1 Wednesday, 18 January 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I'll be very brief.
9 Turns out that Mr. Robinson and I both noticed that in the pace of
10 business yesterday 65 ter number 30953, which was raised in connection
11 with the redirect examination of Mr. Franken, was not tendered and so we
12 would do so now with no objection, as I understand it, from the Defence.
13 Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you for the reminder. That will be
15 admitted. Of course, it should have been marked for identification.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI P4254, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: As indicated by the registrar, we will be sitting
18 until 4.20 today without having to interpose this witness. The first
19 session will be until 10.40, after which we will have a 40-minutes'
20 break, and after which we will sit from 11.20 to 1.00, and then we'll
21 have a two-hours, ten minutes' break, and then we'll sit from 10 past
22 3.00 to 20 past 4.00. I think that's sufficient time to cover this
23 witness and even we can start -- but we'll see.
24 Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
25 WITNESS: PYERS TUCKER [Resumed]
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies. Good
2 morning, Your Excellencies. Good morning to all.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
4 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Tucker. I would like us to go
5 through what you noted personally and what you perceived personally. I
6 would like to draw your attention to a meeting or, rather, what you call
7 the attack in Sarajevo on the 1st of October, 1992.
8 You thought that that was done with the intention of cutting
9 Sarajevo in half, and you said that that was the last such attempt.
10 That's what you said yesterday. Did you know that politically that was
11 not any plan? That was originally the plan of the Yugoslav People's Army
12 that wanted to link its barracks, Marsal Tito and hospital, with the
13 territory of Lukavica, rather, free territory.
14 A. I do not have any knowledge of the kind you describe. All I saw
15 was the -- the attack taking place and the reports which were made by the
16 various UN organisations in Sarajevo, and the deduction that I drew
17 yesterday was General Morillon's supposition. What you describe, I'm not
18 in a position to comment on.
19 Q. I see. Thank you. So that was General Morillon's assumption.
20 It was not rock-hard evidence; right?
21 A. The rock-hard evidence was the fact that an attack took place.
22 We obviously did not have access to the plans of the Bosnian Serb Army,
23 and so therefore obviously I cannot confirm one way or the other. What I
24 described was what General Morillon's deductions were from the attack.
25 Q. Thank you. (redacted)
8 JUDGE KWON: The fact that the other witness testified otherwise
9 does not mean that this witness should agree with him.
10 Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: And, Your Honours, I don't think, furthermore,
12 that Dr. Karadzic's comment as to what the witness said is appropriate
13 given that the witness testified in closed session, and I'd like to ask
14 for a redaction.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That's how you are wasting your time. As I
16 told you yesterday, please consult Mr. Robinson how to conduct your
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency. It's two
19 minutes that were lost, not a lot of time, but the problem is that the
20 amalgamated statement, it doesn't say that this was an assessment. It's
21 presented like evidence. My concern is what kind of attention will be
22 paid to impressions by the Trial Chamber, what the Trial Chamber will do
23 with impressions and generalised statements. But I'll try to have that
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Yes. You confirm then that I was in Geneva and that was also a
2 basis for General Morillon to believe that this was not an attack that
3 had been approved by the political powers; right?
4 A. That is correct. General Morillon was surprised. Was surprised
5 that an attack took place while diplomatic negotiations were going on in
7 Q. Thank you. When speaking of March 1993, you speak about the
8 meeting in Belgrade in relation to the crisis that had to do with
9 Srebrenica -- or, rather, the Drina River Valley; right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. Further on, you say that during that time I was in
12 New York and that the general view was that I could not do much from
13 there; right?
14 A. That was the -- the view held by General Morillon.
15 Q. Thank you. There is an observation of yours here. You say that
16 you thought that General Mladic was rather independent and that in actual
17 fact he would have taken over if the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina were in
19 Many of your observations are correct, not to say brilliant, but
20 do you know that this stems from our system itself? For example, do you
21 know that our constitution --
22 JUDGE KWON: I wanted to -- but did you want the reference for
23 that statement?
24 MS. EDGERTON: Absolutely, please.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Was the amalgamated statement,
1 paragraph 282 and 277. And the one that had to do with my stay in
2 New York is associated Exhibit 65 ter 08616.
3 JUDGE KWON: Then are you satisfied, Ms. Edgerton?
4 MS. EDGERTON: Well, not as to the accuracy of Dr. Karadzic's
5 assertion that Mr. Tucker wrote in his amalgamated statement that
6 Dr. Karadzic could not do much from New York, but I'm satisfied with the
7 reference. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. That position of Mr. Tucker's is in 08616, the associate exhibit,
11 paragraph 6 of that particular document. The rest is in the amalgamated
13 You wrote in your diary in relation to the 13th of March, 1993 --
14 actually, could we please have this displayed, 65 ter -- actually,
15 1D4849. The last page of this document. The fourth one.
16 Could you please read item 4 to us, please.
17 A. "Commander believes Serb military are going far beyond the
18 direction given by their politicians."
19 Q. Thank you. Did you know that in our country the Law on the
20 Organisation of the Army, operative and tactical command over the army
21 was delegated to the Main Staff from the president?
22 A. I believe that that was the case.
23 Q. Thank you. Is that then in line with your position that you
24 presented in the amalgamated statement, in paragraph 279, about this lack
25 of influence with regard to military issues? Please look at that
1 paragraph 279. Is that in line with the fact that the president does not
2 deal with operative and tactical command?
3 A. The understanding -- or rather, the belief that we developed,
4 General Morillon and the staff developed, while I was in Bosnia was that
5 you, Dr. Karadzic, were the president and Commander-in-Chief of the
6 Bosnian Serb armed forces and that General Mladic was the general
7 commanding the Bosnian Serb armed forces. In most cases, we believed
8 that General Mladic and the Bosnian Serb armed forces would do what you
9 directed them to do and what the Serb Assembly directed them to do.
10 However, we believe that if General Mladic believed that they were being
11 ordered to do something or ordered not to do something which was -- which
12 would endanger Bosnian Serbs, that we saw occasions when he, in our view,
13 did not do necessarily what he was ordered to do.
14 Q. Thank you. That is why I wanted to ask you whether your
15 observations -- actually, whether you would have been assisted had you
16 known that in our system, for instance, it was forbidden for politicians
17 to accept capitulation. The constitution said that everyone had to fight
18 to the very last, and from that point of view even the JNA did not need
19 any kind of order to discipline Slovenia. They could have done that
20 without any order coming from the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Did you know
21 these specific characteristics of Tito's constitution?
22 A. That I did not, no.
23 Q. Thank you. Then we had this meeting on the 20th of November,
24 1992, at the Panorama Hotel. So I would like us to highlight a few
25 matters that you observed there.
1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, the pages we saw right now were not
2 included in your exhibit, associate exhibit, and that will be added to
3 the previous diary, or shall we admit it separately?
4 Mr. Robinson?
5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I think we should admit them separately. We
6 have some other excerpts also that are coming in.
7 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That portion of diary will be admitted
8 as a separate Defence exhibit.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, if I may make a brief submission in
10 regard to the diary that was just displayed, that single page that was
11 just displayed, and you may -- Your Honour, I think it would be of
12 assistance for the Trial Chamber to have the entry for 13 March 1993 in
13 full rather than just one page out of context.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, 1D4849 is of four pages. Is it not sufficient?
15 MS. EDGERTON: Correct. I didn't realise that Your Honours were
16 dealing with the four pages in total rather than just the one page that
17 was displayed. I wanted to make sure you had the four --
18 JUDGE KWON: So if we are to admit -- I'm sorry. I was
19 overlapping. If we were to admit four pages, you would have no problem.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Of course not. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It will be admitted.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2026, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In paragraph 66 of your amalgamated statement, you deal with this
2 meeting and the points that were considered there; right? Isn't that
4 A. What is the question?
5 Q. That in this paragraph you deal with our meeting, that is to say,
6 General Morillon's meeting with me that you also attended on the 20th of
7 November, 1992.
8 A. Yes, and other paragraphs around that.
9 Q. Thank you. Now let us see what your diary says in relation to
10 that meeting. Let us look at 1D6481 then.
11 MR. ROBINSON: That's 4681.
12 THE ACCUSED: I think I -- I thought I said that, but in ...
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Could you please read this out to us -- or, rather, interpret for
15 us what it says under item 2. Lower. Below item 2. Yes. Precisely.
16 [In English] "Unfortunately ..."
17 A. "Made a lot of efforts to get Serbs to understand and trust UN."
18 Next paragraph:
19 "Unfortunately, have very strong evidence that UNPROFOR is
20 helping other side. Often find Argentinian, Nepalese ammunition with
21 Croatian and Muslim soldiers, NATO food. Yesterday a report that
22 UNPROFOR helped Muslim and Croat soldiers enter Karlovac Cazinska Krajina
23 in a UN convoy," I can't read the last one, and then the last one is,
24 "Have captured Muslim and Croats who said UN smuggled people in UN
25 vehicles and that UNPROFOR attitude is against Serbs."
1 And that is my handwritten notes of what you, Dr. Karadzic, said
2 at that meeting.
3 Q. Thank you. And what about this page that we have on the screen
4 now? Can we see the portion where you said that I had said that it would
5 be very important to establish who started the attacks? Can you confirm
6 that? Can you take a look at that paragraph? That I asked to have it
7 established who it was that started attacks so that we could know who
8 should be held responsible for the shooting.
9 JUDGE KWON: That seems to be the line with the asterisk in the
11 THE WITNESS: "Karadzic said it's important to establish
12 accurately who started," and by that he meant started shooting.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Thank you. On that same page could you please indicate to us
15 whether you wrote down that small individual groups are the ones
16 committing crimes and that we are trying to eradicate them.
17 A. Can the bottom of that page be enlarged? Yes.
18 "Dr. Karadzic stated all sides make atrocities. Serb military
19 are under unified and effective command. Atrocities are committed by
20 small individual groups who we disown and are trying to root out."
21 Q. Thank you. Can we look at page 48 now. That would be the next
23 Did you note here that we were not committing ethnic cleansing?
24 Can we see that part on this page 48, that we are not committing ethnic
25 cleansing? I would like to see how much of that you wrote down.
1 A. I think it's the third paragraph down from the top.
2 Q. Yes. Could you read this for us, please.
3 A. "Karadzic said that the world needs to be told that the Serb
4 authorities are not ethnic cleansing, et cetera. The war will not end
5 until same pressure is on all sides. We need a balanced approach."
6 Can I see to left, because there's a line going to the left off
7 the screen to me. See whether that leads to a comment. Does it go any
8 further? No. Thank you. And that is what I wrote down that you,
9 Dr. Karadzic, said at that meeting.
10 Q. Do you agree that the partiality and one-sidedness of world media
11 encouraged the Muslims to hope for a military intervention and made them
12 disinterested in peace as much as the Serb side was interested?
13 A. Your Honour, may I ask a question?
14 JUDGE KWON: By all means, Mr. Tucker.
15 THE WITNESS: Should I answer Dr. Karadzic's question, as I don't
16 see that it is relevant to -- to my evidence here?
17 JUDGE KWON: You can answer that way, yes. I think that to be an
18 answer, a legitimate one.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, it is predicated that you agree that
20 the -- there was partiality and one-sidedness, which you may or may not
22 THE WITNESS: Yeah. The impression -- the belief that I had was
23 that there was impartiality by world media who were focusing on the
24 atrocities and ethnic cleansing being carried out by the Bosnian Serbs in
25 Bosnia. I won't refer at all to the Croatian war, as I was not involved
1 in that. But that was because there was cause to be concerned because of
2 the horrific things that Dr. Karadzic, the forces under your command and
3 under your authority, had been conducting. So, yes, there was
4 partiality, but if your forces had not carried out extraordinary horrific
5 actions, perhaps things would have been more balanced.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. But the point is precisely, Mr. Tucker, first of all that we
8 believe that the things that were done by independent elements were
9 ascribed to our army.
10 Secondly, things that the Serb side did were exaggerated while
11 what the other sides committed was ignored, and the actual committing was
12 not established. There was just an impression that was being created.
13 So what was required was to have a more balanced relationship and not to
14 encourage the other side by attacking the Serbs in the media.
15 A. The Bosnian Serb forces conducted ethnic cleansing to the
16 south-west of Banja Luka. The Bosnian Serb forces under your command
17 carried out the attack on -- on Sarajevo that we discussed earlier. The
18 Bosnian Serb forces continued ethnic cleansing and attacking the -- the
19 enclaves in the east.
20 Q. Sir. Sir --
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- no, no --
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is not an answer to my
23 question. That is not an answer to my question.
24 JUDGE KWON: Please do not interrupt the witness answering the
25 question. You hear him out and then you can ask another question.
1 Yes. Please continue, Mr. Tucker.
2 THE WITNESS: And there is documentary evidence of orders made by
3 the Bosnian Serb Army to conduct these attacks in the eastern enclaves.
4 So I do not accept your -- your premise that all the attacks are done by
5 the Bosnian Serb side were actually small elements out of control.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
7 Q. Mr. Tucker, with all due respect, if you say that and if you
8 establish that, then this whole proceedings and the Trial Chamber is
9 unnecessary. What I'm asking you is what you established and what you
10 knew. Now we're dealing with your diary, but let me not put any more
11 questions to you. You believe that I was not right when I said that the
12 media should not be encouraging the other side. This is something that
13 we're going to discuss with someone else then.
14 But can you please look at what you said on page 40 -- 48, page
15 48, about what I said about it being necessary to let the people go out
16 of Sarajevo so that they could survive more easily in the villages? Did
17 you know that since World War II until our civil war, the population of
18 Sarajevo increased nine fold and that the majority of those citizens had
19 their villages, their property, and their homes within the vicinity of
21 A. What am I supposed to be looking at?
22 JUDGE KWON: So do not make argument. Let's find the passage and
23 put the question.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. [In English] Karadzic said that the best help would be to rebase
1 people from Sarajevo to the villages. [Interpretation] Do you see that
2 part? Where I was making the recommendations for people to be allowed to
3 leave in order to survive more easily?
4 A. I can only see at the bottom a statement by General Morillon
5 about freedom of movement. I cannot see anything by Dr. Karadzic.
6 Q. Just before this part where you said [In English] "Best help
7 would be to rebase --"
8 A. Right. Can you enlarge the screen there. Can you enlarge just
9 above where -- no, below that. Just below where it says "For
10 demilitarisation of Sarajevo."
11 Yes. What Dr. Karadzic said was best help would be to release
12 people from Sarajevo to survive the winter in the villages where they
13 have food, et cetera. That is indeed what Dr. Karadzic said not only at
14 that occasion but a number of other occasions as well. The issue was
15 that from the Bosnian Serb Presidency side, they equated releasing people
16 from Sarajevo to ethnic cleansing forced by military arms.
17 Q. Mr. Tucker, were you aware of our position declared even before
18 the war and then reiterated on the 22nd of April in my platform and
19 everywhere at all conferences that the territorial question or the issue
20 of the population would not be prejudiced and that everybody would have
21 the right to return to their hearths once the foundations for a
22 cease-fire were established? Were you aware of that?
23 A. I was not aware of details of negotiations prior to my arrival in
24 Bosnia in October 1992.
25 Q. Mr. Tucker, I would like to dispute in their entirety the
1 assertions on ethnic cleansing, the relocation of the population and
2 taking of territory, military action. All that means nothing, because --
3 JUDGE KWON: That's an argument.
4 THE ACCUSED: No, no.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. -- did you establish that? Was that something that you knew?
7 No, no, no. Mr. Tucker, if you are drawing conclusions then you are
8 required to know the elements, and the element that I am talking about is
9 that we said that no military capture is going to have any effect or be
10 prejudicial on the return of the civilians. How can we talk about ethnic
11 cleansing when the civilians would be able to return? Not the civilians
12 but the population. The population would be able to return.
13 A. Why did you [Audio recording missing], you and your forces
14 [Audio recording missing] them out in the first place? That's ethnic
16 Q. Do you have proof, Mr. Tucker, in cases where you were present in
17 Podrinje Cerska, that we drove them out?
18 A. Yes. In south-west of Banja Luka and in the eastern enclaves.
19 In other words, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde.
20 Q. We will come to that. Let us see if that was so, because in your
21 documents it says something different. On page 49 of this document, you
22 say that you -- that I gave my approval for the local police to escort --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page
24 please, and can we look at the bottom of the page, please.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
1 Q. Could you please read this part here, "Agreed to get." What you
2 got from me at that meeting?
3 A. The heading is "Convey to Srebrenica. Srebrenica to Belgrade
4 some help to Skelani," which is on the Bosnian Serb side. "If reported
5 that help goes simultaneously to Serbs as to Srebrenica." Then
6 General Morillon agreed to get the convoy escorted by local police and to
7 arrange its -- and then there's a route Zvornik, Bratunac, Srebrenica and
8 Skelani, and back. Serbs give escort from Zvornik on Saturday or Monday.
9 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at -- yes, I'm sorry. Excuse me.
10 It's not that document. Can we just -- actually, can we just tender
12 JUDGE KWON: Shall we add this part to the previous Exhibit D2 --
13 2026? Mr. Robinson?
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, can we get one more page now,
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Could you please interpret this paragraph marked with 9,
20 Mr. Tucker. Mr. Tucker, with all due respect, your handwriting resembles
21 the handwriting of a doctor.
22 A. I apologise. I blame my spider. "Discussion over lunch.
23 Muslims must recognise they will never be allowed to dominate in
25 Q. Thank you. Are you following the current developments in Bosnia
1 and Herzegovina? Have you noticed that for the past 15 or 16 months
2 there has been no government because the Christian majority, Serbs and
3 Croats, are not accepting Muslim domination?
4 A. No, I've not been following events in Bosnia, I'm afraid.
5 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at 65 ter 08561. If nothing has
6 changed, this should be an associated exhibit.
7 MS. EDGERTON: That's right. It's P4216.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Do you remember this? This is from the 20th of November. It's a
11 report about this meeting with Karadzic and the commander; is that
13 A. Yes. I drafted the -- the UN report for General Morillon.
14 Q. Yes. And it can be seen here that I was concerned because of the
15 open intervention of the Army of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia; is
16 that right? This was also the same that was noted in the handwriting,
17 but if we can look at page 7, paragraph 9, please, now.
18 JUDGE KWON: It has only four pages.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's on page 3. Not 7, page
20 3. Evidently it's -- there's something wrong with my articulation.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Paragraph 9. Could you please look at this for us.
23 A. Yes. That paragraph is consistent with the previous handwritten
24 notes from the meeting itself.
25 Q. [In English] And I'll read the rest in English.
1 "Providing the Muslims gave up their claims to rule over all of
2 BH, they could quite happily live alongside each other, but each with
3 their own administration and safeguards for minorities."
4 A. That is indeed what was said.
5 Q. Would you agree that it can be concluded on the basis of this
6 paragraph that there would be minorities in the cantons and that they
7 would be protected, that there would be instruments for the protection of
8 their rights?
9 A. That is indeed what you said.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at 1D4862. That's the diary again,
11 and it's page 96.
12 Do you agree that the cantons were not meant to be ethnically
13 pure and that there would be instruments for the protection of minority
15 A. It's certainly -- can it be enlarged, please. I'm looking for
16 anything about cantons and minority rights on this section but can't see
18 Q. I apologise. I apologise. It's my fault. I put the question
19 that actually relates to the previous paragraph while you were waiting
20 for the uploading. It was in the conversation about cantons and so on
21 and so forth. Did you know that many international authorities stated
22 that a mistake had been made in having secessions take place before
23 putting in place the mechanisms for the protection of minority rights?
24 A. I'm not in a position to comment what international authorities
25 may or may not have said, I'm afraid.
1 Q. Thank you. Can we look at page 3 of this document. Do you agree
2 that you wrote down here, and you can interpret that for us, that I made
3 efforts through the media to present the neutrality of the UNPROFOR so
4 that we would not have problems when passing through Serb territory?
5 A. That is indeed what you said.
6 Q. Did you know that in the media I stated this before and after
7 this meeting and that I would make the statements that UNPROFOR should be
9 A. I can't recall specifically for this meeting, but I do know
10 that -- I do recall that on occasions you did make such statements in the
11 Bosnian Serb media. Whether it was immediately before and after this
12 particular meeting, I'm not in a position to confirm.
13 Q. Thank you. Does this then tell you that it's not easy to control
14 civilians and that this was a way of improving their attitude towards
15 UNPROFOR and international organisations?
16 A. You are correct.
17 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the place in the next one where you
18 say that I was in favour of securing the -- this is the third paragraph,
19 "Cannot accept." Could you please interpret that paragraph for us?
20 A. "Cannot accept a long-term grinding on of the war. Want full
21 solution. Cease-fire means can regroup and restart. Cessation of
22 hostilities should lead towards peace."
23 And this is [Realtime transcript read in error "isn't"] in the
24 context of the discussion yesterday about the Bosnian Serbs wanting a
25 cessation of hostilities across all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas the
1 Bosnian Presidency stated they wanted a cessation of hostilities -- they
2 stated they wanted a cease-fire, but they were reluctant to accept the
3 status quo which had been forced upon them through military means and
4 therefore would carry out local attacks and would use cease-fires as a
5 means of regrouping and rearming and replenishing.
6 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the transcript reflects what you read.
7 Could you read it again for the benefit.
8 THE WITNESS: The transcript says "This isn't in the context..."
9 it should read "This is in the context..."
10 JUDGE KWON: No, the quote from your diary above that. The
11 regroup and restart of --
12 THE WITNESS: The -- what I can -- cannot accept that -- I start
13 again. "Cannot accept long-term grinding on of the war. Want a full
14 solution. Cease-fire means they can regroup and restart. A cessation of
15 hostilities should lead towards peace."
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. On several occasions in documents and in reports as well as in
20 the amalgamated statement you said how the Muslims were interested in
21 intermittent and local cease-fires while the Serbs were for a cessation
22 of hostilities and a comprehensive cease-fire and political solution.
23 However, your understanding was that the Serbs wanted to keep everything
24 that they were in control of at that particular time; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And were you informed that from the beginning of the war and from
2 the London Conference stated clearly that we were going to return even up
3 to 20 per cent of the territory and that the territorial issues should
4 not be resolved by military means but by means of negotiations?
5 A. I'm not aware of what was said in detail at the
6 London Conference. What I do know is that your forces were carrying out
7 military operations in order to seize more territory which -- by military
9 Q. With the goal of keeping them; is that correct?
10 A. What the goal of -- was, I'm not in a position to comment. What
11 I can say is your forces were seizing territory and at no time while I
12 was in Bosnia did your forces ever return any territory or allow
13 minorities back in who had been ethnically cleansed by pushing them out.
14 Q. I would kindly ask you to stick to what you know precisely. The
15 minorities returned to Bijeljina before their time, in July and August,
16 and there was a problem. There was killing and chaos. But you don't
17 know that. What I'm asking you this is: Do you know what the objective
18 of the war was for the Muslim side and what it was for the Serb side?
19 A. Our understanding of the objectives of the Bosnian Serb side was
20 the establishment of an independent Republika Srpska, and it was you
21 yourself and General Mladic who informed General Morillon about that at
22 the first meeting that we had with you in -- with General Mladic in the
23 end of October and I think with you something like the 15th of November
24 when you described in detail what your objectives were. My understanding
25 of the objectives of the Bosnian Presidency was to re-establish the
1 territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the single state
2 recognised by the international community earlier that year.
3 Q. All right. Did you know then that this objective of ours, to
4 govern our own part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had been established and
5 proposed by the European Community before the war and that all three
6 parties had accepted that agreement, and then the Muslim side simply
7 withdraw from it?
8 A. I'm not in a position to comment about negotiations and
9 diplomatic matters which happened before I arrived in Bosnia.
10 Q. But this is what I'm trying to say. If you say that we wanted
11 independence, we wanted an autonomous Republika Srpska within
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Did we get that in Dayton? I have to link this up
13 with the situation before the war, because that could have been achieved
14 without a war. Do you agree? We wanted to have an entity of our own
15 within Bosnia-Herzegovina, right?
16 A. What I can confirm is that at those meetings in October/November
17 1992, that you and General Mladic and Professor Koljevic described your
18 desires to establish Republika Srpska as an independent autonomy. What I
19 cannot confirm is the other comments you're making about Dayton. You'll
20 need to speak with other people about that.
21 Q. Thank you. But I have to ask you about what had happened before
22 the war, because you are referring to it as if it just came out out of
23 the blue, but do you know this is something that had been offered to us?
24 Do you know that we conceded to an independent Bosnia only on that
1 A. I say again I'm afraid, Dr. Karadzic, negotiations and
2 discussions which were conducted before the war, before my time, I did
3 not follow those, and it would be improper for me here to comment about
4 things that I don't know about in detail. I don't know what was or was
5 not said. What I do know is following the media, that many things were
6 said and many positions were taken. What exactly the detail was, I'm not
7 here able today to provide any confirmation or denial.
8 Q. [In English] Fair enough. Fair enough. [Interpretation] Then we
9 have to look at your general conclusions within that light, that you
10 simply didn't know about this.
11 Is that right? That was my question, and the transcript doesn't
12 seem to reflect it.
13 A. Sorry, what is the question?
14 Q. I said that that was all right, the fact that you didn't know
15 about these things. However, then if we look at your general comments
16 and opinions as to what the Serbs wanted, all of them should be viewed in
17 that light, namely that you did not know about the political processes
18 that had been going on.
19 JUDGE KWON: Witness has made it clear what he knows and what he
20 doesn't know. Move on to your next question, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. On this page, could you please take a look. What does it say
24 here, that convoys [In English] Accept -- uh-huh. I cannot -- okay. "We
25 will always give guarantees for the humanitarian aid." [Interpretation]
1 Is that right? And that problems with Srebrenica are temporary and that
2 I asked for patience until solutions are found; right?
3 A. Do you want me to read out the paragraph?
4 Q. Yes, please. You will do it better.
5 A. "Dr. Karadzic said we will always give guarantees for
6 humanitarian aims. Problems like in Srebrenica are temporary. Please be
7 patient as we need time to organise and prepare our own people."
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be added to Exhibit D2026.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. D539. Could we call that up, please. Did you notice that I said
13 that we confirm the rights of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to freedom,
14 self-determination, safety and security, and so on. Can we have the
15 first page first so that the witness can identify it, and then I'd like
16 to have page 2 displayed.
17 Are you familiar with this document?
18 A. Yes. It's another document that I drafted for General Morillon
19 after attending a meeting.
20 Q. Towards the bottom it says that this is a personal assessment of
21 the situation, and [In English] "Dr. Karadzic wanted negotiations for
22 peace to be successful. It would be crucial that his forces did not
23 retaliate for the provocations which could continue for some while.
24 Heavy retaliation would be exactly what the radical faction is trying to
1 A. Provoke.
2 MS. EDGERTON: And that passage is at paragraph 75 of the
3 witness's amalgamated statement.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So you were fully aware of the fact that it had to do with action
7 and reaction and that radical elements on the Muslim side wanted
8 precisely that, Serb responses; right?
9 A. Yes. That certainly happened from time to time.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page, please. Let us look at
11 5(a). There's no need for me to read all of it. This is a private
12 conversation, a discussion. And do you agree that you wrote down here
13 that I reaffirmed the right of all Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to freedom,
14 self-determination, and security and so on, that I complained about the
15 lack of confidence and trust? Do you remember that? Do you remember
16 that that had been discussed?
17 A. Yes. I remember writing that down, but it was because
18 General Morillon told me that that is what his discussion with you had
19 been, because it was a private discussion between yourself and
20 General Morillon. But General Morillon told me that, and I drafted up
21 the report.
22 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the bottom of the page where there's a
23 reference to the convoy for Srebrenica. You say here, don't you, that
24 this conversation was interrupted often because Mladic, Zarkovic, and
25 Karadzic kept going in and out. Can I have the next page. And this had
1 to do with the progress of the Srebrenica convoy. Do you remember this?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Do you agree that you had noted here that I and even Mladic were
4 frustrated and even angry because this convoy was not progressing
6 A. Yes, that is correct.
7 Q. Thank you. [In English] Karadzic apologised for having
8 personally misappreciated the strength of the genuine -- of genuine local
9 bitterness towards the Muslims but hoped they were now being genuinely
10 convinced it was in all people's interest to let the convoys and future
11 ones pass."
12 A. I remember the words you've just read. I can't see them on the
14 JUDGE KWON: (D), lower down.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can see it now. Yes, that is correct.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
17 Q. And further down in paragraph 9 it says that we apologised for
18 the fact that we have not persuaded parliament yet to have additional
19 forces of the Canadian Battalion deployed; right?
20 A. Yes. That is what was said at the meeting.
21 Q. Again, we can see from this paragraph that we had informed you of
22 the intelligence that we had to the effect that Muslim underground
23 movements were waiting just for that, for the arrival of international
24 forces to start an uprising in Banja Luka. We informed you about that.
25 And then on another occasion I'm going to show these documents to the
1 Trial Chamber. However, this is what you wrote down yourself; right?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. Thank you. Could we have the next page. (F), please.
4 Subparagraph (f) says, isn't that right, that Mladic ordered the arrest
5 of the commander of this Serb check-point and so on; isn't that right?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. Thank you. And these observations --
8 MS. EDGERTON: Sorry, just to be clear, what's correct, that the
9 document says that or that General Mladic ordered that?
10 THE WITNESS: It is correct that General Mladic said that he
11 would order the immediate arrest of the Serb check-point commander, et
12 cetera. I have no knowledge whether that actually happened or not.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Thank you. But in paragraph 11, we see your remarks that the
15 meeting was workman-like, devoid of rhetoric, and on the next page you
16 say it was constructive too; isn't that right?
17 A. That was indeed the assessment General Morillon had after that
19 Q. Thank you. And then in subparagraph (c) and (d), we see this
20 observation that it is our true wish to see the convoys get through and
21 that the UN should be taken seriously and then the recommendation to the
22 effect that the Bosnian Serbs were truly interested in seeing progress;
24 A. I confirm that that is what was said at the meeting.
25 Q. Was that General Morillon's opinion? And yours, too, probably,
1 these observations and these recommendations?
2 A. These were General Morillon's observations, because I drafted
3 these reports up for General Morillon who then corrected and amended them
4 and then signed them.
5 Q. Thank you. You also wrote about our meeting on the 25th of
6 December, 1992; isn't that right?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. Thank you. And then in 65 ter 11421, page 6, paragraph 3, you
9 confirmed that I gave my consent to have a deblockade of Sarajevo by
10 establishing three supply routes; right?
11 MS. EDGERTON: That's P4220.
12 THE WITNESS: That is correct. The document I'm looking at I
13 drafted for General Morillon after the meeting on the 25th of December.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Thank you. Can we see 1D4683 now to see what you wrote down in
16 your diary.
17 You can recognise your own diary, can you not? It says the 25th
18 of December, 1992, Pale up here, and then we can take a look at page 3.
19 A. I confirm that's my diary.
20 Q. The upper third, could that be zoomed in. Karadzic agreed three
21 routes: Zenica, Pale, Mostar; isn't that right?
22 A. Yes, Karadzic agreed three routes. The arrow means from Sarajevo
23 to Zenica, to Pale, and to Mostar.
24 Q. Can you interpret the rest for us, what Karadzic said, what
25 Morillon said?
1 A. General Mladic then said: "We need to sit together to agree
2 this." Dr. Karadzic then said: "Ready to meet at Karadzic, Koljevic,
3 Mladic level. No secret meetings." It was Mladic -- General Mladic who
4 insisted -- who made the point about the meeting needed to be open rather
5 than secret. And then General Morillon said: "If you insist on
6 inspecting yourself," what that means is inspecting people who actually
7 go up and down these routes, searching them, et cetera, "then you will be
8 accused of restricting freedom of movements. There is a struggle for
9 power between Izetbegovic and Akmadzic. Akmadzic claimed that
10 Izetbegovic is no longer legitimately hanging on to power. Akmadzic
11 seems determined to --" can you enlarge it. "Akmadzic seems determined
12 to cease the illegality as soon as possible. He said he wants to
13 place -- he wants to place the army under the Ministry of Defence. This
14 is very interesting."
15 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Do we agree that Akmadzic was a high
16 ranking Croat official and the Secretary-General of Izetbegovic's
18 A. I can't remember the exact appointment that he had, but I do
19 remember that he was a senior Croat in the government of the Presidency.
20 Q. What he says seems to suggest that Izetbegovic is not really
21 authorise to hold the position of president of the Presidency because his
22 mandate had not been renewed properly; right?
23 A. I can't remember the exact details of Akmadzic's assertion, but
24 it was something along those lines.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be added also to Exhibit D2026.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. We also met on the 16th -- or, rather -- oh, yes. I seem to have
5 been there. The 16th of February. We met then, did we not?
6 A. I --
7 Q. And you speak about that in your amalgamated statement in
8 paragraph 133 and then in paragraph 135; right?
9 A. That is the -- if I recall correctly, the first time that
10 General Morillon met with you since December, because you were in --
11 you'd been in New York, I believe, in the interim.
12 Q. Yes, yes. I was in New York after that as well, was I not,
13 attending negotiations?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You wrote that down in these two paragraphs and it's also
16 contained in associate exhibit 65 ter 08576. Please, can you confirm
17 that I said that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was carrying out attacks
18 in Srebrenica, Bratunac, and that by then 1.260 Bosnian Serb civilians
19 had been killed?
20 A. Yes. That is what you said at that meeting.
21 Q. Do you also agree that I indicated that a mass grave had been
22 discovered, one with 50 bodies, you say, and we said that there were
23 about 50 graves, and the biggest one contained the bodies of 50 Serbs who
24 had been killed while this territory was under Muslim control.
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Thank you. Could we briefly take a look at 65 ter 08576. Ah,
2 yes. 4228 is its P number. Could it please be enlarged. So the general
3 says this was the first meeting with me since the 25th of December, and I
4 that I said that I would probably not return to York since we were not
5 being treated properly since we had restricted movement. I think that
6 you remember that, don't you?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Thank you. Please take a look at this. Karadzic stated that the
9 army had carried out a major offensive in Bratunac, Srebrenica, and that
10 at least 1.260 civilians had been killed until then. Do you know that
11 until July 1995, until the end of the war, the Muslim army killed an
12 additional 2.300 Serbs? So that would total 3.500-something civilians in
13 this so-called Podrinje, Zvornik, Bratunac, and so on?
14 A. I can only confirm that you, Dr. Karadzic, stated that 1.260 were
15 killed in that area as written down in this report. I cannot confirm the
16 second figure that you mention.
17 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page. I'm informing you that
18 Cajnice is under attack, co-ordinated attack. I speak about the
19 discovery of this mass grave. Trebinje is under attack and so on. Isn't
20 that right?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Can we now take a look at what you say about this in your diary.
23 That is 1D4684. Page 335.
24 Do you see this? "Dr. Karadzic, Pale." And now is this
25 General Morillon speaking about Izetbegovic's interview on TV, right?
1 A. General Morillon described Izetbegovic's TV interview yesterday
2 in which he accepted that the Vance-Owen Plan, be it modified, is the
3 only way forward.
4 Q. Thank you. And then further down you see this figure of 1.260
5 Serbs killed in Bratunac since the 28th of January. Can you interpret
6 this for us. (K).
7 A. "Dr. Karadzic said that 1.260 civilians -- Serb civilians had
8 been killed in Srebrenica and Bratunac area since the 28th of January.
9 He has given the strongest order to his local commanders to let UN forces
10 and humanitarian convoys pass. The Muslims are taking military advantage
11 of the convoys and are following up behind them of when they leave the
13 I can confirm that is what you stated at that meeting.
14 Q. Can we have the next page now. The fourth paragraph from the top
15 down. It says -- well, can you read it out. Now towards the -- what we
16 see now, at the very beginning. It's at the top of the page now.
17 A. I can't see that yet.
18 Q. (K) and then the first line that you can see on your screen now.
19 A. It says "Heavy weaponry. Consider the military paper."
20 Q. And what does it say here?
21 A. After that: "Experience with Muslim and Croats is that they ask
22 for local cease-fire when they are weak and then attack when reinforced.
23 We need a global cease-fire. If they attack Trebinje, we will take
25 For clarification, Trebinje was in the bottom right-hand corner
1 and was attacked by the Croats, not by the Muslims.
2 Q. Travnik was at that time also controlled by the Croats; isn't
3 that right?
4 A. Yes, the two major military issues which were being faced at that
5 time by the Bosnian Serbs was the attacks by the Croatian Army from the
6 area of Dubrovnik towards Trebinje and attacks by the Croatian Army
7 across the Sava River and into what was called, at least by the United
8 Nations, the Orasje pocket, out of which they were attacking the Bosnian
9 Serb lines of communication from the east, from Serbia proper, through to
10 the Krajina, and those were the two issues which were of greater concern
11 to General Mladic throughout the time that I was in Bosnia from October
12 1992 through to March 1993.
13 Q. I would like to tender this. I'm sorry, did you want to say
14 something else?
15 A. These two military attacks were where the majority of the Bosnian
16 Serb military forces were positioned, and they had relatively limited
17 military sources -- resources available for operations elsewhere within
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be also added to D2026.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. When you said the Croatian Army, you were not thinking of the
23 army of the Bosnian Croats but the army of the Republic of Croatia about
24 whose presence we constantly warned?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm looking at the time,
3 Excellencies. Oh, no, excuse me. We have a new schedule. I apologise.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Well, the question now is that of Cerska, and I would just like
6 to ask you to recall all the events around Cerska. Do you remember that
7 there was a lot of publicity about Cerska with news reports about an
8 alleged massacre of civilians there in Cerska?
9 A. Yes, that is correct. There were allegations that numbers of
10 Muslims had been shut up in a house or in houses by Bosnian Serbs and
11 that the houses had then been put on fire and that the people inside the
12 house or houses had been burnt to death.
13 Q. Thank you. Can we look at 1D4836, please. Do you agree that
14 Izetbegovic informed General Morillon about these misdeeds and that they
15 were committed by Serbs, that Izetbegovic reported this directly to
16 General Morillon? Is that correct?
17 A. That's not completely correct. What's general -- what
18 President Izetbegovic told General Morillon was that the situation in
19 Kamenica, Cerska, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde was very bad, that there
20 was no food, that people were dying of starvation, that there were no
21 medicines, that there were reports of atrocities, but
22 President Izetbegovic did not make the information to General Morillon
23 about the people dying in -- being burnt in houses. It was the Muslim
24 commander at Tuzla airport who told General Morillon that people had been
25 burnt in houses and specifically asked General Morillon to when he -- if
1 he succeeded in getting into Cerska to look and see if he could find any
2 evidence. He also said that the Serbs would not allow General Morillon
3 to go and look.
4 When General Morillon met with Naser Oric on the evening of the
5 5th of March, 1992, Naser Oric also made the same allegation to
6 General Morillon that he had reports of Muslims having been burnt in
7 houses and atrocities having taken place in Cerska.
8 Q. Thank you. And you testified to this. We don't have to read any
9 further. You testified about that in this case; isn't that right?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Thank you. And what you have just talked about now is something
12 that you described in paragraph 160 of the amalgamated statement, and
13 then in 161, 162, these paragraphs, going to 165, deal with that
14 information, dramatic information relating to Cerska; is that correct?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Thank you. And let's look at what your diary says about this.
17 This is 1D4685 now.
18 Can we look at the next page, please.
19 Could you please tell us, this one line but last where it says
20 "Cerska," can you tell us about that?
21 A. It says Cerska 1.500 wounded, 18.000 civilians. And that was
22 information received from Ganic, the -- I think he was the vice-president
23 or something of the Bosnian Presidency, and it was information provided
24 by Ganic at 1550 hours that day.
25 Q. Thank you. In the Serbian somebody wrote "Drop aid by parachute,
1 Sokolac;" is that correct?
2 A. Yes, that is General Mladic's writing.
3 JUDGE KWON: Could you kindly read that line again in order to
4 reflect in the transcript correctly, "1.500 wounded," comma, and?
5 THE WITNESS: And 18.000 civilians.
6 JUDGE KWON: Means there are 18.000 civilians?
7 THE WITNESS: No, it means that Ganic claims that there were
8 1.500 wounded and 18.000 civilians there. Whether that was the reality,
9 obviously we did not know.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll take a break. We'll add this part
11 to the previous D2026 as well.
12 We will resume at 20 past 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.22 a.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
16 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. I should like to go through the things that are not in dispute as
19 quickly as possible. Could we please see if General Morillon had gone to
20 Cerska and seen for himself that in Cerska there was no trace of any
21 killing or even fighting, let alone a massacre.
22 A. That is not entirely correct. When General Morillon went to
23 Cerska, what he found was a village where there had been heavy fighting.
24 There's a lot of damage to buildings, but he could not find in the
25 buildings any evidence that buildings had been put on fire with occupant
1 people inside them and people burnt to death. What General Morillon was
2 not able to do was to go out into the woods and the area around the
3 houses themselves to see if anything had happened in the woods.
4 Q. But nobody ever said something had happened there. The claim was
5 that something had happened in Cerska itself.
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. Thank you. In your amalgamated statement, paragraph 161, you
8 stated that reports about a large number of civilians being burned alive
9 in their own houses, a claim you repeated in the Oric case, was followed
10 by reports that it was an incident involving 1.500 victims. In fact, in
11 the Oric case, you said that Oric had not been in Cerska, but
12 General Morillon, when he arrived on the 6th of March, found no visible
13 trace of burning of houses or a massacre. That's paragraph 161 of your
14 amalgamated statement; correct?
15 JUDGE KWON: 163.
16 THE WITNESS: It's 161 through to 16 --
17 JUDGE KWON: 4.
18 THE WITNESS: 164.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thus not even houses were burnt down, let alone any civilians
21 being burnt down with it?
22 A. There were some houses which had suffered fire damage. There
23 were many more houses that had suffered battled field damage, as in
24 shells, bullets, et cetera, hitting them and damaging the houses. But
25 there were no houses of which had been burnt down with people inside
2 Q. Did you accompany General Morillon in that visit?
3 A. No. I was back in Konjevic Polje. General Morillon went up into
4 the village and then came back down and briefed me what he had seen, and
5 that is then what I put in the reports that I drafted for him.
6 Q. Thank you. Is it true, as you stated in your statement of 2002
7 and in the associated exhibit 08580, paragraph 11, when you confirmed
8 that the Serbs had allowed General Morillon free access to Cerska,
9 informed him that there had been heavy fighting, and that they had
10 already evacuated Muslim wounded to a hospital, those people who were
11 wounded in battle.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, could we have a reference to at
13 least the page in the 2002 statement, please?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I'm wasting time. It's
15 a problem for me. 1D4967, please. Let's call it up. In the associated
16 exhibit it's paragraph 11. Could we see 1D4967 first. It's a statement
17 dated 1 November 2002. Page 8.
18 THE WITNESS: I confirm that that page provides more detail about
19 what is referred to in paragraphs 161 to 164.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. I can't find it here, but I just rephrased. Is it written
22 somewhere that he got free access and also he returned and found about 30
23 soldiers from a Serbian platoon who were surprised to see him again?
24 A. Yes. I remember writing that, but I can't remember in which
25 document it is.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's proceed.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
3 Q. And you also confirmed that Larry Bollingworth [as interpreted]
4 was in Srebrenica and returned.
5 A. Yes.
6 MS. EDGERTON: It's Larry Hollingworth.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Q. Can we now look at this: Is it true that in your evidence in the
9 Perisic trial -- in fact, it's an exhibit from Perisic. 1D4675. Can we
10 have that? Paragraph 2(B).
11 A. It's on the next page.
12 Q. Towards the top. Let's first make sure. Is it your document?
13 A. No. This is a document written by the -- it looks as if it's a
14 UK national documents. You need to go to the first page to the top to
15 see. Yes. It's a report by the UK national command in -- in Salisbury,
16 and my assumption is that it is compiled based on the receipt of reports
17 from the United Nations and from their own people.
18 Q. Thank you. Hollingworth confirmed that this situation was not as
19 grave as it had been portrayed before. There was no sign of a massacre,
20 there were no cases of undernourishment, and even a few cases of fuel
21 could be found here and there.
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. And under (C), it says that one doctor of the World Health
24 Organisation had stated that there were 200 wounded in Srebrenica;
1 A. I can't see paragraph (C).
2 JUDGE KWON: Let's go to the second page.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can see that. There needs to be some
4 context behind this. Dr. Mardel, the WHO doctor who accompanied
5 General Morillon into Konjevic Polje, he stayed in Konjevic Polje while
6 General Morillon went up to the village of Cerska in order to assess the
7 injured in Konjevic Polje. This is the context that Izetbegovic had said
8 that there were about 700 injured in Konjevic Polje who needed to be
9 evacuated. Dr. Mardel went around all the houses in the village of
10 Konjevic Polje and only found about 70, I think it might have been 72,
11 rather than 700. So one of the statements that the situation was not as
12 grave as had been portrayed was that there were 72 severely injured, not
13 700 severely injured. But 72 severely injured is still an issue. His --
14 Dr. Mardel's statement that there were 200 wounded in Srebrenica is not
15 because Dr. Mardel had yet been to Srebrenica. It was what he was told
16 by -- by Muslims in Konjevic Polje. Dr. Mardel then walked on foot from
17 Konjevic Polje to Srebrenica while General Morillon left the
18 Konjevic Polje area. And when General Morillon arrived back in -- sorry,
19 in Srebrenica for the first time around the 11th, 12th of March, he found
20 Dr. Mardel in Srebrenica.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you very much. Could we just briefly -- in fact may I
23 tender this document?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be next Defence exhibit.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 2027, Your Honours.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we take a brief
2 look at 65 ter 08580. It must also have a P number.
3 MS. EDGERTON: 4229.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Page 3, please, paragraphs 11 and 12. Does it read that Cerska
6 was deserted, apart from a handful of Serb soldiers who had not been
7 expecting General Morillon, and it took an hour of negotiation until the
8 more intelligent local commander turned up, et cetera? Could you present
9 to us this paragraph, please?
10 A. Yes. This is a report which I drafted for General Morillon, and
11 the paragraph about General Morillon's visit to Cerska itself was based
12 on information that General Morillon gave me because obviously I had not
13 personally been in Cerska.
14 The -- the situation in Cerska was that Cerska had been captured
15 by the Bosnian Serb forces and that all the people who could move, who
16 could walk, they had already fled from Cerska to Konjevic Polje, and
17 Naser Oric told General Morillon that those refugees had already left
18 Konjevic Polje on foot towards Srebrenica, and when General Morillon
19 arrived in Srebrenica five, six days later, that was when the mass of
20 refugees who had come from Kamenica, from Cerska, from Konjevic Polje,
21 were arriving in -- in Srebrenica because it's quite a long distance to
22 walk in winter through the -- through the hills and the mountains.
23 You will recall yesterday I used the analogy of a broom sweeping
24 dust in front of it. These were in many cases refugees who had in many
25 cases been pushed out on multiple occasions and were on their fourth,
1 fifth, or sixth time of escaping in front of the attacking Bosnian Serb
3 Q. Thank you. Please look at paragraph 12 as well. He discusses
4 the same thing. Some houses were undamaged with only windows damaged.
5 Some houses were intact or only slightly damaged, and there was no sign
6 of anything that had been earlier reported; correct?
7 A. The -- this report describes what General Morillon told me. It
8 was an area which had suffered one major attack and had been fought over
9 heavily, unlike the areas around Sarajevo which had been fought over for
10 months and had suffered quite a lot heavier damage than these houses in
12 Q. Thank you. Could we see the one page but last. Do you agree
13 that you had been informed, and maybe you even witnessed, the Muslim
14 side, especially Colonel Sadic, being indignant and felt let down because
15 General Morillon did not confirm the version that had been put out for
16 the public about Cerska. That's the Tuzla response paragraph.
17 A. I -- confirm that -- I confirm that when General Morillon came
18 out of Konjevic Polje and went to Tuzla on his way back to report to
19 President Izetbegovic in Sarajevo, that he met with the commander of the
20 Bosnian forces at Tuzla airport and that they were very angry, and
21 [Microphone not activated] saying that General Morillon was either
22 deliberately concealing the truth or that he had been duped by the
23 Bosnian Serbs.
24 Q. Could we see the last page just to take a look at the map,
25 because we're going to show a similar one.
1 Did you or any of your men draw this map of the territory
2 controlled by the Muslims at that point in time, from Konjevic Polje via
3 Srebrenica to Zepa?
4 A. That is my map. I drew it by hand. There's a trace over the top
5 of a 50.000 scale map.
6 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you now, Mr. Tucker. You said a moment
7 ago those people had been expelled. The Defence has to get a
8 clarification what you imply by that. It's clear that those people had
9 not been in contact with the Serb army. They had left earlier. They
10 fled earlier.
11 Does fleeing from war something that you think of equal to
13 A. No. In -- in my own mind, fleeing from war is fleeing ahead of
14 the actual fighting. Being expelled, in my mind, is when you are in your
15 house and somebody physically comes and tells you to get out of your
16 house, you've got 20 minutes to go, and if you don't go there's a strong
17 threat that you will be harmed, and often it happens that in order to
18 encourage you to leave quickly, your house is put on fire.
19 Q. Did that happen in Cerska, or did civilians leave before the
20 fighters came?
21 A. I was -- I was not personally present. I can only report what we
22 were told by refugees who we spoke with, and what they said is that many
23 of them claimed to have been expelled from their houses in towns and
24 villages to the -- to the west and to the north and to the south-west and
25 that they had been expelled back in May, June, July, August, and that
1 they had fled on foot and had eventually ended up in Cerska. Now, in
2 Cerska itself our understanding was that there were a small number of
3 people who had weapons with a limited amount of ammunition in the way
4 that I described yesterday, but there were much larger numbers of these
5 refugees who had been expelled in the way that I described earlier.
6 Now, as the Bosnian Serb forces approached and came close and
7 started shelling Cerska with mortars and artillery, that then -- the
8 refugees then fled further toward Konjevic Polje and then eventually
9 towards Srebrenica.
10 This description -- whilst those who had weapons stayed behind in
11 order in defend the place, and they were the ones who were then
12 eventually overcome in the attack.
13 The way that I describe the use of artillery in order to
14 terrorise the population, in order to flee, is exactly what happened in
15 the areas to the south and south-east and south-west of Srebrenica, which
16 I have described elsewhere in testimony, which is that what would happen
17 is that if you were living in a village and the Serbs were a distance
18 away, the first thing that would happen is that the Bosnian Serb would
19 start shelling the village. So they would fire a shell and maybe --
20 somewhere into the village, and then 40 minutes later another shell, and
21 then an hour later two shells. In other words, it was not a heavy
22 barrage. But to the civilians living there, these shells effectively
23 acted as terrorism and because they knew that the next thing that would
24 happen was in one, two, or three days then Bosnian Serb ground forces
25 would attack the village, and if they were still there then they were
1 likely to be killed. And so therefore as soon as a village started being
2 shelled, the population then picked up their bags and ran, and it was the
3 people entering Srebrenica from the south, the south-west, the
4 south-east, all fled towards Srebrenica and into Srebrenica because of
5 the -- what I described as terrorism by artillery.
6 Q. That is precisely what I am challenging in your evidence,
7 Mr. Tucker, that you are making both the indictment and the judgement.
8 I'm not interested in what would have happened in what village. What
9 happened in this specific village? Was Cerska demilitarised? Was it
10 empty of fighters? Did it initiate fighting itself? Was it a civilian
11 area attacked by the Serbs, as you described?
12 A. Cerska was a village, a civilian village, into which many
13 refugees had fled, expelled by Bosnian Serb forces. The first point.
14 The second point is that the --
15 Q. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Let's see first. Where were they
16 expelled from? Did Serbs expel them or did they flee? If they expelled
17 them, the Serbs, then give us some proof.
18 A. What I can tell you is what these people told us.
19 Q. Do you accept that the warring parties would lie about one
21 A. In our experience, all three warring parties lied, including your
22 own, Dr. Karadzic.
23 Q. Thank you. And now, please, do you know what my position was on
24 the issue of civilians in the combat zone regarding Cerska in particular?
25 A. I have not heard you make any statements about civilians in the
1 Cerska area.
2 Q. Can we look at 65 ter 32215. You knew that during the crisis in
3 Podrinje, Cerska, Konjevic Polje, Srebrenica, in 1993, I was in New York;
4 is that correct?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the English translation of this, too,
7 please. We do have it. This is my telephone conversation with the prime
8 minister of Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic. And now I'm going to show you.
9 The first page is not that important. It deals with the negotiations,
10 and I am telling him that this could be accepted but the disputed parts
11 could be protected by the United Nations and the local authority could
12 stay in place. Can we look at page 2, please.
13 And here you can see this one says to me:
14 "I say that perhaps the Russians and British are interested in
15 resolving it that way and that we could accept that."
16 And then Lukic says:
17 "It would be very good, especially because the Muslims, although
18 they are signing it over there, they are not behaving in accordance with
20 And I say:
22 And then he talks about attacks in Podrinje, Vlasenica, Rogatica,
23 Gorazde. They were all attacking. And then, please, can you look at the
24 bottom, the last line. I say:
25 "Here the newspapers are full of Cerska ..." thinking about this
1 propaganda, about what was going on in Cerska.
2 And can we look at the next page, please.
3 And then he says here that:
4 "It's clear. The papers are full of it. However, our men who
5 went in there found a large number of livestock and farm animals,
6 including some 30 cows, a lot of food. Some even taken from the Serbs,"
7 and so on and so forth.
8 Thus it was some sort of a farce in Cerska, you can be sure of
9 it, that there were no civilians there only fighters and that they were
10 mostly feeding their own army. And can you please look at the bottom.
11 [In English] "Certainly not." [Interpretation] I'm asking:
12 [In English] Yes, yes, therefore they are not hungry at all."
13 He said:
14 "Certainly not. They are not hungry."
15 And another important thing:
16 "We agreed to give all the elderly civilians and children a way
17 out in whatever direction they want.
18 "Yes, yes.
19 "Those who want to stay there and live can put down their weapons
20 and there will be no problems.
21 "Karadzic: Yes, yes, I told Mladic to issue a statement tomorrow
22 and that all Muslim civilians may stay where they are or go where they
23 want and -- but armed gangs must put down their weapons."
24 [Interpretation] And can you look at the last one where I say:
25 [In English] "Fine, it would do good for Mladic to issue a
1 statement to that effect tomorrow and to say in the statement that we
2 will give amnesty to all ordinary combatants, that suspected for war
3 criminals would be tried and in accordance with the law, and that the
4 International Tribunal should be present," and so on.
5 This is not propaganda. I'm speak with the prime minister, and
6 I'm recommending for him to tell Mladic to give a statement that we will
7 amnesty even the regular fighters and that the civilians may stay. Had
8 you known this, would you have included that in your statement?
9 A. What you describe here, Dr. Karadzic, is indeed statements which
10 were made. However, the reality on the ground of what actually happened
11 was rather different.
12 What General Mladic, General Milovanovic, at the meeting on the
13 Yellow Bridge on the 15th of March, et cetera, made very clear is that in
14 practice, all men of combat age, and that was variously described from
15 about 15 up to 60 years of age, would have to be arrested first and would
16 have to be interrogated in order to establish whether or not in your view
17 they had conducted war crimes or not and only then would they be
18 released. That is what in practice in the negotiations was actually
20 The second thing to say is that it's one aspect to make claims
21 like this. The reality that the Muslim civilians experienced on the
22 ground was that they were pushed out and there was never any option left
23 for them to stay. When the Bosnian Serb forces came to expel them from
24 their houses, there was no choice for them to stay. When Kamenica was
25 attacked, when Cerska was attacked, there was no choice to stay. Why
1 were they being attacked in the first place?
2 Q. Sir, we will come to that. Do you believe that when somebody
3 declares war on you that you should not fight, that you do not dare
4 fight? You're a soldier. You know that if somebody attacks you, you
5 have the right to fight, even to capture their capital and to defeat
6 them. Do you have that right?
7 A. Fighting soldiers to soldiers, unfortunately happens. What is
8 not acceptable and is against the Geneva Convention is an order to attack
9 civilians. The Muslims in the area of Cerska, Konjevic Polje were not
10 organised military. They did not have chains of command, they did not
11 have military weapons, they did not have equipment. These were people
12 who were attacked and expelled from their houses. Now, if you were
13 attacked and expelled from your house, would you try and defend your
14 house? What these people did was try and seize those weapons that they
15 could get hold of, and I've already described how few weapons they
16 actually had and how little ammunition they actually had. These were not
17 organised military forces. [Overlapping speakers].
18 Q. [Overlapping speakers] Please, we will come to that.
19 JUDGE KWON: No, no. Mr. Karadzic, do not interrupt while the
20 witness is answering your question. You put that question. No. No.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That was not my question.
22 JUDGE KWON: No.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was theoretical and
25 JUDGE KWON: I will stop you when you are that obstructive in the
2 Please continue, Mr. Tucker.
3 THE WITNESS: No, I've finished.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. I kindly ask you to reply to that part of the question that I put
6 to you, because we will go through all of the things that you have
8 So you assert that there was no army there, that we were not
9 attacked from that area throughout that whole period, that they did not
10 inflict heavy casualties on us, and that for a year after the start of
11 war for no military reason out of the blue we attacked civilians, entered
12 their homes, and made them leave their homes. We drove them out. Is
13 that what you're saying?
14 A. No, it is not entirely what I'm saying. What I'm saying,
15 firstly, is that the people in the Srebrenica enclave were
16 [indiscernible] -- before the war started in April 1992, but were not
17 soldiers, were not in uniform, were not military, were not -- many of
18 them had served as national conscripts in the JNA and therefore knew how
19 to use weapons, but they were not an organised body of -- of force in the
20 same way that the Bosnian Serb Army was. That's the first point I'm
22 The second thing is that when those people were attacked, yes,
23 they tried to defend themselves, and they tried to get hold of weapons
24 that they could, ammunition that they could, and they did carry out
25 attacks towards the Bosnian Serb-held areas, and there is testimony that
1 I have given in the Naser Oric case describing how Naser Oric and his men
2 would conduct raids out of the enclaves with the purpose of securing more
3 weapons, and in particular more ammunition, but also food, from Serbs in
4 the area. So, yes, they did carry out attacks going out from the -- from
5 the enclave.
6 Q. Thank you. So all of your positions, opinions, conclusions that
7 you are bringing forward are based on your knowledge that there was no
8 Muslim army there but that it was a civilian zone; is that correct?
9 A. No. These were civilians when the war started. They then
10 organised themselves in order to defend themselves, but there were many,
11 many more unarmed civilians than armed civilians inside the Srebrenica
12 enclave and inside the enclaves. Simply because they didn't have very
13 many weapons.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you know what the Patriotic League is, and do you
15 know that it was founded on the 30th of April, 1991?
16 A. No, I do not know of it.
17 Q. Do you know what Green Berets are?
18 A. I know in the context of the British and the US armed forces but
19 not in the Bosnian Serb armed forces.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you know how many Serbs were killed and expelled
21 before the spring of 1993 from this area that we're talking about,
22 Srebrenica, Konjevic Polje, Cerska, Kamenica, and that whole area?
23 A. I've heard various estimates from various sources.
24 Q. Were they expelled by civilians or were they expelled by the
25 Muslim army -- or, rather, the paramilitary going by the name of the
1 Patriotic League?
2 A. I cannot comment on Patriotic League. I'm not familiar with the
4 Q. Very well. You think and you base your assertions on the
5 position that the Muslim armed force in this area did not make war plans
6 and did not implement them before they were attacked in the spring of
7 1993; is that correct?
8 A. No, that is not correct. There were attacks - I will call them
9 raids - conducted by the Muslims in the eastern enclaves prior to the
10 spring of 1993.
11 Q. Very well. Can we now look at 1D4998. Could we zoom in on this,
13 Is this map similar to what you sketched in your own hand? Is
14 that correct?
15 A. It is similar. What I don't know from this map is what time is
16 this map meant to represent?
17 Q. It says at the top April-December 1992. Could we zoom in on that
18 place so that we can see the date and where it says "Map 14."
19 April-December 1992. All right. Can we look at the whole map now so
20 that the witness can see it.
21 Sir, are you asserting that in these two enclaves with Zepa at
22 the time being together with Srebrenica, are you stating that there were
23 no attacks conducted before Serb attacks on their territory? Are you
24 asserting that it was not their assignment to link up with Tuzla through
25 Serbian territory and to liberate this territory?
1 A. My understanding is that the Presidency forces in Tuzla and
2 further south in the area of Kalesija and Vogosca were trying to lift the
3 siege of the enclaves. So they were attacking effectively from the west
4 towards the east or north-east.
5 Secondly is that there were infiltration, small groups of people
6 who were trying to carry food and weapons from the main Muslim area into
7 the enclaves in order to help them defend themselves. I also understand
8 that raids were carried out by Muslim forces, armed groups inside the
9 enclaves, out of the enclaves in order to secure weapons, ammunition,
10 food, et cetera, in order to be able to defend themselves.
11 Q. Sir, how do you know that they were supposed to defend
12 themselves? Who would they be defending themselves from? How do you
13 know that the Serbs did not attack first?
14 A. These people were surrounded in the enclaves. They were hungry.
15 They were cut off from the outside world. They had no freedom of
16 movement. There were on occasion Serb attacks towards the enclaves.
17 There is documentary evidence of orders in June/August 1992 and in
18 November 1992 to conduct attacks - this is for the Bosnian Serb Army - to
19 conduct attacks on these -- on these enclaves.
20 Q. We will show documents. Do you know, sir, that the Serbian side
21 accepted that this remains Muslim territory, and much more than that, and
22 that we issued a proclamation that there was no need for them to fight
23 because in the end there would be a political solution. I personally
24 issued a declaration. Do not fight. There will be no need for that.
25 You will probably end up being in Muslim territory anyway. Do you know
1 about this?
2 A. Yes, I remember you making such statements, but your army was
3 issuing orders which were different, and your army was issuing orders
4 which were to attack those enclaves.
5 Q. And do you know that before that the enclaves were active and
6 they inflicted casualties? They cut off our roads, and even the roads
7 that we were using there were ambushes set and a large number of
8 civilians were getting killed. Did you know that?
9 A. Yes, I knew that there were raids being conducted on the Bosnian
10 Serb lines of communication.
11 Q. Did you know that other than what you said that they wanted to
12 attack from Kalesija and to deblock the brigades? Entire brigades that
13 were in Kamenica, Cerska, Zepa, and Srebrenica had the same task and the
14 same plans to start moving towards them and to liberate Podrinje from the
15 Serbs, and this is throughout the whole of 1993, orders, plans, actions?
16 Did you know that?
17 A. What happened later in 1993 after I left Bosnia at the end of
18 March 1993, obviously I'm not in a position to comment on. What I can
19 say is that there were continued attempts by the Muslims in order to try
20 and relieve the beleaguered population inside the enclave of Srebrenica,
21 Zepa, Gorazde. However, I will also say that the Muslim forces inside
22 the enclaves of Zepa, Gorazde, Kamenica, Cerska, Srebrenica, et cetera,
23 were very weak and that they had very little combat power, and it would
24 be difficult to describe them as an organised military force. I go back
25 to my statements that these were ex-national conscripts who had been
1 attacked and who had picked up the weapons that they could find to defend
2 themselves. They were capable of conducting small raids, but they were
3 not capable of conducting any offensives, any military offensives in
4 order to seize large amounts of ground or anything like that. These were
5 people who were beleaguered and under siege.
6 Q. And in what way was the Serbian Army different from them?
7 A. The Serbian Army was carrying out initially limited attacks.
8 Towards the end of 1992, the Serb -- Bosnian Serb Army was conducting
9 limited attacks towards the enclaves, and the reason for that was that
10 the main threat to the Bosnian Serb existence was the attacks by the
11 Croatian Army in Trebinje and the Orasje pocket, and that is where the
12 Bosnian Serb Army concentrated the majority of their combat power. So
13 they had less combat power to exercise against these enclaves. The
14 Bosnian Serb Army, however, despite the statements that Dr. Karadzic
15 has -- has described making, the Bosnian Serb Army continually had orders
16 and was executing orders to attack and remove the eastern enclaves and
17 those attacks were not that successful in October, November, December
18 1992, but that in January they re-issued orders in order to close the
19 enclaves, and I saw in Major Pandurevic's office in -- it was about the
20 18th or 19th of March, I saw on the wall in his office a military map
21 which showed the advances being made by the Bosnian Serb forces around
22 the Srebrenica enclave, showing one line describing the situation on the
23 7th of February, another line on say the 13th, and another line on -- in
24 order that it showed the way that the -- the attacks were progressing.
25 In other words, there was a deliberate and planned military attempt in
1 order to capture the Srebrenica pocket.
2 Q. Sir, if you state that, would that imply that you reviewed all
3 the military documents of both sides and established what were the plans
4 on one side and the other side and then established what came first and
5 what followed, what was the cause and what was the effect? Or was it
6 just because you had the map on the wall and came to these conclusions
7 because you spoke with Muslim refugees?
8 A. This comes in two steps. The first step is what I knew at the
9 time in 1992, 1993 --
10 Q. Wait, please.
11 JUDGE KWON: Again, Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case I'm asking for enough
14 JUDGE KWON: No. You are just arguing with the witness.
15 Please continue, Mr. Tucker.
16 THE WITNESS: My knowledge came in two steps. The first step was
17 whilst I was in present in Bosnia in 1992, 1993. What we witnessed was
18 the Bosnian Serbs struggling heavily with the attacks by the Croats in
19 Trebinje and Orasje and not having much combat power to deploy against
20 the Srebrenica pocket, but they had -- then when I saw the map in
21 Major Pandurevic's office, then I became clear in my own mind that this
22 was a deliberate, planned attacked.
23 After the war, I was shown documents from the Bosnian Serb Army
24 during proofing in the preparation for these meetings where I was shown
25 documents and orders from the -- in the Bosnian Serb Army, some from
1 General Mladic and some from the commander of the corps which was based
2 in and around Zvornik and some from Major Pandurevic, and it is from
3 those documents that I make the statements that there were Serb orders
4 and intent to capture the pocket.
5 At the time when I was serving in Bosnia, I obviously did not
6 have that information.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Well, let me conclude then that what you are saying does not from
9 your immediate knowledge in the field but from preparation that you had
10 through the OTP; is that correct?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. Thank you. Did the OTP also show you Muslim documents from that
13 time, military orders, directives, plans and combat reports about what
14 they did in that area?
15 A. I think I was shown a couple, but I couldn't recall which.
16 Q. Thank you. If you allow me, I will show you this second -- the
17 other side of the truth. Can this page be admitted, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: Are you referring to this map?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, just -- actually, when I go back
21 through the transcript, I see the only thing that Mr. Tucker said about
22 this map was that it was similar to the one attached to one of his
23 associated exhibits. I'm in Your Honour's hands.
24 JUDGE KWON: I also remember that he not specifically rely on
25 this map. He referred to the raids from within the enclave.
1 MS. EDGERTON: Quite so.
2 JUDGE KWON: And on that basis I think we can admit it.
3 MS. EDGERTON: That being the case, Your Honour, just by way of
4 reference, the map was annexed, so Your Honours know, to an open source
5 report entitled "Balkan Battlegrounds, a Military History of the Yugoslav
6 Conflict," prepared by some analysts of the Central Intelligence Agency.
7 And without any further information with regard to some of the markings
8 on the map, it's obviously uncertain as to what weight we might take from
9 this document.
10 JUDGE KWON: Have we not admitted some similar maps earlier on?
11 MS. EDGERTON: We may have. I'm not sure, but I can find out.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes. That will be admitted.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2028, Your Honours.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1596, please. Could we just leave
15 the English version.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Look at this, Mr. Tucker. On the 10th of July, 1992, the
18 Main Staff of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an order
19 relating to this zone.
20 "The staff of the Srebrenica armed forces with the forces
21 available shall join up its free territories (the liberated territory
22 with the free territory in the general sector of Zepa village and in the
23 general sector of Konjevic village, Nova Kasaba, Drinjaca)."
24 So Zvornik is mentioned in paragraph 1 as well. Paragraph 2
25 relates to the armed forces of Zvornik. It says it should link up with
1 Kamenica, attacks on Kamenica-Konjevic Polje axis with a view to joining
2 the two parts. And then it says upon linkage and consolidation of
3 forces, the said forces from Zvornik from Kamenica sector and Snagovo
4 sector shall launch an attack in the direction of Osmaci village, and so
5 on and so forth. Can we see the next page?
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second yes Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Mr. Tucker may be able to deal with this document
8 but we received no notification of it, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is in evidence. This is
11 in evidence. I didn't know that the witness would take this position
12 that civilians were there.
13 JUDGE KWON: If you are insisting -- anyway, we have to doubt
14 your ability to represent yourself. You should know that you should give
15 notice of documents that you are going to use in your cross-examination.
16 The fact that it's already in the evidence does not excuse you from
17 notifying the other party.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, what am I supposed
19 to do when a new element emerges, when the witness challenges that it was
20 a military area? I'm hearing for the first time that the witness
21 believed there were no military forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina there.
22 JUDGE KWON: No, that's not what the witness said. I will allow
23 you to proceed with this, but what you should have said is an apology
24 for -- to -- to the Prosecution for lack of notice. Let's proceed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I can do that much.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. But, Mr. Tucker, please --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could Mr. Tucker look at all of
4 this, items 3 and 4 in their entirety, and the signature of
5 Sefer Halilovic, Chief of Staff, that is to say the chief commander of
6 all the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Were you aware of this order dated 10 July 1992 relating to the
9 area we have just seen on the map?
10 A. Is this the -- the order which had -- sorry. I am aware that
11 Halilovic publicly proclaimed attacks from the main Muslim areas towards
12 the enclaves in order to relieve them and that General Milovanovic, when
13 he met with General Morillon at the Yellow Bridge on the 15th of March, I
14 believe he then requested that that order to attack be rescinded before
15 the Bosnian Serbs were willing to agree to a cease-fire. If that is the
16 order you're referring to, then, yes, I'm aware of that order, but I have
17 not seen this physical document.
18 JUDGE KWON: 15th of March, 1993.
19 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Tucker, without referring to any difficulties, this is a plan
22 for an offensive and the liberation of all that area and its linking up
23 with the territories they consider as free. This is a plan of the armed
24 forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina covering all the areas at that time.
25 Were you aware that these were their activities at the time? This order
1 was indeed implemented and rather successfully. Not completely
2 successfully, but to a great extent.
3 A. I am aware that the Presidency forces tried to conduct operations
4 of the kind that are described in this order. I do not agree that they
5 were very successful. The -- the people inside the pocket, inside the
6 enclave, had very little combat power, as I have repeatedly described,
7 and were not, in our view and understanding - and in anything I have seen
8 or heard - capable of doing more than raids out of the enclave. The only
9 places where there was moderately capable military combat power available
10 was in the main Muslim areas of Tuzla, Kalesija, and Vogosca, because
11 they were not surrounded.
12 There were also many, many civilians and refugees inside the
13 enclave, and the number of armed men was very small compared with the
14 number of refugees and the number of civilians inside those enclaves.
15 Q. But if I tell you that in that area they had 30.000 men, that is
16 to say in the summer of 1999, soldiers, perhaps not completely equipped
17 with uniforms and boots, but 30.000 fighting men who had had their
18 shooting practice in the JNA and who were trained and had officers who
19 were trained in command and control, what would you say to that?
20 JUDGE KWON: Did you say 1999?
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's mistake: 1992.
22 THE WITNESS: I would disagree that the number would be anything
23 like as large as 30.000 fighting men in the enclave, because they simply
24 didn't have that number of weapons. There were much fewer people who had
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Sir, I'm not saying in the enclave, but in this area between
3 Zvornik and Srebrenica. If you don't accept 30.000, how many were you
4 aware of?
5 A. I do not have specific knowledge of how many armed men there were
6 between -- in the area between Zvornik and Srebrenica, but I would say
7 that 30.000 is a wild exaggeration. The number was much less than that.
8 And all the evidence of all the fighting that happened there is that if
9 there had been 30.000 there, then the outcome of the fighting there would
10 have been very different from the outcome that actually happened.
11 Q. And do you know that Oric's 28th Division, which at the time did
12 not exist, but its units did exist, had lost 2.000 men by June 1992,
13 whereas in July 1995, 10.000 men of that division made it through to
15 A. It is very misleading to use the terms "division" and "battalion"
16 and "brigade." The word "division" generally in military parlance means
17 an organised body of men of between 10- and 15.000 men. To claim that
18 Oric had a division of between 10- and 15.000 men is, frankly,
20 Q. Do you really think you know better than the commander of
21 UNPROFOR in Srebrenica?
22 A. I make no such claim.
23 Q. I am telling you that the UNPROFOR commander in Srebrenica
24 confirmed precisely what I said, whereas Muslim services reported that by
25 17 July, 10.000 members of the 28th Division made it through to Tuzla
1 under combat. You were right in saying they did not have enough weapons,
2 but they did wage war in three shifts. One soldier would leave the front
3 line and go on home leave but leave his weapon?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, two things. I'd like to have a
6 reference for what UNPROFOR commander in Srebrenica said. Three things,
7 actually. Perhaps we could place this all in time to assist Mr. Tucker.
8 And I'm just wondering what the relevance is of this as we continue.
9 JUDGE KWON: It's -- he's only arguing with the witness. There's
10 no question. And then what other witness testifies has no relevance to
11 this witness's evidence. You use them as a matter -- as a factor to
12 assess when assessing the credibility of a witness's evidence in your
13 later submission, but it's not time for you to argue with the witness.
14 You're just wasting your time. Consult with Mr. Robinson, as I indicated
15 several times. And by now you have about more than three hours, and you
16 will have about an hour to conclude your cross-examination.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I come from a
18 different legal system where I have to establish what the grounds are for
19 certain things.
20 JUDGE KWON: Then it is a bad decision to decide to represent
21 yourself. We have Rules of Procedure and heed to the advice you are
22 getting from Mr. Robinson.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had not finished stating my
24 position. I am not arguing, but it's very important to me whether the
25 witness was aware of these facts when he made his conclusions. It's very
1 important to me. Now I see he didn't know these things and that's good
2 enough for me, a good answer.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you know, Mr. Tucker, that we were able to take Srebrenica in
5 1993, and I stopped the fighting and even forbade investigations to be
6 conducted into war crimes.
7 A. Yes, it was our military -- it was General Morillon's military
8 assessment that the Bosnian Serbs would have been capable of easily
9 capturing Srebrenica in March 1993 if they had wanted to do so. And I am
10 also aware that -- that you from New York made efforts to prevent the --
11 or ease the situation in Srebrenica.
12 I am not aware of whether you forbade investigations to be
13 conducted into war crimes. It's simply -- I did not hear anything on
15 Q. All right. Could we now call up an exhibit - it's already in
16 evidence - just for you to take a brief look?
17 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, have we admitted the intercept we
18 saw between Mr. Karadzic and Lukic when he was in New York?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope so, but if it's not, I would
20 like to tender it.
21 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D2029, Your Honours.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. One more reason why I'm asking you what our objectives were and
25 what theirs were: Our objective was to defend those territories that we
1 believed should become part of Republika Srpska, whereas their aim was to
2 liberate all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 A. I have already answered this question.
4 Q. For esteemed Ms. Edgerton, Mr. Franken, deputy commander of
5 DutchBat, confirmed the existence of a very well-structured
6 28th Division, and he said they had 4- to 4.500 weapons, rifles and other
7 weapons. And that was after the demilitarisation. Do you know that the
8 military forces of the ABH had that many soldiers and that many weapons
9 in Srebrenica after the demilitarisation?
10 A. I believe that the time that you are referring to and Mr. Franken
11 and DutchBat, that was all 1995, which was two years after I was there,
12 and I'm not in a position to make any comments about the situation in
14 Q. But in 1995, after demilitarisation, they were supposed to have
15 less weapons, not more.
16 A. That is not for me to comment about.
17 Q. Could we now glance at D00105. While we're waiting, Mr. Tucker,
18 were you able to see for yourself the efforts of civilian authorities and
19 myself to provide unhindered passage to the convoys?
20 A. Yes, I was, and the result was that in areas where it wasn't that
21 important, convoys got through, but in areas where people were suffering
22 badly, very few convoys got through, hardly any. It was convenient
23 you -- as was described in testimony earlier today, you made a lot of
24 effort to help get a convoy through to Srebrenica in the end of November
25 1992. However, the next convoy that got into Srebrenica didn't get
1 through to Srebrenica until March 18 of 1993, and there were many, many
2 convoys which were -- tried to get through but did not get through.
3 Q. So you believe those areas were more or less important. Do you
4 see any connection between situations where there is military action from
5 a certain area against us and where is not? Izetbegovic said the combat
6 affected areas cannot get convoys until the fighting ends, and is it
7 connected to the fighting in any way?
8 A. There is a difference between fighting against organised military
9 forces and starving people and preventing medicines getting through to
10 people who are suffering in grave situations in the midst of a very cold
11 winter up in the mountains of eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina.
12 Q. Did you establish that or are you just parroting what the Muslims
13 told you?
14 A. I'm describing what I saw with my own eyes when I was in
15 Konjevic Polje and when I was in Srebrenica. I saw with my own eyes the
16 situation and the condition that the unarmed civilians were having to
17 exist in.
18 Q. I'm asking you this: Did you establish that they were starving
19 and that we were stopping them from getting medicine? Did you establish
20 that, and did you know that, for instance, international medical
21 organisations always had enough medication for Srebrenica?
22 A. You have asked multiple questions there. I'll deal with them one
23 by one going through the transcript.
24 Did I establish that there were starving people? Yes, I did. I
25 saw them with my own eyes.
1 Did you stop them or did the Bosnian Serb forces stop them from
2 getting medicine and food? Yes, they did, because you prevented many
3 convoys from getting through to Srebrenica. Yes, you did get support
4 getting the convoy through to Srebrenica at the end of November, and then
5 again the convoy in about the 18th -- that got into Srebrenica about the
6 18th or -- 18th or 19th of March. However, those were drops in the ocean
7 compared with the need that was present with all the refugees who had
8 been forced out of their homes and were living in the most appalling
9 conditions in the middle of winter in the enclave.
10 Q. Sir, do you know how many people there were in Srebrenica who did
11 not have their own little farms and food production, or do you believe
12 that all of the 30.000 population depended solely on humanitarian aid?
13 A. There are many estimates which have been made about the number of
14 people in the Srebrenica enclave. It is, to the best of my
15 understanding, but it is based on these various estimates and what I have
16 seen myself, that there were probably something like 40.000 people in the
17 Srebrenica enclave at the -- during -- during March, and that of those
18 40.000 people, about 7- or 8.000 were actually living in their own houses
19 and thereby had the ability to store food and draw on food which had been
20 stored earlier. The remainder were all refugees who had had to walk from
21 the houses from which they had been expelled or had been force to flee
22 because of terrorism by artillery, as I described earlier, and those
23 people only had what they could carry with them.
24 Generally speaking, when people had to flee from their houses,
25 they tried to carry as much food with them as possible, but that food, as
1 you can imagine, how much food can you carry with you on foot with your
2 own hands. It can probably last five to ten days. Now, many of these
3 people had been on -- on foot fleeing for many months, so of the 40.000
4 people in Srebrenica, they were having to live off literally the food,
5 the bark they could scrape off trees, biscuits made from a yellow flower
6 which grew on the hills around Srebrenica, and from humanitarian aid.
7 Dr. Karadzic, I ask you, would you risk standing in the middle of
8 a drop zone where pallets weighing about 4- to 500 kilos are being
9 dropped and fight with knives in order to get access to these pallets
10 once they have landed if you had enough to eat?
11 Q. And who told you about though bread crusts and the rest? Did you
12 check that out?
13 A. I saw them myself.
14 Q. Did you see people making bread out of bark? What exactly did
15 you see? Could you describe it?
16 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honours. There's just a line
18 JUDGE KWON: I was told by the interpreter. Could you put a bit
19 of distance from the microphones. Thank you.
20 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Line 3, it wasn't captured. Actually, the witness
22 said, "I saw it myself," in respond to Dr. Karadzic's response about
23 bread crusts and the rest.
24 JUDGE KWON: I confirm hearing that too. Can you confirm it as
25 well, Mr. Tucker?
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I saw it myself, and so did everybody who was
2 with General Morillon and me in Srebrenica in March 12 through to
3 March 20 or so. We all saw it. It's even reported -- it's in a medical
4 report. I can't remember if whether it's by Dr. Mardel or by someone
5 else, but I've seen a number of reports. I think Larry Hollingworth also
6 comments on this.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And who showed you this?
9 A. I saw it myself.
10 Q. You actually went into a house and saw them making food?
11 Somebody had to show you. If you went into a house, which house did you
12 go into?
13 A. I went into many houses.
14 Q. And in all those houses they showed you food they were making out
15 of bark; right?
16 A. They weren't making food out of bark. They were eating bark.
17 They were making food out of the yellow flowers.
18 Q. Sir, do you know that all their villages were full of intact
19 households that had two cows each, 10 to 30 sheep, and one of the
20 witnesses here confirmed to us that all of them had cattle and food and
21 produced food? Were you aware of that?
22 In Srebrenica you were able to see chicken and even goats. Goats
23 are seen in one video that we have here. And you claim that in such
24 circumstances people would be eating bark.
25 A. I cannot confirm your previous statements about intact
1 households, et cetera, et cetera. What I can tell you is what I saw with
2 my own eyes, which is houses with rooms. In each room there were 15, 20
3 people squeezed together. They could not all lie on the ground at the
4 same time. You must remember that the temperature outside was minus 15,
5 minus 20 degrees. This was the winter. And these people had no food
6 with them.
7 When I was in Srebrenica in -- in March 1993, I did not see any
8 chickens or any -- any cows in Srebrenica. They had already been eaten.
9 There may have been a goat, but I don't think it lasted very long.
10 I can tell you that with my own eyes I saw people who were very
11 thin, people who were starving, children with their bellies swollen out
12 because of lack of food and lack of medicine. I saw people who were so
13 ill from lack of food and lack of vitamins and medication that their eyes
14 had gone all dull and that they could not -- they could barely stand up.
15 Was everybody like that? No. But were people very hungry and
16 were people starving? Absolutely.
17 MS. EDGERTON: And, Your Honour, with respect to Dr. Karadzic's
18 comment that -- to the effect that witness -- witnesses here had
19 confirmed that all of them had cattle and food and produced food, I'd
20 like to see a reference, because I haven't seen a single mention of that
21 in the whole transcript.
22 JUDGE KWON: Let us proceed, yes. Be precise when referring to
23 the previous transcript.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I know that the Trial Chamber
25 knows. I think it was a protected witness who told us here all the
1 things that he had.
2 JUDGE KWON: Be precise. Ms. Edgerton is aware of that. She
3 raised it because you were not precise. Let's proceed.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I don't have enough
5 time to show it. I wanted to show whether the witness knew that or not.
6 I don't have to convince him of that today. I want it to be in the
7 transcript --
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you have about half an hour to
9 conclude your cross-examination. It's up to you how to use that
10 remaining time.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This is immediately after my return from New York. Did you know
13 about this order in which I in a way saved and supported the Main Staff,
14 that it could refer to the fact that they could not undertake any
15 offensives without my approval? Did you know about this order?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. And do you see that here it is also very strictly stated that
18 convoys have to be allowed to pass unhindered; is that correct?
19 A. I'm not in a position to confirm or deny this document. What I
20 can say is that at the meeting with General Mladic on the 26th of March,
21 1992, that General Mladic agreed to allow humanitarian convoys to pass
22 into -- into Srebrenica and that a convoy then got into Srebrenica on the
23 28th of March, in other word a couple of days later.
24 Q. Thank you. We won't be needing this document any more.
25 Sir, you talked about Sarajevo and what you knew about that, and
1 you also said how you established that there was justified shelling from
2 a military point of view and that there was also punitive shelling; is
3 that correct?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. Did you know what the deployment of the forces was in Sarajevo?
6 A. I did not personally follow the reports about the deployment of
7 the BiH forces in Sarajevo, but people in Sector Sarajevo did.
8 Q. Very well. And on the basis of what did you state, did you
9 conclude, that Serbian shells were coming from the hills? You said
10 something like that; correct?
11 A. The Serbian shells came from the hills because that's where the
12 Serbian guns were located and that is from where I saw and heard Serbian
13 shells being fired.
14 Q. Was the Muslim army also in the hills around Sarajevo, their
15 positions, their mortars, recoilless guns, and so on?
16 A. No, the Muslim positions were inside the encircled area, which
17 was mostly in low ground of Sarajevo, except for the high ground up to
18 the north-west of Sarajevo, up towards the television transmission tower.
19 Q. You're talking about Hum where the TV tower is. Do you know that
20 all around Sarajevo, on all the hills, there were Serb and Muslim
21 positions, the lines lying next to one another?
22 A. The lines were obviously next to one another because they were
23 fighting. However, the Muslim lines were on the inside and were lower
24 down the hills than the -- the Bosnian Serb positions, which were higher
25 up, because they were surrounding Sarajevo.
1 Q. They were not living around Sarajevo, but they came and
2 surrounded it; is that correct?
3 A. If you're talking about the Bosnian Serb soldiers, no, they lived
4 elsewhere, but in their combat positions, they were at the front line
5 around Sarajevo.
6 Q. You don't know that, sir, either. If I were to tell you that the
7 entire Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was made up of people whose homes were
8 immediately along the front lines, what would you say?
9 A. I'm not in a position to -- to state where the -- each individual
10 soldier lived, but I will say that no soldiers were living on the front
11 line, that their houses may have been nearby. That's entirely plausible.
12 Q. When you say that we were not able to or could not take
13 Srebrenica at the time in 1992 because we were under pressure from the
14 Croat army, then did any of the Drina Corps units fight outside of the
15 Drina Corps AOR? Did any of them fight in the Trebinje or the Gorazde
17 A. I cannot confirm or deny that.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I note the time. We'll take a break
19 now for two hours and ten minutes and resume at 10 past 3.00.
20 When you have a -- you will have about 25 minutes to conclude
21 your cross-examination. Oh, I'm corrected. You have half an hour.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must say that that is not enough
23 for 307 or 308 paragraphs in view of the fact that the witness is very
24 willing to expand and -- his answers and give general statements. I have
25 to contest those general statements. Could you please take into account
1 that a number of OTP witnesses have not been cross-examined. I don't
2 know what weight you are going to attribute to things that are not
3 founded on fact but founded on propaganda, but the Defence cannot take
4 that risk. It would like to confront the witness about the way in which
5 he came to his conclusions and how he came to know what he knows.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber is of the opinion that
7 four hours has been allowed for your cross-examination is more than
8 sufficient time, and you cannot argue for further time after having
9 wasted so much of your time for matters not directly related to the
10 indictment and making statements unnecessary and improper. You'll have
11 half an hour after the break.
12 We will resume at 10 past 3.00.
13 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.02 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 3.17 p.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Tucker, could I ask you to take a look at a letter, 1D04850.
19 1D04850. Could we please have that in e-court?
20 A. My screen is switched off.
21 THE ACCUSED: Neither I have.
22 JUDGE KWON: Is it on Sanction? It is restarting.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. While we're waiting, let me say that this has to do with
25 Sarajevo. You spent about four months there, right?
1 A. That's right.
2 Q. I've already asked something. I'm not sure about all the
3 questions I've asked. On the Serb side, there was the
4 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that had between 15- and 17.000 men, and on the
5 Muslim side there was the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
6 that had up to 80.000 men, out of which 40.000 were in the city itself.
7 A. I'm not in a position to confirm those figures. There's
8 obviously your information --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness speak closer to the mike.
10 Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. What was the information you had? How strong was the 1st Corps?
13 A. We had difficulties assessing the size of the 1st Corps because
14 the organisation kept on changing.
15 Q. Thank you. However -- well, all right. Please take a look at
16 this letter. Do you agree that this is a letter sent to the president of
17 the Presidency -- no, no. No. President -- actually, can we see the
18 bottom, the bottom page. The president of the Security Council, in
19 actual fact. And you'll see ultimately that it's the Secretary-General
20 that's writing this letter. Could you please scroll down.
21 JUDGE KWON: Second page.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Down here. I see. On page 2 we see who is writing the letter,
24 Boutros Boutros-Ghali. And now can we go back to the first page.
25 You see this here, the Secretary-General is informing the
1 president of the Security Council about what is going on in Sarajevo
2 around the 9th -- or, rather, 8th of September. In the second paragraph
3 it says that military personnel wearing uniforms of the government of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina were observed -- actually, there were attacks and
5 people in uniforms of the Bosnian Army are recording that. Isn't that
6 right? That's what it says here. And these were attacks against UN
8 A. May I say that this attack happened before I arrived in Bosnia,
9 in Sarajevo, and I'm aware in general that it happened, but I don't know
10 any details about it.
11 Q. Thank you. However, that was close to the time when you arrived.
12 Did you know that the Muslim side was firing at the representatives of
13 the UN and that they had sustained losses, the UN I mean?
14 A. Yes, it happened on occasion.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this please be admitted.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2030, Your Honours.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. 1D04677. Could we have that, please. Again we're in
20 Sarajevo, the 13th of September, 1993 -- or, rather, the 13th of
21 February, 1993. Could we have the next page, please.
22 You were there at the time with General Morillon. Do you see
23 that it says here that Izetbegovic had been informed about the evidence
24 from the fatal mortar attack on the French battalion? That had happened
25 in September, and this happened in February.
1 Please look at the second paragraph where it says that Siber
2 tried to justify this by saying that it was not possible to determine the
3 direction. However, the UN believed that this was an attack by the
4 Muslims; right?
5 A. Yes. I was at that meeting. Yes, that is the discussion that
6 had happened at that meeting, which I drafted for -- for
7 General Morillon, and, yes, the technique of crater analysis was used by
8 the United Nations whenever possible to identify the direction and the
9 range from which artillery or mortar shells had been fired.
10 Q. Thank you. Could you please take a look at this where it says
11 Eastern Bosnia. General Morillon is writing to UNPROFOR in Zagreb
12 [In English] I particularly emphasise that we had indications that the
13 eastern enclaves had carried out an offensive and were now by all
14 accounts suffering from the Serb counter offensive.
15 A. That is indeed what was said.
16 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. Were you convinced that the Serbs
17 were shooting more than Muslims in the zone of Sarajevo? I'm referring
18 to heavy weaponry.
19 A. The Serbs were shooting -- the Bosnian Serbs were using heavy
20 weaponry around Sarajevo rather than more than the BiH Army was for the
21 simple reason that the Bosnian Serb Army had many more artillery guns and
22 much more ammunition than the surrounded forces of the BH Army inside
23 Sarajevo who had very limited arms and ammunition.
24 Q. But you yourself established that the Muslim army had
25 considerably more personnel and that the Serbs had more weapons and that
1 that was their strategic advantage; right?
2 A. That -- that is correct.
3 Q. This is what I'd like to ask you now: Did you see the lists
4 referring to the heavy weapons of either side and how much ammunition
5 they spent, and did you see the reports of military observers about
6 incoming and outgoing fire on the Muslim side and on the Serb side?
7 A. These are the reports around Sarajevo. Yes, we saw them every
9 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page, please.
10 If I were to say to you that we saw lists here of daily
11 consumption -- of the daily consumption of the 1st Corps in the zone of
12 Sarajevo, and we'll be looking at this even more, and I have to say that
13 although they had less heavy guns, it doesn't mean that they used less
15 Look at this, the 11th and 12th of February, 1993. On to Serb
16 territories one thousand -- 144 grenades and on to residency areas 399,
17 and on the 12th of February a bit less, but again the Serbs were hit two
18 times more than the Muslims.
19 Did anyone inform you about that kind of thing that was going on,
20 that the Muslim side was firing as much as the Serb side was and often
21 even more?
22 A. That only happened in exceptional situations, was very rare. One
23 other occasion that I'm aware of was when the Muslims tried to break the
24 siege of Sarajevo in the Otes and Stup area around the 7th of December,
25 1992, but I'm sure that if you look at these reports you will again see
1 that the numbers fired by the Muslims were high, but when you take the
2 entire time that I was in Sarajevo, by far the majority of fire was from
3 the Serbs into the city rather than from the city outwards.
4 Q. Thank you. Can we see the fifth page. So four pages up, please.
5 The fifth page from here.
6 Do you remember this letter sent to Izetbegovic by Morillon on
7 the 13th of February, 1993, and he is telling him about the results of
8 the investigation into the fatal mortar attack against the French.
9 A. Yes, I drafted that letter for General Morillon.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page now. I would kindly ask
11 you to look at the -- [In English] "I must, however, request you to
12 restrain the populations of the enclaves from offensive actions as aid
13 cannot be delivered where your forces are engaging in active
15 A. Again, that is a letter that I drafted for General Morillon, and
16 I'm aware of the contents.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2031, Your Honours.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can we now briefly take a look at 65 ter 21646. Yes. Please
22 take a look at this. It is your message, and it has to do with your
23 information -- or, rather, your contacts with Oric, and it says:
24 [In English] "The local military commander of Srebrenica received
25 the order from Halilovic to stop any offensive actions towards the -- or
1 against the Serbs. As already stated before, every night some raids were
2 conducted and between 5 and 15 Serbs were killed every night."
3 A. That is correct. That is a transcript of a report which I
4 radioed from inside Srebrenica to the headquarters in Kiseljak in Dutch.
5 It's been translated into English.
6 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2032, Your Honours.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Can we now, since we're in the area, this was March 1993, can we
12 have 1D04833. Let us see how things developed in December 1992.
13 Do you remember a letter I wrote to General Morillon on the 10th
14 of September, 1992?
15 A. That was about a month before I arrived, so it's probably
16 unlikely that I saw it.
17 Q. Were you not there in the autumn of 1992?
18 A. Sorry, you said September. This is December. In December I was
19 indeed there. Yes.
20 Q. Uh-huh. I see. Maybe it's a translation issue, but we do see
21 December written here, so what is described here is one such attack that
22 occurred on the 7th of December when people working in a mine were
23 killed. Eleven were killed and 21 wounded, and it says that they had
24 weapons and ammunition from Arab countries and several UNPROFOR packages.
25 I am asking General Morillon to see whether this had anything to do with
1 the convoy that had just arrived in Srebrenica. And in Cyrillic there is
2 an attachment, a letter written by the municipality of Milici who
3 informed me about what happened, and there is a reference to weapons and
4 ammunition produced by Arab countries, as well as several UNPROFOR
5 packages. Do you remember that I informed General Morillon about this?
6 A. Yes, I believe you did.
7 Q. Thank you. Can this be admitted?
8 JUDGE KWON: Would you like see the translation of the attached
10 MS. EDGERTON: I'd like to see the attached letter as well,
11 please, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: Shall we mark it for identification, pending
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 2033, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, was that your point, Ms. Edgerton, when
16 you rose?
17 MS. EDGERTON: Maybe it's a technical thing, but what I have
18 doesn't have a Cyrillic letter attached. So that was my point, actually.
19 JUDGE KWON: Do you have the second page?
20 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we have time I'm going to read
22 it. I'm going to read it carefully so that they --
23 JUDGE KWON: No. We need a translation by our section. Please
24 continue, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Also in your statements and in your amalgamated statement, too, I
3 think, you mentioned that you were aware of the abuse of certain
4 buildings in the city itself, there was the Muslim soldiers that were
5 using these buildings to fire from them, like from the hospital. So they
6 had firing positions that were actually impermissible; isn't that right?
7 A. What I described was two particular kinds of incident. One was
8 when Bosnian Army units would move mobile mortar -- mortars into the area
9 of the Kosevo Hospital, would then fire their mortars out of
10 Kosevo Hospital in order to try and provoke the Serbs to fire
11 counter-battery back at the position from which the mortars had been
12 fired, and they would -- that incoming fire would therefore land on
13 the -- on the hospital. That's one example.
14 The second example was when Muslim BiH Army units placed mortars
15 next to General Morillon's headquarters and similarly fired out at the
16 Serbs, presumably in the hope that the Serbs would fire counter-battery
17 bombardment in a similar way and would thereby potentially hit the UN
19 Q. Thank you. 1D01956. Could I have that, please. Also, you
20 noticed, did you not, that there were mobile mortars mounted on trucks?
21 Isn't that right?
22 A. I did not personally see them, but a British Army sergeant major
23 who was part of the UN forces who was responsible for delivering diesel
24 fuel to the Kosevo Hospital to power the generators, it is him who saw,
25 and the words that he used was "mortars mounted on the back of trucks."
1 There were other reports we had from other parts of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo
2 who talked about mortars being placed in the back of cars and -- like
3 Volkswagen Golfs.
4 Q. And was the point of that to allow them to move after having
5 fired so that the Serbs would fire into an empty space?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page now. Do you agree --
8 actually, you probably drafted this too. General Morillon is writing
9 about violations of the Geneva Convention and is describing the incident
10 that you have just described, right?
11 A. Yes. I think that's it. I just need to see the next page just
12 to make -- because it talks of attachments.
13 Q. Yes. Could I have the next page as well, please.
14 A. Yeah. That is the incident I was referring to when I just
15 mentioned that a British Army sergeant major reported.
16 Q. Could we briefly take a look at the next page and then the one
17 after that again. That's part of it, isn't it? You know who Cutler is,
18 don't you?
19 A. Yes, he was an officer serving with the UN in Sarajevo.
20 Q. Could we have the next page now. This has to do with the same
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. Thank you. And now, please, the very last page where
24 General Morillon is writing to the President of the Presidency,
25 Izetbegovic, warning him about these violations of the Geneva Convention.
1 This has to do with that incident and also that particular set of
2 documents; right?
3 A. That is correct, and I drafted this document.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this set of documents please
6 be admitted under the same number.
7 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit D2034.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. You were aware, weren't you, you confirmed that for us anyway,
10 that the parties in the conflict were prepared to deceive the
11 representatives of the UN and lie to them. Is it true that you heard
12 rumours to the effect that the scene that was staged by the Muslim
13 civilians in Konjevic Polje had been orchestrated, that it wasn't
14 actually authentic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D04676. Could the witness please
16 be shown that.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Does this relate to the situation in which Muslim civilians
19 blocked you, where two British soldiers were perhaps wounded in
20 Konjevic Polje, or injured, and the mob blocked that location, and the
21 appraisal was that the whole thing was orchestrated, not spontaneous?
22 A. No. That is not quite correct. There are two incidents here.
23 The incidents referred to here in Konjevic Polje is when the
24 British Battalion based in Tuzla sent some armoured vehicles into
25 Konjevic Polje and some transport vehicles in order to evacuate injured
1 and wounded, and that was arranged after General Morillon's visit to
2 Konjevic Polje on the 5th and the 6th, and approval was given by the
3 Bosnian Serb authorities in meetings on the 8th and the 9th of March.
4 When the British arrived there, they arrived on the evening, I
5 believe, of the 11th, and when they tried to leave on the 12th, anxious
6 refugees crowded around the British vehicles, and Serb tanks, and
7 infantry fired into the crowd and -- who were clustered around the
8 British vehicles, and a number of civilians were killed and injured two
9 British soldiers. That is one incident.
10 The second incident is - and that's what is referred in paragraph
11 2 - is in Srebrenica itself, and the crowd blocking this location refers
12 to the crowd blocking the PTT building in Srebrenica. And the crowd
13 surrounding the PTT building in Srebrenica which prevented
14 General Morillon from leaving on the 12th of March, that crowd of
15 refugees was orchestrated. The way it was orchestrated was that there
16 were refugee women with whistles who were walking around the back of the
17 crowd and blowing whistles and giving instructions to the crowd as to
18 where to go and how to block General Morillon and his team, my team, when
19 we tried to get into the vehicles in order to drive away from the PTT
21 Now, the crowd that was being orchestrated were not being
22 orchestrated against their will. They were being orchestrated because
23 the crowd were very anxious that if General Morillon left, they believed
24 that then they would be shelled, because on previous occasions when
25 General Morillon had visited somewhere, the Serb shelling and attacks had
1 stopped, but as soon as General Morillon had departed, the Serb shelling
2 and attacks started again. So the -- the crowd of numbers of thousands
3 of refugees who were crowded around the PTT building, they were already
4 very anxious, but they were orchestrated and controlled as well by these
5 women who were taking instructions from the Srebrenica war council.
6 After the war, I heard that the Presidency had apparently given
7 instructions to the Srebrenica war council to try and prevent
8 General Morillon from leaving and that they were executing that and using
9 the crowd in the way that I described.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2035, Your Honours.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Could we now see 1D04678. I believe this is your report, in
16 fact. It says it's your report. 1D04678.
17 It refers to a vicious circle in central and Eastern Bosnia, and
18 you speak about our aspiration to have a cease-fire, an overall
19 cease-fire, beginning with mid-November. Are you familiar with this
21 A. Yes. That is indeed what -- what I said at the time.
22 Q. Thank you. Could we now see the next page. In fact, the two
23 next pages. The second one is in English, and the third one -- no. In
24 fact, page 3 is the English translation of the French text.
25 This is where General Morillon is reporting to someone. It must
1 have been by radio; correct?
2 A. Yes. Remember that we were inside Srebrenica and had no direct
3 contact with the UN headquarters in Kiseljak, and for this particular
4 report General Morillon himself spoke on the radio, and he spoke to Major
5 Olivier de Bavinchove, who is the person I think signed at the bottom who
6 is a French-speaking officer based in Kiseljak.
7 Q. Thank you. Does it follow from this that after I approved an air
8 corridor between Tuzla and Srebrenica, Morillon asked that your
9 helicopters move information and that Serbs be notified that helicopters
10 flying in formation belonged to the UN, not the Muslims, because a Muslim
11 white helicopter flies alone? Isn't that written here?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Thank you. Can this be admitted?
14 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as Exhibit D2036. And,
15 Mr. Karadzic, I wanted to remind you that your time is up, and it's time
16 for you to conclude.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I have two or
18 three more documents and I'm not spending much time on them. May I be
19 allowed to finish?
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. 65 ter 21647. At that time I was still in York, right? But
23 somebody's contacting me, correct?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. 1(a), you are sending a message that I approved the air corridor
1 from Tuzla to Srebrenica for five days and that's the basis upon which
2 Morillon later asked that UN helicopters fly in formation so that Serbs
3 know that it's not the Muslims.
4 A. I recall the -- the text which is in this document. The comments
5 about flying in formation, the previous document talks about large
6 formations. What I cannot recall is the exact figures which were
7 actually agreed with the Serbs. The previous letter is -- the previous
8 document is an internal discussion between General Morillon and -- and
10 Q. Thank you. But that was on the basis of my approval, and it
11 follows from that that flights were allowed, but the only problem was
12 that the Muslims had a white painted helicopter; right? That was in the
13 first document.
14 A. Yes. The Muslim had a white painted Hip helicopter that I saw at
15 Tuzla airfield.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Exhibit D2037.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have one document now that I
20 should not like to be broadcast, and we don't have to refer to the
21 institution from which it originated, and Ms. Edgerton can intervene.
22 1D3830. Do we have to go into private session, or can we just not
23 broadcast it?
24 JUDGE KWON: Probably we go to private session. Shall we?
25 [Private session]
11 Page 23308 redacted. Private session.
2 [Open session]
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now in open session.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Is it true that you had information that the Muslims were opening
7 fire on their own populous, on their own people? I mean primarily
8 mortality fire.
9 A. There were reports in the media that that happened in Sarajevo,
10 but that was after I left Bosnia, and therefore I had no information
11 beyond what was in the media.
12 Q. Is it true that you met in Germany with a British officer who
13 informed you that the shell at Markale Market-place came from Muslim
15 A. When I was back in Germany after my time in Bosnia, I met by
16 coincidence a British sergeant major who was a specialist in crater
17 analysis and artillery intelligence who had been on the investigating
18 team looking into what I believe is referred to as the first market-place
19 incident, and he said to me that he believed that that the first
20 market-place incident had been fired or had come from the Muslims.
21 Q. Thank you. Did you know --
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please conclude.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one question and one document.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Did you know that there was a private aeroport for two-winged
1 planes in Bratunac, and what you perhaps saw were those little planes
2 dropping something, but they came not from Serbia but the airfield in
4 A. I'm aware that there was a small grass airfield on the outskirts
5 of Bratunac. You are referring to the reports while I was in Srebrenica
6 which was made by two UNMO officers who reported seeing planes fly from
7 over Serbia, across the Drina River, into the air space over
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, drop some bombs and then fly back.
9 All I can -- I did not see these myself. All I can repeat is the
10 words that those UNMO officers reported and which I include in the
11 reports and which I have certainly give -- testified in previous cases
12 and ...
13 Q. Thank you. My last question and last document. D43.
14 While we're waiting, and I've mentioned this before, I issued an
15 order to the army to stop before Srebrenica, not to enter, and not to
16 investigate war crimes, to avoid any possibility of revenge or
17 uncontrolled processes that pending defusion of tensions, nothing should
18 be done. I believe we have a translation for this document.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we do.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. This is the 16th of April, after all the crises and the fighting
22 in Eastern Bosnia. This is my order. Stop the forces at the positions
23 reached and prevent their entry into Srebrenica, facilitate the passage
24 of all humanitarian convoys, ensure pacification of the town in such a
25 way that Muslim forces surrender weapons to UNPROFOR. I underline this:
1 Not to the Serbs but UNPROFOR. And store these weapons on a two-key
2 basis jointly with the Serb forces.
3 After the surrender of weapons, all Muslim soldiers should be
4 treated like other civilians.
5 If you remember my conversation with Lukic, I said that all
6 Muslim fighters should be treated the same as civilians, should be
7 amnestied. Do you remember that intercept I showed?
8 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 MS. EDGERTON: This area of questioning has been the subject of
11 other questions by Dr. Karadzic. It's been talked about at length today,
12 but this is a document we haven't been notified on.
13 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic, about this
14 document? That should be your last question.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to Ms. Edgerton, and I
16 promise I will be tolerant whenever they do the same thing with
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Tucker, that what I announced was
20 specification, treatment of fighters as civilians, and what it says in
21 point 6 is: "Do not conduct any investigation into crimes ..."
22 Do you agree what I discussed with Lukic was operationalised
23 through this order and were you aware of this?
24 A. The date of this document is the 16th of April, 1993. I left
25 Bosnia at the very end of March 1993. So I cannot confirm the contents
1 of this document.
2 Q. Well this, document is in evidence. I just want to know the
3 extent of your knowledge and what was the basis for your positions.
4 Thank you, Mr. Tucker.
5 May I just ask you one thing? Do you all stand by all of your
6 documents so I can tender them through a bar table motion, the documents
7 that you drafted?
8 JUDGE KWON: No. How can he answer that question without seeing
9 all the documents?
10 Yes, Ms. Edgerton, do you have any re-examination?
11 MS. EDGERTON: Four minutes, if I may.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
14 Q. Sorry, let me switch microphones. Mr. Tucker, you talked at
15 length today with Dr. Karadzic about events in Eastern Bosnia, and I
16 wonder whether you might remember him saying to you at one point, and for
17 the record it's on page 62:
18 "Our objective was to defend those territories that we believed
19 should become part of Republika Srpska, whereas their aim was to liberate
20 all of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
21 And also asking you at line 14 whether you had proof in cases
22 where you were present in Podrinje Cerska that we drove them out.
23 Do you remember those two passages?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you. Then I'd just like to go back very quickly to what's
1 now P4249. It's a document you've seen before and commented on at
2 paragraphs 264 and 265 of your statement. It's an order dated 24
3 November 1992, from the Drina Corps command to the Zvornik Light Infantry
4 Brigade, and your indulgence for a moment. Now we see the document on
5 the screen in front of us.
6 In that order, in paragraph --
7 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour. I
8 might have got the P number wrong. I'll try a 65 ter number. 01900.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] By the way, if I may, this is the
10 date three days after the massacre in the bauxite mine. So it would be
11 nice to place things in context.
12 JUDGE KWON: You can give your evidence.
13 Is it coming?
14 MS. EDGERTON: My colleague might be able to help me.
15 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one thing. My intonation
17 indicated that "liberate" was in quotation marks. That's a linguistic
18 difference. "To liberate" should be in quotation marks, line 24.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you are not giving evidence.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's true, Your Excellency, but I
21 see it's not recorded properly. There are no quotation marks.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Pardon me. I was going by an exhibit list I
23 received and I think there might actually be a date issue. Give me one
24 minute, please, and I extend my four minutes I requested.
25 [Prosecution counsel and Case Manager confer]
1 MS. EDGERTON: I think I've got the problem sorted and my sincere
2 apologies, it should be P2085. I'm out of practice, Your Honour. My
3 sincere apologies. P2085.
4 JUDGE KWON: Is it a November document, November 1992?
5 MS. EDGERTON: It is indeed, 24 November 1992. Thank you.
6 Q. Now to go back to my question. This is the order I was
7 describing before, dated 24 November 1992, from the Drina Corps command
8 directing forces of the Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade to launch an
9 attack using the main body of troops and equipment to inflict on the
10 enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust them, break them up, or force
11 them to surrender and force the Muslim local population to abandon the
12 area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde.
13 Now, Mr. Tucker, is this what you saw happening on the ground in
14 March of 1993?
15 A. The attacks ordered in this document are what I saw and what the
16 whole world saw take place in February and early March 1993.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Then nothing further.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just say one thing?
19 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic. No Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I said no.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't even say it yet. I am
23 just telling you.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I said no without hearing what you had to say.
25 Mr. Tucker, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of this
1 Chamber, as well as the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you
2 for coming to The Hague again to give it. Now you're free to go. Please
3 have a safe journey back home.
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Tieger, I note the time, but
6 having asked the next witness to come by, I think we can go with him at
7 least for ten minutes. Is it practicable for you?
8 MR. TIEGER: It's certainly not a problem for me, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE KWON: We are going to hear him in closed session. I was
10 advised to take a five-minute break. We will resume at 20 past and go on
11 till half past.
12 --- Break taken at 6.13 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 4.23 p.m.
14 [Closed session]
11 Pages 23316-23319 redacted. Closed session.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.33 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day
6 of January, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.