Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 22054

 1                           Tuesday, 29 November 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Would the witness kindly take the solemn declaration.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I declare I will tell the truth,

 9     the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10                           WITNESS:  PIETER BOERING

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Mr. Boering.  Please be seated and

13     make yourself comfortable.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, before we move on to this witness,

15     would you like to receive the motion concerning the notes of

16     Colonel Rutten in writing?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we do.  Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

18             Mr. Nicholls.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Good morning.

20                           Examination by Mr. Nicholls:

21        Q.   Good morning, Colonel Boering.

22        A.   [In English] Good morning, sir.

23        Q.   And can you hear me in your language, in Nederlands?

24        A.   [Interpretation] Yes, I hear you perfectly.

25        Q.   Thank you.  First, I have just a couple questions about your


Page 22055

 1     testimony in the Popovic case.  As I told you, we will be admitting --

 2     seeking to admit that evidence rather than asking you all the same

 3     questions again today.  Now, having reviewed your testimony in that case,

 4     can you confirm to the Trial Chamber that the transcript was accurate?

 5        A.   Yes, in the past two weeks I reviewed the testimony again and I

 6     stand behind it entirely.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And second question that I have to ask:  If I were to

 8     ask you the same questions today on the same topics would you answer --

 9     would your answers be the same?  Would you give us the same information?

10        A.   I assume I would provide virtually the same answer.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, I'd seek to admit then that

13     testimony which is 22421A, which would be under seal because it contains

14     some private session, and 22421B, which would be the public version.

15             JUDGE KWON:  What does the confidential part refer to,

16     Mr. Nicholls?  If necessary, we can go into private session.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  To be honest, Your Honour, I'm not sure exactly.

18     I just -- we've been putting one in public and one in private.  I could

19     check that more carefully.  I think there is some private session

20     testimony in there.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll admit them both.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours the 65 ter 22421A will be

23     Exhibit P3968 under seal and 65 ter 22421B will be Exhibit P3969.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:

25        Q.   I'll now read a summary of your testimony, sir.


Page 22056

 1             Colonel Boering arrived in Srebrenica on 3rd January 1995.  At

 2     that time he held the rank of major and he served as the DutchBat liaison

 3     officer with the ABiH, the VRS, civilian leadership on the Serb and

 4     Muslim side, as well as the NGOs, such as MSF, Médecins sans Frontičrs,

 5     the ICRC, and UNHCR.

 6             In the course of his duties, he met with various VRS officers,

 7     including Drina Corps commander, General Zivanovic; Bratunac Brigade

 8     major, Momir Nikolic, with whom he met approximately every two weeks; and

 9     Skelani Brigade commander, Vukovic.  And he also met with Colonel Beara

10     twice.

11             Colonel Boering also met with various ABiH officers in the

12     enclave, including Naser Oric; Ramiz Becirovic; a person named Ekrem, a

13     security officer; and Zulfo, who was an independent leadership in the

14     Bandera triangle.  And the witness would meet with an ABiH leader around

15     about once a week.  In his testimony, Colonel Boering described the

16     mandate and deployment of DutchBat in the Srebrenica enclave, as well as

17     his view of the structures of both the VRS and the ABiH.

18             He described DutchBat's efforts to disarm persons with weapons

19     inside the enclave and the difficulties.  He described smuggling of

20     weapons and helicopter flights into the enclave and complaints from the

21     VRS about ABiH raids launched from inside the enclave to the outside

22     against the Serb areas.

23             Colonel Boering also described the poor humanitarian situation in

24     the enclave and the deteriorating security situation in the months

25     leading up to the VRS attack in July 1995.  He described shortages of


Page 22057

 1     food, water, medical, and fuel supplies for the population, as well as

 2     problems with supplies that DutchBat had and how convoy restrictions

 3     affected the population and DutchBat.

 4             He testified that over the course of May, June, and July 1995 the

 5     intensity of shooting and shelling from the Serbian side into the enclave

 6     increased in this period.  People were hurt and killed and their homes

 7     were shelled.  He, himself, faced fire at his vehicle when leaving the UN

 8     compound to go on patrol in Potocari, and that the increasing fire from

 9     the VRS seriously hampered DutchBat's ability to go out and patrol.

10             Regarding the fall of Srebrenica, Colonel Boering described the

11     attack on Srebrenica, how in July the VRS took over UN observation posts

12     and how some DutchBat soldiers were taken prisoner by advancing UN

13     forces -- VRS forces, excuse me.  The VRS fire at this time into the

14     enclave caused more people to go to Srebrenica and seek shelter there,

15     and the streets were overflowing with people.

16             Boering described -- Colonel Boering described shelling by VRS

17     that was close to the UN Bravo Company in Srebrenica and an incident

18     where a little boy was injured by an explosion.  He said the people

19     looked -- the citizens look apathetic, hungry, and very nervous and asked

20     the UN soldiers what would happen to them.

21             On 10 July, when the situation became, in his words, hopeless,

22     the population started moving towards Potocari and Colonel Boering went

23     to Potocari with the people.  He described the scene at Potocari where

24     there were huge mass, thousands of people gathered around the UN compound

25     there who were frightened and insecure.  He testified that these people


Page 22058

 1     did not have enough food or water with them and that DutchBat could do

 2     very little because of their limited supplies.  He estimated there were

 3     only enough supplies for a day or two.

 4             Coming to the Hotel Fontana meetings which the witness attended.

 5     Colonel Boering was present at all three meetings at the Hotel Fontana in

 6     Bratunac, which took place on the evening and night of 11 July, two

 7     meetings; and on the morning of 12 July, 1995.  VRS representatives

 8     included Generals Mladic and Krstic and an officer the witness recalled

 9     as being named Kosuric or Kosovic and other VRS personnel and at the

10     third meeting civilian personnel.

11             Momir Nikolic was present at the start of all meetings, at least

12     at the beginning.

13             The witness testified that during the first meeting on 11 July,

14     he and the others felt threatened.  He recalled that Commander Karremans

15     and DutchBat soldiers were physically pushed into the corner and that

16     Mladic using threatening language and that Colonel Boering had to push

17     back to get more room for DutchBat.  He recalled that during the second

18     Hotel Fontana meeting, that night, 11 July, an animal was slaughtered

19     outside the meeting and the witness perceived this as an attempt to

20     intimidate the DutchBat representatives present as well as the Muslim

21     representative.

22             The next morning, on 12 July, the witness attended the third

23     meeting at the Hotel Fontana, and he was concerned about General Mladic's

24     comments concerning the screening of all male refugees for possible war

25     crimes.  And the witness pointed out a civilian at the meeting who was


Page 22059

 1     tasked with that.

 2             Still on the 12th of July, after the meeting, Colonel Boering

 3     returned to Potocari.  When he arrived he saw that Serb soldiers were

 4     preparing the boarding on buses of the people and their transport out of

 5     the enclave.  He saw that Muslim men in Potocari were selected from the

 6     crowd and detained at the so-called "White House."  Colonel Boering,

 7     himself, entered the "White House" and saw Muslim men sitting on the

 8     floor.  Their documents were piled in a corner and at gunpoint

 9     Colonel Boering was ordered to leave the building by Serb soldiers, VRS

10     soldiers.

11             Colonel Boering testified that later -- he then later escorted a

12     convoy of buses towards Tisca.  In Tisca the convoy stopped.  At this

13     point he saw men from the convoy being separated, and these men - Muslim

14     men who were taken off the buses, that is - and these men were taken away

15     in the direction of the forest by VRS soldiers in the presence of

16     Major Sarkic, who the witness knew, of the Milici Brigade.

17             Colonel Boering could not follow these men to see what would

18     happen to them.  He was asked to walk with the women and children from

19     Tisca through no man's land to the Muslim-held territories.  He then

20     escorted the women and children to safety.

21             That concludes my summary.

22             Now, Colonel, I'm just going to ask you a few questions to bring

23     us up-to-date on your current situation and then I'll ask you about the

24     third Hotel Fontana meeting.  Could you tell the Trial Chamber what your

25     profession is now.  Are you still in the military?


Page 22060

 1        A.   I'm still in the military.  I'm presently in Enschede at a school

 2     for co-operation between the military and civilians working with seven

 3     other countries specially focused on NATO training.

 4        Q.   And can you tell me what your current rank is?

 5        A.   I'm -- my current rank is lieutenant-colonel.

 6        Q.   And you described this school, but could you very -- just very

 7     briefly describe what your main duties are, in terms of what you've said

 8     about your current job.

 9        A.   My duties, in fact, are that we do exercises, for example,

10     deployment to Africa or a different crisis area; and then in the early

11     stage there's co-operation with civilian organisations such as the UN and

12     NATO and we plan how to set that up.  And also how to elaborate the

13     implementation, for example -- as happened, recently, for example, in

14     Libya.  That's at a higher level.  At lower level in the field, there's

15     co-operation between the Red Cross and other organisations, and in that

16     area we perform trainings, both in Enschede and in the respective

17     countries.  We're also present at the training exercises and, if

18     necessary, go to deployment areas such as Afghanistan to see how the

19     training is proceeding.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I'm now going to ask you just some questions about

21     the third Hotel Fontana meeting on 12 July, and I'm going to watch the

22     video with you.  But before we get to that can you tell us just -- do you

23     remember about what time that meeting started?

24        A.   I think the meeting started at around 10.00 a.m.

25        Q.   And just from your memory, who was there representing DutchBat?


Page 22061

 1        A.   Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans was present and I was present for

 2     DutchBat.

 3        Q.   And do you remember, if you can, who was present from the Muslim

 4     population of Srebrenica side?

 5        A.   Well, there was Nesib Mandic and their representative of the

 6     women -- the first -- her first name was Camila, and the third man,

 7     Nuhanovic, probably was his last name.

 8        Q.   All right.  And we'll see the video, but just from your memory,

 9     do you recall who was there from the VRS and Bosnian Serb civilian side?

10        A.   Present from the VRS was General Mladic, General Krstic,

11     Major Nikolic, Colonel Jankovic.  And for the civilians, I don't remember

12     the name exactly anymore, but if I watch the video I might remember.  And

13     there was somebody else present for the military responsible primarily

14     for our removal and I'd have to see him to remember his name.  That's all

15     I remember for the moment.

16        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  And just to be very clear, I think we all

17     know, but Major Nikolic, that's Major Momir Nikolic; is that right?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct.

19        Q.   Okay.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'd like to play the video if we could now, which

21     is 65 ter 40582, part 2, which starts at 00:05:30 approximately.

22             And, Your Honours, in the book which follows the video which is

23     65 ter 03099, this meeting is at pages 42 to 48, the stills.  And when we

24     play the video I think we may not need English interpretation over it

25     because it has subtitles and you can hear the Serbian and Bosnian


Page 22062

 1     language.

 2        Q.   Okay, sir, I just ask you to look at the video.  See if it helps

 3     you to remember --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 8             If we could -- I'll ask Mr. Reid to play the video.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The French booth has not

10     been provided with a transcript.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we stop for the moment.

13             Did you hear the comment from the interpreter?

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, I did, Your Honour.  I'll see if we can have

15     that e-mailed to them.

16             And could we just go back to the video, Mr. Reid.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could we stop, please.  Go back one -- yeah, thank

19     you.

20        Q.   At 00:05:36.8, right at the beginning, sir, could you just tell

21     us what this place is we see here in Bratunac.

22        A.   That's the entrance to Hotel Fontana, the entrance.

23        Q.   And just if you can, can you tell us, if you remember, who are

24     the four men we see in the frame, maybe starting left to right, if you

25     remember?


Page 22063

 1        A.   At the left I see Major Momir Nikolic; next to him,

 2     Colonel Jankovic; next to him at the door I see General Mladic's

 3     body-guard; and I -- at this time I don't remember the man at the right.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  We could play the video.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could we stop there for one moment.

 8        Q.   The tall man in the camouflage T-shirt who drove the Muslim

 9     representatives to the meeting, who is that?

10        A.   That's me.

11        Q.   Thank you.  That was at 00:06:46.4.  We can continue, please.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we make a stop?

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE KWON:  I was told that there's no -- there has been no

16     French translation, but thanks to Judge Lattanzi we can continue.  But

17     I'm concerned about the French transcript later on.  But in the meantime,

18     let's continue.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I apologise for that.

20     We'll try in the future to make sure we have the French distributed for

21     all of them.

22             Continue, please, Mr. Reid.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  We're at 00:13:09.4 seconds.

25        Q.   The man in the middle of the frame we see with, I'll say, the


Page 22064

 1     civilian open-collared shirt, do you remember at all what his role was,

 2     what you understood his role to be, why he was there?

 3        A.   He'd been assigned a role, primarily to select potential war

 4     criminals among the Muslim population if they had to be selected.

 5        Q.   And that's -- in your previous testimony you referred to that as

 6     screening; is that right?

 7        A.   Yes, it was screening.

 8        Q.   And how did you learn that that was this man's role?  How did --

 9     who did you hear that from, or how did you hear that?

10        A.   That came up at length at that third meeting in Fontana about how

11     they expected to structure the age categories under his leadership.

12        Q.   And do you remember how those age categories were to be

13     structured, approximately?

14        A.   I think not youths up to about 15 and not men from age 70 on.

15     That's what was discussed.

16        Q.   And just to be clear, this is talking about Muslim men in

17     Srebrenica?

18        A.   Yes, that's what we were talking about.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could we play the video, please.

20                           [Video-clip played]

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Stop, please.  We stopped at 00:15:08.6 where the

22     video changes to a different topic.

23        Q.   Just a couple of follow-up questions, sir.  The video we just

24     watched is approximately ten minutes long.  How long was the meeting

25     [Realtime transcript read in error "video"] as you remember it?


Page 22065

 1        A.   I think at least half an hour.

 2        Q.   And we saw watching the video that it jumped a bit at some places

 3     as though it was cut or edited and we didn't see anywhere on the video

 4     the discussion of men being screened, of the process by which men would

 5     be screened for war crimes, which you said in your prior testimony

 6     General Mladic spoke about.  Can you tell us, do you remember if the

 7     whole meeting was filmed or were only parts of it filmed?

 8        A.   During that meeting, the film crew was present throughout and the

 9     scenes that I saw did not reflect the entire meeting.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you've described before how after the meeting

11     you went back to Bratunac or -- sorry, you left Bratunac and went back

12     towards Potocari and had a conversation with Commander Karremans,

13     discussing you realised things were not entirely clear.  And you went

14     back to Bratunac.  Could you just describe that to the Trial Chamber for

15     us, that process.

16        A.   The problem with the meeting in Bratunac was in part the

17     language, even though I was sitting next to Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans

18     and was sitting next to the interpreter and was translating softly for

19     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans what was being said.  So I heard most of it

20     but not everything.  So the actual agreements about how to proceed, I had

21     some gaps about that.  That's why on the way back when we got back to

22     Potocari, it was good to get together with Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans

23     to hear what his findings were and to compare them with what I had heard.

24     And it turned out that it was good to compare these because there was

25     some confusion about the course of how to proceed and the commitments by


Page 22066

 1     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.

 2             For that reason, we decided that I would return to Bratunac to

 3     verify once again how we -- what the process would be from thereon and

 4     how we could assist in that.

 5        Q.   And what did you do after that?

 6        A.   I got in the car, I drove back to Bratunac, back to

 7     Hotel Fontana.  And with a great deal of difficulty, eventually I found

 8     Major Momir Nikolic and asked to verify the status quo.  And he indicated

 9     that I should leave as quickly as possible, that it was clear what would

10     be happening, that's what he indicated, that I had to go back to

11     Potocari.  He was not happy that I appeared again.

12        Q.   And if I'm clear from your answer, he refused to discuss these

13     issues with you?

14        A.   Yes, he refused to elaborate.  He said, "You'll see, it's clear

15     what the intention is."

16        Q.   Thank you.  I have no further questions at this time,

17     Colonel Boering.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we deal with the associated exhibits -- before

19     that, probably I have to ask Mr. Tieger.  During yesterday we admitted

20     the 65 ter 19458, which was the list of criminals, and due to time

21     constraints I asked Ms. West as to its admission, but she -- I don't

22     think she understood the question proceeded with different things and at

23     the end of the day I admitted.  My question is whether you do not object

24     to the admission of that document?  Do you remember what it is about?

25             MR. TIEGER:  Let me make sure I understand the Court's question.


Page 22067

 1     The question is not about the list --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  The list of criminals which was put by the accused

 3     to the witness.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, my -- I'll -- my understanding was that the

 5     issues -- that any issues pending -- that it was an MFI, of course, I

 6     recall.  But as to the list, I thought I understood that Ms. West had not

 7     reserved an objection but had not made an objection.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No, it was admitted in full.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Right.

10             JUDGE KWON:  And I -- my question is:  You do not challenge the

11     authenticity of the document?  That document is also one of the

12     associated exhibits of this witness.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, I believe that was her intention and I didn't

14     think she had any reservations to make with respect to that, but

15     that's --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

17             First, I have to ask the Defence whether they have any objection

18     to specific documents.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, I'd like to note down some -- seven

21     documents about which I have some concerns about their nature as

22     indispensable and inseparable part of the transcript.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  I can say too, Your Honours, and we can see if

24     they overlap with yours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.


Page 22068

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would agree.  And that would be 19455, I -- on

 2     review it's not indispensable as well as 19471.  Taking a look at that I

 3     thought there was not really much comment from the witness in the prior

 4     testimony.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  If I can identify further five.  19458, 19464,

 6     19473, 19730, those are the documents put by the various Defence, but the

 7     witness was not able to answer any questions in a serious manner.  And

 8     therefore I doubt whether -- if they form indispensable and inseparable

 9     part of the transcript.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Um --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Therefore, if you would like to tender them, I would

12     like you to deal with them; otherwise, the Defence may have to deal with

13     them individually.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  If I can just take a

15     quick look.  I think 19458, unless my notes are wrong --

16             JUDGE KWON:  That's the document I referred to --

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  It was admitted.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Admitted yesterday, okay.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  So I will skip that one.

20             19464, I will withdraw that.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, Mr. Nicholls, I omitted mentioning 19469

22     as well.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  I completely agree, Your Honours, starting with

24     19473.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, as we're going along


Page 22069

 1     here, I'm questioning the utility of this exercise because it's going to

 2     increase the time that we need for cross-examination.  I'm wondering

 3     whether or not, given that there's no objection to these documents,

 4     although they didn't form an indispensable part of the testimony, whether

 5     they can nevertheless be admitted as agreed between the parties.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Then we have a tool to admit such documents.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  It seems that it would be more efficient to do it

 8     that way, given that these were documents tendered by the Defence in the

 9     Popovic case and ones that we would like to have admitted.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I meant, in that case, first, the Defence can put

11     the questions in relation to these documents; otherwise, Defence -- it

12     can use also bar table motion on the certain formalities.  I'd like to

13     stick to the principle.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Very well.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  I agree with Your Honour's remaining two, that

17     they're not indispensable.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             With that caveat, all the other associated exhibits will be

20     admitted into evidence and be given a number in due course.

21             Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

24             Lieutenant-Colonel Boering, as you heard, your evidence in the

25     Popovic et al. case, i.e., its transcript has been admitted in full in


Page 22070

 1     lieu of your oral testimony.  And now you will be further asked by

 2     Mr. Karadzic in his cross-examination.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Boering.

 6        A.   [In English] Good morning, sir.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to

 8     suggest that the time before the break -- actually, we can postpone the

 9     time before we begin because there's nobody to assist with the uploading.

10     We need time to make it possible for my team to upload the documents or

11     we can maybe do something else, but we don't have the option of spending

12     the whole morning on uploading the documents.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.  I was trying to follow whether we can hear in

14     Dutch, so I missed your submission.  Let me read your transcript.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Are you suggesting taking a break now?  It's not

17     clear from the transcript.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, yes, if the break will make

19     it possible to do the uploading.  It seems it's not just us who are short

20     of staff, but it seems that the same would apply to the Registry as well.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for 20 minutes.  We'll resume at

23     quarter past.

24                           --- Break taken at 9.52 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 10.17 a.m.


Page 22071

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. Boering, how many statements in all did you provide?

 5        A.   [Interpretation]  Well, quite a few before this Tribunal, at

 6     least five times.  Also to the NIOD, N-I-O-D, other statements, so

 7     probably about ten.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And is it correct that your first statement dates

 9     from September 1995, two months thus after your return to the

10     Netherlands?

11        A.   Well, do you mean a statement for the UN or domestically for the

12     Netherlands?

13        Q.   To the Dutch authorities.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And that was the first statement, right, that you

16     ever gave; is that right?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  In that statement, did you state all the

19     characteristics, all the characteristic facts?

20        A.   Every investigation and every question I was asked had a certain

21     background and the first investigation also served a purpose.  So

22     specific questions were asked and each time I answered those.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to know, after that first statement, after

24     your first statement that you provided to the United Nations, did you go

25     for any kind of consultation?


Page 22072

 1        A.   How do you mean that?

 2        Q.   Did you consult with anyone from the Dutch government in order to

 3     prepare for such a statement?

 4        A.   I don't remember the Dutch government preparing me for sessions

 5     such as this one.

 6        Q.   Did you not state that after the first statement and before the

 7     second statement you visited the minister of defence and that you went

 8     over the documents with him; wasn't that so?

 9        A.   I remember that there was a difference between the statements

10     that I compiled and what was, in fact, issued to the Tribunal, and I

11     asked some questions about that.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection.  I'm sorry to interrupt, but it's a

14     recurring request.  Could we please just have cites, at least to the

15     statement if -- even if Mr. Karadzic isn't -- doesn't have his line

16     references, at least when he says "didn't you state" --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  -- it makes it much easier for me to follow.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I do have the

20     right to put a question like this and to wait for the answer, and then

21     depending on the answer I will see.  Why would I indicate in advance what

22     my intentions are?  I'm interested to know whether that was so or not.  I

23     can say now that it was a statement from the 10th of February, 1998, that

24     Mr. Boering provided.  Now I'm going to look at this as 1D04718, so we

25     can look at it.


Page 22073

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just to briefly reply, Your Honour.  I don't think

 2     Mr. Karadzic's characterisation of his right to ask questions without

 3     saying where they're coming from when they are put as statements of the

 4     witness as correct, he should -- and it's the convention in every other

 5     trial I've been in that when you say "you've said this," you give the

 6     cite to the opposing party and to the witness and to the Court.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  It's coming.  Let us proceed.

 8             Bear that in mind, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   With all due respect, I didn't say you said that.  I asked

11     whether you went to consultations.  And we have information in the

12     statement that I just cited that Mr. Boering went to see the defence

13     minister to go over documents and to refresh his recollection.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you said "did you not state," in that

15     case probably you need to cite the reference.  Let's continue.  We need

16     to switch to e-court from Sanction.  Yes.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Is this your statement?

19        A.   I see my signature and the date, yes, on the front page.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 3504 is what we need.  That's the

21     next page, please.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Look at the next page, please.  Second paragraph.  Would you

24     please read it.

25        A.   I'd like to get back to your previous question.  This document


Page 22074

 1     does not apply to consultations with the Ministry of Defence; this is a

 2     UN investigation.  So I assume that this is a new topic.

 3        Q.   Would you please read this paragraph.

 4             [In English] Would you like me to read it?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We have it.  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like the witness to confirm

 7     that he went to see the minister and then I'm going to ask further what

 8     they discussed -- well, let's finish this.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   You went to see the minister for consultations during this

11     visit --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Where do you have it, Mr. Karadzic?

13             THE ACCUSED:  I read it in English.

14             "I would like to mention that on the second day of this interview

15     I visited Dutch Ministry of Defence and reviewed documents to help

16     refresh my recollection."

17             JUDGE KWON:  Where did he say he met minister, Mr. Karadzic, and

18     consult him?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The ministry, the ministry.  I

20     don't know how this was translated to you, the Ministry of Defence.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, having read that paragraph, please proceed your

22     question, Mr. Karadzic.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Did you get information at the time about what happened to the

25     film that was taken by your associates in Potocari?


Page 22075

 1        A.   No, I did not receive any information about that.

 2        Q.   Do you know why these films were destroyed?

 3        A.   I don't know whether those films were destroyed.

 4        Q.   I will remind you that the person who made the films, who took

 5     the films, stated in his initial statements that he handed the films over

 6     to the intelligence officer, to somebody from the intelligence service,

 7     and that in the later statements he said that they were destroyed.

 8     However, he said that he was told that those films were much more

 9     accusatory or inculpatory than they expected and they told him that he

10     should not talk about the films at all.  Do you know anything about that?

11        A.   I know Mr. Rutten, but I was unaware that he wasn't allowed to

12     talk about that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just for the record, we haven't been told which

15     precise statement, again, that Mr. Karadzic is talking about from

16     Mr. Rutten, but the proposition put to the witness misstates the evidence

17     given yesterday at page 30, line 18.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  I was about to put that question

19     to you as well.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if I had had enough time,

21     Your Excellencies, I would have confronted the witness with his earlier

22     statement -- I mean yesterday's witness.  He said that:

23             [In English] "All of the conversations with Rutten held on

24     18th -- 19th of August, 1992, document 06054891 to 0605482 -- 024,

25     page 4."


Page 22076

 1             [No interpretation]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 3             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'll just say it's incredible not to confront the

 5     witness yesterday with that proposition under the excuse of no time when

 6     the witness yesterday said exactly what happened to the film, which was

 7     different, and then try to use this witness to get in the alternate

 8     theory.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I can't agree more, Mr. Nicholls.

10             But do you not challenge that such statement existed?  Because

11     I'm not -- we are not aware of it.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't have it in front of me, Your Honours.  It

13     may have been notified, but I haven't seen it yet.  I don't at this point

14     challenge that he's reading from something correctly.  My point was it

15     should have been put to the witness yesterday so that he could explain

16     it.

17             JUDGE KWON:  This is really difficult to follow, Mr. Robinson.

18     If you could give Mr. Karadzic advice after this -- after this session.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, I will.  But I can't help but

20     take this opportunity to note that if we had had adequate time to prepare

21     for this portion of the case we could work out some of these problems.  I

22     can tell you, really, from working inside this team that the preparation

23     for the Srebrenica part of the case is woefully inadequate and these

24     things will happen time and time again since we don't have enough time.

25     Thank you.


Page 22077

 1             JUDGE KWON:  No, but I can't accept the explanation that the

 2     Defence has not been given enough time.  We'll continue.

 3             Mr. Karadzic, let's upload that document.

 4             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm very sorry, I don't mean to interrupt, I don't

 6     have the transcript in front of me, but my recollection is that that

 7     topic did come up yesterday --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  -- of the film and this would have been one

10     question.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Let's leave it at that, and then why don't we upload

12     that document Mr. Karadzic was referring to.

13             Do you have the 65 ter number, Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Nicholls?

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  I do not have it at my finger tips, Your Honour.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I only have the ERN number

16     06054891, 19 August, 1998, a report on the interview with Mr. Rutten.  I

17     believe it's a report from the OTP, the Prosecution.  2247, a Prosecution

18     exhibit.

19             Your Excellencies, with all due respect, it's not only that we

20     are short of time.  We have inadequate resources, inadequate personnel.

21     If everybody recognises that this is a mega-trial, our resources are not

22     mega.  They are substandard.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Unacceptable, Mr. Karadzic.

24             Have we found that document?  So why don't we proceed without the

25     document and we'll come back to that issue later on.


Page 22078

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, Your Honour, it's 22457, we found it.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we now waiting for the document

 4     or are we moving on?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  It's coming.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This passage is on page 4.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Here, I'll read it in Serbian:

 9             "First, I spoke to Mr. De Ruiter and then with

10     Commander Bleumink.  De Ruiter told me that something horrendous had

11     happened.  He spoke for a lot, but briefly because Mr. Bleumink took over

12     and he said video footage has more implications than we had initially

13     expected.  I could only think that what was said was true.  I was asked

14     what it was about.  I was asked not to speak about it because we were all

15     required to obey the rule of not divulging information.  I said, 'No need

16     to tell me this.  I have no vested interest in this.'  They can't go any

17     further into this subject."

18             Can you see what is written below?

19             The next day, they told him, in a dramatic tone, that the footage

20     had been destroyed.

21        A.   Yes, I can see that.

22        Q.   Were you aware of that?  And if you were not, how come these

23     things were happening without your knowledge, although you held such a

24     high position?

25        A.   First, I was not in such a high office; second, the rolls of film


Page 22079

 1     were not delivered to me and I was not involved in the entire process,

 2     only, let's say, going off to take pictures.  I did consult with Rutten

 3     about that and I indicated something unusual happened in that region, it

 4     might be a good idea to record it in photographs, I remember that, but

 5     after that I wasn't involved.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  There's no basis to admit this document at the

 9     moment.  I think this could have been the first document you could have

10     put to the witness when Mr. Rutten was here instead of delving into

11     background material.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  And --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just, Your Honours, I mean it's clear what's going

15     on here.  Obviously the Defence read through all of Mr. Rutten's

16     statements before they cross-examined him.  It's hard to believe that in

17     preparation for Colonel Boering, after Rutten finished, they went back

18     and read Rutten's statements and then came up with this question for the

19     first time.  I mean, I think it's a clear tactical choice when Mr. Rutten

20     said yesterday that the film was destroyed by an error, I'm paraphrasing,

21     in the development, they chose not to put this question to him because

22     they didn't want to get the answer from the witness himself.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Actually, Mr. President, that's absolutely not the

24     case and the case is, in fact, that Dr. Karadzic discovered this last

25     night and that's how chaos -- that's a product of chaos and that's what


Page 22080

 1     we have.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Whatever the consequence of that chaos

 3     would be, there's no basis to admit this document through this witness,

 4     so we'll not admit this, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case, I ask you to re-call

 6     Mr. Rutten for me to finish my cross-examination or to admit this through

 7     a bar table motion.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  That's a separate subject.  Let's get on with the --

 9     get on with your cross-examination of Mr. Boering.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   On the 11th of July, 1995, around 8.00 p.m. you had your first

13     meeting with General Mladic at the Fontana Hotel; correct?

14        A.   That's correct.

15        Q.   Thank you.  What was your position regarding the civilians in the

16     enclave?

17        A.   My role was to serve as a point of contact, both with the

18     civilian population and the military leadership in the enclave.  That's

19     why I was in touch with civilian -- civilian institutions in the enclave.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I'm sorry, I may have been imprecise.  You were there

21     as a team, right, and you were led by the battalion commander,

22     Mr. Karremans.  There was also Mr. -- sorry, Major Raven and Mr. Rave and

23     others.  What was the position of your side, not your personal position,

24     what did you come to Mladic with?

25        A.   The enclave had fallen.  The Muslim population was in a dire


Page 22081

 1     situation, and the idea was to see what the best way was to find a

 2     solution for this with the VRS.  At that moment it was unclear whether we

 3     would find Mladic there.  We wanted to meet to find possible solutions.

 4        Q.   Did you come up with a proposal?  Did you have a view?

 5        A.   The view we had was primarily that of the

 6     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.  At that moment the situation was fairly

 7     chaotic.  True joint preparation as a team as to how we would act

 8     together -- I don't remember preparing that in detail in writing or

 9     otherwise, except for a brief talk beforehand, but that was more about

10     consulting with the other side and exploring options there because the

11     idea of truly negotiating was not really present.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Were you informed of the operation of the action

13     undertaken that morning by Ambassador Akashi regarding Srebrenica?

14        A.   No, I know nothing about that.

15        Q.   Did you keep each other informed?  Did you collate information

16     with your centre in Zagreb?

17        A.   I wasn't involved in that.

18        Q.   If your commander was involved, would it be reasonable for me to

19     assume that you had briefings?  Did you have briefings to be informed

20     about orders and other information coming from your command?

21        A.   We had regular briefings and often we would get together for an

22     hour in the early evening to review various matters in a small group.

23        Q.   Was the reason for your failure to come up with proposal the fact

24     that Mladic had asked you to bring representatives of the Muslim army?

25        A.   I don't understand your question.


Page 22082

 1        Q.   Let me put it this way:  Did any proposal or conclusion come out

 2     of that first meeting?

 3        A.   Yes, I remember that General Mladic indicated that he wanted to

 4     consult with Muslims from the enclave, preferably military ones.  And he

 5     wanted that to happen that very night.

 6        Q.   And then you returned the same night, around 11.00 p.m.; right?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   What was the conclusion of that second meeting?

 9        A.   The conclusion of the second meeting, if I remember correctly,

10     was an appointment to meet a third time the next morning, where we made

11     or where we were supposed to make another attempt to try to get a broader

12     composition of the team to elaborate things together.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that Mladic informed you that he had

14     neither the buses nor the fuel to evacuate the civilians and he asked the

15     UN to provide them?

16        A.   At the third meeting there in Fontana, that came up, transport

17     and buses.  I was next to that, so I didn't hear everything.  This was

18     one of the areas that was unclear between Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans

19     and myself.  That's why I returned again after the third meeting, after

20     our consultation, to verify what the actual agreements were.

21        Q.   Thank you.  By that time it was clear to you, wasn't it, that

22     Muslim representatives were asking you to facilitate the evacuation of

23     civilians; right?

24        A.   At the third meeting we spoke about a certain procedure for

25     removing the Muslim population based on age categories, for example,


Page 22083

 1     first the sick and the injured; and afterwards, those who were more

 2     mobile.  Those matters came up at the third meeting.  Even DutchBat's

 3     support in this removal came up.

 4        Q.   Who asked for the removal?  Whose position was it that they want

 5     evacuation?

 6        A.   I remember that there were -- the situation was very bleak for

 7     the population and for the battalion that I was a member of.  I don't

 8     remember -- I don't remember whether the actual initiative came from the

 9     battalion or the Muslim population or General Mladic at the third

10     meeting.  There was talk about that being possible and how, but the

11     initiative, I think that wasn't clearly stated.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 65 ter 02367.  It's

14     probably been admitted already, so there's probably a P number as well.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  P3974, Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can remove the Serbian version.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you remember this telegram sent by your commander?

19        A.   I saw this telegram afterwards, but obviously not during the

20     operation itself.

21        Q.   Would you please look at paragraph 4, what the demands were, that

22     by 2230 another meeting be held and the meeting was to be attended by

23     representatives of all refugees.  Quote:

24             "I found one, although he was not an official

25     representative ...," et cetera, et cetera.  And he said the cease-fire


Page 22084

 1     would last until 10.00 on the 12th of July.  Do you recall this?

 2        A.   I can see only the first part of the page.  Could I see the

 3     second part?  Yes, I remember that.

 4        Q.   He agreed to accept all the humanitarian needs of the refugees,

 5     to admit all the wounded, et cetera, but his conditions were that

 6     soldiers, Muslim soldiers, be disarmed and that they withdraw.  And we

 7     see that he was willing to receive and treat all wounded persons,

 8     et cetera.  Was it, indeed, so?

 9        A.   Do you mean whether General Mladic indicated this orally; is that

10     what you're asking?

11        Q.   Yes, is this report by Karremans correct?  Did you attend these

12     meetings with Mr. Karremans?

13        A.   Yes, I was present there.  And as for whether this came up, yes.

14        Q.   Can we scroll down the page to see item 6, what Mr. Karremans

15     says he was not able to do.  Please look at this.  He says he cannot

16     defend these people, he cannot defend his own battalion, he cannot find

17     suitable representatives of the civilians and their authorities, he

18     cannot find representatives among the military authorities because they

19     are trying to fight for a corridor to the Tuzla area, and he cannot

20     manage to force the ABiH army to hand over their weapons.

21             Was it indeed the situation at the time?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D4883.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 22085

 1        Q.   This is from General Gobillard.  It's a telegram sent to the

 2     north-east sector, I suppose.  It's an order issued to DutchBat.  Do you

 3     remember this?

 4        A.   I didn't see those telegrams at the time.  I wasn't involved in

 5     that.  Well, it was clear that different levels were in contact with each

 6     other.

 7        Q.   This order - it is entitled "Order," isn't it? - was it carried

 8     out by your forces?  Did you act accordingly?

 9        A.   You're talking about my troops.  I wasn't the commander.  I was a

10     staff officer and was responsible for contact between different parties.

11     So I was involved in the process but not actually as a type of commander.

12        Q.   Well, all right, sir, Mr. Boering.  You are testifying here about

13     everything that has to do with Serbs.  Can you testify about anything

14     that has to do with your battalion?  Also, you're not testifying only

15     about your contacts with the parties; you're testifying about different

16     things here.  Was this carried out?  Did your commander behave in

17     accordance with this order?

18        A.   Well, just let me take a look for a moment, please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we zoom in further that second part,

20     starting from the message.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, from what I see, that is,

22     indeed, how we operated on the 11th.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?


Page 22086

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1958, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  19460, could we have

 4     that 65 ter number now, please.  We're going to get the English version

 5     now as well.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Please take a look at this.  Is this telegram being sent by the

 8     General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the 1st Corps command

 9     and to the president of the Presidency of the Republic of

10     Bosnia and Herzegovina at 1325 hours on the 12th of July; isn't that

11     right?  P3981 is the number of this document, actually.  It has already

12     been admitted.

13             You don't have to read all of it.  I'm just asking you whether

14     you agree that this was sent on the 12th of July at 1.25.

15        A.   I see a sheet of paper bearing a date.

16        Q.   Please take a look at the first paragraph.  Do you agree that

17     what it says here is that he is already acting on the instructions that

18     he had received in order to prepare for accepting a large number of

19     civilians from Srebrenica?  It's the first paragraph.  Do you agree that

20     that is what it says there?

21        A.   That's what I'm reading, yes.

22        Q.   Let me ask you this now, Mr. Boering:  Do you know that the

23     Muslim side had consulted Mr. Akashi and that Mr. Akashi, on the 11th,

24     said that he would start talks with the Serb side on the basis of the

25     consultations held with the Muslim side in order to ensure the evacuation


Page 22087

 1     of civilians from Srebrenica.  Now, take a look at this.  Already on the

 2     12th, this one is providing information to the effect that he is acting

 3     upon instructions to receive these civilians, and Akashi says after

 4     consultations with the Muslim side he is going to talk to the Serb side

 5     to make this possible.  Did you know about all of this?

 6        A.   No, I knew nothing about that.

 7        Q.   Did you know about Akashi's telegram to the Secretary-General and

 8     to Annan?

 9        A.   No, I knew nothing about that.

10        Q.   And did you see for yourself that the representatives of Muslims

11     from Srebrenica were asking for the evacuation of the civilian population

12     to be facilitated, that this was their request, and that all of that was

13     in full accord.  On the 11th, it was the government -- is talking to

14     Akashi and sending instructions to this -- this -- this 2nd Corps, the

15     2nd Corps -- the 2nd Corps is already providing information on the 12th,

16     in the afternoon, that they had taken measures.  Now, who was it that

17     asked for the population to be evacuated, Mr. Boering?

18        A.   If you're talking about the representatives of the Muslim

19     population in the enclave, then Mandzic, Camila and Mr. Nuhanovic, they

20     had actual ideas about requesting evacuation.  I remember that in the

21     previous night they were consulting and making phone calls, trying to

22     contact various authorities in Tuzla.

23             But advance instructions or plans, whether they had those, I'm

24     not aware of that.

25        Q.   Thank you.


Page 22088

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 19713.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Do you recognise this?  Is this the usual telegram that is sent

 4     by HQ Sector North East and the Tuzla Airbase?

 5        A.   I can't remember having seen such cover sheets very often.  It's

 6     possible.  It looks authentic.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Please take a look at this.  The date is the 7th of July - isn't

11     that right? - and this has to do with an assessment of the situation in

12     Srebrenica.  It says that the Drina Corps has a strength of 11.000 and

13     that it is responsible for the separation line or confrontation line of

14     90 kilometres and that it is so thinly spread that it is unable to launch

15     an offensive or attack; isn't that right?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Look at what it says in respect of the 2nd Corps.  It says the

18     2nd Corps, the 2nd Corps:

19             [In English] "It is well -- 2nd Corps is well aware of the BSA

20     problems and would like to exacerbate it by making 28th Division more

21     active.  It is worthy of note that the ABiH within Srebrenica and Zepa,

22     although poorly armed, are probably not that much less in number than the

23     total number of the infantry of Drina Corps."

24             [Interpretation] Was that what you knew as well, that they have

25     almost as many soldiers as the Drina Corps?


Page 22089

 1        A.   No, I did not have that impression.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Please take a look at what it says here further on.

 3     It says that 65 per cent of the required food was allowed to enter and

 4     that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was making entrance very difficult

 5     and that at least one convoy returned to Belgrade.  And a bit further

 6     down there's a reference to Oric, that he's in Tuzla.  Did you know that?

 7     Did you know that he had left Srebrenica?

 8        A.   Yes.  Yes, I knew that.

 9        Q.   Let us please take a look at the next page now.  Look at what it

10     says here about Oric, that he treats Srebrenica as his personal fief and

11     [In English] "he is an embarrassment to the BH government as he is

12     suspected of being a war criminal."

13             [Interpretation] Did you know what Naser Oric's forces had done

14     to Serbs in Srebrenica and around Srebrenica?

15        A.   I was aware that there were regular activities outside the

16     enclave by soldiers of the ABiH and also that some people within the

17     enclave were enriching themselves.

18        Q.   You see that Muslims attacks Vis, and further on you see what the

19     Army of Republika Srpska did, they start an attack, and it says the local

20     mayor said that he did not believe that the Army of the Bosnian Serbs

21     wished to take the enclave but, rather, they were after strategic

22     hilltops, and so on and so forth.  Did you see for yourself that the

23     28th Division was more active from mid-June up until these days?

24        A.   I remember that the tension mounted around that time and that

25     freedom of movement, even for us to drive around, became more limited and


Page 22090

 1     that here and there there was some joint actions.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  If it is convenient, Mr. Karadzic, we would like to

 3     take a break now --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Fine.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  -- for 15 minutes and we'll resume at 11.35.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 11.18 a.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 11.37 a.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Before we proceed, before I forget again,

 9     Mr. Robinson, with respect to your request for leave to reply in relation

10     to the motion to compel the interview, your leave is granted, since the

11     Chamber finds that it would be useful.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   So did you realise what the intensity and volume of this enhanced

17     activity of the 28th Division was in the second half of June?  You said

18     that you did know about some operations.  Were you aware of the intensity

19     and volume of these military operations from the enclave?  At your daily

20     briefings, was this being communicated to your command staff?

21        A.   Well, our insight into the operations of the 28th Division,

22     especially operations outside the enclave, was limited, especially

23     because we were heavily restricted in our actions due to lack of

24     personnel, fuel.  Often, we were informed of activities outside the

25     enclave by the Muslims reported primarily, for example, by


Page 22091

 1     Major Momir Nikolic of [as interpreted] Vukovic.

 2        Q.   That was my next question, but you've already answered it.  Did

 3     you take that seriously, the information that was provided to you by the

 4     Serb officers who liaised with you?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, Colonel Boering.

 6             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, no objection, but just for the transcript

 8     being clear on line 38, 2, I think it's meant to be "Nikolic or Vukovic,"

 9     not "of," as though that was a place.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I take it "of" to be Dutch.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Colonel Boering.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course we took the information

14     seriously.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D04727, please.  Can we have a

18     look at that, please.  Can we have that in e-court.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you are minded to tender the previous

20     document UNMO's document?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, sorry, I thought that I

22     already did that.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1959, Your Honours.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 22092

 1        Q.   Do you see this?  Do you see what is being ordered by Rasim Delic

 2     on the 11th of July, Rasim Delic, the Commander-in-Chief of the Muslim

 3     army?  This is what he says in the preamble:

 4             "With a view to intensifying partisan types of combat actions,

 5     active actions, and particularly combat action diversions, I hereby

 6     order:

 7             "Up to the 15th of July, 1995, in the basic zone of operation

 8     carry out all preparations for execution of diversion actions at the

 9     level of divisions and brigades ..."

10             And then further on what should be done, these operations should

11     be carried out as soon as possible and as often as possible on taken

12     territory, and the basic actions are to be of the destroy-and-come-back

13     type.  Do you realise that that was done even before this order?

14        A.   In the time I was in the enclave, it happened regularly, at least

15     according to the VRS liaison officers.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1960, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D4704, can we have a look at that,

21     please.  Yes, that's it.  You can remove the Serbian version so that

22     there will be more room for the English version -- oh, no, actually for

23     the sake of the public, you can keep both, if possible.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Can you see this here, information on combat results of the units


Page 22093

 1     and commands of the 28th Army Division of the 2nd Corps of the Army of

 2     Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zepa.  It's the 8th of July.  Please take a

 3     look at this.  Do you see what they did and to what extent?  I'll read

 4     out the first one:

 5             "The soldiers of the 28th Ground Army Division located in

 6     Srebrenica and Zepa, although completely encircled and facing major

 7     problems related to survival and the obligation to protect free

 8     territory, decided to contribute as much as possible to the fight against

 9     the aggressor and stepped up their activities deep in the temporarily

10     taken territory.  An additional reason for the activities of the members

11     of the 28th Division was to prevent enemy forces from sending additional

12     troops to the Sarajevo theatre of operations from the area around

13     Srebrenica and Zepa by causing losses, primarily the loss of manpower,

14     which would force the aggressor to tie-up troops in the wider area of

15     Srebrenica and Zepa."

16             And then it says here:  "60 Chetniks were liquidated ...," a

17     certain amount of equipment was seized and then the village of Visnjica,

18     you probably know that it's outside the enclave, and so on and so forth.

19             Does this correspond to your own knowledge about their activities

20     in our territory, deep in our territory?

21        A.   We were informed in very limited ways about that.  We didn't know

22     very much about that area.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did you notice that the activities of the

24     28th Division had to do with the activities of the 1st Corps of the

25     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina around Sarajevo, and that these activities


Page 22094

 1     were reinforced in order to spread out Serb forces?  Is this

 2     understandable military logic at that?

 3        A.   Well, it's definitely logical.  Whether there was the link

 4     described here -- well, I can imagine that.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1961, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have a look

10     at 1D04729.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Did you know who Ramiz Becirovic was?

13        A.   Yes, I was regularly in contact with him.

14        Q.   Was he acting commander of the 28th Division when Naser Oric was

15     absent?

16        A.   Generally, yes, but possibly with the exception of the Bandera

17     triangle, where Zulfo was effectively in charge.

18        Q.   Thank you.  We'll go back to the Bandera triangle.  Please focus

19     on this now, this is the beginning of June, the 5th of June, and what is

20     referred to here is taking measures to prepare for sabotage activities

21     and it is an order that he is issuing to these brigades.  The 282nd and

22     the 283rd, to establish a joint sabotage reconnaissance group that they

23     would send to territory temporarily occupied by the aggressor along the

24     axis Podravanje-Kragljivoda-Jezero.  You can see all of this for

25     yourself.  And carrying out this task, et cetera, et cetera, they will be


Page 22095

 1     able to carry out this activity as soon as they have a chance, and so on

 2     and so forth.  Do you see that that is the intensive activity that

 3     started already in the first days of the month of June?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this, please.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D1962.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Can we look at 65 ter 19471, please, so that we can see what was

11     happening, what kind of activities were taking place in April when you

12     were there.  You were there then; right?

13        A.   Yes, I was there in April.

14        Q.   Do you remember that you were ordered to halt the engineering

15     works at your observation points?

16        A.   Just a moment.  Yes, I remember that.

17        Q.   Do you agree that the reason for banning the fortification of

18     your observation posts was because they wanted to pass between Srebrenica

19     and Zepa unimpeded?  That's what it says in the paragraph but last.

20        A.   Yes, it was important for unimpeded passage to be possible.

21        Q.   Do you know that pursuant to the agreement on protected areas,

22     they did not have the right to link-up those two enclaves and that that

23     belt of the territory, that road, was supposed to have been under the

24     control of the Army of Republika Srpska?

25        A.   Well, in any case, I do remember that those two enclaves were not


Page 22096

 1     connected.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And do you recall, do you agree, did you have

 3     information that helicopters with weapons preferred to land in Zepa

 4     rather than in Srebrenica, and that then these weapons were taken from

 5     Zepa to Srebrenica later via this corridor?

 6        A.   No, I don't have my information about that.

 7        Q.   But you did have information about helicopter landings, did you

 8     not, and even about us downing or firing at those helicopters?

 9        A.   Yes, but that related to helicopters intending to land in the

10     Srebrenica enclave, especially in the dark a few times.  Such reports

11     were made, but I didn't personally see them.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did you report the hostile position of the 2nd Corps

13     command and of the 28th Division towards the UNPROFOR?  Did you inform

14     your superiors about this?

15        A.   That was not part of my duties.

16        Q.   Did the battalion report about it?  Was it something that could

17     be found in the media?  Was the command in Zagreb and Sarajevo informed

18     about it?  And was this given out to the media, all that was being done

19     to you in the enclave?

20        A.   Well, there was standard reports about what was happening in and

21     around the enclave - DutchBat drafted them - so anything noteworthy was

22     reported.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And was that reported to the media?  Were there any

24     protests through the media about these hostile actions?

25        A.   I don't remember reports to the media.


Page 22097

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We would like to tender this --

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   I'm sorry, while the document is still on the screen, do you see

 5     that there is reference here to the demilitarisation agreement.  When it

 6     is useful or needed, then there was reference to the demilitarisation

 7     agreement.  Was the Srebrenica area ever demilitarised?

 8        A.   One of our duties was to carry that out, and we were able to

 9     implement that in a very limited manner.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit D1963.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             19472, these --

14             THE REGISTRAR:  This is Exhibit P3990, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   And since probably this document was tendered through you, did

18     you see this document during your preparation for this testimony?

19        A.   I didn't see this document in my preparation.

20        Q.   Could you please look at paragraph 3, where it says:

21             [In English] "The attempt made by the liaison officer of the

22     28th Army Division to prevent UNPROFOR in Srebrenica from continuing its

23     work to set up an observation station in the village of Lozine sector by

24     citing the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities on

25     31st of December, 1994, was erroneous because this is exactly what the


Page 22098

 1     Agreement envisages."

 2             [Interpretation] Do you recall inheriting - you came immediately

 3     after that - the cease-fire that was mediated by President Carter and

 4     signed on the 31st of December, shortly before you arrived?

 5        A.   No, I don't remember that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter 01979,

 8     please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Is it correct that the Muslim side painted its APCs white in

11     order for them to look like your APCs?  Were you informed about that?

12        A.   When I was in the enclave, I didn't see any APCs of the Muslims,

13     let alone painted ones -- let alone ones that were painted white.

14        Q.   Take a look at this.  This is dated the 8th of July, and it

15     states that the UNPROFOR command filed a protest to the Main Staff of the

16     VRS over operations against UNPROFOR observation point at this elevation

17     near Zeleni Jadar and then the Main Staff responded that the Drina Corps

18     command had informed it that the Muslims were using or misusing six

19     armoured personnel carriers painted white and acting at close range.  Do

20     you agree that the Muslims were firing close from your observation points

21     in the near vicinity in order to provoke us to fire back and to break the

22     cease-fire?  Not to break the cease-fire but to actually pull UNPROFOR

23     into the war on their side.

24        A.   I remember that occasionally there were some Muslim activities

25     near the enclave.  I do remember that.  And this was discussed with the


Page 22099

 1     Muslim military.  We said that we did not want to tolerate that.

 2        Q.   You said "near the enclave."  Did you mean to say that in the

 3     near vicinity of your installations they were firing and that that was

 4     something that you were not prepared to tolerate?

 5        A.   Well, in any case our mandate was to act on that, let alone if it

 6     happened in our neighbourhood.

 7        Q.   Mr. Boering, perhaps my question was not clear.  Did the Muslims

 8     abuse your presence in order to fire against the Serbs from positions

 9     that were close to your observation points so that the Serbs would

10     retaliate by firing back at you, yes or no?

11        A.   This may have happened occasionally, yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We would like to tender this.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1964 [Realtime transcript read in error

16     "D1946"], Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not 46 but 64 in the transcript.

18             Let's look at 1D04723.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   This is the final analysis of the air-lift for Zepa and

21     Srebrenica.  It was written on the 17th of February, 1995; however, I

22     think that that was an error.  I think that this happened in 1996, that

23     there was an error made in the year.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page,

25     please.


Page 22100

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can you look at the place where it says that:

 3             "Between the 27th of February, 1993, and the 7th of May, 1995,

 4     there was an air-lift from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina to meet the needs of the enclave of Srebrenica, Zepa, and

 6     Gorazde.  The main aim of introducing and maintaining the air-lift was to

 7     transport" --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's too fast.  Slow down.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to you and to the

10     interpreters, but I believe that they can see this.  It's on the screen.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Well, let me re-tell it then because we can all see it.  Do you

13     see that during those practically two and a half years there was an

14     air-lift with the objective of supplying materiel and weapons for combat,

15     for the evacuation of the wounded, and so on and so forth.  And a little

16     bit lower down, if you can look, it says where it says UNPROFOR, when

17     they were encircled and blockaded, despite the presence of the UNPROFOR

18     which did not fulfil its mandate to protect the civilian population and

19     territories of the so-called enclaves, morale of the fighters and

20     civilians has improved, not only because of the supply of war materiel

21     and material and technical equipment, but also because of the reassurance

22     that they have not been abandoned, and so on and so forth.

23             Thus, it states here that you did not protect the civilians and

24     they had between 6- and 12.000 fighters, actually, in that area; is that

25     correct?


Page 22101

 1             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   My question is:  Did Mr. Boering and his command and his unit

 4     know that for the purposes of combat there was an air-lift between

 5     Bosnia and Herzegovina and these two enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa?

 6     And was it the nature --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Stop there.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   -- of protected zones to --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Ask one question at a time.

11             Yes, Mr. Boering.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You are correct, yes, but I am

13     rushing because of the time.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a very limited air-lift.

15     You couldn't really say that there were excessive reports of air-borne

16     activity around the enclave.  If you look at the arms of the Muslim

17     warriors that we saw, you can hardly say that those fighters were

18     extremely well armed.  As for evacuation of the injured, that was

19     extremely limited.  The time I visited the hospitals and saw the injured,

20     well, you certainly couldn't say that those who were seriously injured

21     were being evacuated by helicopter.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Did you know that the evacuation of the wounded could have been

24     arranged with the VRS and that this was done; it was not necessary to

25     have clandestine flights in order to evacuate them?


Page 22102

 1        A.   I was involved in such a convoy of evacuating injured by bus

 2     once.  Yes, it happened, but the male population was not the first target

 3     group for evacuation.  They didn't trust it.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the next page.  Under C. the control

 5     of air-space is mentioned.  The Serbian version is correct.  I don't know

 6     if the English version is.  The English version is not correct.  It says

 7     here that all the flights were carried out in conditions when the no-fly

 8     ban was in force and they had at least 17 flights and we will see during

 9     which period they took place.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page,

11     please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can you please see where it says the air-lift for Srebrenica

14     lasted for 23 [as interpreted] days.  They tried to have one every other

15     day, but they managed to do so every fifth day.  So every fifth day there

16     would be 17 combat fights for Srebrenica alone, 17 combat flights.  Were

17     you aware that they were firing at our troops from helicopters?

18        A.   I see that the period is described from 27 February 1993 until

19     30 March.  The period we're talking about is unclear to me because I was

20     in the enclave for only six months.  So this -- I can't infer that

21     air-lift of 33 days from this document and I can't remember an air-lift

22     for several days during my stay in the enclave.

23        Q.   We saw on the first page that from the 27th of February, 1993, to

24     the 7th of May, 1995, they maintained the air-lift.  Sometimes the crafts

25     would land in Srebrenica and more often in Zepa.  Did you receive


Page 22103

 1     information from your observers that there were some flights taking place

 2     above the enclaves?

 3        A.   As I indicated earlier, we observed very limited reports, perhaps

 4     four or five times during my period in the enclave.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We would like to tender this

 7     document.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Transcript page 49, line 14, "23 days" should read

 9     "33 days."  Am I correct in so understanding?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry to interrupt.  I don't object to the

13     document.  I just -- when Mr. Karadzic was reading the first page he put

14     up he said:

15             "It states here that they had between 6- and 12.000 fighters in

16     the area."

17             I didn't see that.  I'm not sure if he could point me to it or if

18     it's a mistake.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The reference is from the book of

20     Sefer Halilovic.  We sent the Prosecution the request for

21     authentification.  We showed that yesterday.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Fine, it's not from this document.  If you agree

23     with that, we can proceed.

24             We can admit this.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1965, Your Honours.


Page 22104

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can we look at 1D04722 now, please.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Let's look at what the intelligence sector of his army is writing

 5     to Alija Izetbegovic and we will see that the document is signed at the

 6     end by the main commander Rasim Delic.  On the 13th of July, 1995, it is

 7     said that - and you can see for yourself - the following was carried out,

 8     17 helicopter flights, whereby each time the helicopter was hit.  Some

 9     ended up tragically, some doctors were injured, even though we did allow

10     the doctors to pass through when they were announced in advance.  And

11     then later it says:

12             "Preparations for the future operation of joining up the enclaves

13     we brought and took back four brigade commanders ..."

14             Did you know that these activities of theirs were aimed at

15     linking up these enclaves in June, thus, before the 13th of July?

16        A.   No, I didn't know that.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And now you can see the activities there with

18     replacing the commanders, and it states here that the concept recommended

19     by the people in the Drina River valley was to form an 8th Corps, and so

20     on and so forth.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page,

22     please.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   You see this table.  354.000 something rounds for Srebrenica,

25     173.000 for Zepa, RPGs, mortars of two kinds, et cetera.  Do you see that


Page 22105

 1     it was a constant supply.  Can we look at the next page, there are some

 2     mortars, 82-millimetres.  115 of them arrived at Srebrenica.  Can we see

 3     the next page.  115, 82-millimetre mortars and 10-millimetres -- and ten

 4     mortars of 120-millimetres.  And look at the rifles, that's numbers 51

 5     and 52, mortars, 82-millimetres only to Zepa and 115 mortars of one

 6     calibre and ten mortars of 120-millimetres.

 7             So it was not a very poorly armed division, was it?

 8        A.   Well, this is a supply of ammunition, yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1966, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  For your information, we'll have a break at half

14     past 12.00.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] An hour, right?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   You said that you had partially demilitarised Srebrenica.  What

19     do you understand by "partially"?  You took some of the weapons away;

20     right?

21        A.   When -- whenever -- while patrolling, we encountered people who

22     were armed.  The idea was to confiscate that and gather -- to that end we

23     gathered them at a weapon collection point and managed them so that they

24     could not be used.  But we couldn't drive around everywhere, for example,

25     not in the Bandera triangle.  And given the quantities of vehicles,


Page 22106

 1     personnel, and fuel, we weren't able to patrol the entire area

 2     constantly, nor was it our mandate to enter homes and search homes

 3     independently.  So the process was rather tedious.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D04725, just a brief

 6     look at one report from February showing what Naser Oric had received.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Look how many rounds and especially shells are listed here,

 9     mortar shells 120.  And further down it says the equipment listed does

10     not include equipment shipped in the last flight on 14 and

11     15 February 1995, which has not been delivered to Srebrenica, so it must

12     have arrived at Zepa but not Srebrenica.

13             Do you agree that this is a regular military activity as if the

14     area had not been demilitarised?

15        A.   No, I can't infer that from the report I see.

16        Q.   Not only from this report.  If we take all the activities into

17     account, all the reports about the supply of materiel, do you agree that

18     this is a military activity that was banned for protected areas?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that they had a tank?

21        A.   There was one tank in the weapon collection point, as far as I

22     know, and they -- I saw that among all the material that could not be

23     used and was not used.

24        Q.   Look at this, 120-millimetre projectiles for a tank were

25     supplied.  It's line 5 or 6 from the bottom.  It might be on the next


Page 22107

 1     page in English.  Next page in English, please.

 2             Do you see 100-millimetre tank shells?  February 1995.

 3        A.   I don't remember a tank in the enclave, perhaps in Zepa, but I

 4     wasn't there.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1967, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  And I see the time, Mr. Karadzic.

10             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, just to say, Your Honours, at the bottom of

12     page 1 before we got to the tank shells on the next page, this was -- my

13     reading of what Mr. Karadzic was saying this was the material which

14     urgently needed to be delivered which had not yet -- had not been

15     delivered to Srebrenica.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             We'll take a break for an hour and resume at 1.30.

18                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   I would now like to show you what they had handed over in terms

24     of weapons to you and how they concealed them from you.  So I'm not

25     saying that you turned a blind eye, but let me show you 1D4700.  This is


Page 22108

 1     from 1996, 23rd August, an interview with Naser Oric.  Take, for

 2     instance, the passage about demilitarisation.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the next page, I believe, in

 4     English.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Take a look.  From the beginning of the war until 1993 he was in

 7     touch with Delic and he says they had turned over weapons that are

 8     unusable and the heavy weapons that cannot be hidden.  That's what his

 9     commander told him to do.  And he says they only turned over a few

10     things, for instance, two out of five tanks.  But since we had no fuel

11     for them, we had to burn them down, and we pushed the remaining two

12     further behind the lines.  Then a tank and a howitzer, 122-millimetres;

13     two or three B-1 cannons, two Pragas, one 120-millimetre mortar, and

14     rifles that they manufactured themselves.  Did you ever suspect that so

15     much weaponry had been hidden away from you?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we go back to page 1 in

19     English.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   It says here that from April 1992 to April 1993 they had lost

22     1.860 soldiers.  Did you know about their losses?

23        A.   I read something about the period 1992/1993, but I didn't

24     personally experience that.

25        Q.   And did you see a cemetery?  Do you know where those 1860


Page 22109

 1     soldiers who got killed in only one year were buried, and there was an

 2     equal number of dead in the following year?  Did you ever see a large

 3     army cemetery at that time?

 4        A.   I can't remember having seen one.

 5        Q.   If I tell you that all of them were buried as allegedly victims

 6     of Serb crimes, would that sound reasonable to you?  They're all now in

 7     Potocari in what is known as the memorial centre.

 8        A.   Well, I simply have no context for this story.

 9        Q.   Look at what it says in the same paragraph.  They were all

10     fighting men and he always distinguished between the death of a fighting

11     man and the death of a person who was simply looting Chetnik - that means

12     Serbian - houses.  Before all these villages were burned down, they were

13     looted, all the houses were looted and all the property hauled to

14     Srebrenica.

15             Were you informed, did your own people tell you, that they were

16     bringing back looted property with them when they would come back to

17     their villages?

18        A.   No, I can't remember that.

19        Q.   Further below it says they had 12.000 people able to serve who

20     set out to make breakthrough towards Tuzla from Buljin and they had about

21     3500 men of the division and around 4.000 in total.  12.000 military-age

22     able-bodied men set out towards Tuzla.  You must have known that their

23     combat units set out to fight their way to Tuzla.  Do you know how many

24     civilians and how many fighting men were among them?

25        A.   I think we assumed 2- to 3.000 men were believed to be serving in


Page 22110

 1     the army.

 2        Q.   I'm asking you about your knowledge about your estimates, maybe

 3     about that column of people who decided to fight their way to Tuzla, who

 4     did not go to Potocari, who tried to go to Tuzla.  If I tell you that

 5     there were between 17- to 20.000 people, including 12.000 able-bodied

 6     military-age men, would that be consistent with what you know?

 7        A.   I remember that the military leadership had that figure just

 8     before the enclave fell.  We weren't involved in that ourselves.  We were

 9     working on a plan and -- but that the plan meant leaving the enclave with

10     the number of people you're mentioning wasn't known to me and I didn't

11     see the preparations either.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page.  Next

14     page, please.  Page 3:

15             [In English] "Then Zulfo Tursunovic and I made a plan, so we

16     first cleansed Chetnik villages, launched an attack on the town and took

17     it.  (Srebrenica was liberated in May 1992" --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Why don't we collapse the B/C/S part

19     and zoom in -- no, no, we just collapse.  Yes.  I think that would be

20     more convenient to the Colonel.

21             Yes, please continue.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   When you came to take over that duty, were you informed what

24     Zulfo Tursunovic and Naser Oric had done previously in the villages

25     around Srebrenica?


Page 22111

 1        A.   Of course, in our training we were prepared for who we would

 2     encounter and what the history was of the enclave.

 3        Q.   So you were informed about the area you were coming to and you

 4     knew the history, the background, what happened before your arrival?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can you see in the next paragraph Halilovic --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, this is an example, you read out the

 8     passage from the document and asked two separate questions then you moved

 9     on.  What's the point of your cross-examination if you do not put the

10     passage to the witness?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I put to him the passage

12     below the words "Zulfo" and where Sefer Halilovic says that they had

13     handed over only 200 rifles --

14             JUDGE KWON:  No, your questions were only of general nature, not

15     specifically related to that passage.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought, Your Excellency, that in

17     this briefing they got, they perhaps also found out that the town had

18     been taken over by force in May.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Were you informed about everything that is listed in this

21     paragraph?

22        A.   No, I haven't read the entire paragraph yet.

23             Well, I'm sorry, but I've lost track of what this is about.

24        Q.   I was trying to ask you, this -- these words where they say that

25     they had cleansed Serbian villages and taken over the town by force in


Page 22112

 1     May 1992, did they inform you about all this when you were coming, that

 2     you were coming to a place that had been taken by forced and cleansed of

 3     Serbs, both the town and the villages around?

 4        A.   Not in those terms.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the bottom of this

 7     page to see what they say about UNPROFOR.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   When they realised you had check-points, they set up their own

10     system.  Read till the end of the paragraph and then we'll see the end of

11     the document.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, top of

13     the next page.  [In English] Next page, please.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Page 4.

15                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

16             JUDGE KWON:  I was told that there's some problem with the

17     e-court.  Why don't you read out page 4 -- the contents of page 4, which

18     seems to be very short.

19             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, Excellency, I'll do it.

20             So it says from the third:

21             "When an UNPROFOR patrol was approaching, our guys on the line

22     informed us so we could remove the weapons.  If the UNPROFOR soldiers

23     asked about presence of our boys on the lines, we answered that we could

24     not trust them and that we were afraid of Chetniks, so we wanted to have

25     our guards.  They showed some understanding for that, which was not the


Page 22113

 1     case when we dug trenches and fortifications."

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Is it true that they were cheating like this, that you had

 4     understanding for their men on the front line and that you just

 5     reprimanded them for digging trenches and making fortifications?

 6        A.   As I've indicated earlier today, I remember that this happened

 7     occasionally, that there were activities in the vicinity of the

 8     observation posts too.  But the moment we knew about that, we took action

 9     against it.  But at the -- only at the very end, as far as I can

10     remember, when the enclave had almost fallen, only then was there a

11     certain form of co-operation.

12        Q.   Thank you.  We'll see what this co-operation looked like.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, I want to note one thing at the

16     outset, and that is the -- what this appears to be, an attempt at an

17     inconsistent and opportunistic application of standards by the Defence.

18     Mr. Robinson has repeatedly objected to the tendering by the Prosecution

19     of documents of this type, setting up his own standard of whether it --

20     how closely in time it was related to the events being discussed.  I note

21     that because there are a number of documents that the Prosecution

22     attempted to tender that I think were rejected on that basis.  As it

23     happens, we did argue the contrary at that time, unsuccessfully.  I'm not

24     going to take two different positions.  I'm not objecting to this.  But I

25     do want to point out that this is a document that wouldn't meet the


Page 22114

 1     standard that they have been insisting on.  We don't have an objection to

 2     this document, but we ask for an effort at consistent application by the

 3     Defence.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it has been our -- the Chamber's practice to

 5     admit the statement, in particular a third party statement, only when the

 6     witness confirms or adopts a part of the statement, including this kind

 7     of interview.  But I ask this question because there is a basis on which

 8     we can say the witness confirmed to a certain extent, not -- albeit not

 9     in full.

10             I will consult my colleagues.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE KWON:  So witness's confirmation as to the content of this

13     document is so marginal, the Chamber will not admit this document through

14     this witness.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Were you informed by your soldiers about the Muslim fighters

18     returning from Serb villages with blood-soaked trophies?

19        A.   No, I definitely can't remember that.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D04720, could we please have a

21     look at that.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   This is a book of interviews of Dutch soldiers.  The author is

24     Dutch and it has nothing to do with the Defence.  I'm just going to read

25     the first paragraph:


Page 22115

 1             [In English] "'We saw groups of Muslim men crossing the border

 2     into Serb territory and burn the place down and cut off ears and noses.

 3     They even told us.  They showed us a trophy:  A necklace with pieces of

 4     ear on it ... the Muslims we traded food with every day, killed him --

 5     the Muslims we traded food with every day, killed him.'"

 6             [Interpretation] So this was observed by a sergeant of yours and

 7     he spoke about it here.  How come you never heard about this?  This is a

 8     drastic image, a necklace made of cut off ears and noses.

 9        A.   I can't tell you that, I don't know.  Generally, I was

10     well-informed.  And as for the death of soldier Raviv, well that was a

11     tragic accident.  And conceivably a Muslim fighter lost control of

12     himself and perpetrated that act.  It doesn't seem to have followed a

13     crafty preconceived plan.

14        Q.   Are you trying to say that only Serbs kill in a preconceived way

15     and Muslims do not?  How many soldiers of yours got killed by the Serbs?

16        A.   I'm just answering your question.  As far as I can remember, no

17     soldiers were -- none of our soldiers was killed in action by the Serbs.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I'm not going to tender this because I know you're

19     not going to admit it, but perhaps we're going to call these witnesses.

20             Now can I call up P3980 so that we take a brief look at that.

21     Yes, yes.

22             Let us please take a look at this, what the UNMOs noted in

23     relation to Srebrenica on the 9th of July.  Please take a look at this

24     down here B. UNMO Observations.  It has to do with Srebrenica,

25     assessments and observations.  On the 9th, the Tuzla team --


Page 22116

 1             [In English] I read it in English:

 2             "Team Tuzla PTL observed one ABiH white mini bus with seven

 3     unarmed ABiH soldiers at Dobrinja ..." and so on:

 4             "Comment:  In the past two weeks the team has noticed that the

 5     ABiH are using a lot of white vehicles which could easily be confused for

 6     UN vehicles."

 7             [Interpretation] Did you know that?  I asked you about that today

 8     and you said that you were not aware of them using white paint in order

 9     to have their vehicles to resemble yours?

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't have the cite in front of me, but I think

11     that was a reference before to APCs, if I remember.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   I'd rather say "vehicle," vehicles that resemble UNPROFOR

14     vehicles.  I may have mentioned APCs too, but they did that as well.

15        A.   I don't remember reports about these UNMOs.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you see paragraph 4, they are providing information about

20     stopping your patrols in the area around Tuzla, not allowing them access

21     to a particular area; isn't that right?

22             Did you know that it was not only you but also your units around

23     Tuzla that had their movement restricted by Muslims?

24        A.   No, I knew nothing about that.

25        Q.   Well, do take a look at the next paragraph, it speaks about your


Page 22117

 1     battalion.  And in subparagraph i. it says that the BiH army is blocking

 2     the compound of B and then it says -- it says that your observation post

 3     is being fired at and that your people threatened to respond, to react,

 4     if the BH army would not stop.  So nevertheless, it wasn't a reflex; it

 5     was firing at your position, wasn't it, your observation post at the

 6     south of the enclave?

 7        A.   Okay.  Please give me a chance to read this.  Just a moment.

 8             Okay.  Just a moment.  I don't understand the question properly.

 9     Could you perhaps state your question a bit more specifically.

10        Q.   Thank you.  So paragraphs i. and ii, paragraph i. says that you

11     were blocked, some B position; and then paragraph ii. says that your

12     position is being fired at and you had threatened to respond if that did

13     not stop.

14             So this is my question:  Do you see that this report refers to

15     firing at your observation post, not some incident with a single stray

16     projectile that killed your soldier?

17        A.   That's how it's described here, but I don't remember it as such.

18        Q.   Thank you.  The Defence is a bit surprised that you do not

19     remember such drastic things, but all right.  Is there a reason why you

20     don't remember that?

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, that's a superb example of a

22     question that's impossible to answer.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, I agree, but I did not

24     want to be direct.  Now I am going to be direct though.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 22118

 1        Q.   Do you prefer to remembering Serb sins rather than Muslim sins?

 2     Are you biassed?

 3        A.   No, I don't feel biassed.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Since this has already been admitted, I'm not going

 5     to deal with it any longer.  But you certainly agree that the last

 6     paragraph on the next page -- no, the one before that says that the

 7     action of the Serb army started in the southern part of the enclave.  You

 8     agree that this is the belt between the two enclaves that belonged to the

 9     Serbs, according to the agreement, and that the fighting first took place

10     for that belt between the enclaves.

11        A.   I remember that the activities started in the south of the

12     enclave, so that answer is yes.  I also remember activities between the

13     two enclaves in an effort to unite them, but as I indicated earlier, I

14     did not know about that agreement.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  I just wanted to note, Your Honour, I haven't

17     objected, but there's been a very large amount of documents used today

18     without us receiving notice of them.  I've been asking Mr. Reid over and

19     over again:  Did we get notice of this and --

20             JUDGE KWON:  These are part of the associated exhibits, aren't

21     they?

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yeah, but this may be.  Many of the others today

23     have not been.

24                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

25             JUDGE KWON:  The -- I was advised by the Court Deputy there has


Page 22119

 1     been only one document so far today.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Is it correct that already on the 8th of July you saw refugees

 6     and that you refer to that in your first statement of the 28th of

 7     September, 1995?

 8        A.   I remember that when those attacks or activities were already

 9     happening in the south of the enclave, that refugees were moving from the

10     south toward the city because they were -- they feared for their safety.

11        Q.   So already on the 8th of July refugees were moving towards your

12     centre, or rather, your compound in Srebrenica; right?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please just clarify this for us, the

15     question of this ban on your movement and is it correct that some of your

16     soldiers had been taken prisoner by Zulfo and his men in Zulfo's

17     location -- in the beginning of February, actually, as soon as you

18     arrived?

19        A.   Yes, I remember that well.  I was involved in that too.

20        Q.   More specifically, you had been taken prisoner; right?

21        A.   Yes, that's correct.  There was a group that had been instructed

22     to restore freedom of movement in the Bandera triangle, and that didn't

23     work out.  They were blocked and basically taken prisoner by Zulfo.  And

24     I went there to try to resolve that and was also taken prisoner there --

25     were taken hostage, however you want to call it.


Page 22120

 1        Q.   And you were kept for four days and it was only when your

 2     commander contacted Oric that you were released; right?

 3        A.   Well, was it Oric or Ramic?  I think it was Ramic, but I'm not

 4     positive.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  How long was it that you didn't have any access to

 6     Bandera triangle?  Was it throughout your time there that you didn't have

 7     access to the Bandera triangle?

 8        A.   There were observation posts there and the roads in that

 9     direction could be used, but the area in between was regarded as a no-go

10     area.  I was only in the actual area once, so I don't have a

11     comprehensive impression.  But there were roads to observation posts and

12     there was an area in between with smaller roads that couldn't be used,

13     that we weren't allowed to use.

14        Q.   Do you agree that such restrictions had not been envisaged by the

15     agreement on the safe areas and demilitarisation and that we had reason

16     to be dissatisfied because you did not manage to control the Muslim army?

17        A.   As far as this area is concerned, definitely.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Now let us go back to the 8th of July.  So on the 8th

19     of July around -- you saw around 16.000 persons along the road about 1500

20     hours and you did not see anyone firing at them; right?

21        A.   Well, those numbers, 16.000, and the date, I don't remember that.

22     Perhaps it was on a different date?

23        Q.   Yes, yes.  What I have here is that it says the 8th of July.

24     Just look at this.  It says -- you said this in your statement, yes, your

25     statement, of the 28th of September, 1995, on page 00443271.  I'll tell


Page 22121

 1     you what the 1D number is:  1D04719; 271 is the page number, the ERN.

 2             [In English] During -- by -- down there, to the bottom of page:

 3             "I also put several sick people in my Mercedes Benz and then

 4     drove along with a stream of refugees.  The road is about 5 to 6

 5     kilometres long.  I think there must have been at least 16.000 people

 6     walking along this road.  This took place at about 1500 hours.  During

 7     this journey, I did not notice whether any of the people were fired at."

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, just a second, Mr. Boering.

 9             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  The statement does not say, as was put in the

11     question - unless I'm missing the question, which I don't think I

12     am - that this was the 8th of July --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Correct --

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  It's very clear what date this was from all the

15     other evidence and what was going on.  It's not the 8th of July and

16     doesn't say the 8th of July in the statement.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we clarify with the witness, first, when this

18     passage was referring to.

19             Mr. Boering, do you remember the date?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's what I just wanted to

21     mention.  I think it was 11 July, when the enclave had almost fallen.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will look at the previous page.

23     I have that as the 8th of July, and if that's so, then I apologise.  But

24     in any case ...

25             [In English] "At the beginning of July ..."


Page 22122

 1             [No interpretation]

 2             [In English] ... beginning of July:

 3             "One night, on or around 8 of July ..."

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And it seems to me that this is the last date in the statement

 6     before that piece of information.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the bottom of the

 8     page, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  But the third paragraph from the bottom talks about

10     Private Renssen's death.  When was it he died?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was also around the 8th of

12     July.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   And he was killed by the Muslim side, that soldier was killed by

16     the Muslim side?

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  With respect, we need to go to the next page and

18     look at the second full paragraph, the first sentence.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   That would then mean, if we're looking at this paragraph, that

22     this was on the 9th, that is, the following day after the 8th; is that

23     right?

24        A.   What date are we talking about?  The date I saw the 15.000

25     refugees, on the 11th?  As far as I'm concerned, that's still the 11th.


Page 22123

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, if you read the first paragraph on the next

 2     page, I think it will be clear.

 3             Can we show the witness the next page.

 4             So it refers to your arrival at the Potocari compound.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  So that's 11th of July.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, exactly.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             Can we go back to the previous page, please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Sir, Colonel, do you know the difference between close air

14     support and air-strikes?

15        A.   Yes, I know the difference.  In the past that was one of my

16     specialties.

17        Q.   Then you will agree with me that close air support is intended

18     for situations when your forces are attacked; isn't that right?

19        A.   You use close air support when you can see a hostile activity.

20        Q.   When the enemy activity is directed at you; is that right?

21        A.   Well, do you know, in our mandate I think it said that we were

22     also in charge of security and that also for that close air support could

23     be deployed so as to protect the population.

24        Q.   Sir, I think that that is not so.  I clarified that with

25     Mr. Akashi.  Close air support is meant for situations when your forces


Page 22124

 1     are attacked, and we accepted that.  Air-strikes are participation in the

 2     war, interference in the war, for which you never received our approval.

 3     Does that sound familiar to you?

 4        A.   No, no, that is not my vision, my view.

 5        Q.   Well, then it would have been better if you had not made the

 6     rotation because the people coming after you wouldn't know what had been

 7     agreed.  How did you then have the right to shoot at the Serbs?  Who gave

 8     you the right to fire at the Serbs when you were not attacked?

 9        A.   Well, once again, the way I see it from the mandate, for the

10     protection of the population.

11        Q.   We will see that that was not so, but let us go back to this

12     second paragraph.  You, thus, did not see the Serbs.  You didn't know

13     where the Serbs were when you received the request from the Muslim side

14     for air support.  And you asked the Muslim side to indicate where the

15     Serb locations were and to provide the co-ordinates; isn't that right?

16        A.   I recall that at some stage there was the issue of close air

17     support, or not, to be given and that there had to be the smoking gun

18     principle observed.  This means that really attacks had been ascertained

19     that were taking place either on the Muslim population or on our troops.

20     And against the background of that is how that conversation took place

21     with the Muslim military.

22        Q.   And where did you see that stated about the population and where

23     did you see that there was firing at the population and how many

24     casualties were there among the population?

25        A.   I did regularly see firing at houses where population -- where


Page 22125

 1     people lived.  Here and there, I saw some injured as well.

 2        Q.   Was there any fire from those houses at the Serb troops?

 3        A.   As far as I can recall - you know, I can just recall one or two

 4     cases - and there was nothing like that.

 5        Q.   And in other cases you could see that there was firing from those

 6     houses at the Serb soldiers; is that right?

 7        A.   No, I did not see that.

 8        Q.   But you were not sure that there was no fire either; is that

 9     right?

10        A.   Well, you know, what you don't see you don't know.

11        Q.   Very well.  Then you were co-operating with the Muslim army.

12     They provided you with the co-ordinates for the Serb locations, but you

13     did not see that, did you?

14        A.   As regards the targets that were focused on, the co-ordinates, I

15     was not involved.

16        Q.   Can you look at page 8 of the document where it says:

17             [In English] "Mladic was furious about the air-strikes and said

18     that few Serbs had been killed as a result of that.  Mladic said that he

19     had visited the families of victims ..."

20             [Interpretation] Is that how you became belligerent side,

21     Mr. Boering?

22        A.   Well, I don't see that page before me.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 8, please.  510 is the last

24     numbers of the ERN number.  Could we look at the ERN number, 510 should

25     be the last three digits.  It's at the top of the page.  Could we just


Page 22126

 1     scale down the page a little bit so that we could see the ERN number,

 2     please.

 3             Well, I have different numbering.  Can we look at the next page,

 4     please.  Well, maybe the page before that.  This is not the right page

 5     either.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   I have a statement with your signature.  This seems to be

 8     numbered differently.  Can we look at the page before this one, please.

 9     While we're waiting for that section, can you please tell us, you recall

10     at the first meeting Zivanovic asked you to demilitarise Srebrenica; is

11     that right?

12        A.   Then we're talking about a meeting at the start of our stay in

13     the enclave in early January?

14        Q.   Yes.

15        A.   Yes, I remember that.

16        Q.   Thank you.  But nothing changed since that time; right?

17        A.   I can't remember launching a lot of demilitarisation activities.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Before we look at a new number, look at the one

19     paragraph but last.  However, today you told us that not everything was

20     recorded, is that correct, but here you say that everything was recorded?

21        A.   Well, there's a difference between recording everything and

22     showing everything.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at 1D4718 now, please.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  Also, just for the record, a different meeting,

25     first meeting, than the one we talked about in direct examination, the


Page 22127

 1     third meeting.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 8 of this

 3     document, please.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Could you look at the tenth line from the top:

 6             "Mladic was furious about the air-strike ..."

 7             Can you see that?

 8        A.   Yes, I can see that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Well, can you imagine the Serbian side when it has to

10     report the death of their young men who were killed because you had

11     called in your air-strikes.  Is that the way in which you, yourselves,

12     became a party to the conflict?

13        A.   Well, that was close air support.

14        Q.   We will not agree, Mr. Boering.  Close air support is when you

15     are attacked.  This was an instance of interfering in the war; isn't that

16     right?

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would object as argumentative and asked and

18     answered.  I normally don't object to asked and answered, but it's really

19     been asked many times.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Do not ask -- or refrain from making compound

21     questions.  I think you are done with the close air support and

22     air-strikes.  Move on to your next topic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   And did Mladic inform you then that he didn't have enough food?


Page 22128

 1        A.   I don't remember talking with Mladic about him not having enough

 2     food -- rather, that we didn't have enough food.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Boering, in his previous question Mr. Karadzic

 4     asked whether that was the way in which you, yourself, I mean to be

 5     DutchBat, became a party to the conflict.  I wonder whether you would be

 6     in a position to answer that question?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I'm certainly not in a

 8     position to answer that one.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Could we look at the next page, please, so that we can see how

13     Mladic was informing you that there were limited quantities of food for

14     the civilians.  This is at the end of the second paragraph on page 9.  Do

15     you recall that he informed you that there was very limited food

16     available?

17        A.   I see that written here, that's how it reads.  But I don't

18     remember now whether we spoke about food and what he indicated.

19        Q.   Do you recall that the Serb side brought some food and water and

20     distributed that to the refugees, to the civilians, in your base?

21        A.   Well, I don't remember that.  I saw a very limited distribution

22     of candy on camera.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And did they grab back the things that they

24     distributed to them in front of the cameras?

25        A.   No, no.


Page 22129

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Just give me a moment, please, because I'm skipping

 2     things.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  While he's getting ready, Your Honours, if I could

 4     just have two minutes at the very end of the day to talk about the

 5     schedule.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   And you had a certain impression of Mladic at the end of the

 8     meetings.  Could you please tell us what it was that you concluded?

 9        A.   After the first, the second, or the third meeting, or in general?

10     Well, in any case --

11        Q.   Generally.

12        A.   General Mladic was a general of troops who was very obvious

13     presence and stood his ground and had a predefined plan.  He was clearly

14     in control.

15        Q.   You said in your statement of the 20th of September, 1995, that

16     he decided matters; is that right?

17        A.   At those meetings, yes.

18        Q.   And is that any different from your own officers or from your

19     ideas of your own officers and generals or does this comport with the

20     usual position and duties of a general?

21        A.   Well, I think you could certainly say that he was a typical

22     example of a general of troops.

23        Q.   Thank you.  You stress that you heard that a pig was slaughtered

24     and that you understood that to be as some sort of message.  Do you know

25     that any occasion can serve as a reason to roast a piglet or a lamb and


Page 22130

 1     that that constitutes perhaps a particular honour, to roast a piglet or a

 2     lamb?

 3        A.   Well, I wouldn't assume that, but I do remember that pork is

 4     eaten at some celebrations.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And if people want to feed somebody or provide food

 6     for a larger group, then they would slaughter an animal; right?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Were you familiar with the occurrence of the Muslim soldiers

 9     wearing blue hats and that from a distance of some 15 metres or so they

10     could have been taken for United Nations staff members and that is how

11     they managed to get close to your positions and to fire from those

12     positions at Serbs in order to create the impression that it was actually

13     the DutchBat that was firing?

14        A.   Well, this certainly could have happened, but as for any reports

15     about that from my own troops, at this time I don't remember any of

16     those.  But I do remember that clothing was regularly lost in the

17     laundry.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have a look at 65 ter 03233.

19             You certainly know General van der Wind, don't you?

20        A.   I don't know him personally, no.

21        Q.   Please look at 4.13.  This debriefing had to do with Srebrenica.

22     Do you agree that this is the fact that was presented?

23        A.   I don't know which report which comes from.

24        Q.   P3949 is how the Prosecution had this admitted, and I believe

25     that this was admitted when you testified -- no, sorry, when Rutten


Page 22131

 1     testified.  However, were you questioned about this debriefing for

 2     Srebrenica?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Colonel, I think this is a part of Dutch debriefing

 4     report dated 4th of October, 1995.

 5             I wonder if Mr. Nicholls could be of more assistance.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  It may take me a minute to find it, Your Honour.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the numbers help,

 8     4.13.  Also, point 14, that their soldiers were not always recognisable

 9     as military personnel.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It looks like a general report

11     because in point 12 you see that the BSA was walking around in different

12     attire.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   That is being emphasised on each and every occasion, Mr. Boering,

15     and I want to point out that it was the Muslims who were doing this and

16     that you were aware of it.  There is no shortage of accusations levelled

17     at the Serb side.  What is missing is any accusations vis-a-vis what the

18     Muslim side was doing.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  You're correct, Your Honour, 4th October 1995, the

20     debriefing report.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I wonder whether you could give some general

22     introduction as to the nature of the document so that Colonel Boering

23     could understand what it is about.

24             But now you are aware of this document?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm trying to trace it.


Page 22132

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, let's proceed.  This is the document

 2     already admitted.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 15259, can we have that,

 4     please.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Do you know, you were still there at the time, that the Serb and

 7     Muslim sides signed a declaration on the 17th of July, 1995, with

 8     UNPROFOR bearing witness to it about what had happened after the

 9     take-over of Srebrenica.  Are you familiar with this document?

10        A.   I wasn't there anymore on the 17th of July.

11        Q.   [Microphone not activated]... was there.  I don't know who signed

12     this on your behalf.  Can you recognise this signature?  It's Franken, I

13     think.

14        A.   Franken was the deputy commander and he certainly did not sign

15     anything on my behalf.  He was the deputy commander of Karremans and I

16     was a staff officer.  I wasn't present anymore.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we'll stop here for today and we'll

18     continue tomorrow at 9.00, at which time I expect you to focus on your

19     relevant issues because your time is limited.  You will have about 40

20     minutes tomorrow.

21             Yes, Mr. Nicholls --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just tender this first

23     statement of the 28th of September, 1995.  It's Mr. Boering's statement.

24     It is rather authentic.  It is basically his first statement.

25             JUDGE KWON:  What is the 65 ter number for that, Mr. Karadzic?


Page 22133

 1     4719 -- 1D4719 or 4718?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 9.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1968, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Just very briefly about

 7     the schedule for the rest of the week.  I spoke about this with

 8     Mr. Robinson earlier today.  We have two witnesses on Thursday and Friday

 9     who have come from a very long way away and are fixed because of their

10     schedules, and that's --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Who are experts?

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Experts, exactly.  Mr. Wright, Dr. Wright on

13     Thursday and Baraybar on Friday.  So depending on -- and in between we

14     had Mr. Patelski and Mr. Groenewegen scheduled --

15             JUDGE KWON:  And what about Mr. Rave?

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  And Rave.  Exactly, Your Honour.  So our plan now,

17     and as I say, I have to discuss this with Mr. Robinson, is that we would

18     continue as Rave is scheduled which may take up, I can imagine, most of

19     tomorrow, if not all of tomorrow, perhaps, and then we have our two

20     experts fixed for Thursday and Friday.  So we'll continue in the order

21     after Rave and -- but I just wanted to let Your Honours know that that's

22     where we are at the moment.  If there is time left on Thursday,

23     Mr. Baraybar is fixed for Friday.  If there's time on Thursday left over,

24     we would try to put in wherever we are with the next witness, whether

25     it's Mr. Patelski or Groenewegen.


Page 22134

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Was Mr. Groenewegen included in the witness list?

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  I believe so, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Before Patelski?

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Patelski was before Groenewegen, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Very well.

 6             Mr. Boering, we'll adjourn for today and, as indicated, we will

 7     resume tomorrow at 9.00.  As you may be well aware, you are not supposed

 8     to discuss with anybody else about your testimony.  Do you understand

 9     that, sir?

10             Tomorrow, 9.00.

11                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.01 p.m.,

12                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day of

13                           November, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.

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