     as the abuse of the situation around the airport and several other

17     topics.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   I have a Serbian version before me.  This is a document from the

20     28th Division, and that's a military unit of the Army of Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina in Srebrenica.  Would you agree with that?

22        A.   It seems so, yes, yeah.

23        Q.   In the course of the Muslim offensive in Sarajevo, we see what

24     the 8th Division was doing here.  It was deployed in Srebrenica and Zepa

25     enclaves, and:

Page 11900

 1             "... although facing big problems in connection with food

 2     supplies and protecting the area," and so forth, "... decided to

 3     contribute to the fight against the aggressor, and, with that aim, have

 4     intensified their activities deep inside the territory temporarily

 5     occupied by the aggressor.  In the course of their combat operations,

 6     reconnaissance and sabotage groups and the 28th Division encountered

 7     several times the enemy."

 8             And so on.

 9             And then you can see what they did.  They executed 13 Serbs or

10     killed 13 Serbs, seized so and so, and then it says that:

11             "In order to prevent enemy forces from sending additional forces

12     from the Srebrenica and Zepa area to the Sarajevo theatre ..."

13             And then it says what the outcome was, seven people captured, and

14     so on and so forth.

15             So, sir, can you see here that 10 days before the Serbs captured

16     Srebrenica, they were killing Serb forces and stretching them across the

17     lines in order to prevent them to go to Sarajevo?  So does this show that

18     there was an increase of activities in the Srebrenica area?

19        A.   I can't say it was an increase, but it certainly reports the

20     activities they were carrying out as at the 30th of June.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can this be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will admit it.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 1062, Your Honours.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11901

 1        Q.   Last question, General.  Should one look specifically where a

 2     shell fell to see whether there is a particular target there in order to

 3     be able to characterise that shell?

 4        A.   I don't understand the question.

 5        Q.   Was it important for you and your people to know fully what the

 6     deployment of the opposing forces was in your zone?  Was it not important

 7     for you to know deployment, as a whole, of personnel and equipment?

 8        A.   Of all the parties, do you mean, or just me, my forces?  Of

 9     course, I wanted to know where mine were, and I tried to know where both

10     the Bosnian Serbs and the Federation forces were and what they were

11     doing.

12        Q.   Did either side succeed in concealing anything before you?

13        A.   Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Thank you, General, sir.  My apologies for this rush, and,

16     therefore, some of my questions were unclear because I was not systematic

17     enough.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I take it you have some re-examination after the

19     break.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour, thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for half an hour.  We'll resume

22     at five past 1.00.

23                           --- Recess taken at 12 .35 p.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 1.07 p.m.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

Page 11902

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 2                           Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:

 3        Q.   Good afternoon, General.

 4        A.   Good afternoon.

 5        Q.   I'd like to begin with a question that was raised, I believe,

 6     last Thursday at pages 11468 through 1169 [sic].  General, at that time

 7     you were asked about the information you received, whether you saw things

 8     for yourself or had certain services that sent you information.  The

 9     question was:

10             "How was it that you received information ...," et cetera.

11             And you indicated that in most cases, you were relying on reports

12     from subordinates and occasionally went to see something yourself.

13             I'd like to explore with you, a bit further, the breadth and

14     consistency of the information which you received about political and

15     military events and incidents in your area of responsibility.

16             First of all, did you receive daily reports from various sources,

17     both civil and military, in the UN chain of command?

18        A.   Yes.  Yes, there was a reporting system that I was part of.

19        Q.   Were briefings held on a daily basis?

20        A.   Yes.  There was a morning brief which, if I was in my -- if it

21     was in Sarajevo, I attended, and in the afternoon I would meet again

22     with, sort of, my principal staff officers.

23        Q.   Did the morning briefing include not only members of your staff,

24     but also representatives from other agencies present in Sarajevo at the

25     time?

Page 11903

 1        A.   Yes, such as UNHCR were there, and the sector headquarters would

 2     send a liaison officer up and so forth.

 3        Q.   Did you also receive information from the journalistic community

 4     which was present in Sarajevo?

 5        A.   Yes, but not -- they didn't report to me, in a sense, but one --

 6     my spokesmen were in touch with them continuously, and I had the practice

 7     of meeting, usually over dinner, certain journalists during a week or

 8     when there was the opportunity occurred.

 9        Q.   Now, in addition to these sources, did you also have contact with

10     representatives of both the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serb

11     authorities at both the political and military level?

12        A.   Yes, as has just been discussed during this session.

13        Q.   And I believe you indicated earlier there was, for example, a

14     liaison officer at Lukavica from the Bosnian Serb side.

15        A.   Yes.  A Major Indic, I think.

16        Q.   Thank you, General.  I wanted to turn next to a document that the

17     accused showed you at page 11 -- or beginning at page 11512.  That was

18     P906.  This was a document which he asserted was a telegram sent at 10.36

19     on the 29th of August from Janvier.

20             And if we could call that document up, please.

21             Mr. Karadzic then referred to your third phone call with

22     General Mladic during that period on 29 August, at 10.00 a.m., during

23     which you told Mladic that it had been established beyond reasonable

24     doubt that the shell that killed over 30 persons and injured more than 80

25     others had been fired from Bosnian Serb-held territory.  And then the

Page 11904

 1     accused said to you, at page 11513:

 2             "So at 10.00, you inform Mladic that it is beyond any reasonable

 3     doubt, and your commander, General Janvier, 40 minutes after you, says

 4     that that is not the case, that it was not established, that it cannot be

 5     established?"

 6             And that was on the basis of this document, P906.

 7             Now, can I ask you, General, to look at P906, and tell us if, in

 8     fact, it is a UNPF daily sitrep which covers the time-period for 28

 9     August 1995?

10        A.   It covers the period 28 -- the day of the 28th of August, 1995.

11        Q.   And is it also correct that it emanates from G-3 and not from

12     General Janvier at all?  I think we see the drafter --

13        A.   The drafter is the staff officer, grade 3 of operations.  He has

14     signed it as the releasing officer, and he's sending it to a very large

15     stream of people, including UN headquarters, in the name of

16     Lieutenant General Janvier.  In other words, this is a routine reporting

17     process.

18        Q.   And is it correct, therefore, General Smith, that this is not a

19     determination by General Janvier that what you were telling Mladic on the

20     29th of August was not correct?

21        A.   Well, this is a day -- this is a comment of a day before the

22     29th.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.

24             Staying on that theme for a moment, I want to turn your attention

25     to questions that were asked regarding your conclusions concerning

Page 11905

 1     Markale II at page 11515.

 2             Mr. Karadzic pointed you to language in a document, indicating

 3     that the Cymbeline radar was operating, and if the rounds were fired

 4     close to the confrontation line, they would have been detected, and if

 5     fired from a longer range, the arc of the trajectory would "most likely"

 6     have been below the beam of the Cymbeline radar, thus not detected.

 7             And focusing on that language, "most likely," he asked you:

 8             "What does that sound like to you?  Does it sound like reasonable

 9     doubt?"

10             Now, and you indicated, in response, that:

11             "While not an absolute positive, it is most likely to be

12     positive."

13             Let me ask you about your conclusions, General, a little bit

14     further.

15             First of all, you told the Court, at pages 11457 through 58, that

16     in addition to the UNMO and Sector Sarajevo reports, you brought into

17     your judgement all the other systems; is that right?

18        A.   That's correct, yes.

19        Q.   Let me ask you, then, simply that -- if your determination that

20     the rounds had been fired by the Bosnian Serbs was based on a single

21     factor or, instead, on a weight of the combination of the factors put

22     together?

23        A.   No, it was a combination of the factors.

24        Q.   And did that include, for example, the fact that no one heard a

25     round fired from within the proximity of Sarajevo, although, as you

Page 11906

 1     testified --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid this is leading.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  No, he referred to the reason given by the witness.

 4     Hear him out.

 5             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   General, did that include the fact that no one heard a round

 8     fired from within the proximity of Sarajevo, despite the sound that

 9     a mortar makes and despite the presence of military personnel listening

10     for such incidents?

11        A.   Yes, that was a factor in this judgement.

12        Q.   And, General, you were asked at pages 11547 and 548 about the

13     alleged probability of hitting the particular spot where the Markale II

14     shell landed, and you said, at page 11548, that you didn't see why this

15     alleged fact should have been brought to your attention, since the

16     civilian areas of Sarajevo were "a substantial target" and "much wider

17     than nine metres wide."  So, General, let me ask you directly.  Did that

18     mean that you considered that it was the civilian areas of Sarajevo,

19     generally, that were targeted by the Bosnian Serb Army and not just the

20     specific spot where the shells ultimately landed?

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

22             You know, these questions really are leading.  That suggests an

23     answer.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  I can see why you might think that,

25     Mr. Robinson, but I think, in reality, it's a question which is designed

Page 11907

 1     to elicit a more particular answer by the witness, which is a perfectly

 2     valid tactic in re-examination, to which the answer is not fixed.  It can

 3     be answered in the positive or the negative.

 4             MR. TIEGER:

 5        Q.   General, do you have the --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Sorry --

 7             THE WITNESS:  I'm just re-reading the question.

 8             The point I was trying to make there was that it was a civilian

 9     target that had been hit, and the -- and it was civilians in the market

10     that had been killed and wounded.  It wasn't that particular spot that

11     was the target and had been the result of this attack.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   I'd like to ask you about another discussion that the accused

14     raised with you concerning shelling.

15             At pages 11544 through 45, there was -- there were some questions

16     about shelling and a discussion about alleged prohibitions of fire on the

17     city.  You responded that, in fact, fire was coming into the city.  And

18     then the accused asserted:

19             "That was the case only when we were being shot at.  Returning

20     fire is legitimate."

21             So, General, I wanted to ask you a few follow-up questions in

22     connection with that.

23             First, during the course of your service in Sarajevo, was there

24     Bosnian Serb fire on the city that was unrelated, insofar as you and your

25     staff could tell, to any outgoing fire; that is, fire from the Bosnian

Page 11908

 1     Serbs that took place when they had not been fired on?

 2        A.   There were occasions when one couldn't see, as it were, the cause

 3     for that effect, and there were other occasions where there were no

 4     military targets, as such, where the rounds were falling, but you might

 5     have been able to connect them as a cause and effect because of some

 6     incident on the line of confrontation.

 7        Q.   And, General, was there also fire from the Bosnian Serbs into the

 8     city that --

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the Prosecutor is

10     draining the witness in order to make him give him the answer that he did

11     not give and that he would like to have.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not the one who raised the issue of legitimate

13     fire.  Sorry, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Could you reformulate the question, Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   General, you testified that there was fire after -- after -- let

17     me see if I can reformulate that.  Right.

18             You indicated that there was sometimes fire from the Bosnian

19     Serbs after they had been fired on, but into areas where there were no

20     military targets.  Was there also fire, after the Bosnian Serbs had been

21     fired on, into the city that failed to discriminate between possible

22     military targets and civilian areas?

23        A.   If -- I find that question hard to answer from my memory, but

24     if -- nevertheless, from my memory, if there was a military target and

25     there was some -- some fire fell close to that military target and on the

Page 11909

 1     civil population, then that would have been understood as part of the

 2     same military engagement.  It was when rounds fell in a civil area, where

 3     we had no indication or knowledge of any military target that we could

 4     see there, that we would understand that as being an attack directly onto

 5     a civil -- the civil areas of Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   Thank you, General.  General, you were asked some questions about

 7     the NIOD report at a couple of junctures during your cross-examination,

 8     including pages 11670 and then, in particular, at page 11728.

 9             And, Your Honour, if we could have just a moment, please.

10                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

11             MR. TIEGER:

12        Q.   I wanted to ask you some follow-up questions about that.

13             First of all, generally, was -- when you were -- you spoke with

14     the NIOD people, is this some kind of personal dissertation on your part

15     or were you asked questions to which you were asked to respond?

16        A.   Again, this was some time ago, I think about 10 years ago now,

17     and they came to my office in the headquarters I was in.  And I think

18     they had sent a sort of questionnaire in advance of -- not so much the

19     specific questions, but the sort of area in which questions would be

20     asked, if I remember correctly.  And we then -- there was then an

21     interview with, I recall, fairly long answers, in that these were mostly

22     scene-setting type of questions.  I'd long -- I've only seen the document

23     they produced once or twice before seeing it here again.  And the content

24     of that interview was then reduced, if you like, to the -- to the sort of

25     thing you saw produced in court today.

Page 11910

 1        Q.   You said it was scene-setting.  Was it, in part, aimed at

 2     attempting to get information on how events might have been prevented?

 3        A.   I don't really remember.  It was -- my understanding of what they

 4     were trying to do was to understand what had happened and the setting

 5     of -- in which it had happened so as to understand why it had happened.

 6        Q.   Now, at page 11728, the accused cited the report to show efforts

 7     by internationals, or a passage from that report attributed to you, to

 8     show efforts by internationals to create a rift in the Pale leadership

 9     and decrease his influence.  And as noted in at page 11727 in his

10     question, to reduce his influence over Mladic is how he put it.  And this

11     is an issue that came up again today.  And, incidentally, I wanted to ask

12     you:  To the extent that you were aware of any efforts by international

13     figures to isolate Mr. Karadzic, did you understand that to be because of

14     some personal dislike or because they understood or considered him to be

15     in control of events they wanted to change?

16        A.   My understanding of the isolation was nothing to do with the

17     events of day-to-day life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The isolation was that

18     it was thought possible to make a deal with Milosevic, who had more --

19     perhaps more at stake and was -- therefore, leverage and so forth could

20     be brought to bear upon him in a way that wasn't going to be possible or

21     didn't appear to be possible with Mr. Karadzic.

22        Q.   I believe, in fact, you were asked at 11728, or you were pointed

23     to that part of the report that said:

24             "Had Mladic been Milosevic's man, Srebrenica would not have

25     happened."

Page 11911

 1             And when you were asked to explain that, you said:

 2             "Milosevic would have understood the setting of the Srebrenica

 3     and the no-fly zones and the exclusion zones in a different way to the

 4     Bosnian Serbs."

 5             That was at 11729.  And I take it you recall that.

 6        A.   Yes, I do.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Now, earlier in your testimony, you had referred to the --

 8     at page 11354, the isolation or unworldliness of Mr. Karadzic at points,

 9     views that were not based on a world that anyone else was sharing, and

10     that was at 11674 through 75, and to a meeting with Mladic in August,

11     trying, without success, to explain to him that the Bosnian Serb

12     perception of the world was to their disadvantage.  Do you recall those?

13     That was at 11449.  Do you recall that?

14        A.   Yes, I do.

15        Q.   And when you referred in your answer concerning the comment in

16     the NIOD report, that is, Milosevic would understand it in a way

17     different to the Bosnian Serbs, which Bosnian Serbs were you referring

18     to?

19        A.   I was referring to Dr. Karadzic, who -- and the people around him

20     in Pale.

21        Q.   And just so the Court understands this --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Tieger.

23             Did you say that Mladic would understand it in a different -- in

24     a way different to the Bosnian Serbs?

25             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry.  If I said that, I meant "Milosevic," and

Page 11912

 1     I hope I was understood that way.

 2             THE WITNESS:  That's what I understood.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  And going back to the previous question:  Had Mladic

 5     been Milosevic's man, Srebrenica would not have happened, I think your

 6     answer, cited by Mr. Tieger, was given to my question.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Correct, yes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Did you mean that it was Mr. Karadzic that --

 9     because of Karadzic, Srebrenica -- what happened in Srebrenica happened?

10             THE WITNESS:  Not necessarily.  What I'm saying is, and I think

11     that's what I was saying to the investigation by the Dutch, was that

12     Milosevic had an understanding or appeared to me to have had an

13     understanding of what was going on around him, and he would have seen the

14     potential of dangers of allowing the pocket of Srebrenica to fall.

15             JUDGE KWON:  And by "Srebrenica," did you mean the taking of a

16     safe enclave or the massacre that --

17             THE WITNESS:  I can't -- I can't remember which bit of that or

18     whether I was saying it about the whole.  I just don't remember.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:

22        Q.   Just in follow-up to the President's question:  Did that mean,

23     General, that you were saying that it was only Milosevic who could have

24     influenced Mladic because he had a particular view or perhaps a more

25     realistic view, in your judgement, and Karadzic and Mladic were coming at

Page 11913

 1     it from the same perspective?

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 3             That is a leading question.  Perhaps even Judge Morrison could

 4     agree with me on that one.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  I stand corrected, Mr. Robinson.  I think on

 6     this occasion, that is certainly a leading question, Mr. Tieger.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Well, this is a difficult one to parse out,

 8     Your Honour, but I'll be happy to ask the witness.

 9        Q.   What's the connection between your observations that it might

10     have been different if Mladic had been Milosevic's man and the fact that

11     Karadzic and Mladic were the Bosnian Serbs who saw things differently

12     from Milosevic?

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger, I'm sorry.  You're bordering on

14     inviting speculation, and I think we're going down a very dangerous route

15     here.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Very well, Your Honour.  I'll move on.

17        Q.   General, you were asked quite a number of questions about attacks

18     from the enclaves, that is, from Srebrenica, most recently today, in

19     fact.  And I believe at one point, in response to a question by the

20     accused - that would be 11682 -- he asked you to agree with him that the

21     attack on Srebrenica was a reaction to attacks from the enclaves, and you

22     said:

23             "I think that was the immediate cause, yes."

24             I wanted to ask you about less immediate causes, both ones you

25     may have indicated in your testimony and others.

Page 11914

 1             First of all, General, you explained what has come to be known as

 2     your thesis to the Court, and I believe you indicated that - and that's

 3     contained in both your amalgamated statement and your testimony - that

 4     you concluded that the Bosnian Serbs were determined to resolve, by

 5     military operations, in order -- the issue of Srebrenica in order to

 6     alleviate over-stretching of manpower required by the need to guard the

 7     enclaves; is that right?

 8        A.   They were -- in the thesis, they were -- it wasn't just

 9     Srebrenica.  They were going to resolve this whole affair militarily, and

10     the -- and to do that, they needed to squeeze the enclaves.  The -- and

11     that was to reduce their significance in their rear area and free up the

12     resources that were currently committed to that -- to guarding that

13     threat.

14        Q.   And you arrived at this conclusion at a fairly early stage in

15     your tenure in Sarajevo; is that right?

16        A.   Yes, sometime in early March, this -- after the visit where I

17     met -- Srebrenica, where I had met General Mladic at Vlasenica

18     afterwards.

19        Q.   Now, I presume that your -- you arrived at this conclusion

20     without benefit of access, for example, to internal Bosnian Serb military

21     records or contemporaneous internal political documents.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

23             I'm losing track of who's testifying here.  These last two

24     questions is just Mr. Tieger testifying and asking leading questions.

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger, I think you are beginning to behave

Page 11915

 1     a little bit like Dr. Karadzic in that respect.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, but with respect to the

 3     previous answer, I thought it was -- while arguably leading, it was a

 4     predicate question about which there was no dispute.  But, fine, I will

 5     ask it in a classically non-leading way.

 6        Q.   General Smith, in arriving at your thesis, did you have access to

 7     internal Bosnian Serb military records or to internal political

 8     documents?

 9        A.   No, I did not.

10        Q.   Did your thesis, as you've explained it to us, about squeezing

11     the enclaves and why that would -- why the Bosnian Serbs would undertake

12     that effort, preclude the possibility that there might be other factors

13     that underpinned or supported an intention to squeeze or move on the

14     enclaves?

15        A.   No, I was wide open to other information coming in.  This was the

16     intention.  The purpose of the thesis is to guide my own analysis and

17     understanding.

18        Q.   I want to now direct your attention to a few documents that,

19     principally Bosnian Serb military documents, and then ask you a question

20     or two about that.

21             First, if we could call up P00976.

22             This is a document dated 19 November 1992.  It's a directive for

23     further operations of the Army of Republika Srpska, and --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this from 1992?  Would that be

25     right for that witness?  I'm wondering.

Page 11916

 1             MR. TIEGER:  The issue has been raised by the accused,

 2     Your Honour, of -- or the position taken by the accused is that the

 3     actions taken against the enclaves, and in particular Srebrenica, was a

 4     purely reactive, one, two attacks out of the enclave in 1995, in

 5     particular.  You've heard the general identify his conclusion that well

 6     before that action was taken, he arrived at the conclusion that such

 7     action would be taken, and --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Without having to hear further explanation, let us

 9     see whether the general is able to answer any question about the document

10     which originates from 1992.  Yes.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   And I'm going to just show you a couple of documents very

13     quickly, and read from them quickly.

14             This is a document signed by General Mladic.  Part of it states:

15             "From its present positions, the main forces --" this is for the

16     Drina Corps, "Its main forces shall persistently defend Visegrad, the

17     dam, Zvornik and the corridor, while the rest of its forces --"

18             And this is on page 5 of the English, at the bottom.

19             "... while the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region

20     shall exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him, and

21     force him to leave the Birac, Zepa and Gorazde areas together with the

22     Muslim population."

23             Now, General, 65 ter 2085 is a document dated 24 November 1992.

24     It's a decision for further operations to the Zvornik Light Infantry

25     Brigade pursuant to the document we just saw, the directive to the

Page 11917

 1     Main Staff, and in part one it indicates:

 2             "... launch an attack using the main body of troops and major

 3     equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust

 4     them, break them up, or force them to surrender, and force the Muslim

 5     local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica and

 6     Gorazde."

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?  May I say, before an answer

 8     is given:  I keep saying that this document has been mistranslated.

 9     Mladic is not saying that they should surrender.  He's saying that they

10     should disarm.  And Mladic also is saying that since the people are

11     going, that they should take the army as well; that it's not that the

12     people should go with the army, it's the other way around.  I have

13     cautioned against this translation, and now this witness is going to be

14     put in a difficult position because he's supposed to respond on the basis

15     of a poor translation.

16             JUDGE KWON:  You are referring to Directive 4, not this document?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  What is this?  I don't know

18     what this document is, but he showed Directive 4 and he quoted, I mean

19     Mr. Tieger did, that they should surrender.  But Mladic is saying that

20     they should disarm and become civilians.  And, secondly, Mladic did not

21     say that the army should lead the people; rather, the people should take

22     the army along, as that is what is happening anyway.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Well, the witness must have heard your

24     interpretation or reading.  Let's carry on, Mr. Tieger.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 11918

 1        Q.   General, I am not going to take you through the whole panoply of

 2     documents which this Court will see during the course of the case.  What

 3     I simply wanted to ask you, if these are among or the types of documents

 4     that might have further informed your thesis and expanded your view of

 5     the reasons why the Bosnian Serb political and military forces might move

 6     on the enclaves.

 7        A.   Could I just -- before I answer, could I just see -- you've got

 8     this daily report up here, but I couldn't find the bit you were quoting

 9     from.

10        Q.   I agree.  I'm sorry, I didn't see that that one was up there,

11     because the one to which I referred, I believe, was 65 ter 2085.  Perhaps

12     I misspoke or perhaps my number is incorrect.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document was -- this document

14     was here, but can I just say one word.

15             Again, we are on the wrong path.  Directive 4 does not talk about

16     the ground.  It is "4/1" and its executive, and it says something

17     different.  Directive 4/1 is the relevant document.

18             MR. TIEGER:  The confusion, Your Honour, was that it actually is

19     an exhibit, not a 65 ter number.  So it is 2085, but P2085.

20             JUDGE KWON:  You refer to Exhibit P2085, which is --

21             MR. TIEGER:  Correct.

22             JUDGE KWON:  -- this one.

23             THE WITNESS:  And this of -- that I've now got on the screen is

24     also 1992, and it's part of the cascade of orders, as I understand it,

25     of -- that stems from the original directive you showed me.

Page 11919

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Correct, and I believe I've drawn your attention to

 2     paragraph 1.

 3        Q.   My question was, simply, without going through a long list of

 4     documents, whether these are among the kinds of documents that would have

 5     further informed your thesis and expanded your understanding of why the

 6     Bosnian Serb political and military forces could be expected to move on

 7     the enclaves.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 9             If he didn't see these documents, I don't understand how this

10     question helps the Chamber if this isn't the kind of documents that would

11     have informed his thesis then.  I simply don't understand what is being

12     asked General Smith and how it would assist the Chamber.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Or could it be asked whether it is consistent with

14     his thesis?

15             MR. TIEGER:  That's fine, Your Honour.  Thank you.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  If I had to reverse engineer my thesis, I

17     would have to write something like that at some point.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, General.  Thank you, Mr. President.

19             Just I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about convoy

20     restrictions, General.

21        Q.   There were many questions posed to you concerning the --

22     concerning restrictions, and I believe it was posed to you that

23     restrictions that were imposed on humanitarian aid and UN resupply

24     convoys were due to a concern about supplying Bosnian forces in the

25     enclaves.  Do you recall that?

Page 11920

 1        A.   Yes.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I'd like to look at a couple of documents in that

 3     connection.  First, 65 ter 3675.

 4             This is a document from the Main Staff in April of 1995.  And if

 5     we turn to page 2.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the Serbian version as

 7     well, because the translations are a disaster.

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   And, General, it may be a bit difficult to read the English when

10     it's that size, but I'll do my best to point to you it.

11             The remark is:

12             "We did not approve the following:"

13             And it identifies, in the second paragraph below that -- well,

14     first, in the first paragraph, "Swedish construction project," and then

15     in the paragraph below that:

16             "In addition to the above, we did not approve beef, salt, oil and

17     clapboards for the enclave ..."

18             And, similarly, I wanted to turn your attention to 65 ter 03673.

19             This is also a Main Staff document, Main Staff of the VRS, from

20     April 1995, to the Commands of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and

21     Drina Corps, advising them that they have not approved the following

22     UNPROFOR convoys and teams.  If we look, for example, to item 4:

23             "A convoy which was supposed to transport 12 containers with

24     humanitarian aid (beds, food, clothes, medicines and school supplies)."

25             And if we look to item 10, the last page, page 3 --

Page 11921

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.

 2             Can we see all of page 4.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  The rejection of a convoy to Srebrenica which was

 4     supposed to transport various goods; a water trailer, a large quantity of

 5     field beds, hospital beds, an X-ray machine, beams for construction,

 6     nails, light fittings, a satellite telephone system and cables,

 7     signalling equipment, roofing material, et cetera.  And cleaning goods,

 8     in fact.

 9        Q.   General, I wanted to ask you:  Are these documents consistent

10     with your understanding at the time of -- and consistent with your thesis

11     about the intention to squeeze the enclaves and consistent with your

12     understanding at the time about why humanitarian and UN resupply convoys

13     were restricted?

14        A.   Those remind me, you know, that that was going on, and -- and the

15     extensive nature of what was being -- of the convoys we were -- we

16     weren't able to move.  And, yes, it fitted with the thesis.  It was -- it

17     reinforced that view.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, General.

19             Your Honour, I tender those documents.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Those two will be admitted.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter 03675 was admitted as Exhibit

22     P839, and 65 ter 03673 will be Exhibit P2309.

23             JUDGE KWON:  What was the number of the first one?

24             THE REGISTRAR:  The first 65 ter number was 03675, which was

25     admitted as Exhibit P839.

Page 11922

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Which is already admitted?

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, that's correct.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please be given the

 5     possibility to point out just one document and put two brief questions?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We'll consider it at the end of direct examination.

 7             Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9             That does conclude my redirect examination.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Before putting your question, tell us what the

11     question is about.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The first question is whether, in

13     1992, there were any safe areas.  That's the first question, whether the

14     general knows whether safe areas existed.

15             The second question has to do about the time of Markale, the

16     document of the Norwegian Battalion.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we allow you to put those questions.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             1D3219, could we have that, please, in e-court.

21                           Further cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   While we're waiting for that:  General, do you know that safe

24     areas were established only in 1993, in the spring of 1993?

25        A.   That is -- I did know, yes.

Page 11923

 1        Q.   Mr. Tieger asked you about what was going on during the war in

 2     1992; right?

 3        A.   That is correct, he showed me a document of that time.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please now focus on this document.  Do we

 5     agree that this is a document that covers the 28th and 29th of August,

 6     and on the 29th of August, at 1800 hours, it was sent -- the Norwegian

 7     Battalion sent it to their own country?  29th, at 1800 hours, August

 8     1995.  Is that correct?

 9        A.   Yes, that's it, date, time, group.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, Sarajevo

11     Sector.  And I would like everyone to look at the whole passage, and I'm

12     going to read only one sentence:

13             [In English] "It has not been confirmed where the shells came

14     from either."

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Therefore, not even at the end of the day on the 29th, the

17     Norwegian Battalion was able to determine from which direction the fire

18     came and to put it in the report that they are sending to their

19     government?

20        A.   No, they don't.  This is a battalion up in the Tuzla area, and it

21     would seem to me they are sending a situation report of the whole area

22     back to their government.  And what they're working from is other

23     people's reports from the other sectors that have been copied to them.

24     That's what I think is happening, but you'd need to get the -- someone

25     from the Norwegian Battalion to explain the process for certain.

Page 11924

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the same time, they have

 2     information that the church at Ilidza, and we know it was an

 3     Orthodox Church, that was hit, and that at least one person died from the

 4     wedding party at the time.

 5             Can we have this document admitted into evidence?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The last bit was an unnecessary statement.

 7             Yes, we can admit this document.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1063, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Chamber, and thank you,

10     General.

11             JUDGE KWON:  That concludes your evidence, Sir Rupert.  I thank

12     you, on behalf of the Tribunal and the Bench, for your coming yet again

13     to the Tribunal to give it.  Now you are free to go.

14             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, indeed.  Thank you.

15                           [The witness withdrew]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             Is the next witness ready?  I was told so.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since we often work over time,

19     could we adjourn for the day, because I find it difficult to switch from

20     one witness to another.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton?

22             MS. EDGERTON:  We're ready to go.  It's Dr. Karadzic's

23     cross-examination.  The witness is here.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I hope at least we can hear the

25     examination-in-chief, at least.

Page 11925

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  This is the continuation of a witness whose

 2     cross-examination began yesterday, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes, I was carried away.  I'm sorry.  He was

 4     waiting all the time, yes, Mr. Glavas.

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6                           WITNESS:  TIHOMIR GLAVAS [Resumed]

 7                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Mr. Glavas.

 9             Please make yourself comfortable.  Please be seated.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I apologise for your inconvenience, for the delay.

12     Although we have only 25 minutes, we'll continue with your

13     cross-examination.

14             If you're ready, Mr. Karadzic.

15                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Glavas.

18        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. President.

19        Q.   Forgive me in advance if I sometimes address you as

20     General Smith, because we just finished with him as a witness.

21        A.   No problem.

22        Q.   I believe that yesterday, we stopped at a point when certain

23     activities were rounded up in which the Muslim side finalised some of its

24     activities relating to the increase of number of reserve police officers

25     and providing weapons for them.  Is that correct?

Page 11926

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   In an interview with my adviser, you said that prior to the

 3     outbreak of the conflict, the large part of the Muslim population had

 4     been evacuated.  Can you explain how this happened, and were there any

 5     Serbs crossing over from one zone to another?

 6        A.   Yes, that is correct.  I spoke about similar things when I talked

 7     to representatives of the OTP both in Sarajevo and here in The Hague.

 8     Therefore, the fact is that after certain organisational activities were

 9     finalised pursuant to the directive issued by the then Crisis Staff of

10     the Bosnian side, the composition of which we had at the time, although I

11     am reluctant to give you the names now, although I know them, therefore,

12     according to the directive issued by this Crisis Staff, the population

13     from the area of Ivancica and Zivici [phoen] were nearly all evacuated

14     towards Romanija.  The village of Dupovci, which is on the very entrance

15     point of Hadzici, was evacuated towards Gradac and Pazaric, and one part

16     of Zunovnica and Binjezevo neighbourhood were evacuated in the direction

17     of Mount Igman.  Based on the intelligence gathered on the ground, we

18     knew for certain that that was a predetermined and designed move by the

19     Bosnian authorities, which they saw as the way of dealing more easily

20     with the remaining minority Serb population in Hadzici.  In the meantime,

21     and that's common knowledge, they arrested all able-bodied Serbian men

22     between Zovik and Gornja Rastovica, they arrested them, put them in

23     detention, and confiscated their weapons.  And I used to say that that

24     was a classical example of a military strategy, to -- such strategy, to

25     ensure they are rear lines.  They also attacked the village of Bradina,

Page 11927

 1     which was populated exclusively by Serbs, and they practically saw this

 2     as an obstacle because they perceived that as a buffer zone between the

 3     territory under their control and the territory towards Konjic.  So they

 4     arrested the population there, including, as I said, the Serbs, arrested

 5     in Hadzici from Lazovi [phoen] to Gornja Rastovica, and thereby completed

 6     the preparations.  And then around the 25th of May, they carried out an

 7     all-out attack on Hadzici.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  In order to assist the

 9     Chamber and all the other parties, can we please now have 1D674.  1D674,

10     and I would kindly ask you to mark these places that you just mentioned.

11             So can we have 1D674 in e-court, please.  Thank you.

12             This is an ethnic map of Sarajevo.  Can you mark, for the benefit

13     of the Chamber, the location of Hadzici municipality?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  This map is not something we got notified on.

15             JUDGE KWON:  You can lead with proceeding with this map. ^

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I see, Your Honour.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have three maps.  I think that

18     this one is the clearest one.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Do we agree that Hadzici is to the south-west, somewhere near

21     this area which is marked with number 7?

22        A.   [Marks]

23        Q.   So this is Hadzici, where a Serbian majority lived, and what is

24     this on the left?  These green areas signify Muslim villages; is that

25     correct?

Page 11928

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Can you please circle the Serbian villages which are within the

 3     Muslim territory?

 4        A.   You know what?  I find it very difficult to find my bearings in

 5     the map.  In reality, I can orientate myself excellently, but I'm not

 6     sure how you will also find your way around this map vis-a-vis these

 7     villages.

 8        Q.   If I may help you, Mr. Glavas.  Blue are Serbian villages, yellow

 9     is one Croatian village, and Muslim villages are painted green.  Now,

10     from number 7, if you go up and to the left, you can see a few Serbian

11     villages, and then we also see Tarcin, Pazaric, and the remaining Muslim

12     villages; is that correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Are you telling me that the Serbs from these villages that were

15     in the Muslim territory were arrested?

16        A.   Yes, that's right.

17             I'm sorry.  Now, from the very beginning of the war, a line was

18     established from --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the place names

20     slowly.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

22             Mr. Glavas, the interpreter couldn't hear the names of the

23     places.  Could you repeat your answer, kindly.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, no problem.

25             So at the beginning, there was a sort of improvised separation

Page 11929

 1     line from Tinovo elevation to Dupovci and to the maintenance centre, all

 2     the way up towards Mostar.  Now, from Gornja Rastovica to the tunnel was

 3     the territory that was absolutely under the control of the Bosnian

 4     Government, both then and throughout the entire war.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6        Q.   When you spoke about evacuation of the Muslim civilians from this

 7     Serbian zone, were you referring to these green villages that were within

 8     the red circle?

 9        A.   Yes, yes, that's right.

10        Q.   Can you put the number 1 next to the first circle?  Am I right if

11     I say that you have encircled the town of Hadzici and the surrounding

12     Serbian-held territories?

13        A.   Yes, that's correct.  We held, by far, smaller territory than was

14     the case with the Muslim side, and I think that the ratio was 30 to

15     70 per cent, meaning that the Bosnian Government held 70 per cent of the

16     territory.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please put number 1?

18        A.   [Marks]

19        Q.   And can you now also circle these blue Serbian villages inside

20     the Muslim territory?

21        A.   [Marks]

22        Q.   Thank you.  Put the number 2 next to it.

23        A.   [Marks]

24        Q.   And can you tell me, what was the fate of these villages?  Can

25     you tell the Chamber what happened with the residents of the villages who

Page 11930

 1     remained behind?

 2        A.   Unfortunately, it was very bad.

 3             Mr. Karadzic, if you will allow me, I need some time, and I think

 4     it would be beneficial for you, but primarily I want to say this for the

 5     benefit of the Trial Chamber and the Prosecution.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  If you could be as concise as possible, please.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.

 8             Yesterday, I spoke, among other things, about part of the Muslim

 9     population, especially able-bodied men, and I failed to mention a very

10     important matter which will be of great assistance to the Trial Chamber,

11     but also to the Prosecution, and that is as follows:

12             When the indoctrination was taking place, it is very important to

13     point out a feature that would later on, in the relationship between the

14     Serbs and Bosniaks in that area, have a significant effect, and that is

15     the following feature:  In spite of the very difficult and complex

16     situation, there were some areas where both Serbs and Muslims were very

17     tolerant of each other.  They did not want the war; they wanted peace.

18     I can say this with a clear mind and with a lot of arguments because I

19     know of these instances and cases.  There were towns and villages where

20     people actually stood guard together.  But, unfortunately, after the SDA

21     activities and the Crisis Staff from the Bosnian Corps in the area of

22     Hadzici, Ilidza and Trnovo, and because they did not like this situation,

23     they did all they could in order to upset the balance and the tolerance

24     that existed, both in terms of the faith, the religion, and also the

25     culture and customs of the ethnic groups that lived there, both Muslim

Page 11931

 1     and Serb.

 2             What I'm saying now, you can actually see for yourself.  There

 3     are numerous documents collected by the security services, and everything

 4     that I've said here can be seen in numerous documents that were collected

 5     by the security services.

 6             The crisis staffs decided to bring into those areas KOS [as

 7     interpreted] members, K-O-S members.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Could you please explain to the Trial Chamber what HOS is?

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.  H-O-S.

11        A.   Yes, that's the Croatian Defence Forces, but I have to say that

12     all the members of HOS were members of Bosniak nationality who had

13     already taken part in fighting in Croatia and who had already fought

14     Serbs in those areas.  Now they returned to this area and continued with

15     the same activities that they had been involved in earlier on.  They

16     declared themselves, and we were very well aware of that, as haters of

17     Serbs.  They came to Hadzici and Hrasnica and also Sokolovic Kolonija,

18     and also to the Trnovo area, and in a very brief time they managed to

19     commit numerous war crimes and all kinds of other illicit activities

20     which, as I've already said, were documented by the police.  And I

21     personally submitted a number of criminal reports against certain

22     individuals, and these criminal reports were sent to the competent

23     prosecutor's offices, some of them in Republika Srpska and the others in

24     the Federation.

25             Now, the reason I'm saying this is for the Trial Chamber, when

Page 11932

 1     trying to get the whole picture of the situation in the area, and that

 2     can then serve as a prototype for all other areas where the Serb

 3     population was in the minority, this is how things were actually carried

 4     out.

 5             And, gentlemen, everything I've said here can be found in a book

 6     published in 1996, written by Munir Alibabic, aka Munja.  And let me just

 7     say that he was an old-type, very capable member of the former State

 8     Security Service who was the chief of the Centre of the Security Services

 9     of Sarajevo during the war.  The title of the book was "Bosna in the

10     cause of KOS," K-O-S, which is the Military Counter-Intelligence Service.

11     This was a book by Mr. Munir Alibabic right after the war in 1996, and in

12     it he talks about these groups of HOS members that I spoke about a little

13     earlier, and he acknowledges and admits on one of the pages of this book

14     that these men committed war crimes and that certain groups from

15     Herzegovina committed war crimes.  And as you read on in the book, you

16     can actually deduce that he was referring to the HOS members.

17             And what is also very important is to say is a witness testified

18     about a crime committed in Trebevic [as interpreted], which is in Trnovo

19     municipality, to the fact that members of HOS killed every living soul in

20     that village, and when a member of Bosniak ethnicity asked the leader of

21     the group, Why did you do this, why did you kill the elderly and the

22     women?  They literally said, Well, why did you call us up here?

23             So I told you about this deliberately in order for you to get an

24     overall picture of what the situation was like down there, where we were,

25     when these people came back from other areas.  When they came back to

Page 11933

 1     Pazarici and on their way back to Herzegovina, they stated, literally,

 2     We've managed to create such a deep rift between the Serbs and the

 3     Muslims that they will never again manage to live together in this area.

 4             And I just have to add that they were quite successful in what

 5     they set out to do.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I felt I had to rise, because I think

 8     we've come to a situation where this evidence has gone so far to the edge

 9     of being relevant that it actually has crossed the line into being

10     tu quoque.

11             JUDGE KWON:  This is a Prosecution witness, isn't he?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  It is.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I asked him to be concise.

14             But let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.  Five minutes.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Witness, sir, thank you for pointing these things out, but may I

17     ask you now to be as brief as possible.

18             Tell us, please, these Muslims from the green areas around

19     Hadzici, did they go to the green areas and actually carry out the

20     evacuation themselves?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And what about the Serbs in the blue Serb villages; were they

23     allowed to cross over to Hadzici?

24        A.   No way, out of the question.

25        Q.   Were they arrested, and were they detained at the silos camp,

Page 11934

 1     silos?

 2        A.   Well, almost all of them, and I'm referring to men, although

 3     there were also some female prisoners.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             We will show a document, but before that I would like to do away

 6     with the map.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Could you just tell me now one more thing?  When speaking about

 9     the establishment of two municipalities, did the Serbs have in mind the

10     blue areas, and did they actually include these blue areas in their

11     municipalities?

12        A.   Well, yes, that's -- that's what it -- that's how it was, and I

13     believe I said as much in my statement provided to the Prosecution.

14     These were the Serb villages, and there were no pretensions on Muslim

15     areas.

16        Q.   Thank you.  When people say that the -- when they said that they

17     took over the municipalities, did the Serbs take control over the entire

18     municipalities or just their own areas under the Serb -- or, rather,

19     their part of the municipality?  So is that how it transpired in Hadzici?

20     Did they just take over the Serb parts?

21        A.   That's correct.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please date and sign this map?

23        A.   My apologies, but what is the date.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it's the 15th.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 11935

 1             THE WITNESS:  [Marks]

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             I'd like to tender this into evidence.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 1064, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  And that will be it for today.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I just had one last question

 8     about this same area.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Mr. Glavas, did your family have the same fate -- meet the same

11     fate as the Serbs that were in the Muslim territory, Muslim-controlled

12     territory?

13        A.   Yes, my entire family, my two brothers, my father, and even my

14     mother was supposed to be arrested, but I was tipped off by Croats and we

15     managed to save her.  Otherwise, I'm sure she would have been taken

16     prisoner as well.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Could we briefly see 1D3242 in e-court.  1D3242, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   While we are waiting for it to appear on the screens, let me read

21     out the content, and we can also -- we can see the English version.

22             And it says --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the date.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "Based on intelligence from the

25     ground, we've managed to learn the following."

Page 11936

 1             Why can't we have this document on the screen?

 2             Okay, now we have it.  So we have the Serbian version.  Could we

 3     show the English version?  Oh, we don't have it.  Okay.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   So, take a look at this.  On the 19th of August, 1992 -- that's

 6     the date of this document.  So it says there:

 7             "In the area of Tarcin, the Muslim forces are deployed at

 8     Metarica [phoen] ...," and so on.

 9             But let us see what it says further down in the third paragraph:

10             "The situation at the silo is very difficult, and the leaders of

11     the Serb population are the ones who are exposed to greatest levels of

12     torture; Plakalovic, Vaso; Nenad Kostic, who armed Serbs; Mile Bratic,

13     the staff commander; Laza Kostic, father of Dragan Krstic, who was

14     declared a Chetnik duke; and Vlastimir Glavas, the brother of

15     Tihomir Glavas, were the ones who were tortured most."

16             So is that true?  Is this your brother, and was he tortured

17     there?

18        A.   Yes.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             I would like to admit this into evidence, and I would like to add

21     something.  I can do it in the presence of the witness, but perhaps it

22     would be more appropriate, because of the Prosecution, to do it without

23     the presence of this witness.  Something to do with a comment by

24     Ms. Edgerton.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll mark it for identification,

Page 11937

 1     pending translation.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1065, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             Thank you, Mr. Glavas.  We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to say something that

10     relates to what Ms. Edgerton said.

11             I just want to say that the Defence does -- it is not the

12     intention of the Defence to use the tu quoque principle.  All we want is

13     for the Trial Chamber to get a full picture of what went on there and how

14     it went on, whether there was a plan in place, being put in place, or

15     whether it was a civil war, whether there was a state plan for this,

16     years before it happened, before this conflict broke out, whether the

17     state leadership already had a plan for that or not.  And this is what we

18     are trying to show here, and not trying to actually use the tu quoque

19     defence.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I indicated to you several times

21     before, the criminal trial is not conducted for the purpose of creating

22     or pre-producing a white book.  Certainly, it is important to understand

23     the context, but we don't have to go in detail.  Bear that in mind.

24             We rise.  Tomorrow morning, 9.00.

25                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.33 p.m.,

Page 11938

 1                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of

 2                           February, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.