1 Wednesday, 17 October 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Good morning, Colonel.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. I'm happy to see you
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning to all.
12 WITNESS: ANDREY DEMURENKO [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
15 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. Colonel, toward the end of yesterday's session shortly before we
18 adjourned, we had been discussing - among other things - the differences
19 in the potential traces left by permanent or fixed mortar positions and
20 temporary mortar positions. I wanted to ask you if you were aware that
21 at that time, because of the general situation, the VRS had instructed
22 artillery and rocket units to fire from temporary positions in view of
23 concerns about what NATO or Rapid Reaction Forces might do?
24 A. Of course I could not possibly know about internal instructions
25 of the VRS, but it's perfectly obvious that in any combat operation, any
1 fixed position could be targeted. So it is inherent in artillery to
2 regularly change combat positions, firing positions.
3 Q. In that respect, if I could call up a particular document, that
4 would be 1D08009. Colonel, I'm not sure of your mastery of B/C/S and the
5 extent to which I should read portions of this document to you in English
6 so that you can understand it, but I'll do so for the record and for your
7 potential benefit in any event. This is a document dated the 23rd of
8 August, 1995, it's entitled: "Protection From Rapid Reaction Forces'
9 Actions Order," delivered to all the SRK brigades and regiments. And it
10 indicates, among other things, the following, that:
11 "Due to the technical capability of the immediate discovering of
12 the exact positions of active artillery rocket equipment and the actions
13 of artillery rocket units and artillery pieces, it should be planned that
14 temporary firing positions are to be used, which should be abandoned
15 after the action."
16 And then it goes on to have other instructions related to that
17 order, and it's signed by Colonel Cedomir Sladoje.
18 Colonel, I take it that this document is a reflection of what you
19 mentioned before; that is, that one possible or likely reaction to the
20 possibility of discovery would be to abandon fixed positions and adopt
21 temporary firing positions for artillery and rocket units; is that right?
22 A. That's perfectly right. This is a great document that
23 corroborates my arguments. This order says that one should stay in one
24 firing position the least possible time. So there would be no time to
25 remove any traces of gunpowder or any fragments or any traces that would
1 be left by the weapon. This document speaks eloquently in favour of what
2 I have been saying so far.
3 Q. Colonel, it's the case that these mortars, 120 mortar, for
4 example, not to mention lighter mortars, can be set up and taken down in
5 a matter of minutes; right?
6 A. Generally speaking, a mortar - mobile or fixed - can be easily
7 set up and quickly made ready to fire. But it is one thing to just fix
8 the base plate on the ground. Another thing is to set up artillery
9 sites, to locate them according to landmarks, to prepare on the map the
10 data that is necessary to know what charge to put inside at what angle.
11 All that takes quite a lot of time, although of course not in terms of
12 days, but it all depends on the operativeness and the readiness of the
13 crew. But in any case the preparation of a mortar for firing takes 10,
14 20 minutes, and then the camouflage after the firing takes about half an
15 hour or an hour, but usually nobody does that.
16 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: I was wondering how come it has been already noted
18 as P5918.
19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
20 JUDGE KWON: There was a mistake on the part of the Registry.
21 Yes, it will be admitted -- any objections, Mr. Robinson?
22 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted as P exhibit. Shall we give the
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit P5918.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 You are not tendering the document from angles and mils, albeit
3 from Wikipedia, which you showed us yesterday?
4 MR. TIEGER: I -- yeah, that was an oversight. I would like to
5 tender that, Mr. President, yes.
6 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Robinson?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I don't think we should sink
8 to the level of admitting Wikipedia documents as exhibits. I think --
9 and the witness didn't confirm anything about it either, so I don't think
10 there's a basis for admitting it.
11 MR. TIEGER: Well, in the current context of cross-examination I
12 certainly have to disagree that a concept that reaches such a level of
13 easy access and understanding plays a role in the cross-exam in this
14 particular case I don't think it's necessary if it's going to generate an
15 argument with the Court. I'm not overly concerned about this document,
16 but I want to note as a matter of principle the argument raised by
17 Mr. Robinson doesn't -- is not really apposite to points raised in
18 cross-examination at this time.
19 JUDGE MORRISON: No, but can't we just take as judicial notice
20 the fact that NATO forces used 6.400 mils?
21 MR. TIEGER: That's another aspect as well, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE MORRISON: And everybody knows there's 360 degrees in a
23 circle, so I mean we're not -- it's not rocket science, pardon the pun.
24 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, which is part of the point that was made
25 during the course of the examination.
1 JUDGE KWON: And it's evidenced that Russians adopt the 6.000
2 mils system. If that's in record we don't have to admit that document.
3 MR. TIEGER: As I say, Mr. President, I agree. I didn't want to
4 create any unnecessary controversy over this particular document, so I'm
5 fine with that resolution.
6 JUDGE KWON: Any observation, Mr. Robinson?
7 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President. That resolution is
8 satisfactory to us also. But I -- my point was basically that a
9 Wikipedia document is not reliable enough to be admitted into evidence in
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 Let's proceed.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Colonel, I'd like to turn away for the moment from the question
15 of an erroneous line of direction or the focus on an unduly narrow area
16 from which it was considered the firing might have taken place. But
17 instead, I want to focus now on the areas that you were looking at and
18 referring to in the first place, that is, the -- your selection of the
19 particular points --
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection. I object.
21 This is testifying. When I made comments like this that suggests
22 something that hasn't been said, the Prosecution objected. Look at this
24 JUDGE KWON: What is your objection, Mr. Karadzic?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My objection is that learned
1 Mr. Tieger is commenting on something, that will be abandoned because
2 things were so and so, he's testifying. He's suggesting something that
3 has not the been established here.
4 JUDGE KWON: I take it he was referring to subject of his
5 cross-examination, not necessarily the content of the evidence.
6 Let's move on, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Now, Colonel, as you indicated earlier and as was clear in the
9 video that was shown, you based your calculations of the locations, that
10 is, the distance the mortar would have travelled, from the relationship
11 between the angle of descent and number of potential charges, as
12 reflected in -- for a JNA 120-millimetre model M52; is that right? You
13 show -- held up the firing table for an M52.
14 A. Yes, we used as one of the elements the table for that type of
15 weapon and ammunition.
16 Q. Now, you were asked --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Tieger speak closer to the
18 microphone, please.
19 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry about that. It's a little awkward in this
20 courtroom, but I'll do my best.
21 Q. You were asked during the Dragomir Milosevic case whether you
22 were aware that the VRS used an M74 millimetre mortar as well, that can
23 be found at para 92, in fact, of your amalgamated witness statement. And
24 you said at that time that the 120-millimetre mortars were produced by
25 the Soviet Union and were in the arsenal of the entire former Yugoslavia,
1 so it's one and the same system regardless of the particular model. Now,
2 that didn't quite answer the question -- that's found by the way at para
3 92 of the amalgamated witness statement at transcript 8844 through 45.
4 That didn't quite answer the question of whether you were aware, whether
5 you knew at the time that the VRS had mortars other than the M52, so let
6 me ask you that question now: Did you know whether there were mortars
7 other than the M52 that might have been used in this particular instance?
8 A. I'll try to answer. 120-millimetre mortars do not have any
9 modifications. It's one and the same mortar. If we are talking about
10 calibre 122 millimetres, this is not a mortar it's a howitzer. It has
11 nothing to do with mortars. It's a different type of weapon. This is a
12 total confusion in the understanding of this document.
13 Now, if we turn to K-54 or K-52 that we find in other documents
14 or even 74, and in one document we see even 62, the shells differ across
15 weapons systems, and of course mortars used -- use a range of shells that
16 may not be very different between one another unless we include ballistic
17 elements. That would be my answer. So I don't think this is a good
18 understanding. There are no other mortars of this type. 122 millimetres
19 is a howitzer, a different weapon used also by the weaponry. 120 was the
20 one produced by the Soviet Union and exported into various other
21 countries including Yugoslavia, and it has Russian-produced shells as
23 Q. Well, that's a lot of information not quite about my question.
24 So let me ask it in a different way. Were you aware that the VRS had in
25 its inventory not only an M52 mortar but an M70 120-millimeter mortar,
1 but an M74 and an M75 among others, were you aware of that at the time?
2 A. I was aware that practically all types of Soviet weapons were
3 available to the Yugoslav army. Yes, I know that. The Yugoslav army did
4 not have its own Yugoslav-produced weapons; they only had the Soviet
5 ones. I know that.
6 Q. You never heard of any Yugoslav arms industry that Yugoslavia
7 produced, among other things -- I'm sure the accused would be happy to
8 tell you a lot about that. He's very happy about that.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson. Microphone, please.
11 MR. TIEGER: Okay. I'll abandon the question and move on,
12 although I think it's something that's been -- we've already discussed in
13 this courtroom.
14 Q. Colonel --
15 MR. ROBINSON: Before we move on, Mr. President, that was a
16 comment for which you frequently rebuked Dr. Karadzic and I don't think
17 it ought to go unnoticed. Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: He said he would move on already, but I leave it at
20 Let's carry on, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Colonel, you never heard of a Yugoslav arms industry producing
23 such things -- such sophisticated weaponry, among others, as aircraft and
24 APCs and other significant weaponry? You never heard of that?
25 A. No, I didn't.
1 Q. And according to you, the -- Yugoslavia, former Yugoslavia, got
2 everything from the Soviet Union and relied upon Soviet-produced weaponry
4 A. No, that's not what I said. I said that they had weapons
5 including Soviet weapons. It's quite possible that they received weapons
6 systems from other countries as well. I never said that they exclusively
7 received it from Soviet Union. I did say, however, that what I came
8 across in the VRS was typical standard Soviet weaponry.
9 Q. In any event, based on your responses, it appears that you did
10 not check any firing table for mortars in making your calculations other
11 than the M52 firing table. You didn't check a firing table for an M74,
12 you didn't check a firing table for an M75; is that right?
13 A. Yes, that's correct. The principle that I followed was quite
14 simple, to unmask the initial wrongly made conclusions. I started from
15 what you saw on my sketch, a shell and then the mortar, et cetera. My
16 task was to show that that was a lie. I had no other goal. It wasn't my
17 objective to establish what actual weapon was used to fire the shell,
18 et cetera, et cetera. That's the task for police, for ballistics expert,
19 and so on.
20 Q. Colonel, you assumed in the course of this exercise that the
21 calculations that you obtained from the M52 firing table could be used to
22 identify - as you told the Dragomir Milosevic case - the precise location
23 from which the mortar -- the locations from which the mortar was
24 potentially fired. That's the exercise you explained to us yesterday;
1 A. Yes, that's what I investigated, the possible firing locations.
2 Q. So the assumption that all mortars were the same and that you
3 could ignore any other -- either ignore or not be aware of any other
4 mortars that could have been used and that might result in different
5 firing distances, would have changed the potential locations from which
6 they were fired; isn't that right?
7 A. No, that's not right. Let me remind you, several minutes ago you
8 spoke about 122 mortar. There's no such mortar in the world --
9 Q. I -- you're the one who mentioned 122-millimetre mortar, Colonel.
10 Unless you got a different translation or unless I misspoke and didn't
11 realise it, I don't believe I mentioned a 122-millimetre mortar. I
12 certainly didn't intend to. So let's -- in any event, I had no intention
13 of referring to a 122. If that's what you heard, and that's not what I
14 either said or meant to say.
15 A. Well, we can certainly check that, but let's move on. The firing
16 tables, mortar firing tables, and the shell that we assumed was used were
17 the factors based on which it was concluded that a certain weapon was
18 used to fire it. It was established by the Bosnian police and by the
19 French ballistics expert. And then there was the information that we
20 knew that the Serb forces around Sarajevo had in terms of weaponry. It
21 would have been quite unusual if we were to assume that they had all of a
22 sudden some new types of weapons and if our investigation was directed
23 into that direction. The history simply taught us that that wasn't very
24 likely. Now, as to the possibility of exploring today whether they had
25 some kind of a secret mystical weapon that was possibly used to fire this
1 shell, that would be groundless to do it.
2 Q. Well, let's first call up 65 ter 23850A. This is an inventory
3 sheet as you can see from the heading of the weaponry that was
4 distributed to units. As you can see it's an old inventory sheet used
5 first by the JNA and then later by the VRS. It lists the weaponry of
6 which the units are to report the quantities at the right, and it
7 indicates - among others - the following weapons: an M -- 120-millimetre
8 M52, 120 millimetre M75, 120-millimetre M74, and so on. Now, Colonel,
9 you're not disputing that these weapons -- or are you disputing that
10 these weapons were in the possession of the -- or in the inventory of the
12 A. Of course not. I'm not disputing this. It's quite a clear list.
13 MR. TIEGER: I tender this, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE KWON: Any objections?
15 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: Do you have the date of this document?
17 MR. TIEGER: I don't. I checked on that, Mr. President. I don't
18 have the -- I don't have a date for that.
19 JUDGE KWON: It says the document is from Drina Corps?
20 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 That will be admitted.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Tieger, could you please turn off your
24 microphone. Thank you.
25 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, I'll try to do that when I'm not using
1 it. I was just about to.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That's Exhibit P5919, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm just checking one
5 thing on the transcript.
6 Q. Colonel, a moment ago you said that you used the firing tables
7 and referred to the shell that we assumed was used in order to calculate
8 the six possible locations of potential firing based on the six charges.
9 Do you -- did you know at the time whether or not the M52 fired more than
10 one shell?
11 A. No, I didn't know about the details of the shelling except for
12 the facts that I enumerated yesterday. Yesterday I said that in the
13 sitrep that was issued on that day, on the 28th of August, they spoke of
14 six instances of mortar shelling in town. So I compared the results of
15 the explosions in that instance and other instances. Now, as to the
16 specifics of that particular shelling, what mortar -- what shells were
17 used in that instance, I'm not aware of that and I did not explore that.
18 Q. Well, Colonel, if the M52 fired more than one shell, and if those
19 two shells travelled different distances, then you would need to check
20 out not six locations for six charges but 12 different locations for six
21 charges for two different shells; isn't that right?
22 A. Yes, yes, you're absolutely right. I said yesterday, and I will
23 repeat today, that in order to fully support the work of my commission I
24 spoke of six possible locations. What we did in reality is that we drew
25 on the map the entire territory where the mortars could have been placed
1 and we explored 10, 20, 30, 40 possible locations, all the places where
2 mortars could have been placed except in the forest, on the steep slope,
3 and on the rocks. And we checked all of those locations. So regardless
4 of whether there was one shell, two shells, whether there was one mortar
5 or more, all of that was explored in the area that was accessible for a
6 mortar to be placed there. And we didn't find any such locations. That
7 was the essence of our investigation. We did not look for a single
8 location. That would have been strange.
9 Q. So that's your argument to the -- that's your position to the
10 Court today. So in contrast to what you told the Dragomir Milosevic case
11 about the precision of your locations, in contrast to what you told the
12 media on September 2nd about how you went to six specific locations and
13 made a determination; you now say that the particular locations were
14 irrelevant because we went everywhere over thousands and thousands of
15 metres and checked it out. Is that right?
16 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President --
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, that's not right. The six
18 locations are very important. I never denied that. What I said is that
19 in my interview and also in my testimony here five years ago, I
20 emphasized the fact that, yes, those six locations were checked --
21 actually, not six but four. I mentioned several times in the interview
22 and I mention nowadays, we did not check in principle -- possible
23 locations on the Bosnian Serb side because our goal was to unmask a lie.
24 So this was based on the firing tables. I can repeat once again that
25 this was a broad exploration of all possible locations. I hope that I
1 have answered your question.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. And those six locations and the four that you checked were based
4 on the M52 firing tables but completely ignored whether or not the M52
5 fired two -- at least two different shells that travelled different
6 distances. That's correct - isn't it? - because we're going to check the
7 firing tables in just a second.
8 A. Very well, yes, that's right. If we're going to check the firing
9 tables, that's excellent, because if you're going to compare the firing
10 tables with various modifications, 120 mortar and the shells used there,
11 you will see that the differences are not great, not huge. And in
12 principle, it makes no difference what shells were used. We checked
13 everything. It makes no great difference between shells.
14 Q. Let's turn then to --
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I warn that there was a
17 possible mistake in translation page 13, line 13. The witness said that
18 they -- out of those six possible locations, out of those six possible
19 charges, in principle they did not explore the locations that were on the
20 side of Bosnian Serbs. This is what is recorded that the witness said,
21 but I believe that the witness said that, in fact, they did not check the
22 possible locations on the side that was under the control of Bosnian
23 forces. Could that be clarified with the witness, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Otherwise I was about to ask the
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm ready to repeat. As you
2 remember, in my interview I showed on the sketch six locations, so six
3 charges, six locations. And you can see on that sketch the confrontation
4 line as well. I spoke how it was possible that the fire could have been
5 launched not only from the territory of Bosnian Serbs but also from the
6 territory of the ABiH. However, we did not go there on purpose because
7 it wasn't our goal to look for the culprits. There could have been there
8 as well locations there that could have been possible firing locations,
9 but it wasn't our task to explore there. Our task was to unmask a lie.
10 So to look for the locations that were more elevated to the south was
11 what our job was and I fully agree with this correction that is -- that
12 was just made.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Thank you. Colonel, just by way of guidance I think in that
15 situation you could have said that the clarification was correct and we
16 could have moved on, but thank you for the information.
17 MR. TIEGER: Can we call up 23864A, please.
18 Q. This is a firing table for the M52 and it is the same firing
19 table that you held up that is from 1972 as we can see on the video.
20 Now, Colonel, as we can see on the -- on this page, this basic
21 title page, the M52 uses a number of shells including the M49 and the
22 M62; correct?
23 A. Yes, yes.
24 Q. I'd like to turn quickly to page 3 of the -- before going on to
25 the calculations reflected by the number of charges, let me turn quickly
1 to page 3 of the B/C/S and page 4 of the English. And there's a
2 reference there to something that was discussed earlier, the change --
3 the time needed to change to a combat position, the time needed to change
4 from a combat position. You see that, Colonel?
5 A. I can see the table.
6 Q. And that's reflected in the -- at the top half of the page time
7 need -- under time needed for various aspects, change to combat position,
8 change from a combat position, loading frontally from a combat position,
9 loading onto a truck in pieces, and loading onto a truck folded,
10 et cetera. But I'd now like to turn to the actual charging tables for
11 both the M49 shell and the M62 shell. So if we could move forward on
12 that and we've -- we'll try to present these as efficiently as possible
13 and as clearly as possible for you, Colonel.
14 MR. TIEGER: And for that, Mr. President, in order to do that
15 presentation as effectively as possible we need to go to Sanction.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 MR. TIEGER:
18 Q. We're first looking at charge 1 for an M49 shell. If you could
19 show that on the -- and that's what the table reveals, 700 metres
20 for - and we're looking to the right - for the angle of descent
21 represented by 70 degrees. And that's in -- calculation using the number
22 of mils; now charge 2, and that reflects 1200 metres, again for the
23 figure that most closely approximates 70 degrees; charge 3, 1800 metres;
24 charge 4, 2400 metres; charge 5, 3.000 metres; and charge 6, 3600 metres.
25 Now if we could move on and take a look at whether or not the M62
1 shell, if used, travels different distances. So for charge 1 we see
2 it -- that's 900 metres, so a 200-metre distance. For charge 2, 1600
3 metres. Charge 3, 2400 metres, now we've got a 600 metre difference.
4 Charge 4, 3200 metres. Charge 5, 4.000 metres. Charge 6, 4700 metres.
5 So the difference between the two shells at maximum charge of 6 is now
6 1100 metres, Colonel, which -- and I don't know what you meant when you
7 said there was no difference, but there seems to be a difference of some
8 significance reflected in this table.
9 Now, were you -- I've already talked to you about M74s and M75s.
10 Were you aware that the M74 and M75 also fired an M62 shell?
11 A. It must be some error in interpretation. Weapons cannot be used
12 in a shell. Something is wrong. Maybe you mean shell for the weapon?
13 Q. I'm not sure how it was interpreted but the question is simply:
14 Did you know at the time that the M74 also fired an M62 shell and also
15 fired an M49 shell?
16 A. I cannot say with certainty, with accuracy, what other types of
17 shell it was possible to use. But I want to say again, there's no need
18 to enumerate all types of weapons or all types of ammunition that could
19 have been used in that incident because, for instance, you have no basis
20 for saying that an M62 mortar shell exploded. Show me, show me that that
21 type of weapon was used. This is just an empty suggestion hanging in the
22 air that something could have been used.
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Tieger, did you mean to say M74
24 or M52?
25 MR. TIEGER: No, I'm moving on. We've just seen the tables for
1 the M52, now I want to move on to the M74, and I asked the Colonel
2 whether he was aware - before we looked at the tables for the M74 - what
3 shells they fired.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. And, Colonel, you've just said to me that I have no basis for
7 saying that an M62 mortar shell exploded, but that's not the point, the
8 point -- you're looking very happy about that, Colonel. But the point is
9 that you had no basis for asserting that an M52 mortar was used, and you
10 didn't even have any idea what shell was used - isn't that right? - in
11 reaching your conclusions about firing locations?
12 A. Generally speaking that's right because those few documents,
13 those few reports based on which we acted, indicated a small area for the
14 search, and our task was to conduct a more thorough investigation. At
15 that point in time, to take into account dozens of different types of
16 shells would have been odd. There was simply no basis for that.
17 Q. Well, we've already seen and discussed at considerable
18 length - although I'd be happy to go back over it - what you said at the
19 time, that is, during the media conference and what you said during the
20 course of the Dragomir Milosevic case about what you were looking for and
21 why. But you've also asserted today that there's no difference between
22 these mortars and no huge difference in where the shells fired by those
23 mortars are going to go if they used different shells. So that's what
24 we're looking at right now. I'd like to turn to the M74 firing table,
25 please. Here we see at charge --
1 MR. TIEGER: And, Mr. President, that is the -- that's 65 ter
2 23723A. And I'll also be turning to the M75 firing table which will be
3 23724A, so I just want to make clear so we can move through the
4 presentation which contains all of them.
5 Q. At charge 1 for the M74, using an M49 shell, we see 8- to 900
6 metres; charge 2, 1400 to 1500; charge 3, 2100 to 2200; charge 4, 2800
7 to -- 2800; charge 5, 3500; charge 6, 4100.
8 If we could now turn to the M62 shell: Charge 1, 1.000 to 1100
9 metres; charge 2, 1800 to 1900 metres; charge 3, 2700 to 2800 metres;
10 charge 4, 3600; charge 5, 4400; charge 6, 5100?
11 And finally if we can turn to the M75 table. Using an M62 shell:
12 Charge 1, 1.000 metres to 1100 metres; charge 2, 1900 metres; charge 3,
13 2800 to 2900 metres; charge 4, 3700 metres; charge 5, 4500 metres; and
14 charge 6, 5200 metres.
15 So, Colonel, contrary to what you just told us a few moments ago
16 that there would be no significant difference between which mortar was
17 used and which shell was used in the distances travelled and therefore
18 the potential firing locations, we can see here that there is a
19 difference -- a potential difference of some between 3600 metres and 5200
20 metres, so a difference of some 1600 metres. Those are not the --
21 those -- the distances of the -- for the distances travelled are not at
22 all the same for the different mortars that were potentially used or for
23 the different shells. Isn't that right, Colonel?
24 A. Yes, that's perfectly right. But if you have evidence that fire
25 was opened using that type of shell and that type of mortar resulting in
1 different distances, you could operate on that, but you have no such
2 facts. You are just theorising of what could have been. That's one.
3 And two, when I said that there is no essential difference in the
4 distance using different types of mortars and shells, I meant it made no
5 difference to our investigating group. 2300, 2600, or 3.000 metres does
6 not mean much when we are looking all over the ground, checking thousands
7 of square metres of -- on that slope. And in our search for a place
8 where a weapon, a mortar, could have been placed, it didn't matter really
9 what distance the particular shell travelled. We checked everything.
10 Q. The fact is, Colonel, you didn't know the distances travelled
11 because you didn't know which mortars were potentially used. You didn't
12 know that the M52 used different shells or how far they travelled. That
13 was simply omitted from your exercise, and that's what you made clear
14 when -- during your media conference and during your Milosevic testimony.
15 A. If you are trying to convince the Court that I'm not the greatest
16 expert on the arsenal of the Yugoslav army, I will confirm. I did not
17 serve in the Yugoslav army and I did not need to know the finer points of
18 artillery fire of Yugoslav weapons and mortars. My task was different,
19 to check the entire slope for any - and I underline any - trace of the
20 positioning of such a mortar. The slope was checked, no trace of mortar
21 was found and it doesn't matter if any different model was used or
22 perhaps there was no different model. It doesn't make a difference. You
23 also have no basis for talking about these shells.
24 Q. We can argue about this a long time and I could turn your
25 attention and the Court's attention back repeatedly to what was said
1 earlier, but that doesn't -- that won't be necessary at the moment I
3 Let me turn --
4 MR. TIEGER: So I would tender these documents, Mr. President, as
5 well as the -- at least this final page for ease of reference for the
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE KWON: So you can print out this last page of this
10 Sanction. So we'll admit this first.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, the last page will be
12 Exhibit P5920.
13 JUDGE KWON: And we'll also admit the two further documents,
14 27823A as well as 23724A.
15 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibits P5921 and P5922
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Reid informs me that we didn't catch
19 65 ter 23864A.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll admit that as well.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P5923, Your Honours.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Colonel, I want to turn to the process -- just a little bit about
24 the process through which you got into Bosnian Serb territory to look
25 around at the -- at whatever sites you claim to have looked at. Did you
1 seek authorisation or permission to go past the confrontation lines and
2 to go into Bosnian Serb or VRS-held territory?
3 A. First of all, I did not have to ask anyone's position. My
4 mandate as the Chief of Staff of the entire sector not only allowed me,
5 it imposed upon me the duty to cross the front line on a daily basis
6 because our task as peacekeeping forces was to inspect on one side as
7 well as the other. That's one.
8 Q. Are you suggesting, Colonel, that the VRS always scrupulously
9 abided by the UNPROFOR mandate, and therefore the -- whatever your
10 mandate was was never interfered with -- or whatever UNPROFOR's mandate
11 was was never interfered with. Is that your suggestion to this Court?
12 A. Absolutely, I can confirm numerous times that during my hundred,
13 maybe even thousands trips across the check-points between the warring
14 sides mean that I cross the front line many thousands times. If you want
15 to ask in general whether the Bosnian Serb side violated the cease-fire
16 agreement, then I will tell you that they certainly did and it was
17 reported in various reports, including my reports. But if you're now
18 inquiring about me personally and my team, I can tell you that I crossed
19 the front line as often as necessary. And I didn't encounter many
20 problems except for some manifestations of some attitudes, which is a
21 separate topic for discussion.
22 Q. Well, let's set aside for the moment the question of how you
23 personally were treated. Are you saying you were not aware of the fact
24 that the Bosnian -- that the VRS restricted the movement of UNPROFOR
25 personnel during the period of time you were there?
1 A. Can you please explain to me, restricted the movement of whom?
2 Q. Of UNPROFOR personnel.
3 A. Let me say once again that you can find in documents in basically
4 daily reports records of me crossing the front line numerous times.
5 Perhaps you have some basis, some documents on the basis of which you are
6 claiming that I was not allowed by the VRS to cross the front line, and
7 if so please show me those documents.
8 Q. Well, you're making a distinction which I explicitly asked you
9 not to make in answering this question because I asked you a more general
10 question which seemed to be implicated by your testimony. And that
11 question is: Were you aware of restrictions of movement by the VRS of
12 UNPROFOR personnel?
13 A. I don't understand what you're speaking of. Are you implying
14 that the UNPROFOR personnel was restricted in its movements or was it the
15 VRS troops that were restricted in their movements or are you speaking of
17 Q. I'm speaking about UNPROFOR trying to do what it was mandated to
18 do and be prevented from doing so by the VRS, either because clearance
19 requests were not granted or because they were granted but they were
20 still not permitted to access certain territory or in any other way.
21 A. Now, in that case let me say both warring sides, the Bosnian army
22 and the VRS, they both violated the agreement on the freedom of movement
23 of the UNPROFOR personnel, both sides violated it.
24 Q. And you were also aware, were you not, that UNPROFOR would make
25 clearance requests, requests for movement to particular positions in
1 advance, and sometimes those were denied or rejected or refused or not
2 complied with?
3 A. Yes, there were such cases, but as for me personally, I did not
4 experience any restriction of my freedom of movement. And as I
5 understand this examination today, you're now interested in my personal
6 experiences not in the general situation during the war.
7 Q. Well, let me be clear with you, Colonel. I am also interested in
8 the difference between how you were treated and how other UNPROFOR
9 personnel were treated, and I'll be talking to you about that too. So we
10 will be talking about both things.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, shall we move on?
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Colonel, that was particularly the case, that is, the concern
14 about the movement of UNPROFOR personnel by August of 1995, wasn't it?
15 A. If this does not pertain to me personally, if we're just speaking
16 about the UNPROFOR freedom of movement, then yes there were difficulties
17 throughout. Both warring sides limited the freedom of movement of
18 UNPROFOR personnel; that's true.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you know why the VRS allowed you into their
20 territory to conduct the exercise that we've been speaking about since
22 A. Sorry, did not understand.
23 Q. I'm asking if you know why you were allowed into VRS-controlled
24 territory to look for alleged or potential firing locations?
25 A. You posed the question incorrectly. You posed it as a statement,
1 as though you're claiming -- you are claiming a Russian officer would be
2 allowed to pass and others would not be allowed, which is not true. My
3 rights and duties were identical to those of any other UNPROFOR officer.
4 We had standard operating procedures whereby if we planned to visit, to
5 tour, any sensitive points of one or the other side - sensitive in terms
6 of their combat-readiness - then a request was to be made. It could have
7 been made on the telephone, and we would receive an operative reply, yes
8 or no, and also the dead-line for replying. There were no priorities and
9 there was no preferential treatment granted to Colonel Demurenko, and I
10 don't think you have facts claiming otherwise.
11 Q. Well, let's look at D2284 and see what it was that the VRS itself
12 considered in granting that request. This is a document issued by
13 Chief Colonel Marko Lugonija sent from the command of the
14 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps Main Staff intelligence and security sector and
15 it indicates the following. First a concern about potential -- or about
16 NATO bombing or potential NATO bombing. And then information that they
17 had that you disagreed with the assessment of UNPROFOR and requested
18 permission from the VRS to personally visit the location which UNPROFOR
19 assessed as the point from which the shell had been fired. And
20 Colonel Lugonija proposes that you being given permission to do this
21 after you mark the place that you will visit, and he also indicates that
22 you had requested to visit hospitals in Blazuj where persons who were
23 wounded in the shelling of August 28th were being treated. And
24 Colonel Lugonija continues:
25 "I propose to grant him permission for this too. Demurenko wants
1 in this manner to persuade the UNPROFOR command that the Serbs did not
2 fire the shell and that they were not the target."
3 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the next page for English.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. First of all, Colonel, do you know who the source was who
6 provided -- do you happen to know who the source was who provided this
7 information that reached Colonel Lugonija about your request for
9 A. No, I naturally do not know who the source was, but there were
10 many of them. In the PTT headquarters of the UNPROFOR we had a number of
11 liaison officers including those from the BSA. And since rumours spread
12 quickly throughout the headquarters, for example, a rumour that I was not
13 allowed to conduct a joint investigation -- joint additional
14 investigation with UNPROFOR was something that the liaison officer
15 immediately conveyed to his command, so it really makes no difference who
16 conveyed what information. This was no secret. I never tried to conceal
17 it. And thank you for showing this document. It confirms what I said
18 about that there always was a request. Here you can see that
19 Colonel Demurenko made a request to go to certain territory and this just
20 confirms what I said earlier.
21 Q. Okay. So this document is then accurate in its confirmation that
22 you sought and received permission to go to particular areas?
23 A. Yes. Yes.
24 Q. And it thus indicates that the -- so the VRS -- and that's why
25 you were accompanied by a local commander when you went to those
1 locations, right, local VRS commander who had been instructed by his
2 higher command to accompany you?
3 A. Not exactly. We cannot now go into the reasoning of the command
4 of the 1st Romanija Corps. God knows what considerations they had and
5 what they said to each other. But let me repeat once again, this
6 perfectly shows what I said earlier. A request was made, a reply was
7 received, it was determined at what time it would be implemented, with
8 whom, and a military guide was made available who assisted us in
9 orientating ourselves and going to the location. This is a standard
10 procedure; it applied not only to the Russians but to everybody else.
11 Q. Now I indicated --
12 MR. TIEGER: That document is already in evidence, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I think it is one of the associated exhibits
14 which Colonel refers to in his statement in para 135.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Now, Colonel, you raised the -- actually, we both mentioned the
17 treatment of you in particular by the VRS. I want to confirm, first of
18 all, that when you refer to your team that the core group of the team,
19 that you relied on in this exercise, consisted of fellow Russian
20 officers; correct?
21 A. Those were Russian colleagues, yes. As for any privileges, no, I
22 did not have any preferential treatment. I received the same treatment
23 as everybody else.
24 Q. Let me ask you some questions then about the general, and then
25 more specific, relationship between Russians serving in UNPROFOR and the
1 Bosnian Serbs or the Serbs generally. First of all, you recall our
2 earlier reference to the Komsomolskaya Pravda interview in 1996, and
3 there you noted that Serbs and Russians were brought together by history
4 and that Serbs are a people whom Russians consider dear. Is that a
5 sentiment you still agree with?
6 A. It would be odd to deny that. That's how it is.
7 Q. And would you consider that to be part of the basis for your
8 reaction to allegations concerning the actions of the VRS and the Bosnian
9 Serbs or at least the level of emotion with which you reacted to such
11 A. Not at all. Not at all. As you know, I was a high-ranking
12 officer. I understood perfectly well the requirements of both military
13 science and the UN theory about impartiality. I simply don't have time,
14 but I could tell the Court dozens of cases and perhaps hundreds of cases
15 when I, on the contrary, tried to establish the truth concerning the
16 suffering of Bosnian Muslims in this city of Sarajevo under blockade.
17 They suffered in all possible ways, and I found it strange when my
18 colleagues at the staff smiled at me, or rather, smirked, saying, "You
19 are a Russian. Why are you defending Muslims?" And I said always, "I'm
20 not a Russian here. I am a peacekeeper and I do care about blood being
21 shed, never mind whose blood." I'm sorry I can't find it - in my
22 archives, perhaps, my personal notes - all these anecdotes about cases
23 when I defended Muslims.
24 As for the closeness between the Serbs and the Russians, that's
25 impossible to deny. That's history. And my personal involvement in that
1 incident has nothing to do with it. My point was to prove that we should
2 not be taken for fools who will always listen to the command and nod. We
3 needed to expose the truth and that's what I set out to do.
4 Q. But let me ask you about a more concrete example then, and in
5 particular one you were asked about during the Dragomir Milosevic case.
6 And there were some questions then about whether your nationality and
7 being from Russia and the Russian-Serb closeness had an effect on what
8 you thought or did. And as part of that you were asked whether it was
9 true that Russians got preferred treatment because they were not taken
10 prisoners in May when "all the other UNPROFOR or other UNPROFOR members
11 were taken prisoners." That's found at 8972 of the Dragomir Milosevic
13 You responded that the Russian station in Gorazde were not
14 captured because they were on territory controlled by the SRK and that
15 would create some tactical issues involving the risk of losses. That's
16 at the same page, 8972.
17 But setting aside the situation of the Russian personnel in
18 Gorazde, are you asserting that Russian personnel were not treated
19 differently during the period when UN personnel were being taken captive
20 from similarly situated fellow UNPROFOR personnel?
21 A. Yes, I can answer that. It's a very large and interesting topic
22 for further inquiry, the emotional -- the influence of emotional factors
23 of international personnel in their relationship with local population.
24 But there was more sympathy or even neutrality towards Russians, that's
25 true, but that was not strange. Let me tell you about our peacekeeping
1 battalion in one of those areas. It was never attacked or taken captive
2 by Bosnian Muslims; on the contrary - and it's in the sitrep - our
3 soldiers were injured many times by shells falling from Grbavica, from
4 Serb-controlled territory. Why that happened is a separate issue. But
5 it was not an individual case. It was not all love and friendship, far
6 from that. War is war and there was equal danger to everyone.
7 Q. So can you tell us why you didn't simply tell the Dragomir
8 Milosevic Chamber when you were asked about this issue that, yes, in fact
9 Russians did receive different treatment from the VRS during the course
10 of the taking of captives -- about taking UNPROFOR personnel captive?
11 A. Over these two days I come across again a question that invokes a
12 hypothetical question, hypothetical situation. Why didn't you say, you
13 ask me? There are many things in my life that I didn't say, didn't
14 answer, didn't warn people against. There was no chance and no time to
15 answer all this. I have to say again I'm not taking back anything I said
16 in previous times, including the Milosevic trial. I am standing by that.
17 Q. Just to make clear, the question is not why you didn't volunteer
18 it during the course of your testimony. The question is: Why, when
19 asked specifically whether that happened, you simply directed the -- your
20 answer to the -- you simply said basically because --
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, I think the witness has answered the
22 question. Shall we move on -- but I note the time. But for planning
23 purposes, can I know how much longer you would need to complete your
25 MR. TIEGER: I estimate about a half-hour, Mr. President. I hope
1 that's accurate, but it's certainly roughly accurate.
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll have a break for half an hour and
3 resume at 11.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Let me just clarify one thing before we move on any further,
9 Colonel, and that's in relation to some of the issues discussed yesterday
10 rather than today. First, is it correct that you do not consider
11 yourself an expert on anti-terrorism?
12 A. Yes, that's true.
13 Q. And is it also correct that you do not consider yourself an
14 expert on static explosions?
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 Q. And finally, is it also correct that you do not consider yourself
17 an expert in crater analysis?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Now, we were talking about UNPROFOR personnel taken
20 captive in May and June of 1995 and that's a subject you discussed to
21 some extent in your amalgamated witness statement at paragraphs 70, 73,
22 and 76, stating that it was an adequate response from the Bosnian Serbs
23 to respond in this way - that's at paragraph 70; that the use of the term
24 "hostage" was not really proper but was used because UNPROFOR couldn't
25 come up with a proper word - that's at paragraph 73; and at paragraph 76
1 that they were not real hostages.
2 Colonel, were you aware that UN personnel taken captive were
3 threatened with death by the VRS or Bosnian Serbs if the UN either failed
4 to do something or -- that was demanded or was unwilling to refrain from
5 doing something or that UN personnel were placed in locations as human
6 shields to inhibit any bombing of those places as potential targets?
7 Were you aware of that?
8 A. Yes, I was aware of that. Also, it's true of the other warring
9 party. I have heard of such cases involving the BSA, although I was not
10 an eye-witness and I didn't hear it with my own ears, but in the case
11 when Bosnian Muslims captured a UN post manned by Russian soldiers, my
12 soldiers told me that they were threatened with death when they were
13 taken prisoner.
14 Coming back to your question, there have been such cases and it
15 would be odd to deny it.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, probably you referred to the old para
17 numbers in the 92 ter statement. In the meantime, could you check it
19 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Mr. President, I meant pages, not --
20 those are not designated by paragraphs. That was my mistake. So if you
21 substitute "pages" for "paragraphs," I think it's accurate.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. Colonel, you discussed an incident that you asserted took place
25 at -- you discussed was what you called the only incident between Serb
1 forces and UNPROFOR after the NATO bombing, and that was what you said to
2 be the fighting at the brotherhood and unity bridge. That's at your
3 amalgamated witness statement at paragraph 38. Would it refresh your
4 recollection about where that incident took place if I told you that the
5 only incident that took place between Serb forces and UNPROFOR after the
6 NATO bombing was -- took place at the Vrbanja bridge. Is that the -- was
7 that the incident you were discussing?
8 A. To be quite honest, I don't remember if the brotherhood unity
9 bridge is the same as Vrbanja bridge or it's a different bridge. I
10 simply don't remember. But I remember that on the brotherhood and unity
11 bridge there was a lot of bloodshed in a mutual attack when many UNPROFOR
12 soldiers, French soldiers, were killed, and there must have been other
13 cases. I do remember. They did happen.
14 Q. Well, I'll turn your attention to some documents about the
15 incident, but first let me remind you of how you characterised it in your
16 amalgamated witness statement. And that was essentially that there were
17 two check-points at either end of the bridge with Serbs and Muslims
18 shooting at each other, Serbs went on the offensive and captured the
19 Muslim trenches, so the Muslims told the French about this and the French
20 command ordered its French troops to attack the Serb units at the
21 check-point. So that was your characterisation of the incident, and I
22 take it in your -- that was your -- you were citing that as an example of
23 UNPROFOR siding with Muslims against the Serbs?
24 A. No, you can't look at it so narrowly, that it was typical of
25 UNPROFOR in all ways, in all cases, to take the side of Muslims. But in
1 that particular case it was quite an atypical involvement of UNPROFOR
2 into combat. From the very beginning in many documents and briefings and
3 training sessions, it was said to UNPROFOR soldiers that they should not
4 use weapons except for self-defence or, if necessary, to stop bloodshed
5 between the warring parties, the so-called peace enforcement. And I'm
6 recalling that case more because it was an exception rather than the
8 Q. Well, in contrast to your characterisation of how this happened,
9 let me turn your attention to P2171. It's a cable concerning that
10 incident as we look at -- scroll down the page and look at point number 4
11 concerning UN observation points in Sarajevo. And it refers to nine
12 French soldiers detained at the observation point and a further ten
13 disarmed and detained, and relates that at 0430 hours that morning a
14 group of the Bosnian Serb army dressed in French UN uniforms and
15 equipment took over the FreBat 4 OP at Vrbanja bridge in Sarajevo and
16 removed 10 French soldiers. And it continue that 0800 FreBat 4 mounted a
17 successful operation to regain control of the OP and that soldiers were
18 killed on both sides.
19 So, in fact, Colonel, it was not the case that the Muslims ran to
20 UNPROFOR after their position was captured and then UNPROFOR went on the
21 attack on their behalf. It was the case that the Bosnian Serbs attacked
22 the French observation post wearing French uniforms and then the
23 French Battalion retook the position. Isn't that right?
24 A. No, no, that's not right. You took as evidence a report from the
25 superior command as I understand, a report by General Janvier to the UN.
1 Why don't you take a sitrep that speaks to the same incident in
2 Sector Sarajevo where it happened and compare the information in one
3 report and in the other. As you understand, on the ground things are
4 much clearer than up at the top, and then you would see what actually
6 Q. Let's do that, Colonel. Let's turn to 65 ter 23897. And this is
7 a document that was signed off on by you. So we look at the first page,
8 we see there was a confrontation between BSA and UNPROFOR with reconquest
9 of the Vrbanja OP east. We see at the bottom of that paragraph "all
10 disarmed personnel Bosnian Serb army keeps as hostages." If we turn to
11 page 4, "The hottest point was the reconquest by FreBat 4 of the Vrbanja
12 bridge OP seized by treachery during the last night by Bosnian Serb Army
13 dressed like UNPROFOR personnel with dead, wounded, and captured
14 personnel on both sides." If we turn to page 7, "FreBat 4 at -- on the
15 27th at 0400, Bosnian Serb Army soldiers invade the Vrbanja bridge OP
16 dressed with UN equipment. Between 0800 and 0900 a platoon of FreBat 4
17 reconquered the OP," with exception of the OP western of the position,
18 and it relates that personnel were killed.
19 If we go on to page 10 and 11 we see similar reports. Toward the
20 bottom of the page, reports that today at 0430 Bosnian Serb army soldiers
21 who were wearing in the UN French clothes uniform, helmet, flak jackets,
22 seized Vrbanja bridge and blocked 12 times French UN soldiers in the OP.
23 And then on the next page we see references to the recovery. And if
24 we -- and on page 13 we see a reference to the Bosnian Serb army
25 considering UN soldiers as shields. So not only was the previous
1 document we looked at an accurate representation of what happened,
2 Colonel, but you knew about it at the time. Isn't that right?
3 A. It would be advantageous for me to use your methods when you
4 compared the figures, the figures that I mentioned and the figures that
5 you had in your hands. If we were to have a bit more time, which we
6 don't have, and if we were to look at the first report where it said 4.30
7 in the morning, nine soldiers, ten soldiers, and then they mention the
8 uniform of the special forces of the French army, whereas in this
9 document they mention the UN uniforms, not the French uniforms. So
10 there's a lot of contradiction in these three reports. This is just
11 another indication of the manipulation that took place. Depending on who
12 signed the report, they twisted the truth, they twisted the reality, put
13 their spin on it. So in all these three documents that you showed, the
14 time, the participants, the uniforms, all of that is described
15 differently. That means that one could play it any way one wanted,
16 relying on each of these reports individually.
17 Q. Well, I'm going to introduce this document into evidence,
18 Colonel, and we'll let the Chamber make the comparison between the
19 documents, what they reveal, what you knew at the time, and what you said
20 in your amalgamated witness statement.
21 MR. TIEGER: I tender that document, Mr. President.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we have no objection, Mr. President, but we
23 would appreciate the avoidance of comment.
24 JUDGE KWON: It is for the Chamber to assess the evidence at the
25 end of the trial. This will be admitted.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P5924, Your Honours.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. Colonel, you said in your amalgamated witness statement at
4 paragraph 9 that you never met with Mladic -- [Microphone not activated].
5 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. -- or other leaders while you were Chief of Staff. I think your
8 quote was:
9 "In Sarajevo sector I practically had no dealings with the
10 leadership of the warring parties."
11 And you went on to note that that approach was in support of your
12 duty of impartiality, and therefore you only had contact with liaison
13 officers. I wasn't quite clear on what that meant, when it meant to say,
14 "I practically had no dealings with the leadership of the warring
15 parties." Did that mean you never met with them or that you had limited
16 contact with them or that in a practical sense -- what did that mean?
17 A. Yes, that's a good comment, a useful comment. What I meant to
18 say when I said that I practically never met them meant that we didn't
19 meet individually or for a special reason, but naturally it was my duty,
20 in view of my rank and my position, to meet with the warring sides and
21 with their senior leadership. I met Mladic several times as part of an
22 official delegation, and I also met the general whose name I cannot
23 remember now who was on the side of the Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo,
24 commander of the corps there. Yes, that was part of my regular duties
25 and I met with them in that capacity, but other than that we did not have
1 any private or behind-the-scenes meetings.
2 Q. And what would -- what were the subjects raised or discussed or
3 addressed at these meetings with Mladic when you were part of an official
5 A. When we met and when I was part of an official delegation, there
6 was almost invariably just one issue raised which was how to ensure that,
7 in this particular case the Serb side, would abide by its duties pursuant
8 to a cease-fire agreement or to the disarming agreement or withdrawal of
9 heavy weaponry agreement. Those were the kinds of issues that we
10 discussed. Perhaps I am running ahead of myself. I heard rumours that
11 you may have a document about my alleged attempts to meet with Mladic
13 Q. And when did you hear those rumours?
14 A. I came across that in the documents that I have, the documents
15 that were shown to me by a representative of the Defence team.
16 Q. So why is it a -- why would that be a rumour if you saw a
17 particular document and what document are you referring to?
18 A. I saw it in the Defence material. There was a letter there by
19 one of the staff officers which mentions that, my request to meet with
20 General Mladic. I could not have seen that document earlier because it
21 was an internal document of the Bosnian Serb army, but during proofing
22 when I worked with the representatives of Defence I was shown that
24 Q. And what were you -- what did the letter -- what were you trying
25 to meet with General Mladic about when that letter was sent?
1 A. I will need a bit more time to explain. I'm now refreshing my
2 memories of that period. If you remember, the format of the peacekeeping
3 operation at that time changed. There were broader agreements on
4 cease-fire assigned, the US army got actively involved in September --
5 and then in October when I returned back from Moscow following my short
6 annual leave and some business that I needed to attend to there, I
7 returned back and I was the only one at the time - and to this day I'm
8 still the only Russian officer with American education and training. So
9 I had discussions at the Ministry of Defence on how could we, together
10 with the US army, establish a new group, a new working group on
11 co-operation within the UN and perhaps not just the UN but more within
12 the framework of NATO. And if you remember, it was implemented. We set
13 up a US -- or rather, a Russian Brigade. We established a US-Russian
14 sector. We removed our battalion from Grbavica. And in the early days
15 of those events I was instructed to have consultations with both sides,
16 the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims and, if necessary, the Croats
17 as well, as to what the format would be, what the tasks would be, and
18 where that plan would be implemented. So this was my task for the
20 Q. Did you also talk to General Mladic about the possible provision
21 of personnel, Russian personnel, or weapons to the VRS or to the
22 Main Staff?
23 A. First of all, let me start by saying that in the end I did not
24 meet with General Mladic. I asked to meet; however, we did not meet
25 subsequently. So it all remained on paper, in the planning phase. It
1 was not implemented.
2 MR. TIEGER: Can we turn to P1489, page 108, please.
3 Q. As this is coming up, Colonel, let me tell you that this is a
4 copy of General Mladic's notebook. And here we see, as we get to one --
5 this page, that on the 21st of October, 1995, at 1700 hours there was a
6 meeting with General Mladic, General Tolimir, Colonel Salapura,
7 Major Bukva, and you, Colonel Demurenko, and it goes on to discuss the
8 items, to identify the items discussed, which include as we scroll down
9 to page 21 -- I'm sorry, paginated page 21. That will be two pages ahead
10 from 108, I guess 110 in the e-court. Sorry, just go one page back,
11 please. Goes on to discuss "the possibility of dispatching special
12 troops of the Russian army to the Main Staff. We are prepared to
13 dispatch them immediately. We would like to know how many, when, and
14 what groups to dispatch. Initially it can be a symbolic group but that
15 could be increased."
16 And then it goes on to discuss the possible provision of weapons.
17 "... there we can opt for weapons through the company and in the
18 future ..."
19 Turn the page, please.
20 To go through the "... Russian contingent or through third
22 And it goes on to discuss the use of a private, not state-run,
23 company and so on.
24 Isn't this in fact a reflection of a meeting that you just told
25 us didn't take place, Colonel?
1 A. No. If you remember, I first spoke about discussing with
2 General Mladic individually the format of the future peacekeeping
3 operation. And as you can see none of that is mentioned in this
4 document, this future peacekeeping operation. This involves two
5 completely different events that have nothing to do with each other. As
6 I have told you, concerning the first issue, I was never given an
7 opportunity to meet with Mladic. As for this meeting here, yes, it did
8 take place. It was an official visit, official delegation, we officially
9 discussed the plans that the Russian side had and that the
10 Republika Srpska had. In this meeting I was present as a member of
11 delegation, I did not head the delegation, and we simply exchanged
12 information as is typical for peacekeeping forces as to what difficulties
13 we encountered and so on. Nothing more than that was discussed.
14 Q. You also discussed some of your -- you also raised the issue of
15 some of your discussions with General Mladic and your opinion of
16 General Mladic during the course of that Komsomolskaya Pravda article we
17 referred to earlier.
18 MR. TIEGER: I'd like to turn to that, please, and that is
19 65 ter --
20 JUDGE KWON: Colonel, I wanted to leave it there but I couldn't.
21 You just said that you did not head the delegation, but could we see the
22 page two pages ahead, 108. It clearly says Mladic said it was a meeting
23 with you, nobody else, but Tolimir, Salapura, and Bukva from the VRS.
24 Could you clarify that, Mr. Demurenko?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will explain. I'm mentioned here
1 as a military representative, senior one. But as for all the people who
2 went to Banja Luka, there were also non-military personnel there present
3 representing the interests of the Russian Federation. They were there in
4 order to have consultations and to participate in negotiations. That was
5 their role there.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
7 Back to you, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I just called up 65 ter
10 Q. And in the course of that interview, Colonel, you also referred
11 to the fact that you had occasion to meet with Serb leaders. And you
12 said it would be difficult to find a better commander - and that can be
13 found, by the way, in the second column if we scroll down.
14 MR. TIEGER: Scroll down in the Russian, please, for the benefit
15 of the Colonel, and I think you'll find that at about -- scroll do you
16 happen a little farther, please. Yeah.
17 Q. If you see where that bar is to the right side of the page with
18 the little insert, if you look immediately to the left of that in the
19 second column and the first paragraph below that, that's the portion I'm
20 referring to where you explain that you had occasion to meet with the
21 Serb leaders and it would be difficult to find a better commander than
22 General Mladic, and you describe him as extremely talented, exceptionally
23 literate, tough commander, and then go on to describe some difficult
24 conversations that the two of you had in which he accused all of Russia
25 betrayal. Did those conversations take place in the meetings you
1 described earlier?
2 JUDGE KWON: I think it is on page 4 in English.
3 MR. TIEGER: Yes, that's correct. I'm sorry, Mr. President, I
4 should have alerted the Court.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To tell you the truth, I'm not
6 really prepared to speak of chronology, what happened first, what
7 happened later. And at any rate, I do not take back anything I have
8 uttered. I stand by what I said. Simply, I think that things should not
9 be taken out of context. As you know, when you take something out of
10 context you twist the original meaning. If I spoke about General Mladic
11 being a talented commander, then there was a reason for that. He had
12 graduated from three military academies, magna cum laude. He was awarded
13 a gold medal for each of those diplomas. He took military decisions that
14 did not lead to mass bloodshed. So if you were to quote me as saying
15 that everybody betrayed them, that is not true. It's possible that I was
16 perhaps disappointed by the official position taken by the Russian
17 Federation, which distanced itself from taking part in the international
18 conflict and simply observed things from the sidelines.
19 So I could give you a number of facts to support this position of
20 mine. They simply, for example, forgot about me, their colonel. They
21 simply forgot about me in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They never called me on
22 the phone, they never wrote to me, they never invited me for meetings
23 with persons who should be interested in what I knew. But it's okay that
24 they treated me that way. I'm just an ordinary soldier. Simply, Russia
25 was lost and intimidated at the time and didn't know which position to
1 take. Those sentiments of mine are reflected in this article and to this
2 day I still believe what I said back then.
3 Q. The last subject I want to turn to, Colonel, concerns some
4 references that you made in your amalgamated witness statement at
5 approximately page 70.
6 JUDGE KWON: Are you not tendering this --
7 MR. TIEGER: I am --
8 JUDGE KWON: -- interview at --
9 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I am, Mr. President. Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P5925, Your Honours.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. At page 70 you refer to a sitrep that was originally 1D28149, I
14 don't have the exhibit number at the moment. And you indicate -- the
15 sitrep indicates that mortar and artillery, including homemade bombs,
16 fire also will continue in the usual hot areas, and then you commented
17 that both sides used the homemade bombs.
18 I wanted to turn your attention, Colonel, to 1D28167 -- if
19 someone could call up -- I'm sure that's in evidence too. I don't have
20 the exhibit number.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2318, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. Registrar. And if we could scroll
23 down the page a bit. Thank you.
24 Q. Colonel, that refers to - and this is again a document signed off
25 by you that was a part of your amalgamated witness statement - it refers
1 to one more big explosion detonated since last month in the vicinity of
2 the TV building killing one Bosnian civilian and injuring another four.
3 According to the outcome of investigation, it was a suspected homemade
4 rocket consisting of a shell body and four times small rocket propulsion
5 devices. Origin is still unknown. Is that another reference to the
6 homemade bombs that you referred to in the document we just looked at and
7 at page 70?
8 A. What is the question?
9 Q. Is that yet -- is that just another reference to the homemade
10 bombs you were referring to at page 70 of your amalgamated witness
12 A. Well, yes. There is no contradiction. It's just a repetition, a
13 repeated reference to one and the same facts or similar facts. If you
14 want me to elaborate on the homemade bombs, I can.
15 Q. That's fine. I think I used the time I suggested to the Chamber.
16 I would and -- thank you for your time, Colonel.
17 MR. TIEGER: That concludes my examination, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies. I have a
22 few questions.
23 Good morning, Your Excellency. Good morning, everyone.
24 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Colonel. Yesterday Mr. Tieger on
1 transcript page 6970 suggested that the line of direction that you
2 toured -- sorry, pages 69 and 70, that the axis that you toured in the
3 direction 170 degrees plus/minus 5 was a result of the fact that you
4 applied Russian parameters to Western systems. Do you remember saying
5 that? And that's why your calculation was faulty.
6 A. I remember what I said. I remember everything I said. I
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see P150 or 65 ter 10415
10 in e-court, please. Can we now see page 3 in this document. We can
11 remove the Serb version.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you know who made this -- did you make this report or did
14 someone else?
15 A. I don't know. I suppose it was somebody from the UNPROFOR
16 headquarters in Sarajevo.
17 Q. Thank you. In other words, if I may draw your attention to the
18 first line which includes various elements, time, position, and the
19 bearing 170 plus/minus 5, this was not done by you. You received it from
20 the UN; right?
21 A. Yes, that's correct.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 1 to see
24 whose report this is.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Can you tell us whose report this is?
2 A. Looking at the signature, it's Colonel Konings and somebody,
3 Captain Carbonna.
4 Q. Thank you. So did you determine the direction yourself or did
5 you get it from them?
6 A. As I said already, my first documents indicating the direction
7 and the angle of descent we received from those who did the first
8 investigative steps, and then we took it from there.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 65 ter 9912 in
10 e-court, please.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Colonel, please, look at this document, tell us who drafted it
13 and what it refers to.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think we can do without the
15 Serbian version.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Who is sending this document?
18 JUDGE KWON: Scroll down.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We can see that, General Janvier.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see page 3 of this
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. The passage referring to Sector Sarajevo, can you please look at
1 it. I should now like to read beginning with line 5.
2 "This mortar shell was assessed to be fired from
3 100 [as interpreted] degrees magnetic [in English] in investigation to
4 determine the distance to the firing point is ongoing."
5 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I think there was a
6 misinterpretation. Instead of 100 degrees that was interpreted, it
7 should have been interpreted 170 degrees.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Is this the case that the UN's position was that it was --
11 MR. TIEGER: Objection --
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] --
13 Q. -- that it was 170 degrees --
14 MR. TIEGER: Objection, objection. I'm sorry to interrupt but I
15 knew I'd have to start this early. Even in re-direct, the accused is
16 going to have to refrain from leading questions, which I think is
17 starting to be a habit.
18 [Defence counsel confer]
19 JUDGE KWON: Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will do my best,
21 Your Excellencies, but for two years I had the right to ask leading
22 questions and now I have to get used to not being able to anymore.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Colonel, in view of these few sentences I read out, can you tell
25 us what was the position, the official UN position, concerning the
1 direction from which this shell arrived?
2 A. Obviously it was not different from the one I arrived at in my
3 investigation, 170 degrees. There are no other variants here.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see P1446, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. This is the UNMO daily sitrep.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 21.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Look at paragraph 2 -- sorry, the third paragraph. What was the
13 position of the UNMO, the military observers, concerning the direction
14 from which the shell arrived?
15 A. That's obvious. It's again 170 degrees.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now ask for P1444.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. To shorten this without leading, I'm reading here that this is an
20 UNMO HQ daily sitrep dated 30th August 1995.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see page 20.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Could you please look at the first line in the last paragraph
24 "PTL investigated," and in the second line can you tell us what was the
25 position of UN military observers on the 30th of August regarding the
1 direction from which the shell arrived?
2 A. Yes. If we go through these points one by one, after the words
3 "the Federation side" and we see the bullet points, we see again in the
4 second bullet point 100 degrees again if I'm saying this well --
5 JUDGE KWON: 170 degrees --
6 THE INTERPRETER: 170 degrees, interpreter's correction.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you. Colonel, did you use any map when you went out to --
9 in the field to inspect possible positions?
10 A. Yes, yes, of course. Military men do not move around without a
11 map. A map was the basis for us finding our way on the ground.
12 Q. Thank you. Was the direction of approach of the shell marked on
13 that map and was the margin of error accounted for with regard to the
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: Okay, apparently Mr. Karadzic is seeking guidance in
17 the questions, so how about a question: What was on the map? Rather
18 than specifying what he would like to see on the map.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. This sounds like advocacy training.
20 But could you reformulate the question, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I'd like to thank
22 Mr. Tieger too.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Colonel, what could be seen on the map?
25 A. A map is the main document for the military. One can find
1 everything on the map. So in that particular case we took an empty, a
2 clear, map and then drew the direction line, the likely direction from
3 the crater to the firing position. And then on that direction line we
4 marked the possible firing positions, relying on the six or four possible
5 charges. And then on the map I tasked my team to check the entire area.
6 In the video excerpt you could see that the majority of the
7 terrain in that area is covered by a forest. There's less than 30
8 per cent of the territory that's clear. As you know, mortars cannot fire
9 from forests. And as I have said, I directed my team to explore,
10 investigate, the entire area shown on the map except for forests, and
11 that's what they did.
12 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 123 of your statement, page 56, you say
13 that all directions under 170 degrees, plus or minus a few degrees,
14 weren't suitable for mortar positions because they were steep and there
15 was a lot of brushwood there - is that what it says? - there was a lot of
16 growth. It was very rocky. Is that what it says? Is that still your
18 A. Yes, precisely so.
19 Q. Does that also concern an angle of 160 degrees?
20 A. Yes, that would also apply to the other line that I showed in
21 that video excerpt. We did not only explore the 170 angle plus/minus 5.
22 We explored much more than that starting from 160 and then onwards. It
23 wasn't very difficult to do that because there were very few flat and
24 open areas, meadows. So it wasn't difficult for us to tour all of them,
25 take photographs, and explore them.
1 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 51 of your statement, page 20, you said
2 that your investigation took three days. How much time did you spend in
3 the field and how much time did you need to reach your conclusions?
4 A. At least one and a half full days was spent walking throughout
5 that area. Then we needed several hours to put everything on paper.
6 Q. Thank you. In the course of your examination today, page 1 of
7 the transcript, my learned friend Mr. Tieger suggested that units from
8 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps transferred the artillery to other positions
9 because there was the danger of NATO bombing, and you were shown document
10 P10918 that was signed by Colonel Sladoje. P918 is the number.
11 Now I would like to show you two documents -- P5918. P and the
12 number 5 in the Serbian language sound similar. I would now like to show
13 you D1013. D1013. It's a short document. I hope we'll be able to deal
14 with it rapidly. This is also a document signed by Mr. Sladoje addressed
15 to all the brigades. I'll read it out.
16 "I caution again all unit commanders about my order on banning
17 opening fire on the city of Sarajevo without a pre-approval from the
18 corps command post."
19 Under 2:
20 "You are to inform the corps command in writing by 1400 hours
21 about whether you have opened fire between 1000 and 1200 hours on the
22 town of Sarajevo. If you have, inform us of the time when this was done,
23 the target, and the calibre and weapons used, as well as the reasons for
24 which this was done. The report is to be submitted for artillery weapons
25 of calibre 80 millimetres and above."
1 Thank you. Before I put my question to you I would like us to
2 have another look at another document, 65 ter 16583. This is also from
3 the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. It's to the president of
4 the Republika and to corps commands. Could we please have a look at page
5 3 now and it's page 4 and then 5 in the English version. This part of
6 the combat report has to do with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, concerns
7 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Third page in the Serbian language and I'll
8 read it out now. It's page 5 in the English version. I'll read out the
9 part at the top.
10 "Commanders of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Sarajevo [as interpreted]
11 infantry brigade, the Igman and the Ilidza Brigade, and the mixed
12 artillery regiment, confirmed the corps command in writing that they did
13 not fire artillery weapons on the city of Sarajevo between 1000 and 1200
14 hours on the 28th of August."
15 When you were conducting your investigation in Serbian territory,
16 did anyone from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps inform you that the Army of
17 Republika Srpska had conducted such an internal investigation into
18 whether anyone from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had opened fire?
19 A. No, I didn't know anything about this. Moreover, what I did
20 showed my principled attitude, which is to go beyond the two sides and to
21 conduct an impartial investigation, that is, to show the truth. I didn't
22 ask one side or the other side on purpose. I didn't inquire with them
23 whether they opened fire. The task of peacekeeping forces is to be
24 neutral and to conduct a neutral investigation and to produce
25 conclusions. Had the conclusion been different, I would also announce
1 it. But the conclusion was the one I reached and I had no knowledge of
2 this document and the similar material. I see it for the first time.
3 Q. Thank you. With regard to the results of this internal
4 investigation, do these results correspond to the findings that you
5 obtained in the field?
6 A. Yes, certainly.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted,
9 the last one wasn't admitted.
10 MR. TIEGER: I have no doubt there are plenty of opportunities to
11 tender this document, but this didn't -- it's not a subject that arose
12 from cross-examination which was about -- I see the Court nodding so I
13 won't explain further. And I don't think this kind of generic comment
14 about the document would in any event be sufficient in this instance for
15 admission, so I imagine there -- as the Court is -- want to say, there
16 will be a number of opportunities to do so. I don't think that this is
17 the one.
18 JUDGE KWON: I wondered how it is related to the document we see
19 during the cross-examination which is related to the protection from
20 Rapid Reaction Force. I'll discuss with my colleagues.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Mr. Tieger. You have
23 another opportunity to tender this document.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. On page 29 of today's transcript it was suggested to you that
2 Russian members of UNPROFOR were not captured by the Army of
3 Republika Srpska in May and June 1995. My question is as follows: Did
4 Russia participate in the bombing of Republika Srpska in 1995?
5 JUDGE KWON: Did you hear the question, Colonel?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did hear, but I'm sorry, I'm not
7 following. What do you mean "participated"?
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. The forces from various nations participated in bombing under
10 NATO. Were Russian planes involved in the bombing of Republika Srpska?
11 Did they take part in that bombing? Did they participate in it?
12 A. Even though we were already members of the partnership for peace
13 and NATO, we were not full members of NATO and are not likely to become,
14 so we absolutely did not take part in this.
15 Q. Thank you, Colonel, for having come here to testify.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 "Spasibo," Colonel, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of
20 this Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you for
21 your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you are free to go.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may say something. I'm very
23 grateful to this high Court, to everybody here, including the
24 Prosecution, for their impartial analysis and their attempts in sorting
25 out difficult questions and in your patience for hearing me out. Thank
2 [The witness withdrew]
3 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, it's better to take a break now.
4 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
5 MR. ROBINSON: That's fine as long as you don't charge it to our
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll break till ten past 1.00.
8 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.20 p.m.
9 [The witness entered court]
10 --- On resuming at 1.13 p.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Very quickly, one
13 housekeeping matter. For the 65 ter in e-court for the last slide of the
14 presentation that was admitted as P5920, the 65 ter number should be
15 23922 for the benefit of the Registrar. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 Would the witness take the solemn declaration, please.
18 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
19 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
20 WITNESS: PAUL CONWAY
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, sir. Please take a seat and make
22 yourself comfortable.
23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
24 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, General.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D4831 in the
2 e-court system for the benefit of the witness.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. If you have it before you, is this your statement, and have you
5 had the opportunity of seeing a hard copy of your statement, of going
6 through it?
7 A. This looks like the statement which I have written and signed.
8 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we show him the entire statement, next
9 page, and one page by one page.
11 THE WITNESS: This is my statement. This is my signature. There
12 was one correction which I notified to both sides to one of the
13 paragraphs, it's about the location.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Apart from that correction, does this statement fully and
18 accurately reflect what you, in fact, said?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you. And if I put the same questions to you today, would
21 your answers be the same as those provided in the statement?
22 A. Yes, with the exception of the correction needed in paragraph I
23 think it's 18.
24 Q. Thank you. We'll get to that and we'll make the necessary
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, could this
2 statement please be admitted into evidence.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 Any objection, Ms. West?
5 MS. WEST: None.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D2329.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 I will now read out a brief summary of the statement. In order
9 to proceed efficiently, I will read it out in English.
10 [In English] Paul Conway was an officer of the Irish army who
11 served at the United Nations military observers in the former Yugoslavia
12 from July 1995 through July 1996. He arrived in Sarajevo in early
13 August 1995. He is now retired from the military and since 2001 has held
14 the civilian post as superintendent of the Irish parliament in Dublin.
15 On 28th of August, 1995, at about 9.00 a.m., Commandant Conway arrived at
16 the United Nations observation post known as OP 1 with Thomas Knustad and
17 an interpreter. At around 11.00 a.m. he heard the sound of several
18 explosions. The sound was muffled. A few minutes later he was contacted
19 by UNMO headquarter and asked if he had seen anything. He immediately
20 went to the observation post where he saw plumes of smoke coming from the
21 market area in the city. He is unable to state whether the explosions he
22 heard were from outgoing or incoming fire.
23 In December 1995 he came across a Bosnian army mortar position
24 south of Sarajevo. There were at least four mortars pointed north toward
25 the city of Sarajevo. The mortar position appeared to be
1 well-established and to have existed for a considerable period of time.
2 Prosecution witness Thomas Knustad marked on the map the location of
3 OP 1, the location of the confrontation line, and the direction of fire
4 of the shell which landed on the market -- Markale market on 28th of
5 August, 1995. This map was admitted as Prosecution Exhibit P151.
6 Commandant Conway has marked on this map the approximate location
7 of where he found the Bosnian army mortar position. This location is in
8 the direction in which it is alleged that the shell had landed -- that
9 landed in the Markale market had come from. The map marked by
10 Commander Conway has been given another e-court number 1D4832, and I
11 would ask to see it in the electronic court.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, this map was obtained by the Prosecution from
14 Thomas Knustad and did you add anything to this map; if so, what did you
15 add and what sort of markings have you made on the map?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in, please.
17 [In English] Did you get my question.
18 THE WITNESS: Yeah, okay, sorry, I wasn't sure if I was expected
19 to respond.
20 There is a marking on the map which says the estimated position
21 of mortars alongside the road which runs parallel to river, I made that
22 marking, that's my marking.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Thank you. I would first like to ask you whether OP 1 has been
25 marked at a location in area that was under the control of the Army of
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
2 A. OP 1 was within the Bosnian army area.
3 Q. Thank you. In your statement you said that it could have been
4 between 3 and 4 kilometres from the Markale market; isn't that correct?
5 A. That's what I said and I measured it since on a more accurate
6 map. I think 4 kilometres is probably further than I had imagined. I
7 think 3 is probably closer or more accurate.
8 Q. Thank you. How far towards the south from the OP 1 position was
9 the Muslim line in fact located?
10 A. About 2- 300 metres. OP 1 was on a steep slope and the
11 confrontation line was behind the OP. It was at approximately 300
12 metres. I never walked the distance through the confrontation line. I
13 just knew it from the map marking.
14 Q. Thank you. As for the Serb line, the Serb trenches, where were
15 they in relation to the Muslim lines? Were they even further away; and
16 if so, what sort of distance are we talking about?
17 A. I never visited the Serb positions which were to the south of
18 OP 1. I only observed them closer down to the river in the
19 French Battalion area where the confrontation lines were very close. But
20 in the area of OP 1 I never observed the confrontation line.
21 Q. Thank you. You have marked a position where there were at least
22 four mortars of the ABiH. Was it possible to detect those mortars at an
23 earlier date? Were there any restrictions on UNPROFOR members visiting
24 those places?
25 A. No, it was not possible to go into that immediate area. There is
1 a road that runs parallel to the river south of the river and there were
2 check-points on both ends and we had never been given freedom of movement
3 down that road.
4 Q. Thank you. While you were at OP 1, did you ever observe mortar
5 shells that were fired from the south on the town, not only on the 28th
6 but at any time?
7 A. In my personal time on OP 1, I did not observe any other mortar
8 fire instance.
9 Q. Thank you. Did any of your predecessors or of your colleagues
10 inform you that shells were fired over the OP position from the south and
11 on the town and in the direction that has been marked here?
12 MS. WEST: Objection, Your Honour, as to the form.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the question was: Did anyone
14 inform you of the existence of such fire if you personally did not
15 observe any such incidents?
16 THE WITNESS: To the best of my recollection, no. There were
17 mortar instance to the east of the market position in the
18 Egyptian Battalion area, but I did not investigate those occurrences.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 18 you made a correction. The word
21 "northern" was changed and it now reads "southern ." Isn't that correct?
22 Is that in fact the correction that you made?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Thank you, General.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would now like to give the floor
1 to the Prosecution.
2 JUDGE KWON: The map marked by the witness will be admitted as
3 the next exhibit.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 1D4832 will be Exhibit D2330.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. West.
6 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your
7 Honours. Good afternoon everyone in the courtroom.
8 Cross-examination by Ms. West:
9 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Conway.
10 A. Good afternoon.
11 Q. Sir, I understand your role as a military observer to be one of
12 impartiality; isn't that correct?
13 A. Absolutely.
14 Q. And why was impartiality so important?
15 A. It was essential that any information that was given was accurate
16 as well as impartial. It was being relayed back to UN headquarters in
17 Zagreb and eventually to UN headquarters in New York, where policy-makers
18 were making profound decisions. So anything that was given had to be
19 verified as much as reasonably practical and be accurate.
20 Q. And when you say that it had to be verified, can you tell us a
21 little bit about the process by which you went through to verify
23 A. Normally incidents were investigated by two UNMOs, different
24 nationalities. Every team was made up of a selection of nationalities so
25 there could never be a national bias within a team and incidents were
1 always as much as possible physically verified. For instance, if there
2 was an injury to a person or a claim of an injury, we would go and almost
3 examine the wound, as I had expressed an experience of doing, to make
4 sure that what you were reporting was -- had occurred and was accurately
5 reported on.
6 Q. And was your relationship with either of the parties biased
7 towards one or the other?
8 A. Absolutely not.
9 Q. In regard to your reporting system, did you have access to other
10 military observers' reports?
11 A. When I worked in the UN headquarters in the UNMO headquarters in
12 the PTT building, yes, I would have been receiving reports from all the
13 other teams. That was in the latter part of my service in Sarajevo.
14 Q. So let's focus for this moment for the period of time when you
15 were a military observer moving around. During that period of time --
16 A. In team Zulu?
17 Q. Did you have access?
18 A. No, no, no.
19 MS. WEST: May I have 65 ter 09390, please.
20 Q. Now I understand for Mr. Karadzic you had reviewed a map. It was
21 a map of the area south of Sarajevo - and that was 1D04832, it now has a
22 D number. I also understand that that map was a little bit blurry and it
23 was a bit difficult. So thank you for meeting with me yesterday in order
24 to go over a few more points and a new map, and this is one that I showed
25 you with the hopes that we could do away with the ambiguity of the older
1 map. Do you recognise this map?
2 A. The scale is small but it's the general map of Sarajevo.
3 Q. And is this the map I showed you yesterday?
4 A. It appears to be.
5 Q. And as you saw it yesterday, was it a fair and accurate
6 representation of what you remembered the city of Sarajevo to --
7 A. Yeah, it showed -- the location -- the main feature being the
8 river running through and the road that ran parallel to the river and the
9 hill feature where OP 1 was located.
10 Q. Okay.
11 MS. WEST: May we have 65 ter 23917, please.
12 Q. Now, when you and I spoke yesterday, we took this map, which was
13 a much bigger version, I had you make some markings on it so we could see
14 very clearly where, for example, your command post was. Now, we have
15 that map in front of us now -- or do you recognise what's on the screen?
16 A. Yeah, yeah.
17 Q. Okay. So we see a triangle sort of in the lower half of the map.
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. What does that represent?
20 A. That is it is best recollection or -- that I can place on the
21 location of OP 1. It was on a prominent hill feature overlooking the
22 city and then a transit line through the brewery towards Sedrenik. So I
23 think, you know, based on a reasonable map reading that that's the
24 approximate location of it.
25 Q. Now in your statement at paragraph 11 you mentioned that there
1 was a shed nearby that post. What was the shed used for?
2 A. The shed I think was a shepherd's store room. We used it for
3 storing sand for -- we were still working on the OP. Subsidence had
4 occurred and it was beginning to fall down the hill, so it was just an --
5 fixing it basically.
6 Q. How close was the shed to the OP?
7 A. It was immediate proximity. It was 2, 3 metres away.
8 JUDGE KWON: We can zoom in further.
9 MS. WEST: Thank you. Yes, please.
10 JUDGE KWON: Further, further.
11 MS. WEST: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
12 Q. We also see -- let me back up. You mentioned in your statement
13 that there was a Bosnian army mortar position that you saw in December
14 1995 or January 1996. Yesterday you and I spoke about that. Is that the
15 ovalish red circle we see on this map?
16 A. Yeah, that's my best estimation and -- it was on the road which,
17 as I say, ran parallel to the river. That's the main feature. Now I
18 recognise it.
19 Q. Okay. And the small red circle north of that oval, that
20 represents the location of the Markale market shelling on the 28th;
22 A. That's -- you marked that yourself?
23 Q. Yeah.
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. And do you agree that that approximately represents where it was
2 A. The market?
3 Q. The little red circle.
4 A. You marked that yesterday?
5 Q. Yeah.
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. But my question to you is: Do you agree that that's where it was
9 A. The market?
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. It was in that general area. There was a plaza. If you look to
12 the north-west of my oval area, I recall that being an open area, and
13 that was the general area where I had seen the impacts, but that was
14 based on my understanding of the topography of the city at the time.
15 Q. So for the purposes of today, yesterday you also did a
16 measurement from that little small circle to your oval circle, and you
17 did it at about 170 degrees bearing. Do you remember doing that?
18 A. From the market-place through the mortar positions --
19 Q. Right.
20 A. -- we worked out it's about 170 degrees. Yeah. True. True.
21 Q. Okay. And the distance that you came to between the two was
22 about 500 metres; is that correct?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. So just a few minutes ago when Mr. Karadzic was speaking and
25 before he asked you some questions he gave a summary of your statement.
1 And in his -- transcript page 58 today, and he said:
2 "This location," meaning your oval circle, "is in the direction
3 in which it is alleged that the shell had landed in the Markale market it
4 had come from."
5 And that particular sentence, that's not in your statement, is
7 A. Sorry, can you repeat that, please?
8 Q. Yeah. Let's go exactly back to that. It's page 58 today, and
9 the statement made --
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please quote me exactly
11 because those weren't my words.
12 MS. WEST: I'll read straight from the transcript.
13 "This location is in the direction in which it is alleged that
14 the shell had landed that landed in the Markale market had come from."
15 Q. That particular sentence that I just read out to you, that's
16 nowhere in your statement, is it?
17 A. I don't think so. I don't think I made any allegations -- I was
18 just -- any reports I've said are just fact and what I've seen.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I would ask that both maps be tendered,
21 the original base map and this excerpt. And the reason I'm asking for
22 the base map is because it will be used again by me with another witness
23 and I suspect it will be used several times.
24 JUDGE KWON: Has it not been tendered yet?
25 MS. WEST: No, the original base map, the entire map itself, I
1 don't believe it's ever been tendered.
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
3 Just a second.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't have any objections, but
5 there is something missing here. We don't have the direction of approach
6 of the shell. The 170-degree bearing hasn't been marked.
7 JUDGE KWON: No, it may be a subject for your re-examination.
8 We'll give both versions of map.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 65 ter number 03390 [sic] will
10 be Exhibit P5926, and 65 ter number 23917 will be Exhibit P5927.
11 MS. WEST: And just for the record, I think at line 7 the
12 original 65 ter number is 09390, but I appreciate the new exhibit number.
13 May we have P01957, please.
14 Q. Mr. Conway, we're about -- on the screen in front of you you're
15 about to see a photo, and I'm going to ask if you recognise this photo.
16 What do you see on the screen?
17 A. This is the photo which you showed me yesterday. It was more
18 clear in paper form than screen form, so it's a little bit from memory.
19 But I can recognise Harry Konings is our team leader in the foreground to
20 the left, and then it gives you the western view from the O -- from the
21 observation post. There was also an excellent view towards the north and
22 the east, but that would be largely the view we had over the city towards
23 the east.
24 Q. Okay. And so your view from OP 1 was to the -- in the front to
25 the west, to the north, and to the east; is that correct?
1 A. East, north, and west, yeah.
2 Q. And suffice to say, it was a very good view of the entire city?
3 A. It was an excellent view of that part of the city. That's why
4 the OP was there.
5 Q. Okay. Paragraph 12 of your report you said that around 11.00 you
6 heard several explosions that were muffled. Can you tell us today what
7 you mean by the term "muffled."
8 A. It's a -- in relative to an impact explosion which at that
9 distance I would have expected to hear a larger and more -- perhaps the
10 vibration from an impact. At that time it didn't occur to me that the
11 explosions had occurred so close to the OP. It's always something that
12 surprised me.
13 Q. And when we spoke about this yesterday you said they were muffled
14 and you thought they were not coming from within your team area; is that
16 A. That's correct, yeah.
17 Q. As you mentioned also in paragraph 12 you said that you had heard
18 several explosions in that period of time?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now after this day, after this event, you came to understand that
21 there was more than one explosion in the city centre that day; correct?
22 A. Yes, yes.
23 Q. And there were, in fact, a total of five explosions at about the
24 time that you speak and the Trial Chamber has heard --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's leading. [In English]
1 Sorry, sorry, sorry.
2 MS. WEST: Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: You are entitled to, so this is your cross.
4 MS. WEST:
5 Q. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence about this very exact time
6 of which you speak. They've heard evidence that the timing of the
7 shells, one was at 10.50 in the morning, another at 10.50 in the morning,
8 another at 11.00, another at 11.00, and then one at about 11.14. So my
9 question for you is: Does this timing -- is this timing fairly
10 consistent with the muffled explosions you heard at about 11.00 that day?
11 A. From my memory, if you hadn't given me those times I would have
12 said that the time-span was much closer --
13 Q. Okay.
14 A. -- than those times.
15 Q. You also understand now that the first four shells that landed
16 that day landed in a separate distance a little bit of a ways from the
17 fifth shell that land in front of the Markale market, killing several
18 people. Do you understand that now or after the fact?
19 A. Only because you're telling me. At the time when I observed, I
20 saw several plumes of smoke, all reasonably equal in size and shape,
21 which indicated even to me -- even in memory that there was a closer
22 time-span between the shells. So I'm surprised by the times that you're
23 saying to me.
24 Q. Okay. A few minutes later after you heard these explosions, you
25 were contacted by UNMO headquarters; right?
1 A. Yeah, and it was quite a short period like it wasn't -- I
2 wouldn't say it was ten minutes, I would say it was within the
3 five-minute bracket.
4 Q. How were you contacted?
5 A. On our VHF radio.
6 Q. And where you in a place where you could -- was it on your body?
7 Was it in the post? Could you hear it easily?
8 A. I can't remember precisely where it was, but I always kept the
9 radio within earshot. It was our most important tool on the observation
10 post. So I would have been constantly observing. Even though I was
11 doing the work on the sandbagging, I was constantly observing the radio.
12 Q. And over the radio you told them that you saw plumes of smoke
13 coming from the market area?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Okay. So, Mr. Conway, would you agree with me that the sound of
16 120-millimetre mortar firing is not - to use your word - muffled if fired
17 from a reasonably close distance to the listener?
18 A. I would expect it to make a very distinctive "vrmph" and "trmph"
19 and you'd know that a heavy explosion had occurred.
20 Q. And that sound is not a sound that you heard that morning?
21 A. Not what I would have expected from mortars landing so close.
22 Q. At the time when this happened you reported that you heard no
23 noise or firing from your area and this remains true today; correct?
24 A. Can you repeat that, please?
25 Q. At the time you reported that you didn't hear any noise or firing
1 from your area; does that remain true today?
2 A. I'm not sure what you mean exactly by that.
3 Q. I mean in the area around the OP, in the front of the OP, at that
4 time you didn't tell anyone: Oh, I heard a noise coming from that area,
5 did you?
6 A. I'll tell you what I saw if that answers your question. I was
7 working. I heard the noises. I didn't think they were so close or in
8 our team area. I received a radio message asking me to confirm that
9 explosions had occurred. I observed over the team area. I saw the
10 plumes of smoke. And I confirmed that impacts had occurred.
11 MS. WEST: May we have P01960, please.
12 Q. This is a UNMO patrol report and it's dated from the following
13 day and it's written by Lieutenant-Colonel Konings. You know who he is?
14 A. Yeah, he was the team leader.
15 Q. And if we can go to page 2 of this exhibit, please. Page 2 of
16 the exhibit. Thank you. And if we can zoom into the middle there is a
17 number 2. That's what I want to focus on. This is the report he wrote
18 and I just want to read this out.
19 JUDGE KWON: I think we can do without B/C/S for the moment.
20 MS. WEST: Thank you. Maybe we can make that a little bit
22 Q. Great. So under 2A it says:
23 "In the time-frame of the five impacts, UNMOs of" and it looks
24 like it says "ICZ team." Do you know what that is?
25 A. Z I suspect is for team Zulu.
1 Q. And that's your team, right?
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. "... working on OP-1" then there's a word I can't read, then
4 another word, but then it says:
5 " ... heard no outgoing mortar rounds neither from the Bosnian
6 army territory (general area Bistrik and Colina Kapa) nor from Bosnian
7 Serb army territory."
8 Mr. Conway, is this fact true?
9 A. I can only say that I heard sounds which sounded like impact. I
10 can say -- and I was always confused as had I heard outgoing or incoming.
11 So I can't say that I only heard impact. I don't -- to be honest, I
12 don't know what the explosions I heard were coming from.
13 Q. Okay. But you just said I can only say that I heard sounds which
14 sounded like impact --
15 A. Well I'm using the word -- maybe that's because I know there were
16 impacts, thus I'm saying they're impacts.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. But like, if someone said, what were those noise -- this was a
19 discussion we had at the time in the team, had you heard outgoing or
20 incoming, and I've never been able to say exactly I'd heard. Since then
21 they've generally been referred to as impacts.
22 Q. But nonetheless you also very clearly described the sound that
23 you did hear as muffled, correct?
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. And had you heard something closer to your OP in front of your
1 OP, you would not have expected that noise if it were an outgoing
2 120-millimetre shell -- excuse me, mortar, to be muffled, would you?
3 A. Can you give me that question again, please?
4 Q. Let me ask you this: Yesterday when we spoke to you, you said
5 that: "I would have thought that outgoing rounds would be louder since a
6 launch point would be only 2 or 3 kilometres away downhill." Do you
7 remember saying that?
8 A. I think you might have misunderstood. I thought that the impacts
9 would have been louder because of the distance from the OP.
10 Q. Okay. At paragraph 15 of your statement you said:
11 "I would not agree with the proposition that if someone at OP 1
12 had not heard the sound of outgoing mortar fire, then the fire must have
13 come from the Bosnian Serb side of the confrontation line."
14 That's in your statement. Now it -- I just want to be clear.
15 You disagree with that inference or that conclusion; is that right?
16 A. I think that in order to make a final analysis on this type of
17 situation you need lots of information from lots of different areas, and
18 to make it on just one piece of information I think is a weak final --
19 way to make a final analysis.
20 Q. Okay. So that -- but that's one piece of information?
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. You understand that there were lots of other pieces of
23 information as well?
24 A. Yeah, yeah.
25 Q. And pieces of information to which you were not necessarily
2 A. Absolutely.
3 Q. Right. You mentioned in your statement at paragraph 17 that
4 there was a Bosnian army mortar position at the bottom of a steep hollow
5 in the southern hills of Sarajevo; right?
6 A. Mm-hmm.
7 Q. And we spoke about that earlier because you made a marking for me
8 on a chart. You later made a correction that it wasn't the northern side
9 of the road, it was the southern side of the road. You also said in
10 paragraph 22 that the mortar position was well sandbagged. Were sandbags
11 something that were used at the time to prop-up both permanent mortar
12 positions and temporary mortar positions?
13 A. I'm not sure what you mean by the question, but sandbagging would
14 be a normal military way of giving defence around any type of military
15 installation against incoming fire or shrapnel. Sandbagging takes some
16 time to do. It can be done quite quickly by well-organised military
17 people, but -- so does that answer your question?
18 Q. It does, thank you. At paragraph 21 you said that the four
19 mortars that you saw there were pointed north towards -- towards
20 Sarajevo. And yesterday you described that a little bit better for me.
21 Can you tell us what exactly you mean by pointing north over -- to
23 A. They were pointing towards the area of, for instance, towards
24 Sedrenik which was on the other side of the confrontation line. They
25 were in a very -- what we call in the military reverse slope position,
1 where the ground behind was rising steeply, and they were in a hollow
2 which was not a manmade hollow. It was more of a natural -- small
3 natural feature, like a mini-quarry type situation. So it was a good
4 military position, I'd have to say, from a military perspective.
5 Q. Okay. And do you remember that -- you just said Sedrenik, but
6 they were pointed north over the city, correct?
7 A. Over the city. And there was -- well, like north of the city was
8 well within the range of a mortar like that. That didn't come as a
10 Q. Okay. Now in your conversation with Mr. Karadzic on Monday, you
11 noted that during your time at the OP 1 in 1995 you did not observe any
12 mortars required into the city from Serb positions south of Sarajevo?
13 A. Yeah, but I just want -- maybe I need to give some clarity on
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. Because there had been some firing into the Egyptian Battalion
17 area which was to the north around the area of the river, the library,
18 and then towards the east, and there had been a mortar firing incident at
19 some point while I was there. I can't remember the dates of that.
20 Q. Now let's talk exactly about the dates. Now, you arrive in
21 Sarajevo about a week before your posting --
22 A. It's around a week. I arrived on the exact date as the date that
23 there had been an incident on Mount Igman, when there had been an
24 American negotiating team who were leaving the city, and I understand
25 their APC toppled over, it was a French APC, and I think the occupants
1 sadly were killed during that incident. But that marks the date of the
3 Q. And if I represented to you that that date was August 19th, does
4 that make sense to you?
5 A. If that's the date of that, that's the date I arrived in the
6 city, yeah.
7 Q. And then in late September you changed posts -- I shouldn't use
8 the word "post." You changed roles; correct?
9 A. It would have been late September/early October I moved to -- I
10 think I started as duty officer in the UNMO headquarters in PTT, that's
11 the headquarters building.
12 Q. And from late September through December did your job remain at
13 the PTT building?
14 A. It did. I was the information officer which -- I was deputy
15 information officer and then information officer which meant I was
16 familiar with both of the teams in the city and the other UNMO teams
17 which were also around other locations in Bosnia.
18 Q. And so that means from August 19th until late September for about
19 those five or six weeks, that's the period of time when you're actually
20 patrolling the city; is that right?
21 A. Patrolling the city on a daily basis, but also as information
22 officer I would have had to visit teams from time to time and
23 familiarisation with the general terrain.
24 Q. Let's focus in on that period of time for those six weeks
25 regarding about how many times you would have been posted at OP 1.
1 A. There were I think about eight UNMOs in the team and we did
2 48-hour tours of duty on the OP. So the tour of duty of two days came up
3 every four -- once a little bit over every week, so it's about every
4 eight days or so we would have had to do two days on the OP.
5 Q. Okay. So that means during that period of time you were on the
6 OP maybe five to six times?
7 A. Mathematically it would seem, yeah.
8 Q. So in answer to Mr. Karadzic's question that there were no
9 mortars fired from the city -- fired into the city from the south while
10 you were at OP 1, it's limited to those five or six times?
11 A. Yes, but I would have general knowledge -- it was in our
12 immediate team area so if anything happened in the team area most of the
13 team knew what had happened.
14 Q. All right. Let's put aside mortars for the moment. Were there
15 other types of projectiles that were fired into the city of Sarajevo from
16 August to December of 1995?
17 A. There were reasonably common occurrences of rocket fire and rifle
19 Q. Did you ever experience sniper fire?
20 A. Once -- I did several times, twice I can think of straight away.
21 Once on my way to PTT from the Sedrenik where we were going down the
22 infamous sniper ally roof and rounds landed around the vehicle on the
23 road, and also in our team based in Sedrenik it was overlooked by a
24 position called sharp stone and from time to time rounds were fired on to
25 the wall of the house.
1 Q. And this is all in the period between August and December of
3 A. Closer, August and the end of September, early October 1995.
4 MS. WEST: May we have 65 ter 23904, please.
5 Q. Now, this is going to be a document that's dated September 1st,
6 so this is a period of time where you've not yet changed your position.
7 It's a daily sitrep. You're familiar with this - correct? - or this type
8 of document; correct?
9 A. Yeah.
10 MS. WEST: May we go to page 17 , please.
11 Q. In the format --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel and witness both slow down for
13 the purpose of interpretation. Thank you very much.
14 MS. WEST: Apologies.
15 Q. We're only seeing one page at the moment of this, but the format
16 of these sitreps, was this something with which you became familiar?
17 A. I was familiar, yeah, and this would have been -- nothing jumps
18 out as familiar on that particular document, but it was the -- each day
19 we submitted summary reports to Zagreb.
20 Q. Okay. So here we have under 2:
21 "Warring faction movement/observations/investigations."
22 And then we have the "Federation Side."
23 And here it says:
24 "On August 30th, one mortar round impacted inside the
25 Tito Barracks inside the Ukrainian Battalion compound and three mortar
1 artillery rounds impacted outside the Tito barracks."
2 Were you familiar of the location of the Tito barracks?
3 A. I can't remember the names of all the barracks but there were
4 several large barracks in Sarajevo. As I mentioned, there was the
5 Egyptian barracks in our own area and I remember visiting larger barracks
6 where Ukrainian and I think Pakistani barracks were located.
7 MS. WEST: Okay. Let me show you a map again. May I again have
8 65 ter number 23917. I know it has an exhibit number now, but 23917.
9 THE WITNESS: The date -- can I --
10 MS. WEST:
11 Q. Yes --
12 A. Just an observation.
13 Q. Please.
14 A. Is that date the 29th of August?
15 Q. This says on the 30th of August?
16 A. On the 30th because at that time I could still have been on the
18 Q. Okay. And this says it's 120-millimetre mortar from 160 degree
19 bearing. So if we can look at the map again and if we could zoom in,
20 please. And one -- maybe one more, and one more.
21 Now, you see your oval and if you go sort of north-west, there is
22 a big block. Do you recognise that as a barracks -- as the Tito
24 A. Yes, I see there -- the block you mean --
25 Q. Yeah --
1 A. I recognise that there were barracks in that area. I wouldn't --
2 if you would just give me a plain map, I wouldn't have found it, but I
3 know there were barracks in that general area.
4 Q. That's fine for now. For the purposes of this question, can you
5 tell me if the document we just looked at said that there was a mortar
6 round coming in at a 160-degree bearing, where would that be coming from
8 A. From 160 -- well, 160 is south-east of that position, so it's
9 between -- it probably would be to the south of the marked area, slightly
10 to the south.
11 Q. So you can actually - if this is enabled - write on the screen,
12 if I could ask for the assistance of the usher.
13 JUDGE KWON: Are you fine with the zooming conditions? Would you
14 like to zoom in further --
15 MS. WEST:
16 Q. Maybe --
17 A. No, that's enough. I can see clear enough.
18 JUDGE KWON: All right.
19 THE WITNESS: Can I draw with this? Well, that's 90 degrees,
20 that's 180. So 30 degrees off that is probably somewhere down --
21 somewhere down this way. And that's probably -- but that's 45, so 90 and
22 45 is 135 --
23 Q. [Overlapping speakers]
24 A. -- so it's further to -- it's further south, actually.
25 Q. Yeah. So we said 160.
1 A. 160 would be about the second line, this line here.
2 Q. All right. And if you extend that line that you just drew -- oh,
3 that goes into SRK territory, doesn't it?
4 A. It does, yeah.
5 Q. Yeah. Now, you just put a little check mark. Can you star that
6 so when we're later looking at this we know which line you're talking
8 A. The checked mark is the correct mark.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. Neither mark is [overlapping speakers] --
11 JUDGE KWON: Or for clarity the witness can write down 160.
12 MS. WEST: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
13 THE WITNESS: [Marks]
14 MS. WEST:
15 Q. And now could you sign it, please. Just sign your name on it and
16 date it, and today is the 17th.
17 A. October, isn't it.
18 Q. Yeah.
19 A. [Marks]
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MS. WEST: Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: This will be saved and admitted as the next
23 Prosecution Exhibit.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P5928, Your Honours.
25 MS. WEST:
1 Q. May we go back to 65 ter 23904, please. And may I have page 15.
2 Mr. Conway, earlier you spoke about UNMOs' impartiality, and I
3 want to speak a little bit more about this. In looking at this sitrep
4 report on page 15 - and I want to make sure I said the right number,
5 23904, yeah, thank you - page 15, under G, can you see this? It says
6 "Military Activity."
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. And then we have another column -- columns, observed from, type
9 of fire, origin of fire, impact area. This type of information in this
10 column form, is this something that was typical for UNMO reporting?
11 A. It would have been. Yeah, I'm just looking at it as you speak.
12 Date, time, observed from, type of fire, origin, impact area, remarks,
13 yeah, that's fairly standard stuff, yeah.
14 Q. Okay. And under the column of origin of fire we have Jewish
15 cemetery, then unknown, unknown, unknown, and then we have Debelo Brdo,
16 and my apologies for mispronouncing it. Of those two locations that we
17 know, were those Bosnian Serb positions or Bosnian Muslim locations?
18 A. I can't remember the locations.
19 Q. Okay. That's fine. Let's go to the next page, 16. And that
20 same column we see sharpstone; correct?
21 A. On the top of the page.
22 Q. And was that a Bosnian Serb position?
23 A. Sharpstone was Serb position.
24 Q. And if we go to the following page, back to page 17, and on the
25 top we see Rajlovac, and then underneath it says BSA BiH. Do you have
1 any memory as to whether this was a Bosnian Serb position or Bosnian
2 Muslim position or both?
3 A. I don't have any recollection. The name doesn't mean anything to
5 Q. Okay. But is it fair to say that the UNMOs informed their
6 superiors of firing by both the Bosnian Serb side and the Bosnian Muslim
8 A. Yes, yes.
9 MS. WEST: Your Honour, I would tender this report.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P5929, Your Honours.
12 MS. WEST:
13 Q. Mr. Conway, yesterday in this courtroom a statement was made, and
14 I'm going to tell you what the statement was and then I'm going to ask
15 you a question about it. The statement that was made was this:
16 "Many UNMO observers were partial to the Bosnian Muslim side and
17 they informed only about the incoming fire but not about the outgoing
18 fire by the Bosnian Muslims, thereby portraying the fighting in Sarajevo
19 as a Serb aggression and shelling."
20 My question for you is: Was this a practice you employed while
21 you were in Sarajevo?
22 A. Absolutely no. I would be very proud of the impartiality and
23 accuracy of the UNMO -- all the UNMO officers and the way we operated in
24 Sarajevo and later on in other parts of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslavia
1 Q. And do you find the statement that I just read out to be
3 A. No, no, not at all. It's asserting im -- that the UNMOs weren't
4 impartial. Absolutely no.
5 Q. Thank you, sir.
6 MS. WEST: I have no further questions.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
9 THE ACCUSED: Just indulgence few minutes, please, to consult.
10 [Defence counsel confer]
11 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Before I show you two documents, General, did
13 you see any reports outside the period when you were at OP 1? Did you
14 see any reports showing that from that direction there were shells flying
15 over OP 1, not only that week but outside of that period?
16 A. Not while I was in team Zulu can I recall that I heard or any of
17 the other UNMOs speaking of rounds actually going over OP 1.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now call up in e-court
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. This is a sitrep, isn't it, dated June 1995.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't need the Serbian version.
24 Could we now see page 16. Page 16, please.
25 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it has so many pages.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D28180 is, in fact, the document I
2 want. Maybe I got the wrong page number for this.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. This is also a sitrep dated 19 June 1995.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 7, please.
6 I would like now to read this.
7 [In English] At 18 2300B 1X APC fired by RPG when it coming back
8 from Igman at 19 1615B, numerous shells from down-town (Tito barracks to
9 Poline. At 18th 1615, after Bosnians fired from Tito barracks to BSA
10 side, Serbs fired from Poline to Hotonj with tanks, M18, and mortars.
11 [Interpretation] General, the Marsal Tito barracks was mentioned
12 today. Were you aware of the fact that the Marsal Tito barracks was
13 being used by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and there was such
14 firing from the barracks on the Serbian side?
15 A. This incident refers to June 1995. I wasn't in Sarajevo at that
16 time so I can't make any comment on that.
17 Q. Thank you. It's not the incident itself I'm interested in, but
18 in the nature of the Marsal Tito barracks location, were you aware of the
19 fact that the ABiH was using it and that fire was also opened from that
21 A. I'm not aware of any -- of the facts that you were saying there.
22 My only knowledge of that -- of the barracks, any barracks, that I had
23 been to was occupied by UN troops. There were some locations where we
24 visited liaison officers from the Bosnian army, but I was not aware that
25 units were -- if I understand from what you're saying is that they were
1 located side by side with UN, but I don't know anything about that.
2 Q. Thank you, General. Thank you for having come to testify here.
3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Unless my colleagues have any questions
4 for you, now you are evidence is concluded. On behalf of this Chamber,
5 I'd like to thank you, General, for your coming to The Hague to give it.
6 Now you are free to go.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Please have a safe journey back home.
9 [The witness withdrew]
10 JUDGE KWON: Is the next witness ready? Yes, let's bring him in.
11 Ms. Edgerton, do you need a short break?
12 MS. EDGERTON: Please, very short.
13 JUDGE KWON: Five minutes.
14 --- Break taken at 2.18 p.m.
15 [The witness entered court]
16 --- On resuming at 2.28 p.m.
17 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness take the solemn declaration.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
19 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
20 WITNESS: BLAGOJE KOVACEVIC
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General. Please take a seat and make
23 yourself comfortable.
24 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, General.
2 A. Good day, Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see the following
4 document in the e-court system. Just a minute, please.
5 [Defence counsel confer]
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D6032.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, have you had the opportunity of going through your
9 statement, the statement that you gave to the Defence team?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Is this the statement that we have before us? Would you like to
12 see the last page and the signature?
13 A. I can see the first page and that's it.
14 Q. Was this statement read out to you and does it accurately reflect
15 what you said?
16 A. Yes, it does.
17 Q. Thank you. If I put the same questions to you today as the
18 questions that are contained in the statement, would your answer be the
20 A. Well, I don't know whether I could repeat the very same words,
21 but the substance of my response would be identical.
22 Q. Thank you. I have to ask you and remind myself too that since we
23 speak the same language we should make brief pauses between question and
24 answer, but I don't have many questions for you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, could this
1 statement be admitted into evidence.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours 1D6032 will be Exhibit D2331.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the supplementary documents
5 also be admitted into evidence as an integral part of this one, but we
6 could deal with that at the end of the examination-in-chief.
7 I would now like to read out a summary of General Kovacevic's
8 statement. It will be in English in order to be more efficient.
9 [In English] Blagoje Kovacevic held the rank of VRS colonel and
10 currently is an active officer in the armed forces of BH with the rank of
11 brigadier. From May 1992 to October 1992, he was the commander of the
12 Blazuj Brigade in the SRK. Over the following two months he held the
13 position of Chief of Staff of the Rajlovac Brigade from which he was
14 transferred on 9th of December, 1992, to the 1st Sarajevo Motorised
15 Brigade as chief of operations and training. From June 1993 to 1996, he
16 was the commander of the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the 1st Sarajevo
17 Motorised Brigade. 99 per cent of the members of his unit were not
18 professional military personnel and he encountered problems achieving
19 effective control. There were no professional snipers in his unit.
20 Blagoje Kovacevic has direct knowledge about the quantity and
21 types of armaments in the Marsal Tito barracks, since he worked as a
22 platoon commander and teaching and conducting training pertaining to some
23 of the weapons available therein. Orders from superior commands were
24 that maximum ammunition savings were to be achieved at all levels. All
25 Muslim units in Sarajevo had the same type of armament as the VRS units,
1 since those were JNA and BH TO weapons. However, Muslim forces were also
2 provided with other types of weapons through various illicit channels.
3 Muslims were militarily organised and armed prior to the outbreak of the
4 conflict in BH/Sarajevo. The Patriotic League in Novi Grad municipality
5 of Sarajevo was set up already in autumn 1991.
6 The order of the Supreme Command was that a decisive defence
7 should be assumed at all attained lines, since there was no interest or
8 need to take areas which were not ethnically defined as Serbian. The
9 objectives of the SRK were, first, not to allow Muslim forces to
10 breakthrough from Sarajevo and be used on the other battle-fields;
11 second, to protect the Serbian population in the area of the city of
12 Sarajevo and its environs; and three, to save as many people as possible
13 who had remained in the city under Muslim control.
14 At all positions where Blagoje Kovacevic had been, not a single
15 offensive action had been executed but exclusively defensive ones. These
16 positions were established at the beginning of the war and they remained
17 unaltered until the end of the war. The lines of disengagement had
18 become closer to one another, due to the Muslim army moving towards
19 Serbian lines by digging communication trenches toward the Serbian
20 positions and by nearing the lines with the assistance of UNPROFOR.
21 Several JNA military facilities in Sarajevo remained in the hands
22 of the Muslim forces, among those -- among others the JNA and Bistrik
23 barracks, the Military Hospital, and the Marsal Tito training centre.
24 Throughout the war Muslims never hid their intentions to provoke
25 incidents which would be reason enough for UNPROFOR or NATO to be
1 deployed on their side. They deliberately opened fire at times of truce
2 to provoke the reaction of the part of the Serb forces so that the latter
3 could then be blamed by -- for causing the incident. The 110th Brigade
4 of the 1st Corps of Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was not a
5 regular unit and in which criminal elements predominantly featured, was
6 known for having publicly promised to take Trebevic and Grbavica and
7 cleanse the city of infidels. At the Kazani execution site situated in
8 the zone of responsibility of that brigade, large number of Serbs from
9 the city were liquidated. Serbs around Sarajevo were arrested and ransom
11 The mass victims' scenario was often employed since such cases
12 would cause great public outcry, as for instance the Markale incident.
13 He has no information as to who caused these incidents, but sabotage
14 cannot be ruled out. Blagoje Kovacevic believes that the Markale
15 incidents involved the use of explosives as opposed to shells.
16 Main Staff and civilian authorities called for the city to be
17 completely demilitarised and for all heavy weaponry on both sides to be
18 placed under UN control. The Serb side carried that out one-sidedly. In
19 1992 all PVO weaponry against the air-borne were removed from the
20 vicinity of the Sarajevo airport and at a later stage all 80-millimetres
21 and higher-calibre weapons were removed to a distance to 20 kilometres
22 away from Sarajevo and were controlled by UNPROFOR.
23 All soldiers in the unit were trained in and acquainted with the
24 international law of war and humanitarian law. His unit did not open
25 fire at the civilians and took measures to reduce collateral civilian
1 damages. Orders were passed down to the event -- that in the event of
2 fire opened at civilians, investigations were to be conducted and legally
3 prescribed measures taken against the transgressors. Orders had been
4 given repeatedly by SRK command that fire was to be opened only if lives
5 were directly threatened and then only at targets endangering the
6 security of the unit. He explains that never he or any other members of
7 his unit or their subordinates or superior commands intended to cause
8 civilian casualties, terrorise civilians in the territory under Muslim
9 control, or wield psychological impact on them or attack means of public
10 transportation. They never received or issued any verbal or written
11 orders to that effect. Tram tracks in Sarajevo were about 200 metres
12 behind the Muslim forces. Stray bullets could easily be publicised as
13 deliberate targeting of means of public transportation by Serbian forces.
14 Special Muslim units tried to cut off the Lukavica-Pale road,
15 after which terror against Serbs who had remained in Sarajevo
16 considerably increased. On 6th of January, 1994, Muslim forces executed
17 an attack on the Jewish cemetery and the Vrbanja bridge where a
18 disproportionate high number of civilian casualties occurred. Many
19 positions of adversary unit towered over Grbavica, from where it was
20 under complete control of the opposing units. He also had information
21 that Muslim forces had positions in civilian areas. The entire line of
22 this engagement was in the inhabited areas.
23 Passage of humanitarian convoys was completely unhindered by the
24 Serb forces, whereas abuses for military purposes were committed by the
25 1st Corps of BH Army as well as the existence of a black market for those
1 supplies in the area of the city under Muslim control. Supply of water,
2 electricity, and gas was never interrupted by the Serb forces, yet Muslim
3 forces would cut off their own supply and attribute it to the Serbian
5 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, Dr. Karadzic doesn't have any
6 questions for this witness, so if we could deal with the associated
7 exhibits we request that they be admitted.
8 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?
9 MS. EDGERTON: No.
10 JUDGE KWON: Just one matter. Can we upload D08439 which seems
11 to be a map. I think we need some English translation which are in the
12 text box.
13 Do you agree, Ms. Edgerton?
14 MS. EDGERTON: I've actually received them from the Defence some
15 time ago, so they should have been uploaded I would have thought.
16 JUDGE KWON: With that understanding, we'll admit them all, but
17 could you report as soon as possible when it is uploaded, Mr. Robinson.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
19 JUDGE KWON: So you tendered nine exhibits; correct? To be
21 THE ACCUSED: I think so.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. They will be all admitted and be given numbers
23 in due course.
24 Your cross-examination may start tomorrow, but for that purpose
25 shall we give -- do you think we need to give the witness a warning based
1 upon Rule 90(E) or not?
2 MS. EDGERTON: I do, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think in the future it
5 would be better to give such a warning at the commencement of the
6 witness's testimony not the commencement of cross-examination, but --
7 JUDGE KWON: Usually it was the party who draws the attention to
8 those facts, but it just occurred to me right now.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we don't have any objection.
10 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, we'll do that tomorrow.
11 But we'll adjourn today, General, and resume tomorrow at 9.00.
12 But in the meantime, can I remind you that you are not supposed to
13 discuss about your testimony with anybody else. Do you understand that,
15 THE WITNESS: Yes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 The hearing is adjourned.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 18th day of
20 October, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.