1 Wednesday, 16 January 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr. Hatchett.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Good morning, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning to you and
10 Your Honours.
11 WITNESS: RONALD HATCHETT [Resumed]
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
13 Q. Good morning, Mr. Hatchett.
14 A. Good morning, sir.
15 Q. Let me turn to the statement that you provided in written form
16 and let me turn first to that portion of your statement which indicates
17 that Dr. Karadzic told you during your visit that -- and as reflected in
18 the interview you provided, that ethnic cleansing was not a Bosnian Serb
19 policy but instead just a regrettable consequence of a civil war
20 resulting from civilians who were extremist, intimidating or forcing out
21 people of other ethnicities. I take it that you did not ask him
22 specifically about in particular municipalities and specifically whether
23 forces of the Republika Srpska Army or Republika Srpska police have been
24 represented in those municipalities and that they had been doing in those
25 municipalities at the time.
1 A. That's correct, sir. I was primarily interested in what
2 Dr. Karadzic's personal opinion was on these issues. I mean, it was
3 obvious to anyone who was following what was going on at this time, that
4 ethnic cleansing had been taking place on the part of all the parties.
5 Croats cleansed Muslims, Muslims cleansed Croats, and Serbs cleansed
6 Muslims and Croats and all. But my primary purpose here was to get a
7 better insight as to Dr. Karadzic's positions on these things.
8 Q. And were you aware then about evidence indicating the
9 responsibility of organised forces of Republika Srpska, that is the VRS,
10 the Army of Republika Srpska, or the Republika Srpska Ministry of
11 Interior or police for the -- generally termed the ethnic cleansing of
12 other ethnicities?
13 A. I was not aware specifically of incidents where the regular Army
14 of Republika Srpska was involved in ethnic cleansing at this time. This
15 is in September of 1994. My impression was most of the ethnic cleansing
16 was being done by these militia-type groups like Arkan's Tigers and other
17 type of groups like that. I was not aware of the specifics of any
18 incidents involving the regular troops of the Republika Srpska.
19 Q. I'm not going to go into a great deal of detail, but this
20 Trial Chamber over the course of many months of trial has heard a great
21 deal of evidence about events in municipalities and has heard evidence
22 about the role of both the VRS and the Republika Srpska police in the --
23 in force exerted against other ethnic groups. So let me ask you quickly
24 about just a few of those examples.
25 The Chamber has heard evidence, for example, that in the Prijedor
1 municipality in north-west Bosnia that in late May the military forces of
2 Republika Srpska attacked a large Muslim settlement called Kozarac.
3 Thousands of civilians were rounded up. Hundreds were killed, and there
4 was massive destruction in the area as reflected in both eyewitness
5 testimony and contemporaneous documents of the VRS that this
6 Trial Chamber has received. Were you aware of that when you prepared
7 your statement?
8 A. No, sir, I was not aware of that. But again, what I would point
9 out was I don't doubt that these kind of incidents took place, but as I
10 said, the important thing that I was trying to elicit in my interviews
11 with Dr. Karadzic is to what extent those incidents reflected the
12 policies or the values of Dr. Karadzic. I don't doubt that there are
13 those that have served and many have already been tried by this Tribunal,
14 and the Tribunal has found evidence sufficient to convict them of these
15 kind of things, but my question would be whether or not Dr. Karadzic had
16 a role in causing those military actors to act in the way that they did.
17 Q. I -- I trust you would agree, however, that it would be somewhat
18 easier and more accurate to assess the reliability, credibility, or
19 accuracy of any representations that Dr. Karadzic might make about that
20 policy if you knew what the forces under his control had actually been
21 doing in the municipalities; correct?
22 A. Well, that's -- the assumption once again, that you just made,
23 that is -- it was that those forces were under his control. My
24 impression that I have --
25 Q. Okay. I want you to finish your answer, but I take it you would
1 agree with the general premise of the point I made, that if you knew
2 that --
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. -- it would help you assess.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Okay. Now, please finish your answer.
7 A. Now, what I was saying is that my impression from what I observed
8 there was that there was not a very close working relationship between
9 the political side of the Republika Srpska and the military side. My
10 impression was that the military somehow believed that they were an
11 entity unto themselves and they didn't necessarily have to -- to the
12 extent that we are used to in the West, submit themselves to the control
13 of the civilian authorities. So once again, you know, I would raise the
14 issue of whether or not -- I can see a situation where Dr. Karadzic could
15 have a certain view on these kind of activities and military commanders
16 that theoretically were under his control but not actually, de facto
17 under his control, would have a different point of view on those issues.
18 So that -- that was again why I was focusing on what do you,
19 Radovan Karadzic, think about this.
20 I mean, I had this on videotape for two reasons. One, I was
21 under contract at this time as an international affairs advisor to a
22 television station in Houston which served an area of about 5 million
23 homes, which was the fourth largest television coverage area in the
24 United States, and I wanted to give them a chance to hear from supposedly
25 the horse's mouth on what they -- what Dr. Karadzic believed about these
1 things. So to get him on record saying the things that he had said, it
2 would seem to me was a valuable way of letting the American people have a
3 good idea about the nature of the man running the Serbian Republic at
4 that time.
5 And the other thing about this is I took these video-tapes and
6 turned them over to my acquaintances in the Central Intelligence Agency,
7 and it gave them a chance to judge for themselves, looking at his body
8 language, the way in which he said certain things, to judge for
9 themselves what his veracity was on these kinds of issues.
10 Q. I take it in addition that Dr. Karadzic did not mention to you at
11 that time, nor did you inquire specifically about events in the Zvornik
12 municipality; is that right?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. So you weren't aware, as this Trial Chamber has received
15 evidence, that after a long period of pressure, Republika Srpska military
16 officials, military vehicles, tanks, took positions while RS officials
17 told the Muslims of Kozluk that they had a very short time to gather
18 themselves and leave and that transportation would be provided for that
19 purpose, resulting in the expulsion of nearly 2.000 people. And I take
20 it he didn't tell you that only a relatively few days later he, that is
21 Dr. Karadzic, met with local officials in Zvornik who told him that, "We
22 were most active in evicting the Muslims," and, "We have successfully
23 implemented the President's decision to settle Divic and Kozluk with our
24 children." And that can be found at P1478, pages 246 through 254. Is
25 that correct, sir?
1 A. That is correct. I was not aware of that, but once again I would
2 just raise the issue of to what extent was this all initiated at the
3 decision of the -- President Karadzic and to what extent was it carried
4 out independently by the Serbian military.
5 Q. I trust you would agree that had you had the information I just
6 gave you that is before this Trial Chamber that might have assisted you
7 in making [overlapping speakers] --
8 A. Well, certainly. I would have asked a follow-up question then:
9 How do you explain just -- what you just quoted me, but having no
10 knowledge of it I didn't that follow-up.
11 Q. Let me turn to some aspects of the proposal that he advanced to
12 you. Among other things, he indicated that his proposal would include
13 the fact that Bosnia would remain a single country; correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. And that's contained at paragraph 16 of your statement where you
16 provide some of the details?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Were you aware that this was and had been throughout -- from
19 before the war, throughout the course of the conflict during
20 negotiations, a consistent position and demand by the international
22 A. Yes. I was aware of that. It showed to me that he was willing
23 to accept and incorporate into his concept of ending this many of the
24 ideas. For example, the 49/51 split of territory was also something that
25 was in the international community proposal of the Contact Group plan,
1 whereas at this time, I think about 72 per cent of the territory of
2 Bosnia was under the control of the Serbian military. And so he was
3 saying, "I am willing to back away from this 72 per cent and go back to
4 the 49 per cent as you have asked for in the Contact Group plan."
5 Q. Well, were you also aware that while Dr. Karadzic was
6 acknowledging the position and demand of the international community, in
7 this proposal he was also steadfastly maintaining to his subordinates and
8 associates that the ultimate objective of Republika Srpska was
9 unification with Serbia?
10 A. I'm not aware that it was unification with Serbia proper. I am
11 aware that he wanted a contiguous territory of Bosnia to be part of the
12 Republika Srpska. I am aware that he wanted close ties with Serbs in the
13 Krajina and that he wanted close ties with the Serbs inside of Serbia.
14 As far as union, I was not aware of that.
15 Q. Okay. So you weren't aware of such evidence as in -- as this
16 Chamber has received as close to your discussion as the 9th much January,
17 1994, where he said, "Our goal is to unite with Serbia." That's P5525 at
18 page 12. Or January 17th, 1994, where he said to the Assembly, "Our goal
19 of unification is still valid." And that's P1387. Or when he responded
20 later that year or at the beginning of 1995 when accused of squandering
21 the chance to get a Greater Serbia, that "nothing has been squandered."
22 Instead he explained that we're in a tug-of-war with the international
23 community and the rope is on our side and every day we pull it one
24 millimetre to our side. That's P1405, pages 148 through 149. You were
25 not aware of that?
1 A. I was not aware of the specifics that you just quoted, but once
2 again, I would point out that what he had made and asked me to take to
3 our governmental authorities was a proposal, and that proposal would
4 necessarily involve compromise, which would have involved backing away
5 from some of the positions maybe that he had established previously and
6 accepting some of the positions that the international community had had
7 in their proposals previously. And it also would have involved the
8 international community accepting some new realities in the settlement
9 that they had heretofore not accepted. For example, the main issue that
10 I saw was that especially the United States had been pressing for a
11 unitary state in Bosnia, that is with a single government in Sarajevo
12 that would control the whole of the territory of Bosnia, whereas
13 Dr. Karadzic's proposal was for a federal Republic of Bosnia, a single
14 Bosnia, but with two constituent parts.
15 Q. Thank you, Doctor. And just by way of trying to make our
16 discussion a little bit more efficient because I have limited time, I
17 appreciate that the question involved the issue of negotiations
18 generally, but I had simply been focused on the issue of the unification
19 issue, so I'll ask you to just focus on the questions I ask and we'll
20 either get there or Dr. Karadzic will have a chance to ask you questions
21 in redirect. Only in the interests of time, sir.
22 A. All right.
23 Q. Otherwise, I would be happy to invite an expansive discussion?
24 A. I knew that there was discussion about unification of all of the
25 Serbian peoples, just as there was discussion at this time by the Croats
1 about unification of all the Croat peoples.
2 Q. Okay. Now you had referred a moment ago to the amount of
3 territory the Serbian forces held as being approximately 72 per cent.
4 You refer to that in your statement as well and also refer to the
5 characterization of the proposal that Dr. Karadzic made which included
6 the 51/49 per cent split action generous.
7 Now, would you agree that the generosity of such an offer would
8 at least depend upon the -- who lived on the land that was under the
9 control of the Republika Srpska forces before the war and how that
10 territory was taken? That would have some effect on whether it was a
11 generous offer or not?
12 A. Yes. But again if you look at the maps of the census prior to
13 the war, about 60 per cent of the territory of Bosnia was identified as
14 predominantly Serb in occupation.
15 Q. Let me look quickly at the map that you provided. That's D2743,
16 I believe.
17 Can I take it that when looking at the eastern side of the
18 country that those areas in green are supposed to be representation of
19 Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa?
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. Okay. And the rest of the territory in Eastern Bosnia is
22 territory controlled by the forces of Republika Srpska?
23 A. Well, it's territory that Dr. Karadzic proposed be part of
24 Republika Srpska.
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. Excuse me. If I could point out, this is a map that I made
2 after -- for presentations effects. The actual map that Dr. Karadzic
3 gave me was a 1:250000 scale map which was much more accurate than what
4 is depicted here, and it was that map that I gave to the American
5 government that they used. I have moved about five times since this
6 occurred and I could not locate the map, but the US government had copies
7 of a map that was much more detailed than what we see in this exhibit
9 Q. Okay. Dr. Karadzic was seeking that territory plus a trade for
10 Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zep. But do you know the demographic breakdown
11 of Srebrenica and Gorazde?
12 A. Yeah. At this time these were heavily Muslim areas, but what he
13 was trying to do was to avoid the islands of Muslims embedded inside
14 of -- of Republika Srpska, because he assumed that those would -- those
15 people would rather be part of the Bosnian Muslim Croat federation, and
16 that's why the green that you see around Sarajevo was the territory that
17 he was willing to trade where there was significant Serbian population.
18 He was willing to trade that territory to the Muslims for the territories
19 in those three enclaves in the east.
20 Q. Did you know the demographic -- demographics of many of the other
21 municipalities in Eastern Bosnia, in that area; Zvornik, Vlasenica,
22 Bratunac, Visegrad, Rogatica, Foca? Did you know those before the war?
23 A. Yes, I knew that.
24 Q. And did you know that they were predominantly Muslim?
25 A. Yes, I knew that. I knew that these existed.
1 Q. And do you know what Dr. Karadzic said about why those
2 municipalities came under the control of the Republika Srpska forces?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Well, he said the following in front of the Bosnian Serb
5 Assembly. That's P00988.
6 "To tell the truth, there are towns that we grabbed for ourselves
7 and there were only 30 per cent. I can name as many of those as you
8 want, but we cannot give up the towns we made up 70 per cent. Don't let
9 this get around, but remember how many of us there were in Bratunac, how
10 many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, how much in Rogatica, how much
11 in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, et cetera? Due to strategic importance they
12 had to become ours, and no one is practically questioning it any more."
13 Did he tell you that?
14 A. No, sir, he didn't tell me that.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, did he -- now, did he also mention that he and
16 other Bosnian Serb officials such as Momcilo Krajisnik had insisted that
17 that area, the Eastern Bosnia area, the Podrinje area, had to be cleaned;
18 that is, had to be Serbian?
19 A. He wanted that territory to be part of Republika Srpska. That's
20 what I understood. And it would have involved trading territories and
21 which would imply movement of populations.
22 Q. Okay. And did you know that from 19 -- from as early as 1992,
23 that efforts had been undertaken and directives had been issued to
24 achieve the removal of Muslim population from that area so it could be
25 under Serb control?
1 A. Yes, I knew that some Muslims had been taken from that area, yes.
2 Q. But I'm -- I'm asking you if you were aware, as this
3 Trial Chamber has heard evidence, that when -- that Dr. Karadzic not only
4 acknowledged the objective of ensuring that this area was Serbian but had
5 discussed that matter with his military forces and that directives and
6 that orders were issued to achieve that by the military?
7 A. I was not aware that Dr. Karadzic gave the orders to the military
8 for that to occur.
9 Q. So you were not aware that as early as 8 November, 1992,
10 Dr. Karadzic met with General Mladic and his corps commanders. That
11 there was a discussion about which strategic objectives had been
12 achieves. For example, the Posavina Corridor, and which had not, that is
13 the cleansing of the Podrinje area or Drina area, that's P1481, at pages
14 146 through 147. And at that same month a directive was issued which
15 provided that one of the corps of the Army of Republika Srpska had the
16 responsibility to inflict the heaviest losses on the enemy forces in the
17 wider Podrinje area and force them to leave the areas with the Muslim
18 population. You weren't aware of that?
19 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I think that in order
20 to be fair, Mr. Tieger should alert the witness to whether that directive
21 that he's referring to was something that was signed or authored by
22 Dr. Karadzic, because he's presenting this as if Dr. Karadzic had done
23 that, and in fact I think we know from the evidence that that's not the
25 MR. TIEGER:
1 Q. Were you also aware that Dr. Karadzic had acknowledged in
2 Assembly sessions that he, as had General Mladic, that he was aware of
3 the directives, not to mention the fact that he was present at that
4 November 8th session? Were you aware of that?
5 A. Well, I know that -- you know, he was in the midst of a war, and
6 I know that he was a politician, and I know that a politician to stay in
7 power has to appeal to his constituency, and my point simply is this:
8 The fighting was going on. There were similar types of things that you
9 just described the Serbs having done that were done to the Serbs by
10 Muslims, by Croats, in territories that they were trying to make more
11 ethnically pure as well. So this was being done in a three-way type of
12 activity, and it is a tragedy, a real tragedy that this was going on.
13 But my point simply is that he was bold enough to recognise that this
14 can't go on, and he was -- and he made a proposal to try to end this kind
15 of activity on the parts of all the parties by coming to a negotiated
17 And if you take a look at what you proposed in September of 1994
18 and compare it to the Dayton plan that actually ended the fighting, then
19 they're very similar. What happened was the US government and its
20 Western Allies pocketed his proposal in September of 1994 and brought it
21 out again in 1995 when the offensives by the Muslim armies weren't being
22 as successful as they had hoped, but you know, what I'm saying is I'm not
23 aware of a lot of things that were going on in the areas of the Croats
24 and the Muslims either in terms of crimes against other ethnic groups.
25 Q. Well, did Dr. Karadzic tell you during the course of these
1 discussions and the proposal about which you some to be giving him a
2 great deal of credit, that he'd been told and had reason to understand
3 that the attainment of half of the territory or nearly half of the
4 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a singular achievement, in fact
5 a fairly unprecedented achievement, because of the ethnic cleansing that
6 had taken place?
7 A. I'm not sure I understand what you're saying.
8 Q. Well, he related, for example, to the Assembly, that is Bosnian
9 Serb parliament, how a British diplomat had told -- had asked him the
10 other day why he wasn't acting triumphant, that in spite of the
11 aggression, in spite of the ethnic cleansing, in spite of the atrocities,
12 the crimes committed by your soldiers, that you are before the moment
13 when the international community will recognise the results of your
14 fight. Naturally you cannot get off the hook of 51/49 per cent, but how
15 can you not realise that those 49 per cents are a great result and, as
16 Dr. Karadzic said, a great victory of ours?
17 A. Well, again, that sounds like a political statement. How can you
18 say that if you started out with 60 per cent and you're now going to
19 settle for 49 per cent that was a great victory. I think that was a
20 political statement to try to put the best face on a proposal that he
21 believed would ultimately solve the fighting that was going on in that
23 Q. And he also told the Assembly that that was the first time in
24 history that a country was torn apart after recognition and that the
25 international community would accept it. By the way, those two cites are
1 P1390, page 39, and P1385, pages 114 through 115.
2 A. Well, I would just say that 49/51 split is incorporated in the
3 current situation in the country. So he was correct.
4 Q. By the way, just to clarify something that was raised by
5 Mr. Robinson and which I also presume you're not aware of, and I wouldn't
6 have asked you otherwise, this Trial Chamber in respect of the directive
7 I read to you, this Trial Chamber's also received evidence that that
8 directive was verbally approved by Dr. Karadzic. I take it that's -- you
9 didn't know about the directive and you didn't know about his approval of
10 it; is that correct?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And that's D2149 for purposes of the record. I think e-court
13 page 13.
14 Now, at the time you were talking to Dr. Karadzic, obviously
15 Srebrenica and Gorazde and Zepa were still not under the full control of
16 the Republika Srpska forces; correct?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And that's why you were seeking that trade?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Did he describe this to you as he did to the Assembly, that
21 talking about the successful operations in 1992 and then saying, well,
22 after that, that is after packing -- "Packing Muslims in small areas," or
23 "thus achieving their concentration, we couldn't do more." Did he tell
24 you that?
25 A. No, he didn't tell me that.
1 Q. That's P988, pages 64 through 65.
2 Now, were you aware at roughly the same time, that is in 1994,
3 the Contact Group proposal had been -- was underway and had been advanced
4 to the parties and was under -- had been under discussion?
5 A. Yes, of course. I was aware of it.
6 Q. And I take it you were aware that the Contact Group proposal had
7 not been accepted by Republika Srpska in part because it didn't provide
8 for the territories that the Bosnian Serbs desired?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Do you know what Dr. Karadzic said about what would happen or
11 what should happen if the Contact Group proposal was not accepted?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Okay. Well, at P1394, in roughly the middle part of 1994, he
14 said, "We have to --" if that plan was not accepted, "We have to prepare
15 ourselves according to the wish of our enemy. Be ready for -- to make
16 intensive life-and-death war 'until his complete defeat or until our
17 defeat and expulsion from these territories.'" And he went on to say,
18 "In case of his victory, our enemy would not be generous nor merciful but
19 merciless and ready for our extinction. Therefore, if we do not accept
20 the plan, we have to accept the logic of our enemy and defeat him
21 mercilessly leaving the mercy after the victory."
22 You didn't discuss that with Dr. Karadzic, I take it.
23 A. Well, I did. You know, once again, this is a wartime situation.
24 This is a politician talking to other politicians and to his
25 constituencies. All I know is that I personally observed Dr. Karadzic
1 becoming very short, if not irate, when General Tolimir kept pushing and
2 pushing in the discussions we were having one evening for us -- for me in
3 particular to agree as a military man that the best solution the Serbs
4 could hope for was a military victory by overrunning Sarajevo. And
5 Dr. Karadzic, as I said, almost in anger cut him off, saying listen, I am
6 not going to agree for an all-out attack on a major populated area like
7 this with the intendant loss of life that would occur on all sides when
8 we know we're not going to be able to keep that territory in a negotiated
10 So you know, this was a private, without the politicians around,
11 without a constituency around, this was a private meeting of military and
12 top leadership and the visitors.
13 Q. A private meeting with a visitor or more visitors from the United
14 States present?
15 A. Yes, with me present, one other American present -- no, two other
16 Americans present, and two British.
17 Q. Well, you've just told me about the quote I read you from
18 Dr. Karadzic about being merciless in attaining the objectives that you
19 considered that that might be only a political statement, but are you
20 aware of fact that some months later Dr. Karadzic issued and signed a
21 document known as Directive 7, which included the language:
22 "By planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an
23 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
24 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica or Zepa."
25 Were you aware of that?
1 A. I'm not aware of that.
2 Q. Thank you. Now as a final matter I'd like to turn to the issue
3 of what Dr. Karadzic told you about the -- what would happen at the end
4 of the war and the supposed obligation as he considered it of all three
5 republics, to enable the refugees who wished to come back to their homes
6 to do so.
7 First of all, were you aware of the fact that Dr. Karadzic often
8 spoke of the demographic threat presented by Muslims, that is that they
9 had a high birth rate and would overwhelm the -- the Serbs were at risk
10 of being demographically overrun by Muslims.
11 A. Yes. And I knew that that was the concern of many Serbs and also
12 of the Croats, because -- and that's why both the Serbs and the Croats
13 initially opposed the idea of a unitary state in Bosnia, because they
14 knew that that meant inevitably domination by a Muslim portion of the
15 population, which already had the plurality and would move to a majority
16 very quickly.
17 Q. We discussed earlier the rejection of the Contact Group proposal.
18 Were you aware that one of the objections by the Bosnian Serbs to the
19 Contact Group proposal was the fact that it provided that there would be
20 no border controls on the borders between the entities and therefore for
21 freedom of movement of goods, services, and persons throughout the union?
22 That was considered a problem as -- by the Bosnian Serbs?
23 A. Well, I knew that the Bosnian Serbs wanted control of the borders
24 of their entity, but that's as far as I knew.
25 Q. Right. Within the country. So that would mean that they would
1 be able to control not only the movement of goods and services but the
2 movement of Muslims or Croats into the Serbian entity; correct?
3 A. Theoretically, yes, that would be correct.
4 Q. And were you aware that Dr. Karadzic, since 1992, had been --
5 that is since the issue of possible constituent units within
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina had been discussed, have been stressing the need for
7 those borders, that the borders of the Serbian entity, the Bosnian Serb
8 entity, to be as wide, to be as big, and as thick as possible; that is,
9 to be as impenetrable as possible. Were you aware of that?
10 A. I'm not sure I understand what you mean by that.
11 Q. Well, this Court has received evidence that Dr. Karadzic had said
12 about the Bosnian Serbs entity that the -- that the -- having -- that the
13 external borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be a problem because
14 they would strive to make the borders of the Bosnian Serb entity as wide
15 as possible, that is to have as big an entity as possible, and to have
16 them as thick as possible, that is to make them as -- to have as much
17 control over who came in as they could?
18 A. All I know is that he was willing to settle for 49 per cent of
19 the territory, and as long as he was given control over the borders of
20 that territory. That's what I knew.
21 Q. And those references are at D88 and D456 for the benefit of the
23 Now --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Tieger.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. And finally, Mr. Hatchett, I wanted to ask you if you were aware
4 that -- because you talked about Dr. Karadzic's acknowledgement of the
5 requirements about the international community or the conditions demanded
6 by the international community, if you were aware of his explanation of
7 the need to give the impression that the Bosnian Serbs agreed with the
8 right of return as well as an explanation of how to frustrate that right
9 of return?
10 A. I'm not aware of anything like that.
11 Q. Well, this Trial Chamber has received evidence that Dr. Karadzic
12 discussed that on more than one occasion. So on one occasion in 1994,
13 that's in -- that's P1385 at pages 126 through 127, when one of the
14 officials said, "What I would really like to see here is a firm attitude
15 that the Muslims and Croats will not be allowed to return to the areas
16 under our rule."
17 Dr. Karadzic explained that they would not be in a position to
18 ban the return of refugees and in principle all refugees could return,
19 but that he would therefore add one sentence to the proposal, "This also
20 has to be a two-way process." And that means that the Muslims, for
21 example, from Prijedor, could only return to Prijedor if the Serbs now in
22 Zvornik return to Zenica. And he discussed that again at P13 -- at P988,
23 at page 29, when the same issue was raised about the right of return, and
24 he said:
25 "That's our intention, to say all right, everyone has the right
1 to return to his home after the war if that is an overall process. What
2 does that mean, an overall process? That means that the Muslims from
3 Kozluk can return to Kozluk if the Serbs from Kozluk return to Zenica.
4 If they don't want to return -- if they cannot return, then we need a new
5 war to exchange that, and that's why I think we should always insist on
6 this. So an overall process, either overall or none at all. We can act
7 the Serbian Cyrillic way and tell it to their face or we can be a bit
8 cunning. We do have to be a bit cunning."
9 Were you aware that while Dr. Karadzic was acknowledging to you
10 the right of return that he was discussing ways to frustrate them?
11 A. Well, that's your interpretation of what that meant, but my
12 interpretation of it is that he was saying that it has -- the policies
13 have to be the same for all peoples. If the Muslims are going to have
14 the right to return to their homes inside of Serbian territory, then
15 Serbs also have to have the right to return to their homes inside the
16 territory of the Muslims or the Croats. That's an interpretation that I
17 think is equally valid.
18 Q. All right. And you find that to be --
19 A. You find that to be logical.
20 Q. And you find that to be cunning as well; is that right?
21 A. No. I find it to be logical.
22 Q. No, but Dr. -- I'll leave it at that, Mr. Hatchett. Thank you
23 for responding to my questions.
24 MR. TIEGER: I have nothing further, Mr. President.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Karadzic, do you have
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a few questions. Good morning
4 to everybody.
5 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
6 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Hatchett.
7 A. Good morning.
8 Q. I would like you to tell the Chamber who Mr. James Bissett is.
9 He was mentioned yesterday during the cross-examination.
10 A. James Bissett is the former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia.
11 Q. Thank you. Were you aware of our Serbian position on the
12 resolution of the Bosnian crisis before the war and without the war? Did
13 you know anything about the Lisbon agreement, what we were prepared to
14 do, what we were prepared to accept in order to avoid a war?
15 A. I understand that in the Lisbon agreement, that the European
16 Union was able to put together an agreement by all three of the ethnic
17 groups, the Croats, the Serbs, and the Muslims, to divide Bosnia into
18 ethnic -- ethnic enclaves of autonomy for each one of the three ethnic
19 groups, is my understanding of what it consisted of.
20 Q. Thank you. Did you know that at that time in peacetime we
21 accepted for Republika Srpska not to have a territorial continuity and
22 that it should account for only and not more than 44 per cent of the
24 A. I knew that it was only 44 per cent of the territory, yes.
25 Q. Thank you. Do you understand that priorities and strategic goals
1 change in wartime as opposed to what was supposed to be --
2 MR. TIEGER: Objection.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. -- a good solution in peacetime?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: Yes. I realise that we have been out of court for
7 some period of time, but the practice of leading questions apparently has
8 persisted since last year.
9 THE ACCUSED: I accept it.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. In that case, I will change direction. Dr. Hatchett, would you
13 know what was the ethnic composition of the municipalities of Drvar,
14 Bosanska Grahovo, and Glamoc.
15 A. No, sorry, I don't know the ethnic composition of those.
16 Q. You were shown a map yesterday, and you saw that those were
17 municipalities that are part of the Republika Srpska. Did you know that
18 in 1995, we agreed that those municipalities should be in the Federation
19 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although Drvar has a 100 per cent Serbian
20 population, Grahovo has a 75 per cent Muslim population? Do you remember
21 that, and do you know that they still belong to the Federation of Bosnia
22 and Herzegovina, i.e., the Muslim federation?
23 A. I know that they're in the Muslim federation today, yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Early today Mr. Tieger quoted me saying that Zvornik
25 and Bratunac would remain in the Republika Srpska, although they had a
1 majority Muslim populations. I have to make sure that my question's not
2 leading. However, do you accept that under the conditions when I
3 accepted Drvar, Glamoc, and Grahovo would not be in Republika Srpska, I
4 had to say something to my MPs in order to heal their wounds after having
5 heard that?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: I think everyone in the courtroom was aware that
8 that was -- if it was indeed an attempt to avoid a leading question, it
9 was singularly unsuccessful.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Very well. Let me put a general question to the witness.
12 Dr. Hatchett were you able to assess the sum of the sentences spoken in
13 the Assembly before my voters were political speeches, that that was
14 their nature? What do you think? If somebody gives a statement like
15 that when MPs have to be persuaded to accept a political agreement,
16 wouldn't you say that this is a kind of political speech a politician
17 delivers normally?
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that's a leading question, but the
19 witness said to the effect that that's a political speech. I don't see
20 the point of your question here.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I have no further
23 Thank you very much, Dr. Hatchett, for having made an effort to
24 come here and testify in this courtroom.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic. Unless my colleagues have
1 questions for you -- yes, Judge Morrison has a question for you.
2 Questioned by the Court:
3 JUDGE MORRISON: This is just curiosity as much as anything else,
4 Dr. Hatchett.
5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE MORRISON: I was just wondering what stimulated your
7 initial interest in the Balkan area?
8 A. Well, I was a serving military officer, and I was sent back for a
9 Ph.D. to become a political military affairs officer in Washington and I
10 was specialising in Eastern Europe, and the only Communist country that I
11 could study or visit was Yugoslavia, and so in 1976 as part of my
12 doctoral work, I went to the University of Zagreb and studied for a
13 summer semester, and that got me interested in this -- this region during
14 that time period.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you. It's -- I have to say [realtime
16 transcript read in error "Sarajevo Romanija Corps"] I many years ago had
17 a similar experience. The British military wasn't allowed to travel
18 anywhere except Yugoslavia as well.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Dr. Hatchett. That concludes your
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: On behalf of this Chamber, I'd like to thank you for
23 your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you're free to go.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 [The witness withdrew]
1 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, while -- thank you very much,
2 Dr. Hatchett. I neglected to introduce to the Chamber our intern, so
3 with us during this session is our legal intern Katherine Connolly from
4 the University of Sydney, Australia.
5 JUDGE KWON: My understanding is there's a change in the order of
6 witnesses for today, Mr. Robinson.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We're ready to call the next
8 witness, Vere Hayes, who has a flight out this afternoon, so we moved him
9 up in the batting order one person.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. So before -- before he's brought in, can
11 we hear from Mr. Karadzic about the relevance issue, Mr. Pljevaljcic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Before that, on page
13 24, line 24, I have a correction on the transcript. I can read here the
14 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps as something that Judge Morrison said. I think
15 he said, "I have to say," and not the "Sarajevo-Romanija Corps." So I
16 kindly ask for this to be corrected.
17 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes. As mistakes go, it's pretty fundamental.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I believe that
20 you're absolutely right. Too much importance has been given to the
21 Focatrans crisis. However, there is a certain deal of relevance insofar
22 as this happened before the elections and it was part of the plan that
23 was published in the "Vox" magazine published in Foca, and that plan was
24 about the future treatment of the Serbs. With your leave, I could leave
25 that live with the witness, and then the relevant paragraphs could be
1 deleted, and those are paragraphs from 2 through 16, I believe. Because
2 that crisis was a trigger for many subsequent events that nobody either
3 wanted or ordered. They simply happened. They simply arose from that
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That sounds -- yes, Mr. Tieger. Yes, I'll
6 hear from you first.
7 MR. TIEGER: Sure, Mr. President. And I'm not trying to make a
8 bigger fuss about the Focatrans incident, and this would truly be a storm
9 in a teacup, I think, if I took too much time, but just want to indicate
10 that I might have some trouble grasping the -- I mean, if it's -- if it's
11 not relevant, I don't see how leading it live makes it relevant. And I
12 had the impression that Dr. Karadzic somehow thinks that that problem is
13 cured by doing it in that fashion. I -- I can't see that that's the
15 Now, if somehow he intends to elicit evidence that he thinks then
16 makes it relevant, that's a different story, but as -- as reflected in
17 his comments, it -- it seems that it's -- it's not in any way a solution
18 to a problem the Court has raised.
19 JUDGE KWON: Any response, Mr. Robinson.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I actually made the same point to
21 Dr. Karadzic when we spoke, and I think perhaps the best solution is to
22 redact those paragraphs. And if Dr. Karadzic wants to ask questions,
23 they can be objected to by the Prosecution and you could rule on them at
24 that time.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson's observation.
2 We'll order the paragraphs from 2 to 15 to be redacted. And I understood
3 Mr. Karadzic's submission that this statement is too much detail, so he
4 may ask a question, if necessary, to the extent necessary. So we'll see
5 that question formulated and then whether it is objectionable or not is a
6 matter to be dealt with when it arises.
7 Yes. Let's bring in the next witness.
8 So are you ready, Ms. -- do you have more time to prepare for
9 Ms. Edgerton?
10 MR. TIEGER: We managed to log off during the interview.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, sir.
14 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
15 JUDGE KWON: Would you make a solemn declaration, please.
16 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
17 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Hayes, please make yourself
20 WITNESS: VERE HAYES
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
23 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
24 A. Good morning.
25 Q. In the course of proofing, did you give a statement to my Defence
2 A. I did.
3 Q. Thank you. Can I now call up in e-court 1D05682. Is this the
4 statement that you see on the screen? We don't need two copies of it.
5 A. It is.
6 Q. Thank you. Have you read it and signed it?
7 A. I have.
8 Q. Does this statement accurately reflect your words?
9 A. It does.
10 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today here
11 in court, would your answers substantially be the same?
12 A. They would.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies may I tender the
15 statement into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit his Rule 92 ter statement. Shall
17 we give the number for that.
18 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2745. Thank you.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, with respect to the associated
20 exhibits, there's a number of them. Some have already been admitted, but
21 they're contained at page 4 of the revised Rule 92 ter package. None of
22 them need to be added to our 65 ter list, but one of them, 1D3803, should
23 be admitted under seal because of the Rule 70 conditions by the provider.
24 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Edgerton, with respect to
25 associated exhibits?
1 MS. EDGERTON: No, but I think that 1D3803 is already exhibited
2 as D190. I think. Under seal.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I haven't checked the items that have
4 been already admitted with the revised notification. Could you go one by
5 one which you are tendering?
6 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, Mr. President. It might be easier to
7 go -- to let you know the ones we're not tendering, but -- there's just a
8 few, but whichever way --
9 JUDGE KWON: Shall we go through which items that you are
11 MR. ROBINSON: Okay.
12 JUDGE KWON: The first item I take it is 65 ter 6911?
13 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, the first item that we're tendering
14 is -- we are tendering 6911, but looking at the revised Rule 92 ter
15 notification, the first item is the curriculum vitae, which is 1D05528.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we give the number for that.
17 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2746.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2746. Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MR. ROBINSON: And the next item is 1D05161, a protest letter by
22 General Milovanovic.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. D2747.
24 THE REGISTRAR: 2747.
25 MR. ROBINSON: The next item is 65 ter number 08639, a UN report
1 of the 12 April meeting.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: D2748. Thank you.
4 MR. ROBINSON: The next item is 1D5672, a Canadian Battalion
6 JUDGE KWON: D2749.
7 MR. ROBINSON: 1D5673, report of 19 April 1993 meeting.
8 JUDGE KWON: 2750.
9 MR. ROBINSON: 1D5671, photograph.
10 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Is D2751.
12 MR. ROBINSON: 1D5525, a news media report.
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I don't -- the Chamber has
14 difficulty in seeing the relevance of this document, and the relevant
15 part has been quoted by the witness.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. It was -- it was offered simply to
17 corroborate the fact that he had in fact attended that funeral.
18 JUDGE KWON: So the Chamber will not receive that.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Very well.
20 JUDGE KWON: Then next?
21 MR. ROBINSON: Next is number 1 --
22 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry? We didn't receive it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: 1D5525 shall be assigned --
24 JUDGE KWON: No, we'll not receive it.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Oh, "we'll not."
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
2 MR. ROBINSON: 1D5670. Another photograph.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we give the next number.
4 THE REGISTRAR: D2752. Thank you.
5 MR. ROBINSON: 16849, VRS agreement.
6 MR. TIEGER: If I may, I've had a look at that, and I think that
7 that document is subsumed within P5041. P5041 is an English and B/C/S
8 copy of that same agreement.
9 MR. ROBINSON: That's fine. We'll withdraw that, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Next is 06911, implementation agreement.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we give the next number.
13 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2753.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Next is 1D5526, news media report.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: D2754. Thank you.
17 MR. ROBINSON: And finally the last one, 1D5674, information
18 provided to General Rose.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: D2755. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you for your patience, Mr. Hayes.
22 There are several changes in the notification. We had to do this like
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would now like to
2 read the summary of General Hayes's statement in English.
3 [In English] General Vere Hayes is a retired officer of the
4 British Armed Forces. From April to October 1993, he served as Chief of
5 Staff of the United Nations Command for Bosnia and Herzegovina. He held
6 the rank of brigadier.
7 On April the 8th, 1993, just two days after his arrival, he was
8 made aware of an incident in which the Bosnian Serbs discovered
9 ammunition hidden in the truck of one humanitarian organisation, shipment
10 of humanitarian relief which was being transported from Sarajevo airport
11 to Bosnian Muslim-held area of Butmir. I deliberately didn't mention the
12 name of this organisation.
13 A total of 24 boxes of 9. -- 7.9 millimetre ammunition and a
14 similar number of boxes of 12-millimetre ammunition were found hidden
15 between the containers and drop bed of the trailer. This organisation
16 found an additional 24 boxes of 7.9 millimetres and 12-millimetre
17 ammunition hidden in the same place in another trailer at Sarajevo
19 Brigadier Hayes had no information to suggest that UNPROFOR or
20 these other humanitarian organisation personnel were complicit in the
21 smuggling of the ammunition. However, he realized that unfortunate
22 incidents such as this provided the VRS with a reason to be cautious in
23 inspecting humanitarian convoys of this organisation in the future before
24 allowing them to pass.
25 One of the most pressing issues upon his arrive was the fighting
1 in Srebrenica. This was the focus of many meetings and negotiations over
2 the first month of the stay of General Hayes in Bosnia.
3 On April the 17th, 1993, General Hayes attended marathon
4 negotiations at the Sarajevo airport concerning the cessation of
5 hostilities in and around Srebrenica. At approximately 2.00 a.m. on 18th
6 of April, 1993, an agreement for the demilitarisation of Srebrenica was
7 signed. The agreement called for a total cease-fire in the Srebrenica
8 area and deployment of an UNPROFOR company into Srebrenica and the
9 evacuation of seriously wounded and ill persons by air.
10 It was further agreed that the demilitarisation of Srebrenica
11 would be completed within 72 hours of the arrival of the UNPROFOR
12 company. All weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives, and combat
13 supplies, except medicine, inside Srebrenica were to be handed over to
14 the UNPROFOR. No armed persons or units would remain within the city
15 once the demilitarisation process was completed. Neither side was to
16 hinder the freedom of movement and humanitarian aid would continue to be
17 allowed into the city as planned.
18 It was further greed that a working group would be established to
19 work on the -- to work out the detailed implementation of the
20 demilitarisation. Brigadier Hayes was given the task within the UNPROFOR
21 of leading these efforts. One of the details which was left to the
22 working group was to delineate the geographical boundaries of the safe
23 area that was to be demilitarised. This was a major stumbling-block
24 between the parties.
25 At a meeting of -- on 20th of April, 1993, it was finally agreed
1 that despite their different positions on the delineation of the safe
2 area, the city itself would be part of it and would be demilitarised. On
3 20th of April, 1993, Brigadier Hayes wrote out an operational order under
4 which to implement the agreement. He defined the demilitarised area as
5 urban area of Srebrenica itself, as well as the hills immediately
6 overlooking the urban area from which a direct line of sight into the
7 town existed.
8 On 21st of April, 1993, Brigadier Hayes travelled to Srebrenica
9 by helicopter with a delegation of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb
10 representatives. The purpose was to confirm that the demilitarisation
11 had occurred, to agree upon the boundaries of the demilitarised area, and
12 to physically mark the area. When they arrived in Srebrenica, they went
13 in an armoured personnel carrier to the weapons collections -- collection
14 area. When Brigadier Hayes alighted, he encountered Naser Oric, the
15 commander of the BiH forces in Srebrenica. Oric was armed, as were his
16 two bodyguards.
17 Brigadier Hayes talked to Oric for about half an hour and
18 explained the agreement to him. Brigadier Hayes explained to him that if
19 he remained there when the Serbs appeared, the agreement would not be
20 implemented since he was armed in the demilitarised zone. When
21 Brigadier Hayes got the Serbs out of the APC, Oric was gone.
22 The Serb and Muslim representatives inspected the weapons
23 collection area, toured the boundaries of what Brigadier Hayes had
24 proposed as the demilitarised area of the city and the overlooking hills,
25 and went to the PTT building where they signed the notes reflecting the
1 demilitarisation agreement. The agreed-upon boundaries never extended
2 beyond the urban area and the location on the hills immediately
3 overlooking it that gave a direct line of fire into the city.
4 On May 17 -- the 17th, 1993, Brigadier Hayes attended a funeral
5 for civilian victims of a Bosnian Muslim attack on the Serb villages --
6 village of Ratkovici. The bodies of the victims of the July 1992 attack
7 had been exhumed from a mass grave.
8 In early August 1993, the Bosnian government threatened to
9 withdraw from the Geneva peace talks unless the Serbs pulled back from
10 the positions they had taken on Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica around
11 Sarajevo. Dr. Karadzic returned from Geneva to try to resolve this
13 Brigadier Hayes attended a meeting on the 5th of August, 1993, in
14 Pale with the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Dr. Karadzic. This was
15 the first time he met Dr. Karadzic. He found him to be perfectly civil
16 and reasonable.
17 Dr. Karadzic proposed that Serb forces withdraw from
18 Mount Bjelasnica and Mount Igman as demanded by President Izetbegovic as
19 a precondition for rejoining the talks in Geneva. He said that Serb
20 forces would be willing to withdraw so long as UNPROFOR would ensure that
21 the army -- BH Army did not occupy the area vacated by the Serbs.
22 Karadzic accepted General Briquemont's suggestion that UNPROFOR monitor
23 the area after Briquemont explained that UNPROFOR did not have sufficient
24 troops to occupy the area. Dr. Karadzic also proposed opening a route
25 between Zenica and Sarajevo and agreed to General Briquemont's suggestion
1 that the route from Mostar to Sarajevo through Hadzici also be opened.
2 Dr. Karadzic agreed to the establishment of a joint commission to ensure
3 the restoration of utilities and infrastructure in Sarajevo.
4 After the meeting with Dr. Karadzic, the VRS entered into a
5 written agreement to withdraw their forces from Mount Igman and
6 Mount Bjelasnica. Brigadier Hayes participated in negotiations leading
7 to this agreement. The Serbs fully complied with the agreement for the
8 withdrawal of their troops from Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica.
9 That would be the summary.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General Hayes, there's one issue that I would like your
12 assistance in clarifying since you were the author of a map. Can we call
13 up 1D6304. You were behind the initiative to draft the map.
14 A. Yes, I did draft the map, yes.
15 Q. In this document, the map can be found on page 9.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be magnified. Can it be
17 also placed -- can it flipped so that we have it in the north-south
18 direction and we can read the letters. Counterclockwise. Thank you.
19 Perhaps this will be fine.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, can you please explain to the Chamber what this map
23 A. I can. If might be simpler if I was able to draw, draw it
24 diagrammatically. I'm afraid I'm not an artist, but I will do my best.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could you wait until assisted by our usher,
2 THE WITNESS: Certainly, sir. Would it be possible to have a
3 blank screen so I could draw a diagram?
4 JUDGE KWON: Or you can write on it as well. If you'd like to
5 have a blank --
6 THE WITNESS: My thoughts are is it might be easier to understand
7 if I just draw a diagram on a blank screen. I think if I draw on this
8 map we will -- we will not necessarily be able to -- to understand it as
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well, that can be done. Yes.
11 MR. ROBINSON: In the meantime, Mr. President, we wanted to
12 tender this document with the map. So can that be done before we leave
14 JUDGE KWON: We may come back to this document after having heard
15 his explanation because we haven't heard anything about this document
17 THE WITNESS: Is this screen okay?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it should be coming.
19 THE WITNESS: Okay. The difficulty in establishing what would be
20 an agreed safe area was that neither side could come to any compromise
21 about it. And eventually having looked at the proposals of both sides
22 and listened for a considerable length of time to them, I decided myself
23 that if we just do this -- let's put -- north is up there. This is the
24 road from Zvornik. And there is a road that goes out to Zepa at the
25 bottom. I decided that they had both agreed within what they said, that
1 the urban area of Srebrenica itself, no matter what they proposed, was
2 within the agreement. So that's where the town itself was.
3 I further decided that if that was to be a safe area, then it was
4 important that the area that was drawn included certain points - I will
5 symbolise them with triangles, which is a military symbol to signify an
6 observation post - on the high ground that gave direct line of sight into
7 the city. And I then drew the line of the safe area to encompass the
8 buildings of the town itself and these high points. The line of
9 confrontation was out here diagrammatically. So you had the Serbs on one
10 side and the Muslims were inside.
11 This area here was the only area that was a safe area. Between
12 that boundary and the confrontation line was not within the safe area
13 agreement. No armed person was allowed to stay within this area that I
14 have hatched, and no weapons were allowed to be held within that area.
15 But that did not apply to this area between the limit and the
16 confrontation line. I hope I have explained that, sir.
17 JUDGE KWON: So why don't we put some annotation for the future
18 use. Could you --
19 THE WITNESS: Certainly, sir, yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: Could you indicate the urban area with a -- yes.
21 That's --
22 THE WITNESS: Confrontation line.
23 JUDGE KWON: That's the confrontation line, yes.
24 THE WITNESS: I always find it very hard to write on these
25 screens, I'm afraid.
1 JUDGE KWON: That's okay. And the safe area.
2 THE WITNESS: What's happening here?
3 JUDGE KWON: You can delete as well, if necessary. Yes.
4 THE WITNESS: It's not very tidy, I'm afraid.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much. Shall we keep it and give the
6 number for the next Defence exhibit.
7 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2756. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Should a date be placed and
9 General Hayes' initials?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, point's taken. We saved it already. Shall we
11 upload it again, then?
12 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We can note who -- who drew this picture, so
14 it's not necessary. Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at 1D6304
16 again. Can we have page 9 again.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General Hayes, is this an accurate map? Does it depict the town
19 proper, as it were, and the hills overlooking the town?
20 A. As far as I can tell from that, sir, it's the map that we drew,
21 and that will be the one that we signed as part of the agreement, so it
22 would be accurate.
23 Q. Thank you. Was it foreseen that the other safe area, that of
24 Zepa, should be together with this particular area or were they two
25 separate area?
1 A. It was intended that if Zepa was made a safe area, it would be a
2 separate safe area.
3 Q. Thank you. Who controlled the other areas -- or, rather, does
4 this safe area coincide with the boundaries of the municipality of
6 A. No, it does not coincide with the boundaries of the -- of the
7 Srebrenica municipality. I'm not sure who was controlling the areas.
8 All I can say is that between the area that is marked as a safe area and
9 the confrontation lines, on the inside, if you wish, the side nearest the
10 safe area of the confrontation line, would have been in the hands of the
11 BiH, and outside those areas, to the best of my knowledge, would have
12 been controlled by the VRS.
13 Q. Thank you. One more question. What was the situation like when
14 it came to the shelling of the safe area at the time you -- you were
15 there after the signing of the agreement?
16 A. After the agreement had been signed and we had taken both sides'
17 delegations in, we had marked the area on the map, we had marked it on
18 the ground, and we had visited it. To the best of my knowledge, there
19 was no firing, or there was no shell-fire received in that safe area
20 during the rest of my time in Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is, up until the
21 middle of October, 1993.
22 Q. Thank you, General, sir.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into
24 evidence, please?
25 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
1 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.
2 JUDGE KWON: Could we see page 5 of this document. Page 6, next
4 General, do you remember whose handwriting this is?
5 THE WITNESS: I cannot remember the names of it, but they --
6 these were written by the representatives of the two delegations that
7 came in, the BiH representative and the VRS representative.
8 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the next page. Who signed on behalf of
9 behalf UNPROFOR.
10 THE WITNESS: The UNPROFOR representative there is
11 Colonel Geburt, G-e-b-u-r-t. He was the lieutenant-colonel in command of
12 the 2nd Battalion of the Canadians, CanBat 2 is the way to which it was
13 referred. He was the senior officer of the Canadian detachment which was
14 a company-plus strength that went into Srebrenica to oversee the
15 demilitarisation and put observation posts around the safe area.
16 JUDGE KWON: Do you remember who signed for Bosnian Serbs and for
18 THE WITNESS: I can't remember their names, sir, but the names
19 are on the front of that document.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you. We'll admit it.
21 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2757. Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. For the time being I
24 have no further questions for General Hayes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Before you begin, it's better to have a break given
1 the time.
2 Mr. Hayes, we'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 7
3 minutes past 11.00.
4 THE WITNESS: Very good, sir.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.09 a.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. If I could just take a moment
9 to introduce our legal intern who is present with us during this session.
10 Her name is Romina Arnaudova from Bulgaria. Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. If I could just take a
13 moment before Ms. Edgerton commences. With respect to the redactions in
14 the statement of -- that was previously discussed just before we
15 adjourned, the transcript, as I understand it appears to identify
16 paragraphs 2 through 15, although Dr. Karadzic himself had mentioned 2
17 through 16 which appeared to embrace the Focatrans incident. We also
18 noted that that discussion continues in paragraphs 18 through 20. I
19 wanted to bring that to the Court's attention in case the court
20 considered that paragraphs 16 and 18 through 20 also fell within the
21 parameters of the Court's concern.
22 JUDGE KWON: We'll take a look and come back to the issue.
23 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
25 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
1 Q. Good morning, Brigadier Hayes.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. I would generally like to ask you some questions about the
4 conversation that we had the day before yesterday, but before doing that,
5 perhaps you could just confirm to me that your job with UNPROFOR was to
6 be the principal staff officer at BH command headquarters in Kiseljak;
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. So Kiseljak is where you were based and operated from.
10 A. That's correct, yes.
11 Q. And Kiseljak is about 25 kilometres from Sarajevo. Is that
12 correct as well?
13 A. Correct, through three Serb check-points.
14 Q. And to travel into Sarajevo -- or you said yesterday that you
15 travelled into Sarajevo often to the airport -- pardon me, the day before
16 yesterday, to the airport for negotiations, occasionally to the PTT
17 building or the residency, but that you weren't in the city of Sarajevo
18 proper - those were the words we used - very often.
19 A. That's correct. I travelled in to see the commander in the
20 forward headquarters, to see the French commander of Sector Sarajevo in
21 the PTT building but mainly to the airport for negotiations and Mixed
22 Military Working Group meetings.
23 Q. And keeping that in mind, I asked you the day before yesterday
24 about your impressions of Sarajevo, and you told me a few things, and I'd
25 like to run through those to see if I've understood your impressions
1 correctly. Among other things, you said that you had the feeling that
2 normality had broken down a bit. Is that so?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. And that was, among other things, because you saw a lot of dogs
5 running around and they were eating dead dogs.
6 A. That's one incident that particularly stuck in my mind.
7 Q. You also mentioned seeing lots of devastation and damaged
9 A. That's correct, yeah.
10 Q. You noted that people would not go out very often.
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And you recalled having seen barricades of containers, cars, and
13 other things at exposed areas and intersections. Is that also correct?
14 A. That's correct. Mainly on the eastern side as we drove in from
15 the south going north towards the residency. They were beyond the
16 eastern side.
17 Q. In the context of a discussion about the airport crossings and
18 how they were, in your view, a function of the desperation of people in
19 Sarajevo, you also talked about it being difficult for people to get food
20 and ordinary commodities and noted that they didn't want to go out
21 because of the dangers. Do I have that right?
22 A. Yes. People did cross the airport out of -- or attempt to cross
23 the airport out of desperation to leave Sarajevo, although it was -- any
24 movement across the airfield was banned, as I understood it, in the
25 agreement that had been drawn up between the United Nations and the Serbs
1 for the use of the airport, but, yes, people did attempt to move out.
2 And the normal commodities that you would expect in a city were in short
3 supply, including water.
4 Q. I asked you the day before yesterday whether and what kind of a
5 briefing you had received on the situation in Sarajevo on assuming your
6 duties, and you advised that there was almost no time for a real
7 hand-over from your predecessor because of the situation in Srebrenica at
8 that time. Correct?
9 A. That's correct. I was required to move to assume the post of
10 Chief of Staff a week earlier than was expected because my predecessor
11 left to go to Vicenza, and so we didn't have a hand-over at the time that
12 I was actually assuming the appointment. We had meet before for a short
13 period, but again with so much going on, there was little time for much
15 Q. And, in fact, you said the day before yesterday that the shelling
16 of Sarajevo was not at that point at the top of the agenda because of the
17 situation in Srebrenica. It was, if you like, a fact of life. Do you
18 recall that?
19 A. Certainly the situation in Sarajevo was not something that I was
20 dealing with at that time, although my first meeting with
21 President Izetbegovic was to discuss the possibility, amongst other
22 things, of getting the sewage system repaired. So it was not completely
23 forgotten about, but the situation in Srebrenica was the more important
24 one to try to resolve at that time.
25 Q. All right. Now, just moving on to the incident referred to in
1 paragraphs 5 to 8 of your statement on April 8, 1993, involving the
2 discovery of ammunition in an aid shipment at Butmir. You had no
3 personal involvement in that matter, did you?
4 A. No. I was notified of it, but it depends what you mean by no
5 personal involvement.
6 Q. Were you called to go on scene? Were you involved in any
7 investigation of the incident?
8 A. No. I was involved in no investigation of the incident, and I
9 was not called to go and look at what had occurred.
10 Q. So your involvement or knowledge of the incident was limited to
11 your being notified?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Now, in regard to that incident you said at paragraph 8 of your
14 statement that you realised that unfortunate incidents such as this
15 provided the VRS with reason to be cautious in expecting convoys in the
16 future before allowing them to pass.
17 Now, we also talked about this the day before yesterday, and
18 perhaps I could tell you what I understood you to be saying in regard to
19 that passage, and tell me if I've understood you correctly. You explain
20 that we should take this to mean that you could understand why the Serbs
21 became quite difficult at check-points, but while you could understand
22 it, it doesn't necessarily excuse the fact that Serb forces would hold
23 convoys for up to three days?
24 A. That's correct. I can fully understand why they became
25 difficult. There was paranoia that UNPROFOR was not acting in a way that
1 they expected or anticipated. They believed that we would smuggle in
2 ammunition to Sarajevo and to other Muslim enclaves, and they also
3 believed that humanitarian aid organisations would do the same. And so
4 an incident such as this was -- was grist to that particular mill. So
5 that was a bit of a complicated explanation. It was -- it fed their
6 paranoia, I'm afraid, but just it didn't -- it did not justify holding
7 convoys for three days, but then quite often that was because of the
8 arguments that occurred between the convoy commander demanding freedom of
9 movement and the Serb check-points insisting that they inspected it. So
10 there was an immediate clash which often took a long time to resolve and
11 perhaps somebody else like a United Nations military observer would have
12 to go along to try to mediate.
13 Q. And just in regard to this incident before we leave it
14 altogether, it's correct, isn't it, that UNPROFOR never established --
15 was never able to establish how that ammunition was placed in that
17 A. To the best of my knowledge, that's correct. I was not involved
18 in any further investigation, and I cannot remember anything coming
19 across my desk in relation to it apart from that piece of paper that you
20 already have seen.
21 Q. And were you aware that -- no. Actually, I'll move on.
22 Moving on in time in terms of the chronology of events you
23 discussed in your statement to 11 April 1993, can you confirm that
24 Srebrenica was shelled on that day?
25 A. I can't confirm it. I mean, I can look in my -- in my diary if
1 that's permissible.
2 JUDGE KWON: By all means.
3 THE WITNESS: Srebrenica was being -- was being shelled, and it
4 was one of the main reasons why it was at the top of the list of
6 MS. EDGERTON:
7 Q. And this diary you're looking at, is that a contemporaneous diary
8 you recorded during your tour?
9 A. It is. It's one that I kept for my own purposes. It's not very
10 comprehensive, I'm afraid. I think the only thing I can say about it,
11 from my diary, is to say that there is an entry which says that the
12 parties agreed to attend if there was no more shelling. I must take that
13 to mean that General Halilovic agreed to attend if there was no more
14 shelling. From that, I have to conclude that there may have been
15 shelling on that day. Certainly one incident of shelling in which some
16 children were, sadly, killed gave rise to a press report of body parts
17 being found on the wire being surrounding the area where I think they had
18 been playing. I think it was a school. That was the catalyst, really,
19 for getting the situation in Srebrenica up to the top of the agenda.
20 Q. Now, this incident that you've just discussed, did that incident
21 to your recollection take place on the 12th of April?
22 A. I can't remember. I'm sorry.
23 Q. All right. Perhaps I could show you something that might help
24 your recollection. 65 ter number 13346. It's a letter from the UNPROFOR
25 Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Wahlgren, to Dr. Karadzic on the
1 situation in Srebrenica, dated 12 April 1993.
2 A. I see it, yeah. There's an information copy that has gone to
3 myself in Bosnia-Herzegovina command, main headquarters in Kiseljak. So
4 I will have seen that, though I cannot recollect it at the moment.
5 Q. Could we go over, if you've had a chance to look at this first
6 page, to the second page of this document. And perhaps we could magnify
7 it a bit.
8 Now, this letter from General Wahlgren to Dr. Karadzic refers to,
9 at paragraph A, the latest casualty estimate in Srebrenica being 35 dead
10 and 68 wounded, but those are only the ones that have approached the
11 hospital. And at paragraph B, this quotes a report from his people in
12 Srebrenica. Paragraph B notes that the report says:
13 "I have personally seen and counted 14 dead, including 7 bodies
14 on the road in front of the schoolhouse used as a refugee centre where it
15 appears most casualties occurred. Two of the seven bodies I saw in front
16 of the hospital were children, and one has been -- or one was
18 Does this sound like the incident you just referred to,
20 A. Yes, it does. In paragraph A, though, the latest casualty
21 estimate in Srebrenica will refer, in my opinion, to the number of
22 casualties over a period, and not the number of casualties necessarily
23 that will have occurred as a result of any shelling on the 11th.
24 Similarly in paragraph B where -- it would be a United Nations
25 military observer who is submitting this report, I think. In paragraph B
1 he says:
2 "I personally have seen and counted 14 dead, including 7
3 bodies ..."
4 Again, that does not mean, in my opinion, that that is the result
5 of shelling on the 11th. I think those are figures of shelling over a
6 number of days rather than on a particular day. I suspect that the last
7 sentence in paragraph B is the incident to which I -- to which I'm
8 referring where he sees -- he reports bodies in front of the hospital
9 being children.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Could we have this as a Prosecution
11 Exhibit, please, Your Honours.
12 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.
14 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit P6077. Thank you.
15 MS. EDGERTON:
16 Q. Now, could we just have still on the subject of the 12th of
17 April, 1993, a look at 65 ter number 24415, which is a BH command
18 Kiseljak, and I say this by its cover sheet, a BH command Kiseljak G3
19 operations report on the same meeting you refer to in paragraph 10 of
20 your statement?
21 And before we go further into the document, maybe you want to
22 just have a look at paragraph 10 to refresh your memory. And we can
23 certainly collapse the B/C/S version of this document.
24 A. Okay. I have read that, and in my diary there is -- I would take
25 from my diary that I did not attend that meeting. I went to the airport
1 but then moved on to do some other work elsewhere.
2 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, G3 main Kiseljak -- G3 BH command
3 main Kiseljak would have come under your command. Is that the case?
4 A. Sorry, G3 plans.
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. Yes. G3 plans was a staff branch which was under my command.
7 Q. So this is a report. Can we -- can we take from this and as well
8 from the hand-written notations at the bottom left-hand corner of the
9 cover sheet where we see, among other things, COS, that this is a report
10 that would have come across your desk?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, if we can go to -- slowly through the
13 document --
14 A. Is it possible to see what that report says? I may -- what the
15 rest of that -- I've only seen the cover sheet so far.
16 Q. Absolutely. I've just asked for us to go slowly through that
17 document to give you an opportunity.
18 A. Sorry. I thought you were referring to a different document.
19 Q. No, no, not at all. And when you've had a chance to skim this,
20 please let us know so that we can move on to the next page.
21 A. Yes, I've read that. All right. I've read that page. Yeah,
22 read. Read.
23 Q. And there should be one more page -- oh, pardon me. There should
24 be one more page of relevance with the attendees at this meeting,
25 General Wahlgren, Mr. Thornberry, General Morillon, Mr. Mendiluce,
1 Ms. Boyd, General Mladic, General Gvero, General Tolimir, and
2 Major Indic.
3 Now that you've had a look at this, Brigadier, I wonder if we can
4 go back to page 3 of this document at paragraph 6.
5 Now, in paragraph 6, we see about halfway through that first main
6 paragraph General Mladic say, among other things:
7 "The complete truth was that Srebrenica was not attacked and that
8 it was completely quiet in the area."
9 Which actually quite sharply contrasts with the information you
10 had and the reports we've just seen about shelling in Srebrenica on the
11 11th and 12th of April, doesn't it?
12 A. Did we have a report of shelling on the 12th of April? I thought
13 it was on the 11th.
14 Q. That was the document we just finished, and I refer to the
15 document that we just finished discussing, which was the letter of
16 protest from General Wahlgren to Dr. Karadzic.
17 A. Was that dated the 12th? Sorry, we'll just go back to it. There
18 are sometimes a problem between the date of the document as its
19 transmitted and the information that it is actually containing as a
20 report. I apologise if I missed it.
21 Q. Oh, not at all. P6077 was the number. Formerly 65 ter -- you
22 have it. Thank you very much. You see the cover page of the document --
23 A. I do.
24 Q. -- is date --
25 A. Yup, it's dated the 12th of April.
1 Q. Thank you. And if you go to the next page of the report itself,
2 I note that --
3 A. Yeah. I suspect that this is a report that has come from a
4 United Nations military observer on the 11th and has been forwarded by
5 the force commander on the 12th. So I suspect that that -- what he's
6 reporting there is what happened on the 11th, and things -- it was always
7 very difficult, but I suspect that what General Mladic is saying on the
8 12th is that it's quiet now. He would pick his words very carefully.
9 Sometimes things were lost in translation, but I believe he would be --
10 he was saying it's quiet on the 12th. And looking at that, I would -- I
11 would think that it is reporting shelling on the 11th, not on the 12th.
12 Though I can't do more than say that's my interpretation of it.
13 Q. Thank you. I'll move on then. Now, I would actually like to go
14 in your statement all the way over to paragraph 41 and the associated
15 news article you refer to in this paragraph which you commented on, and
16 in this news article, which is dated 4 August 1993, you're reported as
18 "There is still a military siege, but there has never been a
19 humanitarian strangulation --"
20 JUDGE KWON: Shall we upload that document. Exhibit D2754.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, pardon me, yes, of course.
22 JUDGE KWON: 2754. Exhibit D2754. Or 1D5526.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
24 Q. Now, you're reported as saying:
25 "There's still a military siege, but there has never been a
1 humanitarian strangulation of Sarajevo."
2 Now, in that regard I actually wanted to ask you whether you can
3 confirm that we discussed this remark the day before yesterday, and you
4 indicated you would like to actually temporarily limit your remark to
5 your period of service in BiH and no time before or after that. Do I
6 have that correct?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Now, during our meeting, you also said that aid came into
9 Sarajevo via the Kiseljak route and the air-lift.
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And at the end of July, beginning of August 1993, you said that
12 aid to Sarajevo was actually blocked by fighting in central Bosnia and
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Now, I'd like to turn to 65 ter number 01227, which is the third
16 periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the
17 former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Mazowiecki, who was the Special
18 Rapporteur of the commission of human rights -- on human rights, and it's
19 dated 26 August 1993. And he reports on the situation in terms of
20 humanitarian aid in the area at that time. If we could go over to
21 paragraph 14 on page 3 under the heading "Blocking of Humanitarian Aid."
22 Now, in that paragraph he says -- he refers to 430.000 people are
23 estimated as being dependent on food aid in Sarajevo and its surrounding
24 areas and says that the main supplier is the United Nations high
25 commission for humanitarian -- or pardon me, for refugees, UNHCR. And if
1 we could go over to the next page, paragraph 15, he reads -- he states --
2 reports that convoys, UNHCR convoys which provide food and fuel for
3 Muslims, Croats, and Serbs alike in Sarajevo have been obstructed or
4 attacked by Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat forces, and sometimes also by
5 government forces. He refers to a July -- July 1st, 1993, incident where
6 Bosnian Serb authorities introduce taxes on all aid convoys crossing
7 their territory, stopping deliveries for five days, until which point
8 UNHCR was declared exempt. He refers to a 12-day delay on the 10th of
9 July when Bosnian Croat authorities refused to issue aid convoys with
10 permits to enter territory under their control, and also in paragraph 16,
11 talks about recent attacks on convoys. In July 1993, he says nine UNHCR
12 fuel trucks were blocked at Blazuj, which is outside Sarajevo, by over
13 100 heavily armed Bosnian Serb soldiers with a tank and other armoured
14 vehicles, and the fuel from four trucks was confiscated before the convoy
15 was allowed to pass ten hours later.
16 He also refers to a UN aeroplane involved in relief flights
17 having been hit six times since 21 July by fire from positions held by
18 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Now, looking at this, it seems that Mr. Mazowiecki's report
20 paints a situation somewhat more dire than your remarks on the 4th of
21 August, 1993, suggests, doesn't is?
22 A. What I said has to be taken in the context of what was happening
23 at that time. When those remarks were made, the Geneva peace conference
24 was underway, and it was in danger of stalling because of the fighting up
25 on Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica, and because of this depiction of a
1 siege of Sarajevo.
2 I discussed what was actually happening at that time with
3 Mr. Thornberry, and the problem, as is indicated in paragraph 14 of this,
4 was a fuel convoy. At that particular time, the main problem for
5 Sarajevo was getting in sufficient fuel, and the fuel convoy was being
6 blocked in Central Bosnia by the fighting between the Muslims and the
7 Croats. That is what was stopping the aid coming up through
8 Central Bosnia into Sarajevo. The air-lift was continuing, and my
9 remarks were focused on that in particular. Certainly there was
10 difficulty getting aid into Sarajevo, but it did continue to come in, and
11 it fed. It fed the citizens of Sarajevo of all three ethnic types, and
12 understandably it also fed the government forces, the BiH, who were in
13 there, as you would expect, because there was -- there was no other
14 source of food apart from the black market. I hope that puts it into
15 context for you.
16 Q. Yes. Thank you very much.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honours.
18 Thank you very much, Brigadier, I have nothing further.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
21 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have re-examination?
22 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
23 Q. Sir, you were shown a letter that General Wahlgren sent to me.
24 Do you know what my position was as regards Srebrenica after the 12th of
25 April until the 8th of May when the agreement on demilitarisation was
2 A. I'm not quite certain I understand the question, sir. Are you
3 talking about the -- referring to your attitude as to what should happen
4 as regards the fighting around Srebrenica?
5 Q. Yes. Do you remember? Do you know how operations around
6 Srebrenica were aborted, how they were stopped?
7 A. I understand from looking at that message that you sent that you
8 directed your forces under commander General Mladic to cease operations
9 there. I don't recall seeing it at the time, but I do understand from
10 seeing that particular message that you gave the orders for
11 General Mladic to cease operations there.
12 Q. Thank you. Taking into account what you know about Srebrenica,
13 about Igman and Bjelasnica, what was your experience in addressing me as
14 regards military matters? How did I react to the United Nations'
15 requests? Were my responses positive or negative to those requests?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton. Before you against, General.
17 MS. EDGERTON: I wonder if this is actually a matter that was
18 raise the in cross-examination, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE KWON: Will you move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Well, in that case I
21 don't have any more questions. All that remains for me to do is thank
22 the general for his testimony.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Unless my colleagues have a question for
24 you, Mr. Hatchett, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the
25 Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
3 JUDGE KWON: Now you're free to go.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
5 MS. EDGERTON: And just a slip of the tongue, Your Honour. This
6 is Mr. Brigadier Hayes, not Mr. Hatchett.
7 JUDGE KWON: My apology, Mr. Hayes. My apologies. We are
8 hearing so many witnesses.
9 THE WITNESS: Not a problem, sir.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, the next witness is a protected
12 witness and will require some protective measures as well as some other
13 persons to enter the Chamber, so it may be wise to take a short break to
14 accomplish that.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll do so. You may leave, Mr. Hayes.
16 [The witness withdrew]
17 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will now issue two oral rulings, first
18 on the admission of MFI P6072, a press report dated 27th of December,
19 1994, which was used by the Prosecution on the 15th of January, 2013,
20 during the cross-examination of Witness Milosav Gagovic.
21 The Chamber reiterates its consistent practice that any third
22 party statement not prepared for the purpose of criminal proceedings may
23 only be admitted if they are commented upon, confirmed, or adopted by the
24 witness on the stand. In relation to MFI P6072, Gagovic testified that
25 the portion of the article read to him "refers to that same event," as
1 that referred to in an earlier part of his testimony. The Chamber is
2 therefore satisfied that, contrary to the circumstances surrounding
3 65 ter 45111C which admission was denied on 5th December and confirmed on
4 the 11th of December 2012. In this instance, Gagovic has sufficiently
5 commented on those portions of MFI P6072 which were read out to him on
6 the 15th of January, 2013, for the purpose of admission. The Chamber
7 shall therefore admit it into evidence the three paragraphs of MFI P6072,
8 starting with the questions: "How did you arm the people? You did that
9 right in front of the enemy, under sniper rifle? And it was probably
10 Gagovic." The remainder of MFI P6072 shall not be admitted into
12 Next, the Chamber will issue an oral ruling on the accused's
13 request for presence of counsel to Witness Dragomir Milosevic, filed on
14 the 15th of January, 2013. In the motion, the accused notes that the
15 witness is scheduled to commence his testimony in these proceedings on
16 the 22nd of January, 2013, that the registrar has assigned an attorney to
17 him in connection with this testimony, and that the witness would wish to
18 have his attorney present in court during his testimony. On the 15th of
19 January, 2013, the Office of the Prosecutor stated that it did not wish
20 to respond to the request. The Chamber has no issue with the witness's
21 attorney, Mr. Stephane Bourgon, being present during the witness
22 testimony and therefore grants the request.
23 On a similar issue on the motion for modification of order for
24 the temporary transfer of General Galic filed on the 14th of January,
25 2013, the accused states that the dates of Mr. Galic's transfer to the
1 UNDU should be postponed due to the scheduling of conflicts of
2 Mr. Galic's attorney. The motion states that Mr. Galic's attorney is to
3 be present during his proofing and testimony.
4 So therefore, Mr. Robinson, could you confirm that this is in
5 fact a request that Mr. Galic's attorney be present in court?
6 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE KWON: And I take it there's no position from the
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber grants the request.
11 And unless there's a problem from the parties, on the part of the
12 parties, the Chamber is minded to have an hour break today and adjourn at
13 3.00 instead of 2.45. Would there be any problem?
14 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
15 MS. EDGERTON: None.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Would five minutes be sufficient for the
17 change of setting?
18 MR. ROBINSON: I believe so, yes.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. The Chamber will rise for five minutes.
20 --- Break taken at 11.55 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.05 p.m.
22 [The witness entered court]
23 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness take the solemn declaration.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
25 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 WITNESS: KW571
4 [Witness answered through interpreter]
5 JUDGE KWON: I take it you understand you are referred to as
6 KW571 instead of your real name.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
8 JUDGE KWON: Your face and your voice will not be heard or be
9 seen by the public. Do you also understand that?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do indeed. Thank you very
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
13 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness KW571.
15 A. Good afternoon.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up
17 1D7011 [as interpreted] in e-court, and it shouldn't be broadcast.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
20 Q. Witness, could you please take a look the document in front of
21 you and tell us whether this is indeed your name on it?
22 A. Yes, that is my name.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [no interpretation].
24 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it under seal.
25 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2758, admitted
1 under seal. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Witness, we sent a questionnaire by the Defence team, and did you
5 answer the questions in it?
6 A. Yes, I did, sir.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D05914,
8 also not to be broadcast.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Is this the first page as the cover page of your answers to the
11 questionnaire that was sent to you? We have it both in French and in
13 A. Yes. That is indeed the document I received.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could the Chamber move into private
16 session briefly.
17 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Can pages 2 and 3 of the document be shown, please.
15 JUDGE KWON: Not broadcasting.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Is that page 1 of the answers to the questions?
19 A. Yes, indeed.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show page 2 for the witness,
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Is that the second page of your answers?
24 A. Yes, this is page number 2, indeed.
25 Q. Thank you. If I were to put these same questions to you now,
1 would your answers be the same as the ones provided here in the document?
2 A. Yes, sir. My answers would be the same.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender the document into
5 evidence under seal?
6 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?
7 MS. EDGERTON: No.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit it.
9 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2759 under seal.
10 Thank you.
11 Page 32006 redacted.
7 JUDGE KWON: French translation seems to be overlapped with
8 English, but could you repeat, Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: I actually don't get any French translation on my
10 microphone, so I'm glad to have had the opportunity to raise that.
11 I would like to ask for private session to raise the point I'd
12 like to make if I may, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Could the Chamber move into private session.
14 [Private session]
11 Pages 32008-32010 redacted. Private session.
7 [Open session]
8 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours. Thank
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 As you have noted, Mr. Witness, Mr. Karadzic has completed his
12 examination-in-chief, and your evidence was in most part admitted into
13 evidence in writing. Now you'll be further asked by the representative
14 of the Office of the Prosecutor in its cross-examination.
15 Yes, Ms. Edgerton. Do you have any questions?
16 MS. EDGERTON: I will, Your Honours, but I recall Your Honours'
17 scheduling for today, and I wonder if --
18 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.
19 MS. EDGERTON: -- this is the time you had marked for the break
20 or I'm in Your Honours' hands.
21 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for one hour and resume at
23 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
1 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours. If I may, I think I
2 would like to begin the cross-examination in private session for the
3 reasons I indicated earlier for a very brief period of time.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 [Private session]
11 Pages 32013-32014 redacted. Private session.
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours. Thank you.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
8 Q. Now, in -- Mr. Witness, in your written evidence, in your answer
9 to questions 5 and 6, still on translation issues, you used the term
10 "entonnoir." Did you use that term to describe the mortar's crater?
11 A. Indeed. The word "entonnoir" is used in the military jargon in
12 French because it's the shape that is formed by the shell. But indeed
13 from a generic point of view, this means the crater itself.
14 Q. And in your answers to question 8 and 9 in the same document, you
15 refer to something called "puits de fusee." Is this a term used to
16 describe the tunnel created by the mortar's fuse, the fuse tunnel?
17 A. The fuse tunnel is not created by the shell but by the fuse
18 itself from the projectile, which when exploding moves ahead of the rest
19 and is going to create a tunnel. This is why it's called a fuse tunnel
20 or a detonator tunnel.
21 Q. And is that what you mean to describe when you use the term
22 "puits de fusee"?
23 A. Yes, Madam Prosecutor, indeed.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, your training with your national forces was
25 within the Engineers Unit and focused on the safe extraction and disposal
1 of unexploded ordnances; correct?
2 A. Indeed, yes.
3 Q. And, in fact, although you continue to work in that field, you
4 don't claim to have any ballistics expertise or specialisation in the
5 area of ballistics. You're not here as a ballistics expert; correct?
6 A. No, not as an expert in ballistics.
7 Q. Now, the training you had -- oh, pardon me?
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. President, I didn't object. It was a
9 compound question there, and I'm not sure that the answer actually was
10 complete, so I was wondering if maybe she can rephrase that or break it
12 JUDGE KWON: We can continue.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Fine. Thank you.
14 Q. In terms of your training with your national forces, crater
15 analysis was actually not a part of that programme, was it?
16 A. At the time in question, no.
17 Q. And you were only concerned with the soil or terrain in which an
18 ordnance was located to the extent it affected your main mission, the
19 safe removal of ordnances. Isn't that so?
20 A. Yes, indeed. The objective was to remove safely the areas by
21 removing unexploded ordnance.
22 Q. And the first time you were involved in crater analysis training
23 was when you joined UNPROFOR and arrived in the former Yugoslavia?
24 A. Yes, indeed, Madam Prosecutor.
25 Q. And how long was that training?
1 A. Two days. One to two days.
2 Q. And the crater analysis that you carried out at the market-place
3 in Sarajevo was your first and only official investigation of that type
4 during your tour; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. Just one more question about your written evidence. In your
7 answers to questions 5 and 6, you discuss generally about how tail fins
8 are embedded in craters, and I wonder if I could ask you have you also
9 seen situations where mortar tail fins are not located embedded in the
10 craters, they're found elsewhere?
11 A. During our tour, indeed we found other mortar craters where tail
12 fins were embedded, but we also found other craters without any tail
13 fins. Now, given that the areas were not very safe, we did not go beyond
14 the crater to see whether we would find tail fins and check that it did
15 correspond to mortar shells.
16 Q. Now, specific to the investigation in question, I just want to
17 ask you about your methodology on one area only. That's the methodology
18 you used in determining the direction of fire. Was that methodology
19 something you learned in the two-day training programme you underwent?
20 A. Yes, indeed. This is a methodology that was taught and showed to
21 us by the person in charge of training and during the two days and that
22 we attended this course.
23 Q. In terms of the crater itself, if it had been caused by a device,
24 a static -- that generated a static explosion, how would that crater have
25 been different in shape from the crater you saw?
1 A. If we are dealing with a static explosion device, in fact, if
2 there is fragmentation that is linked to the explosive, it will be spread
3 in the uniform manner around the load that's on the ground. On top of it
4 on the ground you will have traces of powder of explosive that are going
5 to blacken the area around the impact, whereas in fact on -- as far as
6 this crater is concerned, the shape of it leads us to believe that the
7 shell came following a curve, and therefore the projection was regular
8 all around the shell that hit the ground. So the projection is regular
9 and does not match what would look -- what it would look like if it was a
10 static explosion, because, in other words, we would find the shape of the
11 mortar if this mortar had been just placed on the ground, which was not
12 the case here.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Now. I think you've answered all my questions.
14 Nothing further, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well, Ms. Edgerton.
16 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just two brief questions.
18 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
19 Q. [Interpretation] Witness, you have been asked whether this was
20 your first and last crater analysis. Have you received any official
21 rejection of your analysis? Did any of your superiors dispute it?
22 A. No, not as far as I know.
23 Q. Thank you. You were also asked about the appearance of the
24 crater. I should like to know when there is enough time and opportunity
25 to drive the stabiliser into the ground with a hammer?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps Dr. Karadzic could rephrase.
3 JUDGE KWON: Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Could you distinguish between a stabiliser that followed a fuse
7 after an explosion and a stabiliser that was driven into the ground by a
9 MS. EDGERTON: I -- pardon me. I don't think that arises from
10 cross-examination, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: Agreed. I agree, Ms. Edgerton.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Witness, is of any relevance to the -- the extraction of the
14 stabiliser and the trimming of the crater, is it of any relevance if we
15 want to establish the facts?
16 JUDGE KWON: Again. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Different question, but completely outside of the
18 cross-examination, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: It's difficult to see how it arises from
20 Ms. Edgerton's cross-examination.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Esteemed Ms. Edgerton asked about
22 the crater and its appearance, when a shell explodes on the ground as
23 opposed to a shell that landed. I'm asking whether the same effect may
24 be achieved by different means. Can it appear to be the same? If you do
25 not allow this question, no problem.
1 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure she raised that. I think she referred
2 to static explosion. If you could assist me, Ms. Edgerton.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Pardon me. Yes, I'm just trying to locate it
4 quickly in the transcript. My question was:
5 "In terms of the crater itself, if it had been caused by a
6 device, a static -- that generated a static explosion, how would that
7 crater been different in shape from the crater you saw?"
8 JUDGE KWON: It's different from hammering the crater into the
9 ground. Please move on, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I wanted to express my
11 gratitude to the witness for coming here to testify.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 Then, Mr. Witness, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of
14 this Chamber I thank you for coming to The Hague to give it. Now you're
15 free to go.
16 But just one matter, Mr. Robinson, before Mr. Witness goes away.
17 The Chamber is still seized of your motion to subpoena this witness. I
18 take it that's now moot and you are ready to withdraw it.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We withdraw it and thank the
20 witness and the state for their co-operation.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Shall we draw the curtain so that the
22 witness can be excused.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE KWON: I take it the next witness is also a protected one.
1 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President. And there's also a
2 representative to accompany this witness.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I've been negligent once again to
5 identify our intern who is present in court during this session, and I
6 saw you looking at me, but I was wondering what I did wrong. I forgot to
7 worry about the intern. So anyway, we're pleased to have Claire Markwell
8 from Durham university who is part of our team and she's joined us during
9 this session.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Ms. West will be taking my chair, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for the next witness, the
13 Chamber will give its ruling about Mr. Pljevaljcic's statement.
14 In relation to the statement of Trifko Pljevaljcic, the Chamber
15 held earlier today that paragraphs 2 to 15 be redacted from his
16 statement. The Prosecution then submitted that paragraphs 16 as well as
17 18 to 20 also fell within the parameters of the Chamber's order. The
18 Chamber has further reviewed Pljevaljcic's statement in light of the
19 Prosecution's submissions.
20 The Chamber first notes that the English translation of the
21 paragraphs added after the proofing session is poor and at times
22 incomprehensible. The Chamber considers that paragraphs 18 to 20,
23 indeed, refer to the pre-war Focatrans incident in relation to which the
24 accused, as himself stated, that too much importance has been given and
25 which should therefore be redacted from the statement in line with the
1 Chamber's earlier order.
2 Paragraph 16, however, mostly relates to April 1992 and does not
3 fall within the purview of the Chamber's order.
4 In light of the fact that only five short paragraphs would remain
5 in Pljevaljcic's statement after redaction, i.e., paragraphs 1, 16, 17,
6 21, and 22, and that the English translation of the newly added
7 paragraphs is problematic, the Chamber considers it in the interests of
8 justice that the witness be led live and only on those issues which are
9 relevant to this issue -- to this case.
10 As stated earlier this morning, should the accused wish to ask a
11 question as to the Focatrans incident, the Chamber will decide at the
12 appropriate time whether the question can be posed upon hearing the
13 objection from the Prosecution.
14 You can bring in the next witness. Good afternoon, Ms. West.
15 MS. WEST: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Good afternoon Your
16 Honours and everyone in and around the courtroom. There is one brief
17 matter to address. We can do it in the presence of the witness and his
18 lawyers. It regards paragraph 30 of the statement.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was wondering if we could do that in public
23 session, but I'm now assured we can, Ms. West.
24 [The witness entered court]
25 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness take the solemn declaration,
2 MS. WEST: My apologies for interrupting.
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
5 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, sir. Please be seated and make yourself
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
9 WITNESS: KW554
10 JUDGE KWON: I see three members of the representative from
12 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
13 JUDGE KWON: Two members. Welcome Mr. Fox and Ms. Soliman.
14 Yes, Ms. West, before we hear the evidence of the witness.
15 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. If I can direct your
16 attention to paragraph 30 of the statement, and in paragraph 30 the
17 witness indicates an activity that he was involved in once he returned
18 from Bosnia on his first tour in July 1995 and before he returned back to
19 the region in December of 1995. During that period of time, he tells us
20 that he reviewed what he describes as highly classified intelligence
21 information concerning the events in Srebrenica. He says that he was
22 seeking to determine if there was any information that the accused had
23 been involved or informed about the executions that had taken place after
24 the fall of Srebrenica. He then tells us that he found no such
25 information, and he found it significant because given the level of
1 information he reviewed, had the accused been involved or been informed
2 of the execution, this witness would have expected it to be reflected in
3 those materials.
4 Mr. President, we asked Defence counsel whether they themselves
5 had access to those materials or had seen those materials, and they
6 informed us -- we asked on January 7th. They informed us on the same
7 date that they did not have the material referred to in paragraph 30, nor
8 had they seen it. On this same day, we asked the Canadian government
9 whether we could see that material as well, and on January 9th, we were
10 advised the witness did not have the material referred to in paragraph 30
11 and that he was drawing on his memory. They also advised that if we
12 wanted to see the material, we would have to make a formal request for
13 it, but they noted that doing so would take some time to process.
14 That was on January 9th. We declined to start that process,
15 quite candidly, Mr. President, because understanding how much time it
16 would actually take would only delay this witness. And further, if this
17 material indeed was highly classified information, the possibility of
18 actually ever receiving that material, I suspect, would be rather low.
19 However, we are now still left with this paragraph, and I now would ask
20 for the paragraph to be excluded from the statement, and my reason is
21 that it is the Prosecution's position that it would be unfair to allow
22 the admission of this paragraph as we wouldn't have any ability to fairly
23 or thoroughly cross-examine exactly what this witness relied upon when he
24 made this very significant statement.
25 Secondly, this would be particularly difficult considering that
1 we understand that the witness referred -- or reviewed this material in
2 the fall of 1995, which would have been at a time when the witness hadn't
3 been given any advantage or perspective that we now have because of the
4 passage of time, and even if he had seen a document that would have
5 connected the accused to the events, he may not have been aware of it
6 because he was so close to the events. And it's for those reasons that I
7 would ask that paragraph 30 be excluded.
8 JUDGE KWON: Could you expand a bit further as to the point that
9 this paragraph should be deleted instead of going to a matter of weight
10 at the end of the day?
11 MS. WEST: Your Honour, I'm fully confident that the Court could
12 make that appropriate consideration, but the significance of the
13 statement he makes in this paragraph is quite bold, and without the
14 materials that he's reviewed, I am at a loss as how to handle any
15 cross-examination regarding it, and it's for those reasons that I'd ask
16 that you exclude it.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 Can I hear from you, Mr. Robinson.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Besides the issue of weight
20 which we feel is quite correct, the Prosecution has had this statement
21 since September 2012 and could have easily made inquiries, requests for
22 binding orders, if necessary, and would likely have been successful in at
23 least having the material identified and if -- if such material was
24 identified, you could be in a position to decide whether or not to
25 disclose it to them. But to raise it on the day of the cross-examination
1 I don't think warrants the remedy of exclusion. So you can give it
2 whatever weight you wish. They can cross-examine to the extent that they
3 can, and even after this testimony, if they still wanted to make a
4 binding order request, they can do that, and if it's necessary, we can
5 have the witness back.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I add something from my
7 amateurish position or layman's position. On several occasions we heard
8 hearsay evidence from the evidence. This is much more reliable than any
9 hearsay. We did not insist on them bringing the source of the hearsay to
10 this courtroom. We accepted what they presented to us.
11 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to add anything, Ms. West?
12 MS. WEST: No thank you.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: Ms. West, the Chamber is of the view that all this
15 goes to the issue of weight, so we will not exclude the paragraph at the
17 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7101 in
22 e-court, and the document shouldn't be broadcast.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Witness, what you see in front of you on the screen next to the
25 number KW554, do you see your name and your date of birth, and are both
2 A. Yes, I do, and they are both correct.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender
4 this document into evidence under seal.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: It shall be assigned Exhibit D2760 and it's under
7 seal. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up
9 another document which shouldn't be broadcast, although it might be, as a
10 matter of fact. 1D06001. If you believe that it may be broadcast, we
11 would not object to that.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, the last page with the signature
13 shouldn't be broadcast.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Witness, did you provide a statement to my Defence team?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. Thank you. Would that be the statement that you see in front of
19 you on the screen?
20 A. Yes, it is.
21 Q. Thank you. Does your statement truly reflect your words?
22 A. Yes, it does.
23 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you here
24 today, would your answers be the same as they are in this statement?
25 A. Yes, they would be.
1 Q. Thank you. Did you sign the statement?
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we display the last page now,
4 but that page should not be broadcast.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Is this your signature, sir?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender
9 this statement into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, are you minded to tender a public
11 redacted version of this statement, redacting the signature part?
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We'll do that.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Any objection, Ms. West?
14 MS. WEST: No.
15 JUDGE KWON: I take it there are no associated exhibits.
16 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit both versions.
18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
19 THE REGISTRAR: Statement shall be assigned Exhibit D2761,
20 admitted under seal, and the public redacted version shall be admitted as
21 Defence Exhibit D2762. Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I don't have any
24 questions for this witness, at least for the time being.
25 JUDGE KWON: For the public benefit -- benefit of the public, are
1 you going to read out the summary?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, Excellency. I apologise.
3 I'm going to read the summary in English, and I don't think that
4 there are any reasons for this to be read out in private session.
5 [In English] Witness KW554 was an intelligence officer for the
6 UNPROFOR in Zagreb. During his time in UNPROFOR, it was a widely held
7 belief among Western-oriented intelligence analysts, including himself,
8 that the Bosnian Muslims were responsible for some of the notorious
9 shelling incidents which had killed and wounded many people in Sarajevo.
10 It was believed that the Muslims were shelling their own civilians in
11 order to blame the Serbs and obtain foreign intervention in the war on
12 their side.
13 It was widely believed that United Nations forces -- within the
14 United Nations forces that at least one of the market-place shellings in
15 Sarajevo was caused by the Muslims. On one occasion when discussing the
16 responsibility of the Muslims for the first Markale Market place shelling
17 which had occurred before he arrived in the former Yugoslavia, a US
18 soldier confirmed that the Muslims were responsible for this shelling and
19 displayed that he said -- what he said was a photograph of a person
20 dropping a mortar shell from window overlooking the market --
21 Markale Market place.
22 Concerning the second shelling of the Markale Marketplace, the
23 Witness KW554 was informed that the round had been recorded on a
24 Cymbeline radar but it could not be determined from which side of the
25 confrontation line it had been fired.
1 He received credible information that the Muslim -- Bosnian
2 Muslims were violating the Sarajevo weapons exclusion zone in May 1995.
3 However, it was well known that NATO would never launch air-strikes
4 against the Bosnian Muslims because the Muslims had the political support
5 of the United States.
6 During the time of Witness KW554 in Bosnia, there were personnel
7 on the ground in Bosnia who were tasked with covertly locating and
8 recording Bosnian Serb military positions and facilities which might be
9 potential targets for NATO air-strikes.
10 The personnel engaged in these tasks were either working for
11 UNPROFOR, NATO, or their own national armed forces. Among those working
12 for UNPROFOR were group -- a group of British soldiers known as JCOs.
13 Several countries had their own soldiers working covertly in Bosnia, and
14 although they reported directly to their national command, they would
15 share information on targets and intelligence with NATO. The witness
16 knows that national elements were providing information used in compiling
17 the target list for NATO air-strikes because he saw such lists.
18 National elements had forward air controllers on the ground in
19 Bosnia as well. These forward air controllers operated both inside and
20 outside of the enclaves in Bosnia and covertly gathered information on
21 potential targets for NATO air-strikes.
22 General Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR force commander and a general
23 in the British Army was aware that there were forward air controllers on
24 the ground in Bosnia and that they assisted NATO to conduct the
25 air-strikes in Pale in May 1995.
1 The ammunition depot in Pale was an important installation of the
2 Serbs. The Muslims were unable to reach it from any other position. The
3 NATO bombing of that ammunition depot was a significant setback to the
4 Serbs in the war and provided a military advantage to the Muslims.
5 During the time in Bosnia, the Witness KW554, he had frequent
6 contacts with United Nations military observers, UNMOs. Although they
7 were supposed to be unarmed and neutral observers, virtually every UNMO
8 who he encountered in Bosnia thought he was James Bond and tried to do
9 sneaking and peeking. Witness KW554 used them as sources of information.
10 Other national elements also tasked UNMOs to collect information for them
11 from time to time. Witness KW554 would hide in the trunk when the UNMOs
12 took him through military check-points. Although UNMOs were supposed to
13 be unarmed, many of them had weapons. They were like Rambo.
14 When he returned from Bosnia, Witness KW554 undertook a review of
15 highly classified intelligence information concerning the events in
16 Srebrenica in July 1995. He was seeking to determine if there was any
17 information that Radovan Karadzic had been involved in or informed about
18 the executions which had taken place after the fall of Srebrenica. He
19 found no information connecting Dr. Karadzic to those events. He found
20 this significant, because given the level of information in the material
21 he reviewed, had Dr. Karadzic been involved in or informed about the
22 executions, he would have expected it to be reflected in those materials.
23 [Interpretation] That would be a short summary, and I have no
24 questions for the witness.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 Mr. Witness, as you have noted, your evidence in chief has been
2 admitted in its entirety in writing. Now you will be further
3 cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. West.
6 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Cross-examination by Ms. West:
8 Q. Good morning, sir.
9 JUDGE KWON: No, it's 2.20.
10 MS. WEST:
11 Q. Good afternoon, sir.
12 A. Good afternoon, ma'am.
13 Q. Thank you for meeting with me yesterday. One of the questions I
14 neglected to ask you and I'll ask you now is do you speak B/C/S?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. Now, you have a copy of your statement in front of you?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. Okay. If at any time you need to refer to that, you can just go
19 ahead and do that. Just let me know.
20 The first question I want to ask you regards paragraph 14 of your
21 statement, and in that paragraph you indicate that you were present in
22 the former Yugoslavia in May 1995 when the NATO air-strikes were carried
23 out in Pale, but you were not in Pale; correct?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. And so any information you have about the situation comes
1 second-hand. You didn't observe it yourself; right?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Nor did any -- did you have any personal conversations with
4 people who were most affected by the events, like the hostages
6 A. No, I did have some conversations with some of the hostages that
7 were -- that were detained.
8 Q. Okay. So for example, Patrick Rechner, who is the team leader in
9 Pale, you didn't have a conversation with him, though, did you?
10 A. No, not at that time, no. I had spoken with him previously
12 Q. But at the time or any time thereafter, you didn't have any
13 conversation with him in which he related to you exactly what happened
14 during the hostage situation?
15 A. No, I didn't.
16 Q. And any information that you received about the crisis was not
17 received in realtime, was it?
18 A. Could you explain to me what you would mean by realtime?
19 Q. I take it your testimony was admitted in the Ribic case in
20 Canada, and in that case at page 823, in regard this, you said, "I was
21 aware of communications that were going, but once again it's time
22 delayed. It's within maybe hours or a day or whatever, but it's not
23 minute by minute. I'm not watching these transmissions at all." That's
24 what I mean by realtime. The information you received was delayed, was
25 it not?
1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. All right. But nonetheless, you make some general comments about
3 the UNMOs in your statement, and I want to look at those to see if those
4 comments have any relevance to the hostage-taking. Now let's look at
5 paragraphs 24 to 27 and those are the paragraphs in which you speak about
6 the reputation of the UNMOs.
7 The basis of your opinion for these comments comes from your
8 interaction with them as sources; is that right?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. And the UNMOs with whom you used mostly as sources were Canadian
11 UNMOs; correct?
12 A. Yes, that would be correct.
13 Q. And so should we take the comments that you make in this
14 statement to be applicable for the most part to the Canadian UNMOs?
15 A. For the most part, but I did have contact with other UNMOs from
16 other nationalities.
17 Q. Okay. But in paragraph 26 -- in paragraph 26, you say:
18 "Although the UNMOs were supposed to be unarmed, many of them had
19 weapons. They were like Rambo."
20 Of what nationality were these particular UNMOs, these armed
22 A. Other than the Canadian -- Canadians that I saw, I do not recall
23 the nationalities of them.
24 Q. So then should I understand that when you speak about armed
25 UNMOs, you are specifically speaking about Canadian armed UNMOs and no
1 one else?
2 A. No, that is not correct. I did see other UNMOs from other
3 nationalities. I don't recall the countries, but they were armed as
5 Q. Well, let me go again to your Ribic testimony at page 717 and you
6 were asked the question were the UNMOs armed, and your answer was:
7 "I think I mentioned that they looked like Rambos, some of them,
8 not all of them. But they were really misguided. They were armed. I
9 wouldn't say all of them, but certainly the ones that I went with. They
10 were the ones that tried to who me where to hide the weapons, some of
11 them. I'm talking about the Canadian ones now specifically."
12 Do you remember saying that testimony that was admitted in the
13 Ribic case?
14 A. Yes, I do. I think the point that I was making at that time was
15 about the hiding of the weapons and how to hide them. That was a
16 Canadian to Canadian only thing. I wasn't trying to make the statement
17 that other UNMOs weren't -- or I didn't have contact with other UNMOs. I
18 think when I said the Canadian thing, I was referring specifically to the
19 fact of hiding weapons.
20 Q. And the particular UNMOs that you speak about that were armed,
21 were any of them part of the group that was taken hostage in May 1995?
22 A. No, not that I'm aware of.
23 Q. And in paragraphs 16 through 22, you speak about knowing in a
24 general way about the existence of forward air controllers in Bosnia.
25 Were any of the hostages who were taken into custody in May 1995 some of
1 these forward air controllers of which you speak?
2 A. No, not that I'm aware of.
3 Q. If we can go to paragraph 10 of your statement. Here you say,
4 and this is talking about the Markale shelling in February 1994, that you
5 heard that there was a photo showing that one of the mortar shells was
6 detonated by being dropped from a window overlooking the market-place.
7 So that's paragraph 10, and there you wrote that you heard about
9 Then we go to paragraph 11. In 11 you say -- you're speaking
10 about the same shelling, and you say:
11 " ... a US soldier told me that the Muslims were responsible for
12 the shelling," and he displayed a photograph of a person dropping a
13 mortar shell from a window overlooking the market-place. "I didn't
14 examine the photo."
15 Now, these paragraphs as you can see are inconsistent. What is
16 the right version?
17 A. No, I can see how you would -- would say that. I saw the picture
18 from a distance, about the distance between what you and I are standing
19 right now. It was -- I don't know why I said just "I heard," because I
20 did see it. We had a discussion about the picture, but I did not examine
21 it closely, but from what I was told by my source that I was using at the
22 time or the soldier, that it was a picture of the shelling.
23 Q. Now, you just said that you were at a distance about where we are
24 right now. Would you agree that's about 10 feet?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.
1 Q. How big was the picture?
2 A. Traditional, I guess the 5 by 8 size picture.
3 Q. So at a distance of about 10 feet, a 5 by 8 picture, could you
4 see anything at all?
5 A. No, because he did display it very quick and flashed it as
6 opposed to holding it still, so I did not see what was on the picture.
7 Q. But you would agree that in order for a person dropping a mortar
8 shell from a window, in order for that to have been -- photo to have been
9 taken of that, the photographer would have had to have been reasonably
10 close; right?
11 A. Yes, that is absolutely correct, yes.
12 Q. And then the photographer and the camera would have had to have
13 survived the explosion that killed about 66 people and wounded over 140.
14 Wouldn't that be correct?
15 A. Yes, that would be correct.
16 Q. Now, as regards this particular -- the Markale bombing in
17 February 1994, do you remember what you said about it in your Ribic
19 A. No, I don't.
20 Q. Let me tell you what you said about it, because you didn't
21 comment at all about this -- about this photograph. Instead at page 768
22 you said you stood in the market-place and you saw the crater that was
23 created, and then you said:
24 "I have stood where the impact of the mortar round in the market
25 was and I have seen the impact on the ground. Being an ex-artillery man,
1 I have somewhat of a knowledge on how artillery rounds or mortars
3 And then on 7 -- the next page you said:
4 "The way that the round impacted to me, and I'm not an expert at
5 this, indicates that it was a fairly vertical trajectory, straight down
6 as opposed to coming in --" you waved your hand diagonally at this point,
7 "which is what you would have expected from Serbian guns because they
8 were on the hills some kilometres away. So the round would come in on a
9 diagonal trajectory. By my terms what I saw didn't appear to be like
11 Do you remember saying that?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. Okay. And so you suggested that the crater you saw looked like
14 it should have been a vertical trajectory as opposed to a diagonal
15 trajectory which would -- diagonal would have supported it being fired
16 from perhaps Serb positions. Is that what we should understand?
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 JUDGE MORRISON: I don't want to be a Pedant and I certainly
19 don't want to give evidence, but you estimated the distance between you
20 at about 10 feet. Well, from where I'm sitting it seems to be
21 considerably more than that, nearer 20 than 10. If it has to be
22 measured, it has to be measured, but the transcript will only show 10
23 feet, but I don't think that can be right.
24 MS. WEST: Thank you, Your Honour, for those comments, and
25 appreciate your correcting the record as such, and perhaps we'll get back
1 to that, but if we can stay on this for a moment.
2 Q. As regards this very issue, the issue of the crater and it being
3 a vertical trajectory or a diagonal trajectory, the Trial Chamber
4 recently heard evidence from a Canadian UNMO, his name was John Russell,
5 who was one of the people who examined the crater itself.
6 MS. EDGERTON: And for the parties' recollection, this was the
7 testimony regarding the garden hose theory.
8 Q. And in his statement, Mr. Russell's statement D2364, at paragraph
9 22, he said this:
10 "I was struck by how steep of an angle that the round must have
11 come in on to clear the large building adjacent to the crater. This led
12 me to believe that the round had come from a location closer to the
13 crater than a round fired from further away."
14 Mr. Witness, is this just another way of saying the same thing
15 that you said in Ribic?
16 A. Yes, I believe so.
17 MS. WEST: Mr. President, may we go in private session?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 [Private session]
11 Pages 32040-32047 redacted. Private session.
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours. Thank you.
17 MS. WEST:
18 Q. Now, sir, earlier in your testimony I mentioned Patrick Rechner,
19 you said that you had met him once, but that was after the fact; correct?
20 A. No. I met him once before in -- in Bosnia. He had stopped into
21 my office and we just had an informal chat.
22 Q. All right. My mistake. And also as regards Mr. Ribic, had you
23 ever met him?
24 A. No, I did not meet him specifically, although I knew that he was
25 there, but I did not meet him, no. Not until after the fact.
1 Q. And your knowledge of what had happened in Pale in May and June
2 of 1995, that knowledge came from people you spoke to; correct?
3 A. It would have been from people I spoke to plus from reports that
4 I would have received from national level reports and from other
5 countries as well. It's not just people I would have spoke to in the
6 theatre. It would have also been from reports.
7 Q. And as to those sources, did you have a sense as to where the
8 order to take these hostages came from?
9 A. No, I didn't.
10 Q. Sir, I'm going to remind you of your testimony in the Ribic case.
11 It's page 813 to 814 and you were asked:
12 "Is it true that the order to take hostages came from the top
13 level of Serb leadership?"
14 And your answer was:
15 "I received this intelligence information from direct sources.
16 So this is done at a very high level. This is not a local commander in
17 the field gets to make a decision to take hostages."
18 You go on and speak about this more, but in reminding you of that
19 testimony, do you have -- do you have -- what is your position as regards
20 to where the order came from?
21 A. I hope I'm not confusing you here. What I'm -- when I refer to
22 that, I don't know where it came from. I don't know exactly where it
23 came from. We like to have exact. I don't know where it came from.
24 When I talked in the Ribic case, what we tried to have a good grasp on
25 was the knowledge of who was giving orders and when the orders were
1 given. So here when I'm talking about levels, I'm specifically speaking
2 about the military. Now when I say it's from higher up, higher up within
3 a military chain of command as in not in a troop or a section level, not
4 a brigade level -- sorry, not a battalion level but back to a brigade
5 level. So I'm referring to the military structure. It certainly had
6 nothing to do with the political side.
7 MS. WEST: Thank you.
8 Mr. President, I have no further questions.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one question, Excellency.
11 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Witness, a moment ago you were shown an
13 intercept of the conversation between me and Mr. Deronjic through a
14 go-between. Was there anything in that document which hinted at any
15 possible executions? If you'd like us to, we can call it up again.
17 A. Yes, I'd like to just review it just once again if you don't
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P04618, please. The English
20 version, please.
21 THE WITNESS: No. I don't see anything in that indicates
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Witness, for coming here and testifying.
25 JUDGE KWON: Should we upload witnesses statement paragraph 30
1 again. I have a couple of questions for you with respect to the
2 paragraph, Mr. Witness. But we'll not broadcast this.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
4 Questioned by the Court:
5 JUDGE KWON: The second sentence reads like this:
6 "I was seeking to determine if there was any information that
7 Radovan Karadzic had been involved in or informed about the execution
8 which had taken place after the fall of Srebrenica."
9 So my first question is: What kind of execution were you aware
10 of at the time, or what -- what was that execution like that you were
11 aware of that came to know at the time? It was in July, wasn't it?
12 A. That's correct. At that time, we certainly didn't have the
13 hindsight that we do now, and no, I did not know numbers or didn't know
14 of how many and so forth or the scope. We had known that Srebrenica had
15 fallen and that the -- I can remember recalling that the -- there was
16 reports that the males had been rounded up, but there was certainly no --
17 there was no absolute evidence at the time that I saw that there was
18 executions other than the reports saying that we had assumed that that's
19 what was going to happen to these people. I just don't recall. I hope
20 that answers your question.
21 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough. My second question is this: You said
22 that if -- you were seeking to determine if there was information that
23 Radovan Karadzic had been involved. Why Mr. Karadzic? What triggered to
24 try to find whether Karadzic was involved in or not? Why not anybody
1 A. That's -- that's a good question. When -- and I wouldn't say
2 that it wasn't to try and find anybody else. One of the main areas of
3 responsibility that I had when I was deployed in Bosnia was to try to
4 find and figure out the chain of command and who was giving the orders to
5 whom. So when I returned to Ottawa with the BIRT, it was just a natural
6 evolution for me to -- and I was tasked with it, but it was also a
7 personal thing that I wanted to find out at what level. And because of
8 the material I had a chance to review being highly classified, I would
9 have assumed that I would have been able to find out who gave the orders.
10 Just -- not just on Srebrenica but also I was looking at who gave the
11 orders in a general picture so we could formulate a proper chain of
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That concludes your evidence,
14 Mr. Witness. On behalf of the Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your
15 coming to The Hague to give it. I also appreciate the kindness of the
16 representatives of the Canadian government, Mr. Fox and Ms. Soliman.
17 We will rise all together. The hearing is adjourned.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 17th day of
20 January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.