Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 30036

 1                           Monday, 12 November 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  I think we are hearing

 7     French on English channel.  I think it has been corrected.

 8             Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I was also having some

10     volume difficulties, but I think those are resolved.

11             Good morning, Mr. President.  Good morning, Your Honours and

12     everyone in the courtroom.

13                           WITNESS:  SAVO SIMIC [Resumed]

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]

16        Q.   Good morning, Witness.

17        A.   Good morning.

18        Q.   In paragraph 15 of your statement, you note that the SRK was

19     mainly engaged in defensive operations and then provide a few details in

20     connection with that assertion.  I wanted to ask you a few questions

21     about that.

22             First of all, you mention Lukavac 93 as the only offensive

23     operation that you recall, and in connection with our discussion on

24     Thursday before we adjourned, I wanted to call that up briefly.

25             MR. TIEGER:  That's 65 ter 23948.  And if we could turn to page 3


Page 30037

 1     of the English and turn one more page in the B/C/S, please.  And we'll

 2     need one more, I'm sorry.

 3        Q.   And directing your attention to item 2, Colonel, we see that

 4     among the objectives of Lukavac 93 was to prevent the unblocking of

 5     Sarajevo and create conditions for its take-over.  Correct?

 6        A.   Could we zoom in a bit, please, because it's not very legible.

 7     The copy isn't very good.

 8             First of all, the heading of the document says that it's the

 9     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps document.  I didn't see the year, whether it's

10     1993 or 1994.  It wasn't quite clear --

11        Q.   Colonel, if you need us to return to the front page, we can do

12     that.  And I think for your purposes you'll want to read down to the

13     bottom of page 3 and up to the top of page 4.

14             MR. TIEGER:  But let's go back to the front page so the Colonel

15     can see it.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's still not very clear, but

17     that's not a problem.  Let's go back to item number 2.

18             MR. TIEGER:  So return to page 3 of the B/C/S toward the bottom.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here it says the SRK acting

20     together with two brigades from the 1st KK has the following task:  Mount

21     a decisive and active defence to prevent a breakthrough of the Muslim

22     forces on the axis Rajlovac-Rajkovica-Kiseljak.

23        Q.   Right.  And my question was whether or not one of the objectives

24     of Lukavac 93 was to prevent the unblocking of Sarajevo and to create

25     conditions for its takeover.  So in that connection, if you could look to


Page 30038

 1     the bottom of page 3 and then read on to the top of page 4 to confirm

 2     that.

 3        A.   It's clear that the offensive was to prevent the unblocking of

 4     Sarajevo --

 5             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could go to the top of page 4, please.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And then -- yes, that was the SRK's

 7     objective, prevent the unblocking of Sarajevo, and Lukavica 93 had this

 8     objective, to join the SRK with the Herzegovina Corps in order to create

 9     good links with the south and south-eastern part of Republika Srpska.

10     That was the purpose of Lukavica 93, and I -- it says prevent the

11     unblocking of Sarajevo and join up with the Herzegovina Corps.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   Okay.  And I'll be asking you a couple of questions in a minute

14     about the joining up of that region of the country, but I'd like to move

15     on to something else.

16             MR. TIEGER:  If I could tender this document, Mr. President.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P5981, Your Honours.

20             MR. TIEGER:

21        Q.   Now, Colonel, before the winter of 1992 there were efforts

22     undertaken to secure and -- in the terms of the -- used by the VRS,

23     liberate portions of what was considered to be Serbian territory; is that

24     correct?

25        A.   Before winter 1992, as far as I can remember, there was an


Page 30039

 1     attempt to liberate the road to Trnovo and to join up with -- the

 2     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps with the Herzegovina Corps.  But nothing

 3     succeeded.  Only Kijevo was liberated which is behind Sarajevo, behind

 4     Krupac.  But no one continued in the direction of Trnovo, so that action

 5     wasn't successful as far as I remember.  That was in the month of

 6     November or December.

 7        Q.   By the beginning of the winter of 1992, there was -- the VRS did

 8     not consider that it had great need for offensive operations because it

 9     considered that it had achieved many of the military goals of the war and

10     that much of the territory that was sought to be liberated had, in fact,

11     been and was under control of the Bosnian Serbs; correct?

12        A.   I don't know what the Main Staff of the VRS thought or the

13     political leadership of Republika Srpska.  So I don't know how I could

14     answer that question.

15        Q.   Let's turn to P01005 momentarily, please.  Okay.  And we can

16     turn -- this is a document dated the 9th of September, 1992.  If -- it's

17     issued by the SRK command, as you can see, and it indicates at the bottom

18     of page 1:

19             "As winter is around the corner and for the most part we have

20     achieved the military goals of the war and do not expect major movements

21     of the front line ..." turn to the next page, "along certain axes in our

22     favour, which the commanders know ..."

23             And then there is an order in accordance with that assessment.

24     So, Colonel, this reflects the assessment of the SRK command that most of

25     the military goals had been achieved and therefore the need for further


Page 30040

 1     offensive operations to obtain territory or for other purposes was no

 2     longer what it had been; correct?

 3        A.   In the SRK from the beginning of the war until the end, the lines

 4     didn't move on either of the sides.  Only on certain axes the tactical

 5     position of our forces were improved or the positions of the Muslim

 6     forces.  Since winter was approaching, it's obvious that this order was

 7     issued so that the troops could prepare for the winter.  The winters are

 8     hard and cold in Sarajevo and it was necessary to protect the army from

 9     precipitation and low temperatures.  And as a result, shelters were built

10     and fuel was prepared for heating soldiers --

11        Q.   Colonel, I appreciate your attention to detail but we'll move a

12     bit quicker if you can simply focus on my question.  Just to give you an

13     indication of that, I'm focusing on your comment that the operations were

14     largely defensive and I wanted to get underneath that to see why, not to

15     identify the preparations were made for winter.  But thank you.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honours, I would normally have tendered that,

17     but it's in evidence, as you can see.  I should note, however, that it

18     was admitted as a source document, so now I think it should be admitted

19     as any other document.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for that notation.  It will be done.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23        Q.   And in connection with the objectives that P1005 refer to, it is

24     correct that by -- that the Bosnian Serb military forces controlled

25     approximately, if not more than, 70 per cent of the territory of


Page 30041

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

 2        A.   Well, probably, if that's what it says in the document.  At that

 3     time that was probably the case as far as the SRK is concerned.  As far

 4     as I know, in the field, from the very beginning of the war, the

 5     positions changed very little on both sides in the Sarajevo area.  So

 6     there were no drastic changes when it comes to the positions of both the

 7     sides concerned and the objective was to maintain the blockade and to

 8     prevent the Muslim forces from breaking through from Sarajevo, and that's

 9     what I spoke about on Thursday and I told you about what this related to.

10        Q.   Now, Colonel, a moment ago you mentioned the interest in linking

11     up with the Herzegovina Corps.  It was -- it is correct, isn't it, that

12     Lukavac 93 was aimed at, among other things, linking Herzegovina, the

13     other parts of Republika Srpska, and therefore having a contiguous or

14     unified or compact territory and thus achieving one of the broader goals

15     of the war; correct?

16        A.   I think that the main objective was to establish a link between

17     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the Herzegovina Corps, to have better

18     communications between the south and south-eastern part of

19     Republika Srpska and this was also the purpose of support, to facilitate

20     command, and to make it easier for the VRS as a whole.

21        Q.   Maybe we're talking about the same thing in slightly different

22     way, but in that connection let me turn to a couple of documents.  First

23     D00568, page 4 of the English and of the B/C/S.

24        A.   I apologise, but I can't read this document.  I can't see

25     anything.


Page 30042

 1        Q.   We'll have that blown up for you in a second, Colonel.

 2        A.   It's fine now.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And I'm directing your attention to what would be

 4     essentially the second paragraph.  I think you can see the reference to

 5     Lukavac 93.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could split screen with the English so the

 7     Judges can see it in English, please.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be told what this is.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I'm surprised the accused doesn't know that

10     because he introduced it.  It's a speech of Major-General Milosevic at

11     the ceremony of presenting war flags.

12        Q.   And on that occasion General Milosevic said - and we can scroll

13     up on the English, please:

14             "Our entire struggle was somehow crowned by the 'Lukavac 93'

15     operation that took place in the area of Jahorina, Treskavica,

16     Bjelasnica, and Igman," et cetera, et cetera.

17             And then he goes to say:

18             "Soldiers were exceptionally motivated because we were achieving

19     our strategic goal and that was the linking of Herzegovina to other part

20     of RS because without that, we did not have a state."

21             MR. TIEGER:  And similarly, I would like to turn quickly to

22     65 ter 10743, page 37 of the English and page 18 of the B/C/S.  That's an

23     interview with -- lengthy serialised interview in "Nin" with

24     General Mladic in 1994.

25             And that is at page 18 of the B/C/S, page 37 of the English,


Page 30043

 1     please.  And toward the bottom, please, in English.

 2        Q.   Okay, Colonel, I think you'll see the reference to Lukavac 93 in

 3     the middle of the page with the paragraph that begins:  "From February

 4     until 27 July 1993 ..."  And there General Mladic continues discussing

 5     Lukavac 93 at the -- we see at the bottom of the page in English.

 6             "This made it possible to join Herzegovina territorially --" and

 7     I'm quoting now:

 8             "This made it possible to join Herzegovina territorially with the

 9     Sarajevo-Romanija basin and to achieve another one of our strategic

10     aims - unification of the regions of Republika Srpska."

11             So, Colonel, I know when you were answering my question earlier

12     you were speaking in terms of linking up the corps perhaps from military

13     perspective, but it's correct, is it not, that one of the objectives of

14     Lukavac 93 was achieving this broad strategic aim of unification of the

15     regions of Republika Srpska?

16        A.   I think that that is what I said, something to that effect.

17     Linking up, establishing a link between that part and the south part of

18     or the south-eastern part of Republika Srpska, creating such a stretch of

19     territory was an objective and it was also necessary to link up the corps

20     in order to co-operate, provide support, and so on and so forth.  But in

21     any event, it was a matter of uniting ethnic areas where Serbs lived in

22     order to make communications easier, co-operate more easily, and to

23     maintain all communications, all linguist.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, I would either tender that portion of


Page 30044

 1     10743 or leave it to the Court if it considers --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Given that it was read out, I'm asking you whether

 3     it's really necessary.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I was noting that.  I actually thought that

 5     might be the Court's view, so I'm satisfied.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             MR. TIEGER:

 8        Q.   Colonel, let me move on to a different subject.  At a number of

 9     paragraphs in your statement, I think specifically 17, 20, and 29, you

10     address some of the circumstances in which orders to use artillery were

11     given and in which artillery fire was undertaken.  So, for example, in

12     paragraph 17 you refer to opening fire based on requests from adjoining

13     1st Motorised Brigade units, pursuant to an order or approval by the

14     brigade or corps command on noticed artillery positions and enemy firing

15     positions.  In paragraph 20 you referred to those situations when you had

16     to respond to observe firing positions -- to enemy fire from the town and

17     observe firing positions and your selection of the most precise weapon.

18     And in paragraph 29 you refer to the information that you acquired from

19     observers and the details you demanded when there were shots from the

20     depth of enemy territory, information that you say you required before

21     you would consider authorising return fire.  You again emphasise that you

22     would select the weapon which was capable of the most precise fire.  And

23     I wanted to ask you some questions in connection with those paragraphs.

24             First of all, by way of clarification, Colonel, when you referred

25     to authorising return fire or selecting the most precise weapon, which of


Page 30045

 1     your roles that you described on Thursday were you referring to when you

 2     gave such authorisation or orders?  In which capacity were you

 3     functioning when you referred to the circumstances reflected in these

 4     paragraphs?

 5        A.   I had the chief of the artillery of the Sarajevo-Romanija Brigade

 6     in mind.  I asked my subordinates, my professional subordinates, and they

 7     also requested this from their own men and they acted in this manner too.

 8        Q.   And just so I understand exactly what you're saying here, are you

 9     suggesting in any way that this was limited to your efforts and that what

10     you did was exceptional or anomalous or are you asserting that, as far as

11     you were concerned, this was -- this reflected what the corps obligations

12     and practices were?

13        A.   I can speak for myself as chief of the artillery.  I was

14     professionally responsible for the artillery in the 1st Sarajevo Brigade,

15     and this concerned my acts and the acts of my subordinates and this was

16     also requested by the command brigade.  They requested this of me.  When

17     I was an official of the artillery, I had a chief of artillery who

18     decided about everything.  He was above me and I assisted him.  I think

19     the same procedure remained in place, it didn't change at the time, that

20     concerns officials from the corps command and my chief of artillery.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I could just comment on the

22     transcript.  It doesn't say:  When I was an official in the corps.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Simic, do you confirm that, having said so?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  When I was an official

25     in the artillery organ of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.


Page 30046

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             MR. TIEGER:

 3        Q.   Let me follow-up on a few of the points you make in that

 4     statement, then.  First of all, you talk about selecting the most precise

 5     weapon and I take it that would be from the list of weapons that you

 6     provided earlier in your statement; is that right?

 7        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 8        Q.   All right.  Well, I'd like to ask you, then, under what

 9     circumstances you would use which of those weapons and what it was that

10     would make one of those weapons the most precise weapon on one occasion

11     but not the most precise weapon on another occasion.  So let's start, for

12     example, with mortars.

13        A.   What weapons I would choose depended on the target itself, on the

14     type of the target, the position of the target, as well as the position

15     of the artillery assets and units and where they were.  Bearing in mind

16     the position of the target, the firing positions of the artillery

17     weapons, you would choose the unit and the weapon that would be more

18     precise in order to avoid unnecessary collateral damage and the

19     destruction of civilian facilities, i.e., to bring the precision to a

20     maximum.

21        Q.   Well, there seems to be a suggestion there that on some occasions

22     a mortar might be more precise, which I understand to mean more accurate

23     in this context, than a howitzer and on some occasions more precise than

24     a rocket, but on other occasions it would be different.  Is that what

25     you're saying or are you saying something else?


Page 30047

 1        A.   If you are targeting at sheltered targets, if they're on the last

 2     angle, it is impossible to target them with artillery weapons such as

 3     howitzers and cannon.  They would miss and those targets would not be

 4     hit.  A mortar is ideal for such targets.

 5        Q.   And by a sheltered target, I take it you do not mean a protected,

 6     reinforced target, you mean something like a trench; correct?

 7        A.   No.  What I had in mind was the configuration of the terrain.  If

 8     a howitzer fires at it from the other side of the slope, it would

 9     overreach the target, whereas the mortar has a different trajectory and

10     that's why it's more accurate on -- in firing targets on the bottom part

11     of the slope as you're looking from our own positions.

12        Q.   Well, let me ask the question in this way then:  What types of

13     targets are mortars good for?  What are they intended for?

14        A.   Mortars are good to support our forward troops because they're

15     more accurate, whereas the targets in front of the forward lines were

16     mostly on the bottom part of the slope from our position and that's why

17     mortars were more accurate in targeting those targets that directly

18     threatened the positions of our units.

19        Q.   Well, Colonel, mortars are generally speaking anti-personnel

20     weapons; correct?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Okay.  They're not intended as heavy weapons to blow up

23     buildings; right?

24        A.   No, that's not the intention.  But they can be used to destroy

25     trenches and inflicting losses to the troops as well as the destruction


Page 30048

 1     of some lighter structures belonging to the enemy side.

 2        Q.   But more specifically, for example, you wouldn't use a weapon

 3     against, for example, a reinforced command post, wouldn't do much good;

 4     right?

 5        A.   It depends on the reinforcement of the facility, how well

 6     reinforced it is.  I wouldn't use mortars if shells are not supposed to

 7     achieve any effect due to the level of reinforcement of such a facility.

 8        Q.   What about, for example, a sniper in a building, would a mortar

 9     have any significant utility there?

10        A.   I would never use those.

11        Q.   Now, I -- by the way, I wanted to ask you one thing before we

12     began and that is:  Looking at paragraphs 17, 20, and 29, there's an

13     emphasis on the -- returning fire or responding, as you said:  When we

14     had to respond, in paragraph 29, to enemy fire at observed positions.

15     And then, of course, as I mentioned, in paragraph 29 you go on to discuss

16     the information that you considered necessary before returning such fire

17     to such locations.  And I wanted to ask you if those -- if that

18     particular example reflected in those paragraphs reflects the only

19     circumstances under which you and, insofar as you're aware based on your

20     earlier answer, the corps considered it appropriate to use artillery

21     against targets in depth, that is, use artillery against targets in

22     Sarajevo.  Was that it or was there more?

23        A.   I never used artillery in depth, i.e., in Sarajevo, unless our

24     positions were threatened by their mortars and by their artillery from

25     the city.  They would skillfully position those in various


Page 30049

 1     positions - and that's in my statement, I don't need to go over that

 2     again.  They were very skilful at positioning their firing positions next

 3     to the facilities which were supposed to be protected, i.e., which were

 4     not supposed to be targeted, because they knew that if there was no

 5     pressing need, we would not open fire on such positions and that was

 6     indeed the case.  On several occasions while I was the chief of

 7     artillery, I sought approval from the brigade commander to open fire on a

 8     firing position and that was denied several times; rather, I would be

 9     told:  Wait, maybe it would die down, order your troops to seek shelter,

10     and that was communicated to our troops.  In other words, I was not given

11     approval to open fire on such positions although we suffered quite a

12     number of losses from such fire -- from the fire opened from those

13     positions.

14        Q.   Okay.  So you began by directly answering my question but didn't

15     quite complete it because you say you never used artillery in depth, that

16     is, in Sarajevo unless your positions were threatened.  And I take it to

17     mean that unless there was -- there had been outgoing fire from those

18     positions or there was outgoing fire from those positions at the time

19     that you considered whether or not to use artillery?

20        A.   This is precisely what I said.  We didn't open fire on enemy

21     positions from which they had fired until it was really absolutely

22     necessary to do so, but in that we also bore in mind that we had to

23     reduce the number of civilian casualties to a minimum if we opened fire

24     on such positions.

25        Q.   So command posts, communications centres, places where --


Page 30050

 1     barracks, places where people assembled, police stations, factories,

 2     those kinds of things, those were not targets unless somehow, according

 3     to you, fire was launched from that facility?

 4        A.   Those are all legitimate military targets.  They could be

 5     targeted, and if there was an ongoing combat those were targeted.  Their

 6     units that were being assembled, lined up, their command posts, their

 7     communication centres because the main goal was to incapacitate the unit

 8     for further combat.  Their rear units, supply units, their depots, all of

 9     those were legitimate military targets that could be targeted.  However,

10     we had to have precise information about those targets and we did.  We

11     knew that they had been precisely identified.

12        Q.   Well, Colonel, do you consider the fact that something has a

13     military aspect, such as the facilities -- some of the facilities I

14     mentioned before, means that it can be shelled under any circumstances?

15     Once you identify the fact that it has a military aspect, as you say, it

16     becomes a legitimate military target and can be targeted?

17        A.   I have just told you that legitimate military targets in combat,

18     i.e., in mutual engagement, we targeted them because they were legitimate

19     targets and they could be fired upon.  I don't see any ambiguities here.

20        Q.   What information did you require before targeting, that is,

21     before firing mortars, howitzers, rockets, whatever it was in the

22     particular circumstance against such structures or facilities when there

23     was what you call combat?

24        A.   We received information from the intelligence organ of the

25     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps about the deployment of certain elements of the


Page 30051

 1     combat order of the enemy forces.  We would record that on our maps.  We

 2     had all the prepared elements for those targets, but we continued

 3     observing the sector in order to establish whether the facility was

 4     properly described, for example, as a command post.  If we could observe

 5     the movement of vehicles and troops and if we could monitor through our

 6     surveillance means that that was indeed a target that we could fire

 7     upon -- so if there was fire, we knew exactly what we were targeting at

 8     and where the position in question was.

 9        Q.   I take it that when you refer to "combat," you're referring to --

10     you say "mutually engaged."  So you're referring to fire coming -- it

11     being exchanged between the VRS and the forces of the ABiH?

12        A.   Yes, that's correct.

13        Q.   And not necessarily from the particular facility that was

14     targeted -- that was ultimately targeted by the SRK?

15        A.   I'm afraid I did not understand the last portion of your

16     question.

17        Q.   Well, from your statement, as I mentioned earlier, one could --

18     well, one I think could only get the impression that the only fire into

19     Sarajevo occurred when there was outgoing fire from a particular position

20     and it was only that particular position when it was -- when it fired,

21     when it was observed, and when your observers provided you with some sort

22     of specific information about it that it was fired upon.  But now I

23     understand you to be saying that once there was what you called combat,

24     that all of -- that all kinds of facilities were open for shelling .

25        A.   No.  I didn't say that all the facilities were open for shelling.


Page 30052

 1     I mentioned just legitimate targets containing command posts, observation

 2     posts, communications centres.  Not all the facilities.  I'm talking

 3     about legitimate targets, legitimate military targets, that's the

 4     facilities that I mentioned.  I did not have in mind any of the civilian

 5     facilities in the town.  I did never -- I never said that we could target

 6     just any facility.

 7        Q.   Colonel, I'm sorry if it sounded like I was mis-characterising

 8     your words.  I realise that that's not what you were saying a moment ago.

 9     My point was that the statement suggests that you would only fire

10     where -- fire at locations where fire had been taken.  Now I understand

11     from what you're saying that once fire came from the city that there

12     were -- that other targets that you considered to be legitimate military

13     targets then could be fired -- then could be and were fired upon.

14        A.   The brigade commander, if we are referring to the period when I

15     was the chief artillery in the brigade, the brigade commander decided on

16     what facilities would be fired upon, i.e., it would be the commander of

17     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps who did that.  I opened fire on the observed

18     enemy targets from the positions where the fire had come from, and both

19     commanders had a list and were aware of the deployment of their forces,

20     the deployment of the targets, and they could issue an order to fire upon

21     those legitimate military targets.

22        Q.   Now let me ask you about such orders.  Would it be -- when such

23     orders came, did they identify specific military targets, that is,

24     specific buildings or facilities or objects, or did they simply identify

25     a particular area of the city which should be shelled?


Page 30053

 1        A.   First and foremost, it would be the type of target.  For example,

 2     the brigade command post, the corps command post, the division command

 3     post, the observation post of such and such unit, the firing position of

 4     that unit, the communications centre of that unit, the type of target was

 5     specified in order to select the type of weapons to use.  And after that,

 6     the part of the city, i.e., the position where that target could be

 7     found.  I have already told you that we had information about all those

 8     targets from before, and if we were told to open fire on the command post

 9     of the division, we knew in advance where that command post of that

10     battalion could be located.  And that's how we prepared fire and that's

11     how we carried out our firing activities.

12        Q.   Can we agree that it would be inappropriate and, indeed, illegal

13     to simply order firing at some general area?

14        A.   I'm not aware of any such orders.  I don't know if there were

15     any.  I never received any such orders, orders to that effect.

16        Q.   You appreciate that doesn't quite answer my question; right?

17        A.   I would consider this to be illegal.  Firing upon a city without

18     a specific target, that would be inflicting terror on the civilians, on

19     the population of the city of Sarajevo.  I myself never did that.  I

20     myself never received an order to that effect.

21        Q.   Let me return for a moment to the precision of the weapons.  You

22     had talked about mortars and alluded to the difference in use against

23     potential targets between a mortar with high trajectory and a howitzer.

24     Let me ask you about rockets and multiple-barrel rocket-launchers.  Under

25     what circumstances did you consider them to be the most precise weapon


Page 30054

 1     for use including potential use in depth?

 2        A.   Multiple-barrel rocket-launchers, for example, are suitable to

 3     open fire upon surface targets, targets on the surface.  They cover a

 4     larger surface of the enemy target.  We used multiple-barrel

 5     rocket-launchers to open fire on targets mostly during Lukavac 93, on

 6     Igman, in front of the forward defence lines of our forces if the

 7     position of our weapons were suitable for firing upon such targets, for

 8     example, if we were on the flank slope or the forward slope, and this was

 9     done because they were very precise and they have an elliptic trajectory

10     and there were no aberrations and their shells were dispersed a little

11     and that's why we chose targets that could be fired upon from such

12     weapons.  Those would be targets of -- on the surface, not sheltered.  A

13     multiple-barrel rocket-launcher is not intended for destroying

14     facilities; it is intended to destroy manpower in an open area or

15     manpower in trenches which are not covered.

16             I've already told you about mortars.  Howitzer also, they could

17     target any target in depth, save for those that were on a rear slope.

18     But it depended on the position of our own weapons and on the position of

19     the enemy trenches, whether they could target targets in front of the

20     forward slope or not.  It all depended on the conditions on the ground.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Colonel said:  Manpower is being

22     destroyed while attacking our forces, and this was not recorded.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  That can be checked.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Simic, do you confirm that?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I said in the course of the


Page 30055

 1     enemy attack as well as in trenches with light cover or with no cover at

 2     all.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Colonel, under what circumstances, if any, would you consider

 7     rockets to be an appropriate weapon in -- to be deployed against a

 8     densely populated urban area or in the context of a densely populated

 9     urban area?

10        A.   I am not aware of any such case.  I never opened fire on densely

11     populated areas.  I don't know of any such cases.  I don't know of any

12     cases when multiple-rocket launchers were deployed in a densely populated

13     area.

14        Q.   Would that be different for individual rockets as opposed to

15     sending off a salvo of ...?

16        A.   Individual rockets, guided or semi-guided, 9K11, they could be

17     used against individual targets.

18        Q.   But not rockets like the 122 Grad or the 128, those would not be

19     appropriate, correct, for use against a densely populated urban area?

20        A.   I didn't use them, so I don't know, especially I don't know

21     anything about Grad.  I had a multiple-rocket launcher in the brigade.  I

22     don't know whether fire was opened from the other weapons that you

23     mentioned.

24        Q.   You mention in your statement - and you emphasised it again

25     today - that you considered that the ABiH forces used mobile weaponry,


Page 30056

 1     such as mobile mortars.  Those -- that weaponry I think by

 2     definition - as you indicated - is intended to be used and then to move

 3     locations as quickly as possible; right?

 4        A.   Yes, that's right.

 5        Q.   And so, first of all, how did you distinguish between a shell

 6     that had been fired from a mobile position or a fixed position.  And,

 7     secondly, did you fire back against mobile weaponry; and if so, for what

 8     purpose?

 9        A.   As we observed from our observation posts, we established that

10     they had mobile mortars.  They used railway tracks along the railway

11     below the tobacco factory in the direction of Alipasino Polje.  There was

12     a railway track over there and on the railway track they positioned

13     mobile mortars.  We observed that they opened fire from one position,

14     then they would move the weaponry, and they would fire from a different

15     position.  They had firing positions prepared in advance and they had

16     their targets prepared in advance.  They needed little time to move their

17     weapons and to take position and open fire.  When we established that, if

18     they opened fire from one position, if they fired one or two shells from

19     there, we knew it would move because we knew where it would move to and

20     we were waiting for them to appear there and that's where we opened fire

21     on.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On the next position where it was

23     expected.

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   And what --


Page 30057

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Simic, I take it your answer was not properly

 2     reflected in the transcript.  Do you confirm what Mr. Karadzic said?

 3     Could you clarify, Mr. Simic?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.  We fired at the

 5     following position in the direction of its movement because we had

 6     already discovered which position would follow.  It wasn't just one,

 7     there was several of them.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             MR. TIEGER:

10        Q.   What information did you require about the area where the

11     intended fire or the target of the intended fire was to take place?  You

12     spoke about observers and requiring particular information.  What kind of

13     information was that, apart from the location of the fire you say?  What

14     else did you need to know before you would launch a shell or a series of

15     shells?  And let me give you a particular example.  You spoke in your

16     statement about mortars positioned on buildings.  So let's take that as a

17     context, what information did you need?

18        A.   We had organised observation posts at elevated positions around

19     Sarajevo.  I have already said in my statement where those posts were

20     located and there were observers who had their areas of observation and

21     they had been trained.  For their work they had optical sights, laser

22     devices to measure distance, equipment for observation, laser devices to

23     establish distance, devices to determine the target where it was in

24     relation to the observation post.  They had good communications, safe

25     communications, with the unit command, or rather, the brigade command


Page 30058

 1     that they were subordinated to.

 2             These artillery observers informed about the nature of the

 3     target.  A mobile mortar, for example, from a certain sector, from roofs

 4     as you mentioned, these observers observed the positions throughout the

 5     day, they were at the post continually, they had shifts, and they would

 6     easily observe any changes in their areas of observation.  They would

 7     notice if a building had been hit when they saw a flash, for example, and

 8     then suddenly they would see that something was missing.  They would

 9     observe that location and then they noticed that the tiles were being

10     removed from the roofs, that you could just put a barrel through a hole

11     so that it could be fired and then you would see a flash and then the

12     hole would be closed as soon as it had fired.  And that is how we

13     established that we were dealing with a mortar position.

14             As to whether the house was inhabited or not, whether there was

15     anyone there or not, well, they were responsible for the fact that they

16     didn't take into account where they placed their firing positions.  I and

17     my subordinates never allowed civilians to walk around firing positions,

18     and especially not children.  Boys, 13, 14 years old are curious, they

19     want to see weapons, but we did not allow children to approach firing

20     positions.  In case of enemy action, we didn't want any civilian

21     casualties.  And they had to take care of their own civilians, as far as

22     I'm concerned.  This was a matter of directly putting civilians at risk.

23        Q.   What about the use of artillery, that is, the use of shelling,

24     intended to punish the population of Sarajevo for the fact that firing

25     had taken place from within Sarajevo?  Was that a lawful or appropriate


Page 30059

 1     military tactic?

 2        A.   We never had the intention of firing on civilians or punishing

 3     civilians in Sarajevo.  We always took care to protect civilians, to

 4     avoid civilian casualties, and to avoid destroying civilian buildings.

 5     We never wanted to do such things in the course of shelling.  As I have

 6     already said, I think that firing positions were deliberately established

 7     by the Muslim army in the vicinity of facilities that should have been

 8     protected.  They thought that in this way they were protected.

 9        Q.   Now, you said that in your statement before, Colonel.  I wanted

10     to know if it was illegal to use shelling against Sarajevo in order to

11     send a punitive message that the -- that any further military manoeuvres

12     or outgoing fire should not take place?

13        A.   I never received such orders and I'm not aware of any such orders

14     having been issued in order to punish the civilians, in order to open

15     fire on facilities in the town without there being any need to do so.

16        Q.   And you never heard of the use of massively disproportionate fire

17     back into Sarajevo - and by that I mean two or three outgoing shells and

18     dozens and dozens and dozens of incoming shells from the VRS into

19     Sarajevo?

20        A.   No, I never heard about such cases.  I didn't do such things

21     because we didn't even have enough ammunition.  We had to save ammunition

22     because in the second part of the war, the Muslim forces had far more

23     ammunition and they fired on Serbian positions far more than the Serbian

24     artillery on their positions.

25        Q.   I wanted to ask you about a couple of other matters.  We recently


Page 30060

 1     heard evidence from a former member of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised

 2     Brigade who explained to the Trial Chamber, among other things, about a

 3     road that was held within VRS-controlled territory but which was

 4     "constantly under fire" and therefore "under control of the BH army."

 5     That can be found at transcript pages 29189 through 90.

 6             Am I correct that this tactic, that is, keeping a road under --

 7     constantly under fire, is something that's referred to generally as fire

 8     control and were you familiar with that approach to the use of artillery

 9     by either of the ABiH or the VRS?

10        A.   Yes, if you're referring to the Hresa-Vogosca road.  It's the

11     only road and link to the south and south-western [as interpreted] part

12     of Sarajevo, Serbian Sarajevo at the time.  I know that that road was

13     under sniper fire from the Muslim forces in several areas and also it --

14     mortars fired on it.  There were casualties.  It was difficult to use

15     that road to get to Vogosca, Ilijas, Ilidza, and so on and so forth.  The

16     Muslim forces frequently fired on that road.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a comment on the transcript.

18     The witness said "north-west" not "south-west."

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Simic, probably it's about the Hresa or

20     Hresa-Vogosca road is the only part linking to the south and

21     south-western part of Sarajevo.  Is it correct?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] North-west, north and north-west.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   I didn't direct your attention to the use of fire control on any


Page 30061

 1     particular road.  I'm just asking if you're familiar with the concept

 2     generally?

 3        A.   Yes, I am.

 4        Q.   And am I correct that that's something that would be appropriate

 5     or lawful in the context of a road that was -- a communication road that

 6     was outside the city and controlled by the opposite side's forces but

 7     would not be lawful in the context of a road in a densely populated urban

 8     area?

 9        A.   Yes, that's correct.  It wouldn't be correct to fire on a densely

10     inhabited area.  All the streets, all the roads, are used by the

11     inhabitants, by civilians, so it wouldn't be lawful to fire on the

12     civilians, to fire on those streets; and we didn't act in this way.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, for planning purposes, the Chamber has

14     been requested to take a break at 10.15, that is now, for some technical

15     reasons.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Okay, Mr. President.  Thank you for letting me know.

17             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at

18     quarter to 11.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Harvey.

22             MR. HARVEY:  Mr. President, Your Honours, before we continue, may

23     I just please introduce Mr. Alex Friede, who has been working with my

24     team now since August of this year and has been an invaluable member of

25     the team.  Thank you.


Page 30062

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4        Q.   Colonel, this Trial Chamber has received extensive evidence from

 5     UNPROFOR personnel, military observers, international negotiators,

 6     journalists, various citizens, and others that, contrary to what you've

 7     told us about the practices of the VRS in connection with the shelling of

 8     Sarajevo, that the Bosnian Serb military forces engaged for months and

 9     years in the specific shelling of civilian areas, the random shelling of

10     the town including civilian areas, random shelling not intended for any

11     specific point target, and the existence of punitive shelling by pounding

12     the area.  Now, against that backdrop, I wanted to inform you that I want

13     to take you to certain documentation, contemporaneous documentation,

14     reflecting what was happening at the time.

15             First of all, we discussed the issue of punitive firing earlier

16     and you provided an answer about that.  So in connection with that, I'd

17     like to turn to P01041.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, while we're doing that, I want to

19     object to the comment that Mr. Tieger made in which he purported to

20     inform the witness about testimony that's been given at this trial.

21     Since it was not accompanied by a question, I think it is the kind of

22     improper type of comment that you frequently chastised Dr. Karadzic for.

23             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  Let me ask a question in that case.  I

24     just wanted to move on, but that's fine.

25        Q.   Colonel, were you aware of the fact that internationals within


Page 30063

 1     Sarajevo present day after day after day were observing what they

 2     considered to be punitive fire, disproportionate fire, firing at civilian

 3     areas, and a random fire not intended at any point target?  Did you know

 4     about that?

 5        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, in my statement I said that UNPROFOR officers at

 6     the artillery positions of the brigade group -- well, they were there

 7     from the end of June 1992 up until the end of the war.  They were on duty

 8     day and night at the command position of the mixed artillery battalion

 9     and they were accompanied by an interpreter.  At the same time, these

10     UNPROFOR were aware of the following.  If it was necessary to retaliate,

11     to open fire, to fire in the depth of the enemy territory, they were

12     informed of the type of the target concerned, of the position from which

13     artillery was firing on the target, and they were also informed on the

14     number of shells fired on the target.  And they then sent reports to

15     their superiors, to the command, to the superior central - I don't know

16     how to call it - and if they reported objectively, and I don't doubt that

17     that was the case -- well, they were immediately informed of all cases of

18     fire being opened and of what was done.  So there's nothing that can be

19     concealed.

20             They immediately submitted reports after action had been taken.

21     They asked for co-ordinates for the firing positions.  They heard about

22     this two days later, they found out about all the positions, and from

23     that command position they could see from which positions fire was being

24     opened, they listed the weapons, everything was under UNPROFOR control.

25     They had co-ordinates on the targets and information on the nature of the


Page 30064

 1     target.  As to whether they reported on action against our position, not

 2     only our firing positions but the positions of our units, if they were

 3     providing support, well, I don't know about that.  Perhaps there was some

 4     other team that was responsible for such cases.

 5        Q.   So do I understand you correctly that it's your position that

 6     when UNPROFOR or other UN officials complained, as they did repeatedly,

 7     to VRS officials about the firing on civilians or civilian neighbourhoods

 8     or civilian objects, that they were in a position to know exactly what

 9     they were talking about?

10        A.   I don't know what sort of complained they filed with the VRS

11     command.  I do know that they were informed on our artillery action

12     because all the artillery positions around Sarajevo are checked by them.

13     They were at some positions day and night and others were visited.  They

14     knew where our positions were, they could hear where action was being

15     taken from, and they could visit the positions and check things.  But at

16     the artillery positions of the 1st Sarajevo Brigade, the brigade

17     artillery, they were present there 24 hours a day with an interpreter.

18     And they were immediately informed of any fire being opened on the unit

19     being -- on the unit opening fire on the target being fired on and on the

20     reasons for which this was done.

21        Q.   You said you didn't know what complaints they made.  Does that

22     mean that there was no occasion on which your corps commanders notified

23     his personnel that there had been specific complaints by UN officials

24     about the shelling of civilian areas and demand to know what was going

25     on?


Page 30065

 1        A.   I know that a request was made for a report from the superior

 2     command after the Vase Miskina case, after Markale I, after Markale II,

 3     and so on and so forth.  This concerned about whether a unit took action

 4     and which unit, so the dates of these events are known.  UNPROFOR had to

 5     make a note of the positions from which fire was opened, if fire was

 6     opened from certain positions.  So I'm familiar with certain incidents

 7     that occurred in town and the superior command requested a report from

 8     subordinate units, a report on whether fire had been opened from certain

 9     artillery positions.

10        Q.   Now, a few moments ago, at page 28, you said there's nothing that

11     can be concealed.  Isn't it a fact, Colonel, that a concealment and

12     deception of UNPROFOR and the internationals was undertaken repeatedly by

13     the SRK to mask their intentions, to hide their weapons, and generally to

14     be able to do what they wanted to do despite the presence of the

15     international community?

16        A.   When I said nothing was concealed, well, at those positions even

17     if you wanted to hide certain things, it wasn't possible.  If you fire an

18     artillery shell from a howitzer, from a gun, if you fire a shell from a

19     mortar, this cannot be concealed.  It's not a rifle bullet that doesn't

20     allow you to determine where it was fired from.  So if they were on duty

21     in the immediate vicinity of those firing positions or at the command

22     post of the battalion, they were immediately aware of what was going on.

23     We can't say we didn't open fire if the firing position is 200 metres

24     away.  So how shall I put it?  That would have been crazy.  It wasn't our

25     intention to conceal anything.  We immediately informed them of


Page 30066

 1     everything.  Even if we had wanted to, we wouldn't have been able to

 2     conceal anything, but I'm not saying that the corps command wanted to

 3     conceal anything and to deceive UNPROFOR.  It wasn't possible to do that

 4     and we didn't have such an intention.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Let's turn to P1670, please.

 6             This reflects an order dated the 21st of August, 1994, from

 7     General Milosevic.  And let's turn to the second page in the English.

 8     And that refers to an order for the immediate removal of anti-aircraft

 9     guns and relocation to new firing positions where they will be

10     camouflaged and sheltered.  In item 4 [sic], order that all the heavy

11     weapons in the 20-kilometre zone around Sarajevo be camouflaged and

12     hidden.  Move weapons through the 20-kilometre zone only in accordance

13     with the orders so that if the need arises for such movements, they would

14     be concealed from UNPROFOR forces.

15             Turn also in that connection to P00847, which reflects a

16     February very urgent order, February 9th, 1994, to be precise, from the

17     Main Staff, specifically from deputy commander General Milovanovic,

18     ordering the movement of artillery, mainly inoperative weapons, from

19     certain positions and indicating that the commanders of the corps shall

20     put the inoperative weapons unconditionally at the disposal of, and then

21     there's an illegible commander, in order to disguise our intentions.  And

22     then if the cease-fire agreement is signed, these inoperative artillery

23     pieces could then be removed while the current basic weapons could remain

24     for use.

25             And finally if we could turn quickly to D00312.  Page 7 of the


Page 30067

 1     English, please, and it's item 5 of the B/C/S which will be at

 2     approximately -- you see the -- keep scrolling through the B/C/S, please.

 3     There it is.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can this be zoomed in?  Thank you.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could go to the next page of the B/C/S.

 6     Right, and it's toward the bottom of that paragraph.

 7        Q.   This is an analysis of combat-readiness.  This was tendered by

 8     the Defence.  And at this particular part of the analysis it indicates

 9     that:

10             "UNPROFOR observers and units have been stationed near our

11     positions; they have been observed closely in order to prevent them to

12     come to our positions and collect intelligence data."

13             Colonel, contrary to your suggestion that there was never any

14     intention on the part of the command to deceive UNPROFOR or the UNMOs in

15     any way, there was a willingness, interest, and effort to do so; isn't

16     that right?

17        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, about the first document, that document refers to

18     anti-aircraft defence weapons.  It would be the chief of the

19     anti-aircraft defence in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that is -- was in

20     charge of that.  At that time I was the commander of the mixed

21     anti-artillery regiment and my weapons were on positions also under the

22     control of UNPROFOR and they were inactive.  So I wouldn't be able to say

23     anything about the first document.

24             As for the last paragraph in the last document under number 5, as

25     far as I understand it says that in the course of the war, not a single


Page 30068

 1     unit of ours has been taken by surprise by the infiltrated enemy DTGs,

 2     and I believe that this concerns the DTGs.  This doesn't concern

 3     UNPROFOR.  The intention is to prevent DTGs to come in contact with our

 4     troops.  This does not apply to UNPROFOR.  It does not apply to

 5     preventing UNPROFOR from coming to our positions.  I think this is the

 6     way to understand it.

 7             I'm not familiar with any order.  No order arrived at my position

 8     to conceal my artillery.  When I was in charge of artillery during the

 9     periods that I mentioned in the statement, all that artillery was under

10     control of UNPROFOR forces from day one to the last day.  There are

11     reports to that effect which can easily be verified.

12        Q.   Let me make sure I understand you clearly, Colonel, do I

13     understand you, then, that your position is that you didn't hide your

14     weaponry but you're not in a position to know what others did?

15        A.   That's correct.  I did not need conceal anything.  What I had was

16     on display.  At the beginning of the war, when UNPROFOR arrived in

17     June 1992, we displayed everything to them, they made a record of

18     everything, and the weapons could not be moved from those positions.

19     When we did move them, the UNPROFOR knew from what position to what

20     position, they knew and they immediately established that those were the

21     weapons that they were aware of.  They had the serial numbers and they

22     could check them at any moment.  Those were not rifles that you can put

23     on your shoulder and move them as you wished.  Those were heavy artillery

24     weapons and UNPROFOR inspected our positions and our weapons every day.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be asked to slow down


Page 30069

 1     when answering questions.  Thank you.

 2             MR. TIEGER:

 3        Q.   Colonel, I don't know if you received this in B/C/S, but you have

 4     been asked to slow your rate of speech down so the interpreters can keep

 5     up.

 6        A.   Very well.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What the witness said has not been

 8     recorded.  They could also see whether the weapons had been approached or

 9     not.  The witness said that and it was not recorded.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Simic.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Approached by who, Mr. Simic?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The crews.  If fire had to be

14     opened, crews would approach those weapons and the UNPROFOR knew about

15     that, they were informed about that, and they could observe that

16     themselves.  Howitzers were not moved every day from one position to the

17     next.  We did change firing positions from time to time, and UNPROFOR was

18     made aware of that.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   Colonel, let's return to where we were before we discussed

21     briefly the issue of concealment and that was the issue of the

22     contemporaneous documentation bearing on the question of the nature of

23     the artillery fire against Sarajevo.

24             MR. TIEGER:  And I had just asked before we moved to the issue we

25     just discussed to call up P01041 and I'd ask that that be called to the


Page 30070

 1     screen.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can this be zoomed in, please.

 3             MR TIEGER:

 4        Q.   This is an intercepted telephone discussion involving

 5     General Mladic on the 25th of May, 1992, and General Mladic says:

 6             "If a single bullet is fired at you or at 'Jusuf Dzonlic'

 7     barracks or at 'Marsal Tito' barracks, or if a single soldier is wounded,

 8     either at the front or in the barracks, I will retaliate against the

 9     town."

10             And he goes on to note that "Sarajevo is going to shake."

11             And, Colonel, I put it to you that contrary to your suggestion

12     that there was no punitive fire or at least that you claim not to have

13     been aware of it, that from the outset of the war, at this very -- from

14     the very early stage of the war, that was a feature of the shelling of

15     Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serb forces.

16        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I still claim -- I was a battery commander at

17     this time when this document was drafted.  I never communicated with

18     General Mladic; I was not in a position to do so.  So I don't know

19     whether he ordered any such thing.  I cannot say anything about this

20     document.  No order from anybody arrived at my address to retaliate

21     against the city and to punish civilians.  So my firing positions were

22     never involved in any such thing.  No such thing was ever done from my

23     firing positions.

24             Maybe General Mladic did say that in order to avert the attention

25     of the other side, to warn them, to make them stop firing at our


Page 30071

 1     positions.  At that time in June, a major enemy offensive was launched

 2     from the city.  Maybe that's why this order was issued.  I can only

 3     speculate what General thought when he said that because no such order

 4     ever reached me.

 5        Q.   Well, there are a number of ways possibly of being aware of

 6     whether or not this position articulated by General Mladic on the

 7     25th of May came to fruition or not.  So let me show you a couple of film

 8     clips to see whether or not that happened, and then I'm going to ask you

 9     how it was that you weren't aware of whether or not General Mladic's

10     threat that Sarajevo would shake came to pass or not.  So if we --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would it be fair on the witness to

13     show him the entire document.

14             JUDGE KWON:  I think it's for you to take up that issue later on

15     in your re-examination.

16             Let us continue.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  And I'd like to look at P931 and P932 ,

18     please.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             "Every night in Sarajevo you think it can't get worse, but it

21     does, making a mockery of the attempts of mediators to bring peace to the

22     city which is enfolded in war" --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, shall we stop here.  Now I note that

24     the B/C/S translation has started.  Let's continue -- or shall we begin

25     again?  I think that's fair.


Page 30072

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             "Every night in Sarajevo you think it can't get worse, but it

 3     does, making a mockery of the attempts of mediators to bring peace to

 4     this city which is enfolded in war.

 5             "Less than 24 hours earlier, the Serb commanders had put their

 6     signatures on yet another agreement affirming a truce never adhered to

 7     and their readiness to re-open the airport.  Now the Serb gunners in the

 8     hills show where their true commitment lies.  Under a sickle moon, the

 9     city rocks to the explosions.

10             "Lit up by fire and the mass of glowing sparks adrift across its

11     roofs" --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we stop again?  I don't think -- did you hear

13     the translation, Mr. Simic?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not a single word of the

15     translation.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  May it be noted that the interpreters have not

17     been provided with the transcript of the video-clip.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I think it was translated into French but not into

19     B/C/S.  I'll leave it to you, Mr. Tieger.

20                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Can I confirm with the B/C/S booth whether it was

22     impossible to translate without the transcript?

23             THE INTERPRETER:  The B/C/S booth confirms this.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  I'll try to proceed without it.  We can


Page 30073

 1     get -- meanwhile maybe we can -- in case its turns out to be necessary on

 2     the responses, we'll move to get it to the translators if we can do that

 3     within two minutes.  Meanwhile I think I can proceed without it.

 4        Q.   Witness, you saw the images.  This is a broadcast of the

 5     7th of June, 1992, and it refers to the firing of shells from Serb

 6     gunners in the hills and that this night-time firing indicates that a

 7     mass of glowing sparks, sparks drifting across roof-tops, et cetera.  And

 8     I don't know whether or not you could actually hear the shells being

 9     fired, but I presume you could.  Let me try to move on to a shelling that

10     took place on the 9th of June, two days later, and that's P932.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             "No district spared.

13             "All shaking as every ten seconds the rocket shells and mortars

14     land.  The fire so heavy, so incessant, that the deadly streams of light

15     crisscross each other."

16             JUDGE KWON:  Let us stop here again.  If this is not translated,

17     it's fair to play it without sound because the English transcription is

18     transcribed in the LiveNote.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I think we need the sound for the sounds of

20     the shells, if no other reason, and I'm -- if necessary, I'll wait the

21     minute or two to get to the booths so this can be translated.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

23                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24             JUDGE KWON:  So --

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies --


Page 30074

 1             MR. TIEGER:  And --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Could we come to this issue later on because the

 3     transcription could be provided to the booth very soon.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.  Thank you.

 5        Q.   I'm going to return to that video momentarily, Colonel.

 6     Meanwhile, I want to bring your attention to a couple of other issues,

 7     and that's the issue of -- of specific targets versus shelling areas and

 8     scattering shots around the city.  So in that connection I'd like to turn

 9     to P0518.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The B/C/S booth has now

11     received the transcript of the second video.

12             Could the same courtesy be extended to the French booth, i.e.,

13     they need a transcript as well.  Thank you.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, P0 -- I'm sorry, P01518, my apologies.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Zoom in.

16             MR. TIEGER:

17        Q.   Again, this is General Mladic, this time on the 28th of May, now

18     discussing where to fire of the artillery into Sarajevo with

19     Mirko Vukasinovic.  And as you see, General Mladic tells him:  "Shoot at

20     Velesici, also at Pofalici, there's not much Serb population there."  And

21     then tells him:  "Shoot there, around Dobrovoljacka Street, up around

22     Humska," and they talk about Djure Djakovica Street.  And then

23     General Mladic explains:

24             "Apply artillery" -- it's translated as "reconnaissance" here,

25     the word may be closer to "observation" or "monitoring," "so that they


Page 30075

 1     cannot sleep, that we roll out of their minds ..."

 2             All right I'm going to show you two more quickly along the same

 3     lines.  Next 1511.

 4             General Mladic again, this time on the 29th, this time speaking

 5     to Mr. Potpara.  And he says:

 6             "As soon as the motherfuckers attack you, fire at them.  Can you

 7     hit the railway station?"

 8             He says:

 9             "Hit them with something and scatter them around."

10             And finally P1521.  If we can turn the second page of the English

11     and the second page of the B/C/S.

12             General Mladic again, again with Vukasinovic, telling him to fire

13     at Velesici and then asking:  "Can you also shell Bascarsija?"  And when

14     he receives an affirmative answer from Vukasinovic saying:  "Fire a salvo

15     at Bascarsija as well."

16             Now, Colonel, I've just shown you three reflections of the kind

17     of shelling and targeting that was going on.  First of all, it's true,

18     isn't it, that those documents reflect the shelling of areas and not

19     point targeting ordered by General Mladic?

20        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I just told you a little while ago, according to

21     what I know, I did not receive any such orders.  You see who this applied

22     to, you see what firing positions this applies to.  They were never under

23     my control, I was never in command of those, I never received any such

24     orders.  If there are documents to that effect, I suppose that such

25     orders were issued; however, you can see from Colonel Vukasinovic's


Page 30076

 1     answers, we responded, i.e., they returned fire.  They fired upon the

 2     firing positions from which they had been fired at.

 3             That was the end of May and the beginning of June.  This was a

 4     major offensive by the enemy troops, and I just heard on the clip the

 5     cannonade of shells but there was nothing less happening in Lukavica, so

 6     it was an exchange of fire on both sides.  I'm sure that civilians did

 7     get hurt, that civilian facilities did get destroyed, but the culprits

 8     should be sought on the other side.  According to what I know, it was not

 9     our intention to fire -- to shell the city just for the firing sake.

10     Velesici is mentioned here.  You shouldn't forget that the Serbian

11     population from Velesici had been expelled and slaughtered.  Only small

12     groups managed to break through, and I believe that the audio was to the

13     effect of firing at Velesici because of that, because that population had

14     experienced an exodus in the months of May and June.  They had to flee

15     from the territory of Velesici.

16             And here they mentioned targets, the railway station.  And from

17     the sector of the railway station not only mortars fired but also tanks

18     and cannons, weapons of a longer range.  So the target was not a railway

19     station -- the railway station but a military target in the vicinity of

20     the railway station.  This means that those were responses to the enemy

21     offensive that was launched at the time.  Fire was opened in order to

22     protect the Serbian population that was pulling out from Zuc, Velesici,

23     and Hum, and other sectors.  And I underline once again, according to

24     what I know, and you have to bear in mind that I never received such

25     orders, you can see which units this applied to, and you know what units


Page 30077

 1     I was responsible for and you can conclude whether I was in a position to

 2     know about this.  As for the firing and the cannonade of shells, this was

 3     just our response.

 4             And now you actually brought me down the memory lane.  And now I

 5     remember everything that I had to go through in 1992, all the terror, all

 6     those horrific things that I experienced.

 7        Q.   Well, in that connection then let me return to P932 for which

 8     there is now a transcript in the booth --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Before that because -- Mr. Simic you tried to

10     explain General Mladic's position.  I'm asking this.  Shall I upload

11     P1511, the previous intercept where Mladic was indicating to hit the

12     railway station, and you explained to us the reason why Mladic was

13     ordering to hit a railway station.  But after that he -- Mladic said -

14     could you zoom in a bit further - "Hit them with something" and he

15     continued saying "and scatter them around."

16             What does it mean, "scattering them around"?  Why did he need to

17     scatter the shells around?  Could you explain that as well, Mr. Simic?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what he had in mind,

19     but I think that they are thinking about the target that they're firing

20     on in the vicinity of the railway station.  First he didn't say

21     "destroy," destroy, disperse them so that they stop acting from that

22     sector.  I don't know what General Mladic had in mind, but in my opinion,

23     that is what it would be.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.


Page 30078

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

 2        Q.   Colonel, I had asked to play P932 in response to your suggestion

 3     that you didn't know whether Mladic's threat that the town would shake

 4     had transpired or not.  So let me play that again for you.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             "No district spared.

 7             "All shaking as every ten seconds the rocket shells and mortars

 8     land, the fire so heavy, so incessant that the deadly streams of light

 9     crisscross each other.  By early Monday morning, the inundation of the

10     hospitals begins.  For the doctors and the nurses of the city's former

11     military hospital, already up throughout the night, the beginning of a

12     dark, grim day, the like of which they've never known.  Trained fingers

13     which for 24 hours will work without respite, to stem blood, extract

14     jagged metal, preserve life.  But so many casualties of" --

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Colonel, you had a chance to see both 931 and 932, the shelling

17     that took place both on the 7th or the broadcast that took place

18     reflecting the shellings that took place.  Those broadcasts were on the

19     7th and the 9th.  I suggest to you that you would have been well aware of

20     the fact that General Mladic's threat to make the town shake had, indeed,

21     occurred .

22        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, as far as I can see from this clip, the first

23     person wounded who was shown here, 30 or 40 years old, wasn't a civilian.

24     I think he had a military boot on his foot, so he was a military target

25     and he was wounded.  This happens, one is wounded or killed in war.


Page 30079

 1     Unfortunately, there were civilian casualties too.  I think the second

 2     image showed a boy.  Unfortunately, these such things happened too

 3     because it's an urban settlement, an inhabited settlement.

 4             I won't forget the cannonade of the Muslim artillery in May 1992.

 5     I'll repeat that, their intention was to breakthrough the city as soon as

 6     possible and to take up positions around the town.  That was their

 7     intention, their objective, at the time.  Hundreds, thousands, of shells

 8     hit the surrounding villages.  We also sustained casualties at our

 9     positions and in particular in villages, in settlements where there were

10     no firing positions, but they fired at random on those targets.  So there

11     was fire in retaliation and there were probably civilian casualties.

12     That's what I can say about this.  I do remember the period of May and

13     June.

14             And if I could just add another sentence, I know that during that

15     period I couldn't sleep for two nights, for example.  In the course of

16     the day I tried to find half an hour to have a bit of a rest because they

17     were continually requesting support for the forces at the front line not

18     to target the town because these forces hadn't fortified themselves

19     correctly and hadn't secured the line.  So it was necessary to maintain

20     the positions that had been taken at the very beginning, and they were

21     maintained until the end of the war and perhaps there were very minor

22     movements forward or backwards.  It doesn't mean that they were at rest,

23     that they were inactive, and that we targeted them; that is not the case.

24        Q.   You referred to thousands of shells from Muslim artillery.  Are

25     you suggesting to this Court, Colonel, that there was basically parity in


Page 30080

 1     the amount of weaponry, amount and nature of weaponry, between the ABiH

 2     and the VRS at this time and that the shelling by the ABiH was equivalent

 3     to or greater than the incoming fire to Sarajevo by the VRS?  Is that

 4     what you're saying?

 5        A.   As I have already told you, at the beginning we had more

 6     equipment but they soon consolidated themselves and obtained ammunition

 7     and weapons.  The Viktor Bubanj barracks, the Marsal Tito barracks,

 8     Jusuf Dzonlic were abandoned, all of these were abandoned.  A column in

 9     Dobrovoljacka was cut off in army command.  Weapons were taken away.  In

10     the Marsal Tito barracks quite a few artillery pieces remained and the

11     school -- moved it from Zadar to the Marsal Tito barracks, 115-millimetre

12     howitzers remained there, tanks, 122-millimetre howitzers, Gvozdiks,

13     personnel carriers and mortars -- a number of mortars remained there.  So

14     it's not as if they were unarmed.  From the very beginning they fired on

15     us from tanks and cannons and this gradually grew more and more

16     intensive.  There were flame-launchers and perhaps an Oganj, but I'm not

17     sure.  All of these things were in the Marsal Tito barracks.  They

18     remained in the Marsal Tito barracks when the JNA left the barracks.

19        Q.   Let's turn to P2668 and see how General Milosevic characterised

20     it in July of 1995.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It doesn't say Gvozdik or

22     multiple-rocket launcher or flame-launcher, perhaps.  Oganj is also not

23     included in the transcript so the transcript is not quite correct.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Let me just point out these kinds of interventions

25     for the transcript I know are not going to -- I think we're all


Page 30081

 1     accustomed to the fact when the speaker is moving quickly, the transcript

 2     doesn't always immediately reflect those remarks and that's, as I

 3     understand it, remedied through a process after court.  But I'm at the

 4     Court's disposal for that.  I just don't know how many interruptions are

 5     useful when we have a speaker who is going on for a long period of time

 6     in a fast manner.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I -- I note there are several phonetic marks, so I

 8     take it that that will be taken care of by the court reporters.

 9             Do you confirm, Mr. Simic, having said those things referred to

10     by Mr. Karadzic?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I said multiple-rocket

12     launcher, flame-thrower, I'm not sure about the Oganj.  I also mentioned

13     the Gvozdik and the howitzers, the 122 -- the D-30 as well.  I didn't say

14     the D-30 but I had that in mind, too.  They're the Gvozdiks that are

15     120-millimetre -- that have 122-millimetre calibre as well.  So I

16     mentioned all of these items.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Again, given that everything you say is to be

18     translated, please slow down in answering the question, Mr. Simic.

19             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:

21        Q.   Colonel, I told you we wanted to look at a warning issued by

22     General Milosevic in July of 1995 to the brigades, and if you look at the

23     beginning of paragraph 4, we see that General Milosevic says:

24             "While we used massive artillery at a time when the enemy had

25     just a few mortars and the occasional gun, we did not manage to settle


Page 30082

 1     the war ..."

 2             That's a reference to the period in 1992, including the period

 3     we've just been looking at, Colonel, isn't it, and a reflection of the

 4     fact that there was a dramatically disproportionate array of weaponry at

 5     the disposal of the two forces?

 6        A.   I'm not disputing the fact that it was disproportionate at the

 7     beginning of the war.  I said this on two or three occasions.  At the

 8     beginning of the war that was the case, but gradually they armed

 9     themselves in various ways.  Certain witnesses will testify about this

10     after me, witnesses who are familiar with how they obtained weapons and

11     ammunition.  I only heard about this and wouldn't want to go into it.

12        Q.   Who are those witnesses, Colonel?

13        A.   Well, I say there will probably be witnesses from those areas who

14     will be called here, that will probably be the case, perhaps brigade

15     commanders who controlled the passage of convoys of alleged humanitarian

16     aid, of what was supposed to be humanitarian aid.  But amongst the

17     humanitarian aid they would find ammunition and weapons and so on and so

18     forth in their areas of responsibility.  I heard about that, there was

19     such cases -- I only heard about it so I can't confirm this, but there

20     will probably be someone who personally experienced this.  I don't know

21     who these witnesses will be, but I assume that they will include brigade

22     commanders.

23        Q.   Well, let's look at some of the other things that

24     General Milosevic had to say to the troops in 1995.  He notes in the

25     first paragraph that for the first time, for the first time, we are faced


Page 30083

 1     with the fact that on top of having the advantage in manpower, now the

 2     enemy has an advantage of artillery.  And then he goes on in the second

 3     paragraph to note the following:

 4             "Despite being aware that we are facing problems in ammunition

 5     production, especially of specific types, we are continuing with this lax

 6     behaviour and are spending ammunition as if we had it in abundance,

 7     trying at any cost to outfire the enemy artillery.  That is why we very

 8     often fire at inhabited settlements and specific buildings when there are

 9     no combat actions whatsoever, spending vast quantities of ammunition,

10     without paying attention to the fact that we will not have anything to

11     stop the enemy when it comes to mounting a decisive defence."

12             And then he goes on in the third paragraph to note roughly --

13     essentially the same thing, expressing that it is inexplicable that some

14     brigades are spending much more ammunition firing at inhabited

15     settlements where there is no combat than others who are repelling fierce

16     attacks.

17             Now, contrary to your suggestion earlier, I think at page 24,

18     that there wasn't the massive use of artillery against Sarajevo by the

19     VRS because of a lack of ammunition, General Milosevic confirms precisely

20     the opposite, that the SRK was expending vast amounts of artillery and

21     doing so against inhabited settlements where there were no combat

22     actions.  That's the reality, isn't it, Colonel?

23        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, all artillery units had to face up to this lack

24     of ammunition.  They tried to save ammunition.  In 1995 I was an official

25     in the artillery organ and I visited the positions.  I gathered


Page 30084

 1     information with regard to the amount of ammunition available and I

 2     conveyed orders from the chief of artillery and from Commander Milosevic

 3     according to which ammunition should be saved.  Only well-observed

 4     targets should be fired on if fire could be adjusted.  This was in order

 5     to save ammunition and to be as effective as possible.  There are

 6     probably cases, as stated in this document, where certain troops spent

 7     more ammunition than necessary and they probably targeted targets that

 8     they shouldn't have.  I can't say whether this was the case or not, but

 9     the general did issue warnings and said that it was necessary to save

10     ammunition, to use ammunition sparingly.

11        Q.   I had asked you earlier about both offensive operations and I

12     wanted to turn quickly to P5940.  This refers to the Talis 2 operation in

13     1995, and again, Colonel, this would appear to be an offensive operation,

14     indicating that the VRS forces shall continue fighting further to the

15     Main Staff directive with the objective of seizing the Lukavac

16     village-Siljak-Mocevici village line.  So would this be another offensive

17     operation?

18        A.   This isn't an offensive operation.  It's an offensive action, the

19     purpose of which is to improve the tactical position in Lukavica and

20     Siljak sector and so on and so forth.  That is where the Muslim forces

21     moved our positions back in the direction of Trnovo and this order in

22     particular concerns improving the tactical position in the Zlatiste

23     sector, the Debelo Brdo and Brajkovac sector, so that's to the south or

24     south-east of Sarajevo, roughly speaking.  So it concerned improving the

25     tactical position, moving the line by a hundred or 200 metres, even less


Page 30085

 1     in certain areas, perhaps 50 metres in certain areas.  So that order

 2     concerned the 9th of May, 1995.  It's not a matter of operation.  That

 3     would include all the brigade -- all the corps brigades which would have

 4     different tasks.  Here it says improve the position, take back positions

 5     at Siljak, Proskok and so on and so forth, and take Debelo Brdo,

 6     Brajkovac, Rajlaca [phoen].

 7        Q.   The order also refers to placing a major part of Stari Grad under

 8     fire control with the objective of ultimate victory.  Now, I asked you

 9     questions about fire control earlier and you indicated that it would not

10     be lawful or appropriate in the context of an urban area.

11        A.   As I understand it, you said that most of Stari Grad should be

12     placed under fire control.  In order to control their fire, it was

13     necessary to improve the tactical position of our forces so that we could

14     control their fire coming from the inside because that part of town on

15     Zlatiste was a road that was targeted by snipers and mortars from their

16     positions.  This was continually the case.  In order to establish control

17     over that road and control the fire they opened from the inside -- well,

18     I think that's what we had in mind not to establish fire control.  We can

19     establish fire control, or rather, we can control matters.  It doesn't

20     mean we will fire.  To have control and to open fire doesn't mean the

21     same thing.

22        Q.   So you can have fire control without fire?  Is that what you're

23     trying to say?

24        A.   You can have control.  In order to prevent them from taking

25     action, we can have control over the town.  We can observe it without


Page 30086

 1     taking action, without firing on the town if fire isn't opened from the

 2     other side.  Since we knew where our positions were and a breakthrough

 3     couldn't be achieved, they wouldn't try to do anything if they didn't

 4     believe that they could be successful in their attempt, if they didn't

 5     believe they could attain their objective.

 6        Q.   Well, how are you going to convey the message that they can't be

 7     successful in their objective if there is a moratorium on any fire in

 8     order to achieve fire control?

 9        A.   If you mean the ban on opening fire, the Serbian forces never or

10     almost never broke the truce.  They weren't the first to do that.  This

11     was always done by the other side in order to provoke the units of the

12     VRS, to provoke them to react, and they did this deliberately.  This was

13     the case from the very beginning of the war.  Even if there were

14     negotiations on moving the artillery at the time, if there was anything

15     that was to their benefit --

16        Q.   No, no, Colonel, stop -- please --

17        A.   Very well.

18        Q.   I apologise for that, but I'm asking you about this particular

19     order and this particular effort toward the objective of achieving

20     ultimate victory.  And I'm not going to ask you another rhetorical

21     question.  I'm going to put it to you more directly that this was an

22     order to achieve control over Stari Grad through the use of artillery

23     fire in the same manner as the fire-control discussion we had before

24     about keeping a road under fire control by firing at it constantly.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see item 4 in the English


Page 30087

 1     version --

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Wait, wait, wait --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- item 4 that the Prosecution is

 4     referring to now.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Are you referring to para 4, Mr. Tieger, or

 6     number 2?

 7             MR. TIEGER:  It's also in -- I directed the witness's attention

 8     to para 2.  It's also in para 4 with the same language.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Well, then it's fair to show para 4.

10             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

11             JUDGE KWON:  It's here now but not in English.

12             Do you remember the question or shall I ask Mr. Tieger to repeat

13     his question?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, paragraph 2 and

15     paragraph 4 show quite clearly what Mr. -- what General Milosevic said.

16     Mount a decisive defence of the positions obtained and improve tactical

17     positions and breakthrough to certain elevations above Sarajevo in order

18     to establish control over Sarajevo, the Stari Grad that you're talking

19     about, in order to gain control and to have a better view of that part of

20     the town.  That's what he has in mind.  He doesn't mean establish

21     artillery control.  To control and to open fire is not the same thing.

22     In paragraph 4 it says:  I have decided to use the main units of the

23     corps to mount a decisive offence of the positions and to breakthrough to

24     Debelo Brdo and Grdonj.  These are hills above Sarajevo.  It's not in the

25     town; it's above the town.  One of the places is near


Page 30088

 1     Lukavica-Zlatiste-Pale road and the other near Hresa-Vogosca road.  So it

 2     was necessary to establish control of those hills that were making it

 3     difficult to use those roads.  That's what it says quite clearly in

 4     paragraph 2 and paragraph 4 in this decision from the corps commander.  I

 5     don't understand what is not clear here.

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   So your -- Colonel, your testimony is that the -- that

 8     establishing -- the language establishing fire control is not a reference

 9     to artillery use but instead a reference to the physical control of roads

10     above Stari Grad?

11        A.   It says achieve control of the Stari Grad, achieve firing

12     control.  It doesn't say the artillery.  It says we should be able to

13     control that part, that the road is practicable.  We need to control that

14     part.  It doesn't say fire on the Stari Grad from artillery and infantry

15     weapons.  It says place under control, it means establish control over

16     the situation and have an advantageous position, which would be the case

17     if we took those elevations.  So it was an offensive action, not an

18     operation, because it was in a small part of the front.  That's where the

19     action was taken.  It has nothing to do with an attack launched on

20     Sarajevo.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I just suggest something.  In

22     the document it says "shallow," but the transcript never uses this term.

23     The Colonel often mentions shallow incursions.  It's not a breakthrough,

24     it's an incursion.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I think that's again a subject for you to take up in


Page 30089

 1     your re-examination.  I think we can continue.

 2             MR. TIEGER:

 3        Q.   And, in fact, Colonel, the person responsible for fire control of

 4     Stari Grad -- well, first of all, let me -- there were no military

 5     targets in Stari Grad that you named in your statement, were there?

 6        A.   As far as I can remember, from the very beginning of the war,

 7     from Bistrik and from the other side of Sedrenik and from that sector,

 8     mortar fire was opened on Serbian positions in Miljevici, Lukavica,

 9     Grbavica, as well as Mrkovici and Kresa and so on and so forth.  In other

10     words, I remember that there were such things.  At the end of the war, in

11     1995, they provided support to their forces from those areas; in other

12     words, there was mortar fire opened from Stari Grad, from that part of

13     the city.

14        Q.   And I'm referring in particular to paragraph 23 of your

15     statement.

16             And as it happens, Colonel, the person responsible for placing a

17     major part of Stari Grad under fire control was the deputy chief of

18     artillery, you; correct?

19        A.   I could not be responsible for placing Stari Grad under control.

20     I could not be the deputy chief of artillery.  I was a desk officer in

21     artillery.  It must have been somebody above me.  When it comes

22     specifically to this operation on Debelo Brdo, Rajkovac, I was

23     responsible.  Probably the chief of artillery was absent.  So I was

24     not responsible for placing Stari Grad under control but on that

25     particular axis, Zlatiste-Kula and an elevation which is specified in the


Page 30090

 1     order, on that axis - I could show you that on a map if you have one - in

 2     the Rajkovac sector I was responsible for that.  I was not responsible

 3     for placing Stari Grad under control.  It doesn't specify so in the order

 4     nor was I responsible for that.

 5        Q.   Colonel, because of the time I want to move on to the issue of

 6     air bombs which you address in paragraphs 21 through 22 of your

 7     statement.  And in that statement you appear to be a proponent of the

 8     precision and accuracy of air bombs, emphasising that the weapons were

 9     very precise, just like standard artillery weapons.  In terms of

10     direction, there was almost no deviation in relation to the recorded

11     elements.  First of all, I wanted to ask you what you -- what your

12     experience was with air bombs.  You note in your statement that you

13     personally observed the effects of a modified air bomb twice.  That's in

14     paragraph 22.  Apart from those instances, what other experience or

15     responsibilities did you have in connection with air bombs?

16        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, what I stated under 21, I would like to repeat

17     that the first time I encountered an air bomb was in the second half of

18     1994.  That was the first time I came across modified air bombs and air

19     launchers.  That was the first time I observed their activity on the

20     forward line of the enemy in Nisici plateau.  Based on that experience

21     and based on my second experience in the Trnovo sector, I don't know when

22     that was, I believe that it was either in November or December, before

23     the final cease-fire was agreed, that was the command post of the

24     81st Infantry Battalion of the Muslim forces.  And based on those two

25     instances about the behaviour of the weapons during fire, they hit the


Page 30091

 1     target that I requested, I saw the weapons at the time which could not be

 2     made by laymen but by professionals.  They possessed everything else that

 3     the other classic artillery weapons had, optical sights, mechanisms for

 4     moving the launcher in height, and that also required trained crew and

 5     that's how targets were hit.  I don't know whether there were any other

 6     experiences.  I don't know.  I shared with you my experience, my personal

 7     experience, and what I saw and I claim that with full responsibility.  I

 8     don't know if there were any other different experiences in other areas;

 9     I wouldn't be able to tell you about that.

10        Q.   Okay, Colonel, the question was:  Apart from seeing air bombs

11     used twice, did you have anything else to do with them?  And then you

12     proceeded to tell me again, as is contained in your statement, that you

13     saw them twice and then you repeated most of what is contained in

14     paragraphs 21 through 22.  My question was:  Apart from that, did you

15     have anything to do with air bombs?

16        A.   As far as I can remember, no.  I was not in charge, I was not

17     involved, nor was I able to be involved in any shape or form with that

18     regard.

19        Q.   And let's be clear about what we're talking about when we're

20     talking about air bombs, though I think some aspects of your statement

21     make clear.  In paragraph 22 you identify the reason why you think air

22     bombs came into use and that was because the VRS had them in stock.  It

23     wasn't possible to use them in the conventional way by dropping them from

24     airplanes.  And it was a handy way to compensate for some of the -- of

25     what you referred to as the classical artillery ammunition the VRS


Page 30092

 1     lacked.  So what we're talking about here is basically this, that you're

 2     talking about bombs that are intended to be dropped from airplanes;

 3     correct?

 4        A.   Correct.

 5        Q.   With huge explosive potential?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   VRS is unable to deliver them with airplanes and so it devised a

 8     way to deliver them in another manner and that was by using rockets to

 9     propel them?

10        A.   Yes, rocket engines from a launch pad.  That's how they were

11     launched and that's how they were able to hit targets, something to that

12     effect, yes.

13        Q.   How were the rockets affixed to the air bombs in order to get

14     them to the -- to get them to wherever the alleged target was?

15        A.   It was not a rocket -- an air bomb became a rocket.  It was

16     rendered capable of becoming a rocket.  A rocket engine was attached to

17     the back of the air bomb, there was a stabiliser attached to that, and a

18     certain quantity of rocket gunpowder which was activated by electricity.

19     An air bomb, when it became a rocket, was attached -- it was affixed to a

20     launch pad.  There was a device that held it to the launch pad.  When it

21     was activated, the fuel was activated, and that's what propelled the air

22     bomb which became a rocket because it had rocket propellant and that's

23     how it could fly all the way to the target.  If you had all the tables

24     where the professionals had calculated how far the rocket would fly and

25     with which quantity of fuel, that's the elements that we took into


Page 30093

 1     account, the length.  And there is also the classical targeting because

 2     there were devices for moving the launcher in height and precision tools

 3     for targeting.  So there was no difference in sights or setting up

 4     targets, but just the fuel.  The air bomb would become a rocket if

 5     provided with --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  The witness is speaking too fast.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Simic, interpreters noted that you are speaking

 8     too fast.  Could you repeat from the part when you referred to:  "... air

 9     bomb would become a rocket if provided with ..." from there.  After you

10     said:  "There is no difference in sights or setting up targets, but just

11     the fuel," could you repeat from there.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.  The Prosecutor asked me

13     how that rocket was affixed to the air bomb.  It was not that the rocket

14     was attached to the air bomb, but in factual terms the air bomb became a

15     rocket when a rocket engine was attached to the rear of that bomb and it

16     had rocket charge and that changed its purpose and it was no longer an

17     air bomb but a rocket.  That's what we can call it.  Although we did not

18     call it a rocket because it was launched in a similar way as any other

19     rockets in multiple-rocket launchers called Plamen and Oganj.

20             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  Let's take a look at 65 ter 40099.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

23             "The detachment devised and in practice proved the application of

24     utility in sabotage uses.  The 21st Detachment for the first time used

25     the mobile rocket-launcher."


Page 30094

 1             May it be noted that the interpreters were not provided with a

 2     transcript of this video.

 3             "An exceptional fire-power of the detachment reflected in the

 4     ability to launch 18 shells and 152, 57-millimetre rockets."

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   All right.  Colonel, is that one of the ways in which air bombs

 7     became -- as you put it, became rockets?

 8        A.   Yes.  That would be the way.  However, I never saw such a

 9     launcher with five launching pads.  I never saw that.  I saw just the one

10     with the one launch pad.  I suppose that the sabotage detachment of the

11     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had that, but I never saw it.  This is about

12     57-millimetre rocket-launcher.  I'm not familiar with this weapon, but

13     that's how it was done.  A rocket engine was affixed to the air bomb and

14     that's how an air bomb became a rocket, if we're talking about air bombs.

15     I believe that my explanation, the way I provided it, is very much

16     reflected in the video-clip that we have just seen.

17        Q.   In addition to screwing a rocket into the back end of an air

18     bomb, were rockets also affixed to air bombs -- to larger air bombs by

19     welding them -- welding a number of rockets, that is, three or four, to

20     the body of the air bomb and launching it in that fashion?

21        A.   I don't know anything about that.  It's a technical issue how

22     things were affixed to each other.  Maybe you should ask the experts who

23     were involved.  I only know that it was indeed affixed, that it was

24     placed on the launch pad, one air bomb, and that's how it was activated,

25     just as we saw in the video-clip, by electricity.  As far as I know,


Page 30095

 1     nothing was affixed -- nothing else was affixed to air bombs because any

 2     additional element, if you added anything else to the rocket that would

 3     have a bearing on its accuracy.  The air bomb would become heavier, the

 4     elements from the table would not correspond to its properties, and it

 5     would become inaccurate.  It would not hit the target.  The tables did

 6     not envisage attaching anything to that air bomb, just the rocket fuel

 7     could be affixed to it and that was all that was envisaged by firing

 8     tables.

 9        Q.   Okay.

10             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that video, Mr. President.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Do you know the source of it or -- and the timing,

13     Mr. Tieger?

14             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah, I do have that somewhere, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it with the understanding that they will

16     be forthcoming later on.

17             Let's give the number.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, that's Exhibit P5982.

19                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

20             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Mr. President, just a little guidance on the

21     timing of the break.  Do you want to go till 12.30 and then -- or do you

22     want [overlapping speakers] --

23             JUDGE KWON:  How much -- I'm sorry, I was overlapping.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, I won't finish by 12.30 in any event, so I'm

25     entirely in the Court's hands on that.


Page 30096

 1             JUDGE KWON:  We'll take a break at 12.30 --

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  -- if it is okay with you.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  That's fine.

 5        Q.   All right.  So, Colonel, I understand that you don't have any

 6     particular understanding of or grip on the use of air bombs that involved

 7     more than one rocket?  You don't deny that that -- that those were used;

 8     you're just not familiar with it?

 9        A.   Yes, that's correct.

10        Q.   Now, with respect to the use of a single rocket stuck into the

11     back end of an air bomb, let me ask you this question:  Is it your

12     position that -- well, first of all, before I get to that, let me ask you

13     something about the optical -- the built-in sighting mechanism that you

14     referred to and the lack of deviation from any elements.  Now, I'm not

15     sure precisely what you were referring to as the built-in sighting

16     mechanism because that may involve a term of art.  Are you referring to

17     the device that's affixed to, for example, both a mortar at the top of

18     the tripod and also a rocket-launching system so that the firing table

19     calculations can be -- so you can adjust the elevation of the launcher

20     accordingly?

21        A.   Yes, precisely.  The sighting mechanism is for aiming at targets;

22     without it, you would just shoot, aim for nothing.  We had a sighting

23     mechanism in order to hit the target.  We wanted not only to fire the

24     bomb but also to hit the target.  That's why there was sighting

25     mechanisms.  You could -- they were similar to sighting mechanisms on a


Page 30097

 1     mortar.  You could apply elements to them, you could set your target, and

 2     there were devices like on the classical mechanisms on the lower part of

 3     the launcher to adjust the elevation and to adjust the trajectory.  I

 4     don't have to be familiar with any specific weapons, but when I come to a

 5     new weapon, when I see that it has all of those elements, when I have a

 6     trained crew, then I use that piece of weaponry just like any other

 7     classical piece of weaponry.  You do your corrections and so on and so

 8     forth.  The air bombs were precise, they did not deviate much, they had a

 9     rocket engine that could stabilise it throughout flight just like a

10     rocket in a multiple-rocket launcher.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  The witness is speaking too fast.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Simic, interpreters were not able to keep up

13     with you again.  Could you slow down and repeat your question -- repeat

14     your answer, please.  From -- they stopped after they translated you

15     saying that:

16             "The air bombs were precise, they did not deviate much, they had

17     a rocket engine that could stabilise it throughout flight, just like a

18     rocket in a multiple-rocket launcher."

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.

20     I'm trying to speak slowly; however, they were accurate, as I have just

21     told you, because they had rocket engines and stabilisers that they had

22     allowed them a stable flight.  There were no -- there were no deviations

23     in trajectory, just like in rockets that were launched from

24     multiple-rocket launchers.  When it came to distance, it had a similar

25     dispersion picture as a rocket.  It -- targets were over-targeted or


Page 30098

 1     short-targeted but not much.  The deviations were marginal.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that the second

 3     element -- there are two targeting elements, one is distance and the

 4     other is direction, and I don't see that this has been recorded properly.

 5     The direction has not been recorded properly.  It was omitted from the

 6     transcript.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Did you say that, Mr. Simic, those two elements,

 8     distance and direction?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  I was talking about

10     direction where there were marginal deviations, if any at all, and there

11     were also marginal deviations when it came to distance so the target

12     could be either short-targeted or over-targeted but only marginally.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   Okay.  So the process with the air bombs that you assert you're

16     familiar with, that is, the ones where the rocket was screwed into the

17     back end of an air bomb, was that the -- the relative co-ordinates of the

18     target would be identified, then someone would open up the rocket firing

19     tables to find out the elevation that should be used to achieve that

20     distance, then would use that device you talked about to elevate the

21     launcher to the correct number of mils as indicated by the rocket firing

22     table, and then it would be fired or perhaps some directional adjustment

23     could be made as well.  Is that basically it?

24        A.   Yes, that's precisely so.

25        Q.   So you're not suggesting that the addition of a -- an air bomb to


Page 30099

 1     a rocket would somehow improve its precision and accuracy; you're just

 2     suggesting that it didn't make any appreciable difference?

 3        A.   I don't understand your question.  If I understood you properly a

 4     while ago and if things were interpreted properly to me, I explained that

 5     when something is attached to an air bomb and -- the only thing that is

 6     attached to it is a rocket engine which propels it to take it to the

 7     target, nothing else.  And the firing tables had been prepared in advance

 8     and based on the quantity of the fuel that has to propel the air bomb to

 9     a certain distance and that's the elevation that you take.  Based on the

10     weight of the air bomb, that's how you decide the quantity of the fuel or

11     the gunpowder that has to propel it to the target.  Nothing else is

12     attached to it but the rocket engine that propels it to the target.  I

13     don't what else.  What I'm saying is that nothing else is attached to the

14     air bomb but the rocket engine which is necessary to launch the air bomb

15     in the first place.

16             I don't know what you're saying in your question.  Why are you

17     saying that something else is affixed or attached to it?  I don't know if

18     anything else is attached to it or --

19        Q.   Stop, please.  Stop.  You don't have to ask rhetorical questions.

20     We can get this straightened out very quickly.  It's not the bomb itself

21     that has a firing table because it's normally dropped out of an airplane,

22     right; it's rocket that has a firing table?

23        A.   Correct.  However, in view of the situation that we discussed

24     just a while ago, we -- I told you how we launched it.  It could not just

25     be launched arbitrarily.  All the other elements had to be provided in


Page 30100

 1     advance in order to launch an air bomb.  You had to have firing tables,

 2     and those firing tables are made by experts.  I was not involved in

 3     compiling firing tables so I wouldn't know what they entailed.  But just

 4     like any other artillery weapons experts are familiar with the type of

 5     shells, you determine distances for a certain type of ammunition, there

 6     are firing tables for every artillery weapon.  And that's how things were

 7     done for air bombs as well.  That was done subsequently when those

 8     launchers were crafted, and when launching of air bombs started in that

 9     way, firing tables were devised.  They were compiled, they had to be

10     prepared in advance because everything else would have been just shooting

11     blindly, shooting in the air, I don't know where.  Firing tables were

12     compiled in order to hit the target and they accompanied every piece of

13     weaponry, of course.

14        Q.   Did you ever see one of these firing tables?

15        A.   Yes, on those two occasions -- actually on just one occasion.

16     The first time I saw those firing tables, I saw how elements were

17     calculated and applied to the weapon that was used on the Nisici plateau.

18        Q.   And was it a Plamen?  Oganj?  Grad?  Or another firing table?

19        A.   A firing table for Plamen whose rocket weighs 21 or

20     22 kilogrammes and had a rocket propellant cannot correspond to a bomb

21     that weighs 220 kilogrammes or any other.  I don't know how experts

22     calculated all that, but I saw special firing tables for that particular

23     launcher that was used there.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, I see the time.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.


Page 30101

 1             JUDGE KWON:  It's about time to take a break, but can I ask how

 2     much longer would you need to conclude your cross-examination?

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Estimating 30 to 45 minutes.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I just noted that you spent more than four hours,

 5     which you estimated, just for information.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, I noted that as well.  It's one of the reasons

 7     I was -- I repeatedly noted that -- it was not to be impolite but to note

 8     that the witness did have a tendency to speak on for a period of time.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll have a break for 45 minutes and

10     resume at quarter past 1.00.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 1.50 p.m.

14             JUDGE KWON:  The proceedings have been delayed due to technical

15     difficulties again.

16             There are a couple of matters that I'd like to deal with before

17     we go further in the absence of the witness.

18             First, in relation to the witness after the next one, i.e.,

19     Dusan Zurovac, the Chamber notes the following.  The Chamber has received

20     three signed versions of the witness's statements dated respectively the

21     2nd, the 5th, and the 9th of November.  The first of these signed

22     statements made reference to 11 associated exhibits, the second to

23     20 exhibits, and the third to 29 exhibits.  None of the nine additional

24     associated exhibits sought for admission in the third version of the

25     statement are on the accused's 65 ter list.  The third version of the


Page 30102

 1     statement also adds 12 short paragraphs related to scheduled incidents F4

 2     and F10.

 3             The Chamber is concerned that the accused's Defence team met with

 4     the witness three times over the course of one week to produce three

 5     signed statements, adding new material along the way and even after the

 6     date when the witness was scheduled to testify.  The accused's

 7     explanation in the latest Rule 92 ter notification that "revisions were

 8     made necessary by the discovery of additional documents and information

 9     concerning the area of the witness's responsibility" is not sufficient or

10     satisfactory.  It is incumbent on the Defence team to provide one signed

11     statement which reflects the evidence the witness will provide.  This

12     practice of producing multiple signed versions of a witness statement is

13     not an adequate use of the Defence team's time and resources.

14             The Chamber also notes that a large portion of the witness's

15     statement relates to Mostar, a municipality not covered in the

16     indictment, and to crimes committed by Serbs; it also touches upon the

17     witness's publications in relation to "his research concerning the

18     suffering of the Serbs in BiH."

19             Accordingly, the Chamber orders that Dusan Zurovac be led live

20     only on matters related to this indictment.

21             Next matter is related to the ICMP and I can deal with in public

22     session.

23             Mr. Robinson, I note that your motion for a binding order against

24     the ICMP is still pending before the Chamber and that we are still

25     waiting to hear from you on the final results of the ICMP's inquiries


Page 30103

 1     with the family members of the victims regarding disclosure of their

 2     genetic data.  I also note that the last we heard on that is your e-mail

 3     to the ICMP on the 20th of September, 2012, in which you referred to

 4     30 cases awaiting consent.  Since it is now November, I wonder if you can

 5     tell us what the update on that is and whether you have received the

 6     final numbers from the ICMP.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.  I received a

 8     communication from the ICMP about ten days ago, in which they advised us

 9     that they had made some progress.  They provided additional material and

10     I believe that the number of cases in which they have not yet resolved is

11     still about a dozen or less.  So they're -- and they promised that they

12     would be trying to conclude those within a short period of time.  So I

13     definitely have it on my list of things to do, that as soon as they give

14     me the final numbers and the final information, I'm going to advise the

15     Chamber in writing about that.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is something I would like to

18     say, Your Honours, but in open session.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We are -- I think we are open session, but due to

20     technical difficulties the -- on the monitor, the "private session" logo

21     may appear.  And I have to correct my reading of the transcript.  Let me

22     check.  At page 65 , line 22, I think I misread.  It should read "crimes

23     committed to the Serbs."

24             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, with all due


Page 30104

 1     respect, I have to say that I have to prepare for submission.  I am under

 2     the impression that I'm not being treated fairly.  The restrictions

 3     imposed on the Defence are far greater than those that were imposed on

 4     the Prosecution.  Above all, with regard to context, the Prosecution

 5     submitted documents and elements from municipalities that are no longer

 6     included in the indictment.  I can't do that and, furthermore, I haven't

 7     been granted protective measures for certain witnesses.  This makes the

 8     situation a lot more difficult.  And in the case of crimes committed

 9     against the Serbs, this is particularly the case.  I'm not saying this as

10     a tu quoque remark, but it has to do with the context and the

11     understanding the civil war.  Not everything was done under my command.

12     Events followed their own order, so my concern is such that I really have

13     to make a submission to you in regard to this issue.  I believe that the

14     restrictions imposed on the Defence are far greater than those imposed on

15     the Prosecution.  On the other hand, the Prosecution has been position to

16     threaten the witnesses simply by showing them or referring to

17     Rule 92(E) -- or 90(E), rather, simply by virtue of interrogating

18     witnesses to whom it was said that they were suspects.  So there is no

19     possibility of there being parity between the Defence and the

20     Prosecution --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm stopping you here, but it's not

22     appropriate to discuss it in a vacuum.  We'll deal with it as it arises

23     during the course of your examination.

24             Let's bring in the witness.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, before we do that I have


Page 30105

 1     a few matters I would like to also put on the record.  First of all, you

 2     issued a decision on the Prosecution's interviews of Defence witnesses on

 3     the 8th of November, 2012, which in paragraph 14 you directed the

 4     Prosecution to give timely notice to the accused of witnesses that it

 5     wishes to interview to give us an opportunity to speak to those

 6     witnesses, which we appreciate.  However, we were informed by the

 7     Prosecution on Friday, the day after you issued this order, that it had

 8     contacted already one of the witnesses without giving us advanced notice

 9     and the Prosecution indicated that that was inadvertent and they were the

10     ones who brought that to our attention, and we fully accept that

11     representation.  However, I wanted to put it on the record and ask

12     Mr. Tieger to make sure that all members of the Prosecution, not only in

13     his team but any other teams that might have any potential need to

14     contact these witnesses, to comply with the Trial Chamber's order.

15             Secondly, Mr. President, you issued on the 1st of November, 2012,

16     the decision on the accused's motion for protective measures for

17     witnesses KW289, KW299, KW378, and KW543, and I wanted to put on the

18     record that after being informed that their requests for protective

19     measures had been denied, witnesses KW299 and KW543 declined to testify

20     and will not be called.  Thank you.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I say another thing about the

23     witness who is to appear.  Your Excellencies, I asked for time from the

24     beginning of the 1st of March and I'm not free so I can't speak to the

25     witness in a timely fashion.  I only have access to the witness once the


Page 30106

 1     witness appears to testify.  All my investigators don't know all the

 2     things that I know when you put all their knowledge together.  They don't

 3     know what I have to ask the witness about.  I'd like some flexibility

 4     with regard to this.  I'm still receiving 66(B) rule documents.  When am

 5     I going to integrate all of this into my strategy, go over all of this?

 6     Could you please consider this again?  I should have sufficient room to

 7     update everything when seeing the witness because I don't have sufficient

 8     time.  I'm trying to calculate how many witnesses I'll be able to call

 9     and I'll be spending matters that --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we're not going there.  But just

11     simply speaking for myself, you have to accept some consequences of your

12     decision to represent yourself, and it's absolutely not necessary for you

13     to proof every and each witness.  We'll just leave it at that.

14             Shall we bring in the witness.

15                           [The witness takes the stand]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Given that the third session was delayed to start at

17     ten to 2.00, unless there's a serious objection from the parties the

18     Chamber is minded to sit till 20 past 3.00.

19             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President, and we'll try to move as

21     quickly as we can.

22        Q.   Colonel, I had asked you a question earlier that I believe was --

23     well, it was clearly misunderstood so let me try again because that will

24     get us right into the subject -- one of the last subjects I'd like to

25     address with you and that was the following.  First of all, the air bomb


Page 30107

 1     delivery system that we've discussed was dependent upon the rockets for

 2     propulsion; correct?  I'm just taking a step at a time.

 3        A.   Firing air bombs - not aircraft bombs, that's something else -

 4     that depended on the rocket engine.  The rocket engine consisted of the

 5     rocket fuel.

 6        Q.   Okay.  That -- as we discussed before, the underlying rocket that

 7     was used for the purpose of this propulsion, without with regard to the

 8     science of how the rocket propelled itself and the air bomb along with

 9     it, had a certain inherent accuracy to it even before it was affixed to

10     the air bomb; correct?

11        A.   Yes, as I have already said.

12        Q.   And my simple question - at least I hope simple question - is

13     that the inherent accuracy of that rocket was not going to be improved by

14     the -- by being affixed to the air bomb; correct?

15        A.   I don't understand the question.  The rocket, the air bomb -- I

16     said that when you attach a rocket engine to the air bomb and the rocket

17     engine consists of the gunpowder charge which makes it possible to launch

18     it to hit the target -- well, that's what I said.  There's nothing to be

19     improved.  I don't understand the question.  I have explained this on

20     several occasions.  It's not a rocket of any kind.  All I said is that

21     the air bomb became a rocket as of the time that a rocket engine was

22     attached to it.  It's not a rocket.  It's turned into a rocket because it

23     has a rocket engine.

24        Q.   We saw in the video pre-existing rockets which were screwed into

25     the back of an air bomb and you agreed that was one of the mechanisms of


Page 30108

 1     delivery for air bombs; right?

 2        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, that isn't a rocket; it's a rocket engine.  There

 3     is a difference.  The rocket consists of the rocket engine and the

 4     charge.  The charge was in the air bomb in this case and the rocket

 5     engine is the gunpowder that is used for the charge in the shell and it

 6     delivers the shell to the target.  That's the rocket.  A war head with an

 7     explosive charge and a rocket engine, that's it.  There's no rocket here.

 8     The rocket consists of the war head and the rocket engine.  I think I've

 9     been clear.  I don't know else I could explain this.

10        Q.   Colonel, the accuracy of a rocket such as a Plamen or Oganj or a

11     Grad is not dependent upon the charge, it's dependent upon the rocket

12     system, isn't it?  So I'm not talking about the charge, I'm talking about

13     the rocket.

14        A.   Well, naturally.  The precision of any rocket depends on the

15     charge, the amount of charge that is used.  In places where the

16     ammunition is produced, tables are made.  You measure the quantity of

17     gunpowder in grams, it's even more precise.  It depends on the rocket

18     engine.  For example, if you have 2 kilogrammes and 2 and a half grams of

19     gunpowder in the rocket engine -- well, that's not okay.  You don't --

20     that doesn't correspond to the firing tables.  In places where the

21     ammunition is produced, you have to precisely measure the gunpowder

22     charge.  In this case, you have a sort of rod form of gunpowder so that

23     it burns more slowly and because the weight is greater.  This is done so

24     the air bomb can reach its target.  And in the case of the Plamen

25     multiple-rocket launcher and the Oganj, you also used this rod charge and


Page 30109

 1     not powder -- not a powder charge.  I think I've been clear.  So it all

 2     depends, you can't just use any kind of powder as a charge so that

 3     everything is in accordance with the firing tables.

 4        Q.   So your position is that rockets use various charges just like

 5     mortars or howitzers to determine the distance they'll travel?

 6        A.   Naturally.

 7        Q.   All right.  Let's -- apart from that, let me try once more with

 8     the previous question, and if that's not successful, I'll move on to

 9     something slightly different.  Irrespective of how you consider the

10     rocket works, do you -- well, I'm going to move on to something else.

11             You've already told us that in your view, the dispersion of the

12     air bombs that were attached to these rocket engines was essentially the

13     same as the underlying rocket systems themselves.  So I'd like to look at

14     the firing table for one of those underlying systems.

15             MR. TIEGER:  So if we could turn, please, to 65 ter 24036.  This

16     is a firing table for a Vulkan or a Grad system, and if we could turn

17     quickly to page 5 of the -- 6 of the English and page 5 of the B/C/S.

18     No, I'm sorry, it's page 5 of the English.  Excuse me.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be told whose instructions

20     these are, from which army?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not sure I can say at the moment.  What I do

23     know is that both the Grad and the -- this is applicable to both because

24     you have both the Russian system of calculation of mils and the European

25     system and you have calculations for both the Grad and the Vulkan which


Page 30110

 1     are essentially identical.

 2        Q.   That indicates at page 5, Colonel, that the use of these

 3     projectiles, which are identified here by their technical number, for

 4     distances up to 5 kilometres is "possible in extraordinary cases and only

 5     in situations where there are no friendly troops in the direction of fire

 6     since a significant amount of short rounds are possible caused by a large

 7     dispersal of the projectile at these ranges."

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Next I'd like to look at some of the specific firing

 9     table range of error data available, and in that connection I'd like to

10     look at B/C/S page 12 and we can identify the specific -- if we can blow

11     that up, please, and just have that on a single page.  Okay.  At the top

12     of the page we see "daljinar" for the range finder both at 1 to 6.000

13     which would be for the Grad and 1 to 6400 for the Vulkan.

14        Q.   And if we look to the immediate -- to the right, Colonel, I think

15     you can see "po daljini" and "po provcu" so you can see error by distance

16     and error by direction.  And why don't we scroll down, for example, to --

17     as you can see at 1600 we have 250 metres by distance, 9.2 by direction.

18     And if we go down to 5.000, for example, at the next page, and we can see

19     it descending that way.  A slight decrease in the error by distance and

20     an increase in the error by direction.  So at 5.000, we have 215 metres

21     by distance and 29 by direction.

22             Now, first of all, Colonel, can you confirm that these -- that

23     this range of error is -- does not refer to the diameter of the error but

24     to the radius, that is, it essentially is that figure on either side of

25     the intended target.  So in the case of 5.000 metres, it would be


Page 30111

 1     215 metres by direction short or long and 29 metres by direction to

 2     either side.

 3        A.   I'm not familiar with these firing tables.  I'm not familiar with

 4     the Grad or the Vulkan system either, but as a rule, the firing tables

 5     look something like this.  In the firing tables there are certain

 6     deviations for the distance and for the direction when you fire at a

 7     certain distance.  As you increase the range, these errors, this range of

 8     errors, also increases.  When you fire the first projectile, this is

 9     taken into account.  It was quite small, but as you said multiple-rocket

10     launchers and air bombs had greater deviations in the distance than in

11     direction.  You mentioned 200, 250 metres with regard to the distance and

12     20 to 30 metres with regard to the direction.  So 20, 30 metres is not a

13     huge error for such an air bomb with such a destructive capacity.  I

14     think that as a rule firing tables were compiled in this way, but I'm not

15     familiar with these weapons, but these adjustments are taken into

16     consideration when projectiles are fired and this is the purpose for

17     which firing tables are used.

18        Q.   Thank you for that, Colonel.  Are you also aware that the firing

19     table figures discount the extreme -- because when firing tables are

20     assembled based on many, many, many tests, they discard the most extreme

21     firings and try to identify a range of error within sort of a middle

22     ground, in the top 50 per cent, for example.  You're nodding so it

23     appears you're aware of that?

24        A.   I know that firing tables are compiled based on a number of test

25     shots in order to establish an average.  I don't know how averages are


Page 30112

 1     established, but I know that these tables are based on trials.

 2        Q.   And you know that to establish a useful figure, many, many, many

 3     trials are required to come up with a meaningful average?

 4        A.   Yes.  However, firing tables are not compiled by crews who work

 5     on the launchers.  It is professionals who are trained for that who do

 6     that because there is a series of parameters that have a bearing on the

 7     validity of a firing table which will be produced for use in various

 8     conditions.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I'd like to tender this document, Mr. President.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, there's absolutely no basis for

11     tendering the document with this witness.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Why would that be?  I think there's an ample basis

13     for doing so, but I can lay a further foundation if necessary.  The

14     witness talked about whether or not rockets were or should be used in

15     certain conditions, he talked about the relationship between the rockets

16     and the air bombs.  These -- this data would be admissible on either

17     ground, and certainly in light of the fact that both of those factors are

18     relevant here, these tables are also relevant in addition to the general

19     discussion that took place about the table.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Did the witness lay some foundation on this

21     document, Mr. Tieger?

22             MR. TIEGER:  He said --

23             JUDGE KWON:  You have not told us yet --

24             MR. TIEGER:  He recognised -- yes, Mr. President --

25             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, we haven't heard yet where this document was


Page 30113

 1     from.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  It's a firing table produced by the Croatian

 3     government in response to an RFA, so therefore reflecting systems used in

 4     the former JNA and in the various military establishments that developed

 5     thereafter.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Mr. -- I'm sorry to interrupt

 9     Mr. Karadzic, but I see there's an ambiguity in what I said.  I didn't

10     mean it was produced by the Croatian government.  I meant we made an RFA

11     to the Croatian government and we received this in response.  This is a

12     JNA firing table to the best of our understanding.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I remember properly, the witness

15     said that he was not familiar with these systems.  He said that this is

16     the way that tables are compiled; however, the figures contained in these

17     particular tables mean nothing to the witness.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Well, first of all -- let me lay further foundation,

19     then.  First of all, not that I think it's necessary, but first of all,

20     the witness did affirm, as I think is very obvious, that this is a firing

21     table and a type of firing table that he is --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Sorry to interrupt.

23             Why don't you put those questions to the witness so that we can

24     get some foundation of this document from the witness.

25             MR. TIEGER:


Page 30114

 1        Q.   Colonel, you still have that in front of you.  You've used firing

 2     tables in the past, I take it, and in particular in connection with

 3     rockets.  I know you had rocket experience from actually the earliest

 4     phase of your JNA career.

 5        A.   Yes, I used firing tables for the weapons that I used and on

 6     which I was trained and on which I trained my subordinates.  At the

 7     beginning of my career, I was the commander of a battery of multi-rocket

 8     launchers Plamen and I had the firing tables.  These are not JNA firing

 9     tables, they would be in Serbian.  This is Croatian, pure Croatian, as

10     far as I can tell, but it's neither here nor there.  I said that in

11     principle this is what firing tables normally look like, and this

12     particular firing table applies to the kinds of weapons that I'm not

13     familiar with.  When I was in the JNA, I never heard of these types of

14     weapons nor did I see them during the war.  I still don't know what

15     Vulkan looks like, or Grad.  I only heard that Grad looks like the Oganj

16     multiple-rocket launcher, that it is mobile, mounted on a vehicle;

17     however, I've never had an opportunity to see one.

18        Q.   Okay.  Can we -- you're aware of the fact, however, that Grad

19     rockets were used extensively in the air bomb production process, that

20     is, the VRS air bomb production process?

21        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, for the umpteenth time I repeat, Grad rocket and

22     air bombs, I didn't say that they were used.  I don't know where Grad

23     rockets were used, in what part of the theatre of war.  If we at all had

24     that type of rockets, I never saw them.  Rockets on the one hand and air

25     bombs on the other, I've already said rockets and air bombs have nothing


Page 30115

 1     to do with each other.  I have told you that an air bomb becomes a rocket

 2     with an engine, with a gunpowder charge.  This is an air bomb and the

 3     rocket engine propels it to its target.  This is the -- all I can say.  I

 4     have no other explanation.  There is no rocket that is attached to an air

 5     bomb.  Gunpowder rod is attached to the rocket.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Well, it -- I'm getting a little far afield and

 7     moving into my next questions, but in any event I think the witness's

 8     answers previously are sufficient to justify the admission of this firing

 9     table.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we ask Mr. Tieger to ask the

11     witness to read from the left upper corner what kind of charge is in

12     question here.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think that's necessary at the moment.  I'll

14     consult my colleagues.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President ...

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Robinson, now we did hear you object to the

19     application for admission, but we didn't get the grounds of objection.

20     May we have them, please.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President -- Judge Baird.  I don't mean

22     to elevate you to --

23             JUDGE BAIRD:  Never mind.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  The grounds are simply that the witness hasn't

25     confirmed anything about this document, so he doesn't know about this --


Page 30116

 1     these rockets and he isn't capable of confirming whether these firing

 2     tables are accurate, whether they're applicable to the weapons that the

 3     VRS had or used.  And so absent that kind of foundation, in line with

 4     your previous guide-lines that you've been following throughout the whole

 5     trial, this doesn't fall within a document that can be admitted through

 6     this witness.

 7             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you very much indeed.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  May I respond to that because I think it's --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  The Chamber has another question for

10     you, Mr. Tieger.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Tieger, even if this document was admitted,

12     what practical use is it going to be to the Trial Chamber, other than the

13     fact it is a document we've not been asked to nor would we seek to use

14     the figures and the calculations in it because they are not relevant to

15     any evidence we've heard --

16             MR. TIEGER:  That -- I'm sorry, Judge Morrison, I didn't realise

17     you weren't finished.  That's precisely the point.  I wanted to respond

18     in connection with that underlying point to something raised by

19     Mr. Robinson, which is to say that the -- it's -- this can't be admitted

20     unless it's shown that they're applicable to the weapons the VRS had or

21     used.  This is not an abstract document and Mr. -- we have noted

22     throughout that when it serves the purpose of general impeachment, it's

23     certainly sufficient to note that this document is what it purports to

24     be.  In connection with the assertion that we don't have evidence to that

25     effect, I was a bit surprised to hear that since paragraph 155 of


Page 30117

 1     1D25159, an expert report submitted by the Defence, refers to the

 2     modified aircraft bombs, "bearing in mind that the components fitted into

 3     the system FAB-150 and 250 aircraft bombs and 122-millimetre Grad rocket

 4     motors had been manufactured," et cetera, et cetera.  It was the Defence

 5     in part which placed this very squarely at issue and made it relevant,

 6     and that's precisely one of the ways in which the Court should be

 7     entitled to use this firing table in assessing the use of the air bombs.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Can you not produce that -- this firing table when

 9     Mr. -- Dr. Subotic is going to testify?

10             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I believe I could, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             MR. TIEGER:  But it seemed to be entirely relevant right now

13     talking to a commander who told the Court about the impropriety of

14     using -- the underlying rockets in urban areas and now talked about the

15     precision of air bombs which we know depended upon those underlying

16     systems.  And so I thought it was quite relevant for the Court to have

17     that information and available to it right now.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, the Chamber is not satisfied that this

20     witness has given sufficient foundation about this document to be

21     admitted at the moment.  In addition, I note that this was not translated

22     in full, but that's not the reason for postponing the admission.  Let's

23     move on.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, if I could just take

25     this opportunity for a moment to ask the Trial Chamber to consider


Page 30118

 1     imposing some time-limits on the Prosecution's cross-examination so that

 2     we have some parity and Dr. Karadzic alluded to this.  We are feeling

 3     here on the Defence side that there is sometimes decisions of the

 4     Trial Chamber that disadvantage us vis-a-vis the Prosecution.  And you

 5     wanted him to be specific.  So this is a very specific example of a

 6     cross-examination that has taken 10 to 20 times the length of the direct

 7     examination and which exceeded the estimate --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, I'll cut you off here.  The Chamber

 9     expressly stated that it will monitor the conduct of the trial for some

10     time, and as for the Prosecution case, the Defence was at liberty in

11     terms of amount of cross-examination for the first phase of the

12     proceeding.  It took some time to impose time constraint -- restraint to

13     the Defence after -- yes, it took a while since the start of the

14     Prosecution case to start imposing some time-limit.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, by calling this to your attention, I hope

16     you'll consider this for the future depending on how things evolve.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I guarantee the Chamber is more keen to the overall

18     time of the proceedings.  Thank you.

19             Let's move on, Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  And in the interests of

21     time, I'm not responding to what I consider to be an unfair and specious

22     objection, but I'll move right on.

23        Q.   Mr. Witness, I have just a few very discrete areas to cover.

24     First of all, at page 55 I had asked you earlier about your own

25     involvement with air bombs one way or another and you said you weren't


Page 30119

 1     involved in any shape or form with air bombs.

 2             And in that connection I wanted to call up P1300.  Okay.  This is

 3     a document dated the 11th of July, 1995.  It refer -- is sent to various

 4     brigades discussing the needs of the corps and orders that the

 5     above-mentioned units shall issue a FAB 250 and 105 kilogrammes to

 6     Major Simic on July 12th as follows, it lists them, and it says then:

 7             "Major Simic shall obtain 2 aerial bombs of 250 kilogrammes from

 8     the corps reserve which are currently located ..." et cetera, et cetera,

 9     et cetera.  He "shall prepare the deployment plan for the air bomb

10     launcher and make all preparations for the action according to the

11     'Talas 1' plan."

12             Colonel, I put it to you that your answer about not being

13     involved in any way, shape or form, or any shape or form in air bombs was

14     not accurate and the claim -- and the fact that you were involved in air

15     bombs explains your insistence on their alleged precision.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm going to object, Mr. President.  That's

17     another one of Dr. Karadzic's sins of multiple questions within one.

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   Major, you were involved with air bombs despite your claim to

20     this Trial Chamber not very long ago that you were not involved in any

21     shape or form; correct?

22        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, you can see from this document that

23     General Milosevic ordered me to take over air bombs and deploy them

24     across the brigades that had launchers.  I was supposed to take them over

25     and distribute them.  Under 2, you can see -- or rather, under 3, you can


Page 30120

 1     see that:

 2             "Major Simic shall prepare the deployment plan for the a/b

 3     launcher and make all preparations for the action according to the

 4     'Talas 1' plan."

 5             I would like to see that Talas 1 order.  I don't know what that

 6     refers to.  I've done a lot of things from -- I did a lot of things from

 7     1992 to 1995.  I can't remember all the details.  If I saw this plan, I

 8     could tell you what it applies to, but if there was a plan, it doesn't

 9     mean that it was ever acted upon.

10             I stated that I observed the actions of air bombs on two

11     occasions, I mentioned what the targets were.  I'm not contesting that I

12     may have been involved in the planning and delivery of those air bombs.

13     If I had taken them over from a certain position, then I may have

14     deployed them upon the order of the corps commander to the specific

15     brigades.  I would like to see the Talas 1 order to see what that order

16     applies to.  I don't remember.  That was at a time when the Muslim

17     offensive was taking place in the Sarajevo theatre of war in 1995 --

18        Q.   Colonel, you are venturing far afield from the question I asked.

19             Two final matters.  In paragraphs 29, 30 -- basically 30 through

20     32, you offer certain views on Markale I and Markale II, basically to the

21     effect that both incidents involved, in your view, an individual shot

22     without adjusted fire and therefore it was impossible that the shell

23     which landed could have been fired by the Bosnian Serb side; correct?

24     You don't have to repeat it.  I'm just using that as a predicate.  That's

25     the position you take in your statement; right?


Page 30121

 1        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I claim that Markale I and II could not be hit by

 2     a mortar shell fired from any of the Serb positions.

 3        Q.   So it's your position that a -- that single shots into Sarajevo

 4     don't have any possibility of hitting their intended target; correct?

 5        A.   In my statement I stated even if we were to assume that the

 6     target was hit by a mortar shell, it could not have been done from the

 7     first go.  The first shell fired from any position could not have hit

 8     that target.  Second of all, even if that first shell had hit the target

 9     of Markale, knowing how large the market-place is, I'm sure that any

10     artillery -- no artillerymen could see the market from his observation

11     post.  This would have been a blind shot.  After the smoke appeared after

12     the explosion, it would have appeared somewhere else carried by wind.  So

13     that shot would have been unreliable.  It would have not been accurate.

14             Let's assume that the first shot had hit the target.  We could

15     not have observed it.  There's no observation post anywhere from which

16     you could see the Markale market.  I still claim that the first shot

17     could not hit that target.  On the assumption that it had hit the market,

18     which I claim it didn't, but if it had, it would have gone unobserved

19     from any of our observers on any of our observation posts.

20        Q.   So I take it you take the position that any single shot, any

21     single random shot into Sarajevo has no military purpose because it's not

22     going to hit a -- its intended target, that the person firing it doesn't

23     know where it's going to land?

24        A.   No, this is not what I am claiming.  I am talking specifically

25     about the Markale market.  It's a small market between various buildings,


Page 30122

 1     among buildings, those buildings are very high.  And I told you, even if

 2     the first shell had hit that target, it would have gone unobserved.

 3     Second of all, for a shell to land within such a small area among the

 4     buildings, it should have been fired from a shorter distance because of

 5     the angle.  The angle has to be at least 85 degrees, so the angle had to

 6     be almost vertical in order for that shell to land among the buildings in

 7     that small area which could not be observed from any of the Serbian

 8     observation posts.  This is what I'm saying.  I'm not saying that any

 9     individual shell fired during the war was just a randomly fired shell.

10        Q.   Last brief topic I wanted to raise with you arises out of

11     paragraph 25 when you say:

12             "The incident of 27 May 1992, in Vase Miskina Street was

13     explained to me ..."

14             And that's preceded by the words "incident G1."  How did you

15     know -- what made you think that the incident of 27 May 1992 in

16     Vase Miskina Street was incident G1?  Did you see that somewhere or did

17     someone tell you that?

18        A.   I was told that by the Defence team.  They told me that it was

19     the G-1 incident.  I don't know why it was marked that way.  That's how

20     it was marked.  I don't know why, based on what.  It's just known as G-1.

21        Q.   What was it marked on?

22        A.   I didn't hear you properly or perhaps I didn't understand you

23     well.

24        Q.   Yes, who marked it and what was it marked on?

25        A.   When I provided my statement, when I provided my statement about


Page 30123

 1     the incident which is known as G-1 in Vase Miskina Street, I provided my

 2     opinion about that incident and that was marked as G-1.  I don't know

 3     why.  I don't know how.  I don't know that.

 4        Q.   So I take it you did not look at the indictment to see that G-1

 5     is an incident that took place on or about the 28th of May and that, in

 6     fact, whoever told you it was G-1 on the Defence did not accurately

 7     advise you that the Vase Miskina Street incident is not included in the

 8     indictment, as Dr. Karadzic himself noted at T6394 through 95.

 9        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I was asked to provide a statement about the

10     incident in Vase Miskina Street.  I did provide a statement.  I don't

11     know how it was marked.  I did not have an occasion or the need to get

12     familiar with the indictment; therefore, I don't know what it contains.

13        Q.   Thank you, Witness.  I have nothing further.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

15             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have re-examination?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies.

17             Could we look at P1041.

18                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

19        Q.   [Interpretation] While we are waiting, Colonel, sir, did you hear

20     from the Defence team about Vase Miskina for the first time or had you

21     heard about it before?

22        A.   I heard about it before immediately after the event.  I watched

23     the Muslim television and I saw the images on TV.

24        Q.   Thank you.  In the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did you take some

25     investigative measures in order to establish what had happened?


Page 30124

 1        A.   At the time I was a battery commander.  I don't know what the

 2     corps command did at the time.  I know that requests were made to check

 3     whether fire was ever opened from our positions, from our mortars.  This

 4     is as much as I can remember.  I was a battery commander for a battery of

 5     multi-rocket launchers and I don't know how the investigation evolved.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  This document was shown to you by Mr. Tieger;

 7     however, he did not show you the entire document.  First of all, could

 8     you please tell us where are the speakers?  Where are the people who were

 9     intercepted in this conversation?  What about this unknown male person,

10     if you look at the last line of the intercept?

11        A.   The unknown male person, Marsal Tito barracks.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please move to the following

14     page.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   And while we are waiting, can you tell us what was happening with

17     Marsal Tito barracks at the time?  Have a look at the top.  What is

18     Mladic being informed of?  What are the Muslim media conveying?

19        A.   NN, unidentified male person, he says:

20             "They say that the Marsal Tito barracks is carrying out a break

21     through.  That's probably the media.

22             "General Mladic:  Okay.

23             "Unidentified male:  Blow up the bridge, the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo

24     bridge.

25             "Mladic:  Do not worry.  They dare not come close to the


Page 30125

 1     Brotherhood and Unity Bridge or the barracks."

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Have a look at the bottom, third line from below,

 3     from the bottom, let's see what Mladic says there.

 4        A.   "You too can," is that what you have in mind?

 5             "You can take more than they can.  I don't want to kill the

 6     people or to destroy the town.  I don't want innocent people to come to

 7     harm.  If anyone wants to open fire, he should stay in Sarajevo and

 8     should let the army take positions.  They should pull out the civilians,

 9     and if they want a fight, we'll fight.  It would be better to fight

10     somewhere in the hills than in town."

11        Q.   Thank you.  And it says "the people have to live somewhere,"

12     that's stated down below; isn't that correct?

13        A.   Yes, it is.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Have a look at the first line.  What does Mladic say there?

18     Could you read that out?

19        A.   "We aren't in favour of a fight.  We are in favour of peace.  If

20     they want peace, they will have it; if they don't, well, that's not a

21     problem, we can always go to war."

22        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, how does this intercept tally with the

23     information you had and with your experience?

24        A.   As far as I can remember, at that time the Tito barracks was

25     besieged, it was completely surrounded, and pressure was exerted on the


Page 30126

 1     men in the barracks and the barracks was preparing to leave, for an

 2     agreement to leave, to abandon -- not the barracks, I mean the troops

 3     were preparing to leave the Tito barracks.  As far as I can remember, it

 4     was around June that the men left the Marsal Tito barracks.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see D207.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   And this intercept has also been shown to you, the one we're

 9     waiting for now.  And another one was shown to you that relates to this

10     one.  Could we see the last three lines.  Could you read it out, please.

11        A.   Yes, Mr. President.

12             "Mladic:  Look, they want to attack the barracks in order to

13     provoke us to take action on the town."

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry, could we see the English

15     version, page 2 in the English version.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Please continue, Colonel.

18        A.   "Potpara:  Yes, very well.

19             "Mladic:  Tell the people so that the people are aware of this."

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we have a look at

21     page number 4, page number 8 in the English version.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, just for clarification, this is not

23     an intercept, to the best of my recollection, that was shown to the

24     witness previously.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I corrected myself.  I said an


Page 30127

 1     intercept that relates to the one that you were shown.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             Proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Number, or rather, page 8 in the English, the third line from the

 6     bottom, Mladic intervenes and can we see what Potpara says.

 7        A.   "Ah, we won't take any risks, we won't risk people's lives.

 8             "Mladic:  I am of the same opinion.  If they want peace, they'll

 9     have peace.  Last night I issued an order as soon as I arrived ... there

10     was this large-scale attack against the units and you.  I somehow managed

11     to calm the people down in that shooting and to place things under

12     control to prevent action from being taken.  What they're producing now,

13     they probably have some sort of mime artists or some sort of good

14     imitators that makes it possible for them to successfully imitate my

15     voice, your voice, and everyone else's voice."

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next two pages --

17     or the next two lines.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The next two lines.

19             "Mladic:  It seems that they're creating a farce down there,

20     they're deceiving their people about some sort of commands of mine --

21     well, no, that's out of the question."

22             And then Mladic says:

23             "Let them deceive their people.  You should convey this from

24     soldier to soldier.  They shouldn't play around and put their lives at

25     risk.  No one had a reserve life.  We won't fire on the town.  If they


Page 30128

 1     don't violate the agreement, if they don't threaten you, but be extremely

 2     careful.  Don't trust them at all."

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  How does this fit in with your experience of

 5     the VRS in relation to the town of Sarajevo?

 6        A.   Well, this is about the fact that orders were issued to members

 7     of units in the Tito barracks and in the town of Sarajevo, orders

 8     according to which they shouldn't expose themselves to provocations by

 9     the Muslim forces, they should exercise restraint, they should preserve

10     the lives of their subordinates, they should be cautious and observe the

11     situation because they couldn't trust the other side.  This was proved on

12     a number of occasions.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we briefly see P1518, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Colonel, while waiting for that to appear, tell us what is the

16     purpose of observing fire?

17        A.   Mr. President, the purpose of observing fire is to observe the

18     target and action taken against the target in order to adjust firing so

19     that one could fire on the target with as much precision as possible so

20     as not to waste shells, to disperse shells, and inflict harm on civilians

21     and civilian facilities.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please.

24     I apologise.  That's not the one.  I've mixed them up.  Engage in

25     artillery observation.


Page 30129

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can observation be brought into line with random fire?

 3        A.   No, not at all.  If you're observing artillery fire, then random

 4     fire is out of the question.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see D192, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Here the Prosecution showed you images from Van Lynden.  I'd like

 9     to show you a document.  I can't find the page right now.  Van Lynden

10     said that these clips had been put together, it wasn't a direct

11     broadcast.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 3 in both the

13     Serbian and the English version.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   These are the minutes from the Presidency of the Republic of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 17th of June, 1992.  What important event took

17     place on that date, on the 17th of June, 1992?

18        A.   On the 17th of June, if my memory doesn't fail me, around that

19     time we liberated the Zlatiste-Pale road.  It was around the 16th or

20     17th.  I don't remember what happened exactly.  I can't remember right

21     now.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Have a look at what Halilovic says, please.  I see

23     that Halilovic is talking about Sarajevo.  Isn't that correct?

24        A.   Could we zoom in a bit, please.  It's difficult to read.

25        Q.   What is the situation that Halilovic describes?


Page 30130

 1        A.   As far as I can remember, Halilovic was the head, the chief, of

 2     the Muslim General Staff or Main Staff, Sefer Halilovic, if we're talking

 3     about him.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 6 in the Serbian

 5     version and page 5 in the English version, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   What we have in yellow is what I'll read out.  This is what

 8     Halilovic said, his conclusions about Sarajevo.

 9             "In the course of a two-month period of activity, the aggressor

10     sustained a lot of losses in manpower and especially in terms of

11     equipment lost.  He lost about 20 tanks, 20 personnel carriers, six

12     multiple-rocket launchers, five howitzers, seven 120-millimetre mortars

13     and there was a certain number -- a certain amount of equipment was lost

14     and burned, three tanks, six armoured carriers, five howitzers

15     155-millimetre ones, six mortars, and a significant amount of infantry

16     weapons.  Because of important losses in terms of equipment, the

17     intensity of artillery and rocket attacks on Sarajevo diminished."

18             Who inflicted these losses on the Serbs?

19        A.   Well, only the Muslim forces could have done that.  If we're

20     talking about the Sarajevo battle-field anyway.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Under 2, a bit lower down, five, six lines lower

22     down:

23             "The disposition of forces of the TO in the Sarajevo region, the

24     Territorial Defence region of Sarajevo, consists of the following:  The

25     regional TO staff in the Sarajevo region, two 120-millimetre batteries,


Page 30131

 1     12 pieces; 105-millimetre howitzer batteries, five pieces; an artillery

 2     platoon that consists of three pieces of 122-millimetre pieces; an

 3     armoured mechanised platoon, or rather, a group; one tank; and five

 4     armoured carriers; 16 TO staffs, municipal staffs; 16 TO detachments;

 5     about 500 independent platoons; about 450 independent companies; and

 6     about 100 anti-sabotage platoons."

 7             Did you know anything about the forces facing you, the SRK, from

 8     the town of Sarajevo?

 9        A.   Mr. President, we were well aware of that and that is why we

10     defended ourselves.  We mounted a decisive defence at our positions.  It

11     is a fact that they weren't as empty-handed as it was said and this can

12     be seen from the document.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we see page 11 in

14     the Serbian version and then page 10 in the English version which

15     continues on page 11 in the English version.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   In the lower part it says that 91.720 individuals who are

18     registered, 95 were armed, defence is resisting, significant objectives

19     were attained, Chetnik forces in Pofalici, Zuc, and Mojmilo were routed.

20     In the last few days of the war there were significant successes by the

21     artillery units when mounting a defence of the town of Sarajevo.  Thank

22     you.

23             Was it necessary to tell -- was it possible to say whose

24     artillery was concerned in Van Lynden's images?

25        A.   Mr. President, I couldn't tell whose artillery it was, whose


Page 30132

 1     artillery was opening fire.  On the basis of this document, one can see

 2     that at the time they were well armed and equipped with artillery pieces.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at 1D20069,

 5     please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   You were asked about Stari Grad, the old part of town here.

 8     Bascarsija is perhaps what one had in mind.  Please have a look at this,

 9     the Municipal Assembly of the armed forces, Stari Grad, the 16th of July,

10     1992.  Under 2:

11             "The units of the Stari Grad OS participated in the liberation

12     and capturing of the Bistricka Kula facility which is a dominant feature.

13     We are working on engineering fortification of the position at this

14     facility and on all the other defence lines."

15             And then further down:

16             "Action is being taken to establish new units, for example, the

17     Stari Grad Brigade and the already-existing units are to become part of

18     this brigade."

19             My question, Colonel, is as follows:  Could you tell us without

20     me reminding you of the fact which brigades there were once the war had

21     broken out, which brigades there were or which brigades were deployed in

22     Stari Grad, in fact?

23        A.   Mr. President, unfortunately I can't remember, I really can't.

24        Q.   Do you know where the 105th Muslim Brigade was deployed?

25        A.   I have really forgotten everything.  It's been over 20 years


Page 30133

 1     since these events, and I haven't been involved in these issues, I wanted

 2     to get everything as soon as possible, so I have forgotten many things

 3     and I could not confirm where certain brigades were, in fact, deployed.

 4        Q.   It would be leading if I said that the 105th and the 115th were

 5     in the --

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, it would be and I don't think --

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not asking for a response.  I'm

 8     not asking for a response.

 9             Could this document please be admitted into evidence.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   In general terms and in principle, the document you have just

12     seen, how does this document tally with what you know about the arms that

13     the people in Stari Grad had?

14        A.   It shows that in all parts of the city their units were deployed

15     by establishment as they had them.  They were equipped with equipment and

16     manpower.  They were better equipped and had more manpower than we had.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this now be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2414, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             I would like to call up P847.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   The document has already been shown to you, it was shown to you


Page 30134

 1     earlier today as well.  Could you please look at bullet point 3.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this part below bullet point 2

 3     be zoomed in?

 4             It says here:

 5             "If a cease-fire agreement is signed, the artillery weapons

 6     should be moved further away from Sarajevo ..." and so on and so forth.

 7     A ban on moving weapons and military positions and so on and so forth.

 8     Bullet point 3:

 9             "As long as there is a threat of NATO air-strikes against our

10     forces, do not turn the infantry, artillery, and OMJ away from the

11     Muslims and UNPROFOR and do everything to maintain direct contact

12     including full fortification."

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Could you please tell us, Colonel, sir, what were the

15     circumstances when General Milovanovic issued this order and how does the

16     cover-up of weapons and air-strikes correspond to each other?

17        A.   Mr. President, that was when NATO air-strikes and rapid reaction

18     artillery were active against the VRS.  The order was issued in order to

19     be as close and in -- in direct contact with Muslim forces in order to

20     preserve manpower and equipment because we knew that they wouldn't strike

21     if we were close to Muslim positions.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to call up 1D03408.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   You were asked, Colonel, sir, about the number of shells and


Page 30135

 1     about the proportionality of response.  I would kindly ask you to look at

 2     the date, the 16th of June, 1995, at 9.30.  Do you know where was the

 3     102nd Muslim Brigade deployed at the time?

 4        A.   Not off the top of my head.  If it is specified in the document,

 5     then my memory will be jogged, I suppose.

 6        Q.   I'm going to read.  It says:

 7             "Our forces knew information," this is 2.1, "or our forces were

 8     in combat-readiness, they were at the ready and at the starting position

 9     at the envisaged time.  And at 0436 hours, the attack was launched along

10     the axes ..." which are all enumerated.

11             Please look, what rounds they used.  I'm referring to

12     bigger-sized calibre.  My calculation is that they fired 549 shells

13     without [as interpreted] 12.7, which should have also been banned.

14             Could you please read this.  60-millimetre shells, 34;

15     82-millimetre shells, 63; 120-millimetre shells, nine; 12.7-millimetre

16     rounds, 810 - I did not take that into my calculation; 105-millimetre

17     shells, seven; M-57 RB, 11, and so on and so forth.

18             What is this NG rounds, 20 of them were used?

19        A.   It must be -- I don't know what this is.

20        Q.   Is this nitroglycerin?

21        A.   I don't know.

22        Q.   Possibly.  It may be nitroglycerin.

23             What can you tell us, how many brigades of this kind existed

24     within the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the city of

25     Sarajevo?


Page 30136

 1        A.   The city of Sarajevo -- I don't know how many brigades did the

 2     1st Corps have.  It must have had at least three-plus brigades.  I

 3     believe that it had more than three brigades.  In any case, judging by

 4     this document, they were really well equipped and they were very active.

 5     You can see that this was their attack, this was their assault.  It was

 6     an operation that was carried out in 1995 in the month of June and it was

 7     intending to break through from the city of Sarajevo.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic -- yes, Mr. Tieger, any objection?

10             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be admitted.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2415, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  How much more do you have for your re-examination,

14     Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Two more documents, very briefly,

16     Excellency.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I have a couple of matters to deal with at the end

18     of today's session, but let's continue.  Let's see how it evolves.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D20059.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   What was the position of Fikret Prevljak in 1995, do you

22     remember?

23        A.   I can't remember.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20059.  Can this be blown up a

25     little?


Page 30137

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Was this document issued on the 16th of June at 10.00?  The year

 3     is 1995.

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   It says:

 6             "Between 0700 and 1000 hours, our newly reached lines of defence

 7     on elevation 625, Lalovici, on the lines of Zlatiste, Sucura Kuca above

 8     Hladivode, and elevation 830 were exposed to constant and fierce

 9     artillery, tank and mortar fire from weapons of all calibre.  There were

10     intermittent combined artillery and infantry attacks on the

11     above-mentioned lines in half-hour intervals.

12             "The newly reached lines on elevation 830 and elevation 625 and

13     in the sector of Zlatiste were integrated and the unit from the Sucura

14     Kuca line withdrew to its initial position at 0810 hours because of

15     fierce artillery fire.  At the firing position in the sector of Tesanovo

16     hill, we destroyed a tank with a TF-8 projectile at 0950."

17             Can you please tell us what was going on from 7.00 in the morning

18     to 10.00 in the morning?  Who was acting, who was reacting?

19        A.   Mr. President, on that day in June, an attack was launched on all

20     the defence lines of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, both from the inner

21     ring as well as the outer ring, in co-ordination of the 1st Corps and the

22     2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And during

23     the initial period of that operation, the Muslim forces had certain

24     successes on all the front lines, starting with the southern front line

25     as well as the northern and the north-western part of the front line.


Page 30138

 1     Certain positions were broken through; however, we rapidly consolidated

 2     our forces, we received artillery support, we managed to return them to

 3     their initial positions.  Some of those positions took days to be

 4     reclaimed and that defensive lasted for quite a long time.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell us where did the Serbian shells

 6     fall and could they be seen from the town?  Those that fell on Zlatiste

 7     and Sucura Kuca.

 8        A.   I don't understand what you mean when you say "Serbian shells."

 9        Q.   When we attempted to return positions and the artillery fire on

10     our trenches that they had taken over, could that be seen from the city?

11        A.   Maybe from the opposite side.  Those shells were falling on the

12     forward line, i.e., on the deployment of the Muslim forces which were

13     engaged in attack in order to return to their initial positions.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, and I am on

15     to my last document?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Mr. Tieger?

17             MR. TIEGER:  Not to the document in the abstract, which appears

18     to be authentic in the sense we've been using them, but I was waiting for

19     some kind of relevance to the cross-examination to appear in the course

20     of the questions and answers, and I think we're on a document admission

21     exercise that is using unnecessary time and a bar table submission would

22     appear to be more appropriate for matters like this.  I don't see how

23     this arises from the cross that was -- with this witness.

24                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be allowed to respond --


Page 30139

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Whatever the ...

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We almost adjourned.  They say it's okay now.  There

 4     has been a technical difficulty which has been now resolved.

 5             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Tieger asked about the

 7     number of shells and about where the shells fell and where they were

 8     falling.  I wanted to ask the witness where the fierce fighting was going

 9     on, could the Serbian shells be seen from the city and could anybody

10     actually ascribe them to the Serbian side.  I was interested where they

11     were falling and whether they could be discerned from the city itself.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber is of the view that we have a basis to

13     admit this.

14             We'll give the number.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2416, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Can we go for a further five minutes?  I'm asking

17     the Registrar.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one last document and one last

19     question.

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 23920.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   The command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, i.e.,

25     General Milosevic, which is what you see on the second page, under 2 it


Page 30140

 1     says:

 2             "I forbid arbitrary and uncontrolled opening of fire.  Fire is to

 3     be opened only at useful targets - live targets, i.e., such targets which

 4     serve to inflict real losses on the enemy and does not represent

 5     'attempts of intimidation.'"

 6             Colonel, sir, how does this tally with what you know about the

 7     tactics of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the attitude towards the city?

 8        A.   Mr. President, you can see from Article 2, which is part of the

 9     corps command -- commander order, that only military targets should be

10     fired upon in order to achieve effects, i.e., to achieve losses on the

11     enemy side which is why fire is opened in the first place.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. -- Colonel, sir.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies.  I have no

14     further questions.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you for having come to testify.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And of course, this document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit D2417.

19             Just before we adjourn, Mr. Tieger, the Chamber is seized of the

20     Defence motion for image distortion of -- for witness Trifunovic, so I

21     wonder whether we can have your response by tomorrow so that we can issue

22     the decision before witness comes.  I will deal with the remainder

23     thing -- remaining thing tomorrow morning.

24             So, Mr. Simic, that concludes your evidence and I -- on behalf of

25     the Tribunal, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give


Page 30141

 1     it.  Now you are free to go.

 2             THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We will rise all together.

 4                           [The witness withdrew]

 5                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.25 p.m.,

 6                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 13th day of

 7                           November, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.

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