1 Tuesday, 22 February 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, everyone. Good afternoon,
6 Dr. Subotic. Are there any matters to raise? Mr. Robinson?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. With respect to
8 the testimony of Mr. Zecevic, I would like to first ask the Chamber to --
9 or at least call to the Chamber's attention a dispute that the
10 Prosecution and we are having, in which we couldn't seem to resolve among
11 ourselves, concerning which parts of his testimony are expert testimony
12 and which parts are factual testimony.
13 JUDGE KWON: If you are going to raise that issue, we are
14 informed of it in brief manner and we are going to give a ruling.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Very well. Then I won't say more. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: All right. Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
17 Before the witness is brought in, we will deal with it,
18 concerning this evidence. As you are aware, the Chamber previously
19 ordered that Dr. Zecevic to be brought as a viva voce witness rather than
20 pursuant to Rule 92 ter. However, we then observed that in the
21 notification filed by the Prosecution, a statement provided by the
22 witness in 2008 is listed as an expert report, to be tendered as such.
23 Having reviewed the content of this statement, and being
24 cognizant of the fact that Mr. Robinson has already communicated his
25 objection to its admission as an expert report, the Chamber is of the
1 view that it is not appropriate for the statement to be tendered as an
2 expert report. Indeed, its content is of a factual nature concerning
3 matters which Dr. Zecevic observed and experienced during his previous
4 employment. So Mr. Gaynor, if you intend for any of this material to be
5 put into evidence, it should be led live from the witness.
6 Second, I believe, Mr. Robinson, that you also have an objection
7 to the admission of the report titled, "Study of the circumstances and
8 causes of the massacre at the Markale market on 5th of February, 1994,"
9 as an expert report. However, having reviewed the content of the report,
10 the Chamber considers that it was prepared by Dr. Zecevic and others as
11 experts in the field of ballistics, and to give their expert opinion on
12 the Markale I incident. We are therefore satisfied that it is
13 appropriately characterised as an expert report rather than as a factual
14 report akin to some of the police reports previously admitted in this
16 Now, Mr. Gaynor, I hope that you anticipated that you may have to
17 lead the evidence that was in the 2008 statement as live evidence and
18 that you are ready to commence your examination of the witness.
19 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, I'm ready to commence my examination,
20 Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: There is a few further matters. Probably as
22 everyone is aware, due to Dr. Zecevic's medical condition, we are sitting
23 today on a slightly altered schedule with more frequent short breaks.
24 Although we are already ten minutes or five minutes into the session, I'd
25 like to stick to the anticipated schedule, which the parties are all
1 aware of and we will have a five-minutes break at 2.40. During the
2 break, if everyone could please remain in the courtroom while we judges
3 withdraw and Dr. Zecevic may stand up and move around a little.
4 I would appreciate everyone's cooperation in ensuring that breaks
5 take no more than five minutes.
6 And should it be discussed in the presence of the witness? But
7 I was advised that the parties are happy to have a hearing in the morning
8 tomorrow, given that there will be a hearing in the afternoon in this
9 courtroom. And Thursday and Friday, would it be okay to have hearing
10 from 1.30 to 7 in a somewhat extended format with three 90-minute
12 MR. GAYNOR: That's fine, as far as we are concerned,
13 Mr. President.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, that's fine.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That said, we will bring in the witness.
16 Of course, we will sit in regular times tomorrow, i.e. from 9.30
17 to 1.45.
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Professor, if you could take the
20 solemn declaration, please.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon. I solemnly declare
22 that I will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
23 WITNESS: BERKO ZECEVIC
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated and make yourself
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
3 JUDGE KWON: Whenever you find it uncomfortable, Dr. Zecevic,
4 please let us know.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just want to ask if I can
6 occasionally stand up without prior announcement.
7 JUDGE KWON: By all means, Dr. Zecevic.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
9 JUDGE KWON: Before you begin, Dr. Zecevic, I appreciate very
10 much your cooperation with the Tribunal in that you have agreed to
11 testify as long as necessary, although it was your position that you
12 wanted to testify only for three hours.
13 At this moment, I would like to draw your attention to the fact
14 that Mr. Karadzic has a fundamental right to cross-examine any of the
15 witnesses against him, so it is particularly so given that he's charged
16 with very serious criminal offence.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am at your disposal for as long
18 as you see fit that I need to testify.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, doctor. Yes, Mr. Gaynor.
20 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 Examination by Mr. Gaynor:
22 Q. Good afternoon, sir.
23 A. Good afternoon.
24 Q. Could you state your name for the record, please?
25 A. Berko Zecevic.
1 Q. Now, Dr. Zecevic, unless there is an objection, I'm going to go
2 through a few aspects of your professional and work background, and
3 academic background. I'll be grateful if you could just confirm those
4 for me. From August 1975 until 1992, you worked at the Pretis factory in
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. That factory produced artillery and rocket ammunition and
8 aircraft bombs?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. You worked in the research and development centre and your
11 primary fields of work were rocket motors and war heads and developing
12 new rocket projectiles?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. During your 17 years at Pretis, you became familiar with
15 documentation issued to, and received by, Pretis relating to the
16 manufacture and delivery of ammunition and weapons?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Simultaneously, while you were working at Pretis, since 1976,
19 you've been a member of the faculty at Sarajevo University's Faculty of
20 Mechanical Engineering, first in the mechanics department and later in
21 the department of defence technology?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You're currently the head of the defence technology department at
24 the mechanical engineering faculty at the university of Sarajevo?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Between 1980 and today, you've published over 50 academic papers
2 and several books in several different areas of ballistics?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, I'd like you to tell the Court, specifically in respect of
5 the 120-millimetre mortar unit used by the VRS, what is your familiarity
6 with that specific mortar unit?
7 A. You mean the projectile?
8 Q. Yes, very well, the projectile.
9 A. I'm very familiar with it because my factory also produced
10 120-millimetre mortar projectile and then later that manufacture was
11 transferred to a facility in Croatia. Licki Osik and it was my task to
12 develop the propaganda 120-millimetre mine. This is a mine aimed at
13 reducing the morale of enemy forces and the basis for such a new
14 projectile was the 120-millimetre mortar projectile. So I'm completely
15 familiar with all the elements of the manufacture of the 120-millimetre
16 mortar projectiles, with its characteristics, and so on. Should
17 I explain anything else?
18 Q. No. That's fine. I was just waiting on the interpretation.
19 Thank you. Could you tell Their Honours your specific expertise in
20 relation to the modified air-bombs that you've described in one of your
21 expert reports, just in a couple of sentences?
22 A. In 1994, I had the opportunity to see the fuel segment. This is
23 four rocket missiles and the rocket subsystem, which on that day, I think
24 this was the 29th of January 1994, was fired at the Zuc area, which is a
25 hill above Sarajevo. I was asked to look at it and to try to identify
1 that piece of equipment. Before the war, I was following the
2 International Defence Review magazine and I was looking at the aerosol
3 bomb range of products. In 1995 the use of such systems against Sarajevo
4 intensified and a number of such rocket adapted projectiles fell some 500
5 metres away from my house. I was interested to see what this device was
6 and if it directly threatened the security of my family, my friends in
7 the neighbourhood where I lived.
8 I was more involved in this area when the judge asked me to try
9 to identify the type of projectile that hit the TV station in Sarajevo,
10 and together with two of my colleagues, I drafted a study on this.
11 After that, the Prosecution in the case of General Milosevic also
12 engaged me to draft a report.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, prior to the conflict, could you briefly
14 describe your familiarity with air-bombs and specifically fuel-air
16 A. My best friend, Colonel Vladan Tomic, in the Pretis factory was
17 the chief of development of the aerosol bomb, the air-bomb. The two of
18 us spent 15 years together in Pretis because he left Pretis a couple of
19 years before the war began; he went to Belgrade. We lived together
20 nearby. We spent time in each other's company. He was an exceptional
21 expert. We exchanged experiences. I had the opportunity to go with him
22 to Vinca, this is the nuclear institute, and we visited
23 Dr. Zoran Maksimovic there, who was in charge of creating the fuels for
24 aerosol explosions, and who before that specialised in the United States.
25 At that time, I was doing my postgraduate studies and he proposed,
1 Dr. Maksimovic, suggested to me that he be my mentor and that one of the
2 topics of my thesis would be the increase of the efficacy in the
3 application of aerosol bombs. We carried out some experiments in
4 Sarajevo at the practice range of the Pretis factory. Unfortunately, the
5 experiments or the tests were not promising so I abandoned that
6 particular topic for my thesis. This is just a brief summary.
7 Q. Thank you. Now, is it correct that in 1992, and 1993, you worked
8 for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Would you give the dates of your work for the ABiH?
11 A. I think that on the 10th of April, when intense attacks and
12 provocations began in Sarajevo, I signed up with the Territorial Defence.
13 I became more involved on my own initiative, with students from the
14 mechanical engineering faculty, and with another group, we tried to
15 organise the production of the barest possible war technology in war
16 conditions. Within a month, this group of ours, which was a group of
17 volunteers, merged with another group that was already formed by the Main
18 Staff under the direction of Faik Kulovic, and these two groups merged
19 and created the centre for special purpose industry or the military
20 industry. It was our task to try, in spite of restrictions of
21 electricity, to provide a way, despite of these power cuts, in Sarajevo
22 to produce rocket-launched projectiles and hand grenades. This was our
23 main activity. Since there was no supply of explosive materiel to
24 Sarajevo, because there was a very strong encirclement around Sarajevo,
25 I launched an initiative to use unexploded projectiles that were found,
1 and to extract a certain minimum quantity of explosives, for example, one
2 kilogram of explosives in an unexploded projectile that came from outside
3 of Sarajevo, which struck Sarajevo, that a person who brought in such a
4 projectile would be given 1 hand grenade or one rifle grenade.
5 Q. Just generally speaking, could I request that you keep your
6 answers just a little shorter, then I can ask you for further details as
7 they arise, I'm grateful for your cooperation.
8 I'd like you just to confirm the end date of your service with
9 the ABiH.
10 A. In mid-July 1993, the unit that I was in was dismantled,
11 disbanded, and this transition period from the point in time to disband
12 the unit up until the point of time when this was handed over, which was
13 in September 1993, then from September to December 1993, I was available
14 to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina without any particular duties.
15 Q. In your answer concerning the collection of unexploded
16 projectiles, I want to ask you a very specific question about that. Did
17 you ever pick up or retrieve a 120-millimetre mortar projectile which had
18 not exploded and if so, were you able to use the stabiliser which was on
19 that projectile?
20 A. I remember well that I only managed to get at one time a
21 120-millimetre mortar smoke projectile but I never had any need to use
22 the stabiliser from that projectile because my entire activity had to do
23 with rifle grenades and hand grenades.
24 Q. Now, from -- on the basis of your expert knowledge, could you
25 describe whether it is likely that one might be able to retrieve the
1 stabiliser from a 120-millimetre mortar projectile which had ricochetted
2 and landed without exploding?
3 A. Hypothetically speaking, this is possible. In real terms, any
4 projectile, when it ricochets, is exposed to a lot of deviation and is
5 deformed. So nobody would think of taking a part from a used projectile
6 and putting it into a weapon and firing it because that would increase
7 the possibility of an explosion in the barrel during the launching phase
8 rather than actually a successful launch of that projectile at the
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gaynor, we need to have a break for five
12 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
13 --- Break taken at 2.41 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 2.46 p.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
16 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. I'd like to turn now to the Pretis factory in Vogosca. Could you
18 explain, in a couple of sentences, the relative importance of the Pretis
19 factory to the entire defence industry within the SFRY prior to the
20 conflict in Bosnia?
21 A. Pretis factory was an excellent factory, perhaps one of the
22 biggest factories in Europe which produced rocket and other missiles.
23 Its designed capacity was around 750.000 missiles of calibre ranging from
24 76 to 105 millimetres and realistically from 1986 until 1990, it produced
25 around 350.000 rounds of artillery and rocket projectiles per annum.
1 Q. Was part of its production destined for the export market?
2 A. Yes, approximately 60 per cent of the output was intended for
3 export and 35 to 40 per cent was intended for the use of the
4 Yugoslav People's Army.
5 Q. Do you happen to know why such a significant ammunition facility
6 was located in Bosnia rather than, for example, in Serbia?
7 A. Well, when the idea was created to develop a military industry
8 within the federal and later on Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, the
9 trend was that in the central part of Yugoslavia, factories would be
10 established that would be capable regardless of whether any invasion came
11 by the USSR or by NATO, to have good capacities for defence of
12 Yugoslavia. In line with that, the majority of factories were based in
13 Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 Q. Very well. Was it the practice at Pretis to stock raw materials
15 for the manufacture of munitions?
16 A. Yes. The practice was, and also an obligation, that one segment
17 of the production should be dedicated to parts, without assembling them.
18 The purpose was to have them assembled later on based on logistical
20 Q. Are you able to give an estimate as to the stocks of raw
21 materials held at Pretis in April 1992?
22 A. This is not my estimate. This is an estimate of a technological
23 expert who dealt with it. We had an approximately one-year stock of raw
24 materials, and I am referring to metal parts, which were intended for
25 some 350 to 400.000 projectiles on an annual basis.
1 Q. I'd like to move now to the day that you stopped working at
2 Pretis. Do you remember what day that was?
3 A. I do remember. That was a sad day for me. That was the 17th of
4 April 1992.
5 Q. Could you tell the Court why you stopped working there?
6 A. In the period immediately before that date, the situation was
7 extremely tense. There were barricades in Sarajevo, and at one point it
8 seemed that reason would prevail. A number of people who worked at
9 Pretis started coming to work, and I was among them. I remember that on
10 that day, there were about one-third of the currently available people
11 and personnel who came to work. In the building where I worked, which
12 was the development department, were some 15 or 20 of us. I was
13 completely alone in my section because none of my fellow workers
14 appeared. While I was sitting there and doing some work, I felt at one
15 moment an eerie silence. In order for you to grasp how Pretis operated
16 we had a series of plants and about 10.000 people would come to work
17 every day and machines were working all the time, and the sound of
18 machines was actually part of my life. Suddenly, I heard that the
19 machines were silent.
20 I looked out of the window and I saw people leaving the factory
21 in groups. I called the gate house to ask what it was all about, and
22 I was told that quite simply everybody was leaving. So, an extremely
23 negative atmosphere was created. I just picked up a number of books of
24 mine, some research papers that I had, and, believing that this
25 interregnum would probably last 15 to 20 days, I thought that I could
1 continue my work at home. Once I left, I wasn't able to come back to
2 this factory until February of 1996.
3 Q. Why, in a sentence, were you not able to come back until February
5 A. Because the roads were blocked. There were barricades erected on
6 the roads. Shooting started. I heard on TV that the Yugoslav People's
7 Army, as it was still called, entered the factory. I called
8 Radomir Ecimovic, who was the manager of the development department and
9 I wanted to ask him -- excuse me.
10 Q. Sorry, I was just going to ask you -- I'm grateful for the
11 detail. Could I just focus on whether the factory fell under the control
12 of one party to the conflict or another?
13 A. People couldn't move freely and come to the factory, they were
14 prevented from doing that. Only officers of the JNA were able to come
15 and people, so to speak, of Serb ethnicity.
16 Q. So were people who were not of Serb ethnicity permitted to work
17 at Pretis after April 1992?
18 A. In order to reach the premises of Pretis, one had to travel 8
19 kilometres from Sarajevo, and this road was strewn with barricades and
20 obstacles. There were armed people on both sides within the circle and
21 outside the circle. So there was total insecurity and uncertainty. In
22 other words, it was not possible to travel normally and reach the Pretis
24 Q. Now, during the conflict, was the factory under the control of
25 the ABiH or of the VRS?
1 A. It was fully under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska,
2 and according to the information that I have, around 700 people worked in
3 that factory. That's the average annual figure.
4 Q. Now, the next part of the examination-in-chief concerns the
5 Markale I incident, and I'm going to show you some videos and then a few
6 photographs and my initial series of questions will be looking for fairly
7 short response and then I'll give you an opportunity to explain the
8 position in greater detail. Is that all right?
9 A. Absolutely.
10 Q. Very well. Now, did you participate in an investigation of the
11 explosion which took place at Markale market on the 4th of February 1994?
12 A. I worked alongside three of my colleagues, but we were doing this
13 investigation one day after the incident. I volunteered for this work,
14 because I believed that the statements given on the previous day were not
15 correct, and that it was, according to them, impossible to determine the
16 origin of fire. So therefore I attempted, with my colleagues, to provide
17 some additional information. The investigating judge who was on the spot
18 authorised me and my colleagues to proceed with preparing this analysis,
19 and we prepared this analysis in the next 36 hours.
20 Q. I'm going to play a video now and this video is P1711. This will
21 be appearing on the screen in front of you. The first clip is from
22 6 minutes and 39 seconds and it will play until 7 minutes. If you could
23 just look at this clip, Dr. Zecevic.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MR. GAYNOR: You can stop it there, please. It stopped at
1 7 minutes and 13 seconds.
2 Q. Could you describe just in a couple of sentences what you saw
3 there, no need for detailed explanation at this stage.
4 A. In this video, I can only see the effects of the fragments of a
5 projectile on the ground, and I see that there was an attempt to
6 establish the origin of fire.
7 Q. Now, the second clip is from 8 minutes and 32 seconds, and we'll
8 play about 15 seconds.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 MR. GAYNOR: We have stopped at 8 minutes and 46 seconds.
11 Q. Could you describe what you saw in that clip?
12 A. I can only assume this is most probably the point of impact of
13 the projectile on the ground and that was an asphalt surface.
14 Q. Could you describe in greater detail the surface at the
15 Markale Market where the projectile impacted?
16 A. Do you want me to tell you that based on this video or based on
17 what I did?
18 Q. Based on what you did.
19 A. When I arrived on the scene, I knew that an UNPROFOR soldier had
20 dug out the tail-fin support from the ground. I went to this specific
21 location to look at it. I asked for this tail-fin support to be brought
22 to me. I looked at the opening where the stabiliser used to be. I tried
23 to insert the support back into the hole that was there. I took out a
24 few little stones that fell into it, and I inserted it without any
25 effort. After that, I took the supports out again. I measured the depth
1 of the penetration of the stabiliser. I made a sketch. And then, again,
2 I returned the tail-fin support back to its place and, if I may say so,
3 I tried to determine the descent angle or rather the angle of penetration
4 by the tail-fin into the surface. So these were the basic measurements
5 and activities that I performed, that served as the basis for some future
7 Q. In a sentence, could I ask you to describe the nature of the
8 ground where the projectile impacted? How would you describe it,
10 A. It's a gravel surface.
11 Q. Could you describe, is there a top surface followed by something
12 underneath or what is it exactly?
13 A. Very simple: It was an asphalt surface. At the time when the
14 blast and the impact took place, as a result of the detonation that
15 affected this area, and the fragments, the asphalt was removed, there was
16 a small funnel and there were lots of imprints or fragments in the wider
17 area of the asphalt around the point of impact. Inside the soil, as a
18 result of the penetration by the tail-fin, a canal was made, which was
19 about 220 millimetres deep.
20 Q. I'd like to show another clip now which is from 8 minutes and 54
22 [Video-clip played]
23 MR. GAYNOR: We can stop it there, please. That was 9 minutes,
24 we stopped at 9 minutes and 21 seconds.
25 Q. Could you describe briefly what you saw in that clip?
1 A. What we see here is the front side of the tail-fin support
2 protruding from the soil. Around it, you can see pieces of stone and
3 probably pieces of asphalt.
4 Q. We saw somebody digging in that clip. Was that the soldier to
5 whom you referred in your earlier evidence?
6 A. I suppose so. For my analysis, I used this particular video, on
7 the basis of which I learned that this tail-fin support had penetrated
8 the ground surface.
9 Q. I'll go now to 19 minutes and 4 seconds.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 MR. GAYNOR: We can stop there, please.
12 Q. Do you happen to know who placed the chalk around the impact
14 A. I did that, using chalk.
15 Q. Can we go now to 22 minutes and 9 seconds?
16 [Video-clip played]
17 MR. GAYNOR: We can stop there, please. Stopped at 22 minutes
18 and 26 seconds.
19 Q. Could you explain for the Court what the marking is that we see
20 on the ground in that frame?
21 A. One arrow is pointing towards the north. The other arrow is
22 pointing at the direction of the possible position where the mortar was,
23 in other words, the direction from which the projectile came, based on
24 some simple measurements, a 18-degree angle was established between north
25 and east, and by using standard methodology, military methodology, the
1 determination was made based on this asphalt surface which was very
2 suitable for determining the direction and the origin of fire, and my
3 estimate was that the probable origin of fire was 18 degrees plus/minus
4 five degrees. I'm talking about the direction from which the projectile
5 had arrived.
6 MR. GAYNOR: It's 3.10, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will have a break for five minutes.
8 --- Break taken at 3.10 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 3.15 p.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Gaynor.
11 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. My next couple of questions will focus on the measurement of the
13 depth to which the projectile travelled in the ground before coming to
14 rest. Do you understand that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. I'd like to call up and, in fact, I'll just show you one final
17 videoclip, in fact. This is from 22 minutes and 9 seconds, if we can
18 play from there, please. Correction, 26 minutes and 50 seconds, please.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 MR. GAYNOR: And we can stop it there. We stopped at 27 minutes
21 and 28 seconds.
22 Q. Before we get to the distance the projectile travelled before
23 coming to rest, I just want to ask you a couple of questions based on
24 what you saw in that clip. First of all, is what you saw in that clip
25 consistent with detonation of the projectile upon contact with the ground
1 or detonation upon contact with the roofing unit or a stall in the
3 A. This is a classical case of the impact of the projectile or
4 contact with the ground, and the effects of the fuse activating --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to repeat his
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is no way that the projectile
8 acted at a higher elevation or struck a roof.
9 JUDGE KWON: Doctor, if you could repeat your answer. The
10 interpreters couldn't follow your answer in full.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What we saw on the footage is a
12 typical example of effects of the action of a high explosive projectile
13 with -- upon contact with the ground.
14 MR. GAYNOR:
15 Q. Now I want to ask you, hypothetically speaking, no need for a
16 long explanation, but if someone were to go up to the top of this
17 building from where this video footage was taken and to throw off a
18 120-millimetre mortar projectile down to the ground, would that
19 projectile detonate?
20 A. In order for such a projectile to detonate, you would need to
21 make an intervention on the fuse. The fuse would have to be armed, ready
22 to act. Normally this happens only when the projectile leaves the barrel
23 and is at a certain distance from the barrel of the weapon. In the event
24 that somebody is that crazy or that brave and does carry out that
25 intervention and does throw the projectile from the roof, they would need
1 to make sure that the projectile doesn't rotate, but that it, upon
2 contact, hits the head of the fuse, which nobody can guarantee. Besides
3 that, it's also a question of whether that person at the point in time
4 when they throw the projectile would themselves be exposed to the
5 explosion; they could get wounded or killed. So it's an unrealistic
6 scenario that we are talking about. You could only see that perhaps in
7 some science fiction or action movies.
8 Q. I'd like to show you now a photograph of the crater site. If we
9 could call up P1970, and we will look briefly at two photographs,
10 photograph 6, first of all, please. Now, if we could look at photograph
11 8, please.
12 Mr. Zecevic, my question to you is this: Could you clarify
13 whether in your measurement of the distance that the stabiliser had
14 travelled before coming to rest, you were measuring from the top of the
15 surface of the market or you were measuring from the top of what we see
16 to be a depression in the surface caused by the explosion? Do you
17 understand my question?
18 A. I understand, at least I think I'm a professional. I measured
19 from the ground level of the market, the asphalt surface of the ground,
20 to the centre, and I measured in the centre of the crater a depth of 250
21 millimetres. If necessary, I could make a diagram in order to show how
22 I went about the measurements, and I can also use one of the diagrams
23 that I already have here.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. It's up to you to choose.
1 Q. You've anticipated me very well. We have a diagram in one of
2 your reports. This is the 2008 report which I won't be tendering, just
3 solely to bring up a very useful diagram.
4 MR. GAYNOR: Could I call up 10815 and could we go to page 41 in
5 the B/C/S? There is no need to show the English. If we zoom in on the
6 diagram which appears in the middle of this page. Perhaps we can zoom in
7 on the one on the left, please.
8 Q. Does this assist you in explaining the distance that you measured
9 and, if so, could you mark on the screen the distance to which the
10 projectile travelled according to your measurements? Sorry, to which the
11 stabiliser travelled before coming to rest.
12 A. [Marks]
13 Q. Could you mark that with the letter A, perhaps?
14 A. [Marks]
15 Q. Now, while we have this diagram in front of me, I want to ask you
16 a technical question about the reasons why sometimes a stabiliser embeds
17 itself in the ground and sometimes a stabiliser is kicked back from the
18 point of detonation. Could you describe, keeping in mind that we are all
19 laypersons here, why the stabiliser sometimes goes into the ground and
20 why sometimes it doesn't?
21 A. It's a characteristic of 120-millimetre mortar projectiles.
22 There are three possible cases. The first case, which is indicated here
23 as A, is when the projectile of a mortar comes at a pretty high velocity
24 and hits the target, and then each element of that projectile has the
25 same speed. At the point in time of the explosion there is a process of
1 detonation that occurs. It's very brief. Which causes the fragmentation
2 of the body of the projectile. If the speed of the -- of the rebounding
3 of the stabiliser is less than the speed of the projectile, then the
4 stabiliser will have enough energy to hit the surface and penetrate the
5 ground. This is one of the indicators that we can use in order to assess
6 the probable area of the launching of this projectile. Should I continue
7 about these other two cases?
8 Q. Yes, please.
9 A. In the second case, when the projectile is more or less equal to
10 the rebound speed, and the 120-millimetre projectile, this speed can be
11 about 170, plus or minus 20 metres, which can be calculated, then when
12 the rebound speed is approximately the same, or equal to, the speed of
13 the incoming projectile, and this is 170 metres, plus/minus 20 metres,
14 then we will find the stabiliser close to the place of the explosion, and
15 that then indicates to us the position from where the projectile was
17 The third case is when the speed of the incoming projectile is
18 significantly lesser than the speed of the rebound of the stabiliser, and
19 in that case, the stabiliser will be found scores of metres back in the
20 direction from where the projectile came, and that will also give us an
21 opportunity to make an assessment of the area from where the projectile
22 was launched.
23 I can say that these are God's laws, these are laws of mechanics,
24 they don't depend on me or anyone else and this is something that can be
25 plotted exactly.
1 Q. Now, in respect of the Markale I incident, you said you created a
2 report about that incident. Could I call up 10 -- sorry, could I ask you
3 to sign this document and to put your name on it -- sorry, put today's
4 date on it, I should say?
5 A. [Marks] today is the 22nd; is that correct?
6 JUDGE KWON: 22nd.
7 MR. GAYNOR: That's correct, yes.
8 I'll tender that, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2316, Your Honours.
11 MR. GAYNOR:
12 Q. Now, we should be receiving on the screens in front of us the
13 report which you created in respect of the Markale I incident, 10676.
14 Perhaps if we can go to page 13 in B/C/S and page 8 in English,
15 which contain a set of signatures, could you confirm who authored this
16 report and what the report is?
17 A. This is our analysis at the request of the investigating judge,
18 and it's an analysis in which I took part. My colleagues Omerovic,
19 Ahmed, Amir Kurtovic, and also Zijo Pekic, took part in the drafting of
20 the analysis but he wasn't there when it was completed so he didn't sign
21 it, because at the time he was in Dobrinja.
22 Q. Now, I'd like to focus on a couple of the conclusions you came
23 to, which are summarised on this page of the report. I think we've dealt
24 with conclusion number 5. You've already said that you measured the
25 azimuth, or the direction from which the projectile came, to be 18
1 degrees, plus/minus 5 degrees; is that right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, I want to focus on the conclusion number 7, the projectile's
4 estimated angle of descent is 55 degrees to 65 degrees, the English
5 translation contains in error in that regard. Who measured the estimated
6 angle of descent?
7 A. I did.
8 Q. How did you measure it?
9 A. I placed the stabiliser fins into the tunnel created by its
10 penetration. I took an artillery square, which is a device that we use
11 to determine the angle of a barrel of a weapon or some other element.
12 I placed it at the front side of the stabiliser, and I set the angle of
13 60 degrees. Since it would be pretentious of me to say that the 60
14 degree angle was correct, because it's possible that there was some kind
15 of motion during penetration, so some deviation, so I took that to be --
16 the value to be the range from 55 to 65 degrees, which any serious
17 professional would also do in my case. So this angle is definitely
18 correct, the range is correct, for that angle measurement.
19 Q. When you replaced the stabiliser into the hole, could you
20 describe whether it was quite a snug fit or loose fit? To what extent
21 were you satisfied with the accuracy of replacing the stabiliser into the
23 A. I am 100 per cent sure that I positioned it in the way it should
24 have been positioned, and there was no major deviation. For one reason.
25 Later calculations that are accessible to everybody about the penetration
1 into soft barriers indicate that the probable speed of penetration of the
2 stabiliser was 60 plus/minus 20 metres per second. Perhaps this doesn't
3 mean anything to you but 60 metres per second is 200 kilometres per hour.
4 That would be the speed that the stabiliser fin penetrated the barrier.
5 You know what happens when a car strikes a barrier at 200 kilometres per
6 hour; it gets completely deformed. The car is destroyed. This
7 stabiliser entered or penetrated through the barrier at exactly the same
8 speed, or rather penetrated the surface, the ground.
9 Q. Can you distinguish, first of all, before we go any further,
10 between the speed at which the stabiliser penetrated the ground and the
11 speed at which the projectile itself was travelling at the moment of
12 impact? Can you explain if there is a distinction there?
13 A. If the speed of penetration is 60 metres plus/minus 20 per
14 second, margin of error, and if the speed of the rebounding of the
15 stabiliser is about 170 plus/minus 20 metres per second, later analysis
16 that I carried out indicated that the minimum speed of the incoming
17 projectile was 200 metres per second, the minimum speed, which
18 automatically indicates that, in view of the impact speed, the launching
19 zones would probably be five kilometres, 5.400 and 6.400 metres away from
20 the place of the explosion. In any case, if we had found -- we would
21 have found the stabiliser around the place of the explosion or back in
22 the direction of the incoming angle.
23 So this is a very clear thing for any mechanic, any mechanical
24 engineer, this scenario is something that would be crystal clear for such
25 a person. I did determine the zones, not the point of launch, but zones
1 or areas from where the projectile could have possibly been launched.
2 Q. Could you describe -- this is probably my last question before
3 the break. Could you describe briefly how you came to the conclusion
4 that the minimum speed of the incoming projectile was 200 metres per
6 A. I tried to explain that earlier. If the rebound speed is --
7 actually, if the speed of penetration is 60 metres and the speed of
8 rebound is plus or minus 20 metres, then the speed of the rebound of the
9 stabiliser at the point of impact, at the time of the explosion would be
10 170, plus or minus 20 metres. So if we look at minimum values, you could
11 have 40 metres here and you could have 50 metres here so that would be
12 190 metres per second. It could even be 240. I thought that most
13 probably the speed would be 200 metres per second. So I'm talking about
14 the speed of the incoming projectile, the speed of -- of penetration, and
15 the speed of its rebound.
16 So this is a calculation, and I thought that it was 200 metres,
17 it could be 190 metres, 210, 220. I thought that it was at least 200
18 metres and that based on that, I could work out the possible area from
19 where a projectile of this type was launched.
20 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient, Mr. Gaynor?
21 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, indeed, thank you, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for half an hour, resume at 10
23 past 4.
24 --- Recess taken at 3.40 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 4.11 p.m.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson?
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I think we are coming to the
3 point where the Prosecutor was going to offer the Markale expert report
4 into evidence and I just wanted to place on the record, outside of the
5 presence of the witness, our objections to it. I know you've already
6 ruled, but since we didn't have our objections on the record, I would
7 just like to take a minute to do that. And our objections are that this
8 witness is -- there is no showing that this witness is an expert in
9 ballistics forensics, as opposed to the manufacture and design of
10 ballistics. There's no showing he's ever done a crater analysis before
11 this one, there is no showing that the -- the technique of replacing a
12 stabiliser and making calculations from it is a legitimate one, and his
13 work hasn't been peer-reviewed at all. And finally that he's not
14 impartial, and in a few cases in the Sierra Leone Tribunal and in the
15 ICTR, at least, they have disqualified persons who may otherwise have
16 been considered to be expert, because of their lack of impartiality. And
17 I'm referring specifically to a decision in the Charles Taylor case of
18 the 19th of June, 2008, and one at the Akayesu case at the ICTR on the
19 9th of March, 1998. So for all of those reasons we have objected to the
20 expert report being admitted as an expert report. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Gaynor?
22 MR. GAYNOR: Your Honours have already ruled, so I'll just place,
23 I suppose, on the record the Prosecution's reasons for opposing the
24 Defence's motion. This witness has been recognised as an expert in
25 respect of the Markale I incident, both in the Galic case and in the
1 Slobodan Milosevic case. He's also been recognised as an expert,
2 generally speaking, in the Momcilo Perisic case and in the
3 Dragomir Milosevic case. All of the issues raised by Mr. Robinson are
4 appropriate areas for cross-examination. They don't disqualify the
5 witness from acting as an expert, I think from the witness's -- I submit
6 that from the witness's background, he is, in fact, one of the most
7 qualified people coming out of the defence industry of the former
8 Yugoslavia to comment on the impact of a 120-millimetre mortar projectile
9 at a specific location in Sarajevo. There are very few people who are in
10 fact more qualified than he is to make the observations that he's making.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Gaynor.
12 Yes, we agree with Mr. Gaynor in that the reasons referred to is
13 not such that it should be disqualified as an expert.
14 Very well, we'll bring in the witness again.
15 [The witness entered court]
16 JUDGE KWON: Please make yourself comfortable.
17 Yes, Mr. Gaynor?
18 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. Witness, I'd like to turn now to a page of your report relating
20 to the Markale I incident and if we could look at page 7 in English and
21 page 10 in B/C/S, on that page you give six possible distances for an
22 angle of impact of 55 degrees and six possible distances for an angle of
23 impact of 65 degrees; is that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. In fact, we can dispense with the English. I think the B/C/S is
1 sufficient for this. First of all, could you tell us how much time you
2 had to prepare this report?
3 A. I think around 36 hours. It was an extremely complicated
4 situation. Everybody was excited and we were requested to finalise our
5 report as soon as possible, and that was the best we could do at such a
7 Q. Now, the figures which appear in these two columns are in metres;
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And in the first column to the left, you indicate the range on
11 charge 1, charge 2, charge 3, charge 4, charge 5 and charge 6, correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, based on the evidence you've given earlier today, do you
14 exclude any of the potential distances which you set out in this report?
15 A. I exclude the possibility for the projectile to be launched with
16 the first, second and third charges.
17 Q. Could you explain to the Court why you exclude those
19 A. Due to the fact because the launching speed of such
20 projectiles -- actually those speeds were lower than the listed speed that
21 the projectile should have had at the point of impact. Ballistics tells
22 us that the speed at impact is never equal to the launching speed, so if I
23 said that the minimum speed at impact was probably 200 metres per second,
24 then the launching speed for the first charge would be 123 metres per second,
25 for the second one 173, and for the third one 211 metres per second.
1 In other words, the only possibility is that the fourth, fifth and sixth
2 charges were used for launching the shell that hit Markale.
3 Q. Can I put the question -- a related question to you? If the
4 stabiliser had not embedded itself in the ground to the extent that it
5 had, what effect would that have had on your conclusions?
6 A. That would probably include charge number 3, which is the range
7 4.120 to 3.622 metres from the point of explosion.
8 Q. Now, in your earlier evidence you said that the stabiliser
9 embedded itself to an approximate distance of 250 millimetres in the
10 ground. How relevant is that to excluding the possibility that the
11 projectile had been fired from closer than 4.500 metres?
12 A. To put it simply, one can reach two conclusions. As for the
13 second charge, or the third one, depending on the elevation from which
14 the projectile was launched and I mean above sea level, with regard to
15 point of explosion, we could find the stabiliser close to the place of
16 explosion. So then we can speak about the distance ranging between 2.600
17 and 3.000 metres. From the moment when the stabiliser start penetrating
18 the surface, one can speak about the possible zone with respect to a
19 charge number 3. The deeper it went, if it reached 250 millimetres, we
20 can say that that was -- it would be exclusively charges 4, 5 or 6. So
21 if I may say, it is completely irrelevant whether it was 60, 50 or 70,
22 200, 250 or 150 millimetres depth. The only important point was whether
23 stabiliser penetrated the ground or whether it was found in the vicinity
24 of the point of explosion, or whether it was found discarded back to the
25 direction of the launch. These are the only parameters that determine
1 the potential launching zones.
2 Q. I'd like to tender the report at this point, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, you've already ruled, so we don't
5 have anything further, thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: The objection is noted. Yes, we'll admit that.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2317, Your Honours.
8 MR. GAYNOR:
9 Q. Mr. Zecevic, I'm going to turn now to the question of modified
10 air-bombs. Could we call up 65 ter 08347, please? Now, for the benefit
11 of the court, if you intend to consult anything other than your copy of
12 the modified air-bomb, please inform the Court. Do you understand that?
13 Your copy of the modified air-bomb report, I should say. Very well.
14 Now, first of all, the document on the screen in front of you, could you
15 confirm what that is?
16 A. This is an analysis that I made for the Prosecution in the
17 General Milosevic case. It applies to the use of modified aircraft bombs
18 during the siege of Sarajevo in 1994 and 1995.
19 Q. If we could -- I'll be asking some questions about this but I'd
20 like to tender it at this stage, Mr. President.
21 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As P2318, Your Honours.
24 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
25 Q. Could we turn now to page 68 of the report in B/C/S, page 74 in
1 English? My first set of questions will focus on the factors affecting
2 the accuracy and the precision of modified air-bombs. Those are not in
3 fact the pages I was looking for. If you give me a moment, please.
4 If we could go to page 76 in B/C/S, please?
5 JUDGE KWON: 82 in English?
6 MR. GAYNOR: The page I want it is paginated differently to the
7 e-court version. So perhaps if we could ...
8 JUDGE KWON: Is there a probability, you're referring to that.
9 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, this is the page I want, right in front of us.
10 Thank you.
11 Q. If we could just focus in really on the diagram of that
12 projectile there.
13 JUDGE KWON: We need English page as well. Page 87.
14 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Q. Now, could you just briefly confirm that this is a diagram which
16 you made of a modified FAB 250?
17 A. This is a diagram of the modified rocket assisted bomb, FAB 250.
18 It contains three rocket engines, a stabiliser.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the answer?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The diagram was drawn based on the
21 fragments retrieved in Sarajevo.
22 MR. GAYNOR:
23 Q. Now, we can keep this page on the screen. Elsewhere in your
24 report, you describe some of the factors affecting the accuracy and
25 precision of modified air-bombs. One of the -- this is at page 87 of
1 your report in English and page 79 in B/C/S. One of the first factors
2 you describe is that they did not have complex assemblies for controlling
3 individual phases of the bomb's action. I want you to focus on the
4 ignition phase. Could you describe for the Court what effect it would
5 have on the flight of the projectile if one of the three rockets were to
6 be ignited ever so slightly later than the other two?
7 A. Each of these systems was equipped with three independent rocket
8 engines. They were supposed to activate simultaneously. Based on the
9 documents available to me, the assembling of the rocket system was
10 carried out by using predominantly 122 Grad rocket engines, or 128 Organj
11 engines or 127 engines of K-15 guided missiles. The most important
12 problem is that all these engines act independently of each other, which
13 can produce a consequence that each of them would have the difference in
14 the pressure of burning, which means the force would be different during
15 the flight, and this will subsequently cause the deviation from the
16 direction of the rocket that had been previously anticipated, and of
17 course it will miss the target.
18 Q. Is this the same as another factor which you've mentioned in your
19 report where you said that these modified projectiles did not have a
20 means of equalising combustion pressure in the rocket motor? Is that a
21 separate issue or is that the issue that you've just described?
22 A. I understand. In the first system that I found in January of
23 1994, the rocket engines were interconnected in order to equalise the
24 combustion pressure which would compensate for some of the difference
25 between the pressures within each of these engines. These engines
1 consisting of three pieces, did not have pressure compensators, which
2 cause the increased dispersion at the target.
3 Q. Now, elsewhere in your report you said that the centring of the
4 axes in the rocket motors, in the rocket structure, was unsatisfactory.
5 Could you explain briefly to the Court what effect a slightly
6 non-parallel fixing of the rocket motors would have on the accuracy and
7 precision of the projectile?
8 A. This three-rocket engine system is an extremely primitive version
9 of a rocket system. Far better technologically would be the system with
10 four engines that were in use in the beginning of January 1994. This
11 other system was made without using the potential that the Pretis company
12 had. It was below or substandard manufacture. As a result, it could
13 cause, at any point in time, for any of these systems not to have equal
14 performance rates, and the possibility of hitting a planned target was
15 extremely low.
16 Q. Could you explain - actually just staying on that point - a
17 slightly non-parallel alignment of the rocket motors, could you focus
18 very much on that issue, how would that affect the flight of the
20 A. It would cause lateral deviation from the direction. So it's a
21 complex question. At any rate, this will cause a lateral disturbance
22 which would cause the projectile to turn left, right, upwards or
23 downwards, depending on when and how this system was assembled. It was
24 not only rocket engines that were key elements to the system. The
25 stabilising system used here was equally extremely negatively designed,
1 from the point of view of flight stability, and it caused additional
2 dispersion at the targets.
3 Q. What is meant by circular error probability, sometimes referred
4 to as CEP in English?
5 A. It was a statistical parameter which indicates the zone or,
6 rather, the radius which says that of the 120 projectiles, 50 would fall
7 in a zone. If we look at, for example, 155-millimetre shell, the CEP at
8 the distance of 24 kilometres would be 360 metres in diameter. That
9 would be the circle within which, of the 150 projectiles, 50 would fall
10 in that zone and the remaining would fall out of that zone. It has been
11 quite clearly stated that non-guided rocket or artillery weapon can --
12 can target multiple targets. It could only target, for example, a
13 football playground. So there is not a single rocket system or artillery
14 system that can hit a house from a distance of 8 to 10 kilometres. It's
15 as simple as that.
16 MR. GAYNOR: Mr. President, I note the time. Perhaps it's time
17 for the break.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll break for five minutes.
19 --- Break taken at 4.37 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 4.45 p.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. Before the break you described what circular error probability
24 is. Would you be able to give the Court an estimate of the circular
25 error probability of the modified FAB air-bombs which were used on
1 Sarajevo during the conflict?
2 A. I believe that on the basis of the analysis that I tried to
3 provide here with my associates, that the surface where those projectiles
4 would fall would be from 60 to 250 metres, the surface. That would be
5 the circular error probability. You could probably derive it from that
6 to be some 250 metres in radius.
7 Q. During your period at Pretis, you worked on the development of
8 new weapon systems; correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. About how long would weapons system be in the testing and
11 development phase before it was ready to be used?
12 A. Usually a new serious system would take five to seven years to
13 develop. Often it would be ten years. After one or two years, you would
14 quickly define the basic concept and then the rest of the time would be
15 spent to bring the system up to the situation where you could predict its
16 performance. So it would take a minimum of five to seven years for this
17 kind of work.
18 Q. Could you compare, on the one hand, the weapon systems developed
19 in Pretis before the conflict and, on the other, the modified air-bombs
20 which were used on Sarajevo during the conflict, and offer the Court your
21 observations as to the accuracy of the modified air-bombs?
22 A. The process of developing a new system is extremely complex, and
23 demands the participation of a number of organisational systems. If
24 Pretis thus was supposed to develop a new system, it had to include
25 people who would be working on design, people who would be working on the
1 manufacture of components, people who would be working on the inspection
2 of the production process, and also they had to engage technical testing
3 centres that were within the JNA system. This required complete
4 equipment to measure velocity, range, the behaviour of the projectile in
5 flight. You had to include rocket fuel production facilities, explosives
6 production facilities, you had to include people who were working on the
7 firing tables. This would probably be done by the military technical
8 institute from Belgrade in most cases. And only then, after four to five
9 years, the factory would be in a position to say that it had completely
10 mastered the development of a new system and its manufacture and then you
11 would proceed to the production of the zero series, which would then be
12 given to the technical testing centre, which, independently of the
13 factory, would test the weapon independent of the factory that produced
14 that particular system. And then that centre would submit the final
15 suggestions as to whether that system would be part of the weapon systems
16 or not. This is an extremely complex process requiring the engagement of
17 a large number of people, large amount of funds, equipment, and a large
18 amount of time.
19 Q. And briefly "yes" or "no", on the basis of what you were able to
20 establish in your preparation of this report, did the modified air-bomb
21 system go through anything like that process? Very briefly, please.
22 A. No.
23 Q. On the basis of your expert analysis of the modified air-bomb and
24 of your own experience, are you able to offer an opinion as to whether
25 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had modified air-bomb systems during
1 the war?
2 A. No.
3 Q. That is, it did not have such systems, correct?
4 A. They didn't have the technical capacity to produce such systems.
5 They didn't have the material resources. They didn't have the production
6 plants. And they didn't have the power potential or capability in order
7 to manufacture these devices.
8 Q. I'd like to move now to the concept of fuel air, as opposed to
9 TNT, in respect of the content of the air-bombs. Can you tell the Court
10 briefly which has more destructive capacity, a bomb filled with TNT or
11 one filled with a fuel-air mix?
12 A. The question is not precise, but I can try to give you an answer
13 as to why the question is not precise. I can answer the question, but I
14 can also explain the difference.
15 Q. Yes, please go ahead.
16 A. A warhead with a hard explosive such as TNT, at the moment it
17 hits the target and when the fuse is activated, which reacts within an
18 interval of 200 to 300 millionth parts of a second, activates the
19 detonation, the hard explosive begins to turn into gaseous detonation
20 products, and very soon the metal body of the projectile, because of
21 extremely high pressure within the projectile, which is measured in 2 to
22 300.000 bars and the temperature of 3 to 4.000 degrees Centigrade begins
23 to expand, meaning the metal body, under the effect of such high
24 pressure, grows to four or five times the volume and that's when the
25 fragmentation begins. When the fragmentation begins, the detonation
1 products leave the body of the projectile creating an extremely high
2 pressure impulse, a very high value, which radically, quickly, decreases
3 upon impact. The entire fragmentation process lasts some 50, 60 or 70
4 millionth parts of a second.
5 With aerosol bombs, or projectiles, the process is completely
6 different. First, the body of such a projectile has to be shattered with
7 a hard explosive, which causes the fuel explosive to mix with the air
8 around it. It evaporates and expands within a couple of parts of a
9 second, within -- or a couple of second, it mixes with the surrounding
10 air, of the aerosol, with the neighbouring air, and then you need an
11 outside initiation, an outside source of energy, these are usually
12 explosive charges, two or three explosive charges, which then initiate
13 the process of detonation of the aerosol explosive. In the meantime the
14 aerosol has expanded over a wider area, some 10, 20 or 30 metres broad,
15 and then there is the activation, but the pressure in this process now is
16 20 to 30 bars, not hundreds or thousands of bars, and the time required
17 for this pressure process with the aerosol bomb is much longer, and the
18 aerosol bomb has a very good destructive effect on buildings, which are
19 tagged as soft targets, people, bunkers, some warehousing facilities,
20 airplanes, different depots and so on and so forth.
21 Q. If I can ask you this: You said in your report that the fuel-air
22 system was originally developed to clear vegetation in Vietnam; is that
24 A. Correct. So that choppers could land.
25 Q. Now, could you comment on whether -- which system, the TNT system
1 or the fuel-air system, would be more appropriate for the destruction of
2 buildings and which would be more appropriate for destruction of people?
3 A. This is a complex question. If human targets in the open are
4 involved, then there is a greater probability, when a TNT projectile
5 impacts a zone with human targets, that, not the effect of pressure, but
6 the fragmentation effect will cause the destruction of human targets.
7 But if the human targets are dug in in bunkers or if they are dug in, as
8 in the case of Vietnam, in subterranean tunnels, then the air-bomb system
9 is extremely effective. In the same way, if the target is a housing
10 facility, a building, then a greater effect for internal structures and
11 human targets would be caused by the aerosol system, but in order to
12 achieve that, you would really need to be a very talented person in order
13 to be able to strike at urban parts of towns with air-bombs. This is not
14 something that is present in any doctrine of any army.
15 Q. In your report, you've commented on a number of specific
16 incidents concerning the use of modified air-bombs in Sarajevo in 1995.
17 And in most of those cases, you consider, according to your report, that
18 the air-bombs in question contained fuel-air rather than TNT. Could you
19 identify for the Court, in brief terms, what are the factors that you
20 took into account in determining whether the projectile contained a
21 fuel-air mix or TNT?
22 A. In the event that the system had a hard-type explosive such as
23 TNT, at the moment of impact on the target, the air-bomb which can weigh
24 as much as 220 kilograms and contains over 90 kilograms of hard
25 explosives would generate an extremely high blast effect, i.e. pressure,
1 and a large number of fragments, which would have as a consequence that
2 the rocket engines and the stabilisers would be ejected very far from the
3 point of impact. In the case of all the systems that I analysed in the
4 Sarajevo area in my analysis, I always found rocket engines or parts of
5 rocket engines at the point of impact with the stabiliser fins. This is
6 a fact that is not possible to dispute. This is identical, as in the
7 120-millimetre mortar projectiles. But in the case of the 120-millimetre
8 mortar shell, you have 2.2 kilograms of TNT and in the air-bombs you have
9 90 kilograms of TNT. This is the comparison between the two projectiles,
10 the mortar projectile and the air-bomb. These are the main reasons;
11 there are other reasons but they are not as crucial.
12 Q. My question was specifically how you could tell that it was an
13 air-bomb filled with a fuel-air mix compared to an air-bomb filled with
14 TNT. Does that -- do you have any further observations to make?
15 A. It's very simple. In case that a TNT air-bomb explodes near a
16 building, the air-bomb with TNT generates over 7.000 fragments, more than
17 7 milligrams of mass -- 7 grams of mass. So any neighbouring area would
18 be absolutely perforated by lots and lots of fragments. I did not have
19 the opportunity to see that, in any case. If a TNT air-bomb hit a house
20 or a building, and if the explosion occurred within a house, of
21 90 kilograms of TNT, all the walls would be blasted towards the outside.
22 In some cases, I showed clearly that this was not the case, that in the
23 middle of the blast area, there would be a wall still standing straight
24 because the aerosol acted with equal force on either side of the wall and
25 prevented that wall from crumbling; this is in Hrasnica. So all the
1 analysis that were carried out indicate that an aerosol system was used,
2 in each one of those cases, as in the examples in the report that you are
3 showing to me now.
4 Q. To the best of your knowledge and on the basis of your inspection
5 at the sites you describe in your report, did the Army of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina have the technical capacity to produce aerosol bombs during
7 the conflict?
8 A. Would you like a descriptive answer or a short answer?
9 Q. I'd prefer a short answer, please.
10 A. No.
11 MR. GAYNOR: I don't know if Your Honours require further
12 analysis. I'll keep going.
13 Q. That ends this portion of your examination-in-chief. I now want
14 to show you a few documents that you've had a chance to review earlier.
15 Can I call up 15842, please? A couple of these documents are delivery
16 documents concerning munitions and I think it's fair to say that they are
17 quite difficult to follow for --
18 A. Excuse me, I do have an intervention. Here it says 7 milligrams,
19 but actually it's a mass of seven grams. This is a vast difference so
20 7.000 fragments of 5 grams mass or more. 5 grams mass or more.
21 Q. Thank you for that. If we could turn to the next page of the
22 document on the screen, please? I can provide a hard copy for you if
23 it's more comfortable.
24 Could you tell us what this document is?
25 THE ACCUSED: [In English] It would help if he learned what is the
1 origin and who made those marks by pencil.
2 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.
3 Q. Sir, if there are any annotations, Mr. Zecevic, made by pen, you
4 can ignore those, they are simply marks which happen to be on my copy,
5 but I'll get him to explain what the document is, if that allays
6 Mr. Karadzic's concerns.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's proceed.
8 MR. GAYNOR:
9 Q. Could you have a look at the document, witness, please, and first
10 of all just tell us what it is.
11 A. This is a dispatch list of air-bombs weighing 250 kilograms, of
12 the 5th of April 1995, speaking that as of the 1st of January 1994 until
13 the 31st of December 1994, the Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska,
14 the Main Staff in Pale, dispatched 95 bombs.
15 Q. Is there anything else in that document concerning air-bombs that
16 you wish to comment on?
17 A. It states FAB 250 here. So these are air-bombs, FAB 250. There
18 is the price of that bomb, but I don't know in which currency it's
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I assist? The Main Staff was
21 never in Pale. Does the Prosecutor, Mr. Gaynor, have another witness to
22 clarify the origin of this document because there was never a Main Staff
23 in Pale. The Main Staff was some 50 kilometres away from Pale.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it is a proper subject for you to
25 explore during your cross-examination.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not directed at the
2 witness, but at Gaynor.
3 JUDGE KWON: So what I said is your intervention is not helpful
4 at this moment, Mr. Karadzic.
5 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. Witness, could you just confirm, you said it's a dispatch list.
7 Could you tell who it's from and who it's to?
8 A. I couldn't really say because you cannot see who this is
9 sending -- who is sending this ammunition.
10 Q. Very well. On the basis of the witness's identification of the
11 munitions, I'll tender that document.
12 MR. ROBINSON: I think, Mr. President, given some question as to
13 its authenticity, that we would be objecting.
14 JUDGE KWON: Given that the witness was not able to -- I'll
15 consult my colleagues.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE KWON: Since we are not satisfied as to its foundation or
18 authenticity, we will not admit this at this stage, Mr. Gaynor.
19 MR. GAYNOR: Very well, Mr. President.
20 Q. I'll move on to the next document, which is 15709.
21 Dr. Zecevic, you can put down that document. A document will
22 appear on your screen in a moment. Could you tell us what this document
23 appears to be?
24 A. This is a report about the ammunition issued from the holding
25 Pretis further to orders of the Main Staff of the
1 Army of Republika Srpska, sent by the Main Staff of Republika Srpska, the
2 logistics sector, on the 5th of December, 1993, sent to the Main Staff --
3 to the Defence Ministry of Republika Srpska, stating that in the period
4 from the 1st of January 1993 to the 30th of November 1993, the following
5 resources have been issued from the holding company Pretis, further to
6 orders by the VRS Main Staff. And then we have the order number, the
7 type of ammunition, the quantity of the ammunition, and the military unit
8 to which the -- this ammunition was supplied to.
9 Q. In this document in a number of locations we see mortar
10 120-millimetre MB. Would you be able to comment on what that is?
11 A. 82-millimetre mine, MB, mortar shell, and a mortar shell of 120
12 millimetres. You have that. You have 100, 120, pieces. Then you have
13 82-millimetre mortar shells, 600 pieces. Then up 120-millimetre mortar
14 shell, 300 pieces. Then 120 millimetre, 500 pieces. Then you have some
15 500 contact-fuse bullets. This is what I can see here.
16 Q. Are these references to 120 millimetre mortars, is that the same
17 kind of projectile that impacted at Markale Market?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And in a number of the projectiles which the --
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gaynor, I've forgotten that we should have taken
21 a break. We will take a break for five minutes now.
22 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 --- Break taken at 5.15 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 5.20 p.m.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Gaynor.
1 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
2 Q. The Trial Chamber has received information about markings on
3 120-millimetre projectiles containing the letters KB, Cyrillic letters,
4 KB, which in Latin is KV. Do you happen to know what those mean?
5 A. That's the code name for the ammunition factory called
6 Krusik Valjevo.
7 Q. Does that suggest that such parts were made in the Krusik factory
8 in Valjevo?
9 A. Not a single element of the ammunition in the former Yugoslavia
10 could leave the factory without marking being stamped by the factory, the
11 code name of the factory, which is also in line with international
13 Q. Now, the document you've just looked at, there is a reference to
14 quite significant quantities of 120-illimetre mortars being issued from
15 Pretis, correct?
16 A. I can't tell you that. It just said that this ammunition was
17 delivered from Pretis to Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Vogosca Brigade, and so
18 on and so forth. So probably the ammunition was delivered from that
19 particular factory because there is no other ammunition factory in the
21 Q. Are you able to comment on the basis of your experience prior to
22 the conflict, the relationship between Pretis in Vogosca and Krusik in
23 Valjevo in Serbia?
24 A. Before the war, Krusik Valjevo was a factory producing guided
25 rocket missile systems and 60-, 82- and 120-millimetre mortar shells. It
1 also manufactured base charge for mortar shells. Pretis, if they
2 produced 120-millimetre shell, would purchase base charge from Krusik as
3 one of the components that they required. Pretis produced non-guided
4 systems, anti-tank projectiles and aerial bombs.
5 Q. I'd like to tender the document the witness commented on.
6 MR. ROBINSON: We object, Mr. President. We don't think this is
7 a proper witness to tender this type of document.
8 JUDGE KWON: You do not challenge the authenticity of this
10 MR. ROBINSON: We don't really know the authenticity of the
11 document, but I note that it has a seal and a signature on the last page,
12 but Dr. Karadzic has never seen this before, so he's not in a position to
13 stipulate to its authenticity. But in any event, this is -- the kind of
14 comments that this witness has made about the document, when you admit a
15 document for all purposes, it seems like that's a little extreme to admit
16 this document based on the kind of comments that he's made on it.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gaynor, do you like to reply to that?
18 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, I'm happy to ask the question -- the witness
19 further questions. He did work at Pretis for 17 years. He is intimately
20 familiar with documentation relating to the production by Pretis of
21 ammunition. He's confirmed that this -- he confirmed that this document
22 refers to the delivery of 82-millimetre and 120-millimetre mortar
23 projectiles to the Vogosca Brigade, the Rajlovac Brigade, the SRKs. He's
24 confirmed essentially what this document is. Now, we can ask him
25 questions about the person who signed the document, if you wish, in a
1 further effort to establish its authenticity. I have to say I'm somewhat
2 surprised that the Defence is objecting at this stage to the document.
3 They haven't objected to many VRS documents in the past.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think our problem with this
5 is that this witness, by December 5th, 1993, when this document was
6 authored was no longer in any way connected with the VRS, the Pretis or
7 any of this information, so he's commenting on something that really he
8 can't speak to, other than in very general way, and so we don't think
9 that that is sufficient to make a document admissible.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is satisfied with the authenticity of
12 the document, and given that the witness was able to give some context to
13 this document, we will admit this.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2319, Your Honours.
15 MR. GAYNOR: I'm obliged, Mr. President. Could I have 07720,
17 Q. First of all, witness, could you comment on the heading and
18 general appearance of this document? Does it -- where does it appear to
19 have been issued from?
20 A. This is a standard document, or better to say an official
21 document issued by Pretis factory which was part of UNIS group so you
22 have the logo of UNIS and Pretis, and it says, "Pretis Sarajevo". Pretis
23 is an abbreviation of the enterprise Tito Sarajevo. We have the address,
24 71-320 Vogosca, that was the pre-war address. Then Igman Mars Street
25 number 24, telephone 071, area code number for Sarajevo. So this is a
1 typical letterhead.
2 Q. Could you comment on the signature and stamp of this document?
3 A. I can't tell you anything about the signature, but I can tell you
4 that Milorad Motika, an engineer, was a colleague of mine before the war.
5 I knew him and we were on relatively good terms. This stamp was not the
6 one used before the war. It's a more recent one because it says, "Pretis
7 holding Vogosca enterprise." There is no UNIS logo. But it says UNIS,
8 Pretis holding enterprise Vogosca. I cannot say this with 100 per cent
9 certainty, because transformation took place immediately before the war,
10 which was conducive to the change of the stamp, but as I said, I know the
11 director of Pretis holding.
12 Q. Do you happen to know when Milorad Motika was appointed as
13 director of Pretis?
14 A. After the war began.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have recorded in the
16 transcript that this witness said that Motika was an industrious man?
17 Can he confirm that?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 MR. GAYNOR:
21 Q. This document refers to -- I'll read out the words in the English
22 language: "660 FAB 250 aerial bombs without stabilisers with fuses, so
23 we can complete the 122-millimetre rocket engines." Do you see that
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Are you able to explain what the word "complete" means in this
3 A. In this context, as I understand it based on my experience, means
4 that it was necessary to secure FAB 250 bombs with fuses and to deliver
5 122-millimetre rocket engines. Now, Pretis would manufacture additional
6 parts in order to complete these systems, which is the connection between
7 the engines and the aerial bomb, the stabiliser systems, et cetera,
8 because at the end it says, "All other parts for rocket bombs."
9 MR. GAYNOR: I tender that, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2320, Your Honours.
12 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have 65 ter number 15754, please.
13 Q. Are you able to see that, Dr. Zecevic? I have a clean, hard copy
14 here if you wish me to provide it to you.
15 A. If it's no trouble. Thank you.
16 Q. Are you able to describe what that document is?
17 A. The Main Staff of the VRS, logistics sector, 14th, I think June,
18 1995, delivers to the command of the 27th Logistics Brigade and the
19 commander of the 35th Logistics Brigade, and to Pretis, for information
20 only, reference official document strictly confidential, from 1995, it is
21 a -- requested that the 27th Logistics Brigade -- I'm sorry, take over
22 from the 35th Logistics Brigade and hand over to Pretis, 30 pieces and
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please read slowly all the
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The bombs will be taken over --
2 upon takeover, the bombs, along with the corresponding number of
3 128-millimetre rocket engines - 110 pieces, shall be transported and
4 handed over at holding Pretis or to holding Pretis for assembling. This
5 is not what is written in this document.
6 Number 2, complete the bombs in the following manner. Ten FAB
7 100, which are 100 kilogram aerial bombs with three motors each; 20 FAB
8 100 with one engine each and immediately they made a correction by hand
9 and said, 30 pieces with one engine and finally 20 pieces, FAB 250, with
10 three engines each.
11 Upon completing the aerial bombs shall be taken over and stored
12 by the 27th Logistics Base.
13 Commence the implementation of this task immediately, and upon
14 completion the command of the 27th logistics Base Shall inform this staff
15 accordingly. By authorisation of the chief
16 Lieutenant-Colonel Miroslav Cvijetic.
17 Q. Now, the reference in this document to FAB 100 with three motors
18 each, briefly tell us what you believe that to be a reference to?
19 A. This is probably relating to completing these rocket systems with
20 aerosol explosives. That's my assumption.
21 Q. Now we see reference to FAB 100s with three motors and FAB 100s
22 with one motor.
23 A. I think that's a mistake.
24 Q. What was the more typical delivery system for the FAB 100?
25 A. FAB 100 used only one rocket engine.
1 Q. And the FAB 250?
2 A. Normally three or four. More likely it would be three, because
3 the majority of the remnants found indicate that there were three rocket
4 engines, although there are reports that there were four rocket engines.
5 Q. At the end of the first paragraph, there is a reference to,
6 "These bombs are to be transported and handed over to HD Pretis for
7 assembling." Briefly tell us what the word "assembling" means, on the
8 basis of your expertise?
9 A. The purpose of aerial bombs was for them to be dropped from
10 aircraft. In this instance, the connection between aerial bomb and
11 rocket engine meant that a new rocket system would be made consisting of
12 FAB 250 warhead and three 128-millimetre rocket engines. In other words,
13 that would be similar to the aircraft.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Projectiles that targeted
15 Sarajevo back in 1995.
16 MR. GAYNOR: I tender that document, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: For the same reason, we will admit this.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2321, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gaynor, it's time to take another break. Gain
20 very well, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: We will break for half an hour this time.
22 --- Recess taken at 5.40 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 6.09 p.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Gaynor.
25 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President. I just want to note for
1 the record before we go on that the document which was not admitted
2 earlier, 65 ter 15842, the Prosecution's internal records state that that
3 was seized from the premises of the Pretis factory in Vogosca following
4 the reintegration of Sarajevo. I'll continue with the
6 Could I call up 65 ter 13542, please.
7 Q. Could you have a brief read of that document, witness. There is
8 no need to read it out verbatim, we have the translation, but just tell
9 us what it is.
10 A. This is about the forming of an executive team on the basis of a
11 decision by the President of Republika Srpska, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, that
12 would include a number of people whose task would be to equip the armed
13 forces, in terms of materiel and equipment, and to transfer the relevant
14 means from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and place them in
15 agreed-upon locations and it asks that the report on the executed
16 assignment be sent to the president of the republic.
17 Q. You see a number of names on that document. Do you happen to
18 know any of those people yourself?
19 A. I know Branko Prodanovic, and I also had the opportunity to see
20 Momcilo Mandic on television. It's also possible that I know
21 Spasoje Orasanin as well, Colonel Orasanin.
22 Q. Did any of those individuals work at Pretis before the war or did
23 any of them work at Pretis?
24 A. Branko Prodanovic worked in Pretis for many years. He's an
25 economist by profession. And just before the war, he was the
1 director-general of Pretis. According to my information, a couple of
2 months after the war began, he left that position and became the
3 representative of the Pretis company in Belgrade.
4 MR. GAYNOR: I'd like to tender that document, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson?
6 MR. ROBINSON: We object to this. First on relevance. It
7 doesn't relate to air-bombs that we could tell or anything manufactured
8 by Pretis that we could tell from the face of it. And secondly I don't
9 think the witness has spoken enough to the document other than to
10 identify an individual. If that becomes the test then it will really
11 expand the Chamber's guidelines to beyond something that is reasonable,
12 if simply knowing an individual is enough to get a document admitted.
13 MR. GAYNOR: Mr. President, if I can respond. I note that there
14 is no objection to the authenticity of it so far. In his evidence, the
15 witness has referred to cooperation between locations in the FRY and in
16 the Bosnian Serb-held part of Bosnia during the conflict, in relation to
17 the supply of parts from Krusik Valjevo, specifically to Pretis, and the
18 assembly of, specifically, modified air-bombs at Pretis, as well as the
19 relationship between stabilisers produced at Krusik Valjevo and the
20 issuance of ammunition from Pretis. So he has testified about
21 cooperation between authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
22 in the Republika Srpska during the relevant period and he's identified a
23 person who worked at Pretis on this document.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE KWON: Unless the Defence is not challenging the
1 authenticity, we find it relevant and of probative value. On that basis
2 we will admit this.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2322, Your Honours.
4 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further
5 questions. I do have one point which relates to the oral submissions
6 made by Mr. Robinson earlier. We can make it in the absence of the
7 witness or I can simply note it at this stage, as Your Honours wish.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll hear about it in the next break, after the
9 next break.
10 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President, no further questions.
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well. As I indicated, Dr. Zecevic, you will be
12 asked -- cross-examined by Mr. Karadzic. So are you ready to start,
13 Mr. Karadzic?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you. Good evening to
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Good evening, Mr. Zecevic.
19 A. Good evening, Dr. Karadzic.
20 Q. I would first like to dwell on your views and your findings in
21 relation to the modified air-bombs. Would you agree that the main
22 difference between the aerosol bombs and bombs with classic explosive
23 charges, such as TNT, are as follows: The aerosol bomb creates a
24 considerably less pressure compared to bombs with classic explosive
25 charges, but that pressure lasts much longer? Is that right?
1 A. I've already said that.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are kindly asked to pause between
4 question and answer. Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Probably you will be aware of this but given that
6 Mr. Karadzic and you are speaking the same language, it's important to
7 put a pause between the question and answer so that the interpreters can
8 follow. Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You established that, you've said that that was correct, right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. For a classic explosion, it is not necessary to have
13 oxygen from the air?
14 A. What is a classic explosive for you?
15 Q. TNT is a classic explosive.
16 A. That is correct. It doesn't need oxygen.
17 Q. Thank you. And explosives that are used in aerosol bombs need to
18 mix with air; is that correct?
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 Q. Does that have an effect on the construction of each type of
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Are you able to tell us briefly what the difference would be in
24 the construction?
25 A. A classic air-bomb consists of the body, the front and rear fuse,
1 stabiliser, and often it has a braking device. Hard explosive TNT or a
2 mixture of TNT and aluminium is placed inside the body. With the aerosol
3 bomb, there is a primer -- primary explosive charge for which hard
4 explosives are used. And then secondary explosive charges and there is
5 also a liquid that is placed in the body of the bomb. At the point of
6 impact, the primary explosive charge destroys the body of the air-bomb,
7 the gas or the liquid is released, it evaporates, mixes with the air, and
8 then the secondary fuses, after a certain amount of time, are ejected
9 into the area around the place of the explosion and they activate the
10 explosive mixture.
11 Q. Thank you for being so concise. Would we agree that the bomb
12 with the classic explosive acts on a smaller area and that is why it can
13 create craters?
14 A. You mean the blast wave effect only, or do you mean the overall
15 effect of the air-bomb?
16 Q. The overall effect of the air-bomb.
17 A. An air-bomb with TNT creates a destructive effect in the blast
18 zone. It destroys things in the area. And the fragments created in the
19 detonation can damage people and objects within a radius of several
20 hundred metres around the immediate explosion area.
21 Q. But it leaves a crater, does it not?
22 A. Depending on whether the fuse is a contact fuse, a close --
23 immediate contact fuse or a delayed fuse. In any case, if it's a contact
24 fuse, there would be a crater. In case there is a delayed fuse effect
25 the crater will be larger, or it will not be there at all depending on
1 the period of delay because this can be detonated within a building or a
2 bunker. If it's a contact fuse, the effect primarily is of fragmentation
3 which includes -- which increases the kill zone.
4 Q. Thank you. Would we agree that the aerosol explosives act on a
5 larger area and do not create a crater?
6 A. Yes. If a contact fuse is used.
7 Q. All right. Do we agree that with classic explosives, a human
8 being behind a shield can survive, if there is some kind of barrier
9 between the person and the explosive?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Do we agree that this barrier does not provide protection in the
12 case of an air-bomb?
13 A. It depends on the distance where that person is from the bomb.
14 Q. If they are at the same distance, let's say, of 10 to 15 metres
15 in each case, the barrier can protect against classic explosive and the
16 aerosol bomb will not be able to provide the protection.
17 JUDGE KWON: Your answer was?
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to repeat his
20 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your answer, Dr. Zecevic?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, of course, I apologise.
22 In the event that the mixing proceeds very well, of the liquid aerosol
23 with the air, at the same distance of 10 to 15 metres from the centre of
24 the explosion, the person would not manage to get through it unharmed.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Meaning that the person would not be able to survive?
2 A. Well, this is a complex question, depending on the amount of the
3 explosive effect at that point in time.
4 Q. Sir, I am just trying to simplify this double negation. Would
5 not manage to get through it unharmed; is that correct?
6 A. Yes, the person would be wounded.
7 Q. In your statement of the 26th and the 27th of February -- "to say
8 the least" was not recorded in the transcript, "to say the least" is not
9 in the transcript. So the least consequence would be wounding; is that
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. In your statement of the 26th and the 27th of February, you said,
13 as far as the air bombs are concerned, this is something that I made
14 conclusions on by myself. The reasons --
15 THE INTERPRETER: The accused is kindly asked to tell the
16 interpreters where he's reading from and to read slowly.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters were not able to
18 follow you. They wanted to know where you are reading from but slow down
19 when you're reading something.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm just rushing because of
21 time. For this witness we really need a lot of time but I do also take
22 into account his situation. Yes, can we look into e-court 65 ter 09997?
23 Page 4 in the Serbian version, and page 4 in the English version also.
24 Paragraph 6 in the Serbian version and paragraph 6 in the English
25 version. So it's identical.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Can you see this part regarding the air-bombs? Regarding the
3 air-bombs in English. Let me repeat that:
4 "Regarding the air bombs, I came to my own conclusions. It is
5 clear to me that the explosions were caused by air-fuel explosions. The
6 same type of weapons were used by the USA in Vietnam, by the Russians in
7 Afghanistan, and by the Israelis in the Middle East. These projectiles
8 have a blast effect where modified aircraft bombs also cause a
9 fragmentation effect?"
10 Was that your position?
11 A. Can you please remind me to whom I gave this statement?
12 Q. I believe you provided the statement to the OTP. Can we look at
13 page 1. This is page 4. Let's look at page 1 so that Mr. Zecevic can
14 identify the document.
15 A. All right. I do remember.
16 Q. All right. Can we now go back to page 4 now, please?
17 Mr. Zecevic, does this mean that liquid explosives behave in the same way
18 as fuel? They can have fuel combustion or flame combustion or they can
19 be combustible by an explosion?
20 A. No. This is a mistake. Fuel bombs are a fuel-air explosive.
21 They have nothing to do with aeroplane fuel. It's a fuel bomb.
22 Q. All right. Can you please tell us what is the original and what
23 is the translation here?
24 A. Your Honour, may I just provide a comment here, please?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During all of my testimonies, for
2 the OTP, whenever I gave a statement, the statement was first written in
3 the English. Later it was translated back to one of our languages,
4 depending on the ability of the interpreter, the terminology -- their
5 grasp of terminology, they would make these statements. All my
6 objections, in the sense that this term does not correspond to this
7 particular term, they would believe that that was not so important, those
8 objections of mine. So I'm going to say this: This is not aeroplane
9 fuel that we are talking about. The problem here is of a purely
10 linguistic nature. I still stand by what I said, that we are talking
11 about aerosol explosives in English, aerosol weapons have a fuel-air
12 weapon, that is their description but somebody might describe that as
13 aircraft fuel. Fuel-air fire, fuel-air weapons.
14 Q. What it says here is air-fuel, in English air-fuel explosion.
15 And in the original it says, "avionsko gorivo," so the Serbian version is
17 A. Mr. Karadzic, there is an error in the sense of the terminology
18 that is being used. This is a question of The Hague Tribunal and the
19 prosecutor's office. It's a question of the kind of interpreters and the
20 kind of investigators that they hire.
21 Q. Can we have for the transcript --
22 JUDGE KWON: We'll have the last break for today, five minutes.
23 --- Break taken at 6.31 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 6.36 p.m.
25 JUDGE KWON: I thought you wanted to make your observation but
1 we'll hear from you later on, then. Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Witness, can I direct your attention in this same document to
4 paragraph 7, which is the next one, and line 3, but before that, I would
5 like the record to show that the witness has said that both versions, the
6 English and the Serbian ones, were wrong.
7 A. Not wrong but imprecise in linguistic terms, and I think that's a
8 big difference.
9 Q. Thank you. Is it true that at Zuc, at Zuc hill, you had a first
10 encounter with aerial bomb, and you were taken there by a friend of yours
11 who showed you the remnants of that new weapon?
12 A. No. I didn't go to Zuc, but, rather, these remnants were brought
13 close to my house where the staff of that unit was headquartered and
14 I was invited to come over and look at them.
15 Q. Which unit are we talking about?
16 A. To tell you the truth, I don't know.
17 Q. So what was close to your house?
18 A. About 300 metres.
19 Q. Thank you. Now, please look at this document. It reads here --
20 the transcript does not show that you said that the staff was close to
21 your house. Correction, not what, but, rather, staff was close to your
22 house. Let me read you what it says here:
23 "He showed me the remnants of a rocket engines that propelled
24 them. It was a 3 and a half metres long pipe, 500 millimetres in
25 diameter, that was retrieved on the spot. The warhead, however, was not
1 located. After an analysis of the rear part of the projectile, I noticed
2 that this was not an improvised device but rather a highly professional
3 one. I could tell this from the quality of finish. The projectile had
4 four Russian rocket engines of 120-millimetre M21 Grad type and in the
5 middle a container with a parachute." Is this what you stated on that
7 A. Roughly speaking. My report, which is very precise, is held by
8 the OTP, and you can see the exact report with exact terminology. Now,
9 I'm repeating this once again, that the methodology of how witnesses are
10 interviewed, the terminology that I used and the terminology that the
11 people who interpreted me used and compiled the statements, did not
12 correspond fully to what I say, but the essence remains the same.
13 Q. Thank you. Well, then let's look at that report of yours.
14 That's 65 ter 08347. 65 ter 08347. Let's first look at page 1. Can we
15 have the English version as well? Is this the report that you referred
17 A. No. This is a report from February 1994. And it is an integral
18 part of this report. It's at the end.
19 Q. Well, let's see what you said in this report and to that end can
20 we see page 6 in Serbian? And I think it's the same page in English.
21 Now, if this is page 6, is this page 6? It says page 2 here. Number 6
22 in the Serbian, and we'll see which page it corresponds in the English
23 version. Maybe one page back in e-court. We need paragraph 2 - let's
24 see - paragraph 2, line 5. That's page 6 in e-court. Yes, now it's all
25 right. Page 2 in the report and number 6 in e-court. Let us now look at
2 Somewhere in the middle of the paragraph, this is a -- line 5
3 from the top, in paragraph 2.
4 "I examined the fragments of the projectile which consisted of a
5 system comprising four rocket motors of 122-millimetre Grad type and the
6 fifth container for a parachute system. The rocket's motors were
7 connected together at the front with the system for equalising combustion
8 pressure in the chambers and they were fitted in an aluminium plate.
9 These helped to centre the rocket motors and facilitated the link with
10 the warhead section of the rocket projectile."
11 A. I'm sorry, I can't see on the screen what you're reading.
12 Q. We need the next page in the Serbian version so look at paragraph
13 2, line 5, which begins, "I have examined."
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. In English, we have it in English. Can you see it now?
16 A. Yes. I have found it.
17 Q. "On the section towards the nozzles of the rocket motors, there
18 was a stabilising section of the projectile which encompassed the motor
19 assembly. Colour of the rocket motors and the markings on the nozzles
20 fully correspond to Russian military standards."
21 Is this what is written here?
22 A. Yes, it is.
23 Q. Can you tell us how come that you are not describing any longer
24 this pipe of 500 millimetres in diameter and 3 to 5 metres long?
25 A. This 500 millimetre pipe was misinterpreted. That should have
1 been a warhead with 500-millimetre diametre, and the support which
2 connected the war head with the rocket propellant had 500 millimetres in
3 diameter. It's very simple.
4 Q. But they didn't find the warhead?
5 A. Yes. It makes sense because the warhead had exploded. That's
6 why they brought the fragments to me to look at them.
7 Q. However, here we have the mention of the pressure equalising
8 system which you don't mention in your previous statement.
9 A. Mr. Karadzic, this is a precise technical report that I provided,
10 whereas what you're talking about was the statement that I was asked by
11 an investigator to give sometime in February 1996. In other words, the
12 technical report that I compiled and signed as an expert is meritorious,
13 and it reflects my technical observations. What essentially, with the
14 exception of terminological explanation of certain issues, it is
15 completely identical to what is contained in the statement given to the
16 OTP. There is no contradictory statement. My statements, part of my
17 statements, were probably misinterpreted but it doesn't change the style
18 or the essence of my report.
19 Q. Thank you. Does that mean that we should rather stick to your
20 report than your statement?
21 A. I can't give you an answer to that. I maintain that basically
22 neither of these things exclude one another. There are only erroneous
23 linguistic interpretations.
24 Q. Thank you. In your reports, you claimed that Sarajevo was
25 targeted by aerosol bombs. Were those bombs similar to the one that was
1 brought to you from Zuc?
2 A. No.
3 Q. What kind of aerosol bombs were used to target Sarajevo?
4 A. It's a simpler version of an aerosol system compared to the one
5 that was located at Zuc.
6 Q. Very well. We'll try to make this more precise. You claimed
7 that Sarajevo was being targeted by two types of bombs, FAB 100 and FAB
8 250; is that correct?
9 A. I did not only claim that. I attached photographs of an
10 unexploded FAB 100 millimetre bomb and I gave them to the investigators.
11 Q. Which one of those is aerosol?
12 A. FAB 250.
13 Q. So what does this acronym FAB stand for?
14 A. In Russian, it's general purpose bomb, if translated into
15 English, or in Russian, a bomb that produces a blast effect.
16 Q. And you still believe that this was an aerosol bomb?
17 A. Mr. Karadzic, that's not what I think; I know that.
18 Q. Very well. What is contact fuse? Is that a fuse?
19 A. No, no. Fuse is -- contact fuse is, when you have unexploded
20 devices on a pile and you activate them, and you create a contact-fuse
21 detonation whose primary purpose is to cause devastation and destruction
22 and not its primary role.
23 Q. In your report, and we might call it up, it's 0037 -- 3282,
24 1D3282. While we are waiting, can you tell me, according to what you
25 knew, where were aerosol bombs manufactured?
1 A. Are you referring to aerosol bombs?
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. The development of aerosol bombs was initiated at Pretis before
4 the war. Sometime in 1987, the first phase of development was completed.
5 After 1988, Colonel Vladan Tomic moved to Belgrade, he had been the
6 project manager, and he took with him the whole set of documents relating
7 to the development of aerosol bombs. According to what I know, because
8 I personally saw these aerosol bombs, two or three months ago, because
9 the UNDP agency appointed me to be the person who would recommend how to
10 destroy 24 unexploded aerosol bombs kept in BH storages, and 34
11 rocket-assisted bombs that had been produced by Krusik in 1994, so as
12 I said, I personally saw these bombs as well as the rocket-assisted bombs
13 with four rocket engines that are currently kept in the depot of the
14 armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 Q. Can we now look at page 21 of this document? You say here that
16 they were produced in Serbia; is that correct?
17 A. Mr. Karadzic, I think that the terms you're using are not
18 accurate. I gave you my interpretation relating to aerosol bombs.
19 However, if you're asking me about rocket-assisted aerosol bombs, then I
20 can give you a different answer.
21 Q. Go ahead.
22 A. Rocket-assisted aerosol bombs were assembled completely and
23 mechanically at Pretis. This is where the connection of the aerosol bomb
24 body was made, the connecting parts were made to connect rocket engines,
25 also produced were stabilisers and all these parts were, after that,
1 delivered to one of the logistics bases of the Main Staff of the VRS,
2 where the -- these were charged, where aerosol explosive is something
3 I can't tell you because I don't have that kind of information.
4 Q. Thank you. And where were aerosol bombs manufactured?
5 A. Aerosol bombs in general, or are you talking about a specific
7 Q. The aerosol bombs that you claim were fired at Sarajevo, where
8 were they manufactured?
9 A. I said that rocket-assisted aerosol bombs were used to target
10 Sarajevo. In order to use aerosol bombs, one would need to use aircraft
11 to drop them. If you say, and if you're asking me, about rocket-assisted
12 aerosol bombs, one version of them was manufactured or, rather, assembled
13 at Pretis, because air-bombs, FAB 250, had been manufactured before the
14 war and delivered to the JNA. It can be seen from documents that these
15 air-bombs and rocket engines, 122 or 128, were shipped back to Pretis
16 where an assembly of an improvised rocket system was carried out, which
17 consisted of potentially aerosol explosive.
18 Q. Mr. Zecevic, we still didn't get an answer from you, where this
19 aerosol segment of the bomb was manufactured. I'm not talking about the
20 propelling section. Where the aerosol bomb was manufactured.
21 A. Mr. Karadzic, I am reiterating my clear and precise answer: The
22 full assembling of the rocket-assisted system that was made up of an
23 air-bomb, FAB 250, a connection to the rocket engine, and stabiliser, was
24 something that was done at Pretis. The charging of the air-bomb was not
25 done in Pretis because in my opinion, and based on my experience, only
1 the military technical institute from Belgrade could have done that or
2 the people from the Vinca nuclear institute.
3 Q. Thank you. In other words, you don't know where they were
4 produced. You suppose that it was somewhere in Serbia.
5 A. I don't know if you want me to tell you the whole story again and
7 Q. Thank you. How did you acquire information that Pretis delivered
8 bombs without explosive for war reserves as you claim in paragraph 12 of
9 your report -- no, it's a different report. It's 65 ter 08347, 08347.
10 JUDGE KWON: That will be the last question for today.
11 Exhibit P2318.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Page 88 in the Serbian, I think, and in the hard copy, it's page
14 84. In English we need page 97. Look at paragraph 12.1. You say here
15 that Pretis factory was developing an aerosol air-bomb, the first 50
16 bombs were completed, so and so, et cetera. Can you please look at this
17 paragraph and then tell us where did you get this information that Pretis
18 used to deliver bombs without explosives?
19 A. I think that we are misunderstanding each other. In 1998, the
20 Yugoslav army introduced the aerosol bomb into its range of weaponry,
21 which began to be developed in Pretis before the war. I have the
22 standard at home, the military standard, in order to pass the FAB 275
23 aerosol bomb. And what you're seeing here where it says, the Pretis
24 factory developed the aerosol fuel-air-bomb, the first 50 bombs were made
25 in 1990 and the next phase was due to be concluded in 1991-1992, followed
1 by serial production. We are talking about FAB 275. I have photographs
2 of those bombs, FAB 275s, and these bombs, 24 of them, are currently in
3 the depot of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They need to be
4 destroyed because they pose a danger to the lives of the population of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are not talking about FAB 250.
6 Q. But those that were hitting Sarajevo, you said that they were of
7 the 100 and 250 type; is that correct?
8 A. Yes. These are rocket-assisted aerosol bombs, 250, modified or
9 improvised, and they were the ones that were dropping on Sarajevo in
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that's it for today.
12 I wonder, Dr. Zecevic, if you have been informed that tomorrow we
13 will be sitting in the morning, starting at 9.00. Does it cause you a
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it does create problems for
16 me. If you look, I have been walking or standing for five hours.
17 I should be fit. But I will make it. Yes, I will be here tomorrow at
19 JUDGE KWON: I appreciate very much your cooperation. We will be
20 sitting in the same manner tomorrow, as we are today. The hearing is now
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day of
24 February, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.