Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 34222

 1                           Tuesday, 26 February 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Today and tomorrow we'll be

 6     sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis with Judge Lattanzi away due to her

 7     urgent personal matters.

 8             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours.  I

10     have two preliminary matters I wish to raise, the first of which should

11     be raised in private session.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Could the Chamber move into private

13     session briefly.

14                           [Private session]

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Page 34223











11  Page 34223 redacted.  Private session.















Page 34224

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13                           [Open session]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16             Mr. President, the Court is now seized of our motion for relief

17     in regard to the issue of 65 ter summaries and witness statements.  I

18     raise a matter -- I mean, the Defence will respond to that.  The Court

19     will make its decision in due course, but meanwhile, the problem, of

20     course, continues to arise, so I wanted to bring the Court's attention to

21     two particular upcoming instances where that issue is implicated, and

22     specifically that concerns two witnesses for next week, and that would be

23     Mr. Martic and Mr. Kicanovic.

24             In the case of -- let me take Mr. Kicanovic first.  We just

25     received an English statement for him last night.  Now, that's in the

Page 34225

 1     face of completely formulaic and inadequate 65 ter summary.  So our first

 2     awareness of what this witness proposes to testify about is essentially

 3     taking place now since we just have that statement.

 4             We will do our best to be ready to proceed with cross-examination

 5     if possible, but that is far from certain, so I wanted to bring the

 6     Court's attention to that problem.  I raised it with Mr. Robinson.  He

 7     understand the nature of the problem and agrees fully that if the nature

 8     of the statement is such that Prosecution is not in a position to

 9     cross-examine, that there should be an appropriate and reasonable

10     deferral of time to commence cross-examination after the direct

11     examination.

12             With respect to Mr. Martic, who is obviously a witness

13     implicating significant issues, we have nothing meaningful and do not

14     anticipate getting anything meaningful until essentially the moment of

15     direct examination.  That I believe is a problem in part resulting from

16     logistical issues that the Defence has described earlier, but whatever

17     the cause, the impact on the Prosecution is the same.

18             Again, I have discussed this matter with Mr. Robinson.  He fully

19     concurs that under the circumstances a meaningful period of time between

20     any direct examination and the commencement of cross should take place

21     and is necessary to ensure that there is meaningful time to prepare

22     cross-examination.  It's difficult to know under the circumstances

23     precisely how long that might be before we are seized of the information

24     to which the witness will testify, but I think it's safe to say that it's

25     likely to be of sufficient breadth and significance that there will have

Page 34226

 1     to be a significant period of time between direct examination and

 2     cross-examination.  So I wanted to raise that with the Court in advance.

 3             As mentioned, Mr. Robinson and I discussed that, so adjustments

 4     may have been made to the proposed Defence calendar accordingly, but

 5     other than that, this is a problem that will, I believe, continue to

 6     surface until a broader resolution as proposed by the motion filed by the

 7     Prosecution takes place.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

 9             Mr. Robinson.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Well, first of all, we've

11     always taken the position that the Prosecution should have as much time

12     as reasonable in order to prepare once they receive the material, so that

13     remains our position with respect to these two witnesses.  So for

14     Mr. Kicanovic, if the Prosecution would like more time, we'll postpone

15     his testimony or his cross-examination and that's pretty simple.

16             With Mr. Martic it's more complicated, because we were supposed

17     to meet with him this afternoon, myself and Dr. Karadzic, to - what we

18     described as an introductory meeting - to find out from him if he wants

19     to have a lawyer assisting him and how we can work to prepare his

20     Rule 92 ter statement.  The Registry has refused that meeting and said

21     that because of your order separating Dr. Karadzic from Mr. Martic, that

22     that would not be allowed, and so I have asked now if I can meet with

23     Mr. Martic myself, and they wouldn't be able to accommodate that meeting

24     now until Thursday because they have to write him a letter and translate

25     it into his language asking him if he consents to meet with me.  So I --

Page 34227

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just stopping there, did the Chamber prohibit

 2     Mr. Karadzic from proofing his witness?

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  No.  You allowed him to proof the witness, but

 4     they don't see this as a proofing session since we're just going to meet

 5     Mr. Martic for the first time and find out how he wishes to proceed.  So

 6     they consider that to be a contact that was disallowed by them.  Then

 7     they said they will allow one proofing session which obviously has to

 8     occur after the Rule 92 ter statement is prepared.  So we've had some

 9     delay in trying to meet with Mr. Martic and the plan is to prepare -- for

10     me to work with him and prepare a Rule 92 ter statement and to disclose

11     that to the Prosecution.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Sorry to interrupt you again.  So it is the practice

13     that proofing is limited to just one time.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  No, that's not the practice at all, but the UNDU

15     interpreted the purposes of our meeting -- or the Registry interpreted

16     the purpose of our meeting with Mr. Martic not to be included within

17     proofing.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  Was any specific reason given for that

19     determination?

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, we received a written letter, and they simply

21     said that because the Chamber had ordered Dr. Karadzic separated from

22     Mr. Martic other than for proofing that they wouldn't allow the meeting.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, but did they -- was there an explanation

24     given as to why such a meeting is not a proofing meeting?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  No.  So -- but it's -- you know, if -- it's not

Page 34228

 1     essential that Dr. Karadzic be part of that first meeting.  It's just --

 2     it's going to cause some delay.  So we don't expect Mr. Martic will be

 3     testifying immediately as -- next week as we had planned.  We'll do our

 4     best once we've met with him to try to accelerate that, and we will

 5     give -- after we prepare the Rule 92 ter statement, we'll give that to

 6     the Prosecution and figure out when the best time is for him to give his

 7     testimony.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, your Excellency.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Considering that I represent myself

11     and that, so to speak, I am lead counsel, I don't understand why I'm

12     subjected to such restrictions.  I would understand it after the

13     beginning of testimony.  I absolutely understand, and I try hard not to

14     look at any witness even through the window, but I'm not quite clear why

15     am I restricted to one meeting?  I believe there is absolutely no

16     equality of arms here.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson said that it is not the practice, and

18     then this issue is not such an essential issue.  Let's leave it there and

19     then the Chamber will take a look when it arises again.  I originally

20     formed the impression that it has been sorted out in one way other

21     another.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Before we hear the evidence of the next witness,

24     there are three matters I'd like to deal with.  The first two relate to

25     oral rulings the Chamber is minded to give now.

Page 34229

 1             First, the Chamber will issue an oral ruling in relation to the

 2     testimony of Desimir Sarenac, scheduled as the sixth witness to testify

 3     in March 2013.  The accused seeks to tender 230 associated exhibits

 4     through the witness and expects to use 15 minutes on direct examination

 5     with him.

 6             The witness's testimony was initially scheduled for January but

 7     was postponed due to the large number of documents that remained

 8     untranslated.  On 15th of February, 2013, the Prosecution stated that the

 9     proposed associated exhibits were being reviewed but that there would be

10     numerous objections to their admission.  On the 25th of February, the

11     Chamber and the accused were informed via e-mail that Prosecution would

12     object to the admission of all of the 230 proposed associated exhibits.

13             The Chamber simply cannot accept that such a large number of

14     associated exhibits be tendered pursuant to Rule 92 ter as it is not an

15     efficient use of the Chamber's and the Prosecution's out-of-court time

16     and resources.  On several instances during the Prosecution's case, the

17     Chamber proprio motu ordered that certain witnesses through whom the

18     Prosecution was seeking the admission of large volumes of transcript be

19     called viva voce.  The same reasoning must be applied to associated

20     exhibits.  In the specific instance, the witness's statement is 20 pages

21     long, and the proposed associated exhibits are listed in large blocks to

22     illustrate the witness's brief comments.  Just as an illustrative

23     example, paragraph 30 of the witness's statement refers to 102 documents.

24     This is unacceptable.  Furthermore, allowing the accused to tender such a

25     high number of associated exhibits would require the Chamber to grant an

Page 34230

 1     inordinate amount of time for cross-examination to the Prosecution in

 2     comparison to the time used by the accused on chief, which would run

 3     contrary to efficient trial management.  This is also contrary to the

 4     Chamber's recent instruction that the accused should focus and tender

 5     only those exhibits which are really of significance to the case against

 6     him and to avoid tendering peripheral documents through Rule 92 ter

 7     statements.

 8             The Chamber thus orders that Witness Desimir Sarenac be led live.

 9     The Prosecution shall have the same time for its cross-examination as

10     that used by the accused for its examination-in-chief.

11             Next, the Chamber will issue a decision on the Prosecution's

12     "Motion to Partially Exclude the Evidence of Witness Aleksandar

13     Vasiljevic," filed on the 13th of February, 2013, in which the

14     Prosecution seeks to exclude a number of paragraphs from Vasiljevic's

15     statement tendered under Rule 92 ter on the basis that they are

16     irrelevant to the charges in the indictment.  The accused filed his

17     response on the 14th of February, 2013, and, having been granted to do

18     so, the Prosecution filed its reply on the 19th of February, 2013.

19             The Chamber has previously held that detailed evidence on

20     military campaigns during the conflict in Croatia and on events related

21     to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in places other than BiH are not

22     geographically linked to the indictment and are thus beyond the scope of

23     this trial.  As such, the following paragraphs are irrelevant to the

24     charges against the accused and the Chamber orders that they be redacted:

25     Part of paragraph 11, starting from the third sentence; paragraphs 12 to

Page 34231

 1     18; the first sentence of paragraph 23; paragraphs 29 and 31; paragraphs

 2     33 to 37, 40 to 46, 50 to 62; paragraph 65; paragraphs 72 to 83, 97 to

 3     111, and 122 to 123.

 4             The Chamber reminds the accused once again that it will not admit

 5     detailed evidence on crimes against Bosnian Serbs which are not related

 6     to the crimes in the indictment.  Accordingly, the Chamber also orders

 7     that paragraphs 137 and 170 be excluded from the statement.  The

 8     remainder of the Prosecution's motion is therefore denied.

 9             The Chamber hereby instructs the accused to make these redactions

10     and upload the redacted version of the statement onto e-court before

11     Mr. Vasiljevic starts his testimony.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say something for the record,

13     your Excellency?  I know the decision has been made, but I want to say

14     something for the record.

15             JUDGE KWON:  No, not this time, Mr. Karadzic.

16             Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

17                           [Private session]

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 34232

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24                           [Open session]

25             JUDGE KWON:  I take it that the Prosecution is raising -- going

Page 34233

1     to raise some objections with respect to associated exhibits for the next

 2     witness.

 3             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Mr. President.  As foreshadowed in

 5     the message that we sent to the parties and the Chamber, there are a

 6     great number of exhibits that are proposed to be tendered as associated,

 7     the vast majority of which, as we indicated, have not been commented on

 8     at all, and the remaining few do not have sufficient comments, with the

 9     exception of one, to fall within the ambit of associated exhibits forming

10     an inseparable and indispensable part of the statement.  So that's the

11     concern we raised, and we continue to stand by that position.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Dr. Karadzic will deal with

14     that point.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, it is very clear

17     from the indictment that some experts and witnesses for the Prosecution

18     went back to the 14th century.  The following witness produced a large

19     number of documents, and what the Defence offers through him is his own

20     documents.  This is the only way how you can put together the entire

21     picture of the developments even before I appeared on the political

22     scene.  Nothing depended on me, absolutely nothing, and you can see that

23     from those documents.  The restrictions of that kind and the requests by

24     the Prosecution are unjustified.

25             These documents were produced by the witness as part of his daily

Page 34234

 1     job, and if this needs additional justifications and explanations, he

 2     will do that in cross-examination, but these documents confirm everything

 3     that he stated.  They don't have to be a particular commented upon.  They

 4     corroborate whatever he said in his statement.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the point raised by Mr. Tieger and the

 6     Chamber is raising now is this:  In order to admit a certain document as

 7     part of associated exhibits of a Rule 92 ter statement, that document

 8     should form an indispensable and inseparable part of the document.  The

 9     problem is that the statement can be understood without the document,

10     and -- and in some cases it's difficult to understand the -- in what

11     context witness is commenting on that document.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE KWON:  So the Chamber is ordering you to lead live with

14     respect to those documents, except for the one with which the Prosecution

15     agrees.

16             Could you give the number again, Mr. Tieger?  65 ter?

17             MR. TIEGER:  11585, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted as associated exhibit, but as

19     regards the other associated exhibits, I would like you to lead live, and

20     that does not necessarily mean the Chamber will agree with the relevance.

21     We'll deal with the relevance and admission one by one as you go on.

22             That said, we'll bring in the next witness.

23             In the meantime, Mr. Robinson, did you resolve the issue of

24     1D20195, which was allegedly said to be blank?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  It's blank in our description, but it's in e-court

Page 34235

 1     as a regular document.  I don't know if that will be one of the ones that

 2     we'll choose to lead live, but it is in e-court as a regular document.

 3                           [The witness entered court]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration,

 5     please.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 7     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.  Please be seated and make

 9     yourself comfortable.

10                           WITNESS:  VLADISLAV JOVANOVIC

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

13                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, your Excellency.

15        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

16        Q.   I have to ask you kindly to make a little pause after my

17     questions.  We also need to speak slowly so that all of your words may be

18     fully recorded.  This is very important to me.

19             Your Excellency, did you provide a statement to my Defence team.

20        A.   Yes, I did.

21        Q.   I would like to call up 1D7810 in e-court.  7810.  Do you see the

22     statement in front of you?

23        A.   Yes, I do.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did you read the statement, and did you sign it?

25        A.   Yes, I did.

Page 34236

 1        Q.   Is this your signature?

 2        A.   Yes, it is.

 3        Q.   Is this statement accurate?  Does it accurately reflect whatever

 4     you said to the Defence team?

 5        A.   I believe so.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today,

 7     would your answers be the same as they are in the statement?

 8        A.   I believe so.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

10     tender the statement with an associated document into evidence, and

11     pursuant to the Trial Chamber's decision, I will lead some of the

12     documents live with the witness.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we give the exhibit number for the Rule 92 ter

14     statement.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3015, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE KWON:  And, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Robinson, I forgot to

17     mention that there are a few exhibits that could be admitted pursuant to

18     Rule 92 ter as associated exhibits.  I will name them one by one.

19     1D20199, referred to in para 61.  We'll admit it.  Shall we give the

20     number as we proceed.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3016, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  1D20225 referred to in para 40.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3017, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  1D20238, referred to in para 31.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3018, Your Honours.

Page 34237

 1             JUDGE KWON:  1D20257 -- no.  I leave it there.  Yes, 65 ter

 2     number 11585 referred to in para 72.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3019, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I'm going to read a

 6     summary of Mr. Jovanovic's statement in English.

 7             [In English] His Excellency Vladislav Jovanovic was a diplomat.

 8     During his career, he was a member of various diplomatic bodies and the

 9     ambassador of the SFRY to Turkey.  He was the Minister for Foreign

10     Affairs of Serbia and FRY in July 1991 until September 1995.  In

11     September 1995, he was appointed ambassador of the Federal Republic of

12     Yugoslavia to the United Nations.

13             His Excellency Jovanovic considers that before the fighting broke

14     out in B and H, that a number of Western countries were working out a

15     possible option for bringing the process to an end and turning Yugoslavia

16     into a series of banana republics, and at meetings with foreign

17     ambassadors before the violence, the independence of Slovenia and Croatia

18     was openly advocated.

19             He considers that the country was dissolving from within.

20     Representatives of Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia were established in

21     addition to the SFRY ambassador.  In December 1990, the Serbian people

22     living in Croatia were stripped of their status of constituent people and

23     instead given the title of ethnic minority.  The Croatian authorities

24     declared a political war against Serbian peoples.  Serbs were dismissed

25     from public services, and this instilled the fear in them and Ustashas

Page 34238

 1     also began returning to the SFRY republics.  In 1991, the paramilitary

 2     formations of the new Croatian government launched unprovoked attack on

 3     the JNA, cutting off electricity, water, and food to the barracks.  The

 4     JNA were constantly provoked, challenged, and assaulted.  Negotiations

 5     were held, but they were unsuccessful.  The Serbs in Croatia felt a need

 6     to protect themselves.

 7             His Excellency Vladislav Jovanovic's opinion is that The Hague

 8     Conference on Yugoslavia, which commenced on 7th of September 1991, had

 9     the aim to bring Yugoslavia to an end and that the Carrington paper spelt

10     the end of Yugoslavia.  Vladislav Jovanovic argued at the meeting that

11     Yugoslavia must continue to exist and those who wanted to leave could.

12     However, those that wanted to live together should stay together, but

13     this was ignored.  This conference, in his eyes, immediately allowed the

14     break-up of Yugoslavia, despite the fact that there were no valid

15     arguments to justify secession, and Slovenia and Croatia did this

16     unconstitutionally.  As Serbia's minister, he travelled Europe to explain

17     the arguments put forth by the Serbian side in relation to the secession

18     of the republics.  However, he did not receive much support.

19             In BH, an attempt was made to effectively deny the Serbs their

20     status as a constituent people by out-voting them.  Ambassador Cutileiro

21     held talks in an attempt to reach an agreement between the sides.  This

22     plan was accepted by the Serbs but not by the Muslims.  Other plans were

23     drafted.  However, they were not acceptable to the parties.

24             His Excellency Vladislav Jovanovic considers that the

25     London Conference was organised against the Serbs and the conference was

Page 34239

 1     not interested in resolving problems.  Even at this late stage he felt

 2     that politicians did not know the true situation in BH and many were

 3     unwilling to co-operate.  Talks restarted.  However, no plans were

 4     acceptable to the Serbian leadership.

 5             The Muslim and Croatian leadership applied the same model as the

 6     HDZ in Croatia and blocked the JNA barracks.  Vladislav Jovanovic was

 7     also aware that Bosnian Serbs were blamed for incidents that they had not

 8     caused.

 9             Vladislav Jovanovic met and spoke with President Karadzic on a

10     number of occasions, and in the course of these conversations, he never

11     heard anything about the idea of establishing ethnically pure Serbian

12     national territories in BH.  Karadzic supported the Cutileiro Plan that

13     ethnic minorities remain in the cantons and there is no relocation.  He

14     emphasised that the policy was not one of shelling and targeting the

15     city.  The only plan Vladislav Jovanovic heard Karadzic talking about was

16     one aimed at securing freedom and equality of the Serbs in Bosnia.

17     Systematic killing and inhumane treatment of the Muslims and Croats was

18     not the strategy of the Serbian leadership.

19             His Excellency Vladislav Jovanovic was not aware of the existence

20     of camps in Republika Srpska.  He knew that the RS leadership had

21     information about and discovered on a number of occasions that the

22     International Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations were

23     complicit in helping the opposite side with the smuggling of weapons and

24     ammunition.

25             He also was aware of the total exclusion zone that was set up

Page 34240

 1     around Sarajevo.  When the Serbs responded to the Muslim's breach, they

 2     were bombed by NATO.  However, this never happened to the Muslim side.

 3     The only way the VRS had to -- of ending the NATO air strikes was

 4     capturing members of the UNPROFOR as prisoners of war.

 5             Local enclaves were not demilitarised as requested, and attacks

 6     on Serbian military and civilians were mounted from these locations.

 7     Vladislav Jovanovic first learnt about the crimes in Srebrenica when a

 8     meeting of the UN Security Council was called and he ordered that a

 9     report from Belgrade be compiled.

10             And that would be the short summary.  Now I would like to pose

11     few questions for Minister Jovanovic.

12                           [Defence counsel and accused confer]

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Your Excellency, you were a participant in The Hague Conference

15     on Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1991; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes, that is correct.

17        Q.   Could you please tell us what was left to the arbitration

18     commission to discuss?  How was the task of the arbitration commission

19     defined on the 18th of October, 1991?

20        A.   First of all, I would like to remind everybody that the idea of

21     the peace conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague was presented to our

22     side, more precisely to President Milosevic, by President Mitterrand as a

23     form of providing good services which would not be binding upon the

24     participants.  The only thing was to try and find a common language as

25     between brothers who were having an argument.  If nothing -- if there was

Page 34241

 1     no success, everybody would go home out any consequences.  However, this

 2     did not materialise.

 3             From the very beginning that international conference was not

 4     something that was providing good offices but, rather, imposing a

 5     solution, a solution that materialised very quickly.  The conference

 6     started on the 7th of September and already on the 18th of October

 7     Lord Carrington, presiding over the conference, presented the so-called

 8     treaty provisions for convention on Yugoslavia.  In that document, yes,

 9     that -- those were the provisions of an agreement on Yugoslavia, and that

10     agreement in essence put a dot on the I on the existence of Yugoslavia

11     and called upon all its federative republics to opt for independence and

12     to come to Brussels, to the European Union, to get the confirmation of

13     their independence.

14             The decision on the disappearance of Yugoslavia was made even

15     before the conference started, and the conference was the executor of

16     that decision in a very fast and efficient way.  It is a true blitzkrieg.

17     Only a month was given to the federal republic to say what they had to

18     say, and after that a solution was imposed and it was take-it-or-leave-it

19     solution.  All the other crisis all around the world last for 50 or 60

20     years and nobody tries to impose a solution on them within a month.  In

21     Yugoslavia it was done immediately because there was a need to come up

22     with a pattern that would be offered to the future Soviet Union, which

23     was dissolving at the time.  So Yugoslavia was something that had to be

24     concluded before the Soviet Union imploded.

25             When we were there, we were brought before a fait accompli and we

Page 34242

 1     had to accept what had been defined beforehand, and if we did not do that

 2     we would be subjected to sanctions.  Our position was that Yugoslavia

 3     existed as a state.  It was one of the founders of the League of Nations

 4     and the United Nations, and nobody can -- could annul it for as long as

 5     at least half of its inhabitants were loyal to it.  That was the case of

 6     Yugoslavia.

 7             However, the conference gave the entitlement to the other half

 8     that wanted to leave Yugoslavia, and those who wanted to stay in

 9     Yugoslavia were denied the right to stay in that state.  That was double

10     violence towards a state and towards peace because it was a way that

11     paved the road to an all-out crisis in the former Yugoslavia which

12     finally resulted in an armed conflict.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, I would like to say

15     that the witness said that Yugoslavia was a kind of a guinea pig, and it

16     should be translated as a guinea pig, and it was a guinea pig for the

17     Soviet Union.  That's on line 16 on page 20.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Your Excellency, did you present your position on the right of

20     all the people to self-determination?

21        A.   Both President Milosevic and myself as members of the expert team

22     and all the others -- all the other experts in all the other expert teams

23     presented that in a very clear way.  The right to self-determination is a

24     constitutional right of the peoples who reside in Yugoslavia, and in that

25     they were entitled to use that right in agreement with the peoples who

Page 34243

 1     remained in Yugoslavia and not in a violent and unilateral way.  A

 2     constitutional procedure was already in place for such a case.  It was

 3     not part of the constitution, but it had to be agreed before certain

 4     people wanted to secede from Yugoslavia and leave Yugoslavia.

 5     Unfortunately, not only did they not pay attention to such constitutional

 6     solutions, but they rather resorted to a unilateral and violent secession

 7     from the state, and they were supported very strongly by certain

 8     international factors from certain states, and some of them were very

 9     aggressive in their actions towards Yugoslavia as a state.  I primarily

10     mean Germany, the Vatican, Austria, and some other forces that did not

11     shy from openly being against Yugoslavia, and let's not forget that in --

12     that CI in November 1990 -- like by accident circulated a secret report

13     that envisaged that Yugoslavia would dissolve within 18 months in blood.

14     Unfortunately, that happened almost on the dot.

15             I don't know if anybody had that intention for Yugoslavia to be

16     forced to embark on conflicts and violence.  It remains to be seen.

17     However, the fact is that those reports and interpretations appeared,

18     that Yugoslavia could not remain existing as a state, and that's why it

19     had to be eliminated from the political map in a very fast and efficient

20     way.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Your Excellency.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Jovanovic, could I advise you to speak a bit

23     more slowly for the benefit of the interpreters.

24             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, I'll do that.

Page 34244

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On line 1, page 22, the witness

 2     said the CIA, and that was not recorded in the transcript.

 3             I would like to call up 1D20215.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 5        Q.   Your Excellency, when it comes to the constitution and the

 6     provisions on self-determination, does it make a distinction between the

 7     population and the peoples or ethnicities?

 8        A.   The constitution recognises the right to self-determination to

 9     every people.  It does not recognise it for national minorities but for

10     peoples.  The six Yugoslav peoples that united and became Yugoslavia had

11     that right pursuant to the constitution.  However, that right could not

12     be exercised in a unilateral and violent way, arbitrarily.  There was a

13     procedure envisaged by the constitution, and that could be done in

14     agreement with the other peoples who wanted to stay and remain living in

15     Yugoslavia.  That procedure was not honoured.  If it had been honoured,

16     all those things that happened would not have happened, and I mean by

17     that bloody conflicts, nor would have the international circles who were

18     not interested in preserving Yugoslavia been able to openly meddle with

19     Yugoslav business and to support the secession of others and work against

20     the loyalty of some in Yugoslavia.

21        Q.   When you look at that document, do you recognise it?  Is this

22     your document?  Is this your document that you sent to the conference?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the fourth page of this

Page 34245

 1     document.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Could you please tell us what did you mean when you said at line

 4     5 and 4, "the international law on friendly relations and co-operation

 5     among the states" until the end of at that same sentence?

 6        A.   I can't find the sentence.

 7        Q.   The fourth line from the top.

 8        A.   Yes, from the top.

 9        Q.   The right of self-determination is in that sentence.  That's the

10     end of it.

11        A.   Yes.  That was the first question that we as Serbia sent to

12     Badinter's Arbitration Commission.  This was a supported body to the

13     international conference on Yugoslavia.  We had three questions for them,

14     and this one referred to the right of peoples to self-determination.

15     Lord Carrington rephrased question 1 and question 3 without ever

16     consulting us, and that's how he committed a kind of a violence on the

17     original text that we submitted.  Later on when we asked him why he did

18     that, he explained that it was his right to redefine any proposals that

19     were submitted to him.  Obviously, he could not justify that right in any

20     way or explain it by any other principle.

21             In any case, the right to self-determination was what was the

22     core of the crisis in Yugoslavia.  Obviously some people didn't want to

23     live with others in the same state and there was no doubt about that.

24     Even the constitution envisaged that.  The problem was how to exercise

25     that, whether it do it in a way envisaged by the constitution or in a

Page 34246

 1     violent and unilateral way.  On the other happened, the constitution

 2     insisted on the rights of the peoples and not on the rights of republics

 3     or territories, because their delineations were at the demarcation lines

 4     that had been established without any political significance, and those

 5     demarcation lines, those internal administrative lines were not enough.

 6     They didn't suffice for some peoples to leave Yugoslavia.  They had to

 7     reach a preliminary agreement with those who wanted to stay in

 8     Yugoslavia.

 9             Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina were constituent

10     peoples which was confirmed twice, one by the federal constitution and

11     the other times by the republican constitutions of Croatia and Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina respectively, and as such they had equal rights as any other

13     people with whom they lived together, and those were Croats and Muslims

14     in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They had the right to self-determination if

15     that was the case.  The right as such was denied only to the Serbian

16     constituent people in -- peoples in Serb -- in Croatia and Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina.  There was no explanation for that.

18             It was said that the republics of Croatia and Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina could secede from Yugoslavia within their then administrative

20     borders.  In other words, that the example of Yugoslavia was where they

21     applied the principles from the former colonial Africa, when colonisers

22     drew their borders arbitrarily later on when the peoples of Africa were

23     liberated from the colonisers, those arbitrarily drawn borders became the

24     borders of the states in Yugoslavia.  There were no coloniser who drew

25     any borders.  Those borders were administratively arranged by the

Page 34247

 1     socialist Communist powers not because they wanted them to become

 2     international borders one day, the desire behind that was according to

 3     what President Tito said, "A marble lines marbley [as interpreted] cannot

 4     be broken and those lines were there to embellish the whole, not to be a

 5     separation between its parts."

 6             Unfortunately the constitutional provisions of the federal

 7     Yugoslavia were not observed and the right to self-determination were

 8     tied to territory, administrative boundaries.  They declared internal

 9     boundaries as international boundaries, and they declared that

10     international boundaries of the Yugoslavia that existed until then were

11     null and void.  This was violence against the peaceful existence of

12     Yugoslavia, and it heralded the evil years that were to come.  And it is

13     primarily the premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and then

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina that contributed to that.

15             Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance themselves seriously warned

16     against recognising these republics prematurely before all the necessary

17     business had been done before that.  This early premature recognition was

18     accused by many international politicians, Kissinger, Dumas, Mitterrand.

19     So even in the West people realised that what is being done with

20     Yugoslavia was a very dangerous development that could lead to

21     undesirable consequences.  However that was not taken into account,

22     because the interest of certain countries was to do away with Yugoslavia

23     as soon as possible and to recognise the new states as soon as possible.

24             Let us not forget that the German minister,

25     Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was extraordinarily active at the sessions of the

Page 34248

 1     European Union and that he demanded by way of an ultimatum to have

 2     instant recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and that if that were not

 3     done, that the very existence of the European Community would be brought

 4     into question.  Also, there were -- there was pressure exerted by the

 5     Vatican.  Cardinal Sodano, who was secretary of state at the time, openly

 6     called upon Western ambassadors to have their countries momentarily

 7     recognise Slovenia and Croatia.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  We don't have to repeat everything that

 9     is contained in the statement, but I just wanted to ask you what this

10     document represented on the 18th and was it taken into account?  Did it

11     yield certain effects, if you will?

12        A.   As I've already said, the commission did take this into account.

13     He did not touch the second one, Lord Carrington, I mean, but the first

14     and the third one were rephrased by him, and then the Badinter Commission

15     in the first half of 1992 passed its well-known findings.  There are 10

16     or 11 of them.  And basically this was a death certificate for

17     Yugoslavia, paving the way to all the former republics to be

18     internationally recognised.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

21     document into evidence.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  [Microphone not activated]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Could we give the number again.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3020.

Page 34249

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Do you have your statement before you?  Do you have it in hard

 4     copy, Excellency?

 5        A.   Not in hard copy.  But I have it here on the screen.  No, it's

 6     not on my screen.  I didn't bring it because I thought that I didn't have

 7     the right to have any papers on me here.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll print it out for you.  Just a second.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Let us proceed in the meantime.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   In paragraph 41 if you remember, and you'll see your statement in

13     a minute, you said that the Bosnian Serbs had no intention of engaging in

14     war, in taking part in war, and that they wanted to remain in Yugoslavia.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20242, could I please have that

16     called up.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   I would like to ask you to explain to us the position that you

19     presented then.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Do you remember this?  Do you remember as Foreign Minister in

23     Belgrade on the 30th of May when you presented these positions?  I would

24     particularly be interested in this part:  [In English] "And it has been

25     and remains principles and consistent.  We are energetically opposed to

Page 34250

 1     all forms of violence and war." [Interpretation] Then the second and

 2     third paragraphs.  Could you present that to us?  What was the position

 3     that you presented then?

 4        A.   The Serbs in Bosnia had a maximum objective, and that is to

 5     remain in Yugoslavia as its inseparable part.  In other words, they

 6     expressed full loyalty to their hitherto common state.  However, this

 7     right of theirs was directly being challenged by the two other

 8     constituent peoples, the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who

 9     insisted on Bosnia leaving Yugoslavia, leaving the federation, with its

10     entire territory.  Of course the Serbs opposed that on the basis of the

11     right they had as a constituent people, that is to say that without their

12     agreement, such an important decision could not be made.  Therefore, as

13     far as this wish of Bosnia-Herzegovina was concerned, namely to leave the

14     federation, it had to be discussed in accordance with the federal

15     constitution.

16             As we know, this was disregarded, because at the request of the

17     European Community, the referendum was carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina

18     in contravention of the principle of consensus; namely, that there should

19     be no out-voting among the three constituent peoples.  Rather, they had

20     to decide together on all important matters related to the future of

21     their republic.  So the Serb people as a constituent people enjoying the

22     right to self-determination was in essence compelled to fight for this

23     right of theirs in a situation that was changed, different.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember the question of this vote?  How was

25     it ultimately resolved in the Dayton agreement?

Page 34251

 1        A.   In essence the Dayton agreement rehabilitated the right of the

 2     Serb people to self-determination and enhanced their constitutional

 3     quality and was opposed to the right of the other two peoples to out-vote

 4     them.  In this way, the Dayton agreement rectified an injustice for which

 5     a heavy price was paid in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we all paid a heavy

 6     price, all of us in Yugoslavia.  Had the Cutileiro Plan been adopted by

 7     all, then none of this would have happened.  All these terrible things

 8     would not have happened in this terrible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So

 9     Dayton succeeded because it rehabilitated the principle of

10     self-determination and the quality of being a constituent people.

11             Bosnia and Herzegovina was an independent state consisting of two

12     entities.  There was also a third entity that remained invisible, and

13     that is Herceg-Bosna, and that is why this agreement was successful and

14     that's why it was signed by all of those who were supposed to sign it.

15             Again, I'm saying three and a half years had elapsed

16     unnecessarily.  Had the Cutileiro Plan been finalised and adopted, the

17     Dayton agreement would not have been needed at all and war would have

18     been totally unnecessary and all the things that happened during that

19     war.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this document?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3021, Your Honours.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   In paragraph 47 of your statement, you say that you had

Page 34252

 1     information about the Bosnian Serbs being blamed for different incidents.

 2     Did you follow that at the time from the posts that you held?  Did you --

 3     did you manage to find anything out about that, and did you know how

 4     accurate that was?

 5        A.   These news about these explosions were horrific, and everyone had

 6     to be astounded by that, so many civilian casualties just because some

 7     shell fell from somewhere.  And, of course, there was a divergence of

 8     views on that.  As for the explosion in Vase Miskina Street and at

 9     Markale I and II, very soon the Bosnian Serbs were blamed for that.  It

10     was said that the shell had come from there, and on that basis the

11     Bosnian Serb side was condemned even from Serbia itself, because

12     sanctions had been imposed in part by Serbia, too, because of that, what

13     had happened.  Also, there were other things involved, so as far as the

14     bakery was concerned, the explosion in front of the bakery, I found out

15     that there was a report of UN secretariat that said that the shell had

16     come from the Muslim side, not from the Serb side.

17             As far as Markale is concerned, Yasushi Akashi who was the

18     representative of the UN for Yugoslavia, he stated to a journalist that

19     it was well known that the shell had arrived from the Muslim side.  And

20     later on Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the UN,

21     confirmed this, conveyed it to Mitterrand, namely that he was convinced

22     that the explosion was due to a shell that had arrived from the Muslim

23     side.

24             So as far as Markale II is concerned, contrary to all other

25     pressures, media pressures, that this was the result of a shell that had

Page 34253

 1     come from the Serb positions, artillery colonel -- an artillery colonel

 2     from the UN, I think his name was Demurenko, he presented a position that

 3     was quite different.  However, he and his opinion were disregarded,

 4     ignored, and what remained was that it was only the Serb side that was to

 5     be blamed for that.  As we know, Markale II was a pretext for NATO action

 6     and also for the imposition of additional sanctions on Serbian

 7     Montenegro.

 8             These are controversial matters.  I learned of all of that.  I

 9     did not have any direct information from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this is

10     the information I had, and I did notice that there were certain elements

11     that indicated a strong suspicion in respect of these shells, namely

12     whether they had come from the Serb side or from the Muslim side.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have an opportunity of hearing from our

14     leadership, the leadership of Republika Srpska, about these incidents,

15     what their information was?

16        A.   Sporadically when I would immediate them, and I did not have

17     incessant contact with them.  But in situations where they met with

18     President Milosevic.  Of course, I did ask about that, and I was assured

19     by them that this was not done by the Serb forces, by the Serb side,

20     rather, it was the Muslim side that did that, because in this way they

21     wanted to draw international attention to the Serbs and to infuriate the

22     international community against the Serbs and that would ultimately lead

23     to NATO action.  This was a position that was put in very strong terms by

24     the leadership of Republika Srpska at the time.  I heard that position

25     bearing in mind that I also heard what the UN secretariat had done and

Page 34254

 1     Yasushi Akashi and other information that challenged or refuted the

 2     allegations that this had been done by the Serb side.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20243, could we have a look at

 5     that, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 7        Q.   Yes.  This is your interview to Hungarian radio.  I wanted to ask

 8     you about the fourth paragraph here where it says that it doesn't matter

 9     to you, it doesn't matter to Serbia what they would agree on, but,

10     rather, it's important that they reach some agreement.

11             Did Serbia present the Bosnian Serbs or anybody else a concept of

12     their own in terms of the conference itself and the final solution?

13        A.   Serbia, primarily President Milosevic, insisted that all the

14     constituent peoples in Yugoslavia enjoyed the same right to

15     self-determination.  That was done at The Hague conference and elsewhere.

16     However, when this unfortunate war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he

17     insisted on the right of Serbs to freedom and equality of rights since

18     the right to self-determination had already been endangered by war and

19     had been denied as such by war and by the refusal to sign the

20     Cutileiro Plan.  So the Serb side advised the leadership of the Bosnian

21     Serbs to defend their right to freedom and equality of rights and not to

22     insist on the maximum right, and that is the right to remain in

23     Yugoslavia if it was not possible to exercise that right.  The very

24     outbreak of the war showed that it was hard to exercise that right.

25             Serbia throughout all the negotiations with the international

Page 34255

 1     mediators, Vance, Owen, Stoltenberg, and others, insisted on that, namely

 2     that a solution be found within Bosnia-Herzegovina that would equally

 3     ensure the freedom of all three peoples and that would prevent clashes

 4     among them and would prevent them turning into -- from turning into

 5     antagonist forces.  This was not easy because maximum objectives were

 6     present on all sides, and the war added more vehemence to the talks that

 7     were being held, and it was hard to pursue solutions that were based on

 8     compromise.  However, Serbia fully insisted on what it had insisted upon,

 9     and then that ultimately was shown in the plan of the Contact Group and

10     at the Dayton agreement.  It is not surprising that then

11     President Clinton also gave public recognition to President Milosevic for

12     the contributions he gave to the Dayton agreement.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In the third paragraph here, you say:

14             [In English] "Whatever we -- Carrington, whatever the agreement

15     may be, we will accept it."

16             [Interpretation] A bit below you say:

17             "The conference must not be stopped before the three sides have

18     concluded an agreement on the basis of the basic principles already

19     adopted."

20             Did you see any connection between these incidents and

21     interruptions in the conference?

22        A.   You mean the conferences organised by international mediators?

23        Q.   Yes, yes.

24        A.   The war itself was a huge obstacle to peaceful negotiations.

25     Those forces that were not interested in finding a political solution at

Page 34256

 1     a certain point in time strove to prevent it by deteriorating the

 2     situation on the ground so that Lord Owen had to admit his impotence a

 3     couple of times, because very often when the gaps between sides narrowed

 4     and it looked like something can be resolved, the situation on the ground

 5     would suddenly deteriorate and the whole thing would come to a halt.

 6             The Bosnian Muslim side, which was militarily weaker in the

 7     beginning but got better equipped and stronger as time went on, was

 8     anxious to have a foreign military intervention and adapted everything to

 9     that goal, their activity on the ground and their activity in

10     communication with other states.  That was an obstacle in international

11     negotiations that would have proceeded faster had it not been for such an

12     expectation and objective of the Bosnian Muslim side in the civil war.

13             However, Serbia was anxious for a political solution as soon as

14     possible.  If it failed in Lisbon with the Cutileiro Plan, they wanted it

15     on some other occasion.  So Serbia endorsed all these four or five plans

16     and showed clearly in that way that it did not care for a territorial

17     expansion of Serbia.  It cared for stopping the war and achieving a

18     solution that would be satisfactory to all the three sides in

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina, a solution that would not prejudice anyone.  That was

20     the final objective of Serbia which wanted to contribute to stopping the

21     conflict as soon as possible and finding a solution based on the basis of

22     accepting and respecting the right of all constituent peoples to

23     self-determination.

24        Q.   Can you tell me about this next paragraph where you say:  "We all

25     condemn the attack on the bread line," and then something about

Page 34257

 1     sanctions.  Can you tell us, was Security Council able to find out the

 2     real truth, and how did it come about that sanctions were ultimately

 3     imposed although the truth was quite different?

 4        A.   I was at that time in my country, not in New York, but I know

 5     from what I heard that the UN secretariat had made a report, had produced

 6     a report, stating that that shell could not have arrived from the Serb

 7     side; that is to say, it could only come from the Muslim side.  As far as

 8     I know, that report was not debated at that session of the Security

 9     Council.  I don't know why.  But one thing stands; namely, that certain

10     members of the Security Council, primarily those aligned with the United

11     States, were very anxious to tighten the screws on Serbia and Montenegro

12     and by tightening the sanctions and increasing the isolation of the

13     country.  Anything was welcomed that could serve that aim, including that

14     explosion outside the bakery.  As we know, the media ascribed it to

15     Bosnian Serbs immediately, and that was an irrevocable judgement that was

16     not supposed to be doubted.  All the conclusions to the contrary were

17     simply ignored.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,

20     please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3022, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Given the time, shall we take a break now if it is

24     convenient.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly.

Page 34258

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Jovanovic, we will have a break for half an hour

 2     and resume at 11.00.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Your Excellency, you mentioned that in this Muslim tactic there

10     was a lot of orientation towards NATO, and it was all calculated to

11     elicit a NATO reaction.  How did the NATO respond?  To what extent was it

12     responsive to that?

13        A.   When the representatives of the Muslim side, primarily the

14     Prime Minister Mr. Silajdzic and others advocated a military

15     intervention, very clearly they said clearly they wanted it as soon as

16     possible to shorten the war, but primarily it was also because the Muslim

17     side wanted to achieve its maximum objective and an entity of two ethnic

18     communities, and to that they adjusted the situation on the ground, and

19     when it was necessary, incidents were created or when incidents happened

20     such as the bakery and Markale I and II, they made the most of it to put

21     pressure on the international community to get it to get involved and

22     carry out a military intervention against Bosnian Serb forces.

23             That was done quite openly.  It was not concealed at all, and

24     that was close to the heart of all these Muslim activists, and that was

25     probably quite prominent in all their contacts with the international

Page 34259

 1     community.

 2             It's another matter what response they met with, but as we know,

 3     the intervention did occur in the summer of 1995.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  How did -- how NATO responded is not relevant.

 5     Shall we move on.

 6             Was that your point, Mr. Tieger?

 7             MR. TIEGER:  That was part of it.  In addition, I thought it was

 8     an opportunity as well.  I had ignored some suggestive questions earlier,

 9     but this one I noted was -- was a question that reformulated an earlier

10     response that was directed to the information the witness received from

11     the Bosnian Serb leadership and then posited as information that the

12     witness had alluded to independent of that in the course of his

13     testimony, which is obviously problematic.  So for both those reasons I

14     rose, but at this moment my emphasis would be on the need to take care in

15     the formulation of questions.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

17             Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could respond to this now or

19     later to say why this is relevant, but I'll do that later.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   In paragraph 47 you mention Markale I and the connection with the

22     conferences.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 1D20250.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

25        Q.   When you talk about the bakery, which specific incident do you

Page 34260

 1     mean?  How was it known?

 2        A.   That's a bakery in the Vaso Miskin Crni street.  That was the

 3     first incident where a lot of civilians were injured.  It was sensational

 4     news to everyone, and of course everybody first accepted the

 5     interpretation from the Muslim side that it had been done by the Serbs.

 6     Later on came interpretations and statements made by international

 7     players that were rather contradictory.  I've already mentioned that the

 8     UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed his strong

 9     impression that the shell had not come from the Serb side, and

10     Yasushi Akashi said something similar in his interview to a German

11     newspaper.

12             As we see, there were many different interpretations and

13     statements, but the position ultimately taken by Western governments was

14     that it had been done by the Serbian side, and on the basis of that a

15     media and political propaganda against the Serbian side started.

16        Q.   Did you meet on the 7th of February together with President

17     Milosevic with Yasushi Akashi in Belgrade?  Could you please look at this

18     document and in particular the third paragraph from the bottom.

19     [In English] "On Sunday ..."

20        A.   Yes.  If I need to read only that paragraph, I've read it.

21        Q.   [Interpretation] No, no, all of it.  Remind us, please, what was

22     the subject of this that was a day after Markale I.  What was the topic

23     of your discussion?

24        A.   Mr. Yasushi Akashi was very pedantic and precise, and he tried to

25     be impartial to all sides and take into account all the facts, that

Page 34261

 1     distinguished him in a way from others.  I'm not saying that others did

 2     not try the same, but he was exceptional.  He was very interested in

 3     everything going on in Bosnia, in all the incidents and the suffering of

 4     people, and he wanted to find a way to put An end to it, and in these

 5     efforts he met with complete co-operation on the Serb side, primarily

 6     President Milosevic, because he, too, wanted to put a stop to that

 7     unfortunate war for our own Serbian reasons within the country but also

 8     for humanitarian and other reasons.

 9             It says in this paragraph that a plan of the European Union that

10     had been presented in Geneva previously was similar to another plan, the

11     Owen-Stoltenberg Plan supported by the European Union.  As far as I

12     remember, Muslim representatives, including the late Mr. Izetbegovic, if

13     I remember well, were impatient to end this all by defeating the Serb

14     side, which was impossible without a military intervention, so that

15     Mr. Akashi was aware of all that, but his position did not allow him to

16     take sides, and as I remember it, it was a discussion between two parties

17     whose primary goal was to put a stop to the war.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this document, please?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll receive it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3023, Your Honours.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Did you address the court, we're still on paragraph 47, the

23     International Court of justice on account of these pressures?  Paragraph

24     47, the second half of it.  "[In English] The Muslim side in Bosnia

25     pursued a policy ..."

Page 34262

 1        A.   Yes, I'm reading it.  Yes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I call up 1D20203.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Do you recognise this document?  Could you tell us what it is?

 6        A.   The Yugoslav side, I mean the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is

 7     communicating with the international community and has prepared a report

 8     on the crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and

 9     sent that report through the Security Council, but no reply was received.

10     Perhaps it's not usual to reply.  Maybe such reports are just received.

11     In any case, we had no indication what happened with the report later.

12        Q.   This is 24th February.  That's two weeks after Markale I.  Do you

13     remember this document?  Could we see the next page.

14        A.   Where?

15        Q.   It's on the screen.  Is this your document?  Did you send it to

16     the International Court of Justice about NATO activities and decisions?

17        A.   Yes.  Yes.  This was sent in order to inform the

18     International Court of Justice and for that institution to deal with it,

19     because that operation contradicted the usual NATO commitments.  It was a

20     defensive military organisation at the time.

21        Q.   Can we go to page 4, please.  015.  Yes.

22             Could you please look at paragraph 2 where it says that

23     Dr. Boutros-Ghali:  "[In English] It is evident that such an

24     authorisation does not exist ..." Please comment.  What is this about?

25        A.   I would have to read first, if you will allow me to do so.

Page 34263

 1        Q.   I'm interested in the middle part of paragraph 2 when it says

 2     that the right is contradicted.  What does this refer to?

 3        A.   I would love to see the beginning of this document.  I would like

 4     to somehow place it in time and a place.

 5        Q.   Can we then go back to page 1.

 6        A.   Yes, please.  Page 1 would be good.

 7        Q.   Tell us when you want to move on to the following page.

 8        A.   Yes.  Now's the good time to see the following page.  Thank you.

 9     Next, please.  Let's see that.  Please turn the page.

10        Q.   I believe that here you interpret NATO's decisions, and then on

11     page 3 and 4 are -- are your positions.  Please.

12        A.   Yes.  If you will allow me, this is about NATO's decision to use

13     force in Sarajevo and its environs without a pre-consent being given by

14     the Security Council.  NATO's original military organisation that enjoys

15     its status within the United Nations.  However, when it comes to the use

16     of force, the Security Council has to agree.  That agreement had not been

17     obtained, and that was the reason why we sent this warning and request to

18     stop such things happening in the future.  NATO was not authorised to act

19     on its own when it comes to the use of force in third countries.  There

20     is a procedure which has to involve the Security Council.

21        Q.   Can we go to the following page to remind the witness what was

22     requested by way of measures from the court, and then we will see the

23     Court's answer.  Do you remember this?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   When you are ready, we will go to the following page where we

Page 34264

 1     will see the Court's reply to you.  Do you remember that?

 2        A.   Yes, yes.  I remember.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to tender

 4     this document.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  The Court simply did not take

 6     our request into consideration.  Somehow it excluded itself and thus it

 7     paved a way for NATO to proceed.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3024, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   In paragraph 63 of your statement, you speak about a conference,

13     and that conference took place in London in the summer of 1992.  You also

14     speak about your meeting with Prime Minister Major and Minister Hogg.

15     The last sentence in at that paragraph speaks about what you have just

16     testified to.  Did you inform the general public about that?  Was it

17     absolutely transparent that there was such a pressure put onto you?

18        A.   First of all, it was not an international conference.  It was a

19     bilateral visit of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

20     whom I accompanied.  Of course, we had talks with Prime Minister Major

21     and Junior Minister Hogg.  The topic was the crisis in Yugoslavia and

22     everything that surrounded it, and since we presented our historical and

23     legal arguments about the right of Yugoslavia to exist, and especially in

24     the part that decided and opted for its continuation, we received a very

25     brief and curt answer by Minister Hogg, that we could have any sort of

Page 34265

 1     arguments but they did not matter for them.  What mattered for them, for

 2     Great Britain and the rest of the Western countries, was that we had to

 3     adopt their conclusions and decisions.  Obviously we communicated that to

 4     the general public and Prime Minister Panic, who was not prepared for

 5     such a negative position towards us, but that was what had been the truth

 6     from the very beginning, from the moment when the European Union had

 7     started meddling with the crisis in Yugoslavia.  Its positions were

 8     formed beforehand.  The rest were just technicalities.  This was just a

 9     reflection of what existed in the European Union, and that was a negative

10     position to the existence of Yugoslavia as a federal state.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number of

12     document that he would like to call up.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20253.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  And could the witness and Mr. Karadzic make

16     pauses between questions and answers.  Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you remember --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Jovanovic, can I remind you

20     again that you need to put a pause between the questions and answers.

21     Please continue.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, if I may, I don't believe the witness

23     is speaking particularly fast, but because his answers go on for a period

24     of time it obviously becomes difficult over time for the interpreters to

25     keep up, so just another reminder to the witness.  I don't think he's to

Page 34266

 1     blame in a conventional sense, but the circumstances are clearly making

 2     it difficult for the interpreter.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Let's proceed.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would kindly

 5     ask you to allow me not to repeat the contents of the statement.  I would

 6     just like to mention the contents of the documents.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Do you remember that you gave an interview in 1994 in the month

 9     of December of that year, and the title of that interview was:  "What is

10     the Cost of Bosnia?"  Do you remember that interview?

11        A.   Unfortunately, it was a long time ago.  I gave a lot of

12     interviews.  It's very difficult to remember their sequence.  Could you

13     please allow me to jog my memory.

14        Q.   Can we go to page 4 where you will find links to the paragraph in

15     your statement.  Please start reading the fourth paragraph which starts

16     with the words "When former Prime Minister ..."

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Does this tell you what you remember?

19        A.   Yes.  Yes, this is it.  Basically at the heart of all of those

20     things was the fact that the European Union wanted to avoid the

21     impression that it supports the secession of Yugoslavia.  In order to

22     achieve that, it had to proclaim Yugoslavia as a state which had

23     disappeared, because in that case their support to the independence of

24     the former Yugoslav states would not have been a support to secession but

25     a form of assistance to the separate parts of a former state to obtain

Page 34267

 1     their own states.  That's why it was necessary for all the state

 2     continuity of Yugoslavia to be interrupted.  Our problem was to receive

 3     acceptance for those peoples who wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, not to --

 4     only to stay in Yugoslavia also to continue living in that state as a

 5     state that had its continuity.  Lord Carrington objected to that very

 6     energetically.  He repeated on several occasions that those who wanted to

 7     stay in Yugoslavia could stay in Yugoslavia.  You could -- they could

 8     call it Yugoslavia, but it had to be a new state, not the continuation of

 9     the former state and that was the essence of our problems.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3025, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Your Excellency, when Serbia advocated peace and you said that

17     Serbia agreed to all the plans, did it express any territorial

18     pretensions in respect of Bosnia?  How did it support the Serbian side in

19     Bosnia?

20        A.   The position of Serbia from the beginning of the crisis was that

21     it did not have any territorial pretensions towards the other republics,

22     and that position was repeated by President Milosevic officially and

23     privately, and that was the truth.  The only thing that we advocated was

24     an equal treatment of all constituent peoples and their equal rights to

25     self-determination.  When we did not fully succeed in that because there

Page 34268

 1     was a over-voting of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and that

 2     they were forced to resist to such a nondemocratic and illegal solution.

 3     Then we started advocating an equal treatment of Serbs in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  On several occasions we emphasised that for Serbia

 5     everything that the three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina

 6     agreed on about Bosnia-Herzegovina, whatever they agreed on we would

 7     accept it.  When international representatives asked us for our

 8     assistance with that, we not only issued statements, but we also held

 9     them.  Serbia was very constructive in corroboration to that.  I can say

10     that we supported all the peace plans from the very beginning.  We never

11     opposed any of that which was not the case with some other states; for

12     example, the United States of America, which did not accept four of the

13     five peace agreements.

14        Q.   I'm charged here inter alia with my -- wanting to break up Bosnia

15     and joining parts of it to Serbia and what is your information?  What do

16     you know about my positions on that?  What were my positions?  What were

17     the positions of Serbia on that?  Was the Republic of Serbia in favour of

18     the break-up of Bosnia?  Was I the one who expressed the wish to break up

19     Yugoslavia and to join parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia?

20        A.   First of all, Serbia never had territorial pretensions towards

21     any of the former Yugoslav republics and especially not towards

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It left it to the peoples there to agree what they

23     would do, whether they would live in an independent state or whether they

24     would break up and leave.  That was their own thing.  It was not our

25     thing.  As far as I followed or statements, you firstly expressed your

Page 34269

 1     loyalty towards the joint state and your desire to stay in it and that

 2     was the maximum number goal that you as the supreme representative of the

 3     Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina advocated; however, the conditions

 4     changed and they deteriorated and you adapted the maximum goal and

 5     replaced it by a more realistic goal which was for the joint life to

 6     continue and for Bosnia to be an international entity but that all the

 7     peoples in that republic should have equal rights.  That was your initial

 8     position and an ongoing position all the time.

 9             However, you encountered problems and that's why there were ups

10     and downs in your rhetorics.  However, you never expressed a desire for

11     Republika Srpska that was being constituted to secede from Bosnia and to

12     be merged with Yugoslavia.  You considered yourself a loyal part of the

13     joint state of Yugoslavia.  There was no need for somebody to chose

14     something that it already was and since conditions changed your position

15     changed, and for the past several years the focus was on finding a

16     solution within the framework of Bosnia as a separate independent state.

17        Q.   Thank you, Your Excellency.  Let's look at 1D --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20195.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   The first part is about President Bulatovic.  Let's look at the

23     second paragraph, and please tell us what is your position here?  You

24     presented that position.  Please look at the paragraph.  You're talking

25     about June 1993.

Page 34270

 1        A.   Yes.  In June 1993, there was a breakthrough in the efforts of

 2     international representatives of Owen-Stoltenberg who had tried to break

 3     up the stalemate.  And then they first talked to Serbia and then with

 4     other participants in the peace process, and they presented their idea

 5     about the need to create a Bosnia as a union of states or a confederation

 6     or something of the sort.  They presented an idea involving the

 7     percentages that its future constituent parts could keep to themselves.

 8     Obviously that plan was supported by Serbia, and after that it was

 9     presented in Zagreb and Sarajevo and so on and so forth.

10             That was the beginning of considerations of a concept that ended

11     up in the Dayton Accords.  It was the first concept that started taking

12     into account the ethnical principle rather than only the territorial

13     principle.  It was the first to -- to -- to see Bosnia as some sort of a

14     confederation, at least in the initial stages, and those three sides that

15     were very antagonistic could then approach, at the other end accept a

16     realistic situation with time.  This is what I tried to explain in this

17     interview.

18        Q.   Please look at the last paragraph about the Greater Serbia.  Can

19     you please tell us whether you talked to me and the leadership of the

20     Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and whether you sent such aspirations and

21     whether Belgrade was in a position to accept those pressures on it.

22        A.   That project of the Greater Serbia was imposed on Serbia as a

23     propaganda instrument, because in that way Serbia was kept in a defensive

24     position.  Whether the others pretended to be the holders of the truth

25     and justice.  The fact is that Serbia never wanted to be a Greater

Page 34271

 1     Serbia.  If it had wanted to be that, it would have achieved that after

 2     the First World War when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians

 3     were being created.  If it had wanted to do that, it would have done it

 4     during the war when a meeting was held in Jajce and when a decision was

 5     made on the setting up of the federative republic of Yugoslavia.  It

 6     stayed in its borders.  It did not have any pretension towards the parts

 7     of the then Bosnia and Herzegovina or some other parts of what would be

 8     Yugoslavia.

 9             I believe that this part about Greater Serbia took up a lot of

10     time for this court, inter alia, finally that manipulation with that term

11     was abandoned.  And when it comes to you and Bosnia-Herzegovina, you

12     simply were not in a position to think along those lines because the

13     realistic situation that you faced on the ground was such that you had to

14     save your freedom and your equality, at that same time you had to honour

15     the freedom and equality of the other peoples in that country.  Any

16     desire for joining Serbia was unrealistic.  It was impossible.  You never

17     presented that as your idea save for at the very beginning when you

18     emphasised that the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina considered Yugoslavia

19     as their state and their loyalty.  However, as things developed, as

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina was acknowledged as an independent state, that

21     position of yours and that your loyalty towards Yugoslavia as a common

22     state was abandoned, and all that time you tied to find a solution within

23     the framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you were encouraged to do that

24     by Serbia and Milosevic.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 34272

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Still I think you're speaking a bit too fast,

 3     Mr. Jovanovic.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I will do my best to improve.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Any objection, Mr. Tieger?

 7             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3026, Your Honours.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Your Excellency, you have just told us that Serbia supported us

12     in all that.  Did there come a time when there was a complete split

13     between the leadership of Republika Srpska and the leadership of the

14     Republic of Serbia and the federal state of Yugoslavia?  What caused?

15     What plan, if you remember.

16        A.   That was the Contact Group plan.  Later on it turned out that it

17     became 90 per cent of the future Dayton Accords.  Serbia believed that

18     that plan covered most of the needs of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina

19     and Republika Srpska and that the part that was not covered should be

20     left to future negotiations during peacetime, not during wartime.  We in

21     Serbia were aware that that plan was not equal handed towards

22     Republika Srpska on the one hand and Herceg-Bosna on the other, because

23     it allowed Herceg-Bosna to have special relations with Croatia and

24     confederation with Croatia which was denied to Republika Srpska.  What

25     mattered for Serbia was for war to stop, for peace to be established, and

Page 34273

 1     that the rest of the issues should be negotiated in peacetime, and that

 2     they knew that negotiations might take time, but everything was better

 3     than to continue the war.

 4             The Serbs in Bosnia were afraid that they would be manipulated

 5     and deceived, and they did not trust that that plan would fully guarantee

 6     their freedom and equality.  That is why they showed a certain resistance

 7     towards Milosevic, who did not want to procrastinate any longer, deemed

 8     that a moment had arrived for us to interrupt all political relations and

 9     others with Republika Srpska.  I personally was against that, but I was

10     not important.  I was a minority.  I thought that whatever negotiations

11     could be continued were better than a lack of any negotiations and that

12     negotiations could lead to a joint opinion and an agreement.

13             The interaction of all relations with Republika Srpska was a

14     total interruption.  The blockade on the Drina was established.  It was

15     not officially recognised as a blockade but it was.  In exchange for

16     that, Serbia was rewarded by some sanctions being lifted, some minor

17     ones, for an entire year, from approximately the summer of 1994 to the

18     end of the war.  The relations between Serbia and Republika Srpska did

19     not exist.  The only thing that existed was relations between Milosevic

20     and members of parliament of Republika Srpska.  Through them he tried to

21     institute changes or, rather, shake up the leadership of

22     Republika Srpska, but he failed.

23             So we entered a period of very chilly relations.  And that

24     decision itself was a bad one from my point of view because a country

25     that is under sanctions and isolation and that condemns these sanctions

Page 34274

 1     does not have the right to treat someone else the same way, because this

 2     automatically weakened own argumentation against sanctions.  However,

 3     that was the decision made by the state leadership, and it was strictly

 4     observed all the way up until the end of the war -- or, rather, up until

 5     the end of the Dayton process.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In line 13, the witness said "chilly relations," but

 7     he also said "non-existent."

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  It's there at line 9.  Let's continue.

10             THE ACCUSED:  But it was repeated in line 13, after "chilly."

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Not counting on civility and mutual respect and things like that,

14     can you tell the Trial Chamber what the policies were and what the

15     political similarities were between President Milosevic and myself -- or,

16     rather, our leadership in Bosnia?  Because I have been charged with joint

17     criminal enterprise here, that I joined up with President Milosevic and

18     others.

19        A.   As far as I know, the relations between President Milosevic and

20     you personally was a sort of marriage out of necessity, because you were

21     total antipodes politically and ideologically.  It was clear that it

22     could not last for a long time.  You were more liberal.  You were in

23     favour of introducing a democratic regime without any reservations,

24     whereas Milosevic did that, too, but with a bit of reservation.

25             Although he himself hailed from the Communist Party, he was not

Page 34275

 1     an ideological extremist.  On the contrary.  He was very pragmatic.

 2     However, his immediate circle was still encumbered by ideological views,

 3     and that probably was a restriction upon him too.  So in these relations

 4     that were not very cordial from the very outset, as far as I know --

 5     well, they were justified from a working point of view, but they were not

 6     cordial.  And between the two of you, there weren't any identical

 7     affiliations or identical views of international relations.  So the

 8     decision of Milosevic to stop all contact with you and Republika Srpska

 9     and to introduce this blockade was a logical consequence of several years

10     of - how do I put this? - it's not a lack of liking, but these are

11     relations that -- that were not characterised by a particular cordiality

12     or mutual sincerity, if you will.

13        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned the contacts between

14     President Milosevic and our parliamentarians and attempts to change the

15     government in Republika Srpska.  Do you remember before and after that in

16     the democratic processes -- or, rather, in the elections, who was it that

17     President Milosevic supported as well as his inner circle?  Which party

18     in Republika Srpska?  First of all, did he support me and the Serb

19     Democratic Party?

20        A.   Well, he never explained that to me specifically, but I think he

21     did support the Serb Democratic Party because it was the leading party

22     and the most responsible one in the struggle of the Serb people in Bosnia

23     for improving their position.  He was not exactly thrilled by you, and

24     there wasn't much warmth there.  When he tried to remove you through your

25     parliament, that was his - how do I put this?  It was his obsession,

Page 34276

 1     because quite simply he could not get majority support in parliament

 2     against you.  And he tried that very energetically.  As a matter of fact,

 3     he even intimated to Lord Owen and others that things were almost done

 4     and that that would happen soon.  So he did not realistically assess the

 5     balance of power within your parliament itself.

 6             As for others, I think that he had the late Dr. Koljevic in mind,

 7     that he could perhaps replace you if he managed to have you replaced in

 8     the first place, but that was not particularly voiced.  It was just as a

 9     possibility.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D20232 -- 1D2032.  Could we have a

11     look at that.  Could it not be broadcast.  1D2032.  And could it not be

12     broadcast.  1D20232.

13             So now we have the document.  So could it please not be

14     broadcast.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Please take a look at this paragraph, Serbia and Montenegro, and

17     there's a reference to yourself there.  Could you please tell us what

18     this has to do with what you told us about a moment ago.  Of course --

19        A.   Yes.  There is a reference here to Vice-President Simic and

20     myself.  I think that Vice-President Simic particularly highlighted that

21     point regarding this replacement.  I already said what things were like

22     in Milosevic's head, if you will, and of course this was a point when

23     relations between the two parties were at the lowest possible level.

24     Practically there were no contacts whatsoever.  So the rhetoric that is

25     expressed here in this part a consequence of the fact that there was no

Page 34277

 1     relationship between the two.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted

 3     under seal?  Can we show the top of the page so that the witness can see

 4     the institution is concerned, because he is presenting his assessments

 5     there, but please let us not make this public.

 6             Rule 70, Excellencies.  That's why I asked.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it under seal.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3027 under seal, Your Honours.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   I beg your pardon.  To the best of your knowledge and

12     recollection, this breaking of relations and this pressure exerted by

13     President Milosevic in respect of myself, did this reflect on the

14     situation in Republika Srpska, especially my relations with the army and

15     the Socialist Party in Republika Srpska and other forces?  Did you have

16     any knowledge about that, how that was reflected in that respect?

17        A.   I did not have any knowledge about our internal situation in

18     Serbia, and also I did not have any special relation about the situation

19     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  All the knowledge I received was either through

20     the media or through contacts and meetings every now and then with the

21     representatives of Republika Srpska in our country.  Of course, I did

22     find out certain things sometimes when I talked to Milosevic.  The

23     blockade was total, at least that's the explanation I received, and there

24     was no possibility of doing away with that blockade.

25             Now, whether something was done without my knowing about it, I

Page 34278

 1     cannot say.  I can say that all parts of the system in Serbia were not in

 2     full agreement with that, and perhaps there were some small violations of

 3     that blockade from Serbia vis-a-vis Republika Srpska.  I don't know about

 4     that.  I can assume that such things may have happened.

 5             As far as I'm concerned, when I was in New York, when I spoke to

 6     the French Foreign Minister, I think it was Juppe at the time, when he

 7     asked me about the breaking off of all relations with Republika Srpska,

 8     he asked whether it was appropriate for them to continue communicating

 9     with representatives of Republika Srpska.  I explained our situation to

10     him as it was in terms of contacts and negotiations.  I always spoke in

11     favour of negotiations rather than breaking them off.  So in an indirect

12     way I encouraged the renewal of relations with the representatives of

13     Republika Srpska which Milosevic did not look upon kindly, but that is

14     what happened.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell the Trial Chamber about your own

16     knowledge about my position vis-a-vis Muslims as a whole - of course,

17     with the exception of fundamentalism - about my relations, about my

18     attempts to communicate with Zulfikarpasic, Filipovic, and others, such

19     Muslim leaders, Fikret Abdic, these Muslims with a European orientation?

20        A.   On the basis of what I know from your statements, and also a

21     series of interviews that you gave during these years of the war and

22     after that, it was obvious that did not have some kind of a backward view

23     of the Muslims or of the Croats.  When intolerance and antagonisms

24     started boiling in the Bosnian parliament, you cautioned even then

25     against crossing this red line; that is to say, abandoning talks all

Page 34279

 1     together and entering the dark tunnel of conflict.  You also used

 2     metaphors and strong language in order to warn of this great danger that

 3     could stem from that.  From the talks that I had with you every now and

 4     then, while they weren't very in-depth talks, but you never had any

 5     negative preconceptions regarding the Muslims.  You only pointed out that

 6     because of the difficult experience you had with them from the past you

 7     wanted to have fully settled relations on the basis of everyone enjoying

 8     full free dough and equal rights.

 9             You indicated that several times, because in the past during the

10     Ottoman empire, during the Second World War, and even towards the end of

11     the socialist government when the appetites of the Muslim side in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina grew, you wanted to protect yourselves from such

13     things by everyone being on their own and no one could exercise any kind

14     of tyranny or domination.  That is the position you presented to me and

15     probably to others, both about Muslims and Croats.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  1D20191.  Could we

17     please have a look at that.  Could we please have that in e-court.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   On the first page we see your statement -- actually, two of your

20     statements, and there's a letter.  Do you remember these statements?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can you zoom in a bit.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please zoom in a bit.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   In paragraph 72, you speak about humanitarian matters.  Can you

25     tell us what my position was and what the position was of the Federal

Page 34280

 1     Republic of Yugoslavia with regard to humanitarian convoys and the supply

 2     of humanitarian aid to all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 3        A.   As far as Serbia's position is concerned, and that can be

 4     confirmed by the international representatives Mr. Akashi and others, we

 5     invariably, consistently, and strictly advocated the unhindered movement

 6     of humanitarian convoys so that they could reach their proper

 7     destinations.  We also indicated the possibility that it -- that they

 8     could be abused and that arms might be transported that way too.  This

 9     position was repeated time and again to one and all, and all the

10     representatives can confirm that.

11             As for you in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you also stated your views in

12     favour of this unhindered movement of humanitarian aid, but on the ground

13     you heard about more things, and you were exposed to certain surprises,

14     namely that sometimes these convoys were abused for other things like

15     transporting weapons and so on.  You stated that regularly to Milosevic

16     and to the international representatives.  As I know -- as far as I know,

17     this situation was improved gradually, but it probably never was totally

18     clean, if you will, because the Muslim side was strongly tempted to use

19     these channels for receiving weapons and other types of aid.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have the last page, please, although both

21     statements are of interest, but they can be looked at.  Please could we

22     have the last page, your letter to Willy Claes.  Do you remember that

23     letter?

24        A.   Let me just take a look.  I will remember.

25        Q.   What are you informing Willy Claes of concerning my activities

Page 34281

 1     with Abdic and my activities on the humanitarian plane?

 2        A.   Fikret Abdic was man number one of the Muslim side in that Cazin

 3     Krajina, and as such he had contacts with both you and Milosevic.  And

 4     once you had a tripartite meeting in Belgrade, and you had agreement with

 5     him that was supposed to accelerate solutions and putting a stop to the

 6     war.  Unlike some other Muslim personalities, he was a man with both feet

 7     firmly on the ground and unburdened by megalomaniac ambitions, and as

 8     such he came to talk with Milosevic who was also very pragmatic and you

 9     as well, all of you working in that infernal hole which the civil war is.

10             As for humanitarian aid and convoys, I am repeating what has been

11     said before.  Among other things, when the international representatives

12     complained of the problems they are encountering in providing aid to

13     Sarajevo because of the various dangers and obstacles and lack of safety

14     for the escorts, we offered them a different approach from Bar, passing

15     through a piece of territory of Republika Srpska free of fighting that

16     would provide greater security for the drivers and the escorting

17     personnel.  This well-intentioned proposal was not accepted, and they

18     insisted on the old route from Split to Sarajevo despite all the

19     difficulties involved.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3028, Your Honours.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   In the same paragraph 72, you talk about humanitarian issues, and

25     you also talk about gas.  What was the role of Serbia in all that, in the

Page 34282

 1     supply of gas?

 2        A.   The problem of providing supplies to all the parties in the civil

 3     war in Bosnia was an item on the agenda every day, because the civilians

 4     and everyone needed to be supplied, and that included supplying gas.

 5     Serbia itself was under embargo.  It had its own gas production that was

 6     insufficient, but it offered to be a transit country for supplying gas to

 7     the civilian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I believe that proposal

 8     was not accepted because it would have violated the regime of sanctions,

 9     but what Serbia was able to provide as aid, civilian and other forms of

10     aid, primarily to Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it had no direct

11     contact with the others, it did provide, and of course that was a great

12     burden on the Serbian economy.

13        Q.   And what was the fate of Russian gas to Sarajevo?  Where did it

14     come from, and where was the role of Serbia in that?

15        A.   I believe that gas went through Croatia, not Serbia, because

16     there were no gas pipelines to take it through Serbia except if it was

17     transported by these specialised lorries.  I'm not familiar with the

18     details, but I know that Russia offered gas not only to one side but all

19     the parties, and I know Serbia was willing to assist, but how it all

20     ended, I don't know.

21        Q.   May I refresh your memory with a document.  1D20208.  Could you

22     please look at your letter to Lord Owen.

23        A.   Yes.  Just a moment.  Yes.

24        Q.   Could we see the signature at the bottom.

25        A.   Yes.  Yes.  This is one of the letters dealing with that issue,

Page 34283

 1     supplying gas to Sarajevo via HungarySerbia, of course, accepted this.

 2     I don't know how this was done.  Probably using tanks, lorries, cisterns.

 3     And you provided assurances that these convoys will not be hindered by

 4     Bosnian Serb forces, that these trucks would pass through safely.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3029, Your Honours.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 9        Q.   Your Excellency, I have been indicted for a joint criminal

10     enterprise including persecution of Muslims and Croats and so on, and in

11     that joint criminal enterprise, according to the charges,

12     President Milosevic was involved, among others.  Can you tell me, did you

13     have any insight into the treatment of refugees in view of their

14     ethnicity?  Did you have any information about at that, and how many

15     refugees did we have [as interpreted]?

16        A.   Yes.  We had a great number of refugees, and they kept coming.

17     As far as I know, there were over 50.000 [Realtime transcript read in

18     error "150.000"] Bosnian Muslims and perhaps 20- or 30.000 Croats who

19     found refuge in Serbia from the firing raging in Bosnia.  And of course

20     they were received according to our obligations under international

21     agreements.  The International Red Cross arrived immediately.  They asked

22     those people if they wanted to go somewhere and where they wanted to go.

23     We of course created no problems with that, and in the meantime they were

24     provided with all the basic necessities.

25             So that charge of involvement in a joint criminal enterprise is

Page 34284

 1     or concept that is obviously much favoured by the Office of the

 2     Prosecutor here and is constantly used not only against the Serb accused

 3     but also against others, although they were later acquitted.  But I

 4     believe that concept should begin with the beginning of the Yugoslav

 5     crisis and encompass those who are primarily culpable for destroying the

 6     Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including international

 7     players, and those who despite serious warnings of Lord Carrington and

 8     Cyrus Vance brought about the premature recognition of Slovenia and

 9     Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And finally, it should encompass

10     all those who are responsible for the war that NATO conducted in Kosovo

11     and Metohija, and the persons who are directly responsible should be

12     named, because that war was conducted without the consent of the UN

13     Security Council.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 4 I would like a direction.

16     The witness said 50.000, not 150.000 Bosnian Muslims.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now call 1D --

19             JUDGE KWON:  By "we" who do you mean when you asked the witness

20     how many refugees did we have?  You meant Serbia.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't say "we," I said "you."

22     How many refugees did you in Serbia have.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Then the transcript will be corrected in

24     due course.  Let's continue.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want -- have this next document

Page 34285

 1     broadcast.  1D20246.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   How do you view this fact that there were many refugees in Serbia

 4     in light of this charge that President Milosevic and I together were

 5     persecuting Muslims and Croats?

 6        A.   This charge is motivated by political reasons because nothing

 7     like that existed in reality.  Yugoslavia was and remained a multi-ethnic

 8     country.  We have a lot of our own Muslims.  Until some years ago, we

 9     also had a lot of Albanians who are also Muslims.  There is no reason to

10     doubt that -- or to suspect, rather, Serbia of being anti-Muslim or

11     anti-Catholic in any way.  That is a fact.  And as far as I know, you

12     Serbs in Bosnia also had no antagonism, let alone hatred towards Muslims

13     and Croats.  You only sought clear relations wherein everybody would

14     enjoy the same rights, equality, and freedom and live in peace together

15     or at least co-exist in peace alongside.  So that concept of joint

16     criminal enterprise is tempting as a construct, but it has no basis in

17     reality or fact.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could we move into private session

19     briefly.

20                           [Private session]

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 34286

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15                           [Open session]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We are now in open session, Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  And of course I have no objection to the accused

18     eliciting relevant facts from this witness, but I think it's probably

19     best to refrain from inviting legal opinions on matters outside his

20     expertise related to modes of liability, and we certainly have been

21     straying into that.  So with respect to anything the accused considers

22     bears on that issue factually that is within this witness's knowledge, of

23     course no objection, but moving into his opinion of the applicability of

24     modes of liability seems inappropriate.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

Page 34287

 1             Mr. Karadzic, you have noted it.  Please continue.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we see the bottom

 3     of the page, the last paragraph.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And I should like to ask you, your Excellency, to look at these

 6     figures, line three and four from below, and tell us what they refer to.

 7     Also, I only asked about facts, whether I opposed accommodating refugees

 8     and whether I was in favour of expelling or persecuting Muslims and

 9     Croats, and the witness answered.

10             Are these figures correct?  At that time in 1993, there were

11     already 50.000 Muslims and 20.000 Croats.

12        A.   Yes.  That's consistent with what I said.  These numbers later

13     increased.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this document be

15     admitted, please?

16             JUDGE KWON:  We will receive it provisionally under seal, and I

17     will leave it to the parties to sort it out later on.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3030, provisionally under seal, Your

19     Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Excellencies, at

21     this point I have no further questions for His Excellency Mr. Jovanovic.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

23             Mr. Jovanovic, as you have noted, most -- your evidence in chief

24     in this case in its most part has been admitted in writing in lieu of

25     your oral testimony.  Now you will asked by the representative of the

Page 34288

 1     Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Alan Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.  Mr. President.

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

 4        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, we have only a brief time before we will adjourn

 5     for the lunch break, but I'd like to begin by noting that in moving to

 6     cross-examination, we're shifting gears a bit.  I am allotted a

 7     particular restricted period of time by the Chamber to ask particular

 8     questions about the issues that are raised in your statement or perhaps

 9     other issues, so -- and the Court expects me to focus in particular on

10     specifics, as well as you.  So if I ask you a specific question, it is

11     not an invitation to expound or elaborate on the general subject but to

12     please focus on the particular question asked.

13             I raise that, because I noted that, for example, at one point

14     when you were asked about the -- a particular topic of discussion, you

15     provided information about the character of the person involved in the

16     discussion, what that person was interested in generally, who he spoke

17     with generally and so on.  So I will ask you to focus on the question in

18     particular, sir.

19             Turning first to paragraph 25 of your statement.  You indicate

20     there that just like Republika Srpska, and in that instance you're

21     referring to the RSK, it was not recognised by Serbia, but it was not

22     contested either, and I would suggest that that description of Serbia's

23     position vis-a-vis Republika Srpska, that is not contesting statehood but

24     not recognising them, doesn't fully describe the supportive relationship

25     that Serbia had vis-a-vis Republika Srpska.  So for example, it doesn't

Page 34289

 1     indicate, nor does the rest of your statement, what you testified to when

 2     you were here in connection with the Slobodan Milosevic case, where you

 3     said at transcript page 36224:

 4             "It is certain that all three sides had their aiders and

 5     abettors from the outside because there is no civil war without any such

 6     external aid."

 7             Can you confirm that that was your position in the Milosevic

 8     case, sir?

 9        A.   Yes.  I repeat, it was a civil war in which every party had its

10     own external helpers.

11        Q.   You were also asked, this time at -- by the way, when I refer to

12     the transcript pages, I can certainly call them up so you can see them,

13     but mostly I'm doing that for the benefit of the Defence and the Court,

14     which is able to access that.

15             You were also asked at transcript page 36420 during your

16     Milosevic testimony if "each side had its supporters and you knew that

17     you were supporting one side, didn't you?"

18             And you answered:

19             "Politically, financially, and diplomatically, yes.  They were

20     our people."

21             And can you confirm that that was your position and that when you

22     were saying "they were our people," you were referring to the Bosnian

23     Serbs?

24        A.   First of all, by saying "they were our people," I understood that

25     we are one and the same people and we were living in two different

Page 34290

 1     neighbouring states, and our sympathies and support to them is a natural

 2     course of things, because one part of the same people cannot not support

 3     and have sympathies for the part of the same people in a different

 4     country.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I indicate a difference in

 6     translation.  When it is said "our people," it's meant as our people, the

 7     same people as those in Serbia, but there is also the meaning of the word

 8     "people" in the sense of nation people, and that's why differences in

 9     translation occur.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I second that.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Fine.  I don't think that implicates anything here,

12     but of course I am aware of the potential for that distinction and will

13     try to distinguish where I can if I'm referring to a nation or a

14     constituent peoples or nations.  I'll try to be as clear as possible.

15        Q.   During your Milosevic testimony, sir, you were also asked about

16     the level of military support provided by Serbia to Republika Srpska, and

17     is it correct that you indicated, and that's found at transcript page

18     36420, that that was something you couldn't speak to because you were, as

19     you say:

20             "I do not now about that, because as I told you, I knew nothing

21     of military matters."

22             That's -- that's essentially what you testified to in the

23     Milosevic case; correct?

24        A.   Yes, that's correct.  I stated that, because military issues

25     passed me by completely.  I did not receive any information from any

Page 34291

 1     intelligence service on those issues, nor did I receive information on

 2     the military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  All I learned was through

 3     the press or casual or accidental meetings with some people.

 4        Q.   This Trial Chamber has received evidence from various sources

 5     about the extent of military support by Serbia to Republika Srpska or by

 6     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Bosnian Serbs.  Let me ask you

 7     this question:  Were you -- without being aware of specifics as you've

 8     told us, and without -- being in the position you just described, were

 9     you nevertheless aware that the extent of military support provided by

10     the Serbian side to the Bosnian Serbs was substantial?

11        A.   I could not say that.  Anything I would say would be speculation,

12     because I have not a single specific direct piece of information about

13     that.  Whatever I said would not be qualified, because it is not based on

14     original sources, on knowledge.

15        Q.   In paragraphs 37 through 42 of your report --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Statement.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Statement.  Excuse me.  I saw the report in front of

18     me -- in front of my eyes at the moment.

19        Q.   Excuse me, sir.  In paragraphs 37 through 42 of your statement,

20     you make reference to the Cutileiro Plan, and I'd like to ask you about a

21     number of those references.  First of all, you twice make reference to

22     the alleged fact that the plan was "accepted" by the Serbs and that they

23     would never have "signed Cutileiro's agreement" if they had intentions of

24     forcing their way out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25             First of all, Mr. Jovanovic, are you aware of the fact that the

Page 34292

 1     Agreement on Principles was not signed as a formal matter, and that

 2     indeed the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Dr. Karadzic, assured their

 3     followers that it had not been signed and would not be signed until the

 4     Bosnian Serb leadership got exactly what they wanted?  Were you aware of

 5     that?

 6        A.   I was present when Witness Cutileiro submitted his report to the

 7     international conference on Yugoslavia.  He asked two weeks to make

 8     finishing touches for finalising the report, but he said that all three

 9     sides had given their consent, and all those present at the conference,

10     all heads of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, supported that,

11     including President Milosevic, who said that Mr. Cutileiro should be

12     given two weeks to finalise the reports and that Serbia would be among

13     the first to support Bosnia and Herzegovina restructured in that way.

14     Whoever wanted to test Mr. Milosevic could have just waited two weeks to

15     see whether he would indeed sign it.  The only exception was

16     President Izetbegovic, who asked for immediate recognition of Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina.

18             I want to emphasise that the consent of all three sides had been

19     given to that text.  Not the signature, but the consent, which is very

20     important.  And the only the side that withdrew that consent after the

21     pressure of the US was the Muslim side, and that was the end of that

22     process, and its termination heralded the beginning of all the horrible

23     things that happened during the civil war in Bosnia.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we pause here, Mr. Tieger?

25             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.

Page 34293

 1             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at

 2     quarter past 1.00.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 1.17 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, we were discussing some of the portions of your

 8     statement dealing with the Cutileiro Plan.  In paragraph 39 of your

 9     statement, you appear to insist that the position taken with respect to

10     the Agreement on Principles on March 18th was somehow incompatible with

11     any thought by the Bosnian Serb leadership of achieving their objectives

12     through military means.  You state:

13              "Had they had such intentions, they would not have signed

14     Cutileiro's agreement."

15             That's at paragraph 39, and a similar provision in paragraph 49.

16             And Mr. Jovanovic, do you admit or deny or simply claim you are

17     not aware of any positions taken by the Bosnian Serb leadership that if

18     the negotiations failed to achieve what they wanted, that they would do

19     whatever is necessary to protect their interests, including using force

20     to take territories?

21        A.   [No interpretation]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Jovanovic, I'm afraid we are not getting

23     interpretation.  Could you kindly repeat your answer.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Again, we are not getting translation.

Page 34294

 1             Mr. Karadzic, do you hear me?

 2             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, Excellency.  I have Serbian.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could you speak in B/C/S.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  No, we are not getting interpretation still.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe it's about the channel.  You

 7     may have changed the channel as I use channel number 6, and I do receive

 8     the interpretation.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Now we -- it has been sorted out.

10     Please continue, Mr. Tieger.  Or if you could repeat your answer,

11     Mr. Jovanovic.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Having accepted the

13     Cutileiro Plan, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated that

14     they cared for peace much more than for war.  They themselves were scared

15     of war, but essentially it was a sacrifice on their part because they

16     gave up on their objective to remain within Yugoslavia for the sake of

17     living in a joint country, because that plan ensured the equality of the

18     Serbs as a constituent people.  So the alternative to that plan was not a

19     war option for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They were literally

20     forced to go for that option.  Let's not forget who started shooting.  It

21     was the HDZ forces from Croatia who entered in Bosanski broad and burned

22     down the Serb village and then the murder --

23             MR. TIEGER:

24        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, I'm sorry to interrupt, sir, but I'm going to try

25     to keep us both to the guidelines I announced earlier about sticking to

Page 34295

 1     the question.  The question was about your awareness, one way or another,

 2     of the positions taken by the Bosnian Serbs, not an interpretation of the

 3     plan itself or the events that followed.  So I -- do I understand you

 4     correctly that it's your position that the Bosnian Serbs were, as you say

 5     here, literally forced to go for that option, meaning the military or war

 6     option, and as you stated earlier at page 29, they were compelled to

 7     fight.  That's your position; is that right?

 8        A.   Yes.  Don't forget, I recall that in my statement that I attended

 9     only one conversation between President Milosevic and President Karadzic

10     about a possible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina when Dr. Karadzic was

11     seriously concerned after the falling through of the Cutileiro Plan that

12     a war might break out there.  Milosevic said:  "Withdraw to the

13     territories where you are in a majority and don't do anything."

14        Q.   And repeating your statement is particularly not necessary and

15     particularly inefficient.

16        A.   Very well.

17        Q.   Okay.  So can I -- do I understand correctly then that you are

18     not aware of any expressions by the Bosnian Serb leadership either prior

19     to or during the course of the Cutileiro discussions to the effect that

20     if they could not achieve what they sought from those negotiations, that

21     they would do whatever is necessary, including winning territories by

22     force?

23        A.   No.  I never heard such a statement from either of them or from

24     Milosevic.  That option was simply never considered, simply because there

25     was a firm conviction that a peace process would lead to a solution.

Page 34296

 1     Whether it was in somebody's head, I don't know, but there was nothing

 2     like that mentioned in the talks.

 3        Q.   Let's talk about something that you alluded to earlier, and that

 4     was at pages 46 and 49 of today's testimony, and that's the issue of all

 5     Serbs in one state and its linkage to the break-up of Bosnia.

 6             Now, the Cutileiro Agreement on Principles was premised -- or do

 7     you agree it was premised on Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining a state within

 8     its existing borders?  Just yes or no.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And the reality is that the Bosnian Serb leadership never agreed

11     to that in part because the objective, the goal, or even the dream was

12     the eventual uniting of the Serbs in one state, whether a single state or

13     a federation of states; correct?

14        A.   I know what the objective of Serbia was.  It was never the

15     objective of Serbia to create any sort of territorial ambition against

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The objective was to protect Serbs in

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina from possible danger from domination and unitarianism

18     by ensuring them freedom and equality.  What the Bosnian Serbs dreamt of

19     and thought of as a possible development goes beyond rational reality.

20     Everybody is allowed to dream, but that was never the policy expressed by

21     Bosnian Serbs.  They only expressed their huge fears in the event

22     independent Bosnia comes into being, and for that reason they started

23     these talks with Milosevic that I began to explain.

24        Q.   Well, let me look at what they expressed both to their followers

25     and indeed to you, and let me break that down into two aspects of what we

Page 34297

 1     we just talked about.  Number one, Bosnia remaining or not remaining a

 2     state, and then we'll move on to the issue of all Serbs in one state.

 3             First of all, this Trial Chamber has received evidence to the

 4     following effect, and I want to ask you if you were -- if you claim to

 5     have been aware of that at the time.  So from the 42nd Assembly session

 6     in 1994, Mr. Karadzic said --

 7             MR. TIEGER:  That's P1394, e-court page 81 and 82.

 8        Q.   "We won the battle for our republic on 18 March.  And that was

 9     the first time that Alija said yes to three Bosnias on ethnic basis and

10     that was fatal for him.  That was the moment when Bosnia collapsed."

11             He went on to say:

12             "If they had ignored us, kept silent, and acknowledged Bosnia,

13     and then said afterwards that some rebels were overthrowing their own

14     state, we would have faced difficult problems."

15             And at the 37th Assembly session, also in -- I believe in early

16     1994, he explained that this will be the first time in history that a

17     country is torn apart after the recognition and that the international

18     community accepts it.

19             So were you aware that Dr. Karadzic and other members of the

20     Bosnian Serb leadership were taking the position that Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina had essentially been ended as a state by the Agreement on

22     Principles?

23        A.   As far as I can see that statement by Dr. Karadzic was issued in

24     1994 and not immediately after the Cutileiro Plan.  It reflects the

25     situation as it prevailed at the time, which means that the joint state

Page 34298

 1     of Bosnia and Herzegovina stopped functioning as such, that the

 2     situation, the factual situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was contrary to

 3     what a state needs to be recognised and honoured as an independent state.

 4     I don't see in that statement anything else but some degree of euphoria.

 5     All the other statements by Dr. Karadzic in the Assembly of

 6     Republika Srpska and elsewhere, as well as his interviews, exude a

 7     totally different atmosphere, which is that the minimum of what they

 8     wanted and sought in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the protection of their

 9     rights as a constituent people, and to provide a full picture one should

10     look at all of those statements, all of those interviews, and then you

11     would be able to gain a fuller picture and a much better picture than you

12     are presenting here now.

13        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, you were present, were you not, on the 21 January

14     1993 co-ordination council when Mr. Cosic spoke about the recognition by

15     Lord Owen of the intentions to create a state within a state and the fact

16     that discussions about rounding off Bosnian Serb territory was revealed

17     precisely that political objective to Lord Owen?  Do you recall that or

18     do you want me to show that to you on screen?

19        A.   I can't remember exactly, but I know that Lord Owen, who was the

20     first to launch the organisation of the future independent

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina at the so-called confederal principle, that he started

22     from the ethnic moment.  What is imputed as being President Cosic's words

23     at the time was nothing new.  The current Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina is

24     composed of two different entities.  They are not independent states, but

25     those entities are -- have been recognised by international treaties.

Page 34299

 1     The Lord Owen was the father of that idea sometime in mid-1994 or even

 2     before that, and then that idea was adopted by the Contact Group first

 3     and finally by the Dayton Accords.  In that statement that is ascribed to

 4     Mr. Cosic, I don't see anything particularly new.

 5        Q.   Mr. Cosic said on 21 January 1993 that a state, Bosnian Serb

 6     state, was the main political -- "our main political will and objective,"

 7     and only two weeks earlier at the previous council for harmonisation of

 8     views or co-ordination council meeting, Dr. Karadzic had also stated

 9     words to that effect, that is, "We do not recognise Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina as an independent and sovereign state.  Instead of that, we

11     have formed our own state on the basis of the right to self-determination

12     and self-management."  That was the position by the Bosnian Serbs, wasn't

13     it, the formation of its own state, not a recognition of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

15        A.   First of all, I apologise.  Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised

16     internationally in April 1992.  There was no need to subsequently put

17     that question.

18             As far as the state of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina is

19     concerned, that was their goal sometime after 1993, and that goal was

20     finally achieved by the Dayton Accords.  They have their own state, their

21     entity, which has been recognised and which is one of the columns of the

22     current independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.  What Cosic said, maybe he

23     just misspoke.  However, the Serbian state that we have according to him

24     was not contrary to the internationally recognised Bosnia which had

25     already been recognised as of April 1992.

Page 34300

 1        Q.   Well, let's move on to talk a bit about some of the aspects of

 2     that state, and I'd said we'd talk about all Serbs in one state, and I

 3     indicated to you we would -- I would direct your attention to some of the

 4     things stated, not just dreamed about.  So on February 25th, 1992, at the

 5     8th session of the Bosnian Serb parliament, Mr. Krajisnik said:

 6             "We have the opportunity to preserve the Serbian people in a

 7     single state, to preserve the entire Serbian people in Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina and have it become part of the Serbian empire."

 9             On January 9th, 1994, at the ceremonial session of the Bosnian

10     Serb parliament, Dr. Karadzic said:

11             "Our goal is to unite with Serbia.  We do not want to hide that."

12             That's P5525, page 12.

13             A bit later in January 1994, at the 38th session, P1387, he

14     reaffirmed that:

15             "Our goal of unification with Krajina and Serbia is still valid."

16             Mr. Krajisnik on 21 August 1994:

17             "Our goal is that all this we are fighting for today becomes a

18     united state.  May God grant this.  All the territory now called

19     Republika Srpska or Serbian Krajina will be Serbia."

20             Mr. Jovanovic, were you aware or do you claim that you were aware

21     or not of expressions like this over and over by Dr. Karadzic and other

22     members of the Bosnian Serb leadership concerning the long-term objective

23     to unite with Serbia?

24        A.   Thank you.  First of all, let me remind you that all the Serbs

25     were united in the federal state of Yugoslavia.  They stopped being

Page 34301

 1     united once Yugoslavia was broken up by other forces.  Cutileiro's plan

 2     was adopted by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They conceded to an

 3     independence date with three cantons.  When the others destroyed that

 4     plan, not Serbs but the others, the situation occurred --

 5        Q.   And it's not pleasant for me to interrupt you, but I think you

 6     can see or if you can -- you'll see the screen, I'm asking you if you're

 7     aware of expressions like this.  I'm not asking you to --

 8        A.   Yes.  Yes.  I was trying to explain that after that when the war

 9     broke out, that option of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina with cantons

10     was dropped and other options were opened and everybody had a different

11     option, a different dream as to what they could achieve.

12             The statements that you mentioned, I did not notice them at the

13     time when I was in office, perhaps because that was happening in the

14     neighbouring State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and all those things did not

15     reach others in time, and especially they didn't reach -- however, I see

16     them as emotional and euphoric state of mind which speaks more of

17     people's dreams than of the reality.  Their goal may have been expressed

18     in different ways, but in essence it was what it was suggested to them by

19     Serbia all the time, and that was to accept the agreement with the other

20     two parties which ensured them important things, freedom and equality,

21     and that was their focus all the time.  And as for euphoric statements

22     that could be given by ones or the others one or two times is something

23     that can happen in the heat of the moment, but this does not carry any

24     weight when it comes to making proper evaluations of the situation as it

25     was.

Page 34302

 1        Q.   I'm going to look at that in just a moment, but I notice this is

 2     not the first time in your responses that you distinguish between the

 3     positions taken by the Bosnian Serbs at the time of the Cutileiro

 4     discussions and positions taken afterwards.  So with respect to what I

 5     had asked you about earlier, that is Bosnia as a state, the -- the

 6     reality, sir, is this, isn't it, that the first position in the Cutileiro

 7     principles was that Bosnia was a state, and it was always said that

 8     Bosnia was a state, but the Bosnian Serb leadership never accepted that.

 9     That's the reality, isn't it, whether later on or at the time of the

10     discussions?

11        A.   I wouldn't agree with you.  First of all, when they accepted

12     Cutileiro's plan, they accepted Bosnia as a state, because the plan could

13     not have functioned in any other way.  Second of all, they accepted

14     Bosnia as a state by Dayton Accords.  They continue to honour that fact

15     for as long as their recognised rights are honoured in

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  When the war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a new

17     and dangerous state of affairs began, and obviously that state of affairs

18     created an atmosphere in which some words and statements may have been

19     extravagant or unrealistic on any of the sides, including the Serbian

20     side in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I would not ascribe that much weight to

21     those words.  I would -- would certainly pay more attention to the peace

22     process that lasted from 1992 and lasted until 1995.  Those were

23     painstaking negotiations in which Serbs played a role, however

24     unconvincing that role may have been.

25        Q.   Well, you say you wouldn't agree with me.  The fact of the matter

Page 34303

 1     is that you are not agreeing with what Mr. Karadzic himself said at the

 2     49th assembly session --

 3             MR. TIEGER:  That's P1407, pages 116 through 117.

 4        Q.   "The first position in all Cutileiro principles, if you remember,

 5     was that Bosnia was a state consisting of this and that, but it always

 6     said that Bosnia was a state and we never accepted that.

 7             Now, I told you that we would look at all -- we're talking about

 8     with Dr. Karadzic had also said about all Serbs in one state.  You

 9     indicated that you were not aware of that, and that is essentially the

10     position you took during your testimony in the Milosevic case where you

11     repeatedly denied that all Serbs in one state was the underlying

12     objective of everyone on both sides of the Drina, and in that I'm

13     focusing on a question that was asked at transcript page 36367 of the

14     Milosevic testimony.  That was your position then fairly and you repeated

15     that during your testimony; correct?

16        A.   Yes, but let us remind ourselves that there is no nation, there

17     is no people which is divided which does not drive towards having a joint

18     state and unification.  It's a natural thing with all peoples who are

19     divided.  The division of Serbs into several groups was very fresh, and

20     that was after the destruction of the joint federal state.  So it was not

21     surprising that from time to time that emotion erupted and that wish for

22     unification for a joint state.  However, that was not the reflection of

23     political realities, let alone Serbian goals.  The idea of the

24     Greater Serbia of all Serb people living in one state was something that

25     was not realistic and as such was not followed by the official Serbian

Page 34304

 1     politics.  Such statements that were provided by leaders on the Serbian

 2     Bosnia sides for me were the expressions of hopelessness, and that's why

 3     they had to feed themselves sometimes with those big words coming out of

 4     their mouths.

 5        Q.   It may not have been official Serbian politics as you say, sir,

 6     but let me focus you on a number of things that were said and recorded at

 7     the January sessions of the council for harmonisation of views in 1993.

 8     First Mr. Cosic:

 9             "In my opinion, we have to recognise ourselves and finally agree

10     that the achievement of our main political goal, living in one state or

11     in the federation of states, is the long-term aim which could be achieved

12     only step-by-step or gradually."

13             Next Dr. Karadzic at the 9 January 1993 co-ordination council

14     session.  That's 65 ter 06145, at page 68 in the English, 67 in the

15     B/C/S, essentially to the same effect:

16             "It's the long-term aim which could be achieved only step-by-step

17     or gradually."

18             And now your words at the 9 January 1993 meeting for the council

19     for harmonisation:

20             "We have to make a conclusion from it that the community," that

21     is the international community, "and conditions do not allow the ages old

22     dream on union of all Serbs in one Serbian country to become true."

23             That's at page 25 of the English and the B/C/S.

24             Now, sir, do you recall stating that, and does that accurately

25     capture what your position was in January of 1993?

Page 34305

 1        A.   I don't see anything disputable in that part of my statement that

 2     you quoted from.  For centuries the Serbian people lived across various

 3     empires, and it was its goal to unify and live in one state for

 4     centuries.  The fact that I noticed that the international community did

 5     not wish something like to repeat is just stating the facts, stating the

 6     reality, and that was my starting point.  It was not a practical

 7     political goal.  It was something that had been overcome, that was in

 8     January 1993 when the new part of the peace process was in the pipeline.

 9     It was the most promising part of it.  At that meeting everybody

10     presented their own views.  President Cosic is -- was a writer.  He

11     interpreted the things about a bit more freely but not more

12     realistically.  What I said is totally right.  I would not add anything

13     to that.

14        Q.   All right.  And you have repeatedly emphasised that it was not a

15     practical political goal, meaning at that particular moment, but the

16     reality is that you, Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Cosic, and other members of the

17     Bosnian Serb and Serbian leadership insisted that goal was real and had

18     to be implemented step-by-step, gradually; correct?

19        A.   You see, a joint state where all the Serbs and all the others

20     lived together was destroyed.  That doesn't mean that the dream was

21     destroyed that something like that could be repeated, but that could be

22     repeated only through wider processes.  We saw that through the process

23     of the unification of the parts of the former Yugoslavia to the

24     European Union where they would all be living in a joint state which

25     would be called I don't know what.

Page 34306

 1             So one does not have to hold against the people who were

 2     responsible for various parts of the Serbian people at the time that they

 3     had that idea of the need to again have a joint state in -- in the

 4     future.  Every state has the same goal.  The Albanians today, they dream

 5     of a joint state.  The people in Cyprus, the Greeks, Romanians,

 6     Moldavians, they all have their own dreams, but dreams are one thing and

 7     reality is the other thing.  Reality was different to that dream.  I

 8     stated that and as such I rejected the dream as a possibility to push it

 9     as the realistic politics.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection to the

11     transcript.  Line 16, 17, the witness said that the Serbs lived together

12     and that the others lived together in Yugoslavia.  The witness said that

13     according to the interpretation that the Serbs and the others lived in

14     the same state.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to say that we were

16     all great in that federal state, but when that state disappeared we all

17     became small and that was somebody's goal and that goal still pursued and

18     implemented to this day.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   You just stated, Mr. Jovanovic, that you rejected that dream as a

21     possibility to push it, but the reality is that in January of 1993, you

22     simply acknowledged the reality of the moment that it couldn't be

23     accomplished "now in this moment," that's at page 25 of the transcript of

24     that session of the council for harmonisation, and on the next page at

25     page 26 in English but still page 25 in B/C/S, you described it as "the

Page 34307

 1     first phase of the political way of struggle for our national goals."

 2             So the reality is it remained as an objective to be implemented a

 3     step at a time to the extent reality permitted at any given moment.

 4        A.   I don't see anything unnatural in that.  Every people that is

 5     divided and lives across various states has just one natural goal to get

 6     together in one way or another; however, what they want does not mean

 7     that it will be implemented tomorrow, the day after.  It can be a hundred

 8     years or a thousand years long process.  You don't have to make a mound

 9     of a molehill.  We see something that is just an idealistic announcement

10     which is not a danger for political activities.  Such a danger was not

11     only unrealistic but it was also not acceptable by Serbia at the time.

12     All that time we were very persistent there.  We were consistent in our

13     goal to have the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina organised in the way

14     that all the three peoples could accept.  We accepted all that.  There

15     was no possibility for Serbia to expand across the Drina and to be

16     territorially expanded in that way.

17        Q.   Well, let's talk about territory in that case.  Were you aware

18     that there was a map appended to the agreement on principles, the

19     Cutileiro agreement on principles?

20        A.   Yes, I was aware of the map.  I can't remember it right now, but,

21     yes, I was aware of it.

22        Q.   And -- and are you aware that that map depicted the absolute and

23     relative majorities in all the municipalities in Bosnia as a starting

24     point for the discussions about what territory the three entities

25     individually might comprise?

Page 34308

 1        A.   Apologise.  How shall I put it?  I was aware of that in one way.

 2     Since I didn't participate in those talks, I did not get into the details

 3     of majorities in various municipalities.  I dwelt more upon the contours

 4     of the former shape and size of the cantons.

 5        Q.   Let me show you that map quickly.  That's D47 -- 486.

 6             Now, the -- you can see the legend, so the red represents Serbian

 7     majority or relative majority areas, the green Muslim areas as we can see

 8     in particular in central, eastern, and far Western Bosnia.

 9             Were you aware, Mr. Jovanovic, that the Bosnian Serb leadership

10     and Dr. Karadzic in particular didn't like that map and was pleased when

11     it was not accepted?

12        A.   I'm not sure that the other two sides liked the map either.  Each

13     of them had their own preferences.  The fact is, however, that they

14     consented to the map.  Let's not repeat why it did not become the Bosnian

15     reality.  Here we can see parts with majorities being the one or the

16     other, and that's a well-known map.  We're aware of it.

17        Q.   Right.  Well, first of all, there wasn't really much to consent

18     to.  It was a reflection of the status quo, that is, the demographic

19     breakdown of Bosnia at that moment; correct?

20        A.   Are you referring to the Cutileiro Plan and his map?  Cutileiro

21     probably started from the situation at hand and the fact is that all the

22     three sides accepted such a map.

23        Q.   Well, as I just indicated to -- so you were not aware that

24     Dr. Karadzic was not pleased with the map and in particular what he was

25     not satisfied with was Eastern Bosnia as well as Sarajevo and the Neretva

Page 34309

 1     River valley.  Did you know that?

 2        A.   I knew very little.  However, even that little escapes me because

 3     as soon as that plan fell through, the worst thing started happening in

 4     Bosnia.  It is certain that Dr. Karadzic did not like some of the parts

 5     of the solution because some of the cantons were separated from each

 6     other, and that was not as common as for the other two entities, although

 7     their cantons are also separated, Posavina and others, but this was the

 8     result of a compromise that they had to accept.  And all of the colours

 9     on the map depict majority ethnic groups which lived in them.  The plan

10     started from the principle of co-existence between a majority and the

11     minority, and from that point of view was a good solution for Bosnia as a

12     whole.  Unfortunately, it didn't take off the ground.  As we all know,

13     things went a different direction which largely changed the future total

14     picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina as we know only too well.

15        Q.   You were aware of the fact that the Bosnian Serb leadership

16     claimed large -- a large percentage of the territory of Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina and were aware that they attempted to justify that in part by

18     a reference to cadastral registers and survey maps, and that's what you

19     refer to in paragraph 45 of your statement; right?  And also paragraph

20     51.

21        A.   Yes.  Bosnian Serb leadership very often emphasised the fact that

22     they had or were entitled to 64 per cent of the territory based on the

23     cadaster.  This is part of the historical heritage, because Bosnian

24     Muslims and Bosnian Catholics, as the prevalent part of the Ottoman

25     Turkish Empire settled in the cities, whereas the Bosnian Serbs as the

Page 34310

 1     last category of the population had to live in villages in countryside,

 2     so the cadastral result is also the result of the history which made

 3     things to be in that way.

 4        Q.   You've referred repeatedly to Mr. Milosevic certainly during the

 5     course of your testimony today and certainly at great length obviously

 6     during the course of your testimony in his case.  Were you aware of the

 7     fact that Mr. Milosevic himself ridiculed and criticised this position as

 8     transparently absurd?

 9        A.   I'm sorry.  Are you referring to the percentage, 64 per cent, or

10     the map or --

11        Q.   To the argument that the Bosnian Serbs were entitled to such a

12     large percentage of Bosnia's territory because of the cadastral registers

13     and their alleged ownership of that portion of Bosnia.

14        A.   As far as I know, at first Milosevic did not have much

15     understanding for that kind of argument.  Quite simply he was a city man,

16     but later on he relented, and he realised that this argument did have

17     some weight.  It is not state ownership but still it is the ownership of

18     individuals, Serb individuals, and as such it did carry some weight in

19     the discussions that were still underway.  It's not the only thing that

20     mattered and it's not the only thing that mattered in absolute terms, but

21     this is something that had to be taken into consideration duly in all the

22     talks that were held.

23        Q.   I don't know how much later on you assert he relented, but in

24     November of 1995, he said this, referring to the Bosnian Serb claim that

25     the Contact Group offer of 50 per cent of the territory of

Page 34311

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina was unfair:

 2             "They said that this was unfair on the Serbian people although

 3     there are 31 per cent of Serbs in Bosnia.  31 per cent get half of the

 4     territory while 70 per cent get the other half of the territory and it's

 5     unfair on those 31 per cent who got half the territory?  There were still

 6     those who took the bait, well, the Serbs own 62 per cent of the

 7     territory, as if someone would believe it.  It's known that it was all

 8     socially owned property, the meadows, grazing land, and mountains were

 9     nobodies property.  What owners, for goodness sake?"

10             And that's found at P2604, page 6 of the English and B/C/S.  That

11     was Mr. Milosevic's position articulated at the Supreme Defence Council

12     meeting in November of 1995.

13        A.   At the time I was not in Belgrade, and I'm not aware of this.

14     However, I have to add something.  Private ownership in a way was turned

15     into social ownership, but landowners, especially of small plots of land,

16     remained owners of their land.  This never became social property.  And

17     even now in times of transition land had to be returned to the initial

18     owners.  Milosevic had poor relations with Republika Srpska leadership

19     because this happened at the time of Dayton when he had the last say and

20     that's indeed what he did.  This statement of his is in my view part of

21     these ill feelings of his towards the leadership of Republika Srpska as

22     negotiators because he thought he was a better and more successful

23     negotiator and he thought that he could achieve more than those who acted

24     as litigants compared to him.

25        Q.   In connection with the Bosnian Serb claim for territory within

Page 34312

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina, were you aware, yes or no, that the Bosnian Serbs and

 2     Dr. Karadzic in particular claimed a right to territories within Bosnia

 3     and Herzegovina where they constituted a minority because of

 4     World War II?  Did you know that or not?

 5        A.   I did not know it that way, but I did know and I know to this day

 6     that quite a few Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina disappeared during the

 7     Second World War.  They were either killed in a bestial way or they were

 8     expelled.  And this made the population of the Serbs in

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina sparser, and this is the result of a crime, genocide,

10     and it should not be simply stated as if it never happened.  So from that

11     point of view I have some understanding for this argument of

12     Dr. Karadzic's.

13        Q.   Well, the fact of the matter is that he said it in your presence

14     at the 9 January 1993 council for harmonisation.  So at payment 63,

15     page --

16        A.   Yes [overlapping speakers]

17        Q.   -- remember that?  That's when he talked about --

18        A.   Possibly.

19        Q.   And in referring to the territories that he considered should by

20     rights be Bosnian Serb, he mentioned essentially something similar to

21     what you just said, that when -- that -- that he would show the census of

22     1931 would get the response that this is history, and he said to them,

23     that is the internationals, quote:  "That is not a history.  This is a

24     continuation of the World War II."

25        A.   Well, I think what he said is rather correct because this was a

Page 34313

 1     real genocide that was committed against the Serbs, not an invented one,

 2     in the Independent State of Croatia.  No one can deny the figures that

 3     the Germans themselves presented as 300, 400, 5.000, 600.000 persons

 4     that --

 5        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, I'm sorry --

 6        A.   -- disappeared and were killed in bestial ways and --

 7        Q.   I appreciate that that's a sensitive issue, so I hesitate to

 8     interrupt you there, but I want to focus on the concept rather than the

 9     background.

10             Were you aware that among other reasons for claiming territory

11     within Bosnia-Herzegovina there were strategic concerns by the Bosnian

12     Serbs for focusing on particular territories within Bosnia that they

13     considered was -- should go to the Bosnian Serbs and should be held by

14     the Bosnian Serbs?

15        A.   I don't know what is specifically meant by that, but it is a fact

16     that there was this strategy on all three sides to form their final

17     boundaries in such a way that would correspond to their strategic

18     interests.  In his proposals, Lord Owen bore that in mind when he

19     intentionally interrupted the lines among the cantons of the Serbs and

20     others.  This is something that is in the very nature of every policy and

21     of all politics.  Everyone wants to satisfy their own objectives as much

22     as possible or simply has to give up on them if they prove to be

23     impossible.  The other side, the Muslim side, very much insisted on

24     having a direct link with Sandzak and Serbia, and they probably had

25     dreams of their own.  That is why they wanted this so-called green

Page 34314

 1     transversal to be uninterrupted from Istanbul all the way to Sarajevo.

 2     To what extent this is a dream is a dream is a different matter I think.

 3        Q.   Well, to what extent it's a dream, let's focus on what

 4     Dr. Karadzic said to you and others at the 9 January 1993 council for

 5     harmonisation of views.  That's at page 96 in English, 95 through 96 in

 6     B/C/S, where he stated that:

 7             "The Neretva is disputable but we can live without Neretva;

 8     however, we cannot live without Podrinje and Posavina."

 9             That means -- and he continued:

10             "Without them we have no chance of establishing a state and

11     integrating in the future."

12             So that's a reflection of the strategic aims that you were

13     talking about in your answer a moment ago.

14        A.   It is in the very nature of things that people that are separated

15     from their mainstream wants to be closer to its borders and if possible

16     to have contiguous territory, just like Muslim politicians wanted to

17     achieve the exact opposite, to make that impossible.  So this is a

18     question of wishes.  But it's a different matter what can be achieved and

19     what is achieved through negotiations.  However you cannot deny anyone

20     the right to maximum wishes if that is part of politics and politics

21     always consists of maximum and minimums.

22        Q.   Well, let's talk about how that was achieved Mr. Jovanovic,

23     because you were aware, were you not, that Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian

24     Serb leadership were insistent upon the implementation and enforcement of

25     what can be called the factual situation or the de facto situation or the

Page 34315

 1     creation of a new factuality; correct?

 2        A.   This expression factual situation did not only come from the

 3     Serbs but also from others, Lord Owen, too, he also proceeded from the

 4     factual situation in his considerations as to how to proceed.  A civil

 5     war with certain elements of a religious war had been underway for three

 6     and a half years with all its terrible dimensions and it also led to

 7     certain movements in terms of territory and population as a result of the

 8     war activities.

 9             In the peace initiatives, this was not denied all together.  It

10     was partly take into account, like other things; however, this is an

11     eternal law of war and warfare.  It always led to changes in terms of

12     territory and in a certain -- and to a certain extent this is taken into

13     account in peace processes.

14        Q.   You see the demographic breakdown of Bosnia and Herzegovina

15     before the conflict still on the screen before you.  On the 9th of

16     January, 1993, at pages 63 -- 61 through 62 of the B/C/S and page 63 of

17     the English, Dr. Karadzic pointed out the areas which he said were "ours

18     according to the rights and according to the factual situation," and he

19     cited as examples on the Drina just, as examples, Bratunac and Visegrad.

20     Now, you can see the -- the fact that those were majority Muslim areas

21     there.  Were you aware of the fact that Bratunac before the conflict

22     consisted of approximately 21.500 Muslims and approximately 11.400 Serbs,

23     and Visegrad approximately 13.300 Muslims and 7.000 Serbs.  Those were

24     areas that Dr. Karadzic was claiming based on what had happened in the

25     preceding months, correct?

Page 34316

 1        A.   I have to say that I was not nearly that familiar with the

 2     situation in the urban areas and the breakdown of the populations because

 3     Bosnia was a land unknown to me from that point of view.  And as things

 4     evolved, I learned a bit more about the composition of the population in

 5     particular areas.  I learned that through the media and sometimes from

 6     the representatives of Republika Srpska when they made certain comments

 7     in that direction, so I cannot consider myself to be a knowledgeable

 8     person as far as this demographic field is concerned.

 9        Q.   Well, you were certainly aware of the fact that the international

10     community during the course of 1992 and thereafter as well was condemning

11     the ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Croats from Muslim majority areas and

12     elsewhere by the Bosnian Serb forces that resulted in the shift in the

13     factual situation that we just discussed.  You were aware of that; right?

14        A.   I heard about that of course from foreign and domestic sources,

15     and I asked the leadership of Republika Srpska what this was all about.

16     They said to me that this was natural fear of the population that is

17     encircled by the other side.  They want to avoid being with them and they

18     want to join the majority territories of their own people, and this

19     relocation took place in all directions, including Serbs from the regions

20     that were controlled by Muslims and Croats.  That is the explanation that

21     I got.

22        Q.   And when you came here to testify in Mr. Milosevic's case, called

23     by him to testify, you were at some pains to point out that Mr. Milosevic

24     and you personally condemned the ethnic cleansing that took place in

25     these municipalities.

Page 34317

 1        A.   That is correct.  All the rumours that reached us, we expressed

 2     our condemnation in public and privately.  I also proposed to Milosevic

 3     that these weekend fighters that went from Serbia to the other side and

 4     fought there, and then they returned on Mondays with stolen goods, and

 5     that such persons should be brought before a court of law or

 6     court-martialed, and persons like Arkan and others should be detained in

 7     Eastern Serbia or somewhere until the end of the war, because they

 8     behaved like a private army.  This was not accepted, but as far as I

 9     managed to see, after that weekend warriors no longer crossed the river

10     and looted.  Those were the fighters who came from Serbia, went over to

11     Bosnia.

12        Q.   I just want you to confirm a few of the things you said in the

13     Milosevic case.  First you said the Bosnian Serbs "were condemned from

14     many quarters, often rightly so."  That's T 36359.

15             You said:

16             "We constantly condemned ethnic cleansing, the use of violence,

17     and the shelling of those town."  That's T 36421.

18             And you said:

19             "We condemned all crimes in the forcible take-over of territory

20     by all sides.  We financially supported our people there but we did not

21     support crimes."  That's at 3641 through 22.

22        A.   That is correct.

23        Q.   I'd like to turn now to paragraphs 53 and 64 of your statement

24     where you talk about the meeting of 21 January 1993 of the council for

25     harmonisation of views.

Page 34318

 1             Now, at paragraph 64 you state:

 2             "My position was that it was less in the strategic interest of

 3     the Serbian side that the national territories be homogenised and more

 4     that they be economically viable and that national homogenisation must

 5     not be achieved by violent means but rather through a peaceful exchange

 6     of populations if both parties agree to it."

 7             Now, that's not exactly my recollection of what you said.  I

 8     recall that you explained that natural homogenisation was a goal, a

 9     strategic aim, and made no particular reference to both parties agreeing

10     to it.  So perhaps we can take a look at that and that's found at P -- I

11     think the relevant portion is found at P00794.  Page 2 of the English and

12     page 3 of the B/C/S.  I think we'll stay on those for a while.

13             There you state that:

14             "The territory which is gained must be ethnically homogenised as

15     soon as possible."  And you explain that's because it is a "strategic aim

16     which would be pursued and must be achieved."  And then you contrast

17     that.  You say, "If conversely freedom of movement would bring freedom of

18     settlement and the mixing of populations to our detriment, then what has

19     been gained would be gradually eroded.  And in point of fact down the

20     road we lose all this."

21             So you emphasise there the strategic aim of national and ethnic

22     homogenisation; right?

23        A.   In that statement I pointed out national homogenisation and

24     non- -- and not homogenisation at all costs.  Economically viable

25     territories have to exist even at the expense of natural homogenisation

Page 34319

 1     and of course both objectives have to be achieved by peaceful means and

 2     certainly not by violent means and most definitely not by crimes.  This

 3     practice of population exchanges or moving out populations was

 4     internationally accepted only until a couple of decades ago.  Let us

 5     start with the last one, Yugoslavia, Italy.  They had an agreement on

 6     persons who had opted in a different way:  Italians who leave Yugoslavia

 7     could receive damages.  Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1953 had an agreement on

 8     Turks that were moving out of Yugoslavia - Macedonia, and Kosovo that

 9     is - and --

10        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, I'm not asking you for what you consider to be

11     other examples of efforts to nationally homogenise or of whatever you may

12     consider a justification for raising the issue of the strategic aim which

13     you considered should it be pursued.  I just wanted to confirm the

14     reality of that statement in contrast to paragraphs 53 and 64.

15             Now, the fact is that that wasn't the first time that you had

16     raised concerns about the demographic structure of the Bosnian Serb

17     state.  Just two weeks earlier on the 9th of January, 1993, at the

18     preceding council for harmonisation meeting, you pointed to a provision

19     in the Vance-Owen Plan concerning the right to freedom of movement and

20     expressed concern that it might spoil the demographic structure that had

21     been created since the conflict began; correct?  Or do you need to see

22     that?

23        A.   I cannot remember all the details now.  This happened 20 years

24     ago after all, but I said that in the context of preparing for the

25     renewal of the peace process that started in January 2003.

Page 34320

 1             Since the situation was stated as it was on the ground, I wanted

 2     to highlight that all violent means should be avoided and that this

 3     homogenisation, this exchange of population, should be carried out only

 4     in a voluntary way and accompanied by compensation.  I think that that

 5     text also states my opposition to ethnic cleansing as such and to all

 6     forms of violence.

 7             Well, look, this was preparation for the renewal of the peace

 8     process where different ideas were being expressed and where ways and

 9     means were being sought as to how further talks should be embarked on.

10     This was along the lines of what Lord Owen had in his mind.  He did not

11     utter those words until the summer of that year, namely that Bosnia, the

12     future Bosnia, should be set up on an ethnic principle and that what

13     should be recognised is that there was an exchange -- or rather, no, not

14     an exchange but movements of population in different ways, and that could

15     not be denied.  Some by force, some voluntarily, whatever was managed.

16        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, I'll show this if you want, but I'm going to quote

17     it for you, and the fact is that this was not a recognition or an

18     acknowledgement of movements of populations in different ways.  It was an

19     expression of concern that the provision in the Vance-Owen Plan referring

20     to freedom of movement might disrupt the demographic structure, might

21     spoil, in your words, the demographic structure of the ethnic cleansing

22     that had taken place in the months before had created.  You said at page

23     29 of the English, page 25 of the B/C/S of 65 ter 06145:

24             "Secondly, there is something that someone should explain to us.

25     Could the justified fear of spoiled demographic structure of Bosnia be

Page 34321

 1     realised due to such a text?  Would these provinces be prevented or

 2     made -- making difficult for the Muslims, for example, to settle freely

 3     in the Serbian countries.  I remember Mr. Karadzic was pointing to that

 4     danger at some time."

 5             Now, Mr. Milosevic intervened and it's suggested you not worry,

 6     no one will rush there, but you persisted and pointed out quote:

 7             "It was said right to freedom of movement.  It might also include

 8     the right on settlement if it was not said differently.  Therefore we

 9     have to keep it in mind in order to avoid having misunderstandings."

10             That was another expression about the concern about any change in

11     the number of Muslims that were in Serbian territories to the

12     disadvantage of the Serbs; correct?

13        A.   First of all, this Owen-Stoltenberg Plan was accepted by Serbia

14     without any changes.  It was the other side that didn't accept it.  That

15     shows that despite all of these countries, there could be spillovers of

16     the population, et cetera, Serbia accepted that, and of course this

17     change in the population as a result of different migrations, economic,

18     familial, et cetera, that exists in any state including in that

19     situation.  Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation was particularly sensitive

20     in the case of those who had been through the horrors of war, and they

21     always had a greater degree of concern that people who moved in from

22     other ethnic communities might threaten them in the future.  That is

23     natural.  But let us not forget that this meeting was held before the

24     renewal of the peace process and at that after that Serbia supported the

25     plan as it was along with the explanations that you just referred to.

Page 34322

 1        Q.   At -- at page 53 of your statement, you explain your alleged

 2     understanding of Dr. Karadzic's comments at the 21 January 1993 council

 3     for harmonisation of views meeting as saying that he was pointing to

 4     "undesirable and unavoidable effect of any civil war" and that didn't

 5     lead you therefore to believe that there was any plan of forcible

 6     relocation.

 7             Now, first of all, Mr. Jovanovic, let's be clear on this.  You

 8     certainly don't consider that the mass departure of minorities or even

 9     majority peoples from particular areas is in all cases an undesirable --

10     is it in all cases an unavoidable effect of a civil war, because as you

11     stated in the Milosevic case, you were insistent that the elimination of

12     Serbs from the Croatian Krajina resulting from Operation Storm was a

13     purposeful act by President Tudjman and Croatian forces.  Was an act of,

14     as you put it, at 36095 and 96, the greatest ethnic cleansing and a mass

15     expulsion.

16        A.   I did say that, but President Tudjman stated that before me,

17     saying that their goal was that Serbs do not make up more than 3 or 4

18     per cent of the population in Croatia, so I didn't say anything new.

19     That was the greatest ethnic cleansing after the Second World War,

20     because a total of about 400.000 Serbs were expelled from Croatia.  But I

21     didn't say anything new there.  I only repeated what Tudjman himself put

22     forward as a principle, as a goal before the beginning of

23     Operation Storm.

24        Q.   And you don't have any specific information about what people

25     from Zvornik, that is Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Serb authorities from

Page 34323

 1     Zvornik, said to Dr. Karadzic after the departure of Muslims from Zvornik

 2     about how and why they had left, do you?

 3        A.   I don't know that part, but I heard vaguely that bad things were

 4     going on there and that's why I asked from President Milosevic that Arkan

 5     and his group be withdrawn and kept in detention somewhere in Serbia

 6     until the end of the war, because the rumours were circulating that they

 7     were completely out of control and prepared to do anything.  That was

 8     enough for me to draw Milosevic's attention to how undesirable that was.

 9     But what exactly was happening in that part of the Drina valley,

10     including Zvornik, I have no first-hand information, only what I

11     overheard.

12        Q.   And the fact is that you were asked during your testimony in the

13     Milosevic case about this exact quote, that is the same quote from

14     Dr. Karadzic that you referred to in your statement, and after it was

15     quoted to you, the Prosecutor said:

16             "Now, he was describing massive ethnic movements to achieve Serb

17     domination of an area, wasn't he?  Yes or no?"

18             And at that time, you said:

19             "That is the position that Dr. Karadzic was presenting, and I

20     have nothing to do with that."  That's at T 36316.

21        A.   Well, that is correct because I myself did not make that

22     statement, and I'm not competent to comment on it.  It is as it is.  I

23     did not say it, and that's what I -- why I gave that answer.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Are you almost done, Mr. Tieger.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, I have about, I think, three

Page 34324

 1     relatively short discrete areas.  I was -- I'm moving quickly to try to

 2     complete by 2.45.  I don't know if it's possible or not, but I don't know

 3     if that means the Chamber would like -- I'm not quite sure what you have

 4     in mind by way of that inquiry, but I am almost done, but if you're

 5     asking if I will manage to complete before 2.45, I'm not entirely certain

 6     but I'll be close.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please -- please continue, but please conclude

 8     by quarter to 3.00.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I'm doing my best, Mr. President.

10        Q.   Okay.  You stated at paragraph 52, as far as the incidents in

11     Sarajevo were concerned, Karadzic told you that his policy was not

12     shelling, et cetera, and apart from an earlier reference to a few

13     specific incidents, that is essentially all your statement says about

14     Sarajevo.  What it doesn't say, and as you testified to and explain

15     elsewhere is that you were aware of and condemned the illegal shelling of

16     Sarajevo by the authorities in Republika Srpska.  Correct?

17        A.   We condemned all shelling of Sarajevo no matter from which

18     direction, more than once, a different level.  Both Milosevic and I did

19     that, and we wanted all those conflicts to end as soon as possible, not

20     to aggravate any more the overall situation where Serbia was a casualty

21     too.  The issue of Sarajevo was never -- was always unequivocal to me.

22     It's a fact --

23        Q.   In the interests of time let me ask you to confirm some of the

24     things you said in the Milosevic case.  This is at transcript page 36169.

25     Do you remember -- Mr. Milosevic asked you:

Page 34325

 1             "Do you what remember what our -- what was our position with

 2     respect to the shelling of Sarajevo?

 3             "A. Yes.  I remember that from the very beginning at all levels

 4     we, the Presidency of SFRY, the government of the republic, you

 5     personally, and I in numerous statements condemned the shelling and

 6     demanded that the parts of Republika Srpska cease that activity."  That's

 7     unquote.

 8             Further on at 3619 you confirmed that "Milosevic condemned that

 9     kind of behaviour," that's a quote, at a meeting with Douglas Hurd on

10     approximately 18 July 1992.  At transcript 36331, you stated that:

11             "The shelling of Sarajevo was something that was constantly

12     condemned by our government."

13             You said the same thing at 36322:

14             "We were constantly opposed to the shelling."

15             And you also stated that -- you asserted that this view:

16             "... was put into practice by Milosevic in Dayton" by "saying

17     that the entire Sarajevo ought to belong to Bosniaks to the Muslim part

18     of Bosnia and Herzegovina."  That's unquote.  36332.

19             And then at 36342 you said:

20             "Let me stress once again," this is a quote, "let me stress once

21     again we always condemn the siege of Sarajevo."

22             That's all correct, isn't it, sir?

23        A.   I stand by what I said at Milosevic trial, but I also stand by

24     what Dr. Karadzic said to me when he said that they were not doing that

25     shelling.  It was not their military aim, that it was being done by

Page 34326

 1     individuals in groups who had lost family members who were killed by

 2     Muslims and who were doing it on their own initiative.  That's the

 3     explanation I received.

 4        Q.   Let me turn to page -- paragraph 69 through 71 of your report

 5     where you refer to Srebrenica and the -- what you describe as the

 6     misdirected or missent report.  Now, that is a report as you explained in

 7     the Milosevic case at transcript page 36364 that the leadership of

 8     Republika Srpska had sent.  You said:

 9             "I got the information that the leadership of Republika Srpska

10     sent.  It was a rather long text," referring to this same report.

11             That's -- you confirm that?

12        A.   I believe that the leadership -- leadership is the wrong word.

13     It's the president of the municipality of Srebrenica who wrote that, and

14     we received that through the Foreign Ministry without any comment, and

15     since it was a Friday, I read that text.  It didn't sound very convincing

16     to me.  So I asked my secretary to take excerpts that are usable from it.

17        Q.   Okay.  I don't have time for the complete explanation.

18        A.   Very well.

19        Q.   First of all you may say now that "leadership" is a wrong word,

20     but do you confirm or do you want to see instead that you said at the

21     time of the Milosevic case: "I got the information that the leadership of

22     Republika Srpska had sent"?

23        A.   No.  I remember this well.  This was sent to us by the president

24     of municipality.  Perhaps through the leadership, but that paper came

25     from the Foreign Ministry by fax or otherwise.  It was about seven,

Page 34327

 1     eight, nine, ten pages.  It didn't sound convincing to me, so I gave

 2     instructions to be sent not to the president of the Security Council.

 3     That was my mistake; i.e., I wrote that before I saw the heading.

 4        Q.   And when you say it wasn't convincing to you, that's because you

 5     have maintained -- you knew, and as you have stated repeatedly since,

 6     that Srebrenica was an atrocious massacre, a massive massacre, et cetera.

 7     Let me ask you to confirm some of these quotes.  So you said:

 8             "If you're referring to Srebrenica in 1995, then that was an

 9     atrocious massacre," in the Milosevic case.  That's transcript page 36333

10     through 34.

11             You -- when asked who was responsible you said quote -- sorry,

12     this -- I'm now referring to an interview that you did with the Office of

13     the Prosecutor in, I think, about 2009 which I can show you in a moment.

14     If you need to, you said again it was a massive massacre.  When asked who

15     was responsible, you said:

16             "Those who made such a crime, and I don't know whether they did

17     it with the knowledge of their superiors or not."

18             And when asked who those superiors were of those people you

19     mentioned Mladic and Karadzic.  That's at page 27 of that interview.  You

20     said in the same interview:

21             "It's very sad that Serbs were involved in that kind of crime.

22     It's terrible.  Once this prisoner or enemy, he you should be respected.

23     It's always been the custom of Serbian armed forces throughout history,

24     so it was a very bad thing which happened there."

25             And then you continue you still didn't believe it was a genocide.

Page 34328

 1     "It's a massive massacre, which is not acceptable of course."

 2             And then in an interview that you did with Sloboda Bosna --

 3             MR. TIEGER:  That's 65 ter 24669, if we could call up the

 4     transcript of that taped discussion you had, you said --

 5             THE ACCUSED:  This testimony.  I'm sorry to -- this looks like

 6     testimony.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  It's not testimony but it's indeed long.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I think you understand the circumstances,

 9     Mr. President.  I'm -- and this is the last question I have, in fact, but

10     I'm just trying to get -- to see if the witness, a, will confirm these

11     things that he said.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, why don't you put that question now.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Well, if I could just get 65 ter 26449A called up.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, the witness is going to have to

15     return tomorrow anyway for re-examination, so maybe we can recess at this

16     time instead of putting unmanageable compound questions to the witness.

17             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber needs to rise now, so if you don't mind,

18     we'll adjourn for today.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Sure, Mr. President.  That's fine.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Jovanovic, we'll continue tomorrow the 9.00.

21             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  You're not supposed to discuss with anybody else

23     about your testimony.  Thank you.

24             The hearing is adjourned.

25                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m.,

Page 34329

 1                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day

 2                           of February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.