Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 14396

 1                           Wednesday, 8 June 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  I understand that you have

 6     something to raise before the witness enters the courtroom.

 7             Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency.  Thank you.

 9     Good morning to everyone.

10             Before we start this working day, I would like to repeat once

11     again because the transcript recorded the numbers of paragraphs and

12     references to these documents wrong.  We asked for 40 hours, reckoning

13     that the report of this witness, including more than a thousand

14     paragraphs and several thousand references and documents, is too

15     important and practically blended with the indictment so that one cannot

16     really distinguish between the report, the indictment, and the

17     pre-trial brief.  The witness confirmed himself that he was an

18     investigator first and he cannot pin-point the moment when he was made an

19     expert, and he was made an expert because it was too expensive to engage

20     a different expert.

21             The Defence cannot properly challenge this material unless we are

22     given enough time.  Each of these things can be disputed if we get enough

23     time.  We need at least an increase of time by one-third to prove why the

24     report is wrong and what it should really look like.  I'm afraid we would

25     jeopardise the integrity of this process if we treat such important

Page 14397

 1     witnesses and such important material like this and if we are unable to

 2     challenge them.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber is of the view that nine hours is more

 4     than sufficient to cover all the important issues, and I think my

 5     understanding is that you have two and a half hours for today.  And at

 6     the end of the session we'll see whether it would be necessary to give

 7     you the two sessions, but that's it for the moment.

 8             Let's bring in the witness.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, can I raise one quick matter?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             MR. TIEGER:  The Prosecution intends to respond to the 49th and

12     50th disclosure motions forthwith, but we have endeavoured to aggregate

13     those and respond to the two motions together in light of that.  We would

14     orally at this point seek an extension for the word limit for that

15     particular response that addresses both motions to approximately

16     5300 words.  I have raised that matter with Mr. Robinson.  The Defence

17     has no objection.

18             JUDGE KWON:  It's granted, Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Also, Mr. President, I'd like to let you know that

20     we join in the motion for admission of documents from the bar table that

21     the Prosecutor filed yesterday and we won't be filing anything in

22     writing.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we're waiting for the

25     witness, may I remind everyone that we didn't admit D303.  I would like

Page 14398

 1     to remind that on page 14393, beginning with line 21, this witness

 2     confirmed that both agreements from February and March were accepted by

 3     the Muslim side, by the SDA, and then reneged on.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I would just note, Mr. President, that that

 6     same document was raised, as I believe the Court noted, with Dr. Donia.

 7     The issue of --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  The witness can be brought in.

 9             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

10             MR. TIEGER:  The issue of whether there was an agreement in

11     principle, and then backing away is -- is not particularly at issue and

12     was contained, I believe, in the witness's reports and testimony.  So in

13     light of the backdrop to this particular document that the Court noted

14     and is aware of, if the accused is seeking to have that document

15     admitted, it would appear that the Court's interest is in ensuring that

16     the document has been addressed and that that brief reference to a matter

17     that is broadly raised and has not been contested I understood did not

18     seem sufficient for the Court, particularly in light of the issues raised

19     in previous testimony about it.

20                           [The witness takes the stand]

21             JUDGE KWON:  I understand that D303 is a "Politika" article.  The

22     reason why we did not admit it through Dr. Donia was that Dr. Donia was

23     not able to give any confirmation as to the article itself or to the

24     content thereof.  But in this case the witness was able to comment upon

25     that, and as such, we would admit it.  And then that will be fully

Page 14399

 1     admitted.

 2             Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4                           WITNESS:  PATRICK TREANOR [Resumed]

 5                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

 6        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Treanor.

 7        A.   Good morning, Dr. Karadzic.

 8        Q.   Do you agree that the Law on Internal Affairs of the Serbian

 9     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina enacted on 28th of February was

10     adopted based on the agreements already reached about the powers of the

11     constituent units?

12        A.   No, I wouldn't agree.

13        Q.   Please look at paragraph 28 [as interpreted] on page 62 of your

14     document, 65 ter 592.  You say:

15             [In English] "Karadzic seemed to recognise this, telling the

16     SDS Deputies Club on 28th of February, 'Please, until two or three months

17     ago we were hoping to be able to play the Yugoslav card and to say the

18     Yugoslav Army, Yugoslav legality,'" et cetera, "'this is slipping out of

19     our grasp.  This is why we started on another task, a Serbian Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina, our sovereign right, our army.  We are preparing the

21     constitutional framework to be able to have immediately and on the basis

22     of the negotiations in Lisbon, to have a national guard, to have our own

23     police force, to have a government, to turn the Yugoslav Army into the

24     Army of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina ...'"

25             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.  It's paragraph 95.  The

Page 14400

 1     record got it wrong and the page is 62.

 2             You quote in your report yourself what I said to the deputies,

 3     namely, that we cannot play the Yugoslav card anymore, that we should

 4     play the card of our sovereign rights in Bosnia, and that we would be

 5     working to prepare the constitution that would give us the right to a

 6     national government, a police force, an army based on the

 7     Lisbon Agreement?

 8             Do you remember the section in the Lisbon Agreement about the

 9     jurisdiction of different entities implies that we would have our own

10     police force?

11        A.   Yes, but there was no agreement.  It was denounced shortly after

12     it was reached and it was -- so there was no final agreement and I don't

13     think it was even framed as a final agreement.  It was very similar to

14     the later agreement which was simply bases for negotiation.  The

15     preparation and the establishment of separate Bosnian Serb institutions

16     had been going on, as we've seen in the course of my testimony, for quite

17     some months.  And indeed, meetings were held -- or at least one meeting

18     was held as early as October 1991 on establishing a separate -- a Serbian

19     Ministry of Internal Affairs in Bosnia.  So I don't see the adoption of

20     this particular law as in any way executing or being based on the -- the

21     Lisbon -- so-called Lisbon Agreement.

22        Q.   Dr. Treanor, you confirmed yesterday that the only thing left to

23     negotiate on were maps, that maps should be specified.  Do you remember

24     that the Serbs were prepared to accept the independence of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina although they had been deceived and that their basic

Page 14401

 1     condition was not met, that they should have their constituent unit?

 2     That's what Ajanovic himself thinks.

 3        A.   Well, I don't know if I said the only thing left to be negotiated

 4     were the maps.  The Sarajevo Agreement paper that we saw included a great

 5     number of points, including the map, all of which were to serve as a

 6     basis for further negotiations.  So I'm under the impression that even on

 7     the basis of that document, if it had been adhered to, negotiations could

 8     have continued in relation to all those points that we saw yesterday.

 9     The agreement was basically denounced rather quickly by both the Muslim

10     and Croatian sides.

11        Q.   Dr. Treanor, the Croatian side never denounced the agreement.

12     The agreement was called "Agreed Principles."  There were no more

13     negotiations about that.  Only the map was to be negotiated.

14        A.   Well, again, I can only refer to the text of the document.  It

15     says right at the end of the document that it's to serve as a basis for

16     further negotiations, and the negotiations did continue in Brussels on

17     March the 30th or 31st.

18        Q.   I don't know if my question was recorded fully on the transcript.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see D269 in e-court, just in

20     English.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Dr. Treanor, while we're waiting for the document, we saw how the

23     constitutional crisis developed in Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,

24     how Yugoslavia came into being, how Bosnia and Herzegovina came into

25     being, and what its nature was as the republic of three different

Page 14402

 1     peoples.  Now let's see the evolution of my state of mind that you had an

 2     insight into and you were able to include it in your report.

 3             Let's look at this document on the screen.

 4             [In English] "The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina was formed last week /or last Sunday/ in Sarajevo.

 6     Dr. Radovan Karadzic was elected its leader," and so on.

 7             "What are the programme and organisational and political

 8     characteristics of the SDS ..."

 9             [Interpretation] Would you please look at this.  Just cast a

10     glance at this to see how the state of mind of Radovan Karadzic evolved

11     over this crisis.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at page 68 --

13     sorry, page 8 in English.  Page 8 in English.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   "The Serbs and Muslims are basically not in a conflict of

16     interest.  Regardless of what may happen, the Serbs and the Muslims will

17     always live in a common state and they know how and they will know in

18     future how to live together.  There is no need for a third party to fix

19     things between them."

20             This was an interview given to the weekly "Nin."  It was on the

21     20th of July, 1990, a week after the establishment of the Serbian

22     Democratic Party.  I gave an interview to the weekly "Nin" of Belgrade,

23     saying how I see the new era in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

24             JUDGE KWON:  So what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 14403

 1        Q.   Did Dr. Treanor take into account this interview as one of the

 2     earliest interviews where I expressed my political views on the

 3     co-existence of Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia.

 4        A.   Well, yes, I've read this interview.  I can't recall offhand

 5     whether it's cited in any of my reports, but the view that we see

 6     expressed here is reflective of what I believe I said in my testimony so

 7     far, that is, originally the wish of the Bosnian Serbs was for the whole

 8     of Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain a republic in Yugoslavia.  At this

 9     time, that is, in July 1990, preparations were being made for the first

10     multi-party elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The main opponent at

11     those elections was seen, I believe, by all the newly formed

12     non-Communist party as being the Communist party.  They were afraid that

13     there would be very sorts of chicanery and fraud, perhaps, to try to

14     steal the election for the Communists.  And the non-Communist parties in

15     this case or concretely the main parties, the SDS, the SDA, and the HDZ,

16     formed a coalition in order to help prevent that, to guarantee that the

17     non-Communists would have a majority and they at this point in time were

18     all being very nice to each other.  There was no reason for them not to

19     be nice to each other --

20        Q.   With all due respect, Dr. Treanor, my question is:  Did you note

21     and record in your report the initial political views of Radovan Karadzic

22     on the co-existence of the Serbs and Muslims and was the SDA at that

23     moment also in favour of Yugoslavia?  Did you put it in your report, the

24     state of mind of Radovan Karadzic?

25             This was a week after the establishment of the party.  No

Page 14404

 1     challenges, no threats; other people threatened Yugoslavia, the Muslims

 2     and the SDA.  How did my attitude to the crisis evolve?  The basic

 3     question:  Did you take this into account and did you put in your report

 4     the evolution of my state of mind?  Did you record this initial view I

 5     held on co-existence?

 6        A.   Well, again, I think the basic position of the SDS at this time

 7     on -- wishing that Bosnia remain in -- as a whole in Yugoslavia is

 8     included in the report.  As I said, I have -- I have read this interview

 9     and I at this point can't remember exactly what might be said about it in

10     particular, but nevertheless, the fundamental point that the SDS wished

11     that the whole of Bosnia remain in BH is reflected in the reports.  And

12     I've noted the -- the change that took place in their immediate goals

13     after the plebiscite.  The plebiscite confirmed that the --

14        Q.   Doctor, sir, please, I am indicted here, not the SDS.  I am

15     indicted for intolerance towards Croats and Muslims, and this is the

16     declaration of Radovan Karadzic on Muslims and Croats that you did not

17     put in your report.  I'm saying that we have no disagreement with the

18     Muslims and that we can live together with them.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 40129, please.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it is not you that is giving evidence

21     now.  Put your questions.  The last comment is improper, I would say.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I'm in a hurry

23     because I have no time and the witness is using up my time.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Please, Dr. Treanor, are you aware that I am indicted -- I'm

Page 14405

 1     accused of being intolerant towards the Muslims?  And here you have my

 2     view recorded on how I actually viewed co-existence with the Muslims.

 3     When did you -- where did you see that I was intolerant towards the

 4     Muslims?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, that's the question asked and

 6     answered.  Please move on.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Document 40129.  65 ter 40129.  Can

 8     it be shown, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Before that I would like to ask you, in your testimony in the

11     Brdjanin case on page 21034, lines 12 through 18 of the transcript:

12             [In English] "We put in the report what we believed to be

13     relevant, within the scope of trying to keep the report to a reasonable

14     length.  If we got involved in putting in a footnote or something, every

15     document that we could possibly find on every issue, it would be a

16     massive and unwieldy report and certain a massive and unwieldy

17     documentary annex to the report.  One of the duties is certainly to keep

18     our eyes open for any exculpatory evidence."

19             [Interpretation] Now I'm asking you, Dr. Treanor, did you meet

20     that obligation?  Did you note what I'm going to put to you now as I put

21     concerning the previous document, my views on these issues, especially

22     our co-existence with the Muslims?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 4, please.  4 in English and

24     3 in Serbian.  0:27:38 is the time.  Radovan Karadzic says:

25             "Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished Assembly, this plot to

Page 14406

 1     separate Yugoslavia had begun.  With the new constitutions in Slovenia

 2     and Croatia ... the final blows are being inflicted on Yugoslavia which

 3     is expecting to" --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic give the interpreters a

 5     reference, please.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters are struggling to find the

 7     reference.  I think it's time code 00:27:38.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Yes, thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

10             Next page of the Serbian, please.

11             "The former generals, the current statesmen of our republic, are

12     threatening the Serbian people with civil war.  The Serbian people should

13     not be threatened with civil war.  They will take that seriously.  It is

14     absolutely clear to us against whom General Tudjman would be waging the

15     civil war ..."

16             And then further down:

17             "They changed the essence of the borders, the quality and nature

18     of our internal borders.  So the administrative lines which are supposed

19     to join us have been transformed or will soon be transformed into firm

20     state borders which separate us.  The gentlemen are interested in the

21     shape of the border and whether the border is on this or the other side

22     of the stream or field rather than in preserving the nature of those

23     borders which are internal, administrative lines between brotherly

24     peoples ..."

25             Now, in that speech delivered at that Assembly, did you take note

Page 14407

 1     and record that position of mine?  Or did you decide on your own that

 2     this is not exculpatory material?

 3        A.   Well, again, I think this document may be referenced in the

 4     reports, but it certainly reflects the view that I have put forward in

 5     the reports, that the SDS wished to keep the whole of Bosnia within

 6     Yugoslavia.  I --

 7        Q.   The Defence considers --

 8        A.   -- I believe that the -- one thing I can recall specifically on

 9     this is the speech of Mr. Milosevic in which he refers to this issue of

10     administrative borders not being suitable for being international

11     borders.

12        Q.   Dr. Treanor, it is my state of mind here and my conduct and

13     behaviour.  So your report - and it's hundreds of paragraphs - refers to

14     me.  And it was your duty, you were duty-bound, to record everything that

15     went to my advantage which you did not do.  Let me ask you:  Did you have

16     access to this document?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender it into evidence?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1280, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 938 next,

23     please.  Page 2 of the English, please, and of the Serbian.  It has been

24     translated into English.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 14408

 1        Q.   Now, it says:

 2             "The position of the Serbs in Yugoslavia."

 3             It's a public rally of the Serbian Democratic Party held in the

 4     middle of Sarajevo.  Mrs. Plavsic, Koljevic, and so on were present, held

 5     a lecture on the position of the Serbs in BH.  And then it says:

 6             "It is -- tragic is the fate of a country which demands the

 7     rejecting of any people let alone the biggest one as in the case of

 8     Yugoslavia.  When they asked me as a psychologist if the Serbs fear that

 9     all the other people are against them is irrational, I maintain that it

10     is not."

11             And then I go on to say:

12             "The Serbs cannot allow the Muslims to be proclaimed a majority

13     people on the basis of the Ustasha genocide against the Serbs in

14     World War II before which the Serbs were the majority people in Bosnia.

15     We are a state-building people even if we are just 5, let alone

16     31 per cent" --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic kindly slow down.  Thank

18     you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we see the bottom of that

20     English page, please.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   And now on civil war, I say:

23             "I consider there will not be a civil war."

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page for the English, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 14409

 1        Q.    "My opinion is that it won't happen because the Serbs won't

 2     start the skirmish first and the others are afraid to.  No one has reason

 3     to fear the Serbs if they have no misdeeds against them."

 4             Did you note this and record it in your report?

 5        A.   No.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this into evidence,

 7     please.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1281, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 30027,

11     please.  30027.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Take a look at this next document.  It's a talk between

14     President Milosevic and me, a conversation held on the 29th of May, 1991,

15     and the long paragraph at the bottom, if we could focus on that.  I'm

16     informing President Milosevic there that Izetbegovic suddenly came out

17     with a surprising proposal loud and clear, never louder and clearer than

18     he did then, and he proposed that we divide up Bosnia and that we were

19     astounded to hear that.  Then we discussed what we should do.  They said

20     that we don't want to leave the -- we said we don't want to leave the

21     federal Yugoslavia.  They don't want to stay in federal Yugoslavia, and

22     then today we continued the talks, and so on and so forth.

23             Now, did you take note of this conversation where I am saying

24     that Izetbegovic came out with a proposal to divide Bosnia?

25        A.   I don't think that this conversation is cited in the report, no.

Page 14410

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we move on to the next page,

 3     please, both in English and in Serbian.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   President Milosevic asks whether he wants to unite with Croatia

 6     towards the end there, and in English -- and then on next page.

 7             "I don't think he wants to unite with Croatia.  He wants to use

 8     Croatia to leave Yugoslavia because he wanted -- he wants an enclave."

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   "He'd like to see -- to have one as a Muslim enclave in the

12     valley of the river Bosna, which I think he needs for the Arab world."

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page in Serbian, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   He says:  Yes, yes."

16             And then Karadzic goes on to say:

17             "Of course it would be a difficult negotiation and a great

18     problem, how to use each principle.  We didn't want to leave and we still

19     believe that it would be a pity if Bosnia were to be divided.  That is

20     our basic stand, and when it comes to it, we will announce that

21     everybody, every party, should announce their own position."

22             Did you know this position of ours, that we thought it was a pity

23     to divide Bosnia?  And this is the end of May 1991.

24        A.   Well, again, I said that I don't believe this particular

25     conversation is referenced in the report.  What seems to be under

Page 14411

 1     discussion here is the Bosnian Serb desire for the whole of Bosnia to

 2     remain within Yugoslavia.  On the other hand, Izetbegovic does seem to

 3     be, as I think we've discussed here, pushing for independence from

 4     Yugoslavia and perhaps offering as a sweetener for such a deal on the

 5     part of the Bosnian Serbs to have some sort of regionalisation.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now go down a bit on that

 8     page where Radovan Karadzic says:

 9             "All right, but now the situation is -- well, I think he is very

10     cunning.  He doesn't say what he -- those ultimate moves.  Those last

11     moves of his, the last intentions of an Islamic Republic.  And he is

12     hiding behind the state and citizens and there he is walking hand in hand

13     with the communists."

14             Next page, please, in both versions.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   And Karadzic says:

17             "Well, I'm afraid, you see, you saw what happened with the army

18     and with Tudjman, right?  I'm afraid they're going to announce a

19     unification and ask for assistance from Tudjman."

20             Did you include the Islamic Declaration in your report and the

21     state of mind of the Muslim leadership with respect to the administration

22     of the country?

23        A.   Mr. Izetbegovic's Islamic Declaration, I don't think that's in

24     the report, no.  The interesting thing that is reflected here is the view

25     of Dr. Karadzic of Mr. Izetbegovic as being an unreliable negotiating

Page 14412

 1     partner.  Indeed, Mr. Izetbegovic seemed to make sudden reversals on any

 2     number of occasions, some of which we have discussed here, including the

 3     rejection of the Sarajevo -- the Lisbon and the Sarajevo Agreements

 4     during the Cutileiro negotiations.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Then Karadzic says:

 6             "And then to accuse the Serbs of keeping them as hostages in

 7     Yugoslavia," and they're referring to this possible alliance between

 8     Tudjman and Izetbegovic.

 9             "To accuse the Serbs of keeping them as hostages in Yugoslavia or

10     that they're keeping them as -- or that they want to break up Bosnia in

11     any way for whatever.  Their biggest concern is to accuse us and we're

12     not giving them any reason for that."

13             And then somewhat lower down Karadzic goes on to say that:

14             "Recognition for the top-most organs of power, that will be a

15     nice thing.  And I don't know what's happening with the army.  Are they

16     aware of how well armed they are?"

17             And then further down:

18             "This morning we caught a truck with arms and the policemen sort

19     of clouded the issue.  I cannot trace it anywhere."

20             And then further down:

21             "The Muslims are arming themselves."

22             Doctor, did you know that Izetbegovic and Tudjman in June 1991

23     concluded a secret agreement and included President Kucan into that, a

24     secret alliance against Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's Army?

25        A.   June 1991, I can't recall that.

Page 14413

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that the Muslim officials considered

 2     that Bosnia should enter into war the moment that Croatia entered into

 3     war and that they made statements to that effect and that we have those

 4     statements?

 5        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.  I thought the position of the SDA at

 6     least was to remain neutral in the war, that is, the war going on in

 7     Croatia.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document to be MFI'd.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D1282, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now can we look at D270 for a brief

13     moment.  It's already been admitted but just to refresh our memories.

14     D270.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   This is a conversation between myself and Vitomir Zepinic, the

17     Serbian deputy of the joint foreign minister.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 10 of the English, please.

19             THE WITNESS:  The minister of internal affairs, not foreign

20     minister.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Well, I hope I said "internal affairs."  He was the deputy of the

23     minister of internal affairs on behalf of the Serbian people.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] English 10, Serbian 7.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 14414

 1        Q.   This is what I say:

 2             "I have to tell you this.  Tomorrow I won't be able to be able to

 3     keep the Assembly together.  In particular, I won't be able to keep the

 4     Serbian deputies together if things happen, things happen which the

 5     Serbian party in power, the ruling party ... it's the ruling party, it's

 6     not an outsider but a party that holds 35.65 per cent of the power."

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page in the English,

 8     please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And it says:

11             "They are preparing for war.  They have prepared a staff, and you

12     don't know about that, you don't know where their staff is."

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page in the Serbian, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   "They organised parallel television.  Alija as already given TV

16     statements from his war studio for the Yugoslav network.  We know all

17     about that.  There is a huge number of armed people, there are

18     preparations for war, preparations for war, there are drills to block

19     barracks, there are counter-manoeuvres being carried out by the army,

20     Armija, and here they are going to war and the Serbs will no longer ...

21     tomorrow after the Assembly will resolve the issue of Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina ... they want the unlawful way although we've proved to them

23     that they cannot legally or politically carry that out.  We have told

24     them to use the constitutional procedure to change the constitution, but

25     they have no chance."

Page 14415

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.    "They have no chance with the international public or with the

 4     legal system.  All they can do is trick us, but the Serbs will not allow

 5     them to do that tomorrow.  And one of the fires I had to put out these

 6     days was the MUP issue, and tomorrow the deputies will certainly open up

 7     the issue of MUP."

 8             Now, did you have access to this intercepted conversation and did

 9     you take it on board and include it in your report, our knowledge that in

10     June everything was, in fact, prepared for war?

11        A.   I'm not sure when this intercept was acquired, but in principle I

12     had access to everything.  I certainly did not cite these passages in the

13     report.  It's possible that the conversation itself may have been cited.

14     I think there's some discussion in the report, in the original report, of

15     some of the difficulties with MUP and Bosnian Serb dissatisfaction with

16     what was going on there, especially with personnel issues.  That's all I

17     can say on that.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we look at the next page for a

20     brief moment, please.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   And here it says:

23             "Tomorrow is the question of the fate of BH, of Bosnia," Karadzic

24     speaking.  "I have no chance or way to change anything.  Neither the

25     people nor the deputies would accept any exception.  Bosnia will remain

Page 14416

 1     in Yugoslavia until some of its peoples decide differently.  And this

 2     will be seen clearly tomorrow.  Tomorrow maybe the political system ...

 3     BH might collapse and then it will be chaos, but we can't do anything to

 4     help.  We can't bow our heads.  No chance of us doing that.  We had no

 5     chance to change anything, nor do we have the right to do so.  And if

 6     something is done which the people will not accept, there will be chaos

 7     in Bosnia."

 8             Now, this has already been admitted, but I just wanted to remind

 9     you of what the situation was like.  And I'm talking to the deputy police

10     minister who ought to know what was going on in the country.  And you

11     have not included this portion in your report either, have you?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now let's look at D271, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   This is a conversation between me and Dr. Vukic, the regional

17     head of the SDS for Krajina.  And throughout this conversation I'm

18     criticising them for helping Izetbegovic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 2 of the English

20     and page 3 of the Serbian.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Third line from the top, page 2 in English.  I say:

23             "I think that it's clear now that Izetbegovic wants war.  "

24             And a little further down I'm criticising the late Babic and

25     saying:

Page 14417

 1             "Well, he is playing into the hands of this warmongering

 2     Izetbegovic."

 3             Now, do you know that I had to fight a battle with my peripheral

 4     organs, party organs, to have them act in conformity with the law so as

 5     not to give Izetbegovic a pretext for his warmongering?

 6        A.   If you're referring to the movement in Bosnian Krajina to unite

 7     with the Croatian Krajina, I was certainly aware of that and it was

 8     discussed in the report -- in the -- I believe in the leadership study.

 9     Perhaps there's something in the original report as well.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to page 6 of the

12     English and 7 of the Serbian.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Karadzic says:

15             "No, no.  You can say that I talked to them and said that Alija

16     was preparing for war and that he was seeking assistance for war ..."

17             And I go on to say:

18             "... because I'll accuse" -- after swearing I say:

19             "... because I'll accuse them all of giving an incentive for

20     Alija Izetbegovic to start the war."

21             Now, this answer:

22             "There are forces in Bosnia who know that they can't go ahead

23     without war and they need a pretext for the war to put the blame on

24     someone else.  We must not give them this pretext."

25             And then:

Page 14418

 1             "That's the basic thing, otherwise international law and our own

 2     constitutional law is on our side."

 3             Now, Dr. Treanor, am I advocating war here or am I advocating the

 4     avoidance of war?

 5        A.   Well, I think what's going on here is citing arguments that were

 6     used with the people in Bosnian Krajina who wanted to go ahead and in

 7     order to -- with their unification with Croatian Krajina.  To prevent

 8     them from doing that, these types of arguments were used.

 9        Q.   And were arguments used which were in favour of war or against

10     war?  Am I striving for peace and not creating causes for war?

11        A.   Well, yes, that's basically what the argument is here, yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have D273 next, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   These are stenographic notes from the Assembly of the SDS of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 12th of July, 1991.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to page 133 in English

18     and 120 in Serbian.  In e-court it's page 120 in Serbian, that's right,

19     and it's the right page in English towards the top, the second paragraph

20     in English.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   "You see that this struggle is being fought in the parliament.

23     It's good that it's being fought in the parliament rather than the

24     streets.  We will not do anything that would lead to the fight spilling

25     over into the streets."

Page 14419

 1             Did you know about this speech?  Did you note this position I

 2     took, that everything had to be kept within the parliament, that

 3     everything had to be done to prevent war?

 4        A.   I don't believe this passage is cited in any of the reports.  The

 5     document itself is, of course, referenced and used.  I would just remind

 6     the Court that at this time, early July 1991, shortly after the

 7     declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, the outbreak of

 8     fighting in Slovenia and growing tension in Croatia, the JNA was

 9     attempting to mobilise in order to move militarily against Slovenia

10     initially, that was something that the SDS leadership favoured

11     co-operating with, that is, the mobilisation effort; whereas their

12     Croatian and Muslim partners in the Government of BH did not want to

13     assist in that war.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see D274.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   We're still in July, it's a telephone conversation between

18     Radovan Karadzic and Dr. Dragan Djokanovic who was the president of the

19     democratic party of federalists, a different party but a pro-Yugoslav

20     one.  On page 1 in English and Serbian, line 4, Radovan Karadzic says:

21             "Because Alija has nowhere to go now.  It's a dead end.  All the

22     legal side is in our hands.  And now if they mess up somewhere, Muslims

23     will turn with a vengeance against Alija's intention to go to war."

24             We can see -- we can all see that I'm criticising here people on

25     our side who are doing stupid things and giving Alija a trump card.  And

Page 14420

 1     now I'm speaking about the Muslim masses.

 2             "Those who don't want to go to war, they have a republic.  They

 3     have no reason to leave Yugoslavia.  Alija wants to change that.  He

 4     wants to go to war and now he cannot explain to the Muslim people why

 5     should go to war, but if these people do something stupid, then he can

 6     say:  Here is the reason why we should go to war."

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in

 8     Serbian.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   "Now he only needs an alibi for war.  We should not help him find

11     one."

12             Do you agree that this is permanent contribution, permanent

13     advocacy, against the war on my part?

14        A.   Well, I don't know if -- permanent advocacy, I wouldn't say that.

15     It's certainly advocating a position at this particular time when there

16     was a war going on in Croatia and there was growing tension in Bosnia.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D276 is the next document I would

18     like to ask for.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   This is from August, 276.  August telephone conversation between

21     Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik.  Page 2 in both Serbian and

22     English.

23             If you remember, at that time we were talking to

24     Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Mr. Filipovic about a historic Serb-Muslim

25     agreement and Krajisnik says:

Page 14421

 1             "I was thinking last night.  Zulfikarpasic was so convincing,

 2     actually he's getting the maximum for his people."

 3             And a bit further down Karadzic says:

 4             "I think that our hawks can be sorry that they went too.  There

 5     are some of our people too who say, 'Well, let them start,'" then a

 6     profanity, "'so that we can finish it once and for all.'"

 7             And then:

 8             "Many of our own people will be disappointed if we reach an

 9     agreement with the Muslims."

10             And a bit further down, Karadzic says:

11             "Izetbegovic does not care about territory.  He cares about

12     quality.  If it's 300 square metres, let it be 300 square metres.  All he

13     wants is an Islamic state, whereas Zulfikarpasic wants a normal

14     republic."

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And then we need page 3.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   We can see it all.  I'm saying that it's a huge turnabout that

18     the Muslim people should declare their preference for Alija or for Adil,

19     Adil meaning Zulfikarpasic.  I don't need to read it all.  We can all see

20     it for ourselves.  And then page 4, Karadzic says:

21             "We don't want to fight you anymore.  If you go, we will vote

22     against but we will not fight."

23             Did you review and did you take into account our position taken

24     here against the war and in favour of a historic Muslim-Serb agreement

25     aimed at avoiding the war?

Page 14422

 1        A.   Well, the historic -- so-called historic agreement is discussed

 2     in the -- certainly in the leadership study.  The -- and actions by the

 3     hawks that Dr. Karadzic is referring to I believe refers to efforts such

 4     as the one in Bosnian Krajina to unite with Croatian Krajina and that

 5     would have upset the -- those negotiations in his view.  So he opposed

 6     that.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did you notice in Zulfikarpasic's and Filipovic's

 8     work that Mr. Izetbegovic supported this initiative and the negotiations

 9     throughout July up to August of that year and then he withdrew his

10     support from this historic agreement?

11        A.   Yes.  Again, one of the instances of Izetbegovic suddenly

12     changing his opinion, his stand.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D279 is the next document, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is my conversation with a friend, a private person,

16     Gojko Djogo from Belgrade but originally from Bosnia and Herzegovina, on

17     the 12th of October, 1991, concerning this key session of the Assembly

18     when the declaration of independence was made without the Serbian MPs.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 2 in both

20     languages.  Line 6 or 7 from the top.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   "In the Assembly, Alija Izetbegovic took the floor two or

23     three times and then I had to respond."

24             Djogo says:

25             "Brilliant.  They say you told them, 'Gentlemen, we are not going

Page 14423

 1     to and you do what you please.'"

 2             Karadzic says:

 3             "We are letting them, however they are preparing for war.  They

 4     will try to wage a war here.

 5             "Probably as soon as next week."

 6             That means that we are expecting even in mid-October that they

 7     will start a war.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 3, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And he asks:

11             "Where are they supposed to go to war?"

12             And I'm saying:

13             "They're completely nuts."

14             What I'm asking you is:  Were you aware of the level of their

15     military organisation, the level of equipment and weapons they had

16     already in the summer of that year; and if you had known that, would that

17     have made a difference to your report?

18        A.   I think we have already dealt with that issue, and I responded

19     "no" to a similar question.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 65 ter 30401 --

21     65 ter 30406.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   This is a telephone conversation between Radovan Karadzic and

24     Vojo Kupresanin on the 5th of November, just before our plebiscite.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 3 in English and

Page 14424

 1     in Serbian.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Kupresanin says:

 4             "They are copying, every municipality is making copies and they

 5     are all interested, everyone's interested.  All the ordinary people are

 6     very interested ... even the Muslims are very interested."

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in

 8     Serbian.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   "I wonder what it's all about," says he.

11             And I say:

12             "Well, they want to vote.  The people see that Croatia is falling

13     to pieces."

14             And he says:

15             "Quite unexpected.  I personally had about 20 phone calls today

16     from Muslims."

17             And Karadzic says:

18             "Yes, yes, the people want to continue living with us."

19             Is it clear, Dr. Treanor, that we are looking forward to

20     continuing to live together with the Muslims in a common Bosnia and a

21     common Yugoslavia?

22        A.   I think I've said any number of times that that was the goal

23     of -- the original goal certainly of the SDS, to keep the whole of Bosnia

24     within Yugoslavia.  I believe the exact results of the Serbian plebiscite

25     are cited in the report, indicating how many -- among other things, how

Page 14425

 1     many non-Serbs did vote in that plebiscite.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be MFI'd because of our

 4     well-known position on intercepts.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D1283, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see D301 for a moment.

 8     D301.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This is a conversation of the 22nd January 1992, before the

11     joint Assembly session in Bosnia and Herzegovina between Jovica Stanisic

12     and Radovan Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need Serbian page 11 and

14     English page 21.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Karadzic speaking:

17             "On Friday or Thursday we have a meeting of the Deputies Club.

18     We have to prepare very well.  Perhaps our delegation will go to the

19     joint Assembly session ..."

20             And then further down he says:

21             "If the Muslims wanted, we can deal with everything peacefully to

22     everyone's satisfaction, but if not, chaos will begin."

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the next page in English.  We

24     need page 21 in English, towards the bottom.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 14426

 1        Q.   "If the Muslims are willing, we can deal with everything

 2     peacefully so that everyone is satisfied, and if they don't, there will

 3     be chaos."

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page in Serbian, please.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   "So that everything is up to them now.  I believe they would not

 7     be displeased.  In fact, I think they could be very happy ..."

 8             And then the conversation goes on to deal with something in

 9     Turkey, there was some talks going on in Turkey.  And it says:

10             "We have to move with the speed of lightning.  All these talks

11     were in the framework of a conference."

12             Do you agree that these talks with Mr. Vance and Mr. Carrington

13     were taking place even before February, and here in January it says we

14     have to continue the conference on Bosnia?

15        A.   Yes, talks involving Mr. Vance and Mr. -- or Lord Carrington were

16     taking place in the fall of 1991.  The Carrington negotiations, so-called

17     Hague Conference, evolved into the Cutileiro negotiations, which began in

18     February 1992 involving only Bosnia and the -- Mr. Vance's work in the

19     fall of 1991 resulted in the Vance Plan for Croatia.

20        Q.   Thank you.  You see Karadzic says here:

21             [In English] "We achieved important results which will suit the

22     Muslims too."

23             [Interpretation] Did you bear in mind, did you take into account,

24     that on the 22nd of January, 1992, in my view we had made much progress

25     towards peace and dealing with the situation through peaceful means?

Page 14427

 1        A.   Well, I don't think this conversation is specifically mentioned.

 2     The report, of course, especially the leadership study, deals with that

 3     negotiating process, which was geared toward a peaceful solution of the

 4     crisis, if I can use that word, in BH.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P12, please.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  It's time to take a break, Mr. Karadzic, if it is

 7     convenient.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we can.  If we could only get

 9     more time.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for 25 minutes and resume at

11     ten to 11.00.

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can we now see P12, please.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you agree this is from the extended session of the Main and

19     the Executive Boards of the SDS held on the 14th of February, 1992?

20        A.   Yes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see English page 5,

22     Serbian 4.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   It says:

25             "Every individual -- it is up to every individual now to do their

Page 14428

 1     part of the work and that's what we'll discuss today, but I have to say

 2     that we have to be wise, united, and committed," it's towards the bottom

 3     of the English page, "to take the last drop of power into our hands in a

 4     humane way, of course, carry it all out in a humane way, a fair way,

 5     towards both Muslims and Croats who live there, that is particularly

 6     important, that there should be no fleeing en masse from our areas."

 7             Have you seen this part of my speech at this meeting?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Did you put it in your report?

10        A.   This document is referenced in the original report.  I can't

11     recall whether that specific passage was.

12        Q.   Do you remember that a day before this, the first agreement was

13     reached that there would be three Bosnias, on the 13th of February?

14        A.   I believe the Cutileiro negotiations began on the 13th.  I think

15     the Lisbon Agreement that you may be referring to was maybe on the

16     23rd or a few days later.

17        Q.   But do you recall that on 13th of February negotiations began on

18     the transformation of Bosnia and this meeting was held a day later and

19     the talk here is about what had been done and what we would get through

20     this agreement?

21        A.   Well, yes, I think I said that the negotiations began the day

22     before this.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see English page 6.  The

25     Serbian part is towards the bottom.

Page 14429

 1             I'm saying:

 2             "Of course they're trying to hold this referendum under the old,

 3     obsolete law ..."

 4             The middle of the English page.

 5             "Of course they're trying to hold this referendum under the old,

 6     obsolete law, that is not in keeping with the current constitution."

 7             Next page in Serbian.

 8             "That was related to the questions of utility companies,

 9     waterworks, and all the other things, where 51 per cent of votes is

10     enough.  It is written there that some opinion is either obtained or some

11     statutory instrument is enacted, and if it is passed it is binding.

12     However, in such big issues that are related to the constitution, a

13     two-third majority would be required and that is what we suggested to the

14     German ambassador who visited us, we showed him that conclusion and the

15     papers."

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Do you agree that this position I took, that a two-third majority

18     is required, is in keeping with the Cutileiro point number 4?

19        A.   I really can't recall point 4 in either of the agreements that we

20     have been discussing in connection with those negotiations, that is, the

21     Sarajevo Agreement or the Lisbon Agreement, which came first.

22        Q.   Perhaps I was not clear enough.  The Badinter opinion number 4,

23     the one we displayed yesterday, where it says there has to be a two-third

24     majority.

25        A.   Well, again, I don't recall that -- that opinion said there had

Page 14430

 1     to be a two-third majority.  Maybe it did.  That's easy enough to

 2     determine.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 11 in Serbian and

 4     15 in English.  15 in English, 11 in Serbian.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Here you see I'm pointing out what would happen if the Serb

 7     people were to be tricked over all -- they are taking over everything in

 8     the most brutal way without any -- the Serbian people would lose hope.

 9             "Firstly, the biggest cowards would leave, and those who are

10     intellectuals, professionals, and others, they would take a briefcase and

11     go abroad.  Then those who are less sensitive but have a bit more

12     patriotic feeling would take a briefcase and dash off into Serbia.  So in

13     ten years' time or so we would come down to 500 or 600.000 of the poor,

14     who would have no place to go and absolutely no chance to leave Bosnia

15     and Herzegovina.  We must not let that happen.  If there will be any kind

16     of moving it will be only from their canton to our canton, where we shall

17     ensure the sovereign government of the Serbian people.  The map is quite

18     fair.  It leaves out all of their villages wherever that is possible.

19     Alija Izetbegovic would say, 'Damn you.  While drawing those maps, take

20     care that as few of you as possible stay with us and as few of us

21     possible stay with you?'"

22             So did you take note of that part of the speech and did you take

23     it into account when you wrote your report?

24        A.   Well, I've read the speech and it's referenced in my report, so

25     to that extent certainly I took it into account.  I don't think I cited

Page 14431

 1     this particular passage.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 06640.  We

 4     can display only the English page because the Serbian is handwritten.  So

 5     65 ter 06640 is the number.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   These are notes written by my chef de cabinet at the party

 8     headquarters relating to the negotiations with Ambassador Cutileiro.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't need the Serbian.  Page 9

10     of the English, please.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   After Ambassador Cutileiro, Karadzic says:

13             [In English] "We have bad experience with Muslims.  They go down

14     on everything we agree upon.  The Serbian people are putting us under

15     pressure not to accept a unitary ..."

16             "Essentially they are taking us out of Yugoslavia forever and are

17     closing us into BH.

18             "Freedom first, before money, before bread ..."

19             [Interpretation] Did you know and did you have an insight into

20     this conversation which took place on the 27th of February, 1992?

21        A.   Yes, I believe so.  I think the diary is cited in the leadership

22     study.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we have page 14 of the

25     English, please.

Page 14432

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Karadzic says at the top:

 3             [In English] "It should be first clarified what certain people

 4     want.  The people will not accept things which do not correspond to

 5     reality and what is not in the interest of the people.

 6             "Serbs won't accept independent BH, but they will not attack

 7     anyone ..."

 8             [Interpretation] Was this known to you and did you take it into

 9     account?

10        A.   It would be the same answer as to the previous question.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document.

12             JUDGE KWON:  What is the status of this diary?  Has part of this

13     diary been admitted before?

14             MR. TIEGER:  To tell you the truth, Your Honour, I had the

15     impression it was -- without looking -- it was already in evidence, but

16     it's certainly been referenced before, and I see no reason why it should

17     not be admitted.  I don't have an objection.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  It will be admitted.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1284, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             May we now have 65 ter 17555.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   These are stenographic notes from a meeting of the Deputies Club

24     held on the 28th of February, 1992.  And as you know, the 29th of

25     February and the 1st of March was when the referendum was held.  These

Page 14433

 1     are the stenographic notes or transcript from the meeting of the

 2     Deputies Club.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to the next page,

 4     please.  Actually, it's page 4 in English and Serbian.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Radovan Karadzic:

 7             "Yesterday talks were developing in the spirit of what we had

 8     seen, a manoeuvre, Mr. Izetbegovic's attempt at a manoeuvre to decrease

 9     the significance of what was accomplished in Lisbon.  That was certainly

10     a huge pressure on Mr. Cutileiro to decrease the significance of the

11     constituent units."

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have page 6 in both

13     versions.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is part of my speech.  I say:

16             "If they want independence, then we want independence too.

17             "And it's very difficult for them to defend just as it was

18     difficult for the Serbs to defend Yugoslavia because they were accused of

19     wishing to dominate, and so Alija Izetbegovic finds it very difficult to

20     defend his position.  And I told Mr. Cutileiro that, we cannot understand

21     why the Muslims do not wish to accept what we have.  We have our unit,

22     the Croats have their unit, and the Muslims have their unit, plus our

23     joint organs.

24             "And then Cutileiro said something that most probably Izetbegovic

25     had told him.  He said, Yes, but he doesn't have on the borders of Bosnia

Page 14434

 1     and Herzegovina Turkey, whereas you have Serbia and Montenegro."

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 7 in both versions next,

 3     please.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:

 5        Q.   [No interpretation]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I'm not sure if we are getting the

 7     translation.  Could you repeat.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Paragraph 2, starting with:

11             "Izetbegovic asked for an introduction -- Izetbegovic asked for

12     an introduction, and we agreed, of the national and other criteria.  In

13     addition to national criteria, other criteria, as we agreed to it.  They

14     said national, geographic, economic, and other criteria.

15             "That suited us too."

16             Now, do you agree, Dr. Treanor, that we accepted everything that

17     could be accepted, that merited acceptance, and we accepted that they

18     were not to be constituent units only on a national basis, but on the

19     economic basis and other criteria as well, traffic and so on and so

20     forth?

21        A.   The SDS position going into these negotiations was that Bosnia

22     should be a confederation with units drawn on an ethnic basis.  There was

23     discussion of that, and as a result of that, as indicated here, other --

24     other criteria were included.  But the national criteria remained first,

25     and that is what I believe Mr. Izetbegovic was backing off of after -- a

Page 14435

 1     couple of days after the Lisbon Agreement because the -- that had been,

 2     as I say, made the first condition -- the first criteria.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have page 8 in both

 5     versions displayed, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   It says down there:

 8             "We spoke of the need to" -- on the left-hand side, "to the

 9     necessity of working out the overall Croat and Serb relations and

10     everybody can read what my attitude toward Croatia was.  It wasn't our

11     aim that Croatia should not exist, but that it should be rounded off and

12     that it become clear to every Serb that the Serbs and Croats cannot

13     co-exist in a joint state or a joint army" and so on and so forth.

14             Now, the last paragraph:

15             "We looked at the ways and means and principles according to

16     which Serbo-Croatian relations could be resolved regarding Krajina.  They

17     think that the best solution would be to relocate the population.  That

18     blew the wig off Europeans.  They thought that 150- to 250.000 extremely

19     poor Serbs would exchange their rocky country for the richest land

20     properties in Vojvodina.  As if the people of Vojvodina would go to that

21     rocky country-side.  That's a ridiculous idea."

22             So did you note that we were against any relocation of the

23     population, moving the population anywhere?

24        A.   I don't think this passage was cited.  I'm not sure what's being

25     discussed here, whether it's Bosnian Krajina or Croatian Krajina.

Page 14436

 1        Q.   We're talking about resolving overall Serbo-Croat relations in

 2     Yugoslavia.  The Croats were advocating relocation, that the Serbs from

 3     the poor and rocky areas of Krajina would go to Vojvodina and the Croats

 4     of Vojvodina go elsewhere.  I say that that is ridiculous.  Why would the

 5     people of Vojvodina, which is a rich area, go to a rocky, barren area?

 6     So this is pre-eminently a stand against the manipulation of the

 7     population, and this is something that you should have noted and

 8     underlined and taken on board.

 9        A.   I did not cite this passage.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1285, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have P1634 next, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   This is -- these are the stenographic notes of the 14th Session

17     of the Assembly of the Serb people of the 27th of March, 1992, so we're

18     getting nearer to the critical days of April now.  This is

19     Radovan Karadzic's speech at the Assembly session, and this is his state

20     of mind just three or four days before the war broke out and one day

21     after the massacre in Sijekovac and one day or two days after

22     Izetbegovic's rescinding of the Lisbon Agreement.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 11 of the English

24     and 17 of the Serbian, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 14437

 1        Q.   At the beginning of the page there in Serbian - and I'm sure you

 2     will be able to find it in English - "We stand straight and pure before

 3     God!"  That passage.

 4             "We stand straight and pure before God!  We wanted no divisions.

 5     We did not want the destruction of the things that we had in common.

 6     Over 73 years we lived in a joint state, denying our plans, disregarding

 7     our development, belittling our size and strength, with a view to

 8     preserving our joint state.  Even in these times we were the last to

 9     found a political party to represent our people.  We kept on hoping that

10     the forces of unity would prevail over the forces of destruction."

11             Did you include this paragraph and this position and stand, the

12     recapitulation just prior to the beginning of the war into your report?

13        A.   I don't believe I cited this passage, which seems to be a

14     recapitulation of the position that we've discussed any number of times;

15     that is, that the SDS initially certainly wanted the whole of Bosnia to

16     remain within Yugoslavia so that all Serbs would remain within one state.

17     This does not appear to refer to the situation as it existed at this

18     time, in March 1992.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

20             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry to interrupt, Your Honour, but just to

22     ensure we don't have unnecessary duplication.  If the Registrar could

23     check to see whether the document just admitted as D1285 was not

24     previously admitted as P938, that is, the 28 February 1992 Deputies Club

25     session.  Thank you.  Sorry to interrupt.

Page 14438

 1             JUDGE KWON:  That will be looked into.

 2             Yes, please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   The next paragraph:

 5             "In the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina we fought to preserve

 6     a unified Yugoslavia and a united Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Our partners

 7     did not, however, want Yugoslavia, nor did they want a Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina which would also be ours.  They wanted to be the masters of

 9     the house and they placed their proprietary name on the whole of Bosnia

10     and Herzegovina.

11             "... but we are pure and clean before God.  We have not made a

12     single move which was not provoked."

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 12 next in English, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   "... a pretext which forced us to do that.  Perhaps our

16     adversaries, who were supposed to be our partners, led us infallibly

17     exactly where we were supposed to go.  Perhaps this is the best and most

18     just because if it passes without bloodshed, maybe all three peoples will

19     flourish.  I personally think they will because it is obvious that we

20     cannot live together without hindering one another's development."

21             This, then, is a reference to the transformation of Bosnia into

22     three constituent republics; isn't that right?

23        A.   The beginning of the passage seems to refer to the situation

24     which came to a head on October the 15th, that is, the passage of the

25     sovereignty resolutions in the SRBH Assembly by the SDS's coalition

Page 14439

 1     partners as the SDA and the HDZ, which would have put the SDS in a -- did

 2     put the -- the SDS was the minority and if there had been an independent

 3     state, they would have been the minority party in that state.

 4             I note the reference to a pretext for action, which seems to get

 5     back to the idea of planning in advance that we discussed earlier in my

 6     testimony.  I would also note the inability of the peoples to live

 7     together as an idea being expressed here which is or was the basis of the

 8     negotiations at that time.  So that -- that is a reference to the ongoing

 9     negotiations to divide Bosnia ethnically.

10        Q.   Dr. Treanor, I say here that I believe that all three peoples

11     will flourish once each of them is master in his own house; would that be

12     right?

13        A.   That's what it says, yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And then I go on to say that:

15             "It is not specific to the Balkans.  In the middle of Europe

16     there are communities which cannot live together and they can't because

17     each hampers the development of the other.

18             "And there are many plants in the world that can't grow alongside

19     each other.  They have to be separated to flourish.  In the highly

20     cultured Europe, Belgium, they are working on this.  Switzerland began as

21     a confederation.  The smallest canton of 30.000 can now separate,

22     break-away, even form another canton and establish a state of its

23     own ..." and so on and so forth.

24             So is this something you knew about, is this common knowledge to

25     you, that Bosnia could remain but that there should be no domination of

Page 14440

 1     one nation over another?  Was that the Serb position?

 2        A.   Yes, the idea of the negotiations was that Bosnia would be

 3     divided into ethnic units, each of which would be as independent as

 4     possible and would not -- and so that one people would not be able to

 5     dominate another.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in the next paragraph I say:

 7             "I must say that our partners' flirtation with Turkey and not

 8     only with Turkey but also with extremist fundamentalist regimes in

 9     certain Islamic countries have astonished us.  It has served to open our

10     eyes."

11             Now, were you aware of our fears and anxiety, and do you know

12     that of late Turkey is making even greater claims on Bosnia?

13        A.   Well, as I indicated -- I think I indicated that I have read this

14     speech and indeed all Dr. Karadzic's speeches in the Assemblies.  As to

15     Turkey's claims on Bosnia, I have no idea.  I'm not sure what time-period

16     is being referred to, but irrespective of that.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 23 in English and

19     37 in Serbian.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Radovan Karadzic speaking, 23 in English.

22             "Gentlemen, you know that our partners wasted our time for over a

23     year and a half during talks which were always calculated to gain time,

24     without reaching agreement of any sort.  We were aware of this, of

25     course, and we worked as if there were no agreement, although we were

Page 14441

 1     prepared to abide by any agreements that might be reached.

 2             "At a press conference the day before yesterday, Ajanovic

 3     definitely stated that it was a trick to gain independence," next page in

 4     Serbian, please, "and have Europe recognise them."

 5             "They were recognised by Iraq, Turkey, Bulgaria, Libya, and what

 6     has changed?  However, they have gone so far, with regard to the lunacy

 7     of some people, their religious fanaticism and the frenzied state into

 8     which they have brought their people, with their promises about a

 9     large Bosnian state in which they would be the masters and do whatever

10     they please, that their extremists are prepared to do all sorts of

11     things ..."

12             And then further down:

13             "We have certain indications that -- well, we can count on the

14     fact that they can prepare for war and they might try -- they are

15     attempting something ..."

16             Is that what you say, that we foresaw what would happen?  And do

17     you consider that it's a basic prerequisite of intelligence, to

18     anticipate a trick and to be able to avoid it, avoid being duped?

19        A.   Yes, I think I said that the planning was based on waiting for

20     the other side to make some sort of mistake to -- before making the next

21     move by the Bosnian Serbs.  And I think it would be very -- it's a very

22     good thing to be able to anticipate tricks and be able to avoid them.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 24 in English and 39 in

25     Serbian.

Page 14442

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   It says here:

 3             "In Gorazde there is a crazy militant fundamentalist,

 4     Hadzo Efendic, who refused any talk.  He didn't want to see the Serbs or

 5     talk to them.  He played some -- he pulled a stunt at a drill" --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter needs a reference.  I'm sorry.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:

 8        Q.   [No interpretation]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you are reading too fast and you need

10     to give reference to the interpreters.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Third paragraph in Serbian.  "A war

12     in Bosnia and Herzegovina will not solve anything," second paragraph from

13     the top, and this was about Gorazde.  And then below:

14             "The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina will not solve anything."

15             Can the participants now see this passage?

16             "If it begins, you will get plans."

17             But further below it says:

18             "Let the situation be studied to protect and defend lives,

19     territory, and property.  We have no other plans."

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Dr. Treanor, do you agree that up to this 27th of March,

22     throughout those months I always advocated peace and peaceful solutions,

23     never, ever advocating war?

24        A.   Well, yes, I think there was an attempt to reach a peaceful

25     settlement.  The SDS and Dr. Karadzic had certain goals which are talked

Page 14443

 1     about extensively here, that is, remaining in Yugoslavia or changing BH

 2     into a confederation.  If those could be achieved peacefully, so much the

 3     better.  I think everyone would prefer to achieve their goals peacefully

 4     rather than through war.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this is the 27th of March, four or

 6     five days before the war, and still we have no plans for war, and I'm

 7     saying that openly at this meeting.  Explicitly I say here:  "We have no

 8     other plans."

 9        A.   Well, that's what it says.  I'm not sure what -- what that may

10     mean in regard to particular plans.

11        Q.   Could we now take a look at your report and see how it treated

12     the aspect of regionalisation.  Let's look at paragraph -- that is,

13     page 5, item E in your introduction.  65 ter 592.  E5.

14             [In English] "Throughout 1992 the Bosnian Serb leadership pursued

15     a policy of 'regionalisation,' which meant organising areas in which

16     Serbs represented the relative majority into district regions through the

17     concept of 'communities of municipalities.'  By initiating the creation

18     of the regional bodies of authority throughout BH, the SDS thus began

19     preparation quite early for eventual de facto take-over of the

20     Serb-populated territories in BH.  Many of the preparations were

21     conducted conspiratorially and in secret."

22             [Interpretation] In all these territories, there was a majority

23     Serb population; isn't that right?

24        A.   I'm not sure what you mean by "all these territories."  If you're

25     referring to --

Page 14444

 1        Q.   It's not been interpreted correctly.  It says here -- you say

 2     that Serbs on the territories where they were a majority, does that mean

 3     that Serb-populated territories are territories where Serbs are a

 4     majority and where at the elections they were victorious?

 5             [In English] "... eventual de facto take-over of Serb-populated

 6     territories in BH ..."

 7        A.   Well, the reference to the Serb-majority areas in connection with

 8     communities of municipalities is primarily a reference to the

 9     municipalities in which the Serbs formed either an absolute or a relative

10     majority strong enough to have enabled them at the municipal elections in

11     November 1990 to come to power in those municipalities.  Those were the

12     municipalities which joined the new communities of municipalities.

13        Q.   So take-over and take power.  In our language there is a

14     distinction between taking power and taking over.  Do you agree that in

15     those municipalities the Serbs and the SDS had power; they did not need

16     to take it over from anyone else?

17        A.   Well, I think there are two issues there as far as taking power.

18     Dr. Karadzic indicated more than once, it was certainly during the speech

19     that he gave in -- on the 1st of November or the 31st of October, 1991,

20     to SDS officials in connection with the upcoming plebiscite, that

21     although the SDS did have power, have majorities in the Assemblies and so

22     forth of particular -- of many municipalities, they had not exercised

23     that power fully and that they should do so by getting rid of directors

24     of departments and other officials that were not fully obedient to the

25     SDS line.  So there is a difference between winning the election and

Page 14445

 1     getting a majority and actually getting control of all the levers of

 2     power within each municipality, which was a process that Dr. Karadzic

 3     wanted to see continue.

 4             Now, take-over would refer here to removing those municipalities

 5     or regions from the authority of the central government of Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina.  For instance, the decision on the formation of the

 7     Autonomous Region of Krajina in September 1991 specifically stated that

 8     that region was to be a federal unit in Yugoslavia and that the law of

 9     the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would only apply in that region

10     insofar as it was not in contradiction to federal law.

11        Q.   What are the laws, Dr. Treanor, and constitutions that had

12     priority, the federal ones or the republic ones?

13        A.   Well, that's a legal, constitutional question, but I would assume

14     as a layman that the authorities in any particular republic would have to

15     obey the laws and adhere to the constitution of that republic.

16             By the way, the Republic of Serbia in September 1990 had adopted

17     a new constitution.  I believe I cited a speech that Mr. Milosevic gave

18     to the Serbian Assembly during the course of that process.  Anyway, that

19     new constitution of the Republic of Serbia, that is, a full republic, had

20     a clause that stated basically the same thing, that is, that the laws of

21     Serbia were going to be paramount over any federal laws if there was a

22     conflict of interest between the two.

23        Q.   Do you remember the decisions of the Constitutional Court in

24     Yugoslavia that quashed similar decisions by Slovenia, Croatia, and even

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the laws that were not in keeping with the federal

Page 14446

 1     constitution?  Don't these decisions prove the priority of federal

 2     legislation over republican legislation?

 3        A.   Well, I think they show that the Constitutional Court of

 4     Yugoslavia thought that the decisions you're referring to contravened the

 5     Constitution of Yugoslavia.

 6        Q.   This would require a debate with you, Dr. Treanor.  Although I

 7     was opposing the decisions of Bosnian Krajina, did this Bosnian Krajina

 8     proclaim its loyalty to federal laws over republican laws that were

 9     trying to undermine federal laws?  The basic question is:  What is wrong

10     with Krajina's demand that federal laws be applied rather than republican

11     laws if the latter run counter to federal legislation?  Your

12     interpretation changes the essence.  The essence is that federal laws and

13     federal constitution have primacy.  Is that your basic conclusion, that

14     it's the other way around?

15        A.   Well, I think I was trying to avoid making that type of

16     conclusion because it's a legal and constitutional question.  The

17     autonomous region had basically said it itself of its own decision as a

18     federal unit in Yugoslavia, which, as far as I know, would not have been

19     in conformity with either the Bosnian constitution or the Yugoslav

20     constitution.

21             By the way, the previous question as to the constitutional court,

22     I think maybe we can both agree that Slovenia and Croatia rather happily

23     ignored the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             Could we look at paragraph 112 in your document, 529 -- sorry,

Page 14447

 1     592.

 2             [In English] "Over the next few months, Assemblies of the Serbian

 3     people, in fact, created Serbian municipalities in a number of

 4     municipalities in which Serbs were in the majority -- in the minority,

 5     though in one or more municipalities there was opposition to the process

 6     within the SDS.  The Serbian municipalities for which documentation is

 7     available claims to be formed from Serbian portions of the existing

 8     municipalities or listed the towns and villages of which they were to be

 9     composed.  The Serbian municipalities initially functioned as parallel

10     entities and operated alongside the existing municipal organs."

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 606.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   You note here that Serbian municipalities are being established

14     from Serbian settlements and Serbian parts of joint, mixed,

15     municipalities.

16             You probably did not get the interpretation of the question.  The

17     question was:  Is that right?

18             Look at the document, please.  Do you see that an agreement was

19     reached in Vlasenica municipality to create a Serbian municipality and a

20     Muslim municipality in Vlasenica, whereas a separate municipality Milici

21     is still a separate municipality today.  Do you know that this agreement

22     was made in Vlasenica?

23        A.   Yes, I'm aware that there were agreements in certain areas, which

24     is one reason why the recommendation for the formation of Serbian

25     municipalities passed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly in November or

Page 14448

 1     December 1991 was a recommendation and not an order or a decision because

 2     certain deputies said that they were having negotiations in their

 3     municipalities which were going well and that that type of move may upset

 4     those negotiations.  So in certain areas, this apparently being one of

 5     them, there were such agreements.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In your report did you refer to this peaceful --

 7     peaceful -- peace-making way of transforming municipalities?

 8        A.   Well, I thought that the procedure that had been recommended to

 9     the -- by the Bosnian Serb Assembly to Serbian council members in the

10     municipalities in which they were in a minority but felt that they were

11     being out-voted, ignored by their colleagues, was a -- basically a

12     peaceful procedure.

13             As for this particular document, I can see that I cite a lot of

14     documents in the report.  I don't know whether that one is in there.  I

15     believe that the text of this report was not quoted in the report,

16     however.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Does the report contain the information that this

18     process provided good results and worked rather well, that the

19     transformation was successful in several places?

20        A.   Well, I would have to study this document and others in the

21     context of -- to answer that, but it would seem to indicate that in that

22     area there was an agreement.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be received?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 14449

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  With respect to the issue raised by Mr. Tieger

 3     regarding D1285, I looked at the document.  There's a slight difference.

 4     At the end of the page, P938, there's a signature, while Defence version,

 5     I don't see any signature.  And moreover, the Prosecution's version is

 6     more legible.  So I will leave it in your hands whether you are minded to

 7     withdraw the Defence version.

 8             In the meantime, this will be admitted and we give the number.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1286, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm advised that you have ten minutes

11     to conclude your cross-examination in the time allotted to you.  How much

12     would you need to conclude your cross-examination?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I haven't dealt

14     with regionalisation, SDS, JNA, and the paramilitary, and the Chamber

15     made its decision before it became aware of the fact that the interviews

16     made with -- by the Prosecution with Mr. Cizmovic exist.  So I would like

17     to ask you to take that into account.  It's a new element that gives you

18     a good reason to give me an extension at least until the end of today's

19     session and hopefully at least one session tomorrow.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  How much would you need for your re-examination,

22     Mr. Tieger?

23             MR. TIEGER:  No more than a half-hour, and I would estimate at

24     this point in time less, Your Honour.  But I think I would say that's --

25     probably 20 to 30 minutes is my estimate.  That's sometimes amiss.

Page 14450

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you will have the whole session of

 2     today, minus 20 minutes for the re-direct of Mr. Tieger.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And we cannot have an extended day

 4     today, can we?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  There's another sitting in the afternoon.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Could we now call --

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Can I draw your attention to paragraph 113 in your document 592.

10     You talk about associations of municipalities and you say it is a level

11     in between -- [In English] "... in the SRBH regional level organisation,

12     intermediate between the municipalities and the republic existed for

13     the -- for some republic governmental functions, police,

14     Territorial Defence, but there was no regional level territorial

15     administrative entity as such.  Groups of municipalities could

16     nevertheless form 'communities of municipalities' for certain purposes.

17     A number of such 'communities of municipalities' were in fact formed ..."

18     [Interpretation] And so on.

19             [In English] "The concept of 'communities of municipalities' was

20     defined in 1974 SRBH constitution and was redefined by an amendment of

21     the constitution 1989."

22             [Interpretation] Is that right?

23        A.   Yes --

24        Q.   Do we agree, then, that this method of forming associations of

25     municipalities was stipulated by the constitution, both the Article 119

Page 14451

 1     of the federal constitution and the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 2        A.   Yes, that's what it says here.

 3        Q.   In your report you claim that Article 276 of the BH constitution

 4     and the amendments to the constitution, such as numbers 42, allowed the

 5     association of municipalities into separate socio-political communities.

 6     It's in your paragraph 115 of the same document.

 7        A.   Yes, I believe that's correct.  That's what it says.

 8        Q.   You stated that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 9     decided that despite clear provisions concerning urban communities of

10     municipalities specified that this was -- that these were not

11     socio-political communities.

12        A.   Well, yes, the decision is mentioned there.

13        Q.   Is that decision then anti-constitutional?  Does the decision

14     wrongly interpret the constitution?

15        A.   Well, that's a legal and constitutional question that -- maybe

16     that court was best equipped to answer it.  I believe that the basis of

17     their decision and objection to these communities of municipalities had

18     to do with the fact that they had given themselves certain defence

19     functions which they were not authorised to have under the constitution

20     and the law.

21        Q.   And are you aware of Article 119 of the Constitution of the SFRY,

22     where it says that municipalities can co-operate, pooling their

23     resources, setting up joint organs, carry out various functions, and that

24     those organs must have special subjective character, special subjective

25     character?

Page 14452

 1        A.   Well, I can't recall that article offhand, but I'll take your

 2     word that that's what it says.

 3        Q.   And do you remember that even a municipality has its defence

 4     functions and autonomy and defence in case of war and that it can convey

 5     that to the community of municipalities?

 6        A.   Well, I'm certainly aware that the municipalities under the

 7     doctrine of All People's Defence had defence functions, as did just about

 8     everybody in the former Yugoslavia.  I'm not aware that they could

 9     transfer any of those functions to the communities of municipalities,

10     which seems to be what the constitutional court is objecting to here.

11             The reference in the paragraph and in the -- that court's

12     decision to socio-political communities, that's a Yugoslav term for

13     meaning a governmental unit.  A municipality was a socio-political

14     community.  The republic was a socio-political community.  But the

15     communities of municipalities were not, that is, as stated in

16     paragraph 113, that they were not an intermediate level of government.

17     They were simply a voluntary co-operative of associations.

18        Q.   You make that conclusion on the basis of the decision taken by

19     the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 1st of November,

20     which means 15 days after the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which

21     culminated in -- or rather, on the 14th or 15th of October with the

22     declaration on independence; is that right?

23        A.   That's the date of the decision, the 1st of November, yes.

24        Q.   And the constitution on which the community of municipalities

25     were based was the 1974 constitution amended in April 1989; right?

Page 14453

 1        A.   Yes, the 1994 [sic] constitution had been amended any number of

 2     times, including in 1999 [sic] and it was also amended later in 1990,

 3     just before the elections.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we take a look at 65 ter 6128

 5     next, please.

 6             Let's look at the decision and see who signed it.  6128 is the

 7     number.  Page 1.  That's page 1.  May we turn to the last page to see who

 8     signed it.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   The 1st of November, 1991, is the date seen on page 1, and on the

11     last page, was this signed by Kasim Trnka, president of the

12     Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dr. Kasim Trnka?

13        A.   Kasim Trnka, yes.

14        Q.   Do you know that Kasim Trnka was a prominent official of the

15     Party of Democratic Action?

16        A.   I'm aware that he had some connection with that party.

17        Q.   Would you agree that he signed this alone as opposed to the

18     decisions taken by the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, where it was a

19     multi-ethnic group, of multi-ethnic composition?

20        A.   Well, the decisions that we've seen, this decision compared with

21     those decisions are signed in different manners.  I don't know what the

22     practice was in Bosnia as to who would sign those decisions.

23        Q.   Would you agree that the community of municipalities of

24     Bosnian Krajina inherited the community of the municipality of Banja Luka

25     as a socio-political entity?

Page 14454

 1        A.   Well, it's -- certainly seems to have replaced it.  I'm not sure

 2     that the membership was exactly the same; that is, I'm not sure whether

 3     all the municipalities that were in the one association community were

 4     also in the other.  There was a process with the -- the new community of

 5     municipalities of individual municipalities actually joining, in other

 6     words, sort of rejoining.  So it -- it was not simply a change of name or

 7     something.  It seems to be a new community.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 117 of your report you state the

 9     following:

10             [In English] "In the early months of 1991, a number of

11     municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all of which had a Serbian majority

12     or plurality, adopted agreements to form new 'communities of

13     municipalities.'  Some of these municipalities simultaneously severing

14     their ties with existing 'communities of municipalities.'  Our 'community

15     of municipalities' in the Bosnian Krajina held its founding Assembly

16     session on 25th of April, 1991."

17             [Interpretation] And in paragraph 120 you say:

18             [In English] "The establishment of the ZOBK was perceived by

19     other parties to be an initiative of just one party, SDS.  They claimed,

20     moreover, that the primary motivation for the initiative was political

21     rather than economic, the formation of the Serb-dominated regions."

22             [Interpretation] I'd like to underline your conclusion according

23     to which the community of Bosanska Krajina municipalities was together

24     with the Serbs and that the SDS was behind this.  What about Kotor Varos,

25     was that part of the Bosanska Krajina municipality?

Page 14455

 1        A.   Well, I can't remember the membership offhand.  I think that some

 2     information is given on that in the footnotes.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 4978 next,

 4     please.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Before that, Mr. Karadzic, I note the time.  We'll

 6     have a break for 25 minutes now, after which you will have exactly an

 7     hour to conclude your cross-examination.  We may go to around 2.00, given

 8     that the next hearing will start at 2.30.  25 minutes.

 9                           --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 12.36 p.m.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Dr. Donia [sic], do you see here this document where it says that

15     this is an agreement on the association of the municipalities of

16     Bosnian Krajina into a community.  The date is 29 April 1991.  Do you see

17     the list of municipalities that united together?  We can see that on

18     page 1; correct?

19        A.   Yes.  Well, this is -- those names are on the first page of this

20     document.

21        Q.   Thank you.  You say in your conclusion that the association of

22     municipalities of Bosnian Krajina were made up of municipalities with a

23     Serb majority and the SDS fully backed this process.  Did Kotor Varos

24     municipality join this association of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina,

25     as it says here?  It's on the document.

Page 14456

 1        A.   Well, that page of that document doesn't say that those

 2     municipalities did, in fact, join the community of municipalities.  After

 3     this date there was a procedure by which the various municipalities --

 4     the Assemblies of the various municipalities accepted the agreement, that

 5     is, adhered to it.  Whether Kotor Varos in fact did or not, I cannot

 6     recall.  It may be in the footnotes to the report as to which particular

 7     municipalities we had documentation from that indicated that they

 8     actually did adhere to the agreement.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page to see on

10     what basis they formed an association.  Article 1:

11             "For the sake of more rational and efficient pursuit of common

12     interests and meeting the needs of the citizens and harmonising

13     socio-economic development of municipalities ..." et cetera, et cetera.

14     It says Kotor Varos joined as well.

15             Can we now see 65 ter 5193.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   What was the ethnic composition of Kotor Varos, Dr. Treanor?

18        A.   I couldn't tell you offhand.

19        Q.   Serbs were certainly not an absolute majority; right?

20        A.   I don't know.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us look at page 4 in Serbian

22     and in English.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Do you see that Serbs have 38, Muslims 30, and Croats

25     29 per cent.  Yugoslavs are only 1.9 per cent.  Do you agree that Serbs

Page 14457

 1     could not make a decision to have Kotor Varos join this association

 2     against the will of Muslims and Croats?

 3        A.   I'm not sure what this document is we're looking at.  That's

 4     certainly what it says, but again, as a general matter, I don't know

 5     whether Kotor Varos did or didn't and this -- those figures certainly do

 6     indicate that the Serbs were in a relative majority or had a plurality as

 7     stated in paragraph 117.  I can only speculate about Kotor Varos offhand

 8     as I don't know exactly what happened there, but it's entirely possible

 9     that some of the non-Serb council members there, members of the Assembly,

10     for one reason or another, agreed to join the new council -- community of

11     municipalities.  On the other hand, as we've seen, that there was some --

12     quite a bit of sharp political manoeuvring going on.  It's possible that

13     the Serbian members may have voted on that in the absence of members from

14     other parties.  I just don't know.

15        Q.   Well, you should know, Dr. Treanor, that a decision like that

16     cannot be made in the absence of others because such decisions require a

17     majority in parliament.  You know how voting is done in our

18     municipalities.

19        A.   Yes.  Well, again we've seen that certain decisions were taken,

20     for instance, in the SRBH Assembly, perhaps in contravention of the

21     rules.  But I'm just speculating.  I don't know.  And I welcome any

22     documentation that you want to bring to my attention and to the Court's

23     attention as to the actual adhesion of Kotor Varos to the community of

24     municipalities.

25        Q.   Let us look at another municipality not so close to the border.

Page 14458

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 7 in Serbian and 8

 2     in English.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Look at Sanski Most, 42 per cent of Serbs, 47 per cent of

 5     Muslims, and 7 per cent of Croats.  That's 54 per cent of non-Serbs.  Do

 6     you know that Sanski Most also democratically voted to join the

 7     association of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina?

 8        A.   Well, again, I don't know the details of the adhesion of

 9     Sanski Most.  The -- and the composition of the Municipal Assemblies are

10     not -- are not necessarily exactly reflective of the population

11     breakdown.  I don't know offhand the breakdown of party membership in the

12     Assembly of Sanski Most or, as I said, the details of its adhesion to the

13     community.  I think there are figures given in the report for how many

14     communities -- municipalities did adhere to the community by a certain

15     point in time.

16        Q.   Can we come back to 65 ter 4978.  This is an agreement signed by

17     these municipalities and we have a list of the municipalities who joined

18     the association -- the community.  Kotor Varos and Sanski Most are there.

19     Can you see that?

20        A.   Yes.  Well, again, this is the initial agreement.  Irrespective

21     of who may have been there at the meeting and signed this particular

22     document, the Assembly of the given municipality would have to ratify the

23     agreement.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see D286.

Page 14459

 1             Can this document be admitted?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  4978?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D1287, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D286, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   "The community of municipalities of Banja Luka invites non-Serb

 9     municipalities to join."

10             Let us look at the framed part in Serbian.

11             Do you see that the Banja Luka community is inviting

12     municipalities that are majority Muslim and any other municipalities that

13     wish to join their community, to pursue jointly their economic and other

14     interests together?  Did you know about this?

15        A.   Well, this particular article I can't recall, but that seems to

16     be what it says.

17        Q.   Thank you.  So your conclusion that only Serbs were behind this

18     or that it was intended only for the Serbs does not hold water, does it,

19     Doctor?

20        A.   Well, I think the report says that only Serbian majority or

21     plurality municipalities joined irrespective of who was invited to join,

22     I -- as far as we were able to determine, that -- that it was, in fact,

23     the case that only Serb majority or plurality municipalities did join.

24     The goals and so forth of this community I don't think are very different

25     from the preceding community.  So there must have been some reason why it

Page 14460

 1     was formed as to replace the old one.  But again, the actual membership

 2     as opposed to the people that are listed on the putative membership or

 3     the -- even people that signed the initial agreement has to be looked at.

 4     And insofar as we were able to do that, that's what we found.

 5        Q.   Do you agree that the association of municipalities of

 6     Bosnian Krajina were succeeded by the Autonomous Region of Krajina that

 7     proclaimed itself in September after Izetbegovic reneged on the

 8     Serb-Muslim agreement?

 9        A.   Well, they were formed in September, as has been discussed in my

10     testimony and in the report.  I don't -- again, referring to the

11     agreement, I don't think there ever was an agreement and I'm not sure at

12     what point Mr. Izetbegovic withdrew from the negotiations in connection

13     with -- in that -- in connection with that agreement together with the

14     SDS and the MBO.  I believe that that was in August, so that would put

15     the formation of the Serbian autonomous regions after that particular

16     event.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 65 ter 5405.  5405,

19     just to see the first page of that decision to establish the

20     Autonomous District of Krajina, which was later called "Autonomous

21     Region."

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you agree it says here after the preamble:

24             "Proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination

25     including secession based on freely expressed will and in keeping with

Page 14461

 1     its historic aspirations to live united in the federal state of

 2     Yugoslavia as the most suitable form of equal peoples, the Assembly of

 3     the community of municipalities proclaims this decision to proclaim the

 4     Autonomous Region of Krajina as an inseparable part of the Federal State

 5     of Yugoslavia and an integral part of the federal unit of BH."

 6             Do you agree that this autonomous region followed from the

 7     community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina?  You deal with it in your

 8     paragraph 156.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   In paragraph 138 of the same document you state that the work of

11     other independent regions, autonomous regions -- you say conclusions have

12     to be made because there is no documentation for other autonomous

13     regions.

14             Do you allow the possibility that they were never fully in

15     operation?  They remained a dead letter on paper?

16        A.   That is certainly a possibility.

17        Q.   Thank you.  In your paragraph 141 you state the following:

18             [In English] "In regard to the legal constitutional regime that

19     would apply in the ARK, Article number 3 of the decision on the

20     proclamation of the ARK stated:

21             "'Federal law, regulations, and other general acts, laws

22     regulations and acts of the region, as well as the acts of BH which are

23     not contrary to these acts, shall be applied in the territory of the

24     Autonomous Region of Krajina.'"

25             [Interpretation] And a bit further below:

Page 14462

 1             [In English] "'... the laws and regulations and other general

 2     acts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be applied, unless

 3     they are contrary to the Constitution of the SFRY, or to the laws,

 4     regulations and other general acts of the Federal State of Yugoslavia.'"

 5             We just mentioned it.  So the Autonomous Region of Krajina relies

 6     on federal regulations and gives precedence to them; correct?

 7        A.   Well, these paragraphs are as you have read them.  That, of

 8     course, opens the question of who's going to decide whether particular

 9     laws are in conformity or are not in conformity.  Apparently the

10     autonomous region was going to decide that, which I don't think they were

11     authorised to do under the federal or BH constitutions.

12        Q.   Well, in order not to debate it, although I could debate it by

13     saying that Bosnia didn't have the right to secede either, I will just

14     ask you:  In your opinion, is it the case that the Autonomous Region of

15     Krajina practically organised itself as a mini state within a state, the

16     government and the Assembly as legislative and executive authorities and

17     autonomy vis-a-v is central organs, precedence to federal laws over

18     republican laws if the latter run counter to the former?

19        A.   Well, the Autonomous Region of Krajina certainly seems to have

20     been pretty well organised, especially in comparison with the other

21     regions for which you lack documentation and maybe that's why we lack

22     documentation, as Dr. Karadzic has pointed out.  However, Dr. Karadzic

23     was very insistent that the deputies and officials of the organs in the

24     Autonomous Region of Krajina who were members of the SDS or followers of

25     the SDS follow SDS policy.  He didn't really make any distinction between

Page 14463

 1     whether someone was in a -- holding a party position or a government

 2     position as an SDS appointee or electee.  So that he certainly attempted

 3     to keep the Autonomous Region of Krajina under control.  There were some

 4     difficulties in that regard.  I think we mentioned some of them, but that

 5     certainly was his desire and effort.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Is it the case that the officials of the Autonomous

 7     Region of Krajina were elected in the Autonomous Region of Krajina,

 8     nobody else elected them?

 9        A.   Well, they were elected by the Assembly of the Autonomous Region

10     of Krajina, which was composed of delegated members from the municipal --

11     from the Assemblies of the municipalities that were members of the

12     region, the vast majority of which I think would have been members of the

13     SDS.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in paragraph 151 you note what the constitution

15     of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina regulated and what it left

16     to the autonomous regions to deal with.  So would you focus on that

17     paragraph of yours.  Do you agree that the constitution gives a lot of

18     leeway for the municipalities to see to their own affairs?  In other

19     words, there's no regulation or the central organs do not prescribe

20     conduct.  So the regions have a lot of leeway in organising life as they

21     see fit?

22        A.   Yes, the regions run the discussion here, yes.

23             The areas of responsibility are laid out here; however, the

24     regions were not established under the constitution as very powerful

25     entities.  There was a controversy about that.  Previous -- or drafts of

Page 14464

 1     the constitution had included references to the -- or provision that the

 2     autonomous regions have governments and other organs aside from the

 3     Assembly that the final constitution as adopted only gave the autonomous

 4     regions Assemblies, and this was regarded with some dissatisfaction

 5     certainly in the Autonomous Region of Krajina, which did have a

 6     government.  And that was one of the issues that led to the problems in

 7     Banja Luka at the end of February 1992 that we may have discussed

 8     previously.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember, and paragraphs 158 -- or rather, and

10     161 speak about that, that the Assembly of Republika Srpska in

11     September 1992 decided to start centralisation of the government and to

12     try and reduce the authority that the regions had so as to exercise

13     greater control.  Is that what you say there?

14        A.   Paragraph 158?

15        Q.   Yes.  And 161.

16             [In English] "Several documents of subsequent" --

17        A.   Yes, those paragraphs deal with that issue, yes.

18        Q.   [Interpretation] So the central Assembly considered that what the

19     regions had was too much and needed to be centralised in September 1992;

20     right?

21        A.   Yes, and there were also comments in the Assembly made to the

22     effect that the regions had served their purpose, which was to help

23     dismantle Izetbegovic's state or Alija's state, I think, as they referred

24     to it, so they were no longer needed.  And what was needed now was a

25     centralisation in the Bosnian Serb Republic.

Page 14465

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at D283.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Do you tender 5405?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I do.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 1288, Your Honours.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and Momir, and I

 8     think that was Momir Jungic, who was the head of the cultural and

 9     educational community.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to the next page,

11     please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   And the date is the 8th of June, 1991.  And Karadzic says:

14             "We have to prepare the laws -- the legal regulations in order

15     that the regions have their money at their disposal and to ... the

16     republic, to send for the republic needs a certain portion.  And not to

17     centralise everything and then ..."

18             "No, they will give to the republic, but they ... not that I get

19     back 18 dinars out of 100 dinars ..."

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we turn to page 3 in

21     English.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   "It would be a good idea to speed up the process so that the

24     region could feel that they can dispose of their money as they see fit

25     and develop cultural life ..."

Page 14466

 1             And then lower down:

 2             "At the level of the municipality -- everything at the level of

 3     the municipality, libraries and so on, at the level of the region, that

 4     which is the region's, the theatre and things like that ..."

 5             And then:

 6             "That they should have full dominion over their resources.

 7             "And that they send to the republic, well, that is democracy,

 8     there is no more redistribution in the socialist fashion, when you

 9     collect everything and then you give as much as you want."

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page in Serbian.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   "They have been deprived in that way -- they have been robbed in

13     that respect."

14             Now, are you aware of the socialist system, whereby all the

15     monies flew in -- were pooled into a central piggy bank and then

16     distributed locally?

17        A.   I'm not sure how much the municipalities were -- for instance,

18     were able to retain.

19        Q.   Well, they weren't allowed to retain anything, Dr. Treanor.  They

20     had to hand in everything and then wait for the republic to hand out as

21     much as it wanted, and that's what they wanted to change, not to have to

22     wait for the republic to send them resources.  So this is the

23     redistribution that is mentioned here.  And do you know that Banja Luka

24     slipped down to 18th place in development terms?  It was the 18th-most

25     developed town, whereas it used to be the second-most developed -- most

Page 14467

 1     highly developed town?

 2        A.   I don't know its place in the development ranks, but as I

 3     mentioned in the course of my testimony earlier, there was a great deal

 4     of grass-roots support for regionalisation.  And we're seeing here one of

 5     the reasons why, that is, that money was getting sent to the capital and

 6     it wasn't coming back, so that people wanted to keep control over more of

 7     their own resources.  That was certainly one of the grass-roots

 8     incentives for the formation of regions.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 30048 next,

11     please.  30048.  It's a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and

12     Radoslav Brdjanin and Mice Cvjetkovic on the 19th of June, 1991.  They

13     didn't even let me celebrate my birthday properly.

14             May we turn to page 8 in the English and page 5 in the Serbian.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   I am talking to them here and towards the bottom of the page:

17             "You can link up everything, economic and everything else ..."

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page in the Serbian, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   "You can link up everything but not in the state respect.  I

21     don't want any linkage in state terms."

22             And Brdjanin asks:

23             "Territorially we can't mention everything."

24             And Karadzic says:

25             "No, at -- certainly not ..."

Page 14468

 1             And then he goes on to say that:

 2             "We should stay with the functional and economic ..."

 3             Did you know about this conversation?

 4        A.   I can't recall this specific conversation.  It's quite likely

 5     that I did read it, though.  What's being referenced here, as I think we

 6     have discussed before, is the effort to unite Bosnian Krajina with

 7     Croatian Krajina at the end of June 1991, something that Dr. Karadzic and

 8     the SDS leaders in Sarajevo were opposed to in view of negotiations that

 9     were going on at that time with Muslim leaders in Bosnia, if for no other

10     reason.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Marked for identification.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI 1289, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 30123 next,

16     please.

17             This is a telephone conversation held in July between Karadzic

18     and Brdjanin.  May we turn to page 4 of the Serbian and 7 of the English.

19             K says, Karadzic:

20             "We want the whole of Bosnia, the whole of Bosnia is our

21     fatherland.  I mean, we want -- we have the right to it and no one has

22     the right to take us out of Yugoslavia.  Regardless of whether we're in

23     the minority or the majority.  Regardless of what percentage it is and we

24     will regionalise Bosnia and allow them to make a region.  They can have

25     Cazin.  They can make a region.  Not a problem."

Page 14469

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Did you know that in July our position was that Bosnia should

 3     remain whole, an entity, and be regionalised within?

 4        A.   Yes, I think that's the position that was put forward in the

 5     document that we saw earlier what the Serbs propose, which was based on

 6     an earlier document passed by the SDS club of deputies in the SRBH

 7     Assembly.  I would just note that these conversations with Mr. Brdjanin

 8     are with someone who was a prominent SDS official, indeed a deputy in the

 9     SRBH Assembly, and that the heads of all the other organs in the

10     Autonomous Region of Krajina were occupied by -- also occupied by SDS

11     people.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document and then we

14     can move on to the next.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will mark it for identification as D1290.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             May we have 65 ter 30056, please -- 30256, which is the

18     conversation between Karadzic and the late Predrag Radic, who was the

19     mayor of Banja Luka, on the 20th of September, 1991.  3026 is the

20     document number -- 30256.  Page 2.  Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Predrag Radic says at the top:

23             "Last night on television it was announced that this man Naim

24     said that there would be an SDP and SDA gathering here and I think the

25     subject is regionalisation.  Now, if they are going -- if they are going

Page 14470

 1     to be the only ones to talk about reorganisation and not us, then I don't

 2     think that's all right."

 3             And lower down Karadzic says:

 4             "We weren't invited.  They prepared the draft of a statement

 5     which their intellectuals are going to sign."

 6             And then a little further down, Karadzic says:

 7             "... however, we have negotiations at 10.00 again with

 8     Izetbegovic and it's all in keeping with our negotiations.  The only

 9     thing is that we are moving a little faster than we agreed, but they are

10     also being petty and hypocrites.  They are discussing one thing with

11     Silajdzic advocating and something quite different."

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we turn to page 3 of both

13     versions.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Karadzic says to Radic:

16             "You have to be masters of your own goods ..."

17             And then a little lower down:

18             "There is no power without that."

19             And then:

20             "The Muslims will accept all this because we're not going to do

21     anything by force or without having reached a prior agreement."

22             And then he goes on to say:

23             "What they do in Zenica we shall do in Banja Luka."

24             And lower down:

25             "Sarajevo has special status, that's another matter, but there's

Page 14471

 1     no doubt that we are doing this in accordance with our agreements.  The

 2     fact that they are having trouble getting used to it is another matter."

 3             Do you know that everything we did was agreed upon with

 4     Izetbegovic, whereas we implemented the agreement straight away and it

 5     was their intention to deceive us?

 6        A.   I'm not aware of any agreement.  I know the discussions which

 7     were going on about this time for the so-called historic agreement

 8     included regionalisation, but that agreement never came to fruition.  And

 9     I don't know what the reference is to the meeting that the people are

10     holding and what the tenor of that meeting might have been.

11        Q.   Do you recall that the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not

12     forbid anything but just made recommendations that the formation of new

13     regions be stopped?

14        A.   Yes, I believe that's correct.  And they also passed a resolution

15     against the unification of Bosnian Krajina with Croatian Krajina at the

16     end of June 1991.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document to be MFI'd.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, MFI D1291.

20             Mr. Karadzic, you have 15 minutes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             May we have 1D3564.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Do you know how the other two sides behaved in Bosnia in this

25     respect?  Do you know what the Croatian side did?

Page 14472

 1        A.   Well, the HDZ -- some of its leaders were engaged in the summer

 2     and fall of 1991 in establishing the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,

 3     which was --

 4        Q.   Thank you.  This document testifies to that and the 6th of

 5     Kolovoz, as they say, is the 6th of August.  And we have "Kolovoz" here

 6     translated as "August" here, yes.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have Serbian page 6, or

 8     rather, Croatian page 6 and English page 7.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And the entire document is devoted to what you just talked about,

11     creation of Croatian regions.  Look at paragraph 21:

12             "The proposal of the regional HDZ union from Travnik to found

13     regional unions in order to establish the closest possible links between

14     Croatian people, is passed.  On the basis of such links it is necessary

15     to make detailed proposals, feasibility studies, regarding the

16     justifiability of the regional territory linking the Croatian people ..."

17             So is this a parallel process then within the Yugoslav crisis and

18     Bosnian crisis, for the Croatian people to organise themselves along

19     those lines?

20        A.   Yes, broadly parallel.  It's also parallel to the process that

21     took place in Croatia among the Croatian Serbs, that is, the formation of

22     communities of municipalities, the formation of a Serbian National

23     Council, and the formation of Serbian autonomous regions, and the final

24     declaration of a republic.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 14473

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1292, Your Honours.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   I'd like to draw your attention to paragraph 24 of your report,

 6     P92, where you speak about the position of Karadzic as president of the

 7     party.

 8             [In English] "In short, the Presidency was the single-most

 9     important central party institution ..."

10             [Interpretation] And then paragraph 25:

11             [In English] "... a frequent and repeated message from Karadzic

12     to SDS leaders in the field was insistence on the respect of the party

13     hierarchy and discipline.  Karadzic was able to communicate easily in

14     this way with municipal SDS leaders, too, as and when the situation

15     required and to co-ordinate party work at various levels."

16             [Interpretation] Paragraph 26 also says that:

17             "Karadzic, within the frameworks of his party, acted with

18     impunity."

19             [In English] "In fact, within the party per se, Karadzic acted

20     with virtual impunity."

21             [Interpretation] So in your report you portray me as an autocrat

22     and as somebody who is absolute and nobody can do anything to.  Right?

23             Paragraph 41 is similar, as is 67.  These paragraphs indicate the

24     kind of person I was and my position in the party.  Whether it relates to

25     the founding of the SDS as a central party, where strict discipline is

Page 14474

 1     adhered to, that in the SDS Karadzic is particularly powerful and his

 2     closest associates who lead the party, that Karadzic should be considered

 3     an autocrat, dictator, and the embodiment of all things non-democratic.

 4     That's what you say; right?

 5        A.   Does paragraph 67 say that?

 6        Q.   Your paragraphs suggest that my position in the party is the

 7     position of an autocrat, that of an autocrat and somebody who can do

 8     anything without being punished.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we have 65 ter 30048 next,

10     please.

11             JUDGE KWON:  You just made a statement without asking a question

12     or without hearing from the witness.

13             Do you wish to answer the question, Mr. -- Dr. Treanor?

14             THE WITNESS:  Well, I think there was a question there somewhere.

15     Right.  Well, the report does not use the word "autocrat."  I don't want

16     to get bogged down on semantic points, but it certainly portrays

17     Mr. Karadzic as being a very strong party leader, strong and active.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             May we have 65 ter 30048 next, please.

20             We have very little time left, but I just want us to see how

21     Karadzic -- what Karadzic's attitude was towards democracy, quasi

22     democracy, and discipline.  Page 6 in English.  The document is 30048,

23     65 ter 30048 is what we need.  Page 4 in Serbian and 6 in English.

24             JUDGE KWON:  This is what we already looked at, MFI D1289.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  Yes, thank you.

Page 14475

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   But you see that longest sentence -- that longest paragraph where

 3     he says:

 4             "Those idiots are working to Tudjman's advantage ..."

 5             And then towards the bottom he says:

 6             "I cannot understand why I allowed so much lack of discipline in

 7     the party and so much false or quasi democracy in the party ..."

 8             Now, Dr. Treanor, do you know that the SDS cadres and membership

 9     criticised me for doing quite the reverse, that I gave too much leeway to

10     democracy and non-discipline in the party, and we had a witness here

11     yesterday who testified to that?

12        A.   Well, no.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 30357, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Now, in those intercepts did you happen to note all the oral

17     struggles I had with people, first and foremost in Banja Luka, for them

18     to respect what had been agreed?

19        A.   Oh, yes.

20        Q.   Here is one such conversation held on the 16th of October, 1991,

21     the day after the adoption of that declaration on independence.  And when

22     we stepped down from -- upon leaving the Assembly I talked to Dr. Vukic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 5 in Serbian and

24     4 in English.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 14476

 1        Q.   It says:  Karadzic:

 2             "When this political struggle is over, when it's all over, when

 3     the state is saved, I will sign the undertaking now that I will leave

 4     politics.  Of course they will leave too.  Nobody will elect such fools

 5     again.  But let the people elect whom they want, but let them not try to

 6     occupy offices now in a state that does not exist ..."

 7             Do you know that I had to fight not only for the making of

 8     decisions and finding solutions, but to have these decisions implemented

 9     and I met with a lot of resistance and trouble?

10        A.   Yes, there are many conversations where Dr. Karadzic tries to get

11     people to do things that have already been decided or not to go against

12     what had already been decided.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be received?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1293, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly look at P1084.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   This is a telephone conversation in July between Karadzic and

20     Vojo Kupresanin, who was president of the Assembly of the

21     Autonomous Region of Krajina.  At that moment it was just a community of

22     municipalities.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need page 2 in both languages.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Karadzic:

Page 14477

 1             "I'm asking you nicely.  The meeting of the Main Board is on

 2     Thursday.  On Thursday we'll clear up things once and for all, whether

 3     these people belong to the party that is implementing this policy or is

 4     it another party.  We have to clear that up.  I cannot engage in politics

 5     when people there are doing things without authorisation.  That's an

 6     unauthorised move.  It cannot be done without the Main Board ..."

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now page 4.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Karadzic says:

10             "Well, the Serbian Democratic Party -- it's harder -- I have a

11     harder time with our own people than with our adversaries ..."

12             And the last line:

13             "Of course it's harder to deal with our own people ..."

14             Does this reflect my efforts that democratic decisions be

15     honoured?

16        A.   Well, it only reflects the difficulties that were had in trying

17     to get decisions honoured, as you put it.  I don't know what you mean by

18     "democratic decisions."  The reference here seems to be to the Main Board

19     which may have made a decision.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's now time for you to conclude.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have another five minutes as you

22     said.

23             JUDGE KWON:  No, just conclude in two minutes.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             Can we look at D282 -- D280.

Page 14478

 1             Your Excellencies, the entire segment about the interviews with

 2     Mr. Cizmovic remains outstanding, although Dr. Treanor assigned in his

 3     report various roles to Mr. Cizmovic that he didn't have.  That's my

 4     problem.

 5             This is a conversation between Karadzic and Kupresanin.  We need

 6     page 6 in both versions.

 7             It says "Radovan" halfway down.

 8             "The Serbian Assembly made a decision Saturday and Sunday, 7.00

 9     to 7.00 p.m.  Nobody can change it, neither Karadzic nor Milosevic, nor

10     God himself.  From 7.00 to 1900 hours, that's what the Assembly decided!

11             "If the Assembly decided, who am I to change it?  I am just a

12     small player who is serving that Assembly and the entire party and the

13     entire Serbian people!  I am neither a big shot or a big boss to change

14     things and neither is he, Vukic!  Nobody among us!  We are here to serve

15     the Assembly."

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Isn't it clear that the Main Board is the main body in the party

18     and the Assembly for the state?

19        A.   I think the Assembly assigned itself a certain role.  The

20     Assembly, of course, was composed almost entirely of members of the SDS.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look again at P12 and that

22     will be the end.  Unfortunately, I kindly ask that it be taken into

23     account that the OTP interviews with Mr. Cizmovic are in complete

24     contrast with the conclusions made in this report and that it be taken

25     into account.

Page 14479

 1             Can we look towards the bottom of page 1, English page 2.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   We -- that's my speech at the extended session of the Main Board

 4     on the 14th of February, the day after the beginning of official

 5     negotiations.

 6             "We hope that deputies will intensify their activities in

 7     municipalities because deputy is power, parties are a service elected by

 8     people, a service to the people to have the popular will exercised.

 9     Parties are not our government, they are not our main authority.

10     Authority belongs to the Assembly and deputies."

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then page 15 Serbian, English

12     page 20.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   "500.000 Serbs, million Serbs outside Krajina, and we have to

15     agree.  If this policy is wrong, then the Main Board has to say so today

16     that it leads to a dead end, that not a single objective has been

17     achieved so far, and then we should change the leadership.  I will

18     personally be grateful to you.  You will give me a medal or a member --

19     or an honourable member because I was the first president of the party

20     and I will be happy to move into a different sort of politics, to move

21     with a different policy.  If there is a different policy and I'm not

22     implementing it, we deserve to be replaced."

23             And then it says:

24             "The greatest authority in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina is the Serbian Assembly and don't mess around with it."

Page 14480

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 16, English page 22, last

 2     paragraph --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Conclude as soon as possible.  What is your

 4     question?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one paragraph.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   "I don't want to be at the head of this party for a day longer.

 8     I believe I have done my -- I have repaid my debt to the people.  I can't

 9     wait to go back to my profession.  Of course you will find a replacement.

10     Nobody is irreplaceable."

11             Did you know that the party and myself within that party were

12     handing over power to the elected people in various authorities and we

13     had no desire to exercise power ourselves?

14        A.   Yes, I think that's one of the things that is said in the report,

15     that the SDS sort of melded in with the Bosnian Serb governmental

16     structures that were established, all of whom -- all of which structures

17     were staffed by people from the -- from the SDS.  I note the reference

18     here to apparently giving the Main Board the final word in a particular

19     position here.  Again, the Bosnian Serb Assembly and the Municipal

20     Assemblies being referenced were composed of SDS people, and Dr. Karadzic

21     was always insistent that they carry out party policy.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

23             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

25                           Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:

Page 14481

 1        Q.   Dr. Treanor, I'll obviously be brief under the circumstances.

 2     First I'd like to bring you back to something the accused raised

 3     yesterday, and that was a speech by Dr. Kalinic at the 4th Assembly

 4     Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina

 5     on 21 December cited in support of -- of a proposition that the Serbs

 6     recognised that all three peoples had the right to sovereign control of

 7     their lives in territories where they were the majority.  Could I refer

 8     you quickly to another passage of that same Assembly where the accused

 9     said, and that's at page 38 of that Assembly:

10             "We have the right and the ability to prevent anybody on the

11     territories where we conducted our referendum to secede from Yugoslavia

12     in all territories where Serbs took part in the referendum.  Regardless

13     of whether they make 5 per cent or 55 per cent of the population, they

14     are the constituent element of that town or that republic.  All

15     territories where we voted in our referendum to remain within Yugoslavia

16     must stay within Yugoslavia if we decide so."

17             Does that statement by Dr. Karadzic reflect on the territories

18     and areas over which the Bosnian Serb leaders considered Serbs should be

19     sovereign?

20        A.   Yes, it does.  I remember that passage because the 5 per cent

21     figure struck me.  That would make the potential Serbian area within

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina quite extensive.  Dr. Karadzic frequently made

23     reference to the fact that Serbs owned 64 per cent of the land in Bosnia,

24     something which was not technically true.  But that statement along with

25     this one would seem to indicate a very extensive claim to -- on the part

Page 14482

 1     of the Bosnian Serbs to land in Bosnia.

 2        Q.   Today, earlier, the accused put to you that what was termed or

 3     what I think you termed "the Sarajevo Agreement" left only maps to be

 4     decided.  Now, I want to set aside for a -- your -- for purposes of this

 5     question your response, that the document was -- only served as a basis

 6     for further negotiations but just concentrate for a moment on the maps.

 7     And in that connection I wanted to turn your attention to D20 at -- which

 8     is the shorthand record from the 11th Session of the Bosnian Serb

 9     Assembly held on the 18th of March, 1992, the same date as the Sarajevo

10     Agreement.  And turn to a portion where the accused explained to the

11     Assembly deputies the following concerning the negotiations.

12             "What we have here is a process," he said, "and the mistake that

13     Dobrivoje is making has to do with the fact that an unfinished process

14     should not be assessed as if it were a finished one.  We have entered

15     into this process with our strategic goals and we are accomplishing them

16     stage by stage ..."

17             And then he continued:

18             "We have preserved the Serbian people as a corpus in its entirety

19     in the BH and attached it as an entity and now it is a matter of quantity

20     only.  We have achieved the quality.  This is what Europe recognises.

21     Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina exists.  The only remaining question is

22     the one of quantity and it will happen according our political will, our

23     right to self-determination and organisation.  It will happen according

24     to the conditions which are up to you to create."

25             Was -- can you explain in the context you have just been

Page 14483

 1     describing, very quickly, the -- how this affected the issues concerning

 2     the maps and their completion at this time?

 3        A.   Well, as I mentioned, the map was simply a map showing the

 4     relative majorities, ethnic majorities, in the municipalities.  It was by

 5     no means designed to be a final map of the constituent units, and

 6     Dr. Karadzic is here indicating how the final boundaries of the Serbian

 7     unit might be created, referring to -- being a step in a process -- steps

 8     in a process.  As I indicated, the strategy at this time -- the

 9     Bosnian Serb strategy was to create their own entity, assert control over

10     those territories within a confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with

11     a view to eventually attaching those territories to a broader Serbian

12     state.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, you said it is P20 on 11th -- it should

14     be P12.  Is it not P12?

15             MR. TIEGER:  No, I was -- sorry, Your Honour.  I was referring to

16     the 11th Session of the Assembly, which I understood to be D00020.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Could you check it out?

18             MR. TIEGER:  Sure, I'm sorry.  That's -- sorry.  It's D0090.

19             With the -- if -- I don't know if the Court wants to view that

20     document, otherwise I will be moving on.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Please move on.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

23        Q.   Dr. Treanor, you referred yesterday to the consistent position of

24     the Bosnian Serb leadership concerning their intention to -- over the

25     long term to unite with Serbia and other Serbian entities, thereby

Page 14484

 1     splitting up Bosnia.  And you also referred to the fact that that

 2     intention was not emphasised by the Bosnian Serbs during the course of

 3     the negotiations.  Can I turn your attention to 65 ter 06139, please,

 4     page 19 of both the English and the B/C/S.

 5             This is a session of the SFRY Presidency held on March 2nd, 1991.

 6     And this -- there Dr. Karadzic says -- it refers to how they're

 7     constantly -- "the European community, especially the United States, is

 8     constantly warning that BiH is not to be split up and we accepted it.  We

 9     will not split up.  This is not about splitting up but about an internal

10     transformation and they swallowed the bait.  Europe swallowed the bait."

11             And I wanted to ask you whether this is a reflection of some of

12     the terminology used in the course of the negotiations and the emphasis

13     or non-emphasis placed on the ultimate goal of unification?

14        A.   Well, yes the negotiations --

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This calls for speculation.  The

16     first question was leading and this one calls for speculation.  And I

17     don't have a chance to test it later or to challenge it.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, we've heard the repeated use of the

19     term "transformation," and it is now being placed in context and the

20     witness is being asked to comment on that.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, as an expert he can comment on it as far as he

22     can.

23             Yes, Mr. Treanor.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, the negotiations were all about the

25     transformation of BH.  The idea of uniting portions of BH with -- or the

Page 14485

 1     desire to unite portions of BH with any other state were not -- was not

 2     voiced in the framework of those negotiations, rather the contrary.  But

 3     as I think we've seen today in some of the things we've seen but

 4     certainly in other sessions of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, that that was

 5     still the desire of the Bosnian Serbs and their leadership.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  And I would tender this, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2587, Your Honours.

 9             MR. TIEGER:

10        Q.   Dr. Treanor, today at page 27, at least of today's transcript,

11     the accused referred you to an intercept with Gojko Djogo of

12     12 October 1992 and directed your attention to, as he had in -- with a

13     number of previous intercepts, to what he called "preparing for war."

14     Now, let me focus on that Djogo-Karadzic conversation on 12 October 1991,

15     where Dr. Karadzic says at page 2:

16             "We led them but they are preparing for war.  They will try to

17     wage war here."

18             Djogo says:

19             "They will."

20             Karadzic says:

21             "Probably as soon as next week."

22             And then Djogo says:

23             "Where -- where is he going to war?"

24             Karadzic says:

25             "Well, he's crazy.  They're -- they're totally crazy you

Page 14486

 1     know ..." et cetera.

 2             I wanted you to place this in context for us, Dr. Treanor.  What

 3     threat was paramount in the minds of the Bosnian Serbs as far as the

 4     documentary record reflects at this point in October 1991?

 5        A.   Well, at this point the Bosnian -- the Assembly of SRBiH had

 6     begun a joint session and this was the session at which the resolutions

 7     on the sovereignty of BH were introduced and were under discussion.  So I

 8     think that was the threat that was uppermost in the minds of Bosnian Serb

 9     leaders at this time.

10        Q.   And is that referenced in further portions of the intercept, for

11     example, at page 7, where Dr. Karadzic says:

12             "No, they have inflamed irresponsible deputies with the notion

13     that they should get a state?"

14             Or at page 9 of the intercept, Dr. Karadzic says:

15             "We will not force them to do anything but they simply don't have

16     any way to carry out a secession"?

17        A.   Yes, that's reflective of that.

18        Q.   At the time of this intercept did you see any reflections in the

19     documentary record that the Bosnian Serb leadership was concerned about

20     an -- or did you see any threats by the Bosnian Muslim leadership of an

21     imminent military aggression against the Bosnian Serbs?

22        A.   No.  In fact, if I could go back to the A and B document that we

23     discussed, in the preamble of that document it lays out the reason for

24     its existence which it describes as a possible forcible attempt to take

25     BH out of Yugoslavia as in the Bosnian Serb leadership's conception.

Page 14487

 1     "Forcible" would mean the type of action that was taken on October 15th

 2     in -- in voting the sovereignty resolutions which Dr. Karadzic described

 3     as constitutional violence.  That document makes no reference to any

 4     imminent threat.  I was asked whether it was defensive.  It is defensive

 5     in the sense that the whole Bosnian Serb project at that time was

 6     defensive, that is, to defend the rights of the Bosnian Serb people to

 7     remain in Yugoslavia, which involves efforts to define and assert control

 8     over territory.  It is not defensive in the sense that they expected some

 9     sort of imminent military threat.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, we have to leave -- rise.  Is it okay?

11     Would it be okay?

12             MR. TIEGER:  It will have to be, Your Honour.  Let me just note

13     two things quickly as we rise.  Number one, our bar table submission,

14     which is very succinct, is still pending and --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Which is joined by the Defence --

16             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, I didn't mean the recently filed -- I

17     mean in connection with -- appendix B to this -- to the 92 ter

18     submission.  And we tried to be as judicious as possible under the

19     circumstances, in light of the truncated period for the re-direct, I'll

20     consider if any additions are necessary, but I understand the Court's

21     position.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  And theoretically the Prosecution's motion of the

23     6th of June, confidential motion to resume the testimony of Mr. --

24     Dr. Treanor, but given that his evidence is completed, I take it that has

25     been disposed of?

Page 14488

 1             MR. TIEGER:  I agree, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And we can reclassify it as public?

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That will be done.  Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, just one question --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we have to rise.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One short question.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, this is quite unfair.  I didn't get to

 9     complete my re-direct, and -- and ...

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will rise, Dr. Karadzic.

11             That concludes your evidence, Dr. Treanor.  I thank you, and have

12     a safe trip back.

13             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I hope I was able to

14     assist the Court.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Tomorrow, 9.00.

17                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,

18                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 9th day of

19                           June, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.