1 Tuesday, 22 November 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.32 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, everyone. There are several matters
6 that I would like to deal with before we resume hearing the witness.
7 On 10th of November, 2011, during the testimony of KDZ011, the
8 Chamber admitted Exhibit D1911 into evidence and marked D1912 for
9 identification. Subsequently, Ms. Sutherland orally requested the
10 Chamber to reconsider admitting the two documents. Given that D1912 was
11 only MFI'd, the Chamber considers Ms. Sutherland's intervention as an
12 objection to the admission of this document and not as a request for
13 reconsideration of the decision to admit it.
14 The Chamber recalls that D1911 is a 1991 Banja Luka security
15 services report discussing events in Croatia and how they affected the
16 "security situation" in municipalities in BiH along the border, including
17 in KDZ011's municipality of Bosanski Novi. The Chamber notes that KDZ011
18 gave testimony about the presence of Muslim police officers in Suhaca,
19 Bosanski Novi, and stated that in the municipality of Bosanski Novi there
20 were rumours about the situation in Croatia as well as a fear that
21 fighting would "spill over" into Bosnia. The Chamber thus considers that
22 sufficient foundation was laid for the admission of the document and
23 therefore that the Prosecution has not demonstrated the existence of a
24 clear error in reasoning or that of particular circumstances justifying
25 that the admission decision be reconsidered in order to prevent an
2 With regard to MFI D1912, purportedly a "security situation
3 assessment in Bosanski Novi" from 16th of April, 1992, the Chamber notes
4 that it currently lacks an English translation of the document so cannot
5 verify its contents. The Chamber thus considers that any objection
6 relating to its admission, including whether a proper foundation was laid
7 for its admission, may be considered once an English translation has been
8 received and the Chamber proceeds with examining whether the document
9 should be admitted.
10 Next, the Chamber will issue its decision on the status of the
11 annexes to the accused's 61st motion for finding of disclosure violation
12 related to Mevludin Sejmenovic and the accused's supplemental memorandum
13 in support of 60th motion for finding of disclosure violation related to
14 Ivo Atlija, both filed on 26th of October, 2011.
15 The Chamber considered the Prosecution's notification filed on
16 8th of November, 2011, and noted the passage on which the parties agreed
17 and those on which it disagreed and in relation to which the Prosecution
18 submits that they relate to the witness's co-operation with the
19 Prosecution and their privacy and security.
20 The Chamber notes that witnesses Atlija and Sejmenovic are not
21 the subject of protective measures and that there is therefore no reason
22 to redact information related to their co-operation with the Prosecution
23 or the reasons for which they were seeking residence in a third country.
24 The Chamber therefore orders the accused to refile the
25 61st motion for finding of disclosure violation and the supplemental
1 memorandum in support of 60th motion for finding of disclosure violation
2 of 26th of October, 2011, with public redacted versions of confidential
3 Annex A to the accused's 61st motion and of confidential Annex B to the
4 accused's supplemental memorandum in accordance with the redactions
5 agreed upon by the parties and identified in yellow in the Prosecution's
6 submission of 8th of November, 2011. The Chamber further orders the
7 Registry to reclassify the 61st motion and the supplemental memorandum of
8 26th of October, 2011, to the effect that the respective annexes therein
9 are made confidential.
10 That said, could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
11 [Private session]
11 Page 21688 redacted. Private session.
17 [Open session]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
21 Unless there are other matters to deal with, we'll bring in the
23 In the meantime, I think we -- I received the spreadsheet you
24 referred to, which seems to be very helpful.
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, Your Honour, and I just also wanted to say
1 that we have uploaded a redacted version of the expert report, taking out
2 the section which were struck, and that's 11 -- 117A. It should be in
3 e-court now.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we also find the spreadsheet
6 helpful and it might be useful. We don't have any objection if the
7 Trial Chamber receives those kind of materials in advance of the expert
8 witness's testimony in the future. I think that would help things.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you for your kind understanding.
10 That would be helpful indeed.
11 [The witness takes the stand]
12 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN [Resumed]
13 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Mr. Brown.
14 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
15 JUDGE KWON: My apologies for keeping you waiting, but there are
16 several matters to deal with before we start today.
17 Very well. Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Excellencies. Good
19 afternoon to all.
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
21 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Brown.
22 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Karadzic.
23 Q. Before we continue where we broke off on Friday, I would like to
24 ask you something. Are you familiar with our laws and our political
1 A. It is not an area of my expertise that's covered in this report.
2 I'm aware of some of the laws, such as the Law on National Defence, but
3 it's not an area that I am an expert on.
4 Q. Thank you. However, on page 102, lines 122 to 123, you objected
5 and said that I did not get up and tell an MP that he was not supposed to
6 be saying something that he was saying. So that's what you said on
7 Friday. It's in the transcript from page 112 to 123.
8 Do you know that the speaker of the Assembly -- or, rather, the
9 president does not sit throughout Assembly hearings all the time?
10 A. I am unaware one way or the other whether he sits through the
11 Assembly session all the time. It would seem that you certainly spoke at
12 this Assembly session and delegates followed you, and it would seem that
13 the decisions being taken at that Assembly session, in particular the
14 establishment of the army, the Presidency, the issues of the strategic
15 goals, were quite -- quite important. But in answer to your question,
16 I -- I can't say whether or not the speaker of the Assembly sits through
17 the hearings at all time.
18 Q. The president of the republic. My question had to do with the
19 president of the republic, actually.
20 The president of the republic, does he have to sit at all
21 Assembly sessions or not? What I'm putting to you is that that is not
22 case and if he is there, he's not there for very long, and he can leave
23 the session and take care of other business; right?
24 A. I -- I have no view one way or the other. I assume anyone can
25 leave the Assembly session. It wasn't indicated in the minutes,
1 certainly of that Assembly session, that, for example, yourself or
2 Mr. Krajisnik, who I know certainly talked at the end of the session,
3 seemed to have left, but, of course, anyone can leave.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the president of the republic cannot
5 be involved in the upbringing and education of MPs because they're
6 elected, too, and therefore the president does not have the right to
7 reprimand them or caution them or try to educated them in any way?
8 A. I don't know what the regulations may be in relation to formal
9 education or otherwise of delegates or members, but my point on Friday
10 was that I didn't see in the minutes of this discussion you indicating to
11 the delegates that what they were talking about was unacceptable or that
12 they had clearly misread what you had said in relation to the strategic
13 objectives. There doesn't seem to be any language at all in that
14 session, and I -- I at least am left, when I read the minutes, that the
15 delegates took what you told them at the beginning of that session, put
16 their points forward, some of them indicating -- discussing the issue of
17 resettlement, and that there was no interjection by you nor Mr. Krajisnik
18 in relation to the fact that they seem to have got a mis -- the wrong
19 idea about -- about what was expected of them in the coming period.
20 Q. I kindly ask you to give me answers that are as brief as
22 Now I'm going to tell you what it's like in our political system.
23 The president of the republic does not have to sit there at Assembly
24 sessions. The president of the republic can intervene in parliamentary
25 proceedings by refusing to sign a bill and turn it into a law. If a bill
1 goes back to parliament, if the Assembly votes with a two-third majority,
2 then the president has to sign that bill and turn it into a law. Are you
3 aware of that kind of thing in political systems?
4 A. It is not my area of expertise, and I am not aware of that type
5 of regulation.
6 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Brown, you are saying what the
7 president was supposed to do, and I'm telling you what the president can
8 do. But all right, let me ask you this now: You focused on many
9 individual statements made by the MPs. Were you following what had
10 happened? Did such positions prevail? Did they become part of Assembly
11 documents, or did they just remain as a lone voice, as it were?
12 A. I'm not quite sure I've -- I've -- I quite follow the question.
13 I haven't looked at the statements of the delegates and then taken them
14 back to their own particular areas. It would seem that certainly in the
15 case of Mr. Vjestica from Bosanska Krupa that he's talking about what had
16 already happened, not what was necessarily going to be happening in the
17 weeks. But to answer your question, I haven't -- I haven't followed,
18 bearing in mind some of the delegates were from other areas outside the
19 Krajina, but I didn't follow that. That wasn't really within the remit
20 of the report.
21 Q. Thank you. Let us just conclude with dealing with your reference
22 to the Assembly. I'm going to put to you the Defence case now.
23 The Assembly meets to produce one of seven types of documents -
24 the constitution, laws, resolutions, declarations, decisions,
25 conclusions, and recommendations. Do you agree that the Assembly cannot
1 meet with no reason whatsoever and that the reason for the Assembly to
2 meet is the production of legislative documents? Just like in your
3 country, after all.
4 A. Yes. Well, from the minutes that I did review it would seem that
5 there were decisions, there was discussion, there were resolutions in
6 relation to the circumstances at that time.
7 Q. Thank you. Have you found a document of the Assembly where an
8 extremist view prevailed and that I should have refused to sign?
9 A. Well, I -- I would have to go through all of the Assembly
10 sessions, and I think there were a few of them, and it wasn't necessarily
11 a key area of my report, but I think that there was a lot of language
12 in this -- in these -- in the Assembly sessions, and I can draw your
13 attention to some of them, the 16th Assembly session, in particular,
14 which seemed to be quite inflammatory, possibly even derogatory, and I'm
15 not sure necessarily would have aided to a calming of the situation at
16 the time. But, again, the study of all the aspects of the Assembly
17 sessions were not a key component of the report.
18 I do know, and I think I said last week, or I do believe, that
19 the 16th Assembly session was not an isolated, stand-alone Assembly
20 session. There are references from what I remember in some of the
21 previous minutes to the controlling of some of the territory that was
22 highlighted by you, Mr. Karadzic, in relation to the strategic goals.
23 There was discussion in particular in some of the Assembly sessions in
24 March, or discussion and decisions, about taking control, establishing
25 TOs. So the Assembly session on the 16th -- the 16th Assembly session
1 was a stand-alone one, but in relation to your question about extremism,
2 I think there are references in those Assembly sessions certainly with
3 inflammatory language and derogatory language. I can draw your attention
4 to some of them at the 16th Assembly session, because I do have the
5 minutes of those.
6 Q. This is what I'm asking you now, Mr. Brown, and you probably know
7 that. In our system, an MP cannot be held responsible for something he
8 said from the rostrum; however, this is what I'm asking you now: Did
9 extremist views prevail, and did they become part of the Assembly
10 documents? And also, did you see for yourself that I intervened when I
11 saw that an extremist view was about to prevail, but I did not respond to
12 each and every particular contribution to the discussions? Now, that was
13 one question.
14 My next question: Is it true that you selectively looked at this
15 thing or that from the Assembly but --
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, put your question one by one. One at
17 a time.
18 THE WITNESS: I do not remember you interjecting in relation to
19 the issue of extremist views. Maybe at the 16th Assembly session you're
20 able to point out to me where you've done that, because it's not my
21 reading of the minutes. I certainly accept that these are minutes, but I
22 don't see it, in certainly in the minutes of the 16th Assembly session,
23 where you interject in relation to phrases or comments from some of the
24 delegates that could be seen as inflammatory. If they are there, maybe
25 you could point them out to me.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Was the contribution of such delegates incorporated into the
3 documents? Have you come across any such documents, and did the Assembly
4 adopt their views as its own?
5 A. It is not an area of my expertise. I did not look at the
6 decisions of the Assembly. That was dealt with, I believe, by others
7 within the leadership research team. All I can say, as I argue in my
8 report, in particular in relation to the issue of separation, that the
9 military -- there are a number of references in the military documents
10 about separation. For example, one of the documents we saw last week in
11 which the -- not long after this Assembly session, in which the
12 Krajina Corps indicated that those leaving were not going to be
13 returning. But as to the decisions themselves that you talk about, it's
14 not an area of my expertise.
15 Q. We'll come to that. We'll come to that. Please look at your
16 paragraph 1.43 in which you imply that again the issue of territories and
17 my views about that issue is something where you quote as follows:
18 [In English] "... do not want to get a state which has a huge
19 number of those who are against that state ..."
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. And you are interpreting this --
23 JUDGE KWON: Could you identify the para number again,
24 Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1.43, footnote 56.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. So here the Trial Chamber has already seen and admitted into
4 evidence several decisions and orders that I issued and that were adopted
5 after this particular session that would pertain to the civilians from
6 other ethnic communities. Between April and December, 1992, I issued
7 some 20 orders in which I ordered and appealed for the protection of
8 members of other ethnic communities. The majority of them have been
9 admitted into evidence, and I can show them to you.
10 Now, have you seen these documents and have you taken them into
11 account? 65 ter, for example, 1083; 65 ter 1910; 65 ter 1116. Nearly
12 all of them have been admitted into evidence. 65 ter 10537,
13 65 ter 11100.
14 JUDGE KWON: How can the witness follow your question? One at a
15 time again.
16 Before seeing the documents, can you answer the question,
17 Mr. Brown?
18 THE WITNESS: I haven't seen those documents, Your Honour. They
19 may well have been issued. The 1st Krajina Corps issued certain
20 instructions which I've noted in the report, such as abiding by the
21 Geneva Conventions and others. But certainly issuing documents is one
22 thing, and having those implemented or seeing if anything at all resulted
23 from those documents is another.
24 I think I stand by my assertions in paragraph 1.43.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. But, Mr. Brown, isn't it up to the Trial Chamber to decide what
2 kind of documents these are? Have you made any reference to these
3 documents, and did you draw it to the attention of the trial that there
4 is this side of the story as well? Why didn't you present these
5 documents to the Chamber?
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, he said he hasn't seen these
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then I have to call up
9 those documents, although it's going to be a waste of time.
10 Can we have, please, D00426.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Have you seen this document before? It's dated the
13 8th of June, 1992.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's too small, we can only have
15 an English version on the screen.
16 THE WITNESS: I do not remember seeing this document before.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. Can we now have 65 ter 1090, please.
19 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Karadzic, when witness said that he hadn't
20 seen any of these documents, there's no point of putting those documents
21 to the witness. You can use them later on.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think he said he didn't know
23 whether he had seen them before. So I think for -- in those
24 circumstances I don't know what else we could do besides show them to
25 him. Because, if he didn't see them, I think that affects the
1 completeness of his report. And if he did see them and didn't include
2 them, that also could have some implications unless he's given a chance
3 to explain why not. So --
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's do that as briefly as possible.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Brown, have you seen the letter that I wrote to
7 Mr. Boutros-Ghali on the 13th of June in which I say that we denounce the
8 paramilitary groups, that we outlaw them, and that we agreed with any
9 sanctions imposed against them?
10 A. I have not seen this document before. However, on the brief
11 reading that I've just done of the document, it would seem to at least
12 sit with a document later on that the Main Staff pushed out in relation
13 to paramilitary groups. It says here in this document:
14 "We want to inform you about our latest official decision to
15 disown all paramilitary groups that are not ready to be under our
16 political control."
17 There was a document which is referenced in my report which is a
18 large document from the Main Staff, it may even be a little bit later
19 than that this document, relating to the issue of paramilitaries,
20 identifying a large number of paramilitary groups that were operating on
21 RS territory. And in order to control those paramilitary groups, it's
22 advocated the placing of those groups into the ranks of the VRS, and only
23 then if they refused that were they to be disbanded or dealt with. It
24 would seem at least -- I would have to put the other documents together,
25 but it would seem at least this document here, there's a qualification
1 that it's not relating to all paramilitary groups irrespective of what
2 they've done previously; it's relating to paramilitary groups that are
3 not ready to be under the -- "our" or the RS leadership's or the
4 RS authorities' political control. It seemed to echo somewhat of a theme
5 that paramilitaries in RS territory were accepted as long as they were
6 under the control or authority of the formal VRS military. And this
7 doesn't say all paramilitary groups irrespective of what they've done in
8 the past will be dealt with. I think this potentially echos a policy
9 that -- that seemed to, say, be a thread that paramilitary groups were
10 tolerated no matter what they'd done and would only not be tolerated if
11 they refused to be put under army control.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will have an objection to the
13 translation into Serbian. This should be translated as "We are giving up
14 on them."
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, we are imparting here a piece of information that
17 we are going to prosecute those who were not under our control. Do you
18 know that we arrested and convicted all the groups that refused to
19 subject themselves to the control of the military and the police? This
20 Chamber is well aware of such cases. Are you?
21 A. There may well have been some paramilitaries that were prosecuted
22 because they refused to come under the control of the army. I'm not
23 necessarily aware of them off the top of my head. I believe there might
24 have been one group in Doboj, but I'd have to go back and look at that.
25 But it strikes me as the reason they were prosecuted was more of an issue
1 of control and their refusal to come under the control of the RS
2 authorities, that there didn't seem to be a reason or a belief that
3 paramilitaries should be prosecuted for the crimes they committed.
4 As a former military officer, having any paramilitaries who've
5 committed crimes in your ranks strikes me as being, first and foremost,
6 wrong, having criminals in the military. And secondly, if paramilitaries
7 are committing crimes and known to have committed crimes, there's a whole
8 issue of military control. Why would you want to include those
9 individuals in -- in a professional military?
10 My view, I think, reading some of the documents in relation to
11 paramilitaries is that they were accepted as long as they were in the
12 military. It didn't matter what they'd done. And they were only not
13 accepted if they refused to come under the control of the military. The
14 solution was about getting control of them rather than one of a criminal
15 justice issue of prosecuting people who had committed crimes.
16 Q. Mr. Brown, your answers are much too elaborate. I would have
17 enjoyed them immensely had I had enough time. Now, let me ask you this:
18 Did you analyse how our judicial system operated, and did you find that
19 there was any instance in which a group that had committed a war crime
20 evaded Prosecution? Was that also a part of your remit?
21 A. No, it wasn't part of the remit I set myself when I wrote the
22 report. There were a very small number of incidents very much at the low
23 level that I did see in the Banja Luka area. I think there was an
24 incident in Kljuc or Sanski Most municipality, I forget, in which
25 low-ranking soldiers were prosecuted for an incident. It may well have
1 been the school in Kljuc or it may have been two incidents. These are
2 the only ones I really remember.
3 In relation to the prosecution of soldiers for war crimes, I did
4 not see that in -- in any significance at all. And even when there was
5 incidences in the Krajina Corps reports clearly indicating that there'd
6 been criminal activity, I did not see the prosecution of members of the
7 Krajina Corps.
8 For example, in the incident in Vecici in November 2000 -- 1992,
9 where daily combat reports of the corps -- or a daily combat of the
10 corps [sic] reported the massacre of captured members from the village of
11 Vecici by members of the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade, I saw no
12 investigation on that. I did not see any reference in the documents I
13 reviewed that the commander of the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade was
14 investigated or prosecuted, nor did I see the operations group commander
15 above him investigated or prosecuted, nor did I see any staff member of
16 the 1st Krajina Corps, nor General Talic, investigated or prosecuted.
17 And I -- and there are other examples of either retaliatory action or --
18 which is referenced in the Krajina Corps, involving the killing of
19 individuals, and I never saw any senior commander in the Krajina Corps
20 being prosecuted for war crimes.
21 Q. So you never saw any evidence to the effect that our courts did
22 operate and did their job. Did you seek to find such evidence? And can
23 you please give me short answers. Did you look for this particular
24 evidence, and was the subject of your expert report the sanctioning of
25 the crimes?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nikolic.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, I'm not objecting. I just want
3 to -- I do object, actually, to the constant calls to make -- for the
4 witness to make his answers shorter. The witness is giving fairly
5 nuanced answers to some complex questions and trying to explain his
6 answers carefully, so I don't think these have been unfairly long
8 THE WITNESS: I was aware of material taken from the Banja Luka
9 Military Court and was able to review that material. I didn't see
10 anything in that material, apart from a small number - and I'd have to go
11 back in the details, it was a long time ago - a small number of cases
12 very much at the low level, and I think only in two areas. I think one
13 in Sanski Most and this incident in Kljuc. And even reviewing those
14 materials, it didn't seem that there was any substantive punishment or
15 follow -- follow-through with the investigation. So in answer to your
16 question did I look for it, yes. In reviewing the materials that was
17 seized from the Banja Luka Military Court, did I see any significant
18 prosecutions for war crimes? No. General Talic remained as the corps
19 commander until the end of the war and afterwards, and in fact, I
20 believe, became commander of the VRS. And I didn't see any examples of
21 brigade or senior-level commanders in the Krajina Corps being prosecuted
22 or investigated even, I believe, for war crimes.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Brown, are you a jurist?
25 A. I'm not quite sure what the question is, but a jurist, no.
1 Q. Thank you. But as an officer, you know that a commander can be
2 prosecuted for having ordered something or for failing to undertake
3 preventive measures before the fact or prosecution measures after the
4 fact; is that correct?
5 A. It's not just an officer, Mr. Karadzic. I believe it's members
6 of the -- of the VRS. But, yes, it's not just the fact that they order
7 something, but they fail to take steps to prevent it or do nothing
8 afterwards having known that an incident has occurred.
9 I'm not an expert on RS law, however.
10 Q. Did you find any officer from the 1st Krajina Corps who have done
11 something like that, that he either committed a crime or failed to
12 prevent it or failed to take steps and that he avoided prosecution? Can
13 you show us any specific document that would show this?
14 A. Well, I think I can highlight documents from the
15 1st Krajina Corps that reference incidents that would seem to be of a
16 criminal nature. The daily combat report, I believe it's on the
17 4th of November, in relation to Vecici and Kotor Varos claims that there
18 was a massacre of captured prisoners from Vecici by members of the
19 Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade.
20 There was a reference - and I'd have to look at my report - off
21 the top of my head, in relation to Celinac. I believe it references the
22 Celinac Light Infantry Brigade as killing, I believe, five Muslims in --
23 as reprisals for an event that had occurred somewhere else against
24 VRS soldiers.
25 I am aware of a reference from Manjaca camp in which a prisoner
1 was beaten to death, Omer Filipovic, and -- and --
2 Q. Yes. Thank you. Now, was the perpetrator of this particular
3 crime ever tried?
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, I think that the question opened the
5 door to the references that you can tell us where there was a failure to
6 prevent or punish or prosecute, and the witness was answering the
7 question of those cases he's remembered. It's not fair to cut him off
8 just because perhaps Mr. Karadzic didn't like the answer.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I --
10 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic.
12 Do you wish to continue, Mr. Brown?
13 THE WITNESS: Only to conclude that in those three examples that
14 I remember, I do not see any references to the 1st -- the 1st Krajina
15 Corps collection, nor do I remember in the Banja Luka Military Courts
16 commander of the 1st -- the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade being
17 prosecuted for -- or -- or members of his brigade. I don't remember the
18 Celinac Light Infantry Brigade commander, nor members of his brigade,
19 being prosecuted. I do not remember the camp commander at Manjaca,
20 Colonel Popovic, being held accountable for the prisoners under his care,
21 and he certainly was in his -- in position as camp commander at the end
22 of 1992 when the camp was closed after the release of all the prisoners
23 that we talked about last week.
24 I mean, those are three examples that I know. And I certainly
25 don't see any of the staff officers of the Krajina Corps being held
1 accountable for the actions of those in those brigades.
2 There may be other examples in the report, but those are the ones
3 I remember off the top of my head.
4 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Brown, this is not the answer to my
5 question. My question was, have you ever found any document in which the
6 Krajina Corps issued an order to commit a crime or issued an order to
7 cover up a crime? If in their combat report they report about crimes
8 being committed, you can't call it a cover-up; right?
9 A. Maybe if I break your question down. Do I know of any documents
10 in which the Krajina Corps issued an order to commit a crime. I'm not
11 sure I do. I'd have to go and look at all the footnotes, but I'm not
12 sure I do.
13 Do I know of any documents which indicate to me that they tried
14 to cover up a crime. Yes. In particular, the Vecici killings in
15 Kotor Varos in November. There's a series of documents discussing this
16 incident, and it's reported as a brutal massacre by members of the
17 Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade on one day, and the following day is
18 reported in a combat report as combat casualties. And bearing in mind
19 that I didn't see anyone from the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade
20 investigated, from the documents I reviewed and was able to review, one
21 could draw the conclusion that they knew a massacre had happened against
22 prisoners who had been captured from the village of Vecici. It was
23 initially reported that it was a brutal massacre, highlighting the unit
24 that had been involved in that massacre, and then the following day
25 reported as combat casualties, and the subsequent senior commanders were
1 never replaced, as far as I'm aware, as a result of that incident. So,
2 yes, that is one.
3 There are other references in the Krajina Corps documents
4 about -- well, probably -- almost one last week about the -- thank
5 goodness the international community didn't hear about the killing on
6 Mount Vlasic. So -- but certainly in the Kotor Varos case, I would
7 classify that as something of a cover-up.
8 If I may add, also, that it may well be that in relation to
9 Manjaca there was a knowledge, at least looking at the documents -- some
10 of the documents from Manjaca, that there was an awareness that
11 conditions were poor, people were being -- individuals were being abused,
12 that many people in there didn't deserve to be there, and yet during the
13 visits of the ICRC, Mr. Mazowiecki, for example, there seemed to be an
14 indication that, you know, "We're not going to --" that these people are
15 here on some other mission and there is no admission that those
16 conditions -- or about those conditions. So whether that's a cover-up or
17 just being not -- not being completely honest about the conditions
18 there, I ...
19 Q. Well, sir, you see, I'll try to put simple questions. I'll cite
20 an example of Manjaca. There the warden or the commander or one of his
21 men sent a letter to the municipality saying that they had people there
22 who had not taken part in combat, and he said he had no documents about
23 them, and yet we had a witness here from Manjaca who confirmed that these
24 documents were late.
25 Do you understand that from Vecici and from Manjaca that the
1 first information received may well be inaccurate, and by the time a
2 second report is in the pipeline the information is already much more
3 accurate? Do you understand that possibility?
4 If you read a first report which says that there are some people
5 who shouldn't be detained and, by the token of the same report,
6 additional documentation is sought, have you ever had occasion to see a
7 second report as a follow-up advising on the arrival of the requested
9 A. Well, that -- that may well be the case, but certainly in the
10 documents that I was shown in relation to Manjaca it wasn't just one
11 reference. There were a number of references. And there are a number of
12 references in the 1st Krajina Corps reports also indicating to the
13 Main Staff that -- maybe it's not specific to Manjaca, but in detention
14 centres there are many people who didn't deserve to be there.
15 There is a document at the end of August, 22nd of August, which
16 is sent from the forward command post to Prijedor, something of an
17 intelligence report, which discusses -- it's referenced in my -- my --
18 Q. We'll get to the details.
19 A. If I can finish.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Karadzic, do not interrupt the witness,
22 Yes, Mr. Brown.
23 THE WITNESS: This is a document which is referenced in my
24 report, dated the 22nd of August, discussing the issue of camps in the
25 Prijedor area, and they indicate that individuals are washing their hands
1 of detention centres and passing -- attempting to pass on responsibility
2 for the killing of Muslims, or civilians, and the ordering of the killing
3 of civilians in those camps, and this document also makes mention that
4 they're in essence feeling the cost of what they call the needless
5 spilling of blood and the incarceration of individuals who didn't deserve
6 to be there or at least who took no -- who had done nothing against the
7 Serbian state.
8 So it's not just one or two Manjaca documents that indicate that
9 there were individuals in those detention centres who didn't deserve to
10 be there. Some of those references found their way into the main --
11 1 Krajina Corps daily combat reports and were sent up to the Main Staff.
12 And there are other documents, including this one of the 22nd of August,
13 which seems to imply that it is known externally to the corps that there
14 are many people in the detention camps, some who have been killed, who
15 had not taken any -- or who were not against the Serbian state and yet
16 they were still in those places.
17 Q. Sir, you found it in the documents of the 1st Krajina Corps which
18 went from the lower-ranking units up to the Main Staff. Would you call
19 that covering up? Yes or no? I guess you can answer in that way.
20 A. In relation to the Vecici, certainly it went to the Main Staff.
21 Nothing seems to have happened. Nothing came back down from the
22 Main Staff. There was no apparent obvious investigation from the
23 documents that I saw.
24 In relation to Manjaca camp, was it closed because of the
25 conditions and because of the knowledge that large numbers of people
1 didn't deserve to be there? No. It was closed at the end of the year,
2 some five or six months after it was established. It's not for me to say
3 whether it's a cover-up particularly. All I can say is this seems to be
4 what the document said. In a number of cases there were specific
5 examples of killings of non-Serbs by identified units in the
6 1st Krajina Corps. And that's aside from other references more generic
7 about destruction of property or movements out of individuals. But there
8 were some specific examples identifying units that have been involved in
9 killings in which I did not see anyone being prosecuted. I leave it to
10 others to decide whether that's couched as a cover-up or whatever. All
11 I'm saying is this is what I saw from some of the documents in the
12 Krajina Corps.
13 Q. And I say, Mr. Brown, that your knowledge as regards that is
14 basically none. Why should Colonel Popovic be tried for Manjaca?
15 A. I'm not a lawyer, Dr. Karadzic. It's not for me to decide why or
16 what someone might be tried for. All I'm saying in relation to Manjaca
17 was that it was established by the 1st Krajina Corps. It received a
18 large number of prisoners predominantly from other detention sites, such
19 as Omarska and some in Sanski Most. It was commanded and run by
20 Colonel Popovic under the auspices of the 1st Krajina Corps. The
21 documents that I've reviewed indicate that conditions were poor, that it
22 was known by the Krajina Corps that conditions were poor. It was known
23 that a large number of people in Manjaca didn't deserve to be there.
24 There are other indications that beatings took place. And certainly in
25 the case of Omer Filipovic, not long after an ICRC visit he was beaten to
1 death. The ICRC report reported and quoted in a 1st Krajina Corps
2 document that conditions were poor, that they saw fresh traces of blood,
3 they weren't allowed to speak to all the people that they asked to, and
4 that they had concerns about the camps and the prisoners within it.
5 I'm aware from the Krajina Corps that Mr. Mazowiecki, who was
6 there, from the documents, at least, on a humanitarian mission and
7 presumably being a senior UN figure, had wanted to visit the camp. It
8 must have come to his attention --
9 Q. I must interrupt you. I apologise. My question was specific.
10 Why do you refer in today's transcript twice to the fact that
11 Colonel Popovic was not tried? What crime was he, according to you,
12 supposed to have been tried? You mentioned Omer Filipovic; is that
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, he was explaining the reason why he
15 referred to Colonel Popovic.
16 Please continue, Mr. Brown.
17 THE WITNESS: Colonel Popovic, Your Honours, was the commander of
18 that camp, and he came under the authority of the 1st Krajina Corps. The
19 contextual background I've highlighted in relation to Manjaca camp is
20 from the documents that I've seen from the 1st Krajina Corps. And based
21 on those documents it would strike me that at best Colonel Popovic had a
22 case to answer about the conditions in that camp, the treatment of the
23 prisoners over an extended period, for others to decide whether that is
24 accurate, what law may apply, but it would strike me, as my experience,
25 that a former officer, on looking at the documents, that Colonel Popovic
1 certainly had a case to answer in relation to Manjaca camp, the
2 conditions there that were known through the documents that I've
3 reviewed, contemporaneous, 1st Krajina Corps documents. And it may not
4 be just Colonel Popovic. Colonel -- Colonel -- Major-General Talic sat
5 above him. And, again, it may be for others to decide, but it strikes me
6 there's at least a case to answer that that camp was not a healthy place
7 to be. He ran it, and he was aware that conditions were poor and that
8 bad things were going on inside that camp.
9 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient, Mr. Karadzic, we'll have a
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I put just one question. We
12 haven't run the course of the full 90 minutes.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Brown, did you know that at Manjaca there were only two cases
15 of death, three due to natural causes and two were violent deaths, and
16 that in the case of those two violent deaths people were prosecuted? Did
17 you know that the killer of Omer Filipovic was called to -- be called
18 before a court?
19 A. I'm not aware of that. That certainly didn't seem to be the case
20 in 1992. It may well have been the case a long time afterwards. But
21 it's not solely the fact that Filipovic and one other were killed there,
22 but that conditions were poor.
23 Q. I'm not asking you that. I'm not asking you that. Your desire
24 to expand, Mr. Brown, will result in your testimony lasting for a week.
25 Please answer my questions. You --
1 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, the witness is answer your
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. -- are biased.
5 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, that's not a question. That's an
6 accusation. Dr. Karadzic --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question --
8 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, if you ask elaborate questions of
9 an expert witness, you are going to get elaborate answers. The first
10 rule of cross-examination, as Mr. Robinson will no doubt tell you, is do
11 not ask a question to which you do not want to know the answer.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was simple: Did he
13 know they were prosecuted, that the killers were tried? Why would
14 Popovic have to stand a trial when the killers did?
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, put your question one at a time.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what I asked. I was just
17 trying to explain Judge Morrison that my question was simple.
18 May we have this admitted, the one on the screen?
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether witness answered the question.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He said he didn't take this
21 document into account. That's not for me. He should have.
22 JUDGE KWON: So you didn't know that anybody was prosecuted for
23 what happened in Manjaca camp?
24 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour, I'm not.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. And we are talking about 65 ter 1090,
1 Mr. Karadzic. That will be admitted.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1933, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll take a break for 25 minutes and resume at
4 10 past 4.00.
5 [The witness stands down]
6 --- Recess taken at 3.43 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 4.13 p.m.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I just wanted to get back
10 to you as quickly as possible regarding your inquiry concerning KDZ084
11 and the videolink.
12 JUDGE KWON: Shall we go into private session?
13 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry. I thought we began in -- my big
14 mistake -- my mistake.
15 [Private session]
11 Page 21715 redacted. Private session.
25 [Open session]
1 JUDGE KWON: Thanks to the kind understanding and co-operation of
2 the Haradinaj Chamber, we have become able to sit in the morning
3 tomorrow, as well as on the morning of Monday, 28th of November, next
4 week. So I appreciate it very much.
5 Let's bring in the witness.
6 And as we discussed during the private session, we will interpose
7 the next witness's evidence with this witness.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE KWON: Probably I have to inquire of you, Mr. Brown. Due
10 to some circumstances regarding the next witness, we have just decided to
11 interpose her evidence with your evidence. We expect to be able to
12 finish your evidence tomorrow, but there may be a possibility that you
13 have to stay till Thursday. Would it be okay with you, Mr. Brown?
14 THE WITNESS: It would be a pleasure, sir.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for your kind understanding.
16 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Brown, I'm an amateur in matters of law, and therefore I do
20 find it easy to believe that my questions are not sufficiently focussed.
21 In any case, I would still like to ask you to answer as briefly as
22 possible, and I will try to be more focused.
23 In paragraph 1.43, you said that, generally speaking:
24 [As read] "... Karadzic was discussing the separation of members
25 of different ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (as opposed to
1 potential -- a potential division between the ethnic communities in the
2 newly created Serbian state) ..."
3 In other words, you are aware of the fact that it was one thing
4 to separate the ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and another to
5 separate them in Republika Srpska; is that correct?
6 A. Yes, I accept that there can be two -- two questions, one which
7 is the division of Bosnia into separate states and one of the separation
8 of the communities within RS territory.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, before you go further, I have to make
10 a correction from my statement.
11 We'll be sitting in the afternoon next week, Monday, not in the
12 morning. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Then you go on to say that I clearly indicated that movements of
16 population are mandatory in the territory of the SRBiH, and you add that
17 I said, We do not want to get a state which has a huge number of those
18 who are against that state.
19 Further below, you explain that certain deputies mentioned Sweden
20 and Norway.
21 I'll go back to the first part -- no, the second part first. Did
22 you know that before the war there was a suggestion for the entire
23 Yugoslavia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, that a so-called model of the
24 Scandinavian states should be introduced, and were you aware of what such
25 a model would entail?
1 A. Mr. Karadzic, maybe if I break your question up because there are
2 a number of issues here.
3 I don't say it's -- in this -- in the paragraph that movements of
4 populations are mandatory in the territory. I say:
5 "Although, at face value, it may have appeared that Karadzic was
6 discussing the separation of the national groupings within Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina more widely (as opposed potentially to the separation of
8 ethnic groups in the new Serb state) he clearly did indicate that
9 resettlement from within the SRBiH territory would be required.
10 Karadzic, himself, declared that 'We do not want to get a state which has
11 a huge number of those who are against that state' ..."
12 And I believe there is at least another one reference on a
13 similar -- in a similar area that you make.
14 The second section. I am not aware of a model of Scandinavian
15 states would be introduced into -- into Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina. All I'm saying is that the delegate who makes reference to
17 that, I believe, made reference - I'd have to check the notes again - to
18 the fact that the separation, I think in Sweden -- between Sweden and
19 Norway took a long time, and the resettlement of the population as part
20 of that took a long time. But in relation to your second question about
21 was I aware of this model of Scandinavian states should be introduced, I
22 was not.
23 Q. Thank you. There were official proposals at the level of
24 Yugoslavia that Scandinavisation be carried out, i.e., that we part ways
25 the way the Scandinavian countries did and that borders be arranged as
1 well as a certain period of time be left to those who wished to opt which
2 country they wanted to reside in. Were you aware of that?
3 A. No, I was not aware that.
4 Q. Thank you. On Friday we discussed the fact that you noticed I
5 was against megalomania in territorial terms. My proposition now is
6 this: When I said that we cannot have a state with many living in it who
7 are against it, it was actually my recommendation that we should be more
8 modest in terms of territorial requests.
9 What would you say to that?
10 A. I would certainly agree, from the reading of the minutes, that
11 there are delegates who want significantly larger territory and that you
12 caution against that. And I believe there might even be other references
13 outside this Assembly session to that -- to that effect. I'll leave the
14 issue of modesty to others, but it would seem that others were wanting
15 more and that you were advocating against that in certain areas.
16 Q. Thank you. We have a sentence here which I dispute. Apparently
17 you say that I stated that there should be movements of population in the
18 territory of the SRBiH. Did it only entail Republika Srpska or was this
19 supposed to mean that people were to be moved from the RS to the other
20 two entities and back?
21 A. I think in the 16th Assembly session there's reference that Serbs
22 inside BiH territory will -- this resettlement process will include the
23 Serbs being -- being moved into -- into the territory of the RS, and I
24 think there's even a reference by one of the delegates that we should be
25 prepared for that and make preparations because it will involve people
1 moving away from their -- their hearths or their territory.
2 It's also of note, I think, that General Mladic, at the end when
3 he speaks, certainly makes two references, it would appear, to indicate
4 that he himself sees what is being discussed is about the movement of the
5 population. In that way he says that people are not keys in pockets that
6 can be moved from one place to another. I think he makes a reference to
7 that people are not like a sieve, where some can fall through and others
8 stay. And he warns, or appears to warn from the minutes, that, you know,
9 what is going to be -- I think his phrase is genocide, actually.
10 So in answering your question, it isn't simply about the movement
11 of population within RS territory. I think there is an expectation that
12 Serbs inside BiH territory will move into RS territory. And there are
13 other references in documents which seem to indicate that too.
14 Q. Thank you. Have you read this intercept of my conversation with
15 Mr. Milosevic, President Milosevic, where I say that some Croat
16 representatives suggested that the population be resettled, and I said
17 that that was nebulous and a terrible thing that had to be avoided?
18 A. No, I'm not aware of that intercept, Mr. Karadzic.
19 Q. Thank you. Did you see my press conference on the 3rd of May
20 when I returned from the Brussels conference and when I was asked by
21 journalists what would happen with the borders of those who will not be
22 within their own units, whether there's going to be resettlement, and I
23 said we do not envisage, nor do we recommend resettlement; we propose
24 reciprocal protection of rights?
25 Have you seen that press conference, and have you included it?
1 A. I've not seen the press conference. I would like to see it. And
2 it is not included in the report. What was stated in the press, if
3 that's an accurate depiction, I do not see replicated in the -- certainly
4 the 16th Assembly session and some of the other military documents that
5 I've reviewed. It may well be that what was being discussed in the press
6 was for one audience and what was being discussed elsewhere was for
8 Q. Well, I believe that this comment is out of order. Why does
9 every sentence have to be repeated on each and every occasion, Mr. Brown?
10 This is a publicly stated view of the leadership.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have --
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the number.
13 JUDGE KWON: Could you tell the number again.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1410, page 21, towards the bottom
15 of the page. Twenty-one in e-court and then the bottom of the page.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Since there is no translation, allow me to read it out to you.
18 "At the press conference, in response to a question put by the
19 journalist, How many people should be resettled if there were to be a
20 final separation, Dr. Karadzic answered, 'We have not been counting on
21 resettlement, nor do we recommend that. According to our calculations,
22 only 12 to 15 per cent of the population on every side would remain
23 outside the borders of there respective communities. We suggest that
24 they be protected on the basis of a principle of reciprocity and that
25 they enjoy all rights enshrined in international conventions. As for
1 application and protection of that right, the European institutions would
2 take care of that in a role of a supervisor.'"
3 And that was published in the "Borba" newspaper --
4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the date.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Were you aware of this position of mine?
7 A. I'm not aware of this media statement, Mr. Karadzic, and I can
8 only say that this would not seem to be what happened in the days and
9 weeks and months after this statement, if that's a statement that was
10 made in early May.
11 Q. Mr. Brown, if I tell you that there was not and single place in
12 Republika Srpska where there were no Muslims and that there were entire
13 villages that no one had touched, what do you say to that? Did you know
14 about that?
15 A. I don't know the ethnic breakdown of all the areas in the RS. I
16 don't doubt that there may well have been some non-Serbs who stayed there
17 for a period of time for whatever reason or -- but it would seem to be
18 that a large number, a significantly large number in the Krajina area
19 didn't, but I don't doubt that there were non-Serbs who -- who did stay,
20 even through the -- the whole of the war.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted? This is from
23 Smilja Avramov's book. I think that we've already displayed that. It's
24 a quote from the "Borba" daily newspaper though.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, can I hear from you on this?
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, Your Honour, at least it should be marked at
2 the moment since we don't have a translation. I'd like to take a look at
3 it first. The witness did comment on it and stated it didn't appear to
4 be -- reflect what he saw happening and didn't know anything about it,
5 but I don't have any strong objection to it coming in. I'm not sure why
6 the actual article isn't submitted instead of a excerpt or summary. Or I
7 don't know if it's -- if it's verbatim or reprint or what, so it's hard
8 to respond.
9 JUDGE KWON: That was my question as well, Mr. Karadzic. You
10 couldn't locate "Borba" article?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My associates are looking for it.
12 We'll get it some day. But at any rate, this is an historian, a lady who
13 is world renowned, and she included this in her book.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber will not receive this
16 book. Even if -- suppose even if we have an English translation, we
17 have -- we have no idea whether -- while we do not doubt the integrity of
18 the author, but we are not sure whether she correctly reflected what you
19 said in the media interview.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'm going to take a look. I'm
21 going to try to find the text in "Borba" that was quoted. I hope that
22 then it can be received.
23 Can we please go back to the previous document, the amalgamated
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In this same paragraph do you agree that it says -- I mean this
2 MP says, We do not have that solution in this option, the one that has to
3 do with resettlement?
4 Paragraph 1.43. I believe it's on the next page.
5 [In English] "If it is a state border, it is -- intrinsically
6 implies moving of a continent of population. Within the present option,
7 we do not have this solution."
8 [Interpretation] Isn't that right; that's what he said?
9 A. Can I just look at the whole quote from Mr. Milojevic for a
11 Q. What it says here is "implies," goes without saying. That's what
12 is said in respect of resettlement; right? And all of this is being said
13 by the same man who referred to Norway and Sweden; right?
14 A. No, it's a different man, Mr. Karadzic. Professor Milojevic was
15 the one who -- is footnote 58, and the man who talked about Sweden and
16 Norway was, I believe, Trifko Radic.
17 Q. All right. But that is what was stated there, We do not have
18 this solution within the present option. Right?
19 A. Yes, but I -- that's what's in the minutes, but if you look at
20 the whole quote and the whole reference to the paragraph,
21 Professor Milojevic, he is saying -- in fact, maybe it's easier if I read
22 it out.
23 "I would like to suggest there is no doubt that there will be
24 the option of war and then negotiations, that we cannot expect solutions
25 from negotiations only, that negotiations can only represent a
1 modification of the success at war and of war solutions, which implies
2 that we would have to have a map of our own. A border agreed between the
3 political and military leadership of our republic, one thoroughly
4 assessed, and I might add, kept a secret. Divulge it to no one, but each
5 and every general must know this border, and the political leadership
6 should keep this map as a potential negotiating chip. But this map needs
7 to be mastered within a closed circle of people, presented to the
8 deputies, but it is -- but it probably should be kept secret. And
9 secondly, because of the war option which was imposed on us, initially we
10 had been discussing some more peaceful options. This way we aim for a
11 state border. If it's a state border intrinsically implies moving a
12 contingent of the population. Within the present option we do not have
13 the solution."
14 I think what he's saying is that if we continue to negotiate we
15 won't have this solution of resettlement, but if we have the first
16 option, which is war, we will decide what our borders are, we can keep
17 those borders secret, we don't tell anyone, and we use it as a
18 negotiating chip. And if we set those borders, that that will
19 intrinsically imply the moving of people within those borders. I think
20 that's what Professor Milojevic is stating when he spoke at the Assembly
22 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Professor Milojevic is a professor
23 of economics, an economist? He is not a member of parliament. He is an
24 expert in economic affairs.
25 A. I don't know details about Professor Milojevic.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you know that on the 9th of June, in spite of his
2 advice that the envisaged borders be kept secret, we decided to send to
3 the European Community, to the negotiators at the conference, the six
4 strategic objectives and maps?
5 A. I am not aware of that being sent to the European Community. I'm
6 not aware that it would have been couched in those phrases. What does
7 seem to be evident is that the goals were announced at the 16th Assembly
8 session. It is possible that the meeting on the 6th of June in which
9 there seem to be a plotting of borders in some detail may well have been
10 the borders that were set in discussions in the European Community. But
11 I'm not aware of the details and the political negotiations that went on
12 with the European Community at that time.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D428. Can we take a brief look at
14 that, please.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Did you have any insight into the transcripts of the meetings of
17 the Presidency, the Assembly, the government? Have you seen these
18 minutes, for instance? There's got to be a translation.
19 Look at paragraph 10, to make public the strategic goals and map
20 of the Serbian BH and to have this sent to the European Community.
21 A. That's what it says in the minutes. That may well have been the
22 case. It would seem to, if that was true, seem to imply that the
23 strategic goals were of some importance. And as I say, this comes three
24 days after the meeting that's noted in Mladic's diary, which seems to be
25 quite a significant or at least a long meeting. And at one stage there's
1 briefing of a map and it would seem to be plotting out territory that
2 could well be the footprint articulated in the strategic goals. That's
3 what the minutes say. It may well be that they were sent to the
4 European Community. But it does seem to me important that the strategic
5 goals were that footprint that RS territory was to contain as articulated
6 in those goals.
7 And maybe they were sent to the European Community or it's
8 referenced here because those were the goals that you wanted to achieve
9 concurrently with what was going on with the VRS and in the international
10 community with negotiations with the EC and others.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you know that this map of Republika Srpska does
12 not basically differ from the first map that was offered by
13 Ambassador Cutileiro?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could these -- could this please be
15 put on the ELMO. We haven't uploaded the map in colour, so could this
16 please be placed on the ELMO.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. The 22nd of February. On that date it was agreed that more or
19 less this is what the units are going to look like.
20 Mr. Brown, do you know where the rivers Una, Sava, Drina, and
21 Neretva are here? Is it correct that Una is on the western border of
22 this darker area, Sava on the north, Drina on the east, and Neretva in
23 the middle?
24 A. Yes, generically. It's been some time since I looked at a
25 detailed map of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but generically those rivers are in
1 those areas that you've just mentioned.
2 Q. Do you agree that what is envisaged here are a few enclaves that
3 do -- that are not contiguous? Cazinska Krajina, the Bihac pocket. Then
4 in the middle, this white area, is Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc,
5 Muslim municipalities, parts of Muslim municipalities, that is. Then
6 over here, the Serb municipality in Ozren. And here by Sarajevo, east of
7 Sarajevo, there is Romanija and Birac. In the Drina valley, there is
8 Muslim territory.
9 You know where the Drina is, don't you? It's on the very east.
10 A. Yes, I know where the Drina River is. I don't --
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, just a second.
12 Yes, Mr. Nikolic.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: No objection. It's not clear to me what actually
14 is being represented to be on this ELMO at the moment is ... the question
16 "Do you know that this map of Republika Srpska does not basically
17 differ from the first map that was offered by Ambassador Cutileiro?" I
18 don't know what map we're looking at, unless we missed it, and what this
19 is from.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was published in "Glas" on the
22 23rd of February, whereas on the 22nd of February what was agreed upon
23 was that this map is the basis for the building of the three entities.
24 This map shows that the western boundaries of Republika Srpska are
25 supposed to be on the Una, the northern ones on the Sava, the eastern
1 ones on the Drina, and there is Muslim territory along the Drina River,
2 and on the Neretva it is the southern border.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. So my question is: Do you see that the European Community
5 recognised that the right bank of the Una is populated by Serbs and that
6 the strategic objectives, except for the corridor, correspond to what is
7 on this map, that there is no major difference in respect of what was
8 already offered to us on the 22nd of February?
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours --
10 JUDGE KWON: I don't think that's an explanation that
11 Mr. Nicholls wanted. What --
12 Mr. Nicholls, could you be --
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Well --
14 JUDGE KWON: -- of assistance?
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, it is not in evidence that this map
16 was agreed to or represents what the European Union Community had
17 recognised. It may be Mr. Karadzic's position that this map from the
18 "Glas" newspaper reflects what was -- something -- I'm not sure exactly
19 what's saying, but --
20 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I'm not sure whether
21 this is -- this document itself is "Glas" article also.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Then I misunderstood Mr. Karadzic. I thought he
23 was saying this is -- we're looking at something from "Glas."
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a map that was published in
25 all the media on the 23rd of February as the proposal of the
1 European Community as a basis -- we have it in the documents.
2 JUDGE KWON: Tell us what document -- what this is -- this
3 document is about.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a map that was published in
5 the media the day after the agreement had been reached.
6 JUDGE KWON: No, the book itself.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh. This is a survey of news
8 published in "Glas." It's a chronology. But it's also contained in
9 Lord Owen's book. We can find it in several books. It is an indubitable
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: And just to clarify the objection: That -- that
13 doesn't alter the fact that Mr. Karadzic is putting a proposition to the
14 witness as fact which has not been established -- okay.
15 JUDGE KWON: No. We'll come to that later on, but I want to
16 establish what this document is about. It is not a "Glas" newspaper
17 article. It is a -- it may be a compilation of news, but I don't know
18 what it is about. You should put a proper foundation to put your
19 question to the witness. And then it's improper to -- to put the
20 witness, which witness cannot confirm, such as the argument that this map
21 has been agreed to, as Mr. Nicholls and Tieger indicated.
22 Let us continue, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not going to tender this now.
24 We have this in several documents. I'm just asking the witness whether
25 he is aware that the first map that was offered to us recognised the
1 boundaries on the Sava, Drina, Neretva, and Una and that was envisaged
2 were enclaves that were not contiguous.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Before the war, without the war, do you understand that we
5 accepted this?
6 A. It is -- it is -- I'm aware that, in relation to the negotiations
7 in early 1992, the Cutileiro Plan and European Union negotiations
8 suggested the cantonisement of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that those would
9 be -- those cantons would be based on Bosniak, Croat, or Serb -- Serb
10 areas and they -- that there was a map or maybe even a series of maps in
11 relation to the negotiations around that period. The Cutileiro Plan, as
12 I'm aware, allowed for those cantons to be -- to be administered in those
13 areas with a weaker centralised Bosnian government. It may well have
14 been that some of the boundaries of some of the cantons were along the
15 rivers as you note, in part because some of the rivers are -- form the
16 boundary between -- for example, Sava River forms a boundary between
17 Croatia in part. The Drina in part forms a boundary with Serbia. So
18 there are these national issues too.
19 I do not believe that the strategic goals and the territory
20 encompassed within those matched exactly the Cutileiro Plan at all. The
21 Posavina was different. I believe the issue with Sarajevo was different.
22 And the desire to control the whole of the Drina valley, as articulated
23 in the strategic goals, seems different than the Cutileiro Plan.
24 I don't know of the negotiations around the Cutileiro Plan, what
25 was agreed, what was a proposal, what was accepted, and obviously it did
1 not come to fruition, but I do not support your assertion that the
2 strategic goals as articulated on the 12th of May were in some way simply
3 a replication of the Cutileiro Plan. I would accept that some of the
4 boundaries overlapped in both the Cutileiro Plan and the strategic goals,
5 but not in entirety.
6 Q. Well, again, I kindly ask you to give answers that are as short
7 as possible.
8 Do you agree that the corridor was requested only once the war
9 broke out? It is not on the first map. Do you agree? The request to
10 have a corridor appeared only when the war broke out. If you look at the
11 first map, you will see that there is no corridor. Yes or no?
12 A. I believe, in relation to the Cutileiro map, from what I
13 remember, that many of the corridor municipalities were Croat or
14 Bosniak -- [overlapping speakers]
15 Q. That's not what I'm asking you. I'm asking you a simple
16 question. Did we request a corridor before the war, or did we put this
17 forth as an imperative only after the war started? It's a simple issue.
18 When did the corridor appear for the first time? It was on the
19 12th of May, as late as that.
20 A. I don't know what you requested as part of the Cutileiro map or
21 the negotiations. I don't know what happened and whether Cutileiro
22 themselves proposed that that was territory that actually was Croat. So
23 whether you requested it in the Cutileiro negotiations, I have no idea.
24 It may well be that you didn't, but it may well be that you did but that
25 Cutileiro decided that based on the ethnicity of the corridor areas that
1 was going to be a different cantonment. I don't know. There had been
2 some references, I believe, in some of the Assembly sessions about the
3 importance of the corridor area well before the 12th of May, and I would
4 certainly accept that military events in the corridor area in March when
5 the Croats took control of certain key areas did -- did mean that
6 Bosnian Serbs were not in control of the corridor, and I mention that in
7 the report. But I can't answer your question simply because I don't know
8 the negotiations that went on around Cutileiro and whether you requested
9 a corridor but it was denied to you or whether you accepted that that was
10 going to be an area that --
11 Q. But you don't know whether we did request it either. My question
12 refers to the map. Do you know that in February we accepted the map
13 without the corridor?
14 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour --
15 JUDGE KWON: No. It's not for the witness -- to testify whether
16 you accepted or not.
17 But, Mr. Brown, you confirm, can you not, that in the map itself
18 that such corridors were not reflected?
19 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honour. It was cantoned, I
20 believe, for Croats.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Secondly, a moment ago you said that in our six strategic
25 objectives we demanded the control of Podrinje. That is not correct. We
1 wanted to have a soft border on the Drina, rather. That's what you said
2 a minute ago, i.e., that you knew that the control of Podrinje was part
3 of the six strategic objectives, and I'm telling you that that is not
4 correct. We envisaged Muslim municipalities in Podrinje, and our third
5 objective said that the border on the Drina should be soft one; in other
6 words, there shouldn't be any border at all.
7 A. Well, Mr. Karadzic, I can only go by what is reported in the
8 minutes of the session, and it says by you: "The third strategic goal is
9 to establish a corridor on the Drina valley, that is, elimination of the
10 Drina as a border between two worlds. We are not -- we are on both sides
11 of the Drina, and our strategic interest and living space are there. We
12 now see a possibility for some Muslim municipalities to be settled along
13 the Drina as enclaves in order for them to achieve their rights, but that
14 belt along the Drina must basically belong to the Serbian Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina. As much as it is of strategic use for us, in a positive way
16 it helps us by damaging the interest of our enemy in establishing a
17 corridor which would connect them to the Muslim international and render
18 this area permanently unstable."
19 I accept that in this reference you countenance the possibility
20 of Muslim enclaves. I don't believe in Cutileiro, in relation to the
21 cantonment, that the Drina envisaged Muslim enclaves in that manner, but
22 it would seem to me from the minutes of the session at least that you
23 believe the Drina valley should be controlled and that you may allow for
24 the existence of some Muslim enclaves in that area. Importantly not just
25 because you wanted to control it but because it denied that area to -- to
1 the enemy as noted here. And I think that looking at the Drina Corps
2 document and operational directive 4 later on in the year, that that
3 position of having enclaves appeared, at least from that series of
4 documents, to have been removed. Because, in operational directive 4
5 there is the reference that the Drina Corps is to -- is to in essence
6 exhaust the Muslim -- Muslims -- Muslim fighters and units in that area
7 and remove them along with the civilian population. So it may well have
8 been your position in -- on the 12th of May that you accepted there could
9 be Muslim enclaves, but I think later in that year that position had
10 changed. And I don't think your view at the 16th Assembly session is the
11 same as the Cutileiro map that was discussed earlier that year.
12 Q. Thank you. But do you know that the Owen-Stoltenberg and the
13 Vance-Owen Plans, both of which I accepted, envisaged Muslim enclaves in
14 Podrinje? Yes or no? What is important to me is to find out what was
15 the basis of your report. Did you take into account both the
16 Owen-Stoltenberg -- Vance-Owen and Cutileiro Plan and that they both
17 envisaged Muslim enclaves and that we accepted that?
18 A. I am not aware of the Owen-Stoltenberg and Vance-Owen Plans, the
19 negotiations that went on surrounding that. It was outside the scope of
20 this report.
21 Q. Thank you. I promised to show you the transcript, for the sake
22 of saving time, to the effect that in January or February, 1993, on the
23 occasion of the Vance-Owen Plan, I explained what the notion of the Drina
24 means and what this third strategic goal entailed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have in e-court, please --
1 we don't have time to watch the video-clip. Instead, can we have 1D4868.
2 Can we please look at the time-line 02:24:12. Page 24 of 33. 24. We
3 can remove the right-hand side. This is page 23. We need 24 -- yes, we
4 do have 24.
5 MR. KARADZIC:
6 Q. Well, you see -- [no interpretation]
7 [In English] "I think that borders in Europe will never be that
8 important, even though they exist -- existence is necessary."
9 [Interpretation] Can you please read it to yourself and look at
10 what it says here, and I also ask all the parties in the proceedings to
11 do the same.
12 Please tell me once you've read it, and then we will move on.
13 A. Yes, I've read it, Mr. Karadzic.
14 Q. Thank you. Can we now have page 31 of 33. Please look at 2 --
15 24 [as interpreted] -- 45:28, where the Drina is being mentioned and
16 where an explanation of this specific strategic goal is provided.
17 Is it clear to you now that this is a reference to border
18 restrictions rather than the unification with Serbia and the removal of
19 the borders altogether? Did you know this?
20 A. I'd have to read the whole document maybe, but I don't see too
21 much of a difference between what was articulated with strategic goal
22 number 3, that we need to control both sides of the border and this is
23 our territory. I don't know when this statement of yours was
24 articulated. It does seem to be that you're indicating that the
25 strategic aims are still important and extant and that it seems to echo
1 what you said in May 1992, that the Drina should be controlled and it
2 was -- both sides of the border were to be controlled.
3 Q. Well, where do you see the word "control"? I'm talking about
4 restrictions, Mr. Brown. Why are you misrepresenting my words? I am
5 here talking about a soft border, not control. And in doing so I
6 mentioned the examples of the European practice and the boarders between
7 Alsace and Lorraine.
8 A. Well, I read it here that:
9 "... we'll never allow the border running along Serbian
10 territories to become real restrictive, although that was the case for a
11 while because of the situation ... economic relationship was such that it
12 had to be imposed, but things will change."
13 One could read that as, "We don't want a border between Serbian
14 lands, Serbian territories." Maybe that echos what you said about the
15 Posavina corridor. It wasn't just important to have the
16 Posavina Corridor because it linked all the territories in Bosnia, but it
17 was important because if you control Posavina, you were able to link the
18 Serb territories in Croatia, the Serb territories in Bosnia, to Serbia
19 itself. So maybe this is another example that we shouldn't have borders
20 between Serb lands.
21 Q. I'm asking you only this: Does it say here that the border
22 shouldn't be a restrictive one, or does it say that we should unite with
23 Serbia? So not to be a restrictive one, or do we unite?
24 A. It deals with the borders. Those borders between Serb
25 territories were not to be restrictive.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic said at the Assembly
2 session, and he agreed with me, that neither on the Una or the Drina any
3 passports would be required and that there wouldn't be any restrictions?
4 Have you ever come across this statement of his?
5 A. No, I haven't.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the two time-lines
8 admitted into evidence. We might as well tender the video-clip, but we
9 don't have the time to show it.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, what is your observation as to the
11 video-clip itself?
12 MR. NICHOLLS: I'd like to see the video-clip. I think - I may
13 be wrong - this is one of the exhibits we got late notice of for use
14 today. I don't -- I don't object to these pages going in.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll admit those two pages.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1934, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll definitely play the video in
18 the future once we have time.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. In your paragraph 2.35, Mr. Brown, persist in suggesting that the
21 target of military operations were populated places, that is to say
22 civilians rather than the Muslim and the Croat armed forces. Is that
23 right? Please look at your paragraph 2.35.
24 [In English] [As read] "In Sanski Most, for example, in late May
25 against the Muslim and Croat inhabited areas were carried out by both
1 6th Brigade and TO units acting in co-operation." Footnote 322.
2 A. Yes, I see that section.
3 Q. Do you understand this to be an attack on populated places and
4 civilians or an attack on the armed forces deployed there and firing from
5 that area?
6 A. Is it possible to see the footnote reference?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the amalgamated
8 statement of the witness, paragraph 2.35, on our screens.
9 JUDGE KWON: I take it you have your report.
10 THE WITNESS: I have, sir, yes.
11 JUDGE KWON: You wanted to see the --
12 THE WITNESS: -- footnote reference 322.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: I believe, Your Honours, it's P03313.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's upload that exhibit.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have it enlarged.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. So what did you conclude on the basis of this? Did you conclude
18 that the target of the attack was the populated place mentioned here and
19 the civilians, or does this document testify about the existence of armed
20 formations, even those who came from Croatia?
21 A. Is it possible to have page 2, please?
22 JUDGE KWON: It is a four-page document. Could we print it. In
23 the meantime, while the witness is reading the document, let us print it
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In item 2 can you see that there is a request for the enemy
2 forces to be disarmed?
3 A. Yes. And I think that would seem to echo the disarmament
4 operations that were going on in other municipalities around at the same
6 Q. Do you know the strength of the Muslim forces deployed in
7 Vrhpolje, Kamengrad, Hrustovo, and other villages around Sanski Most? Do
8 you know their numbers, including those in the very centre of Sanski Most
9 called Mahala?
10 A. No, I don't know the details of the -- of -- of any armed groups
11 in those areas, but I do know that the area was taken control very
12 quickly after shelling and operations by the TO of Sanski Most and the
13 6th Brigade.
14 Q. Do you know that we tolerated their existence up to the point
15 when they launched offensives? And the Muslims themselves are writing
16 this in a book, where they say we decided to go on the offensive, we
17 clashed with them, and we were defeated. Do you know that we tolerated
18 their existence until the 7th of May? For nearly seven weeks of the war
19 we didn't do anything against them because we didn't know what they had
20 at their disposal. Did you know about that?
21 A. I believe the take-over of Sanski Most by Serbian authorities
22 occurred in the middle to late April, and I'm not aware of significant
23 offensives in Sanski Most launched by the non-Serb population and that
24 this was tolerated until -- until the 7th of May. I think Sanski Most is
25 one of those municipalities in which power was taken over, I believe,
1 around about the 18th or 19th of April. I may be wrong a little bit on
2 the timings. And it's also one of those municipalities from the
3 documents that seem to fit with this chain of disarmament. And there was
4 an attack around this period after this order was issued which involved
5 artillery from the 6th Brigade, and control of Mahala was taken very
6 quickly. There were follow-on operations in which Serb soldiers, I
7 believe, did die and there were casualties. That would indicate that the
8 area was not completely unarmed. But again, Sanski Most was -- well, the
9 territory was controlled very quickly within the first few days of June.
10 JUDGE KWON: So having looked at the document, can you answer the
11 original question put by the accused, i.e., -- I'll read it out:
12 "Do you understand this," the paragraph in your report, "this to
13 be an attack on populated placed and civilians or an attack on the armed
14 forces deployed there and firing from that area?"
15 THE WITNESS: Well, it seems to indicate that it's -- they're
16 couching it as armed -- armed groups in there. There are references to
17 artillery preparation in Mahala and other areas, settlements. It may
18 well be that it's both.
19 JUDGE KWON: We'll take a break, Mr. Karadzic, for 25 minutes.
20 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry. Just before we take the break, could I ask
22 the Defence for a copy of the map, the excerpt which they put on the
23 ELMO, which was represented as being part of some kind of "Glas"
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll take a break for --
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. We have a coloured version
2 from books.
3 JUDGE KWON: -- for 25 minutes and resume at ten to 6.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 5.27 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 5.53 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Did you know that before the attack on the Mahala, which was
10 executed by the Serb army in order to deal with the terrorist --
11 terrorists, it was communicated by radio that all civilians should move
12 to the stadium for the duration of combat?
13 A. I was not aware of that, Mr. Karadzic.
14 Q. Thank you. I'd like to refer you to the testimony of
15 Witness Zulic who described it. Do you know that from the places of
16 Hrustovo and others the army actually protected civilians and took them
17 to Tomina, which was in the same municipality? They were simply taken
18 away for the duration of the fights, and they were accommodated in a
19 different part of the municipality in some Muslim houses in Serb
21 A. I was not aware of that. And if that's what the witness says,
22 that's ...
23 Q. Thank you. I'd like to refer you to the statement of
24 (redacted) She described how she was taken to
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at P3601.
2 MR KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. You must know who Colonel Basara was, because you mentioned him.
4 He was commander of the 6th Brigade in Sanski Most; correct?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. While we are waiting for the document, I'd like to ask you this:
7 Did you know that at a certain point in your report you mentioned that
8 brigades were brought in, the 6th Brigade, for example, which was brought
9 to Sanski Most and the 43rd Brigade to Prijedor. Did you know that these
10 municipalities were the home municipalities of those brigades or did you
11 think they were brought in because of some special reason, other reason?
12 A. Dr. Karadzic, I am aware that that was the areas that those
13 brigades came from. But at the time they were redeployed, they were in
14 operations in Western Slavonia. The whole of the 43rd Brigade didn't
15 deploy back to Prijedor, only a part of it. And in essence they were
16 taken out of combat in Western Slavonia to go back to those areas in
17 Prijedor and Sanski Most. But, yes, I'm aware that the brigades were
18 from that area. They weren't sent back, as I am aware, to be stood down
19 or demobilised, but that they were tasked to control the territory;
20 Prijedor in the case of the 43rd Brigade, and Sanski Most in the case of
21 the 6th Brigade.
22 Q. Did you see this document, and did you refer to it in your
23 report? It is a document by Colonel Basara. Have a look at item 1. He
24 orders that the soldiers who were undisciplined and recalcitrant should
25 be sent away. He also orders that all soldiers prone to committing
1 genocide against people unable to conduct an armed struggle must be
2 discharged, et cetera. Have you seen this document previously?
3 A. I'm not sure. I'd have to check my footnotes, Mr. Karadzic.
4 There are lot of documents in the report, and it's been some time since
5 I've looked at it, so I'd have to check. Maybe I can do that this
7 Q. Can we go to the next page. I haven't found any reference of
8 yours to this document. Have a look at item 6. Do you agree, as an
9 officer, that the 6th Brigade commander undertook preventive measures and
10 that he prohibited certain activities and threatened with sanctioning any
11 potential perpetrators of crimes?
12 A. Yes. I mean, the document does seem to indicate that. I have
13 seen, in fairness, a couple of other documents from the corps indicating
14 that they will take similar sanctions. But as I said earlier on, I don't
15 think I saw too many examples where sanctions were -- were indeed taken.
16 Q. I can only regretfully note that, Mr. Brown, but the Chamber did
17 observe that not a single incident was left that was not sanctioned
18 sooner or later. In any case --
19 MR. NICHOLLS: Completely untrue statement from Mr. Karadzic on
20 the Chamber observing that not a single incident was ever left
21 unsanctioned. Completely untrue from the evidence in this case.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, just put your question and reserve
23 your submission for a later stage.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. You did not include this document in your report in any case, did
3 A. I may not have. I don't know where this document's from, so it
4 may well be that it didn't find its way in there. If I'd seen it, I
5 would probably have referenced it. As I said, I think some of the
6 limitations of the report at the beginning is that it didn't include
7 every single document. But if I had seen this one, I would most likely
8 have made reference to it.
9 Q. Thank you. It was in the possession of the OTP, and it was
10 tendered by P3601.
11 Can we next have -- well, let me draw your attention to
12 paragraph 2, item 100 -- 2.100. In that paragraph you discuss Kljuc and
13 that certain people there were released after questioning initially, and
14 by the 2nd of June, 1992, while some 900 people had been detained:
15 [In English] "The same report also noted that, because Muslim
16 extremists had failed to hand in their weapons, the Muslim population of
17 the area of Lisnja village in Prnjavor municipality had been 'expelled.'"
18 [Interpretation] Did you know that there were almost 19.000
19 Muslims living in Kljuc?
20 A. I don't know the figures of Kljuc in terms of -- in terms of
21 population. I know there were a lot, but I don't know the figures.
22 Q. Did you know that on the 27th of May there were at least five or
23 more synchronised attacks by the Muslim Green Berets on the Serb police,
24 military, and civilians and that there were a number of casualties?
25 A. I am aware of an incident in Kljuc in and around the time of the
1 disarmament operations which was the ambush of a bus containing soldiers
2 of the JNA who I believe were coming back from Knin in which a number
3 were killed. There may also, either in that attack or a different
4 attack, have been a mine placed on the road. I believe I referenced that
5 somewhere in the report. So I don't doubt that there certainly was that
6 incident. There may have been others that I'm unaware of. But there was
7 an incident in Kljuc in which, I think, two or maybe more JNA soldiers
8 were killed and a number injured.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Can we move into private session
11 [Private session]
2 [Open session]
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Taking into account that there were at least five armed attacks
6 which you called incidents and that out of the 19.000 Muslims 900 were
7 captured, does it resemble an attack on the Muslim community to you, or
8 was it a result of fighting, during which process the enemy soldiers were
9 taken prisoner?
10 A. It was not my understanding that the -- let me step back. It was
11 my understanding that operations were planned in Kljuc and that this
12 incident occurred and that the -- the operation in Kljuc was not solely
13 in response to -- to the -- to the attack on the coach. There was a
14 similar incident, for example, in Prijedor. A number of soldiers were
15 killed, and yet in Prijedor there had been this disarmament plan being
16 planned and put into operation.
17 Yes, I believe this document, I have to go back to it again, 900
18 were captured. Kljuc was taken over again very quickly within a couple
19 of days. I would have expected that if 900 individuals were armed and
20 defending Kljuc that it would have taken longer than a day or two to --
21 to take control of the territory. I believe a large number of people in
22 Kljuc subsequently left the municipality.
23 So what I observed in Kljuc was not that there was a large
24 defensive force in which the -- the Bosnian Serb or the VRS engaged in
25 protracted conflict. What I observed in there, and also in Sanski Most
1 and Prijedor, for that matter, was that there was a plan to disarm. The
2 territories were taken over very quickly. There were some Serb
3 casualties. There had been some potentially provocative incidents. The
4 areas were not completely unarmed, but that Serb casualties, in essence,
5 were relatively light. The territories were taken very quickly, often
6 with large numbers of people being taken into captivity or custody and
7 moved between various centres.
8 Q. Well, you see, Mr. Brown, did you take note of the fact that
9 Kljuc was populated by Serbs and that they were in the majority and that
10 not the whole of Kljuc was captured but, rather, it involved a few Muslim
11 villages which had fighters? There was no fighting in the town itself
12 but in the village of Velagic and others surrounding Kljuc. And that as
13 of the 6th of April, when the conflict broke out, until the 20th of May,
14 they were left alone. No one touched them.
15 A. Well, there were problem in Kljuc in early May. I know that's
16 referenced in some documents as well, and I believe -- I'd have to check
17 my reference, but I'm -- I'm -- I believe there was an incident in -- in
18 the first few days in Kljuc in which a non-Serb or some non-Serbs were
19 killed. There clearly was ethnic tensions in Kljuc. There was
20 discussion amongst military commanders about what was happening in there
21 and that that territory needed to be controlled. And I place the events
22 in Kljuc alongside the similar events in Sanski Most and Prijedor. In
23 order to take control of that territory, a disarmament operation was
24 undertaken. It may well have been that in Kljuc, Velagic, Pudin Han, for
25 example, is another one, were the scene of operations, but I believe that
1 other operations took place later in June in order to completely secure
2 the territory.
3 Q. Well, I will now dispute that by showing the following facts: In
4 the valley of the Sana River, in Prijedor, in Sanski Most, and Kljuc,
5 towards the end of May there were synchronised Muslim attacks on Serb
6 soldiers and civilians. Following that, the Serb army undertook
7 operations. Isn't that correct? Do you recall Hambarine on the
8 22nd of May, Kozarac on the 24th of May, and on the 27th May the rest of
9 the municipalities? Prijedor, on the other hand, was attacked by the
10 Green Berets on the 30th of May. Is that correct or is it not?
11 A. Maybe I can break your question up by firstly saying: I've
12 admitted in the report and I've already admitted earlier on that there
13 were a number of incidents in some of those municipalities in which Serb
14 soldiers were killed. But if you look at the chain of events as we
15 discussed last week, that plans of operations in order to disarm and to
16 take control of territory were in operation well before some of those
17 incidents occurred. And there's a reference, for example, in the
18 Prijedor documentation that a plan was underway and it was due to take
19 place, I believe, on the 22nd but that an incident in Hambarine at a
20 check-point at which some soldiers were killed in essence stopped that
21 plan. So it's not that in -- somehow in those municipalities that these
22 flash-point incidents occurred and it was because of that that the
23 territory -- that these military operations took place and the territory
24 was controlled and large numbers of people were rounded up. I would
25 argue that a plan -- plans had already been implemented through the chain
1 that we talked about last week and that either as a result of that
2 planning, or separately, flash-point incidents did occur in which
3 soldiers were killed.
4 I accept that Prijedor, for example, on the 30th of May was
5 attacked and a small group of non-Serbs killed some individuals, I think
6 on the approaches to Prijedor, but the response to that was very swift in
7 Prijedor. Within a very short space of time, not even a day, I believe,
8 was -- control was taken over in the town. I think they attacked the --
9 either the police station or a hotel there. But irrespective, yes, there
10 were flash-point incidents, yes, a number of soldiers appeared to have
11 been killed, but for me those were not the reason that those
12 municipalities were taken over and that operations were conducted. It
13 was already planned that these disarmament operations and controls were
14 due to be undertaken.
15 And furthermore, the fact that in Prijedor within a day or two
16 the Krajina Corps are announcing that thousands of people had been sent
17 to Trnopolje and Omarska does not give me the impression that it was
18 simply the flash-point incidents in Hambarine and Kozarac that were the
19 reason for those operations.
20 Q. Sir, I would kindly ask you to narrow down your answers. Did you
21 know that in all three municipalities the Serb authorities were formed,
22 whereas an offer was made to the Muslims to establish their or -- their
23 own municipalities? For example, the Muslims did initiate the origins of
24 their own municipalities, say, in Sanski Most and Kljuc. That is the
25 underlying question of mine. Did you know about that or not?
1 A. Well, I'm aware, and maybe not of the details, that there were
2 negotiations in Kljuc -- sorry, in Sanski Most in particular, prior to
3 control being taken over in the middle to late April.
4 In relation to Prijedor, I know that the control was taken in
5 that municipality at the end of April, 30th of April, and that involved
6 use of the TO and the police and awareness of the -- by the 34th --
7 43rd Brigade. So maybe there was negotiations, I don't know, in the
8 spring -- in the spring months, but I do know by the end of April that
9 control had been taken over, i.e., political control, I guess, had been
10 taken over in -- in those municipalities. In all three, actually -
11 Kljuc, Sanski Most, and Prijedor.
12 Q. Did you know why there was a take-over in Prijedor without
13 fighting? Did you know that there was an order from Sarajevo that the
14 JNA and Serbs in Prijedor be attacked and that the message was
15 intercepted? That is why the take-over took place, to prevent the attack
16 from happening.
17 A. I would isolate Prijedor from what was going on in the other
18 municipalities. In the end of March, at the Assembly sessions there,
19 there was a decision to form Crisis Staffs. There was a decision to
20 establish TOs. I would see the take-over of power in those
21 municipalities in April more related to what was happening in the
22 Assembly sessions in the middle and late March 1992 and the desire to
23 control that territory. I don't know of any order from Sarajevo that the
24 JNA and Serbs were to be attacked. I haven't seen that. But I would --
25 bearing in mind the pattern that seemed to happen in the middle of April
1 to late April and into May, many of the municipalities were taken over.
2 And I see that more in line with the instructions that were passed out at
3 the Assembly sessions at the end of March 1992 in relation to
4 Crisis Staffs and the TO and taking control of territory.
5 Q. Sir, you seem to be guessing a lot, and you don't know of this
6 key element of this telegram sent from the Ministry of Defence and of the
7 interior explaining the decision of the Muslim-Croat Presidency to attack
8 the JNA and Serbs. This was already something that was shown in the
9 courtroom and yet you are ignorant of the fact. Even after the event we
10 still proposed to them that they create their own municipalities in
11 Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Kljuc. So how was it that we wanted all the
12 territory and yet at the same time we proposed they make their own
14 A. All I can say is I haven't seen the document. If you want to
15 show it to me, I'm more than happy to read it.
16 Q. Thank you, but I have no time. You should have been aware of it.
17 This report without this key element does not stand. You say that the
18 Muslim population was expelled --
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if you put your statement or question,
20 let the witness answer it.
21 Would you like to comment on the comments by Mr. Karadzic that
22 your report does not stand without this key element?
23 THE WITNESS: I have no -- no comment on that, sir. I think the
24 report, I hope, stands on the documents that I was able to see and
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, refrain from making unnecessary
2 comments. That takes up -- will take up more time, Mr. Karadzic. Please
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. But -- very well. I'll
5 leave it at that.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Brown, that you cannot establish a pattern of
8 behaviour of the Serb army without knowing about the activities of the
9 Muslim side? Correct?
10 A. No. I agree that there may be limitations in the report without
11 all the information from the non-Serb side, but I believe, looking at the
12 documents from the Krajina Corps, that I can establish a pattern within
13 the limitations of that report.
14 Q. Thank you. I have no time to further verify this position of
15 yours. Let's look at paragraph 2.100. There you say that the civilians
16 of Lisnja were expelled. We checked the document you referred to, which
17 is 65 ter number 545.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please upload it. I
19 believe there is a translation.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. You seem to refer to the document, so you must have had a
23 Look at item 2, the second part:
24 [As read] "During fighting around Prijedor, some 900 people were
25 taken prisoner and about 400 rifles were seized. In the area of Prijedor
1 the situation is under control and there is no large-scale fighting. The
2 fighting in the area of Sanski Most is unchanged. In the area of
3 Derventa there continues to be occasional artillery fire, well, because
4 Muslim extremists have failed to hand in their weapons. The Muslim
5 population of the area of Lisnja village has been expelled."
6 Oh, here we have the translation. So probably it's not an error
7 on your part.
8 Mr. Brown, they were neither expelled nor resettled. They were
9 simply moved out of the area. Do you see a difference between the three
11 A. I can only say what is stated in the document, that they have
12 been expelled. The Krajina Corps would have put that in. I would have
13 thought they would have put "resettled" or "happily moved out" if it was
14 different. But it references "expelled." It would seem to indicate, at
15 least from this document, that the Muslims in that village were no longer
16 living there due to the fact that extremists or Muslim extremists hadn't
17 handed in their weapons, presumably in relation to the disarmament
18 operations that were going on around that time. I think the document
19 seems to speak for itself.
20 Q. So in the area of Derventa there is artillery fire and the army
21 moved out the Muslim population. Do you know that in accordance with the
22 law on total national defence there is an obligation to evacuate the
23 civilian population while there is fighting going on?
24 A. I would -- I wouldn't link -- as far as I'm aware, Lisnja village
25 is in Prnjavor municipality and not Derventa. I'm not sure linking the
1 two is -- is necessarily accurate. I know there was fighting in Derventa
2 at that time.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, is it your argument that the last
5 sentence of para 2 in this document wrongly translated? Because the
6 document says: "The Muslim population of the area of Lisnja village has
7 been expelled."
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is a mistranslation, and it
9 completely changes the meaning.
10 JUDGE KWON: No, but you --
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is not expelled.
12 JUDGE KWON: Your reading of B/C/S was translated as "expelled."
13 So we'll check it later.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let the interpreters tell you
15 now whether there's a difference between "expelled." "Proterano,"
16 "preseljeno," "iseljeno," these three terms, "expelled," "resettled,"
17 "moved out," is there a difference? Is there a difference between these
18 three concepts and is there a difference in the scale involved?
19 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you read out the last sentence of para 2
20 in this document.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "In the area of Derventa there is
22 still artillery fire from time to time, while in the area of the village
23 of Lisnja, due to the fact that Muslim extremists did not surrender their
24 weapons, the Muslim population was moved out."
25 That's it, "moved out."
1 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Brown?
2 THE WITNESS: I think I would stand by my assessment of the
3 situation, sir.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
6 MR. NICHOLLS: I may want to follow up on that, Your Honour,
7 because I recall that previously I had an interpreter look carefully at
8 this passage to see what the word was and it was reported to me that it
9 was "expelled," but we'll look at that again.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be done.
11 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. You deal with that in paragraph 2.155. Isn't that right? There
15 is another reference to this paragraph and to the corps.
16 [In English] [Previous translation continued] "... after the
17 attack [sic] by units of the 1st Krajina Corps on Lisnja, the Corps
18 reported that the entire population of the village -- of that village had
19 been expelled."
20 [Interpretation] So now you say that it was done by the
21 1st Corps, and this could have been done by the civilian authorities.
22 Isn't that right? Because the civilian protection is duty-bound to move
23 the population while the fighting is still going on. Where do you find
24 this, that it was done by the 1st Krajina Corps?
25 A. Well, I would have to check maybe some other references. I may
1 be prepared to amend it based on this document alone. I'd have to look
2 at other ones. It's reported in the 1st Krajina Corps reports, so it
3 presumably is of importance to them. And the paragraph starts with, The
4 1st Krajina Corps units are still holding the same positions, and then
5 goes into detail about the areas that the corps are working in. I can
6 look at it again. Maybe if I need to amend it, I'm more than happy to do
8 Q. And do you know that according to our law this is a legal
9 requirement, according to our law on total national defence, evacuation
10 of the civilian population, announcing bombing, ultimatums, and so on?
11 Isn't all of that in accordance with the laws, so the civilians would
12 know what lies ahead and that they be given enough time to seek shelter?
13 A. It doesn't make that clear in this document, Mr. Karadzic. It
14 doesn't indicate that for their own safety, you know, in accordance with
15 the law, in order to minimise civilian casualties. It doesn't make
16 reference to that at all. I wouldn't necessarily put this particular
17 incident in isolation either. I don't know the law that you're referring
18 to, and I would be interested to look at it, but I -- my reading of this
19 is not that these individuals are somehow being moved out for -- for
20 their own safety, bearing in mind at the same time what was happening in
21 other municipalities in the Krajina.
22 Q. Mr. Brown, please explain this to me: How are you going to
23 identify unlawful conduct on the part of the 1st Krajina Corps if you're
24 not familiar with the law on the basis of which they are waging war?
25 A. Well, I'm not sure of the question. I'm not a lawyer. What I'm
1 saying is what I see in a regular combat report from the corps in early
2 June and that's what's reported. It seems to fit what was happening in
3 other municipalities around the same time, and it in particular adds to
4 my assessment that there were operations which came through the
5 authorities to conduct operations in order to disarm that resulted in a
6 large number of people in those municipalities either being attacked or
7 moved out.
8 Q. Just a brief question. Do you know or do you agree -- have you
9 identified the following, rather, that it was the police that was in
10 charge of disarming until the first soldiers started losing their lives
11 and that the army got involved only at the end of May when they started
12 firing at the army? Just yes or no. Did you identify that? Did you
13 realise that the army was not interfering until the soldiers actually
14 started getting killed?
15 A. I'm aware that initially the disarmament operations, as
16 articulated through the ARK municipalities, initially tasked the MUP to
17 deal with that but that that changed in and around the middle of May.
18 And I do not see that that was linked to individual soldiers being killed
19 at that time. In essence it seems that the hardening or the involvement
20 of the military came round the middle of the month.
21 Q. Yes. But, sir, Mr. Brown, when the soldiers get fired at by
22 their own civilian population from behind their backs, is it not
23 perfectly legitimate for the army to get involved at that point?
24 A. It would seem legitimate for the army to conduct security
25 operations if they're being fired at. But bearing in mind that what was
1 going on in the Krajina seemed to have occurred in other municipalities
2 outside the Krajina, I don't see this as somehow some localised security
3 operation in which a number of minor incident -- relatively minor,
4 unfortunate, clearly, for the soldiers who were injured or killed, minor
5 operations in which those incidents happened and the army were taking
6 appropriate security measures in order to deal with those individuals who
7 may have conducted that type of attack. It would seem that, you know, if
8 you look at Prijedor, the 1st Krajina Corps documents at the end of May
9 had thousands of people rounded up and placed in Omarska and Trnopolje.
10 If it was a security operation targeted against sporadic -- unfortunate
11 sporadic incidents against soldiers, I wouldn't necessarily -- that
12 wouldn't necessarily necessitate the rounding up of, you know,
13 7.000 individuals, or whatever is annotated in the documents at the end
14 of May.
15 Q. First of all, it's not 7.000. It's less than 3.000. Secondly,
16 sir, this happened, isn't that right, only after the 30th of May, after
17 the attack at Prijedor? And thirdly, you claim that these are
18 individuals that attacked, not armed units. Are you saying that in
19 Krajina there were armed Muslim individuals, or is what I am saying the
20 truth, that even before the war, in all the 103 municipalities that are
21 there, they had a unit and a staff of the Patriotic League?
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: I object to that compound question. I mean, I
24 haven't been objecting, but these are getting huge and complex.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could you break down, Mr. Karadzic.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. So do you claim that these were individuals rather than armed
3 formations? As you said on line 11, page 73. Transcript. Transcript.
4 Line 11, page 73.
5 A. Well, there may well have been armed groups. I'm not aware of
6 the details of all activities from the Muslim side in many of these
7 municipalities. I do know, for example, in the corridor that there was
8 shelling from over the Croatian side. I'm aware that some of the
9 municipalities in the corridor took control and that they were -- they
10 seeped to be quite well armed. There may well have been the planning.
11 There may well have been a desire. There may well have been some groups
12 that were more than just individuals. But it did seem to me that the --
13 whatever armed groups may have been present in some of those
14 municipalities, that they weren't particularly effective. Yes, there
15 were these low -- lowish-level incidents in which some Serbs soldiers
16 were killed, but they certainly didn't stop much at all.
17 And, for example, when I wrote a report in relation to Prijedor
18 and tried to look at this issue, it seemed in comparison that whatever
19 defensive organisation may have been present in Prijedor, it was
20 relatively rudimentary. It didn't seem particularly well structured or
21 organised. It didn't appear to be particularly well armed. They may
22 well have had small arms. They may well have had some explosives and
23 mines and some were maybe hand-held rocket launchers, but it certainly
24 didn't stop the VRS at all. And in comparison, the VRS was able to call
25 on significant assets, including the most up-to-date tanks, artillery,
1 well-seasoned troops that had spent a significant amount of time fighting
2 in Croatia, and that whatever defensive structures or whatever armed
3 structures were in those municipalities certainly weren't particularly
5 It may well have been there had been a desire by non-Serbs to
6 protect their territories and to arm themselves, but it didn't seem to me
7 to be particularly effective, let alone particularly well structured,
8 certainly in comparison to what the VRS were able to call on and the
9 assets they had at their disposal. And it seemed that in many of those
10 municipalities in the Krajina, where operations did take place, they were
11 over relatively quickly, maybe with follow-up operations in the
12 subsequent weeks and months.
13 Q. Well, you see, Mr. Brown, how long your answer is to my simple
14 question. Do you know of the war preparations of the Muslim population
15 in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you know about the establishment of the
16 Patriotic League consisting of 103 municipal staffs and municipal
18 A. Just a point, Mr. Karadzic. I can't answer your questions,
19 often, in a simpler way because there is usually some context behind it.
20 Where I can, I will answer in a simple manner.
21 In relation to the Patriotic League, I'm not aware of it. I did
22 not look at the issue of the Patriotic League. That was not part of the
23 report. It didn't come out necessarily in detail through the
24 1 Krajina Corps documents.
25 It may well have been that the -- obviously there was an ABiH at
1 some stage. Mr. Izetbegovic mobilised the TO, and there was -- I
2 believe, Croatian troops had come over the border in some places in
3 Bosnia, but it wasn't a part of this report.
4 Q. But, Mr. Brown, you are assessing what the 1st Krajina Corps did.
5 And if you don't know what kind of challenges they were up against, if
6 you don't know what kind of problems they were up against, how can you
7 assess the 1st Krajina Corps without knowing what they had been dealing
9 A. Well, I believe I'm -- I do flag up in the report some of the
10 problems that the 1st Krajina Corps faced. I don't deny that the
11 1st Krajina Corps suffered casualties through the -- 1992. I don't deny
12 that the Krajina Corps had a long border in which it was often at the
13 contact point conducting quite tough fighting, certainly on the
14 Central Bosnia area. To a degree there was harrying from artillery in
15 Croatia. So I don't doubt that. But it seems that the municipality
16 attacks that occurred in May and June and in, to some extent, into July,
17 that those municipality attacks were over relatively quickly and that
18 control was taken relatively quickly and the operations that they
19 continued through that -- through the summer were relatively minor. I
20 don't doubt on the contact points that the Krajina Corps was fighting,
21 you know, quite a determined opponent, but that's not what I was looking
22 at. I was looking at some of the municipality attacks. And it seems
23 that in comparison to the -- whatever defensive forces were there or
24 whatever armed groups were there, that -- that control was taken very
25 quickly by General Talic, and it would seem that was the case.
1 Q. Thank you. So you dealt with the in-depth fighting carried out
2 by the 1st Krajina Corps, not fighting at the front line itself.
3 Do you claim that it was the 1st Krajina Corps that attacked
4 Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc, or do you agree with me that first it
5 was the Muslim formations from Kljuc, Prijedor, and Sanski Most attacked
6 the Serbs as civilians and the police as well, and once they attacked the
7 army, they got a military response? I claim that they were the first to
8 attack, and you are talking about attacks in municipalities. We have
9 quite a few documents, but let us get this straight. What is your
11 A. It is my claim that elements of the 1st Krajina Corps were
12 involved in operations in Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc and that those
13 operations took place after control had been seized in April,
14 predominantly, 1992, and that these operations, in order to secure that
15 territory, those operations were undertaken initially under the -- the
16 umbrella of disarming extremist groups or paramilitary groups, and those
17 particularly were located in non-Serb villages. And I didn't see
18 examples of 1st Krajina Corps units operating outside non-Serb villages
19 in order to disarm the population. I do concede that during those
20 operations that there were instances, and it may even be in one or two
21 cases prior to those, there were incidents where Serb soldiers were
22 killed, but it was not that the Serb soldiers were attacked and therefore
23 that was a justification for those operations. I would argue control had
24 been taken. That in order to secure control of those municipalities,
25 disarmament operations were planned and operated. And those operations
1 were successful. They were conducted by components of the corps, often
2 in conjunction with the police. And that that territory was part of the
3 territory that was deemed to be Serb or that they wanted to control and
4 that the control of that -- of those areas was effected very quickly, and
5 there was continuing operations after that.
6 Concurrently with that, there was an operation -- a number of
7 large-scale operations that the Krajina Corps were involved in, in
8 particular Operation Corridor, but obviously operations in other areas,
9 including Jajce.
10 Q. Now we are dealing with what the subject that you wrote about
11 was, the fighting far away from the front line. This is what I put to
12 you, that the army did not interfere with disarmament or fighting until
13 it was attacked. Yes or no? Is it correct that it was first the Muslims
14 that attacked the army in Kljuc, Sanski Most, and Prijedor? Yes or no?
15 A. I do not agree with your position, Mr. Karadzic.
16 Q. Thank you. That will do. That will do.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1353. Could we please have a look
18 at that now. D1353.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. You mentioned Krupa, Bosanska Krupa, in your report, and now we
21 are going to see what the instructions on the evacuation of the
22 population are like, and this has to do with refugees from the local
23 commune of Arapusa.
24 Did you have this document in your possession?
25 A. I don't believe I did, or I don't recognise it.
1 Q. You can read the page in English, and I'm going to tell you what
2 this is all about. Arapusa is a Muslim village, and some other Muslims
3 from Bosanska Krupa fled to Arapusa. Once the fighting for Arapusa
4 started, instructions were issued to evacuate the population.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have the next page. In
6 English it's fine, it seems to me.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So this population was evacuated within Republika Srpska itself.
9 And then it says in this last bullet point that on the basis of the
10 agreement reached between Mr. Vjestica and the commander at the moment
11 when peace is established, the command is duty-bound to ensure the safe
12 return of the population to Arapusa, to their homes there, and the
13 refugees to Bosanska Krupa.
14 Did you see who all the signatories are, Emir Sabic, a Muslim,
15 and another Muslim, Fuad. And, down here, for the commander of the
16 battalion, it was signed by Bozo Erceg and Djordje Jez.
17 Evacuation within the same municipality and the same republic, is
18 that ethnic cleansing or is this an operation envisaged by law?
19 A. I can't say the context behind this evacuation. It may well have
20 been that operations, combat operations, were going on at that time and
21 that those who signed it were under the impression that they were going
22 to be allowed back and that was genuine. It may well have been a
23 distinct possibility that those individuals signed it through fear or
24 under the misapprehension that they were going to be allowed back and
25 that in fact this was a ruse to in -- order them to leave. I don't know.
1 All I can say is that Mr. Vjestica, not long after this, seemed to be
2 under the impression that those Muslims in Bosanska Krupa would not be
3 returning. So I don't know the details of why this document was signed
4 or -- or how it came to be signed, whether those signatories did it
5 through force, misapprehension, or a genuine belief that they were going
6 to be allowed to return at that time. It would seem to me that two weeks
7 later Mr. Vjestica is not saying words that would seem to echo the
8 sentiment of this document, and in fact quite the contrary, that these
9 people were not going to be allowed to return.
10 Q. Mr. Brown, he said that they were not there, that they wouldn't
11 be there for as long as the fighting is going on, and he expressed his
12 doubt as to their return. So you're not reading documents properly.
13 Did the OTP put this document at your disposal and did you just
14 eliminate it on your own?
15 MR. NICHOLLS: I have to object to this argumentative comment
16 that he's not reading documents properly.
17 JUDGE KWON: It's time, Mr. Karadzic, you should know the rules.
18 Refrain from making unnecessary statement.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. But, Mr. Witness, haven't you read Vjestica's words yourself?
21 They will not be there for as long as the fighting is going on. Did you
22 not read that out on the 18th? His words were: "They will not be there
23 until the fighting goes on."
24 A. Is that in this document or is it in the Assembly session?
25 Q. What you quoted, that Vjestica said, and that's what you read
1 out, on the 18th. "They will not be there while the fighting is going
3 JUDGE KWON: While witness is reading that document, Mr. Tieger,
4 did you say you would need five minutes?
5 MR. TIEGER: No, just 60 seconds at most, Mr. President.
6 THE WITNESS: Well, Mr. Vjestica says: "Will they have a place
7 to return to? I think it unlikely after our president has told us the
8 happy news that the right bank of the Una is the border."
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. But, sir, he is anticipating that they were not going to live in
11 the Serbian entity, not that somebody was going to prohibit them from
12 doing so.
13 Secondly, do you know that these people were relocated within
14 Republika Srpska, not outside of Republika Srpska?
15 A. I'm not aware of where these individuals were relocated. It may
16 well have been that they were moved over the river. I'm -- but I'm not
17 aware of the details.
18 Q. [Microphone not activated]
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, your microphone. Yes, it's now on.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Brown, it was possible to determine by localities that they
23 were moving inside Republika Srpska and they even went to Sanski Most.
24 What we have here is the municipality of Krupa.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask whether this 65 ter 545
1 has been admitted into evidence, the one that speaks about the village of
3 JUDGE KWON: I think that has been already admitted,
4 Exhibit P3927.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, I didn't know that.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, should we adjourn for today?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies, but I
8 kindly ask you to reconsider the issue of time. This is the summary of
9 the entire indictment, or almost of the entire indictment. Seven hours
10 is by far too little. With any other witness I would have been given
11 seven days at least.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Brown, as I told you earlier today, that we
13 decided to interpose another witness's evidence with you, my anticipation
14 is that we may be able to resume your evidence around 11.30 tomorrow
15 morning. You may be excused.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: It -- if we can briefly move into private session,
20 Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 [Private session]
9 [Open session]
10 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: If my memory's correct, the Defence didn't take any
12 position with respect to that. Mr. Robinson? If necessary, we'll go
13 back to private session.
14 MR. ROBINSON: No, we can do this in public session. We didn't
15 oppose that motion.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 So we will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day
20 of November, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.