1 Tuesday, 15 January 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. I wish everybody a very
6 Happy New Year.
7 Good morning Mr. Gagovic there in Belgrade. So how is the
8 weather in Belgrade?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Cloudy. Cloudy, but warm.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. The Hague is covered with snow. This is
11 the heaviest snow I have ever seen in ten years' time. But before we
12 begin today, there are several matters to deal with, so, Mr. Gagovic,
13 would you be kind enough to take off your headphones for the moment.
14 The Chamber will first turn to the Prosecution submissions on the
15 status of exhibits provisionally under seal, which was filed on the 20th
16 of December, 2012.
17 In the decision on the status of exhibits provisionally under
18 seal issued on the 14th of December, 2012, the Chamber instructed the
19 Prosecution to inform it whether the provisional under seal status of
20 exhibits D996 and D997 could be lifted pending the Prosecution's
21 confirmation of the identity of an individual who appears in both
22 exhibits. In the Prosecution submission, the Prosecution informs the
23 Chamber, inter alia, that following its review of D996 and D997, the
24 individual who appears in both exhibits is not a witness for whom
25 protective measures are in place.
1 Therefore, the Chamber is satisfied with the Prosecution's
2 submission and instructs the registry to change the status of both
3 exhibits, i.e., Exhibit D996 and D997 from confidential to public.
4 The Chamber will now turn to the accused's motion for subpoena to
5 Slavko Budimir, filed on the 27th of December, 2012.
6 In the motion, the accused argues that he has made all reasonable
7 efforts to obtain the voluntary co-operation of Slavko Budimir by
8 requesting that he submit to an interview by an investigator and testify
9 as a Defence witness in this case. The accused states that
10 Slavko Budimir has declined this request on two occasions, the most
11 recent occasion being the 21st of November, 2012. However, the Chamber
12 notes that no underlying documents that support the accused's contention
13 have been provided. This time the Chamber will afford the accused the
14 opportunity to file the necessary supporting documentation for this
15 motion by Wednesday, 16th January 2013, COB. In the future, however, in
16 the absence of the necessary supporting material, the Chamber might be
17 constrained not to entertain such requests.
18 Now the Chamber will issue an oral ruling in relation to a MFI
19 exhibit. In the decision on the accused's motion to admit documents
20 previously marked for identification and public redacted version of
21 D1938, issued on the 7th of December, 2012, the Chamber, inter alia,
22 denied admission of MFI Exhibit D2202, an intercept which had been MFI'd
23 and placed under seal on the ground that the accused had failed to make
24 any showing regarding its authenticity. The registry has since informed
25 the Chamber that MFI D2225 is the public redacted version of MFI D2202.
1 Therefore, although MFI D2225 was not included in the accused's motions
2 relating to the 7th of December MFI decision, the Chamber will, in the
3 interests of judicial efficiency, deny admission of MFI D2225 and hereby
4 instructs the Registry to mark it as not admitted.
5 Now, could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
6 [Private session]
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours. Thank
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then unless there's anything to be
7 raised, we'll hear Mr. Gagovic's evidence.
8 Yes. If the court officer could do this.
9 Yes, good morning, Mr. Gagovic, again. I thank you for your
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could the witness take the solemn declaration,
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
15 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Could you take a seat and make yourself
18 WITNESS: MILOSAV GAGOVIC
19 [Witness testified via videolink]
20 JUDGE KWON: Would you be kind again to take off your microphone
21 for a brief moment.
22 Yes. I forgot to raise this. Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Robinson,
23 amongst the statement of Mr. Gagovic, the Chamber has difficulty to see
24 the relevance of paragraphs 6, 7, and 9, so I would like these paragraphs
25 to be redacted. Otherwise, at the end of your examination of the --
1 Mr. Gagovic, explain the relevance to the Chamber and lead live, if
2 necessary, those paragraphs.
3 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. And before the witness
5 puts his headphones back on, I simply wanted to mention that in
6 conformity with previous practice, I believe that a 90(E) advisement to
7 be appropriate here as well.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Would you like to make any submission with respect to the issue I
10 raised, i.e., paragraphs, 6, 7, and 9?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellencies. Good
12 morning, your Excellencies. Good morning to everyone, and Happy New
13 Year. Happy all the holidays.
14 As far as these three paragraphs are concerned, I find it
15 necessary that a responsible commander of the 4th Corps should present
16 the circumstances under which these events took place, because the
17 circumstances dictated the conduct of all the parties. Those were
18 actions, and reactions were chaotic. This witness can confirm this.
19 In the months just before the war, it is relevant to know the
20 deployment of the assets and the personnel of the JNA only in Serb areas.
21 Why only Serb areas? Was it because of the Serbs or because of the JNA
22 that was in jeopardy everywhere? That is very important for the claims
23 in the indictment that concern the closeness between the Serb side in
24 Bosnia and the JNA. The JNA was -- the Serb side was pushed into the war
25 in Bosnia. We were very wary of the JNA as a force because it was a
1 force of the previous regime, a Communist one.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, do you have any observation?
4 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President. I think the Court has been aware
5 of this general rationale before, and I consider the issue to be the
6 extent to which the particular information was applicable to an argument
7 that had been raised before and which had justified the admission of some
8 material but -- but not other material, and that seemed to be the issue.
9 I'm not sure the accused addressed that directly. I have some -- we'll
10 have some later argument in connection with at least the document in
11 paragraph 9.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber is not satisfied with the
14 relevance of these paragraphs, either geographically or substantively, so
15 we'll order these three paragraphs excluded from the statement.
16 Yes. If the court officer -- court deputy could help the witness
17 to have the earphones on.
18 Yes, Mr. Gagovic. Thank you again. Before you start giving
19 evidence --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.
21 JUDGE KWON: -- I would like to draw your attention to a
22 particular Rule here at the Tribunal. Under this Rule, Rule 90(E), you
23 may object to answering a question from the Prosecution or the accused or
24 even from the Judges if you believe that your answer will incriminate
25 you. When I say "incriminate," I mean that something you say may amount
1 to an admission of your guilt for a criminal offence or could provide
2 evidence that you have committed an offence. However, even if you think
3 your answer will incriminate you and you do not wish to answer the
4 question, the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the
5 question, but in such a case, the Tribunal will make sure that your
6 testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used as evidence in other
7 case against you for any offence other than false testimony.
8 Mr. Gagovic, do you understand what I have just told you?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I understood
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
13 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Gagovic.
15 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
16 Q. Have you given a statement to the Defence team?
17 A. I have.
18 Q. Thank you. Have you read that statement and signed it?
19 A. Yes. I have read and signed it.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you have the B/C/S version before you?
21 A. I do.
22 Q. Thank you. Is everything in the statement an accurate reflection
23 of what you said?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you. If I were to ask you these same questions today,
1 would your answers be generally the same?
2 A. I believe they would be the same.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this statement, 1D1 --
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, with the redaction I referred to. That's
7 92 ter statement will be admitted into evidence. Shall we give the
9 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2738. Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, turning to the associated exhibits,
12 we would ask permission for the Court to add three of those documents to
13 our 65 ter list. Those are numbers 1D10065, 67, and 68.
14 JUDGE KWON: Have they been uploaded into e-court?
15 MR. ROBINSON: As far as I know, but I can check.
16 JUDGE KWON: If the court officer could confirm.
17 By way of example, can we see the 1D10065?
18 Are we having a difficulty problem with the videolink?
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. Robinson, I take it that you are not
21 tendering 1D6184, which has been referred to in para-9.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. In light of the decision of the Chamber, we
23 won't tender that. Looking through e-court quickly, it looks like the
24 three documents that I mentioned are in e-court but not with
25 translations, so if that's the case, we'll either have to lead them live
1 or give up on those.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 You have no objection, Mr. Tieger, as to 1D1836 and 1D4202?
4 MR. TIEGER: Actually, Mr. President, first of all, 1D01836 is
5 already in evidence as P01509.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. P1509. Yes.
7 MR. TIEGER: Yes. With respect to 1D04202, I looked at that in
8 connection with the previous standards that I understood to have been
9 established for admission in this Chamber, a matter that I've discussed
10 on other occasions with Mr. Robinson, and I tried to reconcile it with
11 some of the recent rulings concerning documents that reflected the
12 statements by SDS officials promulgated through official organs clearly
13 intended to reach the public and to state their position on various
14 matters during the course of the war. This document seemed, as far as I
15 can tell, is a reflection of information provided by a particular source.
16 This witness can tell us nothing about who that source is or the relative
17 accuracy of this information. It's -- my view was that if the other
18 documents I mentioned didn't come in in light of what I would consider to
19 be their probative and reliable nature on their face, this -- this kind
20 of document would -- would fall somewhere below it in terms of
22 As the Court is aware and as Mr. Robinson is aware, I'm generally
23 an advocate of broad admission and the assessment of the totality of the
24 evidence, but in this case I'm trying to reconcile the standards in this
25 courtroom and the various documents which are tendered, and for that
1 reason I bring the Court's attention to the nature of this document and
2 the comments, the limited comments, made by the witness.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, would you like to respond?
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think with respect to that
5 document, what the witness said to it -- said about it in paragraph 5 is
6 that he can agree that the contents of the reports we received from the
7 corps chief of security looked exactly like this. So I think it would
8 probably be more useful to have that document put to him and see what he
9 could say about the document before you decide about its admission.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
11 The Judges cannot see the e-court documents at the moment, but
12 with that understanding, shall we continue?
13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
14 JUDGE KWON: In addition, there seems to be some further problem,
15 but let's give it a try and continue, see how it evolves.
16 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Dr. Karadzic is having
18 trouble actually finding things on -- getting e-court also, but --
19 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Your Honours, good morning. I'm
20 unable to hear the English channel --
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] -- in Belgrade.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, that's the problem that I referred to.
24 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] The witness is able to hear the
25 B/C/S, but I'm unable to listen to the English channel.
1 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we rise for ten minutes and try to sort it
2 out in the meantime. The Chamber will rise for ten minutes.
3 --- Break taken at 9.34 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 9.51 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, you are hearing me in your language?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am. I am.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] I would now like to read
10 Colonel Gagovic's summary in the English language, and then I will shed
11 light on the document 4202.
12 [In English] Milosav Gagovic was a professional soldier. In
13 1992, when war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was the assistant
14 commander for logistics of the 4th Corps of the JNA in Sarajevo. From
15 May 1992, he was acting commander of the 4th Corps of the JNA.
16 Milosav Gagovic considers that the replacement of the
17 single-party social system with multi-party brought turmoil to the ethnic
18 and religious relationships between the people in BH. The political
19 disagreements between the SDA, SDS, and HDZ transferred to their people.
20 Alija Izetbegovic stressed his wish to create an Islamic state, whereas
21 Radovan Karadzic stressed that everyone in BH should receive equal
22 treatment. During the fighting, Colonel Milosav Gagovic noted that all
23 the power in the authorities in B and H was concentrated on
24 Alija Izetbegovic, who was able to influence many events in B and H.
25 To realise their goals, the SDA and the HDZ began to illegally
1 form paramilitary and police forces. Milosav Gagovic was also aware that
2 a known terrorist trained members of the HDZ paramilitary units.
3 Further, the Croatian authorities released prisoners who had been
4 convicted for the most serious crimes of extremes -- extremism,
5 terrorism, and radicalism.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- Mr. Karadzic, was that not the part of what
7 has been excluded?
8 Yes. Was that the point, Mr. Tieger?
9 MR. TIEGER: Yes, and I believe other portions of the anticipated
10 summary also contain some of the redacted material. So the accused
11 should be attentive to that, I think.
12 JUDGE KWON: Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic? Please continue.
13 MR. KARADZIC: Okay. Then I will skip the next paragraph
14 concerning JNA, Listica, Mostar. I do hope it's going to be relevant.
15 Milosav Gagovic considers that Alija Izetbegovic used the
16 referendum regarding the independence of BH to brand the Serbs as an
17 enemy of the other two peoples. This then began a witch hunt against
18 Serbs in Sarajevo which began with the killing of a Serbian wedding
19 guest. Further attacks took place and armed gangs stormed apartments at
20 night, looting them and abusing the people inside. Members of the
21 paramilitary groups were seen parading in villages and singing
22 chauvinistic songs, insulting Serbs. Serb civilians formed guards at the
23 entrances to buildings and barricades were elected. Families began
24 receiving threats over the phone, and abusive notes were thrown into
25 letterboxes. At the time, many people left their properties.
1 Further, HDZ paramilitary formations murdered over 30 Serbian
2 elderly, women, and children in Gornji Malovan village on the 5th of
3 April, 1992. The first armed attack against the JNA followed shortly
4 after this. On the 22nd of April, 1992, Muslim forces attacked the
5 civilian population of Ilidza. A number of JNA soldiers were attacked on
6 the way to assist the civilians. Between 22nd of April and the 2nd of
7 May, 1992, Muslim paramilitary groups attacked the military district
8 group and barracks almost every night. These then became general attack
9 against the JNA features in Sarajevo. The paramilitary -- the military
10 hospital in Sarajevo and the Marsal Tito Barracks were under blockade,
11 and the airport in Butmir was attacked too.
12 JNA forces captured Alija Izetbegovic when he landed in Sarajevo,
13 as they believed he was in charge of the army that carried out the
14 attacks against the JNA. Negotiations were held, and the attacks on the
15 JNA were suspended on 2nd and 3rd of May. However, despite agreements
16 previously made, a convoy was attacked and JNA soldiers were killed. A
17 few soldiers were captured and imprisoned on which occasions they were
18 beaten abused. Further attacks were launched on the JNA military
19 features every day and the soldiers were under blockade at the barracks.
20 Throughout this the JNA command attempted to resolve the matters
21 peacefully by reaching agreements.
22 Muslim paramilitary units attacked JNA depots to obtain large
23 quantities of weapons. Many weapons had already been removed by them
24 illegally. Although agreements had been made to allow the JNA to remove
25 some weapons from the depots, Muslim forces attacked the vehicles
1 carrying these weapons and removed them from the lorries.
2 Milosav Gagovic was aware that Muslim forces used civilian
3 features to attack the Serb positions. Muslim forces constantly opened
4 fire against the Serbian residential areas and the JNA barracks. If the
5 Serbian artillery attacked parts of the city, these were attacks against
6 noticed military targets.
7 Milosav Gagovic, colonel, was co-operated with the legal
8 representatives of -- and ministers in the corps' zone of responsibility.
9 He did not co-operate with any paramilitaries. Crisis Staffs in those
10 areas formed Territorial Defence units where Serbs were the majority.
11 The JNA and Serbian Territorial Defence were not working towards the
12 division of Sarajevo. Their only task was to protect their homes and
13 their families.
14 And that would be the short summary.
15 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, I'd like to ask you to look at a
16 document which we have assigned the number 1D04202. I hope you have it.
17 A. Yes, I do have the document.
18 Q. It's not the document we have in e-court now. Can we please have
19 1D04202. Yes, this is it.
20 Colonel, sir, please look at the date, the heading and the
21 addressee, and then please turn to page 2, the bottom of the page.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you see the paragraph which reads:
24 "The nature of these meetings is still at the level of initial
25 organising efforts," et cetera, and then the sentence: "He claims that
1 he toured the areas of Sandzak, his native, Prijepolje, Rudo, Foca ..."
2 and then you can turn the page.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. "... Visegrad and other areas in the Drina valley." And now he
5 says here that the best organised illegal units are Muslim units in Foca,
6 that they have 2.000 members, that's units for special operations are
7 being formed and they should be given priority, that all the vital
8 facilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are being monitored and that --
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic. Mr. Karadzic, it's very leading.
10 Mr. Karadzic --
11 Mr. Tieger, would you like to say anything? I remember you rose.
12 MR. TIEGER: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. No, the -- you
13 anticipated me, and I think that's particularly the case in the context
14 of the objection that was raised and the ostensible purpose for bringing
15 this document to the witness's attention.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, would you like to respond.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I actually asked Dr. Karadzic
18 to ask the witness a general question about this document before calling
19 his attention to the specific part of the text and I think he should do
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologies.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Colonel, sir, were you able to have a look at page 3?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Were you familiar with these issues? Did you learn them from
2 this document or did you know of these issues from your general
3 knowledge, and how does this fit into your knowledge of the events ahead
4 of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. I did say in my statement that we at the corps command had
6 regular briefings by the corps commander -- or with the corps commander
7 of the situation in the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps.
8 Therefore, all the developments taking place in that period were the
9 subject of our briefings, including this particular information. The
10 undersigned Colonel Simovic briefed us on this matter and told us that
11 the eastern part of Bosnia was more busily working with the Sandzak area
12 and the area in Montenegro. So that when I saw this document, I clearly
13 said that I was aware of these issues. Not only concerning these areas
14 but also other areas that were matter of our briefings. Though I don't
15 think that the name of our former chief of the 4th Corps,
16 Fikret Selimovic, who was by that time already on the side of those who
17 were forming the SDA paramilitary formations.
18 Q. Thank you. I was waiting for interpretation. Can you look at
19 the first paragraph on page 3, which reads that some -- that he wanted to
20 attack some military depot but that the SDA leadership would not give
21 their consent. Can you tell us what -- can you tell us what was the
22 influence of the SDS over the JNA at the time?
23 A. At the time, the SDS didn't have any influence over the JNA at
24 the time, and this was true of all the other political parties. At the
25 time, the JNA was still the people's army, the army of all the various
1 ethnicities, and was recruited from the ranks of all the various
2 ethnicities except for those who refused to respond to call-ups, and at
3 that time it was already something that members of the Muslim and Croat
4 ethnicity did, and we already had the Rump Presidency at the time.
5 Q. As for your command, in early December of 1991, were there still
6 senior officers of Muslim and Croat ethnicities?
7 A. Yes. General Ante Karanovic, the chief of staff, was Croat.
8 There was Rasim Delic who was the operative in the operations department.
9 There was Muharem Nadza, colonel, and there were quite a few junior
10 officers, there were lieutenant-colonels who were in the command corps --
11 in the corps command.
12 Q. And who was the commander of the 10th Brigade at Lukavica?
13 A. It was Kari Kasanovic [phoen], Lieutenant colonel, and the head
14 of the artillery regiment --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness be asked to slow down and
16 repeat his answer.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, could you -- could you repeat your
18 answer, and when answering the question, please slow down for the benefit
19 of the interpreters. Thank you.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. [Interpretation] I said that the corps
21 command at the time included Muslim and Croat senior officers. The chief
22 of the staff was General Ante Karanusic [phoen], a Croat, a native of
23 Split. The operations officer in the first sector was Rasim Delic who
24 later became the commander of the armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
25 that's to say the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was Colonel
1 Nadjak, a Muslim, the chief of ON Nov sector. The chief of the Motorised
2 Brigade, Enver Kari Kasanovic. He was a lieutenant-colonel of the JNA.
3 The commander of the 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment at Kiseljak,
4 Lieutenant-Colonel Polutak. The commander of the 6th Proletarian Brigade
5 in Doboj was Lieutenant-Colonel Cazim Hodzic. They were officers who
6 held key positions and they were Croats and Muslims. Of course, there
7 were more officers also among those who held lower-level positions across
8 the brigades until 1992.
9 Q. One more question, Colonel. On page 3, it is stated that he
10 asked that a unit of specialists be set up for covert execution or
11 assassination. Was there anything that hinted at this?
12 A. Well, we knew of a list of people who were members of the JNA of
13 Serb and Montenegrin ethnicities who were on this list for assassination
14 or liquidation. There were already telephone threats to family members
15 of these JNA officers, threatening messages placed in their letterboxes.
16 The flats of some of the officers were stormed as well. We knew that
17 they planned their quiet liquidation, because we knew that they would
18 offer a taxi service to transport senior officers from the point of
19 Assembly to unknown locations where they would be subjected to blackmails
20 or liquidations.
21 Q. Okay.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have no
23 further questions based on this document. I would now like to tender it
24 into evidence.
25 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Tieger?
1 MR. TIEGER: I have to under the circumstances I'm afraid I have
2 to renew the same objection. I cannot see how the fact that this witness
3 received the document somehow cleanses it of its underlying issues of
4 unreliability. To analogise to the case I raised before, in comparing it
5 to documents that had been rejected, it would be as if someone said, "I
6 received the official SDS organ which contained the interview of this SDS
7 official who wanted us to hear these things." Now, presumably that
8 wouldn't have changed the Court's ruling in that case, although, as the
9 Court is aware, I continue to believe that such information shouldn't be
11 In this case, however, we have an informant, about whom we know
12 nothing, about whom the witness apparently knows nothing, and this
13 information which has been the subject of the discussion about whether or
14 not it is sufficiently reliable for admission should -- should be
15 admitted. And nothing the witness said to that added in any way.
16 The witness contextualised it in a sense but that doesn't change
17 the admissibility issue because in the previous case, as I mentioned
18 before, the -- that issue concerning admission, whether it was
19 contextualised, affirmed, or whether it served as impeachment also
20 existed in the previous case as impeachment, so we get to the underlying
21 issue of -- apparently of reliability, and that's -- which is why the
22 accused was asked to address this document. And we now understand that
23 this witness has been receiving information of this sort, which is
24 essentially a statement from the agent Semso about whom we know nothing,
25 which is much less than we knew about the person who was making the
1 statement that we -- that was tendered in the instance I described before
2 but was rejected.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. The simple answer to this is
5 this goes entirely to weight, and you've admitted before many documents
6 similar to this on behalf of the Prosecution reports of state security,
7 reports of Muslim police organs who took information from other people,
8 so I don't think that this is inadmissible for the reasons stated by
9 Mr. Tieger.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, the Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson's
12 objection. The witness confirmed some part of the document, and as you
13 indicated, contextualised the document. We'll admit it as Exhibit D2739.
14 But there seems again to be another problem with the videolink. Just let
15 us check.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the meantime, may I ask --
17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Tieger.
18 Yes. Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, just to raise one point and not to --
20 this is not to revisit the ruling itself, just to make a point because
21 these issues are recurring and sometimes it's useful at the moment to
22 make an observation that may bear on future tendering and discussions of
24 First of all, I would ask the Court in the future to consider the
25 circularity of the confirmation. I mean, you say that the witness
1 confirmed the information. The witness was getting this information.
2 That was the source of his information. So there's a circular aspect to
3 this. He's saying I knew about this based on this kind of document.
4 Again, that has the problem.
5 Secondly, I think it will bear on and I will -- we -- I think it
6 sheds light on admission and tendering of -- of other types of documents,
7 the type I described, and that's all I wanted to mention.
8 JUDGE KWON: Let's deal with the issue when it arises.
9 Mr. Karadzic, have you completed your examination-in-chief?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellency. In -- on
11 page 18, in line 25 and on page 19, line 1, Mr. Tieger mentioned the SDS
12 out of the context. I don't see what this sentence means at all. This
13 isn't a report by the SDS but by an official organ of the JNA?
14 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Robinson knows what the reference meant and can
15 explain it to the accused.
16 JUDGE KWON: Let's leave it there.
17 Mr. Karadzic, the witness statement said that he was an acting
18 commander of the JNA 4th Corps in Sarajevo in June 1992. Could you ask
19 him what military positions he took after that and when he retired.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Colonel, sir, who was the commander of the 4th Corps before you
23 took up that position?
24 A. It was General Djurdjevac, Vojislav Djurdjevac.
25 Q. Thank you. Before the next commander was appointed, you were
1 acting commander, were you not?
2 A. Acting commander of the 4th Corps. Stand-in commander of the
3 4th Corps.
4 Q. So acting commander would be different from the stand-in
5 commander, would it not?
6 A. Yes, yes.
7 Q. And how long did you stay in that position for?
8 A. From the 11th of May until the 20th of May when the 4th Corps of
9 the JNA was reformed or transformed. And I stayed in Lukavica until the
10 1st of June because of the units that were under a blockade in the
11 barracks in Sarajevo. I stayed until the blockades were lifted, and the
12 last was -- blockade was lifted on the 5th of June at the Lukavica
14 Q. Thank you. Do you recall when it was that General Mladic came to
15 the 2nd Military District and who had appointed him?
16 A. General Mladic came to the 2nd Military District on the 10th of
17 May. He took up the position of acting commander of the military
18 district, and he was appointed by the national secretary for People's
20 Q. Thank you. Do you recall was the decision taken significantly
21 ahead of the outbreak of the conflict?
22 A. I don't know if it was taken earlier on, but it was
23 Milutin Kukanjac who held that position before him.
24 Q. What became of you later? What were the positions that you held
25 subsequently and until what time?
1 A. After this position, I applied for retirement, but before that I
2 used up my annual leave for three months, and officially it was on the
3 1st of November, 1992, that I was retired.
4 Q. Thank you. Colonel, I don't have any further questions for you?
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, as you have noted, your evidence in
7 chief has been admitted in most part in written form, i.e., through your
8 written statement. Now you'll be cross-examined by the representative of
9 the Office of the Prosecutor.
10 Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
13 Q. Good morning, Colonel. I presume you can hear me. It seems --
14 A. Good morning. I can hear you very well.
15 Q. Excellent. Colonel, I want to ask you about a number of
16 documents, in particular intercepted telephone conversations in which you
17 participated. I noted in your Dragomir Milosevic testimony that at one
18 point you asked one of the attorneys why they -- why that person hadn't
19 shown you a particular intercept that you considered existed reflecting a
20 conversation you had, and I'll try to put as many of the precisely
21 relevant ones to you as I can at the moment.
22 First, Colonel, I would like to ask you about 65 ter 30743. And
23 for the benefit of the registrar who will be showing you documents and
24 who may already be aware of the organisation of the binder of hard
25 copies, they are presented in D order, P order, and then 65 ter order,
1 all of which are presented numerically. So the 65 ters will be found
2 toward the back of the binder, and this one is 30743.
3 Now, Colonel, I can play you a portion of this if necessary, but
4 as I said, I understood from your Dragomir Milosevic testimony that you
5 were aware of the fact that many telephone conversations had been
6 intercepted and recorded, and so in the interest of expediency, I'm
7 presenting you with the transcript of those conversations. And this is
8 one that is dated the 11th of May, 1992. And if you look --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And it's between -- first, as we see in the transcript, between
11 yourself and General Mladic. And you are advising him that Baros is on
12 the phone. And then General Mladic goes on to speak with Mr. Baros, and
13 I'll ask you about that in a minute.
14 At this time -- at this time, Colonel, 11 May, where -- where
15 were you and General Mladic located?
16 A. I was in Lukavica --
17 Q. And --
18 A. -- at the barracks called Cedo. General Mladic came to Lukavica
19 from time to time. He came on the 10th to tell us that he had assumed
20 the duties of the commander of the 2nd Military District, and he was
21 moving from unit to unit getting to know people, and he met General Baros
22 by telephone. Because Baros did not have his own telephone he was using
23 mine, and contact was made with him from one radio to another because he
24 was in the Marsal Tito Barracks.
25 You have this conversation, which I didn't know about, because
1 out of decency and subordination I did not listen to everything, but I
2 know that Baros was told that Mladic had taken up the place of
3 General Kukanjac as commander of 2nd Military District.
4 Q. All right. Now, as we see from the discussion as it continues,
5 Baros raises the issue of people coming to the gates, and in that case
6 that would have been, as you've explained, to the Marsal Tito Barracks;
7 is that right, Colonel?
8 A. Yes. Concerning these people that Baros is talking about, they
9 were practically civilians who were intimidated in the city of Sarajevo.
10 They were leaving their homes and fleeing to the Marsal Tito Barracks,
11 which was the closest one to them, being located in the centre of the
12 city, near the railway station.
13 Q. Okay. Colonel, you've indicated that out of decency and
14 subordination you didn't listen to the entire conversation, but as we
15 continue in the discussion, and I turn your attention to the fourth page
16 of the transcript, the B/C/S transcript before you, we see that
17 General Mladic advises Baros that Gagovic is listening, and he will
18 continue, and then you and Baros can continue the conversation that had
19 begun before you got General Mladic on the line.
20 A. Yes. But before that, the general warned me that I can continue
21 with Baros.
22 Q. Yes. I can see that in the transcript. And after returning now
23 to the earlier part of the discussion shortly after General Mladic began
24 talking with Baros and Baros identified the nature of his concern about
25 people at the Marsal Tito Barracks, General Mladic reassures him and
1 tells him to hold on tight and that negotiations will proceed that day
2 concerning release of property, people, and weapons; correct? And I
3 think you'll find that on the second page of your transcript.
4 A. As far as I know, Baros was preoccupied with the civilian
5 population that was at the Marsal Tito Barracks. There were many
6 families, including women and children; families, many of them of
7 military personnel; and some families whose men had already left
8 Sarajevo, leaving them behind. And there was pressure from Muslim
9 military units to surrender, leave behind all the weapons. Baros said
10 there was no danger that they would do that, because he was prepared to
11 defend the barracks.
12 Q. Well, and General Mladic offers him further reassurance about
13 holding tight, and that is when he reminds him that you are still in a
14 better position than they, meaning the Muslims are, that they have been
15 sealed off.
16 "The entire town has been sealed off, and the entire Muslim
17 population. They can't touch you. I will put it to them today in no
18 uncertain terms, because if they dare touch a single hair on the head of
19 any of our members or on the head of any member of our soldiers'
20 families --"
21 A. Well, you see, I don't know how much you know about the
22 environment of Sarajevo. Many areas in Sarajevo and around were
23 populated by Serbs, and in those areas Serbs self-organised themselves to
24 defend their homes and property. That is the kind of encirclement
25 surrounding that Mladic was talking about. And there were daily raids by
1 Muslim units on all sides that created panic among the Serb population,
2 intimidating them so that they would leave even those peripheral areas
3 like they left the central areas of Sarajevo.
4 You know, I had my own private apartment. I wanted to live in
5 Sarajevo among my friends, but I had to relocate my family because there
6 were daily threats. Those were the paramilitary units that were
7 supported and given incentives by the authorities. They wouldn't have
8 been doing those things if they had no support from the government.
9 Q. Colonel. Colonel.
10 A. And when I say authorities, I mean the authorities led by the
11 president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic.
12 Q. Colonel, I have a limited amount of time with you. I -- this
13 is -- these are matters that you had an opportunity to and in fact did
14 raise in the statement you provided the Defence. I'm asking you specific
15 questions about certain issues that arise, and in this particular case
16 about this intercept. I will appreciate it in future questions if you
17 can concentrate on the issue at hand, the question raised, and you can
18 leave it to the Defence if they want to ask you for further elaboration
19 of the context or reasons for those issues. Thank you.
20 MR. TIEGER: Just before the break, Mr. President, I would tender
21 this document.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P6069. Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, we'll have a break for half an hour and
25 resume at 3 past 11.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
3 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any problem with the videolink?
4 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, if that's directed toward -- okay.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, do you hear me in your language?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Now we can see you, Mr. Gagovic.
8 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Q. Colonel, I'd next like to turn to another conversation that took
11 place on the 19th of May. This time first between you and
12 Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic and then Jankovic and General Mladic, and
13 that's found at -- that's 65 ter 30775. I'll give you just a moment to
14 orient yourself on that transcript, Colonel. It's not terribly long, and
15 as you should see from a glance, it is another occasion on which you
16 answered a --
17 A. All right.
18 Q. -- answered a phone call and put General Mladic on the line. And
19 again, this is about the -- initially about the evacuation of the
20 barracks issue, as you can see; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. General Mladic explains to -- seeks information from Jankovic
23 about what the Muslim interlocutor wants, and learns, as you see in the
24 first page of the transcript, weapons in the same state they found them
25 in, and General Mladic talks about the circumstances in which they, and
1 particularly the Muslims, will be able to enter the barracks, that is,
2 when they pass the separation line Jankovic indicates they want it before
3 and General Mladic says that won't happen. I take it that's consistent
4 with your recollection of circumstances at the time.
5 A. This was a relocation of the recruits from the Marsal Tito
6 Barracks after the lifting of the blockade. Jankovic was there with his
7 team to get things done, to relocate the barracks. However, there was a
8 dispute because the representatives of the Muslim side insisted that
9 nothing can be removed from the barracks apart from the personal
10 belongings of the recruits and officers. However, there were many
11 teaching aids in the barracks, although it may sound strange to you that
12 we considered artillery and other pieces as teaching aids. So Mladic was
13 not was not agreeable to that manner of evacuation. Instead, he wanted a
14 real assessment made as to what can be removed and what cannot, and the
15 objective was to relocate the recruits somewhere in the area of Grbavica.
16 I just established this connection, did not participate in this
17 conversation, but you know that all the telephone and other
18 communications went through my telephone number, because all the other
19 telephones were cut off apart from mine that was wire-tapped all the
20 time. So nothing could be decided in the corps command without my
21 knowledge or without my intervention.
22 Q. And -- thank you, Colonel. And again as we saw in the previous
23 conversation which took place on the 11th, General Mladic reassures
24 Jankovic in this case in two ways. Number one -- and you can find this
25 on page 2 of your transcript. Number one, he explains that -- that
1 Jankovic is in a better position than the Muslims, and he says, "We can
2 stay in our barracks a year. It's not the barracks which lack food in
3 Sarajevo." And then he also explains that if there is a threat coming
4 from the Muslim side that there will be dire consequences. That's the
5 section you'll see related to bringing in cisterns, that is Sarajevo.
6 Then he should bring cisterns in as happened in Mostar. "Tell Jovo
7 Divjak that him and I know one another very well." And then he
8 continues, "But he can bring in a cistern, but in that case he would
9 sentence first himself and then entire Sarajevo to death."
10 So in both conversations, Colonel, is it correct that
11 General Mladic was offering reassurance to the other military officials
12 he was speaking to by saying their situation was better than the Muslims'
13 and that the Muslims should not dare to take action because there would
14 be extreme consequences if they do; is that correct?
15 A. I would like to go into that conversation between Mladic and
16 Major or Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic, simply because I did not follow
17 that conversation after making contact. And I made the contact because,
18 as I told you before, my telephone was the only one available to make
19 contact with the corps command.
20 Mladic, like all the negotiators, wanted to take as much as he
21 could, and there were threats to officers and personnel in the
22 Marsal Tito Barracks. This reference to cisterns filled with explosives
23 that would be driven up to the barracks was one of these threats, and
24 such a cistern would have the effect of an atomic bomb. But Mladic was
25 telling Jankovic that these were empty threats, a shot in the dark, as it
1 were. That's how I understand it.
2 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
3 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Mr. President.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Turning -- turning to the
5 authenticity or foundation for the admissibility of intercepted
6 conversations, I'm wondering if the Prosecution can advise us if this
7 particular intercept is among those in the record of the case which was
8 identified by the intercept operators or their supervisors as being an
9 authentic intercept. And the reason I raise that is because of the fact
10 that we've been trying to have our intercepts admitted, and the
11 Prosecution made a filing in December basically saying that essentially
12 we'll have to call the Muslim or Croat intercept operators back if we
13 want to have our intercepts admitted. So if that's going to be the way
14 we have to proceed, then I want to make sure that before the Prosecution
15 has any intercepts admitted that there's some foundation in the record
16 that it's been identified by the intercept operators or witnesses as one
17 of those which was authentic and reliable.
18 JUDGE KWON: You did not object to the admission of previous
19 intercepts, because the witness was one of the interlocutors.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Exactly.
21 JUDGE KWON: But here Mr. Gagovic does not appear.
22 MR. TIEGER: He does, Mr. President.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Other than answering the phone and passing it to
24 Jankovic, but he doesn't appear in the substance of the conversation.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, would you like to respond?
1 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President, I would. Thank you. First of
2 all, I can -- let me respond directly to Mr. Robinson by saying that
3 this -- this was authenticated in P4635, row 453, but more to the point,
4 I think -- I think it's --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. If it has been authenticated in that
6 exhibit, Mr. Robinson would withdraw his objection, I take it.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's correct.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be admitted.
9 MR. TIEGER: Yeah. But we're not trying to -- we are not and
10 were never trying to raise unnecessary hurdles to the admission of
11 intercepts. I think our acknowledgement in the filing we made was
12 consistent with the position we've taken about the intercepted
13 conversations and their reliability overall. So I don't -- I don't want
14 to sign on to the representations made by Mr. Robinson. And finally,
15 there maybe intercepts which -- that I'll be tendering here which are not
16 necessarily authenticated. So I -- sorry, I know you don't want academic
17 discussions --
18 JUDGE KWON: Let us proceed.
19 MR. TIEGER: -- but we'll get there.
20 JUDGE KWON: All right. Thank you. This will be admitted as
21 Exhibit P6070.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. Colonel, in paragraph 39 of your statement, you made some
24 observations about bombings or bombardments in Sarajevo. I wanted to --
25 to draw your attention to one contemporaneous event about which you were
1 aware involving the bombardment of Muslim settlements in the area about
2 which you were contacted by a man named Zekerijah Smajic. I take it you
3 recall Mr. Smajic who was a well-known journalist from Jutel?
4 A. Yes, I do, correct.
5 Q. And just so the Court is aware, Jutel was a media outlet which
6 was somewhat of a symbol of multicultural Yugoslavia. Is that fair?
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, could you kindly repeat your answer.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was Jutel's intention. It was
10 set up as a Yugoslav broadcasting channel, but it did not contribute much
11 to the progress of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the
12 contrary, sometimes even fuelled up the ongoing conflict between the
13 peoples in the former Yugoslavia.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Can we turn to 65 ter 30745, please, and take a look at the
16 discussion that took place between you and Mr. Smajic on the 11th of May,
18 Now, it's a little bit longer than the other -- the
19 [indiscernible] conversations we looked at, Colonel, so let me try to
20 draw your attention to particular portions and identify where they can be
21 found in your transcript as well as in the English version.
22 So first of all at -- on the first page we see that Mr. Smajic
23 introduces himself, including some mention of his military background,
24 and also identifies himself as an inhabitant of the settlement Bresje.
25 That's found at -- so the introduction I mentioned about the military is
1 found at page 1 of your transcript, and the mention that he's an
2 inhabitant can be found at page 2.
3 He then explains that he got involved in some peace missions
4 after the shocking attack the day before yesterday and visited the
5 settlement of Sokolje. You can see that on page 2 as well. And then as
6 you'll see toward the bottom of page 3 of your transcript, he begins
7 talking about the all-out cannonade including attacks on the settlements
8 Boljakov Potok, Sokolje, and Bresje Brdo of the areas that he had visited
10 He continues to tell you that he believes that is in response to
11 or was connected to another shelling aimed at the barracks of Rajlovac
12 but that he says that came from the hill of Zuc and is 99 per cent sure
13 it was a case of intentional provocation.
14 He goes on at -- toward the bottom of page -- excuse me. The --
15 toward pages 4 and 5 of your transcript, talking about a conversation
16 that he had with Colonel Miletic -- excuse me. You tell him about a
17 conversation you had with Colonel Miletic, and that in response, after
18 hearing Miletic saying that he was being shelled from Brijesko Brdo, you
19 called Abdic and asked for his intervention to stop that in order to
20 prevent the responsive shelling and destroying facilities, houses, and
21 especially prevent killing people.
22 And then Colonel, we also see reference by Smajic to basically
23 again a denial that people from those areas are shelling. That they're
24 all in shelters.
25 Finally two more references I wanted to bring your attention
1 to -- well, first of all, Colonel, and before I go on to the final two
2 references, can I take it given the somewhat dramatic nature of this
3 phone call and the plea we were hearing from Smajic that you recall this
4 conversation and the information you were receiving about the shelling of
5 these three Muslim settlements?
6 A. I remember this conversation well. I knew Mr. Smajic from
7 before. He knew me as well. He knew that the JNA was a mediator for the
8 civilian population, that it protected the civilian population regardless
9 of ethnicity or religious affiliation. That's why he called me. At the
10 same time from Rajlovac, a person called Miletic, who was a director in
11 the military factory, complained of having been shelled, that shells were
12 falling on Rajlovac and the airport which was an auxiliary airport. On
13 the other hand, Hajrija called me to say the same things happened in his
14 area, that mortar shells were falling, that the population was scared,
15 and he asked me to do whatever was in my power to prevent all that.
16 Since Mr. Fikret Abdic represented the Presidency of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the 4th of May in a negotiation with the JNA I
18 talked to Fikret and asked him to talk to Miletic, because I spoke to
19 Miletic as well. I wanted the three of them to find -- find a solution,
20 because it was not just one side that provoked the other. Everybody
21 provoked everybody else. Who was it who started with provocation first
22 is something that I can't answer. And as for Zekerijah's words, that
23 nothing happened in his village, that fire was not opened from his
24 village, it was his village that fire was opened on. There were some
25 renegade Muslim groups that had at their disposal mortars. They would
1 mount those mortars on a lorry, they would fire a projectile or two on a
2 location, then they would change locations, and they never gave a second
3 thought to the place where the projectile would fall. Sometimes there
4 were projectiles fall among their own. Sometimes they fell on the
5 Serbian side.
6 I spoke to all three of them, and at the end, we could not
7 conclude who was it who opened the fire first, where the projectiles came
8 from. Mr. Smajic had been an anti-aircraft officer. He then completed
9 his university studies. He became a journalist. He's still a
10 journalist. He was a good journalist then, and he continued being a good
11 journalist. He's a good man and a good professional. And regardless of
12 his professionalism and knowledge of military issues, I'm sure that he
13 could not devise where the projectiles came from. He could only assume
14 as did I, as did Fikret, and as did Mr. Miletic.
15 Q. Well, Colonel, one the things you told Mr. Smajic was that when
16 he was asking for those salvos and destruction to stop was that the
17 party, and you can look at it in context by which it seems clear you
18 meant the SDS, has significant influence. They are armed en masse. They
19 picked up the arms from Faletici. They have lethal weapons at their
20 disposal. And that's found, Colonel, at page -- the second-to-last page
21 toward the bottom of your transcript.
22 So it's correct, is it not, Colonel, that when Smajic called you
23 to beg for intervention to stop the shelling, you referred to the massive
24 arming of the SDS and their possession of lethal weapons?
25 A. I wouldn't say that I had an occasion to discuss that. I didn't
1 mention the SDS, because the SDS did not have any weapons as a party.
2 The term that sometimes appears in my conversations and in the
3 conversations conducted by others refers to something that was used by
4 the other side, the Territorial Defence which was a territorial structure
5 among Muslims and Serbs alike is something that they did not want to
6 refer to as the Territorial Defence. They called it the SDS army,
7 because at the same time they called their own armed forces the
8 Territorial Defence. However, the SDS as a party, as far as I know,
9 never had any armed formations.
10 Q. Colonel --
11 A. Up to the moment when the Serbian Army was set up, they did not
12 have any army, because members of the Serbian ethnicity responded to the
13 JNA call-ups, and able-bodied men joined units of the JNA, either as
14 former recruits or volunteers. They replaced Muslim and Croat members of
15 the JNA who at that time from the end of 1991 onwards had stopped
16 responding to the JNA call-ups.
17 Q. And that's --
18 A. You were talking about lethal weapons, something that I
19 mentioned, but I don't believe that I ever used that term, because
20 everybody knows very well what lethal weapons are. At that time, neither
21 side had those. They could only have conventional weapons of the
22 infantry weapons type. I don't know whether I've answered your question.
23 Q. I believe you did.
24 MR. TIEGER: I tender this, Mr. President.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I don't have any objection, but
1 with respect to this last question and the answer from the witness, I
2 don't think Mr. Tieger was that fair to the witness, because he made his
3 question very general, and then at the end of the question tied it into a
4 particular portion of this transcript. I think it would have been better
5 if he would simply have placed before the witness page -- what appears on
6 the bottom of page 8 of the English, the two answers that relate first
7 to -- with respect to Mr. Krajisnik, and then exactly what Mr. Gagovic is
8 recorded as having said, and ask him the question in light of that,
9 because his attention was never directly called to that particular answer
10 he gave, and I think the answer that he's giving, which seems to be from
11 memory, is not very responsive.
12 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure how accurate that is. I thought I
13 directed the witness's attention to that portion of the transcript
14 explicitly and told him exactly where it could be found in his
16 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I don't want to say anything in front of the
17 witness, but if you look at the answer that the witness gave that's in
18 the transcript, I think if he had read that answer, he would not have
19 given the response that he gave to Mr. Tieger's question. So I don't
20 think it was -- at least the way Mr. Tieger posed the question which
21 started from the general and went to the specific was sufficient to alert
22 the witness to actually read that portion of his answer and make an
23 answer that's responsive.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Gagovic, having heard Mr. Robinson
25 and read the remainder of the document, would you like to add anything?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't see here what the
2 Prosecutor alleged, that I connected the arming of the Territorial
3 Defence with the event described to me by Mr. Zekerijah. It seemed that
4 the Territorial Defence had obtained a certain quantity of weapons when
5 it came in conflict with the Muslims in Faletici and that it was stronger
6 and that they had weapons, but those were conventional weapons such as
7 rifles, 79 millimetres and 76.2 semi-automatic weapons. Those were not
8 lethal or destructive weapons, and in that area where that case happened
9 that Zekerijah described, it's not there. It's a different part of the
10 world north-west of Sarajevo in the direction of Pale.
11 MR. TIEGER: This -- apparently there is no objection to the
12 admission of this document.
13 Q. Let me ask the witness the following: I want to draw your
14 attention to have you confirm something you said during the course of
15 your testimony during the Dragomir Milosevic case. And that is in
16 connection with depots and who took ammunition, and you said beginning at
17 page 8690 and extending into page 8691 of the Dragomir Milosevic
19 "Smaller depots were spread throughout Sarajevo and the
20 environments. The largest one was in Faletici. Paramilitary forces of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina tried to get into these warehouses to get the weaponry
22 and prior to that they carried out large quantities of weaponry illegally
23 to say so. Then there was conflict between the forces of the Territorial
24 Defence of the Republika Srpska and the BH Federation forces and the
25 majority of the weaponry ended up in the hands of the Army of Republika
2 Now, that's a direct quote from the testimony you gave in the
3 Dragomir Milosevic case. Can you confirm that, Mr. -- Colonel Gagovic?
4 I'm not seeking --
5 A. Well, I have not changed that statement with my previous answer.
6 I said the same. Perhaps not in so many words. But in Faletici there
7 was no artillery ammunition. There were no artillery pieces, only the
8 infantry weapons were there, only personal infantry weapons such as
9 rifles, automatic weapons, and machine guns, but not lethal weapons that
10 could be used in the area mentioned by Zekerijah Smajic. It is true that
11 those two armed components conflicted in Faletici and that the
12 territorial forces which belonged to the Serbian side overpowered the
13 other side. They prevailed because they were stronger.
14 Q. Colonel, when you referred to the taking of weapons from Faletici
15 in speaking to Mr. Smajic, you're referring to exactly the same event
16 you're talking about in your -- you talked about in your
17 Dragomir Milosevic testimony, that is the taking of weaponry by the
18 members of or people associated with the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence
19 or, as you say in the Dragomir Milosevic testimony, the Army of Republika
20 Srpska. Isn't that right?
21 A. That happened only in the Faletici depot. The two armed
22 components conflicted, the Muslims on the one side, the Serbs on the
23 other side. The Serbs had prevalence and they managed to get hold of the
24 weapons from at that depot. As far as I remember, I testified about
25 that. But I did not mention that in my conversation with Zekerijah. He
1 mentioned something completely different, the arming of the Serbian Army,
2 i.e., the Territorial Defence of Serbia on the one side and the Muslim
3 Territorial Defence on the other. And I still claim that both used to
4 try and get hold of the weapons that belonged to the city of Sarajevo
5 from their weapons -- from their depots, some of them which were in the
6 city of Sarajevo. And when it comes to the operative part and the
7 manoeuvre part of the Territorial Defence, their weapons were stored in
9 MR. TIEGER: Again, Mr. President, I tender this document. I
10 tender the intercept.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we give the number?
12 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P6071. Thank you.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. In connection with the taking of weaponry by the Bosnian Serbs
15 and their success in Faletici, I want to direct your attention to
16 65 ter 12028. And this is Mr. Milovan Bjelica speaking in
17 Srpsko Oslobodjenje, a publication set up by the RS on the 27th December
18 1994. If you turn to -- you'll see the third column of that article, and
19 it begins on the bottom half of the third column. He's asked about how
20 did you arm the people and explains in particular --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let's make sure that the witness has
22 the document.
23 MR. TIEGER: Sorry.
24 Q. I see from the screen that was just put in front of you, Colonel.
25 If you can direct your attention to the third column, and the question
1 begins, "How did you arm the people ?" And it begins:
2 "Serbian Democratic Party organised all activities related to
3 preparation and organising of people for defence."
4 It talks about taking weapons in various places. And then it
5 concludes at the bottom of that paragraph:
6 "And our greatest success was taking the equipment and weapons
7 from Faletici."
8 And as he continues in the next full paragraph after that, it
9 talks about a confrontation at the -- at Faletici between the forces of
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb forces and their success in
11 prevailing in that confrontation and pulling out the weapons.
12 Now, I take it that in that respect you can confirm, as you did
13 before, that this is the same event you were talking about, that is the
14 removal of weaponry by Bosnian Serb forces after a confrontation with
15 Muslim forces or BiH forces.
16 A. I have read that part. I believe that this refers to that same
17 event. However, it was not that the weapons were only in Faletici.
18 There was a lot of it in the city of Sarajevo, in many facilities that
19 held the weapons of the Territorial Defence. After that case, the Muslim
20 side made a request to the JNA command, i.e., to the General Staff, to
21 compensate them for the two-thirds of that weaponry, because they
22 believed that that was as much as belonged to them. The General Staff
23 responded favourably and tried to implement that compensation, i.e., to
24 restore the weapons to the Muslim side from the depot in [indiscernible].
25 Several trucks of weapons arrived and they were supposed to be stored
1 in -- on the premises of the PTT engineering where UNPROFOR soldiers were
2 billeted. General Louis MacKenzie is well aware of that.
3 Q. Colonel, can I stop --
4 A. However, it was agreed that the weapons would not be
5 distributed -- yes?
6 Q. I'm always in the Trial Chamber's hands, but I believe you
7 answered my question and then went on to address some other issues.
8 MR. TIEGER: I think the Chamber is in agreement with me. Thank
10 I tender this document, Mr. President.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. This is the same
12 category of documents we dealt with with the Tintor and Mrs. Plavsic
13 statements -- after the fact statements before Christmas recess and I
14 think it falls into the same category. This is a 1994 interview by
15 Mr. Bjelica which is reflecting back on events in 1992, and all the
16 witness has said about it was that it refers to the same event, and so I
17 don't believe that there is any basis for admitting it.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I have to say these are constantly
20 moving goal posts by the Defence. This -- first of all, the objection
21 raised by the Defence earlier with respect to the Tintor documents that
22 Mr. Robinson has now cited was already a shifting of the standards for
23 admission that existed before, but just dealing with that now, what
24 happened before was that the argument was there was no affirmation of the
25 document. There is affirmation here. In addition, this document can
1 serve as either affirmation or confirmation or corroboration of what the
2 witness said with respect to the Faletici incident, or it would be the
3 basis for potential impeachment of that.
4 I had a discussion with Mr. Robinson some time ago. This is --
5 the issue about these documents is general reliability. This document is
6 clearly reliable for all kinds of reasons. It's produced through
7 Srpsko Oslobodjenje, a Bosnian Serb -- an RS publication. It's done
8 during the course of the war, not belatedly. Those were all standards
9 Mr. Robinson identified and agreed to in the previous discussions, that
10 is the ones that preceded the Tintor issue. It's affirmed to a
11 significant measure by the witness. There is no reason why the
12 Trial Chamber should be precluded from hearing this evidence. The fact
13 that it doesn't -- if we're going to -- if we're going to --
14 JUDGE KWON: By the way -- just, I'm sorry to cut you off, but my
15 question is this: Not all the documents have been translated and the
16 relevant part was read to the witness and we heard his answer. Do we
17 need to admit this separately in practical terms?
18 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure if that means -- if -- if the issue
19 is -- if -- if what I -- yeah, I think we do, Mr. President. I mean, I
20 paraphrased. I don't mind -- I'm agreeable to the admission of only
21 those portions of the document to which I referred plus any necessary
22 contextualisation introducing the individual, but it cannot be the case,
23 I submit, that we -- we hear the entirety of a document that relates
24 information provided by an unnamed informant about whom we know nothing,
25 but we don't hear precise focused information from an SDS official
1 through an official SDS publication designed for dissemination and to be
2 heard by the public and the world.
3 This is clearly significantly more reliable information and
4 should be admitted for that -- for that reason.
5 Now, I could read -- I could read into the record the entirety of
6 the exchange in the document verbatim, but I did not do so, and this is a
7 faster way of doing it.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The Chamber will admit only those part
10 put to the witness. Shall we give the number. 6072. Yes,
11 Exhibit P6072.
12 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Just so I understand,
14 are you admitting that to -- in the context to the witnesses answer as
15 opposed to for the truth for all purposes?
16 JUDGE KWON: That goes to the weight, Mr. Robinson, but I will
17 consult with my colleagues.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Before you do, if I could just be heard on this.
19 This is also something that Mr. Tieger and I are always arguing over and
21 So let's say that Mr. Bjelica had testified in one of the
22 early -- in the Tadic trial, one of the earlier trials, and had said
23 something like this, and then would you admit his testimony, because if
24 the witness simply said yes that talked about the same event, would you
25 admit his testimony into evidence from the Tadic trial into this trial?
1 And I would suggest that you would not.
2 And the reason we're objecting to these and what distinguishes
3 these from other documents is that these are not contemporaneous but they
4 are reflective recollections of what happened years before the event, and
5 for that to be admissible, we think the witness ought to be here to be
6 questioned about it.
7 And that's difference between other documents and these documents
8 like Tintor, Mrs. Plavsic book, and this, because when a witness is
9 simply recounting his recollection after the fact of an event, that's
10 like testimony, and that's in a different category than contemporaneous
11 things that are said at the time, and that's why we think that you have
12 throughout the case drawn a line for admitting contemporaneous documents
13 that a witness could comment on and not admitting documents which were
14 not contemporaneous but were -- where people were reflecting upon events
15 that they'd experienced, and we believe that that affects the fairness of
16 the trial and not necessarily a question of reliability. Testimony would
17 be reliable, but nevertheless, we don't think it should be admissible
18 without a witness coming and being able to ask the witness about that
19 recollection that they're giving about past events.
20 So that's the basis for our objection, and we think that by
21 admitting this and having it go to the weight, it defeats the purpose of
22 our objection, which is that the fairness of the trial is maintained by
23 not allowing people to be giving evidence on reflection of events that
24 occurred earlier. Thank you.
25 MR. TIEGER: And, Mr. President, if I may. A moment's
1 reflection -- sorry.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: I'll also try to listen to the French transcript, I
4 take it.
5 I was about to say that a moment's reflection, maybe not even
6 that, would make clear that this is not analogous to testimony. If it's
7 analogous to anything, it's far more analogous to the Assembly sessions,
8 for example, which both parties agreed should properly be before the
9 Court and are indeed before the Court.
10 We are not suggesting that everything that is said at any point
11 should be admitted to the Court. It's a case-by-case basis. What I am
12 saying is that this bears no relationship to the rationale which would
13 preclude the admission of previous testimony without abiding by the lex
14 specialis provided. If you're going to draw any analogy at all, I
15 suggest you -- that the analogies relevant here militate strongly in
16 favour of admission, because we've admitted documents of the -- of the
17 same sort. So when you have a document like this intended to for
18 dissemination generally during the events in question, that is during the
19 course of the conflict through an official publication by an official,
20 that's without -- setting aside efforts to spill over into other
21 potential documents, looking at this -- this particular document or any
22 documents that are exactly of that nature, it's clear that there's more
23 than ample reliability and they fall within the category of documents
24 that we have admitted without question, and both sides have urged the
25 Court to admit and consider in this case.
1 JUDGE KWON: I think this is just a storm in a teacup. The part
2 read to the witness is very short paragraph, and the witness confirmed to
3 a certain extent with the content of the paragraph. So I didn't see any
4 problem with admitting that paragraph.
5 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President. Just to clarify.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: It's just so we don't get lost. I referred to what
8 technically constitutes three paragraphs but --
9 JUDGE KWON: No. But I limited to the one paragraph starting
10 with "How did you arm the people?" I think that's the part that was read
11 to the witness.
12 MR. TIEGER: Yeah but I -- no, I --
13 JUDGE KWON: Well, I'd like -- if you need other paragraphs, why
14 don't you put those to the witness.
15 MR. TIEGER: I did, Mr. President. I talked about the battle at
16 Faletici, the confrontation with Muslim forces. That's -- and I
17 indicated to him that was contained in the next full paragraph, so I
18 think I explicitly referred to the paragraph that begins: "How did you
19 arm the people," and then the next small paragraph and the next full
20 paragraph after that. Those were very explicit references - if the Court
21 will check the transcript - with the paraphrase of what that contained.
22 JUDGE KWON: Could you gave the para -- the transcript page and
23 line number?
24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. 41 --
25 JUDGE KWON: 41, from line 10.
1 MR. TIEGER: Correct. So it ends "Our greatest success was
2 taking the weapons and equipment from Faletici."
3 JUDGE KWON: Faletici.
4 MR. TIEGER: And as he continues in the next full paragraph,
5 "after," et cetera. That's just what I referred to a moment ago.
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, the --
7 MR. TIEGER: I referred to that first paragraph which ends with
8 that sentence in order to orient the witness. And then I said:
9 "As he continues in the next full paragraph after that, it talks
10 about a confrontation at Faletici between the forces," et cetera, et
12 All that's contained in the paragraph that begins:
13 "It was probably Gagovic."
14 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure the witness answered or commented
15 anything about the next paragraph but let's leave it. I will have a
16 consultation with my colleagues.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will defer the ruling on this issue in
19 due course.
20 Yes, let's continue, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. Mr. Gagovic, I want to follow up on the events in those
23 particular settlements that were the object of -- or the subject of
24 discussion on the 11th of May with Mr. Smajic, and in that connection I'd
25 like to turn to 65 ter 32794, and these are conversations that took place
1 some days later on the 16th of May.
2 There are two conversations in this exhibit. Let me turn to the
3 first one, Colonel, and that reflects a telephone call you made to
4 Mr. Vukota asking first is he there. He says, hey there old pal. You
5 ask what's up. He talks about pressures from all sides, from Pofalici,
6 Velesici, Boljakov Potok, Buca Potok. They are a group of crap,
7 unbelievable. He says he's striking but he's got no wheat, et cetera.
8 First of all, Colonel, can you tell us who Mr. Vukota was? If
9 you need more time to look at the document, that's fine too. I'm not
10 trying to rush you through.
11 A. Lieutenant Vukota Vukovic had a doctorate in political sciences
12 and was a teacher at the school in Rajlovac. Since he hailed from the
13 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he stayed behind in Rajlovac. As far as
14 I remember, he was the one who called me.
15 On the first day, the Muslim forces committed a massacre in
16 Pofalici. I think that's common knowledge. Elderly people and women
17 were -- and children were killed. Even an elderly person bearing my
18 family name was killed. He was informing me of the fact that this group
19 of people, of the Muslims, were heading from Buca Potok towards Zuc and
20 Rajlovac. This was a threat to the Serbian population that had already
21 fled from elsewhere to Rajlovac.
22 In that conversation I told him, well, you do have these forces,
23 and put up resistance. Don't allow them to break through. From what I
24 can see here, he was saying that they were putting up resistance but said
25 that they were lacking in grain. I think he meant ammunition. That's
1 all that I remember of this conversation with Mr. Vukota Vukotic, unless
2 there was another person by that name, but I don't think so. He worked
3 in the military school centre in Rajlovac. He was not within -- under
4 the command of the corps forces. He worked there as a person who had a
6 Q. And can you continue to read the rest of the exhibit, the rest of
7 the document where there's another phone call between you and Vukota. Is
8 that a continuation of the same issue regarding with a little more
9 specificity about what should be targeted?
10 A. That conversation happened on the same day, I'm sure. I asked
11 about the situation in the field. I asked if they were able to resist
12 these manic hordes, as I called them, that were advancing toward the
13 population. The answer was that they were still advancing and that with
14 some assistance they would be able to prevent these attacks. It was
15 common knowledge that if the JNA provided support, then they would
16 provide a barrage fire between the parties to the conflict. In this way
17 they would halt these forces, would not allow them to advance. They
18 would be forced to stay where they were or even pushed back to the
19 positions that they started from.
20 On that same day, I spoke to General MacKenzie and Fikret Abdic,
21 but I don't see any record of my conversations here. General MacKenzie
22 intervened with the president of the Presidency, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.
23 In the afternoon hours, the attack against Rajlovac across Zuc was
24 aborted, was stopped.
25 Q. And with respect to barrage fire, that's the -- if we look at the
1 first page of the first intercept --
2 A. [No interpretation]
3 Q. Sorry, I didn't get a translation, Colonel. I was just asking
4 you that you mentioned common knowledge that JNA provided support.
5 That's a reflection of the exchange between you and Vukota, "Just tell me
6 where I should cover you from," and his comments, "Strike with all your
7 strength on those. You won't be wrong;" correct?
8 A. You see, the terminology used by people who were not familiar
9 with military matters was quite random. In the army, you cannot fire
10 with all your might. You need to use precision fire. You need to open
11 fire only in the areas where the population is to be protected, to
12 prevent this horde from making an onslaught and repeating the massacre
13 that was committed in Pofalici where they killed everyone in their way.
14 There were women and children killed, even an elderly pair aged 99 who
15 were not even able to move or go out of their house.
16 This is where the home of General Mladic's mother was located as
17 well --
18 Q. Colonel --
19 A. -- that's to say in Pofalici. It was torched that day.
20 Q. Colonel --
21 A. He didn't know that his mother had managed to flee and he was
22 addressing --
23 Q. I -- again, you've moved beyond my questions and that's why I
25 MR. TIEGER: I tender 65 ter 32794, Mr. President.
1 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted.
3 THE REGISTRAR: P6073, thank you. P6073.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. So pending the Chamber's ruling, shall we mark
5 it for identification, the Exhibit P6072. That's Bjelica interview.
6 We'll mark it for identification pending the Chamber's ruling.
7 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. Colonel, in your statement, in paragraph 36, you talk about
10 co-operation with the legal representatives of the people in the corps's
11 zone of responsibility. I'm sorry. I'm going to get to that in just a
12 moment, but I want to ask you one follow-up question to the documents we
13 just looked at. We looked at a conversation you had with Mr. Smajic on
14 the 11th of May, and we then looked at another conversation on the 16th
15 of May. I just wanted to turn quickly to your testimony in the
16 Dragomir Milosevic case at pages 8706 and 8707, because it referred to a
17 date in between that time. And there you say, and I'm quoting now:
18 "I had full control over members of the 4th Corps --"
19 And the question was, by the way, whether or not you, in terms of
20 military control, whether you had full, complete control, and that's the
21 question you were -- as acting corps commander, and that's the question
22 you were asked. And then you said quote:
23 "I had full control over members of the 4th Corps, but I did not
24 have full control over the Territorial Defence troops. That was
25 established on the 12th of May by Republika Srpska in an effort to start
1 putting together its own armed forces, its own army."
2 And I just -- I wanted you to confirm that that was your
3 testimony in the Dragomir Milosevic case, sir.
4 A. As far as I remember, I did say something along those lines in my
5 evidence and that's exactly how it happened. The Territorial Defence of
6 the Serb republic, that's to say the municipalities inhabited by the
7 Serbs, was at municipal level, at local commune level. The
8 municipalities established Crisis Staffs and this part of the Territorial
9 Defence, which was the territorial side of it, the immobile one, was
10 under the command of the Crisis Staffs. The corps command had under its
11 command the operative and manoeuvre units. My statement was along those
12 lines. As a stand-in commander of the corps, I was fully apprised
13 about -- of everything that was happening in the area that was under the
14 corps command.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, in -- I note that I am at about the
17 allocated time. However, I wanted to mention that in view of the
18 circumstances, the videolink, the nature of the intercepts, the longer
19 time taken by the accused, what I hope is my focus on relevant issues, I
20 hope that the Court will permit me to continue, but I wanted to note my
21 awareness of the allocation.
22 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed. But do you think you can finish
23 before the break?
24 MR. TIEGER: I'm going to try. I think that is a genuine
1 Q. Now, Colonel, just before we paused there, I had indicated to you
2 that I wanted to ask you about paragraph 36 of your statement where you
3 talk about co-operating with both Mico Stanisic, the Serbian minister of
4 the interior, and Delimustafic, the Muslim minister. And in that
5 connection, I wanted to turn your attention to 65 ter 32789.
6 Now, this is a very short conversation, Colonel, that took place
7 on the 14th of May. You get a phone call from the communications centre
8 of the Serbian ministry indicating that the minister wants to speak to
9 you. He says -- he identifies himself as Mico Stanisic and asks if
10 you're okay. You say great. Asks what's up. You say, "Well, we are
11 waging war." He says due to the confidence of the number, I am not going
12 to -- I just wanted to tell you that I'm here in Vraca. So you can call
13 me if you need anything." And he gives you what appear to be a couple of
14 code-names, Karlo and Miler. As we see in other references, Miler is
15 apparently a reference to him.
16 This is a reflection, Colonel, of one brief contact you had with
17 Mr. Stanic?
18 A. Yes. Precisely so.
19 MR. TIEGER: Then I would tender this, Mr. President.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a telephone contact.
21 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P6074. Thank you.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. And I wanted to bring -- also draw your attention to your contact
1 with at least one other Bosnian Serb political or military official, and
2 you had repeated contact with Mr. Prstojevic; is that correct? The head
3 of the Crisis Staff and military figure in Ilidza.
4 A. Well, a military figure, I'm not sure about that, but he was the
5 president of the Serb municipality of Ilidza, and by virtue of his
6 position he was also the commander of the Crisis Staff. The municipality
7 of Ilidza fell under the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps, and
8 that they knew that the army was the one that that protected the civilian
9 population. They had a small force and they had had already two attacks
10 by the Muslim forces, and by that time they had quite a few victims --
11 Q. Colonel, please?
12 A. -- and after the 14th of May -- yes?
13 Q. That's an example of what I'm -- just describing to you. I asked
14 you a simple question and you proceeded to use that as a platform for
15 telling me everything you think I might want to hear about Ilidza. So
16 please wait for the question. Okay. By the way, when you say -- when
17 you say you're not sure about him being a military figure, does that mean
18 you don't know -- you didn't know at the time whether he was involved in
19 military affairs or is that a kind of subtle criticism of his military
21 A. Precisely. He did not have military training. It's just his
22 position made him number one at the Crisis Staff.
23 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let me look quickly at three phone calls you
24 had with him. The first one is D01217.
25 It's very short. I'm looking to see whether you have it in front
1 of you yet. Ah. I'm not trying to rush the registrar.
2 Okay. It's Prstojevic calling you again. You say, "Hello,
3 Nedzo." He says "Great leader," to you, and he's indicating he doesn't
4 have powder for recoilless guns and asks if it can be brought to him and
5 notes that four personnel carriers are in the middle of combat.
6 In connection with the same matter I wanted to turn to P5667
7 before I seek any comment from you.
8 The previous conversation was on the 14th of May. This is on the
9 15th of May. The initial part of the conversation is trying to get ahold
10 of Prstojevic. You tell him, "You wanted to speak to me Nedeljko. Good
11 morning." He says, "Good morning. Listen, great leader," and you say
12 there are no great leaders we are all, et cetera, and he tells you he
13 needs urgent protection and he needs two armoured personnel carriers.
14 And you go on to explain to him that essentially armoured personnel
15 carriers don't grow on trees and in any event, you know the terrain he's
16 talking about and you think infantry alone will do.
17 And you can look at the second page of the intercept to confirm
19 A. Ilidza was, I would say, one of rare Serb populated areas in
20 Sarajevo attacked by Muslim armed forces on two occasions. They suffered
21 civilian losses, and of course the JNA, because there were no particular
22 armed forces there except for the weak Territorial Defence, and there was
23 this prior decision by the Presidency and the command of the military
24 district that on the line between Serb territorial forces and the Muslim
25 forces --
1 Q. Colonel, Colonel, I'm sorry.
2 A. -- that a mechanised unit would come --
3 Q. It may be the case that the accused wants to ask you about the
4 precise circumstances in Ilidza in respect of the TO, the JNA, and so
5 forth, but I'm focusing for the moment on your contact with and
6 relationship with Mr. Prstojevic, and I might as well bring your
7 attention to one further document in connection with that. That's 65 ter
8 30 -- 32791?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to correct something
10 in the record. On page 56, line 22, the witness said mechanised units
11 that were using those APCs, and he probably meant to relate the APCs with
12 the conversation under review, and that's not in the transcript. That
13 mechanised unit was placed between the warring parties, and Prstojevic is
14 obviously asking for those same APCs.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, did you hear that? Do you confirm it?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think I've said that. That
17 was a JNA unit that was on the separation line between the armed forces
18 of the Serbian Territorial Defence on one hand and Muslim armed forces on
19 the other hand, and naturally all those municipalities and all these
20 units wanted to have some armour, and they wanted us to assign those two
21 APCs to them to feel safer when they toured positions in those armoured
22 personnel carriers. And I told them that armour is not to be used in
23 those hills. They should instead build a fortification for cover.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's move on. Do you have the
25 intercept Mr. Tieger referred to in front of you?
1 Yes. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. Now, in this intercept, Colonel, we see once again a
4 conversation. This was on the 16th. So we've seen them three days in a
5 row. We see Mr. Prstojevic getting in contact with you again. We see
6 the top of page 3 in the English and it's the middle of your page 3, I
7 believe. He reaches you. "Hello. He's here. You can talk to him, just
8 one moment, please." You say yes. Mr. Prstojevic again says, "Great
9 leader, I salute you." You say, "Hi there." Some pleasantries are
10 exchanged. Then he goes on to talk about the situation and some of his
11 needs. You can read on to see if that generally reflects the
13 A. I don't see where --
14 Q. It's -- go past the first two pages and get to the third page of
15 your transcript, Colonel.
16 He -- after the introductory portion I talked about, he goes on
17 to talk about the people at Orao, his need for a trailer truck, and
18 asking you to assist him in sorting that out. Then he also talks about
19 the situation at Buca Potok, et cetera. Did you see that in the
20 transcript, Colonel?
21 A. Yes, I see that passage, but I don't see anything particular
22 about it apart from -- can I continue?
23 Q. No, that's --
24 A. Apart from the fact that Prstojevic was asking for --
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, what is your question, Mr. Tieger?
1 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
2 Q. Do these three intercepts, Colonel, reflect the general tone of
3 your contact with and Mr. Prstojevic and the general frequently of that
4 contact? Or was this an unusually busy period in your recollection?
5 A. That was a common occurrence precisely in those days because
6 Ilidza was attacked for the second time and it was in danger. Some
7 Muslims had already managed to get in the settlement itself, and we had
8 an intercept, including Abdic, where we were trying to intervene to repel
9 those Muslim forces which we actually managed to do. And he is asking
10 here for another vehicle apart from the two APCs in order to be able to
11 conduct some other business, and I told him that the JNA was not in a
12 position to help him. He should go to Orlovo. They had that industry
13 and could give him such vehicles.
14 I don't know why he addresses me as "Great leader." He must be
15 using that regional custom. But at one point I told him that we don't
16 have any more great leaders, that he should stop, but I see that it's
17 mentioned several times here.
18 Ilidza, generally speaking, was the most exposed part of Serbian
20 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
21 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender 32791, Mr. President. I have one --
22 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
23 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as Exhibit D6075.
24 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I have one additional document, maybe
25 two, but I'd suggest we take the break now otherwise everyone's going to
1 be a little edgy. I mean, obviously I'm at the Court's disposal. I can
2 do what you want, but my suggestion would be we simply break now and I'll
3 conclude very quickly when we resume.
4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
5 JUDGE KWON: How long would you need, Mr. Tieger, could conclude?
6 MR. TIEGER: Well, one document and one transcript reference. I
7 could optimistically say -- well, I mean these things are taking five to
8 ten minutes and sometimes longer if we get a little --
9 JUDGE KWON: If you could conclude in five minutes, please --
10 MR. TIEGER: I don't know that I can, but I'll do my best.
11 Can we turn please to P32787. I'm sorry. That's 65 ter 32787.
12 My apologies. The registrar may have understood without even mentioning
14 Q. Colonel, you testified during the Dragomir Milosevic case at
15 page 8706 that you were in constant contact with, among other people,
16 Hasan Efendic. And this is a telephone conversation with
17 Colonel Efendic. First of all, can you confirm that that was your
18 testimony in the Dragomir Milosevic case, and then I'll move on to ask --
19 talk about the intercept.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, in this particular conversation on the 17th of May, the two
22 of you are talking about -- reach each other and provide each other with
23 an update on events including the discussion about movement from and
24 within the barracks and what happens to the weaponry; correct?
25 A. Yes. As far as I can see, that's how the conversation went.
1 Q. Okay. And then as we continue, there's a reference by
2 Colonel Efendic to the hope that people shouldn't get killed on both
3 sides and then the expression of the view that they're going to be
4 killed, and you say to him, "I agree completely that the lives of people
5 are the priority." And Efendic continues: "Let me tell you, they'll get
6 killed." So you're discussing the risk to various -- to people within
7 Sarajevo; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And then you talk about who has been talking about various issues
10 of various people, who is in charge. Efendic suggests that you're the
11 boss, and you're the boss to Kukanjac as well. You say, "The hell I am.
12 It's just a coincidence," et cetera. You goes on to say you've always
13 been in favour of peaceful solutions and you feel bad that a single
14 bullet was shot in this town in the first place. Is that a -- sorry, I
15 didn't hear your response, sir?
16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear what the Colonel
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. Colonel, the interpreter did not hear what you said. If you
20 could just --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Okay. Is that an accurate reflection as far as you recall --
23 A. First of all it's a conversation that I had with Hasan Efendic, I
24 believe at his initiative, but I'm not sure. I can barely read this.
25 It's a manuscript. I had problems with a group of my own members of the
1 armed forces that went renegade and started attacking barracks under
2 blockade and then they were also firing from mortars at JNA units in
3 Lukavica and forced the JNA members to respond with fire, and in this
4 exchange civilian population could suffer losses too. I was saying,
5 though, that there is nothing more valuable than human life, and that's
6 what we should strive for, but he stressed that he was impotent ...
7 JUDGE KWON: I think it's time to take a break. We'll break for
8 45 minutes and resume at 20 past 1.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 1.27 p.m.
11 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. Colonel, just before the recess, you were talking a bit about the
14 conversation you had with Hasan Efendic, and you had mentioned the fact
15 that the JNA received fire and responded with fire and in this exchange
16 civilian population could suffer losses too. And then you related that
17 back to a comment in the intercept concerning the lives of people being
18 the priority. So that's by way of background.
19 If we look at page 2 of the -- I think it's fairly deep into the
20 conversation, it's almost towards the end of the conversation, as
21 mentioned before, you talk about your regret -- or you express to Efendic
22 your regress that a single bullet was fired in the first place in the
23 town, and then Efendic says, "Well, buddy, you're destroying it." And
24 then by way of response, you ask -- you tell Efendic to ask a commander
25 there whether they were allowed to fire a bullet before someone fired at
2 A. Yes, that's it.
3 Q. And then -- and then you tell him with respect -- apparently with
4 respect to his comment well, fuck it -- excuse me, well, buddy, you're
5 destroying it. You say that that status has remained the same, not
6 firing apparently until --
7 A. I don't have that document with me.
8 Q. I'm sorry. I didn't realise it had been moved. Let's try to get
9 that back in front of you.
10 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Registrar, that is 32787, 65 ter.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't find it here, the bit that
12 he's reading. In this document, there is the conversation between me and
13 Hasan Efendic about the evacuation of the cadets of the military school
14 from the Marsal Tito Barracks. That was the drift of the conversation.
15 The two of us were talking about the possible scenarios of what could
16 happen unless a peaceful evacuation of the barracks is allowed. We
17 concluded that this would not be to the benefit of either of the sides.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. The part I'm referring to --
20 A. I don't see where it is where the two of us --
21 Q. It should begin on page 4 of the transcript in front of you, the
22 B/C/S transcript.
23 A. Colonel Cadja was on the commission that was negotiating the
24 blockade of the barracks on behalf of the JNA General Staff. In this
25 section, we're not talking about any fighting, exchange of fire or
1 anything. Hasan didn't know what my function was at the time.
2 Q. And we went over that a little bit earlier. The part I'm
3 referring your attention to, look down to about the bottom two -- the
4 bottom third of the page, and then you say, "No. No. I've always been
5 in favour, as they say, and the peaceful solutions." And that's where
6 you say you feel bad that a single bullet was fired. He said --
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. He says --
9 A. In our conversation, he was accusing me of --
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gagovic, please. Could you hear the question
11 and answer it, please. So let Mr. Tieger complete his question first.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I realise it's difficult given the lag
14 sometimes to know when to begin.
15 So as you complete that portion of your discussion with
16 Mr. Efendic you continue - and that continuation of the discussion will
17 be found at the top of page 5 of your transcript - you say to ask him,
18 apparently, Enver, about whether they're -- he's allowed to fire a bullet
19 before someone fires, and then you say that status is the same, and then
20 by way of reacting apparently to Efendic saying, "Well, buddy, you're
21 destroying it." You point out: "But fuck it. You know when a shooting
22 occurs, then you know how the army reacts. They fire with whatever they
23 have. That's it." And that was all part of your discussion with
24 Mr. Efendic to explain the concerns he had about the city being
25 destroyed; is that right?
1 A. I don't know. This is an odd conversation. I remember my
2 conversation with Hasan Efendic well. He was offering me the duty of the
3 commander of the Territorial Defence for Bosnia-Herzegovina. He wanted
4 me to take up that duty because the cadets and the last of the forces of
5 the JNA were supposed to leave the territory of the BH. I suggested that
6 he found -- find a common language with the commander of the
7 Territorial Defence, because they were Bosnians, whereas I was from the
8 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I said that as soon as they allowed me
9 to leave, as soon as the blockade of the barracks was lifted, that I
10 would leave for my homeland. I don't know about the exchange of fire.
11 There may have been some. But this was at the time when I was still the
12 commander of the army. That was the 17th of May. I had already reformed
13 the JNA. By the 20th of January, the transfer of all the members of the
14 JNA who were from Yugoslavia was supposed to take place to Yugoslavia.
15 The 17th, the 19th of May, up to the 1st of June, I was there with my
16 assistant for political work, Colonel Jakovljevic, two members of the
17 escort, and a driver. However, at that point I did not offer as an
18 explanation the fact that I didn't have an army. Rather --
19 Q. No. I think you had previously discussed the -- the issue of the
20 JNA firing in response. It appears this is as far as we'll get with
21 further elaboration of this conversation, so I'll move on quickly to the
22 last very short subject.
23 MR. TIEGER: And I'll tender this conversation as an intercept,
24 Mr. President.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No objection.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be admitted as Exhibit P6076.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. And the last thing I have, Colonel, is just to ask you to confirm
4 something you said in the Dragomir Milosevic case when you were talking
5 about who you were in contact with. I had mentioned earlier that you
6 testified about being in constant contact with Colonel Hasan Efendic, and
7 that's found at page 8706, and what you said there is, I quote, and after
8 talking about being in constant contact -- well, I'll read the whole
10 "I was in constant contact with the subordinate commands. I was
11 in constant contact with Fikret Abdic, a member of the BH Presidency;
12 with General MacKenzie; with Colm Doyle until the 7th of May, his tour of
13 duty ended then; and I was in constant contact with Colonel Hasan
14 Efendic, the commander of the Main Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and --
15 and with the leadership of Republika Srpska.
16 "Q. By leadership of Republika Srpska, who in particular are you
17 referring to, sir?"
18 That's a quote of the question that was asked. And then you
20 "Well, specifically, we were in communication with the President
21 of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, at the time."
22 And then you go on to explain that you were in contact with your
23 subordinate commands by telephone.
24 Can I ask you simply to confirm that that was your testimony in
25 the Dragomir Milosevic case.
1 A. I never change my evidence. There's no reason for it. We were
2 really in contact with all these institutions and individuals.
3 Q. Thank you, sir.
4 MR. TIEGER: And I have nothing further, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
6 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellency, several
8 questions, and I will do my best to be as short as possible.
9 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, I need a few clarifications, brief
12 A. Go ahead, Mr. President.
13 Q. Let us start from the last. Are there two Hasan Efendics, or is
14 that the same Hasan Efendic who was elected on the 6th of April, or the
15 8th of April, and who replaced General Bajcetic.
16 A. That's the same Hasan. There was one Colonel Hasan Efendic who
17 was commander of the Main Staff of the Territorial Defence of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the Muslim Croat part that is.
19 Q. Thank you. Did you ever see the directive that he issued on the
20 12th of April and re-issued on the 28th or 29th of April about placing
21 extensive obstacles on roads and barricades and attacks on the JNA?
22 A. Yes. I did have this order of his. I believe that we intervened
23 with him as well as with the president of the Presidency of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, on this issue. Alija Izetbegovic
25 said that it was something that the commander did independently and that
1 this was not the position of the Presidency.
2 Q. Can you tell the Chamber what was going on in the field in view
3 of the 22nd of April and the attack on Ilidza, as well as the 2nd and the
4 3rd of May in Sarajevo, and the 15th of May in Tuzla? Were these
5 developments the result of what the Presidency intended or the result of
6 the orders of Hasan Efendic?
7 A. What happened in reality was the result of what Hasan Efendic
8 wanted, all these attacks on the barracks --
9 JUDGE KWON: Although the witness answered. Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: Yes. I'm objecting because I don't see how this
11 arises from the cross-examination. Furthermore, it's in elaboration of
12 the accused's examination-in-chief, insofar as I can recall, apparently
13 referring to documents that no one bothered to upload so we never saw the
14 translation for. So it's -- it's not comprehensible to me why we are
15 revisiting the statement and the examination-in-chief when not triggered
16 by inquiries made in cross-examination.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My learned friend Mr. Tieger has
20 suggested in his question -- questions that the JNA had demonstrated
21 their intention to open fire on the town while representing Hasan Efendic
22 only as a peace-loving lamb. Instead, we can see that in this document
23 he said that he should have opened fire sooner. I wanted to offer an
24 opportunity to the witness to tell us who this man was and what the
25 consequences of his actions were.
1 JUDGE KWON: So you opted not to tender that document or deal
2 with this document with that witness but now your going to deal with it.
3 Is that the case as indicated by Mr. Tieger.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I only wanted -- I don't know if
5 the Prosecution tendered this document, 32787. I believe that the
6 Prosecution tendered this document, and I want the witness to give us a
7 more in depth insight into it.
8 JUDGE KWON: I understood that you were going to deal with one
9 of -- there were three documents that were not translated.
10 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President, those three documents that were
11 not translated, we've abandoned those because they were admitted under
12 different numbers so we're finished with that. And I think that what
13 Mr. Tieger is referring to some intercepts that we had thought we might
14 use during the direct examination but opted not to use them, one of the
15 reasons being that we hadn't gotten anybody to send them to Ram in
16 Belgrade. So this I think falls squarely on the issue of whether the
17 Prosecution's intercepts that it played with Efendic is something that
18 Dr. Karadzic is entitled to respond to by showing the activities of
19 Efendic at the same time period.
20 MR. TIEGER: Well, whether it's dispositive on this issue or not
21 I am not sure, but it's not accurate to say that I was referring to
22 intercepts. I understood the accused to be turning now to 1D10067, as I
23 think the Court did as well, and in the manner that I don't think is
24 appropriate given the fact that he declined to do so at the appropriate
25 time. That's what I understand this is about, that we're re-opening the
1 direct examination for that reason. But in any event, that's what I was
2 referring to and not intercepts.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. That document is already admitted, so I
5 don't believe that Dr. Karadzic is seeking to admit it through the back
6 door during his re-examination.
7 JUDGE KWON: Then shall we move on.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My apologies. Perhaps I wasn't
9 clear enough. I was dealing with the last document tendered by the
10 Prosecution, 32787, the conversation between Colonel Gagovic and
11 Colonel Efendic.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Colonel, sir, have a look at page 2, the portion where Efendic
14 says: "The only thing we're doing is guaranteeing freedom for the
15 families, the cadets, and everyone else." And he wants to disarm the
16 artillery. Do you see that? It's the bottom half of page 2.
17 A. I understand this without looking at the document. I recall this
18 conversation with him. He could not be trusted precisely for the reason
19 that he decided that as many members of the JNA as possible be captured,
20 neutralised, killed, and at any rate not allowed to cross the border into
21 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This decision of his was already
22 being implemented on the 2nd of May and the 3rd of May, and on the
23 15th -- this was in Sarajevo, and on the 15th of May in Tuzla. There was
24 a unit deployed in Husinjski Rudara [phoen] barracks, and there over a
25 hundred members of the JNA came in harm's way.
1 Q. Thank you. So on the 17th of May you weren't able to trust his
2 guarantees; right?
3 A. Yes, definitely. There was a group of people who was speaking to
4 the General Staff and with some other institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
5 including Fikret Abdic and Hasan Efendic about the lifting of the
6 blockade of the barracks. And in this particular instance I said that
7 this man could not be trusted in view of what his previous actions were.
8 So he seized an opportunity in the case of these attacks to say, "Well,
9 you opened fire previously," and so on and so forth.
10 Q. I apologise. I'm waiting for interpretation, and please do so as
12 Let me ask you this: It has to do with those telephone
13 conversations. Can you tell us where Varos was? Where were you, where
14 was Jankovic, and where was Mladic, physically?
15 A. Physically, Mladic was in Han Pijesak. Varos was in the
16 Marsal Tito barracks under a blockade. I was in the Lukavica barracks.
17 And Jankovic was the person who arrived there with a team of people to
18 evacuate the cadets of the secondary military school and the military
19 academy from the Marsal Tito Barracks.
20 Q. Thank you. What is the distance between you and the Marsal Tito
21 Barracks and between you and Mladic in Han Pijesak approximately?
22 A. Approximately between me and Mladic there was about 70
23 kilometres. I'm not sure. And between me and Marsal Tito Barracks there
24 was about 6 to 7 kilometres approximately.
25 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir. I just wanted to establish whether any
1 of your collocutors were in the same room with somebody else, but they
2 were not, were they?
3 A. No, no. We were all in different locations as it were.
4 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether you were abreast of the law
5 of All People's Defence and the doctrine of armed people?
6 A. Yes. I knew those things well. I had been through all the
7 military schools. I was also familiar with international laws and the
8 provisions of the Geneva Conventions dealing with prisoners of war and
9 the civilian population and so on and so forth. So I was familiar with
10 all those things.
11 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us who was it who had the right to use
12 Territorial Defence units? Which legal entities had the right to use
13 Territorial Defence units?
14 A. First of all, there --
15 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Your Honour --
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- it's a fact that territorial
17 units were connected to their own territories, as the name has it. They
18 are connected to municipalities, local communes, or companies. Even
19 universities in Sarajevo had their own Territorial Defence units. And
20 municipalities had the right to use them.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir.
23 JUDGE KWON: The last part of your question was very much
24 leading. Bear that in mind.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise. I'm in a
1 hurry, that's why. But I'm convinced that the colonel is very familiar
2 with that law.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. I'm asking you this, Colonel, sir, because you were asked about
5 your influence, i.e., your connections with the territorial units and the
6 units of the Territorial Defence that were under the authority of the
7 municipality. As far as you know, when it comes to the
8 Territorial Defence organisation, was anything done against the law at
9 the time?
10 A. No, nothing. This would be my shortest answer: No.
11 Q. Thank you. You were also asked, i.e., you were requested to
12 confirm that you had contacts with the President of Republika Srpska --
13 or, rather, the president of the Presidency at the time, Mr. Karadzic.
14 Can you tell the Trial Chamber whether Karadzic ever asked you to do
15 something that would be contrary to the law or that would be against your
16 role as the JNA?
17 A. Just the opposite. For as long as I was in that position and
18 while General Djurdjevac was in that position before me, you never tried
19 to request us to do anything against the law. I personally can say that
20 you requested your subordinates, your officers, not to dirty their hands
21 and treat the civilians, prisoners of war, and especially the wounded in
22 an inhuman way.
23 Q. While you were there did the JNA intentionally open fire on
24 civilians in Sarajevo? Did they do anything else in order to terrorise
25 the civilians in Sarajevo?
1 A. Never. No single shell was ever fired to inflict losses on
2 civilians. However, when fire was opened on the barracks, when mortar
3 fire and higher calibre fire was opened by the Muslim formations, things
4 like that happened. I believe that General Lewis MacKenzie understood
5 that. He was the UNPROFOR commander. However, those armed Muslim
6 components had mobile units on vehicles on which they mounted mortars,
7 and they would leap from one place to another. They opened fire. So
8 sometimes the civilian population suffered because fire was opened on
9 them. On one such occasion two soldiers were killed at the Lukavica
11 Q. Thank you. Did you know somebody on the Serbian side starting
12 from the highest republican level to the municipal level who advocated a
13 position that the civilian population in Sarajevo had to be fired upon
14 and terrorised? Did you ever come across such an institution or such an
16 A. I never came across such an individual or such an institution.
17 At the time when I was there, the Serbian people did not have any
18 aspirations towards Sarajevo. They didn't have any aspirations
19 whatsoever towards Sarajevo. They only organised the defence of their
20 lives, their houses, their properties that surrounded Sarajevo. However,
21 you have to understand that Sarajevo was under blockade from inside, not
22 from the outside. Those people who wanted to leave Sarajevo could not
23 leave it because of the internal blockade that was organised by --
24 organised by the Muslims. Only those with fat pockets could bribe
25 somebody and leave the city.
1 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir. Just one more document and one more
2 question. A reference was made here, Colonel Miletic, maybe he was
3 major, I don't know what his rank was, he was in a conversation with you.
4 Where was he at that time?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6303.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 A. Miletic was in Rajlovac. He worked in a factory that
8 produced ...
9 There was some interruptions. I don't know whether I completed
10 my answer.
11 Q. Colonel, sir, only half of your answer was recorded. You said
12 that he was in Rajlovac. Was there a military institution there? Were
13 there barracks there?
14 A. The centre of military schools was there, the airforce academy,
15 and the secondary military school was there. There was an auxiliary
16 airport there that was used for the training of some of those students
17 and high school students.
18 Q. Thank you. Could you please take a look at the document in front
19 of you. This is an intercepted conversation between you and Miletic.
20 Could you please tell us whether this document shows clearly who was
21 shooting at whom. Zekerijah says one thing and Miletic tells you what he
22 told you. Can you tell us what transpired on the 11th of May?
23 A. Fikret Abdic got involved in that conversation. He was in charge
24 of contacts with the JNA, General MacKenzie, and all the others who were
25 there. However, none of them, including me personally, could conclude
1 where the fire came from and disturbed people in the suburbs of Sarajevo
2 and Rajlovac.
3 Q. Thank you. Mr. Miletic offered you his telephone to demonstrate
4 to you the thunder going on in his territory and the shooting that comes
5 from the surrounding areas. Did you hear that?
6 A. Yes. I could hear the noise, but even the scouts noticed that in
7 that area of Rajlica [as interpreted] one could observe mortar shells.
8 Q. Whose shells were those? Who fired them?
9 A. Members of Muslim formations did that. I believe that
10 Sefer Halilovic was in command of those forces. Later on, he became the
11 commander of the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
12 Q. Thank you, Colonel, sir. I have no further questions. Thank you
13 very much for your effort in coming to the location to provide your
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Are you tendering that?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, your Excellency. I would
18 like to tender 6303.
19 JUDGE KWON: That will be the next Defence exhibit. Yes,
20 Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Well, in light of the nature of the questioning that
22 is about the sounds, and I think the Court will need it well to have the
23 audio to hear whether, in fact, the alleged sounds can be heard. So
24 we -- we will provide that audio. I think the nature of the questioning
25 pretty much compels that.
1 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Robinson?
2 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE KWON: So shall we give that same number? Yes, we'll admit
4 it together with the audio. I will consult the registrar.
5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will admit it together with the audio.
7 THE REGISTRAR: And the document assigned shall be D2740 together
8 with the audio. Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: Well, Mr. Gagovic, that concludes your evidence. On
10 behalf of the Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your co-operation. Now
11 you are free to go.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
13 [The witness withdrew via videolink]
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Well, I take it the next witness is
15 ready, Mr. Robinson.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, it -- as long as we're at a juncture without a
19 witness in the courtroom, I was wondering if the Court would allow me an
20 me an opportunity to clarify something that Mr. Robinson raised earlier
21 about a filing by the Prosecution. And I discussed this with him. I
22 think he would like the Prosecution to clarify this.
23 JUDGE KWON: It's about that intercept?
24 MR. TIEGER: It's about the filing to the -- in response to the
25 accused's motion for reconsideration regarding Defence intercepts.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Robinson made the representation earlier that
3 the Prosecution's position was that in the absence of the type of
4 authentication protocol that had -- that the Prosecution had gone through
5 during the course of its case with respect to intercepts, that we would
6 object to the authenticity of intercepts. That's not what the motion was
7 intended to convey. I've read it again and think we didn't convey that,
8 but I understand that some confusion exists.
9 We cited, for example, to the best of my recollection, an oral
10 representation or a response made in court, during which the Prosecution
11 said basically now that the Defence has required the Prosecution to go
12 through this entire elaborate process, it wants to be free of the same
13 requirement. We noted that in passing but then made clear, nevertheless,
14 we maintain our original position that the body of intercepts from the
15 general sources presented are reliable and authentic and didn't object to
17 So when there's a reference in the motion to the sources of the
18 intercepts, that -- that's intended to convey the broad source, not --
19 not the -- not the specific limited materials that were the object of
20 scrutiny during the course of the Prosecution case. So we -- in the
21 motion, we noted that we didn't think the Defence had originally given
22 the Court any information about the source of those intercepts, and that
23 might be one of the reasons why the Court denied the motion, and we
24 mentioned that in the response to the motion for reconsideration, but I
25 didn't want us to be understood as insisting, as Mr. Robinson suggested
1 earlier, that they needed to go through the elaborate exercise of
2 recalling individual intercept operators. We were trying to convey that
3 we considered the broad categories, and I think the Court knows those
4 three broad categories of intercepts, to be authenticated and reliable.
5 So I didn't want the Defence to be unfairly disadvantaged by a
6 misinterpretation of what we had submitted.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Would you like to add anything,
8 Mr. Robinson?
9 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President. I appreciate Mr. Tieger
10 stating that.
11 JUDGE KWON: There are a couple of things that I'd like to raise
12 with you, Mr. Robinson, before we hear the next witness's evidence.
13 First, we are seized of a correspondence from the Embassy of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina which was filed on the 11th of January this year,
15 indicating that Mr. Edin Garaplija, in relation to whom the Chamber
16 issued a subpoena to testify, was banned from entering any Schengen
17 state. Do you have any submission to make in relation to this?
18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. With respect to -- as soon as
19 we received that, I contacted the VWS and asked them to determine whether
20 or not that ban would prohibit him from coming as part of the subpoena,
21 and if it does, indicated that we would be prepared to make a motion for
22 a safe conduct order so that he could come notwithstanding that ban, but
23 I haven't gotten any response yet from them. So as soon as I do, I will
24 let the Chamber know and take that step if necessary.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. And the next one is related to the
1 signed statement of Trifko Pljevaljcic, the last witness scheduled for
2 this week. The Chamber would like to hear from you as to the relevance
3 of this -- of this statement to the Defence case, in particular
4 paragraphs 2 to 15, which cover the period 1989 to 1990. Not necessarily
6 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, Mr. President, perhaps Dr. Karadzic, if
7 he wants to address this now we could do it, because we have been
8 discussing that actually with the Prosecution and with Dr. Karadzic
9 concerning the relevance of the events in Foca, and I think Dr. Karadzic
10 is prepared to answer that question.
11 JUDGE KWON: Is he ready to answer that question? He can answer
12 the question later or today or tomorrow.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Perhaps it would be better if we did it in the
14 morning then, first thing.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Shall we bring in the next witness.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, sir. Would the witness take the
19 solemn declaration, please.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. I solemnly declare that I will speak the
21 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Hatchett. Please make yourself
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
25 WITNESS: RONALD HATCHETT
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Professor Hatchett.
4 A. Good afternoon.
5 Q. I would like to call up 1D05638 in e-court, please.
6 Professor Hatchett, or Dr. Hatchett, I don't know how to refer to you,
7 your career is rather impressive. Have you provided a statement to my
8 Defence team?
9 A. I have, sir.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you see that statement in front of you on the
12 A. I do.
13 Q. Thank you. Did you sign the statement?
14 A. Yes, I did. That's my signature.
15 Q. Thank you. Does this statement truly reflect what you stated for
16 the benefit of the Defence team?
17 A. Yes, it does.
18 Q. Thank you. If I were -- I were to put the same questions to you
19 today in this courtroom, would your answers be more or less the same as
20 they are in the statements of yours?
21 A. Yes, my answer would be the same as I've indicated here.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
23 statement pursuant to Rule 92 ter.
24 JUDGE KWON: And the associated exhibits.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. With respect to the
1 associated exhibits, there's three that we're tendering. One is the
2 excerpt of the video, which is 1D5593, and then the map and the article
3 in the newspaper.
4 JUDGE KWON: So you are not tendering the entire video?
5 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
6 JUDGE KWON: Any objections, Mr. Tieger?
7 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: So witness's 92 ter statement as well as three
9 associated exhibits will be admitted into evidence. Let us give the
10 numbers for them now.
11 THE REGISTRAR: They shall be given numbers D2741 to D2744.
12 Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And now I'm going to
16 read a short summary of Dr. Ronald Hatchett's statement in English.
17 [In English] Dr. Ronald Hatchett served for 20 years as a
18 United States airforce officer working on intelligence and
19 politico-military affairs. After his military service, he served as a
20 civilian representative of the United States Secretary of Defence for
21 multinational security organisations in Europe. After leaving government
22 service in 1988, Dr. Hatchett taught at universities in Texas and
23 recently retired as the director of the centre for global studies at
24 Schreiner University.
25 On 13 to 18th September, 1992, Dr. Hatchett visited Pale with
1 other members of the Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, a
2 non-Partisan research centre devoted to the -- to studying affairs in the
4 During his time in Pale, Dr. Hatchett participated in meetings
5 with President Karadzic and other Bosnian Serb civilian and military
6 leaders. He was struck by the efforts President Karadzic was willing to
7 make to end the fighting and save civilian lives. In particular, when in
8 the midst of the discussion General Tolimir tried to get Dr. Hatchett to
9 say as a former military officer that the way to end the fighting around
10 Sarajevo was an all out Serbian military assault, Dr. Karadzic firmly
11 rebuked him saying, "I'm not going to launch a major military assault on
12 a city full of people, killing thousands on both sides, when I know that
13 we will not be allowed to keep this territory in a peace agreement."
14 During the discussions, at no time did Dr. Hatchett ever hear
15 Radovan Karadzic express the view that the Republika Srpska should be
16 ethnically pure and not include Bosnian Muslims and Croats.
17 Hatchett videotaped an interview with Dr. Karadzic during his
18 visit to Pale. He asked Dr. Karadzic what his position was on ethnic
19 cleansing. Dr. Karadzic responded that ethnic cleansing has never been
20 the policy of Republika Srpska and that after the end of the war, it
21 ought to be the obligation of all three republics to enable the refugees
22 to -- who wish to come back to their own homes to do so.
23 Dr. Hatchett had a private meeting with President Karadzic during
24 his trip to Pale. Dr. Karadzic told him that he had a proposal for
25 ending the war and asked Dr. Hatchett to take it back to the highest
1 level of the -- that he could reach in the United States government.
2 Dr. Karadzic's proposal was that Bosnia will remain a single
3 country comprised of two autonomous republics, Republika Srpska and the
4 Muslim-Croat federation. Each republic would have their own constitution
5 and government and will control domestic affairs within its territory,
6 including border access. The central government will represent Bosnia in
7 international organisations. Positions in central government will be
8 equitably shared between Republika Srpska and Muslim-Croat federation.
9 Bosnian territory will be split up proportion 49/51. He proposed a US
10 meditation -- mediation at a location away from media necessary, similar
11 to Camp David mediation between Egypt and Israel in 1979.
12 Dr. Karadzic also provided Dr. Hatchett a map which showed the
13 proposed division of territory. There was never any question that
14 Muslims and Croats would be allowed to live in the Serb areas, and Serbs
15 would be allowed to live in Muslim and Croat areas of the proposed
16 territories and that the rights of minorities would be respected.
17 Dr. Hatchett believes that President Karadzic genuinely wanted an
18 end of the war and thought that as a former US government official, he
19 might have the contacts to help him achieve this. Dr. Hatchett managed
20 to get the proposal to President Clinton who was reportedly excited about
21 it. However, he later learned that the proposal had been shot down by
22 the state government -- State Department.
23 Subsequently, the United States decided to convene negotiations
24 in a controlled area at a military base in Dayton, Ohio. This was
25 similar to what Dr. Karadzic had proposed in September 1994. The
1 agreement that was reached at Dayton in November 1995 resulted in the
2 same proportion, 41 -- 49/51 division of the territory that Dr. Karadzic
3 had proposed in September 1994. The map produced in Dayton does not
4 differ significantly from the map given to the -- to Dr. Hatchett by
5 Dr. Karadzic in September 1994. The political division -- divisions
6 agreed to in Dayton are also similar to those proposed by Dr. Karadzic in
7 September 1994.
8 [Interpretation] That would be a short summary of Dr. Hatchett's
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Dr. Hatchett, I'd like to ask you as a man with rich experience
12 in military matters, have you had the opportunity to look at the nature
13 of the war primarily around Sarajevo, and the nature of the whole
14 conflict related to what is sometimes called a siege, that conflict in
15 the city that lasted 42 months?
16 A. While I was there, I was given the opportunity to visit Sarajevo.
17 In fact, I went down into the built-up area of Sarajevo where there was
18 still quite a significant Serbian population occupying a portion of the
19 city living there --
20 JUDGE KWON: Before you continue, Mr. Hatchett, yes, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Well, I was trying to define exactly where this was
22 going, but if it's seeking some form of expert opinion, it's way too late
23 for that. And furthermore, it -- this appears to be moving into an area
24 that has nothing to do with the statement and was in no way notified to
25 the Prosecution. So I'm a little -- I thought it might relate in some
1 way, but I am having trouble seeing how it's about to, and I wanted to
2 stop it before it moved any further if that's correct.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. President, the question I believe it was
4 intended to elicit Dr. Hatchett's observations when he was in Sarajevo
5 which are depicted on the video that was disclosed to the Prosecution.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let us continue then.
7 Would you like to respond, Mr. Tieger?
8 MR. TIEGER: I do. If there was an intention of eliciting from
9 this witness some view of -- some opinion on documents submitted, that
10 should have been done previously and it was not. And this is --
11 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, view of -- view on documents? I don't
12 follow. What documents do you have in mind?
13 MR. TIEGER: When -- in the normal course of business if a
14 witness is going to be asked to comment upon and evidence is going to be
15 elicited from a witness on materials, then the -- the adverse party is
16 notified of that, and there's been no such notification whatsoever. This
17 is coming entirely out of the blue. It's not in the statement. It's not
18 in the summary. It was in no way -- it's not in a proofing note. It was
19 not -- no indication that the witness would be asked to address such
20 issues has been provided to the Prosecution whatsoever.
21 JUDGE KWON: But speaking for myself, as long as the question is
22 limited to his observation during his visit to Sarajevo, I don't see much
23 problem, but I'll consult my colleagues.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Can I also point out to
25 you that in the summary it says during their stay in Pale his group
1 toured the VRS positions in the hills above Sarajevo as well as the area
2 of Gorazde. So between the disclosure of the video and this portion of
3 the summary, I don't think there's anything wrong with asking him about
4 his view of what he saw in Sarajevo.
5 MR. TIEGER: That's entirely the point, Mr. President. I mean,
6 he focused on a very narrow part. I have no issue if he wants to
7 elaborate some ambiguity in the part that was notified, but this is
8 frankly a kind of trick to identify a very narrow portion and then claim
9 that it gives rise to the opportunity to raise issues that extend far
10 broader than -- than that which was notified.
11 Now, again, if it's about that particular portion and that
12 particular portion only, of course it's fair, but that's not what seems
13 to be happening. Instead, because the word "Sarajevo" is mentioned
14 somewhere in the statement, now the Defence apparently feels free to ask
15 them anything they want about Sarajevo. And the issue is not whether the
16 witness is properly in a position to comment upon observations he may or
17 may not have made, the issue is fair notice, and opportunity to prepare
18 for cross-examination. And that's a point that Mr. Robinson raised
19 repeatedly. We always tried to provide that, including sometimes sending
20 proofing notes very, very late in the evening just to ensure that some
21 notice was provided in an appropriate fashion.
22 JUDGE KWON: In terms of that notice, Mr. Tieger, in case of a
23 partial Rule 92 ter witness as was indicated with respect to this
24 witness, to what extent does one party have to notify the other as to the
25 part that is to be led live?
1 MR. TIEGER: That's the same situation as with a viva voce
2 witness where you provide an adequate 65 ter summary talking about --
3 providing a factual summary of the issues that the witness will be
4 discussing, the evidence that will be elicited from the witness. If it's
5 not provided, then the other side has a fair point that they're not in a
6 position to prepare for the evidence that is sought to be elicited.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, could you tell us the part of the
9 summary that you referred to? Where is it?
10 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. It's the second to last sentence:
11 "During their stay in Pale, his group toured the VRS positions in
12 the hills above Sarajevo, as well as the area of Gorazde."
13 JUDGE KWON: During ... so you referred to para-14 of his
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. It's also included in paragraph 14.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, instead of posing a very general
18 question, could you put your question more specifically with respect to
19 any part of his statement.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellency. Thank you.
21 I just want to say that I believe Dr. Hatchett accepted to take my
22 message to President Clinton and his government only because he was
23 satisfied that my intentions were honest.
24 JUDGE KWON: That's not an appropriate comment. Just put your
25 question, Mr. Karadzic.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Dr. Hatchett, you referred to one of the conversations where you
3 were present wherein military logic told General Tolimir that the war has
4 to end in victory, and you knew that I said that that would not happen.
5 Can you tell us your conclusions about the nature of that war in Sarajevo
6 and around Sarajevo?
7 MR. TIEGER: Objection.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I don't follow your question, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, your Excellencies, I believe
10 Mr. Hatchett referred to my words, "I'm not going to launch a major
11 military assault on a city full of people," and Dr. Hatchett knew exactly
12 what my intentions, and he had observed the city and the fighting, and
13 I'm asking him as such what he concluded, not as an expert.
14 JUDGE KWON: You could ask him how did he understood your comment
15 or whether he understood your intention, but asking him the nature of the
16 war with respect to that comment is far-fetched, I take it.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
19 Q. Could you please answer, Dr. Hatchett, the question kindly
20 phrased by the Presiding Judge and tell us what you saw. What did you
21 witness while you were there?
22 MR. TIEGER: Wait, wait. I don't understand why we're going in
23 circles like this, and I think it's -- it's particularly inappropriate to
24 suggest that the accused has adopted the formulation of the trial Bench
25 and then revert back to his original formulation. That's not at all what
1 the Court was suggesting, and again it's -- these are repeated efforts to
2 do what the -- to try to elicit evidence in a manner the Trial Chamber
3 has said first is not appropriate and then has provided specific guidance
4 for a potentially appropriate way to do so, which is being ignored by the
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll have to rephrase
8 it once again.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Dr. Hatchett, could you tell the Chamber what you saw in
11 Sarajevo, and how does that compare with other cities under siege?
12 JUDGE KWON: Notice, Mr. Tieger?
13 MR. TIEGER: Yes, it's the same issue. And I don't -- I guess
14 this is now sort of a stand-off on who's more stubborn, Dr. Karadzic in
15 continuing to pose the same question over and over, or me in repeatedly
16 getting up to make the same objection which the Court has sustained.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, could you advise Mr. Karadzic how to
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
20 [Accused and Defence counsel confer]
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'll try again, because
22 I wonder why Mr. Tieger is afraid of what Dr. Hatchett might answer --
23 JUDGE KWON: That's not an appropriate comment at all.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Tieger said I was stubborn, so
1 I had to respond.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Dr. Hatchett, can you tell us what you saw in Sarajevo, and how
4 does that relate to the claims that the city was under siege?
5 MR. TIEGER: I don't know exactly what Mr. Robinson explained,
6 but it's difficult to see the difference between this question and the
7 previous formulations. It's the same problem. We were not advised that
8 this witness would be offering a comparative review of cities under siege
9 based on what he saw previously. That's not in the statement. Based on
10 what he saw in Sarajevo. That's not in the statement. And based on a
11 kind of quasi-expert opinion that was not noticed and that is certainly,
12 in any event, belated.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, this question doesn't relate
14 to other cities or asking him to be an expert. He went and saw Sarajevo,
15 and he's being asked whether or not from what he saw did the city appear
16 to be under siege.
17 JUDGE KWON: If it relates to issue of siege or encirclement or
18 whatever, I would like the accused to move on.
19 Move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I think we are missing
21 a good opportunity to hear from a professional, experienced witness, and
22 to help us understand things, but I don't have anything more. I hope
23 that perhaps the Trial Chamber might put these questions.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Hatchett, as you have noted, your
25 evidence in chief was in most part -- in whole admitted in writing, and
1 you will be further asked by the representative of the Prosecutor.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
6 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Hatchett. We will be commencing, but
7 there's only a very short time between now and when we have to adjourn,
8 so we won't be going into too many issues before we have to adjourn.
9 In paragraph 7 of your statement, you mention --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 You have your statement in hard copy with you?
12 THE WITNESS: No.
13 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to have one, sir?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be forthcoming.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. I had just been about to refer to paragraph 7 of your statement
18 where you first mention your trip in September 1994 with -- to Pale with
19 other members of the Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, which is
20 characterised as a non-Partisan research centre devoted to studying the
21 Balkan Peninsula in all its aspects.
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. And I wanted to begin by asking you about the Lord Byron centre,
24 asking you a few more questions about it. First of all, it's correct
25 that the reason it's named the Lord Byron Foundation, named after
1 Lord Byron, is because as indicated on the foundation web site, because
2 he gave his life in the fight to free Balkan Christians from Islamic
3 rule. That's -- is it correct that that's the nature of the origin of
4 the name of the organisation?
5 A. I think that is correct, sir. That was a name that was selected
6 by the primary founder of the organisation which was Dr. Srdja Trifkovic.
7 Q. And in addition to Dr. Trifkovic, was Sir Alfred Sherman one of
8 the primary founding members of the organisation?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. And is it correct that the organisation was founded, as
11 Sir Alfred Sherman has stated, to correct what was considered a
12 systematic propagandistic view of the Balkans? In other words, the
13 organisation was founded to fight the -- a prevailing view of the
15 A. Yes. And my understanding was the organisation's purpose was to
16 provide a more complete picture of what was underlying all of the
17 problems of the Balkans at this time. The feeling amongst several of us
18 was that the information that was in the media was in many ways not
19 reflective of the actual history of the area and the events leading up to
20 the conflict that was occurring at that time and had a decidedly
21 anti-Serb bias in the media which we thought needed to be balanced.
22 Q. In fact, the anti-Serb bias that you refer to was considered to
23 be by the founding members quite strong. So Sir Alfred Sherman, for
24 example, referred that the Serbs were being subjected to a pogrom from
25 the West and that the West was beset by chronic Serbophobia; is that
2 A. Well, I don't know what -- if Sir Alfred really believed in this,
3 but I can just tell you that I didn't feel that strongly about it. I did
4 feel that the media was missing a lot in the discussion about the --
5 again the point of view of the Serbs in the struggle and the rights and
6 the history of the Serbs in the area, and I joined with these others
7 because I thought we could do some service to a better understanding of
8 what was actually transpiring there.
9 Q. Staying with Sir Alfred Sherman for a moment, who has written
10 extensively about it, as has Dr. Trifkovic, he also wrote that a -- he
11 considered an independent Bosnia as the cornerstone of a European
12 Islamistan. Was that consistent with the view of the foundation?
13 A. Well, it's not consistent with my views. All I can tell you is
14 that Sir Alfred Sherman, and perhaps Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, they have their
15 own views about this, but I didn't share 100 per cent their views on what
16 was happening there or the ramifications of what was happening there.
17 Q. Were you aware that Sir Alfred received the order of Njegos by
18 Republika Srpska?
19 A. I was not.
20 Q. Do you have any idea what services he provided to Republika
21 Srpska --
22 A. I do not know how long.
23 Q. Now, Sir Alfred along with Srdja Trifkovic wrote about and
24 apparently believed in what they called the threat of a green corridor
25 linking Bosnia to the east. Were you aware of their views on this
1 particular issue?
2 A. I was aware of those views, but as I said again, those are not my
3 views. I didn't share that. I saw the situation in Bosnia as simply a
4 problem of multiculturalism of three different cultural groups that were
5 trying to find a way to live in new circumstances with the collapse of
6 Yugoslavia. I didn't see a great conspiracy behind what was going on in
7 this region. Maybe to the extent that perhaps Alfred Sherman did or
8 Srdja Trifkovic did. I don't share, as I said, their points of view
10 Q. Okay. And keep that in mind so let me just ask you about one
11 further view that seems to be held not only by a number of
12 representatives of the -- or officials the Lord Byron Foundation and that
13 is contained at various places on the web site of the foundation, and
14 that is the view that the part of the Serbophobia of the West is that --
15 is the establishment of this Tribunal, which is considered "a propaganda
16 machine" which has "acted more in keeping with the processes followed by
17 the Stalinist show trials of the late 1930s." Now, that's on the web
18 site and that was written specifically by Mr. Bissett who was a chairman
19 of the Lord Byron Foundation. Is that a view held by the foundation and
20 by the members of the foundation?
21 A. It may be a view held by Mr. Bissett and it may be a view held by
22 others, but it's not a view that's held by me. In fact, I lent my name
23 to this when it was first beginning, but I haven't been very active in it
24 for the last 8 or 10 years.
25 Q. Okay. And we are just about to adjourn, so let me just finish up
1 that topic. Were you aware that Mr. Trifkovic, too, has written about
2 the same issue along the same lines; that is, he's written that the
3 Tribunal accepts the role of a political tool of its political bosses and
4 paymasters and "its decisions are as predictable as those in Moscow in
6 A. I'm aware that he's written things like this, but, you know, once
7 again I would just point out to you, Mr. Prosecutor, his views and my
8 views are not necessarily the same. In fact, not only not necessarily,
9 they are not the same.
10 Q. Thank you for that. But just to clarify in connection with the
11 organisation, Mr. Trifkovic is or was the executive director of the
12 Lord --
13 A. Yes, he is the driving force within the organisation.
14 Q. Thank you, sir.
15 MR. TIEGER: I think it's the appropriate time, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: We will adjourn for today and continue tomorrow
18 THE WITNESS: All right.
19 JUDGE KWON: Can I advise you not to discuss with anybody else
20 about your testimony.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
22 JUDGE KWON: The hearing is adjourned.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.47 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day
25 of January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.