Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 23221

 1                           Wednesday, 18 January 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'll be very brief.

 9     Turns out that Mr. Robinson and I both noticed that in the pace of

10     business yesterday 65 ter number 30953, which was raised in connection

11     with the redirect examination of Mr. Franken, was not tendered and so we

12     would do so now with no objection, as I understand it, from the Defence.

13     Thank you, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you for the reminder.  That will be

15     admitted.  Of course, it should have been marked for identification.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI P4254, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE KWON:  As indicated by the registrar, we will be sitting

18     until 4.20 today without having to interpose this witness.  The first

19     session will be until 10.40, after which we will have a 40-minutes'

20     break, and after which we will sit from 11.20 to 1.00, and then we'll

21     have a two-hours, ten minutes' break, and then we'll sit from 10 past

22     3.00 to 20 past 4.00.  I think that's sufficient time to cover this

23     witness and even we can start -- but we'll see.

24             Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

25                           WITNESS:  PYERS TUCKER [Resumed]

Page 23222

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies.  Good

 2     morning, Your Excellencies.  Good morning to all.

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Tucker.  I would like us to go

 5     through what you noted personally and what you perceived personally.  I

 6     would like to draw your attention to a meeting or, rather, what you call

 7     the attack in Sarajevo on the 1st of October, 1992.

 8             You thought that that was done with the intention of cutting

 9     Sarajevo in half, and you said that that was the last such attempt.

10     That's what you said yesterday.  Did you know that politically that was

11     not any plan?  That was originally the plan of the Yugoslav People's Army

12     that wanted to link its barracks, Marsal Tito and hospital, with the

13     territory of Lukavica, rather, free territory.

14        A.   I do not have any knowledge of the kind you describe.  All I saw

15     was the -- the attack taking place and the reports which were made by the

16     various UN organisations in Sarajevo, and the deduction that I drew

17     yesterday was General Morillon's supposition.  What you describe, I'm not

18     in a position to comment on.

19        Q.   I see.  Thank you.  So that was General Morillon's assumption.

20     It was not rock-hard evidence; right?

21        A.   The rock-hard evidence was the fact that an attack took place.

22     We obviously did not have access to the plans of the Bosnian Serb Army,

23     and so therefore obviously I cannot confirm one way or the other.  What I

24     described was what General Morillon's deductions were from the attack.

25        Q.   Thank you.  (redacted)

Page 23223

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8             JUDGE KWON:  The fact that the other witness testified otherwise

 9     does not mean that this witness should agree with him.

10             Ms. Edgerton.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  And, Your Honours, I don't think, furthermore,

12     that Dr. Karadzic's comment as to what the witness said is appropriate

13     given that the witness testified in closed session, and I'd like to ask

14     for a redaction.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That's how you are wasting your time.  As I

16     told you yesterday, please consult Mr. Robinson how to conduct your

17     cross-examination.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.  It's two

19     minutes that were lost, not a lot of time, but the problem is that the

20     amalgamated statement, it doesn't say that this was an assessment.  It's

21     presented like evidence.  My concern is what kind of attention will be

22     paid to impressions by the Trial Chamber, what the Trial Chamber will do

23     with impressions and generalised statements.  But I'll try to have that

24     corrected.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 23224

 1        Q.   Yes.  You confirm then that I was in Geneva and that was also a

 2     basis for General Morillon to believe that this was not an attack that

 3     had been approved by the political powers; right?

 4        A.   That is correct.  General Morillon was surprised.  Was surprised

 5     that an attack took place while diplomatic negotiations were going on in

 6     Geneva.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  When speaking of March 1993, you speak about the

 8     meeting in Belgrade in relation to the crisis that had to do with

 9     Srebrenica -- or, rather, the Drina River Valley; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Further on, you say that during that time I was in

12     New York and that the general view was that I could not do much from

13     there; right?

14        A.   That was the -- the view held by General Morillon.

15        Q.   Thank you.  There is an observation of yours here.  You say that

16     you thought that General Mladic was rather independent and that in actual

17     fact he would have taken over if the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina were in

18     jeopardy.

19             Many of your observations are correct, not to say brilliant, but

20     do you know that this stems from our system itself?  For example, do you

21     know that our constitution --

22             JUDGE KWON:  I wanted to -- but did you want the reference for

23     that statement?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely, please.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Was the amalgamated statement,

Page 23225

 1     paragraph 282 and 277.  And the one that had to do with my stay in

 2     New York is associated Exhibit 65 ter 08616.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Then are you satisfied, Ms. Edgerton?

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, not as to the accuracy of Dr. Karadzic's

 5     assertion that Mr. Tucker wrote in his amalgamated statement that

 6     Dr. Karadzic could not do much from New York, but I'm satisfied with the

 7     reference.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   That position of Mr. Tucker's is in 08616, the associate exhibit,

11     paragraph 6 of that particular document.  The rest is in the amalgamated

12     statement.

13             You wrote in your diary in relation to the 13th of March, 1993 --

14     actually, could we please have this displayed, 65 ter -- actually,

15     1D4849.  The last page of this document.  The fourth one.

16             Could you please read item 4 to us, please.

17        A.    "Commander believes Serb military are going far beyond the

18     direction given by their politicians."

19        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that in our country the Law on the

20     Organisation of the Army, operative and tactical command over the army

21     was delegated to the Main Staff from the president?

22        A.   I believe that that was the case.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Is that then in line with your position that you

24     presented in the amalgamated statement, in paragraph 279, about this lack

25     of influence with regard to military issues?  Please look at that

Page 23226

 1     paragraph 279.  Is that in line with the fact that the president does not

 2     deal with operative and tactical command?

 3        A.   The understanding -- or rather, the belief that we developed,

 4     General Morillon and the staff developed, while I was in Bosnia was that

 5     you, Dr. Karadzic, were the president and Commander-in-Chief of the

 6     Bosnian Serb armed forces and that General Mladic was the general

 7     commanding the Bosnian Serb armed forces.  In most cases, we believed

 8     that General Mladic and the Bosnian Serb armed forces would do what you

 9     directed them to do and what the Serb Assembly directed them to do.

10     However, we believe that if General Mladic believed that they were being

11     ordered to do something or ordered not to do something which was -- which

12     would endanger Bosnian Serbs, that we saw occasions when he, in our view,

13     did not do necessarily what he was ordered to do.

14        Q.   Thank you.  That is why I wanted to ask you whether your

15     observations -- actually, whether you would have been assisted had you

16     known that in our system, for instance, it was forbidden for politicians

17     to accept capitulation.  The constitution said that everyone had to fight

18     to the very last, and from that point of view even the JNA did not need

19     any kind of order to discipline Slovenia.  They could have done that

20     without any order coming from the Presidency of Yugoslavia.  Did you know

21     these specific characteristics of Tito's constitution?

22        A.   That I did not, no.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Then we had this meeting on the 20th of November,

24     1992, at the Panorama Hotel.  So I would like us to highlight a few

25     matters that you observed there.

Page 23227

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, the pages we saw right now were not

 2     included in your exhibit, associate exhibit, and that will be added to

 3     the previous diary, or shall we admit it separately?

 4             Mr. Robinson?

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, I think we should admit them separately.  We

 6     have some other excerpts also that are coming in.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That portion of diary will be admitted

 8     as a separate Defence exhibit.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, if I may make a brief submission in

10     regard to the diary that was just displayed, that single page that was

11     just displayed, and you may -- Your Honour, I think it would be of

12     assistance for the Trial Chamber to have the entry for 13 March 1993 in

13     full rather than just one page out of context.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, 1D4849 is of four pages.  Is it not sufficient?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Correct.  I didn't realise that Your Honours were

16     dealing with the four pages in total rather than just the one page that

17     was displayed.  I wanted to make sure you had the four --

18             JUDGE KWON:  So if we are to admit -- I'm sorry.  I was

19     overlapping.  If we were to admit four pages, you would have no problem.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Of course not.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  It will be admitted.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2026, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 23228

 1        Q.   In paragraph 66 of your amalgamated statement, you deal with this

 2     meeting and the points that were considered there; right?  Isn't that

 3     right?

 4        A.   What is the question?

 5        Q.   That in this paragraph you deal with our meeting, that is to say,

 6     General Morillon's meeting with me that you also attended on the 20th of

 7     November, 1992.

 8        A.   Yes, and other paragraphs around that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Now let us see what your diary says in relation to

10     that meeting.  Let us look at 1D6481 then.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  That's 4681.

12             THE ACCUSED:  I think I -- I thought I said that, but in ...

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Could you please read this out to us -- or, rather, interpret for

15     us what it says under item 2.  Lower.  Below item 2.  Yes.  Precisely.

16             [In English] "Unfortunately ..."

17        A.   "Made a lot of efforts to get Serbs to understand and trust UN."

18             Next paragraph:

19             "Unfortunately, have very strong evidence that UNPROFOR is

20     helping other side.  Often find Argentinian, Nepalese ammunition with

21     Croatian and Muslim soldiers, NATO food.  Yesterday a report that

22     UNPROFOR helped Muslim and Croat soldiers enter Karlovac Cazinska Krajina

23     in a UN convoy," I can't read the last one, and then the last one is,

24     "Have captured Muslim and Croats who said UN smuggled people in UN

25     vehicles and that UNPROFOR attitude is against Serbs."

Page 23229

 1             And that is my handwritten notes of what you, Dr. Karadzic, said

 2     at that meeting.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And what about this page that we have on the screen

 4     now?  Can we see the portion where you said that I had said that it would

 5     be very important to establish who started the attacks?  Can you confirm

 6     that?  Can you take a look at that paragraph?  That I asked to have it

 7     established who it was that started attacks so that we could know who

 8     should be held responsible for the shooting.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  That seems to be the line with the asterisk in the

10     lower.

11             THE WITNESS:  "Karadzic said it's important to establish

12     accurately who started," and by that he meant started shooting.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.  On that same page could you please indicate to us

15     whether you wrote down that small individual groups are the ones

16     committing crimes and that we are trying to eradicate them.

17        A.   Can the bottom of that page be enlarged?  Yes.

18             "Dr. Karadzic stated all sides make atrocities.  Serb military

19     are under unified and effective command.  Atrocities are committed by

20     small individual groups who we disown and are trying to root out."

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at page 48 now.  That would be the next

22     page.

23             Did you note here that we were not committing ethnic cleansing?

24     Can we see that part on this page 48, that we are not committing ethnic

25     cleansing?  I would like to see how much of that you wrote down.

Page 23230

 1        A.   I think it's the third paragraph down from the top.

 2        Q.   Yes.  Could you read this for us, please.

 3        A.   "Karadzic said that the world needs to be told that the Serb

 4     authorities are not ethnic cleansing, et cetera.  The war will not end

 5     until same pressure is on all sides.  We need a balanced approach."

 6             Can I see to left, because there's a line going to the left off

 7     the screen to me.  See whether that leads to a comment.  Does it go any

 8     further?  No.  Thank you.  And that is what I wrote down that you,

 9     Dr. Karadzic, said at that meeting.

10        Q.   Do you agree that the partiality and one-sidedness of world media

11     encouraged the Muslims to hope for a military intervention and made them

12     disinterested in peace as much as the Serb side was interested?

13        A.   Your Honour, may I ask a question?

14             JUDGE KWON:  By all means, Mr. Tucker.

15             THE WITNESS:  Should I answer Dr. Karadzic's question, as I don't

16     see that it is relevant to -- to my evidence here?

17             JUDGE KWON:  You can answer that way, yes.  I think that to be an

18     answer, a legitimate one.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, it is predicated that you agree that

20     the -- there was partiality and one-sidedness, which you may or may not

21     do.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  The impression -- the belief that I had was

23     that there was impartiality by world media who were focusing on the

24     atrocities and ethnic cleansing being carried out by the Bosnian Serbs in

25     Bosnia.  I won't refer at all to the Croatian war, as I was not involved

Page 23231

 1     in that.  But that was because there was cause to be concerned because of

 2     the horrific things that Dr. Karadzic, the forces under your command and

 3     under your authority, had been conducting.  So, yes, there was

 4     partiality, but if your forces had not carried out extraordinary horrific

 5     actions, perhaps things would have been more balanced.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   But the point is precisely, Mr. Tucker, first of all that we

 8     believe that the things that were done by independent elements were

 9     ascribed to our army.

10             Secondly, things that the Serb side did were exaggerated while

11     what the other sides committed was ignored, and the actual committing was

12     not established.  There was just an impression that was being created.

13     So what was required was to have a more balanced relationship and not to

14     encourage the other side by attacking the Serbs in the media.

15        A.   The Bosnian Serb forces conducted ethnic cleansing to the

16     south-west of Banja Luka.  The Bosnian Serb forces under your command

17     carried out the attack on -- on Sarajevo that we discussed earlier.  The

18     Bosnian Serb forces continued ethnic cleansing and attacking the -- the

19     enclaves in the east.

20        Q.   Sir.  Sir --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. -- no, no --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is not an answer to my

23     question.  That is not an answer to my question.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please do not interrupt the witness answering the

25     question.  You hear him out and then you can ask another question.

Page 23232

 1             Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Tucker.

 2             THE WITNESS:  And there is documentary evidence of orders made by

 3     the Bosnian Serb Army to conduct these attacks in the eastern enclaves.

 4     So I do not accept your -- your premise that all the attacks are done by

 5     the Bosnian Serb side were actually small elements out of control.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 7        Q.   Mr. Tucker, with all due respect, if you say that and if you

 8     establish that, then this whole proceedings and the Trial Chamber is

 9     unnecessary.  What I'm asking you is what you established and what you

10     knew.  Now we're dealing with your diary, but let me not put any more

11     questions to you.  You believe that I was not right when I said that the

12     media should not be encouraging the other side.  This is something that

13     we're going to discuss with someone else then.

14             But can you please look at what you said on page 40 -- 48, page

15     48, about what I said about it being necessary to let the people go out

16     of Sarajevo so that they could survive more easily in the villages?  Did

17     you know that since World War II until our civil war, the population of

18     Sarajevo increased nine fold and that the majority of those citizens had

19     their villages, their property, and their homes within the vicinity of

20     Sarajevo.

21        A.   What am I supposed to be looking at?

22             JUDGE KWON:  So do not make argument.  Let's find the passage and

23     put the question.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   [In English] Karadzic said that the best help would be to rebase

Page 23233

 1     people from Sarajevo to the villages.  [Interpretation] Do you see that

 2     part?  Where I was making the recommendations for people to be allowed to

 3     leave in order to survive more easily?

 4        A.   I can only see at the bottom a statement by General Morillon

 5     about freedom of movement.  I cannot see anything by Dr. Karadzic.

 6        Q.   Just before this part where you said [In English] "Best help

 7     would be to rebase --"

 8        A.   Right.  Can you enlarge the screen there.  Can you enlarge just

 9     above where -- no, below that.  Just below where it says "For

10     demilitarisation of Sarajevo."

11             Yes.  What Dr. Karadzic said was best help would be to release

12     people from Sarajevo to survive the winter in the villages where they

13     have food, et cetera.  That is indeed what Dr. Karadzic said not only at

14     that occasion but a number of other occasions as well.  The issue was

15     that from the Bosnian Serb Presidency side, they equated releasing people

16     from Sarajevo to ethnic cleansing forced by military arms.

17        Q.   Mr. Tucker, were you aware of our position declared even before

18     the war and then reiterated on the 22nd of April in my platform and

19     everywhere at all conferences that the territorial question or the issue

20     of the population would not be prejudiced and that everybody would have

21     the right to return to their hearths once the foundations for a

22     cease-fire were established?  Were you aware of that?

23        A.   I was not aware of details of negotiations prior to my arrival in

24     Bosnia in October 1992.

25        Q.   Mr. Tucker, I would like to dispute in their entirety the

Page 23234

 1     assertions on ethnic cleansing, the relocation of the population and

 2     taking of territory, military action.  All that means nothing, because --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  That's an argument.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  No, no.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   -- did you establish that?  Was that something that you knew?

 7     No, no, no.  Mr. Tucker, if you are drawing conclusions then you are

 8     required to know the elements, and the element that I am talking about is

 9     that we said that no military capture is going to have any effect or be

10     prejudicial on the return of the civilians.  How can we talk about ethnic

11     cleansing when the civilians would be able to return?  Not the civilians

12     but the population.  The population would be able to return.

13        A.   Why did you [Audio recording missing], you and your forces

14     [Audio recording missing] them out in the first place?  That's ethnic

15     cleansing.

16        Q.   Do you have proof, Mr. Tucker, in cases where you were present in

17     Podrinje Cerska, that we drove them out?

18        A.   Yes.  In south-west of Banja Luka and in the eastern enclaves.

19     In other words, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde.

20        Q.   We will come to that.  Let us see if that was so, because in your

21     documents it says something different.  On page 49 of this document, you

22     say that you -- that I gave my approval for the local police to escort --

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page

24     please, and can we look at the bottom of the page, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

Page 23235

 1        Q.   Could you please read this part here, "Agreed to get."  What you

 2     got from me at that meeting?

 3        A.   The heading is "Convey to Srebrenica.  Srebrenica to Belgrade

 4     some help to Skelani," which is on the Bosnian Serb side.  "If reported

 5     that help goes simultaneously to Serbs as to Srebrenica."  Then

 6     General Morillon agreed to get the convoy escorted by local police and to

 7     arrange its -- and then there's a route Zvornik, Bratunac, Srebrenica and

 8     Skelani, and back.  Serbs give escort from Zvornik on Saturday or Monday.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now look at -- yes, I'm sorry.  Excuse me.

10     It's not that document.  Can we just -- actually, can we just tender

11     this?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we add this part to the previous Exhibit D2 --

13     2026?  Mr. Robinson?

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I --

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, can we get one more page now,

17     please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Could you please interpret this paragraph marked with 9,

20     Mr. Tucker.  Mr. Tucker, with all due respect, your handwriting resembles

21     the handwriting of a doctor.

22        A.   I apologise.  I blame my spider.  "Discussion over lunch.

23     Muslims must recognise they will never be allowed to dominate in

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina."

25        Q.   Thank you.  Are you following the current developments in Bosnia

Page 23236

 1     and Herzegovina?  Have you noticed that for the past 15 or 16 months

 2     there has been no government because the Christian majority, Serbs and

 3     Croats, are not accepting Muslim domination?

 4        A.   No, I've not been following events in Bosnia, I'm afraid.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now look at 65 ter 08561.  If nothing has

 6     changed, this should be an associated exhibit.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  That's right.  It's P4216.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Do you remember this?  This is from the 20th of November.  It's a

11     report about this meeting with Karadzic and the commander; is that

12     correct?

13        A.   Yes.  I drafted the -- the UN report for General Morillon.

14        Q.   Yes.  And it can be seen here that I was concerned because of the

15     open intervention of the Army of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia; is

16     that right?  This was also the same that was noted in the handwriting,

17     but if we can look at page 7, paragraph 9, please, now.

18             JUDGE KWON:  It has only four pages.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's on page 3.  Not 7, page

20     3.  Evidently it's -- there's something wrong with my articulation.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Paragraph 9.  Could you please look at this for us.

23        A.   Yes.  That paragraph is consistent with the previous handwritten

24     notes from the meeting itself.

25        Q.   [In English] And I'll read the rest in English.

Page 23237

 1             "Providing the Muslims gave up their claims to rule over all of

 2     BH, they could quite happily live alongside each other, but each with

 3     their own administration and safeguards for minorities."

 4        A.   That is indeed what was said.

 5        Q.   Would you agree that it can be concluded on the basis of this

 6     paragraph that there would be minorities in the cantons and that they

 7     would be protected, that there would be instruments for the protection of

 8     their rights?

 9        A.   That is indeed what you said.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now look at 1D4862.  That's the diary again,

11     and it's page 96.

12             Do you agree that the cantons were not meant to be ethnically

13     pure and that there would be instruments for the protection of minority

14     rights?

15        A.   It's certainly -- can it be enlarged, please.  I'm looking for

16     anything about cantons and minority rights on this section but can't see

17     any.

18        Q.   I apologise.  I apologise.  It's my fault.  I put the question

19     that actually relates to the previous paragraph while you were waiting

20     for the uploading.  It was in the conversation about cantons and so on

21     and so forth.  Did you know that many international authorities stated

22     that a mistake had been made in having secessions take place before

23     putting in place the mechanisms for the protection of minority rights?

24        A.   I'm not in a position to comment what international authorities

25     may or may not have said, I'm afraid.

Page 23238

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at page 3 of this document.  Do you agree

 2     that you wrote down here, and you can interpret that for us, that I made

 3     efforts through the media to present the neutrality of the UNPROFOR so

 4     that we would not have problems when passing through Serb territory?

 5        A.   That is indeed what you said.

 6        Q.   Did you know that in the media I stated this before and after

 7     this meeting and that I would make the statements that UNPROFOR should be

 8     trusted?

 9        A.   I can't recall specifically for this meeting, but I do know

10     that -- I do recall that on occasions you did make such statements in the

11     Bosnian Serb media.  Whether it was immediately before and after this

12     particular meeting, I'm not in a position to confirm.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Does this then tell you that it's not easy to control

14     civilians and that this was a way of improving their attitude towards

15     UNPROFOR and international organisations?

16        A.   You are correct.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the place in the next one where you

18     say that I was in favour of securing the -- this is the third paragraph,

19     "Cannot accept."  Could you please interpret that paragraph for us?

20        A.   "Cannot accept a long-term grinding on of the war.  Want full

21     solution.  Cease-fire means can regroup and restart.  Cessation of

22     hostilities should lead towards peace."

23             And this is [Realtime transcript read in error "isn't"] in the

24     context of the discussion yesterday about the Bosnian Serbs wanting a

25     cessation of hostilities across all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas the

Page 23239

 1     Bosnian Presidency stated they wanted a cessation of hostilities -- they

 2     stated they wanted a cease-fire, but they were reluctant to accept the

 3     status quo which had been forced upon them through military means and

 4     therefore would carry out local attacks and would use cease-fires as a

 5     means of regrouping and rearming and replenishing.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think the transcript reflects what you read.

 7     Could you read it again for the benefit.

 8             THE WITNESS:  The transcript says "This isn't in the context..."

 9     it should read "This is in the context..."

10             JUDGE KWON:  No, the quote from your diary above that.  The

11     regroup and restart of --

12             THE WITNESS:  The -- what I can -- cannot accept that -- I start

13     again.  "Cannot accept long-term grinding on of the war.  Want a full

14     solution.  Cease-fire means they can regroup and restart.  A cessation of

15     hostilities should lead towards peace."

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   On several occasions in documents and in reports as well as in

20     the amalgamated statement you said how the Muslims were interested in

21     intermittent and local cease-fires while the Serbs were for a cessation

22     of hostilities and a comprehensive cease-fire and political solution.

23     However, your understanding was that the Serbs wanted to keep everything

24     that they were in control of at that particular time; is that correct?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 23240

 1        Q.   And were you informed that from the beginning of the war and from

 2     the London Conference stated clearly that we were going to return even up

 3     to 20 per cent of the territory and that the territorial issues should

 4     not be resolved by military means but by means of negotiations?

 5        A.   I'm not aware of what was said in detail at the

 6     London Conference.  What I do know is that your forces were carrying out

 7     military operations in order to seize more territory which -- by military

 8     means.

 9        Q.   With the goal of keeping them; is that correct?

10        A.   What the goal of -- was, I'm not in a position to comment.  What

11     I can say is your forces were seizing territory and at no time while I

12     was in Bosnia did your forces ever return any territory or allow

13     minorities back in who had been ethnically cleansed by pushing them out.

14        Q.   I would kindly ask you to stick to what you know precisely.  The

15     minorities returned to Bijeljina before their time, in July and August,

16     and there was a problem.  There was killing and chaos.  But you don't

17     know that.  What I'm asking you this is:  Do you know what the objective

18     of the war was for the Muslim side and what it was for the Serb side?

19        A.   Our understanding of the objectives of the Bosnian Serb side was

20     the establishment of an independent Republika Srpska, and it was you

21     yourself and General Mladic who informed General Morillon about that at

22     the first meeting that we had with you in -- with General Mladic in the

23     end of October and I think with you something like the 15th of November

24     when you described in detail what your objectives were.  My understanding

25     of the objectives of the Bosnian Presidency was to re-establish the

Page 23241

 1     territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the single state

 2     recognised by the international community earlier that year.

 3        Q.   All right.  Did you know then that this objective of ours, to

 4     govern our own part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had been established and

 5     proposed by the European Community before the war and that all three

 6     parties had accepted that agreement, and then the Muslim side simply

 7     withdraw from it?

 8        A.   I'm not in a position to comment about negotiations and

 9     diplomatic matters which happened before I arrived in Bosnia.

10        Q.   But this is what I'm trying to say.  If you say that we wanted

11     independence, we wanted an autonomous Republika Srpska within

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Did we get that in Dayton?  I have to link this up

13     with the situation before the war, because that could have been achieved

14     without a war.  Do you agree?  We wanted to have an entity of our own

15     within Bosnia-Herzegovina, right?

16        A.   What I can confirm is that at those meetings in October/November

17     1992, that you and General Mladic and Professor Koljevic described your

18     desires to establish Republika Srpska as an independent autonomy.  What I

19     cannot confirm is the other comments you're making about Dayton.  You'll

20     need to speak with other people about that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  But I have to ask you about what had happened before

22     the war, because you are referring to it as if it just came out out of

23     the blue, but do you know this is something that had been offered to us?

24     Do you know that we conceded to an independent Bosnia only on that

25     condition?

Page 23242

 1        A.   I say again I'm afraid, Dr. Karadzic, negotiations and

 2     discussions which were conducted before the war, before my time, I did

 3     not follow those, and it would be improper for me here to comment about

 4     things that I don't know about in detail.  I don't know what was or was

 5     not said.  What I do know is following the media, that many things were

 6     said and many positions were taken.  What exactly the detail was, I'm not

 7     here able today to provide any confirmation or denial.

 8        Q.   [In English] Fair enough.  Fair enough.  [Interpretation] Then we

 9     have to look at your general conclusions within that light, that you

10     simply didn't know about this.

11             Is that right?  That was my question, and the transcript doesn't

12     seem to reflect it.

13        A.   Sorry, what is the question?

14        Q.   I said that that was all right, the fact that you didn't know

15     about these things.  However, then if we look at your general comments

16     and opinions as to what the Serbs wanted, all of them should be viewed in

17     that light, namely that you did not know about the political processes

18     that had been going on.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Witness has made it clear what he knows and what he

20     doesn't know.  Move on to your next question, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   On this page, could you please take a look.  What does it say

24     here, that convoys [In English] Accept -- uh-huh.  I cannot -- okay.  "We

25     will always give guarantees for the humanitarian aid."  [Interpretation]

Page 23243

 1     Is that right?  And that problems with Srebrenica are temporary and that

 2     I asked for patience until solutions are found; right?

 3        A.   Do you want me to read out the paragraph?

 4        Q.   Yes, please.  You will do it better.

 5        A.   "Dr. Karadzic said we will always give guarantees for

 6     humanitarian aims.  Problems like in Srebrenica are temporary.  Please be

 7     patient as we need time to organise and prepare our own people."

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be added to Exhibit D2026.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   D539.  Could we call that up, please.  Did you notice that I said

13     that we confirm the rights of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to freedom,

14     self-determination, safety and security, and so on.  Can we have the

15     first page first so that the witness can identify it, and then I'd like

16     to have page 2 displayed.

17             Are you familiar with this document?

18        A.   Yes.  It's another document that I drafted for General Morillon

19     after attending a meeting.

20        Q.   Towards the bottom it says that this is a personal assessment of

21     the situation, and [In English] "Dr. Karadzic wanted negotiations for

22     peace to be successful.  It would be crucial that his forces did not

23     retaliate for the provocations which could continue for some while.

24     Heavy retaliation would be exactly what the radical faction is trying to

25     provoke."

Page 23244

 1        A.   Provoke.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  And that passage is at paragraph 75 of the

 3     witness's amalgamated statement.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   So you were fully aware of the fact that it had to do with action

 7     and reaction and that radical elements on the Muslim side wanted

 8     precisely that, Serb responses; right?

 9        A.   Yes.  That certainly happened from time to time.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have the next page, please.  Let us look at

11     5(a).  There's no need for me to read all of it.  This is a private

12     conversation, a discussion.  And do you agree that you wrote down here

13     that I reaffirmed the right of all Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to freedom,

14     self-determination, and security and so on, that I complained about the

15     lack of confidence and trust?  Do you remember that?  Do you remember

16     that that had been discussed?

17        A.   Yes.  I remember writing that down, but it was because

18     General Morillon told me that that is what his discussion with you had

19     been, because it was a private discussion between yourself and

20     General Morillon.  But General Morillon told me that, and I drafted up

21     the report.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the bottom of the page where there's a

23     reference to the convoy for Srebrenica.  You say here, don't you, that

24     this conversation was interrupted often because Mladic, Zarkovic, and

25     Karadzic kept going in and out.  Can I have the next page.  And this had

Page 23245

 1     to do with the progress of the Srebrenica convoy.  Do you remember this?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   Do you agree that you had noted here that I and even Mladic were

 4     frustrated and even angry because this convoy was not progressing

 5     properly?

 6        A.   Yes, that is correct.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  [In English] Karadzic apologised for having

 8     personally misappreciated the strength of the genuine -- of genuine local

 9     bitterness towards the Muslims but hoped they were now being genuinely

10     convinced it was in all people's interest to let the convoys and future

11     ones pass."

12        A.   I remember the words you've just read.  I can't see them on the

13     screen.

14             JUDGE KWON:  (D), lower down.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can see it now.  Yes, that is correct.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

17        Q.   And further down in paragraph 9 it says that we apologised for

18     the fact that we have not persuaded parliament yet to have additional

19     forces of the Canadian Battalion deployed; right?

20        A.   Yes.  That is what was said at the meeting.

21        Q.   Again, we can see from this paragraph that we had informed you of

22     the intelligence that we had to the effect that Muslim underground

23     movements were waiting just for that, for the arrival of international

24     forces to start an uprising in Banja Luka.  We informed you about that.

25     And then on another occasion I'm going to show these documents to the

Page 23246

 1     Trial Chamber.  However, this is what you wrote down yourself; right?

 2        A.   That is correct.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Could we have the next page.  (F), please.

 4     Subparagraph (f) says, isn't that right, that Mladic ordered the arrest

 5     of the commander of this Serb check-point and so on; isn't that right?

 6        A.   That is correct.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And these observations --

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Sorry, just to be clear, what's correct, that the

 9     document says that or that General Mladic ordered that?

10             THE WITNESS:  It is correct that General Mladic said that he

11     would order the immediate arrest of the Serb check-point commander, et

12     cetera.  I have no knowledge whether that actually happened or not.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.  But in paragraph 11, we see your remarks that the

15     meeting was workman-like, devoid of rhetoric, and on the next page you

16     say it was constructive too; isn't that right?

17        A.   That was indeed the assessment General Morillon had after that

18     meeting.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And then in subparagraph (c) and (d), we see this

20     observation that it is our true wish to see the convoys get through and

21     that the UN should be taken seriously and then the recommendation to the

22     effect that the Bosnian Serbs were truly interested in seeing progress;

23     right?

24        A.   I confirm that that is what was said at the meeting.

25        Q.   Was that General Morillon's opinion?  And yours, too, probably,

Page 23247

 1     these observations and these recommendations?

 2        A.   These were General Morillon's observations, because I drafted

 3     these reports up for General Morillon who then corrected and amended them

 4     and then signed them.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You also wrote about our meeting on the 25th of

 6     December, 1992; isn't that right?

 7        A.   That is correct.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And then in 65 ter 11421, page 6, paragraph 3, you

 9     confirmed that I gave my consent to have a deblockade of Sarajevo by

10     establishing three supply routes; right?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  That's P4220.

12             THE WITNESS:  That is correct.  The document I'm looking at I

13     drafted for General Morillon after the meeting on the 25th of December.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see 1D4683 now to see what you wrote down in

16     your diary.

17             You can recognise your own diary, can you not?  It says the 25th

18     of December, 1992, Pale up here, and then we can take a look at page 3.

19        A.   I confirm that's my diary.

20        Q.   The upper third, could that be zoomed in.  Karadzic agreed three

21     routes:  Zenica, Pale, Mostar; isn't that right?

22        A.   Yes, Karadzic agreed three routes.  The arrow means from Sarajevo

23     to Zenica, to Pale, and to Mostar.

24        Q.   Can you interpret the rest for us, what Karadzic said, what

25     Morillon said?

Page 23248

 1        A.   General Mladic then said:  "We need to sit together to agree

 2     this."  Dr. Karadzic then said:  "Ready to meet at Karadzic, Koljevic,

 3     Mladic level.  No secret meetings."  It was Mladic -- General Mladic who

 4     insisted -- who made the point about the meeting needed to be open rather

 5     than secret.  And then General Morillon said:  "If you insist on

 6     inspecting yourself," what that means is inspecting people who actually

 7     go up and down these routes, searching them, et cetera, "then you will be

 8     accused of restricting freedom of movements.  There is a struggle for

 9     power between Izetbegovic and Akmadzic.  Akmadzic claimed that

10     Izetbegovic is no longer legitimately hanging on to power.  Akmadzic

11     seems determined to --" can you enlarge it.  "Akmadzic seems determined

12     to cease the illegality as soon as possible.  He said he wants to

13     place -- he wants to place the army under the Ministry of Defence.  This

14     is very interesting."

15        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  Do we agree that Akmadzic was a high

16     ranking Croat official and the Secretary-General of Izetbegovic's

17     Presidency?

18        A.   I can't remember the exact appointment that he had, but I do

19     remember that he was a senior Croat in the government of the Presidency.

20        Q.   What he says seems to suggest that Izetbegovic is not really

21     authorise to hold the position of president of the Presidency because his

22     mandate had not been renewed properly; right?

23        A.   I can't remember the exact details of Akmadzic's assertion, but

24     it was something along those lines.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 23249

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be added also to Exhibit D2026.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   We also met on the 16th -- or, rather -- oh, yes.  I seem to have

 5     been there.  The 16th of February.  We met then, did we not?

 6        A.   I --

 7        Q.   And you speak about that in your amalgamated statement in

 8     paragraph 133 and then in paragraph 135; right?

 9        A.   That is the -- if I recall correctly, the first time that

10     General Morillon met with you since December, because you were in --

11     you'd been in New York, I believe, in the interim.

12        Q.   Yes, yes.  I was in New York after that as well, was I not,

13     attending negotiations?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   You wrote that down in these two paragraphs and it's also

16     contained in associate exhibit 65 ter 08576.  Please, can you confirm

17     that I said that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was carrying out attacks

18     in Srebrenica, Bratunac, and that by then 1.260 Bosnian Serb civilians

19     had been killed?

20        A.   Yes.  That is what you said at that meeting.

21        Q.   Do you also agree that I indicated that a mass grave had been

22     discovered, one with 50 bodies, you say, and we said that there were

23     about 50 graves, and the biggest one contained the bodies of 50 Serbs who

24     had been killed while this territory was under Muslim control.

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 23250

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Could we briefly take a look at 65 ter 08576.  Ah,

 2     yes.  4228 is its P number.  Could it please be enlarged.  So the general

 3     says this was the first meeting with me since the 25th of December, and I

 4     that I said that I would probably not return to York since we were not

 5     being treated properly since we had restricted movement.  I think that

 6     you remember that, don't you?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Please take a look at this.  Karadzic stated that the

 9     army had carried out a major offensive in Bratunac, Srebrenica, and that

10     at least 1.260 civilians had been killed until then.  Do you know that

11     until July 1995, until the end of the war, the Muslim army killed an

12     additional 2.300 Serbs?  So that would total 3.500-something civilians in

13     this so-called Podrinje, Zvornik, Bratunac, and so on?

14        A.   I can only confirm that you, Dr. Karadzic, stated that 1.260 were

15     killed in that area as written down in this report.  I cannot confirm the

16     second figure that you mention.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have the next page.  I'm informing you that

18     Cajnice is under attack, co-ordinated attack.  I speak about the

19     discovery of this mass grave.  Trebinje is under attack and so on.  Isn't

20     that right?

21        A.   That is correct.

22        Q.   Can we now take a look at what you say about this in your diary.

23     That is 1D4684.  Page 335.

24             Do you see this?  "Dr. Karadzic, Pale."  And now is this

25     General Morillon speaking about Izetbegovic's interview on TV, right?

Page 23251

 1        A.   General Morillon described Izetbegovic's TV interview yesterday

 2     in which he accepted that the Vance-Owen Plan, be it modified, is the

 3     only way forward.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And then further down you see this figure of 1.260

 5     Serbs killed in Bratunac since the 28th of January.  Can you interpret

 6     this for us.  (K).

 7        A.   "Dr. Karadzic said that 1.260 civilians -- Serb civilians had

 8     been killed in Srebrenica and Bratunac area since the 28th of January.

 9     He has given the strongest order to his local commanders to let UN forces

10     and humanitarian convoys pass.  The Muslims are taking military advantage

11     of the convoys and are following up behind them of when they leave the

12     enclaves."

13             I can confirm that is what you stated at that meeting.

14        Q.   Can we have the next page now.  The fourth paragraph from the top

15     down.  It says -- well, can you read it out.  Now towards the -- what we

16     see now, at the very beginning.  It's at the top of the page now.

17        A.   I can't see that yet.

18        Q.   (K) and then the first line that you can see on your screen now.

19        A.   It says "Heavy weaponry.  Consider the military paper."

20        Q.   And what does it say here?

21        A.   After that:  "Experience with Muslim and Croats is that they ask

22     for local cease-fire when they are weak and then attack when reinforced.

23     We need a global cease-fire.  If they attack Trebinje, we will take

24     Travnik."

25             For clarification, Trebinje was in the bottom right-hand corner

Page 23252

 1     and was attacked by the Croats, not by the Muslims.

 2        Q.   Travnik was at that time also controlled by the Croats; isn't

 3     that right?

 4        A.   Yes, the two major military issues which were being faced at that

 5     time by the Bosnian Serbs was the attacks by the Croatian Army from the

 6     area of Dubrovnik towards Trebinje and attacks by the Croatian Army

 7     across the Sava River and into what was called, at least by the United

 8     Nations, the Orasje pocket, out of which they were attacking the Bosnian

 9     Serb lines of communication from the east, from Serbia proper, through to

10     the Krajina, and those were the two issues which were of greater concern

11     to General Mladic throughout the time that I was in Bosnia from October

12     1992 through to March 1993.

13        Q.   I would like to tender this.  I'm sorry, did you want to say

14     something else?

15        A.   These two military attacks were where the majority of the Bosnian

16     Serb military forces were positioned, and they had relatively limited

17     military sources -- resources available for operations elsewhere within

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be also added to D2026.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   When you said the Croatian Army, you were not thinking of the

23     army of the Bosnian Croats but the army of the Republic of Croatia about

24     whose presence we constantly warned?

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 23253

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm looking at the time,

 3     Excellencies.  Oh, no, excuse me.  We have a new schedule.  I apologise.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Well, the question now is that of Cerska, and I would just like

 6     to ask you to recall all the events around Cerska.  Do you remember that

 7     there was a lot of publicity about Cerska with news reports about an

 8     alleged massacre of civilians there in Cerska?

 9        A.   Yes, that is correct.  There were allegations that numbers of

10     Muslims had been shut up in a house or in houses by Bosnian Serbs and

11     that the houses had then been put on fire and that the people inside the

12     house or houses had been burnt to death.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at 1D4836, please.  Do you agree that

14     Izetbegovic informed General Morillon about these misdeeds and that they

15     were committed by Serbs, that Izetbegovic reported this directly to

16     General Morillon?  Is that correct?

17        A.   That's not completely correct.  What's general -- what

18     President Izetbegovic told General Morillon was that the situation in

19     Kamenica, Cerska, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde was very bad, that there

20     was no food, that people were dying of starvation, that there were no

21     medicines, that there were reports of atrocities, but

22     President Izetbegovic did not make the information to General Morillon

23     about the people dying in -- being burnt in houses.  It was the Muslim

24     commander at Tuzla airport who told General Morillon that people had been

25     burnt in houses and specifically asked General Morillon to when he -- if

Page 23254

 1     he succeeded in getting into Cerska to look and see if he could find any

 2     evidence.  He also said that the Serbs would not allow General Morillon

 3     to go and look.

 4             When General Morillon met with Naser Oric on the evening of the

 5     5th of March, 1992, Naser Oric also made the same allegation to

 6     General Morillon that he had reports of Muslims having been burnt in

 7     houses and atrocities having taken place in Cerska.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And you testified to this.  We don't have to read any

 9     further.  You testified about that in this case; isn't that right?

10        A.   That is correct.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And what you have just talked about now is something

12     that you described in paragraph 160 of the amalgamated statement, and

13     then in 161, 162, these paragraphs, going to 165, deal with that

14     information, dramatic information relating to Cerska; is that correct?

15        A.   That is correct.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And let's look at what your diary says about this.

17     This is 1D4685 now.

18             Can we look at the next page, please.

19             Could you please tell us, this one line but last where it says

20     "Cerska," can you tell us about that?

21        A.   It says Cerska 1.500 wounded, 18.000 civilians.  And that was

22     information received from Ganic, the -- I think he was the vice-president

23     or something of the Bosnian Presidency, and it was information provided

24     by Ganic at 1550 hours that day.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In the Serbian somebody wrote "Drop aid by parachute,

Page 23255

 1     Sokolac;" is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes, that is General Mladic's writing.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could you kindly read that line again in order to

 4     reflect in the transcript correctly, "1.500 wounded," comma, and?

 5             THE WITNESS:  And 18.000 civilians.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Means there are 18.000 civilians?

 7             THE WITNESS:  No, it means that Ganic claims that there were

 8     1.500 wounded and 18.000 civilians there.  Whether that was the reality,

 9     obviously we did not know.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll take a break.  We'll add this part

11     to the previous D2026 as well.

12             We will resume at 20 past 11.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 11.22 a.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

16             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   I should like to go through the things that are not in dispute as

19     quickly as possible.  Could we please see if General Morillon had gone to

20     Cerska and seen for himself that in Cerska there was no trace of any

21     killing or even fighting, let alone a massacre.

22        A.   That is not entirely correct.  When General Morillon went to

23     Cerska, what he found was a village where there had been heavy fighting.

24     There's a lot of damage to buildings, but he could not find in the

25     buildings any evidence that buildings had been put on fire with occupant

Page 23256

 1     people inside them and people burnt to death.  What General Morillon was

 2     not able to do was to go out into the woods and the area around the

 3     houses themselves to see if anything had happened in the woods.

 4        Q.   But nobody ever said something had happened there.  The claim was

 5     that something had happened in Cerska itself.

 6        A.   That is correct.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  In your amalgamated statement, paragraph 161, you

 8     stated that reports about a large number of civilians being burned alive

 9     in their own houses, a claim you repeated in the Oric case, was followed

10     by reports that it was an incident involving 1.500 victims.  In fact, in

11     the Oric case, you said that Oric had not been in Cerska, but

12     General Morillon, when he arrived on the 6th of March, found no visible

13     trace of burning of houses or a massacre.  That's paragraph 161 of your

14     amalgamated statement; correct?

15             JUDGE KWON:  163.

16             THE WITNESS:  It's 161 through to 16 --

17             JUDGE KWON:  4.

18             THE WITNESS:  164.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thus not even houses were burnt down, let alone any civilians

21     being burnt down with it?

22        A.   There were some houses which had suffered fire damage.  There

23     were many more houses that had suffered battled field damage, as in

24     shells, bullets, et cetera, hitting them and damaging the houses.  But

25     there were no houses of which had been burnt down with people inside

Page 23257

 1     them.

 2        Q.   Did you accompany General Morillon in that visit?

 3        A.   No.  I was back in Konjevic Polje.  General Morillon went up into

 4     the village and then came back down and briefed me what he had seen, and

 5     that is then what I put in the reports that I drafted for him.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true, as you stated in your statement of 2002

 7     and in the associated exhibit 08580, paragraph 11, when you confirmed

 8     that the Serbs had allowed General Morillon free access to Cerska,

 9     informed him that there had been heavy fighting, and that they had

10     already evacuated Muslim wounded to a hospital, those people who were

11     wounded in battle.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, could we have a reference to at

13     least the page in the 2002 statement, please?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I'm wasting time.  It's

15     a problem for me.  1D4967, please.  Let's call it up.  In the associated

16     exhibit it's paragraph 11.  Could we see 1D4967 first.  It's a statement

17     dated 1 November 2002.  Page 8.

18             THE WITNESS:  I confirm that that page provides more detail about

19     what is referred to in paragraphs 161 to 164.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   I can't find it here, but I just rephrased.  Is it written

22     somewhere that he got free access and also he returned and found about 30

23     soldiers from a Serbian platoon who were surprised to see him again?

24        A.   Yes.  I remember writing that, but I can't remember in which

25     document it is.

Page 23258

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's proceed.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 3        Q.   And you also confirmed that Larry Bollingworth [as interpreted]

 4     was in Srebrenica and returned.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  It's Larry Hollingworth.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8        Q.   Can we now look at this:  Is it true that in your evidence in the

 9     Perisic trial -- in fact, it's an exhibit from Perisic.  1D4675.  Can we

10     have that?  Paragraph 2(B).

11        A.   It's on the next page.

12        Q.   Towards the top.  Let's first make sure.  Is it your document?

13        A.   No.  This is a document written by the -- it looks as if it's a

14     UK national documents.  You need to go to the first page to the top to

15     see.  Yes.  It's a report by the UK national command in -- in Salisbury,

16     and my assumption is that it is compiled based on the receipt of reports

17     from the United Nations and from their own people.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Hollingworth confirmed that this situation was not as

19     grave as it had been portrayed before.  There was no sign of a massacre,

20     there were no cases of undernourishment, and even a few cases of fuel

21     could be found here and there.

22        A.   That is correct.

23        Q.   And under (C), it says that one doctor of the World Health

24     Organisation had stated that there were 200 wounded in Srebrenica;

25     correct?

Page 23259

 1        A.   I can't see paragraph (C).

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Let's go to the second page.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can see that.  There needs to be some

 4     context behind this.  Dr. Mardel, the WHO doctor who accompanied

 5     General Morillon into Konjevic Polje, he stayed in Konjevic Polje while

 6     General Morillon went up to the village of Cerska in order to assess the

 7     injured in Konjevic Polje.  This is the context that Izetbegovic had said

 8     that there were about 700 injured in Konjevic Polje who needed to be

 9     evacuated.  Dr. Mardel went around all the houses in the village of

10     Konjevic Polje and only found about 70, I think it might have been 72,

11     rather than 700.  So one of the statements that the situation was not as

12     grave as had been portrayed was that there were 72 severely injured, not

13     700 severely injured.  But 72 severely injured is still an issue.  His --

14     Dr. Mardel's statement that there were 200 wounded in Srebrenica is not

15     because Dr. Mardel had yet been to Srebrenica.  It was what he was told

16     by -- by Muslims in Konjevic Polje.  Dr. Mardel then walked on foot from

17     Konjevic Polje to Srebrenica while General Morillon left the

18     Konjevic Polje area.  And when General Morillon arrived back in -- sorry,

19     in Srebrenica for the first time around the 11th, 12th of March, he found

20     Dr. Mardel in Srebrenica.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you very much.  Could we just briefly -- in fact may I

23     tender this document?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be next Defence exhibit.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 2027, Your Honours.

Page 23260

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we take a brief

 2     look at 65 ter 08580.  It must also have a P number.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  4229.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Page 3, please, paragraphs 11 and 12.  Does it read that Cerska

 6     was deserted, apart from a handful of Serb soldiers who had not been

 7     expecting General Morillon, and it took an hour of negotiation until the

 8     more intelligent local commander turned up, et cetera?  Could you present

 9     to us this paragraph, please?

10        A.   Yes.  This is a report which I drafted for General Morillon, and

11     the paragraph about General Morillon's visit to Cerska itself was based

12     on information that General Morillon gave me because obviously I had not

13     personally been in Cerska.

14             The -- the situation in Cerska was that Cerska had been captured

15     by the Bosnian Serb forces and that all the people who could move, who

16     could walk, they had already fled from Cerska to Konjevic Polje, and

17     Naser Oric told General Morillon that those refugees had already left

18     Konjevic Polje on foot towards Srebrenica, and when General Morillon

19     arrived in Srebrenica five, six days later, that was when the mass of

20     refugees who had come from Kamenica, from Cerska, from Konjevic Polje,

21     were arriving in -- in Srebrenica because it's quite a long distance to

22     walk in winter through the -- through the hills and the mountains.

23             You will recall yesterday I used the analogy of a broom sweeping

24     dust in front of it.  These were in many cases refugees who had in many

25     cases been pushed out on multiple occasions and were on their fourth,

Page 23261

 1     fifth, or sixth time of escaping in front of the attacking Bosnian Serb

 2     forces.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at paragraph 12 as well.  He discusses

 4     the same thing.  Some houses were undamaged with only windows damaged.

 5     Some houses were intact or only slightly damaged, and there was no sign

 6     of anything that had been earlier reported; correct?

 7        A.   The -- this report describes what General Morillon told me.  It

 8     was an area which had suffered one major attack and had been fought over

 9     heavily, unlike the areas around Sarajevo which had been fought over for

10     months and had suffered quite a lot heavier damage than these houses in

11     Cerska.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Could we see the one page but last.  Do you agree

13     that you had been informed, and maybe you even witnessed, the Muslim

14     side, especially Colonel Sadic, being indignant and felt let down because

15     General Morillon did not confirm the version that had been put out for

16     the public about Cerska.  That's the Tuzla response paragraph.

17        A.   I -- confirm that -- I confirm that when General Morillon came

18     out of Konjevic Polje and went to Tuzla on his way back to report to

19     President Izetbegovic in Sarajevo, that he met with the commander of the

20     Bosnian forces at Tuzla airport and that they were very angry, and

21     [Microphone not activated] saying that General Morillon was either

22     deliberately concealing the truth or that he had been duped by the

23     Bosnian Serbs.

24        Q.   Could we see the last page just to take a look at the map,

25     because we're going to show a similar one.

Page 23262

 1             Did you or any of your men draw this map of the territory

 2     controlled by the Muslims at that point in time, from Konjevic Polje via

 3     Srebrenica to Zepa?

 4        A.   That is my map.  I drew it by hand.  There's a trace over the top

 5     of a 50.000 scale map.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Let me ask you now, Mr. Tucker.  You said a moment

 7     ago those people had been expelled.  The Defence has to get a

 8     clarification what you imply by that.  It's clear that those people had

 9     not been in contact with the Serb army.  They had left earlier.  They

10     fled earlier.

11             Does fleeing from war something that you think of equal to

12     expulsion?

13        A.   No.  In -- in my own mind, fleeing from war is fleeing ahead of

14     the actual fighting.  Being expelled, in my mind, is when you are in your

15     house and somebody physically comes and tells you to get out of your

16     house, you've got 20 minutes to go, and if you don't go there's a strong

17     threat that you will be harmed, and often it happens that in order to

18     encourage you to leave quickly, your house is put on fire.

19        Q.   Did that happen in Cerska, or did civilians leave before the

20     fighters came?

21        A.   I was -- I was not personally present.  I can only report what we

22     were told by refugees who we spoke with, and what they said is that many

23     of them claimed to have been expelled from their houses in towns and

24     villages to the -- to the west and to the north and to the south-west and

25     that they had been expelled back in May, June, July, August, and that

Page 23263

 1     they had fled on foot and had eventually ended up in Cerska.  Now, in

 2     Cerska itself our understanding was that there were a small number of

 3     people who had weapons with a limited amount of ammunition in the way

 4     that I described yesterday, but there were much larger numbers of these

 5     refugees who had been expelled in the way that I described earlier.

 6             Now, as the Bosnian Serb forces approached and came close and

 7     started shelling Cerska with mortars and artillery, that then -- the

 8     refugees then fled further toward Konjevic Polje and then eventually

 9     towards Srebrenica.

10             This description -- whilst those who had weapons stayed behind in

11     order in defend the place, and they were the ones who were then

12     eventually overcome in the attack.

13             The way that I describe the use of artillery in order to

14     terrorise the population, in order to flee, is exactly what happened in

15     the areas to the south and south-east and south-west of Srebrenica, which

16     I have described elsewhere in testimony, which is that what would happen

17     is that if you were living in a village and the Serbs were a distance

18     away, the first thing that would happen is that the Bosnian Serb would

19     start shelling the village.  So they would fire a shell and maybe --

20     somewhere into the village, and then 40 minutes later another shell, and

21     then an hour later two shells.  In other words, it was not a heavy

22     barrage.  But to the civilians living there, these shells effectively

23     acted as terrorism and because they knew that the next thing that would

24     happen was in one, two, or three days then Bosnian Serb ground forces

25     would attack the village, and if they were still there then they were

Page 23264

 1     likely to be killed.  And so therefore as soon as a village started being

 2     shelled, the population then picked up their bags and ran, and it was the

 3     people entering Srebrenica from the south, the south-west, the

 4     south-east, all fled towards Srebrenica and into Srebrenica because of

 5     the -- what I described as terrorism by artillery.

 6        Q.   That is precisely what I am challenging in your evidence,

 7     Mr. Tucker, that you are making both the indictment and the judgement.

 8     I'm not interested in what would have happened in what village.  What

 9     happened in this specific village?  Was Cerska demilitarised?  Was it

10     empty of fighters?  Did it initiate fighting itself?  Was it a civilian

11     area attacked by the Serbs, as you described?

12        A.   Cerska was a village, a civilian village, into which many

13     refugees had fled, expelled by Bosnian Serb forces.  The first point.

14             The second point is that the --

15        Q.   Wait a minute.  Wait a minute.  Let's see first.  Where were they

16     expelled from?  Did Serbs expel them or did they flee?  If they expelled

17     them, the Serbs, then give us some proof.

18        A.   What I can tell you is what these people told us.

19        Q.   Do you accept that the warring parties would lie about one

20     another?

21        A.   In our experience, all three warring parties lied, including your

22     own, Dr. Karadzic.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And now, please, do you know what my position was on

24     the issue of civilians in the combat zone regarding Cerska in particular?

25        A.   I have not heard you make any statements about civilians in the

Page 23265

 1     Cerska area.

 2        Q.   Can we look at 65 ter 32215.  You knew that during the crisis in

 3     Podrinje, Cerska, Konjevic Polje, Srebrenica, in 1993, I was in New York;

 4     is that correct?

 5        A.   That is correct.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the English translation of this, too,

 7     please.  We do have it.  This is my telephone conversation with the prime

 8     minister of Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic.  And now I'm going to show you.

 9     The first page is not that important.  It deals with the negotiations,

10     and I am telling him that this could be accepted but the disputed parts

11     could be protected by the United Nations and the local authority could

12     stay in place.  Can we look at page 2, please.

13             And here you can see this one says to me:

14             "I say that perhaps the Russians and British are interested in

15     resolving it that way and that we could accept that."

16             And then Lukic says:

17             "It would be very good, especially because the Muslims, although

18     they are signing it over there, they are not behaving in accordance with

19     that."

20             And I say:

21             "Really?"

22             And then he talks about attacks in Podrinje, Vlasenica, Rogatica,

23     Gorazde.  They were all attacking.  And then, please, can you look at the

24     bottom, the last line.  I say:

25              "Here the newspapers are full of Cerska ..." thinking about this

Page 23266

 1     propaganda, about what was going on in Cerska.

 2             And can we look at the next page, please.

 3             And then he says here that:

 4             "It's clear.  The papers are full of it.  However, our men who

 5     went in there found a large number of livestock and farm animals,

 6     including some 30 cows, a lot of food.  Some even taken from the Serbs,"

 7     and so on and so forth.

 8             Thus it was some sort of a farce in Cerska, you can be sure of

 9     it, that there were no civilians there only fighters and that they were

10     mostly feeding their own army.  And can you please look at the bottom.

11     [In English] "Certainly not."  [Interpretation] I'm asking:

12             [In English] Yes, yes, therefore they are not hungry at all."

13             He said:

14             "Certainly not.  They are not hungry."

15             And another important thing:

16             "We agreed to give all the elderly civilians and children a way

17     out in whatever direction they want.

18             "Yes, yes.

19             "Those who want to stay there and live can put down their weapons

20     and there will be no problems.

21             "Karadzic:  Yes, yes, I told Mladic to issue a statement tomorrow

22     and that all Muslim civilians may stay where they are or go where they

23     want and -- but armed gangs must put down their weapons."

24             [Interpretation] And can you look at the last one where I say:

25             [In English] "Fine, it would do good for Mladic to issue a

Page 23267

 1     statement to that effect tomorrow and to say in the statement that we

 2     will give amnesty to all ordinary combatants, that suspected for war

 3     criminals would be tried and in accordance with the law, and that the

 4     International Tribunal should be present," and so on.

 5             This is not propaganda.  I'm speak with the prime minister, and

 6     I'm recommending for him to tell Mladic to give a statement that we will

 7     amnesty even the regular fighters and that the civilians may stay.  Had

 8     you known this, would you have included that in your statement?

 9        A.   What you describe here, Dr. Karadzic, is indeed statements which

10     were made.  However, the reality on the ground of what actually happened

11     was rather different.

12             What General Mladic, General Milovanovic, at the meeting on the

13     Yellow Bridge on the 15th of March, et cetera, made very clear is that in

14     practice, all men of combat age, and that was variously described from

15     about 15 up to 60 years of age, would have to be arrested first and would

16     have to be interrogated in order to establish whether or not in your view

17     they had conducted war crimes or not and only then would they be

18     released.  That is what in practice in the negotiations was actually

19     said.

20             The second thing to say is that it's one aspect to make claims

21     like this.  The reality that the Muslim civilians experienced on the

22     ground was that they were pushed out and there was never any option left

23     for them to stay.  When the Bosnian Serb forces came to expel them from

24     their houses, there was no choice for them to stay.  When Kamenica was

25     attacked, when Cerska was attacked, there was no choice to stay.  Why

Page 23268

 1     were they being attacked in the first place?

 2        Q.   Sir, we will come to that.  Do you believe that when somebody

 3     declares war on you that you should not fight, that you do not dare

 4     fight?  You're a soldier.  You know that if somebody attacks you, you

 5     have the right to fight, even to capture their capital and to defeat

 6     them.  Do you have that right?

 7        A.   Fighting soldiers to soldiers, unfortunately happens.  What is

 8     not acceptable and is against the Geneva Convention is an order to attack

 9     civilians.  The Muslims in the area of Cerska, Konjevic Polje were not

10     organised military.  They did not have chains of command, they did not

11     have military weapons, they did not have equipment.  These were people

12     who were attacked and expelled from their houses.  Now, if you were

13     attacked and expelled from your house, would you try and defend your

14     house?  What these people did was try and seize those weapons that they

15     could get hold of, and I've already described how few weapons they

16     actually had and how little ammunition they actually had.  These were not

17     organised military forces. [Overlapping speakers].

18        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] Please, we will come to that.

19             JUDGE KWON:  No, no.  Mr. Karadzic, do not interrupt while the

20     witness is answering your question.  You put that question.  No.  No.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That was not my question.

22             JUDGE KWON:  No.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was theoretical and

24     academic.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I will stop you when you are that obstructive in the

Page 23269

 1     future.

 2             Please continue, Mr. Tucker.

 3             THE WITNESS:  No, I've finished.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   I kindly ask you to reply to that part of the question that I put

 6     to you, because we will go through all of the things that you have

 7     mentioned.

 8             So you assert that there was no army there, that we were not

 9     attacked from that area throughout that whole period, that they did not

10     inflict heavy casualties on us, and that for a year after the start of

11     war for no military reason out of the blue we attacked civilians, entered

12     their homes, and made them leave their homes.  We drove them out.  Is

13     that what you're saying?

14        A.   No, it is not entirely what I'm saying.  What I'm saying,

15     firstly, is that the people in the Srebrenica enclave were

16     [indiscernible] -- before the war started in April 1992, but were not

17     soldiers, were not in uniform, were not military, were not -- many of

18     them had served as national conscripts in the JNA and therefore knew how

19     to use weapons, but they were not an organised body of -- of force in the

20     same way that the Bosnian Serb Army was.  That's the first point I'm

21     making.

22             The second thing is that when those people were attacked, yes,

23     they tried to defend themselves, and they tried to get hold of weapons

24     that they could, ammunition that they could, and they did carry out

25     attacks towards the Bosnian Serb-held areas, and there is testimony that

Page 23270

 1     I have given in the Naser Oric case describing how Naser Oric and his men

 2     would conduct raids out of the enclaves with the purpose of securing more

 3     weapons, and in particular more ammunition, but also food, from Serbs in

 4     the area.  So, yes, they did carry out attacks going out from the -- from

 5     the enclave.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  So all of your positions, opinions, conclusions that

 7     you are bringing forward are based on your knowledge that there was no

 8     Muslim army there but that it was a civilian zone; is that correct?

 9        A.   No.  These were civilians when the war started.  They then

10     organised themselves in order to defend themselves, but there were many,

11     many more unarmed civilians than armed civilians inside the Srebrenica

12     enclave and inside the enclaves.  Simply because they didn't have very

13     many weapons.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know what the Patriotic League is, and do you

15     know that it was founded on the 30th of April, 1991?

16        A.   No, I do not know of it.

17        Q.   Do you know what Green Berets are?

18        A.   I know in the context of the British and the US armed forces but

19     not in the Bosnian Serb armed forces.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know how many Serbs were killed and expelled

21     before the spring of 1993 from this area that we're talking about,

22     Srebrenica, Konjevic Polje, Cerska, Kamenica, and that whole area?

23        A.   I've heard various estimates from various sources.

24        Q.   Were they expelled by civilians or were they expelled by the

25     Muslim army -- or, rather, the paramilitary going by the name of the

Page 23271

 1     Patriotic League?

 2        A.   I cannot comment on Patriotic League.  I'm not familiar with the

 3     name.

 4        Q.   Very well.  You think and you base your assertions on the

 5     position that the Muslim armed force in this area did not make war plans

 6     and did not implement them before they were attacked in the spring of

 7     1993; is that correct?

 8        A.   No, that is not correct.  There were attacks - I will call them

 9     raids - conducted by the Muslims in the eastern enclaves prior to the

10     spring of 1993.

11        Q.   Very well.  Can we now look at 1D4998.  Could we zoom in on this,

12     please.

13             Is this map similar to what you sketched in your own hand?  Is

14     that correct?

15        A.   It is similar.  What I don't know from this map is what time is

16     this map meant to represent?

17        Q.   It says at the top April-December 1992.  Could we zoom in on that

18     place so that we can see the date and where it says "Map 14."

19     April-December 1992.  All right.  Can we look at the whole map now so

20     that the witness can see it.

21             Sir, are you asserting that in these two enclaves with Zepa at

22     the time being together with Srebrenica, are you stating that there were

23     no attacks conducted before Serb attacks on their territory?  Are you

24     asserting that it was not their assignment to link up with Tuzla through

25     Serbian territory and to liberate this territory?

Page 23272

 1        A.   My understanding is that the Presidency forces in Tuzla and

 2     further south in the area of Kalesija and Vogosca were trying to lift the

 3     siege of the enclaves.  So they were attacking effectively from the west

 4     towards the east or north-east.

 5             Secondly is that there were infiltration, small groups of people

 6     who were trying to carry food and weapons from the main Muslim area into

 7     the enclaves in order to help them defend themselves.  I also understand

 8     that raids were carried out by Muslim forces, armed groups inside the

 9     enclaves, out of the enclaves in order to secure weapons, ammunition,

10     food, et cetera, in order to be able to defend themselves.

11        Q.   Sir, how do you know that they were supposed to defend

12     themselves?  Who would they be defending themselves from?  How do you

13     know that the Serbs did not attack first?

14        A.   These people were surrounded in the enclaves.  They were hungry.

15     They were cut off from the outside world.  They had no freedom of

16     movement.  There were on occasion Serb attacks towards the enclaves.

17     There is documentary evidence of orders in June/August 1992 and in

18     November 1992 to conduct attacks - this is for the Bosnian Serb Army - to

19     conduct attacks on these -- on these enclaves.

20        Q.   We will show documents.  Do you know, sir, that the Serbian side

21     accepted that this remains Muslim territory, and much more than that, and

22     that we issued a proclamation that there was no need for them to fight

23     because in the end there would be a political solution.  I personally

24     issued a declaration.  Do not fight.  There will be no need for that.

25     You will probably end up being in Muslim territory anyway.  Do you know

Page 23273

 1     about this?

 2        A.   Yes, I remember you making such statements, but your army was

 3     issuing orders which were different, and your army was issuing orders

 4     which were to attack those enclaves.

 5        Q.   And do you know that before that the enclaves were active and

 6     they inflicted casualties?  They cut off our roads, and even the roads

 7     that we were using there were ambushes set and a large number of

 8     civilians were getting killed.  Did you know that?

 9        A.   Yes, I knew that there were raids being conducted on the Bosnian

10     Serb lines of communication.

11        Q.   Did you know that other than what you said that they wanted to

12     attack from Kalesija and to deblock the brigades?  Entire brigades that

13     were in Kamenica, Cerska, Zepa, and Srebrenica had the same task and the

14     same plans to start moving towards them and to liberate Podrinje from the

15     Serbs, and this is throughout the whole of 1993, orders, plans, actions?

16     Did you know that?

17        A.   What happened later in 1993 after I left Bosnia at the end of

18     March 1993, obviously I'm not in a position to comment on.  What I can

19     say is that there were continued attempts by the Muslims in order to try

20     and relieve the beleaguered population inside the enclave of Srebrenica,

21     Zepa, Gorazde.  However, I will also say that the Muslim forces inside

22     the enclaves of Zepa, Gorazde, Kamenica, Cerska, Srebrenica, et cetera,

23     were very weak and that they had very little combat power, and it would

24     be difficult to describe them as an organised military force.  I go back

25     to my statements that these were ex-national conscripts who had been

Page 23274

 1     attacked and who had picked up the weapons that they could find to defend

 2     themselves.  They were capable of conducting small raids, but they were

 3     not capable of conducting any offensives, any military offensives in

 4     order to seize large amounts of ground or anything like that.  These were

 5     people who were beleaguered and under siege.

 6        Q.   And in what way was the Serbian Army different from them?

 7        A.   The Serbian Army was carrying out initially limited attacks.

 8     Towards the end of 1992, the Serb -- Bosnian Serb Army was conducting

 9     limited attacks towards the enclaves, and the reason for that was that

10     the main threat to the Bosnian Serb existence was the attacks by the

11     Croatian Army in Trebinje and the Orasje pocket, and that is where the

12     Bosnian Serb Army concentrated the majority of their combat power.  So

13     they had less combat power to exercise against these enclaves.  The

14     Bosnian Serb Army, however, despite the statements that Dr. Karadzic

15     has -- has described making, the Bosnian Serb Army continually had orders

16     and was executing orders to attack and remove the eastern enclaves and

17     those attacks were not that successful in October, November, December

18     1992, but that in January they re-issued orders in order to close the

19     enclaves, and I saw in Major Pandurevic's office in -- it was about the

20     18th or 19th of March, I saw on the wall in his office a military map

21     which showed the advances being made by the Bosnian Serb forces around

22     the Srebrenica enclave, showing one line describing the situation on the

23     7th of February, another line on say the 13th, and another line on -- in

24     order that it showed the way that the -- the attacks were progressing.

25     In other words, there was a deliberate and planned military attempt in

Page 23275

 1     order to capture the Srebrenica pocket.

 2        Q.   Sir, if you state that, would that imply that you reviewed all

 3     the military documents of both sides and established what were the plans

 4     on one side and the other side and then established what came first and

 5     what followed, what was the cause and what was the effect?  Or was it

 6     just because you had the map on the wall and came to these conclusions

 7     because you spoke with Muslim refugees?

 8        A.   This comes in two steps.  The first step is what I knew at the

 9     time in 1992, 1993 --

10        Q.   Wait, please.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Again, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case I'm asking for enough

13     time.

14             JUDGE KWON:  No.  You are just arguing with the witness.

15             Please continue, Mr. Tucker.

16             THE WITNESS:  My knowledge came in two steps.  The first step was

17     whilst I was in present in Bosnia in 1992, 1993.  What we witnessed was

18     the Bosnian Serbs struggling heavily with the attacks by the Croats in

19     Trebinje and Orasje and not having much combat power to deploy against

20     the Srebrenica pocket, but they had -- then when I saw the map in

21     Major Pandurevic's office, then I became clear in my own mind that this

22     was a deliberate, planned attacked.

23             After the war, I was shown documents from the Bosnian Serb Army

24     during proofing in the preparation for these meetings where I was shown

25     documents and orders from the -- in the Bosnian Serb Army, some from

Page 23276

 1     General Mladic and some from the commander of the corps which was based

 2     in and around Zvornik and some from Major Pandurevic, and it is from

 3     those documents that I make the statements that there were Serb orders

 4     and intent to capture the pocket.

 5             At the time when I was serving in Bosnia, I obviously did not

 6     have that information.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Well, let me conclude then that what you are saying does not from

 9     your immediate knowledge in the field but from preparation that you had

10     through the OTP; is that correct?

11        A.   That is correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did the OTP also show you Muslim documents from that

13     time, military orders, directives, plans and combat reports about what

14     they did in that area?

15        A.   I think I was shown a couple, but I couldn't recall which.

16        Q.   Thank you.  If you allow me, I will show you this second -- the

17     other side of the truth.  Can this page be admitted, please.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Are you referring to this map?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, just -- actually, when I go back

21     through the transcript, I see the only thing that Mr. Tucker said about

22     this map was that it was similar to the one attached to one of his

23     associated exhibits.  I'm in Your Honour's hands.

24             JUDGE KWON:  I also remember that he not specifically rely on

25     this map.  He referred to the raids from within the enclave.

Page 23277

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Quite so.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And on that basis I think we can admit it.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  That being the case, Your Honour, just by way of

 4     reference, the map was annexed, so Your Honours know, to an open source

 5     report entitled "Balkan Battlegrounds, a Military History of the Yugoslav

 6     Conflict," prepared by some analysts of the Central Intelligence Agency.

 7     And without any further information with regard to some of the markings

 8     on the map, it's obviously uncertain as to what weight we might take from

 9     this document.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Have we not admitted some similar maps earlier on?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  We may have.  I'm not sure, but I can find out.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes.  That will be admitted.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2028, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1596, please.  Could we just leave

15     the English version.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Look at this, Mr. Tucker.  On the 10th of July, 1992, the

18     Main Staff of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an order

19     relating to this zone.

20             "The staff of the Srebrenica armed forces with the forces

21     available shall join up its free territories (the liberated territory

22     with the free territory in the general sector of Zepa village and in the

23     general sector of Konjevic village, Nova Kasaba, Drinjaca)."

24             So Zvornik is mentioned in paragraph 1 as well.  Paragraph 2

25     relates to the armed forces of Zvornik.  It says it should link up with

Page 23278

 1     Kamenica, attacks on Kamenica-Konjevic Polje axis with a view to joining

 2     the two parts.  And then it says upon linkage and consolidation of

 3     forces, the said forces from Zvornik from Kamenica sector and Snagovo

 4     sector shall launch an attack in the direction of Osmaci village, and so

 5     on and so forth.  Can we see the next page?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second yes Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Mr. Tucker may be able to deal with this document

 8     but we received no notification of it, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is in evidence.  This is

11     in evidence.  I didn't know that the witness would take this position

12     that civilians were there.

13             JUDGE KWON:  If you are insisting -- anyway, we have to doubt

14     your ability to represent yourself.  You should know that you should give

15     notice of documents that you are going to use in your cross-examination.

16     The fact that it's already in the evidence does not excuse you from

17     notifying the other party.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, what am I supposed

19     to do when a new element emerges, when the witness challenges that it was

20     a military area?  I'm hearing for the first time that the witness

21     believed there were no military forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina there.

22             JUDGE KWON:  No, that's not what the witness said.  I will allow

23     you to proceed with this, but what you should have said is an apology

24     for -- to -- to the Prosecution for lack of notice.  Let's proceed.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I can do that much.

Page 23279

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   But, Mr. Tucker, please --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could Mr. Tucker look at all of

 4     this, items 3 and 4 in their entirety, and the signature of

 5     Sefer Halilovic, Chief of Staff, that is to say the chief commander of

 6     all the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Were you aware of this order dated 10 July 1992 relating to the

 9     area we have just seen on the map?

10        A.   Is this the -- the order which had -- sorry.  I am aware that

11     Halilovic publicly proclaimed attacks from the main Muslim areas towards

12     the enclaves in order to relieve them and that General Milovanovic, when

13     he met with General Morillon at the Yellow Bridge on the 15th of March, I

14     believe he then requested that that order to attack be rescinded before

15     the Bosnian Serbs were willing to agree to a cease-fire.  If that is the

16     order you're referring to, then, yes, I'm aware of that order, but I have

17     not seen this physical document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  15th of March, 1993.

19             THE WITNESS:  Correct, sir.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Tucker, without referring to any difficulties, this is a plan

22     for an offensive and the liberation of all that area and its linking up

23     with the territories they consider as free.  This is a plan of the armed

24     forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina covering all the areas at that time.

25     Were you aware that these were their activities at the time?  This order

Page 23280

 1     was indeed implemented and rather successfully.  Not completely

 2     successfully, but to a great extent.

 3        A.   I am aware that the Presidency forces tried to conduct operations

 4     of the kind that are described in this order.  I do not agree that they

 5     were very successful.  The -- the people inside the pocket, inside the

 6     enclave, had very little combat power, as I have repeatedly described,

 7     and were not, in our view and understanding - and in anything I have seen

 8     or heard - capable of doing more than raids out of the enclave.  The only

 9     places where there was moderately capable military combat power available

10     was in the main Muslim areas of Tuzla, Kalesija, and Vogosca, because

11     they were not surrounded.

12             There were also many, many civilians and refugees inside the

13     enclave, and the number of armed men was very small compared with the

14     number of refugees and the number of civilians inside those enclaves.

15        Q.   But if I tell you that in that area they had 30.000 men, that is

16     to say in the summer of 1999, soldiers, perhaps not completely equipped

17     with uniforms and boots, but 30.000 fighting men who had had their

18     shooting practice in the JNA and who were trained and had officers who

19     were trained in command and control, what would you say to that?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Did you say 1999?

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's mistake:  1992.

22             THE WITNESS:  I would disagree that the number would be anything

23     like as large as 30.000 fighting men in the enclave, because they simply

24     didn't have that number of weapons.  There were much fewer people who had

25     weapons.

Page 23281

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Sir, I'm not saying in the enclave, but in this area between

 3     Zvornik and Srebrenica.  If you don't accept 30.000, how many were you

 4     aware of?

 5        A.   I do not have specific knowledge of how many armed men there were

 6     between -- in the area between Zvornik and Srebrenica, but I would say

 7     that 30.000 is a wild exaggeration.  The number was much less than that.

 8     And all the evidence of all the fighting that happened there is that if

 9     there had been 30.000 there, then the outcome of the fighting there would

10     have been very different from the outcome that actually happened.

11        Q.   And do you know that Oric's 28th Division, which at the time did

12     not exist, but its units did exist, had lost 2.000 men by June 1992,

13     whereas in July 1995, 10.000 men of that division made it through to

14     Tuzla?

15        A.   It is very misleading to use the terms "division" and "battalion"

16     and "brigade."  The word "division" generally in military parlance means

17     an organised body of men of between 10- and 15.000 men.  To claim that

18     Oric had a division of between 10- and 15.000 men is, frankly,

19     ridiculous.

20        Q.   Do you really think you know better than the commander of

21     UNPROFOR in Srebrenica?

22        A.   I make no such claim.

23        Q.   I am telling you that the UNPROFOR commander in Srebrenica

24     confirmed precisely what I said, whereas Muslim services reported that by

25     17 July, 10.000 members of the 28th Division made it through to Tuzla

Page 23282

 1     under combat.  You were right in saying they did not have enough weapons,

 2     but they did wage war in three shifts.  One soldier would leave the front

 3     line and go on home leave but leave his weapon?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, two things.  I'd like to have a

 6     reference for what UNPROFOR commander in Srebrenica said.  Three things,

 7     actually.  Perhaps we could place this all in time to assist Mr. Tucker.

 8     And I'm just wondering what the relevance is of this as we continue.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  It's -- he's only arguing with the witness.  There's

10     no question.  And then what other witness testifies has no relevance to

11     this witness's evidence.  You use them as a matter -- as a factor to

12     assess when assessing the credibility of a witness's evidence in your

13     later submission, but it's not time for you to argue with the witness.

14     You're just wasting your time.  Consult with Mr. Robinson, as I indicated

15     several times.  And by now you have about more than three hours, and you

16     will have about an hour to conclude your cross-examination.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I come from a

18     different legal system where I have to establish what the grounds are for

19     certain things.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Then it is a bad decision to decide to represent

21     yourself.  We have Rules of Procedure and heed to the advice you are

22     getting from Mr. Robinson.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had not finished stating my

24     position.  I am not arguing, but it's very important to me whether the

25     witness was aware of these facts when he made his conclusions.  It's very

Page 23283

 1     important to me.  Now I see he didn't know these things and that's good

 2     enough for me, a good answer.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Do you know, Mr. Tucker, that we were able to take Srebrenica in

 5     1993, and I stopped the fighting and even forbade investigations to be

 6     conducted into war crimes.

 7        A.   Yes, it was our military -- it was General Morillon's military

 8     assessment that the Bosnian Serbs would have been capable of easily

 9     capturing Srebrenica in March 1993 if they had wanted to do so.  And I am

10     also aware that -- that you from New York made efforts to prevent the --

11     or ease the situation in Srebrenica.

12             I am not aware of whether you forbade investigations to be

13     conducted into war crimes.  It's simply -- I did not hear anything on

14     that.

15        Q.   All right.  Could we now call up an exhibit - it's already in

16     evidence - just for you to take a brief look?

17             JUDGE KWON:  In the meantime, have we admitted the intercept we

18     saw between Mr. Karadzic and Lukic when he was in New York?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope so, but if it's not, I would

20     like to tender it.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We will mark it for identification.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2029, Your Honours.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   One more reason why I'm asking you what our objectives were and

25     what theirs were:  Our objective was to defend those territories that we

Page 23284

 1     believed should become part of Republika Srpska, whereas their aim was to

 2     liberate all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 3        A.   I have already answered this question.

 4        Q.   For esteemed Ms. Edgerton, Mr. Franken, deputy commander of

 5     DutchBat, confirmed the existence of a very well-structured

 6     28th Division, and he said they had 4- to 4.500 weapons, rifles and other

 7     weapons.  And that was after the demilitarisation.  Do you know that the

 8     military forces of the ABH had that many soldiers and that many weapons

 9     in Srebrenica after the demilitarisation?

10        A.   I believe that the time that you are referring to and Mr. Franken

11     and DutchBat, that was all 1995, which was two years after I was there,

12     and I'm not in a position to make any comments about the situation in

13     1995.

14        Q.   But in 1995, after demilitarisation, they were supposed to have

15     less weapons, not more.

16        A.   That is not for me to comment about.

17        Q.   Could we now glance at D00105.  While we're waiting, Mr. Tucker,

18     were you able to see for yourself the efforts of civilian authorities and

19     myself to provide unhindered passage to the convoys?

20        A.   Yes, I was, and the result was that in areas where it wasn't that

21     important, convoys got through, but in areas where people were suffering

22     badly, very few convoys got through, hardly any.  It was convenient

23     you -- as was described in testimony earlier today, you made a lot of

24     effort to help get a convoy through to Srebrenica in the end of November

25     1992.  However, the next convoy that got into Srebrenica didn't get

Page 23285

 1     through to Srebrenica until March 18 of 1993, and there were many, many

 2     convoys which were -- tried to get through but did not get through.

 3        Q.   So you believe those areas were more or less important.  Do you

 4     see any connection between situations where there is military action from

 5     a certain area against us and where is not?  Izetbegovic said the combat

 6     affected areas cannot get convoys until the fighting ends, and is it

 7     connected to the fighting in any way?

 8        A.   There is a difference between fighting against organised military

 9     forces and starving people and preventing medicines getting through to

10     people who are suffering in grave situations in the midst of a very cold

11     winter up in the mountains of eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12        Q.   Did you establish that or are you just parroting what the Muslims

13     told you?

14        A.   I'm describing what I saw with my own eyes when I was in

15     Konjevic Polje and when I was in Srebrenica.  I saw with my own eyes the

16     situation and the condition that the unarmed civilians were having to

17     exist in.

18        Q.   I'm asking you this:  Did you establish that they were starving

19     and that we were stopping them from getting medicine?  Did you establish

20     that, and did you know that, for instance, international medical

21     organisations always had enough medication for Srebrenica?

22        A.   You have asked multiple questions there.  I'll deal with them one

23     by one going through the transcript.

24             Did I establish that there were starving people?  Yes, I did.  I

25     saw them with my own eyes.

Page 23286

 1             Did you stop them or did the Bosnian Serb forces stop them from

 2     getting medicine and food?  Yes, they did, because you prevented many

 3     convoys from getting through to Srebrenica.  Yes, you did get support

 4     getting the convoy through to Srebrenica at the end of November, and then

 5     again the convoy in about the 18th -- that got into Srebrenica about the

 6     18th or -- 18th or 19th of March.  However, those were drops in the ocean

 7     compared with the need that was present with all the refugees who had

 8     been forced out of their homes and were living in the most appalling

 9     conditions in the middle of winter in the enclave.

10        Q.   Sir, do you know how many people there were in Srebrenica who did

11     not have their own little farms and food production, or do you believe

12     that all of the 30.000 population depended solely on humanitarian aid?

13        A.   There are many estimates which have been made about the number of

14     people in the Srebrenica enclave.  It is, to the best of my

15     understanding, but it is based on these various estimates and what I have

16     seen myself, that there were probably something like 40.000 people in the

17     Srebrenica enclave at the -- during -- during March, and that of those

18     40.000 people, about 7- or 8.000 were actually living in their own houses

19     and thereby had the ability to store food and draw on food which had been

20     stored earlier.  The remainder were all refugees who had had to walk from

21     the houses from which they had been expelled or had been force to flee

22     because of terrorism by artillery, as I described earlier, and those

23     people only had what they could carry with them.

24             Generally speaking, when people had to flee from their houses,

25     they tried to carry as much food with them as possible, but that food, as

Page 23287

 1     you can imagine, how much food can you carry with you on foot with your

 2     own hands.  It can probably last five to ten days.  Now, many of these

 3     people had been on -- on foot fleeing for many months, so of the 40.000

 4     people in Srebrenica, they were having to live off literally the food,

 5     the bark they could scrape off trees, biscuits made from a yellow flower

 6     which grew on the hills around Srebrenica, and from humanitarian aid.

 7             Dr. Karadzic, I ask you, would you risk standing in the middle of

 8     a drop zone where pallets weighing about 4- to 500 kilos are being

 9     dropped and fight with knives in order to get access to these pallets

10     once they have landed if you had enough to eat?

11        Q.   And who told you about though bread crusts and the rest?  Did you

12     check that out?

13        A.   I saw them myself.

14        Q.   Did you see people making bread out of bark?  What exactly did

15     you see?  Could you describe it?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry, Your Honours.  There's just a line

17     missing.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I was told by the interpreter.  Could you put a bit

19     of distance from the microphones.  Thank you.

20             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Line 3, it wasn't captured.  Actually, the witness

22     said, "I saw it myself," in respond to Dr. Karadzic's response about

23     bread crusts and the rest.

24             JUDGE KWON:  I confirm hearing that too.  Can you confirm it as

25     well, Mr. Tucker?

Page 23288

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I saw it myself, and so did everybody who was

 2     with General Morillon and me in Srebrenica in March 12 through to

 3     March 20 or so.  We all saw it.  It's even reported -- it's in a medical

 4     report.  I can't remember if whether it's by Dr. Mardel or by someone

 5     else, but I've seen a number of reports.  I think Larry Hollingworth also

 6     comments on this.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   And who showed you this?

 9        A.   I saw it myself.

10        Q.    You actually went into a house and saw them making food?

11     Somebody had to show you.  If you went into a house, which house did you

12     go into?

13        A.   I went into many houses.

14        Q.   And in all those houses they showed you food they were making out

15     of bark; right?

16        A.   They weren't making food out of bark.  They were eating bark.

17     They were making food out of the yellow flowers.

18        Q.   Sir, do you know that all their villages were full of intact

19     households that had two cows each, 10 to 30 sheep, and one of the

20     witnesses here confirmed to us that all of them had cattle and food and

21     produced food?  Were you aware of that?

22             In Srebrenica you were able to see chicken and even goats.  Goats

23     are seen in one video that we have here.  And you claim that in such

24     circumstances people would be eating bark.

25        A.   I cannot confirm your previous statements about intact

Page 23289

 1     households, et cetera, et cetera.  What I can tell you is what I saw with

 2     my own eyes, which is houses with rooms.  In each room there were 15, 20

 3     people squeezed together.  They could not all lie on the ground at the

 4     same time.  You must remember that the temperature outside was minus 15,

 5     minus 20 degrees.  This was the winter.  And these people had no food

 6     with them.

 7             When I was in Srebrenica in -- in March 1993, I did not see any

 8     chickens or any -- any cows in Srebrenica.  They had already been eaten.

 9     There may have been a goat, but I don't think it lasted very long.

10             I can tell you that with my own eyes I saw people who were very

11     thin, people who were starving, children with their bellies swollen out

12     because of lack of food and lack of medicine.  I saw people who were so

13     ill from lack of food and lack of vitamins and medication that their eyes

14     had gone all dull and that they could not -- they could barely stand up.

15             Was everybody like that?  No.  But were people very hungry and

16     were people starving?  Absolutely.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  And, Your Honour, with respect to Dr. Karadzic's

18     comment that -- to the effect that witness -- witnesses here had

19     confirmed that all of them had cattle and food and produced food, I'd

20     like to see a reference, because I haven't seen a single mention of that

21     in the whole transcript.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Let us proceed, yes.  Be precise when referring to

23     the previous transcript.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I know that the Trial Chamber

25     knows.  I think it was a protected witness who told us here all the

Page 23290

 1     things that he had.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Be precise.  Ms. Edgerton is aware of that.  She

 3     raised it because you were not precise.  Let's proceed.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I don't have enough

 5     time to show it.  I wanted to show whether the witness knew that or not.

 6     I don't have to convince him of that today.  I want it to be in the

 7     transcript --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you have about half an hour to

 9     conclude your cross-examination.  It's up to you how to use that

10     remaining time.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This is immediately after my return from New York.  Did you know

13     about this order in which I in a way saved and supported the Main Staff,

14     that it could refer to the fact that they could not undertake any

15     offensives without my approval?  Did you know about this order?

16        A.   No, I did not.

17        Q.   And do you see that here it is also very strictly stated that

18     convoys have to be allowed to pass unhindered; is that correct?

19        A.   I'm not in a position to confirm or deny this document.  What I

20     can say is that at the meeting with General Mladic on the 26th of March,

21     1992, that General Mladic agreed to allow humanitarian convoys to pass

22     into -- into Srebrenica and that a convoy then got into Srebrenica on the

23     28th of March, in other word a couple of days later.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We won't be needing this document any more.

25             Sir, you talked about Sarajevo and what you knew about that, and

Page 23291

 1     you also said how you established that there was justified shelling from

 2     a military point of view and that there was also punitive shelling; is

 3     that correct?

 4        A.   That is correct.

 5        Q.   Did you know what the deployment of the forces was in Sarajevo?

 6        A.   I did not personally follow the reports about the deployment of

 7     the BiH forces in Sarajevo, but people in Sector Sarajevo did.

 8        Q.   Very well.  And on the basis of what did you state, did you

 9     conclude, that Serbian shells were coming from the hills?  You said

10     something like that; correct?

11        A.   The Serbian shells came from the hills because that's where the

12     Serbian guns were located and that is from where I saw and heard Serbian

13     shells being fired.

14        Q.   Was the Muslim army also in the hills around Sarajevo, their

15     positions, their mortars, recoilless guns, and so on?

16        A.   No, the Muslim positions were inside the encircled area, which

17     was mostly in low ground of Sarajevo, except for the high ground up to

18     the north-west of Sarajevo, up towards the television transmission tower.

19        Q.   You're talking about Hum where the TV tower is.  Do you know that

20     all around Sarajevo, on all the hills, there were Serb and Muslim

21     positions, the lines lying next to one another?

22        A.   The lines were obviously next to one another because they were

23     fighting.  However, the Muslim lines were on the inside and were lower

24     down the hills than the -- the Bosnian Serb positions, which were higher

25     up, because they were surrounding Sarajevo.

Page 23292

 1        Q.   They were not living around Sarajevo, but they came and

 2     surrounded it; is that correct?

 3        A.   If you're talking about the Bosnian Serb soldiers, no, they lived

 4     elsewhere, but in their combat positions, they were at the front line

 5     around Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   You don't know that, sir, either.  If I were to tell you that the

 7     entire Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was made up of people whose homes were

 8     immediately along the front lines, what would you say?

 9        A.   I'm not in a position to -- to state where the -- each individual

10     soldier lived, but I will say that no soldiers were living on the front

11     line, that their houses may have been nearby.  That's entirely plausible.

12        Q.   When you say that we were not able to or could not take

13     Srebrenica at the time in 1992 because we were under pressure from the

14     Croat army, then did any of the Drina Corps units fight outside of the

15     Drina Corps AOR?  Did any of them fight in the Trebinje or the Gorazde

16     area?

17        A.   I cannot confirm or deny that.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I note the time.  We'll take a break

19     now for two hours and ten minutes and resume at 10 past 3.00.

20             When you have a -- you will have about 25 minutes to conclude

21     your cross-examination.  Oh, I'm corrected.  You have half an hour.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must say that that is not enough

23     for 307 or 308 paragraphs in view of the fact that the witness is very

24     willing to expand and -- his answers and give general statements.  I have

25     to contest those general statements.  Could you please take into account

Page 23293

 1     that a number of OTP witnesses have not been cross-examined.  I don't

 2     know what weight you are going to attribute to things that are not

 3     founded on fact but founded on propaganda, but the Defence cannot take

 4     that risk.  It would like to confront the witness about the way in which

 5     he came to his conclusions and how he came to know what he knows.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber is of the opinion that

 7     four hours has been allowed for your cross-examination is more than

 8     sufficient time, and you cannot argue for further time after having

 9     wasted so much of your time for matters not directly related to the

10     indictment and making statements unnecessary and improper.  You'll have

11     half an hour after the break.

12             We will resume at 10 past 3.00.

13                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.02 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 3.17 p.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Tucker, could I ask you to take a look at a letter, 1D04850.

19     1D04850.  Could we please have that in e-court?

20        A.   My screen is switched off.

21             THE ACCUSED:  Neither I have.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Is it on Sanction?  It is restarting.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   While we're waiting, let me say that this has to do with

25     Sarajevo.  You spent about four months there, right?

Page 23294

 1        A.   That's right.

 2        Q.   I've already asked something.  I'm not sure about all the

 3     questions I've asked.  On the Serb side, there was the

 4     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that had between 15- and 17.000 men, and on the

 5     Muslim side there was the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 6     that had up to 80.000 men, out of which 40.000 were in the city itself.

 7        A.   I'm not in a position to confirm those figures.  There's

 8     obviously your information --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness speak closer to the mike.

10     Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   What was the information you had?  How strong was the 1st Corps?

13        A.   We had difficulties assessing the size of the 1st Corps because

14     the organisation kept on changing.

15        Q.   Thank you.  However -- well, all right.  Please take a look at

16     this letter.  Do you agree that this is a letter sent to the president of

17     the Presidency -- no, no.  No.  President -- actually, can we see the

18     bottom, the bottom page.  The president of the Security Council, in

19     actual fact.  And you'll see ultimately that it's the Secretary-General

20     that's writing this letter.  Could you please scroll down.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Second page.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Down here.  I see.  On page 2 we see who is writing the letter,

24     Boutros Boutros-Ghali.  And now can we go back to the first page.

25             You see this here, the Secretary-General is informing the

Page 23295

 1     president of the Security Council about what is going on in Sarajevo

 2     around the 9th -- or, rather, 8th of September.  In the second paragraph

 3     it says that military personnel wearing uniforms of the government of

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina were observed -- actually, there were attacks and

 5     people in uniforms of the Bosnian Army are recording that.  Isn't that

 6     right?  That's what it says here.  And these were attacks against UN

 7     vehicles.

 8        A.   May I say that this attack happened before I arrived in Bosnia,

 9     in Sarajevo, and I'm aware in general that it happened, but I don't know

10     any details about it.

11        Q.   Thank you.  However, that was close to the time when you arrived.

12     Did you know that the Muslim side was firing at the representatives of

13     the UN and that they had sustained losses, the UN I mean?

14        A.   Yes, it happened on occasion.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this please be admitted.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2030, Your Honours.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.  1D04677.  Could we have that, please.  Again we're in

20     Sarajevo, the 13th of September, 1993 -- or, rather, the 13th of

21     February, 1993.  Could we have the next page, please.

22             You were there at the time with General Morillon.  Do you see

23     that it says here that Izetbegovic had been informed about the evidence

24     from the fatal mortar attack on the French battalion?  That had happened

25     in September, and this happened in February.

Page 23296

 1             Please look at the second paragraph where it says that Siber

 2     tried to justify this by saying that it was not possible to determine the

 3     direction.  However, the UN believed that this was an attack by the

 4     Muslims; right?

 5        A.   Yes.  I was at that meeting.  Yes, that is the discussion that

 6     had happened at that meeting, which I drafted for -- for

 7     General Morillon, and, yes, the technique of crater analysis was used by

 8     the United Nations whenever possible to identify the direction and the

 9     range from which artillery or mortar shells had been fired.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please take a look at this where it says

11     Eastern Bosnia.  General Morillon is writing to UNPROFOR in Zagreb

12     [In English] I particularly emphasise that we had indications that the

13     eastern enclaves had carried out an offensive and were now by all

14     accounts suffering from the Serb counter offensive.

15        A.   That is indeed what was said.

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.  Were you convinced that the Serbs

17     were shooting more than Muslims in the zone of Sarajevo?  I'm referring

18     to heavy weaponry.

19        A.   The Serbs were shooting -- the Bosnian Serbs were using heavy

20     weaponry around Sarajevo rather than more than the BiH Army was for the

21     simple reason that the Bosnian Serb Army had many more artillery guns and

22     much more ammunition than the surrounded forces of the BH Army inside

23     Sarajevo who had very limited arms and ammunition.

24        Q.   But you yourself established that the Muslim army had

25     considerably more personnel and that the Serbs had more weapons and that

Page 23297

 1     that was their strategic advantage; right?

 2        A.   That -- that is correct.

 3        Q.   This is what I'd like to ask you now:  Did you see the lists

 4     referring to the heavy weapons of either side and how much ammunition

 5     they spent, and did you see the reports of military observers about

 6     incoming and outgoing fire on the Muslim side and on the Serb side?

 7        A.   These are the reports around Sarajevo.  Yes, we saw them every

 8     night.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have the next page, please.

10             If I were to say to you that we saw lists here of daily

11     consumption -- of the daily consumption of the 1st Corps in the zone of

12     Sarajevo, and we'll be looking at this even more, and I have to say that

13     although they had less heavy guns, it doesn't mean that they used less

14     ammunition.

15             Look at this, the 11th and 12th of February, 1993.  On to Serb

16     territories one thousand -- 144 grenades and on to residency areas 399,

17     and on the 12th of February a bit less, but again the Serbs were hit two

18     times more than the Muslims.

19             Did anyone inform you about that kind of thing that was going on,

20     that the Muslim side was firing as much as the Serb side was and often

21     even more?

22        A.   That only happened in exceptional situations, was very rare.  One

23     other occasion that I'm aware of was when the Muslims tried to break the

24     siege of Sarajevo in the Otes and Stup area around the 7th of December,

25     1992, but I'm sure that if you look at these reports you will again see

Page 23298

 1     that the numbers fired by the Muslims were high, but when you take the

 2     entire time that I was in Sarajevo, by far the majority of fire was from

 3     the Serbs into the city rather than from the city outwards.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see the fifth page.  So four pages up, please.

 5     The fifth page from here.

 6             Do you remember this letter sent to Izetbegovic by Morillon on

 7     the 13th of February, 1993, and he is telling him about the results of

 8     the investigation into the fatal mortar attack against the French.

 9        A.   Yes, I drafted that letter for General Morillon.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have the next page now.  I would kindly ask

11     you to look at the -- [In English] "I must, however, request you to

12     restrain the populations of the enclaves from offensive actions as aid

13     cannot be delivered where your forces are engaging in active

14     hostilities."

15        A.   Again, that is a letter that I drafted for General Morillon, and

16     I'm aware of the contents.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2031, Your Honours.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Can we now briefly take a look at 65 ter 21646.  Yes.  Please

22     take a look at this.  It is your message, and it has to do with your

23     information -- or, rather, your contacts with Oric, and it says:

24             [In English] "The local military commander of Srebrenica received

25     the order from Halilovic to stop any offensive actions towards the -- or

Page 23299

 1     against the Serbs.  As already stated before, every night some raids were

 2     conducted and between 5 and 15 Serbs were killed every night."

 3        A.   That is correct.  That is a transcript of a report which I

 4     radioed from inside Srebrenica to the headquarters in Kiseljak in Dutch.

 5     It's been translated into English.

 6        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2032, Your Honours.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Can we now, since we're in the area, this was March 1993, can we

12     have 1D04833.  Let us see how things developed in December 1992.

13             Do you remember a letter I wrote to General Morillon on the 10th

14     of September, 1992?

15        A.   That was about a month before I arrived, so it's probably

16     unlikely that I saw it.

17        Q.   Were you not there in the autumn of 1992?

18        A.   Sorry, you said September.  This is December.  In December I was

19     indeed there.  Yes.

20        Q.   Uh-huh.  I see.  Maybe it's a translation issue, but we do see

21     December written here, so what is described here is one such attack that

22     occurred on the 7th of December when people working in a mine were

23     killed.  Eleven were killed and 21 wounded, and it says that they had

24     weapons and ammunition from Arab countries and several UNPROFOR packages.

25     I am asking General Morillon to see whether this had anything to do with

Page 23300

 1     the convoy that had just arrived in Srebrenica.  And in Cyrillic there is

 2     an attachment, a letter written by the municipality of Milici who

 3     informed me about what happened, and there is a reference to weapons and

 4     ammunition produced by Arab countries, as well as several UNPROFOR

 5     packages.  Do you remember that I informed General Morillon about this?

 6        A.   Yes, I believe you did.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like see the translation of the attached

 9     letter?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I'd like to see the attached letter as well,

11     please, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification, pending

13     translation.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 2033, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, was that your point, Ms. Edgerton, when

16     you rose?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Maybe it's a technical thing, but what I have

18     doesn't have a Cyrillic letter attached.  So that was my point, actually.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have the second page?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we have time I'm going to read

22     it.  I'm going to read it carefully so that they --

23             JUDGE KWON:  No.  We need a translation by our section.  Please

24     continue, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 23301

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Also in your statements and in your amalgamated statement, too, I

 3     think, you mentioned that you were aware of the abuse of certain

 4     buildings in the city itself, there was the Muslim soldiers that were

 5     using these buildings to fire from them, like from the hospital.  So they

 6     had firing positions that were actually impermissible; isn't that right?

 7        A.   What I described was two particular kinds of incident.  One was

 8     when Bosnian Army units would move mobile mortar -- mortars into the area

 9     of the Kosevo Hospital, would then fire their mortars out of

10     Kosevo Hospital in order to try and provoke the Serbs to fire

11     counter-battery back at the position from which the mortars had been

12     fired, and they would -- that incoming fire would therefore land on

13     the -- on the hospital.  That's one example.

14             The second example was when Muslim BiH Army units placed mortars

15     next to General Morillon's headquarters and similarly fired out at the

16     Serbs, presumably in the hope that the Serbs would fire counter-battery

17     bombardment in a similar way and would thereby potentially hit the UN

18     headquarters.

19        Q.   Thank you.  1D01956.  Could I have that, please.  Also, you

20     noticed, did you not, that there were mobile mortars mounted on trucks?

21     Isn't that right?

22        A.   I did not personally see them, but a British Army sergeant major

23     who was part of the UN forces who was responsible for delivering diesel

24     fuel to the Kosevo Hospital to power the generators, it is him who saw,

25     and the words that he used was "mortars mounted on the back of trucks."

Page 23302

 1     There were other reports we had from other parts of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo

 2     who talked about mortars being placed in the back of cars and -- like

 3     Volkswagen Golfs.

 4        Q.   And was the point of that to allow them to move after having

 5     fired so that the Serbs would fire into an empty space?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have the next page now.  Do you agree --

 8     actually, you probably drafted this too.  General Morillon is writing

 9     about violations of the Geneva Convention and is describing the incident

10     that you have just described, right?

11        A.   Yes.  I think that's it.  I just need to see the next page just

12     to make -- because it talks of attachments.

13        Q.   Yes.  Could I have the next page as well, please.

14        A.   Yeah.  That is the incident I was referring to when I just

15     mentioned that a British Army sergeant major reported.

16        Q.   Could we briefly take a look at the next page and then the one

17     after that again.  That's part of it, isn't it?  You know who Cutler is,

18     don't you?

19        A.   Yes, he was an officer serving with the UN in Sarajevo.

20        Q.   Could we have the next page now.  This has to do with the same

21     incident.

22        A.   Yes, that is correct.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And now, please, the very last page where

24     General Morillon is writing to the President of the Presidency,

25     Izetbegovic, warning him about these violations of the Geneva Convention.

Page 23303

 1     This has to do with that incident and also that particular set of

 2     documents; right?

 3        A.   That is correct, and I drafted this document.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this set of documents please

 6     be admitted under the same number.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D2034.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   You were aware, weren't you, you confirmed that for us anyway,

10     that the parties in the conflict were prepared to deceive the

11     representatives of the UN and lie to them.  Is it true that you heard

12     rumours to the effect that the scene that was staged by the Muslim

13     civilians in Konjevic Polje had been orchestrated, that it wasn't

14     actually authentic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D04676.  Could the witness please

16     be shown that.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Does this relate to the situation in which Muslim civilians

19     blocked you, where two British soldiers were perhaps wounded in

20     Konjevic Polje, or injured, and the mob blocked that location, and the

21     appraisal was that the whole thing was orchestrated, not spontaneous?

22        A.   No.  That is not quite correct.  There are two incidents here.

23     The incidents referred to here in Konjevic Polje is when the

24     British Battalion based in Tuzla sent some armoured vehicles into

25     Konjevic Polje and some transport vehicles in order to evacuate injured

Page 23304

 1     and wounded, and that was arranged after General Morillon's visit to

 2     Konjevic Polje on the 5th and the 6th, and approval was given by the

 3     Bosnian Serb authorities in meetings on the 8th and the 9th of March.

 4             When the British arrived there, they arrived on the evening, I

 5     believe, of the 11th, and when they tried to leave on the 12th, anxious

 6     refugees crowded around the British vehicles, and Serb tanks, and

 7     infantry fired into the crowd and -- who were clustered around the

 8     British vehicles, and a number of civilians were killed and injured two

 9     British soldiers.  That is one incident.

10             The second incident is - and that's what is referred in paragraph

11     2 - is in Srebrenica itself, and the crowd blocking this location refers

12     to the crowd blocking the PTT building in Srebrenica.  And the crowd

13     surrounding the PTT building in Srebrenica which prevented

14     General Morillon from leaving on the 12th of March, that crowd of

15     refugees was orchestrated.  The way it was orchestrated was that there

16     were refugee women with whistles who were walking around the back of the

17     crowd and blowing whistles and giving instructions to the crowd as to

18     where to go and how to block General Morillon and his team, my team, when

19     we tried to get into the vehicles in order to drive away from the PTT

20     building.

21             Now, the crowd that was being orchestrated were not being

22     orchestrated against their will.  They were being orchestrated because

23     the crowd were very anxious that if General Morillon left, they believed

24     that then they would be shelled, because on previous occasions when

25     General Morillon had visited somewhere, the Serb shelling and attacks had

Page 23305

 1     stopped, but as soon as General Morillon had departed, the Serb shelling

 2     and attacks started again.  So the -- the crowd of numbers of thousands

 3     of refugees who were crowded around the PTT building, they were already

 4     very anxious, but they were orchestrated and controlled as well by these

 5     women who were taking instructions from the Srebrenica war council.

 6             After the war, I heard that the Presidency had apparently given

 7     instructions to the Srebrenica war council to try and prevent

 8     General Morillon from leaving and that they were executing that and using

 9     the crowd in the way that I described.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2035, Your Honours.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Could we now see 1D04678.  I believe this is your report, in

16     fact.  It says it's your report.  1D04678.

17             It refers to a vicious circle in central and Eastern Bosnia, and

18     you speak about our aspiration to have a cease-fire, an overall

19     cease-fire, beginning with mid-November.  Are you familiar with this

20     report?

21        A.   Yes.  That is indeed what -- what I said at the time.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now see the next page.  In fact, the two

23     next pages.  The second one is in English, and the third one -- no.  In

24     fact, page 3 is the English translation of the French text.

25             This is where General Morillon is reporting to someone.  It must

Page 23306

 1     have been by radio; correct?

 2        A.   Yes.  Remember that we were inside Srebrenica and had no direct

 3     contact with the UN headquarters in Kiseljak, and for this particular

 4     report General Morillon himself spoke on the radio, and he spoke to Major

 5     Olivier de Bavinchove, who is the person I think signed at the bottom who

 6     is a French-speaking officer based in Kiseljak.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Does it follow from this that after I approved an air

 8     corridor between Tuzla and Srebrenica, Morillon asked that your

 9     helicopters move information and that Serbs be notified that helicopters

10     flying in formation belonged to the UN, not the Muslims, because a Muslim

11     white helicopter flies alone?  Isn't that written here?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted as Exhibit D2036.  And,

15     Mr. Karadzic, I wanted to remind you that your time is up, and it's time

16     for you to conclude.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I have two or

18     three more documents and I'm not spending much time on them.  May I be

19     allowed to finish?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   65 ter 21647.  At that time I was still in York, right?  But

23     somebody's contacting me, correct?

24        A.   That is correct.

25        Q.   1(a), you are sending a message that I approved the air corridor

Page 23307

 1     from Tuzla to Srebrenica for five days and that's the basis upon which

 2     Morillon later asked that UN helicopters fly in formation so that Serbs

 3     know that it's not the Muslims.

 4        A.   I recall the -- the text which is in this document.  The comments

 5     about flying in formation, the previous document talks about large

 6     formations.  What I cannot recall is the exact figures which were

 7     actually agreed with the Serbs.  The previous letter is -- the previous

 8     document is an internal discussion between General Morillon and -- and

 9     Kiseljak.

10        Q.   Thank you.  But that was on the basis of my approval, and it

11     follows from that that flights were allowed, but the only problem was

12     that the Muslims had a white painted helicopter; right?  That was in the

13     first document.

14        A.   Yes.  The Muslim had a white painted Hip helicopter that I saw at

15     Tuzla airfield.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit D2037.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have one document now that I

20     should not like to be broadcast, and we don't have to refer to the

21     institution from which it originated, and Ms. Edgerton can intervene.

22     1D3830.  Do we have to go into private session, or can we just not

23     broadcast it?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Probably we go to private session.  Shall we?

25                           [Private session]

Page 23308











11  Page 23308 redacted.  Private session.















Page 23309

 1   (redacted)

 2                           [Open session]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We are now in open session.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Is it true that you had information that the Muslims were opening

 7     fire on their own populous, on their own people?  I mean primarily

 8     mortality fire.

 9        A.   There were reports in the media that that happened in Sarajevo,

10     but that was after I left Bosnia, and therefore I had no information

11     beyond what was in the media.

12        Q.   Is it true that you met in Germany with a British officer who

13     informed you that the shell at Markale Market-place came from Muslim

14     positions?

15        A.   When I was back in Germany after my time in Bosnia, I met by

16     coincidence a British sergeant major who was a specialist in crater

17     analysis and artillery intelligence who had been on the investigating

18     team looking into what I believe is referred to as the first market-place

19     incident, and he said to me that he believed that that the first

20     market-place incident had been fired or had come from the Muslims.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please conclude.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one question and one document.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Did you know that there was a private aeroport for two-winged

Page 23310

 1     planes in Bratunac, and what you perhaps saw were those little planes

 2     dropping something, but they came not from Serbia but the airfield in

 3     Bratunac?

 4        A.   I'm aware that there was a small grass airfield on the outskirts

 5     of Bratunac.  You are referring to the reports while I was in Srebrenica

 6     which was made by two UNMO officers who reported seeing planes fly from

 7     over Serbia, across the Drina River, into the air space over

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina, drop some bombs and then fly back.

 9             All I can -- I did not see these myself.  All I can repeat is the

10     words that those UNMO officers reported and which I include in the

11     reports and which I have certainly give -- testified in previous cases

12     and ...

13        Q.   Thank you.  My last question and last document.  D43.

14             While we're waiting, and I've mentioned this before, I issued an

15     order to the army to stop before Srebrenica, not to enter, and not to

16     investigate war crimes, to avoid any possibility of revenge or

17     uncontrolled processes that pending defusion of tensions, nothing should

18     be done.  I believe we have a translation for this document.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we do.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   This is the 16th of April, after all the crises and the fighting

22     in Eastern Bosnia.  This is my order.  Stop the forces at the positions

23     reached and prevent their entry into Srebrenica, facilitate the passage

24     of all humanitarian convoys, ensure pacification of the town in such a

25     way that Muslim forces surrender weapons to UNPROFOR.  I underline this:

Page 23311

 1     Not to the Serbs but UNPROFOR.  And store these weapons on a two-key

 2     basis jointly with the Serb forces.

 3             After the surrender of weapons, all Muslim soldiers should be

 4     treated like other civilians.

 5             If you remember my conversation with Lukic, I said that all

 6     Muslim fighters should be treated the same as civilians, should be

 7     amnestied.  Do you remember that intercept I showed?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  This area of questioning has been the subject of

11     other questions by Dr. Karadzic.  It's been talked about at length today,

12     but this is a document we haven't been notified on.

13             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic, about this

14     document?  That should be your last question.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to Ms. Edgerton, and I

16     promise I will be tolerant whenever they do the same thing with

17     documents.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Tucker, that what I announced was

20     specification, treatment of fighters as civilians, and what it says in

21     point 6 is:  "Do not conduct any investigation into crimes ..."

22             Do you agree what I discussed with Lukic was operationalised

23     through this order and were you aware of this?

24        A.   The date of this document is the 16th of April, 1993.  I left

25     Bosnia at the very end of March 1993.  So I cannot confirm the contents

Page 23312

 1     of this document.

 2        Q.   Well this, document is in evidence.  I just want to know the

 3     extent of your knowledge and what was the basis for your positions.

 4     Thank you, Mr. Tucker.

 5             May I just ask you one thing?  Do you all stand by all of your

 6     documents so I can tender them through a bar table motion, the documents

 7     that you drafted?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No.  How can he answer that question without seeing

 9     all the documents?

10             Yes, Ms. Edgerton, do you have any re-examination?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Four minutes, if I may.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13                           Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

14        Q.   Sorry, let me switch microphones.  Mr. Tucker, you talked at

15     length today with Dr. Karadzic about events in Eastern Bosnia, and I

16     wonder whether you might remember him saying to you at one point, and for

17     the record it's on page 62:

18             "Our objective was to defend those territories that we believed

19     should become part of Republika Srpska, whereas their aim was to liberate

20     all of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

21             And also asking you at line 14 whether you had proof in cases

22     where you were present in Podrinje Cerska that we drove them out.

23             Do you remember those two passages?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Then I'd just like to go back very quickly to what's

Page 23313

 1     now P4249.  It's a document you've seen before and commented on at

 2     paragraphs 264 and 265 of your statement.  It's an order dated 24

 3     November 1992, from the Drina Corps command to the Zvornik Light Infantry

 4     Brigade, and your indulgence for a moment.  Now we see the document on

 5     the screen in front of us.

 6             In that order, in paragraph --

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.  I

 8     might have got the P number wrong.  I'll try a 65 ter number.  01900.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] By the way, if I may, this is the

10     date three days after the massacre in the bauxite mine.  So it would be

11     nice to place things in context.

12             JUDGE KWON:  You can give your evidence.

13             Is it coming?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  My colleague might be able to help me.

15                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one thing.  My intonation

17     indicated that "liberate" was in quotation marks.  That's a linguistic

18     difference.  "To liberate" should be in quotation marks, line 24.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you are not giving evidence.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's true, Your Excellency, but I

21     see it's not recorded properly.  There are no quotation marks.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Pardon me.  I was going by an exhibit list I

23     received and I think there might actually be a date issue.  Give me one

24     minute, please, and I extend my four minutes I requested.

25                           [Prosecution counsel and Case Manager confer]

Page 23314

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  I think I've got the problem sorted and my sincere

 2     apologies, it should be P2085.  I'm out of practice, Your Honour.  My

 3     sincere apologies.  P2085.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Is it a November document, November 1992?

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  It is indeed, 24 November 1992.  Thank you.

 6        Q.   Now to go back to my question.  This is the order I was

 7     describing before, dated 24 November 1992, from the Drina Corps command

 8     directing forces of the Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade to launch an

 9     attack using the main body of troops and equipment to inflict on the

10     enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust them, break them up, or force

11     them to surrender and force the Muslim local population to abandon the

12     area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde.

13             Now, Mr. Tucker, is this what you saw happening on the ground in

14     March of 1993?

15        A.   The attacks ordered in this document are what I saw and what the

16     whole world saw take place in February and early March 1993.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Then nothing further.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just say one thing?

19             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.  No Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I said no.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't even say it yet.  I am

23     just telling you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I said no without hearing what you had to say.

25             Mr. Tucker, that concludes your evidence.  On behalf of this

Page 23315

 1     Chamber, as well as the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you

 2     for coming to The Hague again to give it.  Now you're free to go.  Please

 3     have a safe journey back home.

 4                           [The witness withdrew]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Tieger, I note the time, but

 6     having asked the next witness to come by, I think we can go with him at

 7     least for ten minutes.  Is it practicable for you?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  It's certainly not a problem for me, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We are going to hear him in closed session.  I was

10     advised to take a five-minute break.  We will resume at 20 past and go on

11     till half past.

12                           --- Break taken at 6.13 p.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 4.23 p.m.

14                           [Closed session]

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 23316











11  Pages 23316-23319 redacted.  Closed session.















Page 23320

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.33 p.m.

 5                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day

 6                           of January, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.