Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 28849

 1                           Tuesday, 16 October 2012

 2                           [Defence Rule 84 bis Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             The Chamber has allowed the accused to make a statement pursuant

 8     to Rule 84 bis today during the first session.

 9             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, you have the floor.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

11     Good morning, everyone.

12             Today I will be addressing you as the accused, not as a

13     self-represented defendant as before.  I am a physician, a psychiatrist,

14     psychotherapist, group analyst, and a literary man.  Instead of being

15     accused for the events in our civil war, I should have been rewarded for

16     all the good things I've done; namely, that I did everything in human

17     power to avoid the war; that I succeeded in reducing the suffering of all

18     civilians; that the number of victims in our war was three to four times

19     less than the numbers reported in the public; that I proclaimed numerous

20     unilateral cease-fires and military containment and I stopped our army

21     many times when they were close to victory; that I constantly sought

22     peace and accepted four out of five peace agreements; that I advocated,

23     initiated, and implemented the humanisation of the conflict by applying

24     all measures of humanitarian nature; that in addition to my many

25     presidential duties, I personally supervised a supply of humanitarian

Page 28850

 1     aid, cease-fires, and the honouring of international law of warfare, and

 2     thus I was the address for many successes of humanitarian actions; also,

 3     I proclaimed and implemented many acts of mercy.

 4             As time passes, this truth will be stronger and stronger and the

 5     accusations and the propaganda, the lies and hatred, will get weaker and

 6     weaker.  I never had anything against Muslims or Croats; on the contrary,

 7     I became a Sarajevo man of my own choice.  I arrived in Sarajevo when I

 8     was 15, although all my countrymen went to Belgrade, and although in

 9     Belgrade I had my father's sister and other family.  I chose Sarajevo of

10     my own will.  I got married there.  My wife Ljiljana and my children

11     Sonia and Aleksandar were born there.  I was friends with the people of

12     Sarajevo, making no distinctions, and I was friends with them deeply and

13     sincerely.  All my colleagues in psychiatry, my friends, my dentists, my

14     tradesmen, my lawyers, all of them were Muslims.  I never made any

15     discrimination.  My hairdresser of many years, Meho Sabic, is a man I

16     visited a few days before the war started, hoping that there would never

17     be a war, and I was always faithful to my choices.  I never allowed for

18     the possibility of even the smallest individual crimes, and especially

19     not crimes on a mass scale, nor the possibility that any of the

20     communities would be permanently removed from the Serb territories.

21     Neither I nor anyone I know could ever think there could be a genocide

22     against any people that we believed to be the same as us, Serbs, although

23     of a different confession.

24             My other occupation is literature.  I authored several books of

25     poetry, including one of poetry for children.  These books have been

Page 28851

 1     awarded by many prominent awards and my poems have been translated into

 2     several great languages.  After leaving my presidential duties, I also

 3     wrote one comedy and one novel called:  "The Wondrous Chronicle of the

 4     Night."  I was active in politics until 1968 -- from 1968, in fact, and

 5     after that for decades I was a dissident, and beginning with 1990 until

 6     1996 I was also active as a founder and the president of the Serbian

 7     Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina and also as a member of the

 8     Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And then I

 9     was president of Republika Srpska.

10             My wife and I were also active in a political movement led by a

11     prominent Muslim woman.  If it hadn't been for the creation of political

12     parties, I would still be in that movement today because I was otherwise

13     not interested in politics.  I was born on 19 June 1945 in a village

14     called Petnijca, not far from Savnik in present-day Montenegro.  Until

15     the Berlin Congress, it was Herzegovina, and that's why we felt so close

16     to Bosnia-Herzegovina because we thought of ourselves as Herzegovinians.

17     My father was a tradesman.  My mother was a housewife.  My family on my

18     father's side had monarchistic sympathies, whereas my mother was more on

19     Tito's side.  My father was active in the so-called Liberation Movement

20     when the war started, but then the communists killed off the prominent

21     elders in our family, those are the well-known leftist inclinations.  And

22     at that time my father chose the royalist army which was later suppressed

23     by Tito.  And then my father came home.

24             My father was very fond of Russian [as interpreted] culture and

25     Russian [as interpreted] monarchy and parliamentarianism.  When -- after

Page 28852

 1     1968 I stopped believing Tito, I was then 32.  I was then 23, in fact.  I

 2     came to see the rightness of my father's views, and until then we argued

 3     a lot.  I see in the transcript that he was fond of Russian culture, in

 4     fact it was British culture and parliamentarianism.  In that army, the

 5     royalist army which was referred to as Chetniks, these Chetniks in my

 6     area did not have any conflict with other ethnic communities.  They only

 7     had an idealogical conflict with communists.  In Montenegro in my region

 8     in Niksic, there are Muslims who live there, even very close to my home

 9     and they were very close also to my parents and our family.  The Muslims

10     of Niksic are very renowned people, very prominent athletes, physicians,

11     et cetera, and there had never been any interethnic conflict or any bad

12     sentiment between communities.  The Catholic church was very close to my

13     school and there I came to love Bach listening to the organ music.

14             Therefore, my experience with the so-called others were more than

15     good and favourable, and my father had a friend as close as a brother who

16     was a Muslim, who was an Albanian.  And I never had any bad experience of

17     that sort, and that's why I chose to live in Sarajevo.  In the 1990s, the

18     Serb community in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 became very anxious when the

19     HDZ appeared in Croatia and when the Izetbegovic made his announcement in

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Serbs were frightened of the Ustasha rhetoric

21     and there were also suspicions that Mr. Izetbegovic, the author of the

22     Islamic Declaration, would apply this Islamic Declaration as a political

23     platform of his party.  There is not a single Serb or any man anywhere in

24     the world who could convince Serbs that there is or isn't a threat of

25     genocide.  It is only when they saw where things were going in Yugoslavia

Page 28853

 1     that they understood what's the writing on the wall before I even said a

 2     word.  The Serb party was established only after those two other

 3     political parties, the HDZ and the SDA, had been founded already with

 4     their very strong anti-Serb political orientation.

 5             I was neighbours with Mr. Izetbegovic.  We met very often and my

 6     literary friends defended him in the former regime.  They did not agree

 7     with the Islamic Declaration, but they didn't think that he should be in

 8     prison either.  I often queried him about what his party was going to be

 9     like and I had the most favourable impression of him, and I told my

10     friends that this man could not possibly do anything that is written in

11     the Islamic Declaration.  And when it became clear that the Serb party

12     had to be established, I informed Mr. Izetbegovic, but he already knew

13     that from a certain Mr. Srebrovac, who had been in jail with him.  And

14     when I said that Srebrovo and myself would be together, he was kind of

15     down-cast.  I don't know why.  But he seemed glad that the Serbs would

16     also have their own political party.  He asked me that the Serbs should

17     not vote for communists among their community because it was customary

18     for people in one community to vote for the worst people in the other

19     community.  So he asked me that Serbs should not vote for Muslim

20     communists.

21             Mr. Izetbegovic was very concerned that the communists would

22     remain in power and that he and his group would perhaps end up in jail

23     for the third or fourth time.  I agreed and we did not vote in the way he

24     feared.  We voted honourably.  And my agreement with Mr. Izetbegovic was

25     that if we win, at the next elections every community could vote from any

Page 28854

 1     of the four ethnic lists; and that still applies in the Federation, one

 2     voter can vote either from the Croatian and Muslim list.  And if it had

 3     been so, there would be no problem.  Mrs. Plavsic received many votes

 4     from Muslim women; we were able to see that.  Quite simply, those Muslim

 5     women were happy to see a woman on the Presidency and we saw a light at

 6     the end of the tunnel, a possibility to live well together.  However,

 7     despite all the resistance that I felt I had to become part of the

 8     Presidency, although I had been refusing to be nominated to the

 9     parliament or the Presidency, and I said that after the elections I would

10     return to my profession which is physician first and author next and I

11     would not be politically active.

12             I'm afraid the interpretation is not correct.  I refused to be

13     nominated and I did not become member of the Presidency or the

14     parliament.  My determination was to remain physician and author.

15             Everybody who knows me know that I am not an autocrat, that I am

16     not aggressive, that I am not intolerant.  On the contrary, I'm a mild

17     man, a tolerant man with a great capacity to understand others.  But it

18     is true that I was strict towards myself and others in implementing

19     democratic decisions.  I did not abuse the great powers given me by the

20     status in the party or the great parties given me later by the

21     Constitution in Republika Srpska.

22             Immediately after the elections, tensions rose in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina and our pre-electoral ideal was ruined because the

24     Party of Democratic Action, the SDA, which represented the Muslim

25     community, changed its main orientation in favour of Yugoslavia.  Already

Page 28855

 1     in the end of January, in mid-January we established the authorities and

 2     in end January the SDA chose secession.  In establishing the authorities,

 3     the Serb side, the SDS and myself, made many concessions to keep peace in

 4     the house.  In numbers we were almost equal to Muslims if we take Serbs

 5     who declared themselves as Yugoslavs; however, Croats and Muslims got the

 6     most prominent posts.  The Muslims got the post of president of

 7     Presidency, a Croat became the prime minister, and the Serbs had to

 8     satisfy themselves with getting speaker in the Assembly.  However, there

 9     were also ministries of power, the Ministry of the Interior and the

10     Ministry of Defence were given to Croats and Muslims.  Even the foreign

11     ministry came under the control of a Muslim, namely a man whom we knew

12     would take Bosnia in the direction of fundamentalist regimes instead of

13     the direction of Europe.

14             Then came a period of underhand dealings and blockages in

15     establishing the authorities.  The Serbs could not get the posts that

16     they were promised.  A Serb could not become the head of MUP.

17     Marginalisation started.  A period of peace time, underhand dealings, and

18     trickery, and we could live with all that still but we were very

19     concerned about manipulations with the MUP.  The MUP became one with the

20     Party of Democratic Action.  The SDA sent its members for military

21     training in Croatia with the intention that these people upon return be

22     integrated into the MUP and into that army of the republic that was in

23     the making already on the 30th of March.  On the 10th of June, the

24     National Council for the Defence of Muslims was already established.

25             Some people who were convicted were also included in this, people

Page 28856

 1     who had been convicted many times before and all of that presented a

 2     great danger to us.  What the Serbs had lived through in areas where

 3     there were less than 50 per cent, such as Visegrad for instance, for the

 4     entire year not a single community in Europe would put up with that, with

 5     the humiliation, even rapes, even murders.  If I tell you that on his

 6     patron saint's day a Serb would invite a Muslim and play good host, you

 7     know what the patron saint's day means for a Serb, and after that the

 8     same man kills him on the door-step of his own home, it is not individual

 9     pathology.  This man obviously thought that it could be done, that was

10     the case with the killing of the member of the wedding party on the 1st

11     of March, 1992.  The father of the groom was killed and some other people

12     were killed, but this was not done by one of those Celos.  He said it on

13     television.  He said that that goes nowadays.

14             In every municipality, in every area where we lived together, the

15     military organising of Croats and Muslims was no secret to anyone.  We

16     could see it, it was obvious.  Arming and the similar problems, when I

17     discussed that with Mr. Izetbegovic, what was happening among the people,

18     he would simply shrug his shoulders and say, "Well, everybody's arming

19     themselves."  It was clear we were heading towards a catastrophe.  We

20     simply made political movements.  We were relying on the Constitution, on

21     the local self-government, and we were aiming for regionalisation.

22     Mr. Izetbegovic - of whom I still think positively because I believe that

23     he was pushed into the war - he suggested to us at the end of May 1992 to

24     split Bosnia.  We were shocked.  He gave that proposal to

25     Mr. Zulfikarpasic as well, he did it at least twice, and

Page 28857

 1     Mr. Zulfikarpasic wrote about that.  We clearly stated we were against

 2     the division of Yugoslavia, against the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina;

 3     the Croats accepted the idea, and then somebody came up with an idea to

 4     exchange populations.  We branded that a nightmare and rejected that idea

 5     as well.  Following that, the Zagreb daily Vecernji List published an

 6     idea of cantonisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mrs. Plavsic on behalf of

 7     the Serb community stated that it was an interesting idea, letting them

 8     know that we did not reject outright such peaceful suggestions.

 9             So all of the political movements we made at the time were made

10     in, so to speak, dire straights, when we were pushed into a corner.  We

11     were pushed into a corner by the movements of our partners in government

12     and by our neighbours of other ethnic communities and we were forced to

13     do that.  Those were the things we had to do from the founding of the

14     party until the war broke out and until the end of the war.  Throughout

15     that time our reactions and my personal reactions were aimed at

16     minimising the damage and doing what we had to do under the

17     circumstances.

18             The president of the Muslim-Bosnian organisation, the second

19     Muslim party, Mr. Zulfikarpasic, one day in the summer of 1992 called me

20     on the phone.  I was about to go on a trip when he told me that we had to

21     get together to save Bosnia and conclude historical Muslim-Serb

22     agreement.  I cancelled all of my other engagements and gladly accepted

23     to meet with him, gladly expected the idea presented to me, and it seemed

24     to me at the time that Mr. Izetbegovic also genuinely accepted that idea.

25     We were expected to give up on the idea of regionalisation and to keep

Page 28858

 1     Bosnia in itself entirety in Yugoslavia.  Upon return from America,

 2     Mr. Izetbegovic discontinued his further support to that project.  And

 3     starting in the end of August there was an increase in tensions.  And it

 4     was only then that we founded the Autonomous Region of Krajina.  It was

 5     done by the local population and nobody could really take it against them

 6     because there were several Muslim municipalities being established at the

 7     time, and the people in that region did not want to accept the domination

 8     of Sarajevo, and neither did they want to accept the domination of Pale

 9     throughout the war.  They really wanted to have a sort of local

10     self-government which they wanted to ensure for themselves.

11             Mr. Izetbegovic once came back from Germany and he looked quite

12     beaten and discouraged, and he said to me and Mr. Koljevic that he was

13     being pushed into fighting for independence and that he had no other

14     choice.  Those were really, really difficult moments, and at the time it

15     really seemed as though somebody was pushing him to fight for the

16     independence.  Throughout that period, even though we could observe that

17     the Muslims and the Croats were organising themselves in the military

18     sense, the entire Serb elite, the intellectuals, members of the party,

19     the leadership of the party, were against the SDS establishing a

20     paramilitary formation.  And the SDS never really had one.  In all of the

21     foreign intelligence services, there was speculations to the effect that

22     perhaps Captain Dragan was a member of the SDS, but they could never

23     claim with certainty that that was the SDS paramilitary formation.  I

24     myself and the entire Serbian political leadership didn't really know

25     what attitude the JNA would take.  At the time the JNA had an identical

Page 28859

 1     attitude towards national parties.  It was an ideological conflict, if I

 2     can call it that, and we had a great dilemma as to what to do should the

 3     war broke out.  Our young men were serving in the JNA, whereas their

 4     young men were under their control and under their command.

 5             So during that time I was faced with a lot of pressure from the

 6     ground.  Local authorities were quite concerned - justifiably

 7     concerned - because they felt abandoned by the federal government, they

 8     felt abandoned by their own leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They

 9     were left to themselves to resolve a multitude of big and small problems.

10     So in turn, they pressured us.  The only means they had at their disposal

11     that nobody could take away from them was the Territorial Defence, which

12     according to the law belonged to each local commune.  And everybody not

13     only could but had to under the law defend their country once it was

14     attacked.  There was no way to betray that people, nor could I have

15     accepted something that they would not have accepted themselves because

16     it would have lasted for a very short time, only two hours.  This is the

17     nation that had a long memory, that remembered everything that had

18     happened to them in the past, and there was no way one could dictate to

19     the Serbs what they should be doing.  So we had enormous pressure exerted

20     on us because the people were afraid that they would all be massacred,

21     and during that time the Serbs were being killed.  It is a terrible

22     misconception and it is a great injustice, this portrayal of the Serbs as

23     those who started the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24             The Serbs were exposed to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina even

25     before the 4th and 6th of April.  A member of the wedding party was

Page 28860

 1     killed on the 1st of March, and then there were -- on the 25th and 26th

 2     of March there was a terrible massacre in Brod and then in Sijekovac.  On

 3     the 5th of April, or rather, on the 4th of April already in Sarajevo, the

 4     Green Berets attacked the barracks, Serb communities, and they occupied

 5     all tall buildings, skyscrapers, put their snipers there, they killed

 6     policemen, they killed young people who tried to cross into Grbavica

 7     which was already under Serb control.  So that was a night of terrible

 8     terror in Sarajevo.

 9             So the beginning of fighting and the beginning of the war in

10     various municipalities have nothing to do with me.  At the time when

11     these killings were committed in Brod, Bijeljina, Kupres, we still had

12     the common state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Mrs. Plavsic, Mr. Koljevic,

13     Mr. Simovic and others, Mr. Ostojic, they went to those hot spots on a

14     task given by joint authorities to calm the situation.  They were not

15     sent there by the SDS.  Simovic was on our list, but he was not a member

16     of the SDS.  These people were tasked by the Government of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina had among its

18     members some Serbs, as there were Serbs in the Presidency and people were

19     sent on these tasks as representatives of the common joint government.

20             On the 1st of March, 1992, a member of the Serb party was killed

21     in Sarajevo the day after the referendum.  Mr. Koljevic and I were in

22     Belgrade at the time, so we were not responsible for the barricades.  The

23     barricades were a spontaneous, a chaotic reaction to the possibility that

24     somebody could dare to kill a Serb in front of an Orthodox church, that

25     somebody could dare shoot at the wedding party without there being any

Page 28861

 1     protection for that wedding party.  We had no influence over the joint

 2     police.  The police was controlled by the Muslims, by the Muslim SDA, by

 3     their extremists.  And before our very eyes it was transforming itself

 4     into the illegal army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We ourselves were

 5     completely powerless.

 6             My escorts who were policemen in the joint MUP escorted my family

 7     in the 11th hour on the 5th of April outside of Sarajevo under fire.  I

 8     was still myself in the Holiday Inn hotel in Sarajevo, and from there

 9     together with two other national leaders I went to the TV station where

10     we had -- we were guests in a live TV show.  We were trying to give our

11     views to the audience.  In front of that time -- at that time there were

12     50.000 protesters in front of Holiday Inn.  Some of them were armed, and

13     this is why my escorts did not allow me to go back to the hotel even

14     though I wanted to do that.  However, two of my body-guards remained

15     there.  They ended up being taken prisoner, mistreated, they barely

16     managed to stay alive.  We were also very concerned for the fate of

17     Professor Buha, however it seemed that some smart people managed to get

18     him outside before that enraged crowd broke into the hotel and started

19     firing.  So the only issue that I should be put on trial for is the

20     social and political stupidity which came as a result of excessive trust

21     that I had in people, and we and the Serb community in Bosnia-Herzegovina

22     could have paid a very high price for this stupidity of mine.

23             The first manifestation of war was the expulsion of Serbs from

24     the towns where Croats and Muslims were in majority.  In the parts of

25     Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Serbs were a minority, they were fair

Page 28862

 1     game, perfect targets, and they never took to arms to defend themselves.

 2     And until September 1992 there was not a single Serb settlement in the

 3     Muslim and Croat Federation that was left intact.  Everything had been

 4     cleansed, killed, set on fire.

 5             Quite to the contrary, in Republika Srpska in the -- in what is

 6     today Republika Srpska and at the time was part of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 7     where we were in majority, there were no traces of war there at the time.

 8             Your Excellencies, there was no pattern of behaviour in the Serb

 9     municipalities.  If we look at the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in

10     Sarajevo and in the predominantly Muslim areas, we see that it was raging

11     starting on the 5th of April, whereas in the neighbouring Serb Rogatica

12     the war didn't start until the 20th of May.  So it is clear that in the

13     areas that were under Serb control there was no war.  The Serb side

14     didn't start a war and no war was started until the Muslims initiated it.

15     Most of the municipalities in Republika Srpska saw war at the end of May,

16     those were the municipalities of Bratunac and Vlasenica, which already

17     had reached an agreement on creating two municipalities and having a

18     peaceful coexistence there.  Mrs. Rabija Subakovic, an eminent Muslim,

19     wrote an open letter to Izetbegovic asking him to support this sort of a

20     project.  In other municipalities as well.  And instead of supporting

21     her, an order came out ordering the Muslims in Bratunac and Vlasenica to

22     start shooting, and those two municipalities were turned into a

23     slaughter-house, and it was not the result of any will of mine, I did not

24     know about this.  This came as a result of negotiations and the attack of

25     arrogant extremists from the SDA party.

Page 28863

 1             This is how it was in the Krajina municipalities also, where

 2     despite the fact that there was a war in other Bosnian municipalities, no

 3     war broke out in Krajina municipalities until it was initiated by the

 4     extremists.  Until that time they had their own police, they had their

 5     own co-operation, and life was going on similar to how it is regulated

 6     nowadays in the European Union.  And the co-operation ended at the end of

 7     May at the order of the SDA, which we could hear from one witness.  Based

 8     on their strategic interest, to ensure that the left bank of the Sana

 9     River were annexed to Cazin and Bihac.  So they started from the Sana

10     River and its left bank.

11             I didn't know anything about that.  I learned about all that only

12     later.  We did not have any reliable communication lines with Krajina for

13     a few months, not only because there was no corridor or the corridor was

14     broken off.  The corridor was actually stabilised towards the end of the

15     year, but that was not the only reason.  Another reason was the fact that

16     we didn't have even telephone lines.  The valley of the Sana is comprised

17     of Kljuc, Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Bosanski Novi.  Those four

18     municipalities were torched towards the end of May and the beginning of

19     June, and that was all based on the strategic interest which was for that

20     area on the left bank of the Sana River to be annexed to the

21     Cazin Krajina.  Although we did not have any communication lines over

22     there, we didn't have any contacts there, the Autonomous Region of

23     Krajina had its parliament, its government, its ministers, they tried

24     hard.  The Krajina people had always been of autonomous views.  The Serbs

25     want to be autonomous wherever they are.  We had our reliable people over

Page 28864

 1     there; for example, the president of the Assembly Mr. Kupresanin, on my

 2     behalf and on his own behalf toured in Vega -- remand prisons, he helped

 3     the prisoners there, he co-operated with the UNHCR, the International Red

 4     Cross, the local Red Cross.  He alarmed the general public about the

 5     possible peril that threatens the civilians.  He went to Manjaca, he went

 6     to the prison in Prijedor.  He wanted to help.  He wanted to diminish the

 7     sufferings.  However, there were no prisons anywhere before Prijedor came

 8     under attack.  The prison was an investigative centre because the remand

 9     unit or the detention unit could only hold up to ten people, not more.

10     And then on the 30th of May there was a large-scale attack on Prijedor

11     which resulted in the arrest of a large number of people.  59 per cent of

12     those people were released immediately after the triage process was

13     completed.  Those prisons were not camps.  Those prisoned existed only

14     for as long as the investigative judges were there and the investigators,

15     and they worked every day, they worked hard.  As soon as all the

16     investigative actions and the triage were over, 41 per cent of the people

17     were sent to Manjaca because they had participated in fighting and some

18     were also subject to criminal proceedings and the rest were released.  In

19     other words, there were no prisons before the war, before the clashes,

20     and there were no clashes before the end of May.  However, we didn't know

21     even that, we didn't have any insight, we didn't have any way to learn

22     about all that or make our mark.  Srdjo Srdic from Prijedor, he was the

23     president of the Red Cross in -- at Prijedor, also an MP.  Whenever he

24     could, he informed us what was going on, what was happening.  He tried

25     hard to inform us, and he gave me firm guarantees that there was no

Page 28865

 1     barbed wire around Trnopolje, but I could only see that for myself

 2     subsequently.  At that time I was in London, at the conference there.  I

 3     personally invited a British journalist to come.  I spoke to Penny

 4     Marshall and her team and I even transported them on our government's

 5     aircraft.  I opened Republika Srpska for them.  I told them they could

 6     visit anything that they wanted to see.  I encouraged them to take

 7     escorts where they wanted.  If they didn't want, they didn't have to take

 8     escorts.  I didn't want to hide anything.  That was my first motive.  And

 9     the second underlying cause was to have the presence of the journalists

10     to curb the influence of some of the renegade elements amongst us.  That

11     was another one of my stupidities because there is no country in the

12     world who would let the journalists to the front line.

13             But I can tell you that the journalists who introduced themselves

14     as journalists to us did a lot more damage to us than NATO's shells.  For

15     example, they would stage a scene where a man would be put next to the

16     barbed wire, although he was not there previously, and then they took a

17     picture of that and sent off that image to the world.  Thomas Deichmann

18     exposed that and now it is very clear; however, at that time this was --

19     this could not be denied.  Every reader had seen that.  So you could not

20     go to every reader to explain that things were not what they seemed.  We

21     continued to attend conferences to discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina.  All

22     of our moves at that time were reactions to the Muslim's side moves.  It

23     was only on the 16th of April that we set up our own Territorial Defence

24     because the Muslims had expelled us from their own Territorial Defence

25     and they removed a Serb general.  On the 22nd of April, I launched a

Page 28866

 1     platform and I suggested that nothing that had been taken by force should

 2     be recognised because any further fighting from that would have been

 3     pointless.  And all that time we participated in the conference on

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina under the -- chairmanship of Lord Cutileiro and Lord

 5     Carrington and then the chairs became Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen.  That

 6     was the continuation of that same conference.  However, the war raged

 7     against our will.  There was no way to influence the events.  We took the

 8     decision on the setting up of our army on the 12th of May, but it was

 9     only on the 15th of June that we actually organised it or made a decision

10     on its organisation.  We spent the entire year of 1992 in trying to

11     structure the Army of Republika Srpska, and we went into great pains to

12     turn common people into soldiers, and they fought only in the territory

13     of Republika Srpska.  And it was defence, all the time we defended

14     ourselves.  We never embarked on trying to conquer Muslim territories

15     because it was abundantly clear that there would be a division, i.e., the

16     reorganisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three different republics

17     and we had under our control over 60 per cent.  So I knew that it would

18     be crazy to take even more territory that we would eventually have to

19     give back.  This put us into a very difficult situation where we had to

20     passively defend ourselves, we suffered a lot of casualties, especially

21     during the so-called truces when we suffered more losses than at the time

22     when we were actively engaged in fighting.

23             The events in the municipalities followed a certain logic.  Apart

24     from Foca and Zvornik, everywhere else - and of course Bratunac - were

25     already -- at the beginning of May Zekic was killed, but that was four

Page 28867

 1     weeks after the 8th of May, after the war had broke out in Zvornik.  So

 2     apart from Zvornik and Foca, and we did not know anything about these

 3     two, in all the other municipalities war broke out much later.  In

 4     Zvornik, we didn't know what was going on there, we didn't have a clue.

 5     Nobody ever invited Arkan there.  I don't think that he was ever there.

 6     Maybe some of his men were there.  There were a lot of paramilitaries

 7     there.  However, on the 16th of April, our police didn't know who was in

 8     control of Zvornik and our police, the secretary from the ministry called

 9     Arkan on the phone and asked him who was in control of Zvornik.  The same

10     applied to Foca.  The late Mr. Koljevic went there with Jeremy

11     Braden [phoen] in April to assist, to see what was going on with the

12     Serbs who were left at the elements' mercy and they almost killed them

13     there.  So that had nothing whatsoever to do with us.  We could not

14     influence any of those events.

15             Now that I have mentioned my participation in conferences,

16     Your Excellencies, many events, many incidents happened while I was

17     abroad attending negotiations or meetings.  I knew that things were not

18     happening was because I was not there, but because those incidents were

19     staged during the conferences in order for the conferences to fall

20     through.

21             On the 20th of May, there was an explosion in Vase Miskin street.

22     It is no longer in my indictment but it is a very significant model.  The

23     ambassador Cutileiro called me on phone and he told me that he had to

24     interrupt the conference, we were in Lisbon at the time, because a shell,

25     a mortar shell, had killed people in a bread line.  I took an hour's

Page 28868

 1     break in order to inquire with our army and the police as to what had

 2     happened and they told me it was a nonsense.  They told me we did not

 3     fire any shells.  It was impossible to fire a shell in such a narrow

 4     street.  They told me that the media had already been there prepared to

 5     film an event, and then I was very certain that we didn't do it and I

 6     told Mr. Cutileiro that and that he shouldn't buy that rubbish.  That was

 7     a model that was followed when the other incidents in Sarajevo happened.

 8     Unfortunately there were also crimes.  For example, Koricanske Stijene,

 9     which was not staged my Muslims, it was done -- it was committed by

10     criminals.  And I was also at a conference at that time.  The army

11     informed the state leadership, they informed me, I was shocked, I was

12     angry, and I asked that the two presidents of the municipalities shed

13     some light on the crime, to take measures.  I shouted at some innocent

14     people, especially the leadership of Skender Vakuf which is today's

15     Knezevo.  We ended the conference on the 27th of August.  On the 28th I

16     flew to Belgrade.  On the 29th I was in Pale.  And on the 30th

17     Minister Subotic was dispatched to the spot of the crime.  (redacted

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 28869

 1             At the end of September 1992, Muslims from Srebrenica killed a

 2     lot of civilians and soldiers between Srebrenica and Milici, and in

 3     Vlasenica there was a mass burial.  Also as -- on my way to next round of

 4     negotiations I stopped by and I attended the burial and I delivered a sad

 5     and humble speech which we had an occasion to hear in the this courtroom.

 6     It was a terrible scene.  Between Srebrenica and Vlasenica and Bratunac

 7     and Zvornik, we were in a large room.  There were about 20.000 armed

 8     Muslims there.  We sent them messages that they shouldn't fight, that

 9     that area would be given to Muslims.  However, we suffered losses.

10     Workers were being killed, farmers in their fields, miners in the mines,

11     they were all being killed.  And we used all the round-about ways across

12     Sekovici and Sapardici [phoen].  But they would come even there.  They

13     would set up ambushes, they would kill civilians, they would stop buses

14     and kill all the civilians there.  They prevented us from having any sort

15     of communication, and they rendered impossible the survival of

16     Republika Srpska and the people in that area.  For an entire year up to

17     the spring of 1993 we suffered all that, we didn't do anything, but then

18     we had to launch a counter-offensive in order to neutralise them.

19             Then we took Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and so on and so forth, and

20     it was then that we saw an unprecedented campaign about blood flowing in

21     Cerska, about a huge number of people having been killed, although what

22     we found there was houses torched and Serbs crucified after having been

23     kidnapped.  We found all sorts of things there.  However, this story

24     about the Serb crimes in Cerska was just a cry wolf and one couldn't

25     match that in the international media.  If General Morillon had not gone

Page 28870

 1     there to inspect the situation, the story would have held and it would go

 2     down in history as a genocide that had been committed by the Serbs.  And

 3     then the families went to Tuzla, whereas the able-bodied men went to

 4     Srebrenica.  It was their choice.  They went to Srebrenica to fight

 5     there.

 6             We continued with our activities, we proceeded with our actions.

 7     I stopped our army.  Some of my generals understood that.  Some were very

 8     angry.  Common soldiers, foot soldiers, were very angry when I stopped

 9     our army at the very entrance into Srebrenica in 1993 because I knew up

10     to then that 1300 Serbs, mostly civilians, had been killed, and the

11     soldiers were from those families, the families that had been killed.

12     And the Ministry of Defence from some more big countries published their

13     communiques, saying that we had entered Srebrenica and that there were

14     again flows of blood on the street.  That candidate of lies and

15     propaganda about the crimes that had been committed is similar to what

16     happened after the fall of Srebrenica in 1995.  The rhetorics was the

17     same, the way things were represented were the same.  And again, it was

18     another cry wolf situation, but nobody could believe that.

19             Your Excellencies, I trust the international community.  I often

20     came at odds with our army.  I attacked our officers for having done

21     things which they didn't do, as a matter of fact.  It turned out that I

22     tended to believe rumours more than my own officers, and they were in

23     dire straits.  They were between a rock and a hard place, and so was I

24     because I tended to accuse them, attack them, because I believed the

25     allegations and most of them were simply not correct.

Page 28871

 1             One of the most common such misunderstandings, or rather, the

 2     sources of misunderstandings between the civilian authorities and the

 3     army was the issue of convoys.  I had thousands of other concerns and

 4     worries.  I had almost 2.000 kilometres of front line and if I --

 5     although I was not engaged in technical command, I was still concerned

 6     with the supplies for the army, the food supplied to them, people who

 7     lived along the front line and how they lived.  However, despite of all

 8     that and despite of my engagement in the negotiations with the

 9     international community, I found time every time somebody asked me to

10     help with the passage of a convoy.

11             We have heard - and I assure you - that at any given moment there

12     were about 700 trucks on the roads of Republika Srpska.  There were times

13     when Croats stopped humanitarian aid for Muslims and the only way

14     sometimes for the humanitarian aid to reach Muslims was through Serb

15     territory.  However, there were many problems with the convoys.  The

16     problems arose due to the great number of trucks or goods that had not

17     been declared or because these transports appeared at check-points where

18     they had not been announced and the soldiers there did not know anything

19     of these convoys, and still in all those situations we did our utmost so

20     that civilians on the other end of the line would get the aid.  This kind

21     of assistance is a tradition that Serbs introduced from the

22     Serb-Bulgarian war and Henry Dunant, the founder of the International Red

23     Cross, was aware of that.  Every time aid came for poor people in

24     Bulgaria, the Serbs stopped the fighting to let the aid through.

25             Professor Koljevic, one of the greatest humanitarians and one of

Page 28872

 1     the best men I have ever known, was made ill by all his efforts to get

 2     the convoys through.  And in those contexts too I often accused unfairly

 3     our local commanders because the Muslims, together with the humanitarian

 4     aid, received all the military equipment they needed.  After every

 5     humanitarian convoy we suffered many more losses because they received

 6     weapons, ammunition, and fuel along with the aid.  And I had terrible

 7     difficulties trying to neutralise the rage of our people who saw for

 8     themselves that it was not humanitarian aid, it was military equipment.

 9     And despite my busy schedule, it never happened that I was too busy to

10     respond to any invitation, any suggestion, that we tried to alleviate the

11     situation and the suffering.

12             Let's take Sarajevo.  We were almost 200.000 in Sarajevo before

13     we were expelled and between 50- and 70.000 Serbs remained in Sarajevo;

14     they were not allowed to leave.  Sarajevo is my city.  And any story that

15     we would shell Sarajevo without any reason is absolutely untrue.  Every

16     shell that fell on Sarajevo hurt me personally.  That was a city where I

17     knew every square foot, but that city had over 2.000 legitimate military

18     targets and I proposed that Sarajevo be demilitarised.  That was

19     rejected.  I suggested that it be placed under UN administration; that

20     was rejected.  They wanted and they managed to keep Sarajevo militarised

21     to the maximum with 50- to 70.000 troops inside, three divisions, one

22     inside the city and two around the city, and they managed to ruin every

23     cease-fire and to create incidents to feed the media, at the same time

24     demonising Serbs, and keeping alive the hope of the Muslim leadership

25     that somebody from the international community would get sucked into the

Page 28873

 1     war, involved in it, on their side.

 2             Examples of this are incidents in Sarajevo.  Mass killings and

 3     the suffering of people, including women and children, in lines for water

 4     and especially Markale I and II.  It is shameless propaganda and tricks

 5     that produced the desired result during the war, but it is unimaginable

 6     that this is appearing now in the courtroom and that the Court is

 7     verifying it as real events.  The first incident, Markale I, was staged

 8     after the 4th of February, when this attempt to orchestrate an incident

 9     with the humanitarian aid queue failed and already some days later in

10     February at an empty market-place where there are no goods on sale, 500,

11     600 people are suddenly there and this massacre is staged.

12             I always asked our army to keep me informed, and you will see it

13     in all the documents.  I always said, "Please admit to it if it's our

14     work.  It will do less damage if we admit it because we have to be

15     credible.  If we say something it has to be true."  And the army

16     convinced me that it was not possible to hit such a place with one shell,

17     there was no visual contact, and it was impossible.  It was not even

18     believable that 500, 600 people would be in such a small space - they had

19     no reason to be there.  And it was, on top of everything, impossible to

20     create such damage in view of all the stalls and tables.  It is a

21     shameless orchestration.  Obviously some people got killed by that

22     explosion, but we also saw android mannequins being thrown onto trucks

23     creating this show for the world.  We resolutely rejected that and we

24     said that we would not accept any investigation unless the Serb side is

25     somehow involved in it.  The investigation was completed without us and

Page 28874

 1     we were not allowed to do our own investigation.

 2             Now, as for Markale II, Markale II was orchestrated in an attempt

 3     to take the crisis to its peak in May, and that attempt failed.  And the

 4     strategic bombing that was supposed to change the balance of powers and

 5     to make us sign a surrender also failed.  However, another opportunity

 6     was taken in end August 1995 by this orchestrated event known as

 7     Markale II.  Our side could not have fired that shell nor could that

 8     shell hit that spot in that way.  However, again we were not allowed to

 9     take part in the investigation.  Some investigating authorities from the

10     international community co-operated with the Muslim police and harmonised

11     their findings, although they should not have done that.

12             So we were in a situation when there was nobody unbiased there

13     who would be able to say what was actually going on.  Muslims enjoyed

14     such support in this trickery but we were helpless.  We could just stand

15     by and watch this catastrophe in the making without being able to do

16     anything.  Markale II is a glaring example.  Again, there was an

17     explosion there.  Some people were killed.  But there were also bodies

18     there that had never been on the market before the explosion.  Some were

19     brought from the front line and also some bodies of people who had died

20     of natural causes were brought from the morgue and added to the number of

21     casualties.  All of this was done to create this image of catastrophe and

22     suffering.

23             Now, speaking of sniping, I was always horrified by sniping

24     because I believe it to be inhumane, although it is a legitimate military

25     technique of eliminating important personalities on the side of the

Page 28875

 1     adversary.  We in Sarajevo were not able to distinguish by appearance who

 2     were Serb, who were Muslim; we are of the same race and there was no

 3     reason to engage in any intense sniping activity.  I myself worked on

 4     many anti-sniping agreements, some of which were signed, but not many

 5     were implemented, not many were honoured.  Along the front line in the

 6     city of Sarajevo itself, Muslims were in a more favourable position in

 7     terms of range than us.  They had positions on top of the highest

 8     buildings.  They hit and sniped wherever they liked.  They killed our

 9     young girls and women.  They also shot people.  And they employed

10     champions in marksmanship to do this.  Incidents around the Vrbanja

11     bridge they presented as Serb activities, although that was automatic

12     fire that went on all day.

13             They engaged in this kind of trickery and crime that could be

14     exposed only by a totally unbiased, impartial observer group, but that

15     was sadly missing because all members of the international community

16     there came with enormous prejudice against the Serbs and there was no way

17     for us to get our truth across, to make it see the light of day.  We were

18     completely trapped.  Nothing that we did around Sarajevo was ever

19     accepted.  We never cut off any water, electricity, or gas.  It was they

20     who fired at the transformer station and cut off water, but they never

21     had any shortages of water.  They only had shortages of power.  Water was

22     in our hands.  They sold water on the black market and those who were

23     engaged in this trade simply did not want water to be available free of

24     charge.

25             Concerning modified air bombs, I heard very vaguely that they are

Page 28876

 1     being researched, that they are being fitted with engines from some

 2     rockets, and that they were being tested at the grounds of the Army of

 3     Yugoslavia to make new firing tables for them.  Nobody was required to

 4     ask me for permission for any innovations or modifications in the army

 5     and nobody asked me.  But this is another aspect of command, the military

 6     technical aspect into which I never interfered -- with which I never

 7     interfered.  But I never heard that such a bomb was ever used in a

 8     populated area.  I heard it was used to crush bunkers in mountains or

 9     perhaps somewhere in the military industry, but not that it was ever used

10     in a populated area.  There was never any piece of news believable to any

11     degree about that.

12             As for Srebrenica 1995, I was not involved in tactical and

13     operative command or control, but whenever I passed through a place where

14     there was some sort of command, especially a corps command, I stopped by

15     to greet those people.  And that's how I stopped by Vlasenica before the

16     operation in Srebrenica, sometime on the 25th, the 26th of June, and by

17     that time we were several days into the horrific Muslim offensive around

18     Sarajevo and Naser Oric's forces stretched our forces thin and

19     co-operated with the forces in Srebrenica.  I need not remind you what

20     this protected area looked like.  It was a military ground for excursions

21     of Naser Oric's forces who avoided conflict with the VRS.  They

22     terrorised civilians.  They gouged their eyes out and tore off their

23     ears, only to come back to the safety of the protected area after that.

24     I gave my approval to a small-scale operation to separate Srebrenica and

25     Zepa, to narrow it down to the urban core, as agreed.  And that operation

Page 28877

 1     was supposed to separate and cut off this corridor between Srebrenica and

 2     Zepa that was used for the transport of military equipment and weapons.

 3     On the 9th, on the morning of the 9th, the Muslims decided not to defend

 4     Srebrenica and the local leadership asked Sarajevo to let them surrender

 5     Srebrenica and let the population evacuate.  The same day General Krstic

 6     asked for instructions because he was able to enter Srebrenica and he

 7     wanted the opinion of the superiors.  I gave our approval.  By that time

 8     I had stopped our army many times.  Our army was called stop-and-go.  We

 9     did not want to win; they wanted to win.  They wanted to have all of

10     Bosnia for Croats and Muslims.  We did not want that kind of victory.  We

11     didn't want all of Bosnia for ourselves and that's why we were not in

12     favour of war, war was not in our interest.

13             I gave approval to enter Srebrenica.  The only civilians we

14     expected to find in Srebrenica were Muslims.  There was not a single Serb

15     there.  I ordered that these Muslims be protected, that all the

16     facilities be protected, I ordered that a police force be established

17     immediately to protect civilians.  I knew that some of the refugees would

18     probably want to go elsewhere, but it never crossed my mind that the

19     entire population would want to leave Srebrenica; to us it came as a

20     complete surprise.  Ambassador Akashi told me that the place was packed,

21     that they were not allowed to leave, that they were not allowed to leave,

22     but it was because their leadership didn't let them leave.  It was not

23     us.  We did not receive any information about mistreatment of civilians.

24     I did not receive any information of even individual murders in

25     Srebrenica.  I got reports of high tensions in Bratunac, where there were

Page 28878

 1     a lot of prisoners and very few troops because Bratunac Brigade was

 2     outside of Bratunac.  And elderly military conscripts and young boys were

 3     guarding a lot of prisoners.  It was not the only time when we had a lot

 4     of prisoners.  There were many situations during the war when we had

 5     prisoners under our control.  It was the usual procedure:  Capture,

 6     triage, and separation of those who were not subject to prosecution and

 7     who are sent to exchanges and the others who were subject to prosecution.

 8     We sometimes effected exchanges directly on the front line or we would

 9     send prisoners, the second group, to camps such as in Batkovic or prisons

10     and then on they would be exchanged.

11             Never once during the war was there any situation where we would

12     interfere in a normal situation where prisoners were treated normally,

13     and as soon as they reached Batkovic or another prison they were

14     available to the International Red Cross and everything was all right.

15     Those were neighbours taking each other prisoners and there were

16     sometimes exchanges even before they ever reached Manjaca or Batkovic.

17             Personal contacts were used to organise these exchanges

18     immediately, and the usual procedure was to send prisoners to Batkovic

19     and then organise large-scale exchanges.  Very frequently I showed -- I

20     pardoned numerous such individuals and the rest were intended for

21     exchange.  They were never subject to any criminal prosecution.  There

22     was no indication that anybody was killed in Srebrenica or after that.  I

23     never once received any piece of information concerning that, be it

24     verbal or in writing.  Those were the same types of rumours that we

25     experienced in 1993 in relation to Cerska and later on in relation to

Page 28879

 1     Srebrenica, and one did not need to trust that or to verify that because

 2     I would have once again come into conflict with the army, having accused

 3     it groundlessly for the umpteenth time.  When Mrs. Albright came across a

 4     body on a surface, on a flat surface, I ordered that it be investigated.

 5     I went on the 22nd or the 23rd of March to the Main Staff and I told the

 6     Main Staff that we should not put up with that propaganda any longer and

 7     that the Presidency and I myself would order that the most detailed

 8     investigation of every single death in and around Srebrenica be

 9     investigated.  Nobody from the Main Staff opposed that idea.  Everybody

10     agreed with me and accepted it.  And after that I issued an order to the

11     army, to the police, to the military prosecutor, and everybody else

12     concerned to investigate every single death in and around Srebrenica.

13     Unfortunately, in mid-May, that is to say five weeks later, I transferred

14     my authorities to Mrs. Plavsic and I could no longer follow the situation

15     concerning those events.

16             At the same time, in addition to those existing 2.000 kilometres

17     of front, I was given an addition in the mileage with the addition of the

18     front in Western Slavonia.  There were numerous municipalities falling

19     one after one, Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoc, Drvar, and Bosanski Petrovac

20     were at risk which were almost entirely Serb municipalities, also

21     Mrkonjic Grad with a dominant Serb majority, and there was no reason or

22     anything else to raise the flag indicating that something else had

23     happened.  What we saw were the fireworks, were the rumours that we had

24     witnessed back in 1993.  So at the time there was no information about

25     it.  I did not learn about it until I came here, where I learned about

Page 28880

 1     things that happened.

 2             Your Excellencies, the Serb local authorities are the model of

 3     caring authorities.  Nobody was ever armed in those municipalities until

 4     there was an attack.  The Serbs always offered that there be two parallel

 5     structures of authorities, that everybody take care of their own people

 6     until there was a final solution.  Why would you want to expel somebody

 7     if you gave them a premises to have their own police, to have their own

 8     municipality authorities in a building right next to you?  It never

 9     occurred to us to do that.  Nor did we want to recognise any

10     fait accompli.  We expected that there would be final negotiations at the

11     end.  On the 24th and the 25th of January, 1992, I said in the parliament

12     of Bosnia and Herzegovina:  If we continue down this road, we will have a

13     religious and ethnical war.  The Serbs will go to Serb municipalities,

14     the Croats to theirs, the Muslims to theirs.  There would be mass murder,

15     there would be blood flowing, and in the end we will have to sign an

16     agreement and have three homogenous ethnic communities, and this is

17     exactly what happened.  I offered that we wait with holding a referendum,

18     to wait for the government to be restructured, Cengic accepted that, and

19     the Serbs were supposed to go to the referendum and to legitimatise it.

20     We were in an impossible situation.  I personally was in an impossible

21     situation, because I was exposing my community to danger because of the

22     concessions that I gave to the other side, because of my peace-loving

23     policies.

24             There was no such example of any other side going to war under so

25     much pressure, faced with so many lies under -- against enemy who was

Page 28881

 1     much stronger.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina the mobilisation ratio was 2:1

 2     in favour of Muslims and Croats.  And once the NATO and everybody else

 3     got involved, the ratio was even much, much worse.  There is no such

 4     example anywhere in the world of that and nobody ever thought of saying:

 5     Let us hear the other side.

 6             Gentlemen, the truth is on our side and it will only grow

 7     stronger.  We did everything in our power to avoid the war and to

 8     minimise the consequences and the damages.  There is no statute of

 9     limitations that will run out on that and lies are subject to statute of

10     limitations and we will live to see it.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

12             We'll have a break for half an hour.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

14                           [The witness entered court]

15                           --- On resuming at 11.24 a.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I apologise for the delay.  The Chamber had to have

17     a discussion.

18             Good morning, Colonel.  If you could take the solemn declaration,

19     please.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

21     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

22                           WITNESS:  ANDREY DEMURENKO

23                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please make yourself comfortable.

25             My understanding is that we have Russian translation, and I'm

Page 28882

 1     happy to know that my colleague Judge Lattanzi would not need any

 2     interpretation today.

 3             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I know it's difficult to

 5     necessarily see, given the configuration of the courtroom, but I

 6     definitely wanted to note that we are joined today by Ms. Vega Iodice,

 7     sitting behind me.  I also wanted to note a brief discussion I had with

 8     the Defence concerning some markings to the documents.  I understand that

 9     those were made in anticipation of the possibility of bringing those to

10     the witness's attention during the course of presentation and to make it

11     more efficient, but the Defence has of course agreed that whether or not

12     that takes place those markings should be removed from the documents

13     before they're tendered into evidence.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, that's correct, Mr. President, and that will

16     be done.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Yes, now, Mr. Karadzic.

19                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Colonel.

21        A.   Good morning.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6029,

23     please.  I would like to make sure that the Colonel can actually see the

24     e-court.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it's there.

Page 28883

 1             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Yes.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Colonel, is this your statement, the statement that you provided

 4     to the representatives of the Defence?

 5        A.   Yes, it is.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have an opportunity to review your statement

 7     and to sign it?

 8        A.   I did.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct?  Is it accurate?

10        A.   Yes, I can confirm that.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, does your statement reflect what you would

12     answer if I were to put those same questions to you today in the

13     courtroom?

14        A.   Yes, I would answer exactly the same.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

17     tender the statement pursuant to 92 ter rule as well as all the

18     associated documents.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll deal with the associated exhibits at the end

20     of your examination-in-chief.

21             But is there any objection to the Rule 92 ter statement,

22     Mr. Tieger?

23             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE KWON:  1D6029 will be admitted.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2270, Your Honours.

Page 28884

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When it comes to the associated

 2     exhibits, we have given up on those.  And now, with your leave, I would

 3     like to read the summary of --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I do not follow what you just said.  You are giving

 5     up the associated exhibit?

 6             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, I think he was referring to the additional

 8     exhibits.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please go on, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The interpretation was wrong.  I

11     said "additional."  I didn't say "associated."

12             With your leave, I would like to read a summary of the statement

13     provided by Colonel Demurenko.  In order to be economical with time, I am

14     going to read in English and I am alerting the interpreters to that fact.

15             [Microphone not activated]

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the accused, please.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

18             Microphone, please.

19             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] Andrey Demurenko is a retired --

20     [In English] Sorry, I do it in English.  Andrey Demurenko is a retired

21     colonel in the Russian army.  In January 1995 he joined the UNPROFOR

22     mission in Sarajevo and served there until December 1995 as Chief of

23     Staff for the Sarajevo sector.  Colonel Demurenko participated in

24     investigating the shelling of the Markale market on 28th of August, 1995.

25     He went to sites -- to the sites two hours after the shelling.  Upon

Page 28885

 1     arriving there he observed a crater of the impact.  He saw that the

 2     experts were there working at the site.  Following that, he gave

 3     instructions to the UNPROFOR members working at the site and then went

 4     back to the headquarters in order to prepare appropriate orders.

 5             Upon his return to the headquarters, he learned that the

 6     spokesperson of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina had quickly organised

 7     a press conference.  The spokesman said that this was just another

 8     example of an atrocity and a crime committed by Serbian army and that

 9     they need to be punished and condemned as the enemies of humanity.  There

10     were absolutely no grounds for the spokesman to state something like that

11     because the investigation was not concluded.  Colonel Demurenko believed

12     that the UN spokesman did -- what the UN spokesman did was an act of

13     provocation.  Colonel Demurenko received two reports that day.  The first

14     one was the report made by a Dutch officer who was a ballistics

15     trajectory expert.  The second report was produced by a ballistics expert

16     who was either a Croat or a Bosniak.  They established the angle of

17     approach of descent at the time the shell reached the surface.  It was a

18     very important document which allowed Colonel Demurenko and his team to

19     proceed with the investigation.

20             Colonel Demurenko gathered a group of experts.  Their first task

21     was to make ballistics calculation in order to either confirm or deny the

22     information given by the first expert on the angle of impact of the shell

23     upon the surface.  Second, to calculate the angle of the shell and draw

24     the line of descent on the map.  Further, the investigation was supposed

25     to include personal inspection of all possible fire positions of that

Page 28886

 1     particular shell, including photo documentation of those locations.  They

 2     worked for three days on 28th, 30th, and 31st of August.  On 1st of

 3     September, they had the results of investigation together with

 4     appropriate conclusions.  When he came with the results to the

 5     investigation -- of the investigation and showed the conclusion to the

 6     assistant of the commander and the assistant realised that their

 7     conclusions differed from those prepared for the public by the UNPROFOR

 8     spokesman, Colonel Demurenko was told:  There will be no publishing of

 9     your report.  It will be impossible to publish it, announce it, or to

10     give this report to the commander.  The result of Colonel Demurenko's

11     investigation indicated that the Serbs would not have fired the shell in

12     that incident.

13             Colonel Demurenko visited all possible firing locations of the

14     Serb side and concluded that those locations were either not suitable for

15     mortar use or that there were no traces of mortar.  Neither of the

16     locations visited on the Serb side of the confrontation line nor the

17     terrain encompassed with the possible mortar margins of deviation radius

18     that he saw with his own eyes were occupied by mortars on 28th of August,

19     1995.  In other words, the terrain was either not suitable for the use of

20     mortars or the location was not used because otherwise he or his team

21     would have seen the traces of the mortar firing or mortar positions since

22     120-millimetre mortars are very heavy and leave traces and impressions in

23     the ground.  The terrain east of the direction of his investigation, east

24     of 170 degrees plus/minus 5, was rocky and full of slopes, therefore not

25     suitable for the mortars.  This would apply to all bearings less than 170

Page 28887

 1     degrees.

 2             Colonel Demurenko also concluded that there was a one in million

 3     chance that the shell would hit the Markale Market from the distance

 4     where Serb positions were located, bearing in mind the size of the street

 5     between the building at Markale and the distance from the Serb positions.

 6     At that point in time, Colonel Demurenko believed that he had two choices

 7     regarding the conclusions of the -- his investigation.  The first avenue

 8     was to cease any activity and not to do anything else to promote the

 9     investigation and truth.  Second avenue was not quite appropriate when

10     from the point of view of military ethics and subordination, but he had

11     to resort to it.  Through the liaison officer for public relations he got

12     in touch with a media company in order to publicise the report.

13     Colonel Demurenko had been waiting a long time for somebody from the

14     UNPROFOR, from the Sarajevo sector, from the BH command, UN command, for

15     the UN in general to ask him while he was still in Sarajevo:  Colonel,

16     could you produce documents to confirm or to corroborate the information

17     that you gave to the Associated Press.  But nobody uttered a word about

18     it.  Instead, he heard from them only two things:  We will throw you out

19     or we will kill you.  That was the only argument.  Nobody asked a thing.

20     It was undesirable information for everyone.

21             Colonel Demurenko was rejected as a source of information leading

22     in an unwanted direction.  It was apparent to him that no one from the

23     UNPROFOR command wanted the truth.  Having publicly declared the findings

24     of his investigation, Colonel Demurenko was threatened by

25     Captain Salajdzic, liaison officer between the BH command and the Sector

Page 28888

 1     Sarajevo, who told him you have one day of life to live, Colonel.  You

 2     have no chance of leaving the headquarters.  At any intersection you can

 3     be killed.  An order was issued to kill you.

 4             Colonel Demurenko suspected that the attack on Markale II was a

 5     terrorist attack from within the city, although a shell can explode only

 6     by being fired from a mortar.  And if one throws it from the roof, it

 7     will not explode.  To simulate an explosion of a shell using a different

 8     explosive device, however, is not difficult because the crater is the

 9     same.  Taking the shell and fixing it using screws or whatever else and

10     exploding it with a different detonator will make the crater look the

11     same.  These are the factors that make Colonel Demurenko believe that it

12     could not have been a mortar shell.

13             Colonel Demurenko believes that other UN members, such as

14     Lieutenant Colonel Konings, instead of conducting an investigation

15     professionally, focused their information on proving that the Serb side

16     was to blame than rather than simply establish the facts and objective

17     conclusions based on those facts.  The UNMOs and the Bosnian police had

18     meetings where they agreed about the method that should be employed in

19     the investigation of the incidents about the type of the projectile, the

20     direction from which it had been fired, and other facts.

21     Colonel Demurenko believed that this was unacceptable and unusual.  The

22     UNMOs should have worked independently and in an unbiased manner.

23             One of the main conclusions of the UNPROFOR documents was that a

24     mortar fired from a middle to long range would have a lower trajectory

25     accurate to a firing position in the Serb territory.  A lower trajectory

Page 28889

 1     round would have passed under the Cymbaline radar's beam.

 2     Colonel Demurenko believes this was the wrong basis to conclude that the

 3     Serbs fired the mortar shell at Markale II.  According to

 4     Colonel Demurenko, mortars fired from middle to long range would have had

 5     a higher trajectory, not lower, and consequently would not have passed

 6     under the Cymbaline radar's beam.  Colonel Demurenko believes that the

 7     conclusion made in this document was unprofessional and amateur and

 8     against the law of physics in the case of mortar fire.  This conclusion

 9     was made by a G2 officer, a position which was always held by the US army

10     intelligence officer.

11             Colonel Demurenko believes that mass media, journalists,

12     reporters, and his Western colleagues from the UNPROFOR and UNMO were

13     spreading rumours that the Serbs were aggressors and that they wanted to

14     destroy the whole of Bosnia.  This idea was unrealistic when he compared

15     it to the situation in the field.  Some 60 per cent of the UNPROFOR

16     personnel supported the idea that the Serbs were aggressors because they

17     were presented by their commanders and media with only selected facts,

18     but they were not shown what the other Bosnian Muslim side was doing.

19     The remaining 40 per cent of the UN personnel had their own opinion, but

20     kept quiet about it and only privately dared to express their own

21     different opinion.  This correct opinion was always expressed in UNPROFOR

22     reports that tended to blame the Serbs for the situation in Sarajevo.

23             Colonel Demurenko observed that although the UNMO and UNPROFOR

24     were two different forces in Sarajevo with two different chains of

25     command, in practice they were the same people.  The task of the UNMO

Page 28890

 1     observers was that they were supposed to differ from different types of

 2     fire and weapons and to recognise all types of military activities,

 3     whether it was an offensive or defensive activity.  Many UNMO observers

 4     were partial to the Bosnian Muslim side and they informed only about the

 5     incoming fire but not about the outgoing fire by the Bosnian Muslims,

 6     thereby portraying the fighting in Sarajevo as a Serb aggression and

 7     shelling.

 8             Colonel Demurenko met twice with the CNN journalist

 9     Christiane Amanpour at the Holiday Inn hotel, and he asked her why she

10     always propogated against the Serbs, and she told him that it wasn't his

11     business.  Many times those in UNPROFOR had the impression that the

12     Bosnian Muslims were sniping their own population, but it was difficult

13     to prove this because the higher command told them that they should stop

14     this kind of investigation.

15             Colonel Demurenko was aware that the Bosnian Muslim army in

16     Sarajevo was sniping and shelling own civilians.  On 8th of June, 1995,

17     Colonel Demurenko released a report stating that the Bosnian civilian was

18     wounded by sniping from a position near the BH parliament which was held

19     by the Bosnian Muslim army.  On 30th of July, 1995, Colonel Demurenko

20     released another report stating that Bosnian Muslim forces from the

21     Presidency area were sniping Muslim civilians in Skenderija.  On 7th

22     August 1995, Colonel Demurenko released a report stating that mortar

23     shells were fired from Bosnian Muslim positions towards the Skenderija

24     area, which was also in the Bosnian Muslim part of the city.

25     Colonel Demurenko was all ready for war when he arrived in Sarajevo, but

Page 28891

 1     there was just occasional exchange of fire and most often by drunk

 2     soldiers firing into the sky tracer bullets and so on.  He also saw a lot

 3     of couples walking in the street which surprised him.  It was clear to

 4     him that Sarajevo was under the blockade by the Serb forces but also that

 5     within the town there were AB -- army -- BH army Muslim -- Bosnian Muslim

 6     troops.  The Serb troops around Sarajevo were also encircled by the

 7     Bosnian Muslim troops from the outer ring.  It was also clear to him that

 8     the VRS did not want to destroy either the town or the population in the

 9     town or even enemy troops, although there was a clear possibility to do

10     so.  Colonel Demurenko believes that the Serb forces around Sarajevo did

11     not want to terrorise the civilian population in Sarajevo under the

12     Muslim control.  There were 250.000 Serb civilians in the city and the

13     Serb soldiers could not identify the nationality of people by sight.  On

14     the other hand, there were individual cases where Serb soldiers who lost

15     their family members acted aggressively.  He is 100 per cent sure that

16     the Bosnian Muslim soldiers were sniping and shelling Serb civilians.  He

17     went to the Serb side of the city.  The life in the Serb side of Sarajevo

18     was exactly the same as in the Muslim part of city.  There were problems

19     with food, water, likewise he also -- he was also 100 per cent sure that

20     the humanitarian aid to the Muslim side was ending at the black markets

21     in Sarajevo.  This is why they tried to organise direct delivery to the

22     humanitarian aid to the civilians.

23             Colonel Demurenko was aware of BH army offensives from Sarajevo

24     to deblock the city.  The biggest part of BH army units was located in

25     civilian buildings.  They had some 20 tanks, five to six mortar

Page 28892

 1     batteries, either battery some five to six mortars 92 -- 82 and the

 2     120-millimetres, heavy machine-gunners, and so on -- guns, and so on.  He

 3     saw that the BH army units provoked the Serb forces to respond by opening

 4     fire and then moving to other locations.  The only incident between the

 5     Serb forces and the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo after the NATO bombing of the

 6     Serb positions that Colonel Demurenko remembers was the fighting at the

 7     brotherhood and unity bridge in Sarajevo.  There were two check-points

 8     from both Serb and Muslim sides of the bridge and the Serbs and Muslims

 9     were shooting against each other.  The Serb soldiers then went to an

10     offensive and captured the Bosnian Muslim trenches.  The Bosnian Muslims

11     informed the French UNPROFOR about this and the French commander ordered

12     its French troops to attack the Serb unit at the occupied check-point.

13     The French soldiers attacked the Serbs and both French and Serb soldiers

14     got killed in this attack.

15             Both the Serb army and the UNPROFOR took each other's soldiers as

16     prisoners of war.  It is obvious that in this case the BH army started

17     the offensive, that the Serbs responded and were bombed, which was unjust

18     and partial action by the so-called impartial third countries.  As a

19     result, the Serbs took those UNPROFOR soldiers from the countries that

20     participated in the bombing as prisoners of war.  It was a critical point

21     of the war, at which point the Muslim side got the help from the bombing

22     countries.  So it was an adequate response from the Bosnian Serbs to

23     respond in this way.  The term "hostages" is unacceptable in this

24     situation.  The word "hostages" were put between inverted commas because

25     the term "hostage" is not a proper term.  Colonel Demurenko did not use

Page 28893

 1     the term "prisoners of war" because formally the UN was impartial in

 2     accordance with the Geneva Convention and he could not therefore use the

 3     term "prisoners of war" for the detained UNPROFOR troops.  There was no

 4     proper term for the situation so the UNPROFOR used the term "hostages."

 5             On 30th of May, 1995, General Smith wrote a message stating that

 6     the Serb soldiers captured the UNPROFOR are de facto prisoners of war,

 7     that they were captured by French forces in a fight, and that he had

 8     ordered command of Sector Sarajevo to hold and secure them.  For

 9     Colonel Demurenko, it is clear that General Smith and General Gobillard

10     showed their involvement in the war when they actively supported the

11     Bosnian Muslim side.  They did not have the right to write this

12     information in the letter, but it was an emotional outburst of

13     General Smith who showed his real intentions.  Also various national

14     units within the UNPROFOR fought together with the Bosnian Muslims

15     against the Bosnian Serbs.

16             In June 1995 as a result of a BH army attack, a Russian

17     observation post was occupied.  On that occasion the Bosnian Muslim

18     troops took 12 Russian UN soldiers and a Russian lieutenant as a

19     prisoner, but the Russian troops had been ordered not to shoot against

20     any side but they also had the instruction not to let any side use their

21     weapons.  As soon as the Russian lieutenant understood that the APC could

22     fall in the Bosnian Muslim hands, he blew it up with a hand-grenade and

23     destroyed the engine of the APC.  However, the Russian soldiers were

24     captured and he got information that they would be killed by the Bosnian

25     Muslims.  Colonel Demurenko told his French commander that they should

Page 28894

 1     organise immediate negotiations because he could not go to the area

 2     without the Muslim -- Bosnian Muslims' permission because they would

 3     shoot him as well.  The general called the Bosnian minister of defence

 4     who arranged the permission for him to go and to collect the bodies of

 5     his dead soldiers.  As the Muslims put it, he ran on foot through the

 6     minefield to get his soldiers and told them to follow in his foot steps

 7     back to the other side and then to the PTT building, thus casualties were

 8     avoided on this occasion.

 9             Approximately once a week or once in two weeks UNHCR people were

10     held by BH troops because BH needed the resources, for example, say 200

11     litres of gasoline.  So they detained them and released them upon the

12     delivery of fuel it was, for example.  They will stop the UNHCR convoy

13     and ask for the materials the BH would need.  If the UN people refused to

14     give, the BH would detain them and take the materials anyway.  Pursuant

15     to an agreement between the sides and the UNPROFOR, the city of Sarajevo

16     was supposed to be a demilitarised zone, free of weapons, but that was

17     the case only in theory.  Sarajevo under the Bosniaks 'control was full

18     of weapons.  Both the military people and so-called civilians had

19     weapons.  The notion of uniform was vague, and only for the reasons of

20     not killing each other by friendly fire, the BH people were wearing

21     ribbons, belts, or other signs to recognise each other.

22             Serbian civilians suffered in the Muslim part of Sarajevo.

23     Serbs -- Serb males -- male civilians tried to hide or escape because

24     they were subject to imprisonment and camps.  The information about the

25     camps for Serbs was kept away from the UNPROFOR by Bosnian Muslim

Page 28895

 1     authorities.  UNPROFOR heard about the camps from different sources

 2     including Sarajevo citizens.  Colonel Demurenko took up a position at

 3     NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, in 1995 and retired from the Russian

 4     army in 1997.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  May it be noted that Mr. Karadzic has just

 6     stopped reading a very long text which was not provided to the

 7     interpreters in advance.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I just heard the intervention from the interpreters

 9     that you read a long text without offering the interpreters text in

10     advance, and I think -- now you completed your reading out the summary?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I just wanted to show a short

12     video-clip to the Colonel and I wanted to ask him --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, just a second, Mr. Karadzic.

14             If my memory is correct that you have spent almost half an hour

15     for your summary.  Given that this is the first witness, the Chamber has

16     given you a bit of leeway.  But speaking for myself, I think it's a bit

17     too long.  Can I remind you that the summary is only for the purpose of

18     informing the public about the written evidence which is just admitted

19     and this does not constitute evidence at all.  And I would also like to

20     remind you that this time for reading out the summary will be taken out

21     from the Defence time.  So it may be in your interest to make it short in

22     the future.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, this is an exception

24     because Colonel Demurenko's statement is also very long, about a hundred

25     pages long, and it is very difficult to provide a short summary on one or

Page 28896

 1     two pages only.  In the future my summaries are going to be much shorter.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And it may be in the interests of justice to deal

 3     with the associated exhibits now before you examine the witness.

 4             Do you have the list with you?  I will deal with some specific

 5     items first.

 6             1D08692, which seems to be Mr. -- Colonel Demurenko's testimony

 7     in the Milosevic trial.  Are you tendering that transcript as an

 8     associated exhibit?  Mr. Robinson.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President, that shouldn't be there.

10             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Thank you.

11             Before I deal with these issues, I need to hear from the

12     Prosecution first.

13             Yes, Mr. Tieger, do you have any objections to any item of the

14     associated exhibits?

15             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

17             And then 1D8695, this is just a picture of Colonel Demurenko

18     holding the firing table and we -- I think that claim is already in the

19     evidence.  What's the relevance of this?  Just -- we can get -- we can do

20     without it.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  We can.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you.

23             And 1D20275, this seems to be an SRK security and intelligence

24     department report.  Given that Prosecution does not challenge the

25     authenticity or the relevance, the Chamber will admit it.

Page 28897

 1             Is that the case, Mr. Tieger?

 2                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 3             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  65 ter numbers 28118, 21 -- I'm sorry 28120, 28180,

 5     in relation to these three documents, all that Colonel Demurenko said is

 6     that he agreed.  The Chamber finds that word -- that term "to agree" a

 7     bit vague and it does not pass the threshold to admit those documents as

 8     an associated exhibit.  So if you would like to tender those documents,

 9     you have to deal with the witness in more specific terms.  Likewise, in

10     relation to the following documents, which is 28112, 28113, 28123, 28125,

11     28134, 28178, 28179, 28184, 28185, Colonel Demurenko made no comment at

12     all or he didn't make any substantial comments; as such, we cannot admit

13     them as associated exhibits.

14             Likewise, the 28124, 28144, 28149, 28167 are not - in the opinion

15     of the Chamber - form indispensable or inseparable documents from the

16     92 ter statement of Colonel Demurenko.  So those items were not admitted

17     as associated exhibits.

18             And more -- and the Chamber has a question, whether -- let's take

19     a look at 20274.  This is an UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo sitrep and

20     Colonel Demurenko dealt with certain part of this sitrep.  So is it the

21     Defence's intention to tender that document in its entirety or only those

22     parts which were dealt by the witness?  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, a document of this length we

24     would tender it in its entirety, unless the Prosecution has any objection

25     to that.

Page 28898

 1             JUDGE KWON:  The same applies to 28117?

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  I think I've already indicated my position vis-a-vis

 5     those documents, Mr. President.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  So all the documents -- other documents would be

 7     admitted as part of 92 ter package and will be given exhibit numbers in

 8     due course by the Registry.

 9             But, Mr. Karadzic, I also expected you to tell us the reason why

10     those documents were not included in your earlier 65 ter list as well as

11     the reason for that.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, I can address that.  Most of

13     these documents were disclosed to us after the 65 -- after the statement

14     was prepared, and so we included at the time we -- on the 15th of

15     September, we submitted our 65 ter list.  We actually received this

16     disclosure on the 14th of September and Colonel Demurenko was not able to

17     be asked about these documents until he arrived here over the weekend.

18     So as a result of that, they were not on our list.

19             JUDGE KWON:  So it's the result of recent 66(B) request?

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Not a recent request.  It was actually -- a

21     request was made a long time ago.  You gave a dead-line to the

22     Prosecution to produce this material by the 10th of May.  Unfortunately,

23     through a clerical error, the Prosecution informed us on the 16th -- on

24     the 14th of September that they had just located those documents and

25     disclosed it to us at that time.  So that's why they're not on our 65 ter

Page 28899

 1     list.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please carry on.

 4                           [Defence counsel confer]

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up D1010,

 6     which is a video-clip.  It has already been admitted into evidence, but I

 7     would like Colonel Demurenko to see it and to tell us whether the

 8     video-clip is what we think it is.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             "First of all, I want to introduce myself.  I am

11     Colonel Demurenko, Chief of Staff Sector Sarajevo.  But really today it's

12     not important because I am like -- only not like Chief of Staff but like

13     citizen of my country and like professional military man, colonel.  I

14     won't explain any details of investigation which was provided UN --

15     so-called UN expertise.  About very terrible events which were a few days

16     ago.  As you know, there was a massacre in down-town when after explosion

17     of mortar, mortar shell, on one of the central street of the city, is it

18     after what was approximately 35 people died and more than 80 in

19     accordance with report wounded.

20             And as a professional man, I cannot agree with argument of UN

21     specialist about reasons and sources of this shelling.  It's absolutely

22     unacceptable for me and for my military friends in this area consent of

23     this argument.  And therefore, I will try explained any new details which

24     I know.

25             "Firstly, if you know the main serious facts for us is following.

Page 28900

 1     This is the material, maybe one portion of whole material of UN

 2     specialist about the shelling.  This is a short report with -- it's

 3     entered on French language but with a very strange conclusion.  This is a

 4     conclusion include idea about the shelling was from Serbian side, I mean

 5     Bosnian Serbs.  This is a small picture which explained angle on the

 6     street, Marsal Tito, and angle which was between ground and shell, mortar

 7     shell.  It's very important for us.  I will explain it following,

 8     afterwards.  This is a copy of photo pictures of this place.  This is the

 9     street.  This is a place where it is exploded of the shell.  This is a

10     very important for us, same picture.  As you can see, this is a direction

11     of fire.  This is place of explosion.  And in accordance with

12     investigation, direction of fire was 176 degrees or in accordance with

13     French custom 2976 mils.  Really, this is a south-east area.  It's very

14     important for us also.  This is a picture about -- it's very interesting,

15     this material of Bosnian police, I mean government Bosnian police, about

16     angle between ground and shell.  As you can see, 70 degrees.  And the

17     last paper is really -- this is a small slice of copy from map and this

18     is my idea which I can explain on this paper.

19             "In accordance with this material, I believe that specialist

20     which was participated in this investigation was very professional and

21     honest people.  And therefore, in accordance once again with this

22     official investigation and material, we have any picture.  It's symbolic,

23     you know, this is Sarajevo.  This is confrontation line, green.  This is

24     two buildings and place where it is exposed this shelling.  In accordance

25     with this material, direction of fire was 100 -- 106 degrees.  In

Page 28901

 1     accordance with another material, it's once again very interesting

 2     question why in UN we have two different material of investigations, but

 3     not different and one conclusion.  But in accordance with another

 4     material of investigation, they said about another angle.

 5             About first, in accordance -- once again, we know what was used,

 6     and so 120-millimetres mortar shell.  It's really former Yugoslavian

 7     weapon and before it, it was Soviet system.  I know it very well because

 8     I am a field commander like a professional soldier.  Many times I

 9     participated in real practical shelling and managed them, I mean by

10     artillery officers.  In accordance with the main documents for this

11     system, this is a table with whole data about characteristics of this

12     system.  We can see that for the system normally used six standard

13     charge -- charges.  And in accordance with this angle, 70 degrees, and

14     this is a direction 176, we can - after comparison with standard

15     data - see on following map.  First explosion, it could be in accordance

16     with this, once again, this degrees and this degrees.  In this area, 900

17     metres.  Next in this area, this is really 1.400.  Next on 2.000.  Really

18     this is on confrontation line.  Theoretically it could be from Serbia,

19     theoretically, I will once again explain it.  And the next three are the

20     2.700, 3.400, and the last charge they can use for 3.600.

21             "Today, personally, with my special -- not special, very small

22     investigation group including artillery officers, we was on this place,

23     this place, this, this, and this really by my foot.  And I can affirm

24     absolutely without or behind any doubts, this is place unacceptable or

25     unsuitable for firing position mortar shell.  No perspective stay on this

Page 28902

 1     position and shell to this area.  And therefore, conclusion of material

 2     of investigation was wrong.

 3             "Now I said only about terrain where is located Serbian troops

 4     and special without my proposals about this area.  This is not my job.  I

 5     am a soldier, I am a colonel, and this is a business for special group

 6     like maybe for this group necessary include criminal prosecutors, members

 7     of court-martial, I don't know, maybe it's a ballistics personnel and so

 8     on, and so on.  But really for us it's necessary understand it that it

 9     was wrong.

10             "About another direction, this is a distance between place of

11     explosion and place of fire position was 2.100 metres.  Same, I was here

12     today, absolutely no perspective locate firing battery or platoon or even

13     one mortar for this area because this is a really rock slope and forest

14     and no perspective fired from this position.  I can affirm it and I will

15     have today a photo picture about each of these places.

16             "I can show for you also map with exactly direction, one this

17     direction and another alternative direction.  And I think the most

18     problem for official investigation group was following.  They investigate

19     only angles and directions and automatically thinking about Serbian

20     so-called aggressions against civil population in Sarajevo, but I think

21     it's not correct.  You agree with me.  It's necessary more deep

22     investigation.  We can organise ballistics expertise, for example, from

23     this place or from all places on this area and we can use the smoke shell

24     for identification place where is exactly can locate this firing

25     position.  And maybe now not necessary more detailed explanation because

Page 28903

 1     I have not time enough for this, but once again I want statement that it

 2     was wrong material, it was absolutely bad conclusion, not correct, and

 3     some subsequences or consequences of this event is very bad because this

 4     is Sarajevo.  Around Sarajevo you can listen sound of shelling and

 5     yesterday we had air-strikes around this area.  Every hour civilian

 6     people and military personnel is wounded and died.  I think it's

 7     absolutely unacceptable, especially unacceptable for professional

 8     military personnel.  We cannot agree when we following after the any

 9     strong group and no chance explain our separate point of view.  We have

10     it, separate point of view.  And once again, I am not like a citizen of

11     my country.  I must say:  Let's stop them, stop false and falsehood lie

12     about Serbian aggression in this area, and specially - specially I

13     stressed on that, I don't speak about Bosnian terrain, it's not my

14     business.  I don't want accuse against somebody or anybody.  This is a

15     problem for professional criminalists, not for us.  But for us necessary

16     every time repeat, please, or investigate it absolutely correctly with

17     full argumentation, or stop it and stop all type of action, I mean UN,

18     NATO, and so on against this country.

19             "And also I want to speak on few words on my native language

20     because I think it's necessary explain why more preferable for me.

21     American mass media and mass media of Russia.  In USA I had few years ago

22     my military education.  I love really this country and I believe that

23     this country can support all type of activity and activity military

24     peacekeeping in this country."

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 28904

 1        Q.   Thank you for your patience.  Colonel, the positions that you

 2     presented then, would you still confirm them today?  Would this be the

 3     same thing that you would say to the general public today?

 4        A.   Yes, absolutely the same.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And now, in view of the importance of the document,

 6     can we quickly go through the documents that you already saw.  Can we

 7     look at 1D28118 in e-court.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the numbers, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I think he referred to 1D28118.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what I said.  I believe it

11     has been interpreted correctly.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Colonel, were you shown this document before?  Are you familiar

14     with it?

15        A.   Yes, of course.  It is assigned report from the institution, a

16     sitrep.

17        Q.   Colonel, is this document authentic?  Does this document reflect

18     what the United Nations concluded at the time?

19        A.   Yes, that's correct.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender the

22     document.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   You were the releasing officer?  You signed that document in what

25     capacity, please?

Page 28905

 1        A.   I was Chief of Staff and it was my duty to sign off the sitreps

 2     that were made on a daily basis.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, in -- on the part of the Chamber in

 4     examining whether or not a certain document can be admitted as an

 5     associated exhibit, the Chamber examines whether that specific document

 6     forms an inseparable and indispensable part of the document.  In the

 7     Colonel's statement all he said is that he agreed with the contents of

 8     this report, without mentioning that either he was the releasing officer

 9     or he signed this document, whether it is consistent with his observation

10     at the time, et cetera.  So please bear that in mind.

11             Yes, we'll admit this document.  Shall we give the number.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2271, Your Honours.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  If you look at page 85

14     of the statement, we can see after the 1D number 28118 it says:

15             "Releasing officer Colonel Demurenko ..."

16             I wonder if in light of that, and that's repeated throughout

17     these documents, if the Chamber might allow us to dispense with showing

18     him each of these documents, knowing now that he was the releasing

19     officer for each of these reports?

20             JUDGE KWON:  So all of these documents I mentioned earlier on

21     were released by Colonel Demurenko?  Can you confirm, Mr. Robinson?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Except for 28179.

23             JUDGE KWON:  So why don't you deal with the latest document 28179

24     and then the Chamber will consider the remainder.

25                           [Defence counsel confer]

Page 28906

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, we won't pursue 28179.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Then all the documents which bears the

 4     subtitle which reads to the effect that Colonel Demurenko was the

 5     releasing officer will be admitted into evidence and will be given

 6     numbers in due course likewise.

 7             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 8                           [Defence counsel confer]

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We just want to check to see

10     if some of the other reasons the Chamber gave for excluding some of these

11     documents are such that we should address them.  I wonder if we could

12     take our lunch break now and we would be able to do that over the break

13     and conclude the direct examination afterwards.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Fair enough, given the time.  We'll break for 45

15     minutes and resume at quarter past 1.00.

16                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.26 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Harvey.

19             MR. HARVEY:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  I would just like, if

20     I may, to introduce Mr. Sam Shnider, who is a Californian attorney who's

21     been working with my team since April and has just given me the good news

22     that he can give me a couple more months and he's been an invaluable aid

23     to our work.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, we have checked the exhibits

Page 28907

 1     that you indicated the Chamber had a problem with, and we've noticed that

 2     they also were authored by Colonel Demurenko.  So we don't have any

 3     further questions of this witness.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  And if you could be more meticulous in the future in

 5     producing the 65 ter list as well as the 92 ter statement.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, we will.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So does it mean that the Defence concluded its

 8     examination-in-chief of Mr. Demurenko?

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

11             Yes, Mr. Tieger --

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may just thank the Colonel for

13     the efforts invested into coming to testify here.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Probably you will have the opportunity to re-examine

15     the witness.

16             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  And good afternoon to

18     everyone in the courtroom.

19                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

20        Q.   Including you, Colonel.  Can I begin with a couple of preliminary

21     matters before I ask you some questions focused on some of the things you

22     said previously.  I noted that in your amalgamated witness statement you

23     appended a couple of articles that is of interviews you gave to the

24     media, and I had occasion to see another one that you gave in May of 1996

25     to Komsomolskaya Pravda and I just wanted to ask you a couple of quick

Page 28908

 1     questions about this those.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  So if we could call up 23 --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Tieger, sorry to interrupt you.

 4     You reminded me of one thing that I forgot.  One of the exhibits that was

 5     admitted as associated exhibit is 1D28164.  Can you upload that, 28164.

 6     Can we see the next page.  I don't think we have a translation of this.

 7     Could you confirm that?

 8                           [Defence counsel confer]

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I believe we do

10     not.  The summary of that could be on the previous page, so we can ask

11     the Colonel to read it out and we'll get the interpretation.  The summary

12     of this document is on the previous page, I believe.

13             JUDGE KWON:  If the Prosecution is fine, given that this passage

14     is very short we can do that.

15             MR. TIEGER:  That's fine, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So, Mr. Demurenko, could you be kind enough so as to

17     be -- read out this passage for our benefit.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With pleasure.  The text reads as

19     follows:

20             "The Bosnian Serbs are withdrawing their heavy weaponry outside

21     of Sarajevo in accordance with the dead-lines as specified by the

22     ultimatum of the UN and NATO.  This was stated today by Chief of Staff

23     Colonel Andrey Demurenko," that is to say me.  "Based on his assessment,

24     the larger part of the equipment and armaments and units (156 units on

25     today's count) have already been dislocated 20 kilometres outside of the

Page 28909

 1     exclusion zone.  There is no doubt that the requirements that were put

 2     forward to the Serbian side will be carried out and that the Serbs will

 3     pull out all of their heavy weaponry except for the tanks and APCs which

 4     are currently out of order."

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Whose handwriting is this, Colonel?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is not my handwriting.  I see

 7     here that there is reference made to -- I apologise.  This is not my

 8     handwriting.  I see that there is reference to the reporter of

 9     Itar Tacc [phoen] agency by the name of Nireskin [phoen].  I knew the

10     man.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  So again I would like to emphasize again

12     the Defence be more meticulous in preparing the 65 ter list.

13             Yes, Mr. Tieger, back to you.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

15        Q.   Colonel, we commence again.  I had referred your attention to a

16     May 1996 interview you gave to Komsomolskaya Pravda.  I just wanted to

17     ask you -- call that up and ask you a couple of quick questions about

18     that.  It seems from your nodding of the head that you remember the

19     article?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   I noted that there's a reference in the article to

22     General Gobillard.  I had also noted that in your amalgamated witness

23     statement you refer to your great respect for the French generals under

24     whom you served, and in this particular article there is a reference

25     to -- and that appears basically in the third column of the document - I

Page 28910

 1     don't know if we have that up in front of you or not -- you may remember

 2     it anyway, so I'll have it called up if necessary.  But you refer to his

 3     runs or jogs through Sarajevo and the firing on him that took place.  And

 4     I just wanted to know if that was intended as any criticism of the

 5     general or an expression of admiration for the general or just a comment

 6     about the nature of the war?

 7        A.   Let me respond.  This was an emotional comment which on the one

 8     hand said that the general, upon arriving in the area of responsibility,

 9     had no idea what was going on in Sarajevo.  He wanted to run around in a

10     demonstrative way like he did in his previous tours, but on the first day

11     he was shot at.  And he didn't think that it was the Serbian side firing

12     at him from up there.  It was most likely that people within the conflict

13     area within Sarajevo itself were protesting against his actions.  And he

14     declined to protest against this publicly under pressure of his own

15     superiors.  And he refused to have body-guards, which was very strange to

16     me.

17        Q.   That's fine.  I also noted a reference to the -- to Mr. Petrovic,

18     whom you also refer to in your amalgamated statement.  Do you recall that

19     you're referring to Mr. Petrovic also in this article and identifying

20     when it was that you first met him?

21        A.   I have to admit that I don't remember all of the details and all

22     of the interviews and the meetings I had with thousands of officers and

23     soldiers at the time.  I remember that there was a Major Petrovic

24     battalion commander who was placed not far from Grbavica close to the PTT

25     building where the headquarters of the peacekeeping forces was.  It would

Page 28911

 1     be difficult for me to say anything more than this.

 2        Q.   If this refreshes your memory, you had referred and referred

 3     earlier today, in fact, or I think it was referred to in the summary that

 4     was read, about retrieving your men by running through the minefield and

 5     I believe you explained in the article that you first encountered

 6     Petrovic who saw you running through that path and that you then made

 7     contact with him.  Is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes, the mike is working now.  I apologise.

 9             I have memories which are different somewhat.  The most vivid

10     moment of the war for me, given that I had to save 12 soldiers, was when

11     I had to run across a minefield.  However, I could not have met Petrovic

12     there.  This must have been either a mistake in your information or in

13     the interpretation I received.  Petrovic was further away from the place

14     where I was saving the soldiers.  I was going back towards the area where

15     the first trenches of the Bosnian battalion were.  The first UNPROFOR

16     soldiers that I came across were either from Slovenia or from Slovakia

17     who were very pleased - just like our soldiers were - to be freed and to

18     avoid death.

19        Q.   Okay.  Thank you, Colonel.  I also wanted to ask you one question

20     about your expertise in artillery and mortars, particularly in relation

21     to the men you commanded.  As I understood your amalgamated witness

22     statement - and indeed what you said in the video that we saw - you --

23     your expertise developed as a general army commander whose responsibility

24     it was to command subordinate units and know enough about the weapons and

25     the weapons systems that they specialised in in order to do so.  Is that

Page 28912

 1     basically correct?

 2        A.   Yes, absolutely, correct.

 3        Q.   And I presume that's also why when you began the effort to

 4     investigate into the shelling that you discussed earlier, you gathered

 5     specialists and experts in those fields; is that right?

 6        A.   Yes, precisely so.  I invited specialists in artillery systems,

 7     yes.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Colonel, then I'd like to turn to some of the elements of

 9     what you discussed briefly today and what was discussed more extensively

10     in the video and obviously in great detail in your amalgamated witness

11     statement.  First of all, you explained on the video that you followed a

12     line of direction, a bearing of 176 degrees from Markale; correct?

13        A.   Yes.  I used the material -- I relied on the material which had

14     been recommended up until that time by the experts.  I relied on the

15     material that initially looked reliable.

16        Q.   And the - as we'll discuss a bit later - the particular locations

17     of potential firing that you went to were based then on the angle of

18     descent of the mortar, checked against the number of charges in the

19     firing cable; is that basically right?

20        A.   I will once again try to explain to the best of my abilities.  A

21     mortar is a very peculiar kind of a weapon because it is basically a tube

22     without grooves --

23        Q.   I don't -- I want to give you a full opportunity to explain the

24     things that you need to to answer the questions, but it really will be

25     much more efficient if we move through step by step rather than pausing

Page 28913

 1     at various junctures for more elaborate explanations.  So I just wanted

 2     to indicate the difference between the line of direction which you've

 3     just discussed and the particular potential firing points that you

 4     identified in the video, which were based on the angle of descent and the

 5     number of possible charges.  That's correct, isn't it?

 6        A.   Yes, there are three factors.  There are only six standard

 7     charges in mortar rounds, and based on the ballistics expertise

 8     discussing 70 degrees of angle of descent - I could be wrong but I think

 9     this is not disputed - and 170 degrees southward of the shelling.  So the

10     investigation focused on those factors.

11        Q.   Did you just say 170 degrees?  That's what the transcript

12     indicates.  You were previously talking about 176 degrees.

13        A.   Yes.  Yes.  I looked at the documents a number of times.  I

14     listened to the comments or to the translation and the figures 170 and

15     176 were frequently confused, interchanged.  And I would like to

16     underline that it doesn't really matter whether it's 170 or 176 because

17     in my interview I said that a margin of error of 5, plus/minus 5, is

18     quite normal.  So it could be 175, 165.  So that's the first thing.  The

19     second thing is when I gave a task to my officer to establish where the

20     firing points could have been, I explored a much broader belt than the

21     one applying to 170 or 176 degrees.  I basically photographed all of the

22     slopes on that mountain.

23        Q.   Well, Colonel, we're going to talk in a moment about the areas

24     that you indicated during your previous testimony and during the course

25     of the video that you explored, and we'll also discuss that photographs.

Page 28914

 1     But for the moment I want to take it step by step and talk about your

 2     identification of line of direction.  And so do I understand you to say

 3     that in your view it didn't matter and you didn't care whether you chose

 4     a line of direction of 176 or 165 or anything else?

 5        A.   Precisely so, because the reconnaissance of the ground was

 6     conducted on a much broader area than the one shown on the sketch.  The

 7     entire area to the right and to the left, much greater than 5 degrees,

 8     was explored so that we wouldn't later be accused of not being thorough

 9     enough.

10        Q.   Let's -- I want to look at what you said at the time and what you

11     represented that you were doing on the particular day that you -- day or

12     days you conducted your examination of the area.  It may well be that the

13     fact that you now say it didn't matter what line of direction you chose

14     affected your consistency in identifying those factors, but I want to

15     check that consistency first.  So you -- to begin with, you testified or

16     that is your amalgamated witness statement states at paragraph 122 that

17     UNPROFOR found that the line of direction was 171 plus or minus 5.  Is

18     that correct?

19        A.   Well, I think that's close to the truth.  Yes, it sounds right.

20        Q.   Okay.  Well at any point you're welcome to check your statement

21     if you --

22        A.   I take you at your word.  I believe it.

23        Q.   And as we noted before, on the video it says you followed the

24     line of direction of 176 degrees.  So that means, Colonel, that you took

25     one of the extremes of the margin of deviation and used that as your line

Page 28915

 1     of direction rather than the line of direction actually found by the

 2     French UNPROFOR investigation; isn't that right?

 3        A.   First of all, we need to begin from the fact that there was no

 4     French investigation at the time when this statement about the Serb

 5     aggression was made.  There was no investigation at all.  There was just

 6     this angle of descent and some approximate line of direction leading to

 7     the front line, and that's all.  That's when the statement was made.

 8     Only later when I started my own investigation did the French and others

 9     appear with some investigative efforts when it was all pointless, when it

10     was all of it too little too late, as we say.

11        Q.   Colonel, let me say two things.  First of all, I want to avoid

12     semantic games with you and I want to remind you that Judge Robinson also

13     pointed out your criticism of the particular term he used during his

14     questioning of you in the Dragomir Milosevic case and defended his

15     terminology.  So I don't really want to get caught up in whether it was

16     an investigation or a conclusion or preliminary efforts.

17             Secondly, you seem to be suggesting here that there was nothing

18     from the French until after your investigation was underway.  And I want

19     to remind you that during the course of the video, that is, the

20     conference or the filming of your statement to the media, that you showed

21     the -- a French document reflecting the number of mils for the line of

22     direction; right?

23        A.   Nevertheless, I still insist that it was not a proper document.

24     It was a piece of paper.  It was not an investigation.  An investigation

25     means a thorough investigation of all possibilities, all leads.  There

Page 28916

 1     was no -- there were no various options taken into account here.  There

 2     was just this angle and one line of direction.

 3        Q.   Colonel, I -- I think everyone here understands that you take the

 4     position that further steps needed to be implemented before you would

 5     consider an investigation to be complete, but I'm just focusing now on

 6     the materials that you had at the time of the video that was made and

 7     that, in fact, you referred to as having relied upon because you consider

 8     them to be professional and honest efforts.  So we're in agreement on

 9     that much; correct?

10        A.   Yes, I agree that I took that into account.  Yes, that's true.

11        Q.   For the moment I'm looking at the methodology that you used and

12     just talk to you about the plus or minus aspect.  Now I want to talk to

13     you about where the figure 171 degrees came from.  Now, Colonel, are you

14     aware that the French did not find that the line of direction - as you

15     stated in paragraph 122 of your amalgamated witness statement - was 171

16     degrees plus or minus 5?

17        A.   Yes, I fully agree.

18        Q.   Do you know what line of direction they found?

19        A.   Of course I don't remember, but I remember that line that went

20     left that was on the sketch, but I don't remember the figure.  It doesn't

21     matter anyway.

22        Q.   Well, I'm going to suggest we will be looking at the distances

23     represented by those different lines at some point, but let me focus on

24     it at the moment in terms of methodology rather than overall

25     consequences.  So I take it then that -- and I can show you the document,

Page 28917

 1     for example, that shows that what the French found was 160 degrees line

 2     of direction.  So I take it you don't dispute that?  You're welcome to

 3     see the document if you wish.

 4        A.   No, no, I believe it.  No problem.

 5        Q.   Now, 160 degrees in the French system is 2850 mils.  Are you

 6     aware of that?

 7        A.   (No verbal response)

 8        Q.   And you're nodding your head, yes?

 9        A.   Right, yes.

10        Q.   Just for the benefit of the Judges, although they may well be

11     aware of this already, mils is a unit of angular measurement used in

12     artillery in particular and that has quite a number depending on the

13     particular system used; right?

14        A.   I don't quite understand the question.  Is it something you're

15     asking me?

16        Q.   In the Russian system is it correct that 6.000 mils is the system

17     used and a single mil is equal to 1/6000th of a revolution, or do you

18     know that?

19        A.   No, there is a system of calculation in thousandth part and the

20     system of calculation in degrees, one and the same system.  It doesn't

21     change anything.  I'm not talking about millimetres.  I'm talking about

22     thousandth parts which is mils.

23        Q.   Colonel, I just heard you say it's one and the same system, but

24     are you not aware that the Russian system uses 6.000 mils for a complete

25     revolution and the NATO countries use 6400 mils.  Do you know that or

Page 28918

 1     not?

 2        A.   No.

 3        Q.   Well, let me just call up the simplest thing I can.  We'll get

 4     more testimony on that, but if we could look at 65 ter 23896, just a

 5     Wikipedia article, something anybody can look up.  We're also going to

 6     see some firing tables, I believe, that reflect the different system of

 7     mils.  If we could just scroll down quickly.

 8             Okay.  You can see in this first paragraph it indicates that

 9     France began with mils at 6400, the Red Army expanded that to 6.000 mil

10     one.  And if we continue with the article, we'll see that difference

11     reflected again and confirmed.  I don't want to get us too deeply into

12     these sorts of details, as I say we'll see them further in the firing

13     tables, but are you satisfied, Colonel, that there is a difference

14     between the Russian system and the system that NATO countries use in

15     terms of mils?

16        A.   I don't mind that every country and every bloc has its own system

17     of measurement.

18        Q.   Now, the reason I raise this is not for idle academic purposes,

19     Colonel.  This is the reason, that, as I say, the -- you have the

20     translation of mils to degrees is obviously done by dividing the mils by

21     360 degrees and if you then get in the French system a figure of 17.777

22     for each mil, and if you divide 2850, which is the mils the French found,

23     you get 160.  So that's their figure of 160.  And you can see in one of

24     the documents in evidence that 2850 mils equals 160 degrees in the French

25     system.  However, Colonel, if you mistakenly use the mils that the French

Page 28919

 1     came up with, 2850, and then apply the Russian standard to that, that is,

 2     you divide 6.000 instead of 6400 by 360, you get a figure of 16.666 for

 3     each mil.  And then if you divide 2850 mils, the figure reached by the

 4     French, with the Russian system of mils, you get the number 171 degrees.

 5     And isn't that, in fact, Colonel, how you came up with the figure 171 as

 6     reflected in your amalgamated witness statement at paragraph 122 because

 7     that 171 is reflected in no other finding by any other investigation?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I object to that and I

 9     don't think that is correct to be put to the witness in that way, and

10     perhaps if you want to hear more about that we could excuse the witness

11     and I can explain, but there's a very misleading element to that

12     statement that I think not fair to put to the witness.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Why is the Prosecution not able to put something to

14     the witness, which the witness, I'm confident, is able to deal with the

15     issue.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, he's just made a statement of fact to the

17     witness that's not correct.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Let's leave it -- if Mr. Robinson is concerned with

19     the last phrase I used, I can drop that, and I just want the witness's

20     response about the actual data that was used and how he arrived at that

21     figure.  So I'll deal with the question of what other investigations came

22     up with in a moment if that's the problem.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   Colonel, I'm sorry about that exchange.  Do I need to repeat the

Page 28920

 1     question?  Because the point is this:  That by mixing and matching or by

 2     mixing up the two systems, that's how you come to the figure of 170

 3     degrees.  It's not the figure that was found by the French, it's not the

 4     figure that's represented by the -- that's reflected in the document you

 5     were showing the media on September 2nd when you held the conference?

 6        A.   Once again, this is my point of view.  First of all, I agree with

 7     you, that this kind of conversion from our mils tables to the firing

 8     tables of NATO we did not do that, we didn't need to.  The calculations

 9     were very simple and even more primitive than you suppose.  I didn't even

10     need to determine what 160 degrees was.  We simply see the line drawn on

11     the map - it doesn't matter at how many degrees - the line drawn by the

12     French.  And we see on the map what landmark on the ground this line

13     reaches.  We go to the ground, we go to those landmarks - there are ten

14     on the road or whatever - and we investigate those points, those

15     locations.  We don't care how many degrees the French investigation

16     reached; it doesn't matter.  It is the old military principle of

17     landmarks that has not been replaced by anything.  There were no GPS

18     systems then, at least we didn't have them.

19        Q.   When you talked to the media on September 2nd, you did not hold

20     up a document that said here's the line on the map drawn by the French

21     which I followed today.  You held up a document that said:  I know the

22     angle of descent and I know the line -- from the Bosnian investigation

23     and I know the line of direction from the French investigation.  And

24     that's what you represented your line of direction was based on; correct?

25        A.   You know, 17 years ago it was difficult to imagine that we will

Page 28921

 1     be discussing this now, in legal terms, mind you, not military terms, not

 2     against the backdrop of shooting behind my back - and remember, there was

 3     a war going on then.  I couldn't imagine that I would be in court 17

 4     years later discussing in legal terms how we are to combine two different

 5     tables.  I have to present briefly my arguments, what, why, and what

 6     needs to be done.  At that time, of course, I wasn't thinking why I

 7     wasn't showing this or another document or the table, why didn't I

 8     comment on it?  It's difficult to think 17 years ahead; just try it.

 9        Q.   Colonel, you may well have done things a little bit different at

10     the time if you knew you'd be in court 17 years ago, but I'm simply

11     focusing on what you did at the time and what you said at the time.  Let

12     me turn to another issue that was raised in your amalgamated witness

13     statement, and that is that assuming that you had followed the right line

14     of direction, where you looked when you got to the spot that you

15     considered the angle of descent and the number of charges indicated was a

16     potential firing point.  Now, there's a paragraph in your amalgamated

17     witness statement devoted to the alleged confusion by the Trial Chamber

18     between two margins of error.  So let me turn first, since you impliedly

19     refer to what the Dragomir Milosevic Chamber said, to what they did find

20     about your conclusions and where you looked.  And that's found at

21     paragraph 722 of the Dragomir Milosevic judgement, and I think we can

22     find that at 65 ter 23899 at page 7.

23             It begins, and this is paragraph 722, after a discussion -- this

24     follows a fairly lengthy discussion of the evidence you gave.  It says

25     that you testified about the mortar, went to the possible firing

Page 28922

 1     locations, concluded for each of the locations it was either not possible

 2     to fire or there were no visible traces.  It goes on you could not

 3     testify as to exactly which bearing you used when you visited the

 4     possible firing locations.  It talks about a satellite photograph that

 5     you were shown indicating the difference in the bearings, that you said

 6     the bearing was one from UNPROFOR.  And then it goes on:

 7             "Colonel Demurenko testified he could calculate the possible

 8     firing locations with a margin of deviation of ten to 15 metres and that

 9     enabled him to search the location within those points.  The

10     Trial Chamber recalls the evidence that any bearing calculated by

11     UNPROFOR or the Bosnia-Herzegovina police had a margin of error of

12     approximately 10 degrees confirmed by QMS Higgs.  It is clear that this

13     margin of error covered a wider area than was covered by the locations

14     visited by Colonel Demurenko on the basis of a margin of deviation of no

15     more than 10 to 15 metres.  The Trial Chamber therefore has a difficulty

16     accepting Colonel Demurenko's conclusions, dismissing any possibility

17     that the shell was fired from SRK-held territory.  This determination is

18     consistent with the Prosecution's line of cross-examination, that

19     Colonel Demurenko confined himself to too narrow an area in seeking to

20     identify the possible launching sights.  It is significant that Colonel

21     Demurenko never answered the Prosecution's questions on this point with

22     any clarity.  In fact, the Trial Chamber characterises his responses as

23     vague and evasive."

24             Now, that's what the Trial Chamber said.  And in your amalgamated

25     witness statement at paragraph 22, you stated that:

Page 28923

 1             "It seems that the Dragomir Milosevic confused these two margins

 2     of error ..."

 3             And by that you meant --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could you give the para number

 5     again.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  122 I believe, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it's noted as -- you said -- just 22.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we show that paragraph to the witness as

10     well.  This is on page 55 end of that paragraph just before the next

11     para.  Next page.

12             MR. TIEGER:  If you scroll down slightly we will see at the end

13     of that paragraph the quote I --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Further, further.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Now, Colonel, we could read the entirety of 122 along with

17     paragraph 121, which is also relevant, but the two margins of error that

18     you're referring to here are, one, the margin of error between -- margin

19     of error for the difference between where a mortar is aimed and where it

20     may actually land, that's on the one hand; and on the other hand, the

21     deviation of error - I'll call it that - in assessing where a potential

22     firing site was based on the firing tables, the number of charges, and

23     the angle of descent.  Correct?  You're asserting that the

24     Dragomir Milosevic Chamber confused those two?

25        A.   Is that a question?

Page 28924

 1        Q.   Yeah, that's actually a statement to which I wish you to either

 2     affirm or deny.  Is that true or not?

 3        A.   I can't tell you anything against the previous Chamber.  I have

 4     full respect to this Court and I came here for the second time, so how

 5     could I doubt their conclusions or anything of the sort?  I trust the

 6     Court.

 7        Q.   Well, Colonel, if you -- I agree with you and if you're willing

 8     to rely on the findings of the Dragomir Milosevic Chamber and retract

 9     your testimony, we can end this cross-examination right now.  But I

10     understand you to be saying in paragraph 122 that the Dragomir Milosevic

11     Chamber was confused about the two kinds of margins of error.  So you

12     tell me if I should proceed or not.

13        A.   I don't understand what is your dilemma now.  What are you

14     actually asking me now?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Shall we show the witness the

16     previous page.

17             So here in para 122 you first explained the table 1 we see here.

18     And next page.  And then you explain another set of a margin of error.

19     And after that - no, further down - in the last sentence just below the

20     table 2 you said:

21             "It seems that the Dragomir Milosevic Chamber confused these two

22     margin or errors (table 1 and table 2)."

23             Could you clarify what you meant by this statement.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask that the witness be given

25     a hard copy of his statement.

Page 28925

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I see no problem.  Do you have it with you?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  It's on page 54 and 55.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  There seem to be some documents inadvertently

 5     appended.  I'll remove them and hand them back to the Defence.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have something to tell you

 7     regarding this.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please proceed.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have a feeling that if we are

10     going to go into the depth of the artillery science, we won't get closer

11     to the end - not only today but we won't get to it this year.  Once it --

12     again, let me tell you, when the firing tables are prepared, there is a

13     full set of facts and a partial one.  So the deviation can depend not on

14     two, like shown here, but dozens of tables.  For example, in order to

15     understand the deviation of a round, one needs not only to take the

16     temperature of the charge but also the temperature of the lower level of

17     the air where the shell landed and in the upper levels of air of the

18     trajectory and additional dozens of --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Sorry to interrupt you.  Let's make it simple.  Do

20     you see the sentence where you said:

21             "It seems that Dragomir Milosevic Chamber confused these two

22     margin or errors ..."

23             Do you stand by that statement?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree with the statement, that

25     those two tables were absolutely not sufficient in order to establish the

Page 28926

 1     truth.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I'll leave it to you, Mr. Tieger.

 3             MR. TIEGER:

 4        Q.   Well, then I'll follow-up on the Trial Chamber's question.  That

 5     was not the question.  The question was simply whether or not you stand

 6     by the statement that they confused those two kinds of deviations or

 7     margins of error?

 8        A.   No, I cannot blame somebody who made conclusions some time ago,

 9     five years ago.  In order to do that, I would need to go into an in-depth

10     study of their facts and conclusions and I'm not prepared to do that

11     right now.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Well, like you, Mr. President, I will leave it there

13     for the moment.

14        Q.   Now, Colonel, you do not explain in your statement how it was, in

15     your view, the Trial Chamber confused these two margins of error since

16     there was no discussion during your testimony that I'm aware of about the

17     margin of error representing the difference between where a mortar is

18     aimed and where it lands, that that wasn't relevant to or addressed in

19     your testimony at all.  Isn't that right?  That wasn't the subject of

20     your testimony, you weren't asked about that, and the Trial Chamber

21     wasn't interested in the -- how far a mortar may deviate from its

22     intended target once fired?

23        A.   I agree that we didn't discuss it in detail for a very clear

24     reason.  As I said in my initial statement and also when I testified in

25     court, I have a very clear belief that there was no mortar shelling at

Page 28927

 1     all.  This was a terrorist act carried out in the streets of Sarajevo.

 2     This is the first thing I wanted to say.  The second thing is if I were

 3     to be given a sheet of paper or a screen where I could show you

 4     graphically the areas that we investigated, it would become clear to

 5     everybody that we not only explored the possible locations shown on the

 6     map; we explored the gigantic area, the entire slope of that mountain,

 7     thousands of square metres.  And it was only after doing that that we

 8     concluded that no mortars could have been placed there because there was

 9     simply no location suitable for mortars to be put there.

10        Q.   Well, Colonel, I understand that's what you're saying now in the

11     face of the Dragomir Milosevic testimony, but let's take a look then at

12     what you said to the Chamber at the time about the nature of your

13     examination to determine whether or not it was possible to have fired a

14     mortar from the areas that you identified as potential firing spots.  So

15     first I'm going to run you through a number of things that you said to

16     the Milosevic Chamber.  First, at page -- transcript page 7780 you

17     referred to specialists visiting location, marking the spot:

18             " ... the very spot from which this shell was allegedly fired."

19             And the same page you refer to:

20             "I have on record photographs which show me pointing my finger on

21     the location," that's 7780.

22             At 7777 you said you and the others looked at firing tables in

23     order to establish "with a margin of error of 1 to 2 metres the exact

24     location ..."

25             At 7781 you again refer to:

Page 28928

 1             " ... the exact locations of fire points ..."

 2             Again at --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Could you please slow down when reading.  Thank

 4     you.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, thank you for that admonition.

 6        Q.   Again at 8992 you talk about pointing at a "precise" location,

 7     and indicate that:  Each photograph was made in a particular location

 8     which "had been identified in advance with a margin of error of 5

 9     metres."  That's at 8992.  And then again a bit later you stated that --

10     asked whether you could see any traces that a 120-millimetre mortar was

11     placed in that area, and that is this exact location to which you had

12     been referring, you said certainly:

13             "And we observed the entire area around this spot, and had I seen

14     10 to 20 metres away from this spot a possible firing position" then that

15     could have been something that would have prompted you to draw some other

16     conclusions.

17             So, Colonel, I put it to you that the Dragomir Milosevic

18     Trial Chamber was not confused about the two different kinds of margins

19     of error reflected in the tables you put into your amalgamated witness

20     statement, but they understood you to be saying exactly what you were

21     saying, that you were focused on very precise locations.  That is the

22     testimony you gave to the Dragomir Milosevic Chamber, isn't it?

23        A.   Let me respond.  That's right, because otherwise had I covered

24     the map with my hand and said I investigated this entire area, it would

25     not have sound convincing.  One needs to be precise in the artillery

Page 28929

 1     sense precise and show everything that is open for calculation, that is,

 2     that can be calculated.  So what we investigated were specific locations

 3     and I covered -- I spoke about all of them in quite precise terms because

 4     we had to show that we knew how to make calculations using the known

 5     angles in order to define the possible firing points.  However, let me

 6     draw your attention to the fact that that doesn't exclude the possibility

 7     that not only 10 to 15 metres further, but 150 metres further and 200

 8     metres further, everything was thoroughly investigated and photographed.

 9     And one doesn't contradict the other.  Have I answered your question?

10        Q.   No, but you have provided some additional information I want to

11     follow-up on.  So your suggestion is that this -- you -- as you said

12     before, you went to all these areas but you were just showing the

13     Trial Chamber how precise you -- your calculations were.  And I put it to

14     you, Colonel, that you had an opportunity in the Milosevic case to tell

15     the Chamber that you covered all the terrain you now say you did because

16     you -- the Trial Chamber confronted you about just this issue and asked

17     about the precise nature of the locations you said you were focusing on.

18     And you didn't tell them:  No, no, no, no, it's true, it's -- it can't

19     be -- you can't be that precise and I covered much more ground to make

20     certain.

21             Here's what you told them, Colonel, and let me describe to you

22     the question that you were asked in the face of all this emphasis on

23     precise locations that you made and then the answer that you gave.  And

24     this is at transcript 7705 through 06 in the Dragomir Milosevic testimony

25     and indeed at paragraph 97 of your amalgamated witness statement.  So

Page 28930

 1     Judge Harhoff asked you:

 2             "But Colonel, would there not be quite a large margin around each

 3     of these six firing points, and even so the farther out you get the

 4     larger the margin within which the fire could have been shot is

 5     increased.  So if you take the example with the six charges, I mean, if

 6     it was fired from there, it could have been fired, I suppose, quite a

 7     large area.  It did not necessarily have to be fired from the position

 8     where you were and where you took this photograph.  If, for instance, a

 9     couple of hundred metres away there would have been a road or something

10     else, the shot could have come from there.  So are you able really to

11     exclude that the mortar could not have been fired even from an area

12     adjacent to the place where you were?"

13             And your --

14        A.   I'm ready to answer.

15        Q.   Well, I'm -- you may be but I want to tell you the answer that

16     you gave at the time.  Because at that time you didn't say what you're

17     saying today, that you covered a tremendous amount of ground.  Here's

18     what you said:

19             "I have to emphasis one thing once again.  I know this weapon

20     very, very well.  Maybe the interpretation of the word 'charge' was

21     misleading.  There are no different shells, six shells there.  There are

22     six charges.  And it's charged manually.  You put the shell inside the

23     tube and it flies up.

24             "So the firing tables for mortars that you saw in that video

25     footage show that in that direction only six charges are possible, either

Page 28931

 1     one, two, three, all the six were taken into account."

 2             And then you said:

 3             "Margins of deviation are measured in metres, like 10 to 15

 4     metres, the size of this room, but the margin of deviation cannot be a

 5     hundred metres.  We took into account ballistic trajectories.  It's the

 6     science of physics.  We cannot go beyond that.  If you take a certain

 7     line of fire, only six possible firing points exist depending on the

 8     charges used.  We photographed an area of 20, 30 square metres.  We

 9     always proceeded from a certain surface on which the mortar had to rely.

10     It cannot hang in the air.  It cannot be suspended on a tree.  We showed

11     the photographs and we saw the ground was pure and clear.  No mortar had

12     stood there."

13             So with an opportunity to tell the Dragomir Milosevic Chamber,

14     indeed not just an opportunity but an obligation because the Judge was

15     asking you that very question, you didn't say that you went -- you

16     covered the entire area for thousands and thousands of metres around.

17     You said:  Look, we looked at the precise spot and the 20 to 30 metres

18     around it in order to determine that the mortar couldn't have been fired

19     from there, and that's why the Milosevic Chamber reached the conclusion

20     it did; isn't that right?

21        A.   I'll answer that.  Concerning the first part, at least I thought

22     it was a question, it's necessary to answer the question about the road.

23     Yes, in theory a road could be a relatively good place to place an

24     artillery weapon.  But in that place where we were there were -- there

25     had never been any asphalt roads.  There were just dirt tracks fit for

Page 28932

 1     horses.  And on the ground, even on the dirt track like that, there would

 2     have been traces, traces of the base plate, traces of the cases of

 3     ammunition, and even if you tried to hide them to remove them, it would

 4     hardly be possible.  That's as far as the road is concerned.

 5             The second thing:  Why I didn't talk more about the area we

 6     covered.  As a professional - not in geology but in another area of

 7     expertise - it's difficult for me to explain why I didn't speak about it.

 8     Perhaps they didn't ask me.  They probably didn't ask me.  But I have to

 9     say that in the interview on the video I said that we explored the

10     locality.  I didn't say a particular location or point.  We explored the

11     locality, and that means that we explored a large area lest we later be

12     accused of a biased conclusion.  That's all I have to say.

13        Q.   Well, let's be a little more concrete then because in fact you

14     persist in saying that nobody -- let me see if I have that right.

15             "They probably didn't ask me."

16             Okay.  Well, let's call up -- we've just -- I've just read to you

17     in detail what Judge Harhoff indeed asked you and you were clearing

18     talking about a meadow.  So let's call up 1D08701.  Now, in your

19     testimony you referred to a pristine meadow, and this was -- I take it

20     this is the meadow you were talking about because I can only recall one

21     picture of a meadow among the four you showed in court.

22        A.   Yes, this one included.  But there was a huge number of

23     photographs.  We took loads of them, but yes this picture shows that my

24     words are consistent with the first.

25        Q.   Judge Harhoff clearly said you're pointing to an area that you

Page 28933

 1     looked at, but if there was a road adjacent maybe a couple of hundred of

 2     metres away, wouldn't that invalidate your conclusions?  And you didn't

 3     say:  No, it wouldn't because as you can see here there's a house and a

 4     road near it and I looked at that road.  You said:  I looked at the 20

 5     to 30 square metres around the point that I identified as being the

 6     firing location.  Isn't that right?

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we would ask that Mr. Tieger read

 8     from the transcript as to exactly what the witness said.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I read it just a few moments ago.  Does Mr. Robinson

10     really want to have that read again.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, just looking at paragraph 97 of the

12     amalgamated statement which quotes from that portion, and I hesitate

13     whether I should say this in the presence of the witness, but in any

14     event, in the last -- second-to-last sentence it says that:

15             " ...  we photographed an area of 20 to 30 metres."

16             It doesn't say we looked at an area of 20 to 30 square metres.

17             MR. TIEGER:  And it --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   And it also states, Mr. Demurenko, that the margin of deviation

21     cannot be what the Judge said it was.  You shouldn't worry about a road a

22     couple of hundred metres away because margins of deviation are measured

23     in metres like 10 to 15 metres, but the margin of deviation cannot be 100

24     metres.  That's what you told the Milosevic Chamber; correct?

25        A.   I'm not going to deny anything I said to a previous Chamber and

Page 28934

 1     I'm not going to deny anything I've said today.  Everything I said I said

 2     perfectly sincerely and honestly.  It's a different matter that somebody

 3     would like to catch me out in an inconsistency between what I said before

 4     and later.  Perhaps there is such a strategy, but I repeat I am not a

 5     legal expert.  I'm a soldier and everything I could say I've already

 6     said, and the rest is up to specialists in other areas of a different

 7     level.

 8        Q.   Colonel, in respect of leaving -- let's leave that aside for a

 9     different moment --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Let me try it for the last time.  Why don't we show

11     the last paragraph in para 122 of the witness's statement.

12             You understand English, Mr. Demurenko?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand it but I have

14     misgivings because over the past few years I've had no practice.  And if

15     I can understand English in colloquial speech or perhaps enough to read a

16     simpler book -- but in a serious discussion when every word - and not

17     only every word but every full stop and comma is important - I would not

18     rely on my English.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Next page.  And let's zoom in a bit.

20             Could you kindly read two lines, one sentence, which appears

21     immediately above paragraph 123.  Could you read aloud.  I will read it

22     for your benefit so that you can hear the translation.

23             "It seems that the Dragomir Milosevic Chamber confused these two

24     margins or errors" and you refer to table 1 and table 2.

25             This is your statement that you stated you would stand by.  What

Page 28935

 1     did you mean by saying this?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's difficult for me to recall my

 3     state of mind and level of understanding from five years ago.  But in

 4     that specific case I meant that not all elements of artillery science

 5     were taken account.  As I said 15 years ago there are not two tables that

 6     are relevant but 20 or 30, and it is not appropriate to compare one table

 7     with another and confine yourself to that.  We should either limit

 8     ourselves to a margin of several centimetres or take into account

 9     properly all the 30 tables that are relevant.  That's I think what I

10     meant.

11             JUDGE KWON:  But this is the statement you made recently, not

12     five years ago.  So could you clarify that, what you meant.  Why did

13     you -- do you think the Milosevic Chamber was confused?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's difficult for me to judge the

15     basis on which this high court made its conclusions.  I believe it was

16     done the way it was done simply because we should not look at the

17     accessories on a suit, on an outfit, but the whole suit, the main thing,

18     not second-rate or third-rate details.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

20             Mr. Tieger.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would it help, Your Excellency, if

22     the witness had read out to him paragraphs 122 and 123 so they be

23     interpreted into Russian so that he should realise it refers to the

24     judgement in the Dragomir Milosevic case.  If we could read to him both

25     these paragraphs, 122 and 123.

Page 28936

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I think Mr. Tieger did it, but it may be a subject

 2     for you to take up at your re-examination if necessary.

 3             Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   All right.  In the remaining time before I move on to an entirely

 6     different area, let me just address this.  Let me just focus on your

 7     assertion that you were looking for various traces that a mortar had been

 8     fired.  First of all, can we agree that there is likely to be a

 9     difference between the traces of a fixed mortar position that has been in

10     a particular place for a period of time and the traces left by a mortar

11     that assumes a temporary firing position for one shot and then departs?

12        A.   Yes, yes, certainly.  Firing positions that have been occupied

13     for years certainly leave more traces or deeper traces.  But

14     nevertheless, even a temporarily-placed mortar would inevitably leave a

15     trace, especially if it has been fired.  If it has been just placed there

16     without firing and then evacuated somehow by a crane, there would be

17     minimal trace.  But if it has been fired, the crew would never be able to

18     remove all the traces of the gun charge that has been fired but does not

19     depart with the shell.  But the main argument for all artillery

20     specialists is that there is one in a million chance that one single

21     mortar would manage to hit one single street occupied by a huge crowd of

22     people.  And let me remind you that two years earlier there had been an

23     identical terrorist act in the same street, killing 88 people and

24     wounding 200.  The chance that a mortar shell would hit such a small

25     street of 6, 8 metres in length distance between those two buildings is

Page 28937

 1     one in a million.  It's virtually impossible.

 2        Q.   Is the chance slightly higher that a mortar will land in a

 3     broader area rather than the precise spot on which it lands?  And are you

 4     asserting here that your judgement about whether -- about where the

 5     mortar was fired from and whether it was a mortar at all is based on your

 6     conclusion that that exact spot, right there, was the target rather than,

 7     for example, the market at large?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, Mr. Tieger is putting

 9     multiple questions to the witness which is something that he criticised

10     Dr. Karadzic for.  So I think if he can break it up and just take an

11     answer to his first question then he can follow it up with the next one.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Fair enough.

13        Q.   So I'll ask the question.  Are you asserting here that your

14     conclusions are based upon your insistence that the mortar was fired at

15     the exact spot it landed -- that the mortar was targeted at the exact

16     spot it landed rather than, for example, the market at large?

17        A.   No, no.  That is not so.  Moreover, I insist that there was no

18     mortar fire.  That's what I insist on.  But even if we accept for the

19     moment the fantastic idea that one mortar was firing at the city with

20     minimal chances of hitting a very small, densely populated area, I'm

21     saying the chance is one in a million.  I want to remind this honourable

22     Court and everybody that on that day it was not the one explosion

23     registered by UN representatives.  I believe there were six detonations,

24     six explosions in that area.  And after the first five mortar shells or

25     so-called mortar shells, only five people were wounded.  And from this

Page 28938

 1     particular shell allegedly killed 88 and wounded 200.  That doesn't

 2     happen.  It just doesn't happen that a shell chooses on its own a point

 3     where it would do the most damage and the greatest casualties.  There

 4     were so many details of that kind presented in the statement made to the

 5     public and the image created that just doesn't -- don't hold water.

 6        Q.   So I understand you to be saying that you scoured thousands of

 7     metres of territory in order to look for the traces of a mortar shell

 8     that you believed had not been fired?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   So you went out there, you say, thinking that you would -- that

11     there was nothing to be found; right?

12        A.   No, no.  I wanted to either confirm what the speaker -- what the

13     spokesman said - that it was from Serb territory - I wanted to confirm it

14     if I was able to by photographs and finding traces, but in the end my

15     inquiry, my investigation, showed it to be a lie.  The objective was

16     reached.  My objective was not to refute it.  My objective was to find

17     the facts.

18        Q.   Did you consider that you might be allegedly looking for the

19     trace of a mortar that was fired from a temporary position, that is,

20     which someone had just driven up, taken the mortar off in about a minute

21     or two, fired it maybe from sandbags, and then departed?  Did you

22     consider that possibility and is that what you say you were looking for

23     in-depth?

24        A.   We were looking for any object, any clue, any lead that would

25     indicate an unnatural change in the area.  Sand would seep to the ground

Page 28939

 1     from those sandbags.  Nobody travelled there with sandbags anyway.  There

 2     would be some trace of the charge, there would be fragments from the

 3     shells.  We were looking for anything that would stand out and anything

 4     we found could be in support of the UN theory.  But we didn't find

 5     anything like that.  And I believe what we found was true, you have to --

 6     I have to remind you, the slope is very steep, 70 degrees or so.  Nobody

 7     fired from there.

 8        Q.   70 degrees, just enough to clear the building and land right in

 9     the street?

10        A.   Yes, it is a hypocritical way of looking at it.  If the shell had

11     flown over the roofs, it would be just a few centimetres over the roofs.

12     And in massive artillery attacks, that's what happens.  The shells land

13     in the street over the roofs, but that's in massive artillery attacks,

14     using just one shot from a mortar the chances are one in a million that

15     would happen.

16        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

17             MR. TIEGER:  We're obviously done for the day, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE KWON:  You will continue tomorrow, Mr. Tieger?

19             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll adjourn soon, but, Mr. Demurenko, can I

21     remind you that you're not supposed to discuss about your testimony with

22     anybody else, including the parties, Defence, and Prosecution.  Do you

23     understand that, sir?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Exactly.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.

Page 28940

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.45 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of

 3                           October, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.