Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 21685

 1                           Tuesday, 22 November 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.32 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, everyone.  There are several matters

 6     that I would like to deal with before we resume hearing the witness.

 7             On 10th of November, 2011, during the testimony of KDZ011, the

 8     Chamber admitted Exhibit D1911 into evidence and marked D1912 for

 9     identification.  Subsequently, Ms. Sutherland orally requested the

10     Chamber to reconsider admitting the two documents.  Given that D1912 was

11     only MFI'd, the Chamber considers Ms. Sutherland's intervention as an

12     objection to the admission of this document and not as a request for

13     reconsideration of the decision to admit it.

14             The Chamber recalls that D1911 is a 1991 Banja Luka security

15     services report discussing events in Croatia and how they affected the

16     "security situation" in municipalities in BiH along the border, including

17     in KDZ011's municipality of Bosanski Novi.  The Chamber notes that KDZ011

18     gave testimony about the presence of Muslim police officers in Suhaca,

19     Bosanski Novi, and stated that in the municipality of Bosanski Novi there

20     were rumours about the situation in Croatia as well as a fear that

21     fighting would "spill over" into Bosnia.  The Chamber thus considers that

22     sufficient foundation was laid for the admission of the document and

23     therefore that the Prosecution has not demonstrated the existence of a

24     clear error in reasoning or that of particular circumstances justifying

25     that the admission decision be reconsidered in order to prevent an

Page 21686

 1     injustice.

 2             With regard to MFI D1912, purportedly a "security situation

 3     assessment in Bosanski Novi" from 16th of April, 1992, the Chamber notes

 4     that it currently lacks an English translation of the document so cannot

 5     verify its contents.  The Chamber thus considers that any objection

 6     relating to its admission, including whether a proper foundation was laid

 7     for its admission, may be considered once an English translation has been

 8     received and the Chamber proceeds with examining whether the document

 9     should be admitted.

10             Next, the Chamber will issue its decision on the status of the

11     annexes to the accused's 61st motion for finding of disclosure violation

12     related to Mevludin Sejmenovic and the accused's supplemental memorandum

13     in support of 60th motion for finding of disclosure violation related to

14     Ivo Atlija, both filed on 26th of October, 2011.

15             The Chamber considered the Prosecution's notification filed on

16     8th of November, 2011, and noted the passage on which the parties agreed

17     and those on which it disagreed and in relation to which the Prosecution

18     submits that they relate to the witness's co-operation with the

19     Prosecution and their privacy and security.

20             The Chamber notes that witnesses Atlija and Sejmenovic are not

21     the subject of protective measures and that there is therefore no reason

22     to redact information related to their co-operation with the Prosecution

23     or the reasons for which they were seeking residence in a third country.

24             The Chamber therefore orders the accused to refile the

25     61st motion for finding of disclosure violation and the supplemental

Page 21687

 1     memorandum in support of 60th motion for finding of disclosure violation

 2     of 26th of October, 2011, with public redacted versions of confidential

 3     Annex A to the accused's 61st motion and of confidential Annex B to the

 4     accused's supplemental memorandum in accordance with the redactions

 5     agreed upon by the parties and identified in yellow in the Prosecution's

 6     submission of 8th of November, 2011.  The Chamber further orders the

 7     Registry to reclassify the 61st motion and the supplemental memorandum of

 8     26th of October, 2011, to the effect that the respective annexes therein

 9     are made confidential.

10             That said, could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

11                           [Private session]

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Page 21688











11  Page 21688 redacted.  Private session.















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17                           [Open session]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.

21             Unless there are other matters to deal with, we'll bring in the

22     witness.

23             In the meantime, I think we -- I received the spreadsheet you

24     referred to, which seems to be very helpful.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, and I just also wanted to say

Page 21690

 1     that we have uploaded a redacted version of the expert report, taking out

 2     the section which were struck, and that's 11 -- 117A.  It should be in

 3     e-court now.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we also find the spreadsheet

 6     helpful and it might be useful.  We don't have any objection if the

 7     Trial Chamber receives those kind of materials in advance of the expert

 8     witness's testimony in the future.  I think that would help things.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Thank you for your kind understanding.

10     That would be helpful indeed.

11                           [The witness takes the stand]

12                           WITNESS:  EWAN BROWN [Resumed]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Mr. Brown.

14             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.

15             JUDGE KWON:  My apologies for keeping you waiting, but there are

16     several matters to deal with before we start today.

17             Very well.  Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Excellencies.  Good

19     afternoon to all.

20                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Brown.

22        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. Karadzic.

23        Q.   Before we continue where we broke off on Friday, I would like to

24     ask you something.  Are you familiar with our laws and our political

25     system?

Page 21691

 1        A.   It is not an area of my expertise that's covered in this report.

 2     I'm aware of some of the laws, such as the Law on National Defence, but

 3     it's not an area that I am an expert on.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  However, on page 102, lines 122 to 123, you objected

 5     and said that I did not get up and tell an MP that he was not supposed to

 6     be saying something that he was saying.  So that's what you said on

 7     Friday.  It's in the transcript from page 112 to 123.

 8             Do you know that the speaker of the Assembly -- or, rather, the

 9     president does not sit throughout Assembly hearings all the time?

10        A.   I am unaware one way or the other whether he sits through the

11     Assembly session all the time.  It would seem that you certainly spoke at

12     this Assembly session and delegates followed you, and it would seem that

13     the decisions being taken at that Assembly session, in particular the

14     establishment of the army, the Presidency, the issues of the strategic

15     goals, were quite -- quite important.  But in answer to your question,

16     I -- I can't say whether or not the speaker of the Assembly sits through

17     the hearings at all time.

18        Q.   The president of the republic.  My question had to do with the

19     president of the republic, actually.

20             The president of the republic, does he have to sit at all

21     Assembly sessions or not?  What I'm putting to you is that that is not

22     case and if he is there, he's not there for very long, and he can leave

23     the session and take care of other business; right?

24        A.   I -- I have no view one way or the other.  I assume anyone can

25     leave the Assembly session.  It wasn't indicated in the minutes,

Page 21692

 1     certainly of that Assembly session, that, for example, yourself or

 2     Mr. Krajisnik, who I know certainly talked at the end of the session,

 3     seemed to have left, but, of course, anyone can leave.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the president of the republic cannot

 5     be involved in the upbringing and education of MPs because they're

 6     elected, too, and therefore the president does not have the right to

 7     reprimand them or caution them or try to educated them in any way?

 8        A.   I don't know what the regulations may be in relation to formal

 9     education or otherwise of delegates or members, but my point on Friday

10     was that I didn't see in the minutes of this discussion you indicating to

11     the delegates that what they were talking about was unacceptable or that

12     they had clearly misread what you had said in relation to the strategic

13     objectives.  There doesn't seem to be any language at all in that

14     session, and I -- I at least am left, when I read the minutes, that the

15     delegates took what you told them at the beginning of that session, put

16     their points forward, some of them indicating -- discussing the issue of

17     resettlement, and that there was no interjection by you nor Mr. Krajisnik

18     in relation to the fact that they seem to have got a mis -- the wrong

19     idea about -- about what was expected of them in the coming period.

20        Q.   I kindly ask you to give me answers that are as brief as

21     possible.

22             Now I'm going to tell you what it's like in our political system.

23     The president of the republic does not have to sit there at Assembly

24     sessions.  The president of the republic can intervene in parliamentary

25     proceedings by refusing to sign a bill and turn it into a law.  If a bill

Page 21693

 1     goes back to parliament, if the Assembly votes with a two-third majority,

 2     then the president has to sign that bill and turn it into a law.  Are you

 3     aware of that kind of thing in political systems?

 4        A.   It is not my area of expertise, and I am not aware of that type

 5     of regulation.

 6        Q.   With all due respect, Mr. Brown, you are saying what the

 7     president was supposed to do, and I'm telling you what the president can

 8     do.  But all right, let me ask you this now:  You focused on many

 9     individual statements made by the MPs.  Were you following what had

10     happened?  Did such positions prevail?  Did they become part of Assembly

11     documents, or did they just remain as a lone voice, as it were?

12        A.   I'm not quite sure I've -- I've -- I quite follow the question.

13     I haven't looked at the statements of the delegates and then taken them

14     back to their own particular areas.  It would seem that certainly in the

15     case of Mr. Vjestica from Bosanska Krupa that he's talking about what had

16     already happened, not what was necessarily going to be happening in the

17     weeks.  But to answer your question, I haven't -- I haven't followed,

18     bearing in mind some of the delegates were from other areas outside the

19     Krajina, but I didn't follow that.  That wasn't really within the remit

20     of the report.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Let us just conclude with dealing with your reference

22     to the Assembly.  I'm going to put to you the Defence case now.

23             The Assembly meets to produce one of seven types of documents -

24     the constitution, laws, resolutions, declarations, decisions,

25     conclusions, and recommendations.  Do you agree that the Assembly cannot

Page 21694

 1     meet with no reason whatsoever and that the reason for the Assembly to

 2     meet is the production of legislative documents?  Just like in your

 3     country, after all.

 4        A.   Yes.  Well, from the minutes that I did review it would seem that

 5     there were decisions, there was discussion, there were resolutions in

 6     relation to the circumstances at that time.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Have you found a document of the Assembly where an

 8     extremist view prevailed and that I should have refused to sign?

 9        A.   Well, I -- I would have to go through all of the Assembly

10     sessions, and I think there were a few of them, and it wasn't necessarily

11     a key area of my report, but I think that there was a lot of language

12     in this -- in these -- in the Assembly sessions, and I can draw your

13     attention to some of them, the 16th Assembly session, in particular,

14     which seemed to be quite inflammatory, possibly even derogatory, and I'm

15     not sure necessarily would have aided to a calming of the situation at

16     the time.  But, again, the study of all the aspects of the Assembly

17     sessions were not a key component of the report.

18             I do know, and I think I said last week, or I do believe, that

19     the 16th Assembly session was not an isolated, stand-alone Assembly

20     session.  There are references from what I remember in some of the

21     previous minutes to the controlling of some of the territory that was

22     highlighted by you, Mr. Karadzic, in relation to the strategic goals.

23     There was discussion in particular in some of the Assembly sessions in

24     March, or discussion and decisions, about taking control, establishing

25     TOs.  So the Assembly session on the 16th -- the 16th Assembly session

Page 21695

 1     was a stand-alone one, but in relation to your question about extremism,

 2     I think there are references in those Assembly sessions certainly with

 3     inflammatory language and derogatory language.  I can draw your attention

 4     to some of them at the 16th Assembly session, because I do have the

 5     minutes of those.

 6        Q.   This is what I'm asking you now, Mr. Brown, and you probably know

 7     that.  In our system, an MP cannot be held responsible for something he

 8     said from the rostrum; however, this is what I'm asking you now:  Did

 9     extremist views prevail, and did they become part of the Assembly

10     documents?  And also, did you see for yourself that I intervened when I

11     saw that an extremist view was about to prevail, but I did not respond to

12     each and every particular contribution to the discussions?  Now, that was

13     one question.

14             My next question:  Is it true that you selectively looked at this

15     thing or that from the Assembly but --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, put your question one by one.  One at

17     a time.

18             THE WITNESS:  I do not remember you interjecting in relation to

19     the issue of extremist views.  Maybe at the 16th Assembly session you're

20     able to point out to me where you've done that, because it's not my

21     reading of the minutes.  I certainly accept that these are minutes, but I

22     don't see it, in certainly in the minutes of the 16th Assembly session,

23     where you interject in relation to phrases or comments from some of the

24     delegates that could be seen as inflammatory.  If they are there, maybe

25     you could point them out to me.

Page 21696

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Was the contribution of such delegates incorporated into the

 3     documents?  Have you come across any such documents, and did the Assembly

 4     adopt their views as its own?

 5        A.   It is not an area of my expertise.  I did not look at the

 6     decisions of the Assembly.  That was dealt with, I believe, by others

 7     within the leadership research team.  All I can say, as I argue in my

 8     report, in particular in relation to the issue of separation, that the

 9     military -- there are a number of references in the military documents

10     about separation.  For example, one of the documents we saw last week in

11     which the -- not long after this Assembly session, in which the

12     Krajina Corps indicated that those leaving were not going to be

13     returning.  But as to the decisions themselves that you talk about, it's

14     not an area of my expertise.

15        Q.   We'll come to that.  We'll come to that.  Please look at your

16     paragraph 1.43 in which you imply that again the issue of territories and

17     my views about that issue is something where you quote as follows:

18             [In English] "... do not want to get a state which has a huge

19     number of those who are against that state ..."

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   And you are interpreting this --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Could you identify the para number again,

24     Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1.43, footnote 56.

Page 21697

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   So here the Trial Chamber has already seen and admitted into

 4     evidence several decisions and orders that I issued and that were adopted

 5     after this particular session that would pertain to the civilians from

 6     other ethnic communities.  Between April and December, 1992, I issued

 7     some 20 orders in which I ordered and appealed for the protection of

 8     members of other ethnic communities.  The majority of them have been

 9     admitted into evidence, and I can show them to you.

10             Now, have you seen these documents and have you taken them into

11     account?  65 ter, for example, 1083; 65 ter 1910; 65 ter 1116.  Nearly

12     all of them have been admitted into evidence.  65 ter 10537,

13     65 ter 11100.

14             JUDGE KWON:  How can the witness follow your question?  One at a

15     time again.

16             Before seeing the documents, can you answer the question,

17     Mr. Brown?

18             THE WITNESS:  I haven't seen those documents, Your Honour.  They

19     may well have been issued.  The 1st Krajina Corps issued certain

20     instructions which I've noted in the report, such as abiding by the

21     Geneva Conventions and others.  But certainly issuing documents is one

22     thing, and having those implemented or seeing if anything at all resulted

23     from those documents is another.

24             I think I stand by my assertions in paragraph 1.43.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 21698

 1        Q.   But, Mr. Brown, isn't it up to the Trial Chamber to decide what

 2     kind of documents these are?  Have you made any reference to these

 3     documents, and did you draw it to the attention of the trial that there

 4     is this side of the story as well?  Why didn't you present these

 5     documents to the Chamber?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, he said he hasn't seen these

 7     documents.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Then I have to call up

 9     those documents, although it's going to be a waste of time.

10             Can we have, please, D00426.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Have you seen this document before?  It's dated the

13     8th of June, 1992.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's too small, we can only have

15     an English version on the screen.

16             THE WITNESS:  I do not remember seeing this document before.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have 65 ter 1090, please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  But, Mr. Karadzic, when witness said that he hadn't

20     seen any of these documents, there's no point of putting those documents

21     to the witness.  You can use them later on.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I think he said he didn't know

23     whether he had seen them before.  So I think for -- in those

24     circumstances I don't know what else we could do besides show them to

25     him.  Because, if he didn't see them, I think that affects the

Page 21699

 1     completeness of his report.  And if he did see them and didn't include

 2     them, that also could have some implications unless he's given a chance

 3     to explain why not.  So --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's do that as briefly as possible.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Mr. Brown, have you seen the letter that I wrote to

 7     Mr. Boutros-Ghali on the 13th of June in which I say that we denounce the

 8     paramilitary groups, that we outlaw them, and that we agreed with any

 9     sanctions imposed against them?

10        A.   I have not seen this document before.  However, on the brief

11     reading that I've just done of the document, it would seem to at least

12     sit with a document later on that the Main Staff pushed out in relation

13     to paramilitary groups.  It says here in this document:

14              "We want to inform you about our latest official decision to

15     disown all paramilitary groups that are not ready to be under our

16     political control."

17             There was a document which is referenced in my report which is a

18     large document from the Main Staff, it may even be a little bit later

19     than that this document, relating to the issue of paramilitaries,

20     identifying a large number of paramilitary groups that were operating on

21     RS territory.  And in order to control those paramilitary groups, it's

22     advocated the placing of those groups into the ranks of the VRS, and only

23     then if they refused that were they to be disbanded or dealt with.  It

24     would seem at least -- I would have to put the other documents together,

25     but it would seem at least this document here, there's a qualification

Page 21700

 1     that it's not relating to all paramilitary groups irrespective of what

 2     they've done previously; it's relating to paramilitary groups that are

 3     not ready to be under the -- "our" or the RS leadership's or the

 4     RS authorities' political control.  It seemed to echo somewhat of a theme

 5     that paramilitaries in RS territory were accepted as long as they were

 6     under the control or authority of the formal VRS military.  And this

 7     doesn't say all paramilitary groups irrespective of what they've done in

 8     the past will be dealt with.  I think this potentially echos a policy

 9     that -- that seemed to, say, be a thread that paramilitary groups were

10     tolerated no matter what they'd done and would only not be tolerated if

11     they refused to be put under army control.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will have an objection to the

13     translation into Serbian.  This should be translated as "We are giving up

14     on them."

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Now, Mr. Brown, we are imparting here a piece of information that

17     we are going to prosecute those who were not under our control.  Do you

18     know that we arrested and convicted all the groups that refused to

19     subject themselves to the control of the military and the police?  This

20     Chamber is well aware of such cases.  Are you?

21        A.   There may well have been some paramilitaries that were prosecuted

22     because they refused to come under the control of the army.  I'm not

23     necessarily aware of them off the top of my head.  I believe there might

24     have been one group in Doboj, but I'd have to go back and look at that.

25     But it strikes me as the reason they were prosecuted was more of an issue

Page 21701

 1     of control and their refusal to come under the control of the RS

 2     authorities, that there didn't seem to be a reason or a belief that

 3     paramilitaries should be prosecuted for the crimes they committed.

 4             As a former military officer, having any paramilitaries who've

 5     committed crimes in your ranks strikes me as being, first and foremost,

 6     wrong, having criminals in the military.  And secondly, if paramilitaries

 7     are committing crimes and known to have committed crimes, there's a whole

 8     issue of military control.  Why would you want to include those

 9     individuals in -- in a professional military?

10             My view, I think, reading some of the documents in relation to

11     paramilitaries is that they were accepted as long as they were in the

12     military.  It didn't matter what they'd done.  And they were only not

13     accepted if they refused to come under the control of the military.  The

14     solution was about getting control of them rather than one of a criminal

15     justice issue of prosecuting people who had committed crimes.

16        Q.   Mr. Brown, your answers are much too elaborate.  I would have

17     enjoyed them immensely had I had enough time.  Now, let me ask you this:

18     Did you analyse how our judicial system operated, and did you find that

19     there was any instance in which a group that had committed a war crime

20     evaded Prosecution?  Was that also a part of your remit?

21        A.   No, it wasn't part of the remit I set myself when I wrote the

22     report.  There were a very small number of incidents very much at the low

23     level that I did see in the Banja Luka area.  I think there was an

24     incident in Kljuc or Sanski Most municipality, I forget, in which

25     low-ranking soldiers were prosecuted for an incident.  It may well have

Page 21702

 1     been the school in Kljuc or it may have been two incidents.  These are

 2     the only ones I really remember.

 3             In relation to the prosecution of soldiers for war crimes, I did

 4     not see that in -- in any significance at all.  And even when there was

 5     incidences in the Krajina Corps reports clearly indicating that there'd

 6     been criminal activity, I did not see the prosecution of members of the

 7     Krajina Corps.

 8             For example, in the incident in Vecici in November 2000 -- 1992,

 9     where daily combat reports of the corps -- or a daily combat of the

10     corps [sic] reported the massacre of captured members from the village of

11     Vecici by members of the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade, I saw no

12     investigation on that.  I did not see any reference in the documents I

13     reviewed that the commander of the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade was

14     investigated or prosecuted, nor did I see the operations group commander

15     above him investigated or prosecuted, nor did I see any staff member of

16     the 1st Krajina Corps, nor General Talic, investigated or prosecuted.

17     And I -- and there are other examples of either retaliatory action or --

18     which is referenced in the Krajina Corps, involving the killing of

19     individuals, and I never saw any senior commander in the Krajina Corps

20     being prosecuted for war crimes.

21        Q.   So you never saw any evidence to the effect that our courts did

22     operate and did their job.  Did you seek to find such evidence?  And can

23     you please give me short answers.  Did you look for this particular

24     evidence, and was the subject of your expert report the sanctioning of

25     the crimes?

Page 21703

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nikolic.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, I'm not objecting.  I just want

 3     to -- I do object, actually, to the constant calls to make -- for the

 4     witness to make his answers shorter.  The witness is giving fairly

 5     nuanced answers to some complex questions and trying to explain his

 6     answers carefully, so I don't think these have been unfairly long

 7     answers.

 8             THE WITNESS:  I was aware of material taken from the Banja Luka

 9     Military Court and was able to review that material.  I didn't see

10     anything in that material, apart from a small number - and I'd have to go

11     back in the details, it was a long time ago - a small number of cases

12     very much at the low level, and I think only in two areas.  I think one

13     in Sanski Most and this incident in Kljuc.  And even reviewing those

14     materials, it didn't seem that there was any substantive punishment or

15     follow -- follow-through with the investigation.  So in answer to your

16     question did I look for it, yes.  In reviewing the materials that was

17     seized from the Banja Luka Military Court, did I see any significant

18     prosecutions for war crimes?  No.  General Talic remained as the corps

19     commander until the end of the war and afterwards, and in fact, I

20     believe, became commander of the VRS.  And I didn't see any examples of

21     brigade or senior-level commanders in the Krajina Corps being prosecuted

22     or investigated even, I believe, for war crimes.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Mr. Brown, are you a jurist?

25        A.   I'm not quite sure what the question is, but a jurist, no.

Page 21704

 1        Q.   Thank you.  But as an officer, you know that a commander can be

 2     prosecuted for having ordered something or for failing to undertake

 3     preventive measures before the fact or prosecution measures after the

 4     fact; is that correct?

 5        A.   It's not just an officer, Mr. Karadzic.  I believe it's members

 6     of the -- of the VRS.  But, yes, it's not just the fact that they order

 7     something, but they fail to take steps to prevent it or do nothing

 8     afterwards having known that an incident has occurred.

 9             I'm not an expert on RS law, however.

10        Q.   Did you find any officer from the 1st Krajina Corps who have done

11     something like that, that he either committed a crime or failed to

12     prevent it or failed to take steps and that he avoided prosecution?  Can

13     you show us any specific document that would show this?

14        A.   Well, I think I can highlight documents from the

15     1st Krajina Corps that reference incidents that would seem to be of a

16     criminal nature.  The daily combat report, I believe it's on the

17     4th of November, in relation to Vecici and Kotor Varos claims that there

18     was a massacre of captured prisoners from Vecici by members of the

19     Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade.

20             There was a reference - and I'd have to look at my report - off

21     the top of my head, in relation to Celinac.  I believe it references the

22     Celinac Light Infantry Brigade as killing, I believe, five Muslims in --

23     as reprisals for an event that had occurred somewhere else against

24     VRS soldiers.

25             I am aware of a reference from Manjaca camp in which a prisoner

Page 21705

 1     was beaten to death, Omer Filipovic, and -- and --

 2        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.  Now, was the perpetrator of this particular

 3     crime ever tried?

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, I think that the question opened the

 5     door to the references that you can tell us where there was a failure to

 6     prevent or punish or prosecute, and the witness was answering the

 7     question of those cases he's remembered.  It's not fair to cut him off

 8     just because perhaps Mr. Karadzic didn't like the answer.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I --

10             THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Karadzic.

12             Do you wish to continue, Mr. Brown?

13             THE WITNESS:  Only to conclude that in those three examples that

14     I remember, I do not see any references to the 1st -- the 1st Krajina

15     Corps collection, nor do I remember in the Banja Luka Military Courts

16     commander of the 1st -- the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade being

17     prosecuted for -- or -- or members of his brigade.  I don't remember the

18     Celinac Light Infantry Brigade commander, nor members of his brigade,

19     being prosecuted.  I do not remember the camp commander at Manjaca,

20     Colonel Popovic, being held accountable for the prisoners under his care,

21     and he certainly was in his -- in position as camp commander at the end

22     of 1992 when the camp was closed after the release of all the prisoners

23     that we talked about last week.

24             I mean, those are three examples that I know.  And I certainly

25     don't see any of the staff officers of the Krajina Corps being held

Page 21706

 1     accountable for the actions of those in those brigades.

 2             There may be other examples in the report, but those are the ones

 3     I remember off the top of my head.

 4        Q.   With all due respect, Mr. Brown, this is not the answer to my

 5     question.  My question was, have you ever found any document in which the

 6     Krajina Corps issued an order to commit a crime or issued an order to

 7     cover up a crime?  If in their combat report they report about crimes

 8     being committed, you can't call it a cover-up; right?

 9        A.   Maybe if I break your question down.  Do I know of any documents

10     in which the Krajina Corps issued an order to commit a crime.  I'm not

11     sure I do.  I'd have to go and look at all the footnotes, but I'm not

12     sure I do.

13             Do I know of any documents which indicate to me that they tried

14     to cover up a crime.  Yes.  In particular, the Vecici killings in

15     Kotor Varos in November.  There's a series of documents discussing this

16     incident, and it's reported as a brutal massacre by members of the

17     Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade on one day, and the following day is

18     reported in a combat report as combat casualties.  And bearing in mind

19     that I didn't see anyone from the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade

20     investigated, from the documents I reviewed and was able to review, one

21     could draw the conclusion that they knew a massacre had happened against

22     prisoners who had been captured from the village of Vecici.  It was

23     initially reported that it was a brutal massacre, highlighting the unit

24     that had been involved in that massacre, and then the following day

25     reported as combat casualties, and the subsequent senior commanders were

Page 21707

 1     never replaced, as far as I'm aware, as a result of that incident.  So,

 2     yes, that is one.

 3              There are other references in the Krajina Corps documents

 4     about -- well, probably -- almost one last week about the -- thank

 5     goodness the international community didn't hear about the killing on

 6     Mount Vlasic.  So -- but certainly in the Kotor Varos case, I would

 7     classify that as something of a cover-up.

 8             If I may add, also, that it may well be that in relation to

 9     Manjaca there was a knowledge, at least looking at the documents -- some

10     of the documents from Manjaca, that there was an awareness that

11     conditions were poor, people were being -- individuals were being abused,

12     that many people in there didn't deserve to be there, and yet during the

13     visits of the ICRC, Mr. Mazowiecki, for example, there seemed to be an

14     indication that, you know, "We're not going to --" that these people are

15     here on some other mission and there is no admission that those

16     conditions -- or about those conditions.  So whether that's a cover-up or

17     just being not -- not being completely honest about the conditions

18     there, I ...

19        Q.   Well, sir, you see, I'll try to put simple questions.  I'll cite

20     an example of Manjaca.  There the warden or the commander or one of his

21     men sent a letter to the municipality saying that they had people there

22     who had not taken part in combat, and he said he had no documents about

23     them, and yet we had a witness here from Manjaca who confirmed that these

24     documents were late.

25             Do you understand that from Vecici and from Manjaca that the

Page 21708

 1     first information received may well be inaccurate, and by the time a

 2     second report is in the pipeline the information is already much more

 3     accurate?  Do you understand that possibility?

 4             If you read a first report which says that there are some people

 5     who shouldn't be detained and, by the token of the same report,

 6     additional documentation is sought, have you ever had occasion to see a

 7     second report as a follow-up advising on the arrival of the requested

 8     documentation?

 9        A.   Well, that -- that may well be the case, but certainly in the

10     documents that I was shown in relation to Manjaca it wasn't just one

11     reference.  There were a number of references.  And there are a number of

12     references in the 1st Krajina Corps reports also indicating to the

13     Main Staff that -- maybe it's not specific to Manjaca, but in detention

14     centres there are many people who didn't deserve to be there.

15             There is a document at the end of August, 22nd of August, which

16     is sent from the forward command post to Prijedor, something of an

17     intelligence report, which discusses -- it's referenced in my -- my --

18        Q.   We'll get to the details.

19        A.   If I can finish.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Karadzic, do not interrupt the witness,

21     please.

22             Yes, Mr. Brown.

23             THE WITNESS:  This is a document which is referenced in my

24     report, dated the 22nd of August, discussing the issue of camps in the

25     Prijedor area, and they indicate that individuals are washing their hands

Page 21709

 1     of detention centres and passing -- attempting to pass on responsibility

 2     for the killing of Muslims, or civilians, and the ordering of the killing

 3     of civilians in those camps, and this document also makes mention that

 4     they're in essence feeling the cost of what they call the needless

 5     spilling of blood and the incarceration of individuals who didn't deserve

 6     to be there or at least who took no -- who had done nothing against the

 7     Serbian state.

 8             So it's not just one or two Manjaca documents that indicate that

 9     there were individuals in those detention centres who didn't deserve to

10     be there.  Some of those references found their way into the main --

11     1 Krajina Corps daily combat reports and were sent up to the Main Staff.

12     And there are other documents, including this one of the 22nd of August,

13     which seems to imply that it is known externally to the corps that there

14     are many people in the detention camps, some who have been killed, who

15     had not taken any -- or who were not against the Serbian state and yet

16     they were still in those places.

17        Q.   Sir, you found it in the documents of the 1st Krajina Corps which

18     went from the lower-ranking units up to the Main Staff.  Would you call

19     that covering up?  Yes or no?  I guess you can answer in that way.

20        A.   In relation to the Vecici, certainly it went to the Main Staff.

21     Nothing seems to have happened.  Nothing came back down from the

22     Main Staff.  There was no apparent obvious investigation from the

23     documents that I saw.

24             In relation to Manjaca camp, was it closed because of the

25     conditions and because of the knowledge that large numbers of people

Page 21710

 1     didn't deserve to be there?  No.  It was closed at the end of the year,

 2     some five or six months after it was established.  It's not for me to say

 3     whether it's a cover-up particularly.  All I can say is this seems to be

 4     what the document said.  In a number of cases there were specific

 5     examples of killings of non-Serbs by identified units in the

 6     1st Krajina Corps.  And that's aside from other references more generic

 7     about destruction of property or movements out of individuals.  But there

 8     were some specific examples identifying units that have been involved in

 9     killings in which I did not see anyone being prosecuted.  I leave it to

10     others to decide whether that's couched as a cover-up or whatever.  All

11     I'm saying is this is what I saw from some of the documents in the

12     Krajina Corps.

13        Q.   And I say, Mr. Brown, that your knowledge as regards that is

14     basically none.  Why should Colonel Popovic be tried for Manjaca?

15        A.   I'm not a lawyer, Dr. Karadzic.  It's not for me to decide why or

16     what someone might be tried for.  All I'm saying in relation to Manjaca

17     was that it was established by the 1st Krajina Corps.  It received a

18     large number of prisoners predominantly from other detention sites, such

19     as Omarska and some in Sanski Most.  It was commanded and run by

20     Colonel Popovic under the auspices of the 1st Krajina Corps.  The

21     documents that I've reviewed indicate that conditions were poor, that it

22     was known by the Krajina Corps that conditions were poor.  It was known

23     that a large number of people in Manjaca didn't deserve to be there.

24     There are other indications that beatings took place.  And certainly in

25     the case of Omer Filipovic, not long after an ICRC visit he was beaten to

Page 21711

 1     death.  The ICRC report reported and quoted in a 1st Krajina Corps

 2     document that conditions were poor, that they saw fresh traces of blood,

 3     they weren't allowed to speak to all the people that they asked to, and

 4     that they had concerns about the camps and the prisoners within it.

 5             I'm aware from the Krajina Corps that Mr. Mazowiecki, who was

 6     there, from the documents, at least, on a humanitarian mission and

 7     presumably being a senior UN figure, had wanted to visit the camp.  It

 8     must have come to his attention --

 9        Q.   I must interrupt you.  I apologise.  My question was specific.

10     Why do you refer in today's transcript twice to the fact that

11     Colonel Popovic was not tried?  What crime was he, according to you,

12     supposed to have been tried?  You mentioned Omer Filipovic; is that

13     correct?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, he was explaining the reason why he

15     referred to Colonel Popovic.

16             Please continue, Mr. Brown.

17             THE WITNESS:  Colonel Popovic, Your Honours, was the commander of

18     that camp, and he came under the authority of the 1st Krajina Corps.  The

19     contextual background I've highlighted in relation to Manjaca camp is

20     from the documents that I've seen from the 1st Krajina Corps.  And based

21     on those documents it would strike me that at best Colonel Popovic had a

22     case to answer about the conditions in that camp, the treatment of the

23     prisoners over an extended period, for others to decide whether that is

24     accurate, what law may apply, but it would strike me, as my experience,

25     that a former officer, on looking at the documents, that Colonel Popovic

Page 21712

 1     certainly had a case to answer in relation to Manjaca camp, the

 2     conditions there that were known through the documents that I've

 3     reviewed, contemporaneous, 1st Krajina Corps documents.  And it may not

 4     be just Colonel Popovic.  Colonel -- Colonel -- Major-General Talic sat

 5     above him.  And, again, it may be for others to decide, but it strikes me

 6     there's at least a case to answer that that camp was not a healthy place

 7     to be.  He ran it, and he was aware that conditions were poor and that

 8     bad things were going on inside that camp.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  If it is convenient, Mr. Karadzic, we'll have a

10     break.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I put just one question.  We

12     haven't run the course of the full 90 minutes.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Mr. Brown, did you know that at Manjaca there were only two cases

15     of death, three due to natural causes and two were violent deaths, and

16     that in the case of those two violent deaths people were prosecuted?  Did

17     you know that the killer of Omer Filipovic was called to -- be called

18     before a court?

19        A.   I'm not aware of that.  That certainly didn't seem to be the case

20     in 1992.  It may well have been the case a long time afterwards.  But

21     it's not solely the fact that Filipovic and one other were killed there,

22     but that conditions were poor.

23        Q.   I'm not asking you that.  I'm not asking you that.  Your desire

24     to expand, Mr. Brown, will result in your testimony lasting for a week.

25     Please answer my questions.  You --

Page 21713

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, the witness is answer your

 2     questions.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   -- are biased.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, that's not a question.  That's an

 6     accusation.  Dr. Karadzic --

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question --

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, if you ask elaborate questions of

 9     an expert witness, you are going to get elaborate answers.  The first

10     rule of cross-examination, as Mr. Robinson will no doubt tell you, is do

11     not ask a question to which you do not want to know the answer.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  My question was simple:  Did he

13     know they were prosecuted, that the killers were tried?  Why would

14     Popovic have to stand a trial when the killers did?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, put your question one at a time.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what I asked.  I was just

17     trying to explain Judge Morrison that my question was simple.

18             May we have this admitted, the one on the screen?

19             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure whether witness answered the question.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He said he didn't take this

21     document into account.  That's not for me.  He should have.

22             JUDGE KWON:  So you didn't know that anybody was prosecuted for

23     what happened in Manjaca camp?

24             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honour, I'm not.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  And we are talking about 65 ter 1090,

Page 21714

 1     Mr. Karadzic.  That will be admitted.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1933, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We'll take a break for 25 minutes and resume at

 4     10 past 4.00.

 5                           [The witness stands down]

 6                           --- Recess taken at 3.43 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 4.13 p.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I just wanted to get back

10     to you as quickly as possible regarding your inquiry concerning KDZ084

11     and the videolink.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we go into private session?

13             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry.  I thought we began in -- my big

14     mistake -- my mistake.

15                           [Private session]

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 21715











11  Page 21715 redacted.  Private session.















Page 21716

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25                           [Open session]

Page 21717

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thanks to the kind understanding and co-operation of

 2     the Haradinaj Chamber, we have become able to sit in the morning

 3     tomorrow, as well as on the morning of Monday, 28th of November, next

 4     week.  So I appreciate it very much.

 5             Let's bring in the witness.

 6             And as we discussed during the private session, we will interpose

 7     the next witness's evidence with this witness.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Probably I have to inquire of you, Mr. Brown.  Due

10     to some circumstances regarding the next witness, we have just decided to

11     interpose her evidence with your evidence.  We expect to be able to

12     finish your evidence tomorrow, but there may be a possibility that you

13     have to stay till Thursday.  Would it be okay with you, Mr. Brown?

14             THE WITNESS:  It would be a pleasure, sir.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for your kind understanding.

16             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Mr. Brown, I'm an amateur in matters of law, and therefore I do

20     find it easy to believe that my questions are not sufficiently focussed.

21     In any case, I would still like to ask you to answer as briefly as

22     possible, and I will try to be more focused.

23             In paragraph 1.43, you said that, generally speaking:

24             [As read] "... Karadzic was discussing the separation of members

25     of different ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (as opposed to

Page 21718

 1     potential -- a potential division between the ethnic communities in the

 2     newly created Serbian state) ..."

 3             In other words, you are aware of the fact that it was one thing

 4     to separate the ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and another to

 5     separate them in Republika Srpska; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes, I accept that there can be two -- two questions, one which

 7     is the division of Bosnia into separate states and one of the separation

 8     of the communities within RS territory.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, before you go further, I have to make

10     a correction from my statement.

11             We'll be sitting in the afternoon next week, Monday, not in the

12     morning.  Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Then you go on to say that I clearly indicated that movements of

16     population are mandatory in the territory of the SRBiH, and you add that

17     I said, We do not want to get a state which has a huge number of those

18     who are against that state.

19             Further below, you explain that certain deputies mentioned Sweden

20     and Norway.

21             I'll go back to the first part -- no, the second part first.  Did

22     you know that before the war there was a suggestion for the entire

23     Yugoslavia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, that a so-called model of the

24     Scandinavian states should be introduced, and were you aware of what such

25     a model would entail?

Page 21719

 1        A.   Mr. Karadzic, maybe if I break your question up because there are

 2     a number of issues here.

 3             I don't say it's -- in this -- in the paragraph that movements of

 4     populations are mandatory in the territory.  I say:

 5             "Although, at face value, it may have appeared that Karadzic was

 6     discussing the separation of the national groupings within Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina more widely (as opposed potentially to the separation of

 8     ethnic groups in the new Serb state) he clearly did indicate that

 9     resettlement from within the SRBiH territory would be required.

10     Karadzic, himself, declared that 'We do not want to get a state which has

11     a huge number of those who are against that state' ..."

12             And I believe there is at least another one reference on a

13     similar -- in a similar area that you make.

14             The second section.  I am not aware of a model of Scandinavian

15     states would be introduced into -- into Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and

16     Herzegovina.  All I'm saying is that the delegate who makes reference to

17     that, I believe, made reference - I'd have to check the notes again - to

18     the fact that the separation, I think in Sweden -- between Sweden and

19     Norway took a long time, and the resettlement of the population as part

20     of that took a long time.  But in relation to your second question about

21     was I aware of this model of Scandinavian states should be introduced, I

22     was not.

23        Q.   Thank you.  There were official proposals at the level of

24     Yugoslavia that Scandinavisation be carried out, i.e., that we part ways

25     the way the Scandinavian countries did and that borders be arranged as

Page 21720

 1     well as a certain period of time be left to those who wished to opt which

 2     country they wanted to reside in.  Were you aware of that?

 3        A.   No, I was not aware that.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  On Friday we discussed the fact that you noticed I

 5     was against megalomania in territorial terms.  My proposition now is

 6     this:  When I said that we cannot have a state with many living in it who

 7     are against it, it was actually my recommendation that we should be more

 8     modest in terms of territorial requests.

 9             What would you say to that?

10        A.   I would certainly agree, from the reading of the minutes, that

11     there are delegates who want significantly larger territory and that you

12     caution against that.  And I believe there might even be other references

13     outside this Assembly session to that -- to that effect.  I'll leave the

14     issue of modesty to others, but it would seem that others were wanting

15     more and that you were advocating against that in certain areas.

16        Q.   Thank you.  We have a sentence here which I dispute.  Apparently

17     you say that I stated that there should be movements of population in the

18     territory of the SRBiH.  Did it only entail Republika Srpska or was this

19     supposed to mean that people were to be moved from the RS to the other

20     two entities and back?

21        A.   I think in the 16th Assembly session there's reference that Serbs

22     inside BiH territory will -- this resettlement process will include the

23     Serbs being -- being moved into -- into the territory of the RS, and I

24     think there's even a reference by one of the delegates that we should be

25     prepared for that and make preparations because it will involve people

Page 21721

 1     moving away from their -- their hearths or their territory.

 2             It's also of note, I think, that General Mladic, at the end when

 3     he speaks, certainly makes two references, it would appear, to indicate

 4     that he himself sees what is being discussed is about the movement of the

 5     population.  In that way he says that people are not keys in pockets that

 6     can be moved from one place to another.  I think he makes a reference to

 7     that people are not like a sieve, where some can fall through and others

 8     stay.  And he warns, or appears to warn from the minutes, that, you know,

 9     what is going to be -- I think his phrase is genocide, actually.

10             So in answering your question, it isn't simply about the movement

11     of population within RS territory.  I think there is an expectation that

12     Serbs inside BiH territory will move into RS territory.  And there are

13     other references in documents which seem to indicate that too.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read this intercept of my conversation with

15     Mr. Milosevic, President Milosevic, where I say that some Croat

16     representatives suggested that the population be resettled, and I said

17     that that was nebulous and a terrible thing that had to be avoided?

18        A.   No, I'm not aware of that intercept, Mr. Karadzic.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Did you see my press conference on the 3rd of May

20     when I returned from the Brussels conference and when I was asked by

21     journalists what would happen with the borders of those who will not be

22     within their own units, whether there's going to be resettlement, and I

23     said we do not envisage, nor do we recommend resettlement; we propose

24     reciprocal protection of rights?

25             Have you seen that press conference, and have you included it?

Page 21722

 1        A.   I've not seen the press conference.  I would like to see it.  And

 2     it is not included in the report.  What was stated in the press, if

 3     that's an accurate depiction, I do not see replicated in the -- certainly

 4     the 16th Assembly session and some of the other military documents that

 5     I've reviewed.  It may well be that what was being discussed in the press

 6     was for one audience and what was being discussed elsewhere was for

 7     another.

 8        Q.   Well, I believe that this comment is out of order.  Why does

 9     every sentence have to be repeated on each and every occasion, Mr. Brown?

10     This is a publicly stated view of the leadership.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters did not hear the number.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Could you tell the number again.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1410, page 21, towards the bottom

15     of the page.  Twenty-one in e-court and then the bottom of the page.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Since there is no translation, allow me to read it out to you.

18             "At the press conference, in response to a question put by the

19     journalist, How many people should be resettled if there were to be a

20     final separation, Dr. Karadzic answered, 'We have not been counting on

21     resettlement, nor do we recommend that.  According to our calculations,

22     only 12 to 15 per cent of the population on every side would remain

23     outside the borders of there respective communities.  We suggest that

24     they be protected on the basis of a principle of reciprocity and that

25     they enjoy all rights enshrined in international conventions.  As for

Page 21723

 1     application and protection of that right, the European institutions would

 2     take care of that in a role of a supervisor.'"

 3             And that was published in the "Borba" newspaper --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters did not hear the date.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Were you aware of this position of mine?

 7        A.   I'm not aware of this media statement, Mr. Karadzic, and I can

 8     only say that this would not seem to be what happened in the days and

 9     weeks and months after this statement, if that's a statement that was

10     made in early May.

11        Q.   Mr. Brown, if I tell you that there was not and single place in

12     Republika Srpska where there were no Muslims and that there were entire

13     villages that no one had touched, what do you say to that?  Did you know

14     about that?

15        A.   I don't know the ethnic breakdown of all the areas in the RS.  I

16     don't doubt that there may well have been some non-Serbs who stayed there

17     for a period of time for whatever reason or -- but it would seem to be

18     that a large number, a significantly large number in the Krajina area

19     didn't, but I don't doubt that there were non-Serbs who -- who did stay,

20     even through the -- the whole of the war.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?  This is from

23     Smilja Avramov's book.  I think that we've already displayed that.  It's

24     a quote from the "Borba" daily newspaper though.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, can I hear from you on this?

Page 21724

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, Your Honour, at least it should be marked at

 2     the moment since we don't have a translation.  I'd like to take a look at

 3     it first.  The witness did comment on it and stated it didn't appear to

 4     be -- reflect what he saw happening and didn't know anything about it,

 5     but I don't have any strong objection to it coming in.  I'm not sure why

 6     the actual article isn't submitted instead of a excerpt or summary.  Or I

 7     don't know if it's -- if it's verbatim or reprint or what, so it's hard

 8     to respond.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  That was my question as well, Mr. Karadzic.  You

10     couldn't locate "Borba" article?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My associates are looking for it.

12     We'll get it some day.  But at any rate, this is an historian, a lady who

13     is world renowned, and she included this in her book.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber will not receive this

16     book.  Even if -- suppose even if we have an English translation, we

17     have -- we have no idea whether -- while we do not doubt the integrity of

18     the author, but we are not sure whether she correctly reflected what you

19     said in the media interview.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'm going to take a look.  I'm

21     going to try to find the text in "Borba" that was quoted.  I hope that

22     then it can be received.

23             Can we please go back to the previous document, the amalgamated

24     statement.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 21725

 1        Q.   In this same paragraph do you agree that it says -- I mean this

 2     MP says, We do not have that solution in this option, the one that has to

 3     do with resettlement?

 4             Paragraph 1.43.  I believe it's on the next page.

 5             [In English] "If it is a state border, it is -- intrinsically

 6     implies moving of a continent of population.  Within the present option,

 7     we do not have this solution."

 8             [Interpretation] Isn't that right; that's what he said?

 9        A.   Can I just look at the whole quote from Mr. Milojevic for a

10     second.

11        Q.   What it says here is "implies," goes without saying.  That's what

12     is said in respect of resettlement; right?  And all of this is being said

13     by the same man who referred to Norway and Sweden; right?

14        A.   No, it's a different man, Mr. Karadzic.  Professor Milojevic was

15     the one who -- is footnote 58, and the man who talked about Sweden and

16     Norway was, I believe, Trifko Radic.

17        Q.   All right.  But that is what was stated there, We do not have

18     this solution within the present option.  Right?

19        A.   Yes, but I -- that's what's in the minutes, but if you look at

20     the whole quote and the whole reference to the paragraph,

21     Professor Milojevic, he is saying -- in fact, maybe it's easier if I read

22     it out.

23              "I would like to suggest there is no doubt that there will be

24     the option of war and then negotiations, that we cannot expect solutions

25     from negotiations only, that negotiations can only represent a

Page 21726

 1     modification of the success at war and of war solutions, which implies

 2     that we would have to have a map of our own.  A border agreed between the

 3     political and military leadership of our republic, one thoroughly

 4     assessed, and I might add, kept a secret.  Divulge it to no one, but each

 5     and every general must know this border, and the political leadership

 6     should keep this map as a potential negotiating chip.  But this map needs

 7     to be mastered within a closed circle of people, presented to the

 8     deputies, but it is -- but it probably should be kept secret.  And

 9     secondly, because of the war option which was imposed on us, initially we

10     had been discussing some more peaceful options.  This way we aim for a

11     state border.  If it's a state border intrinsically implies moving a

12     contingent of the population.  Within the present option we do not have

13     the solution."

14             I think what he's saying is that if we continue to negotiate we

15     won't have this solution of resettlement, but if we have the first

16     option, which is war, we will decide what our borders are, we can keep

17     those borders secret, we don't tell anyone, and we use it as a

18     negotiating chip.  And if we set those borders, that that will

19     intrinsically imply the moving of people within those borders.  I think

20     that's what Professor Milojevic is stating when he spoke at the Assembly

21     session.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that Professor Milojevic is a professor

23     of economics, an economist?  He is not a member of parliament.  He is an

24     expert in economic affairs.

25        A.   I don't know details about Professor Milojevic.

Page 21727

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that on the 9th of June, in spite of his

 2     advice that the envisaged borders be kept secret, we decided to send to

 3     the European Community, to the negotiators at the conference, the six

 4     strategic objectives and maps?

 5        A.   I am not aware of that being sent to the European Community.  I'm

 6     not aware that it would have been couched in those phrases.  What does

 7     seem to be evident is that the goals were announced at the 16th Assembly

 8     session.  It is possible that the meeting on the 6th of June in which

 9     there seem to be a plotting of borders in some detail may well have been

10     the borders that were set in discussions in the European Community.  But

11     I'm not aware of the details and the political negotiations that went on

12     with the European Community at that time.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D428.  Can we take a brief look at

14     that, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Did you have any insight into the transcripts of the meetings of

17     the Presidency, the Assembly, the government?  Have you seen these

18     minutes, for instance?  There's got to be a translation.

19             Look at paragraph 10, to make public the strategic goals and map

20     of the Serbian BH and to have this sent to the European Community.

21        A.   That's what it says in the minutes.  That may well have been the

22     case.  It would seem to, if that was true, seem to imply that the

23     strategic goals were of some importance.  And as I say, this comes three

24     days after the meeting that's noted in Mladic's diary, which seems to be

25     quite a significant or at least a long meeting.  And at one stage there's

Page 21728

 1     briefing of a map and it would seem to be plotting out territory that

 2     could well be the footprint articulated in the strategic goals.  That's

 3     what the minutes say.  It may well be that they were sent to the

 4     European Community.  But it does seem to me important that the strategic

 5     goals were that footprint that RS territory was to contain as articulated

 6     in those goals.

 7             And maybe they were sent to the European Community or it's

 8     referenced here because those were the goals that you wanted to achieve

 9     concurrently with what was going on with the VRS and in the international

10     community with negotiations with the EC and others.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that this map of Republika Srpska does

12     not basically differ from the first map that was offered by

13     Ambassador Cutileiro?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could these -- could this please be

15     put on the ELMO.  We haven't uploaded the map in colour, so could this

16     please be placed on the ELMO.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   The 22nd of February.  On that date it was agreed that more or

19     less this is what the units are going to look like.

20             Mr. Brown, do you know where the rivers Una, Sava, Drina, and

21     Neretva are here?  Is it correct that Una is on the western border of

22     this darker area, Sava on the north, Drina on the east, and Neretva in

23     the middle?

24        A.   Yes, generically.  It's been some time since I looked at a

25     detailed map of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but generically those rivers are in

Page 21729

 1     those areas that you've just mentioned.

 2        Q.   Do you agree that what is envisaged here are a few enclaves that

 3     do -- that are not contiguous?  Cazinska Krajina, the Bihac pocket.  Then

 4     in the middle, this white area, is Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc,

 5     Muslim municipalities, parts of Muslim municipalities, that is.  Then

 6     over here, the Serb municipality in Ozren.  And here by Sarajevo, east of

 7     Sarajevo, there is Romanija and Birac.  In the Drina valley, there is

 8     Muslim territory.

 9             You know where the Drina is, don't you?  It's on the very east.

10        A.   Yes, I know where the Drina River is.  I don't --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, just a second.

12             Yes, Mr. Nikolic.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection.  It's not clear to me what actually

14     is being represented to be on this ELMO at the moment is ... the question

15     was:

16             "Do you know that this map of Republika Srpska does not basically

17     differ from the first map that was offered by Ambassador Cutileiro?"  I

18     don't know what map we're looking at, unless we missed it, and what this

19     is from.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was published in "Glas" on the

22     23rd of February, whereas on the 22nd of February what was agreed upon

23     was that this map is the basis for the building of the three entities.

24     This map shows that the western boundaries of Republika Srpska are

25     supposed to be on the Una, the northern ones on the Sava, the eastern

Page 21730

 1     ones on the Drina, and there is Muslim territory along the Drina River,

 2     and on the Neretva it is the southern border.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   So my question is:  Do you see that the European Community

 5     recognised that the right bank of the Una is populated by Serbs and that

 6     the strategic objectives, except for the corridor, correspond to what is

 7     on this map, that there is no major difference in respect of what was

 8     already offered to us on the 22nd of February?

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours --

10             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think that's an explanation that

11     Mr. Nicholls wanted.  What --

12             Mr. Nicholls, could you be --

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well --

14             JUDGE KWON:  -- of assistance?

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, it is not in evidence that this map

16     was agreed to or represents what the European Union Community had

17     recognised.  It may be Mr. Karadzic's position that this map from the

18     "Glas" newspaper reflects what was -- something -- I'm not sure exactly

19     what's saying, but --

20             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I'm not sure whether

21     this is -- this document itself is "Glas" article also.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Then I misunderstood Mr. Karadzic.  I thought he

23     was saying this is -- we're looking at something from "Glas."

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a map that was published in

25     all the media on the 23rd of February as the proposal of the

Page 21731

 1     European Community as a basis -- we have it in the documents.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Tell us what document -- what this is -- this

 3     document is about.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a map that was published in

 5     the media the day after the agreement had been reached.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  No, the book itself.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh.  This is a survey of news

 8     published in "Glas."  It's a chronology.  But it's also contained in

 9     Lord Owen's book.  We can find it in several books.  It is an indubitable

10     map.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

12             MR. TIEGER:  And just to clarify the objection:  That -- that

13     doesn't alter the fact that Mr. Karadzic is putting a proposition to the

14     witness as fact which has not been established -- okay.

15             JUDGE KWON:  No.  We'll come to that later on, but I want to

16     establish what this document is about.  It is not a "Glas" newspaper

17     article.  It is a -- it may be a compilation of news, but I don't know

18     what it is about.  You should put a proper foundation to put your

19     question to the witness.  And then it's improper to -- to put the

20     witness, which witness cannot confirm, such as the argument that this map

21     has been agreed to, as Mr. Nicholls and Tieger indicated.

22             Let us continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not going to tender this now.

24     We have this in several documents.  I'm just asking the witness whether

25     he is aware that the first map that was offered to us recognised the

Page 21732

 1     boundaries on the Sava, Drina, Neretva, and Una and that was envisaged

 2     were enclaves that were not contiguous.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Before the war, without the war, do you understand that we

 5     accepted this?

 6        A.   It is -- it is -- I'm aware that, in relation to the negotiations

 7     in early 1992, the Cutileiro Plan and European Union negotiations

 8     suggested the cantonisement of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that those would

 9     be -- those cantons would be based on Bosniak, Croat, or Serb -- Serb

10     areas and they -- that there was a map or maybe even a series of maps in

11     relation to the negotiations around that period.  The Cutileiro Plan, as

12     I'm aware, allowed for those cantons to be -- to be administered in those

13     areas with a weaker centralised Bosnian government.  It may well have

14     been that some of the boundaries of some of the cantons were along the

15     rivers as you note, in part because some of the rivers are -- form the

16     boundary between -- for example, Sava River forms a boundary between

17     Croatia in part.  The Drina in part forms a boundary with Serbia.  So

18     there are these national issues too.

19             I do not believe that the strategic goals and the territory

20     encompassed within those matched exactly the Cutileiro Plan at all.  The

21     Posavina was different.  I believe the issue with Sarajevo was different.

22     And the desire to control the whole of the Drina valley, as articulated

23     in the strategic goals, seems different than the Cutileiro Plan.

24             I don't know of the negotiations around the Cutileiro Plan, what

25     was agreed, what was a proposal, what was accepted, and obviously it did

Page 21733

 1     not come to fruition, but I do not support your assertion that the

 2     strategic goals as articulated on the 12th of May were in some way simply

 3     a replication of the Cutileiro Plan.  I would accept that some of the

 4     boundaries overlapped in both the Cutileiro Plan and the strategic goals,

 5     but not in entirety.

 6        Q.   Well, again, I kindly ask you to give answers that are as short

 7     as possible.

 8             Do you agree that the corridor was requested only once the war

 9     broke out?  It is not on the first map.  Do you agree?  The request to

10     have a corridor appeared only when the war broke out.  If you look at the

11     first map, you will see that there is no corridor.  Yes or no?

12        A.   I believe, in relation to the Cutileiro map, from what I

13     remember, that many of the corridor municipalities were Croat or

14     Bosniak -- [overlapping speakers]

15        Q.   That's not what I'm asking you.  I'm asking you a simple

16     question.  Did we request a corridor before the war, or did we put this

17     forth as an imperative only after the war started?  It's a simple issue.

18     When did the corridor appear for the first time?  It was on the

19     12th of May, as late as that.

20        A.   I don't know what you requested as part of the Cutileiro map or

21     the negotiations.  I don't know what happened and whether Cutileiro

22     themselves proposed that that was territory that actually was Croat.  So

23     whether you requested it in the Cutileiro negotiations, I have no idea.

24     It may well be that you didn't, but it may well be that you did but that

25     Cutileiro decided that based on the ethnicity of the corridor areas that

Page 21734

 1     was going to be a different cantonment.  I don't know.  There had been

 2     some references, I believe, in some of the Assembly sessions about the

 3     importance of the corridor area well before the 12th of May, and I would

 4     certainly accept that military events in the corridor area in March when

 5     the Croats took control of certain key areas did -- did mean that

 6     Bosnian Serbs were not in control of the corridor, and I mention that in

 7     the report.  But I can't answer your question simply because I don't know

 8     the negotiations that went on around Cutileiro and whether you requested

 9     a corridor but it was denied to you or whether you accepted that that was

10     going to be an area that --

11        Q.   But you don't know whether we did request it either.  My question

12     refers to the map.  Do you know that in February we accepted the map

13     without the corridor?

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honour --

15             JUDGE KWON:  No.  It's not for the witness -- to testify whether

16     you accepted or not.

17             But, Mr. Brown, you confirm, can you not, that in the map itself

18     that such corridors were not reflected?

19             THE WITNESS:  That is correct, Your Honour.  It was cantoned, I

20     believe, for Croats.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Secondly, a moment ago you said that in our six strategic

25     objectives we demanded the control of Podrinje.  That is not correct.  We

Page 21735

 1     wanted to have a soft border on the Drina, rather.  That's what you said

 2     a minute ago, i.e., that you knew that the control of Podrinje was part

 3     of the six strategic objectives, and I'm telling you that that is not

 4     correct.  We envisaged Muslim municipalities in Podrinje, and our third

 5     objective said that the border on the Drina should be soft one; in other

 6     words, there shouldn't be any border at all.

 7        A.   Well, Mr. Karadzic, I can only go by what is reported in the

 8     minutes of the session, and it says by you:  "The third strategic goal is

 9     to establish a corridor on the Drina valley, that is, elimination of the

10     Drina as a border between two worlds.  We are not -- we are on both sides

11     of the Drina, and our strategic interest and living space are there.  We

12     now see a possibility for some Muslim municipalities to be settled along

13     the Drina as enclaves in order for them to achieve their rights, but that

14     belt along the Drina must basically belong to the Serbian Bosnia and

15     Herzegovina.  As much as it is of strategic use for us, in a positive way

16     it helps us by damaging the interest of our enemy in establishing a

17     corridor which would connect them to the Muslim international and render

18     this area permanently unstable."

19             I accept that in this reference you countenance the possibility

20     of Muslim enclaves.  I don't believe in Cutileiro, in relation to the

21     cantonment, that the Drina envisaged Muslim enclaves in that manner, but

22     it would seem to me from the minutes of the session at least that you

23     believe the Drina valley should be controlled and that you may allow for

24     the existence of some Muslim enclaves in that area.  Importantly not just

25     because you wanted to control it but because it denied that area to -- to

Page 21736

 1     the enemy as noted here.  And I think that looking at the Drina Corps

 2     document and operational directive 4 later on in the year, that that

 3     position of having enclaves appeared, at least from that series of

 4     documents, to have been removed.  Because, in operational directive 4

 5     there is the reference that the Drina Corps is to -- is to in essence

 6     exhaust the Muslim -- Muslims -- Muslim fighters and units in that area

 7     and remove them along with the civilian population.  So it may well have

 8     been your position in -- on the 12th of May that you accepted there could

 9     be Muslim enclaves, but I think later in that year that position had

10     changed.  And I don't think your view at the 16th Assembly session is the

11     same as the Cutileiro map that was discussed earlier that year.

12        Q.   Thank you.  But do you know that the Owen-Stoltenberg and the

13     Vance-Owen Plans, both of which I accepted, envisaged Muslim enclaves in

14     Podrinje?  Yes or no?  What is important to me is to find out what was

15     the basis of your report.  Did you take into account both the

16     Owen-Stoltenberg -- Vance-Owen and Cutileiro Plan and that they both

17     envisaged Muslim enclaves and that we accepted that?

18        A.   I am not aware of the Owen-Stoltenberg and Vance-Owen Plans, the

19     negotiations that went on surrounding that.  It was outside the scope of

20     this report.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I promised to show you the transcript, for the sake

22     of saving time, to the effect that in January or February, 1993, on the

23     occasion of the Vance-Owen Plan, I explained what the notion of the Drina

24     means and what this third strategic goal entailed.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have in e-court, please --

Page 21737

 1     we don't have time to watch the video-clip.  Instead, can we have 1D4868.

 2     Can we please look at the time-line 02:24:12.  Page 24 of 33.  24.  We

 3     can remove the right-hand side.  This is page 23.  We need 24 -- yes, we

 4     do have 24.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:

 6        Q.   Well, you see -- [no interpretation]

 7             [In English] "I think that borders in Europe will never be that

 8     important, even though they exist -- existence is necessary."

 9             [Interpretation] Can you please read it to yourself and look at

10     what it says here, and I also ask all the parties in the proceedings to

11     do the same.

12             Please tell me once you've read it, and then we will move on.

13        A.   Yes, I've read it, Mr. Karadzic.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have page 31 of 33.  Please look at 2 --

15     24 [as interpreted] -- 45:28, where the Drina is being mentioned and

16     where an explanation of this specific strategic goal is provided.

17             Is it clear to you now that this is a reference to border

18     restrictions rather than the unification with Serbia and the removal of

19     the borders altogether?  Did you know this?

20        A.   I'd have to read the whole document maybe, but I don't see too

21     much of a difference between what was articulated with strategic goal

22     number 3, that we need to control both sides of the border and this is

23     our territory.  I don't know when this statement of yours was

24     articulated.  It does seem to be that you're indicating that the

25     strategic aims are still important and extant and that it seems to echo

Page 21738

 1     what you said in May 1992, that the Drina should be controlled and it

 2     was -- both sides of the border were to be controlled.

 3        Q.   Well, where do you see the word "control"?  I'm talking about

 4     restrictions, Mr. Brown.  Why are you misrepresenting my words?  I am

 5     here talking about a soft border, not control.  And in doing so I

 6     mentioned the examples of the European practice and the boarders between

 7     Alsace and Lorraine.

 8        A.   Well, I read it here that:

 9             "... we'll never allow the border running along Serbian

10     territories to become real restrictive, although that was the case for a

11     while because of the situation ... economic relationship was such that it

12     had to be imposed, but things will change."

13             One could read that as, "We don't want a border between Serbian

14     lands, Serbian territories."  Maybe that echos what you said about the

15     Posavina corridor.  It wasn't just important to have the

16     Posavina Corridor because it linked all the territories in Bosnia, but it

17     was important because if you control Posavina, you were able to link the

18     Serb territories in Croatia, the Serb territories in Bosnia, to Serbia

19     itself.  So maybe this is another example that we shouldn't have borders

20     between Serb lands.

21        Q.   I'm asking you only this:  Does it say here that the border

22     shouldn't be a restrictive one, or does it say that we should unite with

23     Serbia?  So not to be a restrictive one, or do we unite?

24        A.   It deals with the borders.  Those borders between Serb

25     territories were not to be restrictive.

Page 21739

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic said at the Assembly

 2     session, and he agreed with me, that neither on the Una or the Drina any

 3     passports would be required and that there wouldn't be any restrictions?

 4     Have you ever come across this statement of his?

 5        A.   No, I haven't.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the two time-lines

 8     admitted into evidence.  We might as well tender the video-clip, but we

 9     don't have the time to show it.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, what is your observation as to the

11     video-clip itself?

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'd like to see the video-clip.  I think - I may

13     be wrong - this is one of the exhibits we got late notice of for use

14     today.  I don't -- I don't object to these pages going in.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll admit those two pages.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1934, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll definitely play the video in

18     the future once we have time.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   In your paragraph 2.35, Mr. Brown, persist in suggesting that the

21     target of military operations were populated places, that is to say

22     civilians rather than the Muslim and the Croat armed forces.  Is that

23     right?  Please look at your paragraph 2.35.

24             [In English] [As read] "In Sanski Most, for example, in late May

25     against the Muslim and Croat inhabited areas were carried out by both

Page 21740

 1     6th Brigade and TO units acting in co-operation."  Footnote 322.

 2        A.   Yes, I see that section.

 3        Q.   Do you understand this to be an attack on populated places and

 4     civilians or an attack on the armed forces deployed there and firing from

 5     that area?

 6        A.   Is it possible to see the footnote reference?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the amalgamated

 8     statement of the witness, paragraph 2.35, on our screens.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I take it you have your report.

10             THE WITNESS:  I have, sir, yes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  You wanted to see the --

12             THE WITNESS:  -- footnote reference 322.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  I believe, Your Honours, it's P03313.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Let's upload that exhibit.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have it enlarged.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   So what did you conclude on the basis of this?  Did you conclude

18     that the target of the attack was the populated place mentioned here and

19     the civilians, or does this document testify about the existence of armed

20     formations, even those who came from Croatia?

21        A.   Is it possible to have page 2, please?

22             JUDGE KWON:  It is a four-page document.  Could we print it.  In

23     the meantime, while the witness is reading the document, let us print it

24     off.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 21741

 1        Q.   In item 2 can you see that there is a request for the enemy

 2     forces to be disarmed?

 3        A.   Yes.  And I think that would seem to echo the disarmament

 4     operations that were going on in other municipalities around at the same

 5     time.

 6        Q.   Do you know the strength of the Muslim forces deployed in

 7     Vrhpolje, Kamengrad, Hrustovo, and other villages around Sanski Most?  Do

 8     you know their numbers, including those in the very centre of Sanski Most

 9     called Mahala?

10        A.   No, I don't know the details of the -- of -- of any armed groups

11     in those areas, but I do know that the area was taken control very

12     quickly after shelling and operations by the TO of Sanski Most and the

13     6th Brigade.

14        Q.   Do you know that we tolerated their existence up to the point

15     when they launched offensives?  And the Muslims themselves are writing

16     this in a book, where they say we decided to go on the offensive, we

17     clashed with them, and we were defeated.  Do you know that we tolerated

18     their existence until the 7th of May?  For nearly seven weeks of the war

19     we didn't do anything against them because we didn't know what they had

20     at their disposal.  Did you know about that?

21        A.   I believe the take-over of Sanski Most by Serbian authorities

22     occurred in the middle to late April, and I'm not aware of significant

23     offensives in Sanski Most launched by the non-Serb population and that

24     this was tolerated until -- until the 7th of May.  I think Sanski Most is

25     one of those municipalities in which power was taken over, I believe,

Page 21742

 1     around about the 18th or 19th of April.  I may be wrong a little bit on

 2     the timings.  And it's also one of those municipalities from the

 3     documents that seem to fit with this chain of disarmament.  And there was

 4     an attack around this period after this order was issued which involved

 5     artillery from the 6th Brigade, and control of Mahala was taken very

 6     quickly.  There were follow-on operations in which Serb soldiers, I

 7     believe, did die and there were casualties.  That would indicate that the

 8     area was not completely unarmed.  But again, Sanski Most was -- well, the

 9     territory was controlled very quickly within the first few days of June.

10             JUDGE KWON:  So having looked at the document, can you answer the

11     original question put by the accused, i.e., -- I'll read it out:

12              "Do you understand this," the paragraph in your report, "this to

13     be an attack on populated placed and civilians or an attack on the armed

14     forces deployed there and firing from that area?"

15             THE WITNESS:  Well, it seems to indicate that it's -- they're

16     couching it as armed -- armed groups in there.  There are references to

17     artillery preparation in Mahala and other areas, settlements.  It may

18     well be that it's both.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll take a break, Mr. Karadzic, for 25 minutes.

20             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry.  Just before we take the break, could I ask

22     the Defence for a copy of the map, the excerpt which they put on the

23     ELMO, which was represented as being part of some kind of "Glas"

24     compilation.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll take a break for --

Page 21743

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  We have a coloured version

 2     from books.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  -- for 25 minutes and resume at ten to 6.00.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 5.27 p.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 5.53 p.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Did you know that before the attack on the Mahala, which was

10     executed by the Serb army in order to deal with the terrorist --

11     terrorists, it was communicated by radio that all civilians should move

12     to the stadium for the duration of combat?

13        A.   I was not aware of that, Mr. Karadzic.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to refer you to the testimony of

15     Witness Zulic who described it.  Do you know that from the places of

16     Hrustovo and others the army actually protected civilians and took them

17     to Tomina, which was in the same municipality?  They were simply taken

18     away for the duration of the fights, and they were accommodated in a

19     different part of the municipality in some Muslim houses in Serb

20     territory?

21        A.   I was not aware of that.  And if that's what the witness says,

22     that's ...

23        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to refer you to the statement of

24     (redacted)  She described how she was taken to

25     Tomina.

Page 21744

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at P3601.

 2             MR KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   You must know who Colonel Basara was, because you mentioned him.

 4     He was commander of the 6th Brigade in Sanski Most; correct?

 5        A.   Yes, that is correct.

 6        Q.   While we are waiting for the document, I'd like to ask you this:

 7     Did you know that at a certain point in your report you mentioned that

 8     brigades were brought in, the 6th Brigade, for example, which was brought

 9     to Sanski Most and the 43rd Brigade to Prijedor.  Did you know that these

10     municipalities were the home municipalities of those brigades or did you

11     think they were brought in because of some special reason, other reason?

12        A.   Dr. Karadzic, I am aware that that was the areas that those

13     brigades came from.  But at the time they were redeployed, they were in

14     operations in Western Slavonia.  The whole of the 43rd Brigade didn't

15     deploy back to Prijedor, only a part of it.  And in essence they were

16     taken out of combat in Western Slavonia to go back to those areas in

17     Prijedor and Sanski Most.  But, yes, I'm aware that the brigades were

18     from that area.  They weren't sent back, as I am aware, to be stood down

19     or demobilised, but that they were tasked to control the territory;

20     Prijedor in the case of the 43rd Brigade, and Sanski Most in the case of

21     the 6th Brigade.

22        Q.   Did you see this document, and did you refer to it in your

23     report?  It is a document by Colonel Basara.  Have a look at item 1.  He

24     orders that the soldiers who were undisciplined and recalcitrant should

25     be sent away.  He also orders that all soldiers prone to committing

Page 21745

 1     genocide against people unable to conduct an armed struggle must be

 2     discharged, et cetera.  Have you seen this document previously?

 3        A.   I'm not sure.  I'd have to check my footnotes, Mr. Karadzic.

 4     There are lot of documents in the report, and it's been some time since

 5     I've looked at it, so I'd have to check.  Maybe I can do that this

 6     evening.

 7        Q.   Can we go to the next page.  I haven't found any reference of

 8     yours to this document.  Have a look at item 6.  Do you agree, as an

 9     officer, that the 6th Brigade commander undertook preventive measures and

10     that he prohibited certain activities and threatened with sanctioning any

11     potential perpetrators of crimes?

12        A.   Yes.  I mean, the document does seem to indicate that.  I have

13     seen, in fairness, a couple of other documents from the corps indicating

14     that they will take similar sanctions.  But as I said earlier on, I don't

15     think I saw too many examples where sanctions were -- were indeed taken.

16        Q.   I can only regretfully note that, Mr. Brown, but the Chamber did

17     observe that not a single incident was left that was not sanctioned

18     sooner or later.  In any case --

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Completely untrue statement from Mr. Karadzic on

20     the Chamber observing that not a single incident was ever left

21     unsanctioned.  Completely untrue from the evidence in this case.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, just put your question and reserve

23     your submission for a later stage.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 21746

 1        Q.   You did not include this document in your report in any case, did

 2     you?

 3        A.   I may not have.  I don't know where this document's from, so it

 4     may well be that it didn't find its way in there.  If I'd seen it, I

 5     would probably have referenced it.  As I said, I think some of the

 6     limitations of the report at the beginning is that it didn't include

 7     every single document.  But if I had seen this one, I would most likely

 8     have made reference to it.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  It was in the possession of the OTP, and it was

10     tendered by P3601.

11             Can we next have -- well, let me draw your attention to

12     paragraph 2, item 100 -- 2.100.  In that paragraph you discuss Kljuc and

13     that certain people there were released after questioning initially, and

14     by the 2nd of June, 1992, while some 900 people had been detained:

15             [In English] "The same report also noted that, because Muslim

16     extremists had failed to hand in their weapons, the Muslim population of

17     the area of Lisnja village in Prnjavor municipality had been 'expelled.'"

18             [Interpretation] Did you know that there were almost 19.000

19     Muslims living in Kljuc?

20        A.   I don't know the figures of Kljuc in terms of -- in terms of

21     population.  I know there were a lot, but I don't know the figures.

22        Q.   Did you know that on the 27th of May there were at least five or

23     more synchronised attacks by the Muslim Green Berets on the Serb police,

24     military, and civilians and that there were a number of casualties?

25        A.   I am aware of an incident in Kljuc in and around the time of the

Page 21747

 1     disarmament operations which was the ambush of a bus containing soldiers

 2     of the JNA who I believe were coming back from Knin in which a number

 3     were killed.  There may also, either in that attack or a different

 4     attack, have been a mine placed on the road.  I believe I referenced that

 5     somewhere in the report.  So I don't doubt that there certainly was that

 6     incident.  There may have been others that I'm unaware of.  But there was

 7     an incident in Kljuc in which, I think, two or maybe more JNA soldiers

 8     were killed and a number injured.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Can we move into private session

10     briefly.

11                           [Private session]

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 21748

 1   (redacted)

 2                           [Open session]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Taking into account that there were at least five armed attacks

 6     which you called incidents and that out of the 19.000 Muslims 900 were

 7     captured, does it resemble an attack on the Muslim community to you, or

 8     was it a result of fighting, during which process the enemy soldiers were

 9     taken prisoner?

10        A.   It was not my understanding that the -- let me step back.  It was

11     my understanding that operations were planned in Kljuc and that this

12     incident occurred and that the -- the operation in Kljuc was not solely

13     in response to -- to the -- to the attack on the coach.  There was a

14     similar incident, for example, in Prijedor.  A number of soldiers were

15     killed, and yet in Prijedor there had been this disarmament plan being

16     planned and put into operation.

17             Yes, I believe this document, I have to go back to it again, 900

18     were captured.  Kljuc was taken over again very quickly within a couple

19     of days.  I would have expected that if 900 individuals were armed and

20     defending Kljuc that it would have taken longer than a day or two to --

21     to take control of the territory.  I believe a large number of people in

22     Kljuc subsequently left the municipality.

23             So what I observed in Kljuc was not that there was a large

24     defensive force in which the -- the Bosnian Serb or the VRS engaged in

25     protracted conflict.  What I observed in there, and also in Sanski Most

Page 21749

 1     and Prijedor, for that matter, was that there was a plan to disarm.  The

 2     territories were taken over very quickly.  There were some Serb

 3     casualties.  There had been some potentially provocative incidents.  The

 4     areas were not completely unarmed, but that Serb casualties, in essence,

 5     were relatively light.  The territories were taken very quickly, often

 6     with large numbers of people being taken into captivity or custody and

 7     moved between various centres.

 8        Q.   Well, you see, Mr. Brown, did you take note of the fact that

 9     Kljuc was populated by Serbs and that they were in the majority and that

10     not the whole of Kljuc was captured but, rather, it involved a few Muslim

11     villages which had fighters?  There was no fighting in the town itself

12     but in the village of Velagic and others surrounding Kljuc.  And that as

13     of the 6th of April, when the conflict broke out, until the 20th of May,

14     they were left alone.  No one touched them.

15        A.   Well, there were problem in Kljuc in early May.  I know that's

16     referenced in some documents as well, and I believe -- I'd have to check

17     my reference, but I'm -- I'm -- I believe there was an incident in -- in

18     the first few days in Kljuc in which a non-Serb or some non-Serbs were

19     killed.  There clearly was ethnic tensions in Kljuc.  There was

20     discussion amongst military commanders about what was happening in there

21     and that that territory needed to be controlled.  And I place the events

22     in Kljuc alongside the similar events in Sanski Most and Prijedor.  In

23     order to take control of that territory, a disarmament operation was

24     undertaken.  It may well have been that in Kljuc, Velagic, Pudin Han, for

25     example, is another one, were the scene of operations, but I believe that

Page 21750

 1     other operations took place later in June in order to completely secure

 2     the territory.

 3        Q.   Well, I will now dispute that by showing the following facts:  In

 4     the valley of the Sana River, in Prijedor, in Sanski Most, and Kljuc,

 5     towards the end of May there were synchronised Muslim attacks on Serb

 6     soldiers and civilians.  Following that, the Serb army undertook

 7     operations.  Isn't that correct?  Do you recall Hambarine on the

 8     22nd of May, Kozarac on the 24th of May, and on the 27th May the rest of

 9     the municipalities?  Prijedor, on the other hand, was attacked by the

10     Green Berets on the 30th of May.  Is that correct or is it not?

11        A.   Maybe I can break your question up by firstly saying:  I've

12     admitted in the report and I've already admitted earlier on that there

13     were a number of incidents in some of those municipalities in which Serb

14     soldiers were killed.  But if you look at the chain of events as we

15     discussed last week, that plans of operations in order to disarm and to

16     take control of territory were in operation well before some of those

17     incidents occurred.  And there's a reference, for example, in the

18     Prijedor documentation that a plan was underway and it was due to take

19     place, I believe, on the 22nd but that an incident in Hambarine at a

20     check-point at which some soldiers were killed in essence stopped that

21     plan.  So it's not that in -- somehow in those municipalities that these

22     flash-point incidents occurred and it was because of that that the

23     territory -- that these military operations took place and the territory

24     was controlled and large numbers of people were rounded up.  I would

25     argue that a plan -- plans had already been implemented through the chain

Page 21751

 1     that we talked about last week and that either as a result of that

 2     planning, or separately, flash-point incidents did occur in which

 3     soldiers were killed.

 4             I accept that Prijedor, for example, on the 30th of May was

 5     attacked and a small group of non-Serbs killed some individuals, I think

 6     on the approaches to Prijedor, but the response to that was very swift in

 7     Prijedor.  Within a very short space of time, not even a day, I believe,

 8     was -- control was taken over in the town.  I think they attacked the --

 9     either the police station or a hotel there.  But irrespective, yes, there

10     were flash-point incidents, yes, a number of soldiers appeared to have

11     been killed, but for me those were not the reason that those

12     municipalities were taken over and that operations were conducted.  It

13     was already planned that these disarmament operations and controls were

14     due to be undertaken.

15             And furthermore, the fact that in Prijedor within a day or two

16     the Krajina Corps are announcing that thousands of people had been sent

17     to Trnopolje and Omarska does not give me the impression that it was

18     simply the flash-point incidents in Hambarine and Kozarac that were the

19     reason for those operations.

20        Q.   Sir, I would kindly ask you to narrow down your answers.  Did you

21     know that in all three municipalities the Serb authorities were formed,

22     whereas an offer was made to the Muslims to establish their or -- their

23     own municipalities?  For example, the Muslims did initiate the origins of

24     their own municipalities, say, in Sanski Most and Kljuc.  That is the

25     underlying question of mine.  Did you know about that or not?

Page 21752

 1        A.   Well, I'm aware, and maybe not of the details, that there were

 2     negotiations in Kljuc -- sorry, in Sanski Most in particular, prior to

 3     control being taken over in the middle to late April.

 4             In relation to Prijedor, I know that the control was taken in

 5     that municipality at the end of April, 30th of April, and that involved

 6     use of the TO and the police and awareness of the -- by the 34th --

 7     43rd Brigade.  So maybe there was negotiations, I don't know, in the

 8     spring -- in the spring months, but I do know by the end of April that

 9     control had been taken over, i.e., political control, I guess, had been

10     taken over in -- in those municipalities.  In all three, actually -

11     Kljuc, Sanski Most, and Prijedor.

12        Q.   Did you know why there was a take-over in Prijedor without

13     fighting?  Did you know that there was an order from Sarajevo that the

14     JNA and Serbs in Prijedor be attacked and that the message was

15     intercepted?  That is why the take-over took place, to prevent the attack

16     from happening.

17        A.   I would isolate Prijedor from what was going on in the other

18     municipalities.  In the end of March, at the Assembly sessions there,

19     there was a decision to form Crisis Staffs.  There was a decision to

20     establish TOs.  I would see the take-over of power in those

21     municipalities in April more related to what was happening in the

22     Assembly sessions in the middle and late March 1992 and the desire to

23     control that territory.  I don't know of any order from Sarajevo that the

24     JNA and Serbs were to be attacked.  I haven't seen that.  But I would --

25     bearing in mind the pattern that seemed to happen in the middle of April

Page 21753

 1     to late April and into May, many of the municipalities were taken over.

 2     And I see that more in line with the instructions that were passed out at

 3     the Assembly sessions at the end of March 1992 in relation to

 4     Crisis Staffs and the TO and taking control of territory.

 5        Q.   Sir, you seem to be guessing a lot, and you don't know of this

 6     key element of this telegram sent from the Ministry of Defence and of the

 7     interior explaining the decision of the Muslim-Croat Presidency to attack

 8     the JNA and Serbs.  This was already something that was shown in the

 9     courtroom and yet you are ignorant of the fact.  Even after the event we

10     still proposed to them that they create their own municipalities in

11     Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Kljuc.  So how was it that we wanted all the

12     territory and yet at the same time we proposed they make their own

13     municipalities?

14        A.   All I can say is I haven't seen the document.  If you want to

15     show it to me, I'm more than happy to read it.

16        Q.   Thank you, but I have no time.  You should have been aware of it.

17     This report without this key element does not stand.  You say that the

18     Muslim population was expelled --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, if you put your statement or question,

20     let the witness answer it.

21             Would you like to comment on the comments by Mr. Karadzic that

22     your report does not stand without this key element?

23             THE WITNESS:  I have no -- no comment on that, sir.  I think the

24     report, I hope, stands on the documents that I was able to see and

25     review.

Page 21754

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, refrain from making unnecessary

 2     comments.  That takes up -- will take up more time, Mr. Karadzic.  Please

 3     continue.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  But -- very well.  I'll

 5     leave it at that.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Brown, that you cannot establish a pattern of

 8     behaviour of the Serb army without knowing about the activities of the

 9     Muslim side?  Correct?

10        A.   No.  I agree that there may be limitations in the report without

11     all the information from the non-Serb side, but I believe, looking at the

12     documents from the Krajina Corps, that I can establish a pattern within

13     the limitations of that report.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I have no time to further verify this position of

15     yours.  Let's look at paragraph 2.100.  There you say that the civilians

16     of Lisnja were expelled.  We checked the document you referred to, which

17     is 65 ter number 545.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please upload it.  I

19     believe there is a translation.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   You seem to refer to the document, so you must have had a

22     translation.

23             Look at item 2, the second part:

24             [As read] "During fighting around Prijedor, some 900 people were

25     taken prisoner and about 400 rifles were seized.  In the area of Prijedor

Page 21755

 1     the situation is under control and there is no large-scale fighting.  The

 2     fighting in the area of Sanski Most is unchanged.  In the area of

 3     Derventa there continues to be occasional artillery fire, well, because

 4     Muslim extremists have failed to hand in their weapons.  The Muslim

 5     population of the area of Lisnja village has been expelled."

 6             Oh, here we have the translation.  So probably it's not an error

 7     on your part.

 8             Mr. Brown, they were neither expelled nor resettled.  They were

 9     simply moved out of the area.  Do you see a difference between the three

10     terms?

11        A.   I can only say what is stated in the document, that they have

12     been expelled.  The Krajina Corps would have put that in.  I would have

13     thought they would have put "resettled" or "happily moved out" if it was

14     different.  But it references "expelled."  It would seem to indicate, at

15     least from this document, that the Muslims in that village were no longer

16     living there due to the fact that extremists or Muslim extremists hadn't

17     handed in their weapons, presumably in relation to the disarmament

18     operations that were going on around that time.  I think the document

19     seems to speak for itself.

20        Q.   So in the area of Derventa there is artillery fire and the army

21     moved out the Muslim population.  Do you know that in accordance with the

22     law on total national defence there is an obligation to evacuate the

23     civilian population while there is fighting going on?

24        A.   I would -- I wouldn't link -- as far as I'm aware, Lisnja village

25     is in Prnjavor municipality and not Derventa.  I'm not sure linking the

Page 21756

 1     two is -- is necessarily accurate.  I know there was fighting in Derventa

 2     at that time.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, is it your argument that the last

 5     sentence of para 2 in this document wrongly translated?  Because the

 6     document says:  "The Muslim population of the area of Lisnja village has

 7     been expelled."

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is a mistranslation, and it

 9     completely changes the meaning.

10             JUDGE KWON:  No, but you --

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is not expelled.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Your reading of B/C/S was translated as "expelled."

13     So we'll check it later.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let the interpreters tell you

15     now whether there's a difference between "expelled."  "Proterano,"

16     "preseljeno," "iseljeno," these three terms, "expelled," "resettled,"

17     "moved out," is there a difference?  Is there a difference between these

18     three concepts and is there a difference in the scale involved?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't you read out the last sentence of para 2

20     in this document.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "In the area of Derventa there is

22     still artillery fire from time to time, while in the area of the village

23     of Lisnja, due to the fact that Muslim extremists did not surrender their

24     weapons, the Muslim population was moved out."

25             That's it, "moved out."

Page 21757

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Brown?

 2             THE WITNESS:  I think I would stand by my assessment of the

 3     situation, sir.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  I may want to follow up on that, Your Honour,

 7     because I recall that previously I had an interpreter look carefully at

 8     this passage to see what the word was and it was reported to me that it

 9     was "expelled," but we'll look at that again.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That will be done.

11             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   You deal with that in paragraph 2.155.  Isn't that right?  There

15     is another reference to this paragraph and to the corps.

16             [In English] [Previous translation continued] "... after the

17     attack [sic] by units of the 1st Krajina Corps on Lisnja, the Corps

18     reported that the entire population of the village -- of that village had

19     been expelled."

20             [Interpretation] So now you say that it was done by the

21     1st Corps, and this could have been done by the civilian authorities.

22     Isn't that right?  Because the civilian protection is duty-bound to move

23     the population while the fighting is still going on.  Where do you find

24     this, that it was done by the 1st Krajina Corps?

25        A.   Well, I would have to check maybe some other references.  I may

Page 21758

 1     be prepared to amend it based on this document alone.  I'd have to look

 2     at other ones.  It's reported in the 1st Krajina Corps reports, so it

 3     presumably is of importance to them.  And the paragraph starts with, The

 4     1st Krajina Corps units are still holding the same positions, and then

 5     goes into detail about the areas that the corps are working in.  I can

 6     look at it again.  Maybe if I need to amend it, I'm more than happy to do

 7     so.

 8        Q.   And do you know that according to our law this is a legal

 9     requirement, according to our law on total national defence, evacuation

10     of the civilian population, announcing bombing, ultimatums, and so on?

11     Isn't all of that in accordance with the laws, so the civilians would

12     know what lies ahead and that they be given enough time to seek shelter?

13        A.   It doesn't make that clear in this document, Mr. Karadzic.  It

14     doesn't indicate that for their own safety, you know, in accordance with

15     the law, in order to minimise civilian casualties.  It doesn't make

16     reference to that at all.  I wouldn't necessarily put this particular

17     incident in isolation either.  I don't know the law that you're referring

18     to, and I would be interested to look at it, but I -- my reading of this

19     is not that these individuals are somehow being moved out for -- for

20     their own safety, bearing in mind at the same time what was happening in

21     other municipalities in the Krajina.

22        Q.   Mr. Brown, please explain this to me:  How are you going to

23     identify unlawful conduct on the part of the 1st Krajina Corps if you're

24     not familiar with the law on the basis of which they are waging war?

25        A.   Well, I'm not sure of the question.  I'm not a lawyer.  What I'm

Page 21759

 1     saying is what I see in a regular combat report from the corps in early

 2     June and that's what's reported.  It seems to fit what was happening in

 3     other municipalities around the same time, and it in particular adds to

 4     my assessment that there were operations which came through the

 5     authorities to conduct operations in order to disarm that resulted in a

 6     large number of people in those municipalities either being attacked or

 7     moved out.

 8        Q.   Just a brief question.  Do you know or do you agree -- have you

 9     identified the following, rather, that it was the police that was in

10     charge of disarming until the first soldiers started losing their lives

11     and that the army got involved only at the end of May when they started

12     firing at the army?  Just yes or no.  Did you identify that?  Did you

13     realise that the army was not interfering until the soldiers actually

14     started getting killed?

15        A.   I'm aware that initially the disarmament operations, as

16     articulated through the ARK municipalities, initially tasked the MUP to

17     deal with that but that that changed in and around the middle of May.

18     And I do not see that that was linked to individual soldiers being killed

19     at that time.  In essence it seems that the hardening or the involvement

20     of the military came round the middle of the month.

21        Q.   Yes.  But, sir, Mr. Brown, when the soldiers get fired at by

22     their own civilian population from behind their backs, is it not

23     perfectly legitimate for the army to get involved at that point?

24        A.   It would seem legitimate for the army to conduct security

25     operations if they're being fired at.  But bearing in mind that what was

Page 21760

 1     going on in the Krajina seemed to have occurred in other municipalities

 2     outside the Krajina, I don't see this as somehow some localised security

 3     operation in which a number of minor incident -- relatively minor,

 4     unfortunate, clearly, for the soldiers who were injured or killed, minor

 5     operations in which those incidents happened and the army were taking

 6     appropriate security measures in order to deal with those individuals who

 7     may have conducted that type of attack.  It would seem that, you know, if

 8     you look at Prijedor, the 1st Krajina Corps documents at the end of May

 9     had thousands of people rounded up and placed in Omarska and Trnopolje.

10     If it was a security operation targeted against sporadic -- unfortunate

11     sporadic incidents against soldiers, I wouldn't necessarily -- that

12     wouldn't necessarily necessitate the rounding up of, you know,

13     7.000 individuals, or whatever is annotated in the documents at the end

14     of May.

15        Q.   First of all, it's not 7.000.  It's less than 3.000.  Secondly,

16     sir, this happened, isn't that right, only after the 30th of May, after

17     the attack at Prijedor?  And thirdly, you claim that these are

18     individuals that attacked, not armed units.  Are you saying that in

19     Krajina there were armed Muslim individuals, or is what I am saying the

20     truth, that even before the war, in all the 103 municipalities that are

21     there, they had a unit and a staff of the Patriotic League?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  I object to that compound question.  I mean, I

24     haven't been objecting, but these are getting huge and complex.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Could you break down, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 21761

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   So do you claim that these were individuals rather than armed

 3     formations?  As you said on line 11, page 73.  Transcript.  Transcript.

 4     Line 11, page 73.

 5        A.   Well, there may well have been armed groups.  I'm not aware of

 6     the details of all activities from the Muslim side in many of these

 7     municipalities.  I do know, for example, in the corridor that there was

 8     shelling from over the Croatian side.  I'm aware that some of the

 9     municipalities in the corridor took control and that they were -- they

10     seeped to be quite well armed.  There may well have been the planning.

11     There may well have been a desire.  There may well have been some groups

12     that were more than just individuals.  But it did seem to me that the --

13     whatever armed groups may have been present in some of those

14     municipalities, that they weren't particularly effective.  Yes, there

15     were these low -- lowish-level incidents in which some Serbs soldiers

16     were killed, but they certainly didn't stop much at all.

17             And, for example, when I wrote a report in relation to Prijedor

18     and tried to look at this issue, it seemed in comparison that whatever

19     defensive organisation may have been present in Prijedor, it was

20     relatively rudimentary.  It didn't seem particularly well structured or

21     organised.  It didn't appear to be particularly well armed.  They may

22     well have had small arms.  They may well have had some explosives and

23     mines and some were maybe hand-held rocket launchers, but it certainly

24     didn't stop the VRS at all.  And in comparison, the VRS was able to call

25     on significant assets, including the most up-to-date tanks, artillery,

Page 21762

 1     well-seasoned troops that had spent a significant amount of time fighting

 2     in Croatia, and that whatever defensive structures or whatever armed

 3     structures were in those municipalities certainly weren't particularly

 4     effective.

 5             It may well have been there had been a desire by non-Serbs to

 6     protect their territories and to arm themselves, but it didn't seem to me

 7     to be particularly effective, let alone particularly well structured,

 8     certainly in comparison to what the VRS were able to call on and the

 9     assets they had at their disposal.  And it seemed that in many of those

10     municipalities in the Krajina, where operations did take place, they were

11     over relatively quickly, maybe with follow-up operations in the

12     subsequent weeks and months.

13        Q.   Well, you see, Mr. Brown, how long your answer is to my simple

14     question.  Do you know of the war preparations of the Muslim population

15     in Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Do you know about the establishment of the

16     Patriotic League consisting of 103 municipal staffs and municipal

17     brigades?

18        A.   Just a point, Mr. Karadzic.  I can't answer your questions,

19     often, in a simpler way because there is usually some context behind it.

20     Where I can, I will answer in a simple manner.

21             In relation to the Patriotic League, I'm not aware of it.  I did

22     not look at the issue of the Patriotic League.  That was not part of the

23     report.  It didn't come out necessarily in detail through the

24     1 Krajina Corps documents.

25             It may well have been that the -- obviously there was an ABiH at

Page 21763

 1     some stage.  Mr. Izetbegovic mobilised the TO, and there was -- I

 2     believe, Croatian troops had come over the border in some places in

 3     Bosnia, but it wasn't a part of this report.

 4        Q.   But, Mr. Brown, you are assessing what the 1st Krajina Corps did.

 5     And if you don't know what kind of challenges they were up against, if

 6     you don't know what kind of problems they were up against, how can you

 7     assess the 1st Krajina Corps without knowing what they had been dealing

 8     with?

 9        A.   Well, I believe I'm -- I do flag up in the report some of the

10     problems that the 1st Krajina Corps faced.  I don't deny that the

11     1st Krajina Corps suffered casualties through the -- 1992.  I don't deny

12     that the Krajina Corps had a long border in which it was often at the

13     contact point conducting quite tough fighting, certainly on the

14     Central Bosnia area.  To a degree there was harrying from artillery in

15     Croatia.  So I don't doubt that.  But it seems that the municipality

16     attacks that occurred in May and June and in, to some extent, into July,

17     that those municipality attacks were over relatively quickly and that

18     control was taken relatively quickly and the operations that they

19     continued through that -- through the summer were relatively minor.  I

20     don't doubt on the contact points that the Krajina Corps was fighting,

21     you know, quite a determined opponent, but that's not what I was looking

22     at.  I was looking at some of the municipality attacks.  And it seems

23     that in comparison to the -- whatever defensive forces were there or

24     whatever armed groups were there, that -- that control was taken very

25     quickly by General Talic, and it would seem that was the case.

Page 21764

 1        Q.   Thank you.  So you dealt with the in-depth fighting carried out

 2     by the 1st Krajina Corps, not fighting at the front line itself.

 3             Do you claim that it was the 1st Krajina Corps that attacked

 4     Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc, or do you agree with me that first it

 5     was the Muslim formations from Kljuc, Prijedor, and Sanski Most attacked

 6     the Serbs as civilians and the police as well, and once they attacked the

 7     army, they got a military response?  I claim that they were the first to

 8     attack, and you are talking about attacks in municipalities.  We have

 9     quite a few documents, but let us get this straight.  What is your

10     position?

11        A.   It is my claim that elements of the 1st Krajina Corps were

12     involved in operations in Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc and that those

13     operations took place after control had been seized in April,

14     predominantly, 1992, and that these operations, in order to secure that

15     territory, those operations were undertaken initially under the -- the

16     umbrella of disarming extremist groups or paramilitary groups, and those

17     particularly were located in non-Serb villages.  And I didn't see

18     examples of 1st Krajina Corps units operating outside non-Serb villages

19     in order to disarm the population.  I do concede that during those

20     operations that there were instances, and it may even be in one or two

21     cases prior to those, there were incidents where Serb soldiers were

22     killed, but it was not that the Serb soldiers were attacked and therefore

23     that was a justification for those operations.  I would argue control had

24     been taken.  That in order to secure control of those municipalities,

25     disarmament operations were planned and operated.  And those operations

Page 21765

 1     were successful.  They were conducted by components of the corps, often

 2     in conjunction with the police.  And that that territory was part of the

 3     territory that was deemed to be Serb or that they wanted to control and

 4     that the control of that -- of those areas was effected very quickly, and

 5     there was continuing operations after that.

 6             Concurrently with that, there was an operation -- a number of

 7     large-scale operations that the Krajina Corps were involved in, in

 8     particular Operation Corridor, but obviously operations in other areas,

 9     including Jajce.

10        Q.   Now we are dealing with what the subject that you wrote about

11     was, the fighting far away from the front line.  This is what I put to

12     you, that the army did not interfere with disarmament or fighting until

13     it was attacked.  Yes or no?  Is it correct that it was first the Muslims

14     that attacked the army in Kljuc, Sanski Most, and Prijedor?  Yes or no?

15        A.   I do not agree with your position, Mr. Karadzic.

16        Q.   Thank you.  That will do.  That will do.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1353.  Could we please have a look

18     at that now.  D1353.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   You mentioned Krupa, Bosanska Krupa, in your report, and now we

21     are going to see what the instructions on the evacuation of the

22     population are like, and this has to do with refugees from the local

23     commune of Arapusa.

24             Did you have this document in your possession?

25        A.   I don't believe I did, or I don't recognise it.

Page 21766

 1        Q.   You can read the page in English, and I'm going to tell you what

 2     this is all about.  Arapusa is a Muslim village, and some other Muslims

 3     from Bosanska Krupa fled to Arapusa.  Once the fighting for Arapusa

 4     started, instructions were issued to evacuate the population.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have the next page.  In

 6     English it's fine, it seems to me.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   So this population was evacuated within Republika Srpska itself.

 9     And then it says in this last bullet point that on the basis of the

10     agreement reached between Mr. Vjestica and the commander at the moment

11     when peace is established, the command is duty-bound to ensure the safe

12     return of the population to Arapusa, to their homes there, and the

13     refugees to Bosanska Krupa.

14             Did you see who all the signatories are, Emir Sabic, a Muslim,

15     and another Muslim, Fuad.  And, down here, for the commander of the

16     battalion, it was signed by Bozo Erceg and Djordje Jez.

17             Evacuation within the same municipality and the same republic, is

18     that ethnic cleansing or is this an operation envisaged by law?

19        A.   I can't say the context behind this evacuation.  It may well have

20     been that operations, combat operations, were going on at that time and

21     that those who signed it were under the impression that they were going

22     to be allowed back and that was genuine.  It may well have been a

23     distinct possibility that those individuals signed it through fear or

24     under the misapprehension that they were going to be allowed back and

25     that in fact this was a ruse to in -- order them to leave.  I don't know.

Page 21767

 1     All I can say is that Mr. Vjestica, not long after this, seemed to be

 2     under the impression that those Muslims in Bosanska Krupa would not be

 3     returning.  So I don't know the details of why this document was signed

 4     or -- or how it came to be signed, whether those signatories did it

 5     through force, misapprehension, or a genuine belief that they were going

 6     to be allowed to return at that time.  It would seem to me that two weeks

 7     later Mr. Vjestica is not saying words that would seem to echo the

 8     sentiment of this document, and in fact quite the contrary, that these

 9     people were not going to be allowed to return.

10        Q.   Mr. Brown, he said that they were not there, that they wouldn't

11     be there for as long as the fighting is going on, and he expressed his

12     doubt as to their return.  So you're not reading documents properly.

13             Did the OTP put this document at your disposal and did you just

14     eliminate it on your own?

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  I have to object to this argumentative comment

16     that he's not reading documents properly.

17             JUDGE KWON:  It's time, Mr. Karadzic, you should know the rules.

18     Refrain from making unnecessary statement.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   But, Mr. Witness, haven't you read Vjestica's words yourself?

21     They will not be there for as long as the fighting is going on.  Did you

22     not read that out on the 18th?  His words were: "They will not be there

23     until the fighting goes on."

24        A.   Is that in this document or is it in the Assembly session?

25        Q.   What you quoted, that Vjestica said, and that's what you read

Page 21768

 1     out, on the 18th.  "They will not be there while the fighting is going

 2     on."

 3             JUDGE KWON:  While witness is reading that document, Mr. Tieger,

 4     did you say you would need five minutes?

 5             MR. TIEGER:  No, just 60 seconds at most, Mr. President.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Well, Mr. Vjestica says:  "Will they have a place

 7     to return to?  I think it unlikely after our president has told us the

 8     happy news that the right bank of the Una is the border."

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   But, sir, he is anticipating that they were not going to live in

11     the Serbian entity, not that somebody was going to prohibit them from

12     doing so.

13             Secondly, do you know that these people were relocated within

14     Republika Srpska, not outside of Republika Srpska?

15        A.   I'm not aware of where these individuals were relocated.  It may

16     well have been that they were moved over the river.  I'm -- but I'm not

17     aware of the details.

18        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, your microphone.  Yes, it's now on.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Mr. Brown, it was possible to determine by localities that they

23     were moving inside Republika Srpska and they even went to Sanski Most.

24     What we have here is the municipality of Krupa.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask whether this 65 ter 545

Page 21769

 1     has been admitted into evidence, the one that speaks about the village of

 2     Lisnja?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I think that has been already admitted,

 4     Exhibit P3927.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, I didn't know that.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, should we adjourn for today?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies, but I

 8     kindly ask you to reconsider the issue of time.  This is the summary of

 9     the entire indictment, or almost of the entire indictment.  Seven hours

10     is by far too little.  With any other witness I would have been given

11     seven days at least.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Brown, as I told you earlier today, that we

13     decided to interpose another witness's evidence with you, my anticipation

14     is that we may be able to resume your evidence around 11.30 tomorrow

15     morning.  You may be excused.

16             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  It -- if we can briefly move into private session,

20     Mr. President.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22                           [Private session]

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 21770

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9                           [Open session]

10             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE KWON:  If my memory's correct, the Defence didn't take any

12     position with respect to that.  Mr. Robinson?  If necessary, we'll go

13     back to private session.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  No, we can do this in public session.  We didn't

15     oppose that motion.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             So we will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day

20                           of November, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.