130214ED

Page 33628

1 Thursday, 14 February 2013

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.

7 Good morning, Mr. Zepinic. How are you today?

8 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,

11 Your Excellencies. Good morning to all.

12 WITNESS: VITOMIR ZEPINIC [Resumed]

13 [Witness answered through interpreter]

14 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

15 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Zepinic.

16 A. Good morning, Dr. Karadzic.

17 Q. I would like to keep things as short as possible so could you

18 please tell us, how long have you and I known each other? Not how long

19 we've known of each other, but how long we've known each other

20 personally?

21 A. Now that you're asking me, I know of you since the student

22 demonstrations of 1968 and the speech that you made at the pavilion. By

23 the way, you recited Njegus on the occasion. We've known each other

24 since you were in power. Of course we knew each other from before from

25 various gatherings. Inter alia, I think we attended an international

Page 33629

1 conference of psychotherapists in Dubrovnik. Once you came to power it

2 was only natural that we got to know each other better. Unfortunately,

3 the role that was given to me as the top man of the Ministry of the

4 Interior meant that through your files I found out a lot of details about

5 all of you, your mentality, your nature, your personality, if you will.

6 Since you've asked. It is only natural that I was interested in learning

7 about your personality for professional reasons. I know that you were

8 also involved in psychotherapy as I was. And I can tell you and conclude

9 on that note, in many situations - as can be seen from the telephone

10 conversations between the two of us - I did not see, or rather, I did not

11 perceive Dr. Karadzic the way I knew him personally, as a person.

12 Because in most of these cases, as you've probably seen through these

13 transcripts, you used swear words, threats, bad language. Knowing you

14 personally and having had coffee with you and having chatted with you,

15 your nature is quite different and also that would not be the nature of a

16 professional, a psychotherapist and a psychiatrist. So now that you're

17 asking me, I can tell you that I knew two personalities: Dr. Karadzic as

18 a professional, a family man, and so on; and Radovan Karadzic as

19 president of the SDS, who was a bit the opposite of the Dr. Karadzic that

20 I knew. Things were similar in relation to Alija Izetbegovic too. I

21 don't know whether this has satisfied you in terms of an answer.

22 Q. [No interpretation]

23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not catch

24 Mr. Karadzic's question.

25 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 33630

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said thank you. And as a matter

2 of fact you forced out some of my questions.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Since we had a professional relationship, was our relationship

5 very dynamic, sometimes even very sharp; and if so, why, on the basis of

6 what, and that can be seen from the intercepts too?

7 A. Unfortunately, Dr. Karadzic, these were bad times for our country

8 and bad times for you and for me. By the very nature of things,

9 regardless of our good relations, our good personal relations, in a way

10 we were on two completely opposite sides, if I can put it that way. On

11 one side I was there with my Ministry of the Interior working for

12 coexistence in peace at all costs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thereby

13 peace in the territory throughout Yugoslavia, in the territory of all of

14 Yugoslavia. Once the problem of Bosnia's resolved, the problem of the

15 former Yugoslavia would be resolved, or rather, the problem of the

16 Balkans. On the other hand, you were a member of the coalition force

17 that was given the mandate to set up a government, and you included me in

18 that government. This coalition had a very optimistic view and made

19 quite a few promises to Bosnia-Herzegovina --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other

21 microphones please be switched off. Thank you.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] However, nothing came out of that.

23 This coalition, it's not that it never functioned as a coalition. As a

24 matter of fact, on the inside, so it's not only that you clashed with

25 those who were against the coalition, but even you as coalition partners

Page 33631

1 had such divergent relations that the only question was for how long you

2 stay on but you needed each other and you never raised a question of the

3 disintegration of the coalition. Formally speaking, Dr. Karadzic, you

4 remained in a coalition with the SDA and the HDZ even up to the beginning

5 of the war although you had left the Assembly on the

6 14th of October, 1991 -- or rather, the deputies of the SDS did. You and

7 I on several occasions had very frank personal discussions. Officially

8 we often had confrontations in respect of my ideas, that is, but as

9 president of the SDS you were also in a position to oppose the even more

10 extremist members of your party because this unfortunate Dr. Zepinic

11 still headed the Ministry of the Interior although he was not obeying the

12 coalition that was in power, if I can put it that way.

13 Also if you wish I can tell you very frankly. There was the

14 example of the conversation you had with the delegation that came from

15 Sokolac and the delegation that came from eastern Herzegovina, the

16 delegation from Banja Luka, and especially I know that you had terrible

17 problems with the chief of the security services centre in Doboj who

18 never agreed with me being on the top, but I did agree that he stay on as

19 chief of the CSB in Doboj because he was the candidate of the SDS.

20 Although at all sorts of meetings with you personally or at the meetings

21 of the parliament of the SDS he asked for a re-examination of my role.

22 So, as I've said, very often we were directly confronted, but also you

23 had to confront even more extremist members of your own party because I

24 headed the Ministry of the Interior.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 33632

1 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you the following: You remember -- you

2 mentioned that sharp language of mine. Do you ever recall -- actually,

3 can you tell me why I called you and when did we have these unpleasant

4 conversations?

5 A. Let us be perfectly clear. I never thought that these were

6 unpleasant conversations between the two of us. Again I'm saying you

7 were using language that was not appropriate and was not characteristic

8 of the Dr. Karadzic that I knew personally. I have to remind you,

9 Dr. Karadzic - and a few of your ministers in the government of

10 Republika Srpska also said that - you were surrounded by very bad people,

11 people who brought information to you, most often brought you wrong

12 information probably for the following reason: So that you would express

13 the authority of the president of the party, that is probably why you

14 used that kind of language in this aggressive approach in certain

15 characteristic situations. So I cannot say that you personally wanted to

16 offend me or attack me. Quite simply, you were not in a position to give

17 the right answer to the wrong information that had reached you, and very

18 often after this aggressive reaction you would call again and say, Why

19 did this policeman go to Kalesija? Because two men were involved in a

20 brawl. I mean, things that had nothing to do with inter-ethnic

21 relations. But the information that you received was that the policeman

22 was a Muslim, and so on and so forth. Do you understand what I'm saying?

23 Things were similar in other situations too. Zone Boban [phoen]

24 killed --

25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction:

Page 33633

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- hit another football fan at a

2 game and then five years later that man got out and said, I'm a Muslim,

3 not a Serb. So this kind of wrong information that was bandied about --

4 I'm surprised, you were an experienced man. You're a professional too.

5 Why did you not double-check that information that reached you? You made

6 such a mess in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of minister -- the minister of

7 information [Realtime transcript read in error "misinformation."

8 Velibor Ostojic, the party said that this was an attack against Serbdom

9 and then you talked about the Second World War and you talks about pits

10 and -- this was a terrible, catastrophic situation. Velibor abused that

11 and he was saying at government meetings, Why is Dr. Zepinic concealing

12 information? And I said, Velibor, it is in your interest for us not to

13 reveal the actual results of the investigation. After that neither you

14 nor anyone else from the SDS ever mentioned that again. I'm trying to

15 say that you did not deem it necessary to check the information that

16 receive -- that you received before reacting and you reacted in a way

17 that did not really correspond to the Dr. Karadzic that I knew and the

18 personality of the Dr. Karadzic that I knew.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Thank you. But were you aware of the fact that the SDA, the top

21 leadership of the SDA, was involved in --

22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The translation was not complete.

23 But yes, I'll hear from you first, Mr. Tieger.

24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. I've been struggling since the

25 last few questions before we adjourned yesterday and the questions raised

Page 33634

1 today to identify their relationship with the cross-examination and how

2 they arose out of the cross-examination without success. And the

3 question that is posed now seems to fall squarely within the category of

4 inquiries that are not -- were not raised by the cross-examination.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

6 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think the entire

7 cross-examination dealt with issues of Dr. Karadzic's presence at

8 meetings when guns were displayed, his gambling with Arkan, his conduct

9 in wanting to expel people, Muslims, his conduct in wanting to split the

10 MUP, and he has ever right I think at this point to ask Dr. Zepinic

11 whether his conduct and his personality was consistent with the crimes

12 that he's charged with in the indictment: The forcible expulsion of

13 Muslims.

14 MR. TIEGER: Well, I'll say two things because the latter one I

15 think deals with this comment specifically. First of all, the inquiries

16 made -- raised in cross, as the Court is aware from the specific

17 references to the paragraph -- paragraphs of the statement submitted,

18 were directly responsive to issues raised in the evidence in chief. So

19 it cannot be a circular matter of that type where the Prosecution

20 responds directly to assertions made in the examination-in-chief in a

21 focused manner, and then the redirect seeks to re-open the entire direct

22 examination on the basis that the cross-examination was responsive. So

23 that is not accurate as a broad conceptual matter.

24 But more directly, even taking Mr. Robinson's objection on its

25 face as valid, this question is -- doesn't go to those matters in any

Page 33635

1 event. Now we're looking at not the matter he suggests justifies the

2 inquiries, but instead some issues of broader justification or broader

3 context, all of which was raised by the direct examination and could have

4 been expanded long before the cross-examination responded directly to

5 some of the issues raised.

6 [Defence counsel confer]

7 JUDGE KWON: I didn't hear in full the question with respect to

8 the SDA. I'm not sure if it's relevant or if you are ready to move on to

9 another topic.

10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if you don't mind, just one

11 intervention from me. When I was talking about Velibor Ostojic,

12 translation is saying "the minister of the misinformation." I would --

13 he was a minister of information not misinformation. I'm sorry for this

14 intervention.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Dr. Zepinic. It's line 6 of page 6.

16 Thank you.

17 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

19 [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, with all due respect,

20 yesterday lines 68, lines 22 and 23, Mr. Tieger suggested, as is his

21 right in cross, to Zepinic that I called him with regard to appointments

22 of Serbian personnel in the MUP. My question is the following: What was

23 the basis or the reasons that I called? I also wanted to ask whether

24 Dr. Zepinic recalls me ever calling him without any reason. I think he

25 said that I called due to certain pressure that was exerted. I wanted to

Page 33636

1 ask the following: Yesterday he confirmed that Hasan Cengic had no right

2 to be involved in the work or meddle with the work of the MUP. Did those

3 people who alarmed me from the field had any reason to be dissatisfied

4 with the influence SDA was exerting over state authorities?

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

6 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President, the Court may be interested in

7 this and I don't want to pre-empt that. However, I do feel compelled to

8 clarify and rectify an erroneous suggestion by the accused. The only

9 reference I made to the previous conversations was placing in context a

10 question that I then asked about subsequent information that the witness

11 had or didn't have about the division of the MUP, not about the nature of

12 the phone calls, what prompted the phone calls, the broad aspect of those

13 phone calls, which is all dealt with, as I recall, in paragraphs 52

14 through 72. So, this is an example of the accused using the thinnest

15 thread, that is, a -- any kind of reference whatsoever to a broad topic

16 and then attempting to use that as a hook to re-open a matter that was

17 raised in direct examination that was not explored in cross. Again, the

18 Court may be interested in this for its own reasons, and I'm not trying

19 to be obstructive in that manner, but I've noted over and over again that

20 that's a technique used by the accused and I couldn't let it pass as a

21 justification in this instance.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will allow the accused to continue, and

24 if necessary the Chamber will consider whether the Prosecution will have

25 another opportunity to cross-examine if necessary.

Page 33637

1 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

2 Did I say the "excuse"? I said the "accused."

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I hope you will use the

4 word "excuse" at the end of the trial.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. On page 68 there is a quote from Dr. Zepinic's interview to the

7 effect that I called him concerning certain candidates and that

8 Izetbegovic and Kljujic sometimes tried to call him but at the end

9 probably called their own representatives. With the assistance of

10 Dr. Zepinic, I wanted to shed some light on the nature of my

11 interventions. To that end, I'd like to direct your attention to an

12 intercept between -- of a conversation between myself and Dr. Zepinic and

13 it is D364.

14 What can you tell us, Dr. Zepinic, why did I call? What kind of

15 pressure was coming from the field? What kind of pressure was I under

16 that would force me to call you and ask for a clarification?

17 A. Dr. Karadzic, as you know, in the coalition partnership you had

18 agreed on a division of certain posts, not only in the

19 Ministry of the Interior but in all other ministries and state bodies and

20 organs to have a restructuring of personnel on the basis of the ethnic

21 key. Given the nature of work and the scope of work I had to deal with

22 at the helm of the Ministry of the Interior, it was our internal

23 arrangement in the ministry to influence directly the top-ranking

24 positions only, such as assistants and deputies to the minister, down to

25 perhaps chiefs of CSBs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Anything lower than that,

Page 33638

1 the arrangement had been that it would be done by three of my assistants

2 as part of a commission. The commission included Mr. Mandic, Ado Hebib

3 or Mr. Selimovic or Bruno Stojic. Objectively speaking you will

4 understand that I could not physically monitor whether an appointed

5 police station chief who was done appropriately. It's not only you but

6 many others who used to call me about certain work posts and positions

7 which belonged or did not belong to any particular party. To be fair, I

8 was in no position to know what every job entailed in terms of which

9 party had the right to it. That is why you as coalition partners while

10 you were in power before the outbreak of the war, you were never fully

11 able to conduct a restructuring exercise as per national party key,

12 irrespective of the fact that they had their organisational boards. It

13 was Rajko Dukic in the SDS who was tasked with it and the HDZ and the SDA

14 had their own people. I think Boban couldn't deal with it but Kljujic

15 did irrespective of the fact that Boban was the head of the party.

16 However, that task was never completed. It was often intervened, and I

17 would be told: We don't have a commander in this or that municipality.

18 And I didn't eve know whether that commander was supposed to be appointed

19 by the SDS, the SDA, or the HDZ. It was something for my assistants to

20 do and know. Unfortunately, as you could experience in our telephone

21 conversations, there were frequent misuses of position on the part of my

22 deputies, too -- my assistants, actually, and they succumbed to the

23 pressure of certain parties to appoint such people who did not meet the

24 qualifications that were necessarily or who, as people, were not the

25 right people for such jobs but they were only party candidates. If you

Page 33639

1 recall, the HDZ asked for me to be removed because I refused to appoint

2 the head of a police station which was marginal in Bosnia-Herzegovina

3 because he simply lacked appropriate qualifications. And then the HDZ

4 said, Well, Delimustafic was appointed the very same way. And I told

5 Kljujic, Well, this is what you agreed to. If you agreed that that kind

6 of candidate can hold that post, that's fine. But I will not accept to

7 appoint a person like that because the person is not qualified.

8 For example, there was a candidate for the Bihac station who had

9 a criminal file. He had been sentenced for having raped a student in the

10 medical high school. That person should not be a policeman let alone

11 head of station or centre.

12 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zepinic. So what was my position with regard to

13 personnel being brought to the MUP? Did I ever try to impose anyone who

14 had never been in the MUP and had a criminal file, irrespective of the

15 pressure from the field?

16 A. I cannot confirm that; however, I can say with certainty as best

17 I can remember with what little intelligence I have left, but I don't

18 remember you ever intervening in favour of someone who had a criminal

19 file for them to be employed in the Ministry of the Interior. But you

20 did, as any other leader, intervene, asking that it should be someone

21 loyal to the party. You did not insist upon and I didn't verify it

22 because it was not my job to do whether such candidates were even members

23 of the party. You were frequently put in a position that you were

24 pressured from the field by the regional or municipal boards to appoint

25 candidates without previous background checks, which created tension

Page 33640

1 between you and me in our telephone conversations and in our private

2 meetings when we discussed such candidates. Let me remind you,

3 Dr. Karadzic, you frequently accepted the arguments that I put to you

4 against certain candidates be appointed to a number of positions. You

5 yourself mentioned the case of Banja Luka. We spent six hours trying to

6 convince each other which would be the right candidate for the position,

7 and my suggestion was adopted in the end. It was a frequent occurrence

8 that there were pressures from the field to appoint personnel who did not

9 meet the qualifications or who had no previous background checks.

10 Q. Thank you. In line 3 it was interpreted in the past participle.

11 Dr. Zepinic, I think in the end you did and rather you said that your

12 suggestion was accepted.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: We presumed the

14 accused wanted to say it was Dr. Zepinic's suggestion that was adopted.

15 Could the speakers kindly slow down and could Mr. Karadzic kindly

16 repeat his question.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. The gist of it was that I accepted Dr. Zepinic's suggestion not

19 that it was accepted.

20 Doctor, do you confirm that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Was that against what the local SDS board suggested?

23 A. Yes, that's what we established yesterday. The regional board of

24 the SDS insisted on a candidate which you had also nominated as the party

25 president. I was against him, not for personal reasons because I didn't

Page 33641

1 know him at all, but I didn't know another candidate who had been at that

2 position prior to your and my arrival. He was in that CSB and based on

3 the information we had it was my estimate that he went about his job

4 professionally which was to be expected in the future. I knew him

5 personally and that was the reason why I insisted on it, and at the end

6 you accepted my proposal that the candidate stay in that position rather

7 than another candidate be placed there who was suggested by the SDS.

8 Q. I'm afraid this is not the document. I'm asking for the

9 18th of -- 17th of June, D270, it's an intercept where I participate

10 alongside Dr. Zepinic.

11 THE ACCUSED: To enable Dr. Zepinic to have display, monitor.

12 [Interpretation] We don't need the audio. We need the transcript in both

13 languages. That's it.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Dr. Zepinic, please look at the tenth line from the bottom where

16 I ask:

17 "Tell me first did the MUP procure anti-armour weapons?"

18 Do you recall such alarming information even from the army that

19 the MUP was being armed in that way? Do you recall that?

20 A. Yes, I looked at the minutes of the presidential session in 1991

21 and we submitted a proposal on the restructuring and reequipping of the

22 Ministry of the Interior. Among other things we had envisaged a special

23 Intervention Platoon to be established alongside another special unit

24 which had already been in existence. Both the government and the

25 Presidency approved it, thus approving the procurement of that kind of

Page 33642

1 weapon. The JNA also approved that transport military helicopters be

2 used to procure such anti-armour weapons that would be used by the

3 special platoon. The JNA approved it, otherwise according to the then

4 law it would not be able to procure it.

5 I don't know who it was from the top of the army who told you

6 that we were arming ourselves against the army. Can I read out the

7 conclusions of the Presidency?

8 Q. Perhaps there's no need.

9 A. At those sessions of the Presidency of the 15th October and the

10 16th of December and the 21st and 29th of December as well as at the

11 sessions of the Council for Constitutional Protection, full support was

12 leant to the work and co-operation between the MUP and the JNA in their

13 efforts to preserve peace and security in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At such

14 sessions there were two representatives from the Presidency who were SDS

15 candidates who also agreed with those decisions. We were not arming

16 ourselves against the army. We were not arming ourselves for any other

17 reasons, save, as I have mentioned yesterday, for our security

18 information which indicated that a war is going to -- was going to break

19 out in June 1991. It was being staged. We prolonged it in a way because

20 it was our assessment that in terms of personnel and materiel as well as

21 weapons we needed to be sufficiently well-equipped in order to put a stop

22 to the ensuing war.

23 Q. Thank you. In Serbian page 5, in English page 7, please. Could

24 we have that now.

25 Doctor, please, what you are saying around the middle:

Page 33643

1 "Tomorrow, tomorrow you will be seeing ..."

2 A. I know about that and you don't even have to put a question.

3 Q. Could you please read it out nevertheless.

4 A. "Hasan Cengic and Osman Brka are to visit me tomorrow."

5 If I may give a free assessment. Perhaps Brka was one of the

6 most extreme members of the SDA and the reason I invited them is the

7 pressure they exerted on Mr. Izetbegovic to appoint persons in the

8 Ministry of the Interior who did not meet the necessary requirements.

9 For example, the chief of the security centre services. That's why I

10 intervened with Mr. Izetbegovic because I was against that. Is it in the

11 interest of the Muslim people to employ criminals in such positions? If

12 that is the case, then let us state this publicly. That's why these two

13 persons were invited to come and see me so that they would be told that

14 they cannot interfere in such a way, to exert pressure on Izetbegovic and

15 then Izetbegovic on me since Cengic was the head of the appointments

16 commission of the SDA and he was supposed to ensure parity on ethnic

17 grounds in the security services and in the MUP.

18 Q. Thank you. On that page do you remember the thing I said after

19 that, that:

20 "We haven't appointed a single criminal and we haven't appointed

21 anyone who was never in the MUP before"?

22 A. If you allow me, I already answered that perhaps a minute or two

23 ago. I cannot recall that you personally intervened on behalf of someone

24 who had a criminal record, for such a person to be admitted into the

25 Ministry of the Interior or to be appointed to one of the top positions

Page 33644

1 there.

2 Q. So your answer here was:

3 "No, no, no, not a single man of ours. There is nothing that

4 could be said"?

5 A. Yes, and if you look further on you asked me whether Coric had

6 been replaced. Zoran Coric was an exceptional professional and I said

7 "no." And up to the very end, if I can put it that way, we were under

8 pressure to replace Coric by someone else. Now that you're asking me,

9 believe me, I have no idea what Coric's ethnic background was and I'm not

10 interested at all. I know that he was an electric engineer, that he was

11 a professional, and that he was an adequate person to stay on in that

12 position --

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we allowed you to continue, but we are

14 struggling to understand how this part arose from the cross-examination.

15 [Defence counsel confer]

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, from what Mr. Tieger dealt

17 with on page 68 yesterday, lines 20 to 23, where it was suggested that I

18 called and tried to interfere in the work of the MUP on an unacceptable

19 basis of sorts. But I'll drop the subject now.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Dr. Zepinic, regardless of these sharp words on both sides in

22 these official communications, did I show any kind of animosity towards

23 you, or rather, did we keep our mutual respect?

24 A. I think that that was the case. I don't know what your opinion

25 is.

Page 33645

1 Q. Thank you. Did you see for yourself that I was intolerant in

2 relation to Muslims or Croats and did I display or have any kind of

3 hatred vis-a-vis them?

4 A. Dr. Karadzic, that is a question that is very hard to answer,

5 whether you personally hated someone or not, that is your own affair.

6 From the position that I held, I would not want to comment upon that

7 because that's a private matter. I have to point out here that - how do

8 I put this? - that the Serb Democratic Party behaved in a different way

9 until the parliament session was -- until the walk-out from parliament in

10 October 1991. Because after that the policy of the SDS was totally

11 against what your coalition had been based on. As you walked out of the

12 Assembly, according to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

13 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina ceased to exist. It was the duty of the

14 Presidency to dissolve the Assembly and to have early elections. That is

15 what the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina says. That's what the

16 elections law of Bosnia-Herzegovina says. And things went on. If we

17 accept that the European community gave you the mandate and that that was

18 on the basis of the existing laws, then everything that happened in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina until the 14th of October, 1991, was unlawful against

20 the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and all the legal provisions that

21 had been passed in earlier years. Because you, as the coalition, had not

22 changed any laws. You hadn't changed the constitution. You hadn't

23 adopted any amendments to the constitution. And then you established an

24 unlawful Assembly and you did not have the mandate to do that because you

25 were not elected to create an Assembly of the Serb people and then you

Page 33646

1 established some republic that was not recognised by the Presidency. In

2 all honesty, no one recognised that. This Presidency was unlawful,

3 irregular. So from the point of view of the Constitution of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the

5 14th of October, 1991, everything you did was unlawful. When I say

6 "you," I'm not saying "you" personally; I'm referring to your coalition

7 of the three national parties. And you did not break up this coalition

8 even up until the beginning of the war. It was only natural for the

9 speaker of the Assembly to say that the coalition was no longer there

10 after the walk-out of the SDS MPs and that the Assembly could no longer

11 function as a lawful Assembly. And then the Presidency was supposed to

12 call an early election. However, you did not call for an election

13 because you knew on the basis of estimates that you would have lost the

14 election. You can keep shaking your head for as long as you want,

15 Dr. Karadzic, but try to say that I'm wrong when I say that not a single

16 national party then could get 500 citizens at one of their rallies. As

17 presidents you could not even go to another village where you were not in

18 power. You sent me to resolve the question of barricades because you did

19 not dare face the people and say: Remove the barricades. You didn't

20 dare do that. Mr. Izetbegovic didn't dare do that. You were just in an

21 APC, Dr. Karadzic, you and Mr. Izetbegovic. At 3.00 at night we went to

22 the barricades in Sarajevo. Not a single one of you dared to go to the

23 barricades and face the citizens. You asked me to do that. Dr. Zepinic,

24 people respect you, and we are going to do what you -- that they are

25 going to do what you're asking them to do. You needed each other so that

Page 33647

1 you would remain in power. And it is for those reasons that you did not

2 call an election when the Assembly and Presidency, and thereby the

3 government, ceased to exist on a lawful basis.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The pace of speech is too

5 fast for interpretation.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Dr. Zepinic, I understand your emotions vis-a-vis Yugoslavia and

8 I believe that the late President Tito would have been very happy.

9 However, I'm asking you something else. Did you see a display of

10 intolerance on my part? Did I display hatred vis-a-vis Muslims? Now I'm

11 talking about your knowledge about me.

12 A. About you personally, Dr. Karadzic, you know that as the head of

13 the Ministry of the Interior I unfortunately knew everything about all of

14 you and I was supposed to know all of that, how you walked, how you

15 breathed, because I was supposed to protect you because I didn't want any

16 one of you to be in harm's way so that the situation in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina would become even worse than it was. You know full

18 well, Dr. Karadzic, that my ministry kept that dispatch from the

19 Ministry of Croatia that Vojo Seselj not be sent to Croatia. We --

20 Delimustafic kept that dispatch for three days and then he was -- Seselj

21 was returned to Serbia. However, since he was supposed to be on TV, our

22 assessment was that this would lead to a great deal of tension and that

23 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina would gather.

24 Q. It doesn't say that Seselj had three soldiers only in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 33648

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Once again, this is too

2 fast for interpretation of each and every word. Thank you.

3 JUDGE KWON: Please bear in mind that your words have to be

4 translated. Your speed is too high for them to catch up with. I'm not

5 sure you answered the question, but please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Dr. Zepinic, from the position of that knowledge could you see

9 for yourself that I was intolerant towards other ethnic communities and

10 individuals or, for example, that I hated them?

11 A. Again, I have to remind you that this is your personal affair,

12 whether you hated someone or not. I'm talking about tolerance among

13 parties. Even at the first session on the 20th

14 of October [as interpreted], 1990, during two days you could not even

15 agree on the agenda.

16 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

18 MR. TIEGER: Just for the benefit of the interpreters, it's very

19 obvious when Dr. Karadzic starts to speak as the interpretation from the

20 answer is still being produced, and that can only lead to the problems

21 we -- that the interpreting staff intervened on a moment ago.

22 JUDGE KWON: Dr. Zepinic, did you complete your answer to the

23 question that -- whether Mr. Karadzic was intolerant or displayed hatred

24 towards certain people?

25 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, Your Honour, before answering your

Page 33649

1 question, I would intervene. I didn't state that it was a session --

2 first session on 20th of October. It was 20th of December, 1990s. I

3 would appreciate to check this.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, Doctor, that's one of the problems with

6 going so fast. The interpreters have an immensely difficult job to do

7 and you will appreciate that as someone fluent in both languages. If you

8 leave a pause between the questions and answers --

9 THE WITNESS: I understand.

10 JUDGE MORRISON: That's better.

11 JUDGE KWON: Then please continue.

12 Would you like to continue your answer, Dr. Zepinic?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I can confirm that at

14 sessions of the Assembly there was no agreement whatsoever within the

15 coalition. Now, whether there was any animosity or hatred or enmity on

16 the part of Dr. Karadzic, whether he did not respect Croats or Muslims,

17 that is his personal affair. But for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina

18 it was catastrophic that this coalition that was supposed to set up a

19 government on the basis of the mandate it had received as a coalition

20 could not even agree on the agenda. Dr. Karadzic, as you know full well,

21 this also contributed to the atmosphere at government sessions, perhaps

22 to a lesser degree, but especially among the members of the Presidency.

23 Your two members of the Presidency decided that they would freeze their

24 work in the Presidency. This institution of freezing does not exist on

25 the basis of the rules of procedure. They did not give up on any one of

Page 33650

1 the perks of office. We did not see any resignations during the work of

2 the coalition that could not agree on anything.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Thank you. Dr. Zepinic, I'd like us to finish now and I'd like

5 to focus on your knowledge about my behaviour, not my emotions, but the

6 manifestations. You as a -- as the minister of the interior, did you

7 provide policemen for my security detail? Did this security detail

8 include Muslims?

9 A. Yes, and in a way there were some interventions to the effect

10 that this security detail which is given to presidents of political

11 parties on the basis of a decision of the Presidency, this was a special

12 department for protecting persons and buildings. And we were not

13 interested in the ethnic backgrounds of policemen. Policemen were

14 supposed to discharge their duties. I do not recall that you were

15 against anything. I visited you once, if you remember, during a dinner.

16 In front of your building there was a Muslim policeman. You did not

17 object to that because he was carrying out his duties together with his

18 colleague because there were always at least two of them. He was doing

19 his job professionally. You also had some personal body-guards, not only

20 you but the other two leaders as well, and our information said that

21 these persons were not eligible at all. And I personally said that they

22 should not be issued with weapons. And Dr. Koljevic accused me of

23 appointing a security detail that would spy on you.

24 Q. Did you see any Croats and Muslims among my friends at the time,

25 people I was socialising with?

Page 33651

1 A. We all had friends and relatives from all ethnic groups in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, yourself included. I don't think that this is

3 something that this Court should be dealing with, but I can give the

4 names of persons of other ethnic backgrounds that you were friends with.

5 But it wouldn't be right for me to do that. However, in view of the

6 nature of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was impossible to have

7 friends in a social circle of only one ethnicity. The people of

8 Sarajevo, Sarajlijas [phoen], had only one ethnicity. They were

9 Sarajlijas, they were people of Sarajevo, and they never raised any

10 ethnic questions.

11 Q. Thank you. What about my position vis-a-vis Yugoslavia and

12 Bosnia remaining in Yugoslavia?

13 A. If you're asking me from my very own position I am going to give

14 you an answer, Dr. Karadzic. There are very few people that I believed

15 loved Yugoslavia and Bosnia more than I did, very few people.

16 Q. And what was my position about Yugoslavia -- Bosnia remaining in

17 Yugoslavia?

18 A. If we're talking privately then we were more or less on the same

19 position. If we're talking about Radovan Karadzic, the president of the

20 SDS, then this is a special atmosphere, if I may put it that way, in

21 which it is not stated precisely what that Yugoslavia would mean. What I

22 meant was Yugoslavia from Zevdjilija [phoen] to Trilav [phoen], not a

23 Yugoslavia that you were a proponent of, some kind of Rump Yugoslavia,

24 Yugoslavia with or without Serbia, greater Croatia, smaller Croatia, a

25 divided Bosnia. Please, Dr. Karadzic, why was there an influence on you

Page 33652

1 just like influence was exerted on the Croatian representative in Bosnia

2 and Herzegovina for Bosnia to have some kind of a subordinate position in

3 the future Yugoslavia in comparison to Serbia and Croatia. Why would

4 Bosnia not have the same equality just like any other republic?

5 Q. And do you recall, Dr. Zepinic, our historical Serbian-Muslim

6 agreement and was it provided at that time for Mr. Izetbegovic to be the

7 first president?

8 A. Dr. Karadzic, allow me to use some statistical indicators --

9 Q. No, please.

10 A. Well, there was the Belgrade declaration. There was a meeting

11 held by President Milosevic with the Assembly presidents of Serbia,

12 Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and according to that proposal, in

13 view of the Rump Yugoslavia as it was called or as some called it

14 Srboslavia without Croatia and Slovenia, in view of the ethnic

15 composition, it was planned that Muslims would have the prime minister

16 and then this function would rotate. Any future election then would

17 award the position of president to a different ethnic group of that

18 Rump Yugoslavia, which should have been Izetbegovic. However, I must say

19 that in the conversation that Mr. Izetbegovic had with Mr. Tudjman and

20 Mr. Milosevic on the 6th of June in Split, if I can recall, it was

21 clearly stated that the two of them had agreed on the division of Bosnia

22 and Izetbegovic warned that he was not accepting any kind of division of

23 Bosnia. If you remember on the 25th of March, 1991, Tudjman and

24 Milosevic met in Karadjordjevic and agreed that 70 per cent of the BH

25 territory would be given to Serbia and 25 per cent would belong to

Page 33653

1 Croatia.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 75 per cent later.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Then in early 1992 they reviewed

4 this and proposed that 65 per cent belonged to Serbia, 20 per cent to

5 Croatia, and 15 per cent to belong to Alija Izetbegovic and the Muslims,

6 that would be along the Bosna River valley.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Dr. Zepinic, neither of us was in that meeting in Karadjordjevic,

9 is that right, and you recall that they never confirmed that

10 conversation?

11 A. I have to dissuade you, Mr. Karadzic. This is something that

12 Tudjman stated publicly, and after the signing of the peace agreement in

13 January 1992 when he said on television that the only solution would be

14 the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia, about

15 which he and Milosevic had already agreed. They had 48 meetings in

16 Karadjordjevo, Tikves, and Brijoni; then it was Saranic and

17 Smilja Avram [phoen] were entrusted with the drafting of the map.

18 Q. Well, all right, Dr. Zepinic. These things are something that we

19 don't know about.

20 A. I know about them. I'm not just speaking off the top of my head.

21 Q. Let's focus on what you know about me. You said today that after

22 the 15th of October, 1991, everything was different. Are you able to

23 tell the Trial Chamber at which point in time at the Assembly of Bosnia

24 and Herzegovina was it that everything was different, there was no more

25 government, Assembly, and so on and so forth?

Page 33654

1 A. It was an Assembly session on the 10th and 11th of October, 1991,

2 and since it was a very stormy situation and the exchange between you and

3 Mr. Izetbegovic when you said that Bosnia would disappear in two days'

4 time and that 400.000 people in Sarajevo would get killed, and so on and

5 so forth, to which Mr. Izetbegovic replied that he would sacrifice peace

6 for the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, I was

7 sitting, if you can recall, in the first row next to the prime minister

8 and I said, These two are bringing war to us. And Jure Pelivan said,

9 Vito, come on, don't say that and so on. And then you had secret

10 meetings - I'm saying "secret meetings" because this was not

11 disclosed - and my service had this information on Saturday and Sunday to

12 co-ordinate your positions and this was proposed by Mr. Krajisnik. There

13 was no harmonisation of positions among you, so then on the 15th of

14 October, 1991, you demonstratively left the Assembly of Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina, I mean the deputies of the SDS. And in my estimate, that

16 was the day that was the crucial day for the future of Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina.

18 If you permit me, I attended a meeting at the Presidency that day

19 with General Kadijevic and his generals who stated at the Presidency

20 meeting -- actually, who just adopted one conclusion, and that is that

21 the Ministry of the Interior should strengthen its co-operation with the

22 Yugoslav People's Army in order to preserve the peace in Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina. That was the only conclusion. Dr. Karadzic, by withdrawing

24 the army we had 200.000 from the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and

25 65.000 -- 65 per cent of the arms of the former Yugoslavia was

Page 33655

1 concentrated in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is something

2 that should have been controlled. This control could not be executed by

3 disbanding the Assembly and by leaving the Assembly and by having fights

4 among the coalition partners in government.

5 Q. Thank you. I would kindly like us to just deal with what you

6 know about me. What was my position in your view on the secession of

7 Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

8 A. You understood the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the

9 way that Bosnia and Herzegovina could not be an independent state. It

10 had to be a component of Yugoslavia without Croatia and Slovenia, and

11 that that would be Yugoslavia without the independence of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina within it, without independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13 Q. Thank you. And did you ever see for yourself that my position

14 was that we would need to expel Muslims and Croats from these areas which

15 would be the Serbian cantons and the Serbian constituent units?

16 A. Dr. Karadzic or President Karadzic, when we're talking about the

17 party, had you in any way directly or through documents said anything

18 like that, I guarantee before this Trial Chamber that you would have been

19 arrested because this was an anti-constitutional decision and you would

20 have violated all the laws in force at the time. So had you at any point

21 mentioned as the president of the party what you have just said you may

22 be assured that you would have been criminally charged without,

23 unfortunately, I have to tell you, any request for immunity to be lifted.

24 Because as president of the party you did not enjoy any form of immunity.

25 Q. Thank you. Well, this was as far as my position was

Page 33656

1 professionally. As for private contacts you had with me, based on that

2 did you ever get the impression that I was in favour of anybody being

3 expelled from Serbian areas?

4 A. Well, I cannot answer that question and I repeat again, had you

5 said something like that to me - I don't know what you meant in view of

6 our profession, Dr. Karadzic, we cannot know what somebody else is

7 thinking - but had you in any way voiced publicly or in writing in a

8 document something like that, you would have been criminally liable. As

9 for you as a person, I have refused many offers to date to write an

10 article about you as a person. So if you would permit me also to do that

11 on this occasion.

12 Q. Thank you. And Cutileiro's Plan that you mentioned or the

13 proposal of the European community of the three -- about the three

14 constituent units, did that imply respect of --

15 JUDGE KWON: How does that arise from Mr. Tieger's

16 cross-examination?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was a question of the rights of

18 ethnic minorities and religious minorities. This was mentioned in the

19 cross-examination. And Dr. Zepinic had his political position, that he

20 was against the secession of the republics, and in particular he

21 disagreed with the idea of the three constituent units. However, he was

22 familiar with Cutileiro's Plan which we accepted and I wanted to ask what

23 this plan was. Did that imply the respect of minority rights?

24 JUDGE KWON: This is a topic you could have raised in your direct

25 examination. I would like you to move on.

Page 33657

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zepinic, for coming to testify. Regardless of our

3 political differences, I'm going to answer your question and, as far as

4 I'm concerned, our mutual respect is intact.

5 [Defence counsel confer]

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. And perhaps if my transcript is going on, did the SDS party in

8 its programme include the policy of the expulsion of Muslims and what

9 would have happened with that party, again along the lines of what you

10 said would have happened to me?

11 A. Again, I'm talking about documents before the

12 14th of October, 1991. Had the service had information of that sort at

13 its disposal, we would have definitely initiated the question of whether

14 that party could survive in view of the amendment to the constitution

15 adopted by the Presidency in March of 1990 of that year, meaning six

16 months before your elections, which clearly stated that a party that aims

17 in its programme an exclusively national character could not be

18 registered or could not function. This would include the splitting of

19 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have no

22 further questions.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

24 Mr. Tieger.

25 MR. TIEGER: No, no questions, Mr. President.

Page 33668

1 municipality.

2 [Interpretation] This concludes the summary. At this point I

3 have no questions for Mr. Batinic.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 Yes, Mr. Batinic, as you have noted your evidence in chief in

6 this case has been admitted in writing. Now you will be cross-examined

7 by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor,

8 Ms. Katrina Gustafson.

9 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

12 Q. And good morning, Mr. Batinic.

13 A. Good morning.

14 Q. I'd like to start with a straightforward question. This is not

15 in your statement anywhere, but if you could just confirm that you were

16 an SDS member; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. At paragraph 14 of your statement you describe the formation of

19 the Serbian Municipal Assembly in Rogatica and you say that it was formed

20 at the end of 1991. And that Assembly was formed in accordance with

21 SDS Main Board instructions; is that correct?

22 A. It is correct that the Serbian municipality was established in

23 late December 1991. Unfortunately, at that time I had not received any

24 instructions of the Main Board of the SDS. I was not present at their

25 meetings because I was not a member of the Main Board of the SDS. It was

Page 33669

1 our belief that it comprised prominent Serb citizens who enjoyed a

2 certain degree of authority in Rogatica.

3 Q. Okay. If we could go to P3407.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 17 the witness stated that it

5 was established because of their belief that things were supposed to be

6 that way and that it was to comprise prominent citizens.

7 MS. GUSTAFSON:

8 Q. Mr. Batinic, this is a report on the activities of the Rogatica

9 municipal organs compiled by Milorad Sokolovic and dates from 1993. If

10 we could go to page 5 of the English and page 4 in the B/C/S. And under

11 Roman numeral II, halfway through the second paragraph -- or, sorry, the

12 first sentence of that paragraph refers to the creation of the

13 Serb Municipal Assembly at the end of December 1991, just as you stated

14 in your evidence. And the second sentence says:

15 "Serb Municipal Assembly included also, as per instructions of

16 the main Serb Democratic Party Board, SDS Local Board Presidents from the

17 area of the municipality ..."

18 And the Chamber has received evidence of SDS Main Board

19 instructions issued at around the same time that precisely required the

20 inclusion of SDS local board presidents for municipalities like Rogatica

21 where Serbs were a minority. And I refer to P5, instruction 4, of

22 Variant B.

23 Now, whether you were aware of it at the time or not, this

24 passage reflects the fact that the Serb Municipal Assembly in Rogatica

25 was formed pursuant to SDS Main Board instructions; right?

Page 33670

1 A. In any case, I read that document two or three days ago. I

2 didn't know of it before that.

3 Q. So two or three days ago you did, in fact, realise that the

4 Serb Municipal Assembly was created pursuant to SDS Main Board

5 instructions; do I understand you correctly?

6 A. For the most part.

7 Q. Okay. And also at paragraph 14 of your witness statement you

8 said that the Serbian municipality -- sorry, the Serbian

9 Municipal Assembly never started functioning and it all remained solely

10 on paper. And then at paragraph 19 you indicate that you were elected

11 president of the Serbian municipality of Rogatica only upon the division

12 of the municipality in early May. So just so I understand your position,

13 is your position that the Serb Municipal Assembly did not start

14 functioning until the municipality was formally divided on the

15 3rd of May?

16 A. Certainly. Let me explain this. As far as I recall, as of the

17 24th of December, the Serb Assembly was established in Rogatica

18 municipality comprising those representatives we mentioned before. It

19 was nominal only because the situation in the field changed from one day

20 to the next. The citizens asked for us to do so because there was a lot

21 of anxiety and fear in town. We established the Rogatica Municipal

22 Assembly, but that's what we left it at until further notice.

23 Q. Okay. So is it your position that it never held any -- that

24 there were no Serb Municipal Assembly sessions until the 3rd of May?

25 A. No. My associates and I believed that there would be an

Page 33671

1 agreement reached at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina and we were simply

2 trying to buy ourselves more time by making decisions like this.

3 Q. Okay. That's not quite an answer to my question. My question

4 was what your -- whether there were any Serb Municipal Assembly sessions

5 between the time it was created, in late December 1991, and the time the

6 municipality was formally divided on the 3rd of May, 1992?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay. I'm going to put to you that's not true and the Serb

9 Municipal Assembly began functioning immediately by holding its inaugural

10 session on the 26th of December, 1991, at which you were elected Assembly

11 president. Do you agree or disagree with that?

12 A. I don't remember, but I guess it could have been the Variant B or

13 the second level, when the Assembly sessions were organised in order to

14 have the authorities put in place, when the Executive Board was

15 established as well. That's probably it.

16 Q. Okay.

17 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to page 8 of this document in

18 English and page 6 in the B/C/S.

19 Q. And, Mr. Batinic, you can see at the top of the English and about

20 a third of the way down in the B/C/S there is a paragraph that says:

21 "On inaugural session of the Municipal Assembly held on

22 26 December 1991 Tomislav Batinic was elected President of the

23 Municipal Assembly, while Deputy President is not yet elected."

24 Does that remind you of the fact that an inaugural session of the

25 Serb Municipal Assembly was elected almost immediately upon its formation

Page 33672

1 and you became its president?

2 A. Yes.

3 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P2835, page 3 in the English

4 and also page 3 in the B/C/S.

5 Q. This is a report on the work of the Crisis Staff between April

6 and June 1992 and you are familiar with this document because it's

7 referenced in your statement. And if we go to the bottom paragraph in

8 both languages it says:

9 "When it is said that the Crisis Staff adopted 18 decisions under

10 its jurisdiction, it is necessary to remember that the Serbian

11 Municipal Assembly of Rogatica at its session on 15 April 1992 by special

12 ruling authorised the Crisis Staff to perform the duties of the

13 Executive Committee ..." et cetera, et cetera.

14 This is another reflection of the fact that the Serb

15 Municipal Assembly was in fact functioning and holding sessions prior to

16 the 3rd of May, 1992; right?

17 A. It is certain, given the fact that the Assembly was constituted

18 only, its speaker was elected, whereas the Executive Board or any of its

19 organs were not appointed nor were any executive bodies. The Assembly

20 authorised the Crisis Staff to act as the Executive Board until it is

21 being -- until it is constituted.

22 Q. Okay. But you don't deny that contrary to what you said a few

23 moments ago that the Serb Municipal Assembly was, indeed, functioning and

24 holding sessions prior to the 3rd of May, 1992?

25 A. It sat twice. For example, at the second session it tasked the

Page 33673

1 Crisis Staff to carry out the functions of the executive organ of the

2 Assembly.

3 Q. Okay. At paragraph 18 of your statement you said that a Serb

4 Crisis Staff was formed a month before the division of the municipality,

5 and so that would be early April 1992. You don't mention this in your

6 statement, but you were a Crisis Staff member; right?

7 A. Yes, by virtue of my other position which was the deputy speaker

8 of the Assembly. At the time I was deputy speaker of the joint Assembly

9 of Rogatica municipality.

10 Q. Right. This was a Serb Crisis Staff, right, Mr. Batinic?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. Again I'm going to put to you that the Serb Crisis Staff

13 was actually formed before early April and it was only expanded in early

14 April on -- precisely on the 8th of April, but there was a Crisis Staff

15 in existence before that time; is that right?

16 A. Yes.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be more precise. Is it

18 the Crisis Staff as an organ of the authorities or of the party, so as

19 not to have any confusion.

20 JUDGE KWON: Well, that can be clarified in your re-examination.

21 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to page 1 of this document in both

22 languages.

23 Q. Now, as the report indicates, the Crisis Staff of the Serbian

24 municipality was established at the session of the Main Board of the SDS,

25 I assume that's of Rogatica, of 8th April 1992. And then in the next

Page 33674

1 paragraph it says:

2 "The former Crisis Staff was extended at the session and since

3 8 April 1992 ... it consisted of ..."

4 And then it lists a number of people, including you. Now, that

5 reference to extending the Crisis Staff at the 8 April session is a

6 reflection of the fact that there was a Crisis Staff in existence before

7 the 8th of April, and on the 8th of April it was expanded and became the

8 Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality; is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And is it right that you were a member of both the earlier

11 Crisis Staff and remained a member of the expanded Crisis Staff until it

12 ceased functioning in the summer of 1992; is that correct?

13 A. Certainly. If I may just explain briefly. The previous

14 Crisis Staff faced a crisis, and after the resignation of the president

15 of the former Crisis Staff and two of us who were members, a new

16 Crisis Staff was elected on the 8th of April, 1992. I was re-elected

17 into the new Crisis Staff as well.

18 Q. Okay. So you resigned from the earlier Crisis Staff at some

19 point. When was that, do you recall?

20 A. Well, I think it may have been, say, the month of March. We

21 talked to the Crisis Staff and the work group of the Muslims in relation

22 to the division of the municipality in order to keep the population. We

23 talked and we came to the conclusion that at that point in time before

24 the situation was resolved at the level of the entire state, it would be

25 best if we passed a resolution on the division of the municipality.

Page 33675

1 However, then the TO was established within the Serb people, and they

2 asked us to do that quickly. We did not agree to that because the

3 division is a major process and we said that it required time. They

4 wanted us to do it as fast as possible and then we tendered our

5 resignations if somebody could do it better.

6 Q. Okay. Well, your specific concern and conflict with the Serb TO

7 in March was due to the fact that that TO, led by SDS Main Board member

8 Rajko Kusic, was ruthlessly rushing with threats to attack the town

9 unless the municipality and the police station were immediately divided;

10 is that right?

11 A. Well, of course our views differed on that because we were in

12 favour of agreement, discussions, and I think that everything led to

13 that. However, there were people who thought along different lines, you

14 see, and they thought that this could be done and over with within two

15 hours. That's not what we thought. We said at one point in time, if

16 there's somebody who can do this better, let them go ahead.

17 MS. GUSTAFSON: Okay could we go to P6105, please.

18 Q. Mr. Batinic, this is a letter that you, along with

19 Mr. Veselinovic and Mr. Ujic, signed and sent to Dr. Karadzic on the

20 25th of March, 1992. And it states that the Crisis Staff is not able to

21 carry out its decisions due to a group of armed Serbs headed by a member

22 of the Main Board, Rajko Kusic, who was ruthlessly rushing with threats

23 to attack the town in case the municipality and the public security

24 station are not unconditionally divided. You say that the Crisis Staff,

25 in compliance with your, presumably Dr. Karadzic's instructions, believes

Page 33676

1 that the factual division on the ground should be and is already there,

2 but you state that the official division must be accompanied by laws

3 issued by Serbian ministries as well as party agreements on the highest

4 level.

5 And then you state:

6 "We believe it is dangerous to be the originator of the war

7 situation when the Serbian people are not sufficiently prepared and

8 provided."

9 Now, it's clear from that last sentence that one of your concerns

10 with what Rajko Kusic was doing at the time was that the Serbian people

11 were not sufficiently prepared at that point for war; is that right?

12 A. It is correct, but let me just explain this. In that period of

13 time there was mobilisation of personnel into the 216th Brigade that was

14 at Han Pijesak. All able-bodied Serbs basically responded to the call-up

15 and it was only able-bodied Muslims who stayed on in town. They

16 boycotted the mobilisation of the JNA. Since the police station had the

17 weapons that were distributed to the reserve police force, mainly

18 Bosniaks, Muslims, Serbs did not respond to the mobilisation of the

19 police station, and then there was fear, hopelessness, and a lack of

20 safety in town. The people expected the establishment of that kind of

21 Territorial Defence unit from among the able-bodied Serbs who had stayed

22 on in town. This happened in Borike and a small unit of the

23 Territorial Defence was established; it was headed by Mr. Kusic. They

24 were concerned because all the able-bodied Serbs were outside Rogatica.

25 They feared for the safety of their families and this probably affected

Page 33677

1 the command of the Territorial Defence, and they probably thought that

2 this division could be carried out very quickly. However, we thought

3 that a different path should be followed because we were already involved

4 in discussions with the Bosniak side. And to be quite honest, I did not

5 think that we would succeed in this division. But I thought that we

6 could buy some time, counting on certain agreements to be reached at the

7 level of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We did not want to give up on discussions,

8 agreements, accommodation of views, but that is why we tendered our

9 resignations.

10 Q. Okay. You wrote to Dr. Karadzic personally and informed him of

11 the situation and the conflict you were having with Rajko Kusic and it's

12 common ground I think that Rajko Kusic did not, in fact, attack Rogatica

13 town until the 22nd of May, approximately two months after this. So did

14 Dr. Karadzic or somebody else on the republic level intervene to resolve

15 this conflict you were having with the Serb TO?

16 A. Well, you know what? We had very poor communication at the time

17 with the then-president, Dr. Karadzic. Perhaps I remember that once I

18 had the opportunity of being at Dr. Karadzic's and he just told me: Try

19 to endure, just negotiate, negotiate, negotiate.

20 Q. Okay. But you don't -- you're not aware of the extent or nature

21 of Dr. Karadzic's contacts with Rajko Kusic, an SDS Main Board member,

22 are you?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Okay. And one last question on this document. You were stating

25 that you were going to resign from all your positions in the SDS and the

Page 33678

1 municipality and put yourselves at the disposal of the JNA. If I

2 understand correctly, you did resign from the then-existing Crisis Staff,

3 but then became a member of the Crisis Staff -- expanded Crisis Staff on

4 the 8th of April. You did not resign from your position as

5 Municipal Assembly president and you did not join the JNA. Do I

6 understand that correctly?

7 A. Yes, fully. Well, I wouldn't want you to misunderstand what I'm

8 saying, but at that point in time I was a person who enjoyed a great deal

9 of authority among the people, the citizens. I held certain political

10 positions beforehand. I held various offices as president of the youth

11 organisation in Rogatica, president of the socialist alliance of the

12 working people in Rogatica. And at that point they did not allow me to

13 retreat. Probably they trusted me as a person.

14 Q. Okay. I'd like to move on to something else now. At

15 paragraph 23 of your statement you state that in May 1992 the Muslims

16 killed a Serb by the name of Drazenko Mihajlovic, and you claim that this

17 is considered the start of the war in Rogatica. The Chamber has received

18 evidence including from Defence witness Mile Ujic who was the Chief of

19 Staff of the Rogatica Brigade in 1992, that on the 22nd of May the

20 Rogatica Brigade launched a shelling and infantry attack on Rogatica town

21 and Muslim villages in the municipality. You don't deny that that attack

22 took place, do you? For the record, the transcript pages 33459 to 33460,

23 where Mr. Ujic's evidence.

24 A. Before that, certainly people were leaving town, people of both

25 ethnic backgrounds. The organs of both municipalities had relocated.

Page 33679

1 Quite simply, the town was no man's land. Only those who saw some

2 interest of their own remained in town. They were involved in looting,

3 they were shooting, and they were barricades all over in town and

4 outside. For security reasons we withdrew from town and I never entered

5 town until the conditions were right to enter town. It is a fact that

6 sometime in May 1992 this young man got killed, and then definitely there

7 was this close contact between both armed forces and we believed that

8 that day was a turning point in terms of the beginning of the war in the

9 territory of Rogatica.

10 Q. Okay. I take it that you do not deny that that attack took place

11 on the 22nd of May, as I described it?

12 A. Yes. I think that then about 12 persons lost their lives,

13 persons of Serb ethnicity. On that day, yes, an attack did take place,

14 an attack against Rogatica and the forces clashed.

15 Q. Okay. And the Chamber has received evidence in the form of

16 General Mladic's military notebooks that five days prior to this

17 22nd of May attack, so on the 17th of May, representatives of Rogatica

18 municipality attended a meeting in Sokolac, also attended by

19 General Mladic, Dr. Karadzic, and Mr. Krajisnik. And at that meeting

20 Dr. Karadzic said:

21 "We are looking for results from the army. That's their job."

22 And that's P1477, pages 349 to 352.

23 Were you at that meeting, Mr. Batinic; and if not, do you know

24 who from Rogatica attended that meeting?

25 A. I can say that I was not there for sure, but it must have been

Page 33680

1 someone who was in charge of the Territorial Defence then.

2 Q. Would it have been logical for Rajko Kusic to be in attendance at

3 that meeting?

4 A. Most probably.

5 Q. Okay. So is it fair that you don't know what was said or decided

6 at that meeting regarding the army's tasks in Rogatica?

7 A. I don't know, that's for sure. I state that with certainty.

8 Q. Okay. Mr. Batinic, the -- I'm going to put to you that the

9 killing of Drazenko Mihajlovic was, at most, an excuse for the

10 Bosnian Serbs to launch the attack on Rogatica on the 22nd of May.

11 The -- I'll also put it to you that the truth is that the Bosnian Serb

12 forces in Rogatica led by Rajko Kusic, VRS brigade commander and SDS

13 Main Board member, attacked and took over Rogatica because of Rogatica's

14 strategic importance in the eyes of the Bosnian Serb leadership. Do you

15 agree or disagree?

16 A. Well, you know, I'm not an officer and I don't know about these

17 military virtues or strategic objectives that the army and certain state

18 organs had. I certainly cannot give an answer in the affirmative because

19 I was not involved and basically I wasn't in charge either.

20 Q. Okay. The Chamber has also received evidence that at the

21 53rd Assembly Session, Republika Srpska Assembly Session, on the

22 28th of August, 1995, a time when I believe you had, in fact, become a

23 member of that Assembly, that Dr. Karadzic said - and this is at P988,

24 page 68:

25 "To tell the truth, there are towns that we grabbed for ourselves

Page 33681

1 and there were only 30 per cent of us. I can name as many of those as

2 you want, but we cannot give up the towns where we made up 70 per cent.

3 Don't let this get around, but remember how many of us there were in

4 Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, how many in

5 Rogatica, how many in Vlasenica, Zvornik, et cetera. Due to strategic

6 importance they had to become ours and no one is practically questioning

7 it anymore."

8 Were you present at the Assembly when Dr. Karadzic said this; and

9 if not, did you hear about these words?

10 A. Firstly, in that period I was not president of the municipality

11 of Rogatica after May 1995. I don't remember the date when I was

12 co-opted as an MP in the Assembly of Republika Srpska because I was on

13 the list of MPs who did not win a sufficient number of votes to become

14 members of the Assembly, but then I was co-opted because there were some

15 MPs who returned their mandate. I don't remember whether I was at the

16 Assembly at the time or co-opted, but I did not hear about this statement

17 of Mr. Karadzic's later on either, to tell you the truth.

18 Q. Okay. Thank you. I'd like to move on now to what you said about

19 the Rogatica secondary school, which at paragraph 26 you describe as a

20 location where families from Rogatica were accommodated, and you state

21 that you told some of the families there that they were free to return to

22 their homes in the town. You don't say anything in your statement about

23 how these people came to be accommodated at the secondary school, but

24 it's true, is it not, that a great many of them had been taken there by

25 the Rogatica Brigade after they had been captured in their villages; is

Page 33682

1 that right?

2 A. Well, you see, Madam Prosecutor, at one point in time I said that

3 all of Rogatica was practically a war zone. We moved into the outskirts

4 of town. The town itself was basically no man's land. We don't know

5 what happened in town and in the territory of the municipality of

6 Rogatica. There was thunder all over. They were exchanging accusations

7 that the other side was shelling Rogatica, attacking it. We did not

8 enter town until it could be entered. I know and there were conflicts in

9 town, I was away on official business then in Belgrade. When I returned

10 I heard that there had been contact between the units and that civilians,

11 citizens, of military age came to the school, the secondary school.

12 That's what we heard. There were civilians, military-age men, et cetera,

13 at the secondary school. I heard that certain persons were saying that

14 all of those who are not able-bodied should move to this collection

15 centre at the secondary school in Rogatica. We did not go there then

16 because it was all risky. And when the citizens relocated to the

17 secondary school we heard that they were being secured by the military

18 police and civilian police. At any rate, the information we had was that

19 they were provided with food there, that it was safe for them there, that

20 nothing bad was happening down there and so on. Quite simply, that's

21 what we heard -- what I personally heard from persons who were in charge

22 of the brigade command.

23 Q. So it's your position that you never heard from the brigade

24 command that they were taking civilians from villages to the Rogatica

25 secondary school; is that right?

Page 33683

1 A. I'm sorry, could you please repeat that question?

2 Q. Did you ever hear from the brigade command that they were taking

3 civilians from villages to the Rogatica secondary school, Muslim

4 civilians?

5 A. No, no. I never did.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: Could we go to 65 ter 24599, please.

7 Q. And I note, for the record, that this document has actually been

8 MFI'd as D2913, but as there is no translation yet we've uploaded the

9 document both English and B/C/S here. And when I'm finished with it we

10 can certainly add the English to the existing exhibit. And this is a

11 letter that you wrote to the Rogatica Brigade command and the gist of it

12 is at the at the bottom where you say:

13 "We invite you to immediately inform us in writing about whether

14 there are prisons and collection centres on the territory of the

15 municipality of Rogatica so that we could in turn inform the Presidency

16 about it in writing."

17 And this is a letter you wrote on the 25th of November, 1992.

18 And if we could now go to Exhibit D2914. This is Rajko Kusic's response

19 to you. You can see in the subject it references your -- the previous

20 document by number and date and it says:

21 "Since the first day of combat activities, the members of

22 Rogatica Brigade have treated civilian population according to the

23 Geneva Conventions. We have separated civilian population from extreme

24 combatants we have fought against. With your approval, we have gathered

25 civilians at the secondary school, church centre, and DP 'Ergela' in

Page 33684

1 Rogatica. In accordance with circumstances, we were providing them with

2 the same food our soldiers on the line had three times a day.

3 "After sufficient number of civilian population was gathered, you

4 have organised their transport to Sarajevo, Bijeljina, Olovo, Zepa, which

5 was escorted by civilian police."

6 So, Mr. Batinic, contrary to what you said a few moments ago, the

7 brigade command did inform you directly that they were taking civilians

8 to the Rogatica secondary school; right?

9 A. Well, you certainly reminded me. I sent a letter like this to

10 the police station -- I don't know what day it was - to take care of

11 people, property, private property, state property. And as far as I can

12 see, we wrote to the command of the Rogatica Brigade here as well and we

13 warned them too. I certainly do not accept the allegation that we

14 organised the collection centres and that we secured them. The civilian

15 authorities, the Crisis Staff, none of us ever wrote or ordered them or

16 asked them for that. We could not do that because we were in a

17 completely different part of the municipality. And we asked them to act

18 in accordance with all of these international conventions and not to hold

19 people in areas where they shouldn't be.

20 Q. And, Mr. Batinic, the Chamber has heard a number of witnesses say

21 that, in fact, they were taken to the secondary school by soldiers,

22 imprisoned there, and then many of them were expelled to the locations

23 listed in this report from Rajko Kusic. So, for example, Elver Pasic

24 gave evidence that on the 7th of June Serb soldiers arrested him together

25 with other Muslims who were hiding in the cellar of a building in

Page 33685

1 Rogatica, seeking shelter from the shelling. Pasic was taken with his

2 mother and grandmother to the secondary school, where he was detained

3 until 27 June when he was taken away and eventually detained at Batkovic

4 prison in Bijeljina. Armin Bazdar testified that on the

5 4th of August, 1992, Serb soldiers took him and his family from their

6 home in Seljani village to Rogatica high school. About 90 Muslims from

7 his village were detained there along with many more Muslims who had been

8 detained there prior to his arrival. The next day military-aged men were

9 separated from the women and children. The women and children were

10 loaded into buses and trucks like cattle and then taken to Hresa where

11 they were later exchanged. The men were taken to Rasadnik and detained.

12 Sefik Hurko testified that Rajko Kusic took him, his father, his mother

13 to Rogatica secondary school where they were imprisoned with other Muslim

14 men, women and children. And Alija Isakovic gave evidence that he was

15 captured in Rogatica town and detained at the high school from

16 10 June 1992 to the 5th of August, 1992, again the women and men were

17 separated. The women were taken to Sarajevo for exchange while the men

18 were taken to Rasadnik.

19 Mr. Batinic, that is the reality of what was happening to the

20 Muslims at the Rogatica secondary school, is it not?

21 A. I can neither confirm nor deny. If the witnesses stated that

22 they were in the high school building, I do not deny it. However, it was

23 not under our authority. What happened there was within the authority of

24 the brigade command in Rogatica.

25 Q. Okay.

Page 33686

1 MS. GUSTAFSON: And I would like to move on put perhaps

2 65 ter 24599, the English could be attached to Exhibit D2913 and we have

3 no objection to its full admission.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We have basis now to admit the MFI D2913 in

5 full. We'll do so.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.

7 Q. Now, Mr. Batinic, at paragraph 35 you state categorically that

8 the Serbian organs of authority never contributed anything to forcibly

9 remove the Muslims from Rogatica and you claim that their organs of

10 authority and the SDA reached the decisions on moving out on their own.

11 Mr. Batinic, the Muslims of Rogatica did not leave the

12 municipality because of any SDA decision to that effect. They left

13 because their homes and villages were being shelled and they were being

14 massacred and abused by the Bosnian Serb forces, principally the

15 Rogatica Brigade led by Rajko Kusic; isn't that right?

16 A. For the most part, the area of Rogatica and town itself was

17 abandoned by both Serbs and Muslims. At some point in time, Rogatica as

18 a whole was a war zone. In any case, the Serbs mainly withdrew to the

19 north and Muslims to the southern part of town towards Gorazde. I

20 believe that neither of the sides had it easy. As for what was taking

21 place in the town itself, we had no influence there because we had no

22 access to the town. We couldn't influence any activities or work of the

23 brigade and its people or of any other units such as paramilitary units,

24 be it Muslim or Serbian. The authority was in the hands of the VRS and

25 the brigade had its own system of command and the issuing of orders.

Page 33687

1 Q. Well, you haven't precisely answered my question. I'd like to go

2 to P1001. Now, this is a warning from General Sipcic, SRK corps

3 commander, to Rajko Kusic personally. And it says:

4 "Kusic, I strictly forbid you to take any action on your own

5 unless I personally approve, particularly any form of mopping up of

6 anybody's villages.

7 "For the last time," double underlined, "I am warning you to

8 refrain from massacre, rampaging, abusing the innocent population of any

9 nationality."

10 And consistent with the contents of this document, the Chamber

11 has received evidence of convictions by the Bosnian state court in recent

12 years of Rogatica Brigade members for crimes against Muslims in the town

13 and villages of Rogatica. I refer to P6106, the 2007 conviction of

14 Radislav Ljubinac for forcible transfer of Muslims to and away from

15 Rogatica secondary school and beating prisoners at Rasadnik. P6107, the

16 2006 conviction of Dragoje Paunovic aka Spiro for the execution of

17 prisoners taken away from Rasadnik. Mile Ujic confirmed his position as

18 a Rogatica Brigade unit commander at transcript 33471 and D1665, that's

19 the 2009 conviction of Stojan Perkovic for murder, cruel treatment,

20 unlawful detention and rape committed against Muslims from a number of

21 different villages. And Perkovic's position as a unit commander in the

22 brigade is identified in P2832, page 4.

23 Now, Mr. Batinic, the contents of General Sipcic's warning and

24 these recent convictions reflect the terror that the Rogatica Brigade was

25 inflicting on the Muslim population of Rogatica, don't they?

Page 33688

1 A. This order, this document produced by Mr. Sipcic to Kusic, is

2 something I see for the first time. They had their own line of

3 reporting, command, and ordering. I have nothing to add. Probably

4 Mr. Sipcic had information we did not have in detail. Once again I

5 reiterate that we were busy with organising civilian life and the

6 functioning of companies, educational institutions, health institutions,

7 and other aspects of life in the municipality. As regards the brigade,

8 its commander had enormous authority and he wouldn't allow anyone

9 interfere with the affairs of the military.

10 Q. Okay. On that note I'd like to go to 65 ter 17452 which now has

11 a Defence exhibit number. It was an associated exhibit. I don't recall

12 it at the moment. This is the message, Mr. Batinic, that you discuss at

13 paragraph 27 of your statement that Dr. Karadzic sent to you and other

14 municipalities on the 14th of July, 1992, in which he states that:

15 Municipality presidents must bear the responsibility to ensure the

16 protection of Croats and Muslims who hand over their weapons and do not

17 intend to fight.

18 Now, you made it very clear in your answer to some of my previous

19 questions that you had no influence on the work or activities of the

20 brigade and its members and that the VRS had its own system of command

21 that you were not a part of.

22 And in relation to that system of command, the Chamber has

23 received evidence of that military chain of command rewarding and

24 commending the Rogatica Brigade and its commander Rajko Kusic. I refer

25 to P6108, that's General Galic's December 1992 congratulations to the

Page 33689

1 Rogatica Brigade for its successes in 1992. P5586 which is

2 Dr. Karadzic's personal promotion of Rajko Kusic to the rank of captain

3 first class. And P2832, reflecting the fact that the entire brigade

4 received the order of Nemanjic. Kusic was given the order of

5 Milos Obilic and Stojan Perkovic who was mentioned was convicted in 2009

6 for crimes against Muslims was singled out for commanding one of the best

7 units in the brigade.

8 Now, in this context, Mr. Batinic, it was a disingenuous gesture

9 for Mr. Karadzic to assert in his telegram that the municipality

10 president was responsible for protecting the non-Serb population in

11 Rogatica while he himself commanded a military structure that promoted

12 and rewarded those who were committing crimes against that population.

13 Do you agree?

14 A. I wasn't aware of these commendations. I hear of it for the

15 first time. As regards Dr. Radovan Karadzic's document, as the president

16 of Rogatica Municipal Assembly I tried to protect all those villages

17 inhabited by Muslims of which there were five or six: Satorovici, Osovo,

18 Okruglo, Tmorni Do, Burati and perhaps another one. I went there

19 personally providing them with food and health care. I frequented those

20 villages, given the fact that it was easier on those people when I

21 appeared because they believed me. That's why I visited them frequently.

22 As for this document, it was probably sent then and I see it now. I do

23 not deny its being sent. I can't discuss its content and who commended

24 who, but I do know for sure that we were in no position to propose or

25 commend and give awards to anyone as civilian authorities.

Page 33690

1 Q. Okay. You just said in your answer that you tried to protect all

2 those villages inhabited by Muslims of which there were five or six. And

3 I take it from that that at a certain point of time there were just five

4 or six villages left in the Serb-held parts of Rogatica where any Muslim

5 inhabitants remained living; is that correct? And if so, at what point

6 of time were there these five or six villages -- sorry, at what point in

7 time had all the Muslims left the other villages aside from these five or

8 six?

9 A. Those were the villages one could access. They were not in the

10 war zone. All of the other Serb and Muslim villages were inside the war

11 zone. They were in a difficult position and that's where there was

12 combat. Simply, people moved away wherever they could at any given point

13 in time.

14 Q. Okay. In paragraphs 29 and 30 you refer to the existence of

15 Muslims remaining in some of these villages, you refer to as loyal

16 Muslims. And you say -- you refer specifically to Burati which -- is

17 that the same village as Burati?

18 A. Burati, B-u -r-a-t-i.

19 Q. Okay. And you say that:

20 "We kept the people in Burati alive and well throughout the

21 entire war."

22 And what about Satorovici, is it your position that they, the

23 Muslims of Satorovici, also remained there throughout the entire war in

24 their village?

25 A. Yes, Satorovici, Osovo, Tmorni Do and Okruglo.

Page 33691

1 Q. And you said you visited these villages. Did you know an elderly

2 woman by the name of Fatima Potorkevic from Burati?

3 A. I did visit a house then where we drank coffee and had lunch. We

4 were hosted by someone who was called Katica, I believe, and there was an

5 infirm grandfather in -- who was bedridden. I don't recall a woman,

6 though.

7 Q. Okay. What about a man by the name of Sejdalija Mirvic from

8 Satorovici?

9 A. Sejdalija Mirvic, I know him.

10 Q. And you know him to be from Satorovici village?

11 A. I do.

12 Q. Okay. Mr. Batinic, I'm going to put it to you that it's not true

13 that the Muslims in these villages remained throughout the entire war,

14 that, in fact, the Bosnian Serb authorities expelled the last remaining

15 Muslims from Rogatica municipality in October 1994. Would you like to

16 respond to that?

17 A. Certainly, but at their request, the citizens requested it.

18 Q. Okay. I'd like to go to P4867.

19 JUDGE KWON: I take it you're coming to a close?

20 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, Your Honour, I have about five minutes

21 remaining.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

23 MS. GUSTAFSON:

24 Q. This is a prisoner exchange report compiled by the

25 Federation Exchange Commission dated the 15th of October, 1994. And if

Page 33692

1 we go to page 2 of the English and stay on page 1 of the B/C/S, it

2 describes what happened during this exchange and it says at the bottom of

3 the B/C/S/at the top of the English:

4 "The aggressor took advantage of the exchange to expel 87

5 Bosniaks, Muslims from the villages of Satorovici, Burati, Osovo,

6 Knezina, Kramer Selo, Kozica, Okruglo, Kovanj."

7 And if we go to page 4 in both languages, the middle of the

8 English and the top of the B/C/S it says that:

9 "... Karadzic's Serbs have taken advantage of the

10 1st October 1994 Agreement ..."

11 And the next sentence says:

12 "In that sense, prior to the exchange Karadzic's Serbs had on

13 5 October expelled the remaining Bosniak population from four Rogatica

14 villages: 66 women, children, and elderly in total. On the

15 10th of October they expelled another 21 residents of the villages of

16 Burati and Kovanj, leaving these territories purely Serb inhabited."

17 And if we could go to 65 ter 24462. Sorry, my mistake.

18 65 ter 24464. This is a "New York Times" article from the same time as

19 the report we just saw and it's in English so I'll just read the relevant

20 parts to you. It's dated the 6th of October, 1994, and it's titled:

21 "Expelled from villages, bewildered Muslims trudge to Sarajevo.

22 "The central image of the Bosnian war was repeated yet again in

23 Sarajevo today when Muslim men, women and children expelled by Serbs from

24 Eastern Bosnia trudged across a city bridge clutching their only

25 remaining possessions in a few ragged sacks.

Page 33693

1 "Dazed and frightened, some of them in tears, they came slowly

2 across the so-called bridge of brotherhood and unity between the

3 Serb-held Grbavica section of Sarajevo and government-held territory.

4 Then as United Nations officials looked on they were bundle onto city

5 buses and taken off to one of the many refugee centres in the Bosnian

6 capital."

7 Then there's a quote:

8 "'Serbian soldiers came to my house today and said I was to leave

9 at once,' said Fatima Potorkevic, aged 75 from the village of Burati near

10 Rogatica in Serb-held Eastern Bosnia. 'I have no idea where I am going.'

11 "Sejdalija Mirvic said his village of Satorovici near Rogatica

12 was entirely emptied of its remaining Muslims today. The Serbian

13 authorities came to each Muslim household and told the families to

14 prepare to leave. They were bundled onto buses to Sarajevo.

15 "'I had these apartments in my house and a small farm with

16 cattle,' Mr. Mirvic, 56, said, 'Now all I have left is in these bags.'

17 He pointed to two bundles on the floor of the bus."

18 Now, Mr. Batinic, you agreed that the Muslims in these villages

19 did in fact leave, although you said it was voluntary, and you said you

20 knew Mr. Sejdalija Mirvic from Satorovici. You don't deny that

21 Mr. Mirvic and Ms. Potorkevic were explaining the truth about what

22 happened to them in their villages, do you?

23 A. It is certain that I knew what the situation was in all of the

24 villages and that is why I tried to make the utmost to make their lives

25 easier. I did everything I could to keep them there. I knew that in

Page 33694

1 Burati village Mustafa Prkos came to me and asked me to do everything so

2 that they could move to Sarajevo. I wasn't happy about it, but I

3 mustered my strength and said, Well, Mustafa, if that is your wish, there

4 is no problem. But do not portray that as if we were consciously moving

5 those people out. And I also told him, All this would be for nothing if

6 we died. If we survive we can discuss it because human lives are the

7 most important. I am sorry for all of the heads of families and citizens

8 in general who had to leave their property behind or lost their lives.

9 At the moment in time and the situation we were in, I don't think more

10 could have been done.

11 Now, whether we chose the best course and whether we were

12 sufficiently prepared at the time, there were probably mistakes and

13 failures, but it is certain that I did my utmost to protect those people

14 in Rogatica municipality.

15 Q. Okay. So when Ms. Potorkevic said:

16 "'Serbian soldiers came to my house today and said I was to leave

17 at once ...'"

18 Is that something you know about, did you know that the

19 Rogatica Brigade or at that point the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade

20 was doing in those villages at this time?

21 A. I don't know. That is certain.

22 Q. Okay. And you said that people came to you and said to do

23 everything that you could -- and asked you to do everything so that they

24 could move to Sarajevo. Mr. Batinic, the situation in these --

25 A. Yes.

Page 33695

1 Q. The situation in these people's villages, the security situation,

2 must have been dire for these people to ask you to take them away from

3 their homes, their farms, their livelihoods, places they'd lived all

4 their lives. Do you agree?

5 A. I accept that those people, despite the level of protection we

6 could offer, still lived in fear daily, fearing that a stray drunken

7 soldier civilian may come in to mistreat them. Of course we couldn't

8 keep everything under control at all times and certainly those

9 individuals thought along those lines.

10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Batinic. I have no further questions.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 Do you have re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency.

14 JUDGE KWON: We'll hear that after the break.

15 We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at 15 past 1.00.

16 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.26 p.m.

17 --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.

18 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue.

19 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

20 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. This is in response to your

21 inquiry yesterday concerning the request for leave in connection with the

22 second motion for subpoena. I indicated we'd be getting back to you, and

23 as you're aware we tried to respond to the Legal Officer in advance but

24 there's no objection.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

Page 33696

1 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Batinic, today you were asked about your

5 resignation and some misunderstandings or differences between the

6 civilian authorities and the TO, which is something that you discuss in

7 paragraph 16 of your statement. In the second part of the paragraph you

8 say:

9 "The civilian authorities in Rogatica which was hoping for a

10 political solution and believed in the negotiations ..." et cetera,

11 et cetera "is opposed to the TO."

12 Can you tell the Chamber what kind of information did the

13 civilian authorities have that they founded their hopes on and what

14 information did the TO have?

15 A. To tell you the truth, we expected that a political solution

16 would be possible and we acted in that vein. We did what we could.

17 However, I suppose that the TO received other information along other

18 lines which was against a dialogue, but rather that different means be

19 applied. It was our belief that we should engage in negotiations and

20 that it was up to us to do our utmost to avoid any unwanted situations.

21 Q. Thank you. In that paragraph you say that their assessment

22 proved to be more correct because shortly afterwards a Serb policeman was

23 killed. The Prosecution suggested to you that we - the Serbs - made use

24 of that killing as an excuse to attack Rogatica. It was also suggested

25 to you that Mr. Ujic on page 33459 said that there was some shooting and

Page 33697

1 the use of artillery and so on and so forth. First of all, tell us this:

2 Where did the murder take place and how far is it from the centre of

3 town?

4 A. It's some 3 kilometres away towards Gorazde, to the south, where

5 Bosnian -- Bosniak forces were in the area of Laze and Pasic Kula.

6 Q. Did you say that it is not or that it is 3 kilometres away?

7 A. It is 3 kilometres away.

8 Q. Thank you. Where was the fighting and where were mortars used?

9 A. In that part when the territory was being liberated in order to

10 pull out the dead man's body.

11 Q. Thank you. In lines 21 and 22, I will read them out to you in

12 English.

13 [In English] "Of course there was an exchange of fire and the war

14 was on its way."

15 [Interpretation] That is page 33459, Ujic. So what is your

16 position? Was it the Serbs who were firing unilaterally or is what Ujic

17 said true, that there was an exchange of fire?

18 A. I think there was an exchange of fire.

19 Q. Thank you. On page 51 of today's transcript you were asked, or

20 rather, what was suggested to you was that we had taken advantage of that

21 incident and the killing of the Serb policeman in order to take over

22 Rogatica. When was Rogatica liberated?

23 A. I think it was sometime towards the end of July.

24 Q. Thank you. In the meantime who was in Rogatica and who

25 controlled the centre of town, the town itself, if you will?

Page 33698

1 A. At first it was no one. After all, it was no man's land and

2 probably it was both that were wandering around.

3 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to ask you to look at a few documents.

4 P3265, could we have a look at that, please. Please, Mr. Batinic, focus

5 on this report of the battalion commander - it was a battalion at the

6 time - of the Municipal Assembly of Rogatica of the 23rd of May and Kusic

7 says there that they fired at an enemy stronghold, Dub, Pokrivenik, and

8 Kozica and Cadovi ... and on Pasica Kula. And further down it says that:

9 "The body of a soldier was recovered that had been in the

10 possession of enemy forces for the last two day. There were no losses in

11 the operations above Rogatica. In the rear the enemy forces killed two

12 old men."

13 So what does that mean "above Rogatica"? And does this report

14 correspond to your own knowledge about this?

15 A. Well, I don't know much about this. I just know that the

16 soldier, Mihajlovic, lost his life and that for about two days they could

17 not get ahold of his body, then there was an exchange of fire, then

18 Mihajlovic was taken out, and I don't know about these further reports

19 and I couldn't really comment on them.

20 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what this means, enemy stronghold

21 Dub, Pokrivenik, and then further on Kopljevici, Kozica, Cadovi?

22 A. In that area, that's where Muslim forces were stationed in the

23 Muslim police. And then a family was killed there, Obradovic, three or

24 four of them were killed brutally so that area towards Ustipraca and

25 Gorazde was primarily under the control of the Bosniak forces.

Page 33699

1 Q. In line 2 the witness said "brutally," "zverski" but maybe it's

2 better to say "bestially."

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. The learned Ms. Gustafson asked you today what it

5 meant that you protected only villages that had expressed their loyalty.

6 What about the other villages? Could you protect the civilians in those

7 villages too that had not expressed their loyalty and what does loyalty

8 or disloyalty consist of?

9 A. Well, I would prefer to say that it was Bosniaks, Muslims, who

10 were the citizens in those villages. As for the other villages, we could

11 not access them. That was within the war operations zone. The villages

12 that we reached were accessible and they were not in the war zone.

13 Q. Thank you. Could I now please ask for 65 ter 7088. Please do

14 focus on this regular operative report of the 29th of May,

15 Commander Rajko Kusic sent it and says under number 2:

16 "In the areas of Pokrivenik and Dub there are considerable enemy

17 forces. About 3.000 to 4 -- or rather, 300 to 400 armed men are around

18 Karacici, Golubovici and Vragolovi."

19 What is that?

20 A. These are villages around the urban part of Rogatica. The

21 population is predominantly Muslim and probably other people from certain

22 villages who were there at the time.

23 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 5 it says that they went to Ferizovici,

24 and on the previous day the enemy operated against our positions in the

25 area. What does that mean? Did the attacks come from Ferizovici?

Page 33700

1 A. These were neighbouring villages. Ferizovici is predominantly

2 Serb populated, and Vragolovi and the rest are Muslim-populated villages.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

5 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated]

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: [Microphone not activated]

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I think it's now activated.

8 All you asked about this document is some names of the places.

9 Ms. Gustafson.

10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, Your Honour. The witness didn't appear to

11 confirm any of the contents of the document, just the --

12 JUDGE KWON: Nothing.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: -- locations, so I don't think the foundation is

14 there.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies,

16 Your Excellencies, I asked on the basis of the questions put during the

17 cross-examination in terms of why they did not protect civilians in

18 Muslim villages. And it turned out that these villages had been taken by

19 the Muslim army and they were actually firing from Ferizovici and this

20 document shows that there was not --

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you are not giving evidence yourself.

22 You did not ask a substantive question at all to the witness.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You were asked about these

24 villages, why you did not protect them. The content of this document, is

25 it something that you're familiar with? Is it true that the enemy army

Page 33701

1 was in those villages and it was firing from those villages.

2 A. I'm not familiar with this document but I know that these

3 villages are around the urban part of town and these villages were

4 primarily Muslim-populated.

5 Q. And were there any Muslim fighters in these villages, any Muslim

6 army?

7 A. Probably, but I cannot confirm with 100 per cent certainty.

8 Q. Thank you. Around these villages and between those villages and

9 Serb villages, was there any fighting?

10 A. Believe me, I cannot confirm that with certainty. It is certain

11 that these villages were in a war zone at the time. There was always a

12 bit of gun-fire. Where and how I cannot say because I was not a

13 participant in this.

14 Q. If this is not sufficient for you, I am going to tender this

15 through someone else who is more familiar with the fighting. You decide.

16 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson.

17 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, I think again the witness doesn't confirm

18 the contents in it and Dr. Karadzic's suggestion is appropriate.

19 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

20 Just a second.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, since you said so, tender it with

23 another witness.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. But in relation to what

25 had been asked and suggested during the cross-examination, I do have to

Page 33702

1 get an answer from the witness in terms of whether civilians were being

2 brought in and whether there was fighting. 65 ter 7543, could I have

3 that, please.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Batinic, did you have any information about these civilians

6 being brought in to town against their own will?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Thank you. Was there any shelling of Muslim settlements with the

9 aim of driving the civilians out?

10 A. I cannot confirm that.

11 Q. Thank you. The second sentence now, please. If you have a

12 problem with your eyesight:

13 "Large numbers of Muslim civilians arrive in town every day,

14 mostly women and children and unarmed people. The people are finding

15 shelter in the secondary school centre.

16 "Snipers are firing from two or three places in town. The enemy

17 attacked a column ..."

18 Et cetera, et cetera. These civilians, were they brought

19 forcibly or did they flee from the fighting and did they come

20 voluntarily?

21 A. There was certainly fighting in town and it is certain that

22 civilians were trying to save themselves. I don't know what was going on

23 there, but if somebody told them to go to the secondary school and that

24 that was a safe place, then they probably went to the secondary school.

25 Q. Thank you. Mr. Batinic, how do you explain this, that the Muslim

Page 33703

1 civilians are seeking shelter from fighting in the Serb-held area of

2 Rogatica? What kind of confidence is that?

3 A. It is certainly true that I would have welcomed that and I would

4 want civilians and helpless people to be given shelter during all that

5 fighting, and also I would want them to have appropriate accommodation.

6 I believe that people -- a large number of people cannot stay in such

7 facilities for a long time.

8 Q. Thank you. Look at the one-but-last:

9 "The following were used in operations in town: 350 x 7.62 mm

10 bullets for the automatic rifle and semi-automatic rifle, 430 x 7.9 mm

11 bullets and 520 bullets for the M84 light machine-gun. No shells were

12 used."

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not catch the

14 question or the answer either.

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Batinic, the interpreters could not hear you

16 because you were overlapping with the interpretation. Could you repeat

17 your answer.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To be honest, I'm not very

19 knowledgeable about weapons and I don't know whether that is a lot or a

20 great deal.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. My question wasn't recorded either. I asked whether this was a

23 large amount of ammunition that was used in urban warfare without shells?

24 A. I think it's not.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

Page 33704

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

2 MS. GUSTAFSON: Again, the witness has basically speculated on

3 the questions that have been put to him. He's made it clear he wasn't in

4 the town at this time and wasn't even there until the operation -- until

5 he says it was safe to go to the town at the end of July. He wasn't

6 involved in any of these operations.

7 JUDGE KWON: But it -- you touched upon this issue, i.e., the

8 situation in which the Muslim civilians were arriving and maybe ending up

9 in the secondary school.

10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, Your Honour, I did. Firstly, the document I

11 put to the witness was a document addressed to him, it was also dated

12 November 1992 after the witness had visited the secondary school. I'm

13 not objecting to the questions; I'm objecting to the admission of this

14 document because the witness wasn't in the town at this time, he wasn't

15 involved in the operations in the town, and he hasn't been able to

16 confirm the contents of the document.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- just a second.

18 Yes, Mr. Robinson.

19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. At the end of page 74 the

20 witness said there was certainly fighting in the town. If you look at

21 the fourth paragraph -- the fifth paragraph of the document it talks

22 about their operations in the town. So he's confirmed that -- he's

23 confirmed part of the document and I think that that's enough for the

24 standard that you've been applying for and the arguments as to what he

25 knew and how he knew it all go to weight.

Page 33705

1 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will receive this document.

2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2933, Your Honours.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us just note that this report

4 is dated the 11th of June, and now let us call up 65 ter 7272.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. You were asked, Mr. Batinic, whether there had been fighting,

7 whether we had attacked, whether we had attacked with the objective of

8 expelling the Muslim population, and now I would like to ask you to take

9 a look at this report of the 12th of June. The first sentence says:

10 "In the area of the municipality the enemy became obvious in

11 several places by infiltrating sabotage groups whose probable objective

12 was creating a space for penetration and for linking forces in the

13 interior with the forces in Zepa."

14 We haven't got a translation yet. This was also written by

15 Rajko Kusic and he sent it to the command of the

16 Army of Republika Srpska.

17 Further down it says:

18 "A larger concentration of Muslim population has been noticed in

19 town and they are staying in the secondary school centre. Among the

20 population there are primarily women and children and there are also

21 unarmed men. In town sniper shooters were also noticed and they were

22 firing at town as the column was passing towards town, or rather, towards

23 Gorazde."

24 You were asked about civilians, about bringing in civilians.

25 This report, is it correct according to what you know about the fighting

Page 33706

1 and the way in which the civilians came into town?

2 A. There were certainly groups that were armed on both sides and

3 certainly there were wounded and dead persons in town. But, as this

4 report says - and believe me, I cannot fully understand it. I was not

5 authorised then. This is the first time that I see it. It is a fact

6 that there was fighting in town, people were getting killed, and people

7 were basically fleeing to places that were supposed to be safer for them.

8 Q. Thank you. In relation to the actual occurrence rather than the

9 document, does this correspond to your own knowledge about the way in

10 which civilians came to town and about the fighting -- actually, the

11 level of conflict, or rather, presence of conflict, not level of

12 conflict?

13 A. Yes, there was certainly fighting for at least two months until

14 late July when one could enter town finally, when we found those

15 civilians in the high school building.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

18 JUDGE KWON: I don't think there's any basis to admit it now.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then I will skip a few

20 other documents in that regard.

21 Could we next have -- I will not tender it. Let's look at

22 65 ter 7951. It is an analysis of combat-readiness until the

23 31st of December, 1992. 65 ter 7951. Page 3, please. There is a

24 translation, apologies, that is why I didn't want to tender it. It has

25 been translated. I wasn't aware of it. The last sentence --

Page 33707

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could we have page 3 as

2 well in the English.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. "In the village of Trnovo" the bottom of that page, in the

5 Serbian the bottom of page 3. "Family" -- well, the next page, please.

6 Obradovic, the Obradovic family, is that the family mentioned?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Let us look at the line below "at the time," which is some ten

9 lines from the bottom. The encircled Ustasha in the town --

10 JUDGE KWON: Let's find the passage in the English as well.

11 MS. GUSTAFSON: I think it's on the bottom half of page 4.

12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

13 THE ACCUSED: At that time ..." [Interpretation] The tenth line

14 from the bottom in the [In English] "... encircled Ustashas ..."

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. "At that time, the encircled Ustashas started strategy Serb

17 property and liquidating Serbs in town. In order to prevent this, the

18 brigade had to intervene promptly in protecting the undamaged property

19 and rescuing and saving those Serbs who were still alive."

20 Is this the period in late July when Rogatica was liberated?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I'm interested in the truthfulness of the following paragraph.

23 "Part of the enemy forces withdrew towards Kukavice ..."

24 What is it?

25 A. It's a large Muslim-populated village in the direction of

Page 33721

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to

4 tender this package according to Rule 92 ter.

5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, we're offering nine associated

6 exhibits, the last six of which that are on our list are not on our

7 Rule 65 ter list and we would ask that they be added as they were not

8 available to us until we interviewed this witness.

9 JUDGE KWON: Before I hear from the Prosecution whether it has

10 any objection, I have several matters with respect to some of the

11 associated exhibits. First, with respect to magazines, possibly the

12 interview of Oric, 1D13045 and 1D13046 referred to in paras 77 and 78,

13 it's a bit difficult from the paragraph themselves in what context the

14 witness is confirming or commenting the content of the magazine. So I

15 would like the accused to lead live. And with respect to 1D13049 which

16 is being referred to in para 82, I note the title of the document

17 referred to in the notification, Rule 92 ter notification, does not

18 mention the underlying document, so if you could check it. Otherwise, do

19 you have any objection, Ms. Sutherland?

20 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

22 MS. SUTHERLAND: We would object to 1D04075 which is referred to

23 in paragraph 52 as not being relevant.

24 JUDGE KWON: That document is dealing with what is contained in

25 para 52?

Page 33722

1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE KWON: So -- but you are not asking for the redaction of

3 the paragraph but not to admit that document?

4 MS. SUTHERLAND: From the word "document number 1D4075" --

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

6 MS. SUTHERLAND: -- to the end of the paragraph I would seek to

7 have redacted.

8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

9 Yes, Mr. Robinson --

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: I would --

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I will hear out Ms. Sutherland first.

12 Yes, please continue.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND: I also seek redaction of three additional --

14 some text in three additional paragraphs and that is paragraphs 18, 53,

15 and 62, making reference to documents that were previously listed on the

16 initial Rule 92 ter notification which was filed which have now been

17 dropped from the revised notification. So if I can take Your Honours to

18 paragraph 18.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

20 MS. SUTHERLAND: I would seek to have the words from the second

21 line "and this is evident from the statements of ..." down to the end of

22 that sentence with "document number 1D4059" because it's now no longer an

23 associated exhibit.

24 JUDGE KWON: So two lines?

25 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes.

Page 33723

1 JUDGE KWON: Part of two lines.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

4 MS. SUTHERLAND: And in paragraph 53 the second -- third sentence

5 starting with "document number 1D4068" to the end of the paragraph should

6 be redacted because that document is no longer an associated exhibit.

7 JUDGE KWON: And 62?

8 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. You have already ruled on

9 that just a moment ago when you said from document number 1D13041 to the

10 end of the paragraph that's been redacted so that's been dealt with.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We don't have any objection

13 to those proposed redactions for 18 and 53. We do persist and believe

14 that the document 1D4075 is admissible and relevant. This is a different

15 situation than tu quoque evidence. When we -- these events around

16 Srebrenica going back to 1992 we can't have a sanitised version of the

17 facts that only Serbs were involved in military operations in that area

18 and redact everything that shows that the Muslims were doing the same.

19 So we maintain that that's considered -- still relevant. And with

20 respect to 13049, I see that you're completely right and the document is

21 misdescribed. In e-court it's accurately described but misdescribed on

22 our 92 ter notification.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Is it not sufficient to admit

24 paragraph 52 without admitting the criminal report? Is it really

25 necessary?

Page 33724

1 MR. ROBINSON: Well, if you applied that same standard to any

2 other documents offered by the Prosecution, there would be a lot fewer

3 exhibits in the case. So it's not absolutely necessary, but I also don't

4 see any reason why we would change the procedure at this stage.

5 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to add anything, Ms. Sutherland?

6 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour. I will leave it with you.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 MS. SUTHERLAND: In relation to that paragraph.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive 1D4075 and leave the sentence there.

11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour --

12 JUDGE KWON: Otherwise, we agree with the -- with Ms. Sutherland

13 as admitted by the Defence, those passages referred to my Ms. Sutherland

14 should be redacted.

15 Yes?

16 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, we also had an issue with 1D --

17 1D4153, which has a lot of handwriting on it, but it was established in

18 the break just a moment ago that the handwriting on that exhibit is, in

19 fact, made by the witness. So I wanted to note that for the record and

20 also there's some underlining and handwriting on 1D13047 and 1D13048.

21 And I -- and that is also the witness 's handwriting.

22 JUDGE KWON: Witness's handwriting has been translated?

23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

25 MS. SUTHERLAND: It's the handwriting in the margin.

Page 33725

1 JUDGE KWON: So you are happy with commenting that on record?

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

4 Shall we admit one by one? Shall we give the number for the

5 statement first?

6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour that's Exhibit D2932.

7 JUDGE KWON: And we'll admit 1D4075.

8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2934.

9 JUDGE KWON: 1D4 -- yes --

10 THE REGISTRAR: 1D4085 as Exhibit D2935. 1D4153 as

11 Exhibit D2936. 1D3045 as Exhibit D --

12 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it later on. And we'll admit 1D13047.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2937, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE KWON: 1D13048.

15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2938.

16 JUDGE KWON: 1D13049.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2939.

18 JUDGE KWON: And finally 1D13051.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2940.

20 JUDGE KWON: Let me check how long it will be to read out the

21 summary.

22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23 JUDGE KWON: With the indulgence of the interpreters and

24 court reporter, we'll hear the summary today and continue tomorrow.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'm going to read the

Page 33726

1 summary out in the English language.

2 [In English] Tomislav Savkic was born in Dubnica on

3 January the 1st, 1956, Milici municipality. He completed his primary

4 school in Milici and the secondary grammar school in Vlasenica, and then

5 he went on to graduate from the electrical engineering faculty in Tuzla.

6 He got his first job in 1980 at the secondary school centre in

7 Vlasenica where he worked as a teacher. After serving in the army he

8 started working at the Boksit coal mine in Milici in 1984. He worked in

9 this company until the outbreak of the war in 1992. In early 1992 he was

10 appointed commander of the defence of the Boksit mine and after that he

11 worked as an engineer. On November the 1st, 1992, he was appointed

12 commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion in Milici. He remained in this

13 post until November the 1st, 1993, when he became president of the

14 Milici Municipal Assembly. From then on until the end of the war he did

15 not have any military duties.

16 Tomislav Savkic noticed that inter-ethnic problems began mounting

17 when the breakup of Yugoslavia began, particularly when the nationalist

18 parties were established. The SDA were particularly active in glorifying

19 its own ethnic group and the founding Assemblies of the SDA served as

20 platforms for the outpours of hatred towards Serbs and instances of Serbs

21 being threatened. Many Muslims displayed their national emblems and

22 there were a number of instances where the SDS flag was burnt in a

23 Serbian village by the Muslim extremists. During the foundation Assembly

24 of the SDS Serbs travelling to the meeting were pelted with stones.

25 As the result of the multi-party elections, the SDS and SDA

Page 33727

1 divided the government in Vlasenica evenly; however, problems arose from

2 the beginning as the Muslims and the SDA did not have professionally

3 trained staff and their nominees did not have the required

4 qualifications. However, these appointments were granted.

5 In June 1991 the Muslims, on orders from the leaders of the SDA,

6 attempted to break up the JNA. They were ordered not to send their

7 recruits for compulsory military service or respond to the mobilisations.

8 In one instance members of the SDA pressured the president of the

9 Municipal Assembly to provide buses to take them to where the territorial

10 units had been mobilised as they wished to return the Muslim men home.

11 During this period that the Muslims began to procure weapons with

12 urgency, the Serbian people began to worry. And although the SJB, police

13 station, attempted to do something about this arming, they were

14 unsuccessful in stopping it. At the same the Muslims were forming

15 paramilitary units. Many were sent to Croatia for training and policemen

16 were also sent to create a further fighting force. The Muslims in the

17 paramilitary units began openly carrying automatic weapons.

18 In September 1991 at a rally, Muslims -- the Muslims publicly

19 declared by that they already had 250 soldiers ready for war. In the

20 same month, Muslim paramilitary formations started setting up ambushes on

21 the main road between Milici and Skelani, stopping buses transporting

22 employees to the Boksit mine to work. The Muslims would hold on to the

23 bus and force the workers to continue the rest of the route on foot.

24 Muslim paramilitaries would enter Serbian villages and terrorise

25 the population. The security situation was beginning to slip out of

Page 33728

1 control so night sentries were established to ensure the population's

2 safety. Further, over this period the municipal authorities were losing

3 power as they were not able to agree to many topics with the Muslims and

4 many civilians began leaving the municipality.

5 Towards the end of 1991 a proclamation from the Muslim

6 National Council of BH which declared their intentions to create a Muslim

7 state, Muslim armed forces, education, and administrative organs. To try

8 to stop a war, the Serbian people suggested the formation of the

9 Autonomous District of Birac, which would be a part of BH. This was

10 passed on 26th of December, 1991. The Serbs in the authorities tried in

11 many peaceful ways to agree with the Muslims on all the problems in the

12 attempt to avoid the war.

13 Mr. Tomislav Savkic is not aware of any instructions allegedly

14 issued by Radovan Karadzic to the representatives of municipalities at a

15 meeting held in the Holiday Inn Hotel on 20th of December, 1991, neither

16 is he aware of Variants of Plan A and B.

17 The municipality of Milici was established on

18 31st of March, 1992. A working group was proposed to draw up an

19 agreement on the division of the municipality. Although an agreement was

20 drawn up the Muslims were ordered to drag their feet with completing to

21 allow as many Muslims to leave Srebrenica [sic] as possible.

22 On 24th of April, 1992, as the situation grew more complicated

23 with the Muslim deputies because less agreements were reached, a

24 Crisis Staff for Vlasenica was established. The task of this

25 Crisis Staff was to monitor closely the newly arisen situation and to

Page 33729

1 issue quickly and efficiently decisions aimed at addressing it.

2 The correct circumstances existed to create the Crisis Staff.

3 The authorities received information that the Muslims were preparing to

4 mount an all-out attack on Vlasenica and therefore Territorial Defence

5 units were sent in to dispel this. Following this, the remaining Muslim

6 population then left the area. A number gathered outside the municipal

7 building and the police station asking to be provided with organised

8 transport. At the same time a large number of Serbian refugees started

9 arriving as they had been expelled from other areas by Muslims. These

10 refugees needed to be housed and the authorities decided that the Serbian

11 refugees should be given temporary accommodation in a T -- in a

12 Territorial Defence building until accommodation could be sorted for them

13 in abandoned houses and flats.

14 This issue was resolved in a few days; however, more Muslims

15 gathered awaiting public transport and therefore a decision was made to

16 house them in the Territorial Defence buildings too. Many Muslims

17 returned to the Territorial Defence building at night as they felt safer

18 there, while during the day they were being in city. When Muslim

19 civilians made requests to be housed or have transport provided, the

20 authorities completed their requests as fully as possible.

21 Muslim paramilitary formations continued to carry out ambushes

22 during May 1992, capturing both drivers and vehicles, killing civilians

23 including women and children. Further, the Muslim forces damaged all

24 electricity power lines, leaving the Milici and Vlasenica without

25 electrical power and also mined bridges and tunnels cutting off Milici

Page 33730

1 and Vlasenica from Drina River and Serbia and the rest of the world. In

2 late 1991 and early 1992, Tomislav Savkic was aware that Muslim

3 extremists repeatedly fired automatic weapons at buses carrying secondary

4 school pupils.

5 The only road that could be used for travel had become unsafe due

6 to the Muslim forces ambushing travellers. These attacks continued into

7 September 1992 killing and wounding civilians and many vehicles were

8 torched. To avoid any further losses and to allow the safe passage for

9 the wounded and the civilians and the military authorities decided that a

10 corridor had to be created.

11 At the same time, the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo launched

12 propaganda claiming that the Republika Srpska army was attacking the town

13 of Cerska and slaughtering civilians. A representative of international

14 forces visited Cerska and saw that this was not the case. Srebrenica and

15 Zepa were declared safe areas to be demilitarised.

16 An attempt was made to demilitarise the area; however, the

17 Muslims had orders to only hand-over their old and faulty weapons. Soon

18 soldiers began carrying weapons publicly and carrying out military

19 training and the UN did not react to ammunition being received by Muslim

20 forces. Soldiers were active even after Srebrenica had been declared a

21 safe area, murdering civilians, ambushing, and looting Serbian property.

22 He was aware that the commanders of the BH Army were preparing to mount

23 fresh combat operations from the safe area of Srebrenica in October 1994.

24 Tomislav Savkic considers that the war the Muslims waged on BH was not

25 defensive but an offensive one.

Page 33731

1 Tomislav Savkic never heard Radovan Karadzic or any other

2 political leader from Pale order the killing or the persecution of

3 Muslims, their detention in a camp or the destruction of their property.

4 He was aware that in the beginning Radovan Karadzic was saying that the

5 Serbs had to try and avoid war in every way and, if it did come to war,

6 great care had to be taken to protect Muslim and Croatian civilians and

7 prisoners of war had to be treated extremely humanely.

8 [Interpretation] I would like to leave my questions for tomorrow,

9 Excellencies.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Briefly two matters before we adjourn today.

11 While we appreciate your objections, Ms. Sutherland, Mr. Tieger and

12 Ms. Sutherland, in the future I would prefer to hear the objections as

13 soon as possible instead of just prior to the witness's evidence. So

14 either orally or in writing. If urgent, you can e-mail -- you can give

15 notice through e-mail and then we can discuss during the courtroom.

16 Second, in the week of 18th of March the Chamber is minded to sit

17 from Tuesday to Friday instead of Monday to Thursday, due to some

18 internal matters. So if the parties could inform the Chamber staff

19 through e-mail whether it has any problem.

20 I thank again for the -- thank the staff for their indulgence.

21 And, Mr. Savkic, we'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. The

22 hearing is adjourned.

23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,

24 to be reconvened on Friday, the 15th day of

25 February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.