Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 33528

 1                           Wednesday, 13 February 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellency.  Good

 9     morning to everyone.

10                           WITNESS:  VIDOMIR BANDUKA [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Banduka.

14        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

15             MS. McKENNA:  Your Honour, if I may, my apologies for

16     interrupting.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. McKenna.

18             MS. McKENNA:  I spoke to -- or we spoke to Mr. Robinson and he

19     kindly agreed for me to make very brief submission in respect of

20     Mr. Banduka's testimony yesterday before Mr. Karadzic continues his

21     re-direct.  It's simply that Mr. Banduka -- two propositions were put to

22     Mr. Banduka which he didn't confirm, and we would seek the admission of

23     three pages of his transcript from his Krajisnik testimony, and those are

24     pages are pages 89, 90, and page 157.  So obviously that's subject to the

25     Defence being given an opportunity to review those pages and give its

Page 33529


 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  We don't have any objection, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Did we admit part of the transcript yesterday or

 5     not?

 6             MS. McKENNA:  We didn't, Your Honour, because the -- because most

 7     of the propositions that were put to Mr. Banduka he accepted that this

 8     relates to two propositions that he did not.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Then we'll admit those three pages.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Should be assigned Exhibit P6110.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

12                           [Defence counsel confer]

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Banduka, yesterday on page 84 of the transcript you were

16     asked about the attack on Hadzici of the 11th of May.  Here the

17     Prosecution mentioned Witness Music who had claimed that they had been

18     attacked on the 10th and 11th in the Musici village, 10th and 11th of

19     May.  What can you tell us about these two different pieces of

20     information?

21        A.   As I said earlier, on the 11th of May an attack took place in the

22     early morning hours on Hadzici from Tinovo Brdo and from Vrbanja.  So

23     that was a Muslim attack which resulted in a number of fatalities on our

24     side and it was repelled on that same day, but I'm not aware of any

25     attack on Musici.

Page 33530

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter 25594 dated

 3     11th of May, 1995 [as interpreted].

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 24594.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Mr. Banduka, let's look at paragraph 1.  Here the Ministry of the

 8     Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina reports on the 11th of May

 9     that at around 25 minutes after midnight there was a renewed attack on

10     Serb positions.  Do you see this first paragraph?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Is this consistent with what you know about this incident?

13        A.   Yes.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please pause between

15     questions and answers.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Could you put a pause between the question and the

17     answer, please.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Probably my question was not

19     recorded.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   This speaks about a renewed attack on the 11th after midnight,

22     that the technical depot was targeted as well as the public security

23     station.  Is that consistent with what you know about this attack?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   What can you tell us about this renewed attack?  When did the

Page 33531

 1     attacks that preceded this one occur?

 2        A.   Well, there was an attack on the 10th of May.  You saw in my

 3     statement that on the 10th of May the Muslims seized the barracks in

 4     Krupska Rijeka and also the Serbs' part were shelled, the Serb parts of

 5     Hadzici.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Should be assigned Exhibit D2921, thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   How often and what was the intensity of the shelling targeting

12     the centre part of Hadzici?

13        A.   Well, the shelling of the central part of Hadzici and the

14     neighbouring villages were a daily occurrence.  Let me tell you just that

15     on 25th of May, when there was a major attack by the Muslim forces, 10 or

16     11 of our troops were killed and eight of them were killed by shelling.

17     In other words, shelling was happening on a daily basis from Igman, from

18     village of Lokve, and Mount Igman.

19        Q.   Thank you.  How would this correspond to D2469, where you say

20     that on one day 27 shells landed and another day 117 shells, including

21     Weber rockets, and they hit the centre of Hadzici?

22        A.   As far as I am able to remember and according to what was

23     recorded, I think that the fiercest shelling was on the 5th or 6th of

24     June when the Muslim forces took over the Pazarici barracks, albeit

25     through negotiations.  There were about some 100 troops there and a large

Page 33532

 1     amount of heavy weapons.  And we estimated that on that very same day

 2     over 1.000 shells fell on Hadzici.

 3        Q.   [No interpretation]

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number of

 5     the document.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is relating to a telephone conversation between

 8     Lieutenant-Colonel Milicevic and General Mladic which took place on the

 9     21st.  Who was --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, could you repeat the number.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 30789.

12             MS. McKENNA:  Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. McKenna.

14             MS. McKENNA:  If I may, this line of questioning has continued

15     for some time and I fail to see how this flows from the

16     cross-examination.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, yesterday the

19     Prosecution refuted the development of events, whereas Mr. Banduka said

20     that we were being shelled on a daily basis.  And whatever was happening

21     was happening during the shelling.  This opened the door for this subject

22     in cross-examination as to whether they had weapons, who went there of

23     their own volition, who was detained in the sports centre and the

24     garages.  All of this was raised as a result of the questions put by the

25     Prosecution and the things happening in Dupovac, Musici, et cetera, even

Page 33533

 1     92 quater which is something that I am not in a position to put questions

 2     about.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure what you meant by saying that

 4     Prosecution refuted the development of events.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, yesterday the

 6     Prosecution said on page 84 of the transcript, they denied the claim that

 7     it was the Muslims who attacked Hadzici and they referred to

 8     Witness Music and the others, and they claim that this was, in fact, done

 9     by the Serbs.

10             JUDGE KWON:  [Previous translation continues] ...

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There was also mention of the

12     sports hall --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Well, I'm not sure whether she made a claim denying

14     Muslim attacks at all, no?

15             MS. McKENNA:  If we could be directed to a specific transcript

16     reference, that would be helpful because that claim wasn't made.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  We'll wait until we

18     find this transcript page, but everything else that was contained in

19     Music's testimony was made reference to and I need to clarify that.

20     Mr. Banduka gave the same response as Music did.  So the whole issue was

21     raised yesterday during cross-examination.

22             JUDGE KWON:  She raised -- she put some questions with respect

23     to -- or in relation to Music's statement.  As far as the item is related

24     to those parts, you may proceed.  But by putting certain paragraph in the

25     Music's statement, it does not open the door for everything that is

Page 33534

 1     contained in his statement.  Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             While we are waiting can we -- oh, yes, now we have the

 4     transcript.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Mr. Banduka, can you see here what it says, I am the commander?

 7        A.   Yes, of the Pazarici unit.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we check -- yes, it says here

 9     Hadzici municipality.  But now we need to go to the penultimate page.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Could you explain first how this relates to

11     Ms. McKenna's cross-examination of yesterday?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I cannot give the exact

13     reference but there was a dispute that they were well-armed.  However,

14     they took over the barracks that was fully loaded with arms and

15     immediately thereafter they launched an attack on Hadzici.

16             JUDGE KWON:  She did ask about the Serbs arming, but I'm not sure

17     she challenged or she disputed the Muslim -- the arming on the part of

18     the Muslim side at all.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 87 the witness said that as

20     soon as the Muslims had left Hadzici of their own volition, it was

21     followed by an attack on the town.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it's page 33477.  Does that mean that somebody

23     was bringing them in or did they arrive of their own volition?  Is it --

24     is this the part you are referring to?  No.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I don't have

Page 33535

 1     that number, or rather, these final numbers in LiveNote.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  No, could you read the passage.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I please have it on the screen,

 4     that page, because I can't find it because I don't have numbers like

 5     that.  I'll try.  I do apologise.  I'll try to find it according to my

 6     own numbers because I don't have those numbers.  Sixteen, 17, and 18 are

 7     the lines in yesterday's transcript.  I'll read it out in English:

 8             [In English] "Q.  Mr. Banduka, I'm going to move on to the topic

 9     of the Hadzici sports centre.  At paragraph 54 of your statement you say

10     that:

11             'The Crisis Staff set up a clothing centre in the sports hall,

12     seeing that the remaining Muslim inhabitants were complaining every day

13     that they were experiencing ...'"

14             And so on and so forth.

15             MR. HARVEY:  Page 33510, page 33510.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now let us take a look at page 74.

17     According to my numbering, lines 22 through 25.  In the question it says:

18             [In English] "Well, Mr. Dupovac who actually attended the

19     council, his evidence was that the SDS didn't refuse to participate in

20     the functions of the council until mid-April.  And, in fact, they used

21     the Defence Council as platform to emphasise their desire for Muslims and

22     Serbs to have separate state.  Mr. Banduka, did you -- were you aware of

23     the SDS making public statements about the desire for Muslims and Serbs

24     to have separate states?"

25             MS. McKENNA:  For Your Honours' reference, that's page 33497.

Page 33536

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             MS. McKENNA:  But once again, it's --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  No.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 87 there's another reference to

 5     Dupovac and I could not cross-examine.  33498 is the page number, lines 5

 6     to 11.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So again this was related to the arming on the part

 8     of the Serbs.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here on page 74 it says -- I'll

10     read it out.  The question was:

11             [In English] "You said that they had already informed their

12     units.  Now earlier today you removed a reference in your statement to

13     the Serbs making preparations in war ..." and so on.

14             "Is it your evidence that the Serbs in Hadzici began to arm

15     themselves and prepare for war only after the JNA pulled out ..." and so

16     on.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, there is total chaos

19     as far as page numbers are concerned.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I found it.  It's 33498.  Yes, court deputy pointed

21     out already.  It's all related to the arming on the part of the Serbs.

22     The Defence -- the Prosecution didn't challenge the arming on the part of

23     the Muslims if I remember correctly.  Instead of using your precious

24     time, I would like you to move on.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I just wanted to draw

Page 33537

 1     your attention to the answer on the next page, the first line, where

 2     Mr. Banduka says that they were the ones who had been attacked on the

 3     11th of May.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Banduka, now we're going to abandon that topic all together.

 6     Tell me, please, what was the attitude of the authorities towards the

 7     Muslim in Hadzici, in the Serb part of Hadzici?

 8        A.   Well, the attitude was the way it was towards all the inhabitants

 9     of Hadzici.  There was no difference, starting with ordinary things,

10     because we had enormous problems with water-supply, power-supply, food

11     supplies, so everybody was in the same position.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P2306, that's what I'd like to draw

13     the attention of the participants to and I'm going to read it out to you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   A report on the work of the Serb municipality of Hadzici.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We do not have the text.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Members of other ethnic groups live in this municipality on the

19     condition that they accept the constitutional order of Republika Srpska.

20     The members of the Assembly said that this has to ensure the equality of

21     rights of Serbs and other citizens living in the area.

22             Are you familiar with this report?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Does this correspond to what you know regarding the attitude

25     towards the Muslims?

Page 33538

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   That is a Prosecution document.  Yesterday you asserted that the

 3     Muslim civilians left and that attack ensued; is that right?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Mr. Music who was mentioned here, mentioned by the Prosecution,

 6     he also confirmed that buses arrived and that they drove civilians

 7     towards Pazarici and that he was even in charge of the evacuation of

 8     these civilians.  Did you know Mr. Mehmed Music?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   That Prosecution report was for 1992, I mean 2306.  Yesterday

11     when asked whether there were prisoners in the sports hall, you said that

12     that could have been the case only if they were released from custody

13     that was actually detention in the municipality building.  Is that what

14     you say today as well?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And Music said on page 132 of his amalgamated statement:

17             [In English] "If a person was presumed to be guilty, the prisoner

18     would be held at the garage; otherwise, they would be taken to sports

19     hall."

20             [Interpretation] Do you say the same thing?

21        A.   Yes, precisely.  Yesterday the Prosecution asked me about this.

22     Yes, these persons who were in the garages had been brought into custody,

23     but there were Serbs among them as well, persons who had committed

24     crimes.  People who were stealing the property of other people, people

25     who were shooting, firing weapons, they were brought into custody to the

Page 33539

 1     garage and that's where they were interrogated as far as I know.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And in paragraph 152 of his amalgamated statement

 3     Mr. Music says:

 4             [In English] "The people who continued to be held at the

 5     municipality building were involved in more serious cases."

 6             [Interpretation] What can you tell us about that?

 7        A.   Well, that's exactly what I said.  They were transferred to the

 8     Kula prison as soon as that was possible so that they could be prosecuted

 9     by the authorities that are in charge.

10        Q.   Yesterday when questioned about civilians at the sports hall you

11     said that that could happen only if they were returned from unsuccessful

12     exchanges.  Then as they waited for an exchange they would stay at the

13     sports hall.  Can you tell us what that means, unsuccessful exchange, and

14     how could civilians actually get there?

15        A.   Exchanges were organised predominantly through Croatian

16     territory.  Actually, our neighbouring municipality was Kiseljak and

17     primarily through the mediation of Croats at the border crossing of

18     Kobiljaca, that's what we called it, that's where these agreed exchanges

19     would take place between the representatives of the Serbs and the

20     representatives of the Muslims.  As far as I know there were even direct

21     contacts between certain families.  So there were large-scale exchanges

22     that took place.  People were transferred by bus to the point where the

23     exchanges were being organised, but for a variety of reasons these

24     exchanges would fail.  There would be problems, technical problems, or

25     there would be strings attached, especially the Muslim side was always

Page 33540

 1     putting forth condition.  So we had no other way of dealing with this

 2     situation but keeping them at the sports hall until a successful exchange

 3     were to take place.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you quoted two parts from Mr. Music's

 6     amalgamated statement.  You said one is from page 132 and the other from

 7     paragraph 152, but I couldn't find those pages -- either in terms of page

 8     number or in terms of para numbers.  Could you give the reference again.

 9     As I see it, the last paragraph number is 133.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll find it right now, Excellency.

11     I think that it was referred to in the transcript as well.  Just a

12     moment, please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  If Ms. McKenna can find the reference, if you could

14     let us know.

15             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.  The reference is 152.

18     That's what I have here, and the paragraph is 52 in the statement.

19     That's the first reference.  I do apologise.  I was reading my own

20     footnotes.  I was reading them out as if they were paragraphs.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I see the quote, para 52.

22             Let's continue.  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Mr. Banduka, Mr. Music in his statement says that he tried seven

25     times to exchange his own family and that it failed six times and then

Page 33541

 1     the seventh time the exchange succeeded.  What do you say to that?

 2        A.   Well, I believe the statement because, as I said previously, that

 3     kind of thing did happen.  There were a great many obstructions from the

 4     Muslim side.  So everything was agreed upon until the exchange was

 5     supposed to take place, and then they invented all sorts of problems.  I

 6     know about that.  That made our work a lot more difficult.  This was

 7     terrible pressure that was exerted on the municipal organs, to exchange

 8     these people who were at the Silo camp and other places.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Banduka, can you just explain another thing to

10     us:  How were these lists created, lists of people who were supposed to

11     leave?  Was that based on their own wishes?  And how were they informed

12     that a bus was ready?  If you were not involved in this, never mind, you

13     don't have to talk about it.

14        A.   Well, I wasn't involved, but as I've already said I did know.

15     Usually through mediation.  It was the Croats who were allowed access to

16     both the Serb and the Muslim sides, and they would bring information and

17     take information.  I remember this one particular case, it had to do with

18     some close relatives of my late sister-in-law and I went to Kobiljaca,

19     and I was an eye-witness to the fact that this Muslim brought this Serb

20     family and he asked me to help bring his family there, that is to say his

21     wife and children.  And of course we went out, brought his family, and

22     the exchange took place right there and then.  So these exchanges were

23     agreed upon in the different ways, and later on it was the commission on

24     exchanges that primarily dealt with the matter.  To tell you the truth, I

25     don't even know who established these commissions.  Were they state

Page 33542

 1     commissions?  I don't know but the anyway, they compiled lists, they were

 2     involved in communications, and so on.

 3        Q.   What about the municipality?  The municipal authorities, did they

 4     have mechanisms in place that would force civilians to leave Hadzici,

 5     civilians to leave Hadzici?

 6        A.   No, absolutely not.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, you may answer now.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it didn't have any mechanisms

 9     nor did they use them, and as a result many Muslims remained in Hadzici.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Banduka.  I have no further questions.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] it wasn't recorded fully.  The

13     witness said:  Many Muslims remained in Hadzici throughout the war.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Banduka?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             Well, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Banduka.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I add something?

19             JUDGE KWON:  What is --

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] One sentence only.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, what is it about?  Yes.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would just like to comment

23     yesterday's questioning.  When the Prosecutor mentioned the sports hall,

24     she mentioned the date of 25th of May when allegedly forces burst into

25     that facility and tortured the prisoners.  I would like to say that by


Page 33543

 1     the 25th of May we had 26 dead men, ages between 20 and 70, including

 2     civilians.  So if somebody slapped somebody on the face, but I can

 3     categorically say that every last man left the sports hall completely

 4     unscathed.  However, people who were incarcerated in the Silo, I'm

 5     talking about the Serb people, were tortured and killed simply because of

 6     the truth and for the sake of the truth.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. McKenna, would you like to ask further questions

 8     with respect to this comment?

 9             MS. McKENNA:  No thank you, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Very well.

11             On behalf of the Chamber, I thank you for your coming to

12     The Hague to give it.  Now you're free to go.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14                           [The witness withdrew]

15             JUDGE KWON:  While we are waiting for the next witness, the

16     Chamber will issue an oral ruling.

17             The Chamber will now issue an oral ruling on the Prosecution

18     notification and request relative to notice of disclosure of translation

19     of report of Stevo Pasalic, filed on the 14th of December, 2012, to which

20     I will refer here after as "request."

21             In the request, the Prosecution first submits that while it does

22     not challenge Stevo Pasalic's qualifications as an expert in

23     demographics, it does not accept the conclusions in the expert report

24     tendered pursuant to Rule 94 bis; second, in the Prosecution request the

25     opportunity to cross-examine him; and third, it requests that the Chamber

Page 33544

 1     not admit annex A of the expert report.

 2             The Prosecution contends that annex A of the report contains

 3     Pasalic's findings relating to the suffering of Serbs and Serb villages

 4     between 1992 and 1995 which are irrelevant to the crimes charged in the

 5     indictment and the alleged criminal liability of the accused in this

 6     case.

 7             The accused did not respond to the request.

 8             The Chamber considers that the information contained in annex A

 9     to the report relates to detailed statistics relating to the "suffering

10     of the Serbs and Serbian settlements" in municipalities of

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina or BiH during the war, some of which have no

12     geographical relevance to this case, and as such, is no different from

13     the information which in the Chamber's practice has been excluded on the

14     ground that it is detailed tu quoque evidence and not relevant to the

15     charges in the indictment.  The Chamber therefore grants the request and

16     shall exclude annex A, namely, pages 69 through 102 of Pasalic's expert

17     report.  A redacted version of the report should be uploaded onto e-court

18     prior to the start of Mr. Pasalic's testimony.

19                           [The witness entered court]

20             JUDGE KWON:  That said, would the witness make the solemn

21     declaration, please.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

23     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

24                           WITNESS:  SAVO CELIKOVIC

25                           [Witness answered through interpreter]


Page 33545

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Celikovic.  Please make yourself

 2     comfortable.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Celikovic.

 8        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   Did you give a statement to the Defence team?

10        A.   Yes, I did.

11        Q.   Please let us pause between questions and answers and let us

12     speak slowly so that everything can be recorded in the transcript.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please have 1D7207 in

14     e-court.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Celikovic, do you see the statement before you?  Is that the

17     statement that you gave to the Defence?

18        A.   Yes, Mr. President.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read the statement and signed it?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Can we please have the last page for you to identify your

22     signature.

23        A.   Yes, I signed it on the 10th of February, 2013.  This is my

24     signature.

25        Q.   Did you read the statement and does it reflect exactly what you

Page 33546

 1     said?

 2        A.   Yes, in full.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today as

 4     posed by the Defence team, would you basically give the same answers?

 5        A.   Yes, I would completely give identical answers as I did in the

 6     statement.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm going to read Mr. Savo Celikovic's summary

 8     statement in English.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, I take it the Defence is not tendering

10     any associated exhibits?

11             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection?

13             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit the Rule 92 ter statement.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Shall be assigned Exhibit D2922.  Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to read the summary in

17     English.

18             [In English] Savo Celikovic was born on 9th February, 1952, in

19     Vlasenica.  He completed the primary school in Vlasenica and he graduated

20     from the secondary school and then from the faculty of mechanical

21     engineering in Sarajevo.  In 1976, he took up employment at the Boksit

22     mine in Vlasenica.  In 1987 he was elected president of the Vlasenica

23     municipality Assembly for a one-year term of office.  After the

24     multi-party elections were conducted in Vlasenica, he was elected to the

25     municipality Assembly as a member of SDP party, left party, leftist

Page 33547

 1     party.

 2             On 21st of April, 1992, he was mobilised in the TO --

 3     Territorial Defence as a logistical support officer, later in the

 4     Sekovici Brigade and then in the Milici and Vlasenica Brigade.  When

 5     Mr. Savo Celikovic worked at the Alpro factory, the enterprise was

 6     ethnically mixed, the production ran smoothly, and there were no

 7     interethnic problems.

 8             The situation in Vlasenica became more complicated after the

 9     Muslims killed a Serbian employee of the Boksit mine as well as ambushing

10     and killing drivers from the mine.  They also killed a Serb who was a

11     deputy of the National Assembly.  The population of Vlasenica panicked

12     and both Serbs and Muslims left in droves, and after this many Muslims no

13     longer reported for work but were not fired.

14             After the multi-party elections, Savo Celikovic was elected to

15     the municipality on the list of SDP.  As I said, the power in the

16     Assembly was shared by the SDA, the SDS, and the SDP, and Alliance for

17     the Reform Forces.  From the beginning he found that the work of the

18     Assembly was difficult because of the frequent disagreements between the

19     Muslims and Serbs and there was not much progress.

20             In mid-1991 the rising ethnic tensions brought on fear among both

21     Serbs and Muslims and therefore night watches were organised in the

22     villages.  These were initially mixed watches; however, due to the

23     growing distrust they became separate.

24             Savo Celikovic was called up in mid-1991 in Han Pijesak,

25     216th Brigade.  He was aware that the reason for the call-up was to

Page 33548

 1     prepare the troops for combat-readiness.  Due to the conflicts in Croatia

 2     their presence was to try to prevent war in Bosnia.  After a few days of

 3     training buses arrived of training close to the Banja -- in

 4     [indiscernible] Banja Luka.  Buses arrived carrying SDA leaders and the

 5     president of the municipality, who was the Muslim from the SDA.  The

 6     leaders of SDA addressed the soldiers and called upon the Muslims in the

 7     units to leave the JNA immediately and return home.  The unit was also

 8     addressed by a battalion commander and a reservist who asked the Muslims

 9     not to listen to the SDA leaders.  The reservist was of Muslim ethnicity.

10     However, many Muslims left the unit after this and soon after the unit

11     was sent home and Savo Celikovic returned to work.  Further training was

12     carried out in 1991 and in 1992 -- and in 1992 the Territorial Defence

13     began to mobilise soldiers.

14             Towards the end of 1991 or early 1992 an idea was debated in the

15     Vlasenica Municipal Assembly for the municipality of Vlasenica to join

16     the SAO, Serbian Autonomous Region, Birac.  The reason for this was the

17     fear of war as it was clear that the Muslims wanted to create a Muslim

18     sovereign state.  After this decision was adopted an initiative was

19     launched in order to preserve the peace in Vlasenica.  The idea was to

20     divide the territory into three municipalities which was adopted.  No one

21     was threatened in the process of this decision being made and many agreed

22     this solution was better than war.

23             The Vlasenica Territorial Defence was mobilised on the

24     21st of April, 1992, and tasked with preventing any sabotage attack on

25     public institutions or enterprises of public interest.  During the night

Page 33549

 1     there were sporadic shooting incidents, mostly in mono-ethnic villages.

 2     Many more residents began leaving Vlasenica and around this time Serbs

 3     who had been expelled from surrounding villages began arriving in

 4     Vlasenica demanding to be housed.  The authorities had already formed

 5     commissions that went around the town and sealed homes and flats of

 6     Muslims who had left, so that their property would not be stolen.  A

 7     commission was formed to assign houses for the Serbian refugees'

 8     temporary use.

 9             To prevent the Muslim population from experiencing stress and

10     mistreatment, the municipal authority decided to turn to the -- the

11     Territorial Defence facilities into a reception -- in Susica into a

12     reception centre for Serbs, and later on Muslims in Vlasenica could be

13     housed in order to protect them from mistreatment or possible physical

14     attacks.  Prior to this, the facilities had been used as a reception

15     centre for Serb -- for the Serb refugees.  When the municipal authorities

16     offered the remaining Muslim population temporary accommodation, the

17     majority of the Muslims accepted it.

18             The formation of the paramilitary groups the Patriotic League was

19     an open secret because it was discussed every day in the town.

20             In the front lines in Vlasenica in the beginning of 1992 were

21     formed spontaneously when the Serbian and Muslim populations relocated on

22     their own initiative and settled the villages where they were the

23     majority.  The lines remained pretty much unchanged until the end of war

24     demonstrating that the war was defensive.  In early May 1992 the Muslims

25     started attacking the Serbian villages which they mainly torched and

Page 33550

 1     destroyed, killing locals and looting their property.  The Serb army did

 2     not attack Muslim villages, it only defended its territory.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This was the summary, Mr. Celikovic.  Would you be so kind as to

 5     tell me since we had a witness here who spoke about cash, can you tell us

 6     which currency was in circulation in Vlasenica?

 7        A.   At the time the currency was the dinar.

 8        Q.   [No interpretation]

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat.  We did not

10     understand.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Whose dinars?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  The interpreters didn't hear you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   What currency was in circulation in Vlasenica at the time?

16        A.   At the time that was the dinar.

17        Q.   Yugoslav dinar?

18        A.   Yes, because the laws were still in force of the federal state of

19     Yugoslavia.

20        Q.   Thank you.  How was your financial situation regarding cash and

21     how did you obtain cash, from where?

22        A.   Well, mainly during that period the economy was still operating,

23     all the enterprises were working, and up until May when due to a

24     deterioration of the political security situation, a considerable portion

25     of both the Serb and Muslim populations left town.  It was unavoidable to


Page 33551

 1     suspend the operation because, quite simply, the majority of people who

 2     were fit for work failed to show up at work and fulfil their obligations.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions at this

 5     moment.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             As you have noted, Mr. Celikovic, your evidence in chief in this

 9     case has been admitted into evidence in most part in writing instead of

10     your oral testimony.  Now you'll be cross-examined by the representative

11     of the Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. File.

12             MR. FILE:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. File:

14        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Celikovic.

15        A.   Good morning.

16        Q.   We're going to start by discussing some items that are not in

17     your statement.  There was a period of time after 1995 when you served as

18     president of the Executive Board of Vlasenica; is that correct?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And you were removed from that position on the

21     29th of November, 1999, by the Office of the High Representative; is that

22     correct?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And that decision banned you from being a candidate in the next

25     municipal elections and banned you from holding any executive office at

Page 33552

 1     any level; correct?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And one of the findings of that decision was that you abused your

 4     power by persistently and seriously obstructing the implementation of the

 5     General Framework Agreement for Peace, that you pursued an extra-legal

 6     agenda, and consistently refused to take ownership of the laws of

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina; is that correct?

 8        A.   That is not true.  May I explain?

 9        Q.   Well, actually let's look at 65 ter number 24600, if we could,

10     please.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  But I think the witness should be given a chance

12     to explain.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Of course.  He can comment after having taken a look

14     at the document.

15             MR. FILE:

16        Q.   You'll see that this is a copy of the decision we're discussing

17     from the 29th of November, 1999.

18             MR. FILE:  If we could go to page 2.

19        Q.   If you'll have a look at the first three lines under "reasons for

20     removal," it says:

21             "Mr. Savo Celikovic has abused his power by persistently and

22     seriously obstructing the implementation of the General Framework

23     Agreement for Peace.  By pursuing an extra-legal agenda, he has

24     consistently refused to take ownership of the laws of

25     Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Page 33553

 1             Do you see that?

 2        A.   How about a translation of this decision so that I would be

 3     reminded?

 4        Q.   Well, I don't have a translation for you, but I just read the

 5     text for you.

 6        A.   Well, may I explain then?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it is a fact that in that

 9     period of time, 1998, I was president of the Executive Board and the

10     Executive Board consisted of either five or six members.  Among them,

11     there was an equitable member of the Muslim people who did not live in

12     Vlasenica.  From time to time he would come to attend sessions once he

13     received the documents for the session involved.  It is a fact that in

14     that period of time of reconstruction and development, the

15     Executive Board worked in accordance with the statute of the municipality

16     of Vlasenica and the laws that were in force, the laws of

17     Republika Srpska, or rather, in accordance with the

18     Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19             In its work during that period of time, when the economy was

20     supposed to get started again, when displaced persons and refugees were

21     supposed to be taken care of as well, also the gradual return of the

22     population that had fled was supposed to be organised too.  There was

23     still a lack of trust and a lack of security as far as returns were

24     concerned.  We resolved these matters together to everyone's

25     satisfaction.  From time to time, when there was certain problems - the

Page 33554

 1     international community held this against me, as a matter of fact -- and

 2     one of these issues was the use of abandoned Bosniak property and freeing

 3     this property of the persons who were using it.

 4             I'm sorry.  We, in the Executive Board, established a commission

 5     for the return of property.  And on behalf of the Executive Board a

 6     person who had a degree in law was on this commission - this person had

 7     worked in various judiciary institutions for many years and other

 8     institutions in Sarajevo - he had fled to Vlasenica because he was a

 9     local person and he was the member of this commission and then also the

10     head for town planning was also a member on behalf of the

11     Executive Board.  He was a professional who was well-versed in these

12     matters --

13             MR. FILE:

14        Q.   Mr. Celikovic, if I could ask you to pause for a moment.  I would

15     like you to focus your attention on the four points that are listed in

16     the document which relate in part to what you've been discussing about

17     this establishment of a Property Commission.  What the document says is

18     in the first point that you were extremely uncooperative and refusing to

19     meet to discussing the establishment of the Property Commission.  The

20     second point says that you finally accepted the establishment of the

21     Property Commission under the condition that two members be appointed by

22     yourself.

23             It goes on to say in the third point that these two members

24     repeatedly intervened with the work of the OMI on evictions and made a

25     number of covert threats, and that this was particularly ominous in view

Page 33555

 1     of the subsequently violent attacks aimed at the OMI officer.  And

 2     finally, that the municipality has passed a number of discriminatory

 3     administrative tax laws, that when you were confronted with that issue by

 4     the international community, you admitted that those laws were designed

 5     to penalise Bosniaks and in spite of your agreement to have those

 6     repealed, that had yet to happened.  Can I ask you, the OMI is the

 7     ministry of refugees and displaced persons, which was tasked with

 8     allowing people to move back into their property; is that right?

 9        A.   I just have to respond to the previous question.  I need to

10     finish by saying what the reasons were for which I thought that I should

11     not be on that commission myself.  Since this was a commission that

12     worked in an operative fashion and practically it was supposed to visit

13     abandoned properties every day and propose laws and different measures,

14     at the time when I talked to different representatives I said, quite

15     literally:  Do you think that it is more urgent to be on that commission

16     or should certain members of the commission propose measures and should

17     the Executive Board headed by myself work out adequate solutions and take

18     measures?  That is one of the questions involved.

19             The second one that has to do with certain taxes, it is a fact

20     that these taxes were somewhat different and that is something that I

21     inherited, if you will, that is to say when I came to the

22     Executive Board.  But it is also a fact that in that immediate period

23     there were some wheelers and dealers, especially from the Muslim side and

24     they, in fact, took large commissions for themselves when mediating for

25     such exchanges and documents.  For example, they would take commissions

Page 33556

 1     of 100 to 200 marks per document.  We launched this initiative at the

 2     Executive Board at the proposal of the Bosniak member and we made a

 3     proposal to the Assembly.  For certain reasons, for a while the Assembly

 4     could not meet.  So the Assembly did not adopt these amendments, these

 5     amended taxes, that is to say aimed at preventing discrimination.  That

 6     is to say that the Executive Board did make certain efforts, but it is

 7     really within the scope of the authority of the Assembly to adopt all of

 8     that.

 9             MR. FILE:  Your Honour, I would tender this document into

10     evidence, and I would note that the ERN is still being obtained.  So we

11     will substitute the document with an ERN'd one once it's available.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow your ERN comment.  What did you mean?

13             MR. FILE:  We're waiting to give -- to have an ERN -- or ERNs put

14     on the pages of the document.  So we'll tender the document into evidence

15     but we'll have to replace it with an ERN'd version once it's ready.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Aha.

17             Mr. Robinson.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Shall be assigned Exhibit P6111.  Thank you.

21             MR. FILE:

22        Q.   Mr. Celikovic, after this removal from office you later ran for

23     election and were elected as a member of the Municipal Board of the SDS

24     party in Vlasenica; is that correct?

25        A.   No.  I did not run for election.  I was still a member of the

Page 33557

 1     Serb Democratic Party and I remained one until I was replaced, but to

 2     this day I don't know the true reasons for my dismissal.

 3        Q.   Well, you were a member of the Municipal Board of the party;

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Yes, I was.

 6        Q.   And you were removed from that position as well on 30 June 2004,

 7     again by the Office of the High Representative?

 8        A.   Yes, I think that I'm a unique case and having been dismissed

 9     twice, and to this day I don't know the true reasons for my dismissal.

10     But in the interest of the party as well, I accepted that and I was no

11     longer active in the party.

12        Q.   Well, in fact, this removal prevented you from being active in

13     the party; correct?  It removed you from your position, it barred you

14     from holding official elective or appointed office, it banned you from

15     running in elections, and it banned you from holding office in any

16     political party; is that right?

17        A.   Well, it is correct, but my constitutional rights had been

18     violated in terms of having the right to vote and to be elected.

19     However, very fortunately I have a degree in engineering and I worked as

20     an engineering, I worked as a professional, and that had nothing to do

21     with the Office of the High Representative.

22        Q.   Well, you say that your rights had been violated, although you

23     were part of a lawsuit against the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina

24     to try to reverse that decision and that went to the European Court of

25     Human Rights and you lost; is that correct?

Page 33558

 1        A.   Well, you never know.  I think that sooner rather than later

 2     justice will prevail and that evidence will become relevant.  Perhaps at

 3     that point in time there was no adequate evidence.  It is a fact that a

 4     few of us handed this case to the law team of Mr. Cavoski.  He

 5     represented us.  But I do know that we lost our case, but we are going to

 6     seek justice and this will yield results eventually.

 7        Q.   There's no -- in this case there's no need to seek justice

 8     because that decision was repealed.  The decision of the office of the

 9     high representative was repealed with the arrest of Ratko Mladic in 2011;

10     correct?

11        A.   Well, that's what was written in the decision, but the reasons

12     for dismissing me were untrue, what was stated then.  As for the

13     president, I didn't even know him and least of all could I contribute in

14     any way to these allegations that were referred to in the decision on my

15     dismissal.

16        Q.   I'd like to turn your attention to your witness statement.  And

17     paragraph 18 you say, and I quote:

18             "Towards the end of 1991 or early in 1992, an idea was launched

19     in the Vlasenica Municipal Assembly for the municipality of Vlasenica to

20     join the region SAO Serbian Autonomous District, Birac District.  By this

21     time Bratunac and Sekovici had already adopted a decision to join.  The

22     reason for joining these municipalities was the fear of war, because it

23     was clear that the Muslims wanted a war in order to create a sovereign

24     Muslim state."

25             Now, was this a spontaneous decision or was this encouraged by

Page 33559

 1     higher authorities with the goal of creating a Serbian Bosnia?

 2        A.   No.  This has to do with that decision.  Actually, before this

 3     decision in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina a decision was passed, or

 4     rather, a declaration was passed on the independence of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This was passed by two peoples, or rather, the

 6     representatives of the Croat and Muslim peoples at the expense of the

 7     Serb people, and a decision was made to have a referendum held.  The Serb

 8     people in the area of Birac had bad experience from the past.  They were

 9     victims in the past.  Quite simply, they were afraid of being out-voted.

10     Otherwise, in the previous period there were these economic, educational,

11     and cultural ties.  So in addition to the fact that we used to belong to

12     Tuzla as some kind of administrative centre, it was Zvornik that was the

13     centre of the region.  For that reason, we believed that such an

14     autonomous region would ensure certain guarantees and rights so that we

15     could protect ourselves.

16        Q.   Well, wasn't --

17        A.   I do apologise --

18        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] pardon me.  Wasn't one of the reasons for

19     joining that it was part of a Serb national goal to establish Serb

20     control over territory that was leading all the way to the Drina River?

21        A.   No.  We, especially the members of the Assembly, who were there

22     representing the alliance for a reformed Yugoslavia from the SDP, that is

23     to say there were three of us who were not of the same ethnicity, we were

24     nostalgic and we advocated the following:  That we should remain within

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Yugoslavia.  That is one of the reasons why

Page 33560

 1     before the Assembly we launched this idea, namely --

 2        Q.   May I just -- may I just clarify one point of this which is you

 3     are speaking as a member of the SDP at this point.  You're not speaking

 4     on behalf of the intentions of the SDS at that time; is that right?

 5        A.   Well, listen.  At the time the representatives of the SDS --

 6     well, it is a fact that there was this proposal to call it the SAO Birac,

 7     the Serb Autonomous Region of Birac.  And it was precisely for the reason

 8     that I mentioned to you a moment ago what we advocated was that this

 9     should not be a Serb autonomous region, but that it should simply be the

10     autonomous region of Birac.  Afterwards, these political parties agreed

11     to that and the decision was passed for it to be called the autonomous

12     region of Birac.  And there would be room there for all Serbs and Muslims

13     in Yugoslavia or in -- within the boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14        Q.   Okay.  My question was more simple than that.  I was asking you

15     when you say what you believe was the reason for joining municipalities

16     into these autonomous districts, you're speaking on behalf of or from

17     your position in the SDP and not speaking on behalf of the intentions of

18     the SDS members?

19        A.   I'm speaking -- well, the SDP and we -- we voted on behalf of the

20     Serb people, and we wanted this kind of decision to be passed.  We did

21     not threaten the rights of the other people in any way by passing that

22     decision, but what we advocated was that as far as the declaration on

23     independence was concerned and also the referendum, we wanted to make

24     sure in that region that we would enjoy all our rights on an equal

25     footing with the other peoples.

Page 33561

 1        Q.   So your interests and plans were aligned with those of the SDP --

 2     I'm sorry, the SDS?

 3        A.   Well, the decision that was made at the time was the decision

 4     that other peoples were involved as well.  The decision was not only

 5     establishing an SAO, but only an autonomous region of Birac.

 6     Unfortunately, due to the events that were happening at a certain pace it

 7     was merely constituted but it never became operational due to the events

 8     that followed and which prevented the implementation of this decision in

 9     practice.

10             MR. FILE:  Mr. President, I'm looking at the clock.  I think this

11     would be a good time for a break.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, let us talk about more concrete issues after

13     the break.

14             We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at three past

15     11.00.

16                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. File, please continue.

19             MR. FILE:

20        Q.   Turning your attention to paragraph 27 of your statement, in that

21     paragraph you say:

22             "The front lines in Vlasenica in April of 1992 were formed

23     spontaneously when the Serbian and Muslim populations relocated on their

24     own initiative and settled in villages where they were the majority."

25             Now, there were military orders specifically related to moving

Page 33562

 1     Muslims out of this area, setting up prison camps and exchanging

 2     prisoners; correct?

 3        A.   I'm not aware of such orders.  If we can have a look.

 4             MR. FILE:  Could we have P3240, please.

 5        Q.   As that's coming up, this is an order from the 31st of May, 1992,

 6     from Major Svetozar Andric.  And what you will see at the top of the

 7     document is it says:

 8             "Pursuant to the decision of the 'Birac' SAR, which regulates the

 9     moving out of the Muslim population from the territory of 'Birac' SAR, I

10     hereby order ..."

11             And then you have a list of four instructions:  First, to set up

12     a camp; second, not to arbitrarily liquidate the prisoners; third, to

13     conduct interviews; and, fourth, to establish contact urgently regarding

14     negotiations on the exchange of prisoners.

15             Now, that does not sound like a spontaneous population movement,

16     does it?

17        A.   Well, I didn't have an opportunity to see this decision, but on

18     the basis of the very fact that the commander Major Svetozar Andric is

19     relying on is something that I'm not familiar with.  I did not have an

20     occasion to find out whether this decision of his was responded by any

21     other organ in terms of adopting their own decisions.  A while ago I said

22     that the motives for setting up autonomous regions was -- however, here

23     he speaks about SAR.  I don't know what he meant by that and I don't know

24     if the Prosecution has this decision that he is invoking for the Muslim

25     population to be relocated.  First of all, I know that this leadership

Page 33563

 1     was a self-proclaimed one, that due to the events it was unable to work,

 2     so unless I can see the original decision I cannot comment upon how this

 3     idea of moving out was designed and conceived.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Well, let's then move to something that you should be more

 5     familiar with, which relates to the actions of the municipal authorities

 6     where you say in statement paragraph 24 that the authorities had already

 7     formed commissions that went around the town and sealed the houses and

 8     flats of Muslims who had left Vlasenica so that their property would not

 9     be stolen.  Now, my question to you is:  Even though Muslim houses were

10     sealed, they were later unsealed and assigned to Serbs by this

11     commission; correct?

12        A.   Look, in that period --

13        Q.   Pardon me for interrupting --

14        A.   -- there was chaos --

15        Q.   Pardon me for interrupting, Mr. Celikovic, but I think this is a

16     very simple question.  Isn't it true that they were later unsealed and

17     assigned to Serbs by this commission?

18        A.   The fact is that there was an invasion of Serbs who were expelled

19     from Tuzla, Kladanj, Zivinice, the Serbian Gorazde, and other places in

20     that period.  There were nearly 2.500 refugees in Vlasenica at the time

21     and accommodation was provided initially in a TO facility pending some

22     permanent solution.  There were no other possibilities to arrange that.

23     They even spent some time in a hall in a school and also in a hotel.

24     Later on the commission which was composed of members of the local

25     authorities drew up records based on which they allocated this property

Page 33564

 1     for temporary use by the refugees.

 2        Q.   And in addition to allocating that property, there was some Serbs

 3     who forcibly broke into Muslim houses that had been left empty and some

 4     Serbs who forcibly evicted Muslim families from their houses; correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Now at paragraph --

 7        A.   Yes --

 8        Q.   [Overlapping speakers]

 9        A.   -- there were such cases not on a large scale but there were

10     families who had abandoned their property or their property was torched

11     and they even suffered casualties.  So, quite simply, they were impatient

12     and they couldn't wait for a property to be allocated to them through

13     legal channels.  So it did happen that they broke into houses, and very

14     rarely some of them even maltreated certain Muslim families, threw them

15     out, et cetera.

16        Q.   Well, this happened [overlapping speakers]

17        A.   After that the municipal authorities tried to put this situation

18     right in a way.

19        Q.   This happened on a large enough scale that you say to prevent

20     such cases from taking place again, this is in paragraph 26 of your

21     statement, you say:

22             "To spare the Muslim population from experiencing stress and

23     mistreatment the municipal authority decided to turn the TO facilities

24     into a reception centre where the remaining Muslims who had not left the

25     municipality of Vlasenica could be housed in order to protect them from

Page 33565

 1     mistreatment or possible physical attacks."

 2             Now, just to make sure that I've understood you correctly, you're

 3     saying that because the Serbs were breaking into Muslim homes and

 4     evicting them from their own property, the municipal government's

 5     response was to set up a place for Muslims to go so they could abandon

 6     their property first; is that right?

 7        A.   Well, I just said that that was a situation bordering on chaos.

 8     There was a large number of refugees and, quite simply, the incumbent

 9     authorities or the public security station were able enough to provide

10     protection to the population.  Since the leadership -- the Muslim

11     leadership had abandoned Vlasenica, individuals representing certain

12     groups demanded on account of fear for their safety to be given temporary

13     accommodation where they would enjoy better safety and security

14     guarantees.  And for that reason the authorities decided to offer this

15     facility that had originally been used by the Serbs to the Muslims to be

16     used.  They also asked to be provided means of transport so that they can

17     travel to Muslim-controlled areas until appropriate conditions were

18     created and they were hence temporarily accommodated in a TO facility in

19     Susica.

20        Q.   Now, you just said that the reason to send Muslims to Susica was

21     to give them better safety and security guarantees.  Now, this

22     Trial Chamber has heard evidence that at that location approximately 500

23     to 550 people were held in a 15 by 30 metre concrete hangar, that they

24     had to share ten unwashed plates when they were fed once a day, that they

25     had to share a 10-litre pot to go to the bathroom in the evening hours

Page 33566

 1     and that when it was full they had to relieve themselves in their own

 2     clothes and that people were beaten to death among other things.  For

 3     that I would cite Prosecution Exhibit 3212, page 31 to 35.  Now, you

 4     would agree that does not sound like protecting people from mistreatment,

 5     does it?

 6        A.   Well, certainly it doesn't sound like that, but I am not sure

 7     that there is evidence that that was exactly the situation there.  The

 8     fact is that the conditions were not fully proper but it was a temporary

 9     solution until such conditions were created for them to go to a desired

10     location of their own choice in the areas where they wanted to go, be it

11     Kladanj, Tuzla, Cerska, or wherever.

12        Q.   Well, you say that you doubt that there is evidence that that was

13     exactly the situation there, but you never visited the Susica camp when

14     it was being used to hold Muslims, did you?

15        A.   I was assistant commander for logistics and as far as I remember,

16     following a battalion commander's order I participated in making certain

17     assessments before this facility was converted for other purposes.  In

18     that period, after the 4th Infantry Battalion was formed as part of the

19     Sekovici Brigade, the command post of the logistic base of the battalion

20     was relocated to Donja Zelkova [phoen], where I spent a certain period of

21     time between June and October.  Therefore, occasionally for the purpose

22     of co-ordination, we had to go to Vlasenica, but I was not familiar with

23     any details relating to the conditions and events taking place in that

24     facility.

25        Q.   You say in your statement:


Page 33567

 1             "I do not know until when the Muslims remained in that building

 2     and what went on there."

 3             Is that true?

 4        A.   Yes, that is exactly what I just told you.  The command post was

 5     in Donja Zelkovi [phoen], it was some 10 kilometres from Vlasenica, and

 6     due to that I was absent from the location.  Also, according to

 7     establishment, it was not my duty to handle any co-ordinating activities

 8     regarding this facility.  Although, I must say, that within that facility

 9     or in one of the facilities, there was a quartermaster warehouse that was

10     used by the 4th Infantry Battalion and which was independent of the other

11     facilities.  And this storehouse had its own guards.

12             MR. FILE:  I have no further questions, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. File.

14             Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

15             THE ACCUSED:  Very few, Excellency.

16                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

17        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Celikovic, did you take part in the

18     elections in 1996?

19        A.   In 1996, yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Was any clearance needed to be provided by the OSCE

21     in the international community for every individual regarding their time

22     of war?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Did you receive that clearance?

25        A.   Yes, I stood in the elections as a candidate on the

Page 33568

 1     Serbian Democratic Party list and that period we shared power with the

 2     Serbian Radical Party who had won the elections and who appointed the

 3     president during that period, and I was the president of the

 4     Executive Committee.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Are you trying to say that the voters did not believe

 6     that the Serbian Democratic Party was not radical enough and that

 7     therefore they voted for the Radical Party?

 8             MR. FILE:  Your Honour, I'm afraid I have to object.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to rephrase the question.

10             JUDGE KWON:  [Overlapping speakers]

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   I'll rephrase the question.  How do you explain that the Radicals

13     had won the elections?

14             MR. FILE:  Your Honour, I would object to this.

15             JUDGE KWON:  How is it relevant?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, the Serbian party

17     is also accused here or branded as an extreme organisation.

18             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, no -- just a second --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You see that ordinary people were

20     even more extreme.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. File.

22             MR. FILE:  That wasn't the thrust of the questions that were put

23     on cross-examination.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Agreed.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

Page 33569

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   You were asked with regard to P3240 document - and I kindly ask

 3     this document to be shown - you were asked whether you were able to

 4     distinguish between detainees and prisoners -- actually, I'm asking that

 5     question of you, Mr. Celikovic.

 6        A.   Detainees were individuals who were in possession of illegal

 7     weapons, but after certain checks had been made it was confirmed that

 8     they, indeed, held illegal weapons, as a result of which the public

 9     security station filed a large number of criminal reports.  And they were

10     kept there until exchanges were conducted in the collection centre in

11     Batkovici where they were later moved.

12        Q.   I wanted to ask you to explain to me the term "prisoner."  How

13     does one become a prisoner?

14        A.   Well, prisoners were individuals who, for example, let's be

15     specific -- there was a group of 150 or so prisoners deployed on the

16     combat line facing Memici and they were captured.  Those were able-bodied

17     men and they were armed.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, can we please

20     ask for item 2 to be properly translated because it relates to prisoners.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Mr. Celikovic, Mr. File asked you - and it was implied in his

23     question - that these houses were given to the Serbs.  Was there ever a

24     single instance when ownership was changed; i.e., that by an illegal

25     decision on the part of the authorities property was confiscated for

Page 33570

 1     someone and given to someone else?

 2        A.   No.  Those were merely temporary solutions for temporary use.

 3     Later, when the conditions were ripe, all these properties were

 4     reinstated to those who had originally used them.

 5        Q.   One more question.  What was the attitude of the authorities

 6     towards individuals who took the solution of their housing problems into

 7     their own hands and harassed the Muslims?

 8        A.   Well, the authorities at the time, especially, for example, the

 9     public security station where certain individuals took it into own hands

10     to file criminal reports and to solve those issues within the service.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And the last question.  The international

12     representative in the period between 1997, 1998, or even up to 2000, how

13     many legally elected Serb representatives were removed from their office?

14        A.   Well, I don't know of the exact number, but I do know that

15     certain officials were subject to sanctions.  I told you that I myself in

16     1999 and in 2004 - and I know that in 2004 over 60 officials mainly from

17     the SDS were under sanctions.  And I think that a total number is more

18     than 200.  So six or seven years later they were rehabilitated, as it

19     were, although I don't understand this notion quite well because their

20     sanctions were removed.  But these people were left jobless, their

21     families were broken, and, quite simply, their livelihood was

22     jeopardised.  It was not only a matter of them not being able to

23     participate in elections, but their whole existence was destroyed.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did any of them instituted lawsuits against the

25     government?

Page 33571

 1        A.   Yes.  I know that a small number of them, maybe just individual

 2     cases, were of that nature.  But I do believe and I want to hope that

 3     once we have the rule of law these cases will be dealt with because every

 4     government has a duty of care to protect its citizens.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I have no further questions.

 6        A.   Thank you, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That concludes your evidence,

 8     Mr. Celikovic.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, on behalf of the Chamber I'd like to thank you.

11     Please have a safe journey back home.

12                           [The witness withdrew]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, could we take a very short break

15     between witnesses just for relocation purposes.

16             JUDGE KWON:  How long would you need?

17             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sure five minutes is sufficient.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll rise for five minutes.

19                           --- Break taken at 11.31 a.m.

20                           [The witness entered court]

21                           --- On resuming at 11.39 a.m.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration.

23             THE WITNESS:  In English or this language?

24             [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth,

25     the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.


Page 33572

 1                           WITNESS:  VITOMIR ZEPINIC

 2                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Zepinic.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Please make yourself comfortable.  Before you start

 6     giving evidence, I would like to draw your --

 7             THE WITNESS:  If you don't mind before starting your question,

 8     I'm not Jepinic, I'm Zepinic, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I apologise.  Mr. Zepinic.

10             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes.  I would like to draw your

12     attention to a particular rule here at the Tribunal.  Under this Rule,

13     Rule 90(E) --

14             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  That's fine.

15             JUDGE KWON:  -- you may object to answering a question from the

16     accused, the Prosecution, or the Judges if you believe that your answer

17     will incriminate you.  When I say incriminate I mean that something you

18     say may amount to an admission of your guilt for a criminal offence or

19     could provide evidence that you have committed an offence.  However, even

20     if you think your answer would incriminate you and you do not wish to

21     answer the question, the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer

22     the question.  But in such a case, the Tribunal will make sure that your

23     testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used as evidence in other

24     case against you for any offence other than false testimony.

25             Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?


Page 33573

 1             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I understand very well

 2     what you said.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Zepinic.

 4             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 5                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 6        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, Dr. Zepinic.

 7        A.   Good day, Dr. Karadzic.

 8        Q.   Could you please bear the following in mind - I'd also like to

 9     remind yourself as well - that we pause between my questions and your

10     answers and also let us speak at a slower pace because I really want the

11     transcript to reflect accurately everything we are saying.  Do you agree?

12        A.   I do.

13        Q.   Did you give my Defence team a statement?

14        A.   I gave a statement to Mr. Robinson when he visited me in London

15     last year.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D05659 in

18     e-court.  1D05659.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Doctor, do you have the statement in front of you, do you see it

21     on your screen?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Is that the statement?

24        A.   [In English] Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you read that statement and sign it?

Page 33574

 1        A.   [Interpretation] Yes, I received it by e-mail, a copy that I

 2     checked, and then I signed it and returned it to Mr. Robinson.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page so that

 5     we can identify the signature.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I certify that this is my signature.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zepinic.  Does this statement faithfully reflect

 9     what you said?

10        A.   Dr. Karadzic, I reviewed this statement and it does generally

11     reflect what we discussed when Mr. Robinson came to visit me in London.

12        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today in

13     this courtroom, would your answers basically be the same as in this

14     statement?

15        A.   Well, it is hard to envisage that I will be able to paraphrase

16     each and every word, but at any rate I shall respond to every one of your

17     questions and all the questions of the other party and I will say what I

18     said in this statement and what I confirmed by my signature.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I'm not going to put questions to you now, but if I

20     were to put the same questions that were put to you by my Defence team

21     would your answers to the same questions be basically the same as they

22     are in this statement?

23        A.   Dr. Karadzic, the statement that I gave and signed is something

24     that I am not willing to change in any way so that I would say something

25     different, even if I were to be subjected to any kind of pressure.

Page 33575

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this document into

 3     evidence, please?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  In addition to this document

 6     there are seven associated exhibits that we're seeking to tender, all of

 7     which are actually on our 65 ter list this time.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Among them with respect to 65 ter number 31878,

 9     which is referred to in paragraph 44, I think the -- there's some mistake

10     in terms of 65 ter number because that intercept seems to be related to

11     27th of August, 1991, which is different from the date referred to in the

12     paragraph.  So with the exception -- that exception, do you have any

13     objection, Mr. Tieger?

14             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Mr. President, other than to note that

15     65 ter 31878 is P02963.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Oh.  Which I just referred to; right?

17             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             MR. TIEGER:  And 65 ter 30234 is P05869, at least that's what our

20     records show.

21             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, if I can --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

23             THE WITNESS:  [Overlapping speakers] some objection.  I'm not

24     quite sure in the summary given to here on the page 2, last paragraph, I

25     don't think that was Ismet Delalic Celo, I think it was Ramiz Delalic,

Page 33576

 1     Celo, if I remember well.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Mr. Karadzic should have noted it.

 3             Yes, then we'll admit those six associated exhibits.  Do you

 4     follow?

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, you're exactly correct.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             Shall we give the number?

 8                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  So shall we give the number for the Rule 92 ter

10     statement?

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, that's Exhibit D2923.

12             JUDGE KWON:  And the other six items in -- will be given numbers

13     in due course liaising amongst the court deputy and the parties.

14             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Now I would like to read out the summary of Dr. Zepinic's

17     statement.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Doctor, the summary is not evidence.  It is information.  But

20     thank you for this correction.

21             THE ACCUSED:  Vitomir Zepinic was deputy minister of interior for

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina from January the 30th, 1991, to

23     April the 4th, 1992.

24             After the 1990 elections, Dr. Zepinic was invited to attend a

25     meeting with the SDS leadership, including Dr. Radovan Karadzic,

Page 33577

 1     Momcilo Krajisnik, and others.  They told him that pursuant to an

 2     agreement among the national parties which had won the elections, the SDS

 3     was able to designate the deputy minister of interior.

 4             During his meeting, Dr. Zepinic made his position quite clear.

 5     He was not a member of the SDS or any other party and not voted -- had

 6     not voted on the 1990 elections, and would not become an SDS party

 7     member.  He was committed to a professional and a non-political

 8     Ministry of Interior with the most qualified people regardless -- with

 9     the most qualified people regardless of their ethnicity.  He was a

10     proponent of the continuation of a multi-cultural society in Bosnia.

11             Dr. Karadzic defended Dr. Zepinic against other members of the

12     SDS who argued that the post should go to a loyal SDS party member.

13     Dr. Karadzic stated that he wanted a competent professional in the job

14     and that it would make it more difficult for the other parties to

15     criticise SDS if the person they nominated was of high calibre,

16     professional, and known to be independent.  During his time as a deputy

17     minister of interior, Dr. Zepinic was regularly confronted with problems

18     in allocating posts within the Ministry of Interior.  Overall,

19     Dr. Zepinic had more problems with the President Izetbegovic and

20     Ejub Ganic than he did with Dr. Karadzic regarding these issues.  They

21     were more extreme, were surrounded by a cadre of the extreme

22     nationalists, and more often tried to use their power to manipulate the

23     appointment of personnel within the Ministry of Interior.  Dr. Zepinic

24     believes that President Izetbegovic is most responsible for the outbreak

25     of war in Bosnia, considering his role as president of BH -- of the BH

Page 33578

 1     Presidency.

 2             Like with other political leaders, Dr. Zepinic had quite frequent

 3     conversations with Dr. Karadzic, at meetings and on the telephone.  Most

 4     of the conversations pertained to personnel discussions within the

 5     Ministry of the Interior or events which threatened the peace in

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  During his contacts with Dr. Karadzic while he

 7     was deputy minister of interior, Dr. Zepinic never understood him to

 8     desire the expulsion of Muslims or Croats.  From his knowledge of

 9     Dr. Karadzic's personality, he does not believe that Dr. Karadzic would

10     have favoured this and he knows that Dr. Karadzic had close friends in

11     Sarajevo who were Muslims and Croats.

12             As deputy minister of interior, Dr. Zepinic had access to a great

13     deal of information collected by ministry operatives on the policy of the

14     national parties, as expressed at Assembly meetings, Executive Committee

15     meetings, and the official party documents.  He was not aware that it was

16     the SDS party policy to favour the expulsions of members of other ethnic

17     groups.

18             Dr. Karadzic often expressed the view that Serbs could not live

19     together with the Muslims.  Dr. Zepinic understood this to mean that they

20     could not live together politically or culturally, not physically.  He

21     never understood Dr. Karadzic to favour physical separation of the Serbs

22     and other ethnic groups through expulsions.

23             On 1st of March, 1992, a Serb was murdered by Ramiz Delalic,

24     Celo, a Muslim at wedding ceremony in a church in Sarajevo.  The

25     Ministry of Interior arrested Delalic and Delalic told the crime

Page 33579

 1     inspectors that the killing had been ordered by President Izetbegovic.

 2     Based upon all of the information the Ministry of Interior had at the

 3     time, Dr. Zepinic believed that Delalic was telling the truth.  This was

 4     confirmed when he was released with no charges -- when Ramiz Delalic,

 5     Celo, was released with no charges against him were filed.  Dr. Zepinic

 6     believed that President Izetbegovic wanted to provoke a conflict with the

 7     Serbs.  The Serbs reacted by erecting the barricades in Sarajevo.

 8     Dr. Zepinic worked hard to negotiate an end to this crisis, travelling to

 9     the barricades during the night.  He called upon President Izetbegovic

10     for help, but he declined, saying that this was a police matter.

11     Ejub Ganic who was in charge of the Crisis Staff of the Presidency was

12     also completely uninterested in helping to solve this problem.

13             Dr. Zepinic was very familiar with the events in Bijeljina on

14     1st and 2nd of April, 1992, and was involved in trying to end the

15     violence there.  He was privy of reports and intelligence informations

16     about the events in Bijeljina on those days.  Dr. Zepinic was convinced

17     that Dr. Radovan Karadzic had nothing to do with the killings in

18     Bijeljina on the 1st and 2nd of April, 1992.  Those killings were

19     perpetrated by Arkan and his men, who came to Bijeljina to loot.  Based

20     upon all the sources of information Dr. Zepinic had about the event, he

21     did not believe that Dr. Karadzic had anything to do with Arkan's coming

22     to Bijeljina or Arkan's criminal activities when he arrived there.

23             When the war broke out, Dr. Zepinic chose to remain at the

24     apartment -- at his apartment in Sarajevo.  He was arrested on several

25     occasions by the Muslim paramilitary forces.  He finally managed to leave


Page 33580

 1     Sarajevo and arrived in Belgrade around July the 19th, 1992.  In late

 2     August 1992, he was arrested by Mico Stanisic and others in Belgrade and

 3     taken to Republika Srpska.  He was detained until the end of November,

 4     when he was driven to Belgrade on the understanding that he would see his

 5     family and return to Republika Srpska.  Dr. Zepinic did not return, but

 6     instead immigrated to Australia in February 1993.

 7             And that would be the summary.  For the moment I don't have other

 8     questions for Dr. Zepinic.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Well, Dr. Zepinic.

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  As you have noted, your evidence in chief in this

12     case has been admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony, and now

13     you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the

14     Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Tieger.

15             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  And it's one minute past

17     noon.

18                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

19        Q.   Good afternoon, Dr. Zepinic.

20        A.   [In English] Good afternoon, Mr. Tieger.

21        Q.   You have just experienced an efficient form of bringing your

22     evidence before the Court, and I will attempt to be equally efficient and

23     not squander the information you have previously provided to this

24     Tribunal either in the form of testimony or statements in the past.  And

25     just to remind you, as I'm sure you're aware, you have provided

Page 33581

 1     information on numerous occasions, including a statement over the course

 2     of four days in 2002, a statement to Canadian authorities in 2006, during

 3     which you essentially confirmed the accuracy of your 2002 statement, a

 4     statement in 2008, testimony before the Stanisic and

 5     Zupljanin Trial Chamber in 2010.  And I will be focusing on the

 6     information that you provided on those previous occasions, trying to, as

 7     much as possible, ask questions in a manner that can simply be answered

 8     yes or no.

 9             I notice that you made the observation that -- about paraphrasing

10     the previous statement you gave in the context of Dr. Karadzic's

11     questions about the statement that was just admitted into evidence.  I

12     won't be asking you to paraphrase your previous evidence because when we

13     take time for that purpose it keeps us from moving on to the next bit of

14     information you've previously provided.

15             So with all that in mind - and I apologise for that lengthy

16     introduction - I'll move forward to ask the questions I have.  First of

17     all, Dr. Zepinic, as you indicated in your 2002 statement and again in

18     your Stanisic/Zupljanin testimony, you were against the ethnic division

19     of the police.  And as you said in 2002:

20             "If we were going to accept that police were established on a

21     national basis, then there was no safe place in Bosnia."

22             Is that correct?  And that's found at English page 6 of the 2002

23     statement.

24        A.   I understand your question.  Do I need to answer you in English

25     or in Serbian?

Page 33582

 1        Q.   Doctor --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  In whichever you prefer.

 3             MR. TIEGER:

 4        Q.   I was going to say the same thing.

 5        A.   [Interpretation] Before I answer your question, I have an

 6     objection to this summary presented by Dr. Karadzic.  On page 1 I always

 7     claimed and I wish to reiterate it in the courtroom here, it wasn't that

 8     the national parties were elected in the elections of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 9     They were set up as a coalition and this was supported by the

10     European Union, the elections that were held in November 1990 had a vote

11     of 41.4 of the entire electorate.  So there wasn't even a simple majority

12     let alone a two-thirds majority, and that was compulsory on the basis of

13     the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to have a valid

14     outcome.  43.6 is the vote that was received by Fikret Abdic who had the

15     largest number of votes, followed by Izetbegovic.  And that is to say

16     that not a single one of these members of the Presidency of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina had received the mandate of the people as an elected

18     member of parliament or the Presidency.

19             Mr. Tieger, in terms of your question, I remained committed to

20     the principle that this is a powder keg to have this division along

21     ethnic lines and I stand by that statement.

22        Q.   And just to amplify that a bit, as you testified in the

23     Stanisic/Zupljanin case and I think the reference to powder keg makes

24     that sufficiently clear, you believed that the splitting of the MUP would

25     result in an armed conflict?

Page 33583

 1        A.   Absolutely.  We had information about paramilitary formations of

 2     all three parties and also armed elements of national parties as well as

 3     certain paramilitary formations that had come either from Croatia or from

 4     Serbia, and we regularly reported to the Presidency about that.  If you

 5     allow me, I am going to read the conclusions of the session of the

 6     Presidency that was held --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not catch the date.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And on the basis of the information

 9     provided by the State Security Service, we had the exact number of

10     members of sabotage groups that were infiltrated from Croatia and the

11     number of paramilitary units that were formed by national parties in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  If the ministry were to be split up, then this would

13     inevitably lead to an armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   Okay.  Thank you, Mr. Zepinic or Dr. Zepinic, excuse me.  You --

16        A.   [In English] It doesn't matter.

17        Q.   I note -- first of all, I notice you have certain documents in

18     front of you.  If you --

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   -- have occasion to feel the need to refer to those documents, I

21     would simply ask that you ask for leave from the Court, indicate what you

22     want to look at so everyone in the courtroom is aware of what information

23     is being referred to.

24             Secondly, to the extent possible, I would ask you to wait for

25     some kind of invitation to elaborate on a question before you do so.  I'm

Page 33584

 1     well aware of the fact that you have a great deal of information about

 2     events at that time.  I'm attempting to get as much of the information

 3     that I believe is relevant at this point to the Court, and I have a

 4     limited time to do that.  So every time you expand on a particular point,

 5     it prevents me from -- it may prevent me from asking questions about

 6     points later on.  So I'm not trying to hamstring you unfairly, but to the

 7     extent possible if you can be guided by the question and wait for an

 8     invitation from either the Bench or myself or Dr. Karadzic to elaborate

 9     more fully on a question that's asked.  Thank you.

10             You referred in paragraph 13 of your statement to Boro and

11     Ramiz --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have your statement with you, Dr. Zepinic?

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:

17        Q.   And you explain that Boro and Ramiz were a symbol of unity

18     between persons of different nationality.  And is it correct that they

19     were a symbol generally of the concept of brotherhood and unity that in

20     former Yugoslavia was the fundamental principle for 50 years?  And I

21     believe you said that in your 2008 statement, refer to the fact that

22     brotherhood and unity had been the fundamental principle in former

23     Yugoslavia for 50 years; is that correct?

24        A.   [In English] Can I give my answer?

25        Q.   Yes.

Page 33585

 1        A.   Thank you.  [Interpretation] Well, you see Boro and Ramiz were

 2     two symbols.  These were indeed historical persons from the

 3     Second World War.  Their ethnic backgrounds were different.  But how do I

 4     put this?  They represented the brotherhood and unity that was there when

 5     opposing the occupiers during the Second World War.  Now, why were

 6     Delimustafic and I proclaimed Boro and Ramiz?  Well, I don't know.  You

 7     know, journalist dealt with this very skillfully in the press and there

 8     were pictures there as well.  So there was in model of unity in the

 9     functioning of the Ministry of the Interior, and this probably led to

10     this declaration of Boro and Ramiz by the president, by the public in

11     general.  Now, whether I'm Boro or Ramiz, I cannot give you an answer to

12     that.  And after all, it doesn't matter.  But my initiative and my

13     leadership in the Ministry of the Interior advocated what had been a

14     principle for 50 years in the previous Yugoslavia; that is brotherhood

15     and unity and respect for all the differences, cultural, religious,

16     et cetera, in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well.  This concept was carried

17     through to the extent possible within the Ministry of the Interior itself

18     to the best of my ability.  However, Mr. Tieger, just as my unfortunate

19     former country felt, well, everybody loved it and appreciated it and yet

20     it went down the drain and then everybody loved and appreciated us and

21     this is what happened.

22        Q.   You have previously stated - and you did so in your 2008

23     statement at page 7, paragraph 36 - that for Radovan Karadzic this

24     concept of brotherhood and unity that you explained did not exist;

25     correct?

Page 33586

 1        A.   The concept of how national parties operated, including the SDS,

 2     the concept of brotherhood and unity was not known to have been promoted

 3     throughout the whole mandate that they acquired.  Let me remind you,

 4     Mr. Tieger, in their election memorandum or platform - and I can quote

 5     Dr. Karadzic, saying that the function and the role and the task of

 6     national parties was to preserve brotherhood and unity in Yugoslavia was

 7     a historical legacy of President Tito and that they should preserve it as

 8     their best treasure.  If possible, I can give you exactly the name of the

 9     document where this statement can be found, but let me tell you that the

10     national parties went astray quite a lot and started dealing only with

11     national matters and they neglected the concept of unity of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13        Q.   Well, I was only quoting from the 2008 statement, but let me be

14     somewhat more specific about the explanations you've provided about

15     Dr. Karadzic's view of this issue.  You stated also in your 2008

16     statement, and that's found at page 4 of the English:

17             "It was the belief of Karadzic that different ethnicities in

18     Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH, could not live together.  He never gave a

19     reasonable explanation or provided any evidence of why he maintained

20     these views.  This concept also became the or was the general policy of

21     the SDS."

22             And I said it's page 4 -- that's at page 7 of the B/C/S.  That's

23     correct, that's what you -- that's the information you provided to the

24     OTP in 2008; correct?

25        A.   Yes, I agree, not only as far as the party is concerned and its

Page 33587

 1     programme.  Any political party.  But that was a reflection of how the

 2     National Assembly operated.  Only the interests, national interests, of

 3     deputies came to the fore during sessions.  There was never any room for

 4     the principled views and attitudes of ordinary citizens of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that was something that was maintained and

 6     consistently implemented both at their political rallies but also on the

 7     sessions of the government and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And in your testimony during the Stanisic/Zupljanin

 9     case you explained further that you had many conversations with

10     Dr. Karadzic, and this is found at transcript page 5705 in e-court

11     page 27.

12             "Regarding his view that, you know, life together between two

13     nationalities in -- in former Yugoslavia or Bosnia, pardon me, is

14     impossible."

15             And that's correct also, isn't it, Dr. Zepinic?

16        A.   In view of the concept and the policies pursued by national

17     parties, it was obvious that two nationalist parties cannot live together

18     and they cannot attain a joint objective together in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19     And that's nothing new.  In my private talks with Dr. Karadzic we

20     discussed this matter and I was not convinced that he really thought

21     about physically elimination of non-Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But

22     the fact remains that the extremism of nationalist parties created a

23     climate in which it was impossible to achieve coexistence, as Dr. Tudjman

24     used to say, and to reconcile this concept with the policies pursued by

25     nationalist parties.  If you allow me, that is why Dr. Tudjman proposed

Page 33588

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina to be divided between Serbia and Croatia and you know

 2     that these meetings did happen and President Mesic spoke extensively

 3     about them.

 4        Q.   And during those talks with Dr. Karadzic and -- he said that life

 5     together between -- in Bosnia between two nationalities is impossible,

 6     you responded to his comments about that issue by pointing out to him

 7     that your sister was married to a Muslim and as you said in the

 8     Stanisic/Zupljanin case:

 9             "I asked him if Serbs and Muslims cannot live together can you

10     tell me on which was -- I will say to my sister that her husband is not a

11     good guy ..." and so on.

12             In short, when Dr. Karadzic explained his view of the

13     nationalities being unable to live together, you said:  What happens to

14     my family?  What happens to my brother-in-law; correct?  That's found at

15     the Stanisic/Zupljanin case transcript page 5706.

16        A.   Not only about what was going to happen with my family but what

17     will happen with about 65 per cent of mixed families in

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So it was not only the issue that I had a relative

19     in a mixed marriage because I originate from a place that was

20     proportionally speaking the most dominant Serb municipality in the former

21     Yugoslavia.  But let me remind you that the SDS did not win the election

22     in Sekovici of which Dr. Karadzic accused me on many occasions and laid

23     blame on me for that.  So as I said, it was not only my personal family

24     problem.  The problem was the whole population of Bosnia-Herzegovina that

25     had an enormous percentage of ethnically mixed marriages.  How can you

Page 33589

 1     physically divide or separate a high-rise building or flats on the same

 2     floor?  How can one expect that such a division would be a guarantee of

 3     peaceful life among neighbours.  Such policy pursued by the nationalist

 4     party was something that I was really not able to swallow, if you allow

 5     me to say that, and I don't believe that Dr. Karadzic was able either.  I

 6     think that he faced problems among his own ranks from his own extremists,

 7     and you heard here evidence that there were people who advocated the

 8     expulsion of everyone who was against the Serb policy, including

 9     Dr. Zepinic, not because I was on the front and because I fought SDS.  I

10     was arrested because I disagreed with the concept of the SDA concept as

11     well as that of the SDS.  That's a fact that, Mr. Tieger, I explain to

12     you that I share the destiny of my former country.  Everybody used to

13     love and appreciate me, but nobody wanted me.  That's it.  What can one

14     do about it?

15             [In English] Does that satisfy your question, please?

16        Q.   There will be more questions along this line, Dr. Zepinic.  In

17     addition to the conversations --

18        A.   Okay.

19        Q.   -- that you had with Dr. Karadzic about this issue, you were also

20     aware that Mrs. Plavsic maintained that Serbs and other nationalities

21     could not live together, which prompted you to say to her that an attempt

22     to separate the ethnic communities would produce violence and thousands

23     of innocent civilians would be killed.  And that's found at -- in your

24     2002 statement at page 5:

25             "I informed her that if you tried to separate the ethnic

Page 33590

 1     communities, then there would be violence and thousands of innocent

 2     civilians would be killed."

 3             That's a correct reflection of what's in your statement and the

 4     information you provided?

 5        A.   [Interpretation] I stand by that statement.  Unfortunately, I was

 6     overly optimistic because the events that happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina

 7     were much more tragic than I had anticipated.  So that is my answer that

 8     I gave often to Biljana Plavsic and Koljevic at our meetings.  And I knew

 9     that Dr. Karadzic personally had problems with those two because, quite

10     simply, they always said that the attitude that I subscribed to was an

11     unacceptable one and that the party should do something about it.  As you

12     know, I offered my resignation twice to the president of the Presidency

13     and the prime minister.  My resignation was rejected.  On the

14     13th of May [as interpreted]I told the prime minister and the president

15     of the Assembly and the presiding member of the Presidency that I was not

16     going to resign, but that I expected them to have the guts to force my

17     resignation.  They didn't have that power and that is how this thing was

18     resolved.

19             So let me say that members of the Presidency, instead of being a

20     collective organ heading the state, were more nationalistic than

21     nationalist leaders themselves, including Mate Boban and Izetbegovic.

22             [No interpretation]

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the last

24     sentence.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Dr. Zepinic.

Page 33591

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, okay.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your last sentence - the

 3     interpreters didn't catch - you after "Izetbegovic."

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Members of the Presidency, instead

 5     of taking a joint position as the head of state, they were more concerned

 6     about nationalist interests, including the president of the Presidency,

 7     Mr. Izetbegovic, who violated the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina by

 8     holding at the same time the post of the president of the party and the

 9     president of the Presidency.  Quite often he acted at the Presidency

10     meetings as the leader of the SDA instead of as the president of the

11     Presidency.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   You mentioned Dr. Koljevic in an earlier -- well, first of all,

14     you said your -- let me clarify something quickly.  You said your

15     resignation was rejected on the 13th of May.  You told the prime minister

16     and the president of the Assembly and the presiding member of the

17     Presidency that you were not going to resign.  Did you mean that date or

18     did you mean another date.  It was translated as "May 13th."

19        A.   No, I'm sorry.  Sometime in early March 1991, when I realised how

20     the situation was progressing I decided that I cannot accept the concept

21     of these parties and I offered my resignation to the persons mentioned

22     before, who rejected it because they believed that that would be a risky

23     move for the further developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24             I mentioned the 13th of May because the 13th of May was the date

25     of security forces, but nobody from the authorities found any decency to

Page 33592

 1     send a celebratory card to the security services for their day.

 2             I was the person who acted professionally in every respect and in

 3     every situation and that is --

 4        Q.   Dr. --

 5        A.   -- the reason why I managed to survive.  [In English]  Please.

 6     Please.

 7             [Interpretation] I sent a telegram and I congratulated the

 8     holiday to all members of the security forces, but I didn't include

 9     members from the authorities because --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the answer.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Could you slow down a bit.  The interpreters --

12             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  I'm sorry, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  If you look at the transcript.

14             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Could you start again from where you said you sent a

16     telegram.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With the exception of Mr. Krajisnik

18     and at my insistence, he was the only one who sent his congratulations.

19     I insisted that others should do the same.  I didn't expect them to

20     organise any ceremonies to give them any medals, et cetera.  But I said

21     that they cannot expect any congratulations coming from people in the

22     authorities who were criminals.  I don't know who organised this rally.

23     I was invited to attend it.  Mr. Krajisnik was there, Joran Livan [phoen]

24     was there, Nikola Koljevic was there.  I said that I stood by the

25     telegram that I had sent, that I could simply -- could not comprehend why

Page 33593

 1     they resent what I wrote in it.  I would like them to request my

 2     resignation and that I myself was not going to resign on my own.

 3             MR. TIEGER:

 4        Q.   Dr. --

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 10 Dr. Zepinic said that it

 6     was not possible to expect congratulations from people that the service

 7     used to deal beforehand including Mr. Izetbegovic was not in the

 8     transcript as well as what he said that Mr. Izetbegovic was really rude

 9     at that meeting.  I would like to ask the witness to speak more slowly

10     because we are really dealing here with the shades of meetings.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me, Dr. Karadzic.

12        Q.   Dr. Zepinic, please, just one moment.  We're about to adjourn

13     because of the time.  I certainly am trying to respect your desire to get

14     as much information as you consider useful to the Court, before the

15     Court, as possible.  And I ask for the same respect in return.  I will be

16     moving on to various topics.  I gave you an opportunity to clarify the

17     date.  That was not meant to be an invitation for an elaboration of the

18     circumstances surrounding that resignation letter in March 1991.  And

19     there will be many topics that are important to the Court that I won't be

20     able to cover if you don't allow me to guide you to the particular

21     subject areas.  So I would appreciate that very much.  Unfortunately

22     we're at the break now and we'll be able to resume after the lunch

23     recess.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would the Chamber like to hear

25     whether the witness confirmed my intervention and what was omitted

Page 33594

 1     originally in the transcript?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Dr. Zepinic, do you confirm what Mr. Karadzic said?

 3             THE WITNESS:  Well, Your Honour, I stated the same twice so it's

 4     no problem.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But it doesn't seem to have made its way to the

 6     transcript, but do you confirm what Mr. Karadzic said?

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  [Interpretation] Yes, I agree.  This was not

 8     recorded because I spoke too fast and after that you warned me.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  So I would request to you to slow down when we

10     resume after 45-minutes' break.  So we'll take a break and resume at 18

11     past 1.00.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

13                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 1.22 p.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17        Q.   Dr. Zepinic, when you were explaining to the Court what you said

18     in -- to Mrs. Plavsic in response to her comments that Serbs and other

19     nationalities could not live together, you also mentioned that that was

20     an answer you gave often to Biljana Plavsic and Koljevic.  So just to

21     round that out it is correct, isn't it, as you stated in your 2002

22     statement at page 6 that Nikola Koljevic also said that the ethnic

23     communities could not live together and, in fact, stated that the Serbs

24     should just expel the Muslims; correct?

25        A.   If you allow me to make a comment.  I believe that of members of

Page 33595

 1     the Presidency, particularly Mrs. Plavsic and Mr. Koljevic, I think that

 2     Koljevic was really extreme in his nationalistic attitudes.  His

 3     statement that it was impossible for the Serbs to live with anyone else

 4     was something that he repeatedly mentioned in various situations as a

 5     slogan.  And due to that, we were often at loggerheads on many occasions.

 6     I even talked to the prime minister, seeking possible intervention from

 7     their part to put a stop to this, although we were talking about a member

 8     of the Presidency, but in his actions and in his views deviated from what

 9     was decided in March, was that any party advocating the breakup of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines cannot be registered.  So I agree

11     with you, this is not something that he said once or twice.  That is

12     something that he commonly said.  He underlined that and these extreme

13     views of his became very evident at some of the most important meetings

14     and gatherings.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Let me move on to a somewhat different topic.  As you

16     stated in your 2008 statement, the national parties wanted candidates for

17     the MUP who were loyal to or favoured the party that nominated them, so

18     interference was always present; is that correct?

19        A.   Yes.  All three parties tried in every possible way to create a

20     situation to have officials, particularly in executive positions, who

21     were loyal to their political party, regardless of their qualification or

22     competence, and that based on an inter parte agreement a parity was

23     established between ethnic communities and their representation in the

24     MUP, and therefore the parties were the ones who nominated the

25     candidates.  Unfortunately in the majority of cases I rejected those

Page 33596

 1     candidates because they had no idea whatsoever about what they were

 2     supposed to do in the ministry, never mind if they were on excellent

 3     terms from -- with another official in the MUP or with someone from their

 4     party.  Very often we in the ministry had arguments and rows with the

 5     political parties over their nominations.

 6        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And specifically, as you stated in your 2008

 7     statement at page 4:

 8             "Karadzic telephoned me on many occasions and discussed some

 9     particular candidates.  He always wanted to have some influence on the

10     appointments.  Alija Izetbegovic as well as Stjepan Kljujic sometimes

11     tried to interfere but not as much as Karadzic."

12             Correct?  That's what you stated in 2008 and that's correct?

13        A.   Yes, that is correct -- [In English] Sorry, I apologise to you.

14     [Interpretation] It is correct that Karadzic called me more often about

15     Serb candidates than Izetbegovic and Kljujic did that regarding their

16     candidates because they often bypassed me.  In most cases they would

17     agree that with Delimustafic or Kvesic or somebody else who was my

18     assistant and after that I would have to examine who the candidates were

19     and then I had to go back to Kljujic and intervene, although I relied more

20     on Mate Boban because Kljujic was so incompetent that I didn't want to

21     have any dealings with him.  So I contacted most often with Mate Boban

22     regarding Croatian candidates and it was Omer Behmeh with regards to

23     Muslim candidates, except when an intervention came from Mr. Izetbegovic.

24     So generally speaking, Dr. Karadzic called me more often than the other

25     two because, as I said, they tried to circumvent me because they were

Page 33597

 1     aware that I would not accept their proposals.

 2        Q.   Now, you were, as you stated in 2008, opposed generally to SDS

 3     policy; correct?

 4        A.   Yes, I was.  I was against any nationalistic policy in the

 5     country, not only the one pursued by the SDS.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the previous answer Dr. Zepinic

 7     said that if they -- if he saw who the candidates were, he would explode.

 8     That means that he would be so enraged and none of that was recorded in

 9     the transcript.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I lost track -- what line did you refer to,

11     Mr. Karadzic?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 10 [In English] No, no, when

13     "Kljujic and intervene, although I relied more on Mate Boban because

14     Kljujic was incompetent ... so I contacted most often Mate Boban."  And it

15     is here line 10 "Croatian candidates and it was Omer Behmeh with regards

16     to Muslim candidates" [Interpretation] And in this portion Dr. Zepinic

17     says:  When I saw who the candidates were, I would explode and I would

18     then appeal to Mr. Izetbegovic to intervene.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Dr. Zepinic.

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that?

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue, Mr. Tieger.

Page 33598

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 2        Q.   You've just confirmed a moment ago you were opposed generally to

 3     SDS policy.  It's correct that others in the MUP were not opposed to or

 4     in conflict with SDS policy.  For example, as you stated in your 2008

 5     statement:

 6             "Mico Stanisic," or Stanic I think it says there, "tried as much

 7     as he could to please Karadzic instead of doing his job."

 8             And that's correct, isn't it?

 9        A.   [Interpretation] That is correct and that's why he was replaced.

10     [In English] I dismissed him from his position because of him looking

11     more about policy proclaimed by Dr. Karadzic than Dr. Zepinic.

12        Q.   Now at paragraphs 32 through 52 of your statement you discuss

13     some telephone conversations in which Dr. Karadzic referred to various

14     events and raised the prospect of the division of the MUP or the country.

15     It is correct that since the time of those discussions you have become

16     aware of various events or meetings which you did not attend at which the

17     division of the MUP was concretely discussed by Bosnian Serb officials.

18     For example, you testified in the Stanisic/Zupljanin case about the

19     11 February 1992 meeting in Banja Luka which you did not attend and did

20     not know about; is that right?

21        A.   Yes, that's right.

22        Q.   For the benefit of the Court, that meeting is reflected in P1083

23     and contains various references to the decision to establish Serbian MUP.

24             And it is also correct, Dr. Zepinic, that you didn't attend

25     Assembly meetings -- an Assembly meeting in late March 1992 when

Page 33599

 1     Dr. Karadzic talked about the establishment of the Republika Srpska MUP,

 2     which he indicated could happen in two or three days; and noted that at

 3     that moment Serbian municipalities would "literally assume control of the

 4     entire territory of the municipality concerned."

 5             That's correct, you -- is it correct you were not aware of that

 6     or did not attend that meeting?

 7        A.   Yes, that's right.  I attended only meetings of the Assemblies of

 8     national parties when it was the Ministry of Interior that was discussed.

 9     And when I was invited to come I did not attend most of them, or rather,

10     I did not attend most of the Assemblies so I do not remember this one.

11        Q.   I understand from your 2008 statement that you were told about an

12     Assembly session in late March 1992 by Stojan Zupljanin and he mentioned

13     that and told you that there was an initiative to split the MUP.  That's

14     a 2008 statement page 13; is that correct?

15        A.   That is correct.  Actually, I found out about this idea of

16     separating the MUP into the three ethnic communities.  This proposal was

17     first presented at the meeting with Mr. Cutileiro in January 1992.  I was

18     terribly surprised when I saw that members of the government attended

19     that meeting, Mr. Djeric and Mr. Mahmut Cehajic, and then at the next

20     government meeting I raised that question.  I asked in which capacity

21     they attended that meeting and in which capacity was it for them to

22     tacitly approve of that proposal and on the other hand the minister and

23     the deputy minister of the interior had no idea about that.  I put that

24     question to Mr. Izetbegovic and then I was accused of spying on members

25     of the Presidency and the delegation that had this meeting with

Page 33600

 1     Mr. Cutileiro.  So if I was spying them, then yes, I was, because it was

 2     my duty to find out what it was they were doing.

 3        Q.   And, in fact, as I believe you made clear in your 2008 statement

 4     at page 11, you felt sufficiently strongly about splitting the MUP along

 5     ethnic lines that you would have arrested Dr. Karadzic and the other

 6     members of the Bosnian Serb leadership when that happened and the reason

 7     you didn't is that you would have been shot; correct?

 8        A.   [In English] I'm sorry for -- [Interpretation] Well, I don't know

 9     whether they would have shot me.  You have to ask them about that.  At

10     any rate, I did not decide to arrest the national leaders, or rather, the

11     members of the Presidency.  I wasn't really interested in power, to be

12     frank.  Through my ministry and through the role that I played, I tried

13     to ensure that the state functioned.  I didn't want to cause a crisis.

14     20 years later, my friend [In English] It's probably quite difficult to

15     understand what happened 20 years ago.

16        Q.   Doctor, I was simply quoting from the 2008 statement where you

17     explained you wanted to clarify that you took no action on --

18        A.   [Interpretation] I agree.

19        Q.   And again, because -- at least you felt you would have been shot?

20        A.   [In English] Yeah.

21        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to speak to you now about the meeting referred to

22     at paragraphs 67 through 70 of your statement at which you tendered your

23     resignation.  And, first of all, that meeting was on the 4th of April,

24     which would have been just a few days after the dispatch sent by

25     Momcilo Mandic; correct?  And you nodded your head?

Page 33601

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 2        Q.   And, in fact, you met with Mandic and Stanisic after that

 3     dispatch, as you explained in your 2002 statement at page 10, and told

 4     them that you did not recognise the decisions of either Radovan Karadzic

 5     or Momcilo Krajisnik and did not recognise the decisions of any

 6     parliament constituted on one national basis; correct?

 7        A.   [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.  All members of the

 8     collegium attended the meeting.  It wasn't only Mandic and Stanisic.  And

 9     the other details you referred to are quite correct.

10        Q.   And then on the 4th of April you met with members of the SDS

11     leadership - that's how they're described in paragraph 68 of the

12     statement - and that included Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Koljevic,

13     Professor Buha, Momcilo Mandic, and Mico Stanisic; correct?  That's what

14     you said in your 2002 statement.

15        A.   [In English] Yes.

16        Q.   Now, Stanisic said at that meeting, again according to the 2002

17     statement as you've explained it, that you were destroying their concept.

18     And when you asked:  What concept?  They said the concept to divide the

19     MUP; correct?

20        A.   That's correct.

21        Q.   And you told them that if they did something like this, that is,

22     split the MUP, then "they would be responsible for the forthcoming

23     conflict because it was impossible to do this peacefully."  That's at

24     2002 statement, pages 12 to 13; is that correct?

25        A.   [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.  But may I just explain

Page 33602

 1     this to you a bit.  As a matter of fact, I expressed my admiration at the

 2     fact that they were prepared to take over this role of waging war in

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the entire catastrophe that would ensue.

 4        Q.   And Dr. Karadzic explained that the SDS had strong support from

 5     Belgrade and that they had strong support from the JNA and the army would

 6     be on their side; correct?

 7        A.   That was his explanation although I did not believe that because

 8     my co-operation with the JNA was much better than that of the

 9     Serb Democratic Party.  You can take a look at the record of the meeting

10     of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 15th of October with

11     General Kadijevic and his coworkers, where full support was expressed.

12     How do I put this?  Also, they paid tribute to the co-operation that the

13     MUP and the JNA had in establishing check-points in Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina in order to prevent incursions by paramilitary groups and

15     criminal groups involved in money laundering, smuggling, et cetera.

16        Q.   And with respect to that expression of strong support --

17     expression by Dr. Karadzic about strong support from the JNA and the army

18     being on his side, it's correct as you explained to the Canadian

19     authorities, isn't it, that you and Dr. Karadzic -- that your

20     understanding, as you discussed with Dr. Karadzic many times, was that he

21     always mentioned that the JNA will be on his side; right?

22        A.   That's what he said, but my meetings with General Kadijevic and

23     General Vasiljevic, General Kukanjac, Uzelac, and other officers of the

24     JNA did not give me that feeling.  That was not expressed to such an

25     extent as presented by Dr. Karadzic in terms of the support that he would

Page 33603

 1     receive.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Dr. Zepinic, back to the meeting at which your

 3     resignation was offered on April 4th.  As you explained in the

 4     Stanisic/Zupljanin testimony, Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Koljevic were

 5     "extremely aggressive" about your opposition to the concept of ethnically

 6     based parties; correct?

 7        A.   I don't know whether I said that Dr. Karadzic was aggressive.  If

 8     I may confirm, Karadzic and Krajisnik, to a degree tried to pacify the

 9     situation, but Koljevic was rather aggressive and then we squabbled and

10     then he turned to Dr. Karadzic and said, "Well, look at what he's doing

11     to me."

12        Q.   The quote is -- and I'm certainly happy to have you see it if you

13     wish, but the parties can follow with me as I read it.  That's on

14     transcript page 5828 and the quote I was referring to is at line 15:

15             "Dr. Karadzic and especially the late Dr. Koljevic were extremely

16     aggressive with regard to my opposition of the concept of ethnically

17     based parties."

18        A.   [In English] Okay.

19        Q.   And as you explained in your 2002 statement they began to accuse

20     and threaten you when you continued to refuse to join them and

21     Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Koljevic said you were an idiot and that "it was

22     impossible for the nationalities to live together."  And that's found at

23     the 2002 statement at page 14.

24        A.   [Interpretation] Well, I admit that I am an idiot because I

25     hadn't eliminated them before that meeting.  That's the only reason.

Page 33604

 1        Q.   And, in fact, Mico Stanisic produced a gun to shoot you saying:

 2             "We can't come to terms with this guy in other ways so let's kill

 3     him to prevent him causing any further headache."

 4             That's found in your Stanisic/Zupljanin testimony at transcript

 5     page 5832.

 6        A.   That's correct.  But you know what?  I don't think that, frankly

 7     speaking, Mico had the courage to shoot me.

 8        Q.   After about half an hour of threatening you, according to your

 9     2002 statement, they let you leave and you went down to enter your car

10     with your chauffeur, Zoran; correct?

11        A.   [In English] That's correct.

12        Q.   And as you enter the car your driver burst out in tears and said

13     that he had been ordered by Mr. Mandic to kill you, otherwise they would

14     kill his family.  And he, your driver, who had been your driver for a

15     long time said to you, "Minister, I cannot kill you."

16             Is that correct?

17        A.   [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.  And, as you can see, he

18     had not killed me.

19        Q.   Doctor, earlier in your testimony you made some reference to your

20     arrest and imprisonment.  That's found in particular at paragraphs 74

21     through 78 of your statement.  And I want to ask you about the

22     imprisonment which began in late August 1992.  That's following your

23     arrest by Mr. Stanisic in Belgrade.  Now, you learned on the fifth or

24     sixth day of your imprisonment, as you explained in your 2002 statement,

25     that Dr. Karadzic was extremely aggressive toward you and had stated that

Page 33605

 1     you should be killed, but insisted that the investigation and procedure

 2     should be completed first because it had been publicly announced by

 3     Stanisic that you'd been arrested but then you should be killed.  That's

 4     found at the 2002 statement, English pages 17; is that correct, sir?

 5        A.   Yes, that is correct.  You know, there were different attempts

 6     that were made to undermine me, to kill me physically.  I have the

 7     original of the decision on my arrest.  If you allow me I'm going to read

 8     it out now.  Dr. Zepinic, doctor of medicine, residing in Sarajevo is

 9     hereby arrested on the basis of Article 119 of the Criminal Code of the

10     Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  And then I'm given the right

11     to appeal against that decision to the district court in Sarajevo and I'm

12     in prison in Pale.  So I'm in prison and this is the signature of

13     Tomo Kovac on behalf of Mico Stanisic as minister of the interior.  I was

14     arrested on the basis of the Criminal Code of the SFRY by members of the

15     Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska in the territory of another

16     state, Serbia, and as such I was taken to the prison in Pale.

17             What I wish to say by this is that as far as arrests were

18     concerned then there was a reference to federal laws and they abided by

19     all federal laws, principles, constitutionality, and so on.  However,

20     when interests of the national party were at stake, then the federal laws

21     were against the national party.  What you said is correct.  Now, whether

22     there were agreements or not for me to be killed, I don't know, but I

23     just do know that Mr. Radmilo Bogdanovic, the minister of the interior of

24     Serbia, intervened with Mr. Slobodan Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic asking to

25     have me released from detention.  I'm saying that because I had a

Page 33606

 1     telephone conversation with Mr. Bogdanovic and he told me during this

 2     conversation that the following was promised to him, that an

 3     investigation had to be made for about a few days and then together with

 4     my mentor, Professor Sternic, they were waiting for me.  And then the

 5     next day Minister Bogdanovic called me and asked me why I wasn't in

 6     Belgrade, why I hadn't been released, and that they betrayed him, they

 7     betrayed Mr. Milosevic, and Professor Sternic was the connection involved

 8     because Mr. Milosevic's body-guard, personal body-guard, Senta was the

 9     connection because his wife worked as a nurse for Dr. Sternic.  And then

10     I was transferred to Kula near Lukavica, the prison there, and I spent

11     some time there.  That is where I gave that famous interview at the

12     request of Dr. Karadzic, that was the explanation that was given to me.

13     He was not quite pleased with what I said.  But, Dr. Karadzic, I still

14     stand by what I stated in that interview.

15             After that I was transferred to the military prison at the

16     Lukavica barracks, and then sometime late in November -- I really have to

17     point out that Colonel Lugonja was very fair at the time.  I was unable

18     to go and visit my family and then in the meantime I was visited in the

19     military prison twice by Dr. Karadzic.  The first time he gave me an

20     offer of having lunch at General Galic's office and I told him that I had

21     already had lunch.  And I asked where my family was and he knew that full

22     well.  And I -- or rather, he asked me whether I knew where my family was

23     and I said that they were in a safe place because I knew why he was

24     asking that.  And then the second time we met just in passing.  And since

25     I was allowed to go and visit my family after having spent a few months

Page 33607

 1     in prison, I took advantage of the situation and I escaped.  I do

 2     apologise to Zoran Kos, who was warden of the prison at the time and he

 3     acted as my driver and I said, "Just wait a minute.  I want to see my

 4     family."  I haven't seen him since and we hid in different places in

 5     Serbia until the end of January when we left Yugoslavia.  I secured a

 6     visa and I left my country, or rather, I arrived in Australia on the

 7     16th of February, 1993.

 8        Q.   Doctor --

 9        A.   [In English] Sorry.

10        Q.   Three relatively quick questions about that period of

11     incarceration.  First of all, you mentioned you knew why Dr. Karadzic was

12     asking about your family.  Why was that?

13        A.   [Interpretation] My family was maltreated, especially my

14     family -- especially my parents.  My mother was killed in this

15     maltreatment.  Dr. Karadzic knows that full well.  And I don't know why

16     they touched my mother.  Dr. Karadzic, in Orthodoxy an attack against

17     one's mother is the greatest crime of all, and you know that very well.

18     You and I had many discussions on many occasions and we talked about the

19     love you had for your own mother and about your relationship with her.

20     I'm sorry that that happened.  My parents, my mother, are not to be

21     blamed at all for my disagreement with national parties.  My parents

22     didn't agree with national parties either and I'm sorry that they ended

23     the way they did because of me.  I really would not like to go on on that

24     note.

25        Q.   I understand, Doctor, but just to finish it and be clear:  Did

Page 33608

 1     you understand the inquiry to be a form of pressure on you?

 2        A.   Yes, I had that pressure from those who were carrying out the

 3     investigation.  But I have to note that members of the Ministry of the

 4     Interior of Republika Srpska also regularly informed me about everything

 5     that was being agreed upon within the leadership of the Serb Democratic

 6     Party that had to do with me.  If I can put it this way, I still had

 7     authority and a reputation among the members of the Ministry of the

 8     Interior.  Dr. Karadzic knows that full well.  You know, it was very

 9     important.  Mr. Izetbegovic did the same thing too.  I mean, let's be

10     clear on that.  At the time when I was in -- under house arrest in

11     Sarajevo and when I was often brought in for different interviews.  So I

12     was informed by my former members of the police of what they were

13     preparing for me while I was in prison in Pale and in Lukavica.

14     And - how do I put this? - I know that there was this pressure that was

15     brought to bear in terms of finding out where my wife and my children

16     were.  However, my old parents did not move from the place where they had

17     been staying.  So for nights and nights - I'm saying "nights" - because

18     usually two or three idiots would come in and maltreat my parents from

19     10.00 p.m. until 4.00 a.m. and that was being repeated time and again.  I

20     didn't feel sorry about the fact that they could have killed me.  Well,

21     that was their decision.  They are in power, they have weapons, I don't.

22     I could understand that.  To this day I can understand that because

23     either one side or the other side or the third side may make an attempt

24     to liquidate me physically, and there were such attempts because of

25     disagreement.  However, I can never understand nor can I ever accept that

Page 33609

 1     on account of that my mother had to be killed.

 2        Q.   Two more --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.  Transcript,

 4     please.  In line 21 Dr. Zepinic said:  Dr. Karadzic asked me to join him,

 5     and that sentence is not included in the transcript.  So line 21:

 6     Dr. Karadzic knows that full well.  Dr. Karadzic [In English] asks me to

 7     join.  [Interpretation] Is that what you said?  Ask me to join.  And then

 8     it says, you know, it was very important, Izetbegovic, and so on and so

 9     forth.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Dr. Zepinic, do you confirm that?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

13             Let's continue.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   Doctor, two more hopefully quick follow-up questions about Kula.

16     While you were interned in Kula in September and October, is it correct,

17     as you explained in your 2008 statement, that you saw about 200 civilians

18     there, men and women, almost all Muslims and were able to conclude that

19     they had been removed from their homes and interned there?

20        A.   Yes, that is correct.  Of the total number of people interned in

21     Kula prison, the only one who were not Muslims was Vladimir Srebrov and

22     myself.

23        Q.   And Vladimir Srebrov is a former SDS official who had a power --

24        A.   [In English] That's correct.  That's correct.

25        Q.   And finally, during the time that you were interrogated, is it

Page 33610

 1     correct, as you also explained in your 2008 statement, that you were

 2     subjected to physical violence by members of the RS MUP?

 3        A.   [Interpretation] Well, I would say that was the normal procedure

 4     with the exception of Tomo Puhalac, an inspector, a former member of the

 5     Ministry of the Interior who was extremely fair in his behaviour.  As for

 6     the others, they just took advantage of the opportunity.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Doctor, at paragraphs 62 through 66 of your statement

 8     you refer to Bijeljina and the killings by Arkan and state that -- your

 9     belief about whether Dr. Karadzic had anything to do with Arkan's coming

10     to Bijeljina.  Now, I take it from the rest of your account of events and

11     your whereabouts that you don't know about any subsequent meetings or

12     contacts between Arkan and Dr. Karadzic or other members of the

13     Bosnian Serb leadership?

14        A.   No, I don't know about that.  I know that Fikret Abdic told him

15     that at the time when the barricades were in place that he and

16     Dr. Karadzic were gambling together at Yugoslavia Hotel after the meeting

17     with Mr. Milosevic attended by Dr. Krajisnik and Dr. Koljevic.  The case

18     of Bijeljina was a simple case of robbery by a group.  In accordance with

19     the information provided to me from the public and state services, the

20     aim was to rob the agricultural bank in Bijeljina that had enormous

21     foreign currency reserves.  And a disagreement erupted there between two

22     criminal groups:  Arkan and his men on the one hand and a local criminal

23     group on the other.  The Presidency decided to send a delegation to

24     resolve the matter.  Since they failed in that attempt, then the

25     Presidency instructed me and Delimustafic to go over there and settle it,

Page 33611

 1     but that's a long story.

 2        Q.   Well, let me just follow-up on one part of what you just said and

 3     that's the reference to what Fikret Abdic told you about Dr. Karadzic's

 4     whereabouts at the time of the barricade, which would have been the

 5     beginning of March 1992; correct?

 6        A.   Yes, the 1st of March.  I tried to get in touch with him and

 7     Koljevic when the barricades were erected, but that this was not exactly

 8     properly organised was confirmed by Biljana Plavsic, with whom I spoke

 9     about 1.00 in the morning, who had no clue about what was happening and

10     about the barricades.  And as for Dr. Krajisnik and Koljevic and the

11     others, none of them was in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.

12        Q.   Let's focus for the moment on the -- I just wanted to place the

13     information you were receiving in context by way of date.  But as I

14     understand it from what you testified a moment ago and also what you

15     stated in 2002 at page 7, Mr. Abdic told you that when he met with Arkan

16     in Bijeljina at the beginning of April, that Arkan confirmed to him that

17     he, Arkan, had been gambling with Karadzic at the time of the barricades

18     in Sarajevo.  That's correct, isn't it?

19        A.   Yes, that is correct.  And among other things he used some bad

20     language at the expense of Abdic and his decision to let Izetbegovic head

21     the Presidency instead of him.

22        Q.   And in addition to the information you received from Mr. Abdic,

23     you also received information, as you explained further in your 2002

24     statement, from representatives of state security to the same effect.

25     That is, you learned from representatives of state security that

Page 33612

 1     Dr. Karadzic was with Arkan gambling at the time of the barricades at the

 2     beginning of March 1992?

 3        A.   This was the information that our State Security Service received

 4     from their counterparts in Serbia.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I want to ask you about something you said at

 6     paragraph 23 of your statement with respect to the mobilisation of large

 7     numbers of reserve police officers and members of the BH TO in some

 8     municipalities.  And you go on to indicate that you took steps to annul

 9     such mobilisation orders and recover any weapons.  And I gather that was

10     successful because, as you testified in the Stanisic/Zupljanin case, the

11     strength of the reserves did not change from the time you -- during the

12     time of your term in office.  And that's found at T -- transcript

13     page 5854 through 55.  As you said there:

14             "As far as I know once we came to power we didn't change the

15     strength of the manoeuvre units or the reserve forces, but in agreement

16     with the chiefs of police stations in the field we launched some

17     operational activities concerning staff which -- to the effect that

18     manoeuvre units be better equipped with staff but we didn't change the

19     strength of the manoeuvre unit or the active police forces or, indeed,

20     the reserve forces."

21             And that's a correct recitation of what you stated in --

22        A.   Yes, that is correct.  We did not change it until the session of

23     the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina of 11th December 1991.  If you wish,

24     I can show you the minutes of that meeting because I have it in my notes.

25     And we proposed that the process of equipping the Ministry of the

Page 33613

 1     Interior and the so-called detachment for special operations was

 2     something that I was criticised for having spent nearly 60 per cent of

 3     the budget.  We had information that the war in the former Yugoslavia was

 4     supposed to begin in the summer of 1991 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that

 5     corroborated some statements made by Mr. Mesic because there was an

 6     agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic to split Bosnia between them.  We

 7     believed that the ministry had to be fully equipped, and for that purpose

 8     we ordered American combat helicopters in order to set up this protection

 9     detachment that could act as a Rapid Reaction Force and be able to

10     prevent any form of armed conflict and similar activities in the area of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In this report and the proposal that was accepted

12     unanimously by the Presidency -- and I purposefully avoided attending

13     that meeting.  I sent Branko Kvesic instead because I knew that

14     Nikola Koljevic and all the other members of the Presidency would be

15     there, including Bogic Bogicevic represented the federal Presidency.  It

16     seems that without paying much attention the Presidency accepted this and

17     approved our request.  I would be the happiest man in the world had this

18     really been accepted and adopted.  There would have been no war in

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  For some reason somebody --

20        Q.   I've got about -- I think about ten minutes left.  I'm going to

21     try to cover -- that's fine.  I'm going to try to cover three relatively

22     discrete and short topics.  The first one is this:  I understand from

23     your Stanisic/Zupljanin testimony that you were aware of a training --

24     police training programme in Croatia that was attended by persons from

25     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Is that generally correct?  And I'm going to ask

Page 33614

 1     you a couple of specific things about that.

 2        A.   Yes, it is.

 3        Q.   And --

 4        A.   That was common practice.

 5        Q.   And I believe you clarified in your testimony there that the

 6     Bosnian MUP had information that people from Bosnia were applying at "an

 7     open competition" at the MUP of Croatia for training slots in a newly

 8     opened training centre.  That's correct, isn't it?

 9        A.   Yes.  Croatia increased the number of members of

10     Ministry of the Interior, and in my first conversation with the Croatian

11     minister of the interior I said that 400 members from Bosnia-Herzegovina

12     who were there he should compensate me in a way for them.  So that was,

13     as I said, common practice to have people from Bosnia-Herzegovina

14     applying to be admitted into the SUP school in Kamenica, in Serbia, or in

15     Croatia.  For example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina we had attendees from

16     Montenegro and other parts.  Now, after they had increased the number,

17     some 400 members were admitted in -- as one lot and they mostly came from

18     Herzegovina.

19        Q.   Next topic I wanted to ask you about, which is a couple questions

20     about Mr. Mandic, you stated in your 2002 statement at page 10 that

21     immediately after the dispatch, that is, the Mandic dispatch regarding

22     the MUP, that Mandic and Ostojic participated in an interview on TV and

23     stated that you had a weekend house built or bought by the SDA and it was

24     obvious you should resign.  Is it correct that that happened and that was

25     an attempt to discredit you?

Page 33615

 1        A.   It is true that this is what Mandic said.  You quoted him

 2     correctly.  But let me remind you that I had a weekend cottage in

 3     Sarajevo in a completely different location.  Momcilo Mandic and his

 4     younger brother, they were honoured to come and excavate foundations for

 5     my house.  And then I said, "How come you excavated foundations for that

 6     weekend cottage and you don't know where it is located?"  And he said, "I

 7     was asked to say that."  And I thought that it would be inappropriate and

 8     unnecessary for me to refute these allegation because we had enough

 9     evidence to file criminal reports against Mandic for all that he did in

10     his position as assistant minister, but we didn't go through with that.

11     So in order to avoid any confusion, let me remind you that at the

12     36th Session of the Serbian republic -- Serbian Assembly in Pale, it was

13     confirmed that I wanted to arrest him and institute criminal proceedings.

14     But allegedly because he made it possible to make payments to policeman

15     of a police station whom I had suspended because of illegal operations.

16             And now, Mr. President, I have to correct you.  Your minister of

17     the interior was a criminal and that was the reason why I filed a

18     criminal report against him and why I initiated a procedure to have him

19     removed from the office.

20        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zepinic.  Just one moment.

21                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

22             MR. TIEGER:  I don't want to risk not coming in under my time

23     when I have an opportunity to do that, so that concludes my examination,

24     Mr. President.

25        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zepinic.


Page 33616

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

 2             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies.  I have to do

 4     that because the esteemed Mr. Tieger asked questions making references to

 5     various statements, but that is his right.

 6                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Let us start with the last things that were

 8     discussed here.  Dr. Zepinic, you said that in an open advertisement for

 9     posts, some 400 young men from western Herzegovina applied.  In addition

10     to that, did you know about the contingent of several thousand candidates

11     that the SDA had sent to be trained in Croatia?

12             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me, this is -- Dr. Zepinic has been called as

13     Dr. Karadzic's witness.  I don't think it's never too early to remind

14     Dr. Karadzic to refrain from leading questions.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  I'll rephrased it.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Doctor, the 400 men mostly from western Herzegovina, were they

19     included in the contingent or, rather, do you know that the SDA was

20     sending their candidates to undergo training?  Did the SDA send their

21     candidates to Croatia to be trained outside of regular MUP channels?

22        A.   Dr. Karadzic, you misunderstood me.  I did not say that 400

23     candidates applied.  I said that they were admitted.  I don't know how

24     many of them filed applications.  You will have to ask the Ministry of

25     the Interior of Croatia about that.  I said that they came from western

Page 33617

 1     Herzegovina.  But there was some Muslims from other parts of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina and they were entitled to file applications.  There

 3     was no law that could have prevented them from applying to be trained in

 4     Skopje, et cetera.  The information that you have that some 5.000 people

 5     from the SDA were trained, I don't have that kind of information.  So

 6     please do not advertise the Ministry of the Interior of Croatia and

 7     improve their image because they didn't have the capacity to admit so

 8     many people.  I don't know who gave you this information.  I'm telling

 9     you that my ministry didn't have it.  We had information that among the

10     400 applicants there was a number of Muslims as well and that is not in

11     dispute.

12        Q.   Were those men sent by the SDA?  By their papers and application

13     papers, et cetera?

14        A.   That was an open advertisement and anyone was eligible to apply.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D360, please, in

17     e-court.  D360.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   With all due respect I didn't say 5.000.  I said "a few

20     thousand."  Now, Dr. Zepinic, could you please look at this instruction

21     for candidates signed by Hasan Cengic and it refers to the training of

22     his men at the MUP of Croatia.  Did Hasan Cengic play any role?

23        A.   Hasan Cengic was not an employee of the Ministry of the Interior

24     at all.  Who gave him the right to refer to any agreements reached

25     between two Ministries of the Interior?

Page 33618

 1        Q.   Thank you.  So you are not familiar with this?

 2        A.   No, and he didn't have the right on behalf of the Ministry of the

 3     Interior to invoke any contacts and communications with the Ministry of

 4     the Interior of the Republic of Croatia.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Dr. Zepinic, did you know where we were staying as

 6     the delegation of Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade when we went there?

 7        A.   Dr. Karadzic, you seem to forget that I was at the head of a

 8     service in the Ministry of the Interior.  It was only natural,

 9     Dr. Karadzic, my friend and colleague, to know every minute detail about

10     your life.  I'm sorry for my language, but we had to know how many times

11     a day you visited the lavatory.  The ministry had to know with whom you

12     maintained contacts, not only you but everybody else who was in the

13     authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Dr. Zepinic, this is because I cannot put leading

15     questions to you, can you tell me at which hotel we stayed in Belgrade?

16        A.   You went to Belgrade so many times, you really expect me to

17     remember everything?

18        Q.   Very well.  I'm asking you about what you heard about Arkan and

19     the gambling.  Do you know that in the Intercontinental Hotel there is a

20     casino as well?

21        A.   I am not interested in that.  I'm just conveying what I heard

22     from Fikret Abdic.

23        Q.   Did anyone tell you what kind of gambling could involve only two

24     persons?

25        A.   Dr. Karadzic, your question is unfair.  I'm telling you again

Page 33619

 1     this information was given me by Mr. Fikret Abdic and he heard it on the

 2     barricades when he met with Arkan.  Whether there was roulette, whether

 3     you played poker, whether there were five or ten of you is beside the

 4     point, and the ministry is not interested in that.  It was interested in

 5     knowing where members of the nationalist parties and Presidency were at

 6     the time when the barricades were erected.  And why was this hot potato

 7     given to the ministry and Dr. Zepinic and the only one who offered some

 8     assistance was Biljana Plavsic.  Neither Izetbegovic, Ganic, Kljujic, you,

 9     or anyone else who could influence the events related to the barricade

10     responded to my pleas.  That is what we were interested in.  Whether you

11     were really gambling and losing money, that was not our problem.

12        Q.   You said today that I knew about your mother.  Unfortunately, I

13     heard about that during the proofing session.  Can you please tell us how

14     your mother died, was she killed or ...?

15        A.   She had a heart attack.

16        Q.   Did you ever hear from me that you should be arrested and killed?

17        A.   No, I didn't hear it from you.  All I'm saying is that there was

18     this information floating around, but you yourself never said that.  I

19     must even admit that in certain situations you tried to protect me and

20     defend me from the extremists in your party and my principles of

21     neutrality.  You said that it was difficult to remove Vito than Tito

22     simply because there were no arguments to initiate any proceedings

23     against me.  You never said to me, at least not publicly that I should be

24     killed, but the service provided me with the information that there were

25     seven attempts on my life and there was no indication that the SDS was

Page 33620

 1     behind them except in one instance involving Kerovic when we went to

 2     Bijeljina.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Doctor, is it a fact -- what did you say about

 4     Kerovic and Bijeljina?  But you believed that I knew nothing about it?

 5        A.   I'm more than certain.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Your commitment to the brotherhood and unity, was it

 7     something that was secret or did you publicly proclaim that?

 8        A.   Well, to be honest, in all my speeches and public appearances I

 9     advocated the brotherhood of unity to remain in our country, and I didn't

10     see any reason for that not to happen.  I cannot separate what I thought

11     in private or in public.  That was my general commitment.

12        Q.   Did I know what your political position was when we nominated you

13     to the MUP?

14        A.   Yes, you were quite clear about my position and you can see from

15     my statement that I explained how it came about.  And I also mentioned

16     that due to that you were exposed to pressure from the Assembly of the

17     SDS not to accept my nomination, but you opposed these kind of views

18     because you simply said that you want a person of authority and a

19     professional in that position, a person who will not side with any

20     political party.  And I really must reiterate that you never insisted on

21     my becoming a member of the SDS because obviously you knew that I would

22     never agree to that.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And did you have an opportunity of seeing what my

24     attitude was towards others or, more specifically, let me ask you this

25     way.  Did you and I take part in the selection of the head of the

Page 33621

 1     regional MUP in Banja Luka?

 2        A.   Yes, we did.  If you remember, we had this painstaking

 3     conversation, six hours long, because people were pressuring you to take

 4     another candidate, whereas I was in favour of keeping Stojan Zupljanin

 5     who was the head of the CSB from before.  I knew him personally from

 6     sports.  He had a degree in law.  There was no reason to dismiss him.  We

 7     did discuss that specifically.  And I know that Banja Luka never forgave

 8     you for that because you agreed to have my candidate, if I can put it

 9     that way, stay on rather than the candidate that was proposed by the SDS

10     for the Banja Luka region.

11        Q.   Thank you.  I'm so glad that you remember that.  On pages 74 and

12     75 the learned Mr. Tieger asked you to confirm whether I was counting on

13     the support of the JNA.  This is what I would like to ask you:  On the

14     whole, what was the SDS in favour of in terms of the state as such?

15        A.   Well, that requires a longer elaboration, Dr. Karadzic.

16        Q.   Just in relation to Yugoslavia, if I may ask him.

17        A.   Well, if I can put it this way, you kept changing your positions,

18     all three parties.  In the beginning, before the elections, the national

19     parties clearly said that they would preserve the brotherhood and unity

20     that was there and that there would not be a conflict at all.  I would

21     like to remind you of your statement, Dr. Karadzic, when you said if

22     Durakovic wins, there's going to be war.  If Izetbegovic wins, we are

23     going to seek agreement; is that correct?  I'm going to remind you of

24     your statement that you made when you were the president of the green

25     party, when you said communism is a bad thing but nationalism is even

Page 33622

 1     worse.  When speaking about Yugoslavia, we have to look at that from

 2     another point of view.  What does Yugoslavia mean?  What does the

 3     Rump Yugoslavia mean?  Tito's Yugoslavia had to go through certain forms

 4     of transformation because the overall world situation called for that.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Doctor.  But let us be specific.  Which programme of

 6     mine would have been supported by the JNA?  What did I think was the

 7     case, the programme of preserving Yugoslavia or the programme of

 8     secession and of splitting up Bosnia?

 9        A.   On the basis of the meetings that I personally have with

10     General Kadijevic and his leadership and the two meetings that he had at

11     the Presidency with his delegation, the JNA was Yugoslav and it did not

12     interfere in political decisions and agreements on the fate of the future

13     Yugoslavia.  I have to remind you that US Secretary of State James Baker

14     when on the 21st of June, 1991, when he landed in Belgrade he expressed

15     his readiness to have Yugoslavia be preserved, but that certain

16     transformations had to be carried out.  Then the JNA was given this

17     mandate to ensure this transformation by peaceful means as much as

18     possible.  He talked to Kucan, Milosevic, and Tudjman as he presented

19     this concept of the preservation of Yugoslavia that would be a democratic

20     community, if I can put it that way, of states and peoples.  And this

21     political pluralism had to be introduced in Yugoslavia after the League

22     of Communists of Yugoslavia fell apart in January 1991.

23        Q.   Thank you, Doctor.  I would like you to look at the following.

24     Could I have counted on the support of the JNA for anything else but the

25     preservation of Yugoslavia and did they count on our support in the

Page 33623

 1     preservation of Yugoslavia, mobilisations, and so on, you did know

 2     something about that, didn't you?

 3        A.   I don't know whether they counted on your support, I cannot say,

 4     because none of them ever confirmed that to me, none of the members of

 5     the leadership or of the staff of the JNA.  Let me also say straight away

 6     that in all the statements that were given and all the meetings, official

 7     and unofficial, with the JNA generals, none of them ever said that they

 8     would support the concept of the SDS or any national party, not even the

 9     concept that was advocated by Mr. Milosevic, that is to say, bringing

10     tanks out into the streets of Belgrade on the 9th of March, 1991.  So the

11     JNA tried as much as possible, at least the leadership that I had contact

12     with - now maybe you contacted some other generals or captains or others

13     authorities - but my talks with the General Staff and the generals were

14     only along the following lines of making a joint effort to ensure peace

15     and the peaceful political transformation of Yugoslavia.

16        Q.   Thank you.  On page 67 you were asked about the statements of

17     Biljana Plavsic and Professor Koljevic is there as well about the

18     functioning of this multi-ethnic society.  Did Mrs. Plavsic have a

19     function in the Presidency that had to do with the

20     Ministry of the Interior?

21        A.   She was president of the council for protecting the

22     constitutional order of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23        Q.   When meeting her officially or privately, did you see whether she

24     was pleased with how things were developing in terms of the protection of

25     the constitutional order?

Page 33624

 1        A.   Which constitutional order?  Are you referring to

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina or Yugoslavia?

 3        Q.   In general terms, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia.

 4        A.   I don't know about whether she was pleased or not, but I do have

 5     to remind you that it was precisely you, the national parties, that

 6     violated the constitutional provisions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And in

 7     that way you violated all sorts of legal provisions.  Mr. Karadzic, I

 8     have to remind you of this.  The parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

 9     Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and you, you did not change a single

10     law, man.  You did not change the constitution.  You did not pass any

11     amendments to the constitution since you were given this mandate by the

12     European community to set up a government, it was your duty to base your

13     authority on the laws that existed before the elections because you

14     didn't have any new laws.  You violated all sorts of constitutional

15     provisions.  And therefore, if this is a question of responsibility then

16     there is the responsibility for the way in which you ignored this through

17     the Presidency, through the government, through the Assembly, all the

18     laws that were still in force, including the election of Mr. Izetbegovic

19     as president of the Presidency.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber how even the most

21     ordinary decisions were reached in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

22        A.   Yes, and I'll do so very gladly.  At the first session of the

23     newly formed Assembly - and that was on the 22nd of December, 1990, and

24     that lasted for two days - and during those two days you did not manage

25     to reach agreement, not even on setting up an agenda.  So you couldn't

Page 33625

 1     even agree on the agenda.  At the end of that second day, Mr. Krajisnik

 2     suggested:  People, let us at least elect this Presidency because nothing

 3     else seems to be working.  And that's how the Presidency was elected.  At

 4     the next session where I was elected, and that also lasted three days, no

 5     agreement was reached.  And I could not even take an oath because again

 6     you were quarrelling about whether it was supposed to be in Cyrillic,

 7     whether it was supposed to include Yugoslavia, whether it should include

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of Yugoslavia, and so on and so

 9     forth.  So these were futile discussions, a waste of public money.  And

10     you could not agree on that at all.  So this was a clear reflection of

11     how these organs operated.  The national parties brought that to my

12     country.

13        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zepinic.  Do you know, do you remember, what the

14     oath was on the basis of the law and who asked for what kind of

15     changes -- actually, what did the Serbs ask for and what did the

16     secessionists ask for?

17        A.   The Serbs asked for the formulation of Yugoslavia only and the

18     Croats wanted "Yugoslavia" to be deleted and the Muslims asked for sort

19     of half-half, if you understand what I'm saying.  So these polemics

20     reflected all of this at various meetings until war broke out.

21        Q.   At that point in time, did the oath include "Yugoslavia" as such?

22        A.   Yes.  According to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that

23     was an integral part.  So since you did not change the constitution, what

24     right did you have to discuss any kind of change to the wording of the

25     oath?

Page 33626

 1        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned today that I was more in favour of the

 2     environmental movement than nationalism.  Do you remember which was the

 3     last national party to be established in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 4        A.   Do you want me to dictate all the dates to you of all your

 5     Assemblies?

 6        Q.   No, no, no, just give me the order, the sequence.

 7        A.   The SDA, the H -- actually, it was the HDZ that was first

 8     established.  Then on the basis of the amendments to the Constitution of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Community that was established by

10     Mate Boban on the 27th of March could not be registered because it

11     included part of the HDZ from Zagreb.  So basically the HDZ, with its

12     first president, Perinovic, was the last party that was registered but it

13     was the first party to be established --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, unless you could conclude very

15     shortly, we'll stop here for today.

16             THE ACCUSED:  I need, Excellency, 15 to 20 minutes, at least, at

17     the minimum.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             Dr. Zepinic, we need to continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.  But

20     before doing so I have a couple of matters.  The Chamber received a

21     filing from the counsel for Mr. Naser Oric requesting for leave to

22     respond to the Defence's second motion for subpoena.  I wonder whether

23     the parties have any observation to make about this?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We would ask that you grant

25     leave.


Page 33627

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, I'm -- I don't have any position on

 3     it at the moment, but I haven't really been seized of that directly.  If

 4     you could give us ten minutes to get back to -- I suspect there won't be

 5     a problem with that, but I'd rather check with anybody who has looked

 6     specifically at the request.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             And in terms of witness schedule, do we have a sufficient number

 9     of witnesses for this week, Mr. Robinson?

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we will be going into Friday, but

11     I'm not sure we will have enough witnesses to complete the whole of

12     Friday.

13             JUDGE KWON:  There's no witness to fill up?

14             MR. ROBINSON:  There is a witness that's coming Thursday night

15     but he would have to testify without being proofed.  Last time we did

16     that, it didn't work out very well, so we would prefer not to.  But if

17     you insisted, we could probably try.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Let's see how it evolves.

19             Please have a nice evening, Dr. Zepinic.

20             The hearing is adjourned.

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 14th day of

23                           February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.