1 Tuesday, 7 June 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 Shall we go into private session briefly.
7 [Private session]
11 Pages 14304-14306 redacted. Private session.
1 [Open session]
2 JUDGE KWON: Before we resume hearing the evidence, it's about
3 the court schedule of 16th of June, which is Thursday, next week. On
4 16th of June, in the morning, the extraordinary Judges' Plenary -- or
5 regular Judges' Plenary is scheduled to take place in the morning, so
6 evidently we are not able to sit. So my suggestion is that we sit for
7 three days in that week and instead to sit five days in the following
8 week, i.e., to sit on 24th of June, Friday, if that does not cause a lot
9 of problems to the parties.
10 Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'd have to, if the Court permits, at
12 least take a few moments to consider that against the scheduling of
13 witnesses. I'm sure that's what in part what the Court would like us --
14 to know and need a little time to consider the implications.
15 JUDGE KWON: So if the parties could let the Chamber know during
16 the course of today if there's any problem.
17 Then let's bring in Mr. Neskovic.
18 My understanding is that, Mr. Karadzic, you have about an hour
19 and a half to conclude your cross-examination of this witness.
20 THE ACCUSED: Yes, Excellency.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Neskovic.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 Mr. Karadzic, please continue your cross-examination.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. Good
3 morning to one and all.
4 WITNESS: RADOMIR NESKOVIC [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
7 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning to you, too, Mr. Neskovic.
8 A. Good morning.
9 Q. We left off yesterday discussing the incidents and crimes which
10 took place, and you expressed -- you're sorry that these crimes weren't
11 prosecuted. Now, were you informed -- did you receive a follow-up? Were
12 you informed about what was going on -- what happened to the perpetrators
13 of those crimes?
14 A. No.
15 Q. I have to remind you to make pauses between question and answer
16 to facilitate the work of our interpreters, who become very tired.
17 Now, it's possible that justice was slow in coming but came
18 nonetheless without you having been given feedback information?
19 A. Well, I'm afraid that the police organs and the courts didn't
20 work as they should have done during that period of time.
21 Q. Do you mean to say that they didn't exist?
22 A. No, they did exist. They were fully organised. There was
23 civilians control, the civilian police force, civilian courts, military
24 security, the military police, military prosecutor's offices, and
25 military courts. So they were fully constituted. However, they didn't
1 prosecute, they didn't do very much. Now, why? I really don't know.
2 Q. But they might have been doing their job without you knowing
3 about it?
4 A. Well, no, I don't think so, because had they been doing their job
5 Batko would have been arrested, an indictment raised against him and a
6 lawsuit taken against him.
7 Q. Now, were you at Grbavica at the beginning of August 1992?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. When did you leave Grbavica?
10 A. In April 1993.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you remember, or rather, do you know where
12 Lenin Street number 2 is?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And what part of Grbavica is that?
15 A. It's Grbavica 1, in the centre of town, a long street, in the
16 centre of Grbavica, one of the main streets branching off from
17 Zagrebacka Street.
18 Q. Thank you. And our authority was established there somewhere
19 towards the end of May, right?
20 A. No, we were in a facility called Mis and this facility was in
21 Zagrebacka Street and formerly it was a department store. After being a
22 department store it was a bank and now it's been destroyed. We came
23 there from Vrace when the Serb army placed Grbavica under its control. I
24 think that was around the 10th of May, but I'm not quite sure.
25 Q. Thank you. Do you remember a drastic event that took place on
1 the 3rd of August, 1992, when a Serb entered the basement with a rifle
2 and killed Husein Dobric and another citizen Borislav, I don't know
3 whether he was a Serb or a Croat, this other man Borislav, but anyway it
4 took place in the basement of the building in Lenin Street number 2?
5 A. No, I don't know about that.
6 Q. Judging by the first name and surname, this man, Husein, was he a
8 A. Well, judging by his name I would say he was a Bosniak, a Muslim,
9 as his first name is Husein.
10 Q. Now, do you know what happened to the perpetrator whose name was
11 Jovo Pejanovic?
12 A. No.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have D596 displayed,
14 please, on e-court, yes. D596 is the document number. And may we have
15 the translation placed on the ELMO.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Is this a document of the military court in Sarajevo written on
18 the 17th of December, 1992?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Is this a judgement by which the accused, Jovo Pejanovic, is
21 being sentenced and said to be guilty because on the 3rd of August, 1992,
22 at about 2300 hours, he entered -- stormed into Lenin Street -- well, you
23 read the paragraph to yourself.
24 A. You mean the judgement?
25 Q. Why he has been found guilty?
1 A. Well, I have only three lines there.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we scroll down. The verdict.
3 That's right. Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Do you then agree -- well, it says why he was found guilty,
6 because on the 3rd of August he went into the basement of the building
7 and killed these two people; is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to the next page in
10 Serbian and probably in English too. Next page, please. Unfortunately
11 we don't have that part in English.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you agree that it says that he has been given a prison
14 sentence of ten years and the prison sentence is counted -- the time
15 spent in detention from the 4th of August, 1992, is counted as running.
16 Now, do you agree that on the 3rd of August, the man committed the crime;
17 and on the 4th of August, he was already arrested and sentenced and found
18 guilty and kept in prison for the next ten years? Thank you --
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you. I'm sorry that this hasn't been translated, but as
21 it's a Prosecution document, we would like to have the whole verdict and
22 judgement translated with the statement of reasons because it was a
23 drastic event and it was prosecuted and there was a trial and there was a
24 solution, but you didn't know about that. So I ask you again: Did
25 things happen which you didn't know about?
1 A. Well, of course. Military affairs, police affairs, security
2 affairs were realms that I knew nothing about. I wasn't informed about
3 them and I didn't deal with anything like that.
4 Q. Thank you. Now let's go back to the Batko case --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may I have 65 ter 52 -- 5268,
6 please, P5268 --
7 JUDGE KWON: Before we proceed, I'm just wondering why this
8 document has been admitted without being marked for identification, given
9 there is no English translation. E-court says "English translation to be
10 uploaded." So I wonder whether it's too late to mark this for
11 identification until we have the English translation.
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE KWON: So we admitted it under the expectation that the
14 hard copy used at the time would be uploaded immediately, but that didn't
15 take place.
16 Do we have a full translation in hard copy?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We received this part of the
18 translation from the Prosecution and we thought it was the entire
19 translation, but now we see that it isn't. So we'll have to translate
20 the rest.
21 JUDGE KWON: Knowing that, we'll mark it for identification until
22 we have the full translation. Very well. Let's proceed.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We needn't keep it on
24 the ELMO any longer.
25 May we have P2568, page 115 first and then we're going on to 116.
1 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, with respect to the last document, if I
2 could just note for the record that was belatedly disclosed. I don't
3 have an issue with that. The Defence advised me of that, but that just
4 came to our attention this morning just before coming into court. I only
5 note that because for a couple of reasons, number one, these things do
6 happen but it's probably best to note when they do and an
7 accommodation -- or no objection is made by the other party; and
8 number two, it may implicate the Prosecution's ability to address it at
9 this moment rather than later.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That has been noted.
11 Let's proceed.
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. The Defence is grateful
14 for Mr. Tieger's understanding, but this emerged from a sentence uttered
15 by the witness yesterday.
16 Now, may we have line 24 and 25 of this page displayed, please.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Tieger asked you here, he said:
19 [In English] "Mr. Neskovic, you mentioned someone named Batko.
20 First of all, do you know whether he -- he held any official position
21 within the military police or any other body?"
22 [Interpretation] And your answer:
23 [In English] "No. He was an armed monster, a pathological type."
24 [Interpretation] Do you stand by the fact that he had no official
25 position and that he was as you described him?
1 A. Yes, but he must have been a member of some unit, I don't know
3 Q. Was he a member of a military or paramilitary unit?
4 A. Well, as to paramilitary units, I don't know about them being in
5 Grbavica. They couldn't have survived. I think they all had to be tied
6 to the army in one way or another.
7 Q. Now, let's take a look at the following page -- we are on that
8 page. Staying with this page then.
9 [In English] "He wore an army uniform and nothing more than that.
10 And I don't know whether he was a member of a paramilitary unit or a
11 regular army unit; I really don't know. I don't know what the make-up of
12 those military formations were. But he did a lot of bad things there.
13 Because with mutual efforts on the part of both Serbs and Muslims, we
14 managed to more or less strike a balance, and then an individual like
15 that comes along and acts like a monster, and he spoils everything. And
16 I mean, during the day, there were police officers there, and later on we
17 had the French army there, and the security situation was rather good.
18 But at night we had a problem because there was no lighting; there was no
19 electricity; it's a big town, and the front lines were crossing across
21 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. And line 18:
22 [In English] "So whenever you crossed him in the streets, you
23 didn't know whether he was going to say hello to you or he was going to
24 shoot you ..."
25 [Interpretation] Now, from this does it follow that Batko chose a
1 night when the police and the citizens and the authorities weren't able
2 to follow him and prevent him from doing what he did?
3 A. Well, I wasn't an eye-witness of his crimes, but the night
4 when -- but at night security was nil.
5 Q. Is the following correct, that instead of saying hello he might
6 shoot you and that you were never quite sure which he would do?
7 A. Yes, the Serbs avoided him and the Bosniaks and Croats shuddered
8 when they heard his name mentioned every day.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have the next page
10 displayed, please, page 116. Next page, 16703.
11 MR. KARADZIC:
12 Q. [In English] "And we went to Simo Sipcic, who was the head of the
13 police at the time, and then he ran to some -- Batko's rooms, and he
14 saved Orhan Djipa and the dog. So Simo could interfere -- or rather,
15 could intervene with his cousin that this person should be taken away or
16 imprisoned or sent away. And we wanted to free Grbavica from this guy,
17 but then somehow after two or three weeks he would always come back. He
18 kept coming back, and then he would once again ask for this person to be
19 removed ..."
20 [Interpretation] And below line 12:
21 [In English] "I think even Biljana Plavsic intervened once and
22 asked for him to be removed from the area once ..." and so on.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 118 in e-court, please.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] While we're waiting, when you talk
25 about Simo Sipcic and when you say that with the help of his relative he
1 could have removed him, you're talking about General Sipcic who was corps
2 commander at the time?
3 A. Yes, Sipcic was, I think, chief of the military police and he was
4 an example of a person in the security organs who tried to do something
5 about it. Others were rather passive.
6 Q. In line 11:
7 [In English] "Was it understood that the primary targets of his
8 attacks were Muslims and Croats?"
9 [Interpretation] Your answer:
10 [In English] "To some extent, yes, but the main targets of his
11 attacks always had to do with money and looting, and then, of course,
12 especially Muslims and Croats. Mostly Muslims ..."
13 [Interpretation] Is it then the case that Serbs feared him too,
14 as you said a moment ago? Was it easy to arrest him?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Do you know that the military intelligence service had planned an
17 operation to arrest him even if they had to kill him, and that's the
18 reason why he ran away?
19 A. There was an another example when a person was picked up the next
20 day after the crime. Batko, on the contrary, was committing crimes for a
21 long time, over a period; and the military security organs were certainly
22 able to arrest him. They had the capacity. They had the ability to
23 prosecute him and try him, just like in the case that you yourself
24 mentioned a moment ago --
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, because the answer was overlapping
1 with your question or the previous answer was not clear to which question
2 it was given. You answered "yes," Mr. Neskovic, to the question whether
3 it was then the case that Serbs feared him as well, as you said a moment
4 ago. But what was your answer to the question -- to the next question of
5 the accused, asking whether it was easy to arrest him?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
7 JUDGE KWON: So it was easy to arrest him?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The military police had the
9 force, had the legal authority, as did the military prosecutor's office.
10 They could have arrested him any time they liked.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. But you don't know that that operation had been planned, and
13 that's the reason why he ran, when he noticed they were encircling him?
14 A. I don't know, Mr. Karadzic. He didn't terrorise the population
15 for just one day; he did that for months. I don't know about that
16 planned operation for his arrest.
17 Q. Thank you. Did he have protection from anyone in the
18 authorities, from you?
19 A. No, certainly not from anyone in the Crisis Staff. We had no
20 contact with him. Now, whether he had protection from someone in the
21 security organs or some other organs, I don't know, maybe.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we look at page 123.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Would his gang have opposed his arrest, taking up arms?
25 A. I don't think so. The commander of his group was a well-known
1 fighting man, Zoran Zivkovic, who later died from his wounds. And I
2 don't think his group would have tried to obstruct his arrest.
3 Q. Look at page 2.
4 [In English] "The witness is meant to answer" -- [Interpretation]
6 [In English] "The witness is meant to answer this question; that
7 is to say, how does he explain the fact that when faced with actions
8 carried out by this gentleman, Batko, and others, he did not decide to
9 alert the highest civilian or military authorities, for that matter,
10 especially considering that he had the possibility of contacting them on
11 the basis of his position."
12 [Interpretation] Answer.
13 [In English] "As to my own situation, I informed the chief of
14 military police because I knew him in person. It was Mr. Sipcic. The
15 higher-ranking officials at Pale had not been informed. I did not inform
16 them because I thought that it was up to the civilian population, the
17 State Security Services ..." [Interpretation] And so on.
18 And from line 18:
19 [In English] "As to my civic duty to raise the issue of Batko at
20 the Crisis Staff or of opposing Batko openly, we did not dare do that
21 because we would have lost our lives, quite simply, because apart from
22 all the other obligations, we also had a duty to protect our own lives
23 and those of our families."
24 [Interpretation] Did you state that in your testimony in the
25 Krajisnik case and does this reflect reality?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, 124.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. From line 8:
6 [In English] "And also, you've heard the fact that the top
7 leadership at Pale was told about Batko by Biljana Plavsic and it never
8 yielded any results, and that meant that the civilian authorities were
9 not in a position to prevent crimes unless they are in command of the
10 military and police forces, as well ..."
11 [Interpretation] Do you agree and do you remember that in
12 Grbavica, in the municipality, the president of the Executive Board,
13 Budo Obradovic, a well-respected man, was killed?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Do you remember he was killed by an armed Serb?
16 A. Yes, it was some settlement of accounts.
17 Q. Was it then difficult to protect the life of the man number one
18 in the municipality under those circumstances in Grbavica? He was killed
19 because they failed to protect him.
20 A. It's difficult to protect the life of an individual at any given
21 moment in war, but it's also a fact that security organs, both civilian
22 and the military, could have done more to protect the lives of the
23 population, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims alike. They had the capacity,
24 they had the force, they had legal authority. They could have applied
25 them. They could have done much more.
1 Q. Were you personally also afraid? Is that the reason why you went
2 to your friend and colleague Orhan Djipa, to protect him but also to hide
4 A. I went to Orhan Djipa to give him the little help I could. It
5 was in an apartment owned by a Serb woman, Mrs. Varagic, on the day when
6 the Muslims were being expelled to the other side from Grbavica. They
7 were in the apartment of Olja Varagic, sitting there together, and they
8 were afraid, not knowing what to do if a group came to their door to
9 drive them out. So we sat down together and made a sort of plan. If
10 somebody comes I would answer the door and say that I lived there. It
11 was not much of a plan, just luckily nobody came to the door that day,
12 none of those people who were driving out Muslims and making them go to
13 the other side.
14 Q. Are you trying to say you couldn't have given those people any
15 orders. You were just going to say it was your apartment?
16 A. Of course I couldn't have given any orders to anyone. I had no
17 authority vis-ŕ-vis the military or the police. And otherwise, the
18 military had a certain hostility to the civilian authorities in Grbavica.
19 There was a day when they practically kidnapped us from the municipality
20 building, put us in trucks, and took us to the front line, said that we
21 were an anti-terrorist unit, we had no right to go home, pick up any
22 clothes, and tell our families. In this very crude manner, everyone from
23 the municipality was just packed into trucks and taken to the front line.
24 So the attitude of the military to the Crisis Staff was
25 completely lacking in respect. It was even hostile because the army
1 people thought that in an area affected by combat, only the military can
2 rule, not civilian authorities. We thought otherwise. We thought that
3 war zone is also a zone of residence. Anyway, the military authorities
4 had no respect or recognition for us and we certainly couldn't order them
5 to do anything.
6 Q. Since you were part of the organs of the Serbian Democratic Party
7 from the day it was founded until the end of the war, you were in the
8 leadership, in the Executive Board, was there ever a moment when you
9 realised that the SDS was developing a policy according to which Muslims
10 should be expelled in -- from Serb-populated territories?
11 A. As far as the Main Board is concerned and its conclusions, the
12 answer is no. The same answer applies to the Executive Board, but what
13 individual officials did in individual municipalities, we would have to
14 look at that case by case. I don't know about that. I believe that
15 things differed a lot from municipality to municipality.
16 Q. Did you have any knowledge that I, myself, wish or are suggesting
17 or am advising to anyone that Croats and Muslims should be expelled from
18 the territories where we were the majority?
19 A. I haven't heard it, but in the A and B document it says that
20 Muslims and Croats would not be expelled but Serbian authority would be
21 applied to them. They would be made to submit to Serb authority and that
22 they would later be made to get involved and join the Serbian authority.
23 So the Variant A and B document does not envisage their expulsion, but
24 their submission to Serb authority in some municipalities.
25 Q. It is the position of the Defence that that document, A and B,
1 was received from well-intentioned retired officers. I'm asking you
2 about that document. Have I ever expressed the desire through the SDS
3 that we wished to get rid of Muslims and Croats?
4 A. First there are two questions in your question. That document,
5 first of all, was not written by well-intentioned officers. I believe it
6 was a trick played upon the SDS by that group of officers, that's one;
7 and second, your attitude toward Croats and Muslims was that they should
8 be kept at any cost within Yugoslavia because you were hung-up on the
9 Yugoslav issue first and foremost and the Serb issue came second on your
10 agenda, and you wanted Muslims and Croats to stay within Yugoslavia.
11 That was the primary objective of your policy, to keep Bosnia, including
12 Muslims and Croats, within Yugoslavia; however, their legitimate wish and
13 will was different - they wanted to secede.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you understand the policy of the Serbian
15 Democratic Party at any point as wishing or advising or suggesting that
16 Muslims and Croats should be beaten, mistreated, or killed?
17 A. No. The Serbian Democratic Party spent all its efforts on the
18 hopeless Yugoslav issue, trying to keep together a state that had already
19 dissolved, and that applies to all the leadership. The SDS did not have
20 as its priority the Yugoslav or even the Serb issue -- sorry, did not
21 have as its priority the Muslim or Croat or even Serb issue, just the
22 Yugoslav issue. That's why there were these negotiations with
23 Izetbegovic, where you even offered him the Presidency of Yugoslavia if
24 they agreed to stay. This preservation of Yugoslavia was your primary
25 interest, and Serbian and other interests took second place. Your policy
1 towards Muslims and Croats, therefore, was to keep them within
3 Q. But once it was obvious that Yugoslavia could not survive, have
4 you ever noticed that the SDS had a programme aimed at destroying Muslims
5 and Croats as ethnic groups? Did such a culture, such an idea, ever
6 exist? Has it ever been built into the programme of the SDS to expel or
7 destroy these two ethnic groups?
8 A. At the level of the programme of the Main Board and
9 Executive Board, absolutely no. At the level of municipal boards, I
10 don't know, I can't say. All I can talk about is the Novo Sarajevo
11 municipality which I know about, but I can't say what local officials did
12 in the various municipalities and how far they abused their power and
13 authority. But from the view of party programmes and so on, no, there
14 wasn't this hostile attitude at all towards the Bosniaks and Croats in
15 the sense of persecution. But it was thought that everything should be
16 done for the Bosniaks and Croats to be forced to remain within
17 Yugoslavia, even if they didn't want to, and if they didn't want to, to
18 establish Serbian power and authority and keep Yugoslavia intact that
20 Q. Just a moment. Let's see what it says in the transcript here.
21 It says "to establish Serbian authority to keep Yugoslavia intact ..."
22 Did you say we wanted them to remain in Yugoslavia or did you say
23 that we wanted Yugoslavia to remain intact? Did you say that you -- we
24 wanted them to remain in Yugoslavia?
25 A. Not only wanted but we took political measures via plebiscites
1 and the Assembly of the Serbian people for the Bosniaks and Croats to be
2 influenced, to prevail upon them that they should remain within
3 Yugoslavia, whether it be intact or rump, as it was called at the time,
4 because it was quite obvious that it couldn't actually remain intact, but
5 anyway, for them to remain in Yugoslavia.
6 Q. Thank you. When we lost Yugoslavia and when it was quite clear
7 that we would accept an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina on condition
8 that we were given our constituent unit, did the Serbian Democratic Party
9 have any plans or ideas of in that Serbian Republic -- of not having
10 Muslims and Croats in that Serbian Republic and to persecute them; or did
11 they feel that the minorities should stay, remain, and be protected?
12 A. Pursuant to the constitution of the 28th of February, 1992, of
13 the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, all citizens had equal rights under
14 the constitution. Now, later on in the war how far the rights of
15 citizens were respected is another matter all together. But
16 constitutionally, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to go back to the subject of Grbavica.
18 Is it correct that until the --
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
20 Mr. Neskovic, before we move on further, can I remind you again
21 to put a pause between the question and the answer for the benefit of the
22 interpreters and us.
23 And I was away yesterday when you gave your evidence in chief due
24 to my personal reasons, but I have yet to read yesterday's transcript but
25 I don't want to miss anything. To the question of Mr. Karadzic in
1 relation to this you said:
2 "The Variant A and B document was not written by well-intentioned
4 And you said:
5 "I believe it was a trick played on the SDS by that group of
7 I was not clear about this. Could you expand on why you said it
8 was a trick. What did you mean by "trick"?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We didn't know for a long time who
10 had written the document. Now we know that it was a certain group of
11 officers who formulated the document, and it was a trick because they
12 didn't sign the document. And it is a basic democratic principle that
13 when you write a document, an official document, you sign it so that you
14 can say who you are and who is tabling the document. They didn't want to
15 sign it. That is the first incorrect procedure.
16 The second incorrect procedure was that they forged the header
17 and wrote "Crisis Staff of the SDS" and no such body existed. So what
18 they did was, as a group that was completely outside the SDS, they took
19 it upon themselves, they took the right, to write this document and to
20 put the Crisis Staff of the SDS as the title.
21 And the third incorrect procedure was that they didn't write the
22 document as a proposal, as a draft for further procedure and
23 consideration, but they wrote it as a military system of measures and
24 instructions and acts that were to be implemented in practice, in which
25 security affairs dominated, monitoring, surveillance, mobilisation,
1 replenishment of JNA movements, supplies, the formation of Crisis Staffs,
2 and so on and so forth. It was also incorrect procedure because it
3 wasn't known who they addressed the act -- the document to, who the
4 document was addressed to. In one paragraph they say that the document
5 would be applied only pursuant to a decision of the President
6 Radovan Karadzic, and that the document can be applied only following his
7 decision, if he gave the okay and as he decided.
8 Furthermore, it was a trick because this group saw the interest
9 of retaining Yugoslavia and equated it with the interests of the Serb
10 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they equated the Yugoslav interest with the
11 interest of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was incorrect.
12 The interests of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their vital
13 interests, were their equality in Bosnia-Herzegovina and not the
14 preservation of Yugoslavia. So this group endeavoured to use the
15 capacities that the SDS had and place them, harness them, to preserve
16 Yugoslavia and to replenish the Yugoslav People's Army as a primary goal
17 to ensure that it was up to strength. So the Yugoslav interest was the
18 primary goal and the Serbian interest was the secondary goal.
19 And it also -- there was also a contradiction there that they
20 wanted to promote to create Serbian authority in municipalities where we
21 were the majority according to A and the minority according to B and to
22 subordinate the members of the other nations to that power and authority,
23 which means the subjugation of the Bosniaks and the Croats to Serb power
24 and creating a policy of fait accompli. And later on, those Bosniaks and
25 Croats would become included, they would be called to become involved and
1 included in that Serb authority and then, together with the Serbs, remain
2 in Yugoslavia and remain supporting the Yugoslav People's Army so
3 that -- perhaps I'm wrong but I personally am of that opinion in reading
4 the document, I see nothing positive in it, nothing positive there, and I
5 see nothing rational either or anything reasonable in its contents.
6 The popular Assembly, the Serbian National Assembly, at the same
7 time passed other acts, documents - and we're talking about
8 December 1991 - to form Serb municipalities, that on Serb territories
9 Serb authority should be set up, that Serb authority in those Serb
10 municipalities where a plebiscite had been held should remain within
11 Yugoslavia; and therefore, this group through this document said nothing
12 new, nothing that hadn't previously been in existence. And now the
13 document was seen to have negative repercussions. And although it wasn't
14 passed by the Serbian Democratic Party and adopted, it was applied
15 nonetheless in practice among the municipalities. That is why I consider
16 this document to be incorrect and a sort of Trojan horse, when you use
17 other people's resources for your own ends and use other people's
18 resources to further your own ends. That's how I understand this. It's
19 like a cuckoo's nest, and the fact that they didn't sign the document was
20 completely incorrect and out of order.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Neskovic.
22 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Now, I'd like to ask you that when we say "Serb municipality,"
1 and you had this in Novo Sarajevo, does that imply that other
2 communities, if they have the conditions to do so in that former
3 municipality, can set up their own municipalities? So when we see "Serb
4 municipality," does that imply that the proposal is that that
5 municipality should be transformed into two or more municipalities?
6 A. Yes, if the other communities wanted to do so, but the problem
7 was that the other communities did not wish to do so. Then you come into
8 conflict with them, clash with them. And as far as I know, there was
9 only one such municipality, and I think it was in Olovo, where the
10 Bosniak community and the Serbian community agreed to divide the
11 municipality before the war into the Bosniak and the Serbian part and
12 that's how it remained to the end of the war. The problem, as I say,
13 when the other communities did not want to divide up the municipality but
14 wanted to have the whole of the municipality to themselves, then they
15 clashed, and then you had a conflict.
16 Q. Do you remember that in more municipalities and not just Olovo
17 where the agreement was adhered to, for example, in Bratunac, in
18 Vlasenica, that there were negotiations in Ilidza and other
19 municipalities, to form administrative power and authority of Serbian
20 local communities peacefully and in the Muslim ones, and that this -- but
21 that this fell through at the beginning of the war, nothing came of it,
22 when the SDA called for it to be rescinded?
23 A. No, I don't know about that. But I know about Olovo because it
24 was implemented there.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have P5 on our screens,
2 that's Variant A and B. Can we have that back on our screens, please,
3 because it might refresh your memory. You might have got things mixed up
4 a bit. My name isn't mentioned there, so may we have P5 on e-court,
6 MR KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. While we're waiting for that to come up, did anybody from the
8 centre control you or force you to apply this piece of paper to your
9 municipality, this document to your municipality?
10 A. No.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the next page in
12 Serbian and may we have the English displayed on the split screen as
13 well, please. Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. For justified doubts that forces -- organised forces want to --
16 activities to be carried out within the framework of the national
17 community of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the purpose of
18 implementing the decision --
19 JUDGE KWON: Slow down, please.
20 THE INTERPRETER: May we have a reference as well, please. Thank
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. If you look at the first sentence, that because of these doubts
24 about unilateral secession. In point 2 they say that:
25 "The purpose of the tasks, measures, and other activities set
1 forth in these instructions is to enhance mobility and readiness to
2 protect the interests of the Serbian people."
3 And then in point 8, in undertaking all these measures, take care
4 that the respect of national rights is guaranteed and the rights of all
5 nations and their involvement in the organs of power and authority later
6 on set up by the Serbs in the municipalities.
7 Can you see that page relating to defence matters, which is
8 military logic; right?
9 A. No. Yugoslavia is mentioned here as the vital interest and the
10 preservation of that Yugoslavia, and that everything that should be done
11 should be done to preserve that Yugoslavia. The interests of Yugoslavia
12 and the preservation of Yugoslavia is equated with the interests of the
13 Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina as being one and the same thing,
14 which it was not.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now take a look at
16 Variant B.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And you said of Variant B that you didn't understand the sense of
19 it because in Variant A we had the power and authority -- or what did you
20 say that you found Variant A nonsensical?
21 A. It's nonsensical if somebody issues instructions for the Serbs in
22 the municipalities where they are majority should proclaim it to be a
23 Serbian municipality and set up Serbian power and authority, when in the
24 legal municipality Assembly they can -- they had the power and authority
25 to pass decisions and to control the municipality. They didn't need this
1 majority in the Serb municipality. So Variant A seems nonsensical to me.
2 Variant B is more understandable, as far as I'm concerned.
3 Q. Now, do you agree that we were the majority and had power and
4 authority in 37 out of the 109 municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. I don't know the exact figures. I don't know how many we had,
6 but roughly 30-odd, yes. I think we had 34 deputies from the
7 municipalities, so that sort of coincides with the number of
8 municipalities. But as I say, I don't know the exact figure.
9 Q. Now, if the Muslims wanted to have their own municipality in that
10 Serbian municipality, that that was an option too?
11 A. No. I think the officers here wrote this document and sent it --
12 addressed it to the Serbs, to harness Serb resources for the preservation
13 of Yugoslavia. They did not have in mind the Bosniaks and Croats here,
14 although they do say that the rights of the Bosniaks and Croats should be
15 protected and later on to include them into Serbian -- into the Serbian
16 authorities, which would already have been set up by then.
17 Q. It says here also --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 9 of the document
19 displayed, please, 9 of the Serbian and 9 of the English.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. And we're looking at Variant B. At the access roads to populated
22 areas that:
23 "... secret monitoring and surveillance should be conducted to
24 see the dangers to the Serbian population and to plan corresponding
25 measures for protection as well as envisaging moving and transferring the
1 population and material goods to more secure areas and regions."
2 Now, was this an offensive or defensive measure which is proposed
4 A. Well, I don't know what kind of measure it is but it was illegal
5 as far as the subjects are concerned. If somebody had to sign these
6 measures, then a ministerial council of the Serbian people should have
7 done that, or the Assembly of the Serbian people, and not some group, a
8 group of men who had no position either -- held no position, either in
9 the party or in the authorities. They didn't have the legality to
10 prescribe any measures which the authorities would then have to apply.
11 So you have this group outside the realm of the authorities, prescribing
12 how the authorities should act. Why didn't the authorities do that
13 themselves, propose measures that they were to undertake? So no.
14 Q. All right. But on the premise that they were hoping that this
15 would be passed at that meeting, is this just a measure for protecting
16 the population, not attacking anyone?
17 A. It's easy to put things on paper, anything, but in practice it's
18 different. For instance, if you place guards at access ways to a Serb
19 settlement, it is implied you have to give them some weapons, even if
20 it's only hunting rifles. But how can you be sure that the group of
21 guards standing there would act defensively or offensively, if they would
22 commit a crime or not? How are you supposed to control that situation?
23 A key document is missing from Serb policy, a document from the Assembly
24 that was supposed to pass a document about the conduct, responsibilities,
25 and powers of Serb municipalities, and they were supposed to be
1 answerable to the Serb Assembly. This void that was created by the lack
2 of this document was filled, unfortunately, by this paper.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that they did this in keeping with the
4 Law on All People's Defence and civil protection?
5 A. No.
6 Q. You are not familiar with the law, are you?
7 A. I know a little bit about it. According to that law, the
8 president of the municipality or the staff of the Territorial Defence and
9 civilian protection under the command of the president of the
10 municipality had the right to propose something like this, because the
11 president of the municipality was by ex officio commander of
12 Territorial Defence. And if anyone could write such a document, it could
13 only have been the president of the municipality.
14 Q. Do you agree that up to this date, 19 December 1991, the SDA
15 already had in every municipality, except Western Herzegovina, a
16 municipal staff of the Patriotic League, they stood guard, they had armed
17 units, the HDZ also had its own armed units and Crisis Staffs, and they
18 introduced Crisis Staffs in municipalities long before us, and Granic,
19 across the border, introduced it in September 1991?
20 A. I believe they had some, but in Novo Sarajevo, as far as I know,
21 there were no Crisis Staffs. I heard of the Patriotic League and
22 Green Berets, but I was not aware of their existence before the
23 5th of April, when they attacked a police station in Sarajevo. That's
24 really the first time I learned that there was a paramilitary unit called
25 the Green Berets.
1 Q. In your municipality in Novo Sarajevo, on the 5th of April, did
2 the Green Berets attack a police station and kill the policeman
3 Nesa Petrovic [phoen]?
4 A. According to what was heard from Serb policemen who ran away,
5 they did attack a police station in Hrasno near the mosque. A policeman
6 who was on duty called Petrovic from Mesic, near Rogatica, was killed,
7 and that night the Serb policemen ran away from that police station and
8 came to Vrace, to the cultural hall, and set up a new police station
10 Q. Before the front line was established in Grbavica and before our
11 forces came to Grbavica, before the 15th of May, was there a lot of
12 movement from the population -- of the population from one side to
14 A. I believe throughout April people went to the other side to work,
15 even later, regardless of the military conflict about the police school
16 at Vrace. War did not spread easily in Sarajevo. People did not accept
17 it. Serbs went to work throughout April. The president of the
18 Executive Board Zarko Djurovic also went to work as long as it was
19 physically possible, and people crossed from one side or another,
20 temporarily or for good, perhaps all the way until June.
21 Q. Apart from this one day when somebody expelled a certain number
22 of Muslims, was there any organised exchange of population during the war
23 from Grbavica to the city and from the city to Grbavica?
24 A. There was a republican commission for exchange and its chairman
25 was somebody Bulajic, but I had nothing to do with it. Second, there
1 were exchanges of population run by some people who were on the wrong
2 side of the law in both communities, on both sides. They were not in
3 conflict. So these groups crossed from the Serb to the Bosniak side
4 easily. They had exchanges of population. Some people helped these
5 crossings for money, some exchanged properties. So those affairs were
6 mainly linked to this government commission for exchange.
7 Q. There's something missing from the transcript: "At their own
9 Is it true that people who did not get into official exchanges
10 paid those groups money to help them cross?
11 A. I heard about it. I did not witness it, but rumour had it that
12 it was possible to pay someone if you want to cross from one side to
13 another. You pay people who are not exactly on good terms with the law.
14 Q. And these regular commissions, they had lists that were made
15 between two exchanges and people applied to be on those lists?
16 A. I don't know how it went on. They spoke to that government
17 commission. They had nothing to do with me.
18 Q. And then they crossed by bus across the Brotherhood and
19 Unity Bridge in both directions?
20 A. I'm telling you, I don't know what this commission was doing, how
21 they transported people, how they made lists, what criteria they used,
22 but they were answerable to the government. It was a government affair.
23 Q. My question was: Is it the case that people applied to be put on
24 those lists and they even looked for connections who could put them on
25 those lists, or were they forced?
1 A. All sorts of things went on. Some people wanted to go, some
2 people were forced to go, and some people were forced out of their homes,
3 some were afraid and wanted to go, some wanted to have family reunions.
4 There were all kinds of motives and reasons why people wanted to go from
5 one side or another. Some people were afraid for their lives.
6 Q. A protected witness said once here that his father was put on a
7 list in the federal part of Sarajevo, and when they came to pick him up
8 he refused to go.
9 Is it the case that until the end of the war a certain number of
10 Muslims and Croats stayed in Grbavica, not wanting to leave?
11 A. Yes. They're in a very difficult situation in the second part of
12 1992 and it continued to deteriorate throughout the war, but despite
13 that, a significant number of Muslims and Croats stayed in Grbavica
14 throughout the war and they still live there.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, today we'll be sitting only till
16 quarter to 2.00. It's time to take a break and we'll break for
17 20 minutes, after which you will have about half an hour.
18 20 to.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.21 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 10.44 a.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Neskovic, yesterday Mr. Tieger, on page 7 of yesterday's
25 transcript, asked you if the members of the Main Board attended sessions
1 of municipal boards to convey the policies on the ground. You said it
2 worked the other way as well, they would also convey demands and requests
3 from the ground. And you said you don't know if the deputies took part
4 in that.
5 Do you know if members of the boards were elected in their
6 constituencies and on that basis were they required to attend meetings
7 and bring the opinions they hear from the ground to the Main Board?
8 A. According to the Statute, 70 per cent of the members of the
9 Main Board had to be elected in electoral units.
10 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you, you were in the top echelons of
11 the Serbian Democratic Party. You were part of the Executive Board. Did
12 we ever make or use codes during our conversations, lists of code-names,
13 such as Linden, Eagle, et cetera?
14 A. You mean the communication within the Executive Board and with
15 the Main Board? No.
16 Q. Thank you. My learned friend Mr. Tieger is very skilful in
17 putting questions, far more skilful than I am, but he asked you a
18 double-barrelled question on page 9 of yesterday's transcript. I'll read
19 it to you now. The second part of the question:
20 [In English] "Although you seem to put a start date on that
21 situation by reference to the time when there was still a joint
22 government, I wanted to ask you how long this was the case, that is, was
23 that the case during the course of the war?"
24 [Interpretation] And the first part of the question you answered
25 "yes." You said: "My authority applied during the war."
1 [In English] "Finally, Mr. Neskovic, you testified that
2 Mr. Karadzic was the undisputed authority in the SDS party and that he,
3 along with Mr. Krajisnik, was the supreme authority of the Serb movement
4 whose policies were implemented through deputies, ministers, MUP
5 officials, through people in government, whether it was joint government
6 or government of the Republika Srpska."
7 [Interpretation] Let me ask you, you know well my position, what
8 I've always stressed is a difference between us and the communists. We
9 don't make decisions, we find solutions. Did I make my own policy
10 according to my wishes and ordered that they be implemented on the ground
11 using deputies or did we together find solutions that were later applied?
12 A. Depends on the particular policy. In a specific policy, such as
13 life within the party, such as charting SDS policy and honouring requests
14 from the ground and honouring the opinions of the grass-root level, there
15 was absolute democracy from the grass roots upwards. So as far as life
16 within the party was concerned, there was democracy.
17 But there were some affairs you dealt with outside the party in a
18 parallel track, such as personnel policy, and that I couldn't really call
19 a democratic process. A party won because the entire personnel policy
20 was outside the party. People were chosen by your decision or at the
21 proposal of Dukic and they were answerable to you. So I would give
22 different answers depending on what kind of policies you are talking
23 about. Charting SDS policy and the work of SDS from within was indeed
24 democratic in keeping with the Statute.
25 Now, this parallel activity of yours, where you acted outside the
1 Main Board, outside the Executive Board, without consulting them, was in
2 effect with various other policies, such as the personnel policy and
3 relationships with executive authorities and people in executive power.
4 I couldn't call that democracy because the SDS organs did not take part
5 in that at all. They were in a way deceived.
6 Q. Do you agree that in the Deputies Club and in the Assembly I had
7 to fight for my positions and I had to modify them very frequently and
8 accept other people's demands?
9 A. If you had to fight for your positions within the party, you
10 indeed had to fight for them because you were surrounded by free-thinking
11 people who acted in an environment of democracy. Sometimes the
12 Executive Board would make a decision you didn't like, you would get
13 angry, but you accepted it. So the answer is yes as far as that is
14 concerned. But there are some affairs that you didn't even want to put
15 before the Main Board or the Executive Board, so the Executive Board had
16 no opportunity to discuss it. You did it outside of the SDS with some
17 people whom I don't know in ways that I'm not familiar with and you
18 determined the relationship of the SDS with the government and the
19 personnel policy that was removed from the SDS.
20 Q. You were a member of the personnel commission. The president was
21 chairman of the Main Board, Mr. Dukic?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you agree it was our position that in the Ministry of the
24 Interior, for instance, the party should not intervene in personnel
25 issues; instead, the Serbs whom we appointed to these positions should
1 protect the interests of the Serbian people, whereas the party should
2 keep out of it. You object to that; right?
3 A. No, that's not exactly so because the party's responsible for the
4 entire governance done by people they elected. The party has great
5 historical responsibility for the activity of people who they never chose
6 or elected or appointed. So the party had the right to appoint people to
7 the MUP, like other sides did, but your position and the position of
8 Dukic was different. You proposed - and it was done -- Serb people were
9 appointed to the MUP who had nothing to do with the Serbian community
10 except Mico Stanisic who ended up as chief of MUP for the city of
11 Sarajevo. Zepinic, Mandic, and others were people whom you and Dukic
13 Q. Through the personnel commission; right?
14 A. No. I was a member of the personnel commission. It was called
15 personnel commission and organisational issues. It never appointed
16 anyone to lower or senior positions. The balance of its activity is
17 zero. Not a single application came before that commission. The
18 commission had no opportunity to have its say, nor was it ever asked
19 about anything. It did absolutely nothing.
20 Q. Thank you. We will find transcripts of that commission. Do you
21 remember that Dukic was authorised to negotiate the power-sharing with
22 the SDA party and the Croatian Democratic Union and he was a well-trusted
23 man to whom we entrusted those negotiations?
24 A. No, he was not authorised. He was charged with helping you, and
25 you as president of the party were the real partner for Izetbegovic and
1 Kljujic. Dukic was charged by the party to help you in that. Now, that
2 he transformed his role from assistant to decision-maker about personnel
3 is a different matter.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we briefly look at the
5 War Presidency of Novo Sarajevo, P2568, page 6 in e-court.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Is it correct that in Novo Sarajevo you refused to apply the
8 system of the Presidency and you said you didn't need a commissioner
9 either because you were able to hold sessions of the municipal parliament
10 and the municipal government?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Did anyone force you to do that or is it the case that these
13 bodies were only envisaged in case the Assembly could not meet?
14 A. They did exist, but there were three bodies. It was confusing.
15 The commissions, the Presidencies, the Assemblies, that made things
17 Q. 25 -- [In English] "And I ask you at the same time whether you
18 became a member of the war commission for the Serbian municipality of
19 Novo Sarajevo ..." [Interpretation] Can we see the next page.
20 [In English] "... in July 1992 and specifically on 21st of
21 July 1992."
22 [Interpretation] Your answer:
23 [In English] "Yes. Although, it is not even clear to me today,
24 not to this day, what this war commission was all about, what was its
25 purpose and what they were supposed to be doing ..."
1 [Interpretation] A bit further down:
2 [In English] "To this day, to be honest, I don't really know what
3 it was all about because at that period, at Grbavica in particular, in
4 the municipality of Novo Sarajevo, the Municipal Assembly and the
5 Executive Committee for the municipality had already been set up ..."
6 [Interpretation] So you refused that because the municipal
7 government was able to operate normally and you didn't need those
8 contingency measures?
9 A. Yes, it was pointless. I told you we set up the Assembly in
10 June, elected members, president of the Executive Board and president of
11 the municipality, and after that it was pointless to establish a
12 commission. Why?
13 Q. And regarding the previous period you said in your statements and
14 testimony that there was a horrible lack of institutions and it was not
15 able to govern in that complete chaos, there were no people in the
16 government and there was no government in Grbavica?
17 A. Yes, I spoke of the government as a closed introverted group that
18 shifted the burden of the war to municipalities and did not look after
19 anything. That's why municipal leaderships were very hard-put, without
20 resources, without assistance, without funding, facing huge problems, and
21 there was little assistance from the government or none at all.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 1D3487 in e-court,
23 page 40 in Serbian, 37 in English. Page 40 in Serbian and 37 in English.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You say here -- we have English -- the English version displayed
1 on the screen.
2 You say the situation was a little tricky and Karadzic says that
3 in the Crisis Staff you had the police and army and the president of the
4 municipality, the Executive Board, the Red Cross, and so on and so forth,
5 as well as the deputies of those municipalities and members of the
6 Main Board of the SDS. I don't think there were any local boards, and
7 that it be a War Presidency and at its head either the president of the
8 SDS or the president of the municipality or Executive Board. And that's
9 where this -- well, we read out this order, Sarovic and I. He played a
10 role there. He advised us not to accept this at all, because that would
11 mean that Sarovic and I would be the heads of the staffs and in command
12 of the army, whereas we weren't capable of commanding the army, let alone
13 taking over the -- a command over the police and army. So he said that
14 we should avoid this at all costs in an elegant way and present arguments
15 supporting that. And you rejected that; is that right?
16 A. Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the next page
18 displayed, both in the Serbian and the English, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. He says here -- well, the question is: Control through those war
21 commissions was supposed to be established?
22 And you said: Well, you can't exercise control if you have an
23 Assembly, a municipality, that is to say, the three of you have control
24 over an Assembly numbering 30 or 40 people. So that was the reason.
25 Now, do you agree that in many municipalities they did not
1 succeed in establishing a Municipal Assembly and Executive Boards by June
2 and that they needed somebody to come there?
3 A. I don't know. I can't say. I had limited information during the
4 war in Sarajevo. I didn't actually know what was happening in
5 April/May 1992. I didn't know what was happening outside Novo Sarajevo
6 in the other municipalities, I didn't have any information about that.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have page 46 displayed,
9 please, and it's 43 in the English.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. The question here is:
12 "From August 1992 onwards until the end of the war what positions
13 did you occupy?"
14 And your answer is:
15 "None. From the 5th of June I did not have a political office.
16 It was a secret vote, democratic. I lost the elections to Branko Radan
17 and he got the majority of votes and became the president of the
18 Executive Board and I did not ..."
19 And then lower down you go on to say that:
20 "... until May 1993 -- I worked on this from June 1992 until
21 May 1993 when I was replaced by the leadership at the time. I don't know
22 why, so I was angry and I left Sarajevo due to my financial crisis and
23 moved," et cetera, et cetera.
24 So that was the denouement of the events in your municipality;
1 A. Yes, the situation deteriorated. We did have democratic
2 elections. I put myself forward for president of the Executive Board of
3 the local municipality. I lost to the other candidate, who took over the
4 function, and I was given charge of seeing to the refurbishment of the
5 damaged houses and waterworks and the utilities in general. And I did my
6 best to work in the field of the utilities. I went to Belgrade to seek
7 donations for the waterworks, networks, and valves were needed or
8 something like that.
9 And when I returned to Grbavica, I was astonished because they
10 showed me disrespect. They told me that I was replaced from my position.
11 There was another president in 1993, I think it was the man who was
12 killed, Budo Obradovic. They told me, "You've been replaced from your
13 post because you didn't come to work for three days. And based on the
14 law governing labour if you don't come to work for three days you lose
15 your job." And that was ludicrous because they knew where I had gone.
16 So I asked them whether somebody had been appointed to replace me and
17 they said yes, Slavko Tosovic will be doing your job. And I understood
18 at that moment that it was intentional. They replaced me intentionally
19 and under the pretext that the security situation around me was very
20 difficult. And then for economic reasons and to save my life, I took my
21 wife and child and fled to Teslic, and from Teslic I went to Banja Luka,
22 never to return, and that was April 1993.
23 Q. Thank you. Obviously it was a well-paid post and so they
24 replaced you?
25 A. I don't know. I think there were lobbies that had already been
1 formed to support each other. People were grouping, forming groups. I
2 wasn't in those lobbies and in their interests linked to business and the
3 accumulation of wealth.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have page 48 in the
6 Serbian and 45 of the English.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. You said here -- you tell us how many contacts -- how much
9 contact you had with President Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the Serbian side
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Anyway, you say that you had around five meetings before 1993,
14 and after 1993 that you had frequent contacts. And your answer when
15 asked why, the purpose of them - next page in the Serbian, please - for
16 what reason you were asked. And then at the bottom of the English page
17 it says:
18 "About five. Throughout the entire war? Well, from 1993 I was
19 in contact with him frequently," you say.
20 And then the question is:
21 "For what reason?"
22 And your answer is:
23 "Well, for example, in 1993 [as interpreted] when the SDS was
24 reactivated in February, I became a member of the Main and the
25 Executive Boards again."
1 Is that correct?
2 A. In the new party, it wasn't a BH party anymore but a party of all
3 Serb lands, the Main Board was not elected. The same board remained but
4 the Executive Board was replaced, and I became a member of that new
5 Executive Board. The president was Jovo Mijatovic, and I was charged
6 with work in the field, the kind of work that I described earlier on.
7 Q. Thank you. So at the SDS headquarters they didn't share the
8 attitude towards you that was displayed in the Novo Sarajevo
9 municipality; is that right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, in view of the fact that I
13 don't have enough time, I'd just like to tender this document 1D3487,
14 which is the Defence interview with Mr. Neskovic, and Mr. Neskovic has
15 confirmed his positions, the ones presented during that interview. So
16 I'd like to tender the document.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: I don't have an objection, Your Honour. On other
19 occasions for other reasons, objections might arise. This document has
20 in fact been referred to extensively, and so various concerns that might
21 otherwise arise I think don't preclude its admission with this document.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1278, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we just look at page 50 of this
1 document and then 46 and 47 in English. So 50 in Serbian and 46 and 47
2 in English.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. So while you were in the SDS we had a dynamic relationship.
5 There was a lot of disagreement, contention, but agreement too. But you
6 left the SDS only in 1997; is that right?
7 A. Yes, in 1997.
8 Q. It says here in the interview -- well, your answer was:
9 "No, no, it's not important for me. This is why I left the SDS
10 in 1997, because I didn't agree with what he did in 1996."
11 What did you mean? What is it that happened in 1996 which
12 prompted you and made you feel that the SDS was no longer what it used to
14 A. Well, at the electoral Assembly in 1996, I understood it that the
15 democratic basis was withering away, so to speak, and I didn't agree with
16 your personnel policy. At the time you wanted to abolish the
17 Executive Board and set up a Presidency which would regionalise the
18 party, and I was opposed to that, and certain personnel, such as
19 Miladin Bosic, you proposed to the SDS Presidency although these were
20 people who had never worked in the SDS. And then through your --
21 wielding your authority you incorporated Marko Pavic, from Prijedor, into
22 the SDS and he became a member of the Main Board and a deputy although up
23 until then he wasn't even a member of the SDS. Then there was
24 Goran Popovic. And you could see this trend and you could see that you
25 insisted on this, as you did in 1990, that the posts should be occupied
1 through your authority by people who never had anything to do with the
2 SDS previously or very little to do with it, except this time it was at
3 the very peaks of power of the SDS that you wanted to exert your
4 influence to bring in these new people or to elect them or appoint them,
5 appoint people who were in democratic regular SDS functions, procedure --
6 could never occupy those positions. If you had to go through the
7 municipal boards and the local boards, it would take them a long time to
8 reach the top, but you bypassed that procedure and appointed them to the
9 head of the party so that Mr. Bosic became a member of the Presidency in
10 1996 and he's the president of the SDS now.
11 And then the other point I disagreed with you on was the
12 relationship towards the international community and the Dayton Accords.
13 We considered that this might not be applied. We didn't see the
14 agreement too seriously, as being too serious, although we did sign it.
15 Now, I might be wrong but I gained the impression that its
16 original democratic source was being lost in the SDS, in the party, its
17 basis and grass roots and so on. And my main objection was certainly the
18 regionalisation of the party with the appointment of the Presidency
19 instead of an Executive Board, and I considered that the party would be
20 regionalised thereby and that the head men would become the sort of
21 ruling princes in their geographic regions and that the party would begin
22 to disintegrate and that it was not good policy and that it was not
23 following on from the organisational set-up of 1991. And I considered
24 that the party would begin to disintegrate through poor organisation and
25 poor personnel policies.
1 So I kept quiet. These were my own musings, and in 1997 I
2 stepped down and left the party.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, do you agree that at the time I was already
4 preparing to withdraw because I had promised that after the Assembly,
5 after St. Vitus Day, the end of June, I would leave the party and with
6 Pavic and all those from the left wing, bringing in the left wing, I
7 wanted to strengthen the left wing of the SDS, which all the dissidents
8 of many years held against me. So was that the basis of your criticism,
9 too, for me bringing in part of a leftist-oriented staff?
10 A. Well, the basis of my criticism, all power to the people that I
11 mentioned, I have every respect for the people I mentioned, but you did
12 side-step democratic procedure. You can't become a member of the
13 Presidency without going through democratic procedure, party democratic
14 procedures. Now, if the leftists wanted to act democratically, let them
15 form a left-wing party. What did the left-wingers have to do in a
16 Serbian national democratic party? Because it turns out that in SDS you
17 paid more attention to the leftists, left-wingers, than to the SDS
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page in the English, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's now time for you to conclude.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Just one more question,
23 then, and I think we'll find it on page 47 of the English.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You say:
1 "Yes, I know. In 1996 that there was nothing to do with that,
2 but there are so many events that I haven't explained. I never found out
3 why he did not allow SDS officials to take part in the government they
4 had won. I have never learned why the government banned the SDS and
5 published this in the Official Gazette," and so on and so forth.
6 So that was the prevailing attitude that you had vis-a-vis my
7 need to expand the basis outside the SDS?
8 A. No. If we're going to extend the party then it's a popular
9 movement, it's not a political party anymore. So I don't think so. My
10 answer is no.
11 Well, if I understood the question correctly, did you ask me
12 whether the prevailing opinion in the SDS was that this is being -- was
13 being held against you? Yes, it was constantly being held against you.
14 You were being criticised for it from 1990 to 1996 by the vast majority
15 of the membership until you withdrew. You persisted in protecting the
16 cadres of the League of Communists, and in 1996 you started bringing them
17 into the top echelon of the SDS.
18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Neskovic. I'm sorry that we hadn't had an
19 opportunity to meet before your testimony here in court. Perhaps we
20 would have been able to define questions and answers better, but at any
21 rate thank you very much.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:
25 Q. Mr. Neskovic, at page 30, I believe, of the statement that you
1 gave to the Karadzic Defence, you indicated that you had looked at some
2 minutes regarding the Crisis Staff in Novo Sarajevo in December of 1991.
3 And the interview indicates that you said that -- something to the effect
4 that I said that the minutes were fabricated, that they were simply
5 untrue. Now, I don't know if that's a translation problem, but I wanted
6 to look at those minutes and quickly look at what you said about those
7 minutes in the course of your testimony in the Krajisnik case. Those
8 minutes are P2575.
9 Now, those minutes are dated the 23rd of December, 1991, just a
10 few days after the distribution of the Variant A and B document by
11 Dr. Karadzic. The document refers to "the materials received from the
12 SDS BH Main Board." Immediately after that, as we can see, it refers to
13 the first degree or step, "prvi stepen" in the B/C/S. It lists 11 items
14 which, as you confirmed in your Krajisnik testimony, are precisely the
15 number of items listed in the Variant A and B document. And the entries
16 in P2575 correspond to the entries in the Variant A and B document. For
17 example, item 2 of the Variant A and B document in the first level
18 Variant A refers to a municipal secretariat. We see here in this
19 document item 2 refers to that. Item 3 similarly refers to a
20 Crisis Staff, and so on, in terms of the persons who were assigned to
21 various tasks as well.
22 Now, is it correct, Mr. Neskovic, that when you reviewed these
23 documents during the course of your Krajisnik case, you didn't say that
24 the minutes were fabricated. You simply expressed the observation that,
25 according to you, something was missing from that document and also a
1 follow-up document that you saw, and that was that you couldn't see who
2 the commander of the Crisis Staff was. And I refer you and the other
3 participants to the transcript pages 16671 through 72.
4 In short, Mr. Neskovic, that was the issue or concern that you
5 raised during the course of your Krajisnik testimony? Yes, is that
7 A. I apologise if a statement of mine has been misunderstood. It's
8 my duty to explain. This document is not a forgery. It is a document of
9 the Crisis Staff of Novo Sarajevo. Based on the contents, it is
10 Variant A. So Variant A is being applied here. My criticism and the
11 remark I made was that there was no signature as to who the command of
12 the Crisis Staff was, although, according to Variants A and B, it should
13 have been the president of the Executive Board of the Zarko Djurovic --
14 of the municipality Zarko Djurovic.
15 But I have to add that Zarko Djurovic as president of the
16 Executive Board and Milivoje Prijic as president of the Municipal Board
17 of the Serbian Democratic Party, although they were -- they mutually
18 clashed, both of them had great reservations towards the application of
19 Variant A and B. And quite obviously here there was a meeting, a certain
20 meeting took place, the meeting was called the Crisis Staff and
21 everything is exact, everything written here is exact. So it's not a
22 forgery, it's not falsified.
23 But if you look at it, we are lacking points 4 and 5. So all the
24 other points are listed, except for points 4 and 5, which were the key
25 points in Variant A. Point 4 related to the formation of the
1 Crisis Staff and point 5 also relates to something about whether
2 mobilisation or -- regarding the JNA or the establishment of power --
3 bodies of power and authority. So perhaps points 4 and 5 were the most
4 important ones which are missing here. So all the other points are being
5 addressed here, but there's no readiness here to set up a separate
6 Novo Sarajevo municipality and its separate bodies set up.
7 So it a document which is valid, is accurate, but my objection
8 was and remark in Krajisnik was a dilemma I had. I don't know whether
9 Djurovic attended the meeting at all, and I see that he's not signed
10 here, whereas he should have been the president. So that was my dilemma,
11 who the head of the Crisis Staff was, otherwise I have no criticisms to
12 make or objections to make to the document itself. It is an original
13 document, a valid document, and that is the Novo Sarajevo document.
14 Q. Mr. Neskovic, just to -- before we leave this document, we'll do
15 so quickly. Just to clarify the identification of the commander and his
16 deputy commander. You've already indicated that according to the
17 Variant A and B document, the commander would be the president of the
18 Executive Committee or president of the Municipal Assembly. Therefore,
19 please look at item 3 where it indicates "Formiran Krizni Stab,"
20 et cetera, and then it says "odredjen komandant po funkcija," "by
21 function"; correct?
22 A. Yes, then by function it's Zarko Djurovic, president of the
23 Executive Board.
24 Q. Thank you. If I could turn next quickly to a point that was
25 raised at some length during the course of your cross-examination and
1 that was with respect to regionalisation. It appeared that during the
2 course of your discussions with Mr. Karadzic yesterday and in the course
3 of your interview with the Defence, you focused to some extent on
4 Banja Luka and appeared to lay responsibility for regionalisation on the
5 Banja Luka authorities, and that was beginning at page 8 of your
6 interview, and asserted that the regions were formed because of the war
7 in Croatia with other regions following Krajina at least on paper, and
8 that was at page 14 of your interview and I believe at transcript
9 pages 14255 through 56.
10 Now, first of all, before the war in Croatia, Mr. Neskovic, it's
11 correct that communities of municipalities were formed; isn't that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And are you aware of the extent to which the accused spoke about
14 or indeed spoke about the communities of municipalities, followed by the
15 autonomous regions, and other steps as having been formulated in advance,
16 leading to the establishment of the organs and entity of
17 Republika Srpska; do you know about that?
18 A. I knew about three different processes of regionalisation, some
19 intertwined, some running parallel. If I might explain, one process is
20 the deputy -- the deputies, the Serb deputies, did. They started with
21 this process from the 24th of October and ended by forming the
22 Republika Srpska. The second process was done by the municipalities from
23 Banja Luka, Herzegovina, Romanija, forming communities of municipalities
24 in the spring of 1991. And in September 1991 they transformed it to
25 become the Serbian autonomous regions, so that's the second line or
1 course of regionalisation. And the third branch was the work that
2 Izetbegovic and Karadzic did on the topic of regionalisation. So these
3 three lines, sometimes they ran parallel, sometimes there was an
5 After the 24th of October, 1991, the lines merged in a way to
6 become one line, one course, which resulted in the formation of the
7 entity the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 Q. Were you aware of the plenary or symposium or consultation,
9 whatever its particular designation, of municipal, regional, and
10 republic-level SDS organs on September 7th, 1991, regarding
12 A. I attended several of those meetings. There was perhaps one
13 meeting dealing with that issue in the MIG building near Pale. I don't
14 know if that's the meeting you mean. That meeting discussed the issue of
15 realisation. It was a catering facility. It was not a very specific
16 systematic discussion with specific conclusions. Now, whether there were
17 other meetings apart from that, I can't recall now. But there was that
18 one meeting in the MIG building about regionalisation I know about
19 because I was there.
20 Q. Well, let's take a look at 65 ter 16722. That's the minutes of
21 the third meeting of the Executive Board of the Serbian Democratic Party
22 held on 16th September 1991.
23 First item on the agenda is the decision on the appointment of
24 the regionalisation staff, which was considered and adopted in accordance
25 with the conclusion adopted at the consultations in Pale. And then
1 further on down the page it continues with:
2 "... the agreement to hold the joint meeting with members of the
3 Executive Board, the regional staff, our members in government to
4 formulate issues and establish tasks in accordance with the importance
5 and urgency of these issues."
6 So that meeting was focused on the conclusions adopted at the
7 earlier meeting to which I referred and took action in accordance with
8 it; correct?
9 A. I don't know if it relates to that meeting, but as far as
10 regionalisation is concerned, it was part of the official activity of the
11 board and the party believed that regionalisation is a legitimate policy
12 aimed against centralisation. So the party was involved in
13 decentralisation. Whether this is a reference to that particular meeting
14 or consultation, I can't know.
15 You know, this consultation may not have -- may not have resulted
16 in any specific conclusions and then at this meeting -- those in the
17 board heard about this meeting in the MIG building at Pale and they
18 wanted to discuss regionalisation in a more substantial way. It's
19 possible that from this point on the party was more focused on
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. TIEGER: I tender that document, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2524, Your Honours -- 2584.
25 MR. TIEGER: And can we also call-up, please, next 65 ter
1 17542 -- no, I'm sorry, the next one would be -- my apologies.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MR. TIEGER: I believe that would be 06602.
4 Q. Mr. Neskovic, this is the fifth meeting of the Executive
5 Committee held on 7 November 1991. The fifth item on the agenda is
6 "Report on Regionalisation."
7 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn to item 5 at page 5 of the
8 English. And if the Registrar could find for the witness item 5 in the
9 B/C/S, which will be toward the end of the document. Thank you.
10 Q. It indicates, among other things, that:
11 "... conditions should be created in the region which would allow
12 the observance that the principle that every region should include and
13 incorporate the national and territorial treasures. The aim is to create
14 a Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina within Yugoslavia and to establish
15 relations with the Muslims and the Croats based on the confederate
17 So, Mr. Neskovic, the Executive Board continued to work on
18 regionalisation, and in particular identifying the portions of territory
19 within Bosnia and Herzegovina which would incorporate within Serbian
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina the national and territorial treasures sought by
22 A. Yes, that's correct.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2585, Your Honours.
2 MR. TIEGER: And finally if we could turn to 01472.
3 Q. These reflect minutes of the main and executive -- the Main Board
4 and Executive Committee or -- held on December 3rd, 1991. Again, we see
5 regionalisation on the agenda on the first page, and I wanted to ask you
6 this. You had earlier said, or just a moment ago, Mr. Neskovic, that
7 regionalisation was about breaking centralisation or against
8 centralisation. If I could turn you to the first entry reflecting the
9 comments of Mr. Karadzic at that meeting, and that's on page 2 of the
10 English and I believe the same page of the B/C/S.
11 Dr. Karadzic states:
12 "They want a sovereign Bosnia - they adopted in the Assembly and
13 seek international co-operation - in that case, by holding on to our
14 territories, we will prevent their sovereignty."
15 Mr. Neskovic, when you spoke about regionalisation being an
16 approach to resist centralisation, that was a reflection of -- was that a
17 reflection of regionalisation's impact on preventing the sovereignty or
18 the attempted sovereignty and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
19 the efforts by Bosnian Muslim and Croat authorities to assert
21 A. The regionalisation in which the SDS took active part implied
22 two consequences. One was an aspiration to prevent the independence of
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina through regionalisation and keep the entire Bosnia
24 within Yugoslavia; or, if that was impossible, to keep one part of Bosnia
25 and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia, the area where the Serbs had had a
1 plebiscite and where they had a majority. That was one of the
2 consequence, keeping Yugoslavia as a priority objective. And this
3 consequence dominated all the way up to end 1991 and the conclusions of
4 the Badinter Commission.
5 After that, when the Yugoslav option fell through and when the
6 Serbian regionalisation as a way to preserve Yugoslavia fell through,
7 then regionalisation acquired another objective, accepting an independent
8 Bosnia but transformed from within, on a regional basis. So the
9 regionalisation had both consequences, one of them prevalent in one
10 period and the other prevalent in another period.
11 So you are right, up to the end of 1991 the first consequence of
12 regionalisation was preserving Yugoslavia and preventing Bosnia from
13 becoming independent.
14 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, if I haven't done so
15 already, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask for a clarification. In
18 Serbian we see something said by Professor Milojevic. I want to avoid
19 confusion. What is written here is said by Professor Milojevic, not
21 JUDGE KWON: Are we looking at the same page? Mr. Tieger, can
22 you help us on this?
23 MR. TIEGER: There is a reference to Mr. Milojevic by
24 Dr. Karadzic, but the speaker is Dr. Karadzic.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Maybe he could tell us where in the Serbian the
1 name "Karadzic" appears. I don't see that.
2 JUDGE KWON: That's why I asked that question, whether we are on
3 the same page.
4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I could -- well, I'm not going to
5 have -- be able to read that as quickly as I would like under the
6 circumstances. We can address that issue, but I think the witness's
7 answer referred more to the concept of the regionalisation.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the Serb version is of seven pages so that we
9 can look at it later on.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you proceed. We'll admit it.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2586, Your Honours.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Mr. Neskovic, yesterday there was reference to -- well, yesterday
15 and throughout the course of your testimony and indeed in the interview,
16 reference to Main Boards and Executive Boards, implementing policies
17 through those organs on one hand and through deputies, the Deputies Club
18 and the Assembly on the other. First of all, with respect to the
19 deputies and their implementation of policy, either party policy or the
20 policy of the leaders of the Serb movement, it's correct, isn't it, that
21 the deputies must -- were required to promote party policy because of the
22 SDS because it was the party that elected them. And I refer you in
23 particular to page 14238 of your testimony in Krajisnik.
24 That's correct, isn't it, Mr. Neskovic, that you stated that the
25 deputies should promote party policy because it was the party that
1 elected them?
2 A. Well, yes. The deputies in their own parties promote and
3 implement party policy, and the deputies of the SDS, as far as I know,
4 implemented, realised, and promoted the programme of the Serbian
5 Democratic Party and its policies, but they were not policed by the
6 Executive Board or the Main Board. They were independent in implementing
7 party policy.
8 Q. And in fact, was it the case that deputies could be dismissed and
9 their mandates withdrawn for abandoning the political stances of the
10 party or the party programme? For example, this Court has received
11 evidence - and that's contained in the 51st Assembly Session held on the
12 14th and 15th of June, 1995 - that the mandates of Andjelko Grahovac,
13 Risto Jugovic, Milan Trbojevic and Milan Tesic were withdrawn for their
14 abandonment of the programme and the adopted political stances of the
16 A. I know about those two cases, but the party did not legally have
17 the right to withdraw a mandate. The party was able, as far as I know,
18 to replace -- to throw out Grahovac and Trbojevic from the party, but in
19 this case I'm not sure. The party did not have a mandate to replace
20 deputies. There was no mechanism for something like that. I don't know
21 the details about Grahovac and Trbojevic. The thing was Trbojevic was
22 that he had changed his electoral base, so something -- with Grahovac it
23 was something else. I'm sorry I'm not able to assist you more, but I'm
24 not sure if the party threw out these deputies. I don't think it was
25 entitled to.
1 Q. Well, despite the legality of such an action, do you know that
2 that decision was based on -- or that withdrawal of the mandate was based
3 on a decision signed by Dr. Karadzic, that's 65 ter 18028, no need to
4 call it up now, which in turn was based on conclusions of the Main Board
5 reflected in 65 ter 18026? But did you know about that progression,
6 Mr. Neskovic, decisions by the party officials and the ultimate
7 withdrawal of the mandate of those deputies?
8 A. I don't remember the details. I was probably there at that
9 meeting too, and I think it was done for the first time in the party in
10 1995. If this was really done, I think the party was wrong, but I don't
11 know the details.
12 MR. TIEGER: Then I'll submit those by way of bar table to
13 expedite the process, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Neskovic, one further point, I think you mentioned at page --
15 I think it was -- well, I'd have to find the page, but you mention in
16 your interview with the Defence that there were approximately seven to
17 eight deputies who were members of the Main Board. So those persons were
18 in a position, each one of them, to advise the Main Board of developments
19 within the Deputies Club and the Assembly; correct?
20 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, leading.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Well, were those persons, Mr. Neskovic, in a position based on
23 their positions as deputies and members of the Deputies Club to advise
24 the Main Board of developments and policy arising in the Deputies Club?
25 A. Yes, there were eight or ten of them. They were indeed in a
1 position to inform the Main Board about the work of the Deputies Club.
2 They were in a position to advise and recommend, but the feedback
3 mechanism, that is, the influence of the Main Board on the Deputies Club
4 did not work, that they were indeed, yes, in a position to inform and
6 Q. And in fact, I count approximately 14 deputies who were also
7 SDS Main Board members during 1991/1992. Let me mention the names and
8 ask you to confirm that -- whether or not these persons were Main Board
9 members. Milovan Bjelosevic, Mr. Buha or Dr. Buha, Dusko Kozic,
10 Momcilo Krajisnik, Vojo Kupresanin, Grujo Lalovic,
11 Dr. Milutin Najdanovic, Miladin Nedic, Milan Novakovic, Srdjo Srdic,
12 Veljko Stupar, Dobrivoje Vidic, Milenko Vojinovic, and Goran Zekic.
13 A. Yes, they were members of the Main Board, as far as I remember,
14 and I knew all of these people.
15 Q. Thank you. Mr. Neskovic, just a couple more points. In your
16 interview with the Defence you described the -- and I think in your
17 testimony yesterday as well you asserted that there was an absence of
18 telephone contact in Novo Sarajevo between April 10th and May 10th, 1992.
19 Now, first of all, during that period of time were you able to have
20 contact with police officials or military officials in the Novo Sarajevo
22 A. With police officials we could have contact without any problem.
23 We just had to travel all day to Sarajevo to see them. But with military
24 officials, I believe we had only one contact at a joint meeting in
25 Vogosca, where General Galic made an address. We were listening to a
1 speech he gave. And with police officials we could easily have contact
2 except we had to travel one whole day around the city to get to Ilijas,
3 Hadzici, et cetera.
4 Q. And with respect to telephone contact, Vrace was in
5 Novo Sarajevo; correct?
6 A. Yes, Vrace was in Novo Sarajevo. It's a hill.
7 Q. And do you know the extent to which officials in Vrace were able
8 to communicate with telephone -- by telephone during that period of time
9 with Bosnian Serb officials in Pale and elsewhere?
10 A. Well, I don't know. Perhaps the only possibility would be to
11 call the police school at Vrace and through them get into contact with
12 the Serbian leadership at Pale.
13 Q. Finally, Mr. Neskovic, there were --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, I'm not sure if the LiveNote is
15 working at this moment. I don't think that -- yes. How much more do you
16 have for your re-direct, Mr. Tieger?
17 MR. TIEGER: Certainly no more than five minutes, Your Honour, if
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
21 Q. Finally, Mr. Neskovic, particularly during the latter part of
22 your cross-examination you discussed the Variant A and B document in --
23 and offered some views about military officials who were -- were or may
24 have been involved in its drafting. Are you asserting that you know who
25 wrote this -- who drafted this document, Mr. Neskovic, or were you simply
1 offering views based on the question that -- and proposition that the
2 accused put to you, that is, that it was drafted by retired JNA
3 officials? And I ask that in particular because, among other things, in
4 your interview you said at page 60 -- well, let me just ask you that
5 question first because I understood you to say in your testimony in
6 Krajisnik --
7 A. I did not know who wrote the document A and B, and the
8 information that it was written by a group of retired officers was
9 something that I learned later, following a trial in this courtroom. I
10 believe it was Mr. Karadzic who said during an examination that it was
11 written by a group of frightened military retirees. And based on that
12 and accepting it as true, although I only heard it following the trial on
13 the internet, am I saying that it was written by them. At the time, I
14 had no idea.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Neskovic.
16 MR. TIEGER: That concludes my re-direct examination,
17 Mr. President. Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, might I just ask
20 one question.
21 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, and I would also note that the reference in
22 the December 3rd document to Mr. Karadzic can be found at the top of
23 page 3 in the B/C/S as I understand it.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
25 About what, Mr. Karadzic?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to ask the witness whether
2 he knows for sure that it wasn't the SDS organs who wrote the document.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do know that. The SDS
4 organs, the legal commission, and the Executive Board did not write this
6 JUDGE KWON: The witness has already answered.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: That concludes your evidence, Mr. Neskovic. On
9 behalf of the Bench and the Tribunal as a whole, I appreciate your coming
10 to The Hague to give it. Now you are free to go.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: But we will rise all together.
13 We will have a break for half an hour and resume at 12.30.
14 [The witness withdrew]
15 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Mr. Treanor.
20 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Treanor, you weren't in court when the case
22 had to be adjourned. I'm sorry that you weren't there to listen to it.
23 You were out of court for a good reason, and I hope you don't think that
24 your personal circumstances were not taken into account as much as they
25 could be in the circumstances in which we faced ourselves. So I just
1 wanted to make that plain, that it was a pity you weren't in court, but
2 in the circumstances it wasn't possible.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I understand completely.
4 JUDGE KWON: Now it's for you, Mr. Karadzic, to continue your
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
7 WITNESS: PATRICK TREANOR [Resumed]
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
9 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Dr. Treanor.
10 A. Good afternoon, Dr. Karadzic.
11 Q. From Friday to today, did you have any contacts with the
13 A. No.
14 Q. Did anybody explain to you why we had the adjournment or
15 postponement of your cross-examination?
16 A. No.
17 Q. I'd like to ask you whether you knew that the Prosecution had had
18 talks with Mr. Jovan Cizmovic and that the material did exist in the OTP?
19 A. Which material?
20 Q. The interview that the Prosecutor had with Mr. Jovan Cizmovic. I
21 think there were two interviews in actual fact.
22 A. I'm not familiar with those interviews.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you think that there's other material which has
24 not been placed at your disposal -- that had not been placed at your
25 disposal before you concluded your report?
1 JUDGE KWON: How can he know that?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you. You're quite
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. We'll deal with that tomorrow, but now I'd like to continue where
6 we left off, Dr. Treanor, and we left off discussing the 19th of
7 December. Do you agree with me that the Muslim-Croat portion of the
8 government and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ignoring the
9 opposition of the Serb members of these organs, asked for international
10 recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as you state in paragraph 95 of your
11 report, 1225?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you agree that this initiative, this call for independence,
14 could only have come from the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and not from
15 the government or Presidency?
16 A. Well, that I don't know.
17 Q. In view of the fact that it is constitutional matter and the
18 change in the nature of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would you
19 agree that it is, in fact, constitutional matter?
20 A. I think that generally that's true, yes.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 Do you agree that Badinter responded to that request and that
23 opinion number 4 relates to the request?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 5816 on e-court,
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you remember that Mr. Badinter responded to the initiative
3 from Bosnia-Herzegovina? Have you had a chance to look at this opinion,
4 opinion number 4?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Let's take a look at the first page. There's some general
7 details there, and in point 4 it says:
8 "Letter of the 27th of December, 1991, from the President of the
9 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Lord Carrington ..."
10 So in that letter -- [In English] I'll read it in English.
11 "Letter of 27th of December, 1991, from the President of the
12 Presidency of the SRBH to Lord Carrington, Chairman of the Conference on
13 Yugoslavia, on the formation of an 'Assembly of the Serbian People in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina ...'"
15 [Interpretation] And then it says further on --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, may we have the next page
17 displayed, please.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. [In English] "The current Constitution of the SRBH guarantees
20 equal rights for 'the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Muslims, Serbs and
21 Croats - and the members of the other nations and ethnic groups living in
22 its territory.'"
23 [Interpretation] And then it would be advisable to look at the
24 whole of the next page, but I don't want to read it out. Let's look at
25 point 3, the commission notes.
1 [In English] "A. That the declarations and the undertakings
2 above were given by the Presidency and the Government of the Socialist
3 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that the Serbian members of the
4 Presidency did not associate themselves with those declarations and
5 undertakings ..."
6 [Interpretation] And paragraph 3:
7 "... outside the international framework of the SRBH, on 10th of
8 November, 1992, the 'Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina' voted in a
9 plebiscite for a common Yugoslav state. On 21st of December, 1992, an
10 'Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina' passed a
11 resolution calling for the formation of a 'Serbian Republic of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina' in a federal state of Yugoslavia if the Muslim and
13 Croat communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to 'change their attitude
14 towards Yugoslavia'" --
15 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, I'm sure Dr. Karadzic just misspoke but
16 that was a reference to 21 December 1991.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I made a slip of the tongue.
19 Probably I read it out wrongly.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Anyway, point 4 -- or rather, it's a continuation.
22 [In English] "On the 9th of January, 1992, this Assembly
23 proclaimed the independence of the 'Serbian Republic of
25 [Interpretation] Paragraph 4:
1 [In English] "In these circumstances, the Arbitration Commission
2 is of the opinion that the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to
3 constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held
4 to have been fully established.
5 "This assessment could be reviewed if appropriate guarantees were
6 provided by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a
7 referendum of all the citizens of the SRBH without distinction, carried
8 out under international supervision."
9 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Assembly of the Serbian
10 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina reacted to this request from the
11 Muslim-Croat part of the government and Presidency, it reacted with a
12 call for them to rescind the decision or the Serbian Assembly would
13 proclaim the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the response
14 of the Arbitration Commission to this same matter was this opinion listed
15 under opinion number 4?
16 A. Yes, in general terms, that's correct.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this into evidence,
19 please, opinion number 4.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: This is part of Badinter opinion. We're admitting
23 only three pages from the document. Very well. That will be admitted.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1279, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's have a look at D86 now,
1 page 96 of the Serbian and 46 of the English.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. At the Assembly of the Serbian people, the -- an opposition
4 deputy, Dr. Kalinic, on the occasion spoke and said -- or rather, did you
5 notice his speech, the speech he delivered in the Assembly of the Serb
6 people? Paragraph 4, page 96 in Serbian and 46 in English.
7 A. I'm sorry, which session is this?
8 Q. The 21st of December, the Assembly of the Serb people after what
9 the government did, coming after what the government did?
10 A. Yes, I read that.
11 Q. I'd like to draw your attention to the reply made by Mr. Kalinic,
12 who at the time was in the Serbian Assembly but not a member of the SDS,
13 but a member of the reformists. It says:
14 "Please, I can state in my own personal name - and I hope that
15 this is your opinion too - that nobody has the right to prevent the
16 Muslim people, which are people with their own tradition and history and
17 sovereign rights, to found their own sovereign national state, but on
18 territories, to use the term used by Mr. Izetbegovic, which they make
19 viable and prosperous in the long run. Similarly, the Serbian people,
20 and I presume the Croatian people as well, would not even dream of having
21 their nation states, that is, establishing independent political
22 institutions on the territories that they cannot make viable and
23 prosperous in the long run."
24 Do you remember that Mr. Izetbegovic before the election said if
25 Croatia steps down from Yugoslavia then Bosnia will too. If we can't
1 have the whole of Bosnia, then the territories will step down which the
2 Muslims can make viable and prosperous?
3 A. I'm not familiar with that particular remark of Dr. --
4 Mr. Izetbegovic.
5 Q. In the intercepts and other material, did you come across
6 confirmation that the initial idea on the division of Bosnia, or rather,
7 the transformation of Bosnia came from Alija Izetbegovic and that I was
8 surprised and informed President Milosevic about that, whereas
9 Mr. Zulfikarpasic wrote about it in his book?
10 A. Well, as to the idea coming from Mr. Izetbegovic, I'm -- I can't
11 recall seeing anything that specific. I'm aware of -- of course of some
12 of these other conversations in which the idea is discussed with
13 Mr. Milosevic, and again the -- referring back to the 30 September 1991
14 Deputies Club meeting at which Dr. Karadzic pointed out that
15 Mr. Izetbegovic was willing to discuss the subject of regionalisation.
16 But to say that he was the originator of the idea, I can't recall
17 anything that specific.
18 Q. Thank you. And do you know that the Zagreb morning paper first
19 publicised the idea on the cantonisation of Bosnia and that Mrs. Plavsic
20 stated her views on that and said that the idea was interesting as food
21 for thought?
22 A. I can't recall that. I'm not -- I don't think I'm familiar with
23 that. I'm not sure what date you're referring to, but I can't recall
24 anything like that.
25 Q. Thank you. Well, we'll have the documents by tomorrow. But let
1 me ask you this: Did you note Dr. Kalinic's speech at the Assembly held
2 on the 21st of December, the one in which he invokes the right of all
3 three peoples to have sovereign control of their life in the territories
4 where they are in the majority and that he recognises that right for both
5 the Muslim and Croatian people?
6 A. Well, yes, as I said, I have read that speech.
7 Q. And do you consider that it would be useful had the view of
8 Dr. Kalinic been included in your report, for instance?
9 A. Well, I don't -- not particularly. I don't see any great
10 difference between that and what the SDS itself was suggesting at that
11 time, that is, that the peoples who wanted to leave Yugoslavia were free
12 to leave, but the Serbs would stay. In regard to Dr. Kalinic, I would
13 have to point out that in my recollection at this time he was an
14 independent deputy in the Assembly of the SRBiH. I believe he had left
15 the reformist party. And I would also point out that he was a member of
16 the Assembly of the Serbian people at this time, as you pointed out, an
17 Assembly that originated in a meeting of the SDS Deputies Club. In
18 effect, he had joined that Deputies Club - if I can put it that way. And
19 of course later on, later years, Dr. Kalinic did join the SDS and was, in
20 fact, the president of the SDS. So I don't see any great distinction
21 between his views and those of the SDS.
22 Q. Thank you. I'd like to draw your attention to paragraph 103 of
23 your report, 1225, where you say that Professor Koljevic had a meeting
24 with the Croatian leadership in order to discuss the ethnic division of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you find that passage?
1 [In English] "Thus, in January 1992, while the BSL was still
2 exploring the possibility of a negotiated solution with the Croatian
3 leadership, Karadzic's political ally, Koljevic, urged the reorganisation
4 of Bosnia within the aim of the homogeneity of certain areas."
5 [Interpretation] Do you see that paragraph? And you refer to the
6 transcript of the talk with President Tudjman, that President Koljevic
7 and President Boras had, or rather, the members of the BH Presidency?
8 A. This is paragraph 103?
9 Q. Yes, that's right.
10 A. Well, I see that paragraph -- I don't see all the words that
11 you've read, though.
12 Q. [In English] "Thus, in January 1992 ..."
13 [Interpretation] You have that in hard copy.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have P986 displayed, please,
15 that's the transcript of the talk with President Tudjman, P986, page 46
16 of the Serbian and 35 of the English. Fine. May we get the English.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Let's see what Franjo Boras, member of the Presidency of BH, has
19 to say on behalf of the Croats.
20 "I would add to your question, Mr. President, that the Muslims
21 would not gladly accept this and that they would not be glad to hear of
22 these discussions of ours this evening. Their concept with Alija as the
23 head, a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina as a civic state, and by that
24 very fact, as Professor Koljevic has already pointed out, they would like
25 to ensure the pre-eminence of the Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 and the gradual eradication of the two peoples, especially the Croatian
2 people ..."
3 Did you take into account these fears that Mr. Boras expressed?
4 A. Well, I -- I've read the transcript and I've given my summary of
5 that meeting in this paragraph. So to that extent, I took them into
6 account, yes. The -- by the way, Franjo Tudjman had similar fears about
7 the demographic threat presented by the Muslims because of their
8 birthright to those that we've seen emanating from SDS circles.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 47 next, please,
10 to hear what Professor Koljevic had to say. It's page 37 in English.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Professor Koljevic, let's see what he has to say.
13 "Let me tell you what the German ambassador said to me in a long
14 talk. A sentence emerged because paradoxically they think that we would
15 be much better firemen, Croats and Serbs, for isolating the Muslims in
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina who then would not have the possibility of linking
17 up further to those transversals.
18 "And now you see what role is being ascribed to our people --
19 what role is being ascribed to our peoples ..."
20 Do you remember that there was the firm conviction that many
21 European countries considered that the Serbs and Croats had to be kept in
22 Bosnia, so as to control the Muslims?
23 A. Well, I'm aware that that view was attributed to unnamed European
24 states or statesmen by the Bosnian Serb leaders.
25 Q. Look, please, what President Tudjman says.
1 "Yes, but it's not the opinion only of the Eff, but the whole
2 world is afraid of what you have called the green transversal and it's
3 the creation of an Islamic state in Europe."
4 Did you take into account the opinion expressed by President
5 Tudjman, that it's not only Minister Eff's opinion but that the
6 linking-up of Bosnia with the Islamic world through this green
7 transversal is a great threat to Europe?
8 A. Well, again, I've read this transcript and I gave my summary of
9 what I believed to be the relevant points of the meeting. If I could
10 just comment that the idea of the green transversal is -- or relates to
11 a -- some sort of, if I could put it, Muslim corridor or bridge from
12 Bosnia to -- through the Balkans to Turkey. One link in that chain would
13 have been the area in Serbia called the Sandzak, which is -- which
14 borders on Bosnia and has a large Muslim minority. So this was an idea
15 again ascribed to various people that -- but in any case was seen as a
16 threat to Serbia itself. Part of the reason for the strategic goal
17 relating to the Drina Valley that we discussed during my testimony was to
18 prevent the creation of such a transversal by interposing Serbian
19 territory in the Drina Valley between the Muslims in -- between the
20 Muslims west of the Drina and those in Sandzak.
21 Q. Thank you. We'll come back to that strategic objective number 3.
22 But your paragraph 103 does not reflect what President Tudjman says.
23 Tudjman is not worried about Serbia at all; he's worried about Europe.
24 And he claims that it's a threat to Europe, not Serbia; correct?
25 A. Well, that seems to be what he's saying, yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 54 of Serbian and
3 42 in English.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Here Professor Koljevic speaks about the need to restructure
6 municipalities. Mr. Lerotic, advisor to Tudjman, asks: Is it possible?
7 Koljevic says it's possible to separate part of the municipalities where
8 they have a hinterland. And let's see what Boras says. He's a deputy to
9 the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10 "According to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there
11 is an option, a possibility, for a Municipal Assembly to take a decision
12 to hold the referendum in a local community where there is only one
13 ethnic group and the people voted a referendum to create a separate local
14 community, on joining another municipality, et cetera, and then the
15 Assembly just has to confirm it.
16 "That is an option that existed in the current constitution ..."
17 Do you know about this? Do you know that what Mr. Boras is
18 saying here is correct, it is a possibility envisaged by the
20 A. I can't recall that specific provision. I wouldn't doubt that
21 it's in there, but I can't recall it offhand.
22 Q. We've seen that this meeting between Professor Koljevic and the
23 Croatian leadership, Serbs and Croats are convinced that the European
24 community is insisting on a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina because the
25 Islamic factor needs to be controlled. Do you agree that due to the fact
1 that world politics are beyond the rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we
2 accepted that Bosnia and Herzegovina be independent on the condition that
3 it be restructured before independence? In other words, do you agree
4 that Serbs had abandoned their constituent status and stopped insisting
5 on Yugoslavia, on the condition that Bosnia be transformed and that Serbs
6 get something out of it?
7 A. Well, that's sort of a complicated issue. I think we've
8 discussed before in my testimony that -- and in the reports that at this
9 time the SDS leadership was insisting on precisely that point, that if BH
10 was going to be independent it would have to be transformed first and
11 then they would accept independence via a referendum after an agreement
12 was reached. And negotiations were taken up under international auspices
13 in February to that effect.
14 As for giving up on Yugoslavia, that's where it gets complicated.
15 In fact, the declaration of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina refers to it as being part of Yugoslavia, which Bosnia was at
17 that time. And the constitution of the Bosnian Serb republic adopted on
18 the 28th of February, 1992, also states that the Serbian Republic of
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina is part of Yugoslavia and that provision of the
20 constitution was never changed in the -- during the following years, the
21 years of conflict. There was some discussion of doing so in the late
22 summer of 1992 in the Bosnian Serb Assembly, but the idea of eliminating
23 that clause of the constitution was rejected. One of the reasons for
24 doing that is because the plebiscite of the Serbian people, which had
25 taken place in November 1991, had come out for exactly that, for
1 remaining in Yugoslavia. And the plebiscite was for the Bosnian Serbs
2 a -- a very strong argument in favour of the legitimacy of their desire
3 to remain in Yugoslavia. We've seen reference to that in the
4 Badinter Commission opinion, which referred to that plebiscite.
5 So, on the one hand, they were willing to -- what -- "they" being
6 the SDS leadership were willing to accept a transformed independent
7 Bosnia, but only basically as an interim stage before the Serbian portion
8 of that Bosnia which they wanted to be a confederation, which in Serbian
9 parlance means not a state, a confederation is not a state, that the
10 Serbian portion would at some later date join together with other Serbian
11 entities to form a single Serbian state.
12 Q. Doctor, do you make a distinction between the outcome of
13 political negotiations and an outcome that comes after the outbreak of
14 the war? In other words, do you know that in case of a political outcome
15 we undertook not to have any territories annexed to anything, and that
16 didn't happen because Bosnia and Herzegovina was plunged into war?
17 A. Well, the negotiations that I'm referring to, generally referred
18 to as the Cutileiro negotiations, never came to an agreement. There were
19 various documents which were to serve as bases for further negotiations.
20 And the point that you mentioned is referred to in those bases, but there
21 never was an agreement to that effect. And I think that the whole thrust
22 of Bosnian Serb policy in this area would have ultimately led to -- or
23 that they would have wanted ultimately to join a -- together with other
24 Serbs in a single state, whatever that particular agreement may have
25 said - and it didn't say anything because it wasn't an agreement.
1 Q. I strenuously deny that, Doctor, and I would like to call
2 paragraph 96 of your report. And I put to you the position of the
3 Defence. In the event of an agreed solution, an agreed arrangement, the
4 Serbs had undertook to stay within Bosnia as long as the borders of
5 Bosnia are respected, whereas in the event of war, any outcome becomes
6 possible. Is that correct? If it's easier for you to wait for the
7 paragraph, 96, to be on the screen, you say:
8 [In English] "Karadzic also informed the Assembly rather
9 cautiously of a new approach to the future of BH on the 21st of December,
10 speaking for the first time about transformation of Bosnia in discussing
11 ongoing negotiations with the Muslims and Croats leaders in B&H.
12 "Karadzic noted, 'I can inform you that our first proposal and
13 this is according to the mandate you have given us, that is, the option
14 preferred by the Serbian people was the preservation of a united, equal
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal unit within Yugoslavia ...' However,
16 'we put forward another proposal which incorporates the idea of a
17 fundamental transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a union of the
18 three equal national communities ...'
19 "More specifically, 'What we have offered is a solution according
20 to which Bosnia and Herzegovina would become a confederation based on
21 territorial and individual autonomy, i.e., mutual independence ...'
22 Further, the Bosnian Serb leaders had suggested ..." and you are quoting,
23 "'... the establishment of three entities in BH, which would not threaten
24 or confront each other ... so that common institutions could be formed at
25 the level of BH, that is, the existing Republic of BH.'"
1 [Interpretation] Finished quote.
2 [In English] "Finally, both the Serbian and Croatian BH might be
3 able to form links with Yugoslavia and Croatia respectively."
4 [Interpretation] Doctor, do you know that every day there was
5 some conference going on, the Cutileiro or the Lisbon conference, then
6 the Vance-Owen conference, then Stoltenberg, then the Contact Group, and
7 then it all ended with the Dayton Accords and it was ended precisely in
8 this way, not three but two units with special parallel connections with
9 Croatia on the one hand and Yugoslavia, that is to say Serbia, on the
11 A. Yes, I know there were many conferences and negotiations.
12 Q. That's not an answer that can satisfy me. Can you point out
13 where exactly we said that the agreed arrangement of Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina would be violated by our secession? In other words, do you
15 agree that in the event of war our undertakings to preserve Bosnia in its
16 borders do not apply any longer?
17 A. Well, let's take the situation before the war. I think you
18 wanted to draw a distinction. The speech that I've referenced in this
19 paragraph is, in my view, an attempt to alert the Serbian people in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, including members of the SDS, that it wasn't going to
21 be as simple as everyone, that is, the Bosnian Serbs, had thought, as
22 simple as just remaining in Yugoslavia, as per the results of the
23 plebiscite. I think I discussed this in -- during my direct examination.
24 The leaders in Belgrade certainly would not be able to permit that for
25 international reasons, and they were -- had to go ahead and form a new
1 Yugoslavia consisting of only two republics, and that including the
2 Serbian territories in Bosnia and Croatia. So there was going to have to
3 be some sort of intermediate stage and this is the beginning of the
4 public mention of such an alternative which eventually caused some
5 dissatisfaction among various Bosnian Serb circles, which I didn't go
7 However, I would note the use of the word "confederation" here.
8 I mentioned that earlier. Serbian leaders in Belgrade and in Bosnia were
9 very insistent that a confederation was not a state, and therefore they
10 had rejected the idea of turning the SFRY into a confederation instead of
11 being a federation. Because if it were a confederation, then the Serbs
12 would not all be in one state. So the position that the SDS did indeed
13 adopt at the beginning of the Cutileiro negotiations called for the
14 creation of a confederation in Bosnia, that is, a confederation of Bosnia
15 which in their conception would not have been a state but which would
16 have consisted of three different entities, and there were repeated
17 references by Dr. Karadzic and other leaders to the fact that the Serbian
18 entity and indeed the Croatian entity would be free to enter into any
19 type of relations that they deemed fit in the future with either Serbia
20 or Croatia. That's all before the war started. They didn't say that
21 during the negotiations per se, but they were saying that among
22 themselves, that we will be free to associate with Serbia in the future
23 in any manner that we desire.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see P782, page 2.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. It is the Defence case, Dr. Treanor, that if Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina was to be outside of Yugoslavia, it should have been like
4 Switzerland. Do you remember our proposal that Bosnia-Herzegovina be
5 turned into a Switzerland on the Balkans? Wherever there are 20.000-plus
6 people in one area of the same ethnicity, ethnic cantons can be formed.
7 Yes or no, do you remember that?
8 A. I vaguely remember something like that, yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 2. I don't know
10 which page it is in Serbian. I think it's the same.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. [In English] "Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue to have its
13 existing borders and neither the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor
14 the governments of the constituent units will encourage or support claims
15 to any part of its territory by neighbouring states."
16 Number 3:
17 "Sovereignty resides in the citizens of the Muslim, Serb and
18 Croat nations and other nations and nationalities who would realise it
19 through their civic participation in the constituent units and the
20 central organs of the republic."
21 [Interpretation] That's on page 1 --
22 A. Which document is this, I'm sorry?
23 Q. Page 1, items 2 and 3.
24 [In English] "Independence."
25 [Interpretation] The heading is "Independence."
1 And further on, on page 3.
2 Do you agree that this was a paper on the basis of which it had
3 been agreed that the future Bosnia-Herzegovina would look this way? It's
4 better known as the Cutileiro Plan.
5 THE ACCUSED: Page 1, please.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, this is a document which I think we generally
7 refer to as the Sarajevo agreement, which is not by any means a final
8 agreement. It was merely a -- as it says right at the end of it, a
9 document to serve as the basis for further negotiations, but those are
10 certainly the terms of that document.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Well, how come, Dr. Treanor, that these were not conditions? The
13 first three items here say that this is what is to be negotiated. Those
14 were the conditions. We can't start the negotiations every morning from
15 square one like Izetbegovic did. Wasn't this an undertaking on our part
16 that we would not secede and join other states in item 2?
17 A. Well, no. I don't read that document as an undertaking. These
18 again are the bases for further negotiations.
19 Q. Well, Izetbegovic didn't think it was a condition either and then
20 the war broke out. Do you see that Serbs and Croats and Muslims have
21 sovereignty and they will realise it through their civic participation in
22 the constituent units?
23 A. Yes, and I think this was regarded by Bosnian Serb leaders,
24 including Dr. Karadzic, as being the most important aspect of these
25 negotiations, the most important victory that they won during these
1 negotiations was to gain the recognition by their negotiating partners
2 and indeed the international community, that Bosnia and Herzegovina could
3 be divided along ethnic lines.
4 Q. Thank you. We'll see tomorrow who celebrated that, if Serbs were
5 the only one.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just see page 2.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. While we're waiting, Doctor, the Muslim side also proclaimed it
9 their victory, and we will show that tomorrow.
10 Did you know that Ajanovic had stated that it was a victory for
11 the Muslims?
12 A. Yes, I -- well, I think I have read some of his statements at
13 that time. Of course, at this time the Bosnian Muslim leaders -- or
14 shortly after the date of this document they, and I think the Croats as
15 well, started to back off of it.
16 Q. I'm afraid you mixed up these two things. It was the Muslims who
17 reneged seven days later. Do you agree it would have been Serbian
18 victory if Bosnia had remained within Yugoslavia or if Serbian lands had
19 remained Yugoslavia, that would have been victory for us? This, instead,
20 was a very painful blow.
21 A. Well, I think that's what I said, that the Muslims as well as the
22 Croats backed off of their acceptance of this document -- well, yes,
23 that's what the Serbs were hoping to achieve, that is, remaining in
24 Yugoslavia. And indeed at this time I would remind the Court that in
25 March 1992, Bosnia still was technically part of Yugoslavia. We saw
1 during my direct examination that around this time, as a voice during the
2 meeting in Belgrade that Dr. Karadzic attended at the beginning of March,
3 that it seemed to be the Serbian view that Bosnia would remain in --
4 within Yugoslavia as long as the negotiations continued and that the JNA
5 would remain in the Serbian portions of Bosnia as long as Bosnia remained
6 within Yugoslavia.
7 Q. Dr. Treanor, if we had more time we would have shed light on all
8 that, but I'm asking you now to look at section D, constituencies. Do
9 you agree that this agreement stipulates that constituent units would
10 have their Assemblies, government, executive power, legislative power?
11 Do you agree that this envisages that Bosnian constituent units would
12 have something not unlike what the republics had in Yugoslavia?
13 A. Well, I don't know how you want to qualify a comparison between
14 these units and the units within Yugoslavia, but that portion of the
15 document certainly does deal with those issues.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the next page, page 3,
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. On page 3, Article 2 [as interpreted] says:
21 [In English] "Members of the nations who would be in a minority
22 in a particular constituent unit would receive protection similar to that
23 in Article 2(3) of the draft Convention."
24 [Interpretation] Do you know and do you agree that we accepted
25 this document, we adopted it with all its articles without any
1 reservations to any of the articles?
2 A. Yes, I believe that all three parties accepted this document as
3 the basis for further negotiations on that date, the 18th of March, 1992.
4 Q. Did then the Serbs accept having part of them living in
5 constituent units of the Muslims and Croats and a part of the Muslims and
6 Croats live in a Serbian constituent unit and that they would enjoy all
7 rights, the protection of their rights?
8 A. That seems to be the -- one of the terms of this document, yes.
9 Q. However, in your report on page 4, in conclusion E2, you state
10 the following -- actually, it's document 592:
11 [In English] "Through the party-derived structures under their
12 influence or control, the Bosnian Serb leadership directed the political
13 and administrative processes which eventually enabled the Bosnian Serbs
14 to secure control of territories and led to large-scale ethnic cleansing
15 of non-Serbs in those territories in spring 1992 ..."
16 A. Yes, that's what it says.
17 Q. [Interpretation] Do you agree that on the 18th of March, we
18 devoted to respecting what was agreed, that the national minorities would
19 exist and that there would be mutual protection of their rights?
20 A. Yes. Again, those are the terms of that document.
21 Q. And do you know or did you come across me saying, after returning
22 from Brussels on the 3rd of May, 1992, in response to a question from a
23 journalist whether it was envisaged that the population be transferred, I
24 said, "No, we do not envisage that or recommend the transference of the
25 population." Just yes or no, did you take this into account, yes or no?
1 A. I don't specifically recall that document.
2 Q. Would you look at section E, definition of the constituent units.
3 [In English] "A working group will be established in order to
4 define the territory of the constituent units based on national
5 principles and taking into account economic, geographical, and other
6 criteria. A map based on the national absolute or relative majority in
7 each municipality will be the basis of work in the working group, and
8 will be subject only to amendments, justified by the above-mentioned
9 criteria. A copy is annexed to this Statement."
10 [Interpretation] But you see, Doctor, that the principles were
11 agreed upon and that we were moving forward. What was for negotiation
12 was not principles but maps, the aspect of the units themselves, and so
13 on and so forth.
14 A. Yes, the negotiations were moving forward at this time.
15 Q. And on page 5 of that same document, a map is attached of the
16 ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is D91 for us to look at on
17 e-court. This is not quite an original, but it does say
18 Carrington-Cutileiro. It's been somewhat modified, but do you agree
19 there is no continuity here, neither of the Serb, Muslim, or Croat
20 territories, that the territory has been discontinued of the constituent
22 A. But let me just say that this map, the Cutileiro map, whether
23 this is it or not I don't know, it seems to be, is simply a map that
24 showed the relative ethnic majority in each municipality, presumably on
25 the basis of the 1991 census. That's what this looks like. And the
1 Court can see what here are described as cantons which, I think, is a
2 term not used in the document we were looking at. I think they were
3 referred to as constituent units. Are not -- the cantons of the three
4 peoples are not all contiguous.
5 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, I didn't see.
6 Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Just to -- first of all,
8 wondering if the Defence could identify all the ways that this document
9 has been modified and perhaps indicate to us the reason for using a
10 modified document in the circumstances.
11 JUDGE KWON: Can you help us, Mr. Karadzic?
12 [Defence counsel confer]
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we didn't modify it. 1D00 --
14 and the number there. We downloaded it. The original document was
15 written -- was drawn by hand, 782, page 4, the previous document, please.
16 It's similar. This is just technically more sophisticated. I just
17 brought it up so that we could see that it was accepted that three
18 constituent units didn't mean territorial unit -- continuity.
19 Contiguity. This is the original document. Can we turn it around?
20 JUDGE KWON: The previous map allegedly modified, Mr. Tieger, was
21 it not one that was already admitted as -- into evidence, D --
22 MR. TIEGER: I can't say offhand, Your Honour, but we'll
23 certainly check immediately.
24 JUDGE KWON: That's D91. But as such -- we can proceed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Dr. Treanor, would you please look and see if you agree that what
3 was -- that this is the hand-drawn map as a component part of the
4 agreement and that the other one we showed was just more sophisticated in
5 technical terms, more perfect in technical terms, but that this is the
6 hand-drawn map?
7 A. Well, I certainly recognise the hand-drawn map. I would have
8 to -- as the Court can see, it's not very user-friendly. And I would
9 have to examine it and the other map side by side in some detail to see
10 whether it's -- the modified map is accurate in that respect, but in
11 general terms it seems to be. Again, this is a map that shows the
12 relative majorities of the three principal peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 by municipality.
14 Q. Thank you. We have time to look at D302 to see how enthusiastic
15 we all were about avoiding a war. D302 to see how high-ranking official
16 of the Party of Democratic Action, a deputy in the Federal Republic of --
17 federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, Irfan Ajanovic, comments on the agreement
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we see the highlighted portion
20 and then the translation of that highlighted portion on the second half
21 of the screen. And we need the translation as well. The title is:
22 "Reactions in the SDA to the fifth round on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
23 Muslims are satisfied with the statehood agreed."
24 And now can we zoom in to the Serbian. Thank you. It says:
25 "That he commented and as the porte-parole spokesperson he said
1 that the Muslim nation in its constituent unit or future ethnic canton
2 would be a majority of 82 per cent represented, while the Serbian people
3 would comprise only 50 per cent ..."
4 And he goes on to list the advantages of the agreement and that
5 the Muslim side fared well in the agreement as did Croatia, if a little
6 less so, whereas the Serbian side fared worst, came out of it worse.
7 And now may we have D303 displayed --
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic, it is time to rise for
9 us. Could you put a question and finish for today.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought it was part of the same
11 question. May we just take one minute to look at 303?
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Dr. Treanor, "The SDA to renounce the Sarajevo agreement." And
15 that was the 26th of March, from the 18th to the 26th of March.
16 "After all the jubilation and celebration that was held, the SDA
17 renounces the agreement that we had already reached ..."
18 Did you note and underline and stress in your report that the
19 agreement was reached and needed to be further elaborated but that one
20 week later the SDA pulled out, renounced it?
21 A. Yes, I believe that is in the report. I believe I mentioned the
22 fact that both agreements, the so-called Lisbon Agreement in February and
23 the Sarajevo Agreement in March were both later rejected by the SDA.
24 Q. Thank you. On that same page it says that the -- a thousand
25 shells from Croatia fell on Bosanski Brod. Did you know that we were
1 negotiating and that political life was evolving under a spray of shells
2 falling from Croatia?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we zoom in to the Serbian.
4 Zoom out, please. Sorry, zoom out.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Believe me when I say that it says
7 "A thousand shells have so far fallen on Bosanski Brod ..."
8 Did you know that that's how life was? And it goes on to say
9 that shells fell on Derventa too.
10 A. Yes, I'm aware that that was happening at that time.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll have that portion translated
13 as well, from the paper "Politika," with the Trial Chamber's permission.
14 And with that I have completed my examination for today.
15 JUDGE KWON: I wanted to note that this document referred to as
16 D303 is the one that has not been admitted, that was denied, that's
17 marked as not admitted. You tender -- you used it with Dr. Donia, but
18 I -- the e-court says it was never admitted. But we'll continue
20 Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: I just wanted to mention, Your Honour, the
22 scheduling proposal --
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 MR. TIEGER: -- for later this month is -- we don't see any
25 problem with that.
1 JUDGE KWON: So instead of 16th, we'll be sitting on 24th,
2 Friday --
3 MR. TIEGER: That's as we understood it and we didn't identify
4 any --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we adopt the document -- admit
7 JUDGE KWON: Likewise, in the case of Mr. Donia, I don't think
8 there's a basis for us to admit this with this witness.
9 We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But he confirmed it,
11 Your Excellency, he confirmed that he knows they were first happy about
12 it and then they reneged on it, both documents confirm it.
13 JUDGE KWON: Let's deal with it tomorrow.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 8th day of
17 June, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.