Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27422

 1                           Tuesday, 17 April 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Before we begin today - if

 7     you could be seated for the moment - I'd like to touch up on a couple of

 8     matters.

 9             First, Mr. Tieger, with respect to the accused's motion to

10     exclude Sarajevo evidence, dated the 16th of January, 2012, you last

11     stated that on the 12th of March that there was to be a meeting between

12     the Prosecution and the Rule 70 provider.  Could we get an update as to

13     how your negotiation with the -- that Rule 70 provider are progressing

14     and whether we would be getting a response from the Prosecution any time

15     soon.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.  That meeting is imminent,

17     meaning this week.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Second, on the 11th of April, 2012, the accused

19     filed a motion to admit transcript excerpts pursuant to Rule 92 ter,

20     Branko Djeric.  In light of the expected witness calendar, the Chamber

21     would be assisted if it could get an expedited response from the

22     Prosecution.  So I wonder whether you can file a response no later than

23     Thursday, 19th of April.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Absolutely, Mr. President, and I can advise the

25     Chamber that I was -- have been in contact with Mr. Robinson about that,

Page 27423

 1     most recently this morning, and have proposed an approach which I think

 2     is eminently reasonable under the circumstances.  That information will

 3     be provided to the Court no later than Thursday, and the matter -- I

 4     can't state it will be considered resolved because I don't think

 5     Mr. Robinson is inclined to withdraw the motion just out of sort of

 6     expediency, but I think the parties will be and the Court will be

 7     satisfied.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

 9             Good morning to you, Mr. Butler.

10             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

11             JUDGE KWON:  If you could take the solemn declaration, please.

12             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

13     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please be seated and make yourself

15     comfortable.

16                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, for the record, could you introduce

18     your expert, military expert.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

20     Good morning to everyone.  General Radovan Radinovic is with us, and the

21     Chamber has already had the occasion to listen to this or to see the

22     presence of this expert in the courtroom.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             Good morning to you, General Radinovic.

25             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

Page 27424

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Thank you.  Good

 2     morning, everybody.  Before I begin, I have a few items to hand out to

 3     the parties and to the Court, which I've discussed with Mr. Robinson,

 4     that I think will be helpful.  The first, if I could have some

 5     assistance, are updated organisational charts that were originally

 6     appended to Mr. Butler's narrative report of the Main Staff, Drina Corps,

 7     Zvornik Brigade, and Bratunac Brigade.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the interpreters also get the

 9     organisational chart, please.  Thank you.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't have extra copies now for the

11     interpreters, I'm sorry, but Mr. Robinson should have a copy, please.

12     And for the interpretation, I'll have some additional charts brought

13     down.

14             The second item is that in Mr. Butler's reports, which were

15     written some time ago, he refers to witnesses in prior cases often by

16     their pseudonym, so we've prepared a chart which correlates, for example,

17     Witness B, Witness C, to explain to the parties who those witnesses are

18     in this case, and if I could pass that out as well.

19             And finally, I have a CD with electronic copies of the reports,

20     and what is useful about these CDs is that the footnotes are hyperlinked,

21     which makes it quite simple when reading the report to read the document

22     which is cited to.  I've spoken to Mr. Robinson about this.  Although

23     it's likely, certain, that not all of the footnotes will be admitted in

24     this case, at the end we'll provide a chart with the exhibit numbers for

25     all the footnotes so that it's clear.

Page 27425

 1             Thank you.

 2                           Examination by Mr. Nicholls:

 3        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Butler.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:

 6        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Butler.

 7        A.   Good morning, sir.

 8        Q.   What I want to do now is go through now just very briefly your

 9     background, mainly with your work here at the Tribunal and some of the

10     reports that you drafted while working here and actually subsequently and

11     then move quickly on into the subject matter of your reports, okay?

12        A.   Yes, sir.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 02515 65 ter number, please.

14        Q.   That's a CV that is, I think, slightly updated that you provided

15     to me this weekend.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could all unnecessary microphones please be

17     switched off.  Thank you.

18             THE WITNESS:  Correct, sir.  That's my updated CV.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  I would tender that --

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would tender that, please, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That will be admitted.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4912, Your Honours.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:

25        Q.   And is it correct as reflected in this CD -- in your CV that from

Page 27426

 1     April 1997 through November 2003 you worked here in this building as part

 2     of the OTP?

 3        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

 4        Q.   And can you just briefly describe, very briefly, the -- your

 5     duties, type of work you did in relation to the Srebrenica investigation.

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  I was assigned as the military analyst for the

 7     investigation team that was dealing with the Srebrenica investigation.

 8     So my responsibilities as the team military analyst were to review

 9     military documents as they were obtained, dealing with the various

10     military and police units that were believed to be associated with the

11     Srebrenica crime base.  I also participated in interviews of military

12     witnesses and suspects in order to advise Prosecutors and investigators

13     on military-related issues that were coming out of a particular

14     interview.  I participated in the analysis of various intercepts that

15     were taken by the 2nd Corps of the Bosnia Army on the communications of

16     the VRS, not necessarily in part to authenticate them although some of my

17     work in fact did that, but also to see how they dovetailed with the

18     military documents that were in the possession of the OTP as the result

19     of various search warrants and other documents that had been turned over.

20             So my role in -- in the sense of the investigation was to be

21     available to the investigation team to advise them of all things of a

22     military nature regarding the allegations of the crimes related to

23     Srebrenica.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I just want to run through some of the reports

25     you created.

Page 27427

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  If I could have 02517, please.

 2        Q.   Now, this is a report dated 5th April 2000, VRS Command

 3     Responsibility Report.  I think this was the first report, is that right,

 4     that you drafted?

 5        A.   One of two, sir, yes.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I just bring up the next one.  I'll now go

 7     to 02520.

 8        Q.   And while we're waiting for that, that's the Srebrenica military

 9     narrative revised Operation Krivaja 95.  And just simply, this is a

10     revised version of a report you had done about two years earlier

11     concerning the Srebrenica events.

12        A.   Correct, sir.  The initial report which was called the Srebrenica

13     Military Narrative, along with the VRS Corps Command Responsibility

14     Report, were requested by the Office of the Prosecutor and ultimately

15     were tendered as exhibits in the Prosecution's case against

16     Radislav Krstic.  Subsequent to that, I was asked to revise and update my

17     narrative report which was then tendered two years later in the

18     Prosecutor's case against Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic.  The

19     version that is up on the screen now, 1 November 2002, is the most

20     updated version of that narrative report.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  And if I could have 02518.  That's the VRS

23     Brigade Command Responsibility Report also from 2002.

24        Q.   And while that's coming up, can you just tell us a little bit

25     about that report, your brigade command report.

Page 27428

 1        A.   Yes, sir.  The corps report, of course, was tendered in the

 2     Krstic case in light of the fact that the accused was a VRS corps

 3     commander.  The accused in the case of the Blagojevic and Jokic case, one

 4     was a brigade commander, the second was a brigade engineering officer and

 5     during some of the relevant period a duty officer.  So I was asked by the

 6     Office of the Prosecutor to author a report that was more tailored to

 7     that particular echelon of command, that being a brigade.  So in this

 8     particular context, the Brigade Command Responsibility Report was

 9     tendered as an exhibit in the case against Blagojevic and Jokic.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Now could I have 02527.  That's a chapter 8

12     addendum to the revised narrative.

13        Q.   And is that correct, that it's just what it says, an addendum

14     that you created to update some information from that report?

15        A.   That is correct, sir.  As the proceedings were underway, the

16     investigation was continued, and particularly with respect to this

17     particular addendum on chapter 8, new information was obtained by the

18     Office of the Prosecutor related to individuals who were known to be in

19     the custody of the VRS at a certain point in time during the month of

20     July 1995, specifically after the fall of Srebrenica, and who were

21     subsequently identified as either killed or missing.  So this particular

22     addendum is how I incorporated that newly obtained information into the

23     revised narrative so it would be available for the Trial Chamber.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  And finally, 03742.  That's from 2006, the

Page 27429

 1     Main Staff Command Responsibility Report.

 2        Q.   Just briefly tell us about that report which you drafted actually

 3     after you had returned to the United States.

 4        A.   Correct, sir.  In this particular case or the next particular

 5     case in chronological order that I was involved in was the Popovic case.

 6     A number of the defendants in that case were members of the

 7     VRS Main Staff.  So I was asked by the Office of the Prosecutor, even

 8     though I was no longer employed by them or working for them, to draft an

 9     additional report which would tailor to the various regulations and roles

10     and responsibilities of the VRS Main Staff during the month of July 1995,

11     in effect in order to fill in the gap now that we had the issues of

12     command responsibility from the lowest brigade level, to finish it off

13     and have a view of the military organisation and its responsibilities at

14     the highest level, which would be the Main Staff.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And I won't bring it up, but --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

18             I won't bring it up now - we don't need to - but 18809 is a

19     proofing note, Your Honours.  It was on our notification.  The only

20     section of that I would tender is section H.  I discussed this with

21     Mr. Robinson this morning.  That's pages 19 and 20, and simply because

22     that updates portions of the narrative.  The rest of that proofing note I

23     would not tender, and the reports in that portion of the proofing note

24     which I've gone through are what I'd seek to tender.  I do not seek to

25     tender the original narrative, 02519, or the comparison, 18808, or the

Page 27430

 1     additional other proofing note, 18810.  So I would tender those reports,

 2     Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  How many of them?  Six of them?  They

 6     will be all admitted.  Shall we give them numbers?

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honours.  65 ter number 02517 will be

 8     Exhibit P4913.  65 ter number 02520 will be Exhibit P4914.  65 ter number

 9     02518 will be Exhibit P4915.  65 ter number 02527 will be Exhibit P4916.

10     65 ter number 03742 will be Exhibit P4917.  And 65 ter number 18809 will

11     be Exhibit P4918, and that's pages 19 and 20 of that.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  And we will need to

14     upload just that section H.  It's not separated out yet.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:

17        Q.   Okay.  What I'd like to do now, Mr. Butler, is go through just a

18     little bit of background before we get to July 1995 and explain a little

19     bit of the context of what we see happening from March through

20     August 1995 in the Srebrenica area.

21             You were not able to do a specific report for this case, but

22     there is some information, quite a lot of information in your other

23     reports about the role of the Supreme Commander.  In your VRS Main Staff

24     Command Responsibility Report, page 9, paragraph 2.1, you wrote the

25     following:

Page 27431

 1             "In accordance with the relevant laws of the Republika Srpska at

 2     the time, the pinnacle of command of the RS armed forces was the

 3     president of the republic functioning as a commander-in-chief of the

 4     armed forces."

 5             And there you cited to Article 174 and other relevant portions of

 6     the Law on the Army.  I'd just like to ask you to expand on that a little

 7     bit as president and Supreme Commander, what forces would

 8     Radovan Karadzic have had under his command?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  In the context of the armed forces of the

10     Republika Srpska there were two primary bodies that fell under that

11     umbrella.  The first one was the army, and incorporated, of course, in

12     the army were the air and air defence forces; and the second component of

13     the armed forces was the forces of the Ministry of the Interior which

14     would include primarily in the context of battle-field operations the

15     various police and special police units that were raised and organised

16     and maintained during the war.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And over the next -- today and the next couple of

18     days we'll discuss the command function over those forces as well as

19     reporting down the command chain.

20             What I want to ask you about now is the creation of the

21     Drina Corps in 1992.  You talk about that in your revised narrative,

22     chapter 1, page 6, paragraph 1, right at the beginning of the narrative,

23     and maybe it would help if we looked at the map book.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  65 ter number 23519, map A3.  That's page 5 in

25     e-court but it's easier to see, I think, in the hard copy but we can

Page 27432

 1     bring it up in e-court.

 2        Q.   Now, can you just tell us if that's an accurate representation of

 3     the boundaries in general of the Drina Corps and why this corps was

 4     created as, I believe, the last of six corps of the VRS.

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  This map is generally accurate to my knowledge.  It

 6     reflects the geographical boundaries that existed after November 1992

 7     with the creation of the Drina Corps.  Unlike the other five corps of the

 8     Army of Republika Srpska that were organised at the very earliest part of

 9     the war in April and May of 1992, the Drina Corps was not established

10     until November of 1992, in part because the other five remaining corps of

11     the VRS have what I refer to as a lineage back to the JNA.  They were

12     based on the organisation and structure of existing JNA corps at the time

13     that the war began in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Drina Corps did not.

14     There were no significant JNA units of any size in Eastern Bosnia south

15     of Bijeljina at the beginning of the war, so that area was divided

16     between the East Bosnia Corps and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

17             As time and history would note, the forces that the VRS and the

18     attention that the VRS command paid to Eastern Bosnia was inadequate to

19     deal with the military threat posed by the considerable amount of Bosnian

20     Muslim military units that were operating in the area.  And in late

21     October, as manifested in early November of 1992, the army determined

22     that the military situation could be best addressed by re-organising the

23     area designating a sixth VRS corps command headquarters, in this case the

24     Drina Corps in Vlasenica, and reassigning various combat units that

25     previously belonged to East Bosnia Corps and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

Page 27433

 1     under the command of the Drina Corps.  So that particular geographical

 2     area now had its own corps-level command to plan and execute larger

 3     operations and subordinate brigades to it to undertake those operations.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And if you could briefly tell us you -- you spoke

 5     there about the -- the threat or the -- from the Muslim forces.  Could

 6     you just tell us briefly, what was the situation facing the VRS or the

 7     Bosnian Serb armed forces and the Bosnian Serb population in that area

 8     around November 1st, 1992, when the Drina Corps was created.

 9        A.   Well, first off, particularly in the municipalities -- the key

10     municipalities bordering the Drina River, the Zvornik municipality, the

11     Bratunac municipality, the Vlasenica-Milici municipality, and even

12     further south towards Zepa, Visegrad, Rogatica, Bosnian Muslims were the

13     dominant population group.  So even though Bosnian Serb territorial

14     forces and locally raised militia units were successful in capturing and

15     holding the town population centres such as Zvornik, Bratunac, Vlasenica,

16     and even for a little while Srebrenica before it was recaptured, there

17     were wide areas of the countryside that were not under control of the

18     Bosnian Serb armed forces.

19             In the early parts of 1992 when the most critical terrain for the

20     establishment and survival of what would then become the Republika Srpska

21     was the Posavina Corridor, that corridor between the Krajina and

22     Eastern Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs had no choice but to accept risk and

23     basically the Eastern Bosnia area was not the highest priority of the

24     conflict.  Once the Posavina Corridor area was secured and the

25     Republika Srpska could count on continued territorial integrity between

Page 27434

 1     Eastern Bosnia and the Krajina, that began the shift to the next critical

 2     area for the establishment and -- or maintenance of the Republika Srpska

 3     which is dealing with the military situation in Eastern Bosnia, where

 4     they recognised by November 1992 was particularly dire from their point

 5     of view.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Just for our information, could you ask the witness

 8     to mark the Posavina Corridor on this map.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, of course, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  That may be helpful.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:

12        Q.   Yes.  Mr. Butler, could you just mark the area you were talking

13     about, the corridor which was the first major military operation that

14     needed to be achieved by the VRS?

15        A.   Yes, sir.  It would be on this boundary region between the

16     East Bosnia Corps and the 1st Krajina Corps area.  So both those corps

17     were particularly engaged in those combat activities for a number of

18     months.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  If you could date and your initial --

20     put your initials.

21             THE WITNESS: [Marks]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That will be Exhibit P4919.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  All right.  And once that's saved, could we go to

24     the next page.

25        Q.   And, Mr. Butler, what's going to come up in front of you is a map

Page 27435

 1     have depicting the Drina Corps area of responsibility.  So more detail on

 2     the area than we see on the present map.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  So that's A4, map A4 of the same exhibit, e-court

 4     page 6.

 5        Q.   Can you see that all right, Mr. Butler?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, I can.

 7        Q.   All right.  Now, let's just speak now of summer of 1995.  Can you

 8     tell me if these boundaries are reasonably accurate regarding the

 9     different brigades within the Drina Corps area of responsibility?

10        A.   Yes, sir, they are.

11        Q.   Thank you.  I'm finished with that.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Have we admitted this map?

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  We haven't, Your Honour, and what I was going to

14     attempt to do later on at the conclusion of Mr. Butler's testimony - I

15     won't go through every map but several of these - is admit the map book

16     as a whole, because we've been using it throughout the trial so --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I think that's fair enough.

18             MR. NICHOLLS:

19        Q.   What I'd like to do now, Mr. Butler, is again briefly go through

20     some charts which were originally appended to your narrative.  These are

21     slightly -- they are updated of the Main Staff, Drina Corps, and then of

22     the Zvornik and Bratunac brigades, the two key brigades for our topics

23     today, and I'll -- with the assistant of the usher if I could pass you a

24     copy of these.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  This is -- 23702 is the number we've assigned to

Page 27436

 1     this packet.

 2        Q.   Now, I won't spend a lot of time on the Main Staff chart,

 3     Mr. Butler, because we've had some evidence on it and some testimony, but

 4     looking at this, could you just look at it quickly, look at the structure

 5     we have here and the assistant commanders for the different sectors --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could you give the 65 ter number

 7     again.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  23702, I believe.

 9        Q.   So as of July 1995, based on all the research you did into the

10     Srebrenica events, is this a good depiction of the different officers in

11     charge of the different sectors and their subordinates and the structure

12     of the Main Staff?

13        A.   Yes, sir.  The one thing would I note with respect to, of course,

14     the Drina Corps, is that from the 1st of July through the evening of

15     13 July 1995, the corps commander was, of course, General Zivanovic.

16     General Krstic, Major-General Krstic, was his Chief of Staff.  On the

17     evening of 13 July 1995, General Zivanovic was ultimately reassigned and

18     retired, and General Krstic then assumed the position of Chief of Staff

19     of the Drina Corps.  So within the context that the chart is labelled

20     July 1995, there were two corps commanders during that month because in

21     the middle of the month there was a command change.

22        Q.   Okay.  In the answer, you've just said that on 13 July in the

23     evening General Zivanovic was ultimately reassigned and retired, and

24     General Krstic then assumed the position of Chief of Staff of the

25     Drina Corps.

Page 27437

 1        A.   I'm sorry, he was the Chief of Staff.  He assumed the position as

 2     commander of the Drina Corps.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And I think that's clear if we go to the next chart

 4     of the Drina Corps.

 5             And sorry, one question - we don't need to go back to the map of

 6     the Main Staff - before we go on.  Do you recall the code-name and

 7     communications used for the Main Staff in July 1995?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  In communications it was referred to as Panorama.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And now we have the Drina Corps chart.  Same question.  If

10     you could look at this and tell us if this looks accurate to you, and we

11     see here the notation of Krstic becoming commander on 13 July 1995.

12        A.   Yes, sir, it does.

13        Q.   Thank you.  And what was the code-name for the Drina Corps in

14     communications?

15        A.   The common code-name for the Drina Corps in the communications

16     was Zlatar.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Next I just want to show the Zvornik Brigade

18     chart.  If we could have that.  Again, July 1995.

19        Q.   If you would just take a look at this for a minute and it's the

20     same question.  Does this accurately depict the structure for the period

21     we're going to spend most of the time on?

22        A.   Yes, sir, it does.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And finally -- oh, I'm sorry.  What was the code-name

24     for referring to Zvornik Brigade in communications?

25        A.   Their -- their code-name was Palma.

Page 27438

 1        Q.   And finally, it's abbreviated the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade

 2     chart.  And it's the same question, Mr. Butler.

 3        A.   Yes, sir, it is accurate, and the code-name for the Bratunac

 4     Light Infantry Brigade in the telecommunications is Badem.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  I'm finished with that.  I would

 6     tender that packet, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be admitted.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4920, Your Honours.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:

10        Q.   Now, I should say, Mr. Butler, you've got some binders with you

11     that you brought into the courtroom.  Is that a binder of your reports

12     and then a binder of documents which were notified to be potentially used

13     with your testimony that I provided you when you arrived here?

14        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I want to talk now a little bit continuing in

16     November 1992.  We talked about the creation of the corps in early

17     November, and I want to talk about directive 4 now for just a minute.

18     This is a topic you deal with in your revised narrative, beginning at

19     page 12, paragraphs 1.22, 1.23, and elsewhere.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  This is P00976.  If I could have that up, please.

21        Q.   I won't spend a lot of time on this, Mr. Butler because it's been

22     discussed quite heavily in this trial, but I would like you view on it.

23     Specifically if we look at English page 5.  I think it's page 10 of the

24     B/C/S.  Tasks for the Drina Corps.

25             While it's coming up, could you briefly tell us based on your

Page 27439

 1     expertise, your study, how would you define a Main Staff directive such

 2     as this directive?  What are they?

 3        A.   While these particular directives are drafted by the Main Staff,

 4     what they represented was the highest level of political-military

 5     direction for the conduct of the war.  I believe during the course of the

 6     conflict there were a total of nine strategic directives that were

 7     published, and at various points in time in the conflict, there were

 8     occasions where the goals, and again the strategic goals, of the

 9     Republika Srpska changed or were established or new ones were established

10     which were occasions where the Main Staff would draft a document for

11     ultimately the approval of the Supreme Command, which would reflect their

12     strategic understanding of the conflict as it was ongoing, their

13     understanding of what the political strategic goals of the leadership of

14     the Republika Srpska were, and their proposals in that sense as to how

15     the military forces of the Army of the Republika Srpska would be

16     organised and the operations that they would undertake in order to best

17     achieve those solutions.  And again in this context, the military drafted

18     the document and the language after negotiation with the various other

19     entities that were involved, primarily the Supreme Command in the

20     Ministry of the Interior.  They would send it up to the Supreme Command

21     for ratification, and you see that more in the later versions than the

22     earlier versions.  The Supreme Command wasn't formed until late in 1992,

23     early 1993 period operational.

24             So those documents at the highest level represent the military's

25     view of how they're going to undertake the strategic conduct of the

Page 27440

 1     conflict that they were engaged in.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I should have said this is at tab 1 of your --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:

 5        Q.   I should have said this is at tab 1 of your binder.

 6             If we look at paragraph marked (D) which assigns task to the

 7     Drina Corps:

 8             "From its present position, its main forces are to defend with

 9     utmost persistence Visegrad (the dam), Zvornik and the corridor, while

10     the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region are to exhaust the

11     enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on them, and force them with

12     the Muslim population to leave the Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas."

13             And this directive we've seen before was drafted by

14     General Manojlo Milovanovic.

15             My question is:  If you could comment on that portion of the

16     directive and whether and how it relates to subsequent military

17     operations we see in the Podrinje area.

18        A.   Yes, sir.  As discussed, even in November of 1992, December 1992,

19     January/February of 1993, there were far more Bosnian Muslims residing in

20     Eastern Bosnia and particularly in the Drina Corps zone than there were

21     Bosnian Serbs, although the Bosnian Serb military held the towns and the

22     key communications routes, the roads, between them.

23             This particular operation again was not only to destroy the

24     various military forces but to create the conditions so that the

25     underlying Bosnian Muslim civilian population would leave those

Page 27441

 1     particular regions, and in fact, if you go through the various months,

 2     January, February, March of 1993, and watch how the operations are

 3     conducted and the ultimate results, it's clear that the Bosnian Muslim

 4     civilian populations in those areas, particularly, for example, the

 5     Cerska area, took one of two courses of action.  They either fled or were

 6     pushed to the west and ultimately towards Tuzla, or they were -- they

 7     fled or were pushed towards the south and clustered in and around the

 8     Srebrenica area.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  If I could have P03037.

12        Q.   That's at tab 2, Mr. Butler, of your binder.  This is from the

13     Main Staff to the command of the Drina Corps, the approximately

14     three-week old Drina Corps.  And it states:

15             "Pursuant to the request by the Supreme Command of the Army of

16     Republika Srpska (President of the Presidency Dr. Radovan Karadzic), and

17     with a view to carrying out timely preparation and holding a military and

18     political seminar at the level of the Drina Corps, I hereby order," and

19     then it continues to describe the seminar that will take place on

20     23rd November which will be chaired and attended by President Karadzic.

21             Can you just comment on that document and what it tell us about

22     the Supreme Commander and the political leadership's connection to this

23     newly formed corps.

24        A.   Well, sir, at its face, I mean, it notes that the president of

25     the Presidency at this time, Dr. Karadzic, requests the Supreme -- he's

Page 27442

 1     the Supreme Command -- in this case the Supreme Commander of the Army of

 2     Republika Srpska, it notes that that there's going to be a meeting

 3     specific at his request with respect to the newly organised Drina Corps,

 4     and not only do they want the military commanders of the various units of

 5     the Drina Corps at this particular meeting, they want the various

 6     municipal authority presidents to attend this meeting as well.  And

 7     within the context of what was happening in the Drina Corps area at that

 8     time, there was a lot of infighting and miscommunication between the

 9     military and the civilian leadership of the various municipalities over

10     the goals and the objectives and ultimately even the control of some

11     military units.

12             So given the fact that this new corps headquarters is standing

13     itself up, it's organising its missions, it's organising its forces, and

14     from the timing it sounds like, you know, in context an excellent

15     opportunity for the highest political and military leadership to be on

16     the ground at the Drina Corps headquarters where they can fully

17     synchronise the military and political objectives of what's going to be

18     happening in Eastern Bosnia in the future.

19        Q.   And this -- and this urgent order on the 20th of November, that's

20     the day after directive 4 that we just looked at; is that right?

21        A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I now have P04248, please.

23        Q.   That's at tab 4, Mr. Butler.  It's the timetable for the

24     conference to be held on the 23rd of November and it lists the speakers,

25     beginning with Dr. Karadzic.  And we see commander of the Drina Corps

Page 27443

 1     Colonel Zivanovic will speak second, and then the various brigade

 2     commanders, Krstic, Kusic, Pandurevic, on the next page Andric, and then

 3     it's closed by Dr. President Karadzic.  Could you just comment on this

 4     document and also on who some of the people I named are, whether they are

 5     still around performing roles in July 1995 in the Drina Corps.

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  Again, most in this context it lays out the time

 7     allotted for each brigade -- for each brigade commander to update the

 8     situation in his brigade area as well as the capabilities of his units

 9     and to essentially brief back to the key military and civilian leadership

10     what he understands his task to be.

11             Again, not necessarily the interesting but the unique thing about

12     this is that many of the individuals who are named here in November of

13     1992 are still key figures within the context of the Drina Corps in July

14     of 1995 respecting -- you know, reflecting a long three-year historical

15     association with all of the activities in Eastern Bosnia.  For example,

16     at the beginning of July 1995, then General Zivanovic is still the corps

17     commander.  So he's fully familiar with the history of Eastern Bosnia

18     from November of 1992 all the way until the last day of his command,

19     13 July.

20             Then Colonel Krstic is a brigade commander of the

21     2nd Romanija Brigade in July -- in -- in 1995, I think it's in March, he

22     becomes the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, and of course on

23     13 July 1995, he assumes command of the Drina Corps.  So he has a long

24     historical association with the history of Eastern Bosnia.

25             Captain Kusic remains with his unit throughout the course of the

Page 27444

 1     entire war.

 2             Colonel Pandurevic at this time is the commander of the

 3     5th Podrinje Unit -- or Brigade, otherwise known as the Visegrad Brigade

 4     in this context.  He -- well, I'm sorry, the Gorazde Brigade in this

 5     context.  He, in December of 1992, was appointed to be the commander of

 6     the Zvornik Infantry Brigade, and he remains the commander of that

 7     brigade through the end of the war in November of 1995.  So again he has

 8     a long historical association with what is happening in the

 9     Eastern Bosnia area.

10             The same can be said of, the second page, Colonel Andric, who

11     begins the war as the commander of the Birac Brigade.  At this time

12     they're still separating the Zvornik and Birac brigades out a bit.

13     But -- or in this context the Birac Brigade.  He then turns around and,

14     you know, remains the commander through 13 July, and on 13 July of 1995,

15     he's elevated to take the role as the corps Chief of Staff.

16             So I mean this just reflects in the military context many of the

17     key individuals who participate in Srebrenica in July 1995 have a long

18     historical association with the VRS military operations in Eastern Bosnia

19     from almost the very beginning.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  If I could have 65 ter 10881.

22        Q.   This is back at tab 3, Mr. Butler.  This is an urgent order from

23     Milenko Zivanovic, the corps commander, which states that this conference

24     we've been talking about will be led personally by the Supreme Commander

25     of the Republika Srpska Army.

Page 27445

 1             Could you -- we've talked about this a bit, but could you just

 2     comment on that portion of the document, what it tells us.

 3        A.   Well, again in this particular document, and I'm sure that people

 4     have discussed prior to me, General Mladic was the commander of the

 5     Main Staff.  He was the senior uniformed army member, but it is

 6     recognised ultimately that the president of the republic under the law of

 7     the Republika Srpska is the Supreme Commander of the army and armed

 8     forces in this particular context.  It is their acknowledgement of such

 9     that the president of the republic is going to be at this meeting and it

10     is expected that, you know, all of the key military principals, and that

11     will be the brigade commanders personally, will be there.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender that, Your Honours?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Both of them, with the timetable as well?

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.  I think the timetable is already admitted as

15     P04248.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, this will be admitted.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4921, Your Honours.

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I please have 65 ter 10728.

19        Q.   That's at tab 5 in your binder, Mr. Butler.  This is dated

20     23 November 1992.  It's a daily combat report.  The part I'm interested

21     in most is paragraph 2 towards the end.  It speaks about providing

22     security for the RS Assembly and then states:

23             "During the day, a military-political conference was held at the

24     garrison command attended by the representatives of the Supreme Command,

25     the Army of Republika Srpska, as well as members of the political

Page 27446

 1     structures."

 2             It's pretty self-apparent, but does this show that this

 3     conference actually took place?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender this document, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  P4922, Your Honours.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Next could I have P02716.

 9        Q.   That's at tab 6, Mr. Butler.

10             E-court page 40 in English, I believe 41 in the original.

11             And, Mr. Butler, this is Mr. Karadzic's notebook from the time.

12     I'm looking at the heading, the entry for 23rd November 1992, the day of

13     the conference, and we've got written:  Consultations, Drina Corps

14     commander, chief of GS [sic] Main Staff, Minister of Defence

15     Colonel Subotic, and General Gvero, brigade commanders, and municipal

16     presidents.  And then we see Colonel Zivanovic, who we can remember was

17     the first speaker after President Karadzic at the conference, and the

18     notes read:

19             "Tasks.  Vitinica, Sapna, Teocak," under 1; 2, Cerska; 3, Zepa;

20     4, Srebrenica; and 5, Gorazde.

21             Now can you tell us what is the military significance of those

22     areas spoken about by the corps commander General Zivanovic at this time,

23     November 1992, a couple days after directive 4's come out?

24        A.   During that time-frame those were all areas that were either

25     already under the control of Bosnian Muslim military forces or

Page 27447

 1     significantly threatened by them, and this appears to be a ranking in

 2     priority of order of what the corps commander believes his priority areas

 3     are to deal with.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  That's -- excuse me.  That's that topic finished.  I

 5     now want to move on to directive 7, moving into 1995.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have that up, please.  It's P00838.

 7        Q.   We'll go through this pretty quickly, because Their Honours have

 8     seen this quite a few times, Mr. Butler.  It's tab 7 of your binder.

 9             If we could get the English page 10 and the Serbian page 14.

10             Now, this is -- this is the section on the Drina Corps you're

11     very familiar with, I know, Mr. Butler.  But the section which speaks of:

12             "... as many enemy forces as possible should be tied down by

13     diversionary and active combat operations on the north-west part of the

14     front using operational and tactical camouflage measures, while in the

15     direction of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves complete physical

16     separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be carried out as soon as

17     possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two

18     enclaves.  By planned and well-thought out combat operations create an

19     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

20     or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

21             And then on page 14 of the English, which I believe is 21 of the

22     Serbian, under the section of the directive headed "Support for combat

23     operations.  Morale and psychological support," we see:

24             "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with

25     UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall through the planned and

Page 27448

 1     unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits reduce and limit the

 2     logistic support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material

 3     resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our goodwill

 4     while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international

 5     community."

 6             And I won't go through the other sections, just for time, of this

 7     directive, but the question is:  Can you comment on this directive and

 8     militarily any connection you see with what we saw in directive 4 in the

 9     goals that were announced in November 1992 now that we're in March 1995.

10        A.   Notwithstanding the creation of the -- the UN safe areas of

11     Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, the VRS's goal as reflected in the

12     military documents in that context has always been clear, and again even

13     as they note in the last line of the top paragraph of page 11 of

14     directive 7, they're still talking about the definitive liberation of the

15     Drina valley region.  In their mind, particularly with the history of

16     what happened in late 1992 and in early 1993 in areas such as Bratunac, I

17     don't believe that there was any thought that there could possibly be

18     some form of an accommodation to live with a sizable Muslim population in

19     those areas.  There was just too much bad history as a result of what had

20     happened.  The Bosnian Serb military forces had always -- in various

21     other documents as well had made it clear that, one, they wanted the safe

22     areas eliminated completely for military reasons and that their history,

23     particularly with the Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas, was that allowing

24     the Muslim population to remain there in effect meant that there would be

25     Muslim military units there, which would be unacceptable.

Page 27449

 1             So I mean, I think their goals from directive 4 to directive 7 in

 2     that context never changed.  It was just they had to accept a

 3     United Nations presence for three years in Eastern Bosnia and seek

 4     somehow to get around that.

 5        Q.   So what you just --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, Your Honour.

 8        Q.   Just to continue on that, what from your analysis and then

 9     looking at what happened afterwards, which we'll discuss, was the

10     objective of directive 7?

11        A.   Well, directive 7 as noted here didn't call for a direct military

12     assault on the enclaves, and clearly with what was going on at the

13     international level, that was deemed to be too provocative.  But what

14     they were looking to do was create a situation where either the UN

15     themselves would quit these areas or that the Bosnian Muslim population

16     residing in them would pressure their own leadership in Sarajevo to

17     withdraw them.  I think I've said in previous testimony, ultimately they

18     wanted to recreate the situation that existed in the spring of 1993 where

19     the population of the Srebrenica safe area specifically was in such dire

20     straits that the United Nations was actively evacuating the population to

21     other -- other areas of Bosnian Muslim-held territory, and that

22     ultimately was what they would have liked to see again as a way of

23     finally handling the issue of the safe areas by the end of July -- or by

24     the end of 1995 or through the end of the operative period of

25     directive 7.

Page 27450

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I now have P02246.

 3        Q.   Mr. Butler, this is at tab 8 of your binder, and it's directive

 4     7/1.  Directive 7/1 is from 31st of March, 1995.  There's been some

 5     discussion about it in this trial.  It's much shorter than directive 7.

 6     It doesn't contain all the language of directive 7 including the parts I

 7     read out.  Can you tell us what's the purpose?  What does this operative

 8     directive number 7/1 do, and does it supplant, replace, or negate

 9     directive 7?  Sorry, that's a compound question, but I think you can put

10     it together.

11        A.   To answer the last question first, no, it does not negate or

12     otherwise supplant directive 7.  What directive 7/1 represents is a

13     technical expansion of the goals of directive 7 more designed for

14     military planners.  For example, when you look at this particular

15     document, it gives more concrete definable goals that can be carried out

16     by military organisations naming various towns, cities, and things of

17     that nature.

18        Q.   Let me stop you for one second.  Maybe we could go to page --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:

22        Q.   Let me stop you for one second.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Maybe we can go to page 5 then and look at

24     paragraph 5.3 of the English.  Also page 5 of the Serbian.

25        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Butler.

Page 27451

 1        A.   No, sir.  I mean, that is an excellent example.  When you look at

 2     directive 7.0, you have a broad task which is, you know, to create an

 3     unbearable situation against the civilian population.  For a military

 4     planner, the first question is, well, what does that mean?  What am I

 5     supposed to do?  As you notice now in directive 7/1 geared more toward

 6     military individuals, they're talking in more concrete terms.  There are

 7     going to be various operations down various axes of attacks and these are

 8     the things that we're going to seek to accomplish.  So again it's not

 9     replacing 7.0 in any way.  This is just a more technical explanation of

10     what the goals of 7.0 are.  So that is my interpretation of what 7-1 is

11     or 7.1 is.

12        Q.   And under the way the VRS worked at the time based on your study,

13     you've talked about the level of directives at the -- at this sort of

14     highest level of goals, do the corps have a role in planning operations

15     themselves that are to take place in their area which are based on

16     directives or higher orders from the Main Staff?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  Particularly within the VRS, which for the most part

18     wholly adopted the doctrine of the former Yugoslav National Army which

19     was a well-developed military doctrine, their officers had been

20     intensively and significantly trained in it, there was a formalised

21     planning process which various military units undertook.  While the

22     Main Staff is -- is obviously the pinnacle of the military leadership

23     with respect to the uniformed military in Bosnia, the reality is that the

24     corps commands and the corps commanders were the people who ultimately

25     were fighting the war on behalf of the Main Staff.  These were the people

Page 27452

 1     who best understood the capabilities and the limitations of their

 2     military units as well as the terrain that they were be expected to fight

 3     on.

 4             So the practice was that while the Main Staff would give general

 5     guidance on various objectives and things of that nature, it was the

 6     responsibility of the corps to plan the details of the operation, and

 7     then once the planning of the operation was put together to the

 8     satisfaction of the corps commander, the corps command itself would then

 9     brief the details of that operation to their superior, which was the

10     Main Staff.  The Main Staff would review that operation and ultimately

11     either seek -- approve the operation, they would disapprove it or they

12     would make whatever changes they deemed were required.

13             Not only did this process happen from the corps level to the

14     Main Staff, but subordinate units as well.  Brigade commanders planned

15     military operations for their brigades, and those operations were

16     reviewed and endorsed or approved by the superior corps commander.  So

17     that is the way that the former JNA military command and staff process

18     worked, and it was adopted and followed as such by the Army of

19     Republika Srpska.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And we'll talk about that a bit more when we --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Excuse me, Mr. Nicholls.

22             Going back to the directive 7/1, were there any other instances

23     than the case of directive 7/1 where either the command of the -- either

24     the Supreme Commander or the Main Staff issued a further directive which

25     you referred to as a technical expansion, other than the case of 7/1.

Page 27453

 1     After issuing a specific directive.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I don't -- I'm not sure of the answer prior to

 3     that.  I think in the case of directive 9 there might have been a

 4     supplemental if I recall correctly, but I just don't remember at this

 5     point in time if in some of the previous directives or in the previous

 6     ones, such as 6 or before that, they had a need to do that.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes Mr. Nicholls.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 9        Q.   I'll come back to that topic raised by His Honour the

10     Presiding Judge in a little while, Mr. Butler, and ask you a couple

11     questions, but first to keep moving, I'd like to ask you now a bit about

12     the use of the MUP forces in military operations.  In your brigade report

13     you discuss this, for instance, at pages 30 to 31, paragraph 6.0.  You

14     talked about it a little bit at the beginning today.  In that paragraph

15     you wrote:

16             "Aside from the forces of the army, VRS, the other component of

17     the armed forces of the Republika Srpska consists of the units and forces

18     of the Ministry of the Interior MUP police.  These MUP assets when used

19     under the purview of national defence are directed by the president of

20     the republic under both the RS constitution and the RS Law on Defence."

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  And with that I'd like to bring up 65 ter number

22     1882, please.

23        Q.   That's tab 9 in your binder, Mr. Butler.  This document is from

24     the Supreme Commander, Dr. Karadzic, has the seals and stamps of the

25     Republika Srpska president.  It's from the 22nd of April, 1995, and

Page 27454

 1     concerns the use of the MUP in combat.  And I won't go through it all,

 2     but could you tell us about this document, what it means?

 3             And I'll just say as well that this is footnoted at footnotes

 4     136, 138, and 139 of your brigade command report.

 5             That's kind of a broad question, but if you could give us your --

 6     your comment on this document and what it tell us about use of the MUP in

 7     combat.

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  The MUP had historically been used to fight in combat

 9     operations with the VRS throughout the course of the conflict.  They --

10     they represented a significant and potent fighting force.  But

11     historically within the framework of that there had always been issues

12     related to the control of the MUP, co-ordination with those MUP forces,

13     logistical responsibilities, who would support them, who would feed the

14     soldiers, things of that nature.  There were historical problems with

15     soldiers often trying to defect to MUP units, and as part of regulating

16     these things in a much more clearer manner, particularly in a state of

17     imminent threat of war or a state of war, a number of laws were passed or

18     revised relating to this.

19             This particular document actually talks about specific articles

20     of the law of the -- or the application of the Law on Interior -- on

21     Internal Affairs during the state of an imminent threat of war and state

22     of war, and it specifically talks about or clarifies issues relating to

23     MUP forces falling under the command of the army and what those types of

24     things meant.

25             Now, keeping in mind that by decree, an imminent threat or an

Page 27455

 1     imminent threat of a state of war existed in the zones of the 1st and

 2     2nd Krajina Corps since November of 1994, and again in June of 1995 that

 3     state of an imminent threat of war was declared for the entire

 4     Republika Srpska.  So even though this document is dated in April, it's

 5     laying out the legal framework by which MUP forces will operate under

 6     army control and the limits to those controls that we would later see in

 7     June and July of 1995.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And if we look at Articles 13 and 14 of the law,

 9     which are -- Dr. Karadzic has set out in this order of his.  Police units

10     shall participate in combat operations by order of the Supreme Commander

11     of the armed forces and Ministry of the Interior.  The minister of the

12     interior commands police units via the staff of the command.  And

13     Article 14, having been engaged in combat activities by order of the

14     Supreme Commander, and it continues.

15             So what -- what's the role of the Supreme Commander in the

16     designation of the use of the MUP in combat and the way they were used in

17     combat?

18        A.   Well, for the first part, ultimately it is the Supreme Commander

19     who makes that decision, and it was a formalised process.  The army would

20     make a proposal to use MUP forces, and they would identify which forces

21     they believed they need to -- through the military chain of command to

22     the Supreme Command, and a decision would be made by the Supreme Command

23     whether to accept that proposal, change it, modify it, or reject it.

24             Now, in this particular context it's noted that the Ministry of

25     the Interior is a member of the actual Supreme Command body that

Page 27456

 1     consisted of about five members who were actually designated as part of

 2     the Supreme Command.  The military was represented there with respect to

 3     their proposals and ideas, but they were not formally part of the

 4     Supreme Command.

 5             So minister in this case -- you know, the minister of the

 6     interior was part of the decision to use his forces with the army.  Once

 7     that decision was made, an order was sent down, and that particular order

 8     defined not what a particular MUP unit would do in a technical manner,

 9     the attack or things of that nature, but it would define the fact that

10     this MUP unit was under military control for the duration -- I'm sorry --

11     for the duration of a particular operation, how long that would be, and

12     set limits such as this unit could not be used for other purposes, it

13     could not be disbanded, things of that nature.

14             So again, those decisions were made by the Supreme Command and

15     were transmitted down to the army and to the MUP for implementation.

16        Q.   And just -- thank you.  And just we can see that this one is

17     actually signed by the Supreme Commander, Dr. Karadzic; correct?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?  May I intervene?  I believe

19     it's better to do it now than to burden the cross-examination with this.

20     I'm afraid that the translation of the document is not right.  And

21     further on, it doesn't say that the minister commands.  The minister is

22     in charge of, and there is a difference.  The last line of number 13.  I

23     cannot scroll down.

24             Perhaps the interpreters could help.  If they could read this

25     out, but not line 13.

Page 27457

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  I thank Mr. Karadzic, but that's something we

 2     could check.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that is noted.  But would you like the accused

 4     to read out that sentence now or -- I'll leave it to you, Mr. Nicholls.

 5     In any event, your intervention has been noted and that will take care of

 6     it.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender this document, Your Honour?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4923, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE KWON:  If you agree, the more efficient way is to resolve

11     it right now.

12             Mr. Karadzic, why don't you read that, the second sentence of

13     Article 13.  We need the next page for the B/C/S probably.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the interpreters please

15     interpret this.  So it's the second sentence that reads as follows:

16             "The minister of the interior is in charge of or has under his

17     control the units of police through the staff of the command of the

18     ministry police forces."

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I take it, then, Mr. Butler, you agree

20     with that.

21             THE WITNESS:  In the context of this document, I mean, a change

22     like that does not -- would not change anything that I've previously

23     noted about this particular document.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I'm afraid that again it hasn't

Page 27458

 1     been translated properly.  There is command and control, RiK, so it is

 2     command and control, and there is a difference between the two.  So the

 3     minister directs, not commands.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I think that's sufficient for now, and you'll take

 5     up the issue during your cross-examination.

 6             Yes.  Thank you for your patience, Mr. Nicholls.  Please proceed.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  I'm not -- are we -- is this time for

 8     the break?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll take a break for half an hour and resume

10     at 11.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

15        Q.   Before we get back to another question or two about the MUP, let

16     me ask you something about a question that the Presiding Judge asked you

17     before the break.  At pages 29 and 30, His Honour Judge Kwon asked you:

18             Going back to the directive 7/1, were there any other instances

19     other than the case of directive 7/1 where either the command or the

20     commander of the Main Staff issued a further directive which you referred

21     to as a technical expansion, other than the case of 7/1.

22             And you weren't quite sure.  I'm just going to see if I can

23     refresh your recollection a bit on that or get your comment on a couple

24     documents.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 65 ter 09348, please.

Page 27459

 1        Q.   This is from the Main Staff.  It's from 25th November 1992,

 2     titled "Very urgent addition" to operative directive number 4, and then

 3     the first line refers to directive 4.  Under item 6, providing combat

 4     support, that's from directive -- that's the section in directive 4 if we

 5     were to bring it up again.

 6             "Only basic principles were discussed.  In view of the combat

 7     situation in all our units, the supplement directive number 4 adds the

 8     following."

 9             Now this isn't listed as 4.1, but is this -- could you just

10     comment on this document in relation to Judge Kwon's query?

11        A.   Yes, sir.  This would be an example of technically amplifying

12     some of the guidance in directive 4.  In this particular case, as it

13     notes, only basic principles were discussed and then, you know, either

14     minor or substantial changes occur to a point where they'll issue

15     additional guidance but they don't feel that they have to create a

16     directive 5.  This one, if you look at the orders, I mean, it appears in

17     paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, they talk about specific facilities that have to

18     be protected, specific groups that should be set up, preparation of

19     units, but again in paragraph 4, it notes, you know, make these decisions

20     in accordance with directive 4.  So it doesn't change directive 4 or the

21     guidance therefore.  It just supplements and provides additional

22     technical guidance.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender that, Your Honour?  It wasn't on my

25     list, but in light of the conversation, I think it's relevant now.

Page 27460

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It will be admitted.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4924, Your Honours.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just in the same line briefly, if I could have

 4     P03052.

 5        Q.   Main Staff, 14 December 1993, very urgent, this time to the SRK,

 6     supplement to directive number 6, and just ask you to comment on what we

 7     see here in relation to this topic.

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  I guess it would be the same as my previous comment.

 9     We noticed that particularly with respect to paragraph 1, it is detailed.

10     There's a good amount of detail, technical issues, technical details in

11     that paragraph pertaining to various decisions as well as, you know, as

12     you go down on the English language page 1 and perhaps further down on

13     page 2, it talks about various military operations and things of that

14     nature.  So again it kind of reinforces what I said earlier, that these

15     are technical supplements to the original base documents.  They're not

16     changes to the overall directive.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Last one, 65 ter number 09475, combat order for

18     carrying out the following combat activities, addition to directive

19     number 6, again from the Main Staff.

20             Just take your time, Mr. Butler, and I'll want to direct you to

21     another page of this afterwards.  Just tell me when you're done and we'll

22     go to the next page.

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Could we have page 2, please, of the English.  And I'd also like

25     to show you the last page when you're done.

Page 27461

 1        A.   Please.

 2        Q.   If we could have the last page.  And there we'll see -- ask your

 3     comment in light of what we've been discussing on the section 5 at the

 4     bottom:  "Secure combat activities pursuant to directive 6," number 6,

 5     signed Supreme Commander Dr. Radovan Karadzic.

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  And again, just like the previous documents, these --

 7     particularly with the military operation and tasks assigned they're

 8     rather technical, so in this sense, again it amplifies in a technical

 9     sense what was basically laid out in directive 6.  And this is an example

10     of a good military document in that sense.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender this, Your Honour?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4925, Your Honours.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:

16        Q.   Okay.  Thank you, Mr. Butler.  If we could switch gears back to

17     where we were just before the break.  I want to show you another document

18     relates -- relating to the use of the MUP in combat.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 1875, please.

20        Q.   This is at your tab 14, Mr. Butler, so it's a little out of

21     order.  This is dated the 16th of June.  It's signed and stamped

22     "President of the Republic, Dr. Radovan Karadzic."  It's to the

23     government of RS, the ministries, all presidents of Municipal Assemblies,

24     the Main Staff of the VRS.  I won't go through it line by line for time.

25             Paragraph 2 states the above-mentioned entities shall bring their

Page 27462

 1     activities and behaviour in line with the laws governing a state of

 2     imminent threat of war and cites the Official Gazette with this order and

 3     other orders that will follow, and then talks about mobilisation and

 4     refers to the MUP various places through it.  So I won't go through it

 5     myself but ask you if you can explain to us the effect or the effect of

 6     this order from President Karadzic regarding the use of the MUP in

 7     combat.

 8        A.   Simply to the degree that they were not already doing it, this

 9     particular order on 16 June 1995, which is now applicable to the entire

10     Republika Srpska, validates that an imminent -- or that an imminent

11     threat of war exists and that all of the organs of the government, which

12     would include the MUP, are to operate in accordance with the various laws

13     that have been written and that were put out in the Official Gazette on

14     29 November 1994.  Specific to the MUP there's a law on the use -- or the

15     Ministry of the Interior in time of imminent threat of war which then

16     references back to some of the prior documents we've looked at which talk

17     about regulating how MUP units are commanded by the military during

18     various operations and how that command and control is effected.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would tender this document, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4926, Your Honours.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:

24        Q.   Thank you.  So that's June 22nd, this order we've just looked at.

25     I want to now move on to July 1995 and Krivaja 95, which you've written

Page 27463

 1     extensively about, and then go into the chronology of events which occur

 2     after Krivaja 95.  You discuss this in the revised narrative, beginning

 3     at page 28, and it's footnoted quite a lot in your narrative.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have P04481.

 5        Q.   That is Krivaja 95.  And that's at tab 20, Mr. Butler.  If we

 6     could go first to page 3 of the English, which is also page 3 of the

 7     original.

 8             In paragraph 2, and we've seen this before but it's from 2nd

 9     July:

10             "The command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to operations directive

11     number 7 and 7/1 of the VRS Main Staff and on the basis of the situation

12     in the corps area of responsibility, has the task of carrying out

13     offensive activities with free forces deep in the Drina Corps zone as

14     soon as possible, in order to split apart the enclaves of Zepa and

15     Srebrenica, and to reduce them to their urban areas."

16             Further down in paragraph 4 we see the objective for the

17     Drina Corps:

18             "By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce in size the

19     Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, to improve the tactical position of the

20     forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the

21     elimination of the enclaves."

22             And what I'd like to ask you first is this portion I read out

23     refers to direct 7 and 7/1.  Can you tell us -- can you comment on this

24     order's basis in those directives and whether this tells us whether 7/1

25     replaced or supplanted directive 7.

Page 27464

 1        A.   Yes, sir, and I think as noted in paragraph 2 of this document,

 2     the individuals who drafted this particular document understood 7 and

 3     7/1, knew that they were the operative documents --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Are there any problems with

 5     interpretation?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  Professor Radinovic is not receiving any

 7     interpretation.

 8             THE ACCUSED:  Me too, but I did not ...

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, we need to fix that.

10             THE ACCUSED:  Yes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we repeat the last question of yours?

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  From line 7.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Can Mr. Radinovic hear me now?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, he nodded.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:

17        Q.   I'll read out the last -- I think this is fine, Mr. Butler, and

18     what I'd like to ask you first is this portion I read out refers to

19     directive 7 and 7/1.  Can you tell us -- can you comment on this order's

20     basis in those directives and whether this tells us whether 7/1 replaced

21     or supplanted directive 7.

22        A.   As indicated in paragraph 2 of this particular document, the

23     individual officers who drafted this document, this operations plan, it

24     was their understanding that both directive 7 and 7/1 were the base

25     documents that they were drafting this operations order in accordance

Page 27465

 1     with.  I don't read this particular passage as an indication that

 2     directive 7 no longer existed or was no longer an operative document.  I

 3     read it as it's written here, which is simply that they're referring to

 4     directive 7 and 7/1.  The people who drafted this operations order

 5     clearly understood the role of both of those documents as a planning

 6     basis.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And this is signed by the Drina Corps Commander,

 8     General Zivanovic; correct?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   If we go to page 10 of the English, and it would be the last page

11     of the -- that's correct.  And the last page of the original.  I want to

12     ask you about what this means, the distribution list.  We have typed in

13     two copies and delivered to, 1, original in the archive of the

14     Drina Corps command, 2, Main Staff VRS, and then the seven copies made

15     and delivered to these other various units and the IKM of the Drina Corps

16     command.  Can you just explain to us what this means where we see this

17     here on the document?

18        A.   Well, this is the standard distribution, who copies of this

19     operations order would go to, clearly one for the unit archives.  You're

20     always going to have a copy of this order at the higher headquarters.

21     And in fact, even before this document was finalised, at some basis the

22     corps would have had to brief the document and the plan to the Main Staff

23     for their approval, and then of course once the plan is finally fixed and

24     all the details are worked out, then copies are sent to the subordinate

25     formations, units, and command posts that would be responsible for

Page 27466

 1     implementing the operation.

 2        Q.   So with the -- if you could explain to us, would the fact that

 3     now this has been signed and stamped and a copy is sent to the

 4     Main Staff, does that indicate whether or not the Main Staff has, in

 5     fact, approved the plan at this point?

 6        A.   Correct, sir.  This document, before it was signed, stamped, and

 7     finalised, at least a rough draft of this particular document, as well

 8     as, you know, a briefing of what the actual plan was intended to be,

 9     would have been briefed to the Main Staff subject to their approval prior

10     to General Zivanovic and his officers finalising the plan.  So the fact

11     that General Zivanovic has signed this particular document, it has the

12     Drina Corps stamp and it's going out for distribution, the implied behind

13     this is that this plan has already been briefed and approved by the

14     Main Staff.  Had it not been so, this plan wouldn't be going out.

15        Q.   Thank you.  In line with that I'd like to show you a map now.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  This is in the map book, 65 ter number 23519.

17     It's map C17, Your Honours, C17 having the English translations on the

18     map.  And it should be at e-court pages 28 and 29 for the original and

19     the English.

20             Oh, sorry.  Strike that.  I've picked the wrong map.  E28,

21     Your Honours.  I apologise.  E29 being the English.  At B/C/S -- at

22     e-court pages 35 and 36.  And this map is entitled "Decision of the

23     Drina Corps commander for active combat operations, military secret,

24     confidential, Krivaja 95, copy 1."

25        Q.   I'll ask you to take a look at this map when it comes up,

Page 27467

 1     Mr. Butler.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  And if we could have the English version as well.

 3     It should be page 29 -- page 36 of the e-court.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Probably we can use only one page, the English

 5     version where the legends are interpreted -- translated.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.  That would be good.  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Let's collapse the B/C/S version.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, in the meantime, I could give Mr. Butler --

 9     here we go.  Yes.  And I think -- perfect.

10        Q.   Now, very simply if we look at this, I don't know if you can read

11     it.  It's kind of small, Mr. Butler --

12             JUDGE KWON:  We can zoom in.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yeah.  If we can zoom in on the top left of this

14     Krivaja 95 map, we see:

15             "I approve, Commander Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic."

16             And if we go down to the bottom, please, on the right, we see the

17     signature of the Drina Corps commander General Zivanovic.

18        Q.   So if I can just ask you to tell us what this map and the

19     signatures tell us about the Krivaja 95 operation.

20        A.   Yes, sir.  And going back to the previous discussion on briefing

21     the Main Staff, while clearly you would have the draft operations order

22     for the staff to review, one of the most effective ways to brief your

23     superior commander about an operation is to do it off of map graphics,

24     and that was the one of the customs of the VRS for particularly large

25     operations.  As part of their military practice, the corps and the corps

Page 27468

 1     commander would submit this as part of the package, and they would

 2     either -- they would physically travel to the Main Staff for this

 3     briefing or the Main Staff representatives and the commander would travel

 4     to the corps command in cases like this, depending on which one it might

 5     be, and there would be a formalised briefing where the plan would be

 6     discussed in detail and ultimately proposed by the corps.  The custom was

 7     as part of their review practice that when the plan was approved by the

 8     superior command, it would be noted as such, and you see again on the

 9     bottom right-hand corner the submission by the corps commander.  And if

10     you go to the top left-hand corner, there's notations there that the plan

11     was approved by the commander, in this case General Ratko Mladic.

12             So this particular document in effect graphically depicts the

13     rather complex JNA staff and planning process that the VRS followed with

14     all of the steps inherent in coming up with a draft operational proposal,

15     flushing it out, putting all the details together, briefing it to the

16     superior command for their comment and ultimately approval, and then

17     disseminating it out to the affected military units that would implement

18     the plan.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And just while we're here, it's moving ahead

20     chronologically a bit in the events, but on the right we can see:

21             "Completed.  This was Serbian and now it's Serbian!

22     12 July 1995."

23             Another signature of General Mladic.

24             Can you comment on your interpretation of what that means, the

25     12 July, Mladic has signed this as completed and that it's now Serbian or

Page 27469

 1     remains Serbian.

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  My understanding of that particular writing at the map

 3     was that it was -- this writing or annotation was placed there on the map

 4     by General Mladic on the 12th of July, 1995, when they had many of the

 5     brigade commanders from the Drina Corps at the Bratunac Brigade

 6     headquarters where they were beginning to plan the next military

 7     operation against the Zepa enclave.  And then as part of that celebratory

 8     dinner and planning conference, General Mladic made these notations on

 9     the former operation plan map for Krivaja 95.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to show you another map.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  This is the one I called out earlier, C17, e-court

12     page 22.  Again, I think the simplest way is probably to show the version

13     which has the English markings, the translations on the map.

14             This one at the top, if we could blow it up.  It states:

15             "Disposition of our enemy and UNPROFOR forces around the enclaves

16     of Srebrenica and Zepa."

17             On the top right:  "Military secret, strictly confidential."

18             And then if we scroll down, under where we see the outlines of

19     the enclaves there are notations on the population, military strength,

20     structure, the ABiH forces, et cetera, as well as UNPROFOR's structure

21     and personnel.

22        Q.   Can you just comment on what this type of map is for prior to

23     Krivaja 95 and -- I'll just ask that to begin with.

24        A.   I take it from the writing on this map and the topical area of

25     this particular map that this would be one that would be created by the

Page 27470

 1     corps intelligence staff.  It's what in my military we would call a

 2     graphic intelligence estimate.

 3             What it depicts and how it relates to Krivaja and Stupcana 95 is

 4     it reflects their intelligence estimates of the forces or the -- in this

 5     case you include the civilians are right against them inside the

 6     enclaves.  So this gives an idea of what their understanding was and the

 7     accuracy of the information that they had available to them related to

 8     the UNPROFOR forces in both the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, the

 9     military forces of the 28th Infantry Division within those particular

10     enclaves, as well as overall numbers relating to the civilian population

11     in those particular enclaves.

12             So this is their reflection -- this is their understanding of

13     what the situation was like at least in terms of military and civilian

14     manpower and UN strength for both of these enclaves.

15        Q.   And my next question is:  If you can, based on all of the work

16     and study you've done on the Srebrenica campaign and events in July 1995,

17     in your assessment, how -- what is the level of accuracy of the estimates

18     relating to the Srebrenica enclave which we see written here regarding

19     the enemy ABiH forces, civilian population, et cetera?  And if you have

20     any trouble reading it, I can give you my hard copy.

21        A.   Yes.  I mean, I've seen this before, so that's not necessary.

22     But it reflects, in my opinion, that the intelligence staff of the

23     Drina Corps had a relatively good picture and an accurate one with

24     respect to the Muslim military forces inside the enclaves, with respect

25     to the UN forces, and the overall population numbers that they use are --

Page 27471

 1     while at the high end, they are consistent with the number ranges that

 2     the United Nations themselves were estimating of civilians inside those

 3     enclaves.  So they had a relatively accurate -- or were receiving

 4     relatively accurate information with respect to what they perceived to be

 5     the situation in those enclaves.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I'm done with that map now.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have a time-frame for this map?

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't have an exact one, Your Honour.  I'm

 9     trying -- it should be something we can figure out.  It's just -- clearly

10     it's before Krivaja 95, and I -- but I don't have the -- an exact date.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  You agree with that?

12             THE WITNESS:  I would -- if I had a take a stab at this, I would

13     say that we're probably looking at March, April, May of 1995, for where

14     these numbers would correspond to what was in the enclaves.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:

17        Q.   All right.  We looked at the -- we've looked at directive 4,

18     directive 7, Krivaja 95, and the planning map.  I want to now start going

19     quickly through the build-up to the fall of Srebrenica and then the

20     events afterwards and talk a little bit now specifically about reporting

21     and information going up the chain.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 65 ter 23684, please.

23        Q.   That's at tab 22, Mr. Butler.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  I should point out, Your Honours, to everybody

25     that this is a document I sought leave to add on the 3rd of April

Page 27472

 1     notification.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Given there's no objection, it's granted.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, and thanks to my friends.

 4        Q.   All right.  I'd like you to just tell us a bit about what this --

 5     the significance of this document to you.  On the top left we see RS MUP

 6     Bijeljina, RDB State Security Department Centre Bijeljina, and the date,

 7     6 July 1995.  On the right, for the VRS security department, again

 8     signed, and it begins in the first paragraph:

 9             "Our source 'Proton' informed us about the contact between

10     political and military leadership in Srebrenica and leadership in

11     Sarajevo that took place early morning 6 July 1995 ..."

12             And I won't read it all, but it is about the Srebrenica

13     representatives asking for a way for Naser Oric in Tuzla to send some

14     troops.

15             In the last paragraph it states:

16             "RDB measures.  We will continue to monitor further development

17     of situation in Srebrenica battle-field through our sources and inform

18     you about further developments in due time."

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the counsel please provide the reference

20     for interpreters.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  This is the bottom last paragraph that begins "RDB

22     measures."  And I'll wait a minute.

23              "We verbally informed the representatives of the VRS OB about

24     the said information source Merkur and personal observations of the

25     operative information reliable."

Page 27473

 1             And I think there's actually a typo that I read out, I'm sorry.

 2     In the first paragraph where it says "our source 'Proton'," in fact that

 3     should be Merkur as well.

 4        Q.   So could you please tell us what this document indicates about

 5     sharing or first of all about monitoring of military events by the RDB.

 6        A.   I guess to step back one, within the context of at least the

 7     enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, it was not just the military intelligence and

 8     security apparatus that was collecting information on them.  The MUP

 9     Ministry of Interior was impacted by those enclaves as well and collected

10     information on them.

11             So effectively within the context of the armed forces of the

12     Republika Srpska, there are three chains of information that exists by

13     which information relating to the enclaves are being passed up and down

14     the various communications chain.  First you have the army reporting on

15     issues; second, that you have the police reporting on issues; and the

16     third is that you have the State Security Service reporting on issues.

17             And as indicated in this particular document, they are doing so

18     in co-operation with each other.  The RDB is not keeping information from

19     the military.  The military is not keeping information from the RDB.

20     They're not keeping information from the police.  So all three of these

21     intelligence collectors, so to speak, are -- are working in co-operation

22     with each other to ensure that everyone has the most accurate and common

23     picture of the events as they are occurring.

24             So from that perspective, the -- the intelligence apparatuses of

25     the state are working as they should.  They're also doing the second part

Page 27474

 1     of intelligence which is they're reporting that up to the various chains

 2     of command.  So they're ensuring that their higher levels within both the

 3     military and the Ministry of the Interior are informed of the things that

 4     they are learning as well and what they are telling the VRS and what the

 5     VRS is telling state security.

 6             So this particular document is an excellent example of that type

 7     of co-operation between the army and the MUP with respect to obtaining

 8     and passing what they believe to be important information about the

 9     opposing military forces in the enclave as the operation is beginning.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would tender this, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4927, Your Honours.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  All right.  If I could now have 23658, please.

15        Q.   That's at your next tab, Mr. Butler.

16             Just same topic.  This is from the RS -- this is headed RS MUP,

17     RDB state security department, to Republika Srpska deputy minister of the

18     interior personally, and RS MUP public security department personally.

19     And it's dated 6th of June at the top but we see immediately that it's

20     discussing the 6th of July.

21             First of all, do you recall who the deputy minister of the

22     interior was at that time?

23        A.   I believe in June and July of 1995 it was Mr. Kovac.

24        Q.   And the head of public security, if you recall?

25        A.   I always get him and the head of the RDB confused.  I think Kajic

Page 27475

 1     is RDB and the name is escaping me for that.  I'm sure we'll see it in

 2     another document.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Can I just remind you?  Is it Karisik?  Does that ring a

 4     bell?

 5        A.   That's -- that's the name, yes, sir.

 6        Q.   So this going to them and it states:

 7             "Early in the morning of 6th July 1995 representatives," I'm

 8     reading from the top, "of the political and military leadership of

 9     Srebrenica established radio contact with the leadership in Sarajevo."

10     The Srebrenica representatives wanted some way to be found for Naser Oric

11     to return to their area urgently and it again discusses three units, as

12     did the previous document we looked at, which was dated also 6th July.

13             Could you just comment on this document as to what you started

14     talking about a moment ago about information through various branches

15     being sent up the chain.

16        A.   Within the context of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska,

17     information was reported to the highest levels at least on a daily basis

18     by the Main Staff in what they would call their daily combat activities

19     report, which went to the Supreme Command, and from the MUP side they

20     also published not only daily but as necessary intelligence information

21     reports to their leadership.  In the case of the MUP, it would be the

22     minister of the interior, Mr. Kovac, who again is a member of the

23     Supreme Command body.

24             So these particular documents, you know, reflect the fact that

25     there was an established mechanism, formal mechanism, by which

Page 27476

 1     information about not only Srebrenica but the entirety of the Republika

 2     Srpska and the armed conflict that was occurring and those issues from

 3     both a military as well as a political perspective were transmitted to

 4     the highest levels of the Republika Srpska leadership.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender that, Your Honours?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4928, Your Honours.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay.  I'm going to continue to move

10     chronologically now, so we'll come back to some of these reporting issues

11     later as it works in.  We were just at 6th July.  I'd like to now show

12     you P04484.  This is an intercept that we've looked at -- it's not an

13     intercept, excuse me.  It's a dictaphone audio recording of a

14     conversation between President Karadzic and General Zivanovic that I

15     believe you hadn't seen before we met and talked about these issues this

16     weekend.

17        A.   Yes, sir, this is correct.  That's the first time I'd seen this

18     document.

19        Q.   Now, this is at your tab 26, Mr. Butler.

20             Looking through this tape -- and it's not dated but we'll look at

21     some documents later that may help explain approximately when this

22     occurred.  I won't read the entire document out, but President Karadzic

23     asks at mid point down the first page in the English:

24             [As read] "... so it looks that immediate task is completed,

25     right?"

Page 27477

 1             The answer from the Drina Corps commander Zivanovic is:

 2             "It is."

 3             And President Karadzic asks:

 4             "Are Sise" - if I pronounce it correctly - "ours?"

 5             And then Zivanovic says:

 6             "They are."

 7             And there's a little bit of discussion about that.  I'll stop

 8     there.  What does that refer to, Sise, if you know?

 9        A.   There's a series of hilltops that geographically on the map

10     are -- are south of Srebrenica, the town, that are essentially along the

11     road from Zeleni Jadar to Srebrenica.  The main axis of the attack was

12     from Zeleni Jadar to Srebrenica.  These hills had a -- of course a slang

13     nickname that were referred to by the local soldiers and of course the

14     leaders knew it as well, but militarily, it was recognised that for any

15     attack into or towards the actual town of Srebrenica to succeed, that the

16     Bosnian Serb military forces that were attacking were going to have to

17     take and control these hilltops.  So essentially what they were referring

18     to is the fact that their forces have achieved those initial objectives

19     and that they're controlling those terrain features.

20        Q.   It might be clearer let me bring up -- bring up a map and have

21     you, if you can, show us where these three features are.  This would be

22     D20 in the map book, e-court page 26, I think is a good page.

23             Now, my only interest in the map at this point, Mr. Butler, when

24     it comes up is for you to just show us where these three elevations are,

25     if you can.

Page 27478

 1             THE ACCUSED:  Excuse me just a moment.  Translators didn't,

 2     neither we, didn't see the whole document in Serbian version so to follow

 3     what is presented to witness.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  You're referring to the audio recording?

 5             THE ACCUSED:  Yeah, but Serbian version is not scrolled as

 6     according to what you've been talking.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, what is your question about?  In

 8     English translation says, "Are the tits ours," but you refer to something

 9     else.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, that is what I'm referring to, Your Honours.

11     The Serbian word is "Sise."  That's what I was reading --

12             JUDGE KWON:  But you said in B/C/S when you referred to "tits."

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, yes.  Yes.  It's the three mountains that

14     are referred to as "the three tits" that are at the Zeleni Jadar area, to

15     be clear.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So now you understood, Mr. Karadzic?  Yes.  Let's

17     continue.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  We just need the map up for Mr. Butler.  And

20     that's 65 ter number 23519, e-court page 26.

21        Q.   Okay.  And I think it's kind of towards the bottom right,

22     Mr. Butler.  Is that the part we should blow-up?

23        A.   Yes, sir.  The lower right-hand side of the map.

24        Q.   And just tell us how -- how much you need it enlarged.

25        A.   That should suffice.

Page 27479

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Before we proceed, Mr. Nicholls, is this a separate

 2     map or part of a --

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  It's an excerpt, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  So which is zoomed in.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.  And I'm just using it for the purpose of him

 6     showing where these mountains are.

 7             THE WITNESS:  You'll note that I've circled in red three

 8     corresponding hilltops which are what colloquially they referred to as

 9     "the three tits."  Militarily or geographically you can see that they

10     control or they dominate the road from Zeleni Jadar in the south towards

11     Srebrenica in the north, and that before you could launch any effective

12     attack toward Srebrenica, you had to secure those three terrain features.

13     So that was a key early military objective for the attacking forces of

14     the Army of the Republika Srpska.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  And I would tender this marked

16     segment.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Probably it may be more useful if we zoom in

18     further.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  And then let's ask the witness to mark it again.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay, Your Honour.  And --

22             JUDGE KWON:  So that we can see the features more clearly.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  And could you --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, just zoom in that part.  Further.  We can zoom

25     in once again so that we can read the numbers even.  Yes.  I think that's

Page 27480

 1     sufficient.

 2             Please wait.  Probably you need to push the button for the colour

 3     or something.  No, no.  Yes.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  So those are the ... [Marks].

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, Mr. Nicholls.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honour, I'd ask to give this a number.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be Exhibit P4929.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:

11        Q.   Now if we could go back to the audio recording, P04484, that we

12     were looking at a moment ago.  And that's at tab 26, Mr. Butler.  And to

13     save time, I will just read a bit before it comes up.  Lower down after

14     Mr. Karadzic says:

15             [As read] "That's good.  We shouldn't give Sise, the tits, at any

16     cost."

17             And there's some laughter.  And then President Karadzic says:

18             "So, what's going on?  There were some blue ones with us, right?

19             "Pardon?

20             "There are the blue ones on our side, right?

21             "They should be treated well.

22             "Properly, properly."

23             And then a discussion how there were no losses.

24             Based on what you know was going on at about the time that this

25     operation took place which seized the Sise, these three elevations, what

Page 27481

 1     would that conversation about the blues refer to, do you believe?

 2        A.   In this context they're already taking custody of some of the UN

 3     soldiers who were at check-points which the UN was observing and actually

 4     had on some of these heights, and rather than fall back through the

 5     battle-field area which they deemed to be too dangerous, a number of

 6     these UN detachments essentially came over to the Bosnian Serb side and

 7     were taken into custody by the Bosnian Serbs.  So I believe that in this

 8     particular context what they are discussing is the confirmation that

 9     President Karadzic is aware that, you know, they -- that the Army of

10     Republika Srpska has custody of some UN peacekeepers who are there and is

11     noting that they should be taken care of.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  If we go to the next page in the English.  Sorry,

14     it must be -- I may have a different version on the first page then.

15     Back to the first page of the English.  Yes, first page of the English,

16     please.  If we could look at the -- towards the bottom where it states:

17             [As read] "Fine.  So I can't give any of the," and then there's a

18     word we can't hear, "to you.  Everything is taken and only if you need

19     any large ones, it should be checked through the Main Staff.  I know that

20     there is some and where it is, so we could probably reinforce you a

21     little."

22             Zivanovic:  "We will also need that."

23             Karadzic:  "Pardon?"

24             "That will also be ... needed."

25             President Karadzic:

Page 27482

 1             "All right, call the Main Staff up there, and I know that it came

 2     in, and you can call me via Barijera and we could talk and reinforce."

 3             And then a little bit further down, Zivanovic says:

 4             "They're escaping that way.  I've urged Gvero up there that the

 5     Milici and Bratunac radio stations be put at a higher intellectual level,

 6     so to speak, and to start working on it a bit through the media.  I don't

 7     mean soft persuasion, not persuasion."

 8        Q.   Now, first of all I'm going to look at some documents in a

 9     minute, but based on your study of this document that we saw this

10     weekend, what is President Karadzic saying to General Zivanovic about

11     reinforcements and calling up there to the Main Staff?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  There -- even with the forces that they already had

13     available to them, they already knew that they were looking to get more

14     combat forces, and one of the options that was out there was potentially

15     to use some of the MUP forces that were deployed in other areas of the

16     battle-field to be reallocated to the Krivaja 95 operation.  And in fact

17     if you look several days later, that is in fact exactly what happens.

18             So I mean in this context, President Karadzic is reminding

19     General Zivanovic he has a general awareness of the overall situation, he

20     knows what's going on, saying, Look, if you need those additional forces,

21     you know, begin the process of doing that through the Main Staff and we

22     may be able to get them to you.

23        Q.   Okay.

24             And could we go now to the next page in English, please.

25             And continuing the conversation that we just talked about, about

Page 27483

 1     the media and the radio stations, President Karadzic said:

 2             "All right, have someone prepare instructions for the journalists

 3     and I will approve them, the minister for ..."

 4             And Zivanovic says:

 5             "I told this to Gvero and hope it will be carried out in that

 6     sense."

 7             And then a minute later President Karadzic says:

 8             "All right, just tell Krle that I can't get to him right now,

 9     well, the entire MUP is engaged.  I really don't have -- these from

10     Zvornik are the last reserves of these in Sarajevo, at Treskavica, in

11     fact at Trnovo.

12             Zivanovic says:  "Yes."

13             President Karadzic says:

14             "So there is no other way.  You have to go with your own forces."

15             First of all, do you know from your study of this what the

16     nickname Krle, whose nickname -- who that refers to?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  That's the nickname for General Radislav Krstic who at

18     this time is the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps but is physically

19     located now at the Drina Corps forward command post south of Srebrenica

20     where he's actively directing Krivaja 95.

21        Q.   And then just a little bit further down, Karadzic towards the end

22     of the conversation says:

23             "All right, General, full speed ahead.  Tell Krstic order them to

24     go full steam ahead."

25             And Zivanovic replies:

Page 27484

 1             "We are working pretty much according to plan and it's going

 2     well, and thank God that we don't have any losses.  That's the key,

 3     especially in these first attacks."

 4             And then there's some more.

 5             If you could just comment what this conversation we see tells us

 6     about the Supreme Commander's ability during combat operations to consult

 7     with corps commanders.

 8        A.   Well, I believe this particular document is illustrative of

 9     several points.  The most obvious one is that the Supreme Commander is

10     not limited to receiving formal reports about the military situation in

11     any particular area of the battle-field.  He has the physical ability and

12     obviously in this particular case chose to exercise it to directly call

13     the corps commander of the corps that's conducting this operation,

14     General Zivanovic, to get a situational update and to directly pass on

15     instructions through General Zivanovic to his subordinate which is

16     General Krstic.  So in that particular sense, it reflects the fact that

17     President Karadzic as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces is

18     engaged in this process.

19             It also reflects the fact that he has a detailed awareness of not

20     only what's happening on the ground at Srebrenica, because he has chosen

21     to inquire, but also he has detailed awareness of military operations in

22     other areas.  In this respect, he's talking about the MUP forces deployed

23     at Sarajevo, Treskavica, Trnovo.  And he has enough of a knowledge base

24     to know that it would be problematic at that particular point to have to

25     pull out MUP forces from one axis to reinforce the Drina Corps in another

Page 27485

 1     one.  He's not saying that it can't be done or that a way wouldn't be

 2     found, but he's not making any knee-jerk reactions.  He has an

 3     appreciation of the various risks on other areas of the battle-field and

 4     is managing those risks.  So it reflects to me an individual who is

 5     suitably engaged in what's happening within the context of the conflict

 6     at Srebrenica.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  I now want to go quickly through a few documents that

 8     are all dated 8 July 1995 and just see if it gives us some context to the

 9     phone conversation -- or the conversation, I should say, that we just

10     talked about and to help date it.  The first one is --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Before we do so, just out of curiosity --

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  -- if you could help us as regards who or what

14     Barijera is, when Mr. Karadzic said to inform him via Barijera on the

15     previous page.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  And I can't, unfortunately.  I don't

17     believe I know the answer to that question.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  If I could just have one

20     second.

21                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 23465, please.

23        Q.   That's at tab 27, Mr. Butler, of your binder.  This is a

24     Drina Corps command 8 July 1995 urgent regular combat report to the

25     Main Staff.  Time stamp is processed at 19.36, and if we could look at

Page 27486

 1     page 2, requests made by General Zivanovic.  Paragraph 9.

 2             "Due to the possibility of enemy attacks in the north-western

 3     part of the front," I'll skip a couple words, "please engage MUP forces

 4     from Zvornik, their 1st Company, through the RS MUP as reserve forces for

 5     the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade on standby to intervene along the

 6     endangered axis."

 7             Again, signed by General Zivanovic.

 8             I'd just ask you if you can comment on this paragraph and its

 9     relation, if any, to the conversation we looked at.

10        A.   Yes, sir.  It talks about the 8 July conversations -- or not

11     conversation, but it talks about the situation on 8 July, the recognition

12     that they're receiving information that there may be other attacks

13     against the Drina Corps in part to relieve pressure on Srebrenica.  In

14     this particular thing they talk about the access from Kalesija, Kladanj

15     and Olovo, and they're already talking about the possibility of a MUP --

16     the 1st MUP Company from Zvornik, which is down at Trnovo, to at least

17     put them on standby to have to deploy to these areas if the situation

18     dictates.

19        Q.   And is this a request -- you talked about earlier the way use of

20     the MUP forces worked.  Is this a request, I think you used the phrase

21     "to get the process started" or something like that, to engage the MUP?

22     Is this the right way to do that?

23        A.   Yes, sir, this would be an example of the correct way to do that.

24     This report would go to the Main Staff.  The Main Staff, having a better

25     view of the entire battle-field, would be able to sit down and make

Page 27487

 1     determinations as to what the overall battle-field situation was, where

 2     these forces or if these forces could be redeployed or made available and

 3     what risks they would assume in doing so, and would those risks be worth

 4     the gain that they anticipate.  So this is part of, you know, that

 5     overall military planning process that's always ongoing.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'd tender that, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4930, Your Honours.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:

11        Q.   All right.  Moving along to another 8 July document, Mr. Butler.

12     This is at your tab 28, P04482, please.  It's a Drina Corps IKM

13     Pribicevac urgent interim combat report.  And I won't read it out to save

14     time, but if you could take a look at paragraphs 2 and 5 and tell us if

15     this 8 July document relates to the conversation between Mr. Karadzic --

16     President Karadzic at the time and General Zivanovic.

17        A.   Yes, sir.  Again they're talking about in this particular interim

18     report, which is drafted by General Krstic who is at the forward command

19     post in Pribicevac, where this interim report is updating both the

20     command of the Drina Corps and the Main Staff on the overall combat

21     situation, and again as part of that, you know, it dovetails in with the

22     conversation that we heard previously with respect to General Zivanovic

23     and President Karadzic.

24        Q.   We see in paragraph 2:

25             "Our forces seized control over the key installations on this

Page 27488

 1     axis including the Tri Sise," the three tits.

 2             And in paragraph 5 a reference to UNPROFOR forces who

 3     surrendered, seven of them, to the VRS because they felt they needed to

 4     be protected from Muslim forces.  It says they were sent to Bratunac.

 5             Is that -- does that connect to the conversation?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, it does.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I intervene once again?  It

 8     seems to me that seven were sent to Potocari.  That's the first part of

 9     the sentence, to their base, to Potocari.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.  There's another reference to seven to

11     Bratunac, but the document says what it says.

12             JUDGE KWON:  This is a document that has already been admitted.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

14             Very quickly, if I could have 23464, please, again 8 July.  This

15     is from General Zivanovic to the Main Staff, to the assistant commander

16     for morale, religious and legal affairs.

17        Q.   Just recalling in the conversation there was a discussion where

18     Zivanovic said, "I already told that to Gvero," and spoke about using

19     radio stations in Milici and Bratunac.  This document from Zivanovic to

20     the assistant commander for morale, religious and legal affairs

21     personally at the Main Staff, who is that?

22        A.   The -- the actual assistant commander at the Main Staff would be

23     General Gvero.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  May I admit this, Your Honour?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 27489

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4931, Your Honours.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Finally in this same -- to round up these

 3     documents from 8 July, D02099.

 4        Q.   That's at tab 30, Mr. Butler.  This is the Main Staff of the army

 5     of the RS, 8 July, very urgent report to the various corps and command

 6     posts but, at the top, to the president of the Republika Srpska.

 7             If we could go to page 3 of the English.  It's also page 3 of the

 8     Serbian original.  Paragraph 6.  I think it's kind of self-evident, but

 9     again if you can tell us where we see here on the part of the front

10     towards Srebrenica, "the Tri Sise feature was seized by us."  We saw the

11     conversation with Mr. Karadzic.  Can you tell us what this shows about

12     reporting?

13        A.   It just reflects the consistency of the reporting by the military

14     of the information up the chain, up the reporting chain.  As it initially

15     came from the forward command post, the IKM, through the Drina Corps

16     command to the Main Staff and then is being reported by the Main Staff to

17     not only its corps and other army elements, but for the benefit primarily

18     of the president of Republika Srpska.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now moving on to the next day, 9 July.  I'd like to

20     show you D02080, Drina Corps IKM, Pribicevac, very urgent interim combat

21     report from Chief of Staff Radislav Krstic.  It's got handwritten time

22     stamp of -- not stamp but handwritten time of 23.20, received, on the

23     bottom.  And if you could just take us through this, your knowledge of

24     the chronology of the events of the fall of Srebrenica.  What is Krstic

25     reporting on here?  What's happened?  Where is the VRS now, the night of

Page 27490

 1     9 July, in terms of the objectives in directive 7 and Krivaja 95?

 2        A.   In this particular context of time, what is happening by the end

 3     of the evening here of 9 July is that despite what they have described as

 4     significant resistance by enemy forces, that the VRS has now taken all of

 5     the relevant necessary terrain features to the south of Srebrenica which

 6     would not only allow them to move north now into the town of Srebrenica,

 7     but as they've also noted, we've taken additional terrain features which

 8     serve to physically separate the known smuggling and communication routes

 9     between Srebrenica and Zepa or -- essentially cutting the military

10     communications routes between the two enclaves.  General Krstic is

11     essentially saying, We've achieved all of the initial objectives laid out

12     in Krivaja 95, and as a result, the conditions are now set for us to

13     continue to advance and again carry out a decisive attack towards

14     Srebrenica.

15             So I mean he's -- he's relatively optimistic about what is --

16     what he's accomplished so far and is making sure that the Drina Corps

17     command as well as the Main Staff are aware of the fact that, you know,

18     as he sees it, the initial and potentially the hardest phase of the

19     operation is completed, is done successfully, and now the stage is set

20     for the next follow-on, which is to really push towards the urban area of

21     Srebrenica as far as he can.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  And I'd like to look now at P02276.  Again from

24     9 July.

25        Q.   This is the next tab in your binder, Mr. Butler.  Main Staff to

Page 27491

 1     the president for information.  To the Drina Corps IKM, where we just saw

 2     General Krstic was.  And to Generals Gvero and Krstic personally, it

 3     states.  The Chamber has even this before so I won't go through every

 4     line of it, but it starts off:

 5             "The President of Republika Srpska has been informed of

 6     successful combat operations around Srebrenica by units of the

 7     Drina Corps and that they have achieved results which enable them to

 8     occupy the very town of Srebrenica.  The President of the Republic is

 9     satisfied with the results of combat operations throughout Srebrenica and

10     has agreed with the continuation of operations for the take-over of

11     Srebrenica, disarming of Muslim terrorist gangs, and complete

12     demilitarisation of the Srebrenica enclave."

13             And then the president has ordered to ensure that UNPROFOR

14     members and Muslim civilians are protected and guaranteed safety,

15     et cetera, and to obey the Geneva Conventions and not burn down homes.

16             There are stamps here for 2350 hours on 9 July.  The other stamp

17     we saw was 23.20.

18             I would just like your view on this document, what it indicates

19     about Karadzic as Supreme Commander at this time, July 1995, receiving

20     reports from the field and being able to make decisions and issue orders

21     based on those reports, if you can.

22        A.   Well, certainly within the time-frame, this is a classic example

23     of two orders passing each other in the night about the same time.  You

24     can infer that at some juncture prior to him actually writing out his

25     interim report, General Krstic has at least verbally briefed his

Page 27492

 1     commander, the Drina Corps, and the Main Staff, about the military

 2     situation and the opportunities that are available.  So that even before

 3     they receive his interim report officially on paper, they have enough

 4     information to go forward and brief the Supreme Commander as to the

 5     ongoing military situation, the current opportunities that are available

 6     to the army as a result of successful operations to date, and to, you

 7     know, receive guidance as to what should be the next objective or, in

 8     this particular context, the final objective.

 9             So even though when you look at the time stamps of the documents

10     coming back and forth, it's clear that there's a very detailed discussion

11     going on between the military commanders on the ground and the

12     Main Staff, and that they're comfortable enough with the overall picture

13     that they brief the president of the republic about what opportunities

14     are out there, what are the potential military objectives that could be

15     taken, and in fact this particular document reflects that the Main Staff

16     did that and that they received the authorisation from the president of

17     the republic to actually move forwards and occupy the town of Srebrenica.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tolimir -- sorry.  Mr. Butler.  I apologise.  If

20     you could help us understand the structure in which this kind of order is

21     sent out -- why -- why General Tolimir is sending out this order.  And

22     where were General Mladic -- Mladic or General Milovanovic?  Why were

23     they skipped, if you could?

24             THE WITNESS:  I don't -- well, in the case of

25     General Milovanovic, I won't say that he was skipped, but certainly we

Page 27493

 1     can account for his absence based on the fact that he was dealing with

 2     issues in the Krajina during this period.  I don't know that in the case

 3     of General Mladic, whether General Mladic was personally present at the

 4     Supreme Command briefing General Mladic [sic] and that what you're

 5     looking at is Mladic calling General Tolimir back at the Main Staff

 6     headquarters to relay the order to General Krstic or whether or not

 7     General Mladic was not physically present because he was en route to

 8     somewhere else, but General Tolimir as the senior officer there was doing

 9     in effect -- representing General Mladic.

10             This particular document doesn't lay it specifically out that --

11     that framework of who attended that meeting.  So I mean, I can't infer

12     too much about whether or not various military officials were or were not

13     skipped.  I don't -- from my historical research on this particular

14     document and everything else, there's nothing irregular about it in the

15     sense that it's General Tolimir relaying the message to General Krstic

16     and General Gvero, who we know on the 9th of July is at the forward

17     command post.  I don't know again where General Mladic was and whether he

18     was the person physically briefing General Karadzic -- I'm sorry,

19     President Karadzic, whether he was en route somewhere else, and how these

20     orders were relayed through General -- from General -- or from the

21     Supreme Commander to General Tolimir.  So I mean, it's just not implicit

22     in the actual document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated] It might be a good time.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It's time.  We will break for an hour and

Page 27494

 1     resume at 1.30.  In the meantime, if you could excuse yourself for a

 2     moment, there's one thing I would like to deal with in private session.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

 5                           [Private session]

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17                           [Open session]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will resume at 1.30.

19                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

24        Q.   Okay, Mr. Butler, if you could go to tab 34 in your binder.

25     That's 65 ter 23686, a document from 10th of July, another RDB Bijeljina

Page 27495

 1     document signed by that centre chief, Goran Radovic.  And I'm just going

 2     to ask some more questions now as we move along chronologically about

 3     information being shared and processed.

 4             This document has handwritten on the top right:  "For the VRS

 5     security department," signed by Dragan somebody.  We don't have the last

 6     name.  More RDB intelligence.  The first paragraph states:

 7             "Please be informed that the VRS units deployed in Srebrenica

 8     battle-field further moved the front line reaching the line Pribicevac

 9     Olivine, Bojna," and then some elevations, "and Pusmulici in the late

10     evening hours of 9 July ..."

11             And states at the bottom:

12             "We will continue to monitor further developments of situation in

13     Srebrenica battle-field through our sources and inform you about these

14     further developments in due time."

15             Now before I ask you a question about that if I could have

16     65 ter 23687 up and I'll ask you a question about both documents.  That's

17     tab 35, Mr. Butler, the next one.

18             This document is from the RS MUP state security department

19     Sarajevo, signed by head of RDB Dragan Kijac, to the deputy minister of

20     the interior personally, and we established that that was Tomo Kovac.

21     And in the first paragraph it begins:

22             "On 9 July this year, the army -- VRS units on the Srebrenica

23     battle-field shifted the front line," and contains the same information

24     as we saw in the one from Goran Radovic of the Bijeljina centre, "up."

25             So if you look at these two documents together, can you again

Page 27496

 1     just comment on what it says to you, including the reference in the first

 2     document that it's to be shared with VRS security?

 3        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe this reflects a positively functioning

 4     information and intelligence chain where information is being collected

 5     at the lower levels.  It is being disseminated up to the various chains

 6     to the leadership levels, first to the head of the RDB, which then uses

 7     the same information to send it to the minister, in this case the deputy

 8     minister of the interior and the head of the public security department.

 9     And it notes in the initial document that the information is also being

10     shared with the army.  So it reflects the continuing close co-ordination

11     and co-operation that the intelligence collection and reporting units or

12     agencies have at the lowest level and rising upwards through the

13     information chain on making sure that all parties have a detailed view of

14     what is happening and, again, more importantly, making sure that that

15     accurate detailed view is being transmitted to their superiors.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender those two documents, Your Honour?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  They will be admitted as Exhibits P4932 and P4933

19     respectively, Your Honours.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:

21        Q.   All right.  Now I'd like to look at another MUP document from

22     10 July, the same day.  This is at tab 38, Mr. Butler.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have P02992.  That may be the wrong

24     number.

25             That's the correct document.  Thank you.

Page 27497

 1        Q.   Now, you talk about this in your revised narrative at pages 32 to

 2     33, paragraph 3.20, and you footnote it in your brigade command report at

 3     footnotes 140, 141, and 142, and in the revised narrative at 194, 195,

 4     and some other places.  I won't read them all because it's footnoted

 5     quite a lot.

 6             This is the 10 July order type-signed by Tomo Kovac.  Pursuant to

 7     the order of the Supreme Commander of the RS and in order to crush enemy

 8     offences being carried out from the safe area of Srebrenica.  I won't ask

 9     you any specific questions right now.  I'd like you to just explain the

10     significance of this document which you included in your reports.

11        A.   In this context, the significance is reflected at the very

12     beginning where it talks about, you know, an order -- based on an order

13     from the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and for the purpose of

14     defeating, crushing, the enemy offensive from the Srebrenica protected

15     zone, a series of orders are being given out by Mr. Kovac.  This

16     dovetails with the provisions of the Republika Srpska Law on the Interior

17     Ministry during time of imminent threat of war or state of war, where it

18     discusses the fact that when the MUP units are going to be used by army

19     forces, then it's the MUP that decides what forces they are and to what

20     degree that they will be resubordinated to the army and under what

21     circumstances.

22             So they're particularly identifying which units will be pulled

23     out from which battle-field areas, who is going to be in command of those

24     particular units, when they're supposed to depart, where they're supposed

25     to go, and in paragraph 5, when they arrive at that location, who that

Page 27498

 1     they're supposed to report to.  In this case, General Krstic, the Chief

 2     of Staff of the Drina Corps.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And we see in here in paragraph 2 that one of the

 4     units -- well, the units are the 2nd Special Detachment -- the

 5     2nd Sekovici Detachment of the Special Police, the 1st Company of the PJP

 6     unit from Zvornik SJB, and then the mixed company of the joint RSK

 7     Serbian and RS MUP forces.  But speaking of the 1st Company from Zvornik,

 8     can you link that at all to the telephone -- to the conversation we saw a

 9     couple of days earlier between President Karadzic and General Zivanovic

10     and the subsequent request by General Zivanovic for the 1st Company from

11     Zvornik to assist?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe that that's the same unit, so of the number

13     of military -- of Special Police Units that they're getting, certainly

14     one of them is the unit that they specifically asked for, the

15     1st PJP Company from Zvornik CSB.

16        Q.   And in fact -- and we'll see some more documents later, but based

17     on your research and understanding, did Commander Borovcanin and these

18     units come and assist on the Srebrenica battle-field or the Srebrenica

19     area?

20        A.   Yes, sir.  They ultimately arrived in the Bratunac area in the

21     late afternoon of the 11th of July, 1995.  So by then the town of

22     Srebrenica had already been captured by the VRS forces advancing from

23     Zeleni Jadar, but, you know, the 1st Sekovici Detachment did arrive, the

24     1st PJP Company did arrive.  The one company from Jahorina training

25     centre did arrive.  The one unit that did not appear to come down there

Page 27499

 1     to participate was the joint MUP forces of the Republic of Serb Krajina,

 2     Serbia and the Republika Srpska.  There's no evidence that that

 3     particular mixed company ever showed up at Potocari on the 11th with the

 4     other formations.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  If I could quickly look now at P02242,

 6     e-court page 89 in English and Serbian.

 7        Q.   And this is at your tab 36, Mr. Butler.  And this is

 8     President Karadzic's appointment diary for 10 July 1995, when it comes

 9     up.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.  And I think we need page 89, if I have my

11     numbers right.  There we go.

12             And we see the entry at 1700, Dragan Kijac and Milenko Karisik

13     meeting with the president the same day that this MUP order was issued

14     sending the units.

15        Q.   Bearing in mind that this is the head of state security and head

16     of public security meeting with Mr. Karadzic that day at that time, can

17     you comment on what this tells you, if anything, about the communications

18     of information from the field up to the Supreme Commander?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that this calls for

20     speculation.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I was actually think the very

22     same thing, and also believe that this is really beyond the expertise of

23     this witness.  There's nothing more that he can add as a military analyst

24     to what you can already infer from the evidence, and I don't believe that

25     this is a necessary part of his expertise in which his opinion would be

Page 27500

 1     helpful to the Chamber.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But the MUP was part of armed forces of the Serb --

 3     Republika Srpska.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  That's absolutely true, but you now have before

 5     you the fact that these two people met with Dr. Karadzic and that there'd

 6     been this communication and what can he tell you any more than what --

 7     he's inferring just the same the thing that you can infer.  There's

 8     nothing from your military expertise that would inform you or assist you

 9     about.  It's just speculating and drawing inferences that the Chamber

10     should be drawing itself.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Can I hear your position, Mr. Nicholls.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes.  I disagree, Your Honour.  As you say, it's a

13     member -- these -- the MUP is a branch of the armed forces which

14     President Karadzic as Supreme Commander commands.  These two men are the

15     head of two branches, the state security and public security of the MUP.

16     It's no different than if Mr. -- President Karadzic at this time is

17     meeting with a VRS subordinate, such as he meets later with Petar Skrbic,

18     for example, during this time period, and he's communicating as we've

19     seen with other -- and we will see with General Gvero during this time

20     period.

21             So I think it's completely within this expert witness's remit to

22     talk about the significance -- I haven't asked him to say what they

23     talked about or speculate on the topic, but to talk about whether the

24     fact that the Supreme Commander not only receives reports, calls

25     commanders in the field, but actually meets in his office with his

Page 27501

 1     subordinates during critical periods of a military campaign at the same

 2     time that important military orders are being issued has any significance

 3     to the way communication and command is exercised, because probably in

 4     some cases commanders don't meet in person in their offices with

 5     subordinates in this manner.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I understand your point but the issue is whether we

 7     need the assistance of this witness to interpret this event.  I will

 8     consult my colleagues.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. --

10             JUDGE KWON:  I will hear from Mr. Nicholls, yes.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  I was just going to say I don't know what the

12     answer will be, but it's conceivable that personal meetings with

13     commanders are part of a rubric that the witness can comment on that adds

14     something to the picture in addition to other forms of communication

15     through phone, radio, or written reports.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Just in brief reply.  The

18     example of Petar Skrbic is an excellent one, because you have a similar

19     situation.  Petar Skrbic meets with Dr. Karadzic during this time period.

20     We're fortunate enough to have his testimony here, and he testified that

21     he never discussed anything about Srebrenica during that time.  So to ask

22     for comments for this -- from this witness is just the kind of

23     speculation that you don't need any help in making.  Thank you.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.  Mr. Butler hasn't come as a fact

Page 27502

 1     witness, and the Chamber can draw its own conclusion on these facts, so

 2     we don't think we need his assistance in interpreting this event.  Let's

 3     proceed.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 5        Q.   All right.  Mr. Butler, moving up to -- just moving quickly to

 6     11th of July.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  And to try to save a little bit of time, I'll just

 8     bring these intercepts up quickly.  Could I have P40629.

 9        Q.   That's at tab 42, Mr. Butler.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Number again.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, P04629.  My mistake.  Sorry.

12        Q.   This is an intercepted conversation between General Gvero and

13     President Karadzic at 16.23.  And do you recall -- I won't ask questions

14     about it now, but do you recall having seen and read this intercept

15     before?

16        A.   Yes, sir, in a different iteration.  I am familiar with this

17     particular intercept.

18        Q.   Okay.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Now could I have P04630.

20        Q.   It's at tab 43, Mr. Butler.  Twenty minutes later, so at

21     approximately 16.43, on the same day.  Now, in the first intercept we saw

22     General Gvero saying everything's going according to plan, don't worry,

23     and in this one we see - I won't go through it because of time - the

24     conversation where we can only see what General Gvero is saying.

25             [As read] "President, Serbian silver, the Serbian church, the

Page 27503

 1     Serbian flag.  But they don't have a reason for it.  The Turks probably

 2     shot at them, if they shot at all at UNPROFOR.  They are in the air

 3     again.  They are setting up again like before.  Good, President, good

 4     luck."

 5             The last one in the series, P04633, just about the same time on

 6     11 July, 16.41.  This intercept in which we can hear President Karadzic:

 7             "They're not allowed to attack us."

 8             The unidentified person:

 9             "They have no reason probably."

10             Some of the same words.

11             And Karadzic says:

12             "Yes, I believe so, but if they start diving, shoot them down."

13             Now what I'd like to ask you is about what this tells you, from

14     your military background, about the level of communications available to

15     the Supreme Commander to contact a member -- one of his generals in these

16     circumstances.

17        A.   Putting the three together, there are three general thematics

18     that they're discussing.  The first one is the acknowledgment that the

19     VRS has captured Srebrenica.  They're talking about who, if anybody, has

20     been firing on UNPROFOR.  And then the third issue that they are

21     discussing is the fact that, again, having been previously attacked by

22     NATO Air Forces over the Srebrenica enclave, and I think those air

23     attacks went in at about 1300, 1400 on the 11th of July, they are noting

24     that there is still aircraft flying over the enclave and instructions

25     being passed what to do if they're attacked again.

Page 27504

 1             In light of the obvious political sensitivity of all three

 2     issues, it's not surprising that the president of the republic would be

 3     personally inquiring as to what the situation is, what the army was doing

 4     or intended to do about things, and telling General Gvero what

 5     instructions should be followed.  It reflects that when it mattered and

 6     when it was deemed important to the supreme leader or the Supreme

 7     Commander in this case, he wasn't shy about directly reaching out to his

 8     subordinate military officers in order to get an accurate picture of what

 9     was happening and to ensure that they understood what his guidance was

10     under those circumstances.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  I'd now like to move to P04450.  We

12     won't go through all of the VRS Main Staff reports to the president, the

13     daily reports during this period, but this one I'd like to.

14        Q.   This is at your tab 46, Mr. Butler.

15             And if we look at page 3 of the English and of the Serbian, we

16     can see the section on the Drina Corps zone of responsibility.  At the

17     bottom of subsection (a), The enemy, it states:

18             "In the Srebrenica enclave the enemy has been putting up fierce

19     resistance to VRS units.  The NATO Air Force has been pounding our forces

20     in the following sectors," et cetera.  "An interim report on the

21     situation in Srebrenica and the NATO Air Force is forthcoming."

22             (B), Situation in the corps.  If we can turn the page.

23             "The corps units are in a state of full combat readiness.  The

24     main forces are being used to mount a persistent defence and part of

25     these forces are involved in offensive operations around the Srebrenica

Page 27505

 1     enclave.  In the course of the day, our forces entered the town of

 2     Srebrenica," and it says that more reports will be coming.

 3             This is from General Miletic.  He's at the Main Staff.  Can you

 4     just discuss here the portion I've read out, the reporting on the entry

 5     of the forces into Srebrenica, and comment on the accuracy and working of

 6     the VRS chain of information up to the president.

 7        A.   This is a reflection again of the fact that the president is

 8     being kept adequately informed by at least one of the three existing

 9     reporting chains that -- that are documented, in this case the military

10     reporting chain.  We have an opportunity, when we look at the documents,

11     to see that the reporting is going from the lower military units to the

12     intermediate units to the Main Staff, it's being then processed and it's

13     going directly to, you know, the president of the Republika Srpska, and

14     it's consistent with what the president of the Republika Srpska is

15     hearing from other individuals associated with the army, for example,

16     that discussion with General Gvero.  It's a reflection that at this

17     particular point this reporting chain is working just as it's supposed to

18     be working.

19        Q.   Now, since we're not going to go through every single one for

20     July 1995, if you've reviewed them, can you just tell us generally your

21     view of the reporting during this month these -- and I'm speaking

22     specifically about these VRS Main Staff reports which go up every day to

23     the president, since we won't look at every single one.

24        A.   From my review of them in previous situations, they reflect a

25     consistent and conscientious effort by the military to accurately report

Page 27506

 1     on the facts from lower levels to higher echelon levels to the Main Staff

 2     and ultimately to the president of the republic.  There's details --

 3     obviously, as you go higher up the chains, you know, the smaller details

 4     tend to get left out because individuals deem that, you know, that's not

 5     newsworthy to the President of Republika Srpska.  But when you look at

 6     the body of reports from the forward operating units to the highest

 7     levels, I mean you can certainly see the consistency of the reporting.

 8     As we call it in the US military, the major muscle movements are all the

 9     same.  It's just a question of how much minutia from any particular unit

10     is deemed valuable enough so that the president of the republic needs to

11     know of it.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'd like to now bring up D202055.  This is the

14     decision on the appointment of the civilian commissioner for the Serbian

15     municipality of Srebrenica.

16        Q.   We're still going in chronological order.  It's 11 July 1995,

17     signed by President Karadzic.  This is footnoted in your Srebrenica

18     revised narrative, footnotes 199 to 201.  It's at tab 47, Mr. Butler.

19             And what I wanted to ask you about was paragraph 4 specifically.

20     It states, and I'll read it while it's coming up in the English -- oh,

21     there it is.

22             "The commissioner shall ensure that all civilian and military

23     organs treat all citizens who participated in combat against the

24     Army of Republika Srpska as prisoners of war and ensure that the civilian

25     population can freely choose where they will live or move to."

Page 27507

 1             And can you just comment about what it says here in paragraph 4?

 2     Who's responsible at this point for the treatment of prisoners of war

 3     under the regulations and practice as you understood it?

 4        A.   I don't read -- I mean, in short, I don't read paragraph 4 to

 5     reflect that the president of the republic has given Miroslav Deronjic

 6     the responsibility for the treatment of all prisoners of war.  His job is

 7     to ensure that civilian and military organisations are treating them as

 8     such in the prescribed manner, but he ultimately isn't responsible for

 9     that.  The prisoners initially are in the custody of the military or the

10     police units that capture them.  How the prisoners are going to be

11     detained, the protocols, and who they ultimately belong to within the

12     context of the state of the Republika Srpska are well defined in the

13     applicable regulations as to the Law of Armed Conflict on the former SFRY

14     which the JNA -- or which the VRS adopted.

15             So again, while Mr. Deronjic's job may have been to, you know,

16     monitor what was happening with these individual units and presumably if

17     they were not being complied with report that up to Karadzic as the

18     president of the republic, Miroslav Deronjic of himself would not have

19     had the authority to tell the military units or the police units that

20     they had to stop or do certain things with them.  I mean, that authority

21     remained vested with the appropriate military and police organs as part

22     of the armed forces and ultimately with President Karadzic as the head of

23     the state.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  All right.  Now moving into 12 July, and we'll

Page 27508

 1     start moving a little bit quicker, I think, through the days.  I'd like

 2     to look at 65 ter 21950.

 3        Q.   This is at tab 51, Mr. Butler.  This is the RS Ministry of the

 4     Interior police force staff Pale order from the next day, 12 July 1995.

 5             "In order to take over urgent task of mopping up the terrain in

 6     the Srebrenica sector, I hereby order:

 7              "1 --" I'll wait, for the interpreters, until the document comes

 8     up.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I was told, Mr. Nicholls, that it hasn't been

10     released.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Oh.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, yes.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, excuse me.  Just while we're waiting

14     for the document to come up, I just want to note that I'll need

15     five minutes at the end of this session to raise something in private

16     session.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated] All right.  I'll come

19     back to that one.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'll come back to that one in a minute.

22     Hopefully.

23             Let's look at another 12 July document.  This is P04680.  It's an

24     intercept of a conversation on 12 July, 0735 hours.  Actually, I think

25     this should not be broadcast perhaps, but I can read the main text.

Page 27509

 1             It's an intercept of a conversation between Krstic and

 2     Lieutenant-Colonel Krsmanovic.

 3        Q.   Now, first question:  Was there a Lieutenant-Colonel Krsmanovic

 4     in the Drina Corps?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  Lieutenant-Colonel Krsmanovic was the chief of

 6     transportation services for the Drina Corps in July of 1995.

 7        Q.   And at this point General Krstic is Chief of Staff still;

 8     correct?

 9        A.   Correct, sir.

10        Q.   Can you just tell us your understanding of what this document

11     is -- the significance of it at 7.35 in the morning of the 12th of July,

12     before the last Hotel Fontana meeting?

13             JUDGE KWON:  But before Mr. Butler answers the question, I'm not

14     sure whether we should not broadcast this.  I think -- I was told that

15     this is admitted publicly.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  In that that case, I apologise, Your Honour.  We

17     can broadcast.  I just wasn't sure.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Butler.

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.  Well, at this point in time this

20     particular intercept discussion is relating to the knowledge of both

21     parties, General Krstic and Lieutenant-Colonel Krsmanovic, where they're

22     talking about buses from various locations, various municipalities, are

23     going to be arriving at the Bratunac area at a certain time, and in this

24     context by 1700, and they're going to make sure they arrive and all of

25     the other associated work that needs to be done with them is done.

Page 27510

 1             There are a number of other documents that are in my report which

 2     reflect earlier orders from the Main Staff and requested from the

 3     Main Staff to the Ministry of Defence where they're requesting the

 4     mobilisation of buses from various municipalities to go to Bratunac at

 5     this time.  So these orders are going out sometime during the late

 6     evening hours of the 11th, early morning hours of the 12th of July, 1995,

 7     and so this conversation kind of is on the back end of that process where

 8     you now have the local military individuals, General Krstic and

 9     Colonel Krsmanovic discussing the issues of inbound buses.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I think I can go back to 65 ter 21950.  And

11     that's at tab 51, Mr. Butler.

12             All right.  This is again type-signed by Deputy Minister Tomislav

13     or Tomo Kovac, dated 12 July 1995, very urgent, to the command centre for

14     the breeding and training of police dogs.

15             "In order to take over urgent task of mapping up the terrain in

16     the Srebrenica sector, I hereby order:

17             "1.  Urgently dispatch all available guides with police dogs to

18     the Srebrenica sector.

19             "2.  Upon arrival in Srebrenica contact Ljubisa Borovcanin,

20     deputy commander of the Special Police Brigade who commands the police

21     forces in Srebrenica, and make arrangements on what to do next."

22             And can you just tell us at this point, 12 July 1995, the order

23     from Tomo Kovac assigning these units, can you comment on what that shows

24     about the way MUP forces are being deployed at this time in this

25     operation?

Page 27511

 1        A.   Yes, sir.  We know from other documents that at this time there

 2     are at least the three MUP companies that are there by the afternoon or

 3     early evening hours of the 11th of July.  The commander of those forces

 4     was Mr. Borovcanin.  The implied issue behind this is that for whatever

 5     reason Mr. Borovcanin believed that he required to have these dogs from

 6     the training centre, he made the formal request to the police staff and

 7     that request was granted.  So a functional chain of command in this case.

 8     A subordinate makes a request.  It goes to the higher staff, in this case

 9     the police staff, and in the name of the minister of the interior, the

10     order is given and these dog guide units are, in fact, sent to

11     Srebrenica.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have P02995, please.

14        Q.   This is at tab 54, Mr. Butler.  Another MUP document.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we ask Mr. Nicholls to show

16     us the entire page.  Hopefully there is a receipt stamp indicating when

17     Kovac received it and the time.

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  My original copy doesn't have any time stamp.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honour, I've been reminded.  May I tender

21     21950?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4934, Your Honours.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:

25        Q.   Now, if you take a look at this document, Mr. Butler, it's from

Page 27512

 1     the RS Minister of the Interior, or the office of the minister, 12 July.

 2     Again from Deputy Minister Tomo Kovac.  This one does have a time at the

 3     top, 0235 hours.  Again, very urgent.  It's to the Zvornik public

 4     security centre chief.  And just if you recall, do you remember who was

 5     the chief in Zvornik in July 1995?

 6        A.   That would be Mr. Vasic, sir.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And what we see here is that Tomo Kovac is sending a

 8     full text of the order of the President of Republika Srpska down to

 9     Zvornik.  And if we look at page 2, we see that on the basis of the above

10     order by President Karadzic, Deputy Minister Kovac has issued the

11     following order:  Establish a public security station in Srebrenica on

12     12 July, appoint commanding officers, et cetera, take all necessary steps

13     to ensure the protection of vital and other business facilities and

14     property in general, the safety of citizens, and prevent the commission

15     of crimes and breaches of law and order.  And while implementing these

16     measures ensure close co-operation with civil commissioner

17     Miroslav Deronjic.  Send daily reports on the progress of implementing

18     the above measures to the office of the minister referring to the

19     dispatch number as stated above.

20             So if you can, if you have an opinion on this document, what is

21     the significance of this order and the transmission of the president's

22     order this way?

23        A.   Well, at its base value, it's an accurate reflection of how the

24     order chain works, at least on the Ministry of the Interior side.  When

25     you read into the document, it reflects that the individuals have

Page 27513

 1     received by some means an awareness of what is happening in the town of

 2     Srebrenica and what steps need to be taken there in order to assert or

 3     reassert appropriate civilian control of the town.  So in this case, I

 4     mean they're aware of what needs to happen.  They're sending out various

 5     orders.  They're reflecting that they know who needs to be co-operated

 6     with.  In this case it's Mr. Deronjic.  And again a verbatim listing of

 7     what orders are to be accomplished.  And the fifth one that closes the

 8     loop on the orders and reporting chain is paragraph 5, where there is the

 9     expectation or order, if you were, just -- that daily reports on the

10     progress of implementing these measures are to be sent to the office of

11     the minister.

12             So it's not a question of an order being given and no thought

13     whatsoever as to whether or not compliance is -- is voluntary or

14     whatever.  He's making it clear that, you know, I want daily reports on

15     this to ensure that -- that all aspects of the order are being complied

16     with.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  And we can see if we look at the first page of

19     this document again that its number is 407/95.

20             I'd like to now go -- this -- this exhibit has two exhibit

21     numbers, Your Honour, the next one.  It's P02996, and it's also P04373.

22     So it's a duplicate, but either one of those, if I could have it up.

23        Q.   This is a document from chief of the CJB Zvornik, Dragomir Vasic.

24     It's in tab 53, Mr. Butler.  And we see at the top, Re:  Dispatch number

25     and it includes 40795.  Acting -- in paragraph 1:

Page 27514

 1             "Acting in accordance with your dispatch I contacted the civilian

 2     commissioner in Bratunac, Miroslav Deronjic.

 3             "2.  A meeting with General Mladic and General Krstic was held at

 4     the Bratunac Brigade command at 0800 hours," this is still 12 July, "at

 5     which tasks were assigned to all the participants.

 6             "3.  The military operation is continuing according to plan.  The

 7     Turks are fleeing towards Suceska while the civilians have gathered in

 8     Potocari, about 15.000."

 9             And then it goes on to talk about the establishment of the police

10     station in Srebrenica, and in paragraph 5:

11             "A meeting will be held at 10.00 with representatives of UNPROFOR

12     and the International Red Cross and a Muslim representative from

13     Srebrenica at which an agreement will be reached on the evacuation of the

14     civilian population from Potocari to Kladanj."

15             It's got in parentheses:  "For them to have more problems there."

16             It talks about trailer trucks for transport.

17             And then 6:

18             "Joint police forces," which we've seen in earlier documents,

19     "are advancing on Potocari with the aim of taking UNPROFOR personnel

20     prisoner, surrounding the entire civilian population and clearing the

21     terrain of enemy groups."

22             "You will be promptly informed of further facts and

23     developments," in number 8.

24             So I'd like your comment on this document keeping in mind the one

25     we just saw from Tomo Kovac with the same number.

Page 27515

 1        A.   The previous document was the order with instructions to report

 2     back on compliance.  This particular document is the first from

 3     Dragomir Vasic which essentially acknowledges, "I have received the

 4     order, and I am carrying out -- or beginning the process of carrying out

 5     the instructions that I've received."  More than even that, Mr. Vasic is

 6     also providing additional information back to the benefit of the police

 7     forces staff in the office the minister as to what is happening in and

 8     around the Srebrenica area with respect to meetings with the military

 9     personnel, General Mladic and General Krstic, about tasks being assigned

10     to participants, the military situation as Mr. Vasic understands it at

11     the time, meetings that are upcoming with UNPROFOR and other

12     representatives, and even noting that trailer trucks -- or in this case

13     over a hundred trailer trucks have been provided for transport already.

14             So even above noting that he has received and is complying with

15     the orders, he's providing additional information to ensure that his

16     superiors have full situational awareness.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And just -- we've heard a lot of evidence on it.  I'm

18     not going to try to go through all the events in Potocari on the

19     12th with you, but just remind us, what's the situation, if you recall,

20     on the ground in Potocari early morning on the 12th of July?

21        A.   At this point in time, the VRS and the police units have not yet

22     moved into Potocari.  They don't do that until after the third meeting

23     which takes place beginning at 10.00 at the Hotel Fontana.  So at this

24     place in -- what you have in Potocari right now are the number of

25     civilians from Srebrenica who have fled to Potocari, and they are still

Page 27516

 1     under the positive control of the Dutch UNPROFOR battalion forces that

 2     are in Potocari.  So that is the situation as it exists in Potocari when

 3     this dispatch is being sent out.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  If I could now have 65 ter 3990.

 6        Q.   That's at tab 55, Mr. Butler.  Another dispatch from chief of

 7     CJB.  It's -- it says "illegible," but that would be Vasic.  This is

 8     12 July 1995.  Very urgent.  In the original we can see that handwritten

 9     at the top it says "Vasic."  On the right.  It's to police headquarters

10     in Bijeljina and the office of the minister in Pale.  And begins stating

11     that at 1030 hours, a meeting was held at a hotel in Bratunac attended by

12     the following:  General Mladic, chief of centre Vasic, Miroslav Deronjic,

13     president of the Municipal Assembly and Executive Council in Bratunac,

14     Colonel Karremans, and I won't read through all the names of the people

15     there, and then goes through a set of conclusions.

16             According to Muslims there are 25.000 people in the base at

17     Potocari, mainly small children, women and the elderly, and only

18     10 per cent are conscripts from 17 to 60 years old.  They want to leave

19     the camp voluntarily and go to Tuzla or Kladanj and they request

20     assistance.  They also request the free passage for able-bodied men

21     because allegedly they are unarmed and they are not in contact with their

22     army in the woods.

23             Number 4:  "After inspection depending on Mladic's decision,

24     able-bodied men may be allowed to go in order to have others in the woods

25     to surrender since our command urge them to do so."

Page 27517

 1             Five:  "Acting upon President Karadzic's order which was conveyed

 2     to us today over the phone, the 2nd Company of the Zvornik PJP,

 3     two platoons, 60 men, shall be dispatched to Srebrenica with the task to

 4     secure all facilities of vital importance in the town and protect them

 5     from looting and misappropriation.  They will carry out the task without

 6     co-operation of the military police which is busy with other tasks.

 7             "A platoon of this company will lie in ambush at Ravni Buljim,

 8     since Muslim groups were been spotted fleeing along this axis.  You will

 9     be informed of further developments and facts."

10             Can you comment on this document now after the last Hotel Fontana

11     meeting on the 12th and what it says about the communications and command

12     within the MUP chain?

13        A.   With respect to the information that Mr. Vasic is providing, I

14     mean he's making a concerted and diligent effort to ensure that his

15     superiors are informed of all of the developments that occurred relative

16     to that third meeting, informing them of what General Mladic and the

17     military have decided, what they have heard from the Muslims as to the

18     number of civilians in Potocari and out of that number of civilians what

19     the Muslims believe to be the percentage of military-aged men.

20             It talks about the fact that General Mladic has made a decision

21     regarding potentially screening the able-bodied men and that he may allow

22     them to go as part of an effort to get other people to surrender.

23             Paragraph 5 is particularly noteworthy insomuch as the fact that,

24     you know, it notes a -- that Mr. Vasic received a telephonic order over

25     the phone to dispatch elements of another PJP company to Srebrenica, and

Page 27518

 1     it was noted again -- whether it was President Karadzic personally

 2     calling or whether or not the person who called told Vasic that the order

 3     comes from President Karadzic is not quite clear, but certainly Mr. Vasic

 4     took it as an order from a proper authority and is letting his superiors

 5     in the chain of command, MUP chain of command, know that he is complying

 6     with it.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  May I tender this, Your Honours?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be admitted.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4935, Your Honours.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Now D0 --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Could I now have D02023.

13        Q.   This is at tab 56, Mr. Butler.  This is a 12 July, 1240 hours

14     intercept.  And I'll just bring it up and then we'll go to another

15     intercept from the same day.

16             This is at -- we can see frequency 785.000, channel 5.  It's

17     headed:  Inaudible, Panorama X-Y.  Just again remind us what Panorama is?

18        A.   Yes, sir.  Panorama is the telephonic code-name for the

19     Main Staff of the VRS.

20        Q.   And it says:

21             [As read] "This morning," at the bottom, "we organised it here.

22     We'll give them everything I talked with them and we will accept all of

23     the civilians who want to and they can stay.  Those who don't want to can

24     choose where they'll go."

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Now, if I could have P04254.  That might be MFI'd.

Page 27519

 1     This is another frequency, same channel, ten minutes later, between

 2     General Mladic and an unidentified male person.  I'll just read it

 3     quickly.

 4             X says:  "Go ahead, General."

 5             Mladic says:  "Have these buses and trucks left?"

 6             X:  "They have."

 7             Mladic:  "When?"

 8             X:  "Ten minutes ago."

 9             Mladic:  "Good, excellent.  Continue to monitor the situation.

10     Don't let small groups of them sneak in.  They've all capitulated and

11     surrendered and we'll evacuate them all - those who want to and those who

12     don't want to."

13             X:  "I understand, General."

14             And then there's some more conversation which I won't read out.

15             What I want to ask you is:  Militarily, what is the situation now

16     at 12.50 on the 12th of July facing the VRS in Potocari in terms of

17     threats or presence of the ABiH?

18        A.   In Potocari?

19        Q.   In that -- yes, in Potocari where the civilians are gathered?

20        A.   Militarily there isn't any.  At this juncture and time, the

21     police and military forces that came down the road over the Yellow Bridge

22     and into Potocari from the Bratunac area have entered the compound.

23     Buses and trucks have entered the compound.  They are already dealing

24     with sorting individuals and putting the first people on buses.  I

25     believe the first bus convoy leaves Potocari somewhere around between

Page 27520

 1     12.00 and 1230 hours on the 12th of July.  And it's eminently clear to

 2     everyone that's there that there are no organised military forces of the

 3     ABiH at Potocari.  It is completely demilitarised in the sense that not

 4     only is it mostly women, children, and elderly, those military-aged men

 5     who were there, they're not armed, and there's no indication overtly that

 6     they're even members of the armed forces.  So they would have had that

 7     awareness very early on once the VRS and police forces entered Potocari

 8     on the 12th of July.

 9        Q.   Now, slightly wider than Potocari, what is the military situation

10     for the VRS in the former enclave this time around 1.00 p.m. on the 12th?

11        A.   By about 1300 on the 12th, the VRS which had been getting

12     persistent reports of small enemy groups forming in columns near Jaglici

13     and Susnjari and working their way out of the enclave and attempting to

14     cross the road at Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje, there are now becoming

15     enough of those reports that there's a -- a serious recognition on the

16     part of the army that the forces of the ABiH aren't where they thought

17     they were.  The army's position going into the morning of 12 July 1995

18     was that since they did not encounter the bulk of the 28th Infantry

19     Division in Srebrenica and there was no evidence that it was actually in

20     Potocari, their view was that it had fallen further into the heart of the

21     enclave area in an area referred to as the Bandera Triangle, which the

22     United Nations had been prohibited by the Muslims from ever inspecting,

23     and presumably preparing to break out towards the direction of Zepa from

24     there.

25             So most of the mobile military forces, the elements of the

Page 27521

 1     Zvornik Infantry Brigade, the Birac Infantry Brigade, the

 2     Romanija Infantry Brigade, and the units that had actually -- you know,

 3     the Drina Wolves, the units that had actually captured Srebrenica were

 4     now moving to the west in order to engage the remaining forces of the

 5     28th Infantry Division in the Bandera Triangle.  By 1300, everyone's

 6     recognising that there's no contact being made with those forces.

 7             So by this point in time, everybody within the leadership

 8     structure of the military and the police there are recognising that the

 9     army isn't in fact in the Bandera Triangle.  The ABiH forces are forming

10     this column and attempting to go out over the road between Nova

11     Kasaba-Konjevic Polje, and they also recognise that there are almost no

12     forces there to interdict them.

13        Q.   And you said earlier in the previous answer that the -- Potocari

14     had effectively been demilitarised at this time, which was one of the

15     goals of the leadership for the enclave; is that right?

16        A.   Well, correct in that sense, but I mean, the way that I look at

17     it, there weren't armed elements of the 28th Infantry Division that

18     accompanied any of the civilians from Srebrenica to Potocari.  There were

19     not armed soldiers there.  There was no military presence there other

20     than UNPROFOR.  And as there has been, I presume, testimony and certainly

21     evidence in other cases that I'm aware of, shortly after the VRS started

22     arriving in Potocari, they begin disarming the Dutch Battalion soldiers.

23     So very quickly, by the time the VRS and police forces arrived in

24     Potocari on the 12th, there was absolutely no threat against them.

25        Q.   And then at that time, the time of this intercept we see with

Page 27522

 1     General Mladic saying, "They've capitulated and surrendered and we'll

 2     evacuate them all - those who want to go and those who don't want to,"

 3     from your analysis is there any military -- military justification for

 4     removing the civilian population?

 5        A.   The -- in an abstract, clearly military commanders would want to

 6     remove or safeguard civilians from an area that they understood would be

 7     a potential battle-field where they can.

 8             While -- when one looks at -- there's the initial bit of

 9     confusion in the early morning hours of the 12th of July as to where the

10     ABiH 28th Infantry Division is, whether it's in the Bandera Triangle or

11     whether it's in the, you know, the column escaping out, there's no one

12     from the VRS leadership, either in the Bratunac Brigade, the Drina Corps,

13     the police staff, or the Main Staff, who's -- who's thinking that the

14     ABiH 28th Infantry Division will somehow turn around and seek to attack

15     Potocari.  So there's no military threat in that context that would

16     necessitate removing the population out of Potocari on that day under

17     those circumstances.

18        Q.   All right.  I'm going to move on to another document from about

19     this time, 12 July, this is P04388.  It's at tab 58, Mr. Butler, in your

20     binder.  This is a document signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic.

21     It's a few hours later, actually, dated 12 July 1995, and it says

22     1730 hours on it.  It's also got handwritten "Security administration

23     chief of operation and training."  It's to the Main Staff of the VRS,

24     sector for intelligence and security and the command of the Drina Corps

25     security.  And it's been -- just remind us, who's Colonel Popovic in the

Page 27523

 1     Drina Corps?

 2        A.   Colonel Popovic is the chief of security for the Drina Corps.

 3        Q.   He reports in paragraph 1:

 4             "In the course of the day our forces and MUP forces did not have

 5     any heavy exchange of fire with the Balijas.  MUP forces entered Potocari

 6     in the morning without combat."

 7             And on the next page, paragraph 3:

 8             [As read] "A refugee group of about 30- to 35.000 women,

 9     children, and elderly, the infirm, and the sick is located after, beyond

10     the UNPROFOR base towards Srebrenica, on the road and inside the

11     facilities of the former factories.  The security was established and the

12     evacuation to Kladanj started.  About 5.000 women and children were

13     evacuated so far.  We are separating men from 17 to 60 years of age and

14     we are not transporting them.  We have about 70 of them so far and the

15     security organs and the DB," state security, "are working with them."

16             So I wanted to ask you what you see as the significance of this

17     very urgent report but also, from the military's perspective, what you

18     would have to say about the fact that VRS security and state security are

19     working with the prisoners, whatever that means exactly at the time.

20        A.   Well, answering that particular question first, from a security

21     perspective, either the military security organs or the state security

22     organs, there would be legitimate purposes for wanting to question those

23     captured men between the age of 17 and 60, presuming that some, if not

24     all, had at least some knowledge of the military structure and situation

25     as it existed in Srebrenica, who leadership figures might be, and what

Page 27524

 1     other valuable military or political information might be obtained from

 2     these individuals.  So in that context, the fact that both the state

 3     security organs and the military security organs are working with them,

 4     and I take this working to be they are interrogating them to obtain this

 5     type of information, is what you might expect those organs to be doing.

 6             On the -- you know, there's another level because particularly

 7     within the context of state security organs and the security organs,

 8     there's also a law enforcement component.  There are -- there was at

 9     least one list floating around and another list as well on individuals

10     who are wanted potentially for their involvements for war crimes against

11     the Serbs.  And so there would also be a legitimate purpose to want to be

12     questioning these individuals as to who they are, what their identities

13     are, to ensure or to vet if these individuals are on those particular

14     lists or, if not, do they know who these individuals are and where they

15     might be located.

16             So there would be -- there are normal legitimate purposes why

17     these individuals will be interrogated by both the military and the MUP

18     security organs.

19        Q.   Can I ask you -- can I ask you in relation to that, we see this

20     here on the 12th of July with the male prisoners.  In your view, would it

21     be routine or out of the ordinary in the context of captured prisoners in

22     general, not specific to the Srebrenica operation, for both state

23     security and VRS security to have contact with the prisoners and -- and

24     question them, interrogate them?

25        A.   That would not be out of the ordinary.

Page 27525

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'd now like to go to 65 ter 1942.

 3        Q.   That's in the second binder, Mr. Butler, tab 104.  So it's far

 4     away.

 5             Now, this is from the head of the RDB, Dragan Kijac,

 6     12 July 1995, to the deputy minister of the interior personally,

 7     Tomo Kovac, head of public security, and chief of RDB Bijeljina.

 8             Representatives -- I won't read out the whole thing but it's a

 9     report on the situation in Srebrenica and reports from international

10     humanitarian organisations, and it states that -- what their information

11     is that the morning on 12 July, the humanitarian situation was "worse

12     than ever.  The population lacks food, medicine and clothing."  The

13     estimates of 30.000 people around the DutchBat base, and it states that

14     according to reports by military observers there's not a single armed

15     soldier of the so-called BH Army among these people.  Speaking about

16     Potocari.  The -- in the event of evacuation of the population via

17     Zvornik as reportedly proposed by the Serbian side, the DutchBat

18     commander propose that UNPROFOR provide 20 buses and complete the

19     evacuation in rounds of about 1.000 people.

20             So my question is:  We saw state security working with the

21     prisoners being present in Potocari in the last document.  Can you

22     comment on the information we see here being distributed up the MUP chain

23     to various heads?

24        A.   It reflects that state security is not exclusively talking to

25     prisoners to gain information.  They are also talking to members of the

Page 27526

 1     humanitarian organisation, and I take it from the context according to

 2     the reports by military observers, they're talking about the

 3     United Nations military observers who came up from Srebrenica and who

 4     were in Potocari and also sending reports back to the UN chain of

 5     command, that they're either accessing or they're talking to these

 6     individuals and gleaning information out of what they are reporting to

 7     their superiors.  And in the context of that information, Mr. Kijac

 8     believes that it's important enough to ensure that the minister of the

 9     interior, the chief of the centre in Bijeljina and the head of the RJB,

10     the public security department, they all personally see this report

11     because it is of significance to what is developing, I would suspect

12     primarily on the reports of the growing humanitarian crisis which would

13     have an impact on the Republika Srpska from the international community.

14        Q.   And based on your work in the Srebrenica investigation and your

15     work on this case for the years that you were with the ICTY, the

16     information regarding the humanitarian crisis that they're passing up,

17     how accurate is it based on what you've seen from other documents, other

18     sources?

19        A.   This is an accurate reflection of what the United Nations and the

20     international observers and the NGOs are reporting up their chain.  So in

21     this particular context, they are accurately reporting the information

22     they are receiving.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  May I tender that, Your Honour?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4936, Your Honours.

Page 27527

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 65 ter 09130, please, 09130.  This is

 2     a -- still continuing to talk about MUP reporting on 12 July 1995.

 3        Q.   This is at your tab 59 in the first binder, back to the first

 4     binder, Mr. Butler.  It's again to the RS MUP, Bijeljina police forces

 5     staff from Chief Vasic.

 6             "We notify you that the evacuation and transportation of the

 7     civilian population from Srebrenica is underway."

 8             Then it begins to talk about the majority of men of military age,

 9     about 8.000, of whom 1.500 armed, led by Ejub Golic and Ibrahim Mandzic

10     are in the Konjevic Polje and Sandici sector, the Sekovici Special

11     Detachment, the 1st Company of the PJP, the same units we were talking

12     about earlier, and the 5th Company of the Zvornik CJB are blocking this

13     section with the goal of destroying these forces.

14             [As read] "For the above reasons I've ordered the roads,

15     Drinjaca," et cetera, "and am hereby notifying you we obtained all the

16     above information from the four men we captured in Konjevic Polje an hour

17     ago at about 1630 hours."

18             So this report's at approximately 1730, around the time of

19     Vujadin Popovic's report.  Can you comment now about, first of all, again

20     the efficacy of the reporting chain through the MUP about military

21     developments on the field?

22        A.   Yes, sir.  And in fact, there are corresponding military reports

23     discussing this same topic from these same four prisoners.  So the MUP

24     and the army people at least within the security and intelligence organs

25     are talking to each other to ensure that information is being shared.

Page 27528

 1     And again going back to my earlier discussion on the legitimate purpose

 2     why the RDB and the state security organs and the military security

 3     organs would want to be interviewing people, it is precisely to identify

 4     relevant, pertinent combat-related information to gain an understanding

 5     of what the enemy is doing in the immediate future so you can react to

 6     it.  So this is an excellent example of that as well.

 7        Q.   And my second question is:  What this document, from your

 8     knowledge and your study, tells us about the role of the MUP where Vasic

 9     speaks about -- that the various MUP forces, Sekovici Specials,

10     1st Company PJP from Zvornik, et cetera, are now going to engage in

11     blocking the road knowing about this group of Muslim men who were trying

12     to break through.

13        A.   Yes, sir.  And in fact, later on the day of 12 July, those units,

14     those police units that were in Potocari were ordered or most of them

15     were ordered to be withdrawn from Potocari and redeployed along the

16     Konjevic Polje-Kravica-Bratunac road because the army recognised that

17     there were inadequate forces along that particular area to prevent the

18     column from breaking through.  So we know that that in fact occurred.  So

19     Vasic is again giving an accurate report as to what is happening with the

20     situation on the ground and what the orders of the various police units

21     are in relation to the growing military threat.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, we'll admit this document.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  I think I have --

24             JUDGE KWON:  And this maybe a proper moment.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 27529

 1             JUDGE KWON:  This will be admitted as Exhibit P4937.  Yes.  We'll

 2     stop here.

 3             And if you could excuse yourself, Mr. Butler, I'll see you

 4     tomorrow.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.  Yes.  Shall we move

 7     into private session.

 8                           [The witness stands down]

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Before we do, Mr. President, there's one quick

10     matter I can raise in public session.  That is with respect to the

11     Registrar's filing of the time estimates.  We wouldn't be disputing that,

12     so perhaps it's unnecessary to submit anything in writing and this

13     acknowledgement can take care of that.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Yes.  Now could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 27530











11  Page 27530 redacted.  Private session.















Page 27531

 1   (redacted)

 2                           [Open session]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Hearing is adjourned for today and will resume

 4     tomorrow at 9.00.

 5                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.59 p.m.,

 6                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day

 7                           of April, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.