Page 32594

 1                           Thursday, 24 January 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Good morning, Mr. Indjic.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

11                           WITNESS:  MILENKO INDJIC [Resumed]

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

14        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Indjic.

15        A.   Good morning.

16        Q.   So you hear me in a language you understand, do you?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   All right.  I'm going to ask you some questions about your

19     written evidence and the evidence you gave in court earlier this week.

20             Now, my first question is looking at your evidence as a whole,

21     the documents you've also referred to, it's fair to say, isn't it, that

22     during the war you were the UN point of contact with the

23     Bosnian Serb Army for both the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps level as well as

24     headquarters level, the command?  Is that fair to say?

25        A.   Yes, and even -- my contacts were even broader.  I also

Page 32595

 1     co-ordinated contacts with the civilian structures of our authorities

 2     with international organisations and -- and institution.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, pardon me.  In the context of your work and at

 4     pages 32428 and 32429 and 32439 of the transcript of your testimony

 5     earlier last week, you talked about the meetings you attended with

 6     members of the warring factions as well as with the UN, and I want to

 7     talk about some of those meetings you were involved in in 1995.

 8             Now, in 1995, some of those meetings included meetings in

 9     connection with the fall of Srebrenica and the Zepa enclaves in July and

10     August; correct?

11        A.   Some of those meetings had to do with these two locations.

12        Q.   Now, at those meetings, were you aware of the fate of the men

13     from Srebrenica?

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I just want to indicate

15     that it appears that we're proceeding pursuant to Rule 90(H) and I know

16     you have indicated that leading questions are permitted during this

17     process but you also indicated you would be vigilant to ensure that the

18     trial is fair.  So I just want to call to your attention at this point

19     that we are now appearing to be proceeding under matters that were not

20     covered in the direct examination nor related to his credibility.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment.

23                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

24             MS. EDGERTON:  First of all, Your Honour, before I engage in any

25     further representations, this discussion is taking place in front of a

Page 32596

 1     witness who understands the English language.  So if there's going to be

 2     submissions, perhaps they should be done outside the presence of the

 3     witness.

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  But this is a matter -- this is a matter of

 5     procedural law rather than substance, isn't it?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Indeed, Your Honours, and this area which I'm

 7     about to discuss is a matter that goes to the witness's credibility

 8     squarely.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will allow the question to be put to the

11     witness.

12             MS. EDGERTON:

13        Q.   Did you hear my question the first time, Mr. Indjic?

14        A.   Yes, I did, and I can answer it.  There was one single meeting at

15     the level of commander of the Main Staff of the VRS and between him and

16     the UNPROFOR commander at the Jela restaurant, and I attended that

17     meeting.  That meeting had to do with Srebrenica.

18             Based on my job or through my job, I was not privy to the events

19     in the course of the operation in and around Srebrenica.

20        Q.   So that single meeting that you refer to at the level of

21     commander of the Main Staff in the VRS and UNPROFOR commander at the Jela

22     restaurant, that's the meeting on the 19th of July, 1995, isn't it?

23        A.   After all this time I cannot really confirm the date with

24     certainty, but the venue of the meeting and the participants, yes.  So

25     most probably that is the meeting at issue.  And in fact, I was there as

Page 32597

 1     an escort to the UNPROFOR commander.  I escorted him to the

 2     Jela restaurant, and it wasn't even necessary for me to sit there and

 3     interpret because the UNPROFOR commander had his own interpreter with

 4     him.

 5             The meeting had been agreed earlier directly between the office,

 6     the liaison office, of UNPROFOR which was at Pale, where an English

 7     officer was the liaison officer, and he had agreed this meeting with the

 8     command of the Main Staff of the VRS.

 9        Q.   So your evidence is that by the date of this meeting, you were

10     unaware.

11        A.   Officially I received no information nor was there a need for me

12     to know anything about operation Srebrenica.

13        Q.   All right.  So let's have a look at a couple of documents in this

14     regard, and this one probably has an exhibit number at this point which

15     I've omitted to update.  It was formerly 65 ter 03727.  Sorry, there's no

16     P number.  65 ter 03727, please.  And it's about a meeting you had in the

17     afternoon of 13 July 1995 on troop rotation in Zepa, where you said the

18     Security Council's -- thank you.  Where you said at paragraph 2 in both

19     languages:

20              " ... the Security Council's Resolution was not reasonable and

21     that it was in fact useless since the Srebrenica pocket was now Serb

22     territory."

23             And if we go over to the next page in both languages, paragraph 7

24     you added -- pardon me, in B/C/S paragraph -- the third page.  You added

25     that you had received orders from Tolimir that contacts with UNPROFOR

Page 32598

 1     were to be limited to telephone contacts between Mladic and Janvier.

 2             So I just want to have a look at a Security Council Resolution in

 3     regard to this document, and that's 65 ter 06202,

 4     UN Security Council Resolution 1004.

 5             Now, this UN Security Council Resolution at paragraph 3 expresses

 6     grave concern at the plight of the civilian population in Srebrenica and

 7     condemns the VRS offensive against the safe area.

 8             Is that the Resolution you were referring to in the document

 9     we've just looked at?

10        A.   I have never seen this Resolution before.  This is the first time

11     I set my eyes on it.  The Resolution I was referring to was the

12     Resolution dealing with the declaration of safe areas.

13        Q.   Fine.  Thank you.  Now --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Do you -- do you remember that Resolution number?

15     Was it 836?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember the number.  But

17     the gist of what I said was that it was an error to establish safe areas

18     the way they were established.  It was an error from the outset, because

19     they were declared safe areas and yet they hadn't been demilitarised.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

21             MS. EDGERTON:

22        Q.   Thank you.  We'll move on.  Now, on the 13th, I want to look at

23     what the rest of the world was talking about or saying and hearing about

24     events in Srebrenica by the 13th of July when you were telling UNPROFOR

25     that Srebrenica was now Serb territory.

Page 32599

 1             Could we have a look at 65 ter 2308, please, page 1.

 2             Now, on the 13th of July, 1995, you see at page 1 AFP reported

 3     the evacuation of Srebrenica refugees continues, Serbs holding male

 4     prisoners, and noting at paragraph 2 that draft-age men had been taken to

 5     a Bosnian Serb-held town where they could be seen herded into a football

 6     ground according to members of a UN convoy.

 7             Now, if we could move on to another document of the same date,

 8     P2278.  It's a report of General Smith on the aftermath of the fall of

 9     Srebrenica.  And if we can go over to page 2 of this document.  At

10     paragraph 3 we see General Smith writing:

11              "The Bosnian Serbs are 'cleansing' Srebrenica.  DutchBat are

12     doing what they can to monitor the situation but reports of abductions

13     and murder, unconfirmed as yet, are beginning to be heard.  Men of

14     military age are being separated from the refugees."

15             So by the 13th, the date that you were telling UNPROFOR

16     Srebrenica was Serb territory and discussing troop rotation in Zepa, the

17     international media -- pardon me, troop rotation in Zepa and receiving

18     orders from Tolimir, the international media, as well as the UN,

19     General Smith in particular, were concerned about the fate of men from

20     Srebrenica.

21             Your evidence is you didn't know anything about their fate by

22     that time; is that correct?

23        A.   I still hold that I didn't -- my position is still that I didn't

24     know anything about it, and I repeat that it wasn't my job.  That area

25     was not within my purview.

Page 32600

 1        Q.   Now -- oh, pardon me.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, before going further, I would like you

 3     to explore with the witness the extent of witness's involvement as far as

 4     the dialogue, negotiation, whatever, between the Main Staff and the

 5     UNPROFOR, because he's a member of the SRK still.  So to what extent was

 6     he involved in the dialogue between the Main Staff and the UNPROFOR.  We

 7     heard about it, but it maybe helpful.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  If I may, Your Honour, I intend to deal with that

 9     area through documents as we go through the cross-examination, and that

10     may provide some of the additional information Your Honours --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Then I will put the question.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Okay.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Could you explain us the extent of involvement?  Do

14     you understand my point of question?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Speaking specifically about

16     Srebrenica, Your Honour, and the events in and around Srebrenica, the

17     level of my participation --

18             JUDGE KWON:  I would like to know first in general how much were

19     you involved as a liaison officer between the Main Staff of the VRS and

20     the UNPROFOR or international part.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I tried to explain that during the

22     examination-in-chief two days ago.  There were two distinct periods, the

23     first period from the outset of the war up until sometime in late 1993

24     when all the communications went through the group for co-operation with

25     UNPROFOR in Lukavica, a member of which I was as well.  Now, after this

Page 32601

 1     follows the second period when UNPROFOR established its own office and

 2     its own liaison officer in Pale, and an UNPROFOR officer was in that

 3     office, and he had direct communication with the Main Staff of the VRS,

 4     so that this office, the Lukavica office, in fact remained the office in

 5     charge for the level of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and for providing

 6     assistance with any meetings that were held at the airport in Sarajevo --

 7     or, rather, meetings in the area of responsibility of the

 8     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Then you saw the report of -- or interoffice memo of

10     the UNPROFOR which states that in one of its meetings you attended

11     representing -- I don't know in what capacity were you there, but that's

12     the question for you.  How come were you involved in that meeting, 13th

13     of July?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, let me try to be precise.

15     You mean this meeting with the liaison officer of the

16     Ukrainian Battalion, the documents that relate to the

17     Ukrainian Battalion, or are you referring to the Jela meeting?  I just

18     want to be clear on this.  I want to avoid any misunderstandings.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Where you stated that United Nations Security

20     Council Resolution was unreasonable and now it has become useless.  Do

21     you remember that meeting?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot -- I do not remember

23     specifically that meeting, but I know that where the Ukrainian Battalion

24     is concerned, because they had frequent troop rotations in Zepa, those

25     rotations and the movements on conveys were agreed via the Lukavica

Page 32602

 1     office.  In addition to that, the liaison officer of the

 2     Ukrainian Battalion frequently went to Lukavica even when he didn't --

 3     when it wasn't on official business --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Shall we upload 3727.  Yes.

 5     Lukavica, yes.

 6             Yes.  I was mistaken in terms of its location.  It took place in

 7     Lukavica.

 8             Yes.  I'll leave it to you, Ms. Edgerton.  Please proceed.  Sorry

 9     for interruption.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, not at all, Your Honour.

11        Q.   Now, you've just given evidence that by the 13th, you were

12     unaware.  Now, as a humanitarian decorated, as you indicated earlier in

13     the week, for humanitarian work, I take it you yourself would have had

14     concerns as to the fate of these men had you been aware of this

15     information; correct?

16        A.   Well, that's a hypothetical question that doesn't make any sense

17     if you ask me.  What would have been had it been so?  So I don't have any

18     intention of answering that question.

19        Q.   Have you been following this trial, Mr. Indjic?

20        A.   Some parts of it, yes.

21        Q.   So are you familiar with the evidence of Robert Block?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   Well, let me tell you about him.  Robert Block is a journalist

24     who gave evidence here, and he wrote a report on the 17th of July, 1995,

25     about what had transpired with the Muslim men of Srebrenica, and I'd like

Page 32603

 1     to show that to you.  It's P4397.

 2             Now, this is a press report from the "Independent," and it's

 3     entitled "Bodies pile up in horror of Srebrenica."  And Robert Block

 4     reports on video footage from the Serb TV station Studio B that he'd seen

 5     of piles of men two feet high, described by the reporter as many dead

 6     soldiers.

 7             So by the 17th of July, Mr. Indjic, were you aware that there

 8     were widespread concerns about the ultimate fate of the men from

 9     Srebrenica?

10        A.   I'm surprised that at a serious trial as this one should use

11     newspaper articles, because were it up to newspaper articles you would

12     speak with a dead man now, because "Oslobodjenje" published in 1992 that

13     they had managed to kill me.  But to answer your question specifically I

14     have to make a distinction between the two periods.  Since the war ended

15     and onwards I learned many things about Srebrenica because I've read

16     numerous documents, but at the time that we're discussing now I had no

17     knowledge as to what was going on in Srebrenica.

18        Q.   But you were in contact, actually, with General Mladic on the

19     17th when reports like Mr. Block's were circulating, weren't you?

20        A.   Well, do you think that General Mladic as the commander had any

21     need to inform me about what was going on?  On the other hand, I didn't

22     have any need for any kind of intelligence work vis-a-vis General Mladic.

23        Q.   Perhaps you'd like to explain what you mean when you say, "I

24     didn't have any need for any kind of intelligence work vis-a-vis

25     General Mladic"?

Page 32604

 1        A.   That is quite clear.  Whoever understand the line of command and

 2     control would know that the commander has no need to inform his

 3     subordinates about something, particularly not those who are not involved

 4     in a particular activity.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I -- may I respond or may I

 6     help?  The witness responded to what was translated to him in the B/C/S.

 7     He was responding to the term "obavijesten," "informed."  So I think that

 8     the question is -- or the answer is not the answer to the question put.

 9     The witness responded to what was translated to him.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I think the point was taken by Ms. Edgerton.  Would

11     you like to ask again?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I'd like to move on, actually.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes.  You can move on.

14             MS. EDGERTON:

15        Q.   Now, you actually haven't answered my question, Mr. Indjic.  Were

16     you in contact with General Mladic on the 17th when reports like Block's

17     were circulating?

18        A.   I don't know if I was in contact with the general at the time.

19        Q.   All right.  Maybe I can help you.  Can we have a look at D1042.

20     It's a UN report on a meeting with General Smith and

21     President Izetbegovic on the 17th of July, 1995.  And if we can go to the

22     next page, paragraph 3, please.  Sorry, the page after that.  My

23     apologies.

24             Now, this document sets out the text of a message Bosnian

25     authorities asked General Smith to pass to the Bosnian Serb Army, and the

Page 32605

 1     message reads:

 2             "I have been asked by the Bosnian government, who wish to save

 3     their people from further suffering, to elicit from the BSA their

 4     conditions for the evacuation of the civilian population of Zepa to

 5     Central Bosnia.  I now wish to establish contact to discuss this matter

 6     at the right level (i.e., Mladic)."

 7             And if you skip down to the sixth paragraph on this page, it

 8     reads that:

 9             "At 5.30, General Smith went to Lukavica Barracks in order to

10     pass the message from the Bosnian government to General Mladic via

11     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic.  The message was passed and Indjic came back

12     with the message that Mladic would personally guarantee the safety of the

13     Bosnian government representatives, and that it was better that they hear

14     the details for themselves."

15             Does this refresh your memory?

16        A.   This is one among a hundred conversations that I had during the

17     war with General Mladic as liaison officer.  I remember now when I see

18     the document, and I'm glad that we took part in it together so that this

19     problem gets resolved in the most favourable way.  I view this as a

20     positive document.

21        Q.   Do you remember the meeting now?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   You don't remember speaking with General Mladic on the 17th?

24        A.   I said a little bit earlier that I spoke with General Mladic at

25     least 100 times, so I cannot provide a decisive answer about a

Page 32606

 1     conversation that took place on a specific date, i.e., the 17th.

 2        Q.   So on the 17th, after -- on the 17th, you were in contact with

 3     the Commander-in-Chief of the operation in Srebrenica to pass a message

 4     related to the fate of civilians in Zepa, and your evidence is you didn't

 5     know anything about the killings of the men from Srebrenica by that date?

 6        A.   I still assert that I didn't know anything, and as far as I can

 7     see in this document and the conversation, absolutely nothing was

 8     mentioned about this.

 9        Q.   And two days after that and since you seem to have trouble

10     recalling the exact date, perhaps we could look at P2280.  Two days after

11     that, on the 19th of July, 1995, you were at a meeting between

12     General Mladic and General Smith, and the topics discussed were

13     Srebrenica, the withdrawal of DutchBat, the situation in Zepa, ICRC

14     access to the detainees.  You can go over when we have both versions of

15     the document up, I think to page 2.  And -- I'm sorry, I don't have the

16     page reference for the B/C/S.  And UNHCR access to Srebrenica.

17             So is it your evidence that at this meeting, having spoken to

18     Mladic two days previously, and this meeting which specifically discusses

19     the situation in Srebrenica, that you still didn't know about the

20     killings?

21        A.   I said a little bit earlier that I came to the meeting as an

22     escort to General Smith.  I joined General Smith, and I came to the

23     meeting in Jela in his vehicle.  I was present at the meeting, and I

24     returned with General Smith to Lukavica.  At no point in time did I have

25     the opportunity nor did I separately alone speak with General Mladic.

Page 32607

 1     Not during this meeting.  And during this meeting I did not know about

 2     any crimes in Srebrenica.

 3        Q.   Now, on the 21st of July, 1995, again you spoke with

 4     General Mladic in the presence of Mr. Harland, and that's at 1D0104.

 5     It's a memo from Mr. Harland relating to negotiations at Zepa.  Do you

 6     disagree?  Do you dispute that you spoke with General Mladic actually

 7     frequently in that period of time after the events in Srebrenica?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  Excuse me, Mr. Indjic.

 9     Could we have that 65 ter number again.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Certainly.  1D0104, paragraph 4.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Could you check it out, Ms. Edgerton?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I've done it again.  1D01014.  And apologies to

13     everyone.  I had Mr. Reid's handwritten note in front of me with the

14     correct number, and I misread it.  Thank you very much.

15        Q.   Paragraph 4 of this document reads that:

16             "At Lukavica Barracks, Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic informed

17     Mr. Harland that he knew nothing of the sector's efforts to broker a

18     local agreement in Zepa."

19             And says of you:

20             "He called General Mladic in my presence.  Mladic told him that

21     there was no need for another agreement; that the Bosnian military

22     authorities in Zepa must accept the capitulation agreement made by

23     the ... authorities two days ago; that no international personnel would

24     be allowed into the enclave until the Bosnians began disarming; and that

25     there would [sic] be no evacuation even of wounded and vulnerable

Page 32608

 1     individuals until this was done."

 2             So this is by the documents your third contact with

 3     General Mladic since the fall of Srebrenica; correct?

 4        A.   I already responded that during the war, I contacted

 5     General Mladic at least a hundred times so that I really cannot say how

 6     many times we were in contact in the course of July.

 7        Q.   Well --

 8        A.   1995.

 9        Q.   Well, let me refresh your memory one more time.  On the

10     27th of July, 1995, you interpreted for General Mladic again when he met

11     with General Smith at Boksanica to negotiate the surrender and evacuation

12     of the Muslims in Zepa.  By that time did you know about the massacres at

13     Srebrenica?

14        A.   The meeting at Boksanica between General Smith and General Mladic

15     proceeded along the same principles as the meeting at Jela.  I

16     accompanied General Smith to Boksanica where the meeting was held, and

17     General Smith had his own interpreter.  During that meeting there was no

18     mention of any crimes in Srebrenica.  So my answer is that I did not know

19     of any crimes in Srebrenica then either.

20        Q.   All right.  I'd like to show you a still from a video-clip which

21     was broadcast or taken from a Serb TV broadcast of that meeting, and that

22     still is 65 ter 24460.

23             Now, do you see General Mladic, General Smith, and to the right

24     behind General Mladic, yourself on this video-clip?

25        A.   Yes, yes.

Page 32609

 1        Q.   Between General Mladic and General Smith, do you recognise

 2     Drina Corps commander Radislav Krstic who was sentenced in April 2004 to

 3     35 years in prison for aiding and abetting genocide in respect of the

 4     massacres at Srebrenica?

 5        A.   Yes, I recognise General Krstic.

 6        Q.   So your evidence is you attended a meeting with the VRS commander

 7     who is presently indicted for the massacres at Srebrenica, and the

 8     Drina Corps commander who -- one of the architects of the massacre, and

 9     your evidence is you didn't have any information about the massacres at

10     Srebrenica at this time?

11        A.   Yes, I stand by what I said.  The meeting in question is a

12     meeting during which the issue of Zepa was discussed.  General Krstic was

13     at the meeting because Zepa was in the area of responsibility of the

14     Drina Corps.

15             JUDGE KWON:  The question was compound in nature to a certain

16     extent.

17             Do you agree, Mr. Indjic, that General Krstic was one of the

18     architects of the massacre?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot give an answer to that

20     question because I don't know how the Srebrenica operation was planned

21     and who had what role in that operation.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Could this be tendered as a Prosecution exhibit,

24     please, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  You are tendering only this one?  You are not

Page 32610

 1     tendering 3727 and 1D1014?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Actually, I intended to deal with these in a line

 3     at the end of the cross-examination, and I missed both right now.  Maybe

 4     I would be better off just doing that, because that's indeed what I had

 5     intended on doing.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  However, we'll not admit 2308, because -- so we'll

 7     admit -- first we'll give the number for -- sorry, I was mistaken.  We'll

 8     admit 3727.  Shall we give the number.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6083, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE KWON:  And we'll admit 1D1014.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6084, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  And this clip will be admitted as Exhibit P6085.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I think we would appreciate it if

14     the exhibits can be offered as they're discussed so that we can have a

15     better way of -- than our normal practice.  After an exhibit is

16     discussed, offered, rather than saving it until the end of the

17     examination.  It would be easier if that could be done.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  For my part of course --

19             JUDGE KWON:  What you mean by offer --

20             MR. ROBINSON:  After the document is discussed with the witness

21     that would be the time to tender it as an exhibit rather than

22     accumulating them and trying to deal with them at the end.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That was my point.  Let us proceed.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

25        Q.   By 22nd of August, 1995, Mr. Indjic, did you know about the

Page 32611

 1     killings by then?

 2        A.   I cannot say that I knew about that in that period either,

 3     because there were no official reports about what had happened at lower

 4     levels.

 5        Q.   On 22nd August 1995, you were actually involved in another

 6     meeting with General Mladic and General Smith at Borike near Zepa to

 7     discuss the withdrawal of British and Ukrainian troops from Gorazde,

 8     weren't you?

 9        A.   I remember being present at the meeting in Borike, but it was

10     long ago so I cannot really remember what the topic was of the meeting.

11     I remember just that General Mladic took General Smith to see the

12     thoroughbred Lipizzaner horses at Borike.

13        Q.   I would like to show you a video-clip of that meeting and ask you

14     a couple questions about that video-clip.  And it's 65 ter number 40576A,

15     we will be starting the video-clip at time-code 1:09 -- 1:09:3.  And we

16     don't need any sound for the video.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   Now, we've stopped at time-code 1:09:49.3.  Do you see

20     General Mladic at this meeting, and do you see yourself now in the image

21     depicted on the screen?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Who's sitting to your right?

24        A.   I cannot recognise who it is.  It's not a very clear image.  I

25     cannot recognise the person.

Page 32612

 1        Q.   Who was sitting to your left?

 2        A.   I think it's General Gvero, but perhaps you can rewind it a

 3     little bit so that I can be sure.

 4        Q.   Actually, what we'll do is we'll go a little bit further in this

 5     clip and then I'll ask you some more questions about it.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can definitely see that it's not

 8     General Gvero but Colonel Milos Djurdjic, who was the liaison officer at

 9     the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, as far as I can recall.

10     He's deceased, unfortunately.

11             MS. EDGERTON:

12        Q.   And who is sitting to General Mladic's right on the far side of

13     the interpreter?  I mean to General Mladic's left.

14        A.   I don't know who that officer is.

15        Q.   All right.  We'll play a further section of the video-clip

16     starting with --

17        A.   It could be Kusic, Rajko, Rajko Kusic, the commander of the

18     Rogatica brigade, but I'm not quite sure in this image.

19        Q.   Thank you.  We're going to just go a little bit further in this

20     video-tape and play from time-code 1:11:23.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   Now, we're stopping at time-code 1:11:31.  Could you tell us who

24     the man is with the moustache sitting at the far end of the table with

25     his face towards us on the left-hand side of the screen?

Page 32613

 1        A.   I really don't know.  These are members of the Drina Corps with

 2     whom I had no official contacts in the course of my duties during the

 3     war.

 4        Q.   Now, you keep referring to no official contacts, and you've used

 5     that word over and over again this morning, and despite the fact that

 6     we've seen that you've had a lot of contact, for example, with

 7     General Mladic over the course of the month of July 1995 formally and

 8     directly, is it your evidence that outside of official contacts you

 9     wouldn't have had any conversation with these individuals?

10        A.   Yes, that is what I'm saying.  I did not have any conversations

11     with those people because my physical place where I was situated,

12     Lukavica, there was no need for that except for meetings.  There was no

13     need for me to go to the areas of any other corps other than the

14     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

15        Q.   But we are just seeing here that in July of 1995, you went far

16     and away outside the area of responsibility of the

17     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, Mr. Indjic.

18        A.   Yes, because this was an order from General Mladic to come and to

19     accompany General Smith so that he wouldn't go through the territory

20     alone to reach the location of the meeting, to be there as liaison

21     officer and to help them to arrive at the meeting in time.  Throughout

22     the time, I am convinced, perhaps, that it would be useful for me to

23     explain again what the role of the liaison officer is, because obviously

24     there is a lack of understanding as to what that role is.

25        Q.   Maybe that's something you could do in your redirect examination

Page 32614

 1     with Dr. Karadzic.  Right now what I'd like to do is look at P1473, a

 2     copy of General Mladic's diary for 22 August 1995.  And let's go just to

 3     pages -- page 310 in English.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  And before I leave that video-clip, I'd like to

 5     tender it, please, Your Honours.  Only those specific time-codes given

 6     that the witness recognised himself and Colonel Djurdjic.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I was wondering whether we need that clip, because

 8     there's no transcript.  The witness confirmed the participants as far as

 9     he knows.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Quite so.  Quite so.  And let's move on to the

11     diary.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  And perhaps for the sake of time, we could just

14     dispense with the B/C/S copy.

15        Q.   Now, this is a transcription and translation of General Mladic's

16     notebook dealing with the meeting at Borike on 22 August 1995.  At the

17     bottom of the page you see the heading "Meeting with General Smith."  And

18     he says:

19             "Present:  Smith, John (Colonel) a Colonel accompanying Smith,

20     Captain Tom.

21              "Our side --" not listing you as accompanying or assisting

22     General Smith at all.

23              "Our side:  Colonel Djurdjic, Indjic, Kusic, Krunic, Kosoric,"

24     and "Suka."

25        A.   God forbid that I am mentioned as somebody who is on the side of

Page 32615

 1     General Smith.  Then I would be a traitor.  Regardless of whom I came

 2     with, I was always a member of my own army.

 3        Q.   Does that refresh your memory about the participants in this

 4     meeting?

 5        A.   There is no reason for me not to believe that these people were

 6     present, although as for the meeting itself, I do recall that it was

 7     held, but I would have difficulty saying anything more detailed about the

 8     meeting itself.

 9        Q.   Now, General Indjic -- or Colonel Indjic, you've given evidence

10     that you worked in the VRS security organ following the war.  Do you

11     remember that?  That was in your evidence earlier on this week.

12        A.   Yes, I remember that.  And before that I was the intelligence

13     organ.

14        Q.   And is it your evidence that -- sorry.  And working in the

15     intelligence organ, the intelligence centre, and the security -- pardon

16     me, and the security administration of the VRS, you didn't recognise the

17     man with the moustache that identified to you at the end of the table who

18     was actually Vujadin Popovic?

19        A.   Now that you mention his name, yes, I could confirm that that was

20     him, but before that, I did not recognise him.

21             By the way, let me just explain something to make myself clear.

22     To be an intelligence officer means to gather information on a possible

23     enemy of your state and your people and not collecting information on

24     your own forces and your people.

25             Now, when I was working in the security administration, my job

Page 32616

 1     was to prevent the foreign intelligence services from collecting data or

 2     information on our own forces.

 3        Q.   Vujadin Popovic is also presently serving a life sentence having

 4     been convicted for, and I quote from the decision, "robust participation

 5     in the genocide in Srebrenica in 2010."

 6             Is it your evidence, given all that we've heard, that by

 7     22 August 1995, you still had no information about the massacres of the

 8     men from Srebrenica?

 9        A.   I stand by what I said earlier.  At this time, I did not know

10     about any massacres of any men either because there was no mention of any

11     of it at this meeting itself, and I had no contacts, no personal

12     contacts, with Popovic; and even if I had, I don't see why we would

13     discuss what was going on or had happened in Srebrenica.

14        Q.   Now --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just a second.

16             Is it your case that the -- the item dealing with this meeting,

17     Mladic's diary's wrong?  You didn't mention Popovic.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  The diary doesn't mention Popovic, but Popovic

19     appears on the film as the witness has just confirmed.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the footage again?

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Of course.

22             Mr. Reid, could you help us with that.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, 244 -- no, 50576A.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Indjic, now do you confirm that it was

Page 32617

 1     Mr. Popovic?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I can recall this is

 3     Popovic, but as I said, the two of us, we were never anywhere together.

 4     We never -- this is perhaps the only time that we attended a meeting

 5     together.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Can you identify Kosoric in this clip?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as I mentioned at the outset,

 8     I believe that it was Kusic, the person I mentioned as Kusic.  That

 9     should be Kosoric, the man with the moustache.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  This is the second of two clips, Your Honour.  If

11     you'd like to go back to look at the participants in the first one, we

12     can do that as well.

13             JUDGE KWON:  No, it's not necessary.  Please proceed.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just interfere -- intervene

16     in the transcript, please.  On page 23, line 11, there was something that

17     was misinterpreted.  The witness did not say, "I don't know why we would

18     discuss this."  Rather, he said, "I don't know why he would tell me what

19     had happened in Srebrenica."  You can check this with the witness.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Indjic?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I said that I don't see any

22     reason why he would tell me that.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

24             MS. EDGERTON:

25        Q.   So you've confirmed that -- or you've stated that by the 22nd --

Page 32618

 1     by that the 22nd of August, 1995, you didn't know anything about the

 2     massacres.  What about the fact that by that time thousands of men from

 3     Srebrenica were missing and unaccounted for?  Did you know anything about

 4     that?

 5        A.   I did not have any official information about the Srebrenica

 6     area.  Therefore, I had no information about any massacres or any

 7     disappearances of anyone.

 8        Q.   You used that term again, "official information."  What about

 9     unofficial information?  What did you hear?

10        A.   Your Honour, I cannot speak about hearsay in such a serious trial

11     as this if I can't recall from whom I had heard something or if I can't

12     be certain about, you know, who told me what.  I can only speak about

13     what I know or what I don't know.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Whether it's hearsay or it's not and -- as to the

15     reliability will be assessed by the -- by the Chamber, you were asked --

16     you used the term that you didn't know -- you didn't have any official

17     information, and then I was about to put that same question.  You were

18     asked by Ms. Edgerton whether you had any unofficial information.  Could

19     you tell us as far as you knew at the time, whatever the source of the

20     information that might have been?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I state with certainty that I had

22     no information, none at all, about any crimes.  What I know is that

23     meetings were being scheduled where the issue of prisoners of war were to

24     be resolved.

25             JUDGE KWON:  The question was not limited only to crimes.  It's

Page 32619

 1     also about disappearance or death or whatever.  Tell us what you knew

 2     about it.  Or heard about it.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is nothing I could say that I

 4     knew or heard.  Perhaps I saw a TV programme or maybe heard something on

 5     the radio, but in the conversations that I had, there was no mention nor

 6     any information about any of this.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The word -- there is a word missing

 9     here.  It should be "in my conversations with officers."  That's what's

10     missing.  Where he says that perhaps he heard something about it on the

11     radio or on TV, but he didn't hear anything in his conversations with

12     officers.  So the word "officers" was missing.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:

15        Q.   Well, now Dr. Karadzic has clarified what you've said and you've

16     limited your sources of information to information with officers.  What

17     about your conversations with enlisted men, with soldiers, with

18     intelligence, members of your intelligence community, members of the

19     security organs of your forces?  What about those sources?  Apart from

20     the officers, what did you hear?

21        A.   I cannot recall that there were any conversations, that I had any

22     need or occasion or time to talk about anything that had to do with

23     Srebrenica, because I keep saying, and I have to repeat, Srebrenica was

24     not the subject of my work.  It wasn't within my purview.

25        Q.   Well, let's go to P898.  It's a report on a meeting of

Page 32620

 1     20 July 1995.  So that's the day following the meeting you've had with

 2     Generals Smith and Mladic where an agreement regarding Srebrenica was

 3     struck, and this document is a cable from David Harland regarding a

 4     meeting on prisoner exchange and the evacuation of Zepa.

 5             Can we go to page 2, please, in both languages.

 6             So we see on page 2 that earlier on the 20th, Mladic indicated to

 7     Gobilliard that the Serbs would like to hold an immediate meeting on the

 8     possibility of a prisoner exchange and that you would have the authority

 9     to sign -- to negotiate and sign an agreement on his behalf.

10             So by this time we have evidence that you'd spoken to Mladic on

11     the 17th, the 19th, the 20th, and the 27th of July; correct?  Yes or no?

12        A.   As for these conversations that were mentioned earlier about my

13     conversations with General Mladic, that's correct, now you reminded me of

14     the dates.  But you asked me about these partial conversations.  I really

15     can't recall all of them, because I had over 100 conversations with

16     General Mladic.  So, yes, I do agree that I did speak with General Mladic

17     at this time, as you reminded me.

18        Q.   So this document goes on and says that you met with David Harland

19     at 1.30 that afternoon, and you told him that Mladic was willing to make

20     an all-for-all exchange, including the Bosnian soldiers in the Zepa

21     pocket.  And then later that day, a meeting took place, a negotiation

22     meeting took place, over the proposal, but there was no final agreement

23     because the Bosnians were not satisfied that Serbs had accounted for all

24     the prisoners taken in the assault on the Srebrenica enclave.  So how,

25     Mr. Indjic, was Srebrenica not part of your work?

Page 32621

 1        A.   This meeting dealt with the exchange of prisoners and not

 2     Srebrenica.  It dealt with the exchange of prisoners on the principle of

 3     all for all, which implies the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 4     So the subject was not Srebrenica but the exchange of prisoners.

 5        Q.   Even the Bosnian authorities by that point in time, by the

 6     20th of July, 1995, knew that their men in Srebrenica were missing, and

 7     you claim you know nothing?

 8        A.   I still claim that I didn't know anything and that they did know

 9     about it.  Of course they did.  They organised it themselves.

10        Q.   Can you explain what you mean by this last remark, "They

11     organised it themselves"?

12        A.   In 1993, there was a meeting in Sarajevo between

13     Alija Izetbegovic and the civilian leadership from Srebrenica.  The

14     civilian leadership from Srebrenica asked -- requested that

15     Alija Izetbegovic help them resolve the issue, the problem, of

16     Srebrenica.  Izetbegovic said, "You had to -- you have to hold out.  The

17     Americans want me to show 3.000 dead so that they can intervene."  This

18     is information that I gathered from a programme on the Muslim TV in

19     Sarajevo.

20        Q.   Oh, fine.  Now we understand the source of the last statement

21     that you just made, so we'll move on.

22             Now, I want to go to something David Harland has said.  Now, you

23     must remember David Harland, because he was the civil affairs officer and

24     political advisor to UNPROFOR command for a long period of time

25     throughout the war.

Page 32622

 1        A.   I do remember him.  He married a Muslim woman from Sarajevo,

 2     thereby showing clearly what his position was.

 3        Q.   Mr. Harland, at page -- pardon me, in P820, paragraph 226, talked

 4     about this meeting and the meetings you had with him over Zepa, and he

 5     said that it was clear that the Bosnian Serbs wanted to make a deal as

 6     quickly as they could.  With hindsight, it would appear this was because

 7     Mladic realised that the Bosnians knew what had happened in Srebrenica,

 8     and he had no chance -- once the Bosnians knew what had happened in

 9     Srebrenica, then he would have no chance of getting any Serb prisoners

10     back.  The Bosniaks were at this time -- at this time were unsure of what

11     was happening but believed that the offer was some kind of a trick.

12             Mr. Indjic, with everything we've heard, and particularly with

13     your involvement in the negotiations regarding the prisoner exchange, it

14     appears you had precise information regarding the men of Srebrenica and

15     their disappearance.  Isn't that the case?

16        A.   No, that's not the case.  It's not correct.

17        Q.   You were well informed about the interests of the

18     Bosnian Serb Army at this point in time.  Yes or no?

19        A.   This was a generalised question.  Could you be more specific,

20     please?

21        Q.   Is it your evidence that you would attend negotiations and

22     briefings and interpret for General Mladic without being well informed of

23     Bosnian Serb Army interests?

24        A.   I really don't know what you mean when you say Bosnian Serb Army

25     interests.  The interests of the Bosnian Serb Army was to end the war.

Page 32623

 1     That was our basic interest.  That was their basic interest.

 2        Q.   I'll be -- I'll be more specific.  We've now seen, and I'll turn

 3     the question a different way, we've now seen evidence of your

 4     participation in successive meetings with people who had been indicted

 5     and convicted for the genocide of Srebrenica, successive meetings

 6     throughout July and August 1995.  We've seen information about what the

 7     world was reporting about the men at Srebrenica.  We've seen information

 8     about what the Bosnian authorities knew about the disappearance and

 9     massacres of the men at Srebrenica.  We've seen articulations of

10     General Smith's concerns, the man that you were involved in the

11     interpretation -- that -- the man for whom you maintain you were

12     interpreting at meetings, and yet your evidence is you knew right up

13     until the end of August 1995 nothing about the disappearance of these

14     thousands of men and their massacre; correct?

15        A.   First of all, I have to correct you.  I have to correct some

16     parts of your speech.

17             First you said that I attended meetings where people who were

18     accused of the crimes in Srebrenica were present.  Those people were

19     attended for the -- were accused of the crimes in Srebrenica only after

20     the war.  So at those meetings, there were no accused and no one was

21     accused of any crimes.

22             Second, I said very specifically on several occasions that I

23     never interpreted for General Smith.  General Smith had his own

24     interpreter, because I don't believe that an Englishman would believe a

25     Serb officer that he was translating correctly his words.

Page 32624

 1             The third, I claim that I had no information of any massacre in

 2     Srebrenica.

 3        Q.   Fine.  I'd like to move on to a completely different topic,

 4     completely different.

 5             On paragraphs 166 to 170 -- pardon me.  At paragraph 166 of your

 6     statement, your written evidence, you referred to a part of a tape of

 7     29 May 1992 of General ordering the shelling of areas in Sarajevo,

 8     including Velesici and Pofalici, and you said you listened to it and

 9     despite the similarity in voice you had some doubts in.  And that's an

10     exert from your testimony in the Galic case in 2003.  Now --

11        A.   Yes, I remember that.  Could you put your question?

12        Q.   Now, if we could have a look at 65 ter number 22 --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could you identify the paragraph

14     number again from his statement?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  I will, if you'll just indulge me for yet another

16     moment.

17             And it appears I've got it wrong again, so if I could just pause

18     for a few seconds.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We may take a break now if it is convenient.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll have a break for half an hour and resume

22     at 5 to 11.00.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m.

Page 32625

 1                           [The witness takes the stand]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  And just to correct the paragraph

 4     citation that I struggled with before our break, the conversation that I

 5     wish to direct Mr. Indjic to is at paragraph 116 of his statement, 116.

 6        Q.   And you recall, Mr. Indjic, when we broke we were talking about

 7     the conversation you were commenting on at paragraph 116, dated

 8     29 May 1992, with General Mladic ordering the shelling of Velesici and

 9     Pofalici.

10             Now, Mr. Indjic, in 65 ter 22552 which is a transcript of an

11     audiotape recorded interview that General Milovanovic had with the OTP,

12     the Office of the Prosecutor, in 2001, we can see at pages 137 of the

13     English and 163 of the B/C/S, we can see that General Milovanovic was

14     asked about this specific conversation.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Don't tell me I've got the number wrong again.

16     Your indulgence for a moment.  22552.

17        Q.   And I'm quite happy to read the relevant passage if my obvious

18     weakness with numbers is affecting things.  And I'll just speak with

19     Mr. Reid for a moment.  Perfect.  Thank you.  Page 137 of the English.

20     So General Milovanovic spoke about this conversation, noting that it had

21     been on the radio for some time, and he asked Mladic:

22             "Did you really say that?"

23             And Mladic said:

24             "Yes."

25             He explained that he talked to someone on the phone and mentioned

Page 32626

 1     that, so he never denied that.  And General Milovanovic listened to the

 2     conversation, and on the next page -- and you see at the bottom of this

 3     page that he recognised Mladic's voice, although the last time he had

 4     heard it was three years previously, and on the next page he said:

 5             "I presume that's a recording made in 1992."

 6             Now, seeing what -- seeing that General Mladic specifically

 7     acknowledged to General Milovanovic that it was him in this conversation,

 8     are the doubts you expressed in the Galic case now resolved?

 9        A.   Let me say at the beginning that the doubt that was expressed was

10     not from the Galic case, but it was from my interview with

11     Mr. Barry Hogan in 2001.

12             Second, during the time that you were talking, in the first

13     sentence when you were explaining, it was stated or it was written in the

14     transcript that General Milosevic had an interview, so that needs to be

15     corrected, because this is actually a reference to General Milovanovic.

16             I did not say that I doubted whether that was General Mladic.  My

17     doubt centred on the fact that the term Velusici was used for the area of

18     town, whereas General Mladic had a family house in that area.  So

19     General Mladic knew very well that the name of that area was Velesici,

20     and this is what my doubt was about.

21        Q.   So -- so --

22        A.   Now I don't have any doubt --

23        Q.   Perfect.  So then it seems that if -- if -- it seems that that

24     additional explanation isn't reflected in the statement that you gave

25     which has been filed as your written evidence, then; is that correct?

Page 32627

 1        A.   I don't know whether that's reflected or not, but this is my

 2     statement given to Mr. Barry Hogan in 2001, and I explained what my

 3     doubts were about.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Let's move on to another topic.  In your testimony

 5     earlier on this week in regard to the subject of sniping, you said at

 6     T32458, starting from line 2:

 7             "The Serb side always expressed its readiness to come to any

 8     agreement that would lead to a cease-fire, including an agreement on

 9     sniping."

10             And then you were also shown a document by Dr. Karadzic, D2782,

11     dated 18 August 1994, referring to a meeting you were involved in on the

12     15th regarding -- and the meeting was regarding the implementation of

13     measures arising from the anti-sniping agreement.  And you said at 32460

14     that it implied, this document, implied that there should be a liaison

15     group established that would include both armies and UNPROFOR so that

16     they could respond to any sniping activities quickly, but the group was

17     never established because, as you mentioned Dr. Karadzic:

18             "I believe that the Muslim side was not ready to send its own

19     representative."

20             Now, I'd like to show you a Sarajevo-Romanija Corps account of

21     that very same meeting, and that's P1617.  And it's a

22     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command intelligence report to the VRS Main Staff

23     intelligence security sector, dated 15 August 1994, and it -- it details

24     the meeting -- this meeting that you gave evidence about between you,

25     along with Colonel Lugonja and UNPROFOR, concerning the implementation of

Page 32628

 1     the anti-sniping agreement.  And it sets out in this first paragraph

 2     UNPROFOR's plan which you see at paragraph 1 at the bottom of the English

 3     page.  And if you go over to page 2 in English, it sets out at

 4     paragraph 1 on page 2 according to General Tolimir's instructions the VRS

 5     proposal.

 6             Now, at paragraph 2, we see the VRS proposal is -- or reads:

 7             "...  we cannot accept anti-sniper units which would operate on

 8     the respective side because it's not part of UNPROFOR's mandate, and a

 9     joint staff is not necessary because elaborate instruments of mutual

10     information already exist."

11             Now, in regard to the same situation we're discussing, I want to

12     go over to P862 next, which is a letter dated 17 August 1994 from

13     Colonel Gausseres, who was the Sector Sarajevo Chief of Staff to Colonel

14     Lugonja, and that reads in paragraph 2, second sentence:

15             "On your request there will be no anti-sniping teams on your side

16     but you are expected not to retaliate if you do not want to worsen an

17     already very tense situation."

18             So, Colonel Indjic, a document from your own forces which is in

19     part confirmed by this UNPROFOR document shows that it was -- not only

20     did the Serb side object to UN anti-sniping teams on their territory, but

21     they specifically refused the joint commission which is completely

22     contrary to the evidence you gave earlier this week, isn't it?

23        A.   First of all, I have never seen these documents before.  I'm

24     seeing them for the first time.  Secondly, I expressed my opinion why the

25     agreement as not implemented.  And thirdly, it's absolutely clear to me

Page 32629

 1     that anti-sniper teams would not be accepted because this was beyond the

 2     UNPROFOR mandate, and any acceptance of going beyond the mandate would

 3     imply going even further beyond the mandate.

 4             As for the documents, I'm seeing them for the first time.  I

 5     don't doubt that they exist.  And in my conversation with

 6     President Karadzic, I voiced my opinion as to why the agreement was not

 7     respected.

 8        Q.   President Karadzic, Dr. Karadzic, asked you:

 9             "Do you know anything, lieutenant-colonel, about why this never

10     materialised, which side was blocking it?"

11             And your answer was:

12              "I believe that the Muslim side was not ready to send its own

13     representative."

14        A.   Precisely.  I expressed my opinion, my opinion as to what the

15     reason was.

16        Q.   And these documents completely contradict your expressed opinion,

17     don't they?

18        A.   I don't see that it's completely contradictory.

19        Q.   We'll move on --

20        A.   The only thing that is discussed here is the modality of the

21     implementation of the agreement.

22        Q.   In fact, this Chamber's heard evidence that from the end of July

23     until the 14th of August, 1994, there was a series of abortive meetings

24     regarding the possibility of an anti-sniping agreement mainly abortive

25     because of the lack of interest in an agreement by Tolimir and

Page 32630

 1     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps liaison officer Colonel Indjic, who obstructed

 2     the negotiations.  The Serb negotiators would find excuses to avoid doing

 3     even the slightest -- pardon me, the easiest things that could be done to

 4     prevent sniping, such as installation of line of site barriers.

 5             That evidence, Mr. Indjic, is completely consistent with the

 6     document from your own corps as well as the UNPROFOR document we've just

 7     looked at, isn't it?

 8        A.   It is really not clear to me what you are talking about in what

 9     you have just said.  You mentioned General Tolimir, myself, obstructions,

10     while it's clear from everything that General Tolimir said that this is

11     only a matter of the mode of implementation of the agreement, and I don't

12     know what kind of obstruction is referred to here.

13        Q.   We'll go on to another topic, and it's about your role in the

14     hostage taking which you discussed at paragraph 191 of your statement.

15     Pardon me, 171, 171.  And you said there in paragraph 171, and I assume

16     it relates to May of 1995, that on the basis of an order, you personally

17     informed the French at Lukavica Barracks that the Serb side considered

18     them war prisoners and they had the right to keep their pistols.

19             So, first of all, when you talk about the French at

20     Lukavica Barracks, I presume you're referring to French peacekeepers who

21     had been posted to the weapons collection point at Lukavica barracks;

22     correct?

23        A.   Yes.  I mean members of the French battalion who were part of the

24     Sector Sarajevo UNPROFOR force.

25        Q.   So the events you describe in paragraph 171, your actions, was

Page 32631

 1     that -- did those take place before or after you ordered them surrounded

 2     and fired at them with RPGs?

 3        A.   Could you please specify which events you are talking about,

 4     whether they happened before or after.

 5        Q.   Perhaps we could -- if you look at the screen in front of you,

 6     you see the evidence you gave in paragraph 171, and what I want to know

 7     is did that happen before or after you ordered them surrounded and your

 8     forces fired two RPGs at them?

 9        A.   In order to avoid misunderstandings, I'm going to take some time

10     and describe the events as a whole.

11        Q.   Well --

12        A.   After --

13        Q.   Well --

14        A.   -- through the operations officer --

15        Q.   Mr. Indjic, my question was did this happen before or after the

16     two RPGs were fired at them?  So it's a kind of a yes or no answer.

17        A.   I don't know.  I don't know what happened before or after.  Can

18     you tell me specifically what it is that you are asking me that happened

19     before or after?

20        Q.   All right.  Let's have a look at 65 ter 24480.  And that's an

21     Associated Press article dated 26 May 1995, entitled "French UN platoon

22     surrenders to Bosnian Serbs."  And if you go down to the fourth paragraph

23     on this page, it reads:

24              "An Associated Press reporter watched Serbs take over 21 French

25     soldiers who had been guarding Serb guns turned over to the UN at this

Page 32632

 1     barracks in a Serb-held suburb of Sarajevo.

 2              "A Serb officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic, first tried to coax

 3     the French into surrender and entered the UN headquarters [sic] unarmed

 4     to negotiate.  The French commander said he had orders not to surrender."

 5             This article says you then ordered military police to take

 6     positions and prepare to fire.  For three minutes, automatic rifle fire

 7     targeted the building where the 21 French men were.

 8             The commanding Serb officer said hold fire and watch for the

 9     white flag.  No flag appeared.  Two rocket propelled grenades hit a truck

10     and an APC and minutes later the French surrendered without firing a

11     shot.

12             Does this help you with the sequence of events and clarify what

13     happened before and after?

14        A.   I know all of this.  I know more about it than you do, but I am

15     not sure.  I don't know what you are trying to ask me, what happened

16     before and what happened afterwards.  There is one very important

17     sentence missing here, and that is when I was inside the building with

18     the French officer unarmed, since he did not have orders to surrender, we

19     agreed that we would fire at vehicles without jeopardising the lives of

20     his men with that, and then when the fire stopped, then he would come out

21     with a white flag and surrender.

22        Q.   So, in fact, this article and your testimony supplement the

23     information that you gave in your written evidence at paragraph 171;

24     correct?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 32633

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Could this be a Prosecution exhibit, please,

 2     Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6086, Your Honours.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:

 6        Q.   Now, I want to ask you about the year prior to this event when

 7     your forces detained around 150 UN personnel following the air-strikes

 8     against Serb forces at Gorazde in April 1994, and to do that I'd like us

 9     to have a look at 65 ter 19302, a report on the detention of Lima HQ and

10     teams from 14 April 1994 to 19 April 1994.  And the drafter of this is

11     Shaun Heintz, UNMO, Shaun Heintz.

12             Page 1 of this document says -- in fact, it's the very second

13     sentence on page 1 which says:

14              "An order was issued from the HQ at Lukavica by LO Major Indjic

15     that all UNMO teams were to be confined to their accommodation."

16             And then if we go over on the next page, bottom of page 2, Heintz

17     reports -- I'll just make sure I can see it on this page, and I do have

18     the page right.  Your indulgence for a moment.  If we could go over to

19     the -- ah, no, it is at the bottom of page 2.  Thank you.  Page 2.

20             At the bottom of page 2, Heintz reports on a meeting you had with

21     him on the 18th of April where you said because of the bombing on the

22     16th, you were expecting the order to kill one UNMO.

23             So a year before the hostage-taking in May 1995, you also ordered

24     the detention of UN personnel in April 1994; correct?

25        A.   That is not correct.  Crucially -- in its crucial points it's

Page 32634

 1     incorrect because from my position I'm not able to order anything.  I can

 2     convey somebody's order, act pursuant to somebody's order, but I myself

 3     cannot issue orders.

 4        Q.   Under whose orders were you acting when you relayed this order to

 5     detain the UN personnel at Lukavica in April 1994?

 6        A.   I cannot specifically say who was the duty operations officer at

 7     that time, but all the orders proceed along the command and control line

 8     via the operations duty officer.  I wished that I was able to read the

 9     document in its entirety, because all I'm being shown here are parts of a

10     document which do not constitute a whole.  I wish I had been given the

11     opportunity to read it in my native language regardless of the fact that

12     I am familiar with English.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I am not sure if we have a B/C/S version.  We will

14     print out these eight pages and provide it to you.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

16        Q.   Now, you also said at paragraph 171 with regard to May 1995, that

17     the first group of UNPROFOR soldiers was captured by individuals without

18     orders, plans, or co-ordination to do so.  When was that first group

19     captured?

20        A.   Perhaps it's a misunderstanding here when it says an UNPROFOR

21     group.  What is being discussed here are military observers, UNMOs, who

22     are in separate observation posts.

23             Before, in any case -- this happened before the capture of the

24     French soldiers.

25        Q.   When?

Page 32635

 1        A.   I'm not able to tell you.  It's been a long time since then.  But

 2     I know that this happened before the capture or the arrest of the French

 3     soldiers.

 4        Q.   Well, where?

 5        A.   In any event, it has to do with the NATO bombing.

 6        Q.   What group do you mean?

 7        A.   I mean the individuals, the military observers, UN military

 8     observers who were part of the United Nations who were deployed at

 9     isolated observation posts, the so-called Lima posts.

10        Q.   Well --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Now shall we pause and give him the time to read

12     this document.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  And this relates to the 1994 issue.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  And, Mr. President, while we're pausing on this

15     point, if I could, assuming that this is evidence that's going to the

16     credibility of the witness since it's related to events that are not part

17     of the -- the 1994 detentions are not part of the evidence in chief.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, Mr. Robinson.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm trying to state it's my understanding that

20     this is not 90(H) evidence but this is related to credibility because

21     this is not something that was covered in the statement or the

22     examination-in-chief, the 1994 detentions of UN personnel in response to

23     the Gorazde incidents.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Well, he talked about UN prisoners of war in

25     general.

Page 32636

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, I believe that that was related to 1995, but

 2     if you're interpreting it more broadly perhaps that's fair, but in any

 3     event, it seemed like that that was related to the -- count 11 of the

 4     indictment.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to respond, Ms. Edgerton?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  It goes squarely again to his credibility,

 7     Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  And just on a related point since the witness is

10     still reading, when it comes to the time when the allotted time for

11     cross-examination has expired, I think it's important for the Chamber to

12     consider how much time we have spent on issues that were not contained in

13     the statement that are purportedly relating to credibility.  It seems

14     like we still haven't really gotten to the core issues of the Sarajevo

15     component of our case and almost the whole two hours has been used.

16                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

17             JUDGE KWON:  I was informed by the Registrar that the Defence,

18     Mr. Karadzic, used for his examination-in-chief 2 hours and 36 minutes,

19     and Prosecution has used so far one and a half hours.  So she has still

20     half --

21                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22             JUDGE KWON:  One and 45 minutes, not one and a half hours.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  And I'm sincerely hoping that this time the

24     witness takes reading a document that he's already commented on is not

25     counting against the allotted time that the Prosecution has,

Page 32637

 1     Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Have you done your reading, Mr. Indjic?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have to read on.  It's not

 4     a problem.  I'm also quite grateful that you gave me a document to work

 5     with since on the screen what I see right now is a very important

 6     paragraph, paragraph 2, specifically, on my screen telling us why the

 7     military observers were grouped in a single location for their personal

 8     safety during the NATO air-strikes.  They were allowed to use the phone

 9     to get in touch with their superiors and to ask to have food and other

10     necessities shipped in, meaning there was no mistreatment or harassment

11     whatsoever.  And it was precisely in order to avoid any random individual

12     incidents against the NATO staff.  They were all grouped in a single

13     location.

14             We decided to do that so that we would keep these people apart

15     from their signals equipment so that they could not use it in order to

16     guide NATO aeroplanes to their targets.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

19        Q.   I'd like to -- I've actually left 1994 some time ago, and we were

20     dealing with questions relating to the matters that were discussed in

21     your statement at paragraph 171, and that's the situation in May 1995.

22             Now, you spoke a couple of times regarding mentioning the French

23     soldiers.  I take it you're referring to the French soldiers who were

24     taken hostage during the attack on Vrbanja Bridge on the 27th of May of

25     that year.

Page 32638

 1        A.   No.  It is not the French soldiers that I have in mind, because

 2     these French soldiers, as far as I can recollect, were taken prisoner by

 3     one of the parties to the conflict, same as a number of VRS soldiers were

 4     taken prisoner by the French battalion, and they were being held at

 5     Sarajevo airport where the French battalion was stationed.  So it's a

 6     question of prisoners of war on both sides of the conflict, so to speak.

 7        Q.   I'd like to show you just on that line document P2434, which is a

 8     letter from UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Commander Gobilliard to

 9     Dragomir Milosevic, dated 3 June 1995.  And it refers to you, and it

10     says -- it talks about how a French officer was forced to kneel in the

11     street with his hands tied behind his back and with a gun at his head

12     while Serb soldiers threatened to shoot him if the UNPROFOR troops

13     refused to withdraw from the OP, observation post, and then it stays

14     that:

15             "Additionally, during the retaking of the position that morning,

16     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic spoke to one of my officers on the telephone

17     and said, 'If you don't stop the attack immediately, I will kill one of

18     the French soldiers.'"

19             Now, you talked earlier this week and in your written evidence

20     about the protests that were sent to your office.  Is this a protest that

21     you would have received about your own specific behaviour?

22        A.   This document is a report.  It's not a protest.  As for the

23     allegations about me making that statement over the phone, that is a

24     blatant lie.  I am sufficiently trained and a sufficiently skilled

25     professional to know that were I to go on and say something like that, I

Page 32639

 1     certainly wouldn't do it over the phone.

 2        Q.   How would you do it then?

 3        A.   Well, I wouldn't do it at all, madam.  It goes against the grain

 4     of everything that I was taught, that prisoners were to be treated in

 5     keeping with the Geneva Conventions and prisoners were not to be killed.

 6        Q.   Fine.  I'd like to go on, now that we're talking about Sarajevo,

 7     to the subject of demilitarising Sarajevo, and you talked about this in

 8     your evidence earlier this week.  During your testimony, first of all --

 9     actually, let me ask you this question:  You would agree that on

10     9 February 1994, the Bosnian Serb Army and the ABiH agreed to a

11     cease-fire, the establishment of a total exclusion zone in Sarajevo, the

12     interposition of UNPROFOR between the two sides, and the placement of

13     heavy weapons in weapons collection points, don't you?

14        A.   I agree [Realtime transcript read in error "disagree"] with

15     everything you said apart from the date.  I can't quite recall the date

16     before I've been shown the relevant document, but everything you said

17     about the actual activities is true.

18        Q.   All right.  Let's have a look at the relevant document.  That's

19     P827, a UN civil affairs weekly political assessment by Viktor Andreev.

20        A.   Excuse me.  I would like to enter a correction to something I

21     said before.  The transcript says "I disagree," whereas I said "I agree"

22     with everything you said apart from the date.

23        Q.   Thank you very much for that.  If we could go over to page 2 of

24     this document, this notes under the heading Sarajevo second bullet point

25     negotiating in the shadow of a NATO threat, the Bosnian Serb Armies have

Page 32640

 1     made an oral agreement for the Greater Sarajevo.  The agreement, which

 2     came into effect on the 10th of February, has four main elements and goes

 3     in to describe the elements.

 4             Now, if we can just flip back over to page 1.  I apologise.

 5     Could we go back over to page 2, please.  My apologies.

 6             So page 2 of this document, in the first paragraph under the

 7     second bullet point makes the date of these events quite clear.  Would

 8     you be prepared to agree that the agreement we're talking about reflects

 9     an oral agreement between the two parties which is to come into effect on

10     the 10th of February?

11        A.   I know that all these activities were carried out.  Now, was this

12     an oral agreement or actually one that was signed black and white, I'm

13     sorry, I can't recall.

14        Q.   I didn't ask you that.  I asked you whether the agreement was

15     something which was to come into effect on the 10th of February.

16        A.   I don't know.  I can't recall the specific time line, so I can't

17     say.

18        Q.   So you're disagreeing with Mr. Andreev's report?

19        A.   Again, I would need to go through the entire report in order to

20     be able to agree or indeed disagree.  I can't judge this report portion

21     by portion, as it were, and not as a whole.

22        Q.   Well, keeping in mind that we have limited time for this, I'm

23     going to move on to another point.  You --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just ask for a reference.

25     Where does the document actually claim that it was to take effect on the

Page 32641

 1     10th?  In the third paragraph in the English [In English] "The armies

 2     were given ten days to withdraw 20 kilometres, and so on and so on.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  With respect, Your Honour, if I am, as everybody

 4     says, to be strictly limited to this time.  Dr. Karadzic has seen this

 5     document and he has seen the reference in the second bullet point,

 6     10th of February.  If we could move on.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please proceed.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:

 9        Q.   Now, in your testimony at 32448, you discussed P1641, dated

10     10 February 1994.  Now, that was a proposal for setting aside artillery

11     from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps commander to the VRS Main Staff.  And

12     Dr. Karadzic asked you whether this proposal, which was from

13     General Milosevic, was accepted and implemented, and you said, "I know

14     that it wasn't," and that was at T24439.  Do you remember that?

15        A.   I remember the proposal talked about using military cunning and

16     to place some of the nonfunctioning weapons into the reserve, but that

17     proposal by the Main Staff was not complied with as proposed.

18        Q.   Well, let's have a look at P847, which is dated 9 February 1994.

19     And it's an order of the VRS Main Staff from General Milovanovic on

20     bringing artillery weapons from around Sarajevo -- pardon me, on bringing

21     artillery weapons around Sarajevo from the Hercegovina Corps and the

22     Drina Corps, and it says under paragraph 1:

23             "In the course of today and tomorrow the command of the SRK shall

24     move artillery from other positions towards Sarajevo, mainly inoperative

25     weapons, which will be put up at the appropriate firing positions around

Page 32642

 1     Sarajevo.  The commanders of the Herzegovina and Drina Corps shall put

 2     the inoperative weapons unconditionally at the disposal of the commander

 3     in order to disguise our intentions."

 4             So the proposal which you say was not implemented on reading this

 5     document is obviously a proposal on the implementation of this order from

 6     General Milovanovic, isn't it?

 7        A.   As far as I can tell, there are some discrepancies here in terms

 8     of time.  This order by General Milovanovic - and I've never seen it

 9     before - is dated the 9th of February, and the proposal is dated the

10     10th of February.

11        Q.   Mr. Indjic.  Mr. Indjic, that's completely unresponsive to the

12     question I asked you.  The question I asked you was:  The proposal which

13     you say wasn't implemented is, on reading this document, obviously a

14     proposal for the implementation of this order from General Milovanovic,

15     isn't it?

16        A.   I see the order.  However, I know what was placed under

17     UNPROFOR's control.  In all of the UNPROFOR documents, you have lists

18     telling you exactly what types of artillery weapons, what exactly was

19     placed under control.  It was all of the artillery that was available to

20     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that ended up being placed under control.

21        Q.   Uh.  So as I understand your evidence, the answer -- actually, I

22     don't understand that you've answered my question, but we'll move on.

23             Let's have a look at 65 ter 09150.  It's a document dated

24     12 February 1994, from General Milovanovic to the corps commanders,

25     confirming that the apparent -- that the apparent withdrawal of heavy

Page 32643

 1     weapons isn't actually a withdrawal and surrender, but, rather, a

 2     manoeuvre of these weapons into various places around Sarajevo.

 3             So not only does this document confirm the document that we've

 4     just spoken about, P00847, it confirms the document you discussed, P1641,

 5     General Milosevic's proposal was being effectively implemented.  Isn't

 6     that the case?

 7        A.   That is not the case.  I'm saying that all of the artillery

 8     weapons that were part of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were placed under

 9     control.  It was necessary because of the fear felt by the soldiers to

10     explain to all the men that this wasn't about surrendering their

11     artillery weapons.  It was necessary to explain to them that the weapons

12     were still around, but none of the weapons remained outside UNPROFOR

13     control, fully functional or broken.  It didn't really make any

14     difference.  All of the artillery weapons were placed under their

15     control.

16             I think the essence of what really matters is what actually

17     happened on the ground and not necessarily just the accompanying

18     documents.  So what happened in actual reality on the ground is all of

19     the artillery weapons were placed under effective control.

20        Q.   All right then.  Let's have a look at some documents from your

21     forces that I think you would probably agree reflect what actually

22     happened on the ground.

23             Could we have a look, please, at P6016.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, may this document that we just

25     looked at be admitted?  I think it would be useful for that -- to

Page 32644

 1     understand the context and explain his answer.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Of course.  My omission.  Could this be a

 3     Prosecution Exhibit, please.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6087, Your Honours.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:

 7        Q.   So P6016 that you see on the screen in front of you is a

 8     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command document with a list of technical and

 9     materiel equipment that has not been pulled out, and it's broken down by

10     brigade.

11             Now, if you go down this list, you see, Mr. Indjic, the

12     Rajlovac Brigade has not pulled out a 40-millimetre gun, a T-55 tank.

13     The 3rd Sarajevo Brigade hasn't pulled out a T-55 tank and a

14     122-millimetre howitzer along with some mountain guns.  The

15     Ilijas Brigade hasn't pulled out a 122-millimetre mortar and two T-55

16     tanks.

17             So, Mr. Indjic, we could go down through this list, but this list

18     contradicts what you've just said in your testimony to the effect that

19     all the artillery weapons were placed under effective control.

20        A.   It's quite obvious from the document that we're talking about,

21     the 21st of February.  I have never seen this document before.  I don't

22     know what was happening up and down the chain of control and command.

23     There may have been some initial attempts to avoid placing all the

24     artillery weapons under control, because this was the initial stage where

25     these weapons were being regrouped, so to speak, and there was a lot of

Page 32645

 1     mistrust.

 2             I stand by my previous statement.  Finally all the

 3     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps artillery was placed under UNPROFOR control.

 4        Q.   But you're now qualifying your previous statement, Mr. Indjic.

 5        A.   I'm qualifying my previous statement because I was not myself

 6     part of the control and command chain.  This is a report by the brigades

 7     to the corps command.  I was no party to this.  I did know about the

 8     check-points and the control that was conducted there, where the weapons

 9     ended up.

10        Q.   But, Mr. Indjic, among the documents that you discussed in your

11     testimony earlier this week, you indicated that you were part of a

12     committee with a view to establishing and ensuring the weapons collection

13     points and moving the weapons into those areas, and you're now saying you

14     weren't part of the command and control chain in that regard?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  And I'll try and find the precise citation in a

16     moment, Your Honours.  That was at T3 -- pardon me.  That was at T32420.

17        Q.   You said:

18             "I'm absolutely familiar with that.  I was personally involved in

19     co-ordinating these activities in terms of pulling out anti-aircraft

20     weapons."

21             And further --

22             MS. EDGERTON:  We'll have to take a moment to find the citation,

23     Your Honour, given the witness's answer.  Your indulgence.

24             We'll find the citation, because we all remember it, Your Honour,

25     but I wonder if Your Honours will allow for the witness to answer the

Page 32646

 1     question.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Is it not 32420, line 1?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  That's one of them.  We're looking for the comment

 4     with respect to an associated exhibit now, Your Honour.

 5             We found it now, Your Honours.  Your indulgence.  The cite is

 6     32452.

 7        Q.   Where, Mr. Indjic, you were asked by Dr. Karadzic, were you

 8     familiar with the progress of the negotiations and how all these things

 9     were being implemented regarding the exclusion area, the total exclusion

10     area?  And your answer was:

11             "Yes I was a member of the delegation doing the negotiations and

12     was personally in charge of co-ordinating activities regarding the

13     grouping of these weapons.

14        A.   It's all true as stated.  I stand by that.  I was involved in the

15     negotiations.  Locations were determined where the heavy artillery

16     weapons would be collected.  I co-ordinated all of the activities in

17     relation to that.  UNPROFOR's arrival, weapons control, the drawing up of

18     lists, I don't see what's open to challenge there.  If there was a ruse

19     somewhere between the corps commanders and the brigade commanders going

20     on, I wasn't interested in that.  My job was to determine whether someone

21     was hiding weapons or not.  My job was not to do that.  My job was to

22     control the actual collection of the weapons.

23        Q.   Let's go, before leaving this topic, to --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, just for planning purpose, you passed

25     two hours a while ago.  How much longer do you need for your cross?

Page 32647

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Twenty minutes, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  And then for the record, could you

 3     scroll back to -- oh, yes.  Page 48, line 8.  When you referred to

 4     transcript page 24439, I take it it should read 32449.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, indeed.  And my sincere apologies.

 6     This has been a problem for months, and I'm particularly afflicted today.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please try to finish before the break.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, indeed.

 9        Q.   Now, you talked in your evidence yesterday -- pardon me, earlier

10     in the week about the removal of anti-aircraft guns from around the area

11     of the airport.  Do you remember that?

12        A.   Yes.  Not just guns but anti-aircraft weapons, generally

13     speaking.

14        Q.   All right.  Then let's have a look at P1650 [sic], and it's a

15     document from General Milosevic on the camouflaging of heavy weapons in

16     the 20-kilometre zone around Sarajevo, and it's dated 21 August 1994,

17     1670.  1670, please.

18             Now, this document talks about four Bofors anti-aircraft guns

19     which were located at firing positions on the MUP roof in Ilidza, and it

20     reports on General Rose's warning to General Milosevic to stop shooting

21     at UN planes with those guns and notes that they haven't been removed

22     despite previous warnings and orders - if we go over to page 2 in the

23     English we see the order displayed in the B/C/S - and orders that they be

24     removed to new firing positions where they will be camouflaged and

25     sheltered from air and ground recon.

Page 32648

 1             So it seems, Mr. Indjic, that the anti-aircraft weapons that you

 2     talked about in your evidence earlier this week that were removed in

 3     1992, in fact, weren't removed at all and weren't removed following the

 4     establishment of the total exclusion zone and weren't going to be removed

 5     but were going to be camouflaged to prevent further identification by UN

 6     forces, doesn't it?

 7        A.   That is not true.  I think there's a general confusion of

 8     concepts here.  My statement about the withdrawal of anti-aircraft

 9     weapons was about surrendering control over Sarajevo airport to UNPROFOR.

10     That's what it was about.  So as part of this withdrawal effort,

11     check-points were toured in Sokolac and further afield, locations that

12     the weapons had been taken to.  If you think that four Bofors guns are

13     all the anti-aircraft artillery weapons available to a corps-level

14     military unit, then I'm afraid you don't know much about the military.

15             I'm not trying to conceal anything.  I'm not going to whether

16     anyone actually tried to conceal these four weapons.  They may well have.

17     But I know what my job was, co-ordinating the artillery withdrawal

18     activities in keeping with the agreement.

19             Now, was there someone who failed to obey these orders?  I don't

20     know, but I think the best thing for you would be to take it up with that

21     person.  It wasn't my job.

22        Q.   Now -- thank you.  I'm going to -- I have two more questions for

23     you -- no, actually two small areas.

24             In today's transcript, at page 7, line 21, you responded to

25     Judge Kwon's questions explaining your roles during the first period of

Page 32649

 1     the war, liaising with UNPROFOR in respect of the VRS in its entirety,

 2     and from late 1993 onwards, liaising with UNPROFOR and providing

 3     assistance only as regards the SRK area of operation.

 4             But, in fact, as we've now seen, you were regularly called on to

 5     assist and advise and interpret for General Mladic and other members of

 6     the Main Staff.  You were a member of multiple commissions at different

 7     times, including mixed working group commissions between the UN and the

 8     VRS, the State Commission for prisoners of war.  You participated in the

 9     negotiations of the total -- relating to the total exclusion zone, the

10     anti-sniping agreement, the withdrawal from Igman and Bjelasnica,

11     negotiations for the restoration of utilities, and you were negotiated --

12     or, pardon me, you were authorised to negotiate and sign the agreement on

13     prisoner exchange in Zepa.

14             So, actually, isn't this a more accurate depiction of your true

15     role within the Bosnian Serb Army?

16        A.   I am grateful to you for showing this, and I am really proud now

17     of the time that I spent in the Army of Republika Srpska, because I --

18     I've almost forgotten all the good things that I've done there, and I

19     believe that this reflects the actual truth.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21        A.   Yes, I did all those things.

22        Q.   And I apologise for interrupting you.  Now, one last question --

23     series of questions.

24             Earlier this week you talked about your duties when the war was

25     over and we talked about them briefly today, and the reference earlier

Page 32650

 1     this week is T32415.  You said you became a member of the

 2     410th Intelligence Centre and after leaving that, you were with the

 3     security administration of the General Staff of the VRS until your

 4     retirement.  So could you tell me the period of time you worked in the

 5     410th Intelligence Centre and the security administration?

 6        A.   I worked at the 410th Intelligence Centre from the end of the war

 7     up until 2001, and I worked at the security administration from 2001

 8     until my retirement.

 9        Q.   All right.  And in that context, it's correct, isn't it, that you

10     would work together with Colonel Ljubisa Beara?

11        A.   That's not correct.  Colonel Ljubisa Beara was in charge of the

12     security organ during the war, and as an intelligence officer, I belonged

13     to the 410th Intelligence Centre.  I know that it's hard for you to

14     understand this, but there is intelligence work and counter-intelligence

15     work, and Colonel Beara was in charge of counter-intelligence and had no

16     connecting points with me.

17             Now, as for the security administration, at the time it wasn't

18     Colonel Beara anymore but, rather, General Lugonja who was at its head.

19        Q.   Let's have a look at 65 ter 24466, and it's a document dated

20     October 1996, in the VRS Main Staff sector for intelligence and security

21     affairs security department.  24466.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  It is released, Your Honours.  The speed at which

23     the system works sometimes defeats us.  And this is the last two

24     questions, Your Honour.

25             All right.  I can deal with the Serbian version on the page.

Page 32651

 1     Thank you.

 2        Q.   Now, this document reports on a meeting you attended with Beara

 3     and Mr. Latapi.  Now you've just said that you had no connections with

 4     Beara.  This document shows the contrary.  Did you have any connection

 5     with Beara during the course of your work, any connection, yes or no?

 6        A.   I have explained, because you asked me about my service at the

 7     410th centre and the administration -- security administration.  Had you

 8     asked me who Colonel Lafet [phoen] was, I would tell you that he was a

 9     French intelligence officer, although the French would have a problem

10     with that because he was there as a French defence ministry person, but

11     my work was as an intelligence officer and that has nothing to do with

12     whether I had anything to do with Beara.  Would you like now us to go

13     into some of the intelligence operations and investigations that were

14     done?  Would you like me to testify here as an intelligence officer?

15        Q.   No.  My question is whether or not you had connection with Beara,

16     and even though you were at a meeting together with him as seen in this

17     document, you -- you maintain that you did not; is that correct?

18        A.   I attended a meeting with Latapi together with Beara, and

19     specifically I had dealings with Latapi and not with Beara.

20        Q.   Could we have a look at 65 ter 04416.  And that, Mr. Indjic, is a

21     statement that General Milovanovic gave in writing to the RS government,

22     dated September 2004.  And if we can go over to page 3 in both languages,

23     second paragraph on page 3 referring to the period at the beginning of

24     1997, we see General Milovanovic says:

25             "General Mladic stayed in Crna Rijeka with his security guards

Page 32652

 1     who were supposed to protect him from being arrested by

 2     The Hague Tribunal.  In the beginning the commander of that powerful

 3     security group was Colonel Ljubisa Beara."

 4             So I'd like to put it to you, Mr. Indjic, that actually your

 5     answer that you've just given is trying to distance you from

 6     Colonel Beara in light of his involvement in protecting General Mladic at

 7     the time.

 8        A.   No, that's not correct.  I -- I'm not trying to distance myself.

 9     Quite the contrary, I'm sorry I did not personally take part in providing

10     security to General Mladic.  I wasn't given the opportunity.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  I have nothing further, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             Shall we take a break before you start your re-examination,

14     Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Although we have a witness, before doing so, the

17     Chamber will issue an oral ruling.

18             I refer to the Prosecution's motion to exclude tu quoque evidence

19     of Witness Srdjan Sehovac filed on the 18th of January 2013, and the

20     accused's response to that motion filed on the 22nd of January, 2013.

21             The Chamber has reviewed the draft statement of Srdjan Sehovac

22     which bears 65 ter number 1D6070 in light of the Prosecution motion and

23     the accused's response and finds that the answers to questions 2, 3, 9

24     the last sentence only, 13, 15 to 18 inclusive, 23, 24, 35, 36(A)(c),

25     36(A)(d) of the statement which the Prosecution seeks to exclude falls

Page 32653

 1     within the category of detailed evidence pertaining to crimes committed

 2     against Bosnian Serbs which the Chamber has consistently excluded on the

 3     grounds that it is irrelevant tu quoque evidence.  Further, the Chamber

 4     also considers that the answers to questions 8, 20, and 28 of the

 5     statement are not relevant to the charges against the accused in the

 6     indictment.

 7             The Chamber therefore grants the motion and excludes the answers

 8     to questions 2, 3, 8, 9, in case of para 9, last sentence only, 13, 15 to

 9     18 inclusive, 20, 23, 24, 28, 35, 36(A)(c) and 36(A)(d) of the statement

10     and will not admit the associated exhibits referred to therein.  The

11     accused is ordered to upload a redacted version of Srdjan Sehovac's

12     statement which reflects this decision.

13             We'll break for -- before doing so, yes, Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Mr. President.  I'm at the Court's

15     disposal with respect to this but I wanted perhaps to raise a scheduling

16     issue that the Court might want to be -- to consider during the recess

17     because I think would certainly arise by the end of the day.  So it's

18     just a very -- I can alert the Court to the nature of the problem before

19     it recesses if you wish.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I know that, particularly

22     in respect of this matter but in respect of related matters, the Court

23     has tried to leave scheduling in the hands of the parties to the extent

24     possible, but this is one matter which requires the Court to resolve, and

25     it concerns the timing of the commencement of the cross-examination for

Page 32654

 1     Mr. Milosevic.  The background to this issue, of course, is -- has been

 2     previously discussed in court and includes the absence of a draft

 3     statement or a 65 ter summary, the belated and recent provision of a kind

 4     of substitute for the 65 ter summary which itself had deficiencies and

 5     was topical in nature to a large degree, the belated and recent provision

 6     of a list of documents to be used, half of which were not translated at

 7     the time it was provided and so on, and I think these issues were

 8     described in somewhat more detail in court earlier.

 9             Now, the Defence position very correctly, and one which has been

10     appreciated, has been that there is indeed a notice problem and that as a

11     result it would willingly accommodate the Prosecution with whatever time

12     was reasonably needed before commencing cross, and this has been the

13     Defence's position even before we came to court and was, I think,

14     expressed in court on Monday as well.

15             Of course sometimes the devil is in the details and in discussion

16     yesterday with the Defence we advised of the period of time that we

17     considered under these circumstances appropriate before the commencement

18     of cross and indicated that we would wish five working days after the

19     conclusion of his cross before we commenced.  The Defence responded that

20     it considered commencing on Monday in light of the -- in light of the

21     weekend to be reasonable.  In -- in our view, that means there was no

22     accommodation since that's commencing in the normal course of business

23     but, more importantly, it doesn't reflect the circumstances here in a --

24     in a fair manner.

25             Now, we never considered that the understanding was that there

Page 32655

 1     was an acknowledgement that the Defence would agree to whatever time it

 2     deemed reasonable.  We thought it would be a more objective reasonable

 3     test, but nevertheless we tried to find a workable middle ground.  That

 4     wasn't successful.  The Defence adhered to the view that commencing

 5     immediately after cross, if it concluded, for example, on Monday, would

 6     be sufficient.

 7             Under these circumstances, we are trying to adjust as much as

 8     reasonably possible bearing in mind that to some extent reasonableness

 9     can differ in the minds of people, but -- so we are only seeking the most

10     modest of accommodations which mean the following:  That we are asking

11     that assuming the cross-examination ends today, which I doubt is the

12     case, that the -- that the direct examination ends today, that the

13     cross-examination would commence on Wednesday, and if it ended on Monday,

14     unless it was only a very brief portion of Monday, that the

15     cross-examination would commence on Thursday.  That is two days in

16     between.

17             So that's our position, Mr. President.  I thought it best to

18     advise you of the circumstances that had arisen so that the Court could

19     be considering it before the conclusion of the day.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Probably now you understand how much pause you

21     should put between the question and answer.  The French translation has

22     been only now completed.

23             MR TIEGER:  I apologise to the translators, in particular to

24     Judge Lattanzi, and that was a painful way -- I think hopefully the

25     lesson is embedded, Mr. President.  Thank you.

Page 32656

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, very briefly on this.  We

 3     obviously agree on the concept and normally we agree on what's

 4     reasonable, but in this particular case we believed that since they had

 5     all the material on last Sunday, that by commencing their

 6     cross-examination on Tuesday they would have had basically eight or nine

 7     days since they got the material to prepare for the cross-examination,

 8     and we thought that was enough.  But if you disagree, we will accommodate

 9     whatever you order.

10             JUDGE KWON:  What are you proposing us to do during those two

11     days in the interim, Mr. Tieger?

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, maybe I take him off the hook

13     a little bit there.  We do have three witnesses that will be here proofed

14     on Sunday and could testify in that period if the Chamber ordered.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  We're prepared to proceed on those witnesses,

17     Mr. President.

18             JUDGE KWON:  And you have no difficulty with conducting

19     cross-examination of those three witnesses?

20             MR. TIEGER:  If -- unless something unexpected happens with their

21     proposed testimony in between, no, we don't have any.  We're prepared to

22     proceed on cross-examination of those witnesses.

23             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will consider your submission and come

24     back to you in due course.

25             We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at 20 past 1.00.

Page 32657

 1                           [The witness stands down]

 2                           --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 1.23 p.m.

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  In regard to your request, Mr. Tieger, the Chamber

 6     sees no difficulty with accommodating it, but speaking for myself, I

 7     would like to be able to -- we could start with cross-examination

 8     immediately following the evidence of those three witnesses, but it

 9     would -- but I'm not sure how long it will take.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  I think about a day and a half.

11             JUDGE KWON:  It's almost two days.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  But, Mr. Tieger, would it be possible?  But shall we

14     leave it there and see how it evolves?

15             MR. TIEGER:  I think that's best, Mr. President, at this point,

16     yes.

17             JUDGE KWON:  And that ensures hard working on the part of

18     Ms. Edgerton.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Always.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, your Excellencies.

22                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

23        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, Colonel.

24        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. President.

25        Q.   Before we begin, I just need to ask for both of us to keep in

Page 32658

 1     mind the necessity of breaks or pauses.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But before that I wanted to say,

 3     Mr. President, that Madam Edgerton is probably the reason for the

 4     generosity in granting this time.  If you recall, the Prosecution had a

 5     large story when we asked for the postponement of Witness Skiljevic.  We

 6     urge -- or, are in favour of flexibility, and we believe that the process

 7     should be mutual.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.  Yes.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, today on page 50 of the transcript, in

11     response to allegations that we avoided pulling the weaponry out and the

12     handing over of those weapons for the UN to monitor, you will recall that

13     this did happen.  Do you remember when the agreement was signed to group

14     the weapons and place it under monitoring?

15        A.   I cannot bring into my memory the date.  I know that I looked at

16     the agreement, that it exists, but I cannot recall the date.  It's not

17     coming into my memory.

18        Q.   Can we look at 1D26670 in e-court, please.  It's possible that

19     parts of this document have already been tendered under different

20     numbers, but this document should be viewed as a single document

21     consisting of two parts.

22             Is this the document that you thought you saw, that being the

23     agreement to place the weapons under monitoring and regarding the

24     unrestricted movement of UNPROFOR verification patrols?

25        A.   Yes.  This document was shown to me by the Defence.  It was

Page 32659

 1     signed at the top level and I know that after this document

 2     organisational orders ensued as to the way in which this can be

 3     implemented.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And what is the date?  When was this agreement

 5     concluded?  When was it signed?

 6        A.   19 February 1994.

 7        Q.   Can you please look at the date again.

 8        A.   Ah.  It was signed on the 18th and was meant to go into effect on

 9     the 19th.  In the paragraph -- the first paragraph it states that it is

10     to be effective from 1200 hours on the 19th of February, 1994.

11        Q.   And was this followed by any kind of verbal agreement?

12        A.   No.  I don't know.  I cannot remember.

13        Q.   After this date, the 18th or the 19th of February, 1994, were

14     there any proposals or suggestions from General Milosevic or Milovanovic

15     about not respecting or about evading this agreement?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  It's leading.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Well, we saw what was written on the 9th.  Do you have any

22     information, knowledge, or any document indicating that after the signing

23     something similar was asked?

24        A.   Well, I don't believe.  I don't think that can be put in any

25     other way.  I don't know.  I don't have an answer to that question.

Page 32660

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at page 2 of the document, please.

 2             Do you remember this protocol of implementing -- can we look at

 3     the last page, please, so that we can look at the date.

 4             What is the date here?

 5        A.   19th of February, 1994.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go back to the previous page, page 2 of the

 7     document, please.

 8             Can you please tell us in relation to paragraph 1, which states

 9     in the event that UNPROFOR withdraws for any reason from mutually agreed

10     sites without out agreement, what would be the rights to our weapons in

11     that case or in the event of Muslim attacks?

12        A.   In paragraph 1, it states that in such a case, the

13     Army of Republika Srpska reserves the right to redeploy its weapons and

14     increase troop levels on the front line; while in the event of a Muslim

15     attack on the Serbs, which UNPROFOR is not able either to prevent or stop

16     immediately, the BSA reserves the right to implement adequate measures of

17     self-defence.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Did the UNPROFOR prevent a single attack by the

19     Muslim forces on the Army of Republika Srpska?

20        A.   UNPROFOR did not prevent any attack, and I think that that is

21     understandable, because the general mandate of UNPROFOR was that it could

22     not use force except in the case of self-defence, defence of its own

23     forces.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did the UNPROFOR ever call upon NATO to protect the

25     Serbian side by bombing Muslim positions?

Page 32661

 1        A.   I don't have such information, and as far as I know, this did not

 2     happen, it did not.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And the condition from paragraph 2 that UNPROFOR must

 4     return to Igman from where we withdrew in August 1993, actually, that the

 5     Muslims should withdraw and the UNPROFOR should return.

 6        A.   Well, this was part of the demilitarisation agreement pertaining

 7     to Igman and Bjelasnica.

 8        Q.   Can you please look at paragraph 6 where it states that neither

 9     the Muslim or the Serb side will be allowed to extract military

10     advantages during the current pacification process in the Sarajevo

11     district?  Did the Serb side extract any advantage and did the Muslim

12     side respect this agreement?

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  This is also leading.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very much.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Did the sides adhere to the conditions stated in paragraph 6?

19        A.   Our side pulled out its heavy weaponry, fulfilling the conditions

20     set in the paragraph, and there was also the respect of the cease-fire.

21     That was also secured.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

23     document, please.

24             JUDGE KWON:  This has been admitted.  Do you have an exhibit

25     number, Ms. Edgerton?

Page 32662

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Page 1 is P1820 and it's also page 1654.  And we

 2     all recognise the other pages as having been previously admitted.  We

 3     just have to track down the numbers, but they were Prosecution exhibits.

 4     Sorry, they were Defence exhibits during the cross-examination of a

 5     Prosecution witness.  D717, possibly.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Let's proceed.  If necessary, we'll come back to

 7     this issue.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now look at

 9     1D01658, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   I think that in the Serbian it was collated erroneously, so the

12     second page should be the first page.  Without reading through the

13     document, can you please tell us how the commander of the

14     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps acted already on the 18th of February in view of

15     the Karadzic-Akashi agreement going into effect of the 19th of February?

16     What does it state here?

17        A.   This is an operative order pursuant to the agreement where the

18     regrouping of weapons are provided for as covered under the agreement in

19     connection with the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.  We're talking about

20     materiel and equipment of 12.7 millimetres and over.

21        Q.   Can we now look at the page -- the first page in the Serbian.

22     Actually, can we look at the last page in both versions where we can see

23     the signature line with the signature of Galic, and can I ask you to read

24     the first sentence at the top of the page and to tell us what sanctions

25     the violators would be subject to.

Page 32663

 1        A.   The order precisely defines that --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me.  One page prior to this

 3     English.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The pages are not the same in the

 5     Serbian and the English, if that's means anything to you.  In the

 6     Serbian, the order precisely defines that in the event of finding hidden

 7     weaponry, the commanders would be subject to all criminal, moral, and

 8     material responsibility.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Thank you.  And does the order encourage or prompt any kind of

11     evasion of the agreement or the order?

12        A.   No, quite the opposite.  It orders the consistence -- consistent

13     respect of the agreement and threatens sanctions in the event that it is

14     not so.

15        Q.   It seems that we're not looking at the same document.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The wrong document has been

17     uploaded.  This document only has five paragraphs.  This seems to be the

18     translation of 1D01659, and we need 58.  The translation that we see is

19     the translation of document 1D01659.  Can this previous document be

20     tendered, and if there is no translation, then perhaps the document can

21     be MFI'd.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I lost that somewhere.  What was the number of the

23     document we are seeing in B/C/S?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it's 1D01658.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And the translation -- yes.  I don't think we

Page 32664

 1     have the correct translation.  I don't know the reason.

 2             Are you done with this document, Mr. Karadzic?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes.  I would like to tender

 4     it, and if we don't find the document, MFI.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Marked for identification, the Serbian version

 7     marked for identification --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll do that.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  -- pending translation.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2800, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I congratulate on it being a round

12     number, 2800.  And can we now look at 1D01659.  The English should remain

13     on the monitor, because that is the correct translation for that

14     document.  This has been put together erroneously as well.  Can we look

15     at page 2.  That seems to be the title, the correct title page.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, this is a regular combat report.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have that in English too.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   The date is the 19th of February, 1994.  Item 2, "Our forces."

21     What exactly were our forces doing?

22        A.   It says here units are preparing and carrying out tasks related

23     to moving TMS, technical equipment and materiel, over 12.7 millimetre in

24     calibre.  Fuel and food are being resupplied and an inventory, records of

25     equipment that will remain at the positions are being compiled.

Page 32665

 1        Q.   Thank you very much.  Is that consistent with your information on

 2     agreement compliance and everything that was done afterwards?

 3        A.   This was the activity that ensued once the order had been

 4     received on the regrouping of forces.  So this is confirms that the order

 5     is being implemented.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.  Can we please move on to the next page.

 7     It's the first page in this document, because the Serbian has two pages

 8     only.  And in the English document it's paragraph 8, item 8, at the very

 9     end of the document.

10             Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, item 8, the third bullet point, our

11     units have -- what does it say there?

12        A.   Our units have, with maximum effort, taken steps to adhere to the

13     measures ordered with regard to complying with the cease-fire and moving

14     TMS artillery pieces over 12.7 millimetre.

15        Q.   Is that in keeping with your information?

16        A.   Yes, this is also about a consistent implementation of the

17     agreement.  It even goes a step further than that.  They're trying to

18     make sure that a cease-fire prevails quite regardless of the fact that in

19     paragraph 1 -- or, rather, the first bullet point here you see that the

20     Muslims are continuing with their engineering work throughout the

21     cease-fire and are continuing to take and capture territory by doing

22     that.

23        Q.   Do you still remember -- perhaps we should go back to the first

24     page.  Is this a secret document?  Is it classified?

25        A.   Yes.  My answer is whenever you have a combat report, it's always

Page 32666

 1     classified to some degree.

 2        Q.   Thank you very much.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document please be

 4     admitted.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2801, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  1D00401.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, this is an interim --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  I think that's already been admitted as D2517.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's possible.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is an interim report concerning the withdrawal of heavy

16     weapons by General Galic.  Who is this report for?

17        A.   It's for the President of Republika Srpska and that was you at

18     the time, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, about the civilian authorities in Hadzici

19     trying to get in the way of the implementation of this agreement,

20     specifically the municipal president, Mr. Ratko Radic.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Line 8 in paragraph 2, that same meeting.  At that

22     meeting lack of confidence was expressed.

23        A.   At that meeting, lack of confidence was expressed in the position

24     that had been taken with it being stressed that the Supreme Command and

25     the corps commander should have submitted an order in writing on the

Page 32667

 1     withdrawal and relocation of the weapons.

 2        Q.   And then the last page.

 3        A.   Despite being urged to respect the recommendations of the

 4     Supreme Commander, those from the brigade commands and the SRK were

 5     present, were unable to convince him to respect them.  End of quote.  In

 6     this case, the VRS did not have the authority on the ground -- did not

 7     have any authority over the local civilian authorities.  For that reason,

 8     the corps commander addresses the president, pleading with him to use his

 9     authority to try and get the local civilian authorities to comply with

10     the implementation of the agreement.

11        Q.   Thank you very much.  What about the Serb part of Hadzici?  What

12     was in position vis-a-vis the enemy, and what about the concern expressed

13     here by the civilian authorities?  Was that a justified concern or was it

14     simple arrogance?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  It's leading and outside of the scope of the

16     cross-examination, Your Honours.  We never discussed Hadzici.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is a corps and its artillery,

18     and that implies everything within a 20-kilometre radius around Sarajevo.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, but the -- you should have stopped after

20     "authorities."  The last sentence was very much leading.  Do you follow,

21     Mr. Karadzic?  We'll allow the question.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you remember the question, sir?

24        A.   Yes.  The concern felt and expressed by the civilian authorities

25     in Hadzici is perfectly understandable.  The Hadzici municipality was in

Page 32668

 1     a really difficult spot.  The most difficult spot of all, the

 2     municipalities within the Sarajevo general area.  It was quite isolated

 3     to the west, and in the eventuality of a Muslim attack from Mount Igman

 4     or from Kiseljak, they would have been entirely unable to defend

 5     themselves.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted, please.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I note that the number D2517 was marked for

 9     identification due to the lack of B/C/S original.  So now it's time to

10     admit it full.  Do you have any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  None.

12                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

13             JUDGE KWON:  I was informed that the English translation in both

14     versions are a bit different.  Do you have any suggestion, Ms. Edgerton?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  I would probably invite my colleagues to send this

16     to CLSS for a revised translation.  My simple recommendation.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no time to check, but

18     perhaps the service itself should check the translation for accuracy.

19     May I continue?

20             JUDGE KWON:  We'll use the previous D2517, and we'll add this

21     original to that, and then that will simplify the procedure.  Let's

22     continue.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01660.  Thank you.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, here we see another regular combat report

Page 32669

 1     dated the 20th of February.  Number 2, "Our forces," the second

 2     paragraph, please.  You don't have to read everything word by word, but

 3     just tell us generally what the Main Staff of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

 4     command is telling us about here.

 5        A.   What is being reported here is the withdrawal of weapons in

 6     keeping with the agreement.  As for the weapons that for one reason or

 7     the other were not moved, these same weapons were inspected by the UN.

 8        Q.   What about UNPROFOR activities?  Paragraph 3 under (a).  There

 9     was a meeting that was held, and what exactly did UNPROFOR say there?

10        A.   It was a meeting with the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija

11     Corps, General Galic.  The Secretary-General's envoy expresses the

12     satisfaction with gratitude to the Serbian side on their efforts to

13     implement the agreement on the withdrawal of artillery pieces.  He

14     visited the military barracks and saw for himself that the equipment had

15     been withdrawn.

16        Q.   Please press on.

17        A.   A meeting was held between General Galic and General Soubirou

18     where details of some problems were discussed with regard to the

19     withdrawal, and it was all successfully resolved.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Lieutenant-Colonel, were the proposals of

21     General Milosevic adopted, General Milosevic and others who invoked

22     caution on the 9th of February?

23        A.   As I said before, the proposals were not adopted, and the

24     agreement was implemented as concluded.

25        Q.   In your opinion, what was the view that ordinary soldiers among

Page 32670

 1     their own ranks took regarding that in Hadzici and elsewhere?

 2        A.   We all took a dim view of that agreement, because we were afraid

 3     of the possibility that the clashes would escalate.  Nevertheless, we

 4     tried to act as true professionals and comply with everything, every

 5     single thing that was agreed.

 6        Q.   Can we move on to the next page, please, and tell us about

 7     item 5, morale and security.  You don't have to read it out out loud.

 8     Just tell us whether it's perfectly consistent with everything that you

 9     have yourself been telling us.

10        A.   Yes.  It's consistent.  It reflects the morale among the troops

11     on the ground and how unhappy they were about this withdrawal of weapons,

12     artillery weapons.  People were afraid -- were afraid of what that

13     withdrawal might give way to.  The ordinary soldiers there saw this as

14     some kind of defeat.

15        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, I was the person who concluded that

16     agreement.  What sort of reputation did I enjoy with the soldiers at the

17     time?  How did they see me?

18        A.   I'm really sorry to have to say this, but your reputation was not

19     really the best at the time.

20        Q.   And that would mean what exactly?

21        A.   People felt that this was some sort of betrayal.

22        Q.   Thank you very much.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted,

24     please.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 32671

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 2802, Your Honours.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Given the anger felt by the soldiers and given the caution

 4     expressed previously by Mr. Radic, the civilian authorities in Hadzici,

 5     given the view that the soldiers took of me at the time, were they

 6     justified in feeling this anger?  Were the Muslims acting in compliance

 7     with the cease-fire or --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  If you're not able to conduct your examination

 9     properly, then the Chamber is thinking about asking the counsel to

10     take -- take up your role.  Please heed to the advice of the Chamber to

11     refrain from making -- asking leading questions.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, was the cease-fire being complied with, the

15     cease-fire that had previously caused us to surrender our weapons?

16        A.   It was obvious based on what happened later on that the

17     cease-fire did not spell an end to the war.  It was just one of many

18     cease-fires.

19        Q.   Thank you.  What was the reason for that?

20        A.   Once this cease-fire took effect, it was soon violated by the

21     Muslims, and then the fighting continued.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D7033, please.  Thank you.  Can we

23     please zoom in.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Sir, are you familiar with this document?  What is it?

Page 32672

 1        A.   One of the commitments of the agreement that was concluded was to

 2     monitor and regularly report on any violations of the cease-fire.  This

 3     report covers several days during which violations committed by the

 4     Muslims occurred.

 5        Q.   Thank you very much.  Can we please go to page 3 in relation to

 6     the 19th and 20th of February.  And the agreement had just been signed.

 7             So who was in charge of this on a minute-to-minute basis, and who

 8     was it who was informed about these violations?

 9        A.   This was kept by the hour at the corps command.  The duty

10     operations officer would receive reports from brigade commanders

11     according to a pre-established schedule.  Violation reports would be

12     received and forwarded to the UNPROFOR command.

13        Q.   And what was their reaction to our reports?

14        A.   Normally there would be no response from UNPROFOR.  Did they do

15     anything about it?  Did they speak to the Muslim side about this?  I

16     don't really know, but even if that was the case, it certainly led to

17     nothing, because the Muslim violations continued.

18        Q.   Thank you very much.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted, please.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  I think this is probably the first document in the

21     redirect where Dr. Karadzic asked one kind of question to establish some

22     basis for the witness to be able to comment on the document, and he asked

23     whether he was familiar with it, and although he didn't say -- the

24     witness didn't say specifically how he might be familiar with it, I think

25     he gave enough context for it to be admitted, but I just wanted to put a

Page 32673

 1     marker down for any further documents that Dr. Karadzic intends on using.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  We haven't heard from the witness from where this

 3     document was from and who produced it, for what purpose.

 4             Do you know, that Mr. Indjic?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.  I explained a

 6     while ago that the operations duty officer at the corps command was in

 7     charge of keeping such documents based on information received from the

 8     brigades.  This type of document would then be translated and submitted

 9     to UNPROFOR for their information so that they would be informed of any

10     cease-fire violations.  So this document passed through my office.

11             JUDGE KWON:  So this document was produced by you.  It's a

12     compilation of information gathered in such a way.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  The document was compiled by

14     the duty operations officer at the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command.  It

15     would then be forwarded by my office to UNPROFOR command.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   What about lines 11 through 14 and page 8?  I thought that was

18     sufficiently clear.  Seventy-eight, 78.  The previous page.  At lines 11

19     through 14, page 78.  What is stated there among other things is that the

20     lieutenant-colonel forwarded these reports to UNPROFOR.

21             JUDGE KWON:  For example, do you know when this report was

22     written?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you look at this report, it

24     covers the period between the 10th and the 20th of February, 1994.  So

25     this was not one of the daily reports.  This was part of the agreement to

Page 32674

 1     report on any cease-fire violations.  So we would take a week or a

 2     fortnight, and after a week or a fortnight we would inform UNPROFOR about

 3     any cease-fire violations.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  My question is whether you know when this document

 5     was written.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] February 1994.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  For example, can you show the witness page 29,

 8     whatever -- how can a document that was produced in February deals with

 9     April?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Then probably this was an analysis

11     of the entire period and all the violations during that period.  It's

12     very difficult for me to answer any questions about the document when I

13     can't see the document in its entirety.

14             JUDGE KWON:  But you testified earlier on just a minute ago that

15     it is a report passed by you to the UNPROFOR, in answer to the question

16     from myself whether it is a compilation of some information.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the report would have

18     been pointless had it not been submitted to UNPROFOR.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.  Just --

20     given the position of the Prosecution, we'll admit this.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  And can I just add a codicil to my position.  When

22     I answered Your Honour's question, I was raising on the basis of what I

23     had seen in e-court.  Subsequent to that, I opened the document in my own

24     e-court and found it to be a 63-page document.  The date's up until

25     November 1994.

Page 32675

 1             JUDGE KWON:  37 pages in B/C/S.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Quite so.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  But you do not object to the admission of this

 4     document.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Actually, could I have your indulgence for a

 6     moment, Your Honour?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I don't object to the part discussed

10     in court, and for the remainder of the document it's contrary to what the

11     witness has expressly said.  On that basis I think it's useful -- no.  I

12     don't object to the part that was discussed in court.  For the remainder,

13     I think Dr. Karadzic can deal with it with another witness.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Should I answer?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is re-examination.  I was not

18     going to tender this document through this witness.  However, there are

19     suspicions that have been expressed about our actions concerning the

20     withdrawal of artillery weapons and the cease-fire compliance.  I sort of

21     took the witness by surprise.  He should have been given a chance to go

22     through the document in its entirety because the violations occurred on a

23     daily basis.  So I'm not being fair to the witness because I'm not giving

24     him a chance to go through this document.  He saw a page dated February,

25     so he was speaking about February.  If I had given him the whole document

Page 32676

 1     and some time to go through it and see for himself, he would have

 2     addressed the document and the entire time-frame.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  To my memory, the witness has not given us a

 4     satisfactory explanation as to the provenance of this document, so I

 5     think it's fair enough to admit only those parts commented upon by the

 6     witness.  I leave it to the Registry in assistance with the parties to

 7     indicate what date it was that was commented upon by the witness.

 8                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Page 3 in B/C/S.  So we'll admit only that page.

10     Shall we give the number.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2803, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  If necessary, you can adduce evidence with

13     assistance of other witnesses.  Let's continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, this was from your corps.  Then what about

17     the Main Staff?  Were there more comprehensive documents and protests

18     lodged by the Main Staff that might tie in with an overview such as the

19     present document?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Can Dr. Karadzic be asked to rephrase his

21     question, but maybe there's no point now.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   What did the Main Staff do about this?

24        A.   I can't respond to that question.  As I said, the liaison office

25     for the UN was established at Pale, so all the correspondence through to

Page 32677

 1     UNPROFOR went through that liaison office.  That being the reason, I'm in

 2     no position to answer your question.

 3        Q.   Thank you very much.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have these daily

 5     protests that were submitted to UNPROFOR, but we'll get to that at a

 6     later stage.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, you were asked some questions about the

 9     exchange of prisoners in July and August 1995.  Did you ever receive

10     instructions from any officers or VRS commands to avoid the issue of

11     prisoner exchange from Srebrenica?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, objection again.  Again it's a

13     leading question.  He's suggesting the answers to the witness.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, I disagree with that.  I

15     don't want to state it necessarily in the presence of the witness, but if

16     you read that question, which I wrote and gave it to Dr. Karadzic, that

17     does not suggest either a yes or no answer.  The witness is free to

18     answer that question either yes or no, and that is not a leading question

19     in my book.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  I will allow the witness to ask -- I'm sorry, allow

22     the accused to ask that question.  The Chamber will allow it.

23             Do you remember the question?  Yes, please proceed.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.  The issue of the

25     exchange of prisoners was an issue that was dealt with by a government

Page 32678

 1     body in charge of prisoner exchanges at the head of which was

 2     Dragan Bulajic.  I attended the meetings as a liaison officer rather than

 3     a member of the exchange commission.  I never received personally from

 4     anyone any suggestion regarding the issue of the imprisoned -- the

 5     persons taken prisoner in Srebrenica.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, you attended some

 8     meetings.  Did you ever observe or notice that the Serb side, which was

 9     in charge of the prisoner exchanges, differentiated when it came to

10     exchanges of prisoners from Srebrenica as opposed to any other area?

11        A.   All of the meetings from 1992 until the end of the war that dealt

12     with prisoner exchanges, in all of them the Serb side always had the same

13     position and that was that prisoners should be exchanged all for all.

14        Q.   [In English] Did you ever observe whether -- or noticed whether

15     the Serb side as opposed [no interpretation] [In English] in comparison

16     to [Interpretation] So the question was:  Was there any difference in the

17     treatment of the prisoners from Srebrenica or prisoners that were held by

18     Serbs from other areas?

19        A.   The meetings which I attended -- at the meetings which I

20     attended, there was never any special treatment of this issue of

21     prisoners from Srebrenica.  The position was always that there should be

22     an all-for-all exchange.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  You admit that there was a

24     discussion about prisoners from Srebrenica.  Can I take your answer to

25     mean that there was actually a discussion about the prisoners from

Page 32679

 1     Srebrenica, which is not different from any other previous discussion?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can recall that Amor Masovic

 3     asked in one of the meetings that the -- the negotiations should include

 4     the persons from Srebrenica.  Now, because there was no information, that

 5     neither Amor Masovic as a Muslim representative nor anyone from our side

 6     had any information about the number of persons from Srebrenica, that

 7     issue remained open and no further negotiations were led on it.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No.  The question from Mr. Karadzic was whether

 9     there's a change in the Serb side as regards the prisoners from

10     Srebrenica, and then you said there's no difference in the treatment of

11     prisoners from Srebrenica.  But how -- how can you discuss your -- the

12     treatment of prisoners from Srebrenica if you knew nothing about it.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can talk about it because

14     what I'm saying is that the general position was always that any of -- at

15     all of the meetings that the exchange should be all for all.  The

16     Srebrenica prisoners were not included in these negotiations because

17     there were never -- there was never any information, specific

18     information, about these people, the numbers, or anything like that.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Was the Serb side trying to avoid this exchange of prisoners from

23     Srebrenica?  That's what the point of my question was when I asked

24     whether there was any difference in their treatment, because in this

25     document it says that Mladic offered that prisoners should be exchanged

Page 32680

 1     all for all.

 2        A.   I have no information, I repeat, that there was ever any attempt

 3     to avoid discussions of any part of the -- about any part of the

 4     territory when it came to prisoner exchanges, and I repeat, the position

 5     was always that they should be exchanged all for all.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, you were going to say

 7     something about the role of the liaison officer.  Could I now invite you

 8     to explain this to us, and especially to point out the positions that the

 9     liaison officer puts forth and what the degree of his autonomy is in this

10     in reporting the positions of the superior command.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Again Dr. Karadzic is, in my submission, leading

13     the witness.

14             JUDGE KWON:  In what part is this question leading?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  The degree of autonomy.  Inviting him to talk

16     about the degree of autonomy in his reporting vis-a-vis the positions of

17     the superior command.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE BAIRD:  Dr. Karadzic, can you restrict your question to

20     this:

21             "Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, you were going to say something about

22     the role of the liaison officer."

23             Can it be kept within those bounds?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely, your Excellency.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 32681

 1        Q.   So could the witness please now reply to the question as you

 2     phrased it.

 3        A.   It is obvious that there is insufficient understanding or a

 4     misunderstanding of the role of the liaison officer, and that's why I

 5     asked to be allowed to explain it.  A liaison officer has absolutely no

 6     command role of any kind, nor can he or she take any decisions

 7     independently.  A liaison officer must consistently report what one party

 8     relates to the other, and in addition, in a technical sense, we as

 9     liaison officers were duty-bound to forward communications and

10     correspondence, to take part in organising meetings, in monitoring the

11     implementation of certain agreements that were reached.  We had to

12     provide constant communication between the Main Staff of the VRS and the

13     UNPROFOR command, to assist in all humanitarian actions including

14     humanitarian convoys, repairs to infrastructures and similar.  As a

15     liaison officer, knowing the situation on the ground, I could put forth

16     certain suggestions to my commander, telling him how I saw the situation

17     and propose what he might do, but it was his decision, and my duty was to

18     consistently implement that, his order.

19        Q.   Thank you.  On page 14 of today's transcript, you were asked

20     about a meeting at the Jela restaurant and what you knew about crimes.

21             Now, the two generals who were at this meeting, Smith and Mladic,

22     did they discuss, did they talk about this issue, the crimes, while you

23     were there?

24        A.   I did not hear any mention of any crimes while I was present at

25     the said meeting.

Page 32682

 1        Q.   Thank you.  On pages 12 and 13, you said, and you repeated this

 2     on several occasions, that you had some 100 communications with Mladic.

 3     How did this happen?  Was it oral, in writing?  Was it face-to-face?  So

 4     technically speaking, what kind of communications did you have with him?

 5        A.   All of the ones that you mentioned.  So phone conversations,

 6     letters or reports in writing, if it was necessary to put forth a

 7     proposal or submit a report, up until going and seeing in person

 8     General Mladic at his command.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Did you and Mladic talk about crimes?  Did you

10     exchange any information about this at the Jela restaurant outside of

11     what was said during the meeting itself?

12        A.   No.  I was not a member of the Main Staff of Republika Srpska,

13     and General Mladic never informed me about things that I did not need in

14     my work.

15        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked about certain reports -- or, rather,

16     reporting in the foreign media.  Did you have access to the foreign press

17     on a daily basis?  Did you receive them?  Did you receive the papers that

18     brought those reports and articles that you were shown here?

19        A.   As the liaison officer who liaised with UNPROFOR and other

20     members of the international community, and thanks to the fact that I

21     understand English, I was able to get information from the press, the

22     foreign press, and the reports that they published on various issues.

23        Q.   But have you read any of the articles that were shown to you by

24     Madam Edgerton, by Mr. Block or others about the allegations about the

25     developments after the fall of Srebrenica?

Page 32683

 1        A.   No, I haven't.  The first time I read anything about Srebrenica

 2     and learned detailed information about Srebrenica was when I received a

 3     Dutch report of many pages which analysed the events in Srebrenica.

 4        Q.   When was is this, what year?

 5        A.   This was after the war.

 6        Q.   What do you know about the accuracy and fairness of reporting of

 7     the foreign media?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Before you answer the question.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Their unbiased reporting.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I think now, Your Honours, we may be just getting

13     a little bit outside of the scope of cross-examination when we begin to

14     talk about the bias of the media, but I --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Did you not put some news clippings from news media.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I put one report by Mr. Block which the witness

17     said he had not -- sorry.  I put one report by Mr. Block and one AP

18     article which the witness said corresponded to and supplemented the

19     evidence he gave in paragraph 171.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I think you also put an AFP clipping as well.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  I think we might be referring to the same

22     clipping, but perhaps not.  I'm not disagreeing with you, Your Honours.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will allow the question.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will answer this simply by saying

Page 32684

 1     that the general opinion in Republika Srpska was prevailed that the Serbs

 2     have lost the media war.  It is easy for me to understand why we had lost

 3     this media war, because there were war correspondents in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina and war correspondents need blood and flesh and not

 5     us.  So all our Serb efforts to end the war and our efforts for peace

 6     were not really that interesting.  It was necessary to find the places

 7     where war was going on and find bloody scenes.  So my answer is that I

 8     feel that the war correspondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina were generally

 9     partial, biased, and that they actually contributed because they were

10     partial in their reporting to the continuation of the war.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 3 it says "us" whereas the

12     witness said "we."

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   So would you please clarify that.  You said that they needed --

15        A.   Well, we didn't need stories about peace.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Just a few more questions.  Could you tell the

17     Trial Chamber at the time of the events in Srebrenica, were there any

18     other developments, war events, around Sarajevo and in Republika Srpska?

19     What was happening in military terms in those days in Republika Srpska?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  [Microphone not activated] I'm not sure either how

21     this arises from the cross-examination, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  [Microphone not activated] Mr. Karadzic -- just a

23     second.  Mr. Karadzic -- can you hear me?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.  I can hear you in my

25     earphones but also in the courtroom.

Page 32685

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Can you explain how it arises from the

 2     cross-examination.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I would like to

 4     know -- I would like to hear what events were in the focus of

 5     Colonel Indjic's interest.  Was it Srebrenica alone, and was he supposed

 6     to know more about it or not?  What all else was happening in military

 7     terms?  There was expressed a suspicion here about his knowledge --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Just a second.  You don't have to continue.

 9     Point taken.  Please continue.

10             Or do you remember the question, Mr. Indjic?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do remember the question,

12     although it is hard now to assess all that was happening in the area --

13     in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but simply put, war was still

14     on, so there was a war going on.

15             As for Srebrenica and everything that relates to Srebrenica, I

16     can only reiterate once again with great certainty that I was never

17     involved in any way, nor did I have any information about Srebrenica at

18     that time.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember did Mount Dinara fall, and at what

21     time of the year was it?  This was -- this is between us and the

22     Knin Krajina.

23        A.   I am aware of all of these final days, but I don't know the

24     details.

25        Q.   Very well.  I withdraw that question.  The last question:

Page 32686

 1     Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, do you remember how the international community,

 2     the international public opinion, and the UN included, how they treated

 3     and dealt with the crisis surrounding Cerska?  Could you tell us about

 4     it?  And could you tell us whether you can see any parallels between the

 5     way Srebrenica was treated and Cerska 93?

 6        A.   I don't have any views of that.  I don't have any knowledge of

 7     that.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.  Never mind then.

 9     Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel, sir.

10                           Questioned by the Court:

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Indjic, transcript page 28 -- 7289, earlier on

12     today in answer -- in answer to the question put by Ms. Edgerton, which

13     was related your knowledge whether there's a claim from the Muslim part

14     or the international community as regards the fate of missing persons

15     from Srebrenica, I'll read out the question:

16             "Even the Bosnian authorities by that point in time, by the 20th

17     of July, 1995, knew that their men in Srebrenica were missing, and you

18     claim you know nothing."

19             And you answered:

20             "I still claim that I didn't know anything and that they did know

21     about it.  Of course they did.  They organised it themselves."

22             And you -- you were asked to clarify what you meant by "they

23     organised it themselves," and you referred to a meeting with

24     Mr. Izetbegovic in 1993.

25             Now that we heard from you that you came to know about what

Page 32687

 1     happened in Srebrenica after reading -- after the war, after reading the

 2     NIOD report, et cetera, I really don't understand what you meant, but the

 3     Muslims organised it themselves.  Can you answer the question?

 4        A.   Well, I will say a few things.  In 1993, the leadership of

 5     Srebrenica asked Alija Izetbegovic to provide a solution, because

 6     Srebrenica could not survive as it was, and Alija Izetbegovic replied

 7     decisively that -- that the Americans wanted him to show 3.000 dead so

 8     that they could take action against the Serb side.

 9             The next thing:  Before the Srebrenica operation - and I learned

10     of this late -- Naser Oric, a division commander, and the entire Muslim

11     leadership pulled out of Srebrenica.  So they were not there while the --

12     the Srebrenica operation was in place.  And the people who were supposed

13     to be sacrificed for the benefit of obtaining NATO intervention, they

14     were the ones who remained in Srebrenica.  That's what I was trying to

15     say.

16             JUDGE KWON:  What do you know about Srebrenica at this time,

17     2013?  Do you still claim that you know nothing about it?

18        A.   Now I know almost everything about it, but not as a person who

19     participated in its -- in it personally, but as a person who made an

20     effort to try and find out what happened.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Are you of the -- are you still of the view that it

22     was organised by the Muslims themselves?

23        A.   I still think that this was organised by the Muslims with the

24     help of their masters - and I'm not going to name them here - whereas the

25     crime itself was committed by the Serb forces, but this was organised by

Page 32688

 1     Muslims plus someone else.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  What did you refer to when it was organised by the

 3     Muslims?  You mean the killing of Muslim people?

 4        A.   I meant the operation against Srebrenica.  So Srebrenica was a

 5     safe area, but it was not demilitarised.  And there were persistent

 6     combat operations launched from Srebrenica in order to provoke an

 7     operation against Srebrenica.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  The question has consistently been about the fate of

 9     Muslim able-bodied men who are allegedly missing.  So the question was

10     about the death of those able-bodied men.  Do you say that it was

11     organised by the Muslims?

12        A.   The Muslims organised and provoked this entire operation, but the

13     killing of these people was committed by the Serb forces as a consequence

14     of what had been organised, because it was never the objective to

15     accomplish peace in that area, to demilitarise Srebrenica and seize with

16     combat operations.  It was necessary to provoke the Serb side so that

17     they would launch an operation that would lead to casualties, and it was

18     well known that they knew that there would be casualties, because in --

19     in Srebrenica there were people who were encircled, and in the brigades

20     that attacked -- that were attacking, there were people who had lost

21     their loved ones in 1993 when their villages were attacked by Muslim

22     forces and Naser Oric at their head.  So it was known that there would be

23     such a development afterward.

24             JUDGE KWON:  You just said that Srebrenica was not demilitarised.

25     In this regard, today you said at transcript page 4, lines 21, 22, you

Page 32689

 1     stated that Security Resolution was not reasonable.  Do you remember

 2     having said that?  Could you expand -- explain it in a bit further detail

 3     why do you think it was unreasonable?

 4        A.   Yes.  I remember saying that, and I stand by that personal

 5     opinion.  It's a personal opinion.  The Resolution was not reasonable for

 6     the following reasons:  Firstly, there is no definition of a protected

 7     area.  That definition is not recorded anywhere, not such a definition

 8     that would give legal basis to that Resolution.

 9             Secondly, it is not possible for someone to be protecting an area

10     and yet in that area there are armed individuals and weapons.  How, then,

11     can you achieve protection?

12             Finally, and again this was an erroneous attitude, if you ask me,

13     creating a protected area in the middle of a war is an absurdity.  Those

14     creating such areas, had they wished to end the war, instead of creating

15     these areas they could have come up with the Dayton Accords already at

16     this point.  The matter is the ratio of territory that had by this time

17     been taken by the one side, and the other side was perhaps deemed to be

18     unfavourable by someone.  So everything that I've just said is my

19     personal opinion.  I would like to underline that.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Did you have frequent contact with Mr. David Harland

21     at that time while you were in Sarajevo?

22        A.   I couldn't say that we were frequently in touch.  I met him

23     whenever he came to the mixed military group meetings which I attended in

24     my capacity as liaison officer.  But I know he was married in the way

25     that I described.

Page 32690

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Did you ever discuss with Mr. Harland about your

 2     impression or opinion on the with -- the Security Resolution, the UN

 3     Security Council's Resolution about it being unreasonable?

 4        A.   Probably.  Whenever I could, I would talk to Mr. Andreev and

 5     others, and I would tell them my personal view on the issue, and that is

 6     what I'm doing now.  My opinion remains unchanged.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Harland testified here at the Tribunal that

 8     the -- to the effect that the obligation placed on UNPROFOR to try to

 9     deter Serb attacks by all means necessary was not predicated on the

10     Bosnian government previous demilitarisation of the areas.  Do you agree

11     with his observation, and was that the reason why you think

12     Security Council Resolution is not reasonable?

13        A.   I do not agree with that observation.  The agreement was crystal

14     clear, and it was understood that the protected areas must be

15     demilitarised.  The agreement is crystal clear about that, entirely

16     unambiguous.  No weapons were to remain inside those areas.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Unless there's a question for you from

18     my colleagues, that concludes your evidence.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I --

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am grateful to you, your

23     Excellency, for underlying this question in relation to Harland.  Could

24     we just have P820 briefly.

25             JUDGE KWON:  What is your point, Mr. Karadzic?

Page 32691

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says here that the Muslims knew

 2     what had happened, whereas Harland says that the Bosniaks themselves were

 3     not even sure at this point as to what had happened.  That's one thing.

 4     And the other was to actually bring up the demilitarisation agreement.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think I raised a question about Srebrenica

 7     vis-a-vis Mr. Harland.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, you have read the

 9     question by Ms. Edgerton, page 29, implying that the Muslims knew what

10     had occurred, whereas Harland in his report claims that the Bosniaks had

11     not yet realised what happened.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I would not allow the first question.  And what is

13     your second point?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In answer to your question at

15     page 96, line 5, about the -- demilitarising the protected areas.

16     Defence Exhibit P3 --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  There is too much

18     background noise for us to be able to hear the witness -- the accused.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat.  Could you tell us first what

20     point -- what your point is, what point you are going to raise.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just clarify whether it's in

22     fact true that the areas were to be demilitarised or not, and who was in

23     charge of of demilitarising them?  This has been challenged but the

24     witness stands by his previous statement.  The document shows exactly

25     what the witness said.  It is consistent with what the witness said.

Page 32692

 1     There is an obligation to demilitarise and pull the weapons out.  If we

 2     can produce that document.  That is the gist of what I'm asking.  1D5356.

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll allow you to put that question, but

 6     subject to the Prosecution may have some question for its cross if

 7     necessary.

 8             Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9                           Further re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Who was in charge of implementing the

11     demilitarisation agreement in the protected areas, to the best of your

12     knowledge?

13        A.   Above all, the Muslim authorities who signed the agreement.  As

14     for the control and monitoring of the implementation, that was up to the

15     UN, and they were supposed to confirm that demilitarisation had been

16     completed.

17        Q.   Thank you very much.  1D5356.  That is the agreement.  We need to

18     be looking specifically at item 4.  This is page 2 in the Serbian and

19     also page 2 in the English.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I think we have it already our exhibit,

21     Exhibit D135.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Possibly.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a -- were you referring to the agreement?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  This is a telegram

25     containing information about the agreement.

Page 32693

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Let's take a look at D135.  Is this it,

 2     Mr. Karadzic?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that's admitted.  I wanted

 4     to have the telegram admitted, but we can track it down.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   What does Article 2 say?  Lieutenant-Colonel, Article 2, please.

 7     Tell us what it's about.

 8        A.   On the ground, the demilitarised zone shall be marked by UNPROFOR

 9     by means of boards on which is stated in English, Serbian, and Bosnian,

10     written in Cyrillic and Latin as follows:

11             "Demilitarised zone.  Any military operation is strictly

12     forbidden.  (Article 60, protocol 1 additional to the

13     Geneva Conventions)."

14        Q.   Next page, please.  Article 3.

15        A.   "Every military or paramilitary unit will have either to withdraw

16     from the demilitarised zone or submit/hand over their weapons,

17     ammunition, mines, and explosives and combat supplies in the

18     demilitarised zones will be handed over/submitted to UNPROFOR."

19        Q.   Than you.  Article 4.  Can we pull the page up a little, please.

20        A.   Article 4:

21             "UNPROFOR shall take the handed over/submitted weapons into

22     custody.

23              "UNPROFOR shall take the handed over/submitted ammunition into

24     custody separately."

25        Q.   First sentence Article 5, please.

Page 32694

 1        A.   "UNPROFOR shall control the demilitarised zone."

 2        Q.   Can we please go back to 1D5356.  Lieutenant-Colonel, did this

 3     materialise?

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   Are you familiar with protocol 60, protocol 1, Article 60?  What

 6     does it envisage in case one of the parties fails to comply?

 7        A.   I don't know what protocol you're talking about.  I don't have it

 8     in front of me.

 9        Q.   Page 2, please.  You read about this article based on which the

10     demilitarisation was carried out.

11        A.   I remember the meeting when this agreement was reached.  It went

12     on for nearly 48 hours, and we didn't sleep at all.  General Mladic asked

13     for Sarajevo to be included in the agreement.

14        Q.   Can you please go through Article 4 or item 4 in its entirety.

15     In the Serbian [indiscernible] is the next page but in English it's all

16     on the same page.  Does it faithfully convey what was actually agreed at

17     the meeting?

18        A.   Yes, in full.  It requires or demands a full demilitarisation.

19        Q.   And who was in charge of carrying this out and performing checks?

20        A.   As for the demilitarisation, that would be the signatories.  As

21     for monitoring, implementation, that was up to the UN, UNPROFOR

22     specifically.

23        Q.   Could you please read out the last sentence in paragraph 4.  The

24     very last sentence of paragraph 4.

25        A.   After the completion the demilitarisation process not a single

Page 32695

 1     armed person or unit apart from UNPROFOR forces will remain in the town.

 2     UNPROFOR is responsible for the demilitarisation process.

 3        Q.   Thank you very much.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted, please?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Have we not admitted this before, Ms. Edgerton?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't know, but with Mr. Reid's help, I can

 7     advise the parties pretty quickly, I would imagine.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it then now.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2804, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE KWON:  So we need to stop here.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 2143, D2143.  It appears to have

12     been admitted.  We might as well keep the number in that case.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to ask any questions, Ms. Edgerton,

14     in this regard?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  No, I have no questions whatsoever.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

17                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

18             JUDGE KWON:  I think it's correct.  We admit it as D2143.  So we

19     don't need to admit it separately.

20             Thank you.  That concludes your evidence, Mr. Indjic.  Thank you

21     for your coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

22             With the indulgence of -- you may be excused.

23                           [The witness withdrew]

24             JUDGE KWON:  -- of the interpreter I need to give this short

25     brief oral ruling now giving the timing.  We'll resume on Monday morning.

Page 32696

 1             As the Chamber refers to the Rule 92 ter notification for the

 2     Witness Milan Mandic and the draft statement which has been uploaded as

 3     65 ter 1D6814.  Having reviewed the statement, the Chamber finds that

 4     paragraphs 13 and 14 relate to crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs and

 5     will not be admitted on the grounds that it is irrelevant.  The Chamber

 6     orders the accused to upload a redacted version of Milan Mandic's

 7     statement to reflect this decision.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we can do that, but with respect to

 9     this and also Mr. Sehovac, if you don't mind, since we're going to be

10     proofing them on Sunday, we would probably prefer to just instead of

11     redacting this, we'll make those adjustments when we make the final

12     revised statement if that's okay.  Otherwise, we'll end up making this --

13     redacting this and then changing it again.  So if you would just be

14     patient, by Monday we will have a revised and final statement for both

15     witnesses that will include the deletions of paragraphs that you've

16     mentioned.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Could you do -- offer a tracked version

18     as well to understand what has been changed?

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, we can do that.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I appreciate the interpreters,

21     court reporters, and everybody's indulgence.

22                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

23             JUDGE KWON:  And I -- on behalf of the Tribunal, I have to

24     apologise to Mr. Milosevic for having waited so long in vain.

25             The hearing is now adjourned.

Page 32697

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.04 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 28th day

 3                           of January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.

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