Page 17062
1 Thursday, 21 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: I see witness is not here and I was advised that
6 Mr. Karadzic wants to raise something with the Chamber.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Your Excellency.
8 Good morning, Excellencies. Good morning, everybody. I wish to say for
9 the record but also for all future trials, I wish to make clear the
10 position of the Defence in respect of this witness and all other
11 witnesses. I don't know if this is a precedent, but it is certainly a
12 dangerous practice that the Prosecution has introduced; namely, to call
13 ambitious witnesses who are their former employees and they directed
14 their work by giving them guide-lines and now they are being presented as
15 independent experts who come here to testify.
16 It is my conviction that this is an instance of giving evidence
17 by the Prosecution and not by independent experts. The written material
18 that we are facing are the complete repetition of one aspect of the
19 indictment and not only that; it is even more ambitious than the
20 indictment. It is very general. There's a general distortion of facts,
21 wrong interpretation, and it even aspires to the status of evidence.
22 What I'm concerned with is the following: Am I to test and probe
23 into each false fact and misinterpretation? There are hundreds of
24 paragraphs and thousands of footnotes and all are wrong, except for those
25 where the law is quoted. And am I expected to prove that this survey
Page 17063
1 is -- isn't worth a thing? There have been five or six such witnesses
2 already who were employees of the OTP and the OTP directed their expert
3 work. If the Trial Chamber is to give any weight to that, then I will
4 request for all such witnesses to be re-called for additional
5 examination. I must say this for this trial and all future trials
6 because I can see that there are many small countries and presidents of
7 these countries who are expected to stand trial.
8 JUDGE KWON: Is that it? So you completed your submission,
9 Mr. Karadzic?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I cannot go into the details now,
11 but as we have seen and as we are about to see, namely, to what extent
12 all this is wrong, is it necessary for me to disprove each and every
13 paragraph to the Trial Chamber; or is it sufficient to show that on some
14 examples? And I'm curious to know to what weight the Trial Chamber will
15 give to this kind of evidence and if so, then I will request for them to
16 be re-called --
17 JUDGE KWON: I'm going to stop you here. This is an example how
18 we are wasting the precious court time. Those witnesses who are called
19 pursuant to Rule 94 bis, and according to the regime -- there's a regime
20 through which you can challenge the qualification or other things. I
21 stand corrected -- I should stand corrected if I'm wrong, but I -- as
22 long as I can remember, you didn't challenge the qualification when there
23 is notice from the Prosecution.
24 And as for this witness and also with other witnesses, their
25 scope of expert reports and their methodologies were made clear through
Page 17064
1 their report. And as professional Judges, we are aware of all the points
2 were raised which all go to the matter of weight. So there's no point to
3 make that submission anew.
4 JUDGE BAIRD: May I add one thing. You said I'm curious to know
5 what weight the Trial Chamber will give this kind of evidence. But at
6 this point in time we can't address that issue, can we, the
7 Trial Chamber, the question of weight?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I believe that. But I wonder
9 how I can defend myself if the segment of the indictment this witness has
10 dealt with and presents it as evidence, if I only have 10 or 15 hours to
11 test all that. It's impossible.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, do you want the Prosecution to
14 comment on this?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's actually Ms. Elliott who would address
17 you on this topic.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 MS. ELLIOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. Just in terms of the issue
20 of time, the Prosecution would point out that Mr. Karadzic has used a
21 significant amount of time cross-examining Mr. Theunens on political
22 matters and, in fact, he did not choose to cross-examine Mr. Treanor on
23 these matters, who dealt directly with issues raised in cross-examination
24 yesterday by Mr. Karadzic, as required to do so under Rule 90(H). So
25 there is an issue of how Mr. Karadzic is organising his
Page 17065
1 cross-examination. Thank you.
2 JUDGE KWON: When we decide the amount of time which is necessary
3 for your cross-examination, the Chamber carefully considers all the
4 circumstances. And after such careful consideration we decided 11 hours
5 for this witness for your cross-examination is appropriate. Having
6 observed your cross-examination so far, as noted by Ms. Elliott, the
7 Chamber is not minded to extend the time allotted to you at the moment.
8 So let's not waste time any more. Let's bring in the witness.
9 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, while we do that, may I just introduce
10 my last intern for the summer, Ms. Sanja Radulovic.
11 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Ms. Radulovic.
12 MR. HARVEY: Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: I note that Mr. Karadzic has spent about six hours
14 and 20 minutes so far and he will have four hours and 40 minutes.
15 And how long would you need for your re-examination,
16 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would think about -- at the
18 time -- at this point in time about 20 minutes.
19 JUDGE KWON: So I wonder whether - I'm asking the parties and
20 staff - if it is possible to sit about -- for about an hour tomorrow,
21 I -- around 11.00. So if -- I would appreciate if parties and staff
22 members let us know through court deputy.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Theunens.
25 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
Page 17066
1 JUDGE KWON: Just for the planning purposes, would you be
2 available tomorrow in the morning?
3 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. I understand it would always
4 be better than to have me fly back in August.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
7 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
9 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Theunens.
10 A. Good morning, Mr. Karadzic.
11 Q. Your report presents the position that the six strategic goals
12 are a public or secret task for the VRS and that the VRS existed and
13 acted in order to realise these goals, to achieve them; correct?
14 A. Your Honours, we have already discussed this question yesterday.
15 I have not put in my report, not concluded in my report, that the sole
16 purpose or that the purpose of the VRS's existence was to implement the
17 six strategic goals. What I have put in my report and what I have
18 concluded is that the operations conducted by the VRS between its
19 establishment, date of its establishment, and the Dayton Agreement are
20 coherent or consistent with the six strategic goals.
21 Q. Did you identify any of these strategic goals as being
22 illegitimate; and if so, which?
23 A. Your Honours, it was not within the direction I had received to
24 determine whether or not these goals or any of these goals were
25 legitimate or illegitimate.
Page 17067
1 Q. Thank you. To corroborate the position of the Defence that these
2 were not military but political goals and that they constituted a
3 platform for talks, let me ask you whether you agree that we were unable
4 to establish that these strategic goals were an item on the agenda, that
5 there was no vote on them, and that they are not to be found among the
6 conclusions of that Assembly session? We did that yesterday.
7 A. Your Honours, I understand that this is the view of Mr. Karadzic.
8 Now, in my report in addition to the references in the minutes of the
9 16th Assembly Session, I have also included in footnote 163, part 2 of
10 the report, a document signed by Mr. Krajisnik, who was the president of
11 the Assembly, which is sent in the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina and contains the six strategic goals. It's a document dated
13 the 12th of May, 1992, reference number -- I mean on the document
14 02-130/92, which indicates to me that the six strategic goals were indeed
15 disseminated or the information concerned of the six strategic goals was
16 disseminated in the SRBiH, and yesterday I also indicated the link I see
17 or I have analysed between the six strategic goals and the subsequent
18 directives by the Supreme Command and/or the Main Staff of the VRS.
19 Q. Thank you. But that was published in the Official Gazette in
20 1993; isn't that right?
21 A. I don't understand the question, Your Honours. What was
22 published in the Official Gazette in 1993?
23 Q. These six strategic goals in the form of a decision, although we
24 have seen that it was not a decision but merely information as part of my
25 presentation. They were only published one year later; correct? They
Page 17068
1 may have been dated the 12th of May, but they were published in the
2 Official Gazette one and a half years later.
3 A. That may well be possible, but a publication in 1993, according
4 to my findings, does not exclude that they were also known on the 12th --
5 I mean, announced and known on the 12th of May, 1992.
6 JUDGE KWON: The question was about the publication.
7 THE WITNESS: I -- it's possible, Your Honours, that they were
8 also published in the Official Gazette in 1993, but my understanding is
9 that the document by Krajisnik is dated 12th of May and the directives
10 are -- I mean the --
11 JUDGE KWON: So you don't know whether it was published in
12 Official Gazette in 1993?
13 THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's correct, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you can simply answer like that.
15 THE WITNESS: Okay.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D428, please.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. These are the minutes from the 4th Session of the War Presidency
20 of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the widened Presidency, held
21 on 10 June 1992. D428.
22 I would like to direct your attention all these items, political
23 work among soldiers, unity of command, terminate activities in town, move
24 a unit from Krajina because if we don't use artillery there is no
25 strategic balance, the prohibition of mass funerals of fallen soldiers,
Page 17069
1 and so on and so forth. And then item 10, that the strategic goals and
2 the map of the Serbian BH be published and sent to the European
3 Community.
4 Why send it to the European Community unless it's meant to be a
5 platform for negotiations?
6 A. Your Honours, this is the first time I see this document. I
7 cannot establish why Mr. Karadzic instructed that the strategic goals and
8 the maps of what is described or identified as Serbian BiH should be
9 published and sent to the European Community. It may well be that it was
10 intended to assist with the negotiations. But in the meanwhile we have
11 already a first directive for further operations dated the 6th of June
12 which identifies or sets a number of goals or tasks for the VRS which are
13 consistent with at least five of the six strategic goals.
14 JUDGE KWON: While you can see the transcript part, could you
15 assist the court reporter as to what you said.
16 THE WITNESS: Yeah, my answer was in the meanwhile we have
17 already a first directive for --
18 JUDGE KWON: Second line of your answer: "I can ..."
19 THE WITNESS: I cannot establish or I cannot say why --
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 THE WITNESS: -- Mr. Karadzic instructed that the strategic
22 goals ... and so on.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Didn't the Presidency decide about this at the session of the
25 Presidency attended also by some persons who were not members of the
Page 17070
1 Presidency, such as Mladic, Gvero, Tolimir, isn't this a decision of the
2 Presidency to send the map and the strategic goals to the
3 European Community? These were our negotiating positions of which we
4 wanted to inform the European Community, our position for the
5 continuation of talks.
6 A. Yes, I mean, it is indeed a report of the -- or the minutes of
7 the meeting of the expanded -- of the Presidency with a number of
8 individuals present who are not members of the Presidency. And the
9 conclusions reflect the view of the members of the Presidency.
10 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Theunens, I must intervene with regard
11 to semantics. This confusion between expanded Presidency or the expanded
12 meeting -- this distinction cost Krajisnik much hard work and possibly a
13 couple of years in prison. So --
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: [Previous translation continues]...
15 Your Honours, these remarks are really not needed.
16 JUDGE KWON: Totally unnecessary and improper. It's time for you
17 to put questions, not to make a statement or comment. Please bear that
18 in mind, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, with all due
20 respect, I testified in the Krajisnik case because of such semantic
21 problems. This says expanded meeting --
22 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]... put your
23 question to the witness.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. What is expanded here, the Presidency or the meeting? Is it
Page 17071
1 expanded by adding some people who are not members of the Presidency?
2 A. Your Honours, I mentioned there are a number of people attending
3 who are not members of the Presidency.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Theunens, you said in your reply that it was a meeting of the
7 expanded Presidency, whereas I say that it was instead an expanded
8 meeting of the Presidency. One thing is an expanded Presidency. Then --
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I think Mr. Theunens has answered the
10 question.
11 "There are a number of people attending who are not members of
12 the Presidency."
13 I think that tells all. Let's move on.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Now I must ask you to assist us about some of your
17 interpretations. Did your work include qualifying my conduct or my
18 documents? Was it your job to analyse them and present them or to state
19 an opinion about them?
20 A. Your Honours, I would like to refer to the scope of the report,
21 and I don't know whether I have to repeat it but I have mentioned it a
22 few times over the previous days, that my task was to analyse the role of
23 Mr. Karadzic as the highest political authority over the Bosnian Serb TO,
24 or the SRBiH TO followed by the VRS, focussing on two aspects. The first
25 aspect is command and control and the second aspect is situational
Page 17072
1 awareness. And I then drew conclusions in relation to these two aspects.
2 Q. Thank you. Let us look at page 278 where humanitarian aid is
3 mentioned. You say that I had a monopoly in deciding about humanitarian
4 aid because I wanted to benefit from that position in which I was to
5 decide about the transit of convoys. It says in sub-item QQ:
6 "The leadership of the Bosnian Serbs headed by Radovan Karadzic
7 uses humanitarian aid to exert pressure on the other war parties and on
8 the international community. Radovan Karadzic reminds" --
9 JUDGE KWON: Let's find the passage first.
10 Can you confirm that it was --
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it is most helpful to always
12 mention a footnote from this page, then it's easy to find, because we
13 seem to have different versions. So it would be much better to address
14 the footnote.
15 JUDGE KWON: Correct. Could -- Mr. Theunens has found the
16 passage.
17 Mr. Karadzic, what footnote are we looking at?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately the OTP merged
19 documents and then the footnote numbers were changed, so there is no
20 correspondence.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, that's not correct. That's
22 what -- we did not change the footnotes. That's why the footnotes are
23 the most helpful to identify the passage in each version that is in front
24 of any of us. The footnotes were not changed at all, just the page
25 numbers.
Page 17073
1 JUDGE KWON: In any event, it's about --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It changed in the translation, the
3 translators merged all the reports into one and the footnote -- and the
4 footnote numbers changed automatically. That's how the Serbian version
5 was made. The translations were merged and then the numbers of the
6 footnotes were automatically adapted.
7 JUDGE KWON: Do you have the table of contents and can you
8 identify where it is about -- or, Mr. Theunens, it's about monopoly of --
9 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I mean, it -- I believe I have the
10 same version as Mr. Karadzic. Mr. Karadzic was citing or quoting from
11 paragraph QQ in the executive summary -- in the summary of section number
12 4 and this refers to information included starting at the sections
13 footnote 1003 and following until 1028. And actually, this conclusion
14 Mr. Karadzic read out from paragraph QQ from the summary can also be
15 found after footnote 1028, part 2 of the report.
16 JUDGE KWON: Where do we have paragraph QQ?
17 THE WITNESS: This is in the summary section of section 4 of the
18 report, Your Honours.
19 And, for example, the word -- I mean, I didn't use the word
20 "monopoly," but I quoted the word "exclusively," which I found, for
21 example, in a document signed -- or a reminder/instruction issued by
22 Mr. Karadzic on the 17th of August, 1994 --
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
24 Could you tell us, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, page number, para QQ?
25 Section 4.
Page 17074
1 THE WITNESS: It should be the 14th or the 15th page of the
2 summary section of section 4.
3 THE ACCUSED: In English 123, page 123, yeah.
4 JUDGE KWON: Different.
5 THE WITNESS: 123 is the page in the original version and there
6 is a merged version now.
7 JUDGE KWON: Footnote number nearby?
8 THE WITNESS: This -- this is summary, Your Honours. There is no
9 footnote there, but the first footnote that follows is 355.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, perhaps in the -- in the merged
11 version it's the ERN number 07046594, there you find QQ.
12 JUDGE KWON: Indeed. Thank you. Yes, page 123, correct. My
13 apologies.
14 Yes, put your question again, Mr. Karadzic.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. You established that I'm interfering or dealing with humanitarian
17 issues, especially the passage of convoys, for the reasons that you
18 mention here; right?
19 A. Yes, Your Honours, and I did so on the basis of the documents I
20 have reviewed between footnote 1004 and footnote 1028.
21 Q. Thank you. So your job was to review documents and to extract a
22 qualification of my behaviour; right?
23 A. Maybe it's an issue of translation, but as I mentioned already in
24 the scope of the report I wanted to find out what the role was of
25 Mr. Karadzic in relation to two aspects: Command and control, whereby I
Page 17075
1 looked, for example, at whether he was issuing orders; were these orders
2 implemented; what did he do to verify the implementation of these orders;
3 what action did he take or not take when these orders were implemented or
4 when the end result was different from the one he intended. Now, the
5 second aspect, situational awareness, covered, among other things,
6 whether Mr. Karadzic was informed of the operations or the activities of
7 the VRS or the situation. That is not just that he receives information,
8 but also that he gathered information himself --
9 Q. All right. But I kindly ask you now just to focus on the
10 humanitarian issues involved, so QQ; right? Was it your job to qualify,
11 on the basis of those documents, my behaviour in view of that particular
12 segment? Is that what you were asked to do?
13 A. No, Your Honours, I was not asked to do that. It is me, myself,
14 who determined that -- who established that actually control over the
15 flow of humanitarian convoys -- I mean, that there was a control
16 exercised in the RS -- or at first SRBiH and then the RS. And during my
17 research I tried to find out who was responsible for the orders that
18 imposed that control. And obviously, I came across military documents, I
19 came across, call it, political documents, including documents signed by
20 Mr. Karadzic or documents referring to orders by Mr. Karadzic. And on
21 the basis of all that documentation, I drew certain conclusions and those
22 conclusions, the summary thereof, can be found in paragraph QQ.
23 Q. Thank you. So you came across texts in which I intervene to have
24 convoys stopped or to have convoys let through?
25 A. That is correct, Your Honours, whereby from the documents I have
Page 17076
1 reviewed it is not so much about individual convoys; it's more the policy
2 behind these individual authorisations or prohibitions.
3 Q. And your conclusion is that I issued orders that made it possible
4 to create further obstacles and impede the delivery of humanitarian aid;
5 right?
6 A. Indeed, Your Honours.
7 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that I had a front line of almost
8 2.000 kilometres, that I had 225.000 soldiers, that I had a million and a
9 half hungry people under sanctions, that I had 61 municipalities where
10 the leaderships were unskillful in carrying out their work, that I had a
11 multitude of international negotiators, that I worked until 2.00 or 3.00
12 at night; and now you say that I issued orders that made it possible to
13 impede humanitarian aid. And this is what the Defence says to that: I
14 interfered in that only at the request of the international community.
15 Did you know that? I was asked to help and to appoint the highest
16 possible authorities that would allow convoys to pass through.
17 A. Your Honours, I -- there's just one example, footnote 989 in Part
18 2 of the report, 10th of April, 1994, the Supreme Command decides to
19 suspend all contacts between the Main Staff of the VRS and the UNPROFOR
20 command and the Supreme Command also imposes a ban on the movement of
21 UNPROFOR personnel and convoys, including humanitarian convoys. And this
22 decision of the Supreme Command is included in a report by the Chief of
23 Staff of the VRS, as I mentioned footnote 989. I mean, and there are
24 several documents that show that Mr. Karadzic himself intervenes in
25 granting or prohibiting freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, including
Page 17077
1 humanitarian convoys as well as allowing, for example, the ICRC to meet
2 blue helmets who had been taken hostage by the VRS in May or June 1995.
3 Q. This is what I'm dealing with right now: Do you accept that on
4 the roads of Bosnia-Herzegovina every day there were about 700 trucks and
5 in Republika Srpska it was 500 because it had the largest territory? Do
6 you accept this information from an agency that dealt with that
7 particular matter, that every day on the roads of Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 there were 700 trucks?
9 A. Your Honours, I didn't verify that, but I have no reason to doubt
10 the information.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you accept a piece of information from this
12 institution that dealt with it as well, that during the course of 1200
13 days on Sarajevo airport in Serb-held territory, 20.000 aircraft landed
14 and you can fire from there even with a pistol?
15 A. Your Honours, I don't see the link between the firing of a pistol
16 and the 20.000 aircraft that landed or allegedly landed on Sarajevo
17 airport.
18 Q. Do you accept that through Serb-held territory and on Serb-held
19 territory - because the airport was within our zone - over 20.000
20 aircraft landed during the course of 1200 days?
21 A. It's possible. Yes, I haven't -- I mean, I haven't come across
22 that information.
23 Q. Do you know that the percentage of convoys that had difficulties
24 is a single-digit number? It is not 10 per cent in any conceivable way.
25 There are very few convoys that had problems with corporals or
Page 17078
1 lower-ranking officers or privates sometimes when the goods that were
2 being transported did not have a proper declaration and so on and so
3 forth. Do you know that on a daily basis the percentage of such trucks
4 would have been single digit?
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The -- Mr. Karadzic is putting here a lot of
8 information to the witness where we -- that are not in evidence --
9 JUDGE KWON: He's not citing any reference --
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, there is no reference where these claims
11 come from. I know that he has a right to put his case to the witness,
12 but he should not formulate it as if these were facts in evidence.
13 JUDGE KWON: No, he didn't say that it was an established fact.
14 The witness can say no or he doesn't know if he doesn't know.
15 Yes, Mr. Theunens.
16 THE WITNESS: You want me to answer the last question by
17 Mr. Karadzic, Your Honours?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I come back to the scope of the
20 report, I -- it was not my role to analyse the flow of humanitarian aid
21 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I analysed whether or not Mr. Karadzic had any
22 authority in that matter, and then on the basis of the material I
23 reviewed, I mentioned what material I drew conclusions as to what
24 authority Mr. Karadzic had in relation to that.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
Page 17079
1 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. But with all due respect, Mr. Theunens, that is not correct. You
4 established whether I had the power to do so as supreme commander, but
5 you also presented your own point of view as to what I did with these
6 powers. You said that I abused them. Do you know what the volume of
7 impediments was in this enormous volume of traffic? You do not. All
8 right.
9 Now, do you know --
10 A. You should at least give me an opportunity to answer the
11 question.
12 JUDGE KWON: By all means, Mr. Theunens.
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, as I mentioned, for the purpose of
14 this report I didn't analyse the flow of information -- the flow of
15 humanitarian aid, I apologise, in Bosnia-Herzegovina; but I can provide
16 examples, if needed, if the Trial Chamber wants me to do so, of what I
17 know from prior to joining the OTP, in particular during the time I
18 served in UNPROFOR, UNPF headquarters in Zagreb 1994/1995.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 Mr. Karadzic.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Theunens, now I'm talking about the QQ conclusion that you
23 made that is accusatory and damning as far as my role in humanitarian aid
24 is concerned, and that is why it is important for me to establish whether
25 you established --
Page 17080
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Karadzic, you ask the question and
2 then if the witness doesn't agree, then that's it. Move on to another
3 topic. You have another -- you have opportunity to argue -- to make a
4 submission as to the credibility or the weight of that evidence later on.
5 Don't argue with the witness.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you know that the international community, its highest
9 representatives, including Mrs. Ogata, asked me to help in situations
10 when some convoys were coming across obstacles at separation lines, or
11 rather, at the front lines that they were crossing? Have you come across
12 my correspondence with Mrs. Ogata and other representatives of UN
13 agencies?
14 A. Your Honours, not during the preparation of this report, but
15 from --
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
17 The French interpretation of the question has now -- just now
18 completed.
19 THE WITNESS: I'm --
20 JUDGE KWON: Please start your -- could you answer now.
21 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: No problem.
23 THE WITNESS: Not specifically during the preparation of this
24 report, but I am familiar with such correspondence as well as statements
25 by various international officials when international humanitarian
Page 17081
1 convoys were subject of restrictions or freedom of movement in the
2 territory held by the Bosnian Serbs or check-point they controlled to
3 access, for example, the safe areas.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Do you know that international factors asked me to appoint a high
6 official of Republika Srpska whose authority would not be in dispute for
7 some sergeant at a check-point, so as to have his orders carried out,
8 that is? Also, for that purpose I even established a committee and
9 appointed Professor Koljevic who was the number two man in
10 Republika Srpska to head that committee. You deal with that on page 278,
11 co-ordination body of the Government of Republika Srpska, and you have
12 several paragraphs there. Page 278.
13 A. Indeed, Your Honours, it -- the committee itself is discussed in
14 footnote 1016 and the section starts with footnote 1011.
15 Q. The footnotes are changed in my version, but on the next page you
16 say that the committee was chaired by Nikola Koljevic, vice-president of
17 Republika Srpska, and the decision indicates that the co-ordinating body
18 of the government was part of that committee. So at the level of the
19 government we have a co-ordination body and at the level of the state we
20 have a committee that is run by the number two man in the republic and --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Because you are asking so many
22 questions, we end up in many times not having a proper answer.
23 Mr. Theunens, did you answer the question whether
24 international -- whether you knew that international factors asked
25 Mr. Karadzic to appoint a high official of Republika Srpska whose
Page 17082
1 authority could not be in dispute for some sergeant at a check-point?
2 THE WITNESS: I did not know that specific point, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. And did you know about the constant objections that were raised
6 by our army because we were too permissive, too lenient, in view of the
7 requests made for convoys to pass, convoys that included goods that were
8 not humanitarian aid, and so on and so forth? Have you come across
9 documents in which I quarrel with my army in terms of this leniency,
10 although it jeopardises the security and safety of our army?
11 A. Your Honours, not specifically for humanitarian aid, but I have
12 seen another document where -- it had to deal with the -- it was dealing
13 with the implementation, I think, of the cease-fire or cessation of
14 hostilities agreement, where some members of the VRS Main Staff opposed
15 the appointment of international observers, I believe, but that was early
16 in the conflict, but that's reported in -- that's included in my report.
17 Q. Thank you. In sub-item 7 in this section about the co-ordination
18 body you say that:
19 "Throughout the 1993-1995 period, the Main Staff on an almost
20 daily basis notified its subordinate units of its agreement with the
21 approval given by the government for the passage of humanitarian aid
22 convoys and of personnel through VRS-held territory, including
23 distribution subject to inspection, or rather, restrictions, for example,
24 limitation on amount of ..." et cetera and so on and so forth.
25 Do you know that these were thousands of convoys and thousands of
Page 17083
1 approvals and there were very few impediments that were put on their
2 path, either by civilians or soldiers on the ground?
3 A. Your Honours, I included a few documents referring to impediments
4 in footnotes 1023 to 1027. Now, for my activities outside the OTP, I
5 mean prior to joining the OTP, mainly in the UNPROFOR/UNPF headquarters,
6 it was out understanding there were many more impediments. And I think
7 it is important to highlight the detailed nature of the impediments, for
8 example, that limitations are imposed on the amount of school supplies
9 that can be provided to the other side, if I can put it that way, or even
10 prohibition on fuel or heating equipment to eastern enclaves, that
11 medical equipment is confiscated, that shows a -- I would say very
12 detailed and a very, yeah, specific intervention or even interference
13 with the free flow of humanitarian aid.
14 Q. Do you know that there was a flourishing trade there in these
15 goods that we kept under our control and that the Army of Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina in the enclaves got its supplies through this humanitarian
17 aid. For example, fuel. Their smugglers in the enclaves smuggled
18 those -- that fuel that we let through, they traded in that. Just yes or
19 no. Did you know that or did you not know that? And did you take into
20 account the fact that the restrictions placed by the army had to do with
21 the safety and security of our army, not the needs of civilians?
22 A. Your Honours, the restrictions I just read out, like, for
23 example, school supplies, school supplies don't have a military -- don't
24 serve a military purpose --
25 Q. Oh, please, I'm asking you about fuel. I'm asking you about
Page 17084
1 fuel. And I'm asking you about food. Were -- did we have an obligation
2 to feed the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina or did we have the right not
3 to let through this food that was being sent to the army?
4 A. I mean, I understand that -- what I remember from my work
5 outside -- prior to joining the OTP, that is -- was that humanitarian aid
6 was intended to alleviate the needs of the civilian population. There
7 may have been misuse, but that happens in all conflicts, sadly. Now,
8 whether -- whether -- this is -- can be a justification to stop all the
9 flow of humanitarian aid or not, it's a matter I can't address here, it's
10 outside my expertise.
11 Q. 1D3908, could we please have a look at that.
12 Have you seen evidence of our army constantly raising these
13 objections with me, asking me why we were letting all of this get through
14 in order to meet the needs of our enemies? This is military
15 correspondence, military documentation, that you had to come across.
16 Have you come across such correspondence between myself and the
17 Main Staff, certain generals? If you're waiting for the document before
18 you respond, that's all right --
19 A. No --
20 Q. You see here General Milovanovic is saying --
21 A. I see the document, but I was -- I mean, I only see the first
22 page.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the English page, the
24 next one, please.
25 JUDGE KWON: Let us collapse the B/C/S version for the moment.
Page 17085
1 Mr. Theunens, you read the first page, let us know. It's a
2 three-page document.
3 THE WITNESS: I have read the first page, Your Honours.
4 Okay.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page then.
6 THE WITNESS: It's okay for the English.
7 THE ACCUSED: Next page.
8 THE WITNESS: Okay.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Can we now see 1D309, my reply to the general. 1D3909, 3909.
11 A. Okay.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When everybody has read it, we can
13 move on to the following page, but I leave that to the Trial Chamber.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, next page.
15 Can Mr. Karadzic now ask a question to you?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you see this lesson, Mr. Theunens, is this an attempt of mine
20 to disrupt humanitarian aid or am I forced to argue with my army and tell
21 them not to impede convoys? Have you seen this document? And if you
22 have seen it, do you still stand by your conclusion as in item QQ?
23 A. Your Honours, I had not seen Mr. Karadzic's reply. I'm not sure
24 whether I saw Mr. Milovanovic's document, but again from certain comments
25 the military include in their orders to subordinates to allow the passage
Page 17086
1 of humanitarian convoys, I could indeed feel or see that there was
2 criticism towards the decisions of the committee. Now, on the other
3 hand, I have also seen that - and I mentioned those documents - that on
4 the orders of Mr. Karadzic the flow of humanitarian aid is stopped and
5 that occurs, for example, at occasions when there is pressure of the
6 international community on the Bosnian Serbs, which led me to conclude
7 that they can use humanitarian aid as part of their strategy to achieve
8 their goals.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender these two
11 documents.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 1D3908 will be Exhibit D1589 and
14 1D3909 will be Exhibit D1590.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
16 Q. Mr. Theunens, do you agree that on several occasions the
17 international community opened fire on our military units and that those
18 were the cases, two or three of them, when I stopped UN and humanitarian
19 aid convoys, that it was always linked to the opening of fire on our
20 army? Do you -- are you familiar with the circumstances under which I
21 prohibited the passage of convoys?
22 A. As I mentioned earlier, there are, for sure, a number of cases
23 where indeed Mr. Karadzic or the Main Staff decides to suspend the free
24 flow of humanitarian aid following, for example, the use of close air
25 support or air-strikes by UNPROFOR, air-strikes provided by NATO. But
Page 17087
1 again, there are also restrictions - and we read out some of
2 them - restrictions imposed without such -- or in different situations.
3 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'm asking you about what you established that I
4 stopped the convoys on some occasions. Was that just like that or was it
5 triggered by conflicts between the VRS and international units, yes or
6 no? Did I do it lightly or was it triggered by armed conflict?
7 A. Your Honours, my answer was that there are indeed examples where
8 Mr. Karadzic imposes such prohibitions after UNPROFOR has used close air
9 support or called for air-strikes. However, there are also other
10 examples where there were restrictions on, systematic restrictions, on
11 the flow of humanitarian aid. And that answer is based not only on the
12 documents included in my report but also my knowledge or my experience
13 during the time I worked in the UNPROFOR/UNPF headquarters in Zagreb
14 1994/1995.
15 JUDGE KWON: What did you mean by different situations?
16 THE WITNESS: For example -- and again, Your Honours, this is not
17 in my report, but we noticed there were patterns in relation to the
18 access or free access to the airplanes to the airport of Sarajevo,
19 patterns in the sense that fire would be opened on aircraft landing on
20 the airport close to or during or after negotiation sessions led by
21 international community, for example -- I mean, peace talks in Geneva or
22 somewhere else.
23 JUDGE KWON: Fire by who?
24 THE WITNESS: That could not always be established, Your Honours,
25 but on the basis of the reports we received in the headquarters it
Page 17088
1 included also fire originating from areas that were under Bosnian Serb
2 control. And there was no possibility for a criminal or a forensic
3 investigation of those incidents, but in that sense I have included in my
4 report at least one order by Mr. Karadzic prohibiting the opening of fire
5 on aircraft landing in Sarajevo airport, which suggested, at least based
6 on the knowledge of Mr. Karadzic, some of that fire originated from the
7 VRS.
8 I also remember - and again I have not included in my report
9 because I couldn't come across the documents when conducting the research
10 here - that actually throughout the conflict -- and especially the
11 eastern enclaves, for example, Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb forces
12 controlled the access to the enclave. That doesn't rule out that there
13 were cases of black marketing between VRS and ABiH, but, for example, for
14 the Dutch blue helmets who were deployed in Srebrenica that, almost from
15 the beginning from their arrival, there were restrictions on
16 food-supplies to them as well as -- that is not humanitarian aid, but
17 still on the military equipment that they were allowed to take into the
18 enclave. And, for example, they brought APCs to the enclave, but the VRS
19 prohibited them from taking in the anti-tank missiles that were part of
20 the equipment of those APCs. And this is outside my report.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Theunens, with all due respect, I'm standing trial here and
24 I'm asking you if, in case of armed conflict between my army and the army
25 of the United Nations, the danger for the UN increases when they turn up
Page 17089
1 at our check-points. Did you find -- did you come across any prohibition
2 of mine that was not in the content -- within the context of armed
3 incidents? I'm talking about my orders and not what some corporal on the
4 ground did.
5 A. Your Honours, I don't understand the concept of "army of the
6 United Nations." UNPROFOR was sent as a peacekeeping force with
7 essentially humanitarian mandate, i.e., to assist with the free flow of
8 humanitarian --
9 Q. That wasn't my question. The concept was that there were UN
10 forces there and that were armed incidents between the VRS and those
11 forces. Did I ever put up obstacles outside the context of these
12 incidents? Or was it in a situation where new incident would only have
13 made things worse? Please answer my questions.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --
15 JUDGE KWON: But --
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- the witness has just --
17 JUDGE KWON: I'm dealing with it, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
18 But you formulate your question as referring to armed conflict
19 between your army and the army of the United Nations, so Mr. Theunens was
20 perfectly entitled to clarify the meaning. But I think he made it clear,
21 that point. And can you kindly proceed to answer the remainder of the
22 question.
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the documents I reviewed do not allow
24 to conclude whether the restrictions imposed by Mr. Karadzic were only
25 related to the use of force, again in the framework of United Nations
Page 17090
1 Security Council Resolutions, by UNPROFOR against the VRS.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. You didn't establish that, but you put forward the allegation
4 that I am responsible for that. I'm concerned by your interpretations,
5 Mr. Theunens, but let's leave this topic now and go to other instances of
6 this topic. It's around footnote 1165 where you deal with the
7 Yellow Wasps. Do you know -- are you familiar with the notion of the
8 Yellow Wasps?
9 A. Yes, Your Honours, I am.
10 Q. It's a paramilitary formation in Zvornik; right?
11 A. I mean, yes, it's -- it's Serbian volunteer group officially
12 called a paramilitary formation who participated in the take-over in --
13 of Zvornik as well as the aftermath.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There is no footnote 1165.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know, it's been merged, but
16 let's look at 65 ter 09220. It's a document --
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. It's the document you are citing. It's a police report to the
19 MUP headquarters at Pale about the Yellow Wasps. Could we please see it.
20 A. Yes, Your Honours, it is mentioned among others in footnote 481,
21 part 2 of the report.
22 Q. Thank you. So you are saying that I or the Serbian leadership is
23 responsible for this formation that calls itself the Yellow Wasps and
24 which you -- as you rightly say, began as a volunteer unit and later
25 became a paramilitary unit. Did you establish that, that they initially
Page 17091
1 were a volunteer unit and later became a paramilitary unit?
2 A. Your Honours, it's all about how we defined the concepts. In
3 Serbia they were called volunteer units, and we have established why that
4 was done so. Now, we see that in the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 orders are given to subordinate volunteer groups to the VRS or otherwise
6 they should be removed. And then we see that for those groups who refuse
7 to be subordinated the term "paramilitary groups" is used to identify
8 them, which refers or emphasises their illegal character as it is used --
9 I mean, "paramilitary" is used for non-legal groups who are organised in
10 a military manner and use military means or tactics to achieve certain
11 goals.
12 Q. I'm interested in the following: You're saying in one of these
13 paragraphs that it can be seen from this what -- that the Crisis Staff of
14 the Serbian municipality of Zvornik had the leading role in the setting
15 up of the military structures of the Bosnian Serbs. And then you say
16 that Vojin Vuckovic, according to the allegations in his statement,
17 that's my footnote number 1168, but that is probably due to the merging,
18 and Vojin Vuckovic took part in some operations and then he made a
19 statement and so on. Are you trying to say that this paramilitary group,
20 the Yellow Wasps, is mine and that the police arresting them is not mine?
21 A. Your Honours, I have not stated in the report that the
22 Yellow Wasps are -- or belong to Mr. Karadzic. That's how I understand
23 the word "mine." However, they do participate in the take-over of
24 Zvornik at a time when there is a Bosnian Serb or SDS-led Crisis Staff in
25 Zvornik that is issuing orders to establish military formations in
Page 17092
1 Zvornik. MUP conduct a mobilisation and issues instructions for related
2 activities. So my conclusion was that the Yellow Wasps participated in
3 the take-over with the knowledge and approval of the Crisis Staff. And
4 actually, footnote 476, for example, states that -- I mean, there are
5 several groups, there is also the Zuco group, there is the Pivarski
6 group, the Niski group, they are all identified by the Bosnian Serb
7 authorities in Zvornik as TO of the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik.
8 JUDGE KWON: Approval of the Crisis Staff of Zvornik.
9 THE WITNESS: Exactly. Yes, Your Honours, I'm sorry.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Is the TO of a municipality under the jurisdiction of that
12 municipality and are volunteers a legal component of the armed forces
13 until they break loose and become renegades?
14 A. Based on the additional instructions and orders that were issued
15 in June/July 1992 by the civilian and military authorities in the
16 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would agree with that proposition.
17 Now -- sorry, if they become renegades, then you would expect the police
18 and/or the military to ensure that law and order is being abided by and
19 appropriate measures are taken against renegades.
20 Q. And were such measures taken against the Yellow Wasps? Do you
21 know that they were arrested in a well-planned operation in which nobody
22 was killed, all 180 of them or how many there were, I don't know?
23 A. Your Honours, I -- I'm familiar with the fact that they were
24 arrested. I don't recall exactly when and I don't know the number of
25 people in that group.
Page 17093
1 Q. Okay. Let's remove this document --
2 A. Maybe if I -- if you allow me, Mr. Karadzic. I also have a
3 recollection that there has been a trial in Serbia or an attempt of a
4 trial in Serbia in 1994, but that that trial was not finalised then. And
5 that most recently, I think after 2000, a new trial took place. So
6 again, that would suggest that they were indeed arrested but released.
7 Attempts at trial were undertaken, but then apparently they were released
8 again. It's only most recently, after 2000, I think I was working at the
9 OTP when a trial took place in Belgrade -- of members of the
10 Yellow Wasps.
11 Q. Wasn't the brother of that Vuckovic during the war sentenced to
12 imprisonment and didn't he die in prison and didn't we ban all these
13 people from entering the RS and didn't I order the arrest of the
14 Yellow Wasps? Do you know any of that?
15 A. I -- I don't know the precise answer. I mean, the -- I see now
16 in my report I included that actually, the trial in Serbia is covered in
17 footnote 499, that concerns an indictment -- or it's basically an
18 indictment that is issued against Dusko Vuckovic and also against
19 Vojin Vuckovic, so I'm not sure which brother Mr. Karadzic is now talking
20 about. Because according to this indictment issued by the Sabac,
21 Serbia -- I mean, Serbia district attorney, they were still alive in
22 April 1994. And Dusko Vuckovic was also still alive in 2005, so maybe
23 Mr. Karadzic is talking about Vojin Vuckovic, then after 1994.
24 Q. Thank you. When you speak about Serb forces, do you include the
25 Yellow Wasps and such groups?
Page 17094
1 A. When I use the term "Serb forces" in the context of the take-over
2 operations, indeed, for Zvornik I include the Yellow Wasps. And I just
3 gave a reference of a document whereby -- indicating that the Bosnian
4 Serb authorities in Zvornik called these volunteers members of the TO of
5 the Serbian municipality. That was footnote 476.
6 Q. Is this police officer, the one who's reporting, part of the Serb
7 forces? Is he part of the government or are the Yellow Wasps a
8 government structure?
9 A. They may be both. I mean, it depends of the moment in time and
10 the context. The -- I understand that the police officer you referred
11 to, footnote 481, now that's a report compiled by the Pale crime
12 directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I cannot establish whether or not he or people from
14 that department -- directorate took part in the take-over operation.
15 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Theunens, when you use the term "Serb forces"
16 in the context of the take-over operation for Zvornik, is that the only
17 instance when you use it referring to the Yellow Wasps?
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, we would have to look at what moment
19 in time -- I mean, we would have to look at the moment in time because if
20 the Yellow Wasps are declared a renegade group, then they're not part of
21 anymore what I called the Serb forces. But during the take-over they are
22 for sure part of the Serb forces. Afterwards we would have to look at
23 the context. Because some of these groups broke away, and not just in
24 Zvornik but also in other areas, groups that are initially part of the
25 Serb forces conducting the take-over operation, then, yeah, go their own
Page 17095
1 way or start pursuing their own goals, sometimes with support of local
2 authorities, and then obviously their status changes.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you know that in the particular case of Zvornik, they arrested
5 these authorities and that the authorities were relieved when they were
6 arrested. When they ceased to be volunteers and became a paramilitary
7 group, the authorities turned against them and they turned against the
8 authorities. Did you know that when a volunteer group breaks away from
9 the chain of command and control of the army or the police, the whole
10 government structure from the municipal authorities up to the highest
11 echelons of government turns against that group and eliminates it?
12 A. Your Honours, I'm familiar with the orders that were issued - and
13 I mentioned that already - by -- orders and instructions by Mr. Karadzic
14 as well as by the command of the Main Staff. Now, we would have to look
15 at the specific cases to see how these orders were implemented. But
16 indeed, orders were issued to subordinate these groups or to have them
17 removed. And I have given a few examples where groups were indeed
18 removed. There are other examples where groups, for example, leave, come
19 back, on the request of local authorities; and there's also the example
20 of Arkan, for example, where Arkan comes back in -- in -- to the wider
21 Sanski Most area in September 1995, as we saw during the examination.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I note the time. Do we have
23 another five minutes or ...?
24 JUDGE KWON: Court deputy could approach the bench.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
Page 17096
1 JUDGE KWON: I was advised that the court deputy hasn't heard
2 from the parties whether it is possible to sit tomorrow.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The Prosecution is available. I, myself,
4 will not be here, but Ms. Elliott is also prepared to do the re-direct.
5 JUDGE KWON: Defence.
6 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, we haven't actually had a
7 chance to speak about this, but I think it would be okay. I also myself
8 won't be here, but I believe -- certainly Dr. Karadzic will be here and I
9 believe at least one of our case managers.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 We'll have a break now. We'll resume at 11.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: If necessary, the Chamber is minded to sit for a
15 session tomorrow from -- starting from 11.00. In that case, only two
16 Judges will be sitting, myself and Judge Baird. I think -- we considered
17 the matter and the Chamber is of the opinion that it's possible, but I
18 would like to hear if there would be any objection to that.
19 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we don't really have any position
21 on that, so thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
23 Would you like to make a --
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think it should be possible.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
Page 17097
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's allowed to do that.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
3 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Theunens, on page 137, subsection (b), operation of take-over
7 of power, then in paragraph (e) you say the allegations of the
8 involvement of Serb forces in grave crimes in Bijeljina. And then you
9 refer to a report of Dragan Andan to me, 65 ter 15324, but I believe it
10 has a P or a D number. Can we have that document -- in e-court, I mean.
11 65 ter 15324. There is no P number? No?
12 THE REGISTRAR: No, it's not admitted as yet, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. You refer to it in some footnote. Mine are all different now. I
16 believe that there is an English version. Can we have the next page in
17 Serbian and then we're going to identify. Do you remember this document?
18 A. Indeed, Your Honours, it's -- it's for sure mentioned in footnote
19 419, in Part 2 of the report.
20 Q. Thank you. So in the first bullet point down here it says
21 "terrorising the population." Now, this policeman is describing what
22 happened in Bijeljina and he says:
23 "After their armed forces were destroyed by the Serb
24 Territorial Defence ..." and so on and so forth. And he describes, inter
25 alia, what the side effects were as the terrorising of the population,
Page 17098
1 that is, after that; right? And there is no reference to a take-over of
2 power, but actually crushing the rebellion of the Red Berets. But you
3 are saying that that is the take-over of Bijeljina. I'm sure you
4 remember. I can read it out, this first part, and there is no reference
5 to take-over there. It has to do with crimes of groups that you call
6 Serb forces.
7 A. I don't really understand the question because I never spoke
8 about rebellion by Red Berets. We mentioned the obstacles erected by
9 Green Berets or the roadblocks erected by Green Berets, which were
10 removed, according to the reports I included, by members -- under the
11 leadership or under the direction of the Crisis Staff, or the supervision
12 of the Crisis Staff, and this was done by members of the local TO,
13 Serbian national guard, and Serbian volunteer guards, and that is
14 footnote 381. And okay, this is a report about mainly the aftermath of
15 these events. So I don't see that as a problem that the author does not
16 speak about a take-over. When I used the expression "take-over," I base
17 that on a number of documents and we have discussed those documents. So
18 the conclusion for me was that the power or the authority in Bijeljina
19 changed and that authorities were put in place that did not respond
20 anymore to the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
21 that responded to authorities of the self-established Serb Republic of
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was obviously a new creation.
23 JUDGE KWON: The report we are seeing is an identical one cited
24 in footnote 419?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, judging by --
Page 17099
1 JUDGE KWON: Where can we find the report number 18-3-84 here?
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it should be 65 ter number
3 20128, that should be an identical document if I'm not mistaken.
4 THE WITNESS: Yeah -- excuse me, Your Honours, the reference
5 number should be on the cover page I think. I don't think this is the
6 first page. Because the --
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, correct. Thank you.
8 Shall we upload 20128?
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE KWON: Could it be released.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can remove the Serbian version
12 completely.
13 We can do it this way too, if possible.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. In the first part, it says that as is well-known after the attack
16 of the Muslim forces, the territory of this centre of the security
17 services, after the attack of the Muslim forces. The attack was
18 repelled, and then it says in these paramilitary groups that you call the
19 Serb forces tried to introduce parallel government. And there's a
20 reference to all the things they did, and it says that their efforts were
21 thwarted too. We will see that as well. At the end of this document you
22 see a handwritten note of mine: "Continue with the establishment of law
23 and order." Do you remember that?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not see the document
25 at all.
Page 17100
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have anything? Can we have
2 the Serbian version at least?
3 JUDGE KWON: Could you bear with the court deputy until he's able
4 to upload it and it is to be released. We have the English translation
5 in his report so we can refer to -- refer back to 15324.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. If the participants can
7 use the report, can we have the Serbian version back. This is the cover
8 letter signed by Mr. Andan. You know that. Can we have the next page.
9 JUDGE KWON: Where do we see your handwritten note, Mr. Karadzic?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The last page. First we're looking
11 at the one before that -- but let's have the last page now. Let's see
12 that too. Yes. You can see on the first page that it's sent to me. And
13 now let's see the last page, what it is that I wrote:
14 "Continue with the introduction of law and order."
15 I was convinced that this had been admitted when Mr. Davidovic
16 was here.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: This is correct, Your Honour. I also now
18 recognise it. It was an exhibit tendered in the -- with the
19 Witness Davidovic, but we are just trying to locate the P number.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 2 then -- I
21 beg your pardon.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Please take a look at this, is this the chief of the centre of
24 the security services in Bijeljina that signed this? Whoever's reading
25 the English version can see that. Chief of the CSB Dragan Andan, and we
Page 17101
1 appointed him there because of his attitude towards the paramilitaries.
2 After his report from Brcko and his proposed measures, we appointed him
3 acting chief and we brought him together with Mr. Davidovic to resolve
4 the question of the paramilitaries. Now he is reporting to me as to what
5 was going on after the crisis in Bijeljina. And he does not say
6 "take-over of power," because he was in power before the crisis and after
7 the crisis. And in the first paragraph it says that an attempt was made
8 to establish a parallel government, there were pressures against the
9 public security station, and then in these bullet points it says
10 terrorising the population, both Muslims and Serbs, appropriation of
11 apartments and houses, ten persons of different ethnic backgrounds were
12 killed.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in
14 Serbian, please.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I take it that Mr. Theunens must have
16 read this document, given that he's citing this document. You can put
17 your question.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Theunens, do you know that this man was in power before the
20 crisis and after the crisis and that he was my representative up there,
21 not the Serb forces for which you say there are allegations of
22 involvement of Serb forces? This representative of the state is fighting
23 against these forces that you are calling the Serb forces; right?
24 A. Your Honours, we are talking about two different matters. When I
25 talk about the Serb forces, including Arkan, I base myself on a report,
Page 17102
1 footnote 380, which is actually issued by the same structure, the
2 Bijeljina SJB, when they say that -- and again I have mentioned that a
3 few times already, but during the night of 31st of March and 1st of
4 April, 1992, Bosnian Serb TO, Serbian National Guard, and the Serbian
5 Volunteer Guard, i.e., Arkan's men, under the supervision - and under the
6 supervision I have quoted from that document - of the Bijeljina
7 Crisis Staff start to remove barricades erected by members of the
8 Green Berets. Now, in this document which dates from a number of months
9 later, Mr. Andan from the Bijeljina SJB puts Mr. Karadzic on notice of
10 crimes committed or allegedly committed by the Serbian Volunteer Guard in
11 the aftermath of what I have described as the take-over of power in
12 Bijeljina.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we just found it. It is P2900.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Very well then. Do you accept that this man, as well as Jesuric
16 and all the others, were in power before the crisis in Bijeljina and
17 after the crisis in Bijeljina and that the municipal government was the
18 same before the crisis and after the crisis and that the establishment of
19 a parallel government did not succeed which was an attempt made by these
20 paramilitaries --
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if you are coming to the issue of and
22 meaning of taking over, I think you -- we have exhausted that issue. Why
23 don't you move on?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 17103
1 Q. Do you accept that this man who expelled those forces and who is
2 reporting to me that -- do you believe that he is the representative of
3 Republika Srpska rather than these forces that he had expelled?
4 A. Again, Your Honours, we're talking about two different matters.
5 At one moment in time, i.e., end of March/early April, the Serbian
6 Volunteer Guard operates in Bijeljina under the supervision of the
7 SDS-led Crisis Staff in Bijeljina. And now this is in -- I'm just trying
8 to find -- on the 29th of July, 1992, Mr. Andan reports about the crimes
9 committed by the Serbian Volunteer Guard.
10 Q. Did they do that after the crisis and after getting out of -- out
11 of the control of the Territorial Defence? Do you distinguish the moment
12 when the volunteer unit becomes a paramilitary unit? Do you agree that
13 the key moment is when it gets out of the chain of command and control?
14 A. I mentioned that earlier, Your Honours. In -- when they are
15 operating under the command or the authority of the Crisis Staff, they
16 are considered or called volunteers. And then when they conduct
17 activities like crimes whereby it's -- from the document by Mr. Andan, it
18 is not clear whether they have gotten out of the chain of control -- of
19 the chain of command and control, as Mr. Karadzic puts it. But at one
20 moment in time they started to commit crimes, and then in that context
21 Mr. Andan qualifies them as a paramilitary group.
22 Q. Thank you. You remember that you spoke about Mr. Blagojevic as
23 well; right? Mr. Blagojevic --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, before we leave this document. I
25 compared the two documents, i.e., 15324 and this P2900, there's
Page 17104
1 differences in terms of page numbers. The former being of six pages and
2 this five pages. Page 5 of 15324 is missing in this document, if you --
3 somebody take a look at it and -- in the meantime we proceed.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at the last page
5 in English. Let us see. Probably it is the cover letter that is
6 missing. We do have it in the Serbian version and you can see from there
7 that he is writing to me. Yes, the last page is fine. There's this
8 signature and there is my handwritten note.
9 JUDGE KWON: We can't compare the English translation because we
10 do not translation of 15324, but 15324 has six pages. If you could take
11 a look later on. In the meantime, we proceed.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you remember that you quoted Mr. Blagojevic at his press
15 conference?
16 A. Yes, I do, Your Honours. And this can be found in footnotes 399
17 until 4 -- excuse me, 401, part 2 of the report.
18 Q. And you say, you quote Mr. Blagojevic. You say that there was no
19 massacre of the Muslim population. And then you interject something.
20 You stop quoting him and you interject your own explanation, saying:
21 "During the take-over of power ...," and then you continue quoting him.
22 Is that right?
23 A. Indeed, and the reason I do that because he holds his press
24 conference on the 9th of April, and that is after the take-over of power.
25 Q. Is that his qualification, this take-over of power, or did you
Page 17105
1 not interject this as your own comment, you interjected this, "during the
2 take-over"?
3 A. Indeed I added this and I think it's clear from the way how it is
4 written because there are no quotation marks and it's not in italics. So
5 I would assume that the reader understands that this is my addition.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 A. And again, I mean, footnote 400, whether you call it take-over or
8 liberation, the result is the same. Mr. Blagojevic -- Mirko Blagojevic,
9 for obvious reasons he talks about the combat for the liberation of
10 Bijeljina.
11 Q. Thank you. In the section "The Achievement of the Strategic
12 Objectives of the Bosnian Serbs," you quote General Mladic and analysis
13 of combat-readiness of the Army of Republika Srpska for 1992. I have to
14 see which paragraph that is -- or rather, which number. Which document
15 that is. I think it's actually been admitted already. So there's an
16 introduction, there's number 1 and number 2, and then your quotation is
17 "both forces," it's a reference to the Serb forces before the army was
18 established.
19 "These forces from the very beginning of the inter-ethnic
20 conflict in mid-March up until the 19th of May managed to protect the
21 Serb people from bigger massacres and in part to protect the territories
22 that are predominantly or in part populated by Serbs ...," and so on and
23 so forth.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We could not find the
25 reference.
Page 17106
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you know what the objectives were that were placed before the
3 Army of Republika Srpska?
4 JUDGE KWON: If --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D351 -- no? 325, D325, that's the
6 document.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. But you have quoted it and you quoted it here but my numbers are
9 all mixed up because of what I've already explained, but I hope you know
10 what I'm saying. That's the document, isn't it?
11 A. Indeed, but I have quoted it several times. I'm a bit lost as to
12 which reference you are referring to or which specific quotation you are
13 referring to.
14 Q. I'm going to find it. Page 69 -- no, no, 1056, page 69 of the
15 document in English. Page 69 in the English language. That is what it
16 says here, in this footnote. That's not it in Serbian probably. "These
17 forces ..."
18 Yes, here it is. It's the fourth paragraph. "From the beginning
19 of inter-ethnic conflict ..."
20 Have you found it? Yes, it's the fourth paragraph from the top.
21 A. Indeed, I see it.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see what General --
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
25 Q. Actually, remember this formulation: "... and they managed to
Page 17107
1 protect the Serb people from larger massacres and the -- and managed to
2 protect the territory."
3 65 ter 22551. It has to do with the first interview of
4 General Milovanovic, the number two man of the Army of Republika Srpska,
5 his first encounter with the Prosecution --
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we think it is footnote 377
7 where this particular issue is addressed in Mr. Theunens' report.
8 JUDGE KWON: Part 1?
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Part 2, part 2.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page of this
12 interview of General Milovanovic. I cannot recognise the page itself.
13 Can we look at the next one. Another page down, please. 9653 is the ERN
14 number. 9653 in Serbian. The next one, please. This isn't it. The
15 next page, please. Yes, this is it. We have it now.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. And now this is what it says here:
18 "General Milovanovic then said that the Tribunal should not try
19 to prove the character of the war through such trials."
20 But let's see what he says here. He asked the then-leadership
21 for the objectives of the war, and these were the objectives:
22 "1. To protect the Serbian people from destruction in order to
23 avoid a repeat of events that took place between 1941 and 1945.
24 "2. To stay within Yugoslavia, or as an alternative to this, to
25 have our own state."
Page 17108
1 Mr. Theunens, do you see the extent to which this coincides with
2 that sentence of General Mladic and do you see that this was placed
3 before the army as objectives, not the six strategic objectives?
4 A. Your Honours, when I see the first point identified by
5 General Milovanovic, to protect the Serb people from destruction, the
6 language is quite similar to the explanation Mr. Karadzic gives to the
7 Assembly members on the 12th of May, when he details or when he describes
8 the first strategic goal to them.
9 Q. But I'm asking you whether we ordered the army to win a -- an
10 exit to the sea by military means or was it different --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused repeat the last sentence.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you are asked to repeat the last
13 sentence.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure which sentence I said
15 last.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. But were the army ordered to realise the six strategic goals or
18 did they have only these two objectives, whereas the others were
19 political objectives that were to be realised through talks with the
20 European community and the other two parties?
21 A. Your Honours, I have answered that question during the previous
22 days. I have compared the six strategic goals -- no, I have compared the
23 nine directives which are issued by the Supreme Command and/or the
24 Main Staff of the VRS, and these directives are issued between May 1992
25 and September or October 1995. I have compared them with the six
Page 17109
1 strategic goals and there is -- they are consistent. It is true,
2 however, that the sixth goal, the access -- the establishing access to
3 the sea, I haven't seen any military documents that refers to the
4 implementation of that goal. And we discussed yesterday how that goal
5 was indeed one of -- part of the negotiations. However, the other goals,
6 there is, as I said, clearly a consistency between these goals and the
7 tasks the Main Staff and Mr. Karadzic gave to the VRS throughout the
8 conflict.
9 Q. Thank you. Let us look at 65 ter 1039. This document is subject
10 to Rule 70. I don't know why, but we needn't broadcast it publicly.
11 This may have to be clarified. It's an interview I gave from that time,
12 the time of my platform. Yesterday you saw my platform of 22nd April for
13 the first time. Please do not broadcast publicly until -- until -- or as
14 long as it's subject to Rule 70. It's no longer confidential. Or -- it
15 says it isn't confidential and it was published in Le Figaro?
16 JUDGE KWON: I think Mr. Robinson can help us in this regard. It
17 is offered to the Defence, not to the Prosecution.
18 MR. ROBINSON: If I'm not mistaken, Mr. President, this was a
19 document provided to us by a provider, one of the states, and they did
20 have a blanket rule that it should all be confidential unless we get
21 permission from them in advance. And we haven't gotten that permission,
22 as I understand it so far with respect to this document.
23 JUDGE KWON: So it is for you to clarify whether the provider --
24 to clarify as to the meaning.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I'm still questioning whether this is one of
Page 17110
1 the documents we received directly or whether we received it from the
2 Prosecution, given that it has an ERN number, but it may be the same
3 situation. I'm not sure which one of us has the responsibility to
4 clarify it with the provider, but both of us have received from the same
5 provider newspaper articles and I'm not exactly sure which of us received
6 this one directly.
7 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, let us proceed without broadcasting
8 this one.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Serbian version also be
10 displayed.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Have you read this interview, Mr. Theunens?
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, just in relation to -- now
14 looking at the document, there is no restriction on it any longer.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you for that clarification.
16 Yeah, it is a Figaro article -- yes.
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, from my experience here, the issue
18 may have been an issue of copyright, that the organisation that provided
19 the article did so without necessarily having the authorisation --
20 JUDGE KWON: That may have been the reason, but we heard that
21 there's no restriction anymore so we can --
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's correct, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 17111
1 Q. In the Serbian version Rule 70 is mentioned in line 3. That's
2 why I was being careful.
3 Can you see that a day after I published my platform, that is, on
4 the 22nd of April, I'm giving an interview to this newspaper and it can
5 also be broadcast publicly now. You see that this journalist is asking
6 me:
7 "According to you, all nationalities have now accepted the
8 partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why is the war continuing?"
9 And then I reply:
10 "On 18 March, an agreement was reached. The EEC gave its
11 approval. The terms are clear: Three separate Bosnia and Herzegovinas
12 will be established. They will be based on ethnic principles."
13 And I don't want to read it out all. He mentions territory and I
14 answered that territory is relative. And goes on to say about taking
15 territory by force and I said that my proposal was that no territory
16 should be seized by force.
17 "The new map of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be based on ethnic
18 borders that are perfectly clear. At present people are killing and
19 being killed for nothing because at the end of the day all the
20 territories occupied by force will have to be handed back to their
21 inhabitants."
22 And then he asks about Arkan and other groups. And I say that:
23 "They are paramilitary groups. They arrived in Bosnia to respond
24 to the infiltration by units of regular Croatian army ...," and so on.
25 "The war is pointless. It must end."
Page 17112
1 Do you know that we returned territories and throughout the war
2 we were willing to return a good part of the territories that we held?
3 A. Your Honours, I'm not sure whether the question refers to all the
4 peace agreements or anything specific in my report.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, instead of you reading out, let the
6 witness read the document, all the document, ask -- put your question.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Yes, please, go ahead. Read the document, which clearly shows my
9 position. And pay attention to that, my position with regard to
10 territorial issues and that you link with the six strategic objectives.
11 A. Your Honours, I think we have been over this issue --
12 JUDGE KWON: There's a next page, second page.
13 THE WITNESS: Sorry.
14 JUDGE KWON: When you're done, let us know.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, we can go ahead. I'm finished reading.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Do you agree that this interview touches upon some strategic
19 objectives; Sarajevo, territorial issues, especially the fate of the
20 territories that were taken by force or are being controlled? Do you
21 agree that I put forward my position with regard to the six strategic
22 objectives?
23 A. Your Honours, I agree that Mr. Karadzic mentions issues like
24 Sarajevo, territorial issues, and Arkan and so on; but I do not know and
25 I cannot establish whether he links that to the six strategic goals or
Page 17113
1 not.
2 Q. But do you agree that I said just in the platform one day earlier
3 that territories should not be taken by force because that will not be
4 recognised; the territorial issue will be solved politically at a
5 conference?
6 A. I mean, I'm familiar with you -- the platform you presented and
7 where you spoke also about territorial issues, but again on the 12th of
8 May you do present the strategic goals to the Assembly members and
9 except - and I saw that yesterday again - for the fourth or the fifth
10 strategic goal, there is no reference to the ongoing peace efforts
11 whatsoever when Mr. Karadzic presents these six strategic goals to the
12 Assembly members. And again, in the directives for further operations
13 that are issued by the Main Staff and/or the Supreme Command to the VRS,
14 there is no references to these -- to the platform or any other peace
15 efforts of that time, of March/April 1992.
16 Q. Sir, all these goals were dealt with at conferences. We'll --
17 we'll get there yet.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document in
19 the meantime.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1591, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us now look at the ethnic map
23 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. We'll take a brief look to see whether you are familiar with it,
Page 17114
1 D225.
2 THE WITNESS: I would just like to correct the record in line 7
3 it should be added: "Except for the fourth or the fifth strategic goal
4 there is no reference ..."
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you know that these territories marked blue are the ones where
7 the Serbs are the absolute majority in some places even they -- they even
8 constitute 100 per cent of the population?
9 A. That is indeed what the legend of the map states.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we please see Cutileiro's basic map. Please
11 repeat the exhibit number. The green colour in the west and there's some
12 green enclaves in the Serbian territory. Some are orange, they stand for
13 Croats. 1D931 is the exhibit number of the Cutileiro map. Let us
14 enlarge it a bit. Can you see that Mr. Cutileiro respected that ethnic
15 map and he envisages enclaves or cantons in the Serbian territory and
16 other enclaves in the Muslim territory? Can you now mark the Una river
17 on this map?
18 JUDGE KWON: But, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do you not challenge that
19 this is the Cutileiro map?
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would have to consult.
21 [Prosecution counsel confer]
22 JUDGE KWON: We have -- there are some Cyrillic writing at the
23 end. This is -- yeah, the map is written in Cyrillic or in -- written --
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: At the moment I am -- I can't say. We have
25 to check what --
Page 17115
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if you could --
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
3 JUDGE KWON: -- if Mr. Karadzic could explain as to the
4 provenance of this map.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the map drawn by the late
6 Mr. Darwin who was the cartographer of the Carrington-Cutileiro team. It
7 was drawn on plain paper and its purpose is to show the whereabouts of
8 the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim cantons respectively. At the time we
9 expected there would be no war. We were about to see another map which
10 is in line with the Muslim proposal, but for the time being what I would
11 like Mr. Theunens to show where the following rivers are: The Una, the
12 Sava, the Drina, the Neretva, and what the status of the Sava was to be.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We will see what we can do with this
14 exercise but, Mr. Theunens, if -- can you do this?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, without expressing any views
16 about whether this map is authentic or not. I just draw on the screen.
17 The Una --
18 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, you have to push the button first.
19 THE WITNESS: Sorry.
20 JUDGE KWON: Just wait a minute. You know how to operate it,
21 please --
22 THE WITNESS: No, I think I know by now. Can I touch the screen?
23 JUDGE KWON: Not yet.
24 Proceed, yes.
25 THE WITNESS: The Una goes more or less here -- yeah, it should
Page 17116
1 be close to the green line.
2 JUDGE KWON: Shall you put number 1, then, for Una.
3 THE WITNESS: Una.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Do you agree that it flows into the Sava up there?
6 A. Yes, if I remember well, the Sava is more or less for a large
7 part on the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, but I'm
8 not entirely sure how far it goes. It goes -- okay, north of Brcko and
9 so on.
10 JUDGE KWON: With the assistance of our usher, let's change the
11 colour for Una. We can delete the Sava River.
12 THE WITNESS: Or maybe I can use an interrupted line or something
13 or dots.
14 JUDGE KWON: Or we can change it to blue.
15 THE WITNESS: And actually the -- I mean, if it's yellow, it goes
16 back to this point more or less. Maybe it goes into Croatia. I don't
17 remember exactly. But anyway, for the largest part, the border between
18 Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the north coincides with the Sava.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. You are right, but you should continue westward where
21 the upward section of the Una stops, that's where the Sava is, and it
22 joins the Sava in the west. The Una joins the Sava where it starts
23 flowing straight. Do you remember that?
24 A. I don't remember exactly, Your Honours. It's quite some time
25 ago, but I believe Mr. Karadzic when he says so.
Page 17117
1 Q. Thank you. Can you mark the Drina, mark it green, let's say. Is
2 the Drina between Serbia and Bosnia?
3 A. That is correct, Your Honours. Shall I proceed or ...?
4 JUDGE KWON: Can you proceed without the assistance of our usher?
5 THE WITNESS: I don't know which colour is going to come out of
6 it now, but otherwise I can do it with crosses. Now it's blue, okay, it
7 makes sense. So -- I don't remember exactly how it goes further south,
8 but the Drina is more or less -- is more or less here. I will mark it
9 with a 3.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Thank you. It flows northward. Can you now mark the Neretva.
12 A. The Neretva goes more or less -- I would have to see where Mostar
13 is on the map. I'm -- it's hard for me to read it, but the Neretva goes
14 through Mostar, so I would almost say it goes here then to the coast,
15 assuming that this dot is Mostar because my understanding is -- yeah, and
16 then it goes further north, but I don't know exactly how it flows further
17 north. And that would be a 4 then. But if I had a more detailed map
18 obviously it would be easier to see where Mostar is. Because I know
19 that, I remember that the Neretva goes through Mostar and ends up on the
20 coast.
21 JUDGE KWON: I think you noted the place where Mostar is.
22 THE WITNESS: Okay.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Thank you. It's a bit too far to the east, but okay. Can you
25 tell us whether we are here on the Una, on the Sava, on the Drina, and on
Page 17118
1 the upper flow of the Neretva which you haven't marked here, but on a
2 more detailed map we would see that the Neretva flows also east of this
3 number 4. And there is also Sarajevo here marked in a different colour
4 from everything else.
5 A. Yes, that is what the map is showing.
6 Q. Thank you. We will establish the provenance of the map since you
7 could not confirm it. I would now just like to ask you to initial this.
8 JUDGE KWON: And the date.
9 THE WITNESS: I just put my initials --
10 JUDGE KWON: And the date.
11 THE WITNESS: And the date, okay.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this.
13 JUDGE KWON: This will be marked for identification.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Your Honour, we were not notified of
17 this map, therefore we cannot be hundred per cent clear here and it was a
18 bit difficult to establish. However, the Cutileiro map is part of the
19 Exhibit P2538. And what we see in -- that's the Cutileiro Plan. And
20 what we see in this map, that it does not correspond with what we see
21 here.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it's -- I don't remember we have seen this
23 map --
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes --
25 JUDGE KWON: -- so that's why I suggested marking it for
Page 17119
1 identification as the next exhibit.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1592, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We will prove that this
4 is his original map. The first map -- actually, the Muslim proposal is
5 D486. Could we please see it now. D486.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that here, both on the Una, on the
8 Sava, on the Drina, and in the Sarajevo zone we are present and a large
9 part of Sarajevo is coloured red and given to us. Do you agree? And we
10 won the upper flow of the Neretva river; in other words, everywhere where
11 we are the overwhelming majority.
12 A. I wouldn't entirely agree, Your Honours, because when we look for
13 the Una, for example, in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sanski Most and
14 Prijedor are identified here in the legend as Muslim areas and they are
15 east of the Una. And even the -- maybe also the municipality of
16 Bosanska Krupa goes a bit beyond -- I mean, to the east of the Una. The
17 Sava -- okay, we see on the map there is no geographic connection between
18 Serb areas in the west and Serb areas in the east. The Drina -- I mean,
19 we see Muslim areas, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebrenica, and so on further
20 to the south. And also for the Neretva, I don't really -- I wouldn't
21 draw the same conclusions Mr. Karadzic does from this map.
22 Q. I said that we're not present along the whole flow of the Una,
23 but are we present along the Sava, the Drina, and the upper flow of the
24 Neretva as well as Sarajevo -- in fact, all territories except on the
25 coast? Not the entire Una is ours. The same applies for the Sava, the
Page 17120
1 Drina, and the Neretva, but we are present on those rivers; right?
2 A. I mean, I have answered the question, Your Honours, so ...
3 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that Sarajevo here is part of a Serbian
4 unit and do you agree that there is no corridor and that we accepted
5 that?
6 A. Your Honours, my answers are based on the map I see in front of
7 you. I'm not hundred per cent familiar anymore with the different
8 versions of the Cutileiro Plan and how the different parties saw it or
9 interpreted it. And -- because I didn't analyse that for the -- for this
10 report. But here you can see that on this map Sarajevo is -- is mixed,
11 the municipality, okay, is largely red, Serb areas. But there is also --
12 there is also to be a green area there. And I don't know whether the
13 Bosnian Serbs accepted this particular map or not.
14 Q. All right. We'll establish that easily. Is it true that there
15 is no corridor here? We have no territorial link between the red zones?
16 A. Yes, that's correct, Your Honours. There is no corridor in the
17 Sava valley.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D -- or rather,
20 1953. 1D -- I beg your pardon. 65 ter 19153.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The next plan was the Vance-Owen Plan after the Cutileiro Plan;
23 right?
24 A. That is correct, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: But just for the record, the map we just saw seemed
Page 17121
1 to me almost identical to the one referred to by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff,
2 which is on page 111 on that document. And I have to note that -- I have
3 to ask you, Mr. Karadzic, this one is also prepared by the Defence team
4 based on the information you have, using the -- using one of the maps
5 which is in the -- in our court binder; correct, Mr. Karadzic?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not sure. This is from the
7 documentation of the Conference on Bosnia. This is the proposal of the
8 Vance-Owen Plan.
9 JUDGE KWON: No, who put numbers and colours on this map?
10 [Defence counsel confer]
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The OTP, the OTP provided this to
12 us. [In English] Court binder.
13 JUDGE KWON: I left my court binder in my office.
14 Do you have the court binder?
15 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 0701 is the ERN number. 0782, it's
17 within that page range. Page 61 of the binder.
18 JUDGE KWON: Correct, yes.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. So, Mr. Theunens, do you agree that provinces 2, 4, and 6 were
21 marked as Serb provinces and that according to this plan we are on the
22 Una, Sava, Drina, Neretva, and Sarajevo is extra-territorial here, it
23 doesn't belong to anyone; is that right?
24 A. Your Honours, I agree with the first part of Mr. Karadzic's
25 proposition, i.e., the correspondence between the numbers and the Serb
Page 17122
1 areas. Now, whether that means that the Serbs or the Bosnian Serbs are
2 on the Una, Sava, Drina, Neretva, and Sarajevo -- excuse me, not
3 Sarajevo, that's a matter of interpretation. I have mentioned already
4 province 1, it goes beyond the Una to the east and the same applies to
5 the Muslim areas number 5, I mean they are on the Drina.
6 Q. Well, we do agree, but I'm asking you whether we were on those
7 rivers too, whether we were there as well. And is it correct that
8 province number 3 does not belong to the Serbs; therefore, there is no
9 corridor. Right?
10 A. It is correct that according to the Vance-Owen Plan there would
11 be no corridor.
12 Q. And do you know that I accepted this map, this plan, in Athens?
13 A. Yes, Your Honours, and this was discussed already I think
14 yesterday or the day before, but at the end of the day the Bosnian Serbs
15 rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, mainly on the basis of the map.
16 Q. Thank you. Thank goodness it's not the Bosnian Serbs that are
17 being tried. I am being tried. So let us stick to what I did. Can this
18 map be admitted, although it has been admitted in a way already. You
19 don't really need to sign anything, do you?
20 JUDGE KWON: No, but we'll admit this.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1593, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at P799,
23 page 137. P799, Lord Owen's book. In Serbian it's page 137. We don't
24 need to see the English because it's a drawing.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 17123
1 Q. After the Vance-Owen Plan, did the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan ensue?
2 A. Yes, it did, Your Honours. I just want to emphasize that all
3 these issues related to the various peace proposals of the international
4 community are not discussed as such in my report. So I'm now providing
5 answers based on my knowledge outside the scope of my report.
6 Q. Thank you. Do you see that all of the Una river was given to us
7 here, also a large part of the Sava, a large part of the Drina, Sarajevo
8 is extra-territorial, and in the valley of the Drina, in Podrinje, the
9 Muslims had linked-up enclaves, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica. Is that
10 right? While in Brcko we do have a corridor but we called it the T
11 viaduct and we referred to it in different ways. It is this map on the
12 left-hand side, on page 234.
13 A. Are we talking, Your Honours, about the map on the left, map 9;
14 or the map on the right, map 10?
15 Q. Number 9. That's the Owen-Stoltenberg map with regard to a union
16 of three republics: The Serb, Croat, and Muslim. The Serb areas are
17 white, so there is all of Una, a large part of the Sava, a large part of
18 the Drina, and Sarajevo is under UN administration.
19 A. Indeed, Your Honours, I can see that on the map and I would then
20 refer to the date of the map, August 1993, where we see that in the
21 meanwhile significant military operations have taken place in order to
22 implement the six strategic goals. There are several directives for
23 further operations that have been issued to the VRS, again in support of
24 implementing the six strategic goals the VRS has made territorial gains,
25 for example, in the east where we see the creation of the enclaves. And
Page 17124
1 my conclusion would be that the plan proposed by Messrs. Owen and
2 Stoltenberg reflects those realities on the ground.
3 Q. Mr. Theunens, you keep sticking to that, that our people were
4 waging war because of the strategic objectives. Didn't they have to wage
5 war when they were being attacked? Did they have to wage war because
6 they were being attacked, irrespective of any strategic objectives? As a
7 military expert, say yes or no. Is counter-offensive a legitimate
8 military operation?
9 A. Your Honours, my report doesn't try to show whether these
10 operations were legitimate or illegitimate. I just tried to -- tried to
11 analyse how command and control was implemented, and analysing whether or
12 not there was a link between the six strategic goals and the directives
13 for further operations is, in my view, a key aspect in order to
14 understand how command and control, especially from the highest civilian
15 level of authority, i.e., the supreme commander, to the various
16 commanders -- that is, in the VRS was implemented. That is all I did.
17 It is not up to me to say whether these operations are legitimate or
18 illegitimate or whether -- who started or who responded to whom in the
19 conflict.
20 Q. Is it the opposing side that gives directives to our army? Do
21 you see that the Muslims are waging war to their own detriment? The
22 longer they wage war, the worse things get for them. We had accepted
23 plans that were far more favourable than those that were ultimately
24 adopted; right?
25 A. Your Honour, that is -- that is a subject matter that falls
Page 17125
1 outside the scope of my report.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that map 10 shows how many territories
3 we were prepared to return, territories that were at that point under our
4 control?
5 A. Your Honours, it's -- it's maybe an issue of wording, but again
6 for my recollection at the time and I read the book by Lord Owen, it is
7 not so much territories the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to return but
8 territories they would be requested to return if they would accept the
9 maps linked to the -- to this peace plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. And
10 my recollection is that they did not accept the maps -- the map, sorry.
11 Q. Your recollection is wrong, Mr. Theunens. The Serbs had accepted
12 this plan as well. I accepted it. I accepted the Cutileiro Plan. I
13 accepted the Vance-Owen Plan. I accepted the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. And
14 I accepted the Dayton Agreement. I only did not accept the plan of the
15 Contact Group. Out of five plans, I accepted four. Do you know that?
16 And most of them run against our strategic objectives, they run counter
17 to our strategic objectives.
18 A. Your Honours, I have a different recollection - and again, this
19 falls outside the scope of my report.
20 JUDGE KWON: A different recollection being what?
21 THE WITNESS: Of the Bosnian Serbs' attitude or reaction to these
22 various peace plans.
23 JUDGE KWON: But as to the -- his attitude you don't remember --
24 you don't know?
25 THE WITNESS: The only thing I know was in relation to the
Page 17126
1 Vance-Owen Plan, that indeed Mr. Karadzic initialled, I believe, part of
2 the plan in Athens in spring 1993. My overall recollection is that the
3 Bosnian Serbs, and Mr. Karadzic was the main negotiator for the Bosnian
4 Serbs, their main objective -- excuse me, objection to the various peace
5 plans were related to the maps that were presented.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Is it correct, Mr. Theunens, that I did not initial part of the
8 plan but the entire plan in Athens, the Vance-Owen Plan, and I accepted
9 this plan too, and the Cutileiro Plan as well. And that I accepted and
10 created with Ambassador Holbrooke the Dayton Agreement in its entirety,
11 and they spoiled it in Dayton later on. Is it correct --
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do not argue with the witness. Put
13 your questions one by one if you like to get evidence from the witness at
14 all.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Why did you say "at least a part," when I accepted the entire
17 Vance-Owen Plan in Athens?
18 A. Your Honours, the -- my answer was based on the best of my
19 recollection. As I said earlier, the various peace plans fall outside
20 the scope of my report.
21 JUDGE KWON: He's asking the reason for your answer. You said I
22 believe -- part of the plan in Athens, referring to Vance-Owen Plan.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, I do -- I mean, my recollection
24 is that the agreement Mr. Karadzic gave was at least to the principles.
25 The maps I'm not -- the map, I'm not hundred per cent sure.
Page 17127
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this page be
2 admitted, this page from Lord Owen's book.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The left map, map 9, seems to me almost
4 identical to the page 116 of Exhibit P2538, but that map -- the latter
5 map does not -- bears the markings.
6 We can admit this.
7 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
8 JUDGE KWON: Oh, that's already -- it is part of an exhibit that
9 has been already admitted.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, it's part of Exhibit P799.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Can we now have 65 ter 06344, the map of the Contact Group plan.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I just want to mention that we
14 were not notified about the maps, so we cannot be particularly helpful
15 here.
16 JUDGE KWON: Page 117 of Mr. Treanor's report is referring to
17 Contact Group map. We'll see whether it's identical to this one or not.
18 That's identical.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Take a look at the map of the Contact Group. Do you agree that
22 we still have access to the Una river, not the entire Una river; then
23 also access to the Sava river. Did the Contact Group give us territorial
24 link rather than a corridor between the east and the west? It's -- do
25 you agree that we have also been cut off in the area of Brcko and that
Page 17128
1 the Muslims have Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica all together and that we
2 are also at the upper part of the Neretva river where the Una, Sava,
3 Drina, Neretva, and we have participation in Sarajevo that is
4 extra-territorial yet again under the UN?
5 A. Yeah, that is more or less what the map represents.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's already been admitted --
8 oh, it hasn't. Within the Treanor report?
9 JUDGE KWON: But it's -- this document as such was not admitted.
10 We'll admit this.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1594, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Can we now have 65 ter 19671, the Dayton map.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Are you familiar with this map in which we were given 49 per cent
16 of the territory, again, part of the Una, part of the Sava, a significant
17 corridor, a wide corridor, a large part of the Drina except in Gorazde,
18 and part of Sarajevo as well where we live to this day. Everything
19 except for access to the sea. This plan also recognises what is defined
20 as our political objective, not as our military objective, and this is
21 recognised by politics, not the military.
22 A. Your Honours, my answer is similar to the one I gave when looking
23 at the Contact Group peace plan map, that is, that this map again
24 reflects the realities on the ground as they had developed through the
25 use of military force by all sides and this is, for example, visible in
Page 17129
1 Western Herzegovina, where the Federation has captured or conquered
2 significant parts of terrain in -- during September 1995. And then,
3 obviously, the final map is a result of political negotiations, whereby
4 these realities in the field are taken into account.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you remember the first map, the ethnic map, or the
6 first Cutileiro map, the basic map, do you remember that all these
7 territories that we held all the time and that we finally got were
8 inhabited by a significant Serb majority? That these are traditional
9 Serb lands and have been so for centuries.
10 A. Your Honours, that is Mr. Karadzic's interpretation. I think the
11 maps speak for themselves and the colours that were used.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the strategic objectives were also
13 honoured here by the international community as legitimate ones and they
14 were all verified except for access to the sea?
15 A. I would not agree with that interpretation, Your Honours, because
16 the Dayton plan also foresaw the return of people who had to leave their
17 houses due to the war. So the separation of the Serbian people from the
18 other two nationalities -- national communities was not respected by the
19 Dayton plan and we can continue the discussion for the other goals as
20 well. Sarajevo was not divided.
21 Q. Says who, Mr. Theunens? Do you know that there is Eastern
22 Sarajevo that we used to call Serb Sarajevo, Eastern Sarajevo, of 100.000
23 people there were out of about the 200.000 people who were there and
24 30.000 Yugoslavs, 100.000 people stayed on and a new city was built that
25 is called Eastern Sarajevo. And do you know that we accepted annex 7 and
Page 17130
1 that people are only returning to Republika Srpska. No one's returning
2 to the Federation. Did you know that?
3 A. I mean, there's again a lot of questions about issues that fall
4 outside the scope of my report, but if Mr. Karadzic says that the Serb
5 Sarajevo was a newly built city, well, okay, that's fine. My
6 understanding of the Dayton plan is that Sarajevo was handed over to the
7 Federation, and we all remember how Serbs who were living in parts of
8 Sarajevo that, under the implementation of the Dayton plan in the early
9 months of 1996, were to be handed over to the Federation, that Bosnian
10 Serbs there were called by their leadership to leave, and indeed they
11 left.
12 Q. None of that is correct, Mr. Theunens. That's not part of your
13 expert report. And the return of refugees is not part of your report and
14 you want to harm the Defence and you are expanding the story. Why are
15 you doing that? It is not true that we asked them to leave. We asked
16 them to come back. It is not true that the Muslims got all of Sarajevo.
17 They got the main part of Sarajevo, but you just don't know these
18 things --
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you are not giving evidence. Just put
20 your questions to the witness.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, just a remark, it's unfair
22 to now say that Mr. Theunens expanded. He was asked a question and he
23 answered the question as far as he could.
24 JUDGE KWON: In any event, would you like to comment on the last
25 comment by the accused, Mr. Theunens?
Page 17131
1 THE WITNESS: Just a small correction that Sarajevo was given to
2 the Federation and the Federation consists of Muslims, or Bosniaks, and
3 Bosnian Croats.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. And do you know that East Ilidza, East Novo Sarajevo, East Stari
6 Grad, and Pale, and Trnovo is part of Sarajevo as well, and that that
7 remained in Serb hands as well as Lukavica and part of Dobrinja, that
8 Serbs did get part of their Sarajevo, they ceded Vogosca, Ilijas, the
9 Serb part of Ilidza, the second part of Serb Ilidza and Hadzici and that
10 is why the Muslims did not want to have Srebrenica returned to them
11 because they liked this better? Do you know that we are there and I'm
12 not asking you about refugees and I'm not asking you from the point of
13 view of human rights. I'm asking you from a military point of view, from
14 the point of view of six strategic objectives. Were they legitimate and
15 were they recognised by all the peace plans of the international
16 community, all of them, and ultimately verified at Dayton, yes or no?
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, how can the witness answer yes or no
18 to this lengthy question? Put your question again and we'll have a
19 break.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
21 Q. My question: The basis of your report are the six strategic
22 objectives. The Defence says that these are legitimate political
23 objectives aimed at negotiations, and I'm asking you whether they were
24 achieved in negotiations with the international community and the other
25 two sides by political means?
Page 17132
1 A. Your Honours, I have answered the question. My conclusion is
2 that the operations conducted by the VRS based on the operational
3 directives that were issued by the Supreme Command and the Main Staff are
4 coherent with the six strategic goals.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll have a break for 50 minutes and
6 resume at 25 past 1.00.
7 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 1.27 p.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Theunens, on page -- or, excuse me --
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender the previous
14 document, the Dayton map.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1595, Your Honours.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Theunens, in the examination-in-chief on transcript page 57,
19 lines 22 through page 59, line 3, you were asked about an order issued by
20 Colonel - or whatever his rank may have been at the time - anyway, now
21 he's a general, Svetozar Andric and it was admitted as Exhibit P3055 and
22 you said that his item 6, probably an item in his order, about the
23 relocation of Muslim population was indeed how things went.
24 [In English] "... That his take-over was accompanied by movement
25 of population, more specifically of non-Serbs."
Page 17133
1 [Interpretation] Do we agree that this is a mistake. You say
2 that the Serbs took over Zvornik in early May. Wasn't it in early April?
3 A. Your Honours, the events -- in Zvornik took, indeed, place I
4 think in the first and second week - I mean, the take-over - of April
5 1992 -- the 9th and the 10th the -- is the actual date of the operation,
6 and after that we have the aftermath with all -- I mean, with related
7 events that are mentioned in my report.
8 Q. Thank you. So did you ask yourself why that Colonel Andric
9 waited until the 28th of May to include in his order the manner of
10 relocation of the Muslim population. Why didn't he do so immediately?
11 Do you have an explanation? Do you have a context that can serve to
12 explain and shed light on that order? Or do you think that was part of
13 ethnic cleansing?
14 A. Could we see the document, please, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P3055.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Item 6. Why as late as 28 May? If you have no explanation,
19 that's fine, just say so.
20 A. Your Honours, I would appreciate if Mr. Karadzic would give me
21 the time to listen to the translation and also to read the document.
22 JUDGE KWON: By all means.
23 THE WITNESS: I mean, a number of questions have been issued.
24 The fact that we see a reference to moving out of Muslim population on
25 the 28th of May does not allow to draw any conclusions as to whether
Page 17134
1 instructions to that effect were issued at an earlier time. Now, I have
2 not used the terminology "ethnic cleansing" in my report. When
3 commenting on the document during the examination I read out the
4 paragraph and my conclusion was that this was consistent with the first
5 strategic goal. I don't think I have commented as to the circumstances
6 how and -- this Muslim population was moved out.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you. Do you know that on 22 May, six days before this, all
9 three parties, under the auspices of the UNHCR or the Red Cross - I don't
10 remember which - signed an agreement that the relocation of the
11 population from the combat zone to municipalities willing to accept them
12 would take part in an orderly and controlled fashion. One such agreement
13 was signed before his order and four after.
14 A. Your Honours, I'm not familiar with such an agreement, so if I'm
15 invited to comment on it, it would be helpful if I could see it.
16 Q. It's in evidence. I can inform you that it was signed on the
17 22nd in a regulated fashion with escort -- with the provision of
18 guarantees on their own territory, civilians are to be relocated from the
19 combat zone. And, obviously, the colonel received it within six days and
20 included it in his order --
21 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Karadzic, if
22 you want to further questions in relation to this issue, you should show
23 the witness the document, as he requested. Otherwise, you just move on
24 to other topics.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I have no time to
Page 17135
1 display documents that are in evidence.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. But it's my impression, Mr. Theunens, that it would have been
4 good for you to have access to these things, given the fact that you're
5 commenting such orders; right?
6 A. It may be the case, yes. It always helps to have more
7 information, so ...
8 Q. Thank you. Did you know that in the Drina River valley about
9 15.000 Muslim fighters had assembled?
10 A. Your Honours, again, it would be helpful to see a document with
11 also, like, references and dates, you know, to allow me to comment on
12 that question or to answer that question.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, fair enough.
14 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. We will find some documents. I don't have time. But what I'm
17 interested in, Mr. Theunens, if it's your conclusion that we liberated or
18 took Podrinje because it was our objective and not because we were
19 attacked from there, then you should know whether or not there were
20 forces. Do you or don't you know that throughout the war, even in
21 Srebrenica there were forces. Somebody said there was a 28th Division
22 and in the early days of the war there were considerable forces there
23 which incessantly attacked us?
24 A. Your Honours, I know from my professional activities prior to
25 joining the ICTY that, indeed, there was a unit called the 28th Division
Page 17136
1 of the ABiH in Srebrenica, and that, for example, end of 1992/early 1993
2 units of the ABiH conducted offensive operations in the wider
3 Srebrenica -- I mean, in Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina area. But it's not
4 part of my report.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that the Muslim side declared war on
6 Serbia and Montenegro and us, that is, they proclaimed the state of war
7 and labelled us as enemies on 20 June 1992?
8 A. Your Honours, that may be the case. I don't have an exact
9 recollection and, again, it falls outside the scope of my report.
10 Q. I don't think so, Mr. Theunens. If you are assessing the conduct
11 of the VRS, then you should know whether war was declared on them or not;
12 right?
13 A. Your Honours, I explained again this morning why I included the
14 six strategic goals and also how I established that there was a
15 consistency between the six strategic goals and the operations conducted
16 by the VRS throughout the armed conflict. I'm not assessing the conduct
17 of the VRS whether -- I'm not concluding whether what they did was
18 legitimate or illegitimate; that is not up to me. I'm just looking at
19 the simple aspect of consistency in the implementations of the principles
20 of command and control, i.e., single authority and also establishing who
21 held that authority, unity of command, i.e., that there was consistency
22 in the orders of the Supreme Command and the activities of the
23 lowest-possible-level units, as well as the obligation to implement
24 decisions, i.e., were the orders implemented; and if they were not
25 implemented, whether the superior who issued the orders took corrective
Page 17137
1 or other action to ensure future implementation.
2 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Theunens, the question was whether you knew
3 that war was declared.
4 THE WITNESS: But I answered that question, Your Honours, and
5 then there was a subsequent question by Mr. Karadzic and my longer answer
6 now is an answer to that subsequent question.
7 JUDGE KWON: Your answer was "that may be the case"?
8 THE WITNESS: Exactly, Your Honours. I don't recall exactly and
9 it falls outside the scope of my report. That's in line 2 and 3 --
10 JUDGE KWON: You don't recall what? The date or whether the --
11 whether the war was declared?
12 THE WITNESS: Exactly, Your Honours. I don't remember whether
13 war was declared. It must obviously have been the case, but I don't
14 remember the exact wording nor a date.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. But then you continued. It may be the case but it has nothing to
18 do with my report. Here's my question: Would there have been operations
19 on the part of the VRS if war hadn't been declared and would there have
20 been VRS operations if there had been no Muslims offensives against us?
21 A. Your Honours, the -- I think it's a very hypothetical question,
22 but I mean if -- referring to my report I can try to give a partial
23 answer. I understand Mr. Karadzic stated that this declaration of war
24 was on the 20th of June. Well, the first directive for further action,
25 and that's directive number 1, dates from the 6th of June, 1992.
Page 17138
1 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that the Presidency of the VRS with
2 my signature issued an appeal to the Muslims not to fight, that there is
3 no point, and that their territory might eventually belong to their
4 constituent unit and some villages accept that and stayed with us all the
5 way through 1995 without any problem?
6 A. Your Honours, I don't remember seeing such a document, but if
7 Mr. Karadzic can show it now then I can maybe try to answer the question.
8 Q. The document is already in evidence. Can we see 1D03913. I'm
9 just interested whether you knew about it while you were drafting your
10 report. 1D03913. This is an order by Sefer Halilovic -- there should be
11 a translation. An order of the Main Staff of the armed forces in
12 Sarajevo dated 10 July 1992. General Sefer Halilovic orders the
13 following:
14 "1. The Srebrenica armed forces staff shall link its free
15 territory, the liberated territories with the free territory and the
16 wider surroundings of the Zepa village and the wider area of the
17 Konjevici village, Nova Kasaba, and Drinjaca, with all available forces."
18 It seems that the translation is still not done. It says about
19 Zvornik here -- and, actually, the following subparagraph reads:
20 "Upon the setting up of the link with the free territory and
21 Zepa, secure the Zepa-Zlovrh-Podravanje road with focus on holding Orlov
22 Kamen."
23 And then item 2:
24 "The Zvornik armed forces staff in the area of Stara Kamenica
25 shall attack along the axis of Kamenica-Konjevic Polje with all available
Page 17139
1 forces in order to link up with the armed forces of Srebrenica and
2 Bratunac."
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the following page,
4 please.
5 [In English] Next page, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. "3. The Srebrenica staff of the armed forces shall provide
8 assistance to Vlasenica and Bratunac in the setting up of staffs of the
9 armed -- of armed forces in these municipalities which would act on these
10 free territories and which subsequently would organise armed forces in
11 these areas."
12 That was the 7th of July. Do you know that until the spring of
13 the following year, this group of 15.000 soldiers constantly attacked our
14 army from behind. You said that you know about the presence of some
15 forces, but did you know that it was on a daily basis, those were
16 permanent attacks?
17 A. Your Honours, I don't have detailed knowledge of these
18 operations. I don't have a detailed recollection of the operations of
19 these ABiH units nor about exact figures and the frequency and the nature
20 of the attack because it falls outside of the scope of my report. So I
21 didn't analyse this for the purpose of my report. I do remember that
22 indeed they conducted -- the ABiH conducted offensive operations in the
23 latter half of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 in Eastern
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 Q. Thank you.
Page 17140
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
2 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I think it's necessary to understand the
5 context of the witness -- this witness's evidence, and on that ground we
6 will admit this. Mark it for identification.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1596, Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see
9 65 ter 09 --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Please repeat the number.
11 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 09148.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you agree that here in the first paragraph the document says
15 that the forces are moving between Kamenica, Zepa, Cerska, and so on, and
16 that they are 10.000 to 15.000 soldiers strong. The greatest
17 concentration of these forces is in the general area of Srebrenica. The
18 enemy is regrouping these forces in line with the purpose and goals of
19 combat operations."
20 And it goes on to describe where the individual things are --
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, instead of reading out, let the
22 witness read the document, ask your question. That's faster and more
23 efficient.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I thought that by --
25 that by my summarising we could save some time, but I seem to have been
Page 17141
1 wrong.
2 THE WITNESS: I have read the first part -- the first page of the
3 document.
4 JUDGE KWON: I think he's going to ask a question about what is
5 contained in para 1.
6 So proceed to put your question, Mr. Karadzic.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Theunens, do we agree that it was stated that there are
9 forces there and that there are about 10.000 to 15.000 soldiers strong,
10 that they are regrouping, that they have combat plans, as well as that
11 there is a war on there?
12 A. That is, indeed, what the document states. It's the assessment
13 of the Drina Corps -- or the assessment the Drina Corps makes of the
14 enemy forces in the area.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender the document.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1597, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, I must make a
20 selection of documents because I cannot show them all. I will not
21 proceed with the following documents.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. But let me ask you about section 4, the implementation of the
24 strategic objectives. Do you agree that if the six strategic objectives
25 were a task given to the army, that the Chief of Staff of the VRS should
Page 17142
1 know about it and the Chief of Staff is the number two man in the army?
2 Do you agree? Is that correct?
3 A. I mean I'm not sure how we can establish whether Mr. Milovanovic
4 knew about these goals, yes or not, at the time of the events -- I'm not
5 sure whether we can establish that Mr. Milovanovic knew about these
6 goals, yes or no.
7 Q. Sir, if you are claiming that the political leadership assigned
8 goals to the army, would it be logical for Milovanovic to know? Just say
9 yes or no.
10 A. I mean, I have answered the question. The directives -- the
11 operational directives issued by the Main Staff, including the two signed
12 by Mr. Karadzic, are consistent with the strategic goals, even if the
13 strategic goals as such are not identified systematically in these
14 documents.
15 Q. The strategic objectives and the directives and the entire
16 struggle, don't they have a common foundation and that foundation is to
17 protect the people from massacre. That was the task that Milovanovic
18 got: Protect the people. And that is the origin of consistency or
19 similarity. It's not that one flows from the other, but they both flow
20 from the same premise, that the people must be protected.
21 A. Your Honours, I don't remember seeing a document where
22 Mr. Milovanovic draws that conclusion. It may well be the case, but I
23 would like to draw your attention to footnote 361 in part 2 of the report
24 where it -- and this is part of directive for further operations number
25 2, where General Mladic comments -- or he states that:
Page 17143
1 "The VRS has liberated the territories we considered ours and
2 created conditions for political and military leadership of SRBiH so that
3 they could perform all activities and negotiations regarding the future
4 state of BiH from the position of the stronger one in this territory."
5 He furthermore adds:
6 "We have broken through corridors in Eastern Bosnia and
7 Bosanska Posavina and has made possible the century-long aspiration of
8 the Serbian people from BiH and the Serbian Republic of Krajina to be
9 joined with the fatherland, Serbia."
10 This is just an example to illustrate the mind-set of the command
11 of the Main Staff and he expresses in the directive for further
12 operations number 2, which is dated the 22nd of July, 1992. So it goes
13 well beyond a purely defensive effort to protect the Bosnian Serbs from
14 massacre, as Mr. Karadzic put it in his question.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Theunens, I take it Mr. Karadzic was referring
16 to General Milovanovic's interview, where he said two objectives.
17 THE WITNESS: Okay.
18 JUDGE KWON: Now you remember?
19 THE WITNESS: I remember from this morning, Your Honours, yes.
20 Again, that is the view Mr. Milovanovic expressed during his
21 interview. I refer to the views the chief -- the commander of the
22 Main Staff expresses at the time of the events, and similar views are
23 expressed in other combat documents between May 1992 and November 1995.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. If I need to remind you, it's 65 ter 2251, but I believe that it
Page 17144
1 was also assigned a D number. It's General Milovanovic's interview?
2 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it has been admitted, 22551, and at
3 the time you didn't tender it.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I seek to tender it now.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. --
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I object to tendering this.
7 This is a summary of a meeting that the Prosecution had with this
8 General Milovanovic and I don't really see how that can be admitted
9 according to the rules that this Trial Chamber has established.
10 JUDGE KWON: I don't remember what Mr. Theunens commented on,
11 but -- I would like to see the page. Give me one moment.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D22551 and then 06089653, I believe
13 it's page 7. The ERN number ends in 653. These are minutes.
14 JUDGE KWON: This is what Mr. Theunens answered:
15 "When I see the first point identified by General Milovanovic to
16 protect the Serb people from the destruction, the language is quite
17 similar to the explanation Mr. Karadzic gives to the Assembly members on
18 the 12th of May when he detailed or described the first strategic goal to
19 them."
20 So in that sense I think we had a basis to admit that page for
21 the reference purpose.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: For reference purpose, yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 So we'll admit that page. Give the number.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1598, Your Honours.
Page 17145
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Now, Mr. Theunens, are you saying that this coincidence between
3 the efforts to secure the people and strategic goals is in place or do
4 you think that the strategic goals were actually given to the army as a
5 task?
6 A. Both apply, actually. When Mr. Karadzic explained the first
7 strategic goal at the Assembly session, he refers to the need or
8 indirectly he refers to the need to protect the Serbs and that in his
9 view that can only be achieved by separating the Serbs from what he calls
10 their enemies or our enemies. And in addition -- I mean, the second part
11 of the question, the strategic goals - as I mentioned several times - it
12 is my conclusion that these strategic goals serve as the basis for the
13 operational directives and subsequent orders and commands throughout the
14 VRS chain of command for the units to conduct military operations.
15 Q. Is that a mere coincidence or is it something that the leadership
16 tasked the military with? It's a simple question. Did you find proof to
17 show that the army received that, not as a basis for negotiations, but
18 that it was something it was tasked with?
19 A. Your Honours, I have not seen a document that -- I mean, a
20 document from the Supreme Command stating that the military has to or the
21 Main Staff has to implement the six strategic goals. It would be
22 helpful -- I mean, just for the context to maybe see the document
23 Mr. Krajisnik issues on the 12th of May with a decision on the six
24 strategic goals because maybe that wording will allow me to provide a
25 more precise answer. And that document is included in footnote 163.
Page 17146
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this document has P number
2 00955.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the issue of the
4 Official Gazette and the date be shown when it was published. Could we
5 please see the Official Gazette. Or let's go about it this way.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Do you accept that it was only published in the autumn of 1993?
8 JUDGE KWON: That has been dealt with.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. So you do not have any proof of that being given to the military
11 as a task and it was made public only in 1993. Can we now, once you've
12 read it, 1D --
13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the number.
14 JUDGE KWON: Having seen this document, would you like to add
15 anything?
16 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honours, I can just read the date.
17 Apparently, according to the Gazette, it was also published in 1993, but
18 I don't think that that allows to conclude that it was only published in
19 1993, at least not on the basis of the documents I have seen.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Do you have proof of it having been made public sometime before
22 that?
23 A. You mean the actual document, Your Honours? No, I don't have
24 proof.
25 Q. Thank you.
Page 17147
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3934.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. We saw what General Milovanovic said in his interview with the
4 OTP. Let us see what he said when he testified in the Tolimir case on
5 the 18th of May, 2011. Can we have the next page.
6 Please take a look at this from line 5 onwards. Let us see what
7 General Milovanovic, who was number two man of the army throughout the
8 war, says.
9 A. I've read the page, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page as well
12 and then I'm going to put a question, lines 6 through 12.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Does it seem logical to you now, Mr. Theunens, that the six
15 strategic objectives were envisioned for negotiations? Had they been
16 envisioned for the military, they would have been put in the form of an
17 order to the military.
18 A. Your Honours, I have -- I have answered that question several
19 times. It is my conclusion -- and again, we also see that from the
20 operations the VRS conducts as well as, actually, the evolution in the
21 various peace proposals and the maps that are presented by the
22 international mediators during the conflict, that is, that the VRS
23 implements these goals, on the basis of directives for further
24 operations, and that results in changes on the terrain, together, of
25 course, also with changes imposed by the other parties, especially
Page 17148
1 leading to the map that was presented in Dayton and that is then the
2 basis for negotiations. As I mentioned yesterday when Mr. Karadzic
3 presents the six strategic goals to the Assembly members, he doesn't
4 describe it as a basis for political negotiations.
5 Q. Did you see that on the 9th of June it was concluded that the
6 maps be sent to the European Community along with them, with the aim of
7 negotiating? We have shown that document. You don't have to answer.
8 We've all seen this. Let me ask you something else. Is it correct that,
9 by way of analogy, you conclude that if things developed in a certain way
10 on the ground that had to be due to the six strategic objectives?
11 A. I mean, the question is rather unclear. What is meant by "if
12 things developed in a certain way on the ground"?
13 Q. You have no proof that the directives and order and conduct of
14 the army were based on an explicit order based on the six strategic
15 objectives; however, you do conclude that on the basis of what the army
16 was doing this must have --
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we're done with this. He answered the
18 question several times.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Can these two pages be admitted?
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, if it is for reference purposes
22 only, I have no objection. Otherwise, it is actually read into the
23 record. I see no real purpose.
24 JUDGE KWON: You may call General Milovanovic, Mr. Karadzic.
25 We'll not admit this.
Page 17149
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the Prosecution is going to
2 be calling him unless they give up because he's on the list, Milovanovic
3 I mean. If General Milovanovic does not come, I ask that this and that
4 be admitted. 1D3935, can we have that now, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This is Mr. Krajisnik's testimony. He was the speaker of the
7 Assembly. It's probably the Popovic case. It's from line 13 onwards. I
8 don't have to read it out. Could you please have a look at that up to
9 page, or rather, line 20.
10 A. Yes, I've read that section.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Now from 5 until 13.
14 A. Okay.
15 Q. Does this differ now from what you thought about this until now?
16 A. Well, Mr. Krajisnik is testifying the same as you have been -- as
17 Mr. Karadzic has been saying in court. I mean, it doesn't change my
18 view. If you look at the principles of command and control on one
19 hand -- I mean, you look at the doctrine on one hand and then how it was
20 implemented by the Supreme Command and the Main Staff on the other hand,
21 it is hard to imagine that the objectives the VRS pursued which actually
22 didn't change during the war, that they were just the result of
23 self-imagination or coincidence or anything else the VRS, the Main Staff,
24 implemented the instructions of the Supreme Command. There are two
25 directives for further operations that are signed by Mr. Karadzic, and,
Page 17150
1 again, the objectives that are included in these directives for further
2 operations are fully consistent with the six strategic goals. It may
3 also have been that these were used during negotiations, but again that
4 would show the consistency between the political and military goals the
5 Bosnian Serbs pursued during the conflict.
6 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the Serb territorial claims pertain
7 to Serb territories, that -- territories that they have been inhabiting
8 for centuries and where they were a majority and that they were even
9 ready not to have all of them included, from 44 to 52 -- we stopped at 49
10 actually. So the political leadership, did it place an order before the
11 military asking them to take something that had not been Serbian?
12 A. Your Honours, I cannot answer that question because I don't
13 know -- I mean, I'm not a demographer and I don't know how or what
14 territory was inhabited exactly by Serbs and on when and so on. So
15 it's -- it falls outside the scope of the report.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: Different from the past practice and quite
19 correctly, Mr. Karadzic put the question without reading out the
20 transcript, instead asking the witness to read out. So in order to
21 understand the context of this witness's evidence, probably we -- for the
22 reference purpose we need to admit those transcript pages.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.
24 JUDGE KWON: So we'll admit the previous Milovanovic's transcript
25 pages, i.e., T-14276 and the next page 14277, and these two pages as
Page 17151
1 well. We'll give the number.
2 THE REGISTRAR: They will be Exhibits D1599 and D1600,
3 respectively.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm very grateful.
5 JUDGE KWON: Just for reference purposes, Mr. Karadzic.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I heard from my advisors that the indictment cannot be evidence,
8 so I wonder whether perhaps this entire report cannot be admitted at all
9 because it looks like an indictment more as an expertise. Maybe it can
10 only be taken as a reference. There's a mistake in the transcript.
11 I asked my advisors whether the indictment can be evidence and I
12 was told that it cannot. So this report cannot be evidence either.
13 Maybe it should just be marked for reference because it looks like an
14 indictment more than an expertise.
15 JUDGE KWON: Unnecessary and improper comment, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at how
17 things stand with the operative directives of the Main Staff of the
18 Army of Republika Srpska. That is item 1 and then (A) is the
19 introduction.
20 Can I ask for D00325 now. Let us see what is being planned by
21 our foe, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what lies in store for the
22 Serbian side.
23 No, no, D00325, it says the aim of the operations in the Muslim
24 offensive: To concentrate part of the forces and to deblockade Sarajevo
25 with the simultaneous engagement of part of the forces, et cetera,
Page 17152
1 et cetera.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have a
3 reference.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Let me ask you: Did you know what the military objective of the
6 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was?
7 JUDGE KWON: Before that we have -- we should have the correct
8 document. Do you have the page number?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D232. I seem to have asked for the
10 wrong number. Page 7 in this analysis. Please, let us look at page 7 of
11 this analysis. Actually, let's leave the previous one, 325, D325.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. You cite that page, 325. I believe that you referred it to in a
14 footnote.
15 A. Yes, Your Honours. This document is mentioned in -- it's the
16 first, excuse me, directive for further action. It's footnote 359 in
17 part 2 of the report.
18 Q. Now I'm interested in seeing part of this analysis, D325, page 7
19 in English. Page 7, is that page 7? In English, I don't think this is
20 page 7.
21 JUDGE KWON: This is both in e-court and hard copies page 7.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to read it out in
23 English.
24 "The objective of the operations ...
25 JUDGE KWON: The interpreter doesn't follow. Is it third
Page 17153
1 paragraph on this page?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is the objective of our
3 operations, that's paragraph 3, whereas this has to do with the Muslim
4 objectives.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot find it in
6 either language.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Did you know that the aim of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was
9 to deblockade Sarajevo and to liberate all of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. Your Honours, this is outside the scope of my report, but I
11 remember from my work prior to joining ICTY that -- I think at the latest
12 end of 1993 the then-Chief of the General Staff of the ABiH,
13 General Delic, announced what he called "the Liberation War." That was
14 indeed intended to what he described as liberating the whole of the
15 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm not fully familiar anymore with the
16 goals of the ABiH at an earlier stage.
17 Q. Can we find something in your report now -- sorry, just a moment.
18 Operative directives of the Main Staff, that's the chapter I'm looking
19 for. I'll find it in a moment. Just a second. My apologies.
20 A. It starts at footnote 357, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE KWON: Part 2?
22 THE WITNESS: Part 2.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. It's page 118, if this is correct. 1034 is the number I have but
25 all of this has been mixed up. 65 ter is 01717. On page 7 of that
Page 17154
1 document you actually identify the actions and plans of the Muslim army;
2 right?
3 A. Your Honours, it would be helpful to see the document because I'm
4 not sure whether I understand what Mr. Karadzic is referring to.
5 Q. Can we have the operative directives, this page 118, if that is
6 correct. Can we have that in e-court, 118, that's a page from your
7 document, your report, that is.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The operational directives start in the
9 merged document in the English at page 130.
10 JUDGE KWON: Not 127?
11 THE WITNESS: That is in the old version, Your Honours, of
12 part 2, that's correct.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Whatever. Let's just have it.
14 JUDGE KWON: If you are going to put question in relation to his
15 expert report, we all have it so you can proceed to ask the question.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Have you noticed, Mr. Theunens, that the objectives of our
19 enemies were to cut the corridor, to take territories, and also that they
20 were mercilessly dealing with the Serb people and prisoners, that they
21 were trying to legalise their illegal procurement of weapons; is that
22 right? That is what is contained in the document that you referred to in
23 a footnote.
24 A. Your Honours, these directives for further operations do include
25 a paragraph on enemy forces, and it may well be that the information that
Page 17155
1 is now provided by Mr. Karadzic is included there. But it doesn't mean
2 that I have verified whether this information is accurate or not because
3 that was not part of my responsibilities.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
6 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, what is in e-court seems to be an
7 old version. This is page 130.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I was looking at a different
9 version. It's -- this is -- it would be 12 --
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this is what is identical to what I have and --
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: 127 --
12 JUDGE KWON: -- Mr. Theunens said it was an old version.
13 Yes, shall we go back to then 127 Mr. Karadzic is referring to.
14 Probably next page.
15 Yes, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Do you agree that our army identified the objectives and plans of
18 our military foes, as is stated here, however, I don't know how much is
19 contained in your text and how much is contained in the footnote that I
20 called up and included in my question. The ERN number of the footnote
21 that you referred to is 00607339 up until 7480. That is what you
22 referred to. You referred to that document in this regard.
23 A. Indeed, and that ERN corresponds with the -- with footnote 355,
24 that is, the analysis of the combat-readiness, whereby I use that as an
25 introduction to the section on -- where I discuss the directives for
Page 17156
1 further operations in detail. Because -- and we have seen that passing
2 when you were going through e-court. The analysis of the
3 combat-readiness highlights the functioning or the functioning of the
4 system of command and control including the single authority. And also
5 the consistency between the political goals and the military objectives
6 that follow from these political goals, and that's why I included a
7 reference to this analysis of the combat-readiness in the introduction to
8 the section on the operational directives or directives for further
9 operations.
10 JUDGE KWON: We have to show the page 365 in e-court and next
11 page.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, in the middle of the page
13 footnote 355.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can we agree that (a), (b), (c), and (d) are your interpretation.
17 You are stating items from direction number 1 and in parenthesis there is
18 your explanation to which directive this refers.
19 "Secure parts of Sarajevo with a Serbian population majority";
20 correct?
21 A. That is correct, Your Honours, I added the references to the
22 strategic goals.
23 Q. Did General Mladic add that he was acting pursuant to the order
24 in connection with the fifth strategic goal or is it only logical for him
25 to protect his people? Does he make any reference to the fifth strategic
Page 17157
1 goal?
2 A. I don't remember him making a specific reference to the fifth
3 strategic goal. I added this reference because it was my conclusion that
4 this specific task, i.e., securing the parts of Sarajevo that have a
5 majority Serb population, serves the implementation of strategic goal
6 number 5.
7 Q. It serves or coincides with. That is, the army received this as
8 a task and that's why it wants to protect the Serbs in Sarajevo; correct?
9 A. Well, there's at least two questions here. Again, based on my
10 understanding of how command and control was implemented in the SRBiH and
11 then in the RS and with the VRS, I don't think -- it's not my conclusion
12 that things happened by coincidence, and again referring to the analysis
13 on the combat-readiness. The well-functioning and the effective
14 functioning of the system of command and control is highlighted there.
15 And the second part of the question, the protection of the Serbs in
16 Sarajevo, I have not found that in that specific document, I believe. It
17 may well be that that was one of the goals that was pursued, but it was
18 not explicitly put in that directive as far as I remember.
19 Q. How come it made its way to a document? Where did it come from?
20 Can we see directive number 1? It says here directive for subsequent
21 action number 1 and four operative goals are mentioned, (a), (b), (c),
22 and (d). (A), (b), (c), and (d) are from the Mladic document and what we
23 see in brackets is your understanding of the documents and your
24 understanding of the link with these strategic objectives.
25 A. That is correct, Your Honours.
Page 17158
1 Q. What is not in brackets, is it part of directive 1?
2 A. Indeed, even if I may have summarised the text, we would have to
3 compare the two.
4 Q. Directive 1 is D232. Can we see it now, lest we should forget
5 where we are. The rest of it, (b), (c), and (d), contain any reference
6 of Mladic's to six strategic goals?
7 A. I read the first page.
8 Q. Let's go to the following page. You have seen under item 2 that
9 the army got the task to launch offensive action with limited goals and
10 thus improve its position. But there's no mention of six strategic goals
11 anywhere; correct?
12 A. That is true, and I've mentioned that earlier. And again, the
13 goals as I have mentioned them in footnote 359 can be found in the
14 section "The Goal of the Action." But there is no explicit reference to
15 the six strategic goals, that is correct.
16 Q. Thank you. Can we see the segment that reads: "I decided ..."
17 It's on page 4 or page 5. We can leaf through until we find the
18 decision. It must be the following in Serbian. Can't see it here.
19 A. It --
20 Q. Or possibly it's on page 1 under item 4. Can we go back to the
21 first page. Yes, here it is. "I decided defend the lines already
22 attained by means of persistent and active defence; prevent infiltration
23 of sabotage groups and infiltration of enemy groups in the main
24 directions; by using a part of our forces, implement active offensive
25 actions in order to mop-up the territory or mop-up remaining groups and
Page 17159
1 individuals belonging to the enemy in the territory; provide secure
2 communication ..." and so on.
3 Is -- does this reflect military logic, Mr. Theunens, justified
4 and legitimate military logic?
5 A. This is yeah, the decision of the command of -- it's not up to me
6 to decide whether it is justified, or to establish whether it is
7 justified or not. That is the overall task he sets for the VRS, and that
8 is further -- is then further specified in the tasks of the subordinate
9 units and the specific territorial goals he sets for these units.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that until the setting up
11 of the army we more or less attained all our strategic goals, apart from
12 the corridor which wasn't really a goal before the war. Do you know that
13 the army basically inherited all territories? The lines in Sarajevo were
14 drawn on the 5th of April, and then we only gradually lost territory
15 without gaining any and the entire Serb territory was protected before we
16 had an army. Is that correct?
17 A. I think that is a judgement or a conclusion one can draw with
18 insight, I mean, after the events. The question that would be -- could
19 be raised would be then: What were the expectations -- what were the
20 goals at the time? And actually there we find the answers in the six
21 strategic goals and the directives for further operations. The
22 directives for further operations are not just limited to consolidating
23 control over the terrain that is already under Serb control, but over the
24 years they also include instructions to obtain control over additional
25 territory.
Page 17160
1 Q. You're trying to say that at the end of the war we had more
2 territory than at the beginning. I'm saying that at the beginning of the
3 war, before the army was established, controlled nearly all our
4 territories. We had more and later on we lost territory. And you said
5 that these directives were used to conquer more territory?
6 A. Your Honours, it's a question of logic. It is correct that the
7 VRS -- but I doubt whether it was in May 1992. My understanding is that
8 by the end of 1992 the VRS controls approximately 70 per cent of the
9 territory of BiH. And it is correct that with the Dayton Agreement they
10 only -- only between brackets obtained 49 per cent. But that is a
11 conclusion or a judgement that we can make after the operations and it
12 doesn't exclude -- I mean, the fact that they had 49 at the end has, in
13 my view, nothing to do with the fact that throughout the conflict
14 instructions are given to capture additional terrain. The other parties
15 were also obviously involved in the conflict, they conducted offensive
16 operations, sometimes defensive, and all that had an effect on the degree
17 to which the directives for further operations were implemented.
18 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Theunens, I kindly ask you to leave
19 aside logic and analogies and go back to the facts. My question was
20 clear: Didn't we have most at the beginning and later on only lost? And
21 where did you find an order to take territory belonging to others? Is
22 there such an order?
23 JUDGE KWON: Did he not answer the question, Mr. Karadzic?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He didn't answer that there was an
25 order. He said that it was logical, and I have a problem with logic and
Page 17161
1 analogies and understanding here. I don't have a problem with facts.
2 THE WITNESS: I don't think that's an accurate representation
3 of -- of my answer. What I was trying to say is that at -- during the
4 conflict one could not predict the outcome of the conflict. And so it is
5 a bit of a strange judgement to try to justify the outcome or to use the
6 outcome of the conflict as a justification for what the intentions were
7 at the beginning of the conflict because it is not just one party that
8 determines or influences the outcome of the conflict. The VRS controlled
9 more than 70 per cent of the territory of BiH by end of 1992. As a
10 result of the Dayton Agreement the Bosnian Serbs obtained 49 per cent.
11 Now, I have not seen in the directives for further operations any
12 instructions as to limit or reduce the extent of the ground or terrain
13 controlled by the VRS.
14 Mr. Karadzic asked whether I have seen any instruction on how to
15 capture additional terrain. Just referring, and we have mentioned that
16 in directive number 7 which is signed by Mr. Karadzic and that is
17 footnote 371, we're talking about the physical separation of Srebrenica
18 and Zepa. And it talks about definitely liberating the Drina Valley.
19 Now, it's not my task to determine whether the Drina Valley belonged to
20 party A, B, or C, or whatever. But in the peace plans or the various
21 maps we saw this morning, we saw a number of maps that indicated that the
22 Drina Valley in fact -- or that there were districts, like in the
23 Cutileiro Plan, that would be attributed or stay under the control of the
24 Muslims. And that is just one example.
25 Q. Can we agree, did you find my statements that we don't want to
Page 17162
1 defeat the Muslims and that we don't want to wage war for territory, but
2 favour a political solution? And can we agree that the goal of the Serb
3 side was to preserve Serbian territory and that the goal of the Muslim
4 side was to conquer all of Bosnia? As a soldier, you should know that.
5 What was the objective of the Serb side, to take all of Bosnia or to
6 preserve what they have? And what was the objective of the Muslim army?
7 A. Your Honours, there's again a lot of questions. I can only refer
8 to my report, and there, it is my conclusion that the six strategic goals
9 were the basis for the operation -- excuse me, the operations conducted
10 by the VRS as a result of the directives for further operations that were
11 issued by the Main Staff and the Supreme Command to the VRS. I have not
12 analysed the goals or the war goals of the ABiH.
13 Q. Thank you. Is it true that apart from directive 2 you mention
14 Mladic's words who said, We have liberated the territories we consider
15 ours and created conditions for the political and military leadership of
16 the SRBH to engage in all talks on the future structure of BH from the
17 position of the stronger party? So the final word will be said in
18 negotiations; correct? Is it correct that Mladic here does not suggest
19 "uti possidetis juris" but instead he says that it will be solved in
20 negotiation?
21 A. Mladic says what he says. He does mention negotiations, but he
22 doesn't say that the conflict will be solved through negotiations. He
23 just states that the actions and the activities of the VRS allow the
24 political leadership, and actually the military leadership too, to
25 perform all activities and negotiations concerning the future of BiH from
Page 17163
1 the stronger position.
2 Q. That means the holding of territory has to -- tactical rather
3 than strategic importance. It means that the Serbs will be returned it
4 when peace is achieved. Lord Owen said that it hasn't yet happened in
5 history that an army that is undefeated returns 30 per cent of the
6 territory. Do you know that?
7 A. I'm not -- I don't remember anymore this statement or this
8 alleged statement by Lord Owen, but he may well have said that.
9 Q. In the BBC's film about Yugoslavia, these are the words of
10 Lord Owen. But Mladic, in sound mind, states that whatever's done is
11 done for the purpose of negotiations and not with the attitude: What we
12 take will remain ours.
13 A. Well, we would have to look at when Mladic makes that statement,
14 in which circumstances, and then further -- also look at the context, and
15 then maybe I'm in a position to comment. I mean, in the paragraph we
16 quoted now, 361, Mladic mentions negotiations, but he says actually
17 "could perform all activities and negotiations." So it's not restricted
18 just to negotiations.
19 Q. All right, sir. This is the 22nd of July, 1992, directive number
20 2. This is on the following page, and you comment there that it was
21 issued and refers to the cease-fire agreement reached in London and so
22 on, and under (b) you quote Mladic as saying that he said that the army
23 has created a good negotiating position. And you know what "uti
24 possidetis juris" means, the rightful ownership of that which one
25 possesses. Is that what Mladic says here or does he say that we have
Page 17164
1 created a favourable negotiating position?
2 JUDGE KWON: I think we dealt with it. You can move on to next
3 topic. We dealt with it.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. The third directive, Mr. Theunens, was published on 3 August 1992
6 and you state on the following page that its goals are: Prevent the
7 lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo and the arrival from -- of Ustasha
8 forces from Croatia. And in brackets you add which is in line with
9 strategic goals 2 and 5; correct?
10 A. Indeed, Your Honours, and I have added the references to the
11 strategic goals. The other text, I mean in the small print, is taken
12 from the directive. This is footnote 362, part 2 of the report.
13 Q. Thank you. Can you see from this directive that our enemy is
14 planning to lift the siege of Sarajevo, break through from Central Bosnia
15 toward Posavina, that is, the corridor, breaking through toward
16 Eastern Bosnia and breaking through from the Cazin Krajina and towards
17 Central Bosnia and directive 3 doesn't say that Sarajevo and
18 Central Bosnia are to be taken, but rather what we already have should be
19 preserved; correct?
20 A. It is correct that the directive doesn't say that Sarajevo should
21 be taken, which is again consistent with the strategic goal number 5
22 which is -- consists of maintaining the division of Sarajevo. And I just
23 would like to add that is -- also mention is made of offensive
24 operations. So it's not just of keeping what one -- or preserve what one
25 has, but also to conduct offensive operations, and offensive operations
Page 17165
1 are normally intended to obtain additional terrain or achieve control of
2 additional terrain.
3 Q. And can you see why? To create a favourable negotiating position
4 in the talks with the Muslim-Croat coalition. I'm reading from the
5 Serbian translation, but I'm sure you can find the relevant section.
6 It's right on the following page. It says here: Tactical advance toward
7 Majevica and other mountains, but it also states the reasons to take
8 dominant features in order to create a favourable negotiating position.
9 A. That is correct, Your Honours, but it refers to other -- to
10 operations in other territories, not Sarajevo,
11 Central Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the towns that are identified -- I mean,
12 geographic objectives that are identified under the previous paragraph
13 "offensive operations."
14 Q. Thank you. But the purpose of creating a more favourable
15 negotiating position remains. Isn't that what it says literally?
16 A. In that section it does, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. Do you know how the crisis in the Kotor Varos
18 municipality developed when the village of Vecici demanded that the
19 civilians be released, whereas they wanted to stay behind and fight? Do
20 you know about that? It's the very beginning of November 1992?
21 A. Your Honours, I'm not familiar with that because that falls
22 outside the scope of my report. I didn't deal with matters that occurred
23 in the territory of -- corresponding with the Autonomous Region of
24 Krajina.
25 Q. All right. Do you know that the combat operations in the war in
Page 17166
1 Eastern Bosnia, the issue was raised and it was General Morillon,
2 applications were submitted to him to make possible the departure of
3 Muslim civilians from Podrinje to Tuzla and our condition was the release
4 of Serbia civilians from Tuzla so they may leave the territory controlled
5 by the 2nd Corps of the BH army. Did you know about that? You had to
6 come across these documents.
7 A. Your Honours, I don't remember coming across such documents
8 during the preparation of this report. But again, if Mr. Karadzic wants
9 to show me documents, I can try my best to analyse them and answer his
10 questions.
11 Q. What I would like to know is what you knew when you were writing
12 the report. I don't want you to write another report, that will not
13 happen. I want to find out what you knew and what you didn't.
14 We'll now deal with directive number 4. Does it refer to
15 Eastern Bosnia?
16 A. I'm just reading the text. It's footnote 3 --
17 JUDGE KWON: Just two pages -- yes, that's right.
18 THE WITNESS: Footnotes 363 --
19 JUDGE KWON: We are having -- we have it on the monitor.
20 THE WITNESS: Ah, okay. Excuse me, sir.
21 JUDGE KWON: Do you see that?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
23 It doesn't mention Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the following page where
25 the aims of the operations are mentioned.
Page 17167
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. First: Crush and drive out the regular units of the Armed Forces
3 of Croatia from the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then
4 preserve the free territories on all fronts, set up a border service,
5 stabilise the existing corridors and open new ones to ensure unimpeded
6 communication in the RS. And you add that this corresponds to strategic
7 goal 2, and I say this coincides to the logic of survival, and not
8 strategic goal 2; isn't that correct?
9 A. I mean, the logic of survival is the interpretation of
10 Mr. Karadzic. When I see stabilising existing corridors and opening new
11 ones, the logical conclusion would be -- and when comparing that with the
12 strategic goals is to look at the strategic goals and determine whether
13 there is a strategic goal that refers to corridors and then strategic
14 goal number 2, i.e., establishing a corridor between Semberija and
15 Krajina, is the logical conclusion.
16 JUDGE KWON: It's time to rise for today, Mr. Karadzic. I take
17 it that you evidently need more time?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? Oh, absolutely. Can we
19 work for longer than one hour tomorrow, with our appreciation to the
20 staff?
21 JUDGE KWON: Unfortunately, I have another official commitment.
22 You have spent about ten hours and 40 minutes.
23 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, 20 minutes would be enough for your
24 re-examination -- or Ms. Elliott.
25 MS. ELLIOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
Page 17168
1 JUDGE KWON: You will have 40 minutes. Try to conclude in 40
2 minutes.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, before we rise --
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- you asked a question about the
6 Exhibit P2900 in relation to the missing page, and we have found out that
7 you are absolutely correct. There is a page missing, both in the English
8 and in the B/C/S. However, 65 ter 15324, that's the item that
9 Mr. Karadzic put forward, is complete, both in the English and in the
10 B/C/S. So I think it's probably the best to replace the one with the
11 other.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. But do we have the English translation
13 for that?
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, yes.
15 JUDGE KWON: We didn't have it at the time when I saw that.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's correct, Your Honour. But now it is
17 uploaded -- yeah, it is uploaded and it can be replaced.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 That will be done.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Directive 3, as far as I understand
21 matters, hasn't been admitted. Can it be admitted? The witness and his
22 report deal with it.
23 JUDGE KWON: What was the 65 ter number? Do you have that?
24 THE WITNESS: It's footnote 362, but I don't --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 6314, that's what it should be,
Page 17169
1 6314, that should be the 65 ter number.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: As far as I can identify it from the
3 footnote, it should -- it should be 65 ter 01600.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Very well. I can't comment -- but I'll
5 leave it in the hands of the court deputy.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
7 JUDGE KWON: With confirmation from the parties. We'll admit
8 directive number 3.
9 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 01600 is Exhibit D235.
10 JUDGE KWON: Oh, it's already in the --
11 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct.
12 JUDGE KWON: 11.00, tomorrow morning.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Friday, the 22nd day of
15 July, 2011, at 11.00 a.m.
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