1 Tuesday, 23 October 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 Before we begin today, the Chamber will issue two oral rulings.
7 The Chamber will first issue an oral decision on the Prosecution request
8 in relation to the status of Exhibit P71 filed on the 16th of October,
9 2012. In the request, the Prosecution notes that Exhibit P71 is
10 identified on the Registry's exhibit list as confidential and asks that
11 Exhibit P71 remain under seal and that a public redacted version of P71
12 uploaded to e-court under Rule 65 ter number 90047A be admitted into
13 evidence. On the 17th of October, 2012, the accused's legal adviser
14 informed the Chamber by e-mail that the accused does not oppose the
15 Prosecution's request in the motion.
16 The Chamber notes that P71, a witness statement for
17 Safeta Hamzic, was provisionally admitted into evidence on 10th of
18 November, 2009, pursuant to Rule 92 bis subject to the Prosecution
19 complying with the formal requirements of Rule 92 bis (B). On the 19th
20 of November, 2010, the Prosecution informed the Chamber that the
21 attestation procedure for the witness statement of Safeta Hamzic had been
22 completed. On the 10th of December, 2010, the Chamber admitted P71 into
23 evidence as a public exhibit.
24 The Chamber recalls its decisions of 10th of November, 2009, and
25 10th of December, 2010, whereby it admitted P71 publicly and notes that
1 the Registry's exhibit list is incorrect in that respect. The Chamber
2 therefore understands the request to be a motion for reconsideration of
3 the public status of P71. Given the Prosecution's submissions in the
4 request and in accordance with the practice in this case, the Chamber is
5 not satisfied that it is necessary to reconsider the public status of P71
6 to prevent injustice. The Chamber, therefore, denies the Prosecution's
7 request to place Exhibit P71 under seal and to admit a public redacted
8 version and requests the Registry to mark P71 as public in e-court.
9 Next could the Chamber move into private session.
10 [Private session]
11 Page 29226 redacted. Private session.
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we bring in the next witness. I take it the
2 next witness is Mr. Veljovic?
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, a small correction to the
4 transcript from yesterday. Page number 29179, line 8, currently the
5 exhibit number listed there is Exhibit D2334. Instead it should read
6 Exhibit D2344. Thank you.
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE KWON: Could the witness take the solemn declaration.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
10 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 WITNESS: STEVAN VELJOVIC
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated and make yourself
15 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, good morning.
17 Good morning to everybody.
18 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
19 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Veljovic.
20 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6040 in
22 e-court. There is a Serbian version as well.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Veljovic, have you read the printed version of your
1 A. Yes, fully.
2 Q. Thank you. Did you sign it as well?
3 A. Yes, I did. In English, I signed it in English, however.
4 Q. Thank you. I have to ask you and I have to remind myself that we
5 are speaking the same language and that we should make little pauses
6 between questions and answers and answers and questions for the benefit
7 of the interpreters.
8 Does the statement reflect what you stated?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. If I were to put the same questions to you today, would your
11 answers be the same?
12 A. Yes, I would be -- they would be the same. I would also add to
13 the statement that I completed a reserve officer military school and that
14 in peace time I held different duties starting with platoon commander to
15 battalion commander.
16 Q. Thank you for the addition.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to
18 tender this statement into evidence, the statement provided by
19 Witness Veljovic.
20 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As well as the associated
22 documents, the whole package of course.
23 JUDGE KWON: I take it that you are tendering only one document
24 as an associated exhibit?
25 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?
2 MS. EDGERTON: No.
3 JUDGE KWON: They will be admitted.
4 Shall we give the numbers.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter number 1D06040 will be
6 Exhibit D2351, and 65 ter number 1D20286 will be Exhibit D2352.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 I would like to read a short summary of Mr. Veljovic's statement
9 in English.
10 [In English] Stevan Veljovic was an operative officer in the
11 1st Romanija Brigade during the war. Long before the outbreak of the
12 conflict, he had learnt about the formation of paramilitary Muslim units
13 and their secret arming, while in late 1990 and during 1991 this was no
14 secret anymore. At this time they began forming the main bodies of the
15 Patriotic League and the Green Berets.
16 By 1991, inter-ethnic division was pervasive. In early 1992
17 Muslims who were in the Patriotic League started openly controlling roads
18 in the municipality. They would stop vehicles and search them as well as
19 the passengers for weapons.
20 Stevan Veljovic was mobilised to the 216th Mountain Brigade on
21 30th of June, 1991, and was the assistant commander for operations and
22 training. This mobilisation was boycotted by most of the Muslims. By
23 18th [sic] of May 1992 an agreement had been reached about the pullout of
24 JNA units from BH. He was tasked to move the unit to the Lukavica
25 barracks. Before the unit's departure to this location, Muslim and
1 Croatian officers and soldiers left the unit.
2 As of September 1992, local battalions whose function was to
3 protect the Serbian villages around Sarajevo and which were manned
4 exclusively by local inhabitants were included in the composition of the
5 brigade. The brigade was armed with establishment infantry weapons. The
6 unit had snipers, but they were insufficiently trained reservists, so
7 they used sniper rifles like standard weapons rather than sniper rifles.
8 Training of sniper instructors was organised as late as 1995 on the order
9 of the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. His unit had numerous
10 problems with the logistics support. Supply routes were frequently
11 controlled and covered by enemy fire. They were constantly short of
12 shells for the support equipment.
13 The combat lines of the 1st Corps of BH army were very close to
14 his unit's defence positions and were often separated by one street. The
15 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and its soldiers shared the same strategy: To
16 guard and protect Serbian settlements, their families and property in the
17 zone of defence of the brigade. This is why offensive operations were
18 never carried out, but merely defensive ones. They were aware that if
19 the forces of the 1st Corps of BH army broke through any segment of their
20 line of the defence, it would have freed up numerous and serious [sic]
21 enemy forces. Muslim forces were positioned in various features that
22 were dominant in relation to his unit's line of defence and from which
23 they constantly shelled and inflicted casualties, especially in Grbavica
24 and Nedzarici.
25 Neither the brigade nor any of its organs ordered shelling of
1 civilians or civilian buildings, only military targets and only when
2 under artillery and infantry fire from the Muslim side. Even though they
3 knew that Muslim units and equipment often used civilian buildings as
4 shelter. Muslim forces used important cultural, social, historical,
5 health, commercial, and civilian facilities or were positioned near UN
6 monitoring forces, with the strategy of Chetniks being immediately
7 accused of deliberately destroying those buildings when they did return
8 fire at such targets.
9 There had been several orders from the -- all Sarajevo-Romanija
10 Corps command levels that fire was to be opened only if lives were
11 directly threatened, and only at targets endangering the security of the
12 unit. Neither he nor his unit ever had the intention during combat to
13 cause civilian casualties or to terrorise civilians. It was prohibited
14 to fire at civilians, civilian facilities, and means of public transport.
15 He never issued orders in that sense nor did his unit receive such
17 Stevan Veljovic stated that his brigade constantly respected all
18 truces, unlike the Muslim forces, which persistently violated them. UN
19 observers were alongside them at all times and they could see this for
20 themselves. He drafted numerous regular and interim combat reports for
21 the brigade -- for his brigade that clearly shows that they were
22 constantly attacked and shelled and thus forced to return fire.
23 Regarding humanitarian aid, convoys frequently passed through his
24 unit's zone of responsibility and were never obstructed in any way,
25 unless they were transporting at the same time items intended for
1 military use.
2 In early August 1995, Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was recognised --
3 reorganised and he was appointed commander of the 4th Sarajevo Brigade.
4 He then detached and intervention platoon and the entire 220- [sic] and
5 80-millimetre mortar battery was sent to Trebinje front to assist in the
6 defence of the Herzegovina Corps of the VRS against forces of Republic of
7 Croatia. After that, there was no support equipment left in his brigade.
8 Therefore, in this connection to the Markale II incident, he maintains
9 that at that time there was not a single 120-millimetre mortar on that
11 Thank you.
12 [Interpretation] At this stage I have no questions for
13 Mr. Veljovic.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, thank you.
16 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
17 Q. Good morning, Mr. Veljovic.
18 A. Good morning.
19 Q. You've testified previously at this Tribunal, haven't you?
20 A. Yes. In the month of May in 1997 in the General Milosevic case.
21 Q. In fact, it wasn't actually 1997, it was 2007, wasn't it?
22 A. In 2007, yes, I testified in the Milosevic case. It started in
23 the month of May. I was here from the 22nd of May to the 1st of June.
24 Q. And when you say "the Milosevic case," you refer to
25 General Dragomir Milosevic; correct?
1 A. General Dragomir Milosevic. I was an operative in the corps from
2 1994, from the month of December, up to August 1995. That's why I
3 testified in his case.
4 Q. So can you confirm then something that wasn't mentioned in your
5 statement related to this. General Milosevic was also your commander in
6 the 216th Mountain Brigade; correct?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. And it was under his command that you and other soldiers in the
9 216th Brigade moved to Sarajevo in May 1992?
10 A. Correct. We moved to Sarajevo in 1992 from the Drina river
11 sector. We were a unit of the JNA and we had to obey orders issued by
12 the JNA. We were moved to Sarajevo because we had manpower and assets
13 which could help people move from the barracks in Sarajevo. We could
14 also provide them with fuel. We arrived in Sarajevo on the 3rd of May,
16 Q. Who was your operations commander in the 216th Mountain Brigade?
17 A. That was me at the beginning of the war and before the war it was
18 a Muslim, Nehru Ganic, and then he defected and joined the BiH army and
19 now he is a BiH general.
20 Q. And in the 1st Romanija Brigade you continued to serve under
21 Dragomir Milosevic; correct?
22 A. That's correct. General Milosevic was appointed by the
23 government, i.e., by the ministry of Republika Srpska as the commander of
24 the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade. And then he selected officers who
25 would compose his brigade. Many had by then left for Yugoslavia.
1 Q. Milosevic moved in February 1993 to serve with the Drina Corps;
3 A. Yes, he went to the Drina Corps for chief of the operations
4 sector of the Drina Corps, and Colonel --
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the name.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- came to replace him as the
8 MS. EDGERTON:
9 Q. It was actually Vlado Lizdek that came to replace him; is that
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And in the 1st Romanija Brigade, who was your operations
14 A. It was me right until 1994 when on the 19th of December, 1994, I
15 came to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps as an operative officer because
16 Commander Milosevic was already appointed and he called me to become the
17 operations officer of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
18 Q. So Milosevic called you to become operations officer. How -- was
19 that a phone call? Was that an appointment? How did it happen?
20 A. He issued an order that I should come for that duty, and so I
21 reported pursuant to this order. Well, since he knew me from before, he
22 provided me with this opportunity, or rather, this post because I knew
23 how to do this job.
24 Q. And as operations officer within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps you
25 were part of the staff of the corps; correct?
1 A. Yes, as part of the corps staff, and Colonel Cedomir Sladoje was
2 my superior.
3 Q. And what was his position?
4 A. He was the deputy commander and Chief of Staff at the same time.
5 Q. Maybe since you were in the corps staff I can read you some names
6 and you could tell me whether the names I give you were also members of
7 the staff. How about Marko Lugonja?
8 A. Marko Lugonja, he was the assistant commander for intelligence
9 and security.
10 Q. And as assistant commander for intelligence and security, he
11 reported, I suppose, directly to the corps commander; correct?
12 A. Yes, it's correct that he was his assistant but they had separate
13 channels. The security organ was connected with the Main Staff because
14 the operatives have special powers.
15 Q. Who in the Main Staff or what organ in the Main Staff was Lugonja
16 then connected to?
17 A. With General Tolimir who was Mladic's assistant for intelligence
18 and security.
19 Q. So he reported in two lines: Directly to the corps commander,
20 General Milosevic, and also to General Tolimir; correct?
21 A. Yes, but the intelligence staff have a separate thing that they
22 do it like that. Even though he was Milosevic's assistant, he was
23 tightly connected to Tolimir. That's how it was in the Serbian army
24 because this is approximately how these rules were adhered to.
25 Q. Was Luka Dragicevic also a member of the corps staff?
1 A. Yes, Luka Dragicevic was in the corps staff. He was the
2 assistant commander for morale and legal affairs.
3 Q. Did he also have a separate reporting channel to the VRS
4 Main Staff?
5 A. No, he did not. He was responsible to General Milosevic but he
6 also had some links with the assistant. They would meet from time to
7 time. Security is something separate, special, and morale and legal
8 affairs is not. This is how the intelligence people do it in order to
9 gather data.
10 Q. When you say he also had some links with the assistant and they
11 would meet from time to time, I take it you're referring to
12 General Gvero?
13 A. Yes, General Gvero. He was the assistant for morale at the
14 Main Staff.
15 Q. Aleksa Krsmanovic?
16 A. Aleksa Krsmanovic was the assistant commander for logistics, for
17 logistical units for provisions.
18 THE ACCUSED: This is supposed to be answer, not question, on
19 line 13, 14.
20 MS. EDGERTON:
21 Q. Tadija Manojlovic?
22 A. Tadija Manojlovic was the chief of artillery at the corps staff.
23 Q. And who was he linked with in the Main Staff?
24 A. Of course he was linked with the chief of the artillery at the
25 Main Staff. There are close links there. That is how the relations of
1 subordination are in the army, from top towards the bottom and from the
2 bottom up, in terms of reporting.
3 Q. And who was the artillery chief in the Main Staff?
4 A. I don't know.
5 Q. Milan Ugresic, who was he?
6 A. Milan Ugresic was the chief of anti-aircraft defence, the PVO.
7 Q. Milja [phoen] Vlahovic, who was he?
8 A. He was the chief of engineering.
9 Q. Dusan Josipovic, who was he?
10 A. Dusan Josipovic was the chief of communications.
11 Q. And Milivoj Solar, who was he?
12 A. Milivoj Solar was a Croat. He was in our corps. He was the
13 chief of the technical service which was attached to the logistics
14 sector, so Aleksa Krsmanovic was his boss.
15 Q. What are the technical services?
16 A. Logistics comprises the technical service, the medical corps, and
17 the quartermasters sections. That is -- those comprise the logistics
19 Q. Now, we'll come back to that, your time in the corps staff. But
20 I want to go and look a little bit at your job description, if I can call
21 it that, back down in the brigade level. And tell me if I'm correct.
22 Part of your job as operations officer within the brigade was to receive
23 and collate reports from the battalions and their subordinate units?
24 A. An operations officer in the brigade or in the corps is someone
25 who deals with combat issues, works on the war and military skills, makes
1 and sends reports to the commander, and they can also receive command
2 assignment. He can be given two battalions and command them. They also
3 draft TKT documents.
4 Q. In your job with the Romanija Brigade, did you receive reports
5 from the battalions and their subordinate units, yes or no?
6 A. Yes, every day.
7 Q. And if you weren't there for one reason or another, did you have
8 a duty officer who collected information on your behalf?
9 A. Yes. We had duty officers, but the operations officer was always
10 informed about it and the Chief of Staff. I'm talking about the
11 battalion reports.
12 Q. So the reports that you'd receive at brigade level would come in
13 from all the units - am I right? - the companies, the battalions, the
14 platoons, and the squads?
15 A. No, they would only come from the battalions and the artillery
16 division and the staff units, such as the smaller units, engineers,
17 communications, the staff units --
18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the last
20 MS. EDGERTON:
21 Q. Can you just repeat your last sentence, please, after "staff
23 A. The companies would send reports to battalion commanders or to
24 the batteries, then to the division commander, and then the komandirs of
25 the platoons and the companies, signals, and so on, and then the
1 communications company commander, which was a staff unit, would send his
2 reports to the brigade.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Previous translation continues]...
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do not overlap while the interpreters
5 are interpreting. Yes, we couldn't hear your words, Mr. Karadzic. What
6 was it?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mike.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. In the answer in line
11 23 something has been mixed up. The witness said that the companies and
12 the batteries in the artillery would send reports to their first
13 superiors, and here it seems as if they were sending it to the battalion
14 commanders or to the batteries. Perhaps we could ask the witness to
15 speak slowly because he said company or a battery at the same level and
16 then above that it was their superiors.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The brigade command would receive
18 reports from battalion commanders and commanders of batteries and
19 independent staff units, while battalions comprised companies and
20 divisions comprised batteries, and they and the companies are receiving
21 to the division and the companies are receiving to the battalions and the
22 battalion comprises all of that and sends it to the brigades.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
1 Q. So the reports that the brigades received, did they come orally
2 or in writing or both?
3 A. It would receive oral reports, but there had to be a written
4 report in the evening which would be sent to the brigade; and then the
5 brigade would send it to the corps and this would be an encrypted report.
6 The corps would send it to the Main Staff and the Main Staff would send
7 it to the Supreme Command, and that's how it went.
8 Q. To do this job the brigade, I take it, had communications with
9 the operations officers and centres at the subordinate level; correct?
10 A. The brigade had a system of communications and it had links with
11 the battalions, and then in turn the battalions had links with the
12 companies, and the brigade had links with the corps, the corps had links
13 with the Main Staff, and the Main Staff with the Supreme Command.
14 Q. Now, these reports that went from the brigade level up to the
15 corps command, who approved them before they were sent?
16 A. Every report would be signed by the corps commander or by
17 somebody standing in for him on that day if the commander -- if the corps
18 commander was absent.
19 Q. So I asked you about the brigade level command -- the brigade
20 level reports that went up to the corps command and your answer talked
21 about reports that went from the corps command further up to the
22 Main Staff. But just to fill this in, who at the brigade level approved
23 the reports before they went to the corps command?
24 A. 90 per cent or 100 per cent the brigade commander; if the brigade
25 commander was not there, the Chief of Staff; if the Chief of Staff was
1 not there, then the operations officer would sign it.
2 Q. You said that these reports would have to go in written form to
3 the corps command in the evening. What was the dead-line for sending
4 that -- those reports in?
5 A. By 8.00 in the evening they would be sent, by 2000 hours at the
6 latest they would be sent. There were also extraordinary reports if
7 something happened unforeseen, then the extraordinary report would also
8 be sent.
9 Q. And would you do an updated report in the morning?
10 A. No, not in the morning. Only in the evening when the operations
11 officer would write the report, then the commander would update it. If
12 he didn't like something, if something was not done properly, then he
13 would ask to have that corrected. It would be corrected and then he
14 would approve it, send it and -- sign it and send it to the superior
16 Q. Thank you. So you've already given evidence just a few minutes
17 ago that once these reports arrived in the corps operations section,
18 they'd be sent further on to the Main Staff. What was the dead-line, the
19 daily dead-line, for doing that?
20 A. The daily dead-line was in the evening, by 9.00 p.m., that's the
21 time by which the Main Staff had to be informed.
22 Q. And what about the other -- when we're talking about reports sent
23 to the Main Staff, what about the other sections? Did those daily
24 operations reports contain reports from the other sectors we've just
25 talked about, artillery, security, morale, for example?
1 A. Yes, correct. It all had to be there, artillery, firing, enemy
2 fire, our fire, everything that was done that day had to be put in the
4 Q. And there was a -- you've alluded to a link between some of the
5 other sectors and the Main Staff. Did they also -- did those sectors,
6 security, for example, also generate separate reports for the Main Staff?
7 A. Well, since I never did any intelligence work but I was involved
8 in operations and command, I did not really have much to do with the
9 intelligence tasks. I wasn't permitted to do that and I wasn't able to
10 do that, and that wasn't part of my duties either.
11 Q. I just asked you about reporting. Did the other sectors also
12 generate separate reports for the Main Staff?
13 A. No, just one report would be drafted, but the intelligence
14 section had a separate channel. They would compile data regarding the
15 units. They did the security and intelligence for the units and that is
16 why they were treated as a special service, intelligence and security.
17 Q. All right. Let's move on to another area just to clarify some
18 things from your statement. I just want to talk about the
19 Romanija Brigade's command. You said in your statement that it was
20 located in three places, Tilava, the Bob facility --
21 A. 1st Romanija.
22 Q. Thank you. The Bob facility and Miljevici. So until when were
23 you at Miljevici?
24 A. Every brigade command has its command post and it also has a
25 forward command post. Miljevici and Bog were a forward command post
1 where you would have an operations officer or some other duty officers,
2 and then the main command post would be located in the rear. There could
3 also be a number of forward command posts.
4 Q. So Tilava was your main command post; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, in the beginning, but this actually changed several times.
6 Q. Where were you in 1993 -- where was the brigade's command post in
8 A. In 1993 the brigade command post was in Ljubogosta in autumn in a
9 restaurant or cafe. This was in the municipality of Pale.
10 Q. And in 1994 and 1995?
11 A. In 1995 the 1st Brigade command was at the
12 Nisicka Visoraban [phoen] elevation and there was a command post in
13 Jahorina in 1993. The command post switched locations frequently because
14 of security.
15 Q. And depending on the operations; correct?
16 A. I didn't understand the question.
17 Q. That's fine. I'll move on. So back to the corps again. As a
18 member of the corps staff you became familiar with how the corps staff
19 worked, didn't you?
20 A. Yes. I took part in the planning of the work of the corps for
21 certain periods of time and so on and so forth.
22 Q. And those -- that planning work was prepared according to
23 directors' directives and orders from your superior command?
24 A. Exactly. Every army -- I mean, we're soldiers, we draft plans,
25 we make certain predictions, estimates, we make plans, and it's quite
1 another thing whether those plans will be implemented or not. What else
2 could they do other than draft tactical moves or deal with tactics when
3 we're talking about one army against another.
4 Q. How often in a day did the commander, General Milosevic, meet
5 with his corps staff?
6 A. General Milosevic would have a briefing every morning. He would
7 provide certain guide-lines regarding the line of defence of the brigade
8 in order to have an overview of certain jobs in the field, the correction
9 of certain tactical positions and so on. And then in the evening we
10 would report back about what we did and what the staff officers did.
11 Q. And when you had these daily meetings, were the sector assistants
12 also present?
13 A. Yes, they were obliged to attend, the sector assistants, yes.
14 Q. If you needed to get information for these meetings from the
15 subordinate units, how would you do that?
16 A. The intelligence and security organ provided a lot of information
17 about the enemy, and that was their assignment. The operations and
18 training organ cannot work unless they have intelligence information from
19 the intelligence and security organ. They had their scouts, observers,
20 and they reported information so that we could set up the best possible
21 defence in case something was being prepared. If some actions of theirs
22 were being prepared, then we would be able to respond to that since the
23 entire time we were in the defensive and not in the offensive.
24 Q. Was the Chief of Staff always present at these meetings?
25 A. Of course. The Chief of Staff is the one who leads the staff.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat.
2 MS. EDGERTON:
3 Q. I'm afraid you were speaking a little bit too quickly and softly
4 and the interpreter didn't hear your answer after:
5 "Of course. The Chief of Staff is the one who leads the staff."
6 Could you repeat your answer.
7 A. The corps command has the corps commander and his assistants for
8 security, for logistics, for morale, and the Chief of Staff is in charge
9 of the services, the artillery, the engineers, the infantry
10 communications, and so on, and so he is their head. I hope that's clear
12 Q. So Cedo Sladoje was always present at these meetings?
13 A. Cedo Sladoje, yes.
14 Q. And if for some reason General Milosevic wasn't present, who led
15 the meetings, Cedo Sladoje?
16 A. Yes, he was also his deputy at the same time.
17 Q. So would it be true then that the commander and the Chief of
18 Staff would co-ordinate their actions?
19 A. Yes, it's correct. They would meet very often, eyeball to
20 eyeball, and they would discuss certain things in order to make the staff
21 briefings as efficient as possible.
22 Q. And if for some reason both the commander, General Milosevic and
23 Cedo Sladoje, weren't available, who then led the meetings?
24 A. One of the assistants, the assistant -- assistant's corps
25 commander or in some cases the operative because the operative was also
1 the deputy Chief of Staff. The chief operative was also the deputy Chief
2 of Staff.
3 Q. So decisions were made at these meetings; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And orders were issued at these meetings?
6 A. Yes. And that's true for all the armies of this world; right?
7 Q. And notes or minutes were kept of these meetings, weren't they?
8 A. Yes. Minutes were kept at each meeting. Tasks were issued,
9 those were recorded by one of the officers who was in charge of keeping
10 the minutes. It would usually be the chief for morale. And also it was
11 recorded what was implemented and what was not. That's why every word
12 was recorded and this helped when it came to monitoring what was achieved
13 and what was not.
14 Q. So Luka Dragicevic was the one who kept the minutes and notes of
15 these meetings?
16 A. Luka Dragicevic as well as Milan Ugresic because he kept very
17 good minutes. But the commander would appoint the person. If somebody
18 had a bad handwriting, they would obviously not be in charge of keeping
19 the minutes.
20 Q. And the operations section, your section, sometimes took
21 minutes -- the minutes of those meetings; correct?
22 A. Well, yes. He recorded everything that the commander said in
23 order to undertake operative and defensive measures in the unit. If some
24 other more common things were discussed, such as supplies or assignments,
25 then he would not record that -- those.
1 Q. Thank you. So how often -- or maybe you can confirm this: The
2 corps commander would also meet his brigade commanders as a group,
3 wouldn't he?
4 A. Yes. Very often the corps commander had briefings with the
5 brigade commanders, but that was not that often. It was once a week or
6 once in a fortnight.
7 Q. As a brigade operations officers and as corps operations officer,
8 you would have attended those briefings on both ends, wouldn't you have?
9 A. Yes, I attended and I also kept minutes. I recorded what the
10 brigade commander said, what tasks they were given. I kept those minutes
11 and I also monitored the implementation of those tasks.
12 Q. And you would have done that at both the brigade and corps level,
13 wouldn't you have?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Those meetings would also have included the regiment commanders;
17 A. Yes, independent regiments. There was a mixed artillery
18 regiment, there was a mixed anti-tank regiment, the PVO regiment, the
19 commander of the military police, the staff units at the corps, the chief
20 of engineers, the engineering battalion, they were at the level of the
21 brigade commanders. Those were the so-called independent units that
22 belonged to the corps.
23 Q. What about these brigades that you've referred to in your
24 statement, the Trebevic Battalion, the Jahorina Battalion,
25 Podgrab Battalion, those were also independent -- so-called independent
1 units that belonged to the corps, aren't they?
2 A. No, no, they belonged to the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade and
3 later, after the reorganisation, they were given to the
4 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade. That's who they were assigned to.
5 They were never independent. They were always elements of a brigade.
6 Q. Thank you. Now talking about the brigades, I saw that you
7 mentioned in your statement that the zone of responsibility of the
8 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade was Zlatiste on the right and Djukica Potok
9 on the left, and as far back as Tilava, and Tvrdemici, but this Chamber
10 has already heard evidence that Zlatiste, for example, was in the area of
11 responsibility of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade. Did they assume
12 responsibility for that area after it was held by your brigade?
13 A. Yes. They took the responsibility over from us. At first it was
14 our zone, Zlatiste on the right, Djukica Potok on the left, and Tilava
15 in-depth. But a zone of responsibility is in-depth and in width. And
16 then when we were joined by the three battalions, namely,
17 Paljevine [phoen], Jahorina, Podgrab, and Kresani. Then we -- i.e.,
18 General Lizdek assigned two battalions from Grbavica to the 1st Sarajevo
19 Brigade, and then our zone of responsibility was from Trebinac to -- or
20 Bistica [phoen] brook Vidikovac and to Radovan. In-depth, the villages
21 of Rakulic [phoen] and Mokra and Romanija. The zone changed depending on
22 the composition of the brigade. Sometimes things overlapped and that's
23 why you are puzzled about the fact that at one point our zone of
24 responsibility belonged to the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade. It did
25 happen over time. The composition of the brigade would change and the
1 zone would change slightly.
2 Q. Who commanded the Novo Sarajevo Brigade of the
3 Territorial Defence that you referred to in your statement?
4 A. The Novo Sarajevo brigade was under the command of a person who
5 is no longer amongst the living. His name was Obradovic. He was killed
6 during the war. Pod [phoen] Obradovic was his name. That was the
7 Territorial Defence of the Serbian army, i.e., the Serbian guards. When
8 the Republika Srpska army arrived, it was ordered that those brigades
9 should join our brigade as battalions.
10 Q. And who was Radomir Kojic?
11 A. Radomir Kojic was a policeman at the beginning of the war. And
12 then on the 31st of October or thereabouts in 1992 when commander -- the
13 commander of the Trebevic Battalion Milorad Lolovic was killed, he was
14 appointed as the commander of the Trebevic Battalion which was an element
15 of the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade.
16 Q. And did it remain in the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade?
17 A. It remained in the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade up to the
18 7th August 1995. And for only two months they belonged to the
19 1st Sarajevo Brigade. And then the 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade
20 was set up, and then that changed because the 1st Romanija Brigade went
21 to Nisici and there was a sort of an interregnum before the new
22 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade was set up. In any military there
23 are very frequently changes, very frequent manoeuvres, hence all the
24 subsequent changes.
25 Q. So -- maybe so we can get this straight in my mind I can have you
1 look at a map.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have 65 ter number 09390G, please. Can
3 we blow that up a bit. Thank you.
4 Q. Now, I wonder if -- because I'd like to see this in -- more
5 visually laid out, I wonder if you can mark on this map the area of
6 responsibility of the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade after it absorbed
7 these independent units, and I accept that we might have lost a bit of
8 territory on the east side of Sarajevo. Can you mark that? Can you
9 indicate that?
10 A. I'm really sorry that we're in the courtroom and we're discussing
11 military issues without the original maps of the 1st Corps of the Army of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. A map is one of
13 the most important elements of the military because the map reflects
14 everything that we did. You would see the deployment of both forces.
15 When the Milosevic trial was on we saw the map of the 1st Corps map by
16 General Karavelic, we also saw our map, and we could not lie about any of
17 the zones of responsibility. We knew exactly where the units were and
18 this is a very small scale and I cannot observe, I cannot notice
19 everything. It's not visible to -- the red line here, usually it is done
20 on a map who -- which -- with a scale of 1:50.000. I can't see Grbavica
21 here at all.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Can we make it a little bit smaller for
23 Mr. Veljovic. And you had previously magnified it one time which looked
24 pretty good.
25 Q. Does that help you, Mr. Veljovic, or would you like it one
2 A. Yes, but I can't see anything in the south-east. You can't see
3 anything from the Miljacka river. There are no lines there. I can see
4 Trebevic. I understand the map because a map represents everything that
5 is on the ground, forests, meadows. I am sorry that there's no expert in
6 the courtroom who could correct me if I misspeak. When it comes to the
7 1st Romanija Brigade, this is Grbavica to Djukica Potok and across
8 Trebevic and below the road that leads through the forested part of
9 Trebevic all the way up to Mrkovici here. However, I cannot see Mrkovici
10 here at all.
11 Q. Mr. Veljovic, would you like us to make it -- to magnify it once
12 more for you? That's no problem. Because, Mr. Veljovic, you were there,
13 so you would be in the ideal position to indicate your brigade's zone of
15 A. Yes, but -- but I can't see anything here on this map. This map
16 is not the original map that was drafted by the corps. Throughout the
17 other trial we had it in the courtroom -- during the Milosevic and
18 Galic's trials you could see both sides, our side and the enemy's side.
19 You could see the deployment of all the units at every observation point,
20 the artillery positions, anti-aircraft positions. And when you can see
21 that, you know that we cannot lie because that map contained everything.
22 Because whatever the Muslims drew up on their side we copied on our side.
23 I'm sorry that you can't show me that map -- those maps, not this one.
24 Q. What's your concern with marking this map? You said just now
25 that we cannot lie with a pre-marked map, referring to one you had seen
1 in your previous trial. What's --
2 A. I can't see well.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Magnify it, please, one more time and then we'll
4 see what can happen.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't see the Zeljo pitch,
6 Grbavica, the Jewish cemetery, I can't see all that on this map. I can't
7 even see Trebevic. I don't know where Trebevic is.
8 MS. EDGERTON: One more time, please.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The scale is too small. It's
10 impossible for any operative to use a map of this kind, to work with a
11 map of this kind. Now I might be able to draw something perhaps.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be provided
13 with a pen.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now this has to be moved, you have
15 to move the map because -- move it to the left, to the left.
16 MS. EDGERTON: We'll have to have him --
17 Q. We'll have to have you initial and date this, please,
18 Mr. Veljovic, before we move it to the --
19 JUDGE KWON: We'll ask him to draw again. We move the map --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is not the zone of
21 responsibility, not all of it.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes --
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Move to the left, move the map to
24 the left.
25 JUDGE KWON: We will lose your marking already, but why don't we
1 do that. We can lose this.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Fine, Your Honour. Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Or we can delete it. Whatever.
4 MS. EDGERTON: So at this magnification if we could just move the
5 map to the left so the witness can see the east side of the city, and
6 further east, please. Further east, please.
7 JUDGE KWON: Would you wait until assisted by our usher, please.
8 Is this map okay, Mr. Veljovic?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] More to the left. More to the
10 left. More to the left. More to the left. More and more to the left.
11 There you go. That's it.
12 MS. EDGERTON: If he can be helped with his pen now. I think
13 Mr. Veljovic can sketch out the area of responsibility of the
14 1st Romanija Brigade after they had absorbed these battalions he referred
15 to in his statement.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But the previous line has been
17 erased so I don't know. Again you have to move the map so that I can
18 find Radava which is at the top part of the map. Move the map closer to
20 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, this clearly doesn't suit the
21 witness and I think we'll move on and perhaps over the break we can get
22 him a hard copy so he can have a look at this. I don't want to spend any
23 more time in court on this.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that's the way to go. Give
25 me a copy on paper and I will draw anything you want me to draw.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. But I was wondering whether we could not
2 use the map prepared by the SRK, which we saw earlier on.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Um --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's the way, the -- yes, that's
6 the map. That's the map I need and want. Yes.
7 MS. EDGERTON: I'll look into it and let Your Honours know after
8 the next break if that's all right.
9 JUDGE KWON: How much longer would you need to conclude your
10 cross-examination, Ms. Edgerton, after the break?
11 MS. EDGERTON: The next session after that, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: Shall we take a break now?
13 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, since we do have another
14 witness here today and we're not scheduled to be in session again until
15 next Tuesday, could the Chamber look into potentially extending the
16 sitting for today's session so that we could complete that witness?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe shorter [In English] Or not
18 to start. A little longer so to release the witness.
19 JUDGE KWON: Just speaking for myself, I wondered why you would
20 need all that hours to examine such a thing with this witness, but how
21 much would you expect for the next witness, Mr. Tieger? Is it you that
22 would cross-examine the next witness?
23 MS. EDGERTON: It's also me, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 MS. EDGERTON: And I actually think we would be able to be done
1 with both of them today.
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
3 MS. EDGERTON: I mean -- I'm speaking somewhat optimistically,
4 but I would make all efforts to be done with both of them today.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 So there's one matter I would like to deal with in private
7 session in the absence of the witness.
8 So, Mr. Veljovic, we'll take a break for half an hour, so you may
9 be excused now.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 JUDGE KWON: Could the Chamber move into private session.
12 [Private session]
15 [Open session]
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The Chamber will take a break for half an
18 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 Q. Mr. Veljovic, just one question on the subject of reports that I
23 actually omitted to sort of finish off with. These reports that you said
24 at the corps were prepared to go to the Main Staff, who drafted those?
25 Was it the operations section?
1 A. Yes, it was the operations section that on the whole drafted
2 those reports in 99 per cent of the cases. The corps commander would
3 then send them, having read it, and then they would be sent to the
4 superior command for encoding.
5 Q. Thank you. Now to go on to another subject that you added to
6 your statement and you -- in the version that you signed, you added a
7 paragraph about Faletici saying that in April 1992 members of the
8 Patriotic League and Green Berets started driving weapons from Faletici
9 away. Where did you get that information?
10 A. Well, that's because the 216th Brigade was part of the JNA at the
11 time. We received an order to protect that warehouse so that it didn't
12 fall into the hands of the Green Berets; in other words, to prevent them
13 from seizing the weapons. The 216th Brigade was part of the JNA at the
14 time and we received the -- an order to protect the warehouse, to ensure
15 that weapons of the Territorial Defence for the town of Sarajevo were not
16 seized because there were a lot of rifles and other materiel and
17 technical and military equipment in that warehouse.
18 Q. So you were there; is that what you're saying?
19 A. Yes, the 216th Brigade was at the site, and on that occasion we
20 clashed with the Patriotic League and the Green Berets.
21 Q. Do you know who Milovan Bjelica is?
22 A. I know who Milovan Bjelica is. He's from Sokolac. He's also a
23 relative of mine because his father and my mother -- brother and sister.
24 Q. And do you know who Jovan Bartula is?
25 A. Yes, Jovan Bartula, at the beginning of the war he was in the
1 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps where he had the duty of a commander of a mixed
2 anti-armoured regiment.
3 Q. So I'd like to go to 65 ter number 12028. It's a copy of an
4 interview that Milovan Bjelica gave to Srpsko Oslobodjenje on 27 December
5 1994. And I think that the far right-hand column on this first page
6 is -- I'll just -- your indulgence for a moment. The far right-hand
7 column towards the bottom is the one that should be enlarged for
8 Mr. Veljovic.
9 Mr. Veljovic, Milovan Bjelica in this interview says that he was
10 also there and said that in answer to the question:
11 "How did you arm the people?"
12 Milovan Bjelica said:
13 "And our greatest success was taking the weapons -- the equipment
14 and weapons from Faletici" --
15 JUDGE KWON: English page.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Pardon me, Your Honours. English page 3. My
18 Q. He's then asked the question:
19 "You did it right in front of the enemy, under sniper rifle?"
20 And he answers:
21 "We stole it from their hands. We agreed with the then-minister
22 of defence and with a man from security of the then-Sarajevo Corps."
23 It was:
24 "Gagovic was there as well. We did it by night in April 1992.
25 We entered with hundred trucks on the first night. There was a group of
1 young men, activists of SDS which I was leading, and also a group from
2 Pale from the party led by Radomir Kojic, then unit of current Colonel
3 Jovan Bartula, then Ilija Maletic with his people from Stari Grad. This
4 depot contained all weapons of the Territorial Defence of the former
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. We raided in there the first night and as soon
6 as we entered the depot, the Green Berets and special forces of
7 Dragan Bikic started surrounding the barracks."
8 And further he says:
9 "We repelled the attack and started pulling out the weapons. The
10 first night, we took whole artillery and weapons. There was about 300
11 artillery tubes from 35- to 50.000 rifles as well as other equipment."
12 And further he says:
13 "We were helped by the unit of Colonel Dragoljub Milosevic, i.e.,
14 the 1st Romanija Brigade ... and we brought all weapons and equipment to
15 the territory of Romanija in three days."
16 So, Mr. Veljovic, it seems that Mr. Bjelica your relative was
17 also there and contradicts your assertion about events in Faletici.
18 A. I didn't see Mr. Bjelica. He was there daily or a day later.
19 When the 216th Brigade arrived there, I did not see Milovan Bjelica or
20 Radomir Kojic on that day. We had between 600 and 700 soldiers. We
21 helped to protect the warehouse. We got some of the weapons out and
22 placed them in Mokro, in the barracks. And I don't know where some of
23 the other weapons went towards Sokolac I think. These were the weapons
24 of the Territorial Defence staff, not of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but of
25 the town of Sarajevo. As for this report, or rather, article, it's the
1 first time I've seen it.
2 Q. I take it from your answer you don't dispute what Mr. Bjelica
3 says happened?
4 A. Not a hundred per cent. But it's true that we got a lot of the
5 weapons out of the Faletici warehouse and, as I said, we placed them in
6 the barracks in Mokro in some warehouses in Sokolac because they attacked
7 the warehouse first and then we protected it. The Green Berets and the
8 Patriotic League also took quite a few weapons from the warehouse in
9 Faletici. Everyone was trying to grab these weapons.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have this as a Prosecution exhibit,
12 please, Your Honours.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. This is the statement
14 of a third party and she'll have another opportunity to tender this
15 during later Defence witnesses, particularly KW-38.
16 JUDGE KWON: The witness confirmed to a certain extent that they
17 took a lot of the weapons out of that Faletici warehouse. Do we need to
18 admit it separately, Ms. Edgerton?
19 MS. EDGERTON: No. Thank you, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: Then let's move on.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 Q. Now, just a couple of questions about Dragomir Milosevic. You've
23 said that you knew him quite well, and in your Dragomir Milosevic
24 testimony you said you toured the combat lines with him; correct?
25 A. That's correct. I visited the lines with him. I was an
1 operations training officer.
2 Q. And, in fact, he was regularly on the front lines. You told the
3 Chambers in the Dragomir Milosevic case that he went to every trench
4 along the front line, not once but several times.
5 A. He was a field man and he was continually paying visits to the
7 Q. And when you came here to testify in his defence, you knew what
8 he was charged with at that time?
9 A. Yes, I knew what he had been charged with.
10 Q. So you knew that just like Dr. Karadzic he was charged with a
11 120-millimetre mortar shelling in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995 that killed
12 43 and injured 75; correct?
13 A. On the 28th of August, 1995, Milosevic wasn't in command of the
14 corps. He had been wounded and he was at the military medical academy.
15 And Cedo Sladomir [as interpreted],
16 Colonel Cedo Sladomir [as interpreted] was replacing him, so Milosevic
17 wasn't present when Markale was shelled. In the judgement you can see
18 that he was liberated. Karavelic, the commander of the 1st Corps, also
19 confirmed this in his order of the 26th. He confirmed that the citizens
20 and troops should be protected because Cedo Sladoje would be shelling the
21 town of Sarajevo.
22 But they allowed for the market, but I don't think that a shell
23 can fall on Markale because 120- and 82-millimetre mortar, well, these
24 are weapons that I know very well. And in order to hit such a
25 location -- well that is simply impossible. I'd stake my life on that
1 and I would go as far as standing at that site and being shelled there.
2 We didn't have any mortars on Trebevic in 1995 because it's covered by
3 forest. There aren't very suitable positions for firing positions. All
4 the mortars were withdrawn because there was an order from Cedo Sladoje,
5 according to which some of the SRK forces should be sent to Trebinje.
6 And my unit in the event of an attack would be supported by --
7 Q. Mr. Veljovic --
8 A. -- a corps -- by the corps artillery --
9 Q. Mr. Veljovic, Mr. Veljovic, I asked you a simple question. You
10 knew that Dragomir Milosevic was charged with exactly the same incident
11 that Dr. Karadzic is here today; correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And when you came to testify in General Milosevic's Defence, your
14 testimony was specifically related to that incident; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You offered up an alibi for him?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And in fact in your testimony at those previous -- that previous
19 trial, you actually never denied that the shell had fallen on the
20 market-place on 28 August 1992 [sic], but you're doing it today?
21 A. Well, I heard about that, since it was conveyed through the
22 media. We asked for expert reports and we wanted to visit the site
23 because at the time the army wasn't active. Only one shell was fired
24 then. It seems it hit Markale, the market, and caused a massacre. And I
25 said --
1 Q. Mr. Veljovic --
2 A. -- said that General Milovanovic --
3 Q. Mr. Veljovic, when you testified before the Trial Chamber in the
4 Dragomir Milosevic case, you didn't deny that the incident had happened,
5 but today you are. Which testimony are we supposed to rely on?
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
7 Ms. Edgerton, could you clarify your statement that he didn't
8 deny that the incident had happened. Do you mean that he admitted that
9 it was fired by the Serb Sarajevo-Romanija Corps members?
10 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, his testimony was specifically
11 focused on General Dragomir Milosevic's absence from the theatre at that
12 time, and --
13 JUDGE KWON: I'm asking you whether by saying that he didn't deny
14 the incident, that he -- did he admit that it was done by Serbs?
15 MS. EDGERTON: He made no specific admission one way or another,
16 Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: So could then -- could you reformulate your
19 Yes, Mr. Robinson, before I ask -- I give the floor back to
20 Ms. Edgerton, did you have anything to say?
21 MR. ROBINSON: I did, but you took the words out of my mouth so
22 it's not necessary for me to say anything anymore.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Yes -- pardon me. Your indulgence for just a
1 second, Your Honours.
2 Q. In your testimony here at this Tribunal in the Dragomir Milosevic
3 case, you didn't mention the evidence you've now offered in your signed
4 statement to the effect that you had 120-millimetre mortar battery on
5 your command operating on the slopes of Trebevic and it was sent by you
6 to Trebinje.
7 A. Well, we sent the battery to Trebinje before the 28th, around the
8 23rd, and they returned sometime in mid-September. We believed in our
9 opinion we hadn't fired that shell. It had been planted and activated by
10 a remote control. That was our opinion. Our opinion was that the Muslim
11 forces had done this for propaganda purposes in order to ensure that we
12 were bombed. In the Milosevic case I did not say anything about Markale
13 as far as I know, as far as I can remember.
14 Q. Mr. Veljovic, you're clearly familiar with the incident. It's
15 one of the --
16 A. Yes, yes. I'm familiar with it but I wasn't questioned about it.
17 Q. But --
18 A. In the Milosevic case, when I testified in that case.
19 Q. Um --
20 A. Because I wasn't in the corps then. I was in the 4th Brigade and
21 I wasn't asked about Markale.
22 Q. Your testimony -- let me try again. This incident is one of the
23 single-most controversial events in the history of the conflict around
24 Sarajevo, and in the Dragomir Milosevic case you were testifying at what
25 might have been the last opportunity to provide that evidence. And
1 you're saying now it didn't even occur to you to bring it up?
2 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I object to -- excuse
3 me, Mr. Veljovic. Hold on one second, please. One second.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. President, that's a question to which
6 the answer would have absolutely no probative value. He's not in control
7 of what he can give -- what is the subjects of his testimony. And if the
8 lawyers for General Milosevic or the Prosecutor chose not to ask him
9 about that, there's nothing that reflects on his credibility from that.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the witness said, Ms. Edgerton, that he was not
11 asked about that. Could you start from the actual transcript or
12 reformulate your question, Ms. Edgerton.
13 MS. EDGERTON:
14 Q. In the transcript in your Dragomir Milosevic testimony you talked
15 specifically about your command of the 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry
16 Brigade. You said it was established on the 7th of August. You
17 explained how you incorporated the Trebevic Battalion and other brigades.
18 You said I didn't have enough support artillery and I had to rely on the
19 corps artillery. Do you remember that?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be provided with a
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do remember that. Since the
23 4th Brigade was established late there were only firing groups and we
24 didn't have the possibility of forming a brigade artillery group. And
25 therefore, I had to rely on the corps artillery group that was to the
1 east, on the opposite side from Trebevic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 11 --
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please wait when interpreters are
4 continuing to interpret. Do not overlap, please.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought they had finished because
7 the transcript had come to an end. Line 17, the witness said that there
8 were only battalion firing groups in existence, and "battalion" is
9 missing. It hasn't been entered in the transcript.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Your indulgence for a moment.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I asked for a reference for the
13 Milosevic testimony that Ms. Edgerton was referring to.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Transcript page 5834, 5835.
15 Q. You had the opportunity in these proceedings to talk about that
16 mortar battery, and you -- are you asserting now the only reason why you
17 chose not to raise it is because you weren't asked?
18 MR. ROBINSON: Well, excuse me, Mr. President, that's an unfair
19 question to the witness. He doesn't have the opportunity to raise
20 issues. He can only answer what he's asked. That's -- really, she's
21 making a point that this is omitted from the Milosevic testimony and
22 that's as far as she can go with it.
23 JUDGE KWON: I think that's fair enough.
24 MS. EDGERTON: It is. And perhaps we could have, in light of
25 everything, 65 ter number 23851 shown to the witness. It's a report on
1 the availability of ammunition and fuel for combat vehicles, and it's
2 dated 31 August 1992. And -- pardon me, 1995. And if you go over to the
3 second page of the document you see that it's signed by the witness.
4 Q. So, Mr. Veljovic, this document lists a number of weapons and
5 vehicles available to your unit, a T-55 tank, some self-propelled guns,
6 and a number of mortars, including 120-millimetre mortars. It seems that
7 this document dated 31 August 1995 puts in doubt your assertion that your
8 brigade's mortar battery was out of the Sarajevo theatre.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Could you go back to the first page so that he
10 could see the first page of the document.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there's nothing surprising
12 about this. I signed this. This is what I brigade had at its disposal
13 at the time, although they were in Trebinje battle-field I counted them
14 as our men [as interpreted]. That's why I made a list of the equipment
15 that we had in order to be able to issue that equipment to the brigade.
16 MS. EDGERTON:
17 Q. So the note at item number 11 that you had 13, 120-millimetre
18 mortar --
19 A. Well, I had the Jahorina Battalion, the Podgrab Battalion, but I
20 listed all this -- I listed all this here, all the equipment that
21 belonged to a number of battalions was listed here.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I comment on the transcript?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the 4th Sarajevo Light
24 Brigade, all their weapons: The Trebevici Battalion is one segment, the
25 Podgrabski Battalion is another segment, the Jahorina Battalion is
1 another segment, then you have the units attached to HQ. That's why I
2 made a list of all the materiel and equipment in order to be sure that I
3 knew what we had. From the 31st of August I started making a list and on
4 the 7th it was necessary for the brigade to be ready for combat, 31st of
6 MS. EDGERTON:
7 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to another topic --
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 8 it says "as our men"
10 [In English] "As our own." [Interpretation] I signed, or rather, I made
11 a list of these weapons which were ours.
12 JUDGE KWON: I see that.
13 Let's continue, Ms. Edgerton.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
15 Q. Another area that you spoke about in your Dragomir Milosevic
16 testimony but also haven't mentioned here was related to the subject of
17 modified air bombs. Do you remember that?
18 A. I do.
19 Q. So maybe I could put some propositions to you about modified air
20 bombs. From your Dragomir Milosevic testimony you were quite familiar
21 with them; correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And is it true with respect to modified air bombs that you often
24 heard the commander saying they shouldn't be used because of your safety
25 and because they weren't technically perfected?
1 A. Well, yes. The air bombs with launchers were devised by
2 craftsmen. They were not approved, they were not precise, and the
3 elevation was determined based on the equipment on the lorry and the fuel
4 that fuelled the air bombs. And that's -- they could be off target by as
5 much as 2 kilometres. That's why we were not supposed to use them in
6 urban areas. We were allowed to use them only in wider areas where the
7 two armies were in contact but there were no civilians, not in urban
8 areas because there was a risk that we might actually hit our own men or
10 Q. And it's true, isn't it, that air bombs are actually highly
12 A. Yes, from 250 to 500 kilogrammes or even up to 1.000 kilogrammes
13 intending to be launched from aircraft; however, that civil war forced
14 people to devise those launchers. But we were supposed to use those air
15 bombs only in wilderness where there were no human settlements, where
16 there was no habitation, and all they created was panic among the troops.
17 Q. And that's because, as you described them, they were completely
18 inaccurate; correct?
19 A. Completely inaccurate. They were not tested. Even some crews
20 were killed and the commanders were taken to court because it did happen
21 that those bombs actually exploded there and then when they were
22 activated. Only some of the brigades had them, not all of them. Only a
23 few brigades on the strength of the corps had those air bombs, not all of
25 Q. Where were the commanders taken to court?
1 A. I know that something happened in Vogosca and some squad
2 commanders whose crews were killed were handed over to courts. I don't
3 know what happened next. I don't know how many were found guilty. I
4 haven't a clue. But I know that some crews were killed because of those
5 air bombs that were activated on the spot because those air bombs were
6 not technically perfected.
7 Q. And it's true that their deployment and use was directed by the
8 corps commander; isn't that right?
9 A. That's right. It would be either the corps commander or brigade
10 commanders, but all that excluded urban settlements. They could be used
11 only in wilderness, as it were, where there were no urban settlements.
12 Q. The corps commander or the brigade commander would decide on
13 these air bombs with the approval of the Main Staff; isn't that the case?
14 A. I really don't know whether it would be on the approval of the
15 Main Staff but that should have been the case because the Main Staff
16 signed the order for them to be removed from Vogosca and they were
17 responsible for air bombs because some sort of a protection was added
18 onto them after they were delivered from the factory or something of the
20 Q. And, in fact, there was a group within the corps staff who was
21 specifically responsible for monitoring the use and information -- pardon
22 me, implementation of the air bombs; isn't that the case?
23 A. Well, most probably those were chiefs of artillery, but I am not
24 aware of the existence of such a group.
25 Q. Now, you've said that you didn't use these bombs on urban areas,
1 but I want you to have a look at P1297. It's a document you actually saw
2 during your previous testimony in the Dragomir Milosevic case. Pardon
3 me, I misspoke, P1782. It's a report from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
4 command to the VRS Main Staff dated 7 April 1995. And on page 2 in both
5 versions under the heading "Our Forces" you see the notation that:
6 "In Ilidza one 120-millimetre mine was fired and one 250
7 kilogramme air bomb was launched in the centre of Hrasnica."
8 This document appears to -- this document suggests that something
9 else happened other than what you've said, Mr. Veljovic.
10 A. It is correct that I testified in the Milosevic case and that
11 this order was shown to me. However, imagine an aerial bomb weighing 250
12 kilos with such a destructive power. Its detonation can be heard 60
13 kilometres away. Hrasnica is close to the airport and UNPROFOR sources
14 would have recorded an event like that and most probably would -- they
15 would have informed the Main Staff in Zagreb. And since they did not
16 register that -- I saw this order in the Milosevic case and I saw the
17 records from one date to another date, and they never mentioned anything
18 of that kind happening in the territory of the city of Sarajevo, UNPROFOR
19 never did.
20 Q. Are you then saying that this didn't happen?
21 A. It didn't happen. I saw UNPROFOR reports which were shown to me
22 at the Milosevic case. They sent a report for a certain date. They said
23 everything was calm in Sarajevo. Hrasnica is 50 -- 500 metres away from
24 the airport, and you have to know that the detonation of such a bomb
25 could not have been not heard, and they would have heard it, they would
1 have informed somebody about it. They never did. This never happened.
2 Q. Well, I'd actually like to show you who did get informed about
4 MS. EDGERTON: Could we see 65 ter number 16453.
5 JUDGE KWON: But in that sentence, Mr. Veljovic, it refers to a
6 Luna rocket. Do you understand what it is about?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it is the Muslims who
8 mentioned that. The Muslim forces mentioned that it was a Luna rocket
9 which weighs 200 kilogrammes. Actually, it contains 200 kilogrammes of
10 explosive, but we didn't have that either.
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's a rocket 6 metres long. The
13 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps did not have such rockets at their disposal. I
14 remember everything that I testified to in that case and what I'm saying
15 now is correct.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 Please move on, Ms. Edgerton.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, thank you. If we could go back to that
19 65 ter number 16453.
20 Q. Mr. Veljovic, I'd like to show you who did get informed about
21 this. This is a report from the Main Staff of the VRS to the president
22 dated 7 April 1994 [sic]. And if we could go over to paragraph 3(B) in
23 both documents, please. I think you just need to go -- thank you. And
24 in --
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Did you say "1994"? It should be
1 1995, the same date.
2 MS. EDGERTON: It should be indeed. Thank you. My apologies.
3 Over to page 5 in the English version of the document.
4 Q. Now, this document talks about the situation in the
5 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and it says under heading 3(B):
6 "Situation in the Corps:
7 "The enemy activity was adequately responded to whereby an air
8 bomb (250 kg) was launched on the centre of Hrasnica."
9 And then says:
10 "The units have been engaged on additional engineering work on
11 the positions, monitoring of activities being undertaken by the enemy,
12 and prevention of surprises."
13 So this document says not only that Dr. Karadzic was informed and
14 contradicts your assertion that it didn't happen.
15 A. I don't know what the Main Staff told the Supreme Command. I
16 didn't know anything about that and that's why referred to the UNPROFOR
17 report covering the four-day period which was relevant and coincided with
18 this event, and for that period they stated that the situation in
19 Sarajevo was calm.
20 Q. But you've given evidence in the Dragomir Milosevic case that as
21 a brigade operations officer you were completely aware of what was
22 happening in the area of your brigade and as a corps operations officer
23 you knew almost everything going on in your brigade. You've also given
24 evidence today that the operations sector was involved in drafting these
25 reports that went up to the VRS Main Staff and to the president. So what
1 should we rely on, Mr. Veljovic?
2 A. I did not draft this report. I didn't know anything about an
3 aerial bomb being launched. Only UNPROFOR could know about that and they
4 were close by. If they confirmed that that was the case, then that was
5 the case. However, the UNPROFOR did not say anything, that's why I
6 didn't suffer any consequences when I testified in the Milosevic case.
7 Q. So in contrast to what you said in the Milosevic case and what
8 you've said today, that this bomb wasn't launched, you're now saying you
9 didn't know anything about it; is that correct?
10 A. I don't know anything about that. That's why I'm saying I told
11 you that a detonation would have been heard at a distance of 60
12 kilometres. The airport was closed. The UNPROFOR soldiers were there.
13 They would have heard it; however, they didn't hear anything. They said
14 everything was calm, hence my statement. And I believe that you will
15 find it on the Internet what I testified to in the Milosevic case, and
16 I'm telling you why I testified the way I did.
17 Q. Just one more thing then before we leave that point. I'll just
18 remind you, Mr. Veljovic, of what you said in the Milosevic case.
19 MS. EDGERTON: And the reference for the record is 5936.
20 Q. In answer to a question from Judge Mindua you specifically said:
21 "This aerial bomb was not launched, that's for sure."
22 You no longer stand by what you said in the Milosevic case, do
24 A. I still stand by that, because I relied on the UNPROFOR report.
25 I didn't know about that and I thought that the UNPROFOR recorded
1 everything. If the UNPROFOR had recorded that I would have agreed.
2 Since the UNPROFOR never recorded such a launch, based on that I stated
3 that the launch never took place.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Veljovic, I find it very difficult to follow
5 what you are saying. I don't think you drafted any of the UNPROFOR
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. We saw the documents from
8 UNPROFOR because I didn't remember that. Maybe I wasn't there on that
9 day. Maybe I was absent. I'm telling you that the explosion didn't
10 happen. If it had had -- if it had happened then they would have sent a
11 report to their own staff, and then I would know that it did occur.
12 However, I couldn't confirm because I did not know about it, I did not
13 hear it, I was not informed about it.
14 JUDGE KWON: It's a separate thing to say that it -- the aerial
15 bomb was not launched at all from saying that you don't know. But even
16 after having looked at the Sarajevo Corps document as well as the
17 Main Staff document, which are saying to the effect that aerial bomb was
18 launched, you are still saying that that bomb was not launched, which
19 means that these two reports are -- were lying at the time.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether they're there
21 or not, but maybe. That moment I was not there so I was in no position
22 to know that that bomb was launched. That's why I referred to the
23 UNPROFOR report because they were close, and if the UNPROFOR had
24 confirmed the launch then yes, it happened. However, if they didn't
25 confirm the launch, then it didn't happen. I don't know who signed this
1 on behalf of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. I don't know who signed it on
2 behalf of the Main Staff and who then sent it to President Karadzic. I
3 don't know who signed this on behalf of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. I
4 don't know.
5 JUDGE KWON: So to be sure, it is your submission that if the
6 UNPROFOR report does not confirm the content of this document, this is
7 not true?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because maybe that day I was
9 in Rogatica and that's why I did not know about that bomb. Maybe I was
10 at home on furlough, and that's why I wanted to see the UNPROFOR report.
11 I relied on the UNPROFOR report. If the UNPROFOR report confirmed that
12 there was a launch, then yes; but they said it was calm so there was no
13 launch. I wanted to see the UNPROFOR report, it was shown to me on the
14 screen, and it stated that Sarajevo and Zepa were calm during that
15 particular period on those days, the document was shown to me on the
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, back to you, Ms. Edgerton.
18 THE ACCUSED: Transcript, please. Line 5 witness said "I asked
19 to see" not "I wanted to see." I asked to see. [Interpretation] "I
20 asked to see."
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes Ms. Edgerton.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Could I have that 65 ter number, I
23 think it was 16453, tendered as a Prosecution exhibit, please,
24 Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 Mr. Robinson, no objections?
2 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted as next Prosecution
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P5943, Your Honours.
6 MS. EDGERTON: And before it slips my mind completely,
7 65 ter number 23851, please.
8 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P5944 , Your Honours.
11 MS. EDGERTON: And I think before we break one last area.
12 Q. Mr. Veljovic, you said in your statement that with respect to
13 Bascarsija, paragraph I think it was 27, that you could have destroyed
14 that part of the city with artillery but we never even tried to do that
15 although we knew they were military targets and you received strict
16 orders that that part of the city was never to be shelled under any
18 Now, that was in the context of a discussion or you dealt with
19 this matter in your Dragomir Milosevic testimony as well in the context
20 of a discussion related to a document exhibited in that case. And I note
21 that when you were pressed on the issue you said:
22 "I claim," at T5932, "with full responsibility and I am prepared
23 to face the consequences if it proves to be true that Bascarsija was not
25 And let me just check the cite for a second, Your Honours. I
1 need to make sure that I've referred to this properly.
2 JUDGE KWON: Can you upload that part so we can see that part as
4 MS. EDGERTON: The 65 ter number for that transcript is 1D26977,
5 I think.
6 Q. And, yes, just to remind you about the context. On the subject
7 of shelling Bascarsija you were played a transcript of an intercepted
8 conversation dated 28 May 1992 between General Ratko Mladic and one
9 Mirko Vukasinovic and asked the question --
10 A. Vukasinovic.
11 Q. -- and asked the question by my former colleague Mr. Waespi:
12 "Mr. Veljovic, General Ratko Mladic, he was interested in the
13 barracks, he was interested in firing at Bascarsija; right?"
14 And your answer was:
15 "You can hear that they should fire at Bascarsija but that did
16 not happen. I claim with full responsibility and I'm prepared to face
17 the consequences if it proves to be true that Bascarsija was targeted."
18 Is it your assertion then that Bascarsija was never targeted by
19 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps forces?
20 A. I claim this with full responsibility. The Sarajevo-Romanija
21 Corps never did that. There are even orders issued by General Milosevic
22 that Bascarsija should not be targeted. Bascarsija is the biggest
23 culture and historical monument that the city of Sarajevo has. It was
24 built in Turkish times, and if only one 120-millimetre projectile had
25 fallen on that, everything would have burnt because there are no hard
1 materials there. That's why I claim with full responsibility and I
2 invite experts to go there, and if they find that it is not the same as
3 it was in the 1980s, then you can punish me. You can do an expert report
4 on the paints, on the wood, everything the same. Sometimes people become
5 euphoric and they issue certain orders, but there is the staff that
6 alters those orders. So I can claim - and I do with full
7 responsibility - that not a single projectile was ever fired on
9 Q. Now, you've given evidence here today that you know something
10 about mortars, so you must know that mortars are anti-personnel weapons;
12 A. Yes, if I'm an officer there are certain things that I must know.
13 Q. So let's have a look at P823. It's a report dated
14 3 November 1993. And there should be a translation into B/C/S available.
15 So, Mr. Veljovic, this is a weekly BH political assessment drafted by
16 UNPROFOR and an UNPROFOR civil affairs official on events in the region
17 for the week of November 1993. And if we could go over to page 7 in the
18 English and page 8 in the B/C/S, the first full paragraph on page 8. And
19 the second paragraph on -- it's the second paragraph on the B/C/S page.
20 Mr. Veljovic, contrary to what you've just told us, this document reports
21 that Sarajevo and Gorazde have been under heavy bombardment in the past
22 week. And in response to BH mortar fire, the old town of Sarajevo
23 received almost 500 shells in a one-hour period on 27 October. And the
24 old town, which has the highest percentage of Muslims in any Sarajevo
25 area, is densely populated.
1 Now, this contradicts what you've just told us with respect to
2 shelling of Bascarsija?
3 A. I wasn't an operations officer in the SRK in 1993; I was in the
4 brigade. But as for 500 shells, if they had fallen on the town they
5 would have razed it to the ground. The entire Army of Republika Srpska
6 didn't have 500 shells. I think this is grossly untrue. Five hundred
7 shells to hit the old part of town, well, do you know what that means?
8 What sort of inferno would have resulted from that? How many civilian
9 casualties would there have been? The town of Sarajevo was never shelled
10 in this way. Karadzic and Mladic prohibited this. But when you saw
11 certain buildings on fire it was in 1992 when barracks were being
12 protected which were in areas that were densely populated by Muslims.
13 But to use 500 shells, well, what did we fire them from since at that
14 time we didn't have that many launchers? It's quite impossible to
15 understand how a human mind could have imagined such a thing. Five
16 hundred shells, well, there would have been thousands of dead civilians.
17 JUDGE KWON: Before going further, Ms. Edgerton, could we clarify
18 whether the old town of Sarajevo and Bascarsija refer to the same place.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Bascarsija is a smaller area. The
20 old town includes Bistrik and Sedrenik. It's huge. It covers a very
21 extensive surface, whereas Bascarsija is only one neighbourhood. This is
22 really very interesting. Five hundred aerial bombs, well the Russians
23 didn't drop that many bombs on Berlin.
24 MS. EDGERTON: If I may, Your Honour, actually Mr. Veljovic is
25 rather correct. Bascarsija is a local community next to Zajednica within
1 Stari Grad, the old town. So it's one of several in that area and
2 includes indeed some of the areas he's just mentioned, Bistrik, Sedrenik,
3 and if I give further I might be doing it on the basis of my recollection
4 and that wouldn't be appropriate.
5 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on. Yes, continue, Ms. Edgerton.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a very sorry affair, this
7 report here.
8 MS. EDGERTON:
9 Q. Thank you. You talked a little bit in your statement about
10 targeting. And you said legal military targets were the ones obtained
11 through reconnaissance and intelligence from captured refugees or
12 exchanged persons.
13 So how -- what do you think is a legal military target?
14 A. A legal military target, well, the demarcation lines or the
15 forward defence line, any firing position regardless of whether it is
16 located in or outside town. Since the Muslims were defending themselves
17 at the edges of the town of Sarajevo, and according to the military
18 establishment they had the artillery and the depth, we weren't allowed to
19 fire on such targets. Although we knew about targets in Hrasno and
20 Bascarsija and by the hospital, we didn't fire on these targets to avoid
21 civilian casualties and especially in order to avoid killing children.
22 So we couldn't fire into the depth because we wanted to avoid civilian
23 casualties, although the other side took advantage of this. You can't
24 put the artillery at the front line. It has to be positioned in the
25 depth, and since the town was being defended they positioned their
1 artillery in the depth and we couldn't fire on them. The only thing that
2 could happen is if Sarajevo is semi-encircled and then we are assisted by
3 units, if the gunpowder is wet when we're firing or if the information,
4 the data, isn't correct, when you fire a shell then the shell doesn't
5 reach the necessary range and hit the town. But it was forbidden to fire
6 buildings in the town. The Supreme Command had forbidden this, and this
7 command, this order went down to the lowest-level units. The command
8 that the town shouldn't be targeted and that the artillery in urban
9 neighbourhoods shouldn't be targeted either.
10 [Prosecution counsel confer]
11 MS. EDGERTON: I think I don't have anything further,
12 Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
14 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, a few questions,
16 Your Excellency.
17 [Defence counsel confer]
18 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
19 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Veljovic, could you explain for the benefit
20 of the Chamber whether the Podgrabski Battalion, the Jahorina and
21 Trebevic Battalion, were located which -- this concerns the number of
22 mortars, in fact, that your unit had?
23 A. The Podgrabski Battalion was facing Gorazde and the Jahorina one
24 was facing Trnovo. And later, after Lukavica 93, that Jahorina Battalion
25 was sent to the Nisic plateau to become part of the 1st Sarajevo-Romanija
1 Corps. The Trebevic Battalion was on Trebevic and facing the town. It
2 was in a forested area and it couldn't have opened infantry fire on the
3 town from that area. It could have only opened fire on Muslim trenches
4 which were also located in forested areas.
5 Q. Thank you. On page 48 you were asked who authorised the use of
6 aerial bombs and it was suggested that the Main Staff as well as the
7 corps commander authorised this. You said you didn't know about this but
8 that it was possible. Do you have any information according to which the
9 president of the republic authorised the use of aerial bombs or any other
10 kinds of weapons?
11 A. I never heard any orders of any kind from the president, from the
12 state, or from the Supreme Command. I only received orders from the
13 corps command; they were conveyed through the Main Staff of the Army of
14 Republika Srpska.
15 Q. Thank you. How many municipalities are there in the old town in
16 Sarajevo and are there any uninhabited areas?
17 A. The municipality of the old town is very big and there are also
18 rural areas within it as well as urban areas, so it is a very large
19 municipality. It covers Trebevic which is also part of the old town,
20 then Borci, Sedrenik, Vrace, Vucja Luka, and so on.
21 Q. Although it's called the old town or Stari Grad it's not an urban
23 A. It is partly urban, yes, and partly rural.
24 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you the following: Which -- what
25 sort of fuel did these modified aerial bombs use?
1 A. These aerial bombs used some sort of motors with rocket fuel and
2 they travelled on rails or they were on rails that were on our lorries.
3 The lorry would then raise its platform or lower the platform and this is
4 how the device was used. It wasn't very precise. The Muslims called
5 it --
6 Q. Thank you. I'd just like to ask you whether these rocket motors
7 had tables of their own?
8 A. They had --
9 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours --
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- some kind of tables --
11 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I think that goes beyond the scope
12 of cross-examination.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The subject matter is precision.
14 It doesn't go beyond the scope.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the witness testified to the inaccuracy of the
16 aerial bomb.
17 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. While you were in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did you hear or
21 gain any insight into documents that the Main Staff sent to the
22 president? Did you hear about such documents?
23 A. Well, when I was in the corps since when the Main Staff sends
24 reports to the Supreme Command, this would be sent down to the corps but
25 not to the brigade.
1 Q. Thank you. Did you see this report that was shown to you
2 according to which an aerial bomb was dropped on Hrasnica?
3 A. Perhaps not at that time. I wasn't in the corps command all the
4 time. Sometimes I was on leave. Sometimes I had certain duties that I
5 had to perform somewhere. So it wasn't possible for me to read through
6 each and every report.
7 Q. Thank you. Were you involved in the work that was carried out on
8 building the modified aerial bombs?
9 A. I'm not competent for such things. I'm an infantry officer. I
10 don't know anything about rocket motors, metals, and so on and so forth.
11 I did not participate in that. I'm not an expert on such matters. I'm
12 not a technical expert by profession.
13 Q. Thank you. And you're not a ballistics expert either, are you?
14 Do you have any ballistics training?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. Did you hear anything about whether these rockets were tested in
17 the field or on training-grounds in Yugoslavia? Did you have any such
19 A. There was never any such testing in the Yugoslav People's Army.
20 This was the latest thing in the civil war. This wasn't part of the
21 weapons of the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army.
22 Q. Thank you. Is there training-ground in Yugoslavia where new
23 weapons are tested?
24 A. Well, that is probably the case. There probably is some such
25 training-ground. I think it must be near the Pasuljanske fields, in
1 those areas, that's what I know from the media.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see the following
3 document, 1D8436 in the e-court system.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Did you know about the forces, the military forces, in Hrasnica,
6 anything about their presence and infrastructure there?
7 A. No. I know that there was a brigade in Hrasnica, or rather, that
8 in the town of Sarajevo there was the 12th Division under the command of
9 Fikret Pljevljak and the town of Sarajevo had the most numerous forces.
10 That's where it was possible to mobilise the most men, the largest number
11 of men, and experts who knew about certain technical issues.
12 Q. Thank you. Could I ask you to have a look at this analysis of
13 the defence line. Could you tell the Chamber what period we are talking
14 about and what it has to do, and pay particular attention to item 3, or
15 rather, item 4, and (b) under 4. Could we zoom in or enlarge this for
16 the benefit of the witness.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Um, Your Honours, um, again I'm not yet sure how
18 this arises from the cross-examination.
19 JUDGE KWON: You showed the document which refers to the bombing
20 of the centre of Hrasnica. That's the extent that I understand this line
21 of questions.
22 Yes, let's continue.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour --
24 Your Excellency.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Veljovic, please have a look at this proposal, have a look at
2 item 4. What is this lieutenant-colonel suggesting with regard to
3 retaliations because of groups, sabotage groups that are being
4 infiltrated? Which military targets are being referred to?
5 A. Well, it says the post office in Hrasnica, is that what you have
6 in mind?
7 Q. What does KM stand for?
8 A. KM stands for command post. It's the command post of a given
9 unit. I don't know whether it relates to a brigade, a battalion, a
10 corps, or a division. KM is a military target, command post.
11 Q. So the KM of the 4th MTBR, MTBR does that stand for motorised
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And it's in the post office in Hrasnica; is that correct?
15 A. Yes, the post office KM. The KM of the 1st Mountain Brigade I
16 suppose, the mountain home Hrasnica.
17 Q. Thank you. I won't ask you about these barracks. Under (b) it
18 says business targets or economic targets? What does it say? Can you
19 read it out, please.
20 JUDGE KWON: Shall we see the next page in English.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Economic facilities, the primary
22 school in Hrasnica, production of shells, the production of shells in
23 Hrasnica, Aleksa Santic primary school in Hrasnica, shell production.
24 Q. So is this also a legitimate military target?
25 A. Yes, of course, but it was difficult for us to decide to fire on
1 such targets because we were afraid of killing civilians. We only fired
2 on the demarcation lines, but there was a margin of error, 50 metres. It
3 all depended on psychological factors, on the target person, on the
4 charge, on the calibre of the barrel not being appropriate for the shell.
5 Then you have to use plastic shells. The gases aren't appropriate for
6 expelling the projectile. Many errors can be made in the artillery. In
7 France in the first world war, 10.000 soldiers were killed by their own
9 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber when it was determined that
10 there were such targets in the centre of Hrasnica, could you tell us
11 anything about the dates?
12 A. Well, 0508 of -- the 5th of August, 1994, at the time I wasn't in
13 the corps so I couldn't say anything. At the time I was in the
14 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade. I was at the Nisic plateau. I was in
15 command of two battalions, the Sokolac and the Jahorina battalion. That
16 was during this period of time. I wasn't in the corps command. I was in
17 the corps command as of the 19th of December, 1994, but here I see that
18 it's the 5th of August, 1994. So I couldn't say anything because that
19 wasn't close to me.
20 Q. Did you hear that as of that date up to 1995 the centre of
21 Hrasnica was ever targeted, although they were aware of the installations
22 and the legitimate targets there?
23 A. I don't remember that that was ever targeted. We always knew
24 that they were making those things, that they placed their command posts
25 in the schools, and we knew that if we targeted them that we would
1 inflict civilian casualties.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document please be admitted
4 into evidence.
5 THE INTERPRETER: And could the witness please be asked to come
6 closer to the microphones. Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no objection?
8 MS. EDGERTON: No.
9 JUDGE KWON: That that will be admitted as a Defence exhibit.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2353.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Veljovic, when answering the questions could you
12 speak to the microphone? For example, I take it that you can come a bit
13 closer to the microphone. Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Can you please tell us to what extent were you familiar with
16 aerial bombs; i.e., those modified aerial bombs? How familiar were you
17 with them? What was your participation in all of that?
18 A. I was not well informed about those aerial bombs. Several of our
19 brigades had those aerial bombs: The 1st Romanija didn't have them; the
20 1st Sarajevo didn't have them; the 2nd Sarajevo didn't have them; the
21 Ilidza had them; the Iljas Brigade had them; the Vogosca and the others
22 that had facilities nearby such as the Pretis institute, the maintenance
23 depot, they made them.
24 Q. Thank you. Did your brigade have them?
25 A. No. My brigade, which was the 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry
1 Brigade, didn't have them, nor did the 1st Romanija Brigade.
2 Q. Thank you. Did you participate in the launch of that bomb?
3 A. Only in the Trnovo theatre of war around Treskavica I saw the
4 bomb being launched, but it is wilderness. There are no settlements
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Veljovic, for your testimony. I have no further
7 questions for you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Veljovic. On
9 behalf of the Chamber I would like to thank you for your coming to
10 The Hague to give it. Now you are free to go.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will take a break so we'll rise all
13 together. We'll break for 45 minutes and will resume at quarter past
15 [The witness withdrew]
16 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.26 p.m.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 --- On resuming at 1.16 p.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness take the solemn declaration.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
21 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
22 WITNESS: SINISA MAKSIMOVIC
23 [Witness answered through interpreter]
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Maksimovic.
4 A. Good afternoon.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6041 in
6 e-court. This is Mr. Maksimovic's statement.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Have you read this statement? Have you reviewed it,
9 Mr. Maksimovic?
10 A. Yes, I have.
11 Q. Did you sign it as well?
12 A. Yes, I did.
13 Q. Does it accurately reflect what you stated?
14 A. Yes, it does.
15 Q. If I were -- we have to wait for the interpretation. If I were
16 to put the same questions to you today and offer your answers in lieu of
17 the statement, would your answers be the same as they are in your
19 A. Yes.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to
21 tender this 92 ter package into evidence.
22 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objection, Ms. Edgerton?
23 MS. EDGERTON: No, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE KWON: His Rule 92 ter statement as well as five associated
25 exhibits will be admitted into evidence.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the statement 65 ter number 1D06041
2 will be Exhibit D2354.
3 JUDGE KWON: The other associated exhibits' number will be given
4 in due course.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to read a
6 short summary of Mr. Maksimovic's statement. I'm going to do it in
8 [In English] In May 1992 Sinisa Maksimovic became a member of the
9 communications platoon of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps on Tvrdimici, until
10 September 1992 when he was transferred to the Igman's Brigade's
11 4th Infantry Battalion in Blazuj. In January 1993 he became a member of
12 intervention platoon of the Igman Brigade.
13 In the summer of 1993 he took part in the operation to occupy the
14 hills of Golo Brdo, Obeljak, and Stupnik, all dominant positions from
15 which the Muslim forces fired at and shelled Hadzici. His conclusion is
16 that in these units there were people who had been convicts. During this
17 operation his brigade took the position on Brezovaca on Igman. The
18 Tresnjevo Brdo hill was also taken but his unit withdrew under superior
19 command's order. They were promised that these positions would be
20 occupied by UNPROFOR and not Muslim forces. Immediately after withdrawal
21 the Tresnjevo Brdo hill was occupied by Muslim forces, situation that
22 remained unchanged until the end of the war.
23 In June 1994, after having completed his schooling in the first
24 class -- at the first class college for officers and being given the rank
25 of 2nd lieutenant, Sinisa Maksimovic was transferred to the 1st Romanija
1 Brigade of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. He was accompanied company
2 commander in Mrkovici in July 1994. All fire was aimed at the enemy
3 lines of -- all fire -- devices of this brigade -- company were on the
4 enemy lines which were very close to theirs, at a distance from 20 to 100
5 metres. Almost all soldiers in this company were local men, among whom
6 the dominant conviction was that the Markale I incident had been
7 engineered by the enemy.
8 The units opposed to his were from the 105 Brigade -- Mountain
9 Brigade of 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Muslim
10 forces possessed sniper weapons. Muslim special units "Laste" took
11 Spicasta Stijena at least once, in mid-September 1994.
12 In late 1994 he was transferred to the Igman Brigade. In August
13 1995 a systematic bombing of and artillery assault on Serb positions was
14 initiated by the UN Rapid Reaction Force stationed in the
15 Igman-Bjelasnica sector. Sinisa Maksimovic watched the UN Rapid Reaction
16 Forces, positioned in Muslim-controlled territory, transport heavy
17 weaponry along the road over Igman. This assault had air support from a
18 large number of aircrafts. The Muslim forces also opened fire but dared
19 not launch an infantry assault due to the intensity of the UN artillery
20 and aircraft fire.
21 Regarding incident in Sedrenik area on 17th of April of 1993, the
22 positions of Sinisa Maksimovic's unit remained unchanged even before his
23 arrival as a company commander. Associated document 1D08572 shows the
24 area where his unit was located in the woods.
25 Regarding incident Sedrenik area on 6th of March, 1995, and to
1 the best of Sinisa Maksimovic's knowledge, Serb units at that location
2 did not have trained snipers in their ranks. The units were comprised of
3 local people who were not trained for sniper fire. The alleged positions
4 from which the sniper attack in Sedrenik was allegedly carried out were
5 under constant enemy fire.
6 Regarding incident occurred in the junction of Sedrenik Street
7 and Redzepa Gorusanovica Street on 22nd November 1994, and beside the
8 argument put forward in connection to the aforementioned incidents,
9 Sinisa Maksimovic ask that he never issued any order for civilians to be
10 fired upon, nor did he ever received any information that civilian
11 targets had been fired upon by members of his unit.
12 That would be a short summary and I do not have questions for
13 that witness at this point of time.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 Ms. Edgerton.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
17 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
18 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Maksimovic.
19 A. Good afternoon.
20 Q. I have a couple of questions about your evidence, the evidence
21 set out in your statement, and they're actually in regard to the
22 incidents you spoke about in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of your statement.
23 So in paragraph 7 you were asked some questions about an address at
24 Sedrenik 157. Do you remember that?
25 A. Yes, I remember the question that was put to me. However, I'm
1 not familiar with the address, Sedrenik 157 --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
3 provided with his statement in Serbian.
4 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to have your statement in front of
5 you, Mr. Maksimovic?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
7 JUDGE KWON: Do you have a copy, Mr. Karadzic?
8 THE ACCUSED: I'm just --
9 JUDGE KWON: Or we can print it up thanks to the Registry.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MS. EDGERTON:
12 Q. Great. Now, if you could just flip over to paragraph 7, there
13 you were asked some questions with respect to an incident at an address
14 at Sedrenik 157. And when you were asked those questions, were you told
15 that this incident took place on 17 April 1993?
16 A. I was told that the incident had happened in the month of April
17 and that I was not the company commander in Mrkovici at that time. I was
18 also told that I should look at the pictures, the photos, the map, and to
19 point at the positions of my units. To my knowledge, those positions had
20 not changed and did not change after I became the company commander.
21 Q. Now, in paragraph 8 you were asked some questions about an
22 incident dated 6 March 1995. You weren't company commander in Mrkovici
23 at that period of time either, were you?
24 A. I was not company commander at the time.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I assist. The witness said
1 that the lines were not changed either before or thereafter, which is why
2 he was asked to talk about that. That's on lines 9 and 10. The witness
3 said that the lines had not changed before he joined or after he joined.
4 JUDGE KWON: He said that and then you can take up that issue in
5 your re-examination. Please refrain as far as possible, Mr. Karadzic.
6 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
8 Q. Now, the third incident you were asked questions about in
9 paragraph 9, were you told that Dr. Karadzic is not charged with that
11 A. No, I wasn't told that. I didn't have that information.
12 Q. Thank you. Now in your statement and I think -- and in relation
13 to the situation at Sedrenik generally, you talked about the ABiH holding
14 a position between -- beneath Spicaste Stijene and you've talked about
15 whether or not your unit opens sniper fire from Spicaste Stijene. Is it
16 your evidence today that SRK units at that area did not shoot from
17 Spicaste Stijene at all?
18 A. I can't say that. We did open fire when necessary when we were
19 attacked. Of course we fired. However, our activities were aimed at the
20 enemy positions, exclusively at the enemy positions.
21 Q. Maybe you could answer a question I have then about a document
22 that we've received in evidence here, P1619, please. It's a report
23 prepared by UNMO Sector Sarajevo on 6 March 1995 and it's been translated
24 into B/C/S. I'll just wait until we can see the version in your
25 language. Wonderful. Thank you. If we could jump over to English page
1 3 in both versions -- sorry, English and B/C/S page 3, paragraph 8,
2 sub a, sub ii and iii.
3 There we see reports on the wounding of two civilians on 6 March
4 from Sharpstone. One is a male aged 48 and the other is a male aged 14.
5 Now if we could jump back over to page 1, paragraph 3(b), I'd like you to
6 have a look at that. Now, paragraph 3(b) says after these incidents that
7 I've just referred to the UN EgyptBat anti-sniping APC at that location
8 returned fire onto Bosnian Serb army positions at Sharpstone. And
9 following this retaliation, the UNMO Vogosca team received a telephone
10 call from the commander Radava Battalion, Vogosca Brigade, Bosnian Serb
11 army, stating that if the EgyptBat APC in his target practice area
12 (Sedrenik) is not removed within 30 minutes it will be fired upon. And
13 shortly after this call the sector commander arrived at the APC location.
14 The UNMO Vogosca team received another telephone call shortly thereafter
15 from the Radava Battalion commander stating that he would also fire on
16 the UNPROFOR reinforcements with the APC and the APC was then moved to a
17 safer position.
18 And I wonder if that affects your answer in any regard.
19 A. Well, it doesn't affect it. Those things happened in 1995 when I
20 was not in the command of the Mirkovic company. I can't say that the
21 report is not correct, I can't say that. However, as for what was
22 happening then I can't talk about that because I was not present in the
23 unit at that time. That was March 1995 and already in December 1994 I
24 was transferred to the Igman Brigade.
25 Q. Thank you. We'll move on to the incident you discussed at
1 paragraph 7 in your statement. You were shown a photograph and it has
2 the 65 ter number 1D8572, and you were told that that photograph was
3 taken from the approximate place where the alleged victim of the incident
4 was located, and you made some markings on that photograph.
5 MS. EDGERTON: I wonder if we could call that photograph up.
6 Thank you.
7 Q. Once you've had a look at that, I'd like to show you another
8 photograph that was taken from the actual incident location, and it's
9 65 ter number 9563A [sic].
10 MS. EDGERTON: And maybe we could display those two photographs
11 side by side on the computer monitor. And, by the way 9536A is a still
12 image taken from the 360-degree image that was admitted through Barry
13 Hogan as P2207. Page 2 now. Thank you.
14 Q. Now, this photo 9536A, page 2, is a photo of the Sharpstone area
15 taken from the actual incident location. And I wonder if having those
16 two photos side by side that changes your answer and the markings you
17 made in any regard.
18 A. I would like an explanation of this photo, F2. I can see two
19 houses there. I can see some trees. And in the background I can see one
20 part of a hill but not too well. I don't know what you want me to say
21 based on the right-hand side photo. I marked the left-hand side photo.
22 I put a rectangular sign to show where my units were not, whereas the
23 circular sign marks Spicaste Stijene. I don't recognise any of those
24 things in the other photo, in F2.
25 Q. Now, this Chamber has received evidence that this photograph was
1 taken from the actual incident location and the small green triangle,
2 upside down triangle that you see, the hilltop in the distance, is the
3 alleged origin of fire.
4 MS. EDGERTON: And if we can zoom in to that triangle. Thank
6 Q. On 65 ter number 9536A, you see that it displays a different area
7 than the one that you've marked and the photo was taken from a different
8 angle than the picture that you've marked in 1D8572.
9 A. Again, can I have an explanation with regard to the left-hand
10 side house. Is that the same house that we can see in the other photo
11 where I marked the position of my unit?
12 Q. It is.
13 A. It is, yes, okay. In that case I can't say anything about the
14 position from which it was allegedly fired because it doesn't seem to
15 belong to the area of responsibility of my company. It seems to me that
16 that position is a bit further to the right from the end of the zone of
17 responsibility of my company, and if this is the assumed direction from
18 which the bullets arrived, then I can say that this did not belong to the
19 Mokrovici Company. That bullet must have belonged to another unit that
20 was our neighbour on the left flank.
21 Q. Thanks for that clarification.
22 MS. EDGERTON: And since this photograph is already part of an
23 exhibit we're not going to tender it and just move on.
24 Q. Now, at paragraph 8 of your statement you said -- answering
25 questions about the incident that took place on 6 March 1995 that Serb
1 positions from the alleged incident locations were more than a thousand
2 metres away. I'd like to ask you about that. Did you get told the
3 address of the incident location?
4 A. No, I didn't know the address. The address would not have meant
5 much to me anyway when it came to the positioning of the location or the
6 way I understood it, the location of the incident, that is. What I could
7 see in the photo was something that I assumed must have been very far
8 from our positions. I don't know if you understand my answer.
9 Q. I think I do. Your estimate of a thousand metres is an
10 assumption based on a photo you were shown; is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. All right. Thank you. Now for the last question, and also in
13 relation to this incident, you said your units - I imagine referring to
14 the time you were in the Mrkovici company - your units had
15 7.62-millimetre automatic rifles whose efficacy was no less than 800
16 metres in relation to the target; correct?
17 A. Yes, I said that. However, it was a bit exaggerated. Eight
18 hundred metre is a lot for the efficacy of the rifle. It is most
19 efficient at 3- to 400 metres. Eight hundred metres would be the
20 ultimate distance for which it can be assumed that that rifle could hit
21 its target. Eight hundred metres is much too much. I made a mistake
22 there. Being familiar with the automatic rifles and automatic weaponry,
23 I would say that its true efficiency range is at some 300 to 400 metres.
24 That's its quality efficiency range.
25 Q. And you also had 7.9-millimetre weapons and ammunition; correct?
1 A. I think that there was an M53 machine-gun in the unit. I can't
2 remember which location exactly. The entire company had about 12 to 13
3 trenches or fortified positions. As to where the machine-gun was located
4 exactly, I could not say. I can't remember.
5 Q. Maybe -- let's maybe have a look at one last document while we're
6 talking about fire-arms like this. 65 ter number 23826. And while we're
7 waiting for that to come up, what's the effective range of an M53
9 A. I assume that it would be between 7- and 800 metres. An M53
10 machine-gun is extremely unreliable. It's an unreliable weapon. Bullets
11 often get jammed. When you open fire from such a machine-gun the result
12 is very imprecise, in fact. The machine-gun is used to fire bursts of
13 fire. I think the enemy is more affected by the bursts of fire than by
14 the results achieved by the machine-gun fire itself.
15 Q. Thank you. Just one last document dated 29 October 1993, and
16 it's a document from the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade to the Sarajevo
17 Corps command responding to a query from the corps commander and
18 indicating that in the brigade they had M76, 7.9-millimetre sniper
19 rifles; M48, 7.9-millimetre sniper rifles; M59/66, 7.62-millimetre sniper
20 rifles. Are you familiar with the effective ranges of these three types
21 of sniper rifles that I've just described?
22 A. I think the 7.9, the M76, has a range of 1.000 metres, an
23 effective range of 1.000 metres. As for the other two sniper rifles, the
24 M48 and 59, the M59/66, I'm not sure about the range of these two
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have this as a Prosecution exhibit,
3 please, Your Honours?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P5945, Your Honours.
6 MS. EDGERTON:
7 Q. And just one last question and it's relating to the last sentence
8 in paragraph 10 of your statement. You referred to the Laste, the
9 Bosnian special unit, taking Spicaste Stijene in mid-September 1994.
10 That only lasted for a couple of days, didn't it? Your forces recovered
11 the ridge a couple of days after that; correct?
12 A. That's correct.
13 MS. EDGERTON: I have nothing further, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a few questions,
16 Your Excellency.
17 Could we have a look at P5945 just to see if the title -- to see
18 what it says there.
19 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Maksimovic, could you please just read out
21 the first part --
22 A. Intensifying sniping activity against Muslim forces to the
23 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command, the command of the 1st Romanija Infantry
25 Q. Thank you. Since you graduated from the college for officers,
1 could you tell us whether the Muslim forces are legitimate target for
3 A. The ABiH was a legitimate target. The Muslim forces were a
4 legitimate target. The title is a bit strange.
5 Q. On the basis of what we have here, was it possible to target
6 civilians? Could snipers target the civilians?
7 A. Could I read through all of this? I don't know what is at stake.
8 Is this a report? I'm not sure what the nature of this document is.
9 It's not quite clear to me.
10 Q. Read out the first sentence. I think that's quite sufficient.
11 A. Yes, it's a report. Could you please repeat your question.
12 Q. Does this document allow for snipers to target civilians? Does
13 it imply that such action could be taken?
14 A. Of course not because a report is a document that is sent to the
15 superior command and it reports on the situation in the unit, on
16 situation with regard to materiel and technical equipment, and so on and
17 so forth.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have a look at
20 Prosecution Exhibit P2193. Could we zoom into the top right-hand corner.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you recognise this map, the map of the town?
23 A. Yes, it's Sarajevo and its surroundings.
24 Q. Thank you. The Defence team showed you a different map that the
25 Prosecution marked this map, it marked the locations of incidents 2, 13,
1 and 17. Can you locate Sedrenik, Groblje, Skajca [phoen], Sokak. Do you
2 recognise these places and can you tell us how far are the locations
3 where these incidents occurred were located from your positions?
4 A. Quite far. Incident number 2 I think is about -- or the location
5 of that incident is at a distance of 800 metres to a kilometre roughly
7 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Just to underscore, as I said earlier, this --
10 with the witness, incident 2 -- pardon me, incident 13 was dropped from
11 the indictment against Karadzic. He's no longer charged with that. And
12 I let the paragraph referring to that incident in the witness's statement
13 go in because I thought in context it was the fair thing to do. But I
14 just wanted to remind Dr. Karadzic, before we go down that road, that he
15 can't have a kick at the can, so to speak, with a dropped incident,
16 particularly since the Prosecution was precluded from referring to
17 dropped incidents in our case in chief.
18 JUDGE KWON: But you have no difficult with F2 -- 2nd and 17th
20 MS. EDGERTON: No, none at all.
21 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Maksimovic, can you see the main street in the Sedrenik
24 neighbourhood here and can you tell us whether it was possible for you to
25 target these locations, location number 2 and location number 17?
1 A. I think it is very difficult to provide you with any specific
2 answers on the basis of this map. Sedrenik is a densely populated area
3 and as for the location of the street where incident number 2 occurred, I
4 believe that could be the main street that led to Mrkovici. As for
5 incidents 17 and 13, or rather, incident number 17, if I can see this
6 clearly I think that it is located beneath Trdonje -- Grdonj.
7 And it would be difficult to say that it was a visible location
8 from my positions. The top of the Grdonj hill was not under our control,
9 the top of the Grdonj hill. So incident number 17, as far as that
10 incident is concerned I wouldn't say that it occurred because it was
11 targeted from our positions because it is beneath Grdonj. As for
12 incident number 2, the location is quite a distance from the line itself.
13 So if such a incident occurred it would be difficult to say that it was a
14 deliberate hit fired from our positions. It's difficult to say whether
15 fire was opened from our positions in fact.
16 Q. Thank you. What's the altitude of the hill of Grdonj in relation
17 to the positions of your company and Sedrenik?
18 A. It's a dominant position, it's above Sedrenik, and part of the
19 Grdonj hill at the level of Mala Kula, if you have a look at the map it's
20 to the north of the hill, at the level of Mala Kula that is, in fact,
21 where my units were located, or rather, my company and platoons.
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Maksimovic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions,
24 Your Excellency.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 That concludes your evidence, Mr. Maksimovic. On behalf of this
2 Chamber I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.
3 Now you are free to go. Please have a safe journey back home.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
5 [The witness withdrew]
6 JUDGE KWON: Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
7 [Private session]
11 Page 29308 redacted. Private session.
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Is there anything to raise? Yes, Mr. Robinson.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I would just like to put on
1 the record the fact that the next witness that we had scheduled to
2 testify who had been designated as KW-341 declined to testify after being
3 notified that the Chamber had denied our motion for protective measures.
4 And so he will not be called.
5 JUDGE KWON: So who is the next one?
6 MR. ROBINSON: The witness I am referring to is K --
7 JUDGE KWON: No, no, who will be testifying?
8 MR. ROBINSON: The next witness to be testifying on Tuesday, the
9 30th of October, is Colonel Steven Joudry and we filed a witness list
10 today for that week.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
12 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I don't want to belabour this point,
14 but I'm not entirely sure why it was necessary to put that on the record,
15 but if it is to be intended to be a suggestion that the Trial Chamber's
16 failure to provide protective measures were somehow -- were a reflection
17 of the nature of the witness's concerns in not testifying, I feel obliged
18 to say the Prosecution doesn't accept that insinuation. We consider that
19 the witness would have been subjected to cross-examination of a nature
20 that he didn't want exposed to the public and that's the nature of the
21 failure to appear now. And if we continue this discussion, I'd be more
22 than happy to discuss that evidence in more detail.
23 Secondly, I also wanted to address a comment that was made the
24 other day to the effect that no Prosecution witnesses ever had protective
25 measures sought ultimately denied; that is simply not accurate.
1 JUDGE KWON: Well, let us leave it at that.
2 Unless there are any other things to be raised, the hearing is
3 now adjourned.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.08 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 30th day of
6 October, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.