Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 13106

 1                           Thursday, 10 March 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Good morning, everybody.  It was hoped that we

 7     were going to be able to sit on Monday, but I understand, Mr. Robinson,

 8     that that's impossible because of pre-arranged Defence conferences; is

 9     that right?

10             MR. ROBINSON:  No, I don't -- actually, we do have one conference

11     between 2.00 and 5.00.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  That was when we were going to try and sit.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  I see.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  So that obviously negates that because the

15     conference, I understand, was the witness who was to immediately follow

16     on -- from that conference.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  So be it.  Then we'll simply have to press on.

19     Thank you.

20             Yes, Dr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

22     Good morning to everyone.

23                           WITNESS:  KDZ182 [Resumed]

24                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]


Page 13107

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Witness.

 2             Is it true -- true that you proposed changes and amendments to

 3     the agreements on DMZ and the total exclusion zone?

 4        A.   This is not quite correct.  The changes I suggested were

 5     essentially changes in the establishment of the weapons collection

 6     points.  We felt that the idea and principle on which these centres were

 7     based did not enable us to control these weapons the way we wished.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Would you be so kind just to confirm.  We already

 9     explained that.

10             To whom did you suggest it -- this?

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... the name.

14        A.   Fine.

15        Q.   But you said that you proposed this to the Serbian side and that

16     the Serbian side did not respond.

17        A.   I don't entirely remember this affirmation.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger, you're seeking a redaction of lines

19     10 and 11, presumably.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Correct, Your Honour.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   What kind of reply did you get from your superiors?

24        A.   There was no answer.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2483.  There's no


Page 13108

 1     need for it to be broadcast.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Is this a document that was forwarded to your superiors?

 4        A.   Yes, I can see the signature.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness kindly be asked to speak into

 6     the microphone, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you.  We can look at the rest of the pages, but I have no

 9     further questions relating to this document.  I just want it to be

10     admitted into evidence along with your reply that you received no

11     response.

12        A.   As far as I know, no.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  The document's been identified and there's no

14     doubt to its authenticity so we will admit it.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D1122, under seal.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   We mentioned some disruptions in supplies provided for the city.

19     Yesterday, I showed you a UN document saying that the Muslim side was

20     opening fire at a cargo plane.  The Defence submits that very often the

21     Muslim side obstructed the provision of supplies for the citizens of

22     Sarajevo in order to blemish the Serbian side, to create a crisis, and to

23     disrupt relations.  Can you confirm that?

24        A.   At my level, I found myself operating on the ground, which means

25     that I relied on facts.  I was trying, with the UN forces on the ground,


Page 13109

 1     to be as objective and impartial as I possibly could.  I don't know what

 2     the general policy was above me.  What I do know is that --

 3        Q.   Sir, with all due respect, and I'm really interested in hearing

 4     all this provided we had time.  My question was:  Did you know that the

 5     Muslim side obstructed the provision of supplies for the citizens of

 6     Sarajevo in order to tarnish the Serbian side?

 7        A.   The duty of the UN forces was to ensure free circulation of the

 8     supply convoys.  Any obstacle obstructing these free movements were

 9     obstacles which we tried to do away with, whether these obstacles be

10     physical or psychological.

11        Q.   Were there any obstacles on the side of the Muslims?  Did they

12     disrupt the provision of supplies for their own citizens?  Yes or no?

13        A.   [Previous translation continues] ... which would enable me to

14     answer a positive yes.  I don't know.

15        Q.   We're now going to show you a series of UN documents that show

16     this, and to that end can we have 1D3366 in e-court, please.

17             This is a report on the observation of the cease-fire agreement

18     in March.  If we recall, this was an agreement brokered by

19     President Carter.  Can we go now to page 4.  To your estimate, how many

20     convoys used to pass through, Mr. Witness?

21        A.   You mean the passage rate, or the proportion of convoys due to

22     arrive and those that actually reached their destination, is that what

23     you mean?

24        Q.   Yes.  We already have the answer.  This UN document says that

25     Bihac received 29 per cent, Sarajevo 71 per cent, Srebrenica 93, Zepa


Page 13110

 1     80 per cent, and the last place, 80-something per cent.

 2             Do you agree that the Serbs did not hinder much the passage of

 3     these convoys?

 4        A.   These figures undoubtedly -- I'm not familiar with this document.

 5     This document relates to a particular period of time.  I don't see where

 6     the assessment date of these convoys is mentioned.  This was during a

 7     fairly calm period, as far as Sarajevo was concerned.  This figure seems

 8     to me to be a reasonable figure.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now look at page 2 of this document.

10             Take a look, please, concerning the restoration of utilities.

11             "[In English] Continuing efforts for the restoration of utilities

12     yielded limited results.  In Sarajevo there was little progress, but

13     neither was there much erosion; gas, electricity and water are all

14     available at relatively abundant levels."

15             [Interpretation] Do you agree, Mr. Witness, that these were the

16     benefits of the Carter cease-fire that was still in force more or less,

17     and as one can see, the Serbian side did not present any obstacles and

18     that life in the city was tolerable.

19        A.   I think you should put the question to the residents of Sarajevo

20     whether this was bearable or not.  I'm not sure that they felt that at

21     the time.  But I would like to specify this:  As far as the restoration

22     of utilities, electricity, and so on, let me remind you that a number of

23     UNPROFOR soldiers were injured.  They were shot at when they were trying

24     to conduct repairs.  Not during the period --

25        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] Mr. Witness.  Mr. Witness.  Does this


Page 13111

 1     document indicate that -- or still in March there was cease-fire brokered

 2     by President Carter and that the supply of water, electricity and gas was

 3     tolerable?  Can you tell me just that?  Yes or no?

 4        A.   During this period, that is correct.  There was a relative lull

 5     at the time, and life was probably easier at this time than at other

 6     times, as I mentioned in my consolidated statement.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted?

 8     And at the end of the document, there is a chart showing which side was

 9     in violation, and there were no innocents in that respect.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  The witness has affirmed part of the

11     document, and it's an official UN document.  It will be admitted.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1123, Your Honours.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Let's move on.  Can we

14     now have 1D3367.  The Carter truce is still in force, but let's see how

15     the situation deteriorated.

16             This is a telegram sent by Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan, dated the

17     7th of April, 1995.  Can we now look at page 2.

18             Let's take a look at paragraph C:

19             "[In English] The airport routes were open, tram services were

20     running and the utilities were beginning to be repaired and maintained.

21     All progress came to a halt due to the referral of the Bosnian side to

22     attend the Central Joint Commissions, designed to negotiate, amongst

23     other things, the status of Sarajevo.  The flagrant disregard of the COHA

24     by the BiH when they launched two military offensives in the Travnik and

25     Stolice areas also contributed considerably to the worsening situation in


Page 13112

 1     Sarajevo.  Additionally, the killing of two Serbian children by sniper

 2     fire within Sector Sarajevo influenced and hardened BSA attitude."

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Sorry, I'm waiting for the interpretation.

 5             Now, is this consistent with what you and your people knew about

 6     the situation in Sarajevo at the time?

 7        A.   As far as the attacks in Travnik and elsewhere are concerned, I

 8     don't remember, since this was not within the Sarajevo area of

 9     responsibility.  As far as the obstructions on the Bosnian side because

10     they wished to be part of the commissions, admittedly they were -- did

11     not agree with the fact that we should continue with the negotiation as

12     had initially been planned.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Again, the document appears to be affirmed in

16     general terms, because -- and it is again an official document.  We can

17     admit it.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1124, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have 1D3365.

20     The date is the 17th of April.  It's a reply by Mr. Annan to Mr. Akashi.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Let's look at the second sentence in paragraph 2.

23             "[In English] We would be grateful if you would provide a

24     comprehensive assessment of the actual supply situation in the safe areas

25     both for UNPROFOR and UNHCR.  According to your daily sitreps, UNPROFOR


Page 13113

 1     continues to have access by land convoys, although we note the absence of

 2     fuel deliveries in recent days.  Preliminary information obtained from

 3     UNHCR likewise seems to indicate that humanitarian supplies in principle

 4     do not appear to be running low.  We hear they are currently meeting

 5     75 per cent of their targets."

 6             [Interpretation] Does this correspond to the situation on the

 7     ground?

 8        A.   I believe that the figure mentioned here seems right.  That would

 9     apply to the end of April.  After that, it's a different story.

10        Q.   Thank you.  But we'll see later why it was different.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, it's probably not necessary, Dr. Karadzic,

13     because you've read the important part into the transcript and the

14     witness has affirmed it, so it's -- the important part's in evidence

15     anyway.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have 1D3369.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Witness, do you know that the obstacles for convoys imposed

19     by the Serbian part were always based on specific grounds that the

20     Serbian side made clear and announced in advance?

21        A.   I haven't quite understood the question.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll leave this document for

23     later.  Can we now have 65 ter 17721.  65 ter 17721.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   This is a daily report addressed to the Security Council, dated


Page 13114

 1     9th of June.  Number 1 says:

 2             "[In English] The UNHCR, UNPF, UNPROFOR delegation to Pale held

 3     more than six hours of discussions yesterday with Drs. Karadzic and

 4     Koljevic.  They successfully negotiated an agreement to start delivery of

 5     humanitarian aid by land routes to Sarajevo as soon as possible.  The

 6     text of the joint statement issued to the media is as follows:

 7             "'A crucial agreement has just been reached between the Bosnian

 8     Serb authorities and UNHCR to allow the resumption of humanitarian aid

 9     deliveries by land to the people of Sarajevo."

10             [Interpretation] Et cetera.  Do you recall that this meeting was

11     held?

12        A.   Not at all.  I wasn't in the loop of the meeting.

13        Q.   This is what Mr. Akashi is writing to Mr. Annan.  You were not

14     there but somebody from UNPROFOR must have been there because we have

15     here the participants listed, i.e., UNHCR, UNPF, and UNPROFOR.  The two

16     top men of Republika Srpska were working for six hours towards reaching

17     an agreement which was ultimately reached.  Do you agree with that?

18        A.   The report states that there were UNHCR representatives and UNPF

19     and UNPROFOR representatives present.  Not only was I not aware of this

20     meeting, but nobody reported to me what had been said at that meeting.

21     The only thing I did know is that an agreement had been signed, that's

22     all.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is an official UN document,

25     and I'd like it to be admitted.


Page 13115

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, again, Dr. Karadzic, the document's been

 2     identified.  The part you wanted the witness to agree to, that there had

 3     been a negotiated agreement, is now in evidence, but the witness couldn't

 4     go further than that.  It seems to me that the matter you wanted is again

 5     in evidence in the transcript.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  That brings me into a

 7     situation that I have to read longer passages than I would have liked,

 8     but I accept what you said, and I would just like to make note that this

 9     was an official telegram.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  It doesn't actually require that.  What it

11     requires is, Dr. Karadzic, that if you're going to read something in, you

12     simply stick to what you regard as the critical points, and if the

13     witness adopts them, so be it, but you don't have to read the whole of

14     the document.  I'm simply trying to cut down the number of exhibits that

15     are not necessary to admit in evidence.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Believe me, this whole document is

17     significant.  This was a telegram exchange between two key figures, Annan

18     and Akashi.

19             I would like you to reconsider admitting the whole document,

20     because we might find ourselves in a situation in the future that we

21     would have to tender it into evidence after all.

22             Can we look at page 2, which shows that it also arrived in Zepa,

23     and Zepa was also important.  Page 2, please.  It says here, paragraph 4:

24             "[In English] A UNPF convoy of one truck and one APC arrived at

25     Zepa at 1935 hours last night carrying rations and fresh food.  The


Page 13116

 1     Ukrainians now have about 25 days supply.  The convoys supplying the

 2     sectors in Croatia," and so on and so on.

 3             [Interpretation] Therefore, the whole document is significant,

 4     and it shows that these shortages were not exactly as they were being

 5     portrayed.  It says here:

 6             "[In English] Convoy supply in the sector in Croatia are now

 7     running at a normal rate again.  Sarajevo has less than two weeks of

 8     fresh food."

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, Dr. Karadzic, you asked for the document

10     to be admitted having dealt with page 1.  If you want to ask the witness

11     about matters concerned on page 2, of course you're free to do so.  It's

12     better to do that before you ask for the document to be admitted.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

14        Q.   Mr. Witness, do you agree and do you know that on the

15     9th of June -- or, rather, the 8th of June, a convoy reached Zepa and

16     that this document confirms that the Ukrainians had enough supply for the

17     next 20 days?

18        A.   As far as the supply of Zepa is concerned, I agree.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender it into evidence now?

20             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, and if you'd done that in the first place

21     before asking to admit it, then the answer would have been yes then.  It

22     will be admitted.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1125, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  You're right, but I'm

25     endeavouring to save time.


Page 13117

 1             Can we now have 1D3369.  That's another Akashi's telegram sent to

 2     Mr. Annan.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now, let's see how this convoy of the 8th of June passed through

 5     and reached Zepa.  That was an UNHCR convoy.

 6             Look at this document where it says exchange of fire, Sarajevo,

 7     and then paragraph 4:

 8             "[In English] UNHCR convoy to Zepa was stopped by the BSA at

 9     Rogatica.  Three small boxes of ammunition were reportedly found in the

10     convoy.  We have no more details at this time.  The convoy to Srebrenica

11     reached its destination with 72 metric tonnes of humanitarian aid."

12             [Interpretation] My question, Witness, from earlier was -- which

13     I didn't actually put to you clearly enough, is this:  This smaller

14     number of convoys that had difficulties, was it always stopped with some

15     reason that the BSA army reported to UNPROFOR, saying the reason is such

16     and such?  Would you agree with that?  Did you receive any kind of

17     explanation from the BSA for convoys that were not let through?

18        A.   UNHCR convoys, with regard to them I only had information when

19     they reached their destination.  I was only told that it had arrived,

20     without further explanation.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this convoy passed through even

22     though ammunition was found?  Not a significant number, three small

23     boxes, but the convoy did arrive, nevertheless, at its destination in

24     Zepa as the document states.

25        A.   I did confirm that that convoy had arrived, and if it had


Page 13118

 1     arrived, that meant that it had gone through.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this document,

 4     please?

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1126, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now we will see what

 8     the United Nations felt was the reason for the difficulties in supplying

 9     the town of Sarajevo.  Can we now look at 1D3374, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Of course, you are familiar with the name of Philip Corwin; is

12     that correct?

13        A.   I know him by name, but I didn't know him personally.  But I am

14     aware of his name, yes.  I'm familiar with the name.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can I please ask you to look at the following at the

16     first paragraph:

17             "[In English] At the very last minute, the Bosnian side, this

18     afternoon, rejected a proposal to restore utilities to Sarajevo.  The

19     Serbian side had agreed to the necessary technical arrangements arranged

20     by Mr. John Fawcett from the Office of the Special Coordinator for

21     Sarajevo.  But the Bosnian side insisted on UNPROFOR control of

22     Bacevo ..."

23             [Interpretation] And it goes on to say:

24             "[In English] ... as relates to several gas supply points ..."

25             [Interpretation] And then it goes on to say in the second:


Page 13119

 1             "[In English] In the meantime, the utilities should be restored

 2     but the Bosnian side refuses, and at the end they even try to link

 3     restoration of utilities to food convoys."

 4             [Interpretation] Paragraph 3.

 5             "[In English] It appeared that the Bosnian side did not want the

 6     utilities restored.  There are several reasons.

 7             "By keeping their own people in need, they hope to gain world

 8     sympathy.  The press is on their side and one can expect CNN (Clearly Not

 9     Neutral)."  The CNN abbreviation is "Clearly Not Neutral," and so on.

10             [Interpretation] Did you know that the Muslim side wanted to

11     increase the suffering of its population in order to gain some benefit?

12        A.   I'm not in a position to answer because I was not part of the

13     drafting of this document.  I did not participate in the meetings.  I was

14     not among the addressees of this message.  So I can't tell you or confirm

15     that this is a correct document at all.  I don't know anything at all

16     about it.  I have no information that would make it possible for me to

17     say to you that this is a fair reflection of reality, no.

18        Q.   Can you please look at paragraph 4, please:

19             "[In English] As for the Serbs, they had requested the meeting,

20     and were clearly in favour of restoring the utilities.  Our guess is that

21     the 100.000 citizens of Serbian Sarajevo are suffering badly, and are

22     quite annoyed with their blood(y) brothers in Pale."

23             [Interpretation] Blood brothers as in relatives, I think, not

24     bloody brothers.  This is an intervention for the translation.

25             This is quite a major thing, sir.  You and other witnesses also


Page 13120

 1     talked about the difficulties in supplying the citizens of Sarajevo.  The

 2     position of the Defence is that these difficulties were caused by the

 3     Muslims, because it was to their advantage to have a bad image of

 4     Sarajevo in the media, and it was not to the advantage of the Serbs.

 5             Would you agree that the media image of the suffering in Sarajevo

 6     was to the detriment of the Serbian side and an advantage for the Muslim

 7     side in Sarajevo?  This is something that you mentioned in your statement

 8     as well.

 9        A.   In my statement I said that I did not pay attention to what the

10     media would say, and my reasoning was not based on information from the

11     media.  As for this document, I repeat that I'm seeing it for the first

12     time, and the position as stated by Mr. Corwin to be sent to the UN

13     authorities is his own personal opinion.  I'm not here to cast judgement

14     on what he said.

15        Q.   Do we agree that this is not a personal letter but it's an

16     official dispatch?

17             Can we scroll down a little bit this page so we can see the

18     letterhead.

19             Is this an official dispatch by Akashi?

20        A.   I hope this is an authentic document.  If it is now displayed on

21     the screen, I guess it is, but I never had an opportunity to read it.  It

22     was not addressed to me, and there was not even a copy meant to be sent

23     to me.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this?  It is a United


Page 13121

 1     Nations document.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  It is a United Nations document, but -- and I

 3     don't suppose that the provenance or authenticity is going to be in

 4     doubt, but this witness hasn't confirmed anything on it.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Your Honour, but I mean I would

 6     be -- he's been examined about various portions of it and asked to

 7     respond to it.  At least in some respects it will have to clarify that,

 8     for example, the document identifies what Bacevo was, which was not made

 9     clear.  Also the accused's intervention to blood and bloody was

10     inaccurate.  It's obvious that --

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, it's an attempt at humour.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah, and at making a point about the perception of

13     the Pale leadership.  So I note that in connection with the admissibility

14     issues, but I take the Court's point.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  That's -- taking the Court's point is -- is a

16     Delphic way of saying --

17             MR. TIEGER:  I think I made it clear I don't object to the

18     admission, but I'm not trying to battle the Court in its ongoing attempts

19     to control document admissibility pursuant to guidelines it deems

20     appropriate, but from our point of view, no, there's no objection.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  No.  Well, strictly speaking, the witness didn't

22     confirm it.  On the other hand, it's an authentic document.  The issues

23     which it relates to are important issues, and it seems to me on balance

24     as a matter of fairness we will admit it.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1127, Your Honours.


Page 13122

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  For the parties, it's

 2     explained in parentheses what Bacevo is.  It's the main source of water

 3     that was located on Serbian territory.  Thank you.  Can we now have

 4     1D3373, please.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Witness, you mentioned on a number of occasions the difficulties

 7     regarding UNPROFOR's freedom of movement.  Were these difficulties caused

 8     only by the Serbs or were they caused also by the Muslims?

 9        A.   It is difficult to tell you to what extent it was one or the

10     other party's cause, but there were difficulties arising from the Serb

11     and also from the Muslim, caused by both.  You know, 16 years after the

12     events I can't have an exact recollection, but I can tell you that both

13     Serbs and Muslims would put obstacles to our free movement.

14        Q.   Can you please look at this report by Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan of

15     the 16th of June, and the second sentence in the first paragraph states:

16             "[In English] UNPROFOR's freedom of movement has been restricted

17     by the proliferation of the BiH check-points in the city and its ability

18     to assess the situation further diminished by the lack of the OPs within

19     the area."

20             [Interpretation] A bit lower.

21             "[In English] Clearly the BH actions are intended to break the

22     current efforts of the UNPF/UNPROFOR to stabilise the situation and

23     return to the status quo ante.  Thus, whether or not the BiH are in a

24     position to break the siege of Sarajevo could be irrelevant to their

25     calculations as -- if their actions prompt the usual overreaction by the


Page 13123

 1     BSA on the city of Sarajevo, international sympathy for their cause will

 2     become further reinforced, calls for stronger action against the Serbs

 3     louder, and criticism of the UNPF/UNPROFOR's inaction more strident.

 4     They could well be gambling that images of Sarajevo being pounded by Serb

 5     mortars could influence domestic opinion in the US, pressurising

 6     President Clinton to reverse his decision on the unilateral lifting of

 7     the arms embargo."

 8             [Interpretation] Witness, sir, do you recall that with the

 9     offensive initiated by the Muslim side on the 15th of June there was an

10     obstruction in the co-operation of the Muslim side and the forces and

11     elements of the United Nations in the city?

12        A.   The only thing I can confirm, and this document is a general

13     document of which I was not aware today, the only thing I can confirm is

14     that indeed movement within the city of Sarajevo for UNPROFOR units was

15     limited by Muslim actions within the city.  This I can confirm.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be tendered?

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Your Honour.  It did occur to me that

20     when such large portions of a document are read in, I'm not sure there's

21     any efficiency advantage to not admitting it.  I think that probably in

22     the end it's easier for the parties and the Court to access the

23     information.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  We'll admit the -- admit this document.


Page 13124

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1128.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  It may not be particularly pertinent with this

 3     witness at this time, Dr. Karadzic, but sometimes in order to save time

 4     it might be worth finding out whether or not the witness can read the

 5     document to themselves quickly and that would save time, but the point

 6     that Mr. Tieger makes is very accurate.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  Can we

 8     now have 1D3370.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This is also a telegram by Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan of the

11     16th of June.  Can we now look at page 2.

12             This is the supply situation as it relates to the city, and it's

13     a meeting between representatives of the United Nations, UNPROFOR

14     number --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not catch the number.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   -- on page 1, and it states here that:

18             "[In English] I undertook to consider possible alternatives in

19     order to accommodate the wishes of the Bosnian government but did not

20     rule out any option consistent with the relevant Security Council

21     Resolutions.  Presumably Muratovic's opposition to UNPROFOR convoys

22     passing through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is based on two

23     considerations:  The government's wish to maintain the isolation of

24     Belgrade as well as Pale; and its wish to see the perpetuation of the

25     logistic crisis in the enclaves, prompting us to consider more extreme


Page 13125

 1     resupply measures."

 2             [Interpretation] Could you tell the Trial Chamber who

 3     Mr. Muratovic is, whom you perhaps had meetings with?

 4        A.   Yes, I did meet him.  As far as I know, he was the minister in

 5     charge of European relations.  Well, of co-operating with the UNPROFOR.

 6        Q.   A minister in the Muslim government; is that right?

 7        A.   Absolutely.  He was a minister of the Muslim government.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that now we might have to

 9     move to private session just briefly, and then we're going to tender this

10     document.  So can we move to private session just briefly?

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

12                           [Private session]

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 13126

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18                           [Open session]

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Now, this is the second page of the document that we were looking

23     at earlier, and this can be broadcast now.  Do you see that in this

24     paragraph Mr. Muratovic, in a telegram of the United Nations, sent by

25     Akashi to Annan, and Akashi probably received it in turn from the UN in


Page 13127

 1     Sarajevo, states that Muratovic is not interested in supplies via

 2     Yugoslavia for political reasons in order to isolate Belgrade as Pale.

 3     Is that something that conforms with your knowledge about manipulations

 4     of the humanitarian issues?

 5        A.   I cannot pass judgement as to what was in the mind of

 6     Mr. Muratovic.  The only thing I can confirm I confirmed earlier on.  He

 7     seemed to be somewhat disinterested with regard to Srebrenica, and he

 8     found it difficult to ensure free movement within the city of Sarajevo.

 9     As for the rest, I can't express any judgement at all.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this?

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger.

13             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  We admit it.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1129, Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3376 now.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Now, again, this is a dispatch from Phillip Corwin to Mr. Akashi,

19     in Zagreb, experiences with the Serbian side about the same questions.

20     And then we have the first paragraph:

21             "[In English] I had a long talk with Professor Koljevic this

22     afternoon in Pale.  He said that President Karadzic was very eager to

23     meet with Carl Bildt.  The Serbs considered that the situation was

24     deteriorating, especially with regard to humanitarian aid, and they

25     wanted to meet urgently."


Page 13128

 1             [Interpretation] This is the 6th of July as we can see.  Can we

 2     scroll down this page, please.  And now can we look at the following

 3     page.

 4             "[In English] Koljevic seemed genuinely eager to establish

 5     contact with Bildt.  He repeated several times that he was concerned

 6     about the deterioration -- deteriorating humanitarian situation."

 7             [Interpretation] And at the bottom, the last sentence, the last

 8     two sentences of paragraph 7 in the English, I will read them:

 9             "[In English] Clearly he and Karadzic are not happy with having

10     lost power to the military, but they are also not happy about the course

11     that the military might take."

12             [Interpretation] Do you know -- does this sound familiar to you?

13     Do you know that there was this meeting with Professor Koljevic and do

14     you confirm that Professor Koljevic was the number 2 man in Republika

15     Srpska, he was the vice-president of the Republic; is that correct?

16        A.   [Previous translation continues] ... at all of the meeting so I

17     cannot confirm what was said during that meeting.  The only thing I know

18     is that Dr. Koljevic was indeed the number 2.  That is what I had been

19     told, but I met him only once at a meeting, that's all.

20        Q.   Can you see here that the recommendation to Mr. Akashi here is

21     that Bildt should come to Pale, and if not to Pale, then to Zvornik?  Do

22     you remember that there was the position for the Serbian side in Bosnia

23     to be isolated in order to negotiate with Belgrade rather than with Pale?

24        A.   Now, you're showing me a document, and you are casting a

25     judgement on it.  I cannot confirm it at all, because this was not within


Page 13129

 1     my remit.

 2        Q.   With all due respect, you spoke about a number of things that you

 3     didn't see and that were not in your jurisdiction, so I wonder that you

 4     don't have any information about what was being attempted to do with the

 5     Serbs, namely to isolate them.  Are you able to confirm that the

 6     situation was worsening in July, the humanitarian situation was

 7     worsening, and that what Professor Koljevic said to Mr. Corwin was

 8     correct?

 9        A.   I did not attend the meeting.  I can therefore not confirm what

10     was said.  The fact that the situation deteriorated is true in Sarajevo.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, the witness simply can't confirm anything

14     about this document.  He's agreed with the point that you've made, but

15     the document itself is something he's not able to express an opinion on.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Witness, please, in your amalgamated statement, as well as on

19     some other occasions, you -- excuse me.  I have to go back to the

20     previous document.

21             Mr. Witness, you claimed that the Serbian side had the strategy

22     of terrorising the citizens of Sarajevo, whereas it was the Serbian side

23     who proposed meetings that would alleviate the plight of the citizens and

24     improvement -- improve the humanitarian situation.  Did you know that the

25     Serbian side had a positive attitude towards the process of restoring the


Page 13130

 1     utilities and that the Serbian side had a positive attitude towards the

 2     passage of convoys and that that was in contravention of the conclusion

 3     that it was the Serbian side who was bent on terrorising the citizens of

 4     Sarajevo?

 5        A.   I would like to move into private session, please, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

 7                           [Private session]

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 13131

 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

10

11  Page 13131 redacted. Private session.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25


Page 13132

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11                           [Open session]

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   May I remind you, Witness, that your position was that the

15     Serbian side in the total exclusion zone had calibres that were in

16     violation of the provisions of the zone, whereas the Muslim side had

17     artillery pieces of calibre below 12.7 millimetres?  Is that correct?

18        A.   My information was based on reports coming from my units and the

19     visible actions we were able to observe.

20        Q.   Please, look at page 47 of your amalgamated statement, somewhere

21     in the middle of the page where you say.

22             "[In English] The weapons used by the Bosnian side were weapons

23     lower than 12.7 millimetres."

24             [Interpretation] And you say that that was the information you

25     had received from your subordinates; is that correct?  Do you still


Page 13133

 1     maintain this position?

 2        A.   I am saying that the reports indicated that other reports did not

 3     perhaps indicate that a higher calibre was used.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have in e-court 1D3375.

 6     This is also addressed to the UNPROFOR HQ in Zagreb on the 18th of June,

 7     1995.  Can we now have page 4 of this document.

 8             Item B -- no, no.  It should be page 5, not page 4.  I'm sorry.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Please look at these highlighted portions where there is mention

11     of the violations of the total exclusion zone.  Look at the assessment

12     down there:

13             "[In English] The situation is expected to stay uncertain and

14     tense.  It's still unclear whether BH offensive will continue or not.

15     Current condition on WF's activity allows to conclude that BH did not get

16     the expected results."

17             [Interpretation] And downwards, fire incidents:

18             "[In English] During the last 24 hours, most firing incidents

19     were observed in Igman, Butmir, Sharpstone, Sedrenik, Osijek, Ilidza,

20     Dobrinja, Mojmilo, Svabino Brdo, S of OP-1, airport, Nedzarici, and Log

21     bus stop areas.  Some explosions also reported today in Igman,

22     Butmir ..."

23             [Interpretation] And so on.  Could you please look yourself at

24     this portion which was encircled.

25        A.   Yes, I can see it.


Page 13134

 1        Q.   Do you think that these explosions could be caused by ammunition

 2     of 12.7 millimetres and below, or are we talking about higher calibres?

 3        A.   The document does not specify what kind of explosive device or

 4     calibre was used.  These were observations made by the unit as regards

 5     the sounds they heard, but the calibre is not specified.

 6        Q.   But we do agree that there was no explosive ammunition below

 7     12.7.  If it is an explosive ammunition, it must be over

 8     12.7 millimetres.  No --

 9        A.   But the report in this instance does not specify what kind of

10     calibre was used.  When you talk about an explosion, these might be due

11     to mortar explosions or infantry shells or shots fired.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have ERN page 297.

13     That's four pages forward.  That's not the right page.  Within this same

14     document, if I can have the next page.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Please look at this column marked with red pencil, and can you

17     explain what this column signifies?

18        A.   These are the -- the firing observed and coming from both sides.

19     Firing incidents.

20        Q.   So this is talking about explosions.  One hundred and forty-four;

21     correct?  But what about the last column?  What does this signify?

22        A.   These are explosions.

23        Q.   And the last but one?

24        A.   These are weapons.  What is your question?

25        Q.   Whose weapons are these?  Are these the pieces below 12.7, or are


Page 13135

 1     these explosions caused by artillery pieces of the calibre in excess of

 2     12.7 millimetres?

 3        A.   [Previous translation continues] ... weapons might have been

 4     used.  I can't tell for the time being.  It is not mentioned.

 5        Q.   Let's look at it.  Column number 1, warring factions.  Second

 6     column, small arms.  Third column, machine-guns; and the fourth column,

 7     HY --

 8        A.   This --

 9        Q.   -- does that stand for "heavy weapons"?

10        A.   [Overlapping speakers] [Previous translation continues] ...

11     assessment conducted by the sector.

12        Q.   We are overlapping.  I'm sorry, we're not making pauses.

13     Therefore, could you please confirm that column number 1 is warring

14     factions; number 2, small arms; number 3, machine-guns; and the fourth

15     one, heavy weapons?  Can you confirm that?

16        A.   I can confirm what you're saying.

17        Q.   Thank you.  By definition, heavy weapons implies calibres over

18     12.7; is that right?

19        A.   Yes, indeed.  It is above 12.7.  This was recorded as an

20     explosion and was not checked.  The units passed value judgement on the

21     type of weapon used but did not check or did not see what kind of weapon

22     was used.

23        Q.   Is it correct that in the last column it says that 100 shells

24     exploded in the Serbian territory, whereas 44 exploded in the Muslim-held

25     territory?


Page 13136

 1        A.   [Previous translation continues] ...

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go back one page, please.

 3             Do you agree that this table indicates freedom of movement on the

 4     18th of June?

 5        A.   Yes, that's right.  I believe that this is a correct document.

 6        Q.   Do you agree that this table also shows that not a single bus had

 7     reached the Serbs but that between Sarajevo and Igman we can see the

 8     vehicles pass in the last three rows, which is 14 cars, 13 cars and

 9     11 trucks, and the last one -- or, rather, a total of 27 cars and

10     25 trucks --

11        A.   [Previous translation continues] ...

12        Q.   -- whereas on the Serbian side it was 0?  Is that correct?

13             Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this document into

15     evidence?

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  The witness has confirmed that he considers it

17     to be a correct document.  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1130, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3378.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have page 3 of this

25     document.  I'm going to read it out loud.  18th of June, 1995.


Page 13137

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Please focus on paragraph 8, which is encircled and which says

 3     that the government offensive commenced on Tuesday [as interpreted]

 4     morning with heavy exchanges of mortar and artillery fire along the

 5     Hrasnica-Ilidza-Hadzici-Ilijas access.

 6             These places, were those places within the total exclusion zone?

 7        A.   These are in the zone.

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger, sorry.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry to intervene.  Can we seek a redaction at

10     page 30, lines 20 through 22.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  I'm sorry to interrupt, Mr. Witness, but

12     it's important that the redactions are dealt with as they arise.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can confirm that the

14     Hrasnica-Hadzici-Ilidza line was in the exclusion zone.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Then it goes on to say that as the attack progressed it became

17     evident that that was an attempt to break through the siege of

18     Sarajevo --

19             "[In English] ... that the main thrusts of the attack was aimed

20     at forging a passage through Hadzici in addition to the secondary

21     objectives of cutting or interdicting the Bosnian Serb main supply routes

22     into the city."

23        A.   That's correct.

24        Q.   [Interpretation] It seems, doesn't it, Mr. Witness, that you were

25     wrongly informed in the light of what you said on page 47 of your


Page 13138

 1     amalgamated statement:

 2             "[In English] The weapons used by the Bosnian side were weapons

 3     lower than 12.7 millimetres."

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the accused please repeat the portion in

 5     the English.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Is it true that out of the exclusion zone fire was opened at us

 8     using larger calibres?

 9        A.   I think that the information wasn't perhaps quite correct, but as

10     far as the attacks are concerned, it is clear that what was observed by

11     the units was the following:  The actions conducted by the Serbs were

12     greater in number than the actions conducted by the Muslims, but the

13     Muslims did also conduct actions and mortar fire and artillery fire was

14     exchanged.  The origin of the weapons had not been checked or seen by

15     UNPROFOR units.

16        Q.   Mr. Witness, can you tell us, during that period that you are

17     familiar with, which particular offensive was mounted by the Serbian

18     side, and if so, can you provide evidence to that?

19        A.   I cannot answer this question today.  I do not clearly remember

20     all of this and cannot answer this question.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have the next page of this document.  Look

22     at paragraph 9.

23             "[In English] The launch of the attack coincided with the greatly

24     enhanced security measures whereby a general alert was introduced and the

25     existing curfew was extended to run from 9 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. daily.


Page 13139

 1     Check-points in and around Sarajevo were closed and UNPROFOR vehicles

 2     were denied access to the logistic supply route across Mount Igman."

 3             [Interpretation] In your statements, did you notice what was

 4     being done by the Muslim army both to us and to you?  Did you highlight

 5     this fact in your statements, and did you notice that this offensive

 6     launched in June by the Muslim army had effect both on your supply routes

 7     and on your movement around Sarajevo?

 8        A.   I said earlier in my testimony that we -- our movement was

 9     restricted in Sarajevo, which was the area where we operated.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this into evidence?

12             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, that could be tendered.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1131, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do we have time for a few more

16     questions, or do we need to take a break now?

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, we intend to break at 10.30.  If you can

18     ask a short question, take us up to then.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it's better if we take a

20     break.  I don't want to rush through the document, which is rather

21     lengthy.

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  So you're confirming, Dr. Karadzic, you don't

23     have short questions?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  The document is a long one.

25     The questions are going to be short.


Page 13140

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  We will take a break now for 30 minutes until

 2     11.00.  Thank you.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Robinson, I understand you have something to

 7     say.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.  We just wanted to

 9     alert the Chamber that with respect to the next witness, KDZ354, two

10     proofing notes were prepared yesterday and they were not able to be

11     transmitted to Dr. Karadzic until today, and he still hasn't looked at

12     them because we've been -- from the minute he arrived, which was about

13     10 minutes before the session started, we've been working on this

14     witness's exhibits and trying to cut them down.  So we're not really in a

15     position where he can cross-examine Witness KDZ354 today, and I wanted to

16     let you know.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  What's the extent or volume of these

18     supplemental matters?

19             MR. ROBINSON:  It's about four pages, but it covers a fair

20     amount -- we could provide them to you if you'd like to see them.  It

21     covers a fair amount of -- a few different incidents of this witness.

22     It's something that we -- if it was overnight, I think we would be able

23     to deal with it, but the fact that it's the same day, I think it's a

24     little unreasonable to expect him to have 15 or 20 minutes to read it and

25     incorporate it into his cross-examination.


Page 13141

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Something you and I did every day, Mr. Robinson.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Maybe you, but I always asked for more time.

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Well, Your Honour, I agree with the Court's

 5     observation.  It also, you know, implicates the ongoing issue of the

 6     accused taking on every responsibility for himself by his own volition,

 7     but more importantly, this information is going to be led live.  I don't

 8     think there's going to be difficulty incorporating that into the

 9     accused's understanding of the events and ability to deal with it at the

10     time.  It's discrete issues not related, as I understand it, to the bulk

11     of the witness's evidence.  I think it will be apparent to the Court at

12     the time that we can proceed, and even in the event, which I don't think

13     will occur, that the Court considers that cross-examination on those

14     discrete issues needs some brief period of time for assimilation given

15     the timing of the court, that's probably -- that can be deferred to the

16     end of the cross-examination, which, based on the schedule, is probably

17     going to occur at the very end of the day or the first thing tomorrow

18     anyway.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, that's -- that seems likely, and,

20     Mr. Robinson, let's for the moment make no hard and fast decisions but

21     play it by ear.  There is a -- I appreciate, it is a pressure, but there

22     is, after all, another 30-minute adjournment coming up, and let's see if

23     this can be done.

24             In any event, we are hoping -- it's not been confirmed yet, to

25     sit until 3.00 today.


Page 13142

 1             Yes.  Have the witness back in, please.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And as part of that, I'm hoping

 3     that the Trial Chamber will give me a little bit more time, because there

 4     are many documents and areas that we have not illuminated with this

 5     witness.  I note that his statement is large, 100 pages, lots of

 6     interviews, lots of superficial or generalised assertions.

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, again, that will be something we'll

 8     consider on its merits once the time allotted has expired.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. Witness.  Sorry for the

11     short delay.

12             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Witness, were you aware of a manoeuvre by the Muslim forces in

15     the town of Sarajevo to position themselves very close to UN

16     installations and to residential areas so that the civilians and the

17     United Nations would serve as a shield for them and then they could fire

18     from those positions at the Serbs in an attempt to get the Serbs to

19     retaliate?

20        A.   I do not know whether they wanted to use the civilians and

21     UNPROFOR soldiers as shields, but what I know is that they indeed would

22     put themselves as close as possible to UN forces, in particular close to

23     the confrontation line.  They wanted to involve and put themselves

24     deliberately that way, embed themselves in that way to give the

25     impression that there were in locations where such embedding could carry


Page 13143

 1     with itself serious consequences.

 2        Q.   And if they were fired at when they were close to you or in

 3     civilian areas, would that create the impression of the town being

 4     terrorised?

 5        A.   I do not know whether that was the consequence to be drawn from

 6     that, but I know that that -- when they would fire or have response fire

 7     to UN positions, the latter being dovetailed with the will of the

 8     Bosnians to be as close as possible to the UN positions.  So they were

 9     also finding themselves in the midst of the population.  There was a

10     total mix of the UN forces, of the population, and the Muslim forces.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Can we call 65 ter 23033.  I

13     believe that this can be broadcast.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Would you please look at the date and also the recipient and the

16     person who is dispatching the message.

17             Can we look at page 5, please.  It's this assessment, the second

18     paragraph.  I'm going to read it in English.

19             "[In English] ABH proceeds using of UN locations in the city as

20     shield for deployment of the heavy weapon what provoke BSA retaliatory

21     fire and jeopardise civilian -- civilians and UN troops.  As confirmation

22     mentioned we observed mortar fire originated from the areas of the TV

23     building and PTT nearby the headquarters Sarajevo."

24             [Interpretation] The rest everyone can read.  Do you recall --

25     and here it is stated somewhere that they are very, very close.  Do you


Page 13144

 1     remember this report?  And does that reflect your knowledge as well as

 2     the position of the sender?

 3        A.   I can't remember this report precisely, but I know the author.  I

 4     can see the author's name here, and I think this reflects the situation

 5     as it was to be found on the ground on that day.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  We will come back to this document.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D3384 once again

 8     but can it not be broadcast, please.  1DD3483 [as interpreted].  It's in

 9     English as well.  Can we look at page 8 in the English.  1D3384.  Page 8,

10     please -- or, actually, seven from this one and 8 with the cover page

11     where paragraph 63 is.  One more.  [In English] Next page in English,

12     please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Can you please look at paragraph 63.  I am going to read if from

15     the second sentence on.

16             "[In English] The big ambiguity as well as for Sarajevo was that

17     Bosnian wanted very often to be the closest to the United -- UNPROFOR

18     forces.  I noticed that many times in Sarajevo, especially during a night

19     when we received 3.000 missiles when the Bosnians were at 1.5 metre to

20     the UN [sic] forces."

21             [Interpretation] Do you stand by this position stated in that

22     statement?

23        A.   Yes, I do confirm this.  This was in Debelo Brdo.  There was a UN

24     post there, and gradually it had been eroded by the Bosnian forces, and

25     basically the UN forces and the Muslim forces were dovetailed, sort of


Page 13145

 1     interwoven.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go back to 65 ter 23033,

 4     which we were looking at a little bit earlier.  Can we look at the ERN

 5     page 030, last three digits, or page 9 of 14.  Yes, that's it.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Again, just like in the previous document but now this is for the

 8     28th of June, does this not show the table of freedom of movement, and

 9     that, as we can see, the Sarajevo to Igman route was crossed by a total

10     of --

11        A.   Absolutely.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the numbers of the

13     vehicles.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Do you agree that this lower chart shows that the Serbian side

16     did not receive anything, that nothing was let through to the Serbs?

17        A.   Indeed.  What had been observed by the UN units in charge of

18     observing.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the next page.  That same table

20     speaking about the machine-gun and heavy weapons and explosions, and the

21     Serbian side used 92 to 74, but on the Serbian territory, more exploded

22     in the Serbian territory, 295 compared to 91.  So more shells exploded on

23     the Serbian side.

24             Do you agree that Muslims were able to fire at us in the

25     exclusion zone using their weapons which were actually located outside


Page 13146

 1     the exclusion zone?

 2        A.   If I look at Annex C in this report, indeed there were

 3     explosions.  As to the exact calibre and as to the origin of the fire,

 4     that probably was not specified in the various reports, but I do confirm

 5     this document saying that there were explosions in the Serbian zone.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this, please?

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  The witness has confirmed the contents, so, yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1132, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that we have to move to

11     private session for this question.  And can we have 1D3384 in the e-court

12     once again, please.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, private session, please.

14                           [Private session]

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 13147

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11  Pages 13147-13148 redacted. Private session.

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Page 13149

 1   (redacted)

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 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18                           [Open session]

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Let's establish that this is an UNMO report of the 12th of April,

23     1995, and it pertains to Zepa.  It reads:

24             "[In English] Officially, inside the demilitarised zone Zepa, no

25     troops should exist.  However, UNMOs have been reporting since the


Page 13150

 1     signature of the cease-fire agreement in 1993 that armed groups still

 2     remain inside the pocket.  UNMOs confirmed in several occasions the

 3     presence of armed people, but regular troops, units, are not reported so

 4     far.  The former local commander Colonel Avdo Palic is the man

 5     responsible for the control of the military situation and the troops.

 6     UNMOs confirm that the local B and H headquarter the existence of a

 7     Comcen with radio and Capsat equipment.  It is estimated that the

 8     strength of the troops in pockets about five Coys."

 9             Did you know anything about this and were you in touch with this

10     person?

11        A.   On one occasion, but it wasn't during this period at all, I

12     received a phone call and talked to Colonel Palic, but this must have

13     been in July, I believe, or as far as I remember.  I remember the reports

14     of the Ukrainian units very well.

15        Q.   Thank you.  The second encircled paragraph speaks about a

16     developed black market which the UNMOs of the United Nations find to be

17     of concern.  They are also talking about the local Mafia and the fact

18     that certain incidents confirm that there was involvement on the part of

19     the authorities but that it was yet unclear.

20             Did you know about this, and were you able to obtain certain

21     information from the military observers?

22        A.   I was not aware of this, all the more so that the UN observers

23     were part of a different military chain of command.

24        Q.   But you did meet them at joint briefing sessions; right?

25        A.   I would like to move into private session, please.


Page 13151

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

 2                           [Private session]

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

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25   (redacted)


Page 13152

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid we have to stay in

16     private session for the next document, which is 1D3151.  For your

17     information, my point is that we were accused of imposing restrictions of

18     food reaching Zepa.  However, there was a food black market as well.

19             Can we now go to page 140.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Witness, do you recall that the strategic idea of

22     Mr. Silajdzic was to have the Serbs enter Zepa and bloody their hands?

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, we're still in open session, so we

24     must go back into private session.

25                           [Private session]


Page 13153

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8                           [Open session]

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Witness, did you have an opportunity to see for yourself that

13     the fact was that Mr. Silajdzic's idea was for the Serbian Army to enter

14     Zepa and bloody their hands, even though he was in favour of the

15     evacuation of population, but he was nevertheless keen to have the

16     Serbian Army bloody their hands on his people.

17        A.   I don't quite understand your question.  I'm not in the shoes of

18     Mr. Silajdzic. (redacted)

19     (redacted)  I'm not quite sure

20     what it is you want me to react to.  Could you please clarify this.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have to go to private session

22     now.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

24                           [Private session]

25   (redacted)


Page 13154

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 3

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 6

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10

11  Pages 13154-13158 redacted. Private session.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

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20

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24

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Page 13159

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6                           [Open session]

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Back in open session, Your Honours.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Concerning your last answer, Mr. Witness, is it true that

10     United Nations, together with the Muslims who took Krupac illegally,

11     entered negotiations with them and that the Muslims withdrew without

12     sustaining any losses?

13        A.   The United Nations cannot say whether there were any casualties

14     on the other side.  What I do know is that military action was launched

15     against Krupac.

16        Q.   Is it true that the Muslims remained inside the Igman

17     demilitarised zone illegally until June or July 1995?  So from the

18     5th of October, 1994, until the summer of 1995, and only then under

19     pressure did they withdraw.

20        A.   In October 1994, the Bosnian forces withdrew from Krupa after a

21     military operation conducted by the United Nations.  As far as the entire

22     demilitarised area is concerned, the directives that had been given were

23     the following:  We had to detect any form of infiltration in the

24     demilitarised zone, whatever side this came from, and this is indeed what

25     we did.  Every time we noticed an illegal location, we tried to make sure


Page 13160

 1     that the Serb staff or Bosnian staff leave the area.

 2        Q.   Mr. Witness, the Defence claims that that was not the case, that

 3     very difficult negotiations were conducted, that they refused to withdraw

 4     for several months and that that was the reason for our falling out with

 5     them, and that is to say, the deterioration of the relations.

 6        A.   Of course there were tough negotiations, as you say, but the

 7     UN mandate and the mandate of the UN soldiers was to protect the

 8     neutrality of the DMZ.  And during the negotiations, we were still trying

 9     to detect those people who had infiltrated the area to make sure that

10     they leave the area.

11        Q.   Mr. Witness, are you familiar with this drawing?

12        A.   I think I actually saw it.  I might have even been the person who

13     wrote this.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this link between AMZ [as

15     interpreted] and ABiH zone was under the UN control and that that was

16     both the exit and entry point in and out of Sarajevo that was used by the

17     Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina military extensively?

18        A.   Let me repeat.  This area, i.e., the DMZ and the airport area,

19     were placed under the authority of the United Nations.  Notwithstanding

20     the negotiations that may have taken place regarding the crossing, we

21     tried to make sure that these areas, and more specifically the DMZ,

22     remain free from any movement or passage on the part of the Bosnians or

23     the Serbs, and that was essentially the mandate of the UN at the time.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this drawing, please.


Page 13161

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1135, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3396.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And while we're waiting, Witness, sir, I'm going to state the

 6     position of the Defence.  The Defence asserts that Sarajevo was not under

 7     siege, that was there a regular manoeuvre by the forces of the Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina army with whole units entering and exiting with their

 9     weaponry through this link between Dobrinja and Butmir.

10             And now can we look at the English version as well.  Just one

11     illustration.

12             On the 21st of March, the commander of the 102nd Brigade orders

13     400 soldiers and officers to leave the city of Sarajevo and to go to the

14     zone of the 16th Division, up north, thus to take out a section, with the

15     60-millimetre weaponry and 102-millimetre weapons with them, and they

16     were even going to carry out a review in the yard of the Pavle Goranin

17     school, and then when the review is over, they're going to do a joint

18     march and then take the Sarajevo-Butmir-Krupac-Kiseljak --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters kindly note we don't see the

20     text that Mr. Karadzic is reading from.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Do you agree that this column had to pass the Igman road?

23        A.   I'm not in a position to confirm that the column passed through

24     the Igman road.  (redacted)

25     (redacted)


Page 13162

 1     (redacted)

 2        Q.   Is there any other road from Hrasnica or from Butmir leading out

 3     other than the Igman road?  You can see Sarajevo, Butmir, Krupac,

 4     Kiseljak, and so on and so forth.

 5        A.   There was certainly another alternative to the Igman road, one

 6     that was not controlled by the United Nations.

 7        Q.   Let me ask you this then, Mr. Witness --

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger.  Just a moment.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry to intervene.  If I could seek a redaction at

10     page 55, lines 10 through 12.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Witness, sir, the road, any road, any road that is being used for

14     this type of manoeuvre, can it be considered a military target from the

15     military point of view?

16        A.   I cannot answer your question as to how to define targets, how

17     parties define targets, sorry.  I mean, our responsibility as the UN was

18     for the Igman road, only for that.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this document?

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Again, it seems to me that there's -- that the

22     witness couldn't confirm the movement, the specific movement which was

23     put to him, nor could he confirm the issue of the legitimacy of

24     targeting.  So there's no basis at the moment for admitting it, but it

25     may well be that you can adduce it through another method.


Page 13163

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Witness, you commented on numerous documents that you had not

 4     previously seen, that were presented to you by the OTP.  May I call up

 5     now 1D3400 so that we can see if you can comment on this too.

 6             This is a document of the 12th Division a month after that first

 7     one, thus they are relieving men on a monthly basis, and this is a

 8     change-of-shift plan according to the brigades, and you can see the

 9     28th of April of the 115th Brigade; the battalion on the 26th of April;

10     the 105th Brigade from Sarajevo on the 30th of April; 102nd Brigade from

11     Sarajevo on May 2nd, 1995.  Could all of these soldiers pass by any other

12     road other than the link between Hrasnica and Igman?  Was there any other

13     route for these soldiers to take out?

14        A.   The UN knew that the road they controlled was fully observed.

15     Should there have been any troop movements, there would have been reports

16     by the units on the ground.  In other words, it could be that if there

17     were rotations, they were done following other roads.

18        Q.   Can we look at the English version and look at the last two lines

19     and then move to the following page.

20             "The battalion from Sarajevo shall leave at 1900 hours on

21     buses of the -- although it is buses, DB, Dobrinja-Butmir feature,

22     strictly moving along the road to Butmir.  From there they shall march on

23     foot to Radeljevaca, and so on and so forth.  If this Radeljevaca is on

24     the Igman road, would you then accept that they had to take the Igman

25     road?


Page 13164

 1        A.   I repeat that if they had taken that road, the UN units being on

 2     the ground would have reported such movements, and I do not have any

 3     recollection to the effect.

 4        Q.   In order to be fair to you, Witness, I accept the possibility

 5     that you were not always properly informed, so we're going to show the

 6     next document.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document being admitted?

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  It falls into exactly the same category as the

 9     last document, Dr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Can we now have

11     65 ter 000 -- 65 ter 11070, and can we move into private session.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

13                           [Private session]

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22                           [Open session]

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Witness, sir, I'm going to show you one of the sources of

25     possible misunderstanding and lack of information, information that was


Page 13165

 1     denied to you.  Can you please look at this document of the Army of

 2     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These are the Muslim forces, the 1st Corps, of

 3     the 30th of September, 1994.  These are instructions or a supplement to

 4     the order, supplement to the order relating to conduct towards the

 5     UNPROFOR forces.  Guide units which are inserted into the temporarily

 6     occupied territory - it is actually Serbian territory but this is how

 7     they referred to it - through the 20-kilometre exclusion zone running

 8     parallel to the UNPROFOR forces in complete secrecy.  Conceal and

 9     disguise the bringing in and deployment of units.  Units which are

10     attacking from the front in the zone of exclusion and in the UNPA zones,

11     according to the agreement of the 13th of August, 1993, shall also take

12     measures of concealment while they are brought in, advancing and

13     approaching until the units are led to the initial positions and, rather,

14     JP.  And then it says if UNPROFOR forces try physically by using force to

15     prevent you from carrying out a task you shall respond in kind to all of

16     their actions.

17             "Respond to diversionary operations by UNPROFOR with diversionary

18     operations.

19             "Return fire when fire is opened on our forces troops and

20     hardware in order to protect the lives of our soldiers and carry out

21     tasks."

22             Witness, do you agree that the Muslim side took quite systematic

23     measures to conceal from you their illegal activities in the total

24     exclusion zone and in the DMZ in Igman?

25        A.   I can't express an opinion as to what the Bosnian units wanted to


Page 13166

 1     do or may have done.  Remember that the UN mandate was to do everything

 2     they could to prevent any movement in the demilitarised zone.  And as to

 3     our troops, we did not have many.  It was impossible to cover and observe

 4     the entirety of the zone.  Therefore, if Bosnian forces managed to go

 5     through the DMZ to go somewhere else, well, we had some suspicions about

 6     it, but we did everything we could in order to be able to detect such

 7     unit.  It may be that they transited outside the places where we would

 8     observe what was happening.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  My question is this:  It's not just the DMZ, but it's

10     also the 20-kilometre exclusion zone.  Thus, in the centre of town all

11     these movements and manoeuvres were concealed from you in all possible

12     ways.  Does this document confirm that Muslim forces concealed from the

13     United Nations their heavy weaponry and the movements and their attacks

14     in the forbidden areas, in the DMZs, and in the total exclusion zones?

15     All I'm asking you is does this document confirm that you were prevented

16     from being informed about their illegal activities?

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Well, the logical problem with the formulation of

19     that question I think is fairly obvious and I saw from the Court's

20     reaction that you were about to intervene for the same reason so ...

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, Dr. Karadzic, to ask a witness to confirm

22     he didn't know something is getting to be a logical impossibility.  If

23     you don't know something -- if you have no knowledge of something, it

24     stands alone.  You cannot confirm that you didn't know something.  You

25     cannot deny that you didn't know something if you had no information on


Page 13167

 1     which to base a state of knowledge.  So it seems to be a fruitless line

 2     of cross-examination.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Witness, sir, in line 8 on this page 59, you said that you are

 5     unable to voice your opinion about what the Bosnian units intended.  Does

 6     that mean that you cannot voice your opinion about what the Serb units

 7     wanted either?

 8        A.   As a witness, I am not able to know what other people's

 9     intentions were.  I know one thing; namely, that what the UN units saw

10     they reported on.  Now, as to suppose or speculate as to things that I

11     have not seen or witnessed, I cannot do that.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Had you received this document in early October 1994

13     would you have known considerably more?  Would your position have been

14     different?

15        A.   Since I did not receive it, how do you want me to answer?

16        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at your amalgamated statement, page 22,

17     paragraph 2 from the bottom where you confirm --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do we need to go into -- for

19     several seconds, for a minute, for several minutes into private session.

20             JUDGE MORRISON:  If there's a risk that we need to, we need to.

21     Let's go into private session.

22                           [Private session]

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 13168

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Page 13170

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11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17                           [Open session]

18             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We would like to tender this

20     document, 11070, that talks about the attitude towards UNPROFOR.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry.  Momentarily lost track of that document.  I

23     can't see that it falls outside the -- it seems to fall within the same

24     category as the previous documents.

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  That's certainly my view, Dr. Karadzic.  Again,


Page 13171

 1     this may well be a document which, as alluded to before by Mr. Tieger,

 2     would be better suited to, as other documents are, bar table motions.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect,

 4     Your Excellency, I believe this witness said earlier, on the first day,

 5     that the Muslims were in a position to deceive them, but let it stay as

 6     you wish.

 7             Can we look at 1D1044 before the break, please.  There is also a

 8     translation.  This is a document of the command of the 1st Corps.  There

 9     is an English version too.  We must put the English version on the ELMO,

10     it seems to me.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This is the 15th of June, 1995.  The command of the 1st Corps

13     confirms that they are still at Igman and that they even have a forward

14     command post there, Igman.  This is the fourth line from the top:

15             "[In English] Forward command post Igman."

16             [Interpretation] Is it correct that in mid-June they were still

17     in the DMZ, the Igman DMZ, Witness?

18        A.   This is a report from the Bosnian forces.  As far as I know,

19     there is no correspondent report from the UN, but I can't express an

20     opinion on this document which is not a UN document, and -- that I'm not

21     aware of.  I didn't know of it before, and I didn't know of it until

22     today.

23        Q.   With all due respect, Witness, sir, you did comment on Serb

24     documents that you were seeing for the first time.  What I'm asking you

25     now is this:  Did you have knowledge that this document was correct?  Did


Page 13172

 1     you know that in mid-June they were still at Igman, the Muslim forces

 2     were still at Igman?

 3        A.   I can't answer your question.  If he says so, it may be right,

 4     but I'm not sure.  I don't know.  I can't answer.

 5        Q.   Let's leave the document for a moment.  Were they there at the

 6     time, or did you drive them away from Igman earlier or later?  I'm not

 7     talking about Krupac.  I'm talking about the DMZ at Igman, where they

 8     have a forward command post.

 9        A.   Can we move into private session?

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

11                           [Private session]

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 13173

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20                           [Open session]

21             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask for advice as to

24     what should the Defence do if we believe that a witness is biased and

25     that, for example, he authenticates the Serbian documents and he doesn't


Page 13174

 1     do the same with the Muslim documents.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  That's not a helpful comment which Mr. Tieger is

 3     no doubt about to emphasise.  The short answer is that if you suspect

 4     somebody of being biased, you put a direct question to them and receive a

 5     direct answer.

 6             We're now going to rise for half an hour.  We've considered the

 7     position as to whether or not to allow any further time for

 8     cross-examination, and we are prepared to grant a further 30 minutes,

 9     which will start from the moment we re-enter the court.  The court will

10     sit until 3.00.  It will be necessary to have a short adjournment between

11     2.00 and 2.10 for a tape change, and we will reassemble at five minutes

12     past the hour.

13                           --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 1.07 p.m.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, Dr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Witness, do you still stand by your position that due to the

19     meandering line of confrontation, it was difficult to determine where

20     fire was coming from?

21        A.   I do confirm what I said.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be asked to put his

23     microphone on.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Thank you.


Page 13175

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the Judge's microphone please be switched

 2     off.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:  I think the witness's microphone is not -- I don't

 4     know whose control is -- okay.

 5        Q.   Would you please repeat -- [Interpretation] Can you please repeat

 6     your answer.

 7        A.   Yes, I do confirm that the confrontation line was a sinusoidal

 8     line, and it was difficult to determine the origin of fire.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  All right.  Mr. Witness, did you know what the

10     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps strength was?  Were you familiar with its

11     strength, its composition, and its deployment?

12        A.   We did indeed have information which was provided to us by the

13     liaison officers of UNPROFOR who were with the various parties.  Whether

14     this was or certainty and entire truth, I don't know.  I had a vague

15     understanding of the locations as provided by our liaison officers.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know what the strength and area of deployment

17     was of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18        A.   I would be afraid of making a mistake.  I don't remember.  We,

19     the UN forces, were peace partners for both sides.  We did not conduct an

20     analysis as an opponent would do in the standard fashion.  This was not

21     our objective at all and not the objective of our assignments.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that the first row of hills around the

23     town of Sarajevo was under the Muslim control, that is to say, the

24     BH Army?  If it would be easier for you, I can give you the names:

25     Igman, Mojmilo, Hrasno Brdo, Debelo Brdo, Colina Kapa, Mala Kapa.  That's


Page 13176

 1     to the south; right?

 2        A.   I would not be as positive about all those names after all the

 3     years that have elapsed, but what was on Bosnian territory was held by

 4     the population.  Inside that area there might have been Bosnian units,

 5     but I cannot ascertain that with a hundred per cent certainty.

 6        Q.   Do you agree that Debelo Brdo is a dominant feature over the

 7     central part, including Skenderija, and that on the northern slopes of

 8     Debelo Brdo were Muslims and that the Serbs were on the southern slope?

 9        A.   The most important thing for the UN forces was the position of

10     the UN forces which was located on the summit of Debelo Brdo.  Therefore,

11     at a distance which I cannot calculate now, very close distance, there

12     were Bosnians in the northern area and Serb forces in the southern area.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that on the northern side there were

14     a number of dominant elevations held by the BH Army, and I can also

15     enumerate them starting from east to west, off the top of my head;

16     Sedam Suma, Grdonj Hill, Sedrenik, Hum, Brijesce Brdo, Zuc, Orlic,

17     Sokolje.  This whole range on the north.  Do you agree that all these

18     dominant features were under the control of the BH Army?

19        A.   I think they were in the north.  They were controlled by the Army

20     of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but if it is a matter of identifying those

21     locations with precision, I must say that my memory doesn't serve me that

22     well now.  That would be difficult for me.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can we agree that in Sarajevo there was the

24     Main Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that there was the

25     Main Staff of the 1st Corps, the staff of the 12th Division, and the


Page 13177

 1     staff of all the accompanying installations and staff units of the 101st,

 2     102nd, 105th, 115th, 152nd, 111th, and 112th Brigades?  Are you familiar

 3     with the names of these brigades?

 4        A.   Everyone knew the name of his brigades.  Depending on the level

 5     of responsibility, we knew where such and such a unit was.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that with regard to an inquiry from the

 7     United Nations, you were informed by the Muslim army that the buildings

 8     around the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the close proximity of

 9     Holiday Inn, were under the control of the police rather than the army,

10     and that any sniper shooters that might be operating there would be from

11     the police, not from the military?  That was a response to a protest

12     issued by the United Nations to the effect that sniper nests were located

13     there, and the BH Army informed the United Nations that those belonged to

14     the police and not to the army.  Do you remember that?

15        A.   I do remember this information.  This was a subject of concern

16     for all the people working for the United Nations.  We tried to detect

17     the positions or the sniper nests on either side.  This was a concern for

18     all the UN forces.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that the Serbian side offered truce

20     in Sarajevo on several occasions and that they even proclaimed cease-fire

21     in and around Sarajevo unilaterally?

22        A.   I don't recollect this exactly, what the document stated and what

23     documents were provided and what information these documents contained.

24     I know that during a fairly long period of time outside peaks of

25     activity, there was a decrease in the pressure exerted.


Page 13178

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Am I right if I say, and now we are talking about the

 2     relevant period, that the Muslim side never offered truce in Sarajevo?

 3        A.   I cannot answer that question.  Perhaps it did.  Perhaps it

 4     didn't.  As far as the level of responsibility is concerned, I was not

 5     aware of that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Were you aware of the previously reached agreements

 7     between the parties and the United Nations?  Specifically, did you know

 8     that there was a protocol accompanying the agreement on the total

 9     exclusion zone from March 1994, February 1994?

10        A.   I would like to move into private session, please.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

12                           [Private session]

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20                           [Open session]

21             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honour.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Is it true that you were informed that from the Jewish Cemetery,

25     the Serbs targeted the building of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency


Page 13179

 1     by using the so-called Maljutka, which is a wire-guided missile?

 2        A.   Yes, quite right.  I can confirm that.  I do confirm that

 3     information.

 4        Q.   Do you agree that in the building of the Presidency there was

 5     also the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that on both those

 6     grounds the Presidency building was a legitimate military target?

 7        A.   What I can say is that I did acknowledge that a round was fired.

 8     Now, whether to draw a conclusion on the identity of the inhabitants,

 9     that is something else.  I know that there were members of the government

10     and the Presidency there.  Where the various offices and personalities

11     were housed, I cannot actually say.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this information could have been

13     misinformation, having in mind numerous buildings, pylons, and

14     installations of all kinds, and that a wire-guided missile from the

15     Jewish Cemetery all the way to the Presidency building didn't have much

16     chance of hitting the target?

17        A.   What was reported to the UN forces and their representatives was

18     that the shot originated from an area which was occupied by the Serb

19     forces.  Despite firing difficulties, we acknowledged that this shot had

20     been fired.  This was an observation on the part of UN personnel.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Were you aware of the fact that in the city of

22     Sarajevo, inside the total inclusion zone -- exclusion zone, there were

23     numerous plants and workshops that manufactured weapons and various types

24     of ammunition?

25       A.   Such a rumour circulated in the town of Sarajevo.  (redacted)


Page 13180

 1     (redacted)

 2     (redacted)  This rumour did circulate.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall and were you informed that there were

 4     two --

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR TIEGER:  Sorry.  A redaction, please, at page 73, line 1.

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  I think you -- I'm not sure you have the right

 8     line there, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  It's actually different on two different screens,

10     but I think you're looking at line -- line 3; correct.  That's how it

11     shows on the LiveNote, but on the version that's broadcast on the

12     opposite screen in court it came out as line 1, but according to the

13     LiveNote we've been going on, it is line -- it would be line 3; correct.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  So be it.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you remember, Witness, that there were numerous independent

17     battalions in Sarajevo and that there were also two Special Police

18     brigades that had been equipped by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

19     that used them in combat?  One of those units was called Lasta, and the

20     other one was called Bosna.

21        A.   The UN forces all saw policemen in Sarajevo, Muslim policemen in

22     fairly large numbers.  We did not know the names of these units, and we

23     didn't know what their purpose was.  This information was never disclosed

24     to us, as far as I know.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3403 for a moment,


Page 13181

 1     and after that 3407.  There should be a translation as well.  Yes.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Is it right that what we see here is the command of the

 4     12th Division issuing an order to prepare firing positions for

 5     105 howitzer gun in co-ordination -- or, rather, with the last order

 6     immediately camouflage the artillery piece in -- and protect it against

 7     reconnaissance by UN forces.  And listed below are axes where they're

 8     going to open fire, which are, in fact, the Serbian villages that were to

 9     be the targets.

10             Do you agree that it was impermissible for them to do that in the

11     exclusion zone, and the fact that they wanted to hide this from the

12     United Nations constituted an illegal action?

13        A.   Two parts to my question.  The first thing is that I see this

14     document for the first time.  The second thing is that if it is true to

15     fact, the Bosnian forces were violating the initial protocol relating to

16     the exclusion zone.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

19             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry to rise to make the same point, but

20     it's -- it's another in a line of similar submissions.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, what the witness has said is that

22     if it's true, then the Bosnian forces were violating the initial

23     protocol, which may be self-evident.  But it doesn't assist in the

24     admission of the document itself.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like also to


Page 13182

 1     show 3407, just so that we can see for ourselves that the

 2     2nd Police Brigade, the Bosna Brigade, was under the command of the army

 3     and that the army equipped it with banned weapons in the total exclusion

 4     zone.

 5             Let's just wait for the English translation.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   We have Bosna here, and it's supposed to form a company using the

 8     following units:  120-millimetre mortar, 82-millimetre mortar, four

 9     pieces, and this is being relocated to the Bosna brigade, which is a

10     police brigade.  Does this also present a violation of the total

11     exclusion zone agreement, and before that, can you look at what brigade

12     is supposed to be given what.  The 105th is supposed to provide the

13     commander and an 82-millimetre mortar, then also the 105th is giving a

14     squad commander and 120-millimetre mortar, and so on and so forth.  Does

15     this also not represent the flagrant violation of the total exclusion

16     zone agreement and concealment of all of this from the United Nations?

17        A.   I repeat the answer I gave earlier.  I'm seeing this document for

18     the first time, and if it is true, this is a violation of the protocol

19     relating to the exclusion zone.  That's all I have to say.

20             JUDGE MORRISON:  And the same must apply as far as admissibility

21     is concerned, Dr. Karadzic.

22             Now, looking at the time, make this your last question, please.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Although I believe that

24     that is a pity, but, all right.  We will now manage somehow.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 13183

 1        Q.   Witness, sir, do you remember that President Carter managed to

 2     broker a truce in late December 1994 and that we all enjoyed the benefits

 3     of that truce for quite some time?

 4        A.   I remember the arrival of President Carter very well.  I think it

 5     was on the 19th of December, 1994, and there was a combination of what

 6     the president had achieved and the weather conditions which led to a

 7     substantial lull during this period.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             Can we now have 1D3394.

10             If I were to say to you, Witness, sir, that the Muslim side did

11     not take part in the truce sincerely and that this document would show

12     that, would you agree that we also had the right to be angry and to be

13     cautious and to be distrustful, because if one cannot obey the agreement

14     brokered by President Carter, what could we hope for?  Would you agree

15     that this truce was betrayed?

16        A.   I believe the facts observe by UN personnel on the ground

17     demonstrated that both sides or neither side had complied with the entire

18     agreement.  What the share of responsibility of one or other side is I

19     cannot calculate this, and I cannot assess in mathematical terms the

20     level of responsibility of one or other party.

21        Q.   Can you, please, sir --

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, there must be some error in

23     translation of the English "last question" into Serbian.  This is

24     definitively your last question.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, yes.  I was thinking about


Page 13184

 1     the last document.  That's why I was saying.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Do you agree, Witness, sir, that this document attests to the

 4     fact that on the 6th of January, an order was issued on full readiness,

 5     full combat readiness, and that nobody is in possession of a similar

 6     document by the Serbian Army?

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  It calls for speculation.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, and for simply agreeing the document says what

 9     it purportedly says.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Second half of the question, perhaps, but the first part talks

12     about preparations a week after the four-month truce was brokered.

13        A.   Once again I repeat what my position is:  If this document is

14     true to fact, it is difficult to say whether there is any breach of the

15     protocol.  I'm a witness.  How can I assess a document of a general

16     nature which I see for the first time today?  You are asking me to assess

17     this document.  I think this is rather utopian.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  But, Mr. Witness, does the same general

19     principle apply, that if this document were, in fact, a true and accurate

20     account, then it would suggest a breach of protocol?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is what I said before I

22     provided my answer.  That's correct.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.  Thank you very much.

24             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do you admit -- can we admit this


Page 13185

 1     document?

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, it by definition falls into

 3     exactly same category of the other documents dealt with in the same way

 4     by the witness.

 5                           Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:

 6        Q.   Mr. Witness, I have just a very few follow-up questions.  During

 7     the course of your cross-examination, you were shown D1117.

 8             And if that could be called up on the screen, please.

 9             It's a document dated the 26th of April, 1995, sent by

10     General Nikolai to General Delic.  And if we can scroll down to the

11     bottom.  CC'd to Lieutenant-General Milovanovic.  And the subject was

12     "Heavy weapon violations of safe areas/exclusion zones."

13             And if we could next, and just to -- so you can compare it to the

14     next document, you can see the first paragraph is over -- begins with

15     "Over the last two months," then "Protest letters," then "I want to

16     emphasise," then "Therefore," and so on.

17             If we could next call up -- and, Witness, that document was

18     presented to you in the context of explaining -- about the accused

19     explaining or at least suggesting what Muslims were doing, what Bosnian

20     forces were doing and what Bosnian Serb forces were not.

21             So I'd like to show you 65 ter 90239.

22             And, Witness, there we see another document dated 26 April 1995,

23     also sent by General Nikolai.  Subject again is "Heavy weapon violations

24     of safe areas/exclusion zones."  The text appears to be identical, but

25     this one is sent to Lieutenant-General Manojlo Milovanovic in Pale.  And


Page 13186

 1     if we scroll down we see that it was cc'd to General Delic.

 2             Witness, do these appear to be similar or precisely the same

 3     protests sent to both sides on the same date, and are the two documents,

 4     when seen together, a further reflection of UN impartiality that you

 5     spoke of?

 6        A.   I believe that all the UN high representatives wanted to remain

 7     impartial.  Whenever an event would occur, this gave an opportunity to

 8     remind both parties of the rules they had to comply with.  Therefore,

 9     whatever their level, all people in charge would follow the same policy.

10        Q.   Thank you, Witness.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I would tender this document, 90239.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, the, as it were, sister document was

13     admitted, was it not?  Yes.  That will be admitted as well.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2442, Your Honours.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Witness, you were also asked quite a number of questions about

17     convoys and restrictions of humanitarian aid and questions about Bosnian

18     Muslim responsibility for restrictions and Bosnian Serb interest in

19     supposed or alleged interest in maintaining full humanitarian aid access.

20             Let me show you a couple of documents if I may.  The first is

21     65 ter 19424.

22             Witness, this is a code cable dated the 6th of July, 1995, from

23     Mr. Akashi in Zagreb to Mr. Annan in New York, and it describes the

24     situation in Bihac, and then on the second page in the eastern enclaves

25     and then going on to Sarajevo.  Turn to the second page, please.  And it


Page 13187

 1     begins in describing the situation in Sarajevo by saying:

 2             "The suspension of the UNHCR air-lift to Sarajevo since 8 April

 3     has affected UNHCR's capacity to deliver food supplies to the city."

 4             And if we can -- then it describes some of the problems.  If we

 5     continue to the next page.  To the middle of the page.  The document also

 6     describes an agreement reached with the Bosnian Serbs on the 8th of June

 7     for convey access, and then continues in approximately the middle of that

 8     first paragraph:

 9             "However, despite this agreement, the Bosnian Serb authorities

10     still continued to obstruct access and demanded 50 per cent of deliveries

11     rather than the usual 23 per cent based on a needs assessment.  When

12     clearances were finally obtained, convoys were blocked because of the

13     BiH offensive around Sarajevo."

14             And the document continues, if we look at the first sentence of

15     the next paragraph:

16             "UNHCR has not received clearance from the Bosnian Serb side to

17     deliver aid to Sarajevo since 20 June, and the humanitarian situation in

18     the city has become very serious."

19             And that paragraph ends:

20             "UNHCR is today facing the most serious disruption in its food

21     distribution in Sarajevo since its assistance programme began in 1992.

22     Another aspect of the situation which is of great concern to UNHCR is the

23     current level of shelling which the civilian population has been

24     subjected to in recent days."

25             Witness, does that -- is that consistent with your recollection


Page 13188

 1     of events with respect to Bosnian Serb --

 2        A.   This concords perfectly with the situation.  I would not want

 3     anyone to believe that freedom of movement, which was indeed somewhat

 4     limited by the Bosnians, within Sarajevo would have been far less than

 5     the freedom of movement called by the Bosnian Serbs outside Sarajevo.  So

 6     whether -- whether it was about restricting road access or air-lift to

 7     provide supplies.  There was no proportionality with regard to freedom of

 8     movement.  The freedom of movement caused by the Serbs was far greater

 9     than the freedom of movement limited by the Bosnians within Sarajevo.

10        Q.   Thank you, Witness.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I tender 19424, please.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  The witness has confirmed the essence of

13     it.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P2443, Your Honours.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank you, Witness.  That

16     concludes my redirect.

17             JUDGE MORRISON: [Interpretation] This brings your testimony to an

18     end.  Thank you for coming to The Hague.  It is not easy when you have to

19     move between private and open session all the time, but I want to thank

20     your colleagues also for their help.  And I wish you all a very good day.

21             [In English] There are technical arrangements which need to be

22     put in place for the next witness.  I'm advised that ten minutes will do

23     it.  So we'll rise now and sit again at 2.00.

24                           [The witness withdrew]

25                           --- Recess taken at 1.51 p.m.


Page 13189

 1                           --- On resuming at 2.02 p.m.

 2                           [The witness entered court]

 3                           WITNESS:  KDZ354

 4                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Hello, Madam Witness.  If you would like,

 6     please, to take the solemn declaration.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 8     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.  If you'd like to sit and make

10     yourself comfortable.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  Ms. Edgerton.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  Thank you.

14                           Examination by Ms. Edgerton:

15        Q.   Madam Witness, I've got a few questions for you about the

16     evidence you've previously given to this Tribunal.  Do you recall giving

17     a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor in June of 1997, and

18     following that, do you recall testifying before this Tribunal in the

19     Krajisnik case in April 2005?

20        A.   Yes, I do.

21        Q.   And is it correct that this year, 2011, on February 4th and 5th,

22     you had read back to you a further statement by a representative of the

23     Office of the Prosecutor consolidating this earlier evidence?

24        A.   Yes, I remember.

25        Q.   And you added a small amount of additional information at that


Page 13190

 1     point?

 2        A.   Yes, because that pertained to the period up until the very end

 3     of the war.

 4        Q.   And you signed that statement.

 5        A.   Yes, I did.

 6        Q.   Now, if I was to ask you the same questions today as those which

 7     gave rise to the written evidence in that statement you listened to in

 8     February of this year, would you give the same answers?

 9        A.   Of course.  Absolutely the same answers.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Then, Your Honours, that statement is

11     65 ter 90222.  Could that be please be a Prosecution exhibit under seal?

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P2444, under seal,

14     Your Honours.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  I'll now read a summary of that

16     written evidence.

17             This witness lived with her family in the area of Grbavica prior

18     to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and remained there with her mother

19     throughout the conflict and the period of reintegration in 1996.

20             The witness describes her neighbourhood, its population and

21     composition, and how non-Serbs -- non-Serbs were affected with the

22     outbreak of war in 1992 and the takeover of Grbavica by Bosnian Serb

23     forces.  She provides details on the Bosnian Serb military presence in

24     the area and the firm control exercised by the military.

25             The witness not only saw but was subject to persecutions by


Page 13191

 1     Bosnian Serb forces, in particular from the late spring and into the

 2     autumn of 1992.  These persecutory measures included arbitrary arrests as

 3     well as repeated house searches.  She gives evidence of the expulsions of

 4     Muslims from Grbavica, including an incident on 30 September 1992, where

 5     Muslims were expelled by armed soldiers.

 6             On 11 June 1992, the witness and her mother were taken from their

 7     home at gunpoint by Veselin Vlahovic, otherwise known as Batko.  Batko

 8     then raped, beat, threatened, and robbed both women, the witness and her

 9     mother.  Batko, the witness concluded, was a member of the military.

10     Following the incident, she saw Batko interviewed on TV.

11             After the incident the witness tried repeatedly to leave Grbavica

12     for Bosnian-held territory.  The night of 30 September 1992, after seeing

13     numbers of Muslims being driven out of the area, the witness and her

14     mother were evicted from their flat by a man in military police uniform.

15     The next morning, with nowhere to go, the witness visited the military

16     police headquarters and asked to be expelled.  She was told that this

17     wasn't being done any longer and Grbavica was completely blocked.

18             The witness describes her experiences of life for civilians in

19     Bosnian-Serb-held Grbavica during the years of the conflict.  She saw

20     mortars in her neighbourhood and notes that there were tanks in the area

21     all the time, from as early as May 1992.  She talks of mortar and tank

22     fire coming from Grbavica, of seeing snipers passing by.  Everybody in

23     Grbavica knew who the snipers were.  They would walk in the streets with

24     their special rifles.  She saw them going up into the apartment building

25     at Lenjinova 58, one of the locations from which the snipers operated.


Page 13192

 1        Q.   Now, having read that summary, I'd like, Madam Witness, to ask

 2     you some questions relating to the matters that you discussed in the

 3     statement, in the written evidence that we filed.

 4             First, Madam Witness, did you ever report the incident involving

 5     Batko to Bosnian Serb -- local Bosnian Serb authorities?

 6        A.   On one occasion I went to the premises of the military police,

 7     which was on Zagrebacka Street, which was called the street of

 8     General Dragoljub Draza Mihajlovic during the war.  I wanted to ask them

 9     what should my mother and I do.  Since we didn't have any papers, we were

10     not able to move around, and I had to go out occasionally to do some

11     shopping for bread or -- and things like that.  I asked them how could I

12     obtain some ID.  At first they listened to me, but then they asked me

13     about my identification card, and I said I didn't have one.  They kept

14     asking for it, insisting on it.  I said that we didn't have any IDs, that

15     they had been confiscated from us, and I was speaking on behalf of my

16     mother as well.  They asked me who took them away, and then I started

17     telling them the whole story.  I burst into tears.  Then they asked me if

18     I had any problems.

19             I tried to believe that they wanted to know what kind of problems

20     I wanted, because everybody had problems had problems during the war.  So

21     in response to that inquiry, I mentioned the name of this -- I don't know

22     how to call him, a human being or whatever, Veselin Vlahovic, and I said

23     that he had taken my mother and me, but I couldn't put it into words

24     immediately.  While I was talking, they looked at me in a sort of way,

25     and it occurred to me that people were looking at me in disbelief,


Page 13193

 1     wondering whether it is possible that somebody could have survived

 2     something that was done by such a criminal.  That's what I felt.

 3             Now, this whole story started to unravel.  I told them a number

 4     of things.  One of those military policemen, his name was Boro Sljuka,

 5     and they all had ID cards or passes, badges on their jackets.  He was

 6     making notes while I was talking.  When I mentioned the name of the

 7     criminal, he put this paper that he had been writing on in a drawer in

 8     front of me.  He then glanced at another policeman and said, "We're not

 9     going to take any more notes about this."

10             And that's what happened on the occasion when I went to the

11     military police and outlined what had happened to me to them.  I just

12     gave them the crux of the matter.  I told them that my mother and I were

13     the victims of a savage assault, a beastly assault by a man who used on

14     top of everything abusive language and called us all kinds of names.  So

15     this is how I reported it then.

16        Q.   Do you remember approximately when that was?

17        A.   It could have been in July of 1992.  In July 1992, yes.

18        Q.   Subsequent to that, were you ever at any time approached by

19     Bosnian Serb authorities with respect to any investigation into the

20     incident?

21        A.   No, no, no.  No.  I realised and I said then that actually the

22     wisest thing, if one can speak about that at all, not to mention this

23     ever, and it was something that would be a fairytale, looking at it in

24     hindsight, if I had expected anyone to do anything about this.

25        Q.   Thank you.  To move on in your statement, at paragraph 65 you


Page 13194

 1     referred to Batko and you said:

 2             "Based on the clothes and the weapons he carried, one could

 3     conclude that he was definitely a member of some organised military."

 4             When you used those orders "organised military," were you

 5     referring to anything in particular?

 6        A.   As someone who has no military experience, naturally, but by

 7     looking at a man in full uniform and with the insignia worn by others and

 8     carrying a rifle, what else could I have concluded other than what I did?

 9     It was only natural and normal.

10        Q.   You have just referred to insignia, that he was in uniform and

11     bore the insignia worn by others.  I wonder if you can recall what

12     insignia those were.

13        A.   Since he did not come only once, he came to our flat twice before

14     he took us away, the first time round he had a rather long overcoat.  He

15     is a rather short person, and this coat did not suit him or did not fit

16     him at all, and underneath he had an olive-drab uniform.  Of course he

17     had a rifle.  The second time he came, he was dressed in a camouflage

18     uniform with the insignia on his sleeve reading "The Army of Republika

19     Srpska," and there was a flag as well.

20        Q.   Further in your statement, at paragraph 92, you referred to a lot

21     of mortar and tank fire from Grbavica onto the other side, and I was

22     wondering whether you saw where those weapons you referred to were

23     located.

24        A.   First of all, I would like to say something about the tanks that

25     were passing along this road nonstop.  And this road that used to be the


Page 13195

 1     street along which trolley buses ran was the road that everyone had to

 2     cross in order to reach the central point in Grbavica where the open-air

 3     market was, and on the premises of the former local commune there was a

 4     church.  Therefore, everybody had to travel down that road, speaking

 5     about pedestrians.

 6             Now, speaking about weaponry and tanks that later had some

 7     Cyrillic inscriptions like Black Djordje, Crni Djordje, whether that was

 8     after the tank driver or whoever, and weapons such as -- I even saw some

 9     weapons positioned between buildings, the passages between buildings that

10     were leaning on pillars which created a certain space, and I suppose they

11     would leave those weapons there if they were not in action.  One could

12     even see that those were equipped with very precise instruments.  I saw

13     it myself, and I think those were mortars that were on some kind of

14     support, and close to a military staff that was headquartered in the

15     offices of the former Digitron Buje company.  That was the name of the

16     company from Slovenia.

17             What I want to say is that everyone who is familiar with Grbavica

18     will know which location I'm referring to.  So there's a staircase there

19     that goes from this flat part of Grbavica to the Vraca neighbourhood.

20     Now I've given you a more accurate location.  One of those locations.

21        Q.   Can we just go back to something that you said that I actually

22     don't quite understand.  You said that you -- am I correct if I

23     understand that you said you saw weapons positioned in passages between

24     buildings that were leaning on pillars?  Because I'm just wondering how

25     passages could be leaning on pillars.


Page 13196

 1        A.   Yes.  Yes, yes.  Yes.  These are not standard passages.  So at

 2     the end of a building it is protruding by some 3 or 4 metres, and it is

 3     leaning on pillars, and I referred to it as a passage in that sense.  I

 4     didn't give you a proper technical term.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Further in your statement, at paragraphs 93 and 94,

 6     you mentioned seeing snipers passing by, walking in streets with special

 7     rifles and going up into the big apartment building at Lenjinova 58.

 8             How common were these special rifles?

 9        A.   That happened on a daily basis.

10        Q.   Sorry, could I just stop you for a second.  Perhaps I could

11     rephrase.  These -- what makes you describe these rifles as "special

12     rifles"?

13        A.   I couldn't find a better term, because these rifles were in kind

14     of sheaths or holsters that served as the protection, but it was clear

15     that there was a rifle inside, and all of us who would pass by could

16     clearly see these soldiers bearing these rifles.  Some people would

17     recognise some of the soldiers from before, only now they were in

18     uniforms.  They knew their names and they knew some other details about

19     these people and they knew what those people were involved in at that

20     time.

21        Q.   Were these special rifles carried by many soldiers?

22        A.   No, no.  After a while, we knew exactly, because overall that was

23     such a long period of time and the area was small, so you start

24     recognising things.  As you recognised your neighbours before, you

25     started recognising the faces of sharpshooters.


Page 13197

 1        Q.   Also at paragraph 93 you said that everybody in Grbavica knew who

 2     the snipers were.  Do you, yourself, know who the snipers were by any

 3     chance?

 4        A.   One of those snipers was -- I don't know his full name.  His

 5     first name was Marinko.  He used to work for Dobrotvor.  That's a Serbian

 6     charitable organisation that organised parcels to be sent in and out.

 7     Marinko used to work there at a later stage.

 8             There was also a man called Zlatko Subotic, and a friend of mine

 9     recognised him without doubt, and she used to live in Grbavica as well.

10             And another rather painful thing was that there was a woman

11     called Nada, who had worked before the war in a supermarket on

12     Djura Djakovica Street.  She was a sniper as well.

13             The friend that I have just mentioned lived on Zagrebacka Street,

14     number 30.  From her balcony she saw that these snipers, the ones that I

15     named, as well as a couple of others, or maybe seven or eight of them,

16     would sometimes come to what would be a small shop in the basement.  You

17     have to go down the stairs.  It's called Mak.  And this is where they

18     would hold some sort of meetings, and then they would all emerge from

19     these premises together.  This is something that I recall.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And now to go on to the final questions or area I

21     have for you.  It's in relation to paragraph 101 on your -- of your

22     statement.  You reported on an occasion where you saw Vojislav Seselj

23     walking by your window, by your apartment window, accompanied by

24     Slavko Aleksic.

25             In that regard, perhaps you could tell us, to your knowledge, who


Page 13198

 1     was Slavko Aleksic?

 2        A.   That person was of striking appearance.  Just before the war, I

 3     saw in the media, on television, I saw this man, and there was some

 4     mention of some titles like Vojvoda and things like that, which obviously

 5     meant a lot to him.  Then I used to see that man in the marketplace.  He

 6     would always be in the company of two other people.  I suppose they were

 7     the -- his escort or his drivers.  I don't know.  He was driving in a

 8     Land Rover.  There were not too many vehicles at the time, so I

 9     recognised it easily.  But I also heard from another source about a man,

10     because the brother of one of ours, that is to say, Dragan Markovic was a

11     Serbian soldier.  His wife was a Muslim.  He told me that his brother

12     Nedeljko or Nediljko Markovic was a personal escort of this Aleksic

13     person since I saw him on the marketplace together with Aleksic, which

14     means that I knew for sure who that person was and how he looked like.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  And just before we conclude, then, on this topic,

17     I'd like to go to a video, 65 ter number 45107.  It's in Sanction so we

18     should all be able to follow the transcript.

19        Q.   We're going to go through this video, Madam Witness, and I'm

20     going to stop the video at particular points and ask you at those

21     particular points for -- a couple of questions.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Okay.  You can play.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             MS. EDGERTON:

25        Q.   Now, we've just paused at video at time-code 00:33.3.


Page 13199

 1             Madam Witness, we see on the video text on the top left-hand

 2     corner that says that it dates from 14 May 1993, and I wonder if you

 3     recognise the location that's depicted on the video screen at this point.

 4        A.   Yes, that is Zagrebacka Street.  I think that on my left-hand

 5     side is the forestry faculty building, but you can't see it from the

 6     overgrown foliage on the streets.  That's what they looked like at the

 7     time.

 8        Q.   So to your recollection, this film accurately depicts the

 9     situation on Zagrebacka Street in 1993?

10        A.   Yes.  Yes, that's what the street looked like.  Although our

11     movement was limited and everything would happen in the early morning

12     hours or during early in the day, yes.  I didn't see it at the time.  I

13     hear that the citizens welcomed him.  I wasn't there when they welcomed

14     him.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  If we could continue the video, please.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may say something.  I can see

19     a building that I described a little bit earlier.  This is how that part

20     looked, the end of the building with the pillars.  I'm talking about the

21     building you can see.  This is what those passages looked like, like

22     extensions to the buildings in Grbavica, which I mentioned earlier.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  And for the record, the witness has made that

24     comment at time-code 00:54.4 of the video-clip.  Perhaps we could

25     continue then.  Thank you.


Page 13200

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             MS. EDGERTON:

 3        Q.   Madam Witness, do you recognise any personalities that you see on

 4     the screen in front of you now at time-code 01:16.1?

 5        A.   Yes.  This is the Zagrebacka 30 building.  I think that's what it

 6     is.  The entrance is at the end of the building.  Behind it is the

 7     building that I mentioned where the snipers had meetings.  My friend saw

 8     that very clearly from her balcony.  The persons that I recognise here

 9     are Slavko Aleksic on the left-hand side.

10        Q.   If in --

11        A.   This is the man in uniform with long black hair, with a cap.

12        Q.   Thank you.  If we could move on in the video, please, and it will

13     go now for a couple of minutes before I ask the next question, and after

14     that it's quite a short video.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             MS. EDGERTON:

17        Q.   Now, at time-code 02:28.7, we've seen Mr. Seselj standing in

18     front of a building giving an interview.  Do you recognise the building

19     where you see him?

20        A.   That is the building number 2 in Grbavica -- or the building in

21     Grbavica 2.  This is what we called that part of Grbavica.  It's a

22     high-rise building behind a building we called Soping.

23             I don't want to conceal the fact that my heart is beating very

24     strongly.  I wouldn't want to deny the words of Mr. Seselj who says

25     himself, "Here are the military positions."  I was just speaking about


Page 13201

 1     that myself in an attempt when I tried with a professor of mine, who

 2     actually was killed, Branko Krpan, I tried to cross over to the other

 3     side.  When I tried do that, I passed through those.  Today I ask myself

 4     how that was possible.  We crossed.  I'm thinking of those military

 5     positions.  And then we entered the Soping area.  This is what I'm

 6     talking about.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A small intervention in the

 8     transcript with my apologies to the witness.  The witness said died, not

 9     killed.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  I know very well what

11     I'm talking about.  Professor Krpan, Mr. Karadzic, died after he left

12     Grbavica, a year or so later.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not your mistake.  The

14     translation was that he was killed, not that he died.  It's not your

15     mistake.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  If we can continue for precisely two

17     more minutes on this video and we will be coming to the end.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   Now, we've stopped the film at time-code 04:10.5, and,

21     Madam Witness, I'd like to ask you if you recognise the building depicted

22     on the video at this time.

23        A.   Yes.  This is the entrance to the Soping.  It's at that level

24     when you climb the stairs.  There were different shops there, furniture

25     shops, post office, the bank.  This is where I used to be in peacetime.


Page 13202

 1     That was that central area that people referred to as Soping.

 2        Q.   Is this the same location you called Soping which you referred to

 3     in your statement when you described a military headquarters that you

 4     visited?

 5        A.   Yes.  That is that place.  It's just that we entered from the

 6     other side, which is to the right side of here.  You also take the stairs

 7     up, and that also suited us because of the direction that we were coming

 8     from.  In one of the furniture shops, actually in all of those furniture

 9     exhibition areas, which were quite large, instead of furniture there was

10     some remnants of furniture.  There were many soldiers who were sleeping

11     there if there was a bed there that had been left in the show-room.

12     There were some sleeping bags.  Quite untidy-looking people with full

13     combat equipment.  I had the feeling there that they were lying there and

14     waiting for something, waiting to go somewhere.  That was the impression

15     I got.  And then at the end of the passage that we're talking about, when

16     you climb the stairs and get to that level, there was a military

17     headquarters, I guess, where we were sent by those who we had asked along

18     the way how we could get to someone.  They sent us to some commander who

19     was there.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I'd seek to tender this 65 ter 45107

22     now, please.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P2445.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  And, Your Honours, that's the


Page 13203

 1     examination-in-chief.  There is but one associated exhibit of this

 2     witness, and I would seek to tender that associated exhibit.  Would you

 3     like me to identify the 65 ter number?

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, please.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  21552.  A map marked by the witness.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Are we going to see that now?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  It's an associated exhibit referred to in her

 8     statement.  If you would like it displayed, Your Honour, I'm quite happy

 9     to do that and to have her comment on it.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Just to make sure that this is -- it's been

11     identified by the Defence as well.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  If it we could call up, then, 65 ter 21552,

13     please.

14        Q.   Madam Witness, do you recognise the map that you see on the

15     screen in front of you?

16        A.   Yes.  This is the Grbavica area.  Of course, this is showing a

17     slightly wider area.  I wasn't there.  Grbavica.  What it is, yes, it's

18     Grbavica.

19        Q.   And do you recognise the markings on this map?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   How do you recognise them?

22        A.   My sense of direction is clear about the position of the streets,

23     the names of the streets, also the main features that are drawn in

24     partially are drawn in and are not drawn in and so on and so forth.

25        Q.   I take from your answer, then, these are markings that you made?


Page 13204

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And is this the map, Madam Witness, that's referred to on a

 3     number of points during the course of your amalgamated statement that you

 4     signed in February of this year?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Is that sufficient, Your Honour?

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  Then that can be admitted together with

 8     the statement.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just ask something?

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, you're going to have an opportunity to

11     cross-examine on the map if you want to, Dr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  I'm just asking about the

13     legend.  Can we just know what the numbers mean.  Have the map in the

14     material, because if I don't have access ...

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, can you simply identify them quickly,

16     Ms. Edgerton, what the numerals attached to the markings indicate.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'll have to go back to

18     the witness's amalgamated statement and go through that paragraph by

19     paragraph.  I can't do it as quickly as Your Honours want to.

20             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, in that case let's leave it for the moment

21     because that's a task that can be undertaken and reduced into a short

22     form.  It's plain that we're not going to complete this witness's

23     testimony today in any event.

24             I'm sorry, Ms. Edgerton, did you say you'd concluded?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  I have.


Page 13205

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  The map will be Exhibit P2446, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Karadzic, would you like -- plainly you're

 4     not going to come anywhere close to finishing today, but it's worthwhile

 5     using the 12 minutes or so that we have for you to start your

 6     cross-examination.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  I would rather prefer, Excellency, if I start

 8     tomorrow and finish tomorrow in one piece, but if I have to, I will

 9     start.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, it's not a question of whether you have

11     to.  I mean, if you feel that you are -- you would be able to do a more

12     concise job by us rising now and then starting afresh tomorrow, then so

13     be it.  If that is the position, I was simply giving you an opportunity

14     to warm-up today.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is just because I received the

16     additional pages this morning.  So I would prefer, then, to begin

17     tomorrow, only for that reason.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  Very well.

19             Well, Madam Witness, impossible for us to have finished your

20     testimony today, so inevitably you have to come back tomorrow morning.

21     Have a peaceful evening, and we will meet again tomorrow at 9.00.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.50 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 11th day

25                           of March, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.