1 Thursday, 24 January 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Good morning, Mr. Indjic.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
11 WITNESS: MILENKO INDJIC [Resumed]
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Indjic.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. So you hear me in a language you understand, do you?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. All right. I'm going to ask you some questions about your
19 written evidence and the evidence you gave in court earlier this week.
20 Now, my first question is looking at your evidence as a whole,
21 the documents you've also referred to, it's fair to say, isn't it, that
22 during the war you were the UN point of contact with the
23 Bosnian Serb Army for both the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps level as well as
24 headquarters level, the command? Is that fair to say?
25 A. Yes, and even -- my contacts were even broader. I also
1 co-ordinated contacts with the civilian structures of our authorities
2 with international organisations and -- and institution.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, pardon me. In the context of your work and at
4 pages 32428 and 32429 and 32439 of the transcript of your testimony
5 earlier last week, you talked about the meetings you attended with
6 members of the warring factions as well as with the UN, and I want to
7 talk about some of those meetings you were involved in in 1995.
8 Now, in 1995, some of those meetings included meetings in
9 connection with the fall of Srebrenica and the Zepa enclaves in July and
10 August; correct?
11 A. Some of those meetings had to do with these two locations.
12 Q. Now, at those meetings, were you aware of the fate of the men
13 from Srebrenica?
14 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I just want to indicate
15 that it appears that we're proceeding pursuant to Rule 90(H) and I know
16 you have indicated that leading questions are permitted during this
17 process but you also indicated you would be vigilant to ensure that the
18 trial is fair. So I just want to call to your attention at this point
19 that we are now appearing to be proceeding under matters that were not
20 covered in the direct examination nor related to his credibility.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment.
23 [Prosecution counsel confer]
24 MS. EDGERTON: First of all, Your Honour, before I engage in any
25 further representations, this discussion is taking place in front of a
1 witness who understands the English language. So if there's going to be
2 submissions, perhaps they should be done outside the presence of the
4 JUDGE MORRISON: But this is a matter -- this is a matter of
5 procedural law rather than substance, isn't it?
6 MS. EDGERTON: Indeed, Your Honours, and this area which I'm
7 about to discuss is a matter that goes to the witness's credibility
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will allow the question to be put to the
12 MS. EDGERTON:
13 Q. Did you hear my question the first time, Mr. Indjic?
14 A. Yes, I did, and I can answer it. There was one single meeting at
15 the level of commander of the Main Staff of the VRS and between him and
16 the UNPROFOR commander at the Jela restaurant, and I attended that
17 meeting. That meeting had to do with Srebrenica.
18 Based on my job or through my job, I was not privy to the events
19 in the course of the operation in and around Srebrenica.
20 Q. So that single meeting that you refer to at the level of
21 commander of the Main Staff in the VRS and UNPROFOR commander at the Jela
22 restaurant, that's the meeting on the 19th of July, 1995, isn't it?
23 A. After all this time I cannot really confirm the date with
24 certainty, but the venue of the meeting and the participants, yes. So
25 most probably that is the meeting at issue. And in fact, I was there as
1 an escort to the UNPROFOR commander. I escorted him to the
2 Jela restaurant, and it wasn't even necessary for me to sit there and
3 interpret because the UNPROFOR commander had his own interpreter with
5 The meeting had been agreed earlier directly between the office,
6 the liaison office, of UNPROFOR which was at Pale, where an English
7 officer was the liaison officer, and he had agreed this meeting with the
8 command of the Main Staff of the VRS.
9 Q. So your evidence is that by the date of this meeting, you were
11 A. Officially I received no information nor was there a need for me
12 to know anything about operation Srebrenica.
13 Q. All right. So let's have a look at a couple of documents in this
14 regard, and this one probably has an exhibit number at this point which
15 I've omitted to update. It was formerly 65 ter 03727. Sorry, there's no
16 P number. 65 ter 03727, please. And it's about a meeting you had in the
17 afternoon of 13 July 1995 on troop rotation in Zepa, where you said the
18 Security Council's -- thank you. Where you said at paragraph 2 in both
20 " ... the Security Council's Resolution was not reasonable and
21 that it was in fact useless since the Srebrenica pocket was now Serb
23 And if we go over to the next page in both languages, paragraph 7
24 you added -- pardon me, in B/C/S paragraph -- the third page. You added
25 that you had received orders from Tolimir that contacts with UNPROFOR
1 were to be limited to telephone contacts between Mladic and Janvier.
2 So I just want to have a look at a Security Council Resolution in
3 regard to this document, and that's 65 ter 06202,
4 UN Security Council Resolution 1004.
5 Now, this UN Security Council Resolution at paragraph 3 expresses
6 grave concern at the plight of the civilian population in Srebrenica and
7 condemns the VRS offensive against the safe area.
8 Is that the Resolution you were referring to in the document
9 we've just looked at?
10 A. I have never seen this Resolution before. This is the first time
11 I set my eyes on it. The Resolution I was referring to was the
12 Resolution dealing with the declaration of safe areas.
13 Q. Fine. Thank you. Now --
14 JUDGE KWON: Do you -- do you remember that Resolution number?
15 Was it 836?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember the number. But
17 the gist of what I said was that it was an error to establish safe areas
18 the way they were established. It was an error from the outset, because
19 they were declared safe areas and yet they hadn't been demilitarised.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
21 MS. EDGERTON:
22 Q. Thank you. We'll move on. Now, on the 13th, I want to look at
23 what the rest of the world was talking about or saying and hearing about
24 events in Srebrenica by the 13th of July when you were telling UNPROFOR
25 that Srebrenica was now Serb territory.
1 Could we have a look at 65 ter 2308, please, page 1.
2 Now, on the 13th of July, 1995, you see at page 1 AFP reported
3 the evacuation of Srebrenica refugees continues, Serbs holding male
4 prisoners, and noting at paragraph 2 that draft-age men had been taken to
5 a Bosnian Serb-held town where they could be seen herded into a football
6 ground according to members of a UN convoy.
7 Now, if we could move on to another document of the same date,
8 P2278. It's a report of General Smith on the aftermath of the fall of
9 Srebrenica. And if we can go over to page 2 of this document. At
10 paragraph 3 we see General Smith writing:
11 "The Bosnian Serbs are 'cleansing' Srebrenica. DutchBat are
12 doing what they can to monitor the situation but reports of abductions
13 and murder, unconfirmed as yet, are beginning to be heard. Men of
14 military age are being separated from the refugees."
15 So by the 13th, the date that you were telling UNPROFOR
16 Srebrenica was Serb territory and discussing troop rotation in Zepa, the
17 international media -- pardon me, troop rotation in Zepa and receiving
18 orders from Tolimir, the international media, as well as the UN,
19 General Smith in particular, were concerned about the fate of men from
21 Your evidence is you didn't know anything about their fate by
22 that time; is that correct?
23 A. I still hold that I didn't -- my position is still that I didn't
24 know anything about it, and I repeat that it wasn't my job. That area
25 was not within my purview.
1 Q. Now -- oh, pardon me.
2 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, before going further, I would like you
3 to explore with the witness the extent of witness's involvement as far as
4 the dialogue, negotiation, whatever, between the Main Staff and the
5 UNPROFOR, because he's a member of the SRK still. So to what extent was
6 he involved in the dialogue between the Main Staff and the UNPROFOR. We
7 heard about it, but it maybe helpful.
8 MS. EDGERTON: If I may, Your Honour, I intend to deal with that
9 area through documents as we go through the cross-examination, and that
10 may provide some of the additional information Your Honours --
11 JUDGE KWON: Then I will put the question.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Okay.
13 JUDGE KWON: Could you explain us the extent of involvement? Do
14 you understand my point of question?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Speaking specifically about
16 Srebrenica, Your Honour, and the events in and around Srebrenica, the
17 level of my participation --
18 JUDGE KWON: I would like to know first in general how much were
19 you involved as a liaison officer between the Main Staff of the VRS and
20 the UNPROFOR or international part.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I tried to explain that during the
22 examination-in-chief two days ago. There were two distinct periods, the
23 first period from the outset of the war up until sometime in late 1993
24 when all the communications went through the group for co-operation with
25 UNPROFOR in Lukavica, a member of which I was as well. Now, after this
1 follows the second period when UNPROFOR established its own office and
2 its own liaison officer in Pale, and an UNPROFOR officer was in that
3 office, and he had direct communication with the Main Staff of the VRS,
4 so that this office, the Lukavica office, in fact remained the office in
5 charge for the level of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and for providing
6 assistance with any meetings that were held at the airport in Sarajevo --
7 or, rather, meetings in the area of responsibility of the
8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
9 JUDGE KWON: Then you saw the report of -- or interoffice memo of
10 the UNPROFOR which states that in one of its meetings you attended
11 representing -- I don't know in what capacity were you there, but that's
12 the question for you. How come were you involved in that meeting, 13th
13 of July?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, let me try to be precise.
15 You mean this meeting with the liaison officer of the
16 Ukrainian Battalion, the documents that relate to the
17 Ukrainian Battalion, or are you referring to the Jela meeting? I just
18 want to be clear on this. I want to avoid any misunderstandings.
19 JUDGE KWON: Where you stated that United Nations Security
20 Council Resolution was unreasonable and now it has become useless. Do
21 you remember that meeting?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot -- I do not remember
23 specifically that meeting, but I know that where the Ukrainian Battalion
24 is concerned, because they had frequent troop rotations in Zepa, those
25 rotations and the movements on conveys were agreed via the Lukavica
1 office. In addition to that, the liaison officer of the
2 Ukrainian Battalion frequently went to Lukavica even when he didn't --
3 when it wasn't on official business --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Shall we upload 3727. Yes.
5 Lukavica, yes.
6 Yes. I was mistaken in terms of its location. It took place in
8 Yes. I'll leave it to you, Ms. Edgerton. Please proceed. Sorry
9 for interruption.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, not at all, Your Honour.
11 Q. Now, you've just given evidence that by the 13th, you were
12 unaware. Now, as a humanitarian decorated, as you indicated earlier in
13 the week, for humanitarian work, I take it you yourself would have had
14 concerns as to the fate of these men had you been aware of this
15 information; correct?
16 A. Well, that's a hypothetical question that doesn't make any sense
17 if you ask me. What would have been had it been so? So I don't have any
18 intention of answering that question.
19 Q. Have you been following this trial, Mr. Indjic?
20 A. Some parts of it, yes.
21 Q. So are you familiar with the evidence of Robert Block?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Well, let me tell you about him. Robert Block is a journalist
24 who gave evidence here, and he wrote a report on the 17th of July, 1995,
25 about what had transpired with the Muslim men of Srebrenica, and I'd like
1 to show that to you. It's P4397.
2 Now, this is a press report from the "Independent," and it's
3 entitled "Bodies pile up in horror of Srebrenica." And Robert Block
4 reports on video footage from the Serb TV station Studio B that he'd seen
5 of piles of men two feet high, described by the reporter as many dead
7 So by the 17th of July, Mr. Indjic, were you aware that there
8 were widespread concerns about the ultimate fate of the men from
10 A. I'm surprised that at a serious trial as this one should use
11 newspaper articles, because were it up to newspaper articles you would
12 speak with a dead man now, because "Oslobodjenje" published in 1992 that
13 they had managed to kill me. But to answer your question specifically I
14 have to make a distinction between the two periods. Since the war ended
15 and onwards I learned many things about Srebrenica because I've read
16 numerous documents, but at the time that we're discussing now I had no
17 knowledge as to what was going on in Srebrenica.
18 Q. But you were in contact, actually, with General Mladic on the
19 17th when reports like Mr. Block's were circulating, weren't you?
20 A. Well, do you think that General Mladic as the commander had any
21 need to inform me about what was going on? On the other hand, I didn't
22 have any need for any kind of intelligence work vis-a-vis General Mladic.
23 Q. Perhaps you'd like to explain what you mean when you say, "I
24 didn't have any need for any kind of intelligence work vis-a-vis
25 General Mladic"?
1 A. That is quite clear. Whoever understand the line of command and
2 control would know that the commander has no need to inform his
3 subordinates about something, particularly not those who are not involved
4 in a particular activity.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I -- may I respond or may I
6 help? The witness responded to what was translated to him in the B/C/S.
7 He was responding to the term "obavijesten," "informed." So I think that
8 the question is -- or the answer is not the answer to the question put.
9 The witness responded to what was translated to him.
10 JUDGE KWON: I think the point was taken by Ms. Edgerton. Would
11 you like to ask again?
12 MS. EDGERTON: I'd like to move on, actually.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes. You can move on.
14 MS. EDGERTON:
15 Q. Now, you actually haven't answered my question, Mr. Indjic. Were
16 you in contact with General Mladic on the 17th when reports like Block's
17 were circulating?
18 A. I don't know if I was in contact with the general at the time.
19 Q. All right. Maybe I can help you. Can we have a look at D1042.
20 It's a UN report on a meeting with General Smith and
21 President Izetbegovic on the 17th of July, 1995. And if we can go to the
22 next page, paragraph 3, please. Sorry, the page after that. My
24 Now, this document sets out the text of a message Bosnian
25 authorities asked General Smith to pass to the Bosnian Serb Army, and the
1 message reads:
2 "I have been asked by the Bosnian government, who wish to save
3 their people from further suffering, to elicit from the BSA their
4 conditions for the evacuation of the civilian population of Zepa to
5 Central Bosnia. I now wish to establish contact to discuss this matter
6 at the right level (i.e., Mladic)."
7 And if you skip down to the sixth paragraph on this page, it
8 reads that:
9 "At 5.30, General Smith went to Lukavica Barracks in order to
10 pass the message from the Bosnian government to General Mladic via
11 Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic. The message was passed and Indjic came back
12 with the message that Mladic would personally guarantee the safety of the
13 Bosnian government representatives, and that it was better that they hear
14 the details for themselves."
15 Does this refresh your memory?
16 A. This is one among a hundred conversations that I had during the
17 war with General Mladic as liaison officer. I remember now when I see
18 the document, and I'm glad that we took part in it together so that this
19 problem gets resolved in the most favourable way. I view this as a
20 positive document.
21 Q. Do you remember the meeting now?
22 A. No.
23 Q. You don't remember speaking with General Mladic on the 17th?
24 A. I said a little bit earlier that I spoke with General Mladic at
25 least 100 times, so I cannot provide a decisive answer about a
1 conversation that took place on a specific date, i.e., the 17th.
2 Q. So on the 17th, after -- on the 17th, you were in contact with
3 the Commander-in-Chief of the operation in Srebrenica to pass a message
4 related to the fate of civilians in Zepa, and your evidence is you didn't
5 know anything about the killings of the men from Srebrenica by that date?
6 A. I still assert that I didn't know anything, and as far as I can
7 see in this document and the conversation, absolutely nothing was
8 mentioned about this.
9 Q. And two days after that and since you seem to have trouble
10 recalling the exact date, perhaps we could look at P2280. Two days after
11 that, on the 19th of July, 1995, you were at a meeting between
12 General Mladic and General Smith, and the topics discussed were
13 Srebrenica, the withdrawal of DutchBat, the situation in Zepa, ICRC
14 access to the detainees. You can go over when we have both versions of
15 the document up, I think to page 2. And -- I'm sorry, I don't have the
16 page reference for the B/C/S. And UNHCR access to Srebrenica.
17 So is it your evidence that at this meeting, having spoken to
18 Mladic two days previously, and this meeting which specifically discusses
19 the situation in Srebrenica, that you still didn't know about the
21 A. I said a little bit earlier that I came to the meeting as an
22 escort to General Smith. I joined General Smith, and I came to the
23 meeting in Jela in his vehicle. I was present at the meeting, and I
24 returned with General Smith to Lukavica. At no point in time did I have
25 the opportunity nor did I separately alone speak with General Mladic.
1 Not during this meeting. And during this meeting I did not know about
2 any crimes in Srebrenica.
3 Q. Now, on the 21st of July, 1995, again you spoke with
4 General Mladic in the presence of Mr. Harland, and that's at 1D0104.
5 It's a memo from Mr. Harland relating to negotiations at Zepa. Do you
6 disagree? Do you dispute that you spoke with General Mladic actually
7 frequently in that period of time after the events in Srebrenica?
8 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Excuse me, Mr. Indjic.
9 Could we have that 65 ter number again.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Certainly. 1D0104, paragraph 4.
11 JUDGE KWON: Could you check it out, Ms. Edgerton?
12 MS. EDGERTON: I've done it again. 1D01014. And apologies to
13 everyone. I had Mr. Reid's handwritten note in front of me with the
14 correct number, and I misread it. Thank you very much.
15 Q. Paragraph 4 of this document reads that:
16 "At Lukavica Barracks, Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic informed
17 Mr. Harland that he knew nothing of the sector's efforts to broker a
18 local agreement in Zepa."
19 And says of you:
20 "He called General Mladic in my presence. Mladic told him that
21 there was no need for another agreement; that the Bosnian military
22 authorities in Zepa must accept the capitulation agreement made by
23 the ... authorities two days ago; that no international personnel would
24 be allowed into the enclave until the Bosnians began disarming; and that
25 there would [sic] be no evacuation even of wounded and vulnerable
1 individuals until this was done."
2 So this is by the documents your third contact with
3 General Mladic since the fall of Srebrenica; correct?
4 A. I already responded that during the war, I contacted
5 General Mladic at least a hundred times so that I really cannot say how
6 many times we were in contact in the course of July.
7 Q. Well --
8 A. 1995.
9 Q. Well, let me refresh your memory one more time. On the
10 27th of July, 1995, you interpreted for General Mladic again when he met
11 with General Smith at Boksanica to negotiate the surrender and evacuation
12 of the Muslims in Zepa. By that time did you know about the massacres at
14 A. The meeting at Boksanica between General Smith and General Mladic
15 proceeded along the same principles as the meeting at Jela. I
16 accompanied General Smith to Boksanica where the meeting was held, and
17 General Smith had his own interpreter. During that meeting there was no
18 mention of any crimes in Srebrenica. So my answer is that I did not know
19 of any crimes in Srebrenica then either.
20 Q. All right. I'd like to show you a still from a video-clip which
21 was broadcast or taken from a Serb TV broadcast of that meeting, and that
22 still is 65 ter 24460.
23 Now, do you see General Mladic, General Smith, and to the right
24 behind General Mladic, yourself on this video-clip?
25 A. Yes, yes.
1 Q. Between General Mladic and General Smith, do you recognise
2 Drina Corps commander Radislav Krstic who was sentenced in April 2004 to
3 35 years in prison for aiding and abetting genocide in respect of the
4 massacres at Srebrenica?
5 A. Yes, I recognise General Krstic.
6 Q. So your evidence is you attended a meeting with the VRS commander
7 who is presently indicted for the massacres at Srebrenica, and the
8 Drina Corps commander who -- one of the architects of the massacre, and
9 your evidence is you didn't have any information about the massacres at
10 Srebrenica at this time?
11 A. Yes, I stand by what I said. The meeting in question is a
12 meeting during which the issue of Zepa was discussed. General Krstic was
13 at the meeting because Zepa was in the area of responsibility of the
14 Drina Corps.
15 JUDGE KWON: The question was compound in nature to a certain
17 Do you agree, Mr. Indjic, that General Krstic was one of the
18 architects of the massacre?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot give an answer to that
20 question because I don't know how the Srebrenica operation was planned
21 and who had what role in that operation.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be tendered as a Prosecution exhibit,
24 please, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: You are tendering only this one? You are not
1 tendering 3727 and 1D1014?
2 MS. EDGERTON: Actually, I intended to deal with these in a line
3 at the end of the cross-examination, and I missed both right now. Maybe
4 I would be better off just doing that, because that's indeed what I had
5 intended on doing.
6 JUDGE KWON: However, we'll not admit 2308, because -- so we'll
7 admit -- first we'll give the number for -- sorry, I was mistaken. We'll
8 admit 3727. Shall we give the number.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6083, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: And we'll admit 1D1014.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6084, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: And this clip will be admitted as Exhibit P6085.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think we would appreciate it if
14 the exhibits can be offered as they're discussed so that we can have a
15 better way of -- than our normal practice. After an exhibit is
16 discussed, offered, rather than saving it until the end of the
17 examination. It would be easier if that could be done.
18 MS. EDGERTON: For my part of course --
19 JUDGE KWON: What you mean by offer --
20 MR. ROBINSON: After the document is discussed with the witness
21 that would be the time to tender it as an exhibit rather than
22 accumulating them and trying to deal with them at the end.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That was my point. Let us proceed.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
25 Q. By 22nd of August, 1995, Mr. Indjic, did you know about the
1 killings by then?
2 A. I cannot say that I knew about that in that period either,
3 because there were no official reports about what had happened at lower
5 Q. On 22nd August 1995, you were actually involved in another
6 meeting with General Mladic and General Smith at Borike near Zepa to
7 discuss the withdrawal of British and Ukrainian troops from Gorazde,
8 weren't you?
9 A. I remember being present at the meeting in Borike, but it was
10 long ago so I cannot really remember what the topic was of the meeting.
11 I remember just that General Mladic took General Smith to see the
12 thoroughbred Lipizzaner horses at Borike.
13 Q. I would like to show you a video-clip of that meeting and ask you
14 a couple questions about that video-clip. And it's 65 ter number 40576A,
15 we will be starting the video-clip at time-code 1:09 -- 1:09:3. And we
16 don't need any sound for the video.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 MS. EDGERTON:
19 Q. Now, we've stopped at time-code 1:09:49.3. Do you see
20 General Mladic at this meeting, and do you see yourself now in the image
21 depicted on the screen?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Who's sitting to your right?
24 A. I cannot recognise who it is. It's not a very clear image. I
25 cannot recognise the person.
1 Q. Who was sitting to your left?
2 A. I think it's General Gvero, but perhaps you can rewind it a
3 little bit so that I can be sure.
4 Q. Actually, what we'll do is we'll go a little bit further in this
5 clip and then I'll ask you some more questions about it.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can definitely see that it's not
8 General Gvero but Colonel Milos Djurdjic, who was the liaison officer at
9 the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, as far as I can recall.
10 He's deceased, unfortunately.
11 MS. EDGERTON:
12 Q. And who is sitting to General Mladic's right on the far side of
13 the interpreter? I mean to General Mladic's left.
14 A. I don't know who that officer is.
15 Q. All right. We'll play a further section of the video-clip
16 starting with --
17 A. It could be Kusic, Rajko, Rajko Kusic, the commander of the
18 Rogatica brigade, but I'm not quite sure in this image.
19 Q. Thank you. We're going to just go a little bit further in this
20 video-tape and play from time-code 1:11:23.
21 [Video-clip played]
22 MS. EDGERTON:
23 Q. Now, we're stopping at time-code 1:11:31. Could you tell us who
24 the man is with the moustache sitting at the far end of the table with
25 his face towards us on the left-hand side of the screen?
1 A. I really don't know. These are members of the Drina Corps with
2 whom I had no official contacts in the course of my duties during the
4 Q. Now, you keep referring to no official contacts, and you've used
5 that word over and over again this morning, and despite the fact that
6 we've seen that you've had a lot of contact, for example, with
7 General Mladic over the course of the month of July 1995 formally and
8 directly, is it your evidence that outside of official contacts you
9 wouldn't have had any conversation with these individuals?
10 A. Yes, that is what I'm saying. I did not have any conversations
11 with those people because my physical place where I was situated,
12 Lukavica, there was no need for that except for meetings. There was no
13 need for me to go to the areas of any other corps other than the
14 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
15 Q. But we are just seeing here that in July of 1995, you went far
16 and away outside the area of responsibility of the
17 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, Mr. Indjic.
18 A. Yes, because this was an order from General Mladic to come and to
19 accompany General Smith so that he wouldn't go through the territory
20 alone to reach the location of the meeting, to be there as liaison
21 officer and to help them to arrive at the meeting in time. Throughout
22 the time, I am convinced, perhaps, that it would be useful for me to
23 explain again what the role of the liaison officer is, because obviously
24 there is a lack of understanding as to what that role is.
25 Q. Maybe that's something you could do in your redirect examination
1 with Dr. Karadzic. Right now what I'd like to do is look at P1473, a
2 copy of General Mladic's diary for 22 August 1995. And let's go just to
3 pages -- page 310 in English.
4 MS. EDGERTON: And before I leave that video-clip, I'd like to
5 tender it, please, Your Honours. Only those specific time-codes given
6 that the witness recognised himself and Colonel Djurdjic.
7 JUDGE KWON: I was wondering whether we need that clip, because
8 there's no transcript. The witness confirmed the participants as far as
9 he knows.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Quite so. Quite so. And let's move on to the
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MS. EDGERTON: And perhaps for the sake of time, we could just
14 dispense with the B/C/S copy.
15 Q. Now, this is a transcription and translation of General Mladic's
16 notebook dealing with the meeting at Borike on 22 August 1995. At the
17 bottom of the page you see the heading "Meeting with General Smith." And
18 he says:
19 "Present: Smith, John (Colonel) a Colonel accompanying Smith,
20 Captain Tom.
21 "Our side --" not listing you as accompanying or assisting
22 General Smith at all.
23 "Our side: Colonel Djurdjic, Indjic, Kusic, Krunic, Kosoric,"
24 and "Suka."
25 A. God forbid that I am mentioned as somebody who is on the side of
1 General Smith. Then I would be a traitor. Regardless of whom I came
2 with, I was always a member of my own army.
3 Q. Does that refresh your memory about the participants in this
5 A. There is no reason for me not to believe that these people were
6 present, although as for the meeting itself, I do recall that it was
7 held, but I would have difficulty saying anything more detailed about the
8 meeting itself.
9 Q. Now, General Indjic -- or Colonel Indjic, you've given evidence
10 that you worked in the VRS security organ following the war. Do you
11 remember that? That was in your evidence earlier on this week.
12 A. Yes, I remember that. And before that I was the intelligence
14 Q. And is it your evidence that -- sorry. And working in the
15 intelligence organ, the intelligence centre, and the security -- pardon
16 me, and the security administration of the VRS, you didn't recognise the
17 man with the moustache that identified to you at the end of the table who
18 was actually Vujadin Popovic?
19 A. Now that you mention his name, yes, I could confirm that that was
20 him, but before that, I did not recognise him.
21 By the way, let me just explain something to make myself clear.
22 To be an intelligence officer means to gather information on a possible
23 enemy of your state and your people and not collecting information on
24 your own forces and your people.
25 Now, when I was working in the security administration, my job
1 was to prevent the foreign intelligence services from collecting data or
2 information on our own forces.
3 Q. Vujadin Popovic is also presently serving a life sentence having
4 been convicted for, and I quote from the decision, "robust participation
5 in the genocide in Srebrenica in 2010."
6 Is it your evidence, given all that we've heard, that by
7 22 August 1995, you still had no information about the massacres of the
8 men from Srebrenica?
9 A. I stand by what I said earlier. At this time, I did not know
10 about any massacres of any men either because there was no mention of any
11 of it at this meeting itself, and I had no contacts, no personal
12 contacts, with Popovic; and even if I had, I don't see why we would
13 discuss what was going on or had happened in Srebrenica.
14 Q. Now --
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Just a second.
16 Is it your case that the -- the item dealing with this meeting,
17 Mladic's diary's wrong? You didn't mention Popovic.
18 MS. EDGERTON: The diary doesn't mention Popovic, but Popovic
19 appears on the film as the witness has just confirmed.
20 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the footage again?
21 MS. EDGERTON: Of course.
22 Mr. Reid, could you help us with that.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, 244 -- no, 50576A.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Indjic, now do you confirm that it was
1 Mr. Popovic?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I can recall this is
3 Popovic, but as I said, the two of us, we were never anywhere together.
4 We never -- this is perhaps the only time that we attended a meeting
6 JUDGE KWON: Can you identify Kosoric in this clip?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as I mentioned at the outset,
8 I believe that it was Kusic, the person I mentioned as Kusic. That
9 should be Kosoric, the man with the moustache.
10 MS. EDGERTON: This is the second of two clips, Your Honour. If
11 you'd like to go back to look at the participants in the first one, we
12 can do that as well.
13 JUDGE KWON: No, it's not necessary. Please proceed.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just interfere -- intervene
16 in the transcript, please. On page 23, line 11, there was something that
17 was misinterpreted. The witness did not say, "I don't know why we would
18 discuss this." Rather, he said, "I don't know why he would tell me what
19 had happened in Srebrenica." You can check this with the witness.
20 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Indjic?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I said that I don't see any
22 reason why he would tell me that.
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
24 MS. EDGERTON:
25 Q. So you've confirmed that -- or you've stated that by the 22nd --
1 by that the 22nd of August, 1995, you didn't know anything about the
2 massacres. What about the fact that by that time thousands of men from
3 Srebrenica were missing and unaccounted for? Did you know anything about
5 A. I did not have any official information about the Srebrenica
6 area. Therefore, I had no information about any massacres or any
7 disappearances of anyone.
8 Q. You used that term again, "official information." What about
9 unofficial information? What did you hear?
10 A. Your Honour, I cannot speak about hearsay in such a serious trial
11 as this if I can't recall from whom I had heard something or if I can't
12 be certain about, you know, who told me what. I can only speak about
13 what I know or what I don't know.
14 JUDGE KWON: Whether it's hearsay or it's not and -- as to the
15 reliability will be assessed by the -- by the Chamber, you were asked --
16 you used the term that you didn't know -- you didn't have any official
17 information, and then I was about to put that same question. You were
18 asked by Ms. Edgerton whether you had any unofficial information. Could
19 you tell us as far as you knew at the time, whatever the source of the
20 information that might have been?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I state with certainty that I had
22 no information, none at all, about any crimes. What I know is that
23 meetings were being scheduled where the issue of prisoners of war were to
24 be resolved.
25 JUDGE KWON: The question was not limited only to crimes. It's
1 also about disappearance or death or whatever. Tell us what you knew
2 about it. Or heard about it.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is nothing I could say that I
4 knew or heard. Perhaps I saw a TV programme or maybe heard something on
5 the radio, but in the conversations that I had, there was no mention nor
6 any information about any of this.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The word -- there is a word missing
9 here. It should be "in my conversations with officers." That's what's
10 missing. Where he says that perhaps he heard something about it on the
11 radio or on TV, but he didn't hear anything in his conversations with
12 officers. So the word "officers" was missing.
13 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.
14 MS. EDGERTON:
15 Q. Well, now Dr. Karadzic has clarified what you've said and you've
16 limited your sources of information to information with officers. What
17 about your conversations with enlisted men, with soldiers, with
18 intelligence, members of your intelligence community, members of the
19 security organs of your forces? What about those sources? Apart from
20 the officers, what did you hear?
21 A. I cannot recall that there were any conversations, that I had any
22 need or occasion or time to talk about anything that had to do with
23 Srebrenica, because I keep saying, and I have to repeat, Srebrenica was
24 not the subject of my work. It wasn't within my purview.
25 Q. Well, let's go to P898. It's a report on a meeting of
1 20 July 1995. So that's the day following the meeting you've had with
2 Generals Smith and Mladic where an agreement regarding Srebrenica was
3 struck, and this document is a cable from David Harland regarding a
4 meeting on prisoner exchange and the evacuation of Zepa.
5 Can we go to page 2, please, in both languages.
6 So we see on page 2 that earlier on the 20th, Mladic indicated to
7 Gobilliard that the Serbs would like to hold an immediate meeting on the
8 possibility of a prisoner exchange and that you would have the authority
9 to sign -- to negotiate and sign an agreement on his behalf.
10 So by this time we have evidence that you'd spoken to Mladic on
11 the 17th, the 19th, the 20th, and the 27th of July; correct? Yes or no?
12 A. As for these conversations that were mentioned earlier about my
13 conversations with General Mladic, that's correct, now you reminded me of
14 the dates. But you asked me about these partial conversations. I really
15 can't recall all of them, because I had over 100 conversations with
16 General Mladic. So, yes, I do agree that I did speak with General Mladic
17 at this time, as you reminded me.
18 Q. So this document goes on and says that you met with David Harland
19 at 1.30 that afternoon, and you told him that Mladic was willing to make
20 an all-for-all exchange, including the Bosnian soldiers in the Zepa
21 pocket. And then later that day, a meeting took place, a negotiation
22 meeting took place, over the proposal, but there was no final agreement
23 because the Bosnians were not satisfied that Serbs had accounted for all
24 the prisoners taken in the assault on the Srebrenica enclave. So how,
25 Mr. Indjic, was Srebrenica not part of your work?
1 A. This meeting dealt with the exchange of prisoners and not
2 Srebrenica. It dealt with the exchange of prisoners on the principle of
3 all for all, which implies the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 So the subject was not Srebrenica but the exchange of prisoners.
5 Q. Even the Bosnian authorities by that point in time, by the
6 20th of July, 1995, knew that their men in Srebrenica were missing, and
7 you claim you know nothing?
8 A. I still claim that I didn't know anything and that they did know
9 about it. Of course they did. They organised it themselves.
10 Q. Can you explain what you mean by this last remark, "They
11 organised it themselves"?
12 A. In 1993, there was a meeting in Sarajevo between
13 Alija Izetbegovic and the civilian leadership from Srebrenica. The
14 civilian leadership from Srebrenica asked -- requested that
15 Alija Izetbegovic help them resolve the issue, the problem, of
16 Srebrenica. Izetbegovic said, "You had to -- you have to hold out. The
17 Americans want me to show 3.000 dead so that they can intervene." This
18 is information that I gathered from a programme on the Muslim TV in
20 Q. Oh, fine. Now we understand the source of the last statement
21 that you just made, so we'll move on.
22 Now, I want to go to something David Harland has said. Now, you
23 must remember David Harland, because he was the civil affairs officer and
24 political advisor to UNPROFOR command for a long period of time
25 throughout the war.
1 A. I do remember him. He married a Muslim woman from Sarajevo,
2 thereby showing clearly what his position was.
3 Q. Mr. Harland, at page -- pardon me, in P820, paragraph 226, talked
4 about this meeting and the meetings you had with him over Zepa, and he
5 said that it was clear that the Bosnian Serbs wanted to make a deal as
6 quickly as they could. With hindsight, it would appear this was because
7 Mladic realised that the Bosnians knew what had happened in Srebrenica,
8 and he had no chance -- once the Bosnians knew what had happened in
9 Srebrenica, then he would have no chance of getting any Serb prisoners
10 back. The Bosniaks were at this time -- at this time were unsure of what
11 was happening but believed that the offer was some kind of a trick.
12 Mr. Indjic, with everything we've heard, and particularly with
13 your involvement in the negotiations regarding the prisoner exchange, it
14 appears you had precise information regarding the men of Srebrenica and
15 their disappearance. Isn't that the case?
16 A. No, that's not the case. It's not correct.
17 Q. You were well informed about the interests of the
18 Bosnian Serb Army at this point in time. Yes or no?
19 A. This was a generalised question. Could you be more specific,
21 Q. Is it your evidence that you would attend negotiations and
22 briefings and interpret for General Mladic without being well informed of
23 Bosnian Serb Army interests?
24 A. I really don't know what you mean when you say Bosnian Serb Army
25 interests. The interests of the Bosnian Serb Army was to end the war.
1 That was our basic interest. That was their basic interest.
2 Q. I'll be -- I'll be more specific. We've now seen, and I'll turn
3 the question a different way, we've now seen evidence of your
4 participation in successive meetings with people who had been indicted
5 and convicted for the genocide of Srebrenica, successive meetings
6 throughout July and August 1995. We've seen information about what the
7 world was reporting about the men at Srebrenica. We've seen information
8 about what the Bosnian authorities knew about the disappearance and
9 massacres of the men at Srebrenica. We've seen articulations of
10 General Smith's concerns, the man that you were involved in the
11 interpretation -- that -- the man for whom you maintain you were
12 interpreting at meetings, and yet your evidence is you knew right up
13 until the end of August 1995 nothing about the disappearance of these
14 thousands of men and their massacre; correct?
15 A. First of all, I have to correct you. I have to correct some
16 parts of your speech.
17 First you said that I attended meetings where people who were
18 accused of the crimes in Srebrenica were present. Those people were
19 attended for the -- were accused of the crimes in Srebrenica only after
20 the war. So at those meetings, there were no accused and no one was
21 accused of any crimes.
22 Second, I said very specifically on several occasions that I
23 never interpreted for General Smith. General Smith had his own
24 interpreter, because I don't believe that an Englishman would believe a
25 Serb officer that he was translating correctly his words.
1 The third, I claim that I had no information of any massacre in
3 Q. Fine. I'd like to move on to a completely different topic,
4 completely different.
5 On paragraphs 166 to 170 -- pardon me. At paragraph 166 of your
6 statement, your written evidence, you referred to a part of a tape of
7 29 May 1992 of General ordering the shelling of areas in Sarajevo,
8 including Velesici and Pofalici, and you said you listened to it and
9 despite the similarity in voice you had some doubts in. And that's an
10 exert from your testimony in the Galic case in 2003. Now --
11 A. Yes, I remember that. Could you put your question?
12 Q. Now, if we could have a look at 65 ter number 22 --
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could you identify the paragraph
14 number again from his statement?
15 MS. EDGERTON: I will, if you'll just indulge me for yet another
17 And it appears I've got it wrong again, so if I could just pause
18 for a few seconds.
19 JUDGE KWON: We may take a break now if it is convenient.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Absolutely. Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll have a break for half an hour and resume
22 at 5 to 11.00.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. And just to correct the paragraph
4 citation that I struggled with before our break, the conversation that I
5 wish to direct Mr. Indjic to is at paragraph 116 of his statement, 116.
6 Q. And you recall, Mr. Indjic, when we broke we were talking about
7 the conversation you were commenting on at paragraph 116, dated
8 29 May 1992, with General Mladic ordering the shelling of Velesici and
10 Now, Mr. Indjic, in 65 ter 22552 which is a transcript of an
11 audiotape recorded interview that General Milovanovic had with the OTP,
12 the Office of the Prosecutor, in 2001, we can see at pages 137 of the
13 English and 163 of the B/C/S, we can see that General Milovanovic was
14 asked about this specific conversation.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Don't tell me I've got the number wrong again.
16 Your indulgence for a moment. 22552.
17 Q. And I'm quite happy to read the relevant passage if my obvious
18 weakness with numbers is affecting things. And I'll just speak with
19 Mr. Reid for a moment. Perfect. Thank you. Page 137 of the English.
20 So General Milovanovic spoke about this conversation, noting that it had
21 been on the radio for some time, and he asked Mladic:
22 "Did you really say that?"
23 And Mladic said:
25 He explained that he talked to someone on the phone and mentioned
1 that, so he never denied that. And General Milovanovic listened to the
2 conversation, and on the next page -- and you see at the bottom of this
3 page that he recognised Mladic's voice, although the last time he had
4 heard it was three years previously, and on the next page he said:
5 "I presume that's a recording made in 1992."
6 Now, seeing what -- seeing that General Mladic specifically
7 acknowledged to General Milovanovic that it was him in this conversation,
8 are the doubts you expressed in the Galic case now resolved?
9 A. Let me say at the beginning that the doubt that was expressed was
10 not from the Galic case, but it was from my interview with
11 Mr. Barry Hogan in 2001.
12 Second, during the time that you were talking, in the first
13 sentence when you were explaining, it was stated or it was written in the
14 transcript that General Milosevic had an interview, so that needs to be
15 corrected, because this is actually a reference to General Milovanovic.
16 I did not say that I doubted whether that was General Mladic. My
17 doubt centred on the fact that the term Velusici was used for the area of
18 town, whereas General Mladic had a family house in that area. So
19 General Mladic knew very well that the name of that area was Velesici,
20 and this is what my doubt was about.
21 Q. So -- so --
22 A. Now I don't have any doubt --
23 Q. Perfect. So then it seems that if -- if -- it seems that that
24 additional explanation isn't reflected in the statement that you gave
25 which has been filed as your written evidence, then; is that correct?
1 A. I don't know whether that's reflected or not, but this is my
2 statement given to Mr. Barry Hogan in 2001, and I explained what my
3 doubts were about.
4 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to another topic. In your testimony
5 earlier on this week in regard to the subject of sniping, you said at
6 T32458, starting from line 2:
7 "The Serb side always expressed its readiness to come to any
8 agreement that would lead to a cease-fire, including an agreement on
10 And then you were also shown a document by Dr. Karadzic, D2782,
11 dated 18 August 1994, referring to a meeting you were involved in on the
12 15th regarding -- and the meeting was regarding the implementation of
13 measures arising from the anti-sniping agreement. And you said at 32460
14 that it implied, this document, implied that there should be a liaison
15 group established that would include both armies and UNPROFOR so that
16 they could respond to any sniping activities quickly, but the group was
17 never established because, as you mentioned Dr. Karadzic:
18 "I believe that the Muslim side was not ready to send its own
20 Now, I'd like to show you a Sarajevo-Romanija Corps account of
21 that very same meeting, and that's P1617. And it's a
22 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command intelligence report to the VRS Main Staff
23 intelligence security sector, dated 15 August 1994, and it -- it details
24 the meeting -- this meeting that you gave evidence about between you,
25 along with Colonel Lugonja and UNPROFOR, concerning the implementation of
1 the anti-sniping agreement. And it sets out in this first paragraph
2 UNPROFOR's plan which you see at paragraph 1 at the bottom of the English
3 page. And if you go over to page 2 in English, it sets out at
4 paragraph 1 on page 2 according to General Tolimir's instructions the VRS
6 Now, at paragraph 2, we see the VRS proposal is -- or reads:
7 "... we cannot accept anti-sniper units which would operate on
8 the respective side because it's not part of UNPROFOR's mandate, and a
9 joint staff is not necessary because elaborate instruments of mutual
10 information already exist."
11 Now, in regard to the same situation we're discussing, I want to
12 go over to P862 next, which is a letter dated 17 August 1994 from
13 Colonel Gausseres, who was the Sector Sarajevo Chief of Staff to Colonel
14 Lugonja, and that reads in paragraph 2, second sentence:
15 "On your request there will be no anti-sniping teams on your side
16 but you are expected not to retaliate if you do not want to worsen an
17 already very tense situation."
18 So, Colonel Indjic, a document from your own forces which is in
19 part confirmed by this UNPROFOR document shows that it was -- not only
20 did the Serb side object to UN anti-sniping teams on their territory, but
21 they specifically refused the joint commission which is completely
22 contrary to the evidence you gave earlier this week, isn't it?
23 A. First of all, I have never seen these documents before. I'm
24 seeing them for the first time. Secondly, I expressed my opinion why the
25 agreement as not implemented. And thirdly, it's absolutely clear to me
1 that anti-sniper teams would not be accepted because this was beyond the
2 UNPROFOR mandate, and any acceptance of going beyond the mandate would
3 imply going even further beyond the mandate.
4 As for the documents, I'm seeing them for the first time. I
5 don't doubt that they exist. And in my conversation with
6 President Karadzic, I voiced my opinion as to why the agreement was not
8 Q. President Karadzic, Dr. Karadzic, asked you:
9 "Do you know anything, lieutenant-colonel, about why this never
10 materialised, which side was blocking it?"
11 And your answer was:
12 "I believe that the Muslim side was not ready to send its own
14 A. Precisely. I expressed my opinion, my opinion as to what the
15 reason was.
16 Q. And these documents completely contradict your expressed opinion,
17 don't they?
18 A. I don't see that it's completely contradictory.
19 Q. We'll move on --
20 A. The only thing that is discussed here is the modality of the
21 implementation of the agreement.
22 Q. In fact, this Chamber's heard evidence that from the end of July
23 until the 14th of August, 1994, there was a series of abortive meetings
24 regarding the possibility of an anti-sniping agreement mainly abortive
25 because of the lack of interest in an agreement by Tolimir and
1 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps liaison officer Colonel Indjic, who obstructed
2 the negotiations. The Serb negotiators would find excuses to avoid doing
3 even the slightest -- pardon me, the easiest things that could be done to
4 prevent sniping, such as installation of line of site barriers.
5 That evidence, Mr. Indjic, is completely consistent with the
6 document from your own corps as well as the UNPROFOR document we've just
7 looked at, isn't it?
8 A. It is really not clear to me what you are talking about in what
9 you have just said. You mentioned General Tolimir, myself, obstructions,
10 while it's clear from everything that General Tolimir said that this is
11 only a matter of the mode of implementation of the agreement, and I don't
12 know what kind of obstruction is referred to here.
13 Q. We'll go on to another topic, and it's about your role in the
14 hostage taking which you discussed at paragraph 191 of your statement.
15 Pardon me, 171, 171. And you said there in paragraph 171, and I assume
16 it relates to May of 1995, that on the basis of an order, you personally
17 informed the French at Lukavica Barracks that the Serb side considered
18 them war prisoners and they had the right to keep their pistols.
19 So, first of all, when you talk about the French at
20 Lukavica Barracks, I presume you're referring to French peacekeepers who
21 had been posted to the weapons collection point at Lukavica barracks;
23 A. Yes. I mean members of the French battalion who were part of the
24 Sector Sarajevo UNPROFOR force.
25 Q. So the events you describe in paragraph 171, your actions, was
1 that -- did those take place before or after you ordered them surrounded
2 and fired at them with RPGs?
3 A. Could you please specify which events you are talking about,
4 whether they happened before or after.
5 Q. Perhaps we could -- if you look at the screen in front of you,
6 you see the evidence you gave in paragraph 171, and what I want to know
7 is did that happen before or after you ordered them surrounded and your
8 forces fired two RPGs at them?
9 A. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I'm going to take some time
10 and describe the events as a whole.
11 Q. Well --
12 A. After --
13 Q. Well --
14 A. -- through the operations officer --
15 Q. Mr. Indjic, my question was did this happen before or after the
16 two RPGs were fired at them? So it's a kind of a yes or no answer.
17 A. I don't know. I don't know what happened before or after. Can
18 you tell me specifically what it is that you are asking me that happened
19 before or after?
20 Q. All right. Let's have a look at 65 ter 24480. And that's an
21 Associated Press article dated 26 May 1995, entitled "French UN platoon
22 surrenders to Bosnian Serbs." And if you go down to the fourth paragraph
23 on this page, it reads:
24 "An Associated Press reporter watched Serbs take over 21 French
25 soldiers who had been guarding Serb guns turned over to the UN at this
1 barracks in a Serb-held suburb of Sarajevo.
2 "A Serb officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic, first tried to coax
3 the French into surrender and entered the UN headquarters [sic] unarmed
4 to negotiate. The French commander said he had orders not to surrender."
5 This article says you then ordered military police to take
6 positions and prepare to fire. For three minutes, automatic rifle fire
7 targeted the building where the 21 French men were.
8 The commanding Serb officer said hold fire and watch for the
9 white flag. No flag appeared. Two rocket propelled grenades hit a truck
10 and an APC and minutes later the French surrendered without firing a
12 Does this help you with the sequence of events and clarify what
13 happened before and after?
14 A. I know all of this. I know more about it than you do, but I am
15 not sure. I don't know what you are trying to ask me, what happened
16 before and what happened afterwards. There is one very important
17 sentence missing here, and that is when I was inside the building with
18 the French officer unarmed, since he did not have orders to surrender, we
19 agreed that we would fire at vehicles without jeopardising the lives of
20 his men with that, and then when the fire stopped, then he would come out
21 with a white flag and surrender.
22 Q. So, in fact, this article and your testimony supplement the
23 information that you gave in your written evidence at paragraph 171;
25 A. Yes.
1 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be a Prosecution exhibit, please,
2 Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6086, Your Honours.
5 MS. EDGERTON:
6 Q. Now, I want to ask you about the year prior to this event when
7 your forces detained around 150 UN personnel following the air-strikes
8 against Serb forces at Gorazde in April 1994, and to do that I'd like us
9 to have a look at 65 ter 19302, a report on the detention of Lima HQ and
10 teams from 14 April 1994 to 19 April 1994. And the drafter of this is
11 Shaun Heintz, UNMO, Shaun Heintz.
12 Page 1 of this document says -- in fact, it's the very second
13 sentence on page 1 which says:
14 "An order was issued from the HQ at Lukavica by LO Major Indjic
15 that all UNMO teams were to be confined to their accommodation."
16 And then if we go over on the next page, bottom of page 2, Heintz
17 reports -- I'll just make sure I can see it on this page, and I do have
18 the page right. Your indulgence for a moment. If we could go over to
19 the -- ah, no, it is at the bottom of page 2. Thank you. Page 2.
20 At the bottom of page 2, Heintz reports on a meeting you had with
21 him on the 18th of April where you said because of the bombing on the
22 16th, you were expecting the order to kill one UNMO.
23 So a year before the hostage-taking in May 1995, you also ordered
24 the detention of UN personnel in April 1994; correct?
25 A. That is not correct. Crucially -- in its crucial points it's
1 incorrect because from my position I'm not able to order anything. I can
2 convey somebody's order, act pursuant to somebody's order, but I myself
3 cannot issue orders.
4 Q. Under whose orders were you acting when you relayed this order to
5 detain the UN personnel at Lukavica in April 1994?
6 A. I cannot specifically say who was the duty operations officer at
7 that time, but all the orders proceed along the command and control line
8 via the operations duty officer. I wished that I was able to read the
9 document in its entirety, because all I'm being shown here are parts of a
10 document which do not constitute a whole. I wish I had been given the
11 opportunity to read it in my native language regardless of the fact that
12 I am familiar with English.
13 JUDGE KWON: I am not sure if we have a B/C/S version. We will
14 print out these eight pages and provide it to you.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
16 Q. Now, you also said at paragraph 171 with regard to May 1995, that
17 the first group of UNPROFOR soldiers was captured by individuals without
18 orders, plans, or co-ordination to do so. When was that first group
20 A. Perhaps it's a misunderstanding here when it says an UNPROFOR
21 group. What is being discussed here are military observers, UNMOs, who
22 are in separate observation posts.
23 Before, in any case -- this happened before the capture of the
24 French soldiers.
25 Q. When?
1 A. I'm not able to tell you. It's been a long time since then. But
2 I know that this happened before the capture or the arrest of the French
4 Q. Well, where?
5 A. In any event, it has to do with the NATO bombing.
6 Q. What group do you mean?
7 A. I mean the individuals, the military observers, UN military
8 observers who were part of the United Nations who were deployed at
9 isolated observation posts, the so-called Lima posts.
10 Q. Well --
11 JUDGE KWON: Now shall we pause and give him the time to read
12 this document.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. And this relates to the 1994 issue.
14 MR. ROBINSON: And, Mr. President, while we're pausing on this
15 point, if I could, assuming that this is evidence that's going to the
16 credibility of the witness since it's related to events that are not part
17 of the -- the 1994 detentions are not part of the evidence in chief.
18 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, Mr. Robinson.
19 MR. ROBINSON: I'm trying to state it's my understanding that
20 this is not 90(H) evidence but this is related to credibility because
21 this is not something that was covered in the statement or the
22 examination-in-chief, the 1994 detentions of UN personnel in response to
23 the Gorazde incidents.
24 JUDGE KWON: Well, he talked about UN prisoners of war in
1 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I believe that that was related to 1995, but
2 if you're interpreting it more broadly perhaps that's fair, but in any
3 event, it seemed like that that was related to the -- count 11 of the
5 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to respond, Ms. Edgerton?
6 MS. EDGERTON: It goes squarely again to his credibility,
7 Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
9 MR. ROBINSON: And just on a related point since the witness is
10 still reading, when it comes to the time when the allotted time for
11 cross-examination has expired, I think it's important for the Chamber to
12 consider how much time we have spent on issues that were not contained in
13 the statement that are purportedly relating to credibility. It seems
14 like we still haven't really gotten to the core issues of the Sarajevo
15 component of our case and almost the whole two hours has been used.
16 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
17 JUDGE KWON: I was informed by the Registrar that the Defence,
18 Mr. Karadzic, used for his examination-in-chief 2 hours and 36 minutes,
19 and Prosecution has used so far one and a half hours. So she has still
20 half --
21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
22 JUDGE KWON: One and 45 minutes, not one and a half hours.
23 MS. EDGERTON: And I'm sincerely hoping that this time the
24 witness takes reading a document that he's already commented on is not
25 counting against the allotted time that the Prosecution has,
1 Your Honours.
2 JUDGE KWON: Have you done your reading, Mr. Indjic?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have to read on. It's not
4 a problem. I'm also quite grateful that you gave me a document to work
5 with since on the screen what I see right now is a very important
6 paragraph, paragraph 2, specifically, on my screen telling us why the
7 military observers were grouped in a single location for their personal
8 safety during the NATO air-strikes. They were allowed to use the phone
9 to get in touch with their superiors and to ask to have food and other
10 necessities shipped in, meaning there was no mistreatment or harassment
11 whatsoever. And it was precisely in order to avoid any random individual
12 incidents against the NATO staff. They were all grouped in a single
14 We decided to do that so that we would keep these people apart
15 from their signals equipment so that they could not use it in order to
16 guide NATO aeroplanes to their targets.
17 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
19 Q. I'd like to -- I've actually left 1994 some time ago, and we were
20 dealing with questions relating to the matters that were discussed in
21 your statement at paragraph 171, and that's the situation in May 1995.
22 Now, you spoke a couple of times regarding mentioning the French
23 soldiers. I take it you're referring to the French soldiers who were
24 taken hostage during the attack on Vrbanja Bridge on the 27th of May of
25 that year.
1 A. No. It is not the French soldiers that I have in mind, because
2 these French soldiers, as far as I can recollect, were taken prisoner by
3 one of the parties to the conflict, same as a number of VRS soldiers were
4 taken prisoner by the French battalion, and they were being held at
5 Sarajevo airport where the French battalion was stationed. So it's a
6 question of prisoners of war on both sides of the conflict, so to speak.
7 Q. I'd like to show you just on that line document P2434, which is a
8 letter from UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Commander Gobilliard to
9 Dragomir Milosevic, dated 3 June 1995. And it refers to you, and it
10 says -- it talks about how a French officer was forced to kneel in the
11 street with his hands tied behind his back and with a gun at his head
12 while Serb soldiers threatened to shoot him if the UNPROFOR troops
13 refused to withdraw from the OP, observation post, and then it stays
15 "Additionally, during the retaking of the position that morning,
16 Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic spoke to one of my officers on the telephone
17 and said, 'If you don't stop the attack immediately, I will kill one of
18 the French soldiers.'"
19 Now, you talked earlier this week and in your written evidence
20 about the protests that were sent to your office. Is this a protest that
21 you would have received about your own specific behaviour?
22 A. This document is a report. It's not a protest. As for the
23 allegations about me making that statement over the phone, that is a
24 blatant lie. I am sufficiently trained and a sufficiently skilled
25 professional to know that were I to go on and say something like that, I
1 certainly wouldn't do it over the phone.
2 Q. How would you do it then?
3 A. Well, I wouldn't do it at all, madam. It goes against the grain
4 of everything that I was taught, that prisoners were to be treated in
5 keeping with the Geneva Conventions and prisoners were not to be killed.
6 Q. Fine. I'd like to go on, now that we're talking about Sarajevo,
7 to the subject of demilitarising Sarajevo, and you talked about this in
8 your evidence earlier this week. During your testimony, first of all --
9 actually, let me ask you this question: You would agree that on
10 9 February 1994, the Bosnian Serb Army and the ABiH agreed to a
11 cease-fire, the establishment of a total exclusion zone in Sarajevo, the
12 interposition of UNPROFOR between the two sides, and the placement of
13 heavy weapons in weapons collection points, don't you?
14 A. I agree [Realtime transcript read in error "disagree"] with
15 everything you said apart from the date. I can't quite recall the date
16 before I've been shown the relevant document, but everything you said
17 about the actual activities is true.
18 Q. All right. Let's have a look at the relevant document. That's
19 P827, a UN civil affairs weekly political assessment by Viktor Andreev.
20 A. Excuse me. I would like to enter a correction to something I
21 said before. The transcript says "I disagree," whereas I said "I agree"
22 with everything you said apart from the date.
23 Q. Thank you very much for that. If we could go over to page 2 of
24 this document, this notes under the heading Sarajevo second bullet point
25 negotiating in the shadow of a NATO threat, the Bosnian Serb Armies have
1 made an oral agreement for the Greater Sarajevo. The agreement, which
2 came into effect on the 10th of February, has four main elements and goes
3 in to describe the elements.
4 Now, if we can just flip back over to page 1. I apologise.
5 Could we go back over to page 2, please. My apologies.
6 So page 2 of this document, in the first paragraph under the
7 second bullet point makes the date of these events quite clear. Would
8 you be prepared to agree that the agreement we're talking about reflects
9 an oral agreement between the two parties which is to come into effect on
10 the 10th of February?
11 A. I know that all these activities were carried out. Now, was this
12 an oral agreement or actually one that was signed black and white, I'm
13 sorry, I can't recall.
14 Q. I didn't ask you that. I asked you whether the agreement was
15 something which was to come into effect on the 10th of February.
16 A. I don't know. I can't recall the specific time line, so I can't
18 Q. So you're disagreeing with Mr. Andreev's report?
19 A. Again, I would need to go through the entire report in order to
20 be able to agree or indeed disagree. I can't judge this report portion
21 by portion, as it were, and not as a whole.
22 Q. Well, keeping in mind that we have limited time for this, I'm
23 going to move on to another point. You --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just ask for a reference.
25 Where does the document actually claim that it was to take effect on the
1 10th? In the third paragraph in the English [In English] "The armies
2 were given ten days to withdraw 20 kilometres, and so on and so on.
3 MS. EDGERTON: With respect, Your Honour, if I am, as everybody
4 says, to be strictly limited to this time. Dr. Karadzic has seen this
5 document and he has seen the reference in the second bullet point,
6 10th of February. If we could move on. Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please proceed.
8 MS. EDGERTON:
9 Q. Now, in your testimony at 32448, you discussed P1641, dated
10 10 February 1994. Now, that was a proposal for setting aside artillery
11 from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps commander to the VRS Main Staff. And
12 Dr. Karadzic asked you whether this proposal, which was from
13 General Milosevic, was accepted and implemented, and you said, "I know
14 that it wasn't," and that was at T24439. Do you remember that?
15 A. I remember the proposal talked about using military cunning and
16 to place some of the nonfunctioning weapons into the reserve, but that
17 proposal by the Main Staff was not complied with as proposed.
18 Q. Well, let's have a look at P847, which is dated 9 February 1994.
19 And it's an order of the VRS Main Staff from General Milovanovic on
20 bringing artillery weapons from around Sarajevo -- pardon me, on bringing
21 artillery weapons around Sarajevo from the Hercegovina Corps and the
22 Drina Corps, and it says under paragraph 1:
23 "In the course of today and tomorrow the command of the SRK shall
24 move artillery from other positions towards Sarajevo, mainly inoperative
25 weapons, which will be put up at the appropriate firing positions around
1 Sarajevo. The commanders of the Herzegovina and Drina Corps shall put
2 the inoperative weapons unconditionally at the disposal of the commander
3 in order to disguise our intentions."
4 So the proposal which you say was not implemented on reading this
5 document is obviously a proposal on the implementation of this order from
6 General Milovanovic, isn't it?
7 A. As far as I can tell, there are some discrepancies here in terms
8 of time. This order by General Milovanovic - and I've never seen it
9 before - is dated the 9th of February, and the proposal is dated the
10 10th of February.
11 Q. Mr. Indjic. Mr. Indjic, that's completely unresponsive to the
12 question I asked you. The question I asked you was: The proposal which
13 you say wasn't implemented is, on reading this document, obviously a
14 proposal for the implementation of this order from General Milovanovic,
15 isn't it?
16 A. I see the order. However, I know what was placed under
17 UNPROFOR's control. In all of the UNPROFOR documents, you have lists
18 telling you exactly what types of artillery weapons, what exactly was
19 placed under control. It was all of the artillery that was available to
20 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that ended up being placed under control.
21 Q. Uh. So as I understand your evidence, the answer -- actually, I
22 don't understand that you've answered my question, but we'll move on.
23 Let's have a look at 65 ter 09150. It's a document dated
24 12 February 1994, from General Milovanovic to the corps commanders,
25 confirming that the apparent -- that the apparent withdrawal of heavy
1 weapons isn't actually a withdrawal and surrender, but, rather, a
2 manoeuvre of these weapons into various places around Sarajevo.
3 So not only does this document confirm the document that we've
4 just spoken about, P00847, it confirms the document you discussed, P1641,
5 General Milosevic's proposal was being effectively implemented. Isn't
6 that the case?
7 A. That is not the case. I'm saying that all of the artillery
8 weapons that were part of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were placed under
9 control. It was necessary because of the fear felt by the soldiers to
10 explain to all the men that this wasn't about surrendering their
11 artillery weapons. It was necessary to explain to them that the weapons
12 were still around, but none of the weapons remained outside UNPROFOR
13 control, fully functional or broken. It didn't really make any
14 difference. All of the artillery weapons were placed under their
16 I think the essence of what really matters is what actually
17 happened on the ground and not necessarily just the accompanying
18 documents. So what happened in actual reality on the ground is all of
19 the artillery weapons were placed under effective control.
20 Q. All right then. Let's have a look at some documents from your
21 forces that I think you would probably agree reflect what actually
22 happened on the ground.
23 Could we have a look, please, at P6016.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, may this document that we just
25 looked at be admitted? I think it would be useful for that -- to
1 understand the context and explain his answer.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Of course. My omission. Could this be a
3 Prosecution Exhibit, please.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6087, Your Honours.
6 MS. EDGERTON:
7 Q. So P6016 that you see on the screen in front of you is a
8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command document with a list of technical and
9 materiel equipment that has not been pulled out, and it's broken down by
11 Now, if you go down this list, you see, Mr. Indjic, the
12 Rajlovac Brigade has not pulled out a 40-millimetre gun, a T-55 tank.
13 The 3rd Sarajevo Brigade hasn't pulled out a T-55 tank and a
14 122-millimetre howitzer along with some mountain guns. The
15 Ilijas Brigade hasn't pulled out a 122-millimetre mortar and two T-55
17 So, Mr. Indjic, we could go down through this list, but this list
18 contradicts what you've just said in your testimony to the effect that
19 all the artillery weapons were placed under effective control.
20 A. It's quite obvious from the document that we're talking about,
21 the 21st of February. I have never seen this document before. I don't
22 know what was happening up and down the chain of control and command.
23 There may have been some initial attempts to avoid placing all the
24 artillery weapons under control, because this was the initial stage where
25 these weapons were being regrouped, so to speak, and there was a lot of
2 I stand by my previous statement. Finally all the
3 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps artillery was placed under UNPROFOR control.
4 Q. But you're now qualifying your previous statement, Mr. Indjic.
5 A. I'm qualifying my previous statement because I was not myself
6 part of the control and command chain. This is a report by the brigades
7 to the corps command. I was no party to this. I did know about the
8 check-points and the control that was conducted there, where the weapons
9 ended up.
10 Q. But, Mr. Indjic, among the documents that you discussed in your
11 testimony earlier this week, you indicated that you were part of a
12 committee with a view to establishing and ensuring the weapons collection
13 points and moving the weapons into those areas, and you're now saying you
14 weren't part of the command and control chain in that regard?
15 MS. EDGERTON: And I'll try and find the precise citation in a
16 moment, Your Honours. That was at T3 -- pardon me. That was at T32420.
17 Q. You said:
18 "I'm absolutely familiar with that. I was personally involved in
19 co-ordinating these activities in terms of pulling out anti-aircraft
21 And further --
22 MS. EDGERTON: We'll have to take a moment to find the citation,
23 Your Honour, given the witness's answer. Your indulgence.
24 We'll find the citation, because we all remember it, Your Honour,
25 but I wonder if Your Honours will allow for the witness to answer the
2 JUDGE KWON: Is it not 32420, line 1?
3 MS. EDGERTON: That's one of them. We're looking for the comment
4 with respect to an associated exhibit now, Your Honour.
5 We found it now, Your Honours. Your indulgence. The cite is
7 Q. Where, Mr. Indjic, you were asked by Dr. Karadzic, were you
8 familiar with the progress of the negotiations and how all these things
9 were being implemented regarding the exclusion area, the total exclusion
10 area? And your answer was:
11 "Yes I was a member of the delegation doing the negotiations and
12 was personally in charge of co-ordinating activities regarding the
13 grouping of these weapons.
14 A. It's all true as stated. I stand by that. I was involved in the
15 negotiations. Locations were determined where the heavy artillery
16 weapons would be collected. I co-ordinated all of the activities in
17 relation to that. UNPROFOR's arrival, weapons control, the drawing up of
18 lists, I don't see what's open to challenge there. If there was a ruse
19 somewhere between the corps commanders and the brigade commanders going
20 on, I wasn't interested in that. My job was to determine whether someone
21 was hiding weapons or not. My job was not to do that. My job was to
22 control the actual collection of the weapons.
23 Q. Let's go, before leaving this topic, to --
24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, just for planning purpose, you passed
25 two hours a while ago. How much longer do you need for your cross?
1 MS. EDGERTON: Twenty minutes, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well. And then for the record, could you
3 scroll back to -- oh, yes. Page 48, line 8. When you referred to
4 transcript page 24439, I take it it should read 32449.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, indeed. And my sincere apologies.
6 This has been a problem for months, and I'm particularly afflicted today.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please try to finish before the break.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, indeed.
9 Q. Now, you talked in your evidence yesterday -- pardon me, earlier
10 in the week about the removal of anti-aircraft guns from around the area
11 of the airport. Do you remember that?
12 A. Yes. Not just guns but anti-aircraft weapons, generally
14 Q. All right. Then let's have a look at P1650 [sic], and it's a
15 document from General Milosevic on the camouflaging of heavy weapons in
16 the 20-kilometre zone around Sarajevo, and it's dated 21 August 1994,
17 1670. 1670, please.
18 Now, this document talks about four Bofors anti-aircraft guns
19 which were located at firing positions on the MUP roof in Ilidza, and it
20 reports on General Rose's warning to General Milosevic to stop shooting
21 at UN planes with those guns and notes that they haven't been removed
22 despite previous warnings and orders - if we go over to page 2 in the
23 English we see the order displayed in the B/C/S - and orders that they be
24 removed to new firing positions where they will be camouflaged and
25 sheltered from air and ground recon.
1 So it seems, Mr. Indjic, that the anti-aircraft weapons that you
2 talked about in your evidence earlier this week that were removed in
3 1992, in fact, weren't removed at all and weren't removed following the
4 establishment of the total exclusion zone and weren't going to be removed
5 but were going to be camouflaged to prevent further identification by UN
6 forces, doesn't it?
7 A. That is not true. I think there's a general confusion of
8 concepts here. My statement about the withdrawal of anti-aircraft
9 weapons was about surrendering control over Sarajevo airport to UNPROFOR.
10 That's what it was about. So as part of this withdrawal effort,
11 check-points were toured in Sokolac and further afield, locations that
12 the weapons had been taken to. If you think that four Bofors guns are
13 all the anti-aircraft artillery weapons available to a corps-level
14 military unit, then I'm afraid you don't know much about the military.
15 I'm not trying to conceal anything. I'm not going to whether
16 anyone actually tried to conceal these four weapons. They may well have.
17 But I know what my job was, co-ordinating the artillery withdrawal
18 activities in keeping with the agreement.
19 Now, was there someone who failed to obey these orders? I don't
20 know, but I think the best thing for you would be to take it up with that
21 person. It wasn't my job.
22 Q. Now -- thank you. I'm going to -- I have two more questions for
23 you -- no, actually two small areas.
24 In today's transcript, at page 7, line 21, you responded to
25 Judge Kwon's questions explaining your roles during the first period of
1 the war, liaising with UNPROFOR in respect of the VRS in its entirety,
2 and from late 1993 onwards, liaising with UNPROFOR and providing
3 assistance only as regards the SRK area of operation.
4 But, in fact, as we've now seen, you were regularly called on to
5 assist and advise and interpret for General Mladic and other members of
6 the Main Staff. You were a member of multiple commissions at different
7 times, including mixed working group commissions between the UN and the
8 VRS, the State Commission for prisoners of war. You participated in the
9 negotiations of the total -- relating to the total exclusion zone, the
10 anti-sniping agreement, the withdrawal from Igman and Bjelasnica,
11 negotiations for the restoration of utilities, and you were negotiated --
12 or, pardon me, you were authorised to negotiate and sign the agreement on
13 prisoner exchange in Zepa.
14 So, actually, isn't this a more accurate depiction of your true
15 role within the Bosnian Serb Army?
16 A. I am grateful to you for showing this, and I am really proud now
17 of the time that I spent in the Army of Republika Srpska, because I --
18 I've almost forgotten all the good things that I've done there, and I
19 believe that this reflects the actual truth.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 A. Yes, I did all those things.
22 Q. And I apologise for interrupting you. Now, one last question --
23 series of questions.
24 Earlier this week you talked about your duties when the war was
25 over and we talked about them briefly today, and the reference earlier
1 this week is T32415. You said you became a member of the
2 410th Intelligence Centre and after leaving that, you were with the
3 security administration of the General Staff of the VRS until your
4 retirement. So could you tell me the period of time you worked in the
5 410th Intelligence Centre and the security administration?
6 A. I worked at the 410th Intelligence Centre from the end of the war
7 up until 2001, and I worked at the security administration from 2001
8 until my retirement.
9 Q. All right. And in that context, it's correct, isn't it, that you
10 would work together with Colonel Ljubisa Beara?
11 A. That's not correct. Colonel Ljubisa Beara was in charge of the
12 security organ during the war, and as an intelligence officer, I belonged
13 to the 410th Intelligence Centre. I know that it's hard for you to
14 understand this, but there is intelligence work and counter-intelligence
15 work, and Colonel Beara was in charge of counter-intelligence and had no
16 connecting points with me.
17 Now, as for the security administration, at the time it wasn't
18 Colonel Beara anymore but, rather, General Lugonja who was at its head.
19 Q. Let's have a look at 65 ter 24466, and it's a document dated
20 October 1996, in the VRS Main Staff sector for intelligence and security
21 affairs security department. 24466.
22 MS. EDGERTON: It is released, Your Honours. The speed at which
23 the system works sometimes defeats us. And this is the last two
24 questions, Your Honour.
25 All right. I can deal with the Serbian version on the page.
1 Thank you.
2 Q. Now, this document reports on a meeting you attended with Beara
3 and Mr. Latapi. Now you've just said that you had no connections with
4 Beara. This document shows the contrary. Did you have any connection
5 with Beara during the course of your work, any connection, yes or no?
6 A. I have explained, because you asked me about my service at the
7 410th centre and the administration -- security administration. Had you
8 asked me who Colonel Lafet [phoen] was, I would tell you that he was a
9 French intelligence officer, although the French would have a problem
10 with that because he was there as a French defence ministry person, but
11 my work was as an intelligence officer and that has nothing to do with
12 whether I had anything to do with Beara. Would you like now us to go
13 into some of the intelligence operations and investigations that were
14 done? Would you like me to testify here as an intelligence officer?
15 Q. No. My question is whether or not you had connection with Beara,
16 and even though you were at a meeting together with him as seen in this
17 document, you -- you maintain that you did not; is that correct?
18 A. I attended a meeting with Latapi together with Beara, and
19 specifically I had dealings with Latapi and not with Beara.
20 Q. Could we have a look at 65 ter 04416. And that, Mr. Indjic, is a
21 statement that General Milovanovic gave in writing to the RS government,
22 dated September 2004. And if we can go over to page 3 in both languages,
23 second paragraph on page 3 referring to the period at the beginning of
24 1997, we see General Milovanovic says:
25 "General Mladic stayed in Crna Rijeka with his security guards
1 who were supposed to protect him from being arrested by
2 The Hague Tribunal. In the beginning the commander of that powerful
3 security group was Colonel Ljubisa Beara."
4 So I'd like to put it to you, Mr. Indjic, that actually your
5 answer that you've just given is trying to distance you from
6 Colonel Beara in light of his involvement in protecting General Mladic at
7 the time.
8 A. No, that's not correct. I -- I'm not trying to distance myself.
9 Quite the contrary, I'm sorry I did not personally take part in providing
10 security to General Mladic. I wasn't given the opportunity.
11 MS. EDGERTON: I have nothing further, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 Shall we take a break before you start your re-examination,
14 Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Although we have a witness, before doing so, the
17 Chamber will issue an oral ruling.
18 I refer to the Prosecution's motion to exclude tu quoque evidence
19 of Witness Srdjan Sehovac filed on the 18th of January 2013, and the
20 accused's response to that motion filed on the 22nd of January, 2013.
21 The Chamber has reviewed the draft statement of Srdjan Sehovac
22 which bears 65 ter number 1D6070 in light of the Prosecution motion and
23 the accused's response and finds that the answers to questions 2, 3, 9
24 the last sentence only, 13, 15 to 18 inclusive, 23, 24, 35, 36(A)(c),
25 36(A)(d) of the statement which the Prosecution seeks to exclude falls
1 within the category of detailed evidence pertaining to crimes committed
2 against Bosnian Serbs which the Chamber has consistently excluded on the
3 grounds that it is irrelevant tu quoque evidence. Further, the Chamber
4 also considers that the answers to questions 8, 20, and 28 of the
5 statement are not relevant to the charges against the accused in the
7 The Chamber therefore grants the motion and excludes the answers
8 to questions 2, 3, 8, 9, in case of para 9, last sentence only, 13, 15 to
9 18 inclusive, 20, 23, 24, 28, 35, 36(A)(c) and 36(A)(d) of the statement
10 and will not admit the associated exhibits referred to therein. The
11 accused is ordered to upload a redacted version of Srdjan Sehovac's
12 statement which reflects this decision.
13 We'll break for -- before doing so, yes, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Mr. President. I'm at the Court's
15 disposal with respect to this but I wanted perhaps to raise a scheduling
16 issue that the Court might want to be -- to consider during the recess
17 because I think would certainly arise by the end of the day. So it's
18 just a very -- I can alert the Court to the nature of the problem before
19 it recesses if you wish.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I know that, particularly
22 in respect of this matter but in respect of related matters, the Court
23 has tried to leave scheduling in the hands of the parties to the extent
24 possible, but this is one matter which requires the Court to resolve, and
25 it concerns the timing of the commencement of the cross-examination for
1 Mr. Milosevic. The background to this issue, of course, is -- has been
2 previously discussed in court and includes the absence of a draft
3 statement or a 65 ter summary, the belated and recent provision of a kind
4 of substitute for the 65 ter summary which itself had deficiencies and
5 was topical in nature to a large degree, the belated and recent provision
6 of a list of documents to be used, half of which were not translated at
7 the time it was provided and so on, and I think these issues were
8 described in somewhat more detail in court earlier.
9 Now, the Defence position very correctly, and one which has been
10 appreciated, has been that there is indeed a notice problem and that as a
11 result it would willingly accommodate the Prosecution with whatever time
12 was reasonably needed before commencing cross, and this has been the
13 Defence's position even before we came to court and was, I think,
14 expressed in court on Monday as well.
15 Of course sometimes the devil is in the details and in discussion
16 yesterday with the Defence we advised of the period of time that we
17 considered under these circumstances appropriate before the commencement
18 of cross and indicated that we would wish five working days after the
19 conclusion of his cross before we commenced. The Defence responded that
20 it considered commencing on Monday in light of the -- in light of the
21 weekend to be reasonable. In -- in our view, that means there was no
22 accommodation since that's commencing in the normal course of business
23 but, more importantly, it doesn't reflect the circumstances here in a --
24 in a fair manner.
25 Now, we never considered that the understanding was that there
1 was an acknowledgement that the Defence would agree to whatever time it
2 deemed reasonable. We thought it would be a more objective reasonable
3 test, but nevertheless we tried to find a workable middle ground. That
4 wasn't successful. The Defence adhered to the view that commencing
5 immediately after cross, if it concluded, for example, on Monday, would
6 be sufficient.
7 Under these circumstances, we are trying to adjust as much as
8 reasonably possible bearing in mind that to some extent reasonableness
9 can differ in the minds of people, but -- so we are only seeking the most
10 modest of accommodations which mean the following: That we are asking
11 that assuming the cross-examination ends today, which I doubt is the
12 case, that the -- that the direct examination ends today, that the
13 cross-examination would commence on Wednesday, and if it ended on Monday,
14 unless it was only a very brief portion of Monday, that the
15 cross-examination would commence on Thursday. That is two days in
17 So that's our position, Mr. President. I thought it best to
18 advise you of the circumstances that had arisen so that the Court could
19 be considering it before the conclusion of the day.
20 JUDGE KWON: Probably now you understand how much pause you
21 should put between the question and answer. The French translation has
22 been only now completed.
23 MR TIEGER: I apologise to the translators, in particular to
24 Judge Lattanzi, and that was a painful way -- I think hopefully the
25 lesson is embedded, Mr. President. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, very briefly on this. We
3 obviously agree on the concept and normally we agree on what's
4 reasonable, but in this particular case we believed that since they had
5 all the material on last Sunday, that by commencing their
6 cross-examination on Tuesday they would have had basically eight or nine
7 days since they got the material to prepare for the cross-examination,
8 and we thought that was enough. But if you disagree, we will accommodate
9 whatever you order.
10 JUDGE KWON: What are you proposing us to do during those two
11 days in the interim, Mr. Tieger?
12 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, maybe I take him off the hook
13 a little bit there. We do have three witnesses that will be here proofed
14 on Sunday and could testify in that period if the Chamber ordered.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: We're prepared to proceed on those witnesses,
17 Mr. President.
18 JUDGE KWON: And you have no difficulty with conducting
19 cross-examination of those three witnesses?
20 MR. TIEGER: If -- unless something unexpected happens with their
21 proposed testimony in between, no, we don't have any. We're prepared to
22 proceed on cross-examination of those witnesses.
23 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will consider your submission and come
24 back to you in due course.
25 We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at 20 past 1.00.
1 [The witness stands down]
2 --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 1.23 p.m.
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 JUDGE KWON: In regard to your request, Mr. Tieger, the Chamber
6 sees no difficulty with accommodating it, but speaking for myself, I
7 would like to be able to -- we could start with cross-examination
8 immediately following the evidence of those three witnesses, but it
9 would -- but I'm not sure how long it will take.
10 MR. ROBINSON: I think about a day and a half.
11 JUDGE KWON: It's almost two days.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
13 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Tieger, would it be possible? But shall we
14 leave it there and see how it evolves?
15 MR. TIEGER: I think that's best, Mr. President, at this point,
17 JUDGE KWON: And that ensures hard working on the part of
18 Ms. Edgerton.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Always.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, your Excellencies.
22 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
23 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Colonel.
24 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
25 Q. Before we begin, I just need to ask for both of us to keep in
1 mind the necessity of breaks or pauses.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But before that I wanted to say,
3 Mr. President, that Madam Edgerton is probably the reason for the
4 generosity in granting this time. If you recall, the Prosecution had a
5 large story when we asked for the postponement of Witness Skiljevic. We
6 urge -- or, are in favour of flexibility, and we believe that the process
7 should be mutual.
8 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue. Yes.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, today on page 50 of the transcript, in
11 response to allegations that we avoided pulling the weaponry out and the
12 handing over of those weapons for the UN to monitor, you will recall that
13 this did happen. Do you remember when the agreement was signed to group
14 the weapons and place it under monitoring?
15 A. I cannot bring into my memory the date. I know that I looked at
16 the agreement, that it exists, but I cannot recall the date. It's not
17 coming into my memory.
18 Q. Can we look at 1D26670 in e-court, please. It's possible that
19 parts of this document have already been tendered under different
20 numbers, but this document should be viewed as a single document
21 consisting of two parts.
22 Is this the document that you thought you saw, that being the
23 agreement to place the weapons under monitoring and regarding the
24 unrestricted movement of UNPROFOR verification patrols?
25 A. Yes. This document was shown to me by the Defence. It was
1 signed at the top level and I know that after this document
2 organisational orders ensued as to the way in which this can be
4 Q. Thank you. And what is the date? When was this agreement
5 concluded? When was it signed?
6 A. 19 February 1994.
7 Q. Can you please look at the date again.
8 A. Ah. It was signed on the 18th and was meant to go into effect on
9 the 19th. In the paragraph -- the first paragraph it states that it is
10 to be effective from 1200 hours on the 19th of February, 1994.
11 Q. And was this followed by any kind of verbal agreement?
12 A. No. I don't know. I cannot remember.
13 Q. After this date, the 18th or the 19th of February, 1994, were
14 there any proposals or suggestions from General Milosevic or Milovanovic
15 about not respecting or about evading this agreement?
16 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 MS. EDGERTON: It's leading.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Well, we saw what was written on the 9th. Do you have any
22 information, knowledge, or any document indicating that after the signing
23 something similar was asked?
24 A. Well, I don't believe. I don't think that can be put in any
25 other way. I don't know. I don't have an answer to that question.
1 Q. Thank you. Can we look at page 2 of the document, please.
2 Do you remember this protocol of implementing -- can we look at
3 the last page, please, so that we can look at the date.
4 What is the date here?
5 A. 19th of February, 1994.
6 Q. Thank you. Can we go back to the previous page, page 2 of the
7 document, please.
8 Can you please tell us in relation to paragraph 1, which states
9 in the event that UNPROFOR withdraws for any reason from mutually agreed
10 sites without out agreement, what would be the rights to our weapons in
11 that case or in the event of Muslim attacks?
12 A. In paragraph 1, it states that in such a case, the
13 Army of Republika Srpska reserves the right to redeploy its weapons and
14 increase troop levels on the front line; while in the event of a Muslim
15 attack on the Serbs, which UNPROFOR is not able either to prevent or stop
16 immediately, the BSA reserves the right to implement adequate measures of
18 Q. Thank you. Did the UNPROFOR prevent a single attack by the
19 Muslim forces on the Army of Republika Srpska?
20 A. UNPROFOR did not prevent any attack, and I think that that is
21 understandable, because the general mandate of UNPROFOR was that it could
22 not use force except in the case of self-defence, defence of its own
24 Q. Thank you. Did the UNPROFOR ever call upon NATO to protect the
25 Serbian side by bombing Muslim positions?
1 A. I don't have such information, and as far as I know, this did not
2 happen, it did not.
3 Q. Thank you. And the condition from paragraph 2 that UNPROFOR must
4 return to Igman from where we withdrew in August 1993, actually, that the
5 Muslims should withdraw and the UNPROFOR should return.
6 A. Well, this was part of the demilitarisation agreement pertaining
7 to Igman and Bjelasnica.
8 Q. Can you please look at paragraph 6 where it states that neither
9 the Muslim or the Serb side will be allowed to extract military
10 advantages during the current pacification process in the Sarajevo
11 district? Did the Serb side extract any advantage and did the Muslim
12 side respect this agreement?
13 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
15 MS. EDGERTON: This is also leading.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very much.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Did the sides adhere to the conditions stated in paragraph 6?
19 A. Our side pulled out its heavy weaponry, fulfilling the conditions
20 set in the paragraph, and there was also the respect of the cease-fire.
21 That was also secured.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
23 document, please.
24 JUDGE KWON: This has been admitted. Do you have an exhibit
25 number, Ms. Edgerton?
1 MS. EDGERTON: Page 1 is P1820 and it's also page 1654. And we
2 all recognise the other pages as having been previously admitted. We
3 just have to track down the numbers, but they were Prosecution exhibits.
4 Sorry, they were Defence exhibits during the cross-examination of a
5 Prosecution witness. D717, possibly.
6 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed. If necessary, we'll come back to
7 this issue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now look at
9 1D01658, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I think that in the Serbian it was collated erroneously, so the
12 second page should be the first page. Without reading through the
13 document, can you please tell us how the commander of the
14 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps acted already on the 18th of February in view of
15 the Karadzic-Akashi agreement going into effect of the 19th of February?
16 What does it state here?
17 A. This is an operative order pursuant to the agreement where the
18 regrouping of weapons are provided for as covered under the agreement in
19 connection with the demilitarisation of Sarajevo. We're talking about
20 materiel and equipment of 12.7 millimetres and over.
21 Q. Can we now look at the page -- the first page in the Serbian.
22 Actually, can we look at the last page in both versions where we can see
23 the signature line with the signature of Galic, and can I ask you to read
24 the first sentence at the top of the page and to tell us what sanctions
25 the violators would be subject to.
1 A. The order precisely defines that --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me. One page prior to this
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The pages are not the same in the
5 Serbian and the English, if that's means anything to you. In the
6 Serbian, the order precisely defines that in the event of finding hidden
7 weaponry, the commanders would be subject to all criminal, moral, and
8 material responsibility.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Thank you. And does the order encourage or prompt any kind of
11 evasion of the agreement or the order?
12 A. No, quite the opposite. It orders the consistence -- consistent
13 respect of the agreement and threatens sanctions in the event that it is
14 not so.
15 Q. It seems that we're not looking at the same document.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The wrong document has been
17 uploaded. This document only has five paragraphs. This seems to be the
18 translation of 1D01659, and we need 58. The translation that we see is
19 the translation of document 1D01659. Can this previous document be
20 tendered, and if there is no translation, then perhaps the document can
21 be MFI'd.
22 JUDGE KWON: I lost that somewhere. What was the number of the
23 document we are seeing in B/C/S?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it's 1D01658.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And the translation -- yes. I don't think we
1 have the correct translation. I don't know the reason.
2 Are you done with this document, Mr. Karadzic?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I would like to tender
4 it, and if we don't find the document, MFI.
5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
6 MS. EDGERTON: Marked for identification, the Serbian version
7 marked for identification --
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll do that.
9 MS. EDGERTON: -- pending translation.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D2800, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I congratulate on it being a round
12 number, 2800. And can we now look at 1D01659. The English should remain
13 on the monitor, because that is the correct translation for that
14 document. This has been put together erroneously as well. Can we look
15 at page 2. That seems to be the title, the correct title page.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, this is a regular combat report.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have that in English too.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. The date is the 19th of February, 1994. Item 2, "Our forces."
21 What exactly were our forces doing?
22 A. It says here units are preparing and carrying out tasks related
23 to moving TMS, technical equipment and materiel, over 12.7 millimetre in
24 calibre. Fuel and food are being resupplied and an inventory, records of
25 equipment that will remain at the positions are being compiled.
1 Q. Thank you very much. Is that consistent with your information on
2 agreement compliance and everything that was done afterwards?
3 A. This was the activity that ensued once the order had been
4 received on the regrouping of forces. So this is confirms that the order
5 is being implemented.
6 Q. Thank you very much. Can we please move on to the next page.
7 It's the first page in this document, because the Serbian has two pages
8 only. And in the English document it's paragraph 8, item 8, at the very
9 end of the document.
10 Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, item 8, the third bullet point, our
11 units have -- what does it say there?
12 A. Our units have, with maximum effort, taken steps to adhere to the
13 measures ordered with regard to complying with the cease-fire and moving
14 TMS artillery pieces over 12.7 millimetre.
15 Q. Is that in keeping with your information?
16 A. Yes, this is also about a consistent implementation of the
17 agreement. It even goes a step further than that. They're trying to
18 make sure that a cease-fire prevails quite regardless of the fact that in
19 paragraph 1 -- or, rather, the first bullet point here you see that the
20 Muslims are continuing with their engineering work throughout the
21 cease-fire and are continuing to take and capture territory by doing
23 Q. Do you still remember -- perhaps we should go back to the first
24 page. Is this a secret document? Is it classified?
25 A. Yes. My answer is whenever you have a combat report, it's always
1 classified to some degree.
2 Q. Thank you very much.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document please be
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2801, Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D00401.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, this is an interim --
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 MS. EDGERTON: I think that's already been admitted as D2517.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's possible.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This is an interim report concerning the withdrawal of heavy
16 weapons by General Galic. Who is this report for?
17 A. It's for the President of Republika Srpska and that was you at
18 the time, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, about the civilian authorities in Hadzici
19 trying to get in the way of the implementation of this agreement,
20 specifically the municipal president, Mr. Ratko Radic.
21 Q. Thank you. Line 8 in paragraph 2, that same meeting. At that
22 meeting lack of confidence was expressed.
23 A. At that meeting, lack of confidence was expressed in the position
24 that had been taken with it being stressed that the Supreme Command and
25 the corps commander should have submitted an order in writing on the
1 withdrawal and relocation of the weapons.
2 Q. And then the last page.
3 A. Despite being urged to respect the recommendations of the
4 Supreme Commander, those from the brigade commands and the SRK were
5 present, were unable to convince him to respect them. End of quote. In
6 this case, the VRS did not have the authority on the ground -- did not
7 have any authority over the local civilian authorities. For that reason,
8 the corps commander addresses the president, pleading with him to use his
9 authority to try and get the local civilian authorities to comply with
10 the implementation of the agreement.
11 Q. Thank you very much. What about the Serb part of Hadzici? What
12 was in position vis-a-vis the enemy, and what about the concern expressed
13 here by the civilian authorities? Was that a justified concern or was it
14 simple arrogance?
15 MS. EDGERTON: It's leading and outside of the scope of the
16 cross-examination, Your Honours. We never discussed Hadzici.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is a corps and its artillery,
18 and that implies everything within a 20-kilometre radius around Sarajevo.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but the -- you should have stopped after
20 "authorities." The last sentence was very much leading. Do you follow,
21 Mr. Karadzic? We'll allow the question.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you remember the question, sir?
24 A. Yes. The concern felt and expressed by the civilian authorities
25 in Hadzici is perfectly understandable. The Hadzici municipality was in
1 a really difficult spot. The most difficult spot of all, the
2 municipalities within the Sarajevo general area. It was quite isolated
3 to the west, and in the eventuality of a Muslim attack from Mount Igman
4 or from Kiseljak, they would have been entirely unable to defend
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: I note that the number D2517 was marked for
9 identification due to the lack of B/C/S original. So now it's time to
10 admit it full. Do you have any objection, Ms. Edgerton?
11 MS. EDGERTON: None.
12 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
13 JUDGE KWON: I was informed that the English translation in both
14 versions are a bit different. Do you have any suggestion, Ms. Edgerton?
15 MS. EDGERTON: I would probably invite my colleagues to send this
16 to CLSS for a revised translation. My simple recommendation.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no time to check, but
18 perhaps the service itself should check the translation for accuracy.
19 May I continue?
20 JUDGE KWON: We'll use the previous D2517, and we'll add this
21 original to that, and then that will simplify the procedure. Let's
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01660. Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, here we see another regular combat report
1 dated the 20th of February. Number 2, "Our forces," the second
2 paragraph, please. You don't have to read everything word by word, but
3 just tell us generally what the Main Staff of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
4 command is telling us about here.
5 A. What is being reported here is the withdrawal of weapons in
6 keeping with the agreement. As for the weapons that for one reason or
7 the other were not moved, these same weapons were inspected by the UN.
8 Q. What about UNPROFOR activities? Paragraph 3 under (a). There
9 was a meeting that was held, and what exactly did UNPROFOR say there?
10 A. It was a meeting with the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija
11 Corps, General Galic. The Secretary-General's envoy expresses the
12 satisfaction with gratitude to the Serbian side on their efforts to
13 implement the agreement on the withdrawal of artillery pieces. He
14 visited the military barracks and saw for himself that the equipment had
15 been withdrawn.
16 Q. Please press on.
17 A. A meeting was held between General Galic and General Soubirou
18 where details of some problems were discussed with regard to the
19 withdrawal, and it was all successfully resolved.
20 Q. Thank you. Lieutenant-Colonel, were the proposals of
21 General Milosevic adopted, General Milosevic and others who invoked
22 caution on the 9th of February?
23 A. As I said before, the proposals were not adopted, and the
24 agreement was implemented as concluded.
25 Q. In your opinion, what was the view that ordinary soldiers among
1 their own ranks took regarding that in Hadzici and elsewhere?
2 A. We all took a dim view of that agreement, because we were afraid
3 of the possibility that the clashes would escalate. Nevertheless, we
4 tried to act as true professionals and comply with everything, every
5 single thing that was agreed.
6 Q. Can we move on to the next page, please, and tell us about
7 item 5, morale and security. You don't have to read it out out loud.
8 Just tell us whether it's perfectly consistent with everything that you
9 have yourself been telling us.
10 A. Yes. It's consistent. It reflects the morale among the troops
11 on the ground and how unhappy they were about this withdrawal of weapons,
12 artillery weapons. People were afraid -- were afraid of what that
13 withdrawal might give way to. The ordinary soldiers there saw this as
14 some kind of defeat.
15 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, I was the person who concluded that
16 agreement. What sort of reputation did I enjoy with the soldiers at the
17 time? How did they see me?
18 A. I'm really sorry to have to say this, but your reputation was not
19 really the best at the time.
20 Q. And that would mean what exactly?
21 A. People felt that this was some sort of betrayal.
22 Q. Thank you very much.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted,
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 2802, Your Honours.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Given the anger felt by the soldiers and given the caution
4 expressed previously by Mr. Radic, the civilian authorities in Hadzici,
5 given the view that the soldiers took of me at the time, were they
6 justified in feeling this anger? Were the Muslims acting in compliance
7 with the cease-fire or --
8 JUDGE KWON: If you're not able to conduct your examination
9 properly, then the Chamber is thinking about asking the counsel to
10 take -- take up your role. Please heed to the advice of the Chamber to
11 refrain from making -- asking leading questions.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, was the cease-fire being complied with, the
15 cease-fire that had previously caused us to surrender our weapons?
16 A. It was obvious based on what happened later on that the
17 cease-fire did not spell an end to the war. It was just one of many
19 Q. Thank you. What was the reason for that?
20 A. Once this cease-fire took effect, it was soon violated by the
21 Muslims, and then the fighting continued.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D7033, please. Thank you. Can we
23 please zoom in.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Sir, are you familiar with this document? What is it?
1 A. One of the commitments of the agreement that was concluded was to
2 monitor and regularly report on any violations of the cease-fire. This
3 report covers several days during which violations committed by the
4 Muslims occurred.
5 Q. Thank you very much. Can we please go to page 3 in relation to
6 the 19th and 20th of February. And the agreement had just been signed.
7 So who was in charge of this on a minute-to-minute basis, and who
8 was it who was informed about these violations?
9 A. This was kept by the hour at the corps command. The duty
10 operations officer would receive reports from brigade commanders
11 according to a pre-established schedule. Violation reports would be
12 received and forwarded to the UNPROFOR command.
13 Q. And what was their reaction to our reports?
14 A. Normally there would be no response from UNPROFOR. Did they do
15 anything about it? Did they speak to the Muslim side about this? I
16 don't really know, but even if that was the case, it certainly led to
17 nothing, because the Muslim violations continued.
18 Q. Thank you very much.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted, please.
20 MS. EDGERTON: I think this is probably the first document in the
21 redirect where Dr. Karadzic asked one kind of question to establish some
22 basis for the witness to be able to comment on the document, and he asked
23 whether he was familiar with it, and although he didn't say -- the
24 witness didn't say specifically how he might be familiar with it, I think
25 he gave enough context for it to be admitted, but I just wanted to put a
1 marker down for any further documents that Dr. Karadzic intends on using.
2 JUDGE KWON: We haven't heard from the witness from where this
3 document was from and who produced it, for what purpose.
4 Do you know, that Mr. Indjic?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I explained a
6 while ago that the operations duty officer at the corps command was in
7 charge of keeping such documents based on information received from the
8 brigades. This type of document would then be translated and submitted
9 to UNPROFOR for their information so that they would be informed of any
10 cease-fire violations. So this document passed through my office.
11 JUDGE KWON: So this document was produced by you. It's a
12 compilation of information gathered in such a way.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The document was compiled by
14 the duty operations officer at the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command. It
15 would then be forwarded by my office to UNPROFOR command.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. What about lines 11 through 14 and page 8? I thought that was
18 sufficiently clear. Seventy-eight, 78. The previous page. At lines 11
19 through 14, page 78. What is stated there among other things is that the
20 lieutenant-colonel forwarded these reports to UNPROFOR.
21 JUDGE KWON: For example, do you know when this report was
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you look at this report, it
24 covers the period between the 10th and the 20th of February, 1994. So
25 this was not one of the daily reports. This was part of the agreement to
1 report on any cease-fire violations. So we would take a week or a
2 fortnight, and after a week or a fortnight we would inform UNPROFOR about
3 any cease-fire violations.
4 JUDGE KWON: My question is whether you know when this document
5 was written.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] February 1994.
7 JUDGE KWON: For example, can you show the witness page 29,
8 whatever -- how can a document that was produced in February deals with
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Then probably this was an analysis
11 of the entire period and all the violations during that period. It's
12 very difficult for me to answer any questions about the document when I
13 can't see the document in its entirety.
14 JUDGE KWON: But you testified earlier on just a minute ago that
15 it is a report passed by you to the UNPROFOR, in answer to the question
16 from myself whether it is a compilation of some information.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the report would have
18 been pointless had it not been submitted to UNPROFOR.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic. Just --
20 given the position of the Prosecution, we'll admit this.
21 MS. EDGERTON: And can I just add a codicil to my position. When
22 I answered Your Honour's question, I was raising on the basis of what I
23 had seen in e-court. Subsequent to that, I opened the document in my own
24 e-court and found it to be a 63-page document. The date's up until
25 November 1994.
1 JUDGE KWON: 37 pages in B/C/S.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Quite so.
3 JUDGE KWON: But you do not object to the admission of this
5 MS. EDGERTON: Actually, could I have your indulgence for a
6 moment, Your Honour?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 [Prosecution counsel confer]
9 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I don't object to the part discussed
10 in court, and for the remainder of the document it's contrary to what the
11 witness has expressly said. On that basis I think it's useful -- no. I
12 don't object to the part that was discussed in court. For the remainder,
13 I think Dr. Karadzic can deal with it with another witness.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Should I answer?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is re-examination. I was not
18 going to tender this document through this witness. However, there are
19 suspicions that have been expressed about our actions concerning the
20 withdrawal of artillery weapons and the cease-fire compliance. I sort of
21 took the witness by surprise. He should have been given a chance to go
22 through the document in its entirety because the violations occurred on a
23 daily basis. So I'm not being fair to the witness because I'm not giving
24 him a chance to go through this document. He saw a page dated February,
25 so he was speaking about February. If I had given him the whole document
1 and some time to go through it and see for himself, he would have
2 addressed the document and the entire time-frame.
3 JUDGE KWON: To my memory, the witness has not given us a
4 satisfactory explanation as to the provenance of this document, so I
5 think it's fair enough to admit only those parts commented upon by the
6 witness. I leave it to the Registry in assistance with the parties to
7 indicate what date it was that was commented upon by the witness.
8 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
9 JUDGE KWON: Page 3 in B/C/S. So we'll admit only that page.
10 Shall we give the number.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2803, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: If necessary, you can adduce evidence with
13 assistance of other witnesses. Let's continue.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, this was from your corps. Then what about
17 the Main Staff? Were there more comprehensive documents and protests
18 lodged by the Main Staff that might tie in with an overview such as the
19 present document?
20 MS. EDGERTON: Can Dr. Karadzic be asked to rephrase his
21 question, but maybe there's no point now.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. What did the Main Staff do about this?
24 A. I can't respond to that question. As I said, the liaison office
25 for the UN was established at Pale, so all the correspondence through to
1 UNPROFOR went through that liaison office. That being the reason, I'm in
2 no position to answer your question.
3 Q. Thank you very much.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have these daily
5 protests that were submitted to UNPROFOR, but we'll get to that at a
6 later stage.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, you were asked some questions about the
9 exchange of prisoners in July and August 1995. Did you ever receive
10 instructions from any officers or VRS commands to avoid the issue of
11 prisoner exchange from Srebrenica?
12 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, objection again. Again it's a
13 leading question. He's suggesting the answers to the witness.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, I disagree with that. I
15 don't want to state it necessarily in the presence of the witness, but if
16 you read that question, which I wrote and gave it to Dr. Karadzic, that
17 does not suggest either a yes or no answer. The witness is free to
18 answer that question either yes or no, and that is not a leading question
19 in my book.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE KWON: I will allow the witness to ask -- I'm sorry, allow
22 the accused to ask that question. The Chamber will allow it.
23 Do you remember the question? Yes, please proceed.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. The issue of the
25 exchange of prisoners was an issue that was dealt with by a government
1 body in charge of prisoner exchanges at the head of which was
2 Dragan Bulajic. I attended the meetings as a liaison officer rather than
3 a member of the exchange commission. I never received personally from
4 anyone any suggestion regarding the issue of the imprisoned -- the
5 persons taken prisoner in Srebrenica.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Thank you. Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, you attended some
8 meetings. Did you ever observe or notice that the Serb side, which was
9 in charge of the prisoner exchanges, differentiated when it came to
10 exchanges of prisoners from Srebrenica as opposed to any other area?
11 A. All of the meetings from 1992 until the end of the war that dealt
12 with prisoner exchanges, in all of them the Serb side always had the same
13 position and that was that prisoners should be exchanged all for all.
14 Q. [In English] Did you ever observe whether -- or noticed whether
15 the Serb side as opposed [no interpretation] [In English] in comparison
16 to [Interpretation] So the question was: Was there any difference in the
17 treatment of the prisoners from Srebrenica or prisoners that were held by
18 Serbs from other areas?
19 A. The meetings which I attended -- at the meetings which I
20 attended, there was never any special treatment of this issue of
21 prisoners from Srebrenica. The position was always that there should be
22 an all-for-all exchange.
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. You admit that there was a
24 discussion about prisoners from Srebrenica. Can I take your answer to
25 mean that there was actually a discussion about the prisoners from
1 Srebrenica, which is not different from any other previous discussion?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can recall that Amor Masovic
3 asked in one of the meetings that the -- the negotiations should include
4 the persons from Srebrenica. Now, because there was no information, that
5 neither Amor Masovic as a Muslim representative nor anyone from our side
6 had any information about the number of persons from Srebrenica, that
7 issue remained open and no further negotiations were led on it.
8 JUDGE KWON: No. The question from Mr. Karadzic was whether
9 there's a change in the Serb side as regards the prisoners from
10 Srebrenica, and then you said there's no difference in the treatment of
11 prisoners from Srebrenica. But how -- how can you discuss your -- the
12 treatment of prisoners from Srebrenica if you knew nothing about it.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can talk about it because
14 what I'm saying is that the general position was always that any of -- at
15 all of the meetings that the exchange should be all for all. The
16 Srebrenica prisoners were not included in these negotiations because
17 there were never -- there was never any information, specific
18 information, about these people, the numbers, or anything like that.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Was the Serb side trying to avoid this exchange of prisoners from
23 Srebrenica? That's what the point of my question was when I asked
24 whether there was any difference in their treatment, because in this
25 document it says that Mladic offered that prisoners should be exchanged
1 all for all.
2 A. I have no information, I repeat, that there was ever any attempt
3 to avoid discussions of any part of the -- about any part of the
4 territory when it came to prisoner exchanges, and I repeat, the position
5 was always that they should be exchanged all for all.
6 Q. Thank you. Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, you were going to say
7 something about the role of the liaison officer. Could I now invite you
8 to explain this to us, and especially to point out the positions that the
9 liaison officer puts forth and what the degree of his autonomy is in this
10 in reporting the positions of the superior command.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes?
12 MS. EDGERTON: Again Dr. Karadzic is, in my submission, leading
13 the witness.
14 JUDGE KWON: In what part is this question leading?
15 MS. EDGERTON: The degree of autonomy. Inviting him to talk
16 about the degree of autonomy in his reporting vis-a-vis the positions of
17 the superior command.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Karadzic, can you restrict your question to
21 "Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, you were going to say something about
22 the role of the liaison officer."
23 Can it be kept within those bounds?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely, your Excellency.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So could the witness please now reply to the question as you
2 phrased it.
3 A. It is obvious that there is insufficient understanding or a
4 misunderstanding of the role of the liaison officer, and that's why I
5 asked to be allowed to explain it. A liaison officer has absolutely no
6 command role of any kind, nor can he or she take any decisions
7 independently. A liaison officer must consistently report what one party
8 relates to the other, and in addition, in a technical sense, we as
9 liaison officers were duty-bound to forward communications and
10 correspondence, to take part in organising meetings, in monitoring the
11 implementation of certain agreements that were reached. We had to
12 provide constant communication between the Main Staff of the VRS and the
13 UNPROFOR command, to assist in all humanitarian actions including
14 humanitarian convoys, repairs to infrastructures and similar. As a
15 liaison officer, knowing the situation on the ground, I could put forth
16 certain suggestions to my commander, telling him how I saw the situation
17 and propose what he might do, but it was his decision, and my duty was to
18 consistently implement that, his order.
19 Q. Thank you. On page 14 of today's transcript, you were asked
20 about a meeting at the Jela restaurant and what you knew about crimes.
21 Now, the two generals who were at this meeting, Smith and Mladic,
22 did they discuss, did they talk about this issue, the crimes, while you
23 were there?
24 A. I did not hear any mention of any crimes while I was present at
25 the said meeting.
1 Q. Thank you. On pages 12 and 13, you said, and you repeated this
2 on several occasions, that you had some 100 communications with Mladic.
3 How did this happen? Was it oral, in writing? Was it face-to-face? So
4 technically speaking, what kind of communications did you have with him?
5 A. All of the ones that you mentioned. So phone conversations,
6 letters or reports in writing, if it was necessary to put forth a
7 proposal or submit a report, up until going and seeing in person
8 General Mladic at his command.
9 Q. Thank you. Did you and Mladic talk about crimes? Did you
10 exchange any information about this at the Jela restaurant outside of
11 what was said during the meeting itself?
12 A. No. I was not a member of the Main Staff of Republika Srpska,
13 and General Mladic never informed me about things that I did not need in
14 my work.
15 Q. Thank you. You were asked about certain reports -- or, rather,
16 reporting in the foreign media. Did you have access to the foreign press
17 on a daily basis? Did you receive them? Did you receive the papers that
18 brought those reports and articles that you were shown here?
19 A. As the liaison officer who liaised with UNPROFOR and other
20 members of the international community, and thanks to the fact that I
21 understand English, I was able to get information from the press, the
22 foreign press, and the reports that they published on various issues.
23 Q. But have you read any of the articles that were shown to you by
24 Madam Edgerton, by Mr. Block or others about the allegations about the
25 developments after the fall of Srebrenica?
1 A. No, I haven't. The first time I read anything about Srebrenica
2 and learned detailed information about Srebrenica was when I received a
3 Dutch report of many pages which analysed the events in Srebrenica.
4 Q. When was is this, what year?
5 A. This was after the war.
6 Q. What do you know about the accuracy and fairness of reporting of
7 the foreign media?
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Before you answer the question.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Their unbiased reporting.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
12 MS. EDGERTON: I think now, Your Honours, we may be just getting
13 a little bit outside of the scope of cross-examination when we begin to
14 talk about the bias of the media, but I --
15 JUDGE KWON: Did you not put some news clippings from news media.
16 MS. EDGERTON: I put one report by Mr. Block which the witness
17 said he had not -- sorry. I put one report by Mr. Block and one AP
18 article which the witness said corresponded to and supplemented the
19 evidence he gave in paragraph 171.
20 JUDGE KWON: I think you also put an AFP clipping as well.
21 MS. EDGERTON: I think we might be referring to the same
22 clipping, but perhaps not. I'm not disagreeing with you, Your Honours.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will allow the question.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will answer this simply by saying
1 that the general opinion in Republika Srpska was prevailed that the Serbs
2 have lost the media war. It is easy for me to understand why we had lost
3 this media war, because there were war correspondents in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and war correspondents need blood and flesh and not
5 us. So all our Serb efforts to end the war and our efforts for peace
6 were not really that interesting. It was necessary to find the places
7 where war was going on and find bloody scenes. So my answer is that I
8 feel that the war correspondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina were generally
9 partial, biased, and that they actually contributed because they were
10 partial in their reporting to the continuation of the war.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 3 it says "us" whereas the
12 witness said "we."
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. So would you please clarify that. You said that they needed --
15 A. Well, we didn't need stories about peace.
16 Q. Thank you. Just a few more questions. Could you tell the
17 Trial Chamber at the time of the events in Srebrenica, were there any
18 other developments, war events, around Sarajevo and in Republika Srpska?
19 What was happening in military terms in those days in Republika Srpska?
20 MS. EDGERTON: [Microphone not activated] I'm not sure either how
21 this arises from the cross-examination, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated] Mr. Karadzic -- just a
23 second. Mr. Karadzic -- can you hear me?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. I can hear you in my
25 earphones but also in the courtroom.
1 JUDGE KWON: Can you explain how it arises from the
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I would like to
4 know -- I would like to hear what events were in the focus of
5 Colonel Indjic's interest. Was it Srebrenica alone, and was he supposed
6 to know more about it or not? What all else was happening in military
7 terms? There was expressed a suspicion here about his knowledge --
8 JUDGE KWON: No. Just a second. You don't have to continue.
9 Point taken. Please continue.
10 Or do you remember the question, Mr. Indjic?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do remember the question,
12 although it is hard now to assess all that was happening in the area --
13 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but simply put, war was still
14 on, so there was a war going on.
15 As for Srebrenica and everything that relates to Srebrenica, I
16 can only reiterate once again with great certainty that I was never
17 involved in any way, nor did I have any information about Srebrenica at
18 that time.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. Do you remember did Mount Dinara fall, and at what
21 time of the year was it? This was -- this is between us and the
22 Knin Krajina.
23 A. I am aware of all of these final days, but I don't know the
25 Q. Very well. I withdraw that question. The last question:
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, do you remember how the international community,
2 the international public opinion, and the UN included, how they treated
3 and dealt with the crisis surrounding Cerska? Could you tell us about
4 it? And could you tell us whether you can see any parallels between the
5 way Srebrenica was treated and Cerska 93?
6 A. I don't have any views of that. I don't have any knowledge of
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well. Never mind then.
9 Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel, sir.
10 Questioned by the Court:
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Indjic, transcript page 28 -- 7289, earlier on
12 today in answer -- in answer to the question put by Ms. Edgerton, which
13 was related your knowledge whether there's a claim from the Muslim part
14 or the international community as regards the fate of missing persons
15 from Srebrenica, I'll read out the question:
16 "Even the Bosnian authorities by that point in time, by the 20th
17 of July, 1995, knew that their men in Srebrenica were missing, and you
18 claim you know nothing."
19 And you answered:
20 "I still claim that I didn't know anything and that they did know
21 about it. Of course they did. They organised it themselves."
22 And you -- you were asked to clarify what you meant by "they
23 organised it themselves," and you referred to a meeting with
24 Mr. Izetbegovic in 1993.
25 Now that we heard from you that you came to know about what
1 happened in Srebrenica after reading -- after the war, after reading the
2 NIOD report, et cetera, I really don't understand what you meant, but the
3 Muslims organised it themselves. Can you answer the question?
4 A. Well, I will say a few things. In 1993, the leadership of
5 Srebrenica asked Alija Izetbegovic to provide a solution, because
6 Srebrenica could not survive as it was, and Alija Izetbegovic replied
7 decisively that -- that the Americans wanted him to show 3.000 dead so
8 that they could take action against the Serb side.
9 The next thing: Before the Srebrenica operation - and I learned
10 of this late -- Naser Oric, a division commander, and the entire Muslim
11 leadership pulled out of Srebrenica. So they were not there while the --
12 the Srebrenica operation was in place. And the people who were supposed
13 to be sacrificed for the benefit of obtaining NATO intervention, they
14 were the ones who remained in Srebrenica. That's what I was trying to
16 JUDGE KWON: What do you know about Srebrenica at this time,
17 2013? Do you still claim that you know nothing about it?
18 A. Now I know almost everything about it, but not as a person who
19 participated in its -- in it personally, but as a person who made an
20 effort to try and find out what happened.
21 JUDGE KWON: Are you of the -- are you still of the view that it
22 was organised by the Muslims themselves?
23 A. I still think that this was organised by the Muslims with the
24 help of their masters - and I'm not going to name them here - whereas the
25 crime itself was committed by the Serb forces, but this was organised by
1 Muslims plus someone else.
2 JUDGE KWON: What did you refer to when it was organised by the
3 Muslims? You mean the killing of Muslim people?
4 A. I meant the operation against Srebrenica. So Srebrenica was a
5 safe area, but it was not demilitarised. And there were persistent
6 combat operations launched from Srebrenica in order to provoke an
7 operation against Srebrenica.
8 JUDGE KWON: The question has consistently been about the fate of
9 Muslim able-bodied men who are allegedly missing. So the question was
10 about the death of those able-bodied men. Do you say that it was
11 organised by the Muslims?
12 A. The Muslims organised and provoked this entire operation, but the
13 killing of these people was committed by the Serb forces as a consequence
14 of what had been organised, because it was never the objective to
15 accomplish peace in that area, to demilitarise Srebrenica and seize with
16 combat operations. It was necessary to provoke the Serb side so that
17 they would launch an operation that would lead to casualties, and it was
18 well known that they knew that there would be casualties, because in --
19 in Srebrenica there were people who were encircled, and in the brigades
20 that attacked -- that were attacking, there were people who had lost
21 their loved ones in 1993 when their villages were attacked by Muslim
22 forces and Naser Oric at their head. So it was known that there would be
23 such a development afterward.
24 JUDGE KWON: You just said that Srebrenica was not demilitarised.
25 In this regard, today you said at transcript page 4, lines 21, 22, you
1 stated that Security Resolution was not reasonable. Do you remember
2 having said that? Could you expand -- explain it in a bit further detail
3 why do you think it was unreasonable?
4 A. Yes. I remember saying that, and I stand by that personal
5 opinion. It's a personal opinion. The Resolution was not reasonable for
6 the following reasons: Firstly, there is no definition of a protected
7 area. That definition is not recorded anywhere, not such a definition
8 that would give legal basis to that Resolution.
9 Secondly, it is not possible for someone to be protecting an area
10 and yet in that area there are armed individuals and weapons. How, then,
11 can you achieve protection?
12 Finally, and again this was an erroneous attitude, if you ask me,
13 creating a protected area in the middle of a war is an absurdity. Those
14 creating such areas, had they wished to end the war, instead of creating
15 these areas they could have come up with the Dayton Accords already at
16 this point. The matter is the ratio of territory that had by this time
17 been taken by the one side, and the other side was perhaps deemed to be
18 unfavourable by someone. So everything that I've just said is my
19 personal opinion. I would like to underline that.
20 JUDGE KWON: Did you have frequent contact with Mr. David Harland
21 at that time while you were in Sarajevo?
22 A. I couldn't say that we were frequently in touch. I met him
23 whenever he came to the mixed military group meetings which I attended in
24 my capacity as liaison officer. But I know he was married in the way
25 that I described.
1 JUDGE KWON: Did you ever discuss with Mr. Harland about your
2 impression or opinion on the with -- the Security Resolution, the UN
3 Security Council's Resolution about it being unreasonable?
4 A. Probably. Whenever I could, I would talk to Mr. Andreev and
5 others, and I would tell them my personal view on the issue, and that is
6 what I'm doing now. My opinion remains unchanged.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland testified here at the Tribunal that
8 the -- to the effect that the obligation placed on UNPROFOR to try to
9 deter Serb attacks by all means necessary was not predicated on the
10 Bosnian government previous demilitarisation of the areas. Do you agree
11 with his observation, and was that the reason why you think
12 Security Council Resolution is not reasonable?
13 A. I do not agree with that observation. The agreement was crystal
14 clear, and it was understood that the protected areas must be
15 demilitarised. The agreement is crystal clear about that, entirely
16 unambiguous. No weapons were to remain inside those areas.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Unless there's a question for you from
18 my colleagues, that concludes your evidence.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I --
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am grateful to you, your
23 Excellency, for underlying this question in relation to Harland. Could
24 we just have P820 briefly.
25 JUDGE KWON: What is your point, Mr. Karadzic?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says here that the Muslims knew
2 what had happened, whereas Harland says that the Bosniaks themselves were
3 not even sure at this point as to what had happened. That's one thing.
4 And the other was to actually bring up the demilitarisation agreement.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: I don't think I raised a question about Srebrenica
7 vis-a-vis Mr. Harland.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, you have read the
9 question by Ms. Edgerton, page 29, implying that the Muslims knew what
10 had occurred, whereas Harland in his report claims that the Bosniaks had
11 not yet realised what happened.
12 JUDGE KWON: I would not allow the first question. And what is
13 your second point?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In answer to your question at
15 page 96, line 5, about the -- demilitarising the protected areas.
16 Defence Exhibit P3 --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: There is too much
18 background noise for us to be able to hear the witness -- the accused.
19 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat. Could you tell us first what
20 point -- what your point is, what point you are going to raise.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just clarify whether it's in
22 fact true that the areas were to be demilitarised or not, and who was in
23 charge of of demilitarising them? This has been challenged but the
24 witness stands by his previous statement. The document shows exactly
25 what the witness said. It is consistent with what the witness said.
1 There is an obligation to demilitarise and pull the weapons out. If we
2 can produce that document. That is the gist of what I'm asking. 1D5356.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll allow you to put that question, but
6 subject to the Prosecution may have some question for its cross if
8 Yes. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
9 Further re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Who was in charge of implementing the
11 demilitarisation agreement in the protected areas, to the best of your
13 A. Above all, the Muslim authorities who signed the agreement. As
14 for the control and monitoring of the implementation, that was up to the
15 UN, and they were supposed to confirm that demilitarisation had been
17 Q. Thank you very much. 1D5356. That is the agreement. We need to
18 be looking specifically at item 4. This is page 2 in the Serbian and
19 also page 2 in the English.
20 JUDGE KWON: I think we have it already our exhibit,
21 Exhibit D135.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Possibly.
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a -- were you referring to the agreement?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. This is a telegram
25 containing information about the agreement.
1 JUDGE KWON: Let's take a look at D135. Is this it,
2 Mr. Karadzic?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that's admitted. I wanted
4 to have the telegram admitted, but we can track it down.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. What does Article 2 say? Lieutenant-Colonel, Article 2, please.
7 Tell us what it's about.
8 A. On the ground, the demilitarised zone shall be marked by UNPROFOR
9 by means of boards on which is stated in English, Serbian, and Bosnian,
10 written in Cyrillic and Latin as follows:
11 "Demilitarised zone. Any military operation is strictly
12 forbidden. (Article 60, protocol 1 additional to the
13 Geneva Conventions)."
14 Q. Next page, please. Article 3.
15 A. "Every military or paramilitary unit will have either to withdraw
16 from the demilitarised zone or submit/hand over their weapons,
17 ammunition, mines, and explosives and combat supplies in the
18 demilitarised zones will be handed over/submitted to UNPROFOR."
19 Q. Than you. Article 4. Can we pull the page up a little, please.
20 A. Article 4:
21 "UNPROFOR shall take the handed over/submitted weapons into
23 "UNPROFOR shall take the handed over/submitted ammunition into
24 custody separately."
25 Q. First sentence Article 5, please.
1 A. "UNPROFOR shall control the demilitarised zone."
2 Q. Can we please go back to 1D5356. Lieutenant-Colonel, did this
4 A. No.
5 Q. Are you familiar with protocol 60, protocol 1, Article 60? What
6 does it envisage in case one of the parties fails to comply?
7 A. I don't know what protocol you're talking about. I don't have it
8 in front of me.
9 Q. Page 2, please. You read about this article based on which the
10 demilitarisation was carried out.
11 A. I remember the meeting when this agreement was reached. It went
12 on for nearly 48 hours, and we didn't sleep at all. General Mladic asked
13 for Sarajevo to be included in the agreement.
14 Q. Can you please go through Article 4 or item 4 in its entirety.
15 In the Serbian [indiscernible] is the next page but in English it's all
16 on the same page. Does it faithfully convey what was actually agreed at
17 the meeting?
18 A. Yes, in full. It requires or demands a full demilitarisation.
19 Q. And who was in charge of carrying this out and performing checks?
20 A. As for the demilitarisation, that would be the signatories. As
21 for monitoring, implementation, that was up to the UN, UNPROFOR
23 Q. Could you please read out the last sentence in paragraph 4. The
24 very last sentence of paragraph 4.
25 A. After the completion the demilitarisation process not a single
1 armed person or unit apart from UNPROFOR forces will remain in the town.
2 UNPROFOR is responsible for the demilitarisation process.
3 Q. Thank you very much.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted, please?
5 JUDGE KWON: Have we not admitted this before, Ms. Edgerton?
6 MS. EDGERTON: I don't know, but with Mr. Reid's help, I can
7 advise the parties pretty quickly, I would imagine.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it then now.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2804, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: So we need to stop here.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 2143, D2143. It appears to have
12 been admitted. We might as well keep the number in that case.
13 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to ask any questions, Ms. Edgerton,
14 in this regard?
15 MS. EDGERTON: No, I have no questions whatsoever.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE KWON: I think it's correct. We admit it as D2143. So we
19 don't need to admit it separately.
20 Thank you. That concludes your evidence, Mr. Indjic. Thank you
21 for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you are free to go.
22 With the indulgence of -- you may be excused.
23 [The witness withdrew]
24 JUDGE KWON: -- of the interpreter I need to give this short
25 brief oral ruling now giving the timing. We'll resume on Monday morning.
1 As the Chamber refers to the Rule 92 ter notification for the
2 Witness Milan Mandic and the draft statement which has been uploaded as
3 65 ter 1D6814. Having reviewed the statement, the Chamber finds that
4 paragraphs 13 and 14 relate to crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs and
5 will not be admitted on the grounds that it is irrelevant. The Chamber
6 orders the accused to upload a redacted version of Milan Mandic's
7 statement to reflect this decision.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we can do that, but with respect to
9 this and also Mr. Sehovac, if you don't mind, since we're going to be
10 proofing them on Sunday, we would probably prefer to just instead of
11 redacting this, we'll make those adjustments when we make the final
12 revised statement if that's okay. Otherwise, we'll end up making this --
13 redacting this and then changing it again. So if you would just be
14 patient, by Monday we will have a revised and final statement for both
15 witnesses that will include the deletions of paragraphs that you've
17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Could you do -- offer a tracked version
18 as well to understand what has been changed?
19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we can do that.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I appreciate the interpreters,
21 court reporters, and everybody's indulgence.
22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
23 JUDGE KWON: And I -- on behalf of the Tribunal, I have to
24 apologise to Mr. Milosevic for having waited so long in vain.
25 The hearing is now adjourned.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.04 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Monday, the 28th day
3 of January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.