1 Monday, 4 March 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. I'm not sure why that
6 signal indicates that we are in private session. I take it we are in
7 open session.
8 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, and
10 everyone in the courtroom.
11 Mr. President, when we -- as we were adjourning the other day,
12 the Trial Chamber asked if the Prosecution would address the Defence
13 motion for a modification of segregation regime first thing this morning,
14 and I'm prepared to do so now if the Court wishes.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, there is no basis for granting this
17 motion. First, the motion itself states that there is no reason why
18 Dr. Karadzic should not be able to have contact with Mr. Martic. That
19 reflects a failure to review the order and the reasons given for the
20 order that remains in -- that remains under seal, so I won't refer to it
21 directly, but let me say more generically that it is a fairly
22 conventional and time honoured prophylactic measure to impose some
23 measure of segregation to avoid the possibility of interference or
24 improper communications between an accused and certain witnesses in this
25 case. This is a witness who was convicted for his participation in a
1 joint criminal enterprise which involved the accused, so the basis for
2 imposing restriction under such circumstances should be fairly clear.
3 I am not aware that there is any jurisprudence suggesting that
4 such segregation is in any way impermissible and the Defence has
5 suggested none.
6 Now, this order was made in early January, and now, approximately
7 two months later, we see this motion which is clearly a motion for
8 reconsideration which in no way attempts to address the standards for
9 reconsideration. I want to be clear that I'm not suggesting that there
10 should be an insurmountable standard for motions for reconsideration.
11 Clearly if mistakes are made under appropriate circumstances, they should
12 be remedied, but here the point is there is no attempt to even
13 acknowledge the standard much less attempt to show how the Defence motion
14 satisfies that standard. Instead, two things are suggested in passing,
15 basically. One, that Dr. Karadzic has not been segregated from other --
16 all other detainees, and two, that the Prosecution has been free to have
17 contact with its witnesses at any time except during their testimony.
18 With respect to the first, Mr. President, given the ambitious
19 nature of the Defence witness list, the accused would have to be in
20 virtual isolation to segregate him from every person on his list, I would
21 suggest, and it appears that for those persons who -- from whom he was
22 not initially segregated after the witness list came out was obviously a
23 somewhat idle gesture to impose it at that time. And in any event, it
24 does not serve the Defence to argue that an imperfect system should be
25 made more imperfect simply because logistical aspects make it difficult.
1 It's clearly a different situation imposed on the Registry's attempt to
2 balance the interests and the Trial Chamber's attempt when there's a
3 temporary detainee coming in from outside. And in any event, here the
4 Registry was responding to a direct order from the Court.
5 And finally, with respect to the assertion about the Prosecution
6 being free to have contact, the Defence team is also free to have
7 contact. This is not a measure imposed on Dr. Karadzic as counsel, this
8 is a measure imposed on him as an accused and it does not apply to the
9 remainder of the trial team. There is no impermissible or improper
10 segregation being imposed with respect to the teams, and this is a
11 misleading characterization.
12 So for those reasons, Mr. President, I would submit that there is
13 no basis for this motion, and it should be denied.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 Would you like to add anything, Mr. Robinson?
16 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, very briefly. I'm actually
17 very surprised to hear the Prosecution's position because we didn't
18 interfere or attempt to take any positions when it was deciding how it
19 could meet its witnesses and prepare its witnesses. In fact, if you
20 think of Momir Nikolic, who was also detained at the UNDU, I'm sure he
21 was pulled out of his cell at least 20 times, if not more, so that the
22 OTP could meet with him during the course of his detention and the course
23 of his preparation for testimony.
24 So I think it's a little incongruous for the Prosecution, first
25 of all, even to be taking a position about how the Defence can access its
1 witnesses, and secondly, to take one that's completely contrary to its
2 own practice with its witnesses. So the reason that we believe that this
3 motion is well founded is because there's simply no logical reason for a
4 restriction on Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Martic meeting before his testimony,
5 and any restrictions ought to be proportional to the aim at which they're
6 directed. And the aim here is to avoid interference with a witness who
7 is going to give testimony, and that applies when the witness starts his
8 testimony. That's how it applies to the Prosecution, and that's how it
9 applies to the Defence. And so we don't mind that kind of segregation
10 once the testimony starts, but there's no logical reason why Dr. Karadzic
11 can't meet with Mr. Martic on any other occasions. And so in the absence
12 of any logical reason for the restriction, we don't think that it ought
13 to be maintained. Thank you.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: I just want to address what may be a -- what appears
16 to be a misunderstanding, because I don't think it was intended to be a
17 mischaracterization, but to do so, I need to refer to the order which
18 remains confidential. So unless anyone is minded to lift that
19 confidentiality, we'll have to move into private session for me to refer
20 to that.
21 JUDGE KWON: So you would like to address that issue in private
23 MR TIEGER: Well, I will be talking about something specifically
24 in the Court's order.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Could the Chamber move into private
1 session briefly.
2 [Private session]
23 [Open session]
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for all the submissions. The Chamber will
25 consider the issue and will issue its decision in due course.
1 Shall we bring in the witness.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, now, before we do that, first of
3 all, if we could just put on the record something with respect to the
4 exhibits that were tendered during the testimony of President Bulatovic,
5 and that is that we have agreed with the Prosecution on the pages to be
6 included in those exhibits.
7 So for P6161, we agree that it should be pages 31 is and 32 and
8 45 and 47 -- through 47. For P6162, we have agreed that it should be
9 pages 24 through 30. And then for P6164, we have agreed that should be
10 pages 1 through 29, and 62 through 96. Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I thank the parties for their
12 co-ordination and co-operation. Yes, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. Because of the submissions this
14 morning, Mr. Robinson may have momentarily forgotten that I had indicated
15 to him that there were a couple of additional pages with respect to 6141.
16 So we'll get those on the record by the end -- before the end of the day.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have to mention something,
19 too, because we have not yet identified the B/C/S pages. I think that is
20 definitely something that the Registrar wants to know. And in relation
21 to P -- P6161, it would be the B/C/S pages 26 to 27, and 38 to 41. And
22 in relation to P6162, it's the same pages in B/C/S; that means 24 to 30.
23 In relation to P6164, it's the B/C/S pages, so far, 1 to 29, and 31 [sic]
24 to 96, and more perhaps if Mr. Tieger and Mr. Robinson agree. And then
25 there's forgotten P6165, and for this the parties had agreed it would be
1 the pages 1 to 29 in English, and that is 1 to 35 in the B/C/S.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, there is a mistake in the
4 transcript. I've probably misspoken. It needs to be -- in line 22, it
5 needs to be 61 to 96 and not 31 to 96.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. As regards the associated exhibits
7 Defence is planning to tender through this witness, General Vasiljevic,
8 is 1D21027 not part of 20137?
9 MR. ROBINSON: I'll have to check that, Mr. President.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think, Your Honour, I was also surprised
11 and didn't understand why it were two different ones.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, General.
14 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
15 JUDGE KWON: Would you make the solemn declaration, please.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
17 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 JUDGE KWON: Please be seated and make yourself comfortable.
19 General Vasiljevic, probably you will be well aware of this, but
20 before you commence your evidence, I must draw your attention to a
21 certain Rule of evidence that we have at this Tribunal. That is
22 Rule 90(E). Under this Rule, you may object to answering any question
23 from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you
24 believe that your answer will incriminate you in a criminal offence. In
25 this context, "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to
1 an admission of guilt for a criminal offence or saying something that
2 might provide evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence.
3 However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you and as a
4 consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you know that
5 the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the question, but in
6 that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony compelled
7 in such circumstances would not be used in any case that might be laid
8 against you for any offence save and except the offence of giving false
10 Do you understand what I have just told you, General?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General Vasiljevic.
13 WITNESS: ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,
17 Your Honours. Good morning, everyone.
18 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
19 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
20 A. Good morning.
21 Q. I have to ask you, as I ask everyone else speaking B/C/S, to make
22 pauses between question and answer and to be slow when speaking so that
23 everything will be recorded.
24 Did you give a statement to my Defence team?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show 1D07820 in
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, can you see on the screen in front of you the statement?
6 A. Yes, I can see it.
7 Q. Thank you. Have you read and signed this statement?
8 A. Yes, I have.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show the last page to
11 the General so that he could confirm that he has signed it.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is my signature.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Thank you. Is everything you told the Defence team truthfully
15 recorded in this statement?
16 A. I think so, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. If I were to ask you the same questions today, would
18 your answers be the same as in the statement essentially?
19 A. Yes, essentially they would be the same.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this 92 ter package?
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. You were correct concerning
23 the duplication of that one exhibit, so we're tendering six associated
24 exhibits. If you'd like me to read the numbers or if you already have
25 that information, it's up to you.
1 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it's necessary. Any objections,
2 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour, no objections. I just
4 wanted to -- to make -- question whether this -- this statement is the
5 latest version, because there were a few more paragraphs to be removed.
6 Is that the final version?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. There's a -- the final redactions have been
8 made in e-court, the document that includes all the latest redactions.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour. Then no objections.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll admit the statement as well as six
11 associated exhibits.
12 THE REGISTRAR: The statement will be Exhibit D3065, and the six
13 associated exhibits will be Exhibits D3066 to D3071 respectively.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will now read a short
16 summary of General Vasiljevic's statement in the English language.
17 [In English] Aleksandar Vasiljevic is a retired general from the
18 Yugoslav Army, VJ. From 1986 to 1998, General Vasiljevic was the chief
19 of the counter-intelligence service within the Department of Security of
20 Federal Secretariat for People's Defence. In 1988, he was commander of
21 division in Sarajevo where he stayed until July 1990. From 15th of June,
22 1991, to May the 8th, 1992, General Vasiljevic was the head of the
23 Department for Security. In May 1992, General Vasiljevic retired. He
24 was reactivated on 7th of April, 1999, and he became deputy chief of the
25 security department of VJ.
1 As chief of the counter-intelligence service, General
2 Aleksandar Vasiljevic's job was to uncover foreign intelligence services,
3 intelligence activity against the JNA and the army and to uncover the
4 activities of the Yugoslav enemy emigration. In addition to -- in
5 addition, he was to uncover enemy activities within the JNA. In this
6 role, he uncovered Croatian separatist groups within the JNA as well as
7 Albanian separatist organisations who tried to carry out several
8 terrorist operations including poisoning of food of soldiers and
9 officers. Further, a significant number of foreign intelligence agencies
10 were discovered in Yugoslavia, and following Tito's death, there was a
11 rise of nationalist tensions which the foreign services exploited,
12 supporting separatist movements.
13 General Vasiljevic considers that as early as in the mid-'80s
14 [sic] the Croats armed themselves illegally and with a large number of
15 weapons. They created their illegal army, which they later renamed to
16 law enforcement officers when they were uncovered. All that time they
17 were arming their HDZ party illegally, and advocated the killing of JNA
18 and Serbs on their doorsteps regardless of age or gender. The Croatian
19 authorities had prepared everything to create a Serbian camp. When this
20 information became public, this caused a general uprising and revolt
21 among the Serbs. The state of SFRY was unable to prevent these events
22 because it had to order the army to disarm all these formations and
23 arrest all rebels. The Serbs in Croatia, therefore, had no other choice
24 but to organise themselves in order to protect themselves.
25 The JNA did not try to protect Serbs in Croatia, merely prevent
1 clashes between the two ethnic groups. Serbs did not have paramilitary
2 organisations. In the second half of 1990, HDZ, Croatian party, had
3 control in Western Herzegovina, which the authorities of BH were aware
4 of. Despite Aleksandar Vasiljevic's request not to involve BH in the
5 war, Croatia tried to get Bosnia and Macedonia involved at all costs.
6 In July 1991, the first reports of the SDA, Muslim party in
7 Bosnia, military organisation in the Doboj sector of BH were received.
8 Military training had begun in Croatia, which then spread to Sarajevo.
9 However, there were no hard facts. Sometime in mid-September,
10 information was passed to General Vasiljevic that the Patriotic League
11 was being formed from SDA headquarters and that three or four officers
12 had left the army and joined them.
13 There were regional offices for the Patriotic League in Serbia
14 and part of Montenegro and there existed both military and political
15 staff at every level. The Patriotic League began to block roads and JNA
16 facilities. The Patriotic League was financed through exchanges of old
17 Croatian money, in which -- as a matter Yugoslav money that was in
18 Croatia, in which the Patriotic League would take half of the amount of
19 exchange. This money was used to buy weapons from the Croats.
20 In early 1991, the SDA began to make defence plans and preparing
21 for secession and joining Croatia. Radovan Karadzic issued an order that
22 Serbs should not provide Muslims and Croats with an excuse to attack.
23 The SDA conducted raids to obtain more weapons from the Patriotic
24 League -- for the Patriotic League. JNA operations were disrupted,
25 attacks carried out on military organs, and secretariats for national
1 defence in municipalities were broken into and records set on fire.
2 The Patriotic League opened fire upon two wounded Serbs. To
3 prevent escalation, Serbs were reminded not to retaliate, and they
4 remained passive. Pleas were made in the JNA to stop Bosnia being
5 dragged into the war as the Croats were moving troops through Bosnia.
6 Some JNA troops were mobilised which was met with some resistance from
7 the troops in Croatia and between 12 and 15 soldiers were killed. A
8 number of Muslims left the JNA and a large number of Serbian volunteers
9 and -- filled their places.
10 In October 1991, joint check-points with the BH MUP were
11 established to secure five bridges, and this action postponed the war in
12 Bosnia by six months. However, these types of actions were not possible
13 in Croatian part of Herzegovina. Roadblocks in the area were set up and
14 heavy and anti-aircraft weapons appeared in Western Herzegovina where the
15 HDZ were well armed.
16 The charitable society Merhamet was used by the SDA Crisis Staff
17 for paramilitary organisation of its members. In December 1991, further
18 weapons were distributed to the Patriotic League from the chief of the
19 MUP of police. In early 1992, the Serbs did not have a military staff.
20 They did not have people making plans or a structure of the units, and
21 they did not issue orders to attack the JNA units. The JNA were
22 supported by the Serbs as people responded to the call-up and the
23 mobilisation, recording -- reporting for compulsory military service and
24 did not block the JNA army barracks or attack JNA members and their
1 After a joint meeting at the BH MUP on 19th of January, 1992, it
2 was agreed that paramilitary units should be disbanded. However, this
3 was not done because there was no political will by any of the military
4 leaders to publicly issue a call to their people to lay down their
5 weapons. The service wrote a report to the SFRY Presidency about the
6 situation and proposed that the Presidency declare a state of emergency.
7 However, this was returned without an option about the measures proposed.
8 At a meeting with Izetbegovic, General -- of General Vasiljevic,
9 he denied -- Izetbegovic denied knowledge of the SDA paramilitary
10 organisations and refused to communicate with Milosevic, the Serbian
11 leadership, or to preserve Yugoslavia, but he did promise that as long as
12 it was up to him, there would be no attack on the army in Bosnia.
13 Publicly, Izetbegovic denied having any knowledge of the Patriotic
15 In March 1992, a Serbian wedding guest was killed in Bosnia, and
16 the Muslims began to make public appearance in Patriotic League uniforms.
17 Barricades were erected and despite the efforts of the service these
18 remained standing. The situation worsened as the Green Berets opened
19 fire on a military police patrol and entered flats of military servicemen
20 searching for weapons. During March, there were a number of skirmishes
21 between the military and the paramilitary units.
22 Fighting broke out in Bijeljina and was the first armed conflict
23 between Serbs and Muslims and the first serious clash as a bomb was
24 thrown to -- at the cafe where Serbs and Muslims gathered. Cafes, two
25 cafes. The SDA carried out planned attack during April 1992, killing
1 officers, seizing weapons, raiding a number of premises, blocking JNA
2 premises, disarming soldiers, and spreading misinformation. Many further
3 attacks occurred in the Serbs -- or on the Serbs despite the talks of
4 withdrawal. These were not successful.
5 The Republika Srpska military security arrested the Zute Ose,
6 Yellow Wasps, and turned them over to the Bijeljina MUP for killings
8 Relations between Serbs and JNA were complex. The JNA assisted
9 local commanders in BH if requested. The JNA was attacked as the enemy
10 by the SDA, but the JNA continued to assist the Serbs by arming them
11 with -- when they could. The JNA was a guarantor of peace. The Serbs
12 sent recruits and reserves to the JNA as they did not have their own
13 military organisation. Co-operation between the army and the BH MUP was
14 supported by the Serbs, check-points were set up to control the territory
15 and assist in disarming.
16 And that would be the very short summary of this significant
17 statement, and I do not have questions for General Vasiljevic at that
19 JUDGE KWON: Just one quick question for Mr. Karadzic or
20 Mr. Robinson. In paragraph 218, it refers to 1D55. We -- that we
21 admitted just now, but it refers to a JNA warehouse, but looking at the
22 document, I don't see any comment about JNA warehouse. If you could
23 clarify that issue, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, by your leave, I
25 just need some time to have it clarified.
1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we upload 1D55. Or if you are minded to
2 withdraw that exhibit, we'll just proceed.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, we have withdrawn
4 far too many documents. In other words, this is an invaluable witness,
5 and we can lead hundreds of documents through him.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General, can you tell us what the command of the 741st DOP is?
8 A. It is the command of the 741st Replenishment Regiment located in
9 Travnik. Within their area of responsibility, there was a warehouse of
10 JNA weapons and ammunition cache in Slimena. At that warehouse there was
11 an attack on the 5th of April by members of the HOS, which was a Croatian
12 paramilitary force, and the Patriotic League. 31 soldiers were taken
13 prisoner and one officer at the warehouse. The HOS members executed two
14 soldiers by firing squad on the site and the rest of the soldiers were
15 taken to their military prison in Ljubuski, whereas 10 soldiers were left
16 in the hands of Muslims. DOP doesn't stand for any volunteer unit, but
17 it was an establishment unit called Replenishment Regiment. It was a
18 kind of reserve unit as part of the JNA.
19 Q. Thank you, General. So in paragraph 218, it shouldn't say "KOS"
20 but "HOS," H-O-S?
21 A. Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, does this answer
23 your question about the document?
24 JUDGE KWON: My question was whether this document refers to
25 either that JNA warehouse or the attack against it.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, as the
2 General just explained. He explained the acronyms used in the heading.
3 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether this document refers to what
4 General just has said.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I see your point, because
6 this document is referring to the Territorial Defence depot at Slimena.
7 So perhaps Dr. Karadzic can ask the witness what the connection is
8 between that depot and the JNA warehouse referred to in paragraph 218.
9 JUDGE KWON: The General has heard what Mr. Robinson has said.
10 Can you assist us as regards this document you are looking at on the
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could someone please put the volume
13 up for me to hear interpretation. If I understood properly, I need to
14 explain what the link is between the 741st Replenishment Regiment and the
16 JUDGE KWON: The warehouse which is allegedly to be TO depot at
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It was a JNA warehouse under
19 the authority of the command of the -- of the 741st Replenishment
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. General, do you see the document in
22 front of you? In the first paragraph it refers to the TO depot,
23 Territorial Defence depot, at Slimena.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At Slimena a part of the weapons
25 could have been that had been withdrawn from the TO by virtue of an order
1 of the chief of the General Staff from 1989. This is a daily report
2 drafted by the commander of the Replenishment Regiment describing the
3 situation on that day. Some pressure is being exerted by members of the
4 HOS and Muslims, primarily members of the Patriotic League, to have the
5 weapons distributed to them as well so that they wouldn't be left without
6 any. So the Slimena warehouse was a military warehouse where part of the
7 TO weapons were probably located following their withdrawal in 1989 by
8 the order of the Chief of the General Staff. However, it was not a TO
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
11 Since this has been already admitted, I'll leave it at that, but,
12 Mr. Karadzic, in the future, when you are tendering documents as part of
13 associated exhibit, be cautious whether they form indispensable and
14 inseparable part of the statement.
15 General Vasiljevic, as you have noted that your evidence in chief
16 in this case has been admitted in writing, i.e., through your written
17 statement in lieu of your oral testimony, and now you will cross-examined
18 by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor,
19 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
20 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
21 Q. Good morning, General.
22 A. Good morning.
23 Q. General, first of all, I wish to thank you for participating in
24 an interview with the Prosecution last week, and I will address some of
25 the topics that we discussed during the interview in the course of the
1 cross-examination, and as we have to cover quite some topics and very
2 little time, I kindly ask you to just answer the questions as precisely
3 as possible and not add matters that I didn't ask you about. Otherwise,
4 I will have to interrupt you, and I would not like to do that.
5 General, in paragraph 32 of your statement, you said that in the
6 relevant time, the JNA was the fourth strongest army in Europe, and in
7 paragraph 70 you -- you stated, referring to the situation in March 1991,
8 you said that the army did not burst at ethnic seams.
9 General, at that time you were proud of being a JNA officer;
11 A. That is right, and I'm still proud for having been a member of
12 the JNA.
13 Q. And you saw the JNA as a multi-ethnic army with a mission to
14 protect the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia; right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. General, you were retired on the 8 of -- 8th of May, 1992,
17 together with 38 other generals, although the conditions for your
18 retirement were not met; is that right?
19 A. It is.
20 Q. Those retiring you at that time were opposed to your view of the
21 multi-ethnic concept of the army; is that correct?
22 A. Partially correct.
23 Q. In your testimony in the Slobodan Milosevic case, you said the
24 following: You speak of the general climate of discrimination at that
25 time, that there was an ethnic cleansing of the army of those who were
1 not born in Serbia and Montenegro, and you gave the example of
2 Deputy Tumanov, and that you also said that General Panic scolded you for
3 still having some Croats in your service.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I refer here to the -- to the
5 Slobodan Milosevic testimony of the General, and it is uploaded under
6 65 ter 22492, and I was referring to the e-court pages 306 through 308,
7 and e-court page 589.
8 Q. General, that -- that captures the situation, how it was in
9 spring 1992, does it not?
10 A. Yes, it does.
11 Q. General, in the beginning of the armed conflict in the former
12 Yugoslavia, the JNA acted as a buffer army between the two sides, but
13 that changed in the course of the year 1991; is that correct?
14 A. The general principle in the JNA did not change. However, much
15 depended on the movements of certain local commanders in the field who
16 deviated from the positions provided by the SSNO, the Federal Secretariat
17 of All People's Defence. So in the field there were occasions where they
18 supported local forces.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have document P02601 on the
21 Q. General, and as it is coming up, it is a cover letter by
22 Major General Polic of the 9th Corps Command of the JNA, and if we go to
23 the next page, it is enclosing the directive -- on both pages, please.
24 It's enclosing the directive of the Federal Secretariat of
25 National Defence on the use of the armed forces of the 10th of October,
2 General, I assume you are familiar with this directive.
3 A. It was not on the 10th of October but on the 10th of December.
4 Q. Yes, you're right. I misspoke. Thank you very much.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we have page 3 in both languages, and we
6 have to focus on the top part. And -- in both languages.
7 Q. And as it says here:
8 "Our armed forces are entering a new period of exceptional
9 significance for accomplishing the ultimate aims of the war: protection
10 of the Serbian population ..." and so on and so forth.
11 General, the JNA at that time was no longer a buffer, no longer
12 protecting all peoples, but, rather, protecting the Serbs, at least
13 according to this directive, is it not?
14 A. Since this is December 1991, it means that the war in Croatia had
15 ended by that time and Slovenia had seceded. Not -- by not honouring any
16 procedure, Croatia had seceded as well from the then Yugoslavia and the
17 JNA was put in a new position as compared to the period before the
18 15th of September when there were military attacks of the Croatian armed
19 forces on the JNA, when the war broke out between Croatia and the JNA.
20 So this is late 1991 when the directive was drafted.
21 It was decided that people be protected from terror and
22 destruction. Those people who disagreed with living outside of
23 Yugoslavia, those who were denied their right to enjoy the same privilege
24 as the other people as to choose where to live. The Serb people refused
25 to live in the seceded banana states and it opted for remaining in
1 Yugoslavia. Since it was contrary to the policy in place in Croatia at
2 the time, they were supposed to be protected from persecution and the
3 conflict between the autonomous regions which had been constituted at the
4 time. The JNA, in other words, was protecting the Serb population that
5 was in danger. It doesn't mean that it persecuted others who lived in
6 Serbia. You know well that Serbia is a multinational state, and neither
7 Croats nor any other ethnicities had problems with remaining there and
8 living there as they had before. I see nothing that would be disputed in
9 this directive.
10 By your leave, since I recall it particularly well, although you
11 asked me not to go off on a tangent, but the directive also deals with
12 the issue of dealing with paramilitary and volunteer formations once
13 wartime activities have been concluded.
14 Q. Yes. Thank you, General. I actually wanted to move on to this
15 topic, and if you go to page 4 in both languages, under point 6 -- under
16 point 6 it says:
17 "In all zones of combat operations, place under command of the
18 most senior JNA officer all units of the JNA and TO as well as volunteer
19 units ..." and so on and so forth.
20 And, General, that is what you just referred to, this principle
21 of unified command; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And this principle continued also in Bosnia, and it was also
24 applied by the VRS; is that right?
25 A. One needs to distinguish between the TO and -- well, I've already
1 testified about it in the Milosevic case. In Slavonia and Srem, there
2 were two TOs in my view. There was the legal TO and a local TO
3 established by the new authorities in the area.
4 Q. Let --
5 A. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was only one TO. So it had not been
6 divided into two, at least not until late March 1992.
7 Q. But here in this particular order when it refers to the JNA and
8 the TO, it was basically the Serb TO; correct?
9 A. Yes. It was the TO of the independent or autonomous region of
10 Western Srem and Baranja. Let me remind you --
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --
12 Q. Sorry, General. I have to interrupt you because we have to move
13 on. If we need more details, I will tell you.
14 But here the Serb TO in that area and later also in Bosnia, they
15 were considered friendly force and co-operating with the JNA while the
16 Croat and the Muslim TOs were not; correct?
17 A. Well, the Serb TO, as you define it, never attacked the JNA. The
18 Muslim and Croat TOs were objectively paramilitary formations by
19 definition, and they attacked the JNA. Neither of the TOs, although I
20 underscore the difference between the TO in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the TO
21 in Krajina and the Sirmium or the Srem region. As for the Patriotic
22 League, as what was to become the TO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, well, they
23 killed our first officers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the 5th of April,
24 1992, in the village of Sapna, for no reason at all, a military police
25 patrol was attacked when warrant officer Mihajlo Stanojevic was killed
1 and two reserve sergeants as well as four soldiers out of the ten that
2 were there. For no reason at all.
3 Q. Let me stop you here. I mean, we have all these details in
4 written form already before the Court, so we do not need to repeat this.
5 I would like to -- to move on now and referring to armed Serbs.
6 You have mentioned armed Serbs in your statement, and I refer here to
7 paragraphs 88 and 113. General, the JNA or, rather, elements thereof
8 armed the Serb TO in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
9 A. It is right if we address it as an occurrence or a relationship
10 as of March 1992. Let me remind you of the fact that the TO of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, objectively speaking, was broken up because the
12 reserve part of the TO which comprised Muslims and Croats, simply did not
13 respond to any call-ups to replenish the units of the TO, the legitimate
14 TO headed by Drago Vukosavljevic, a JNA general. So the manning levels
15 in units went down because Alija Izetbegovic called on all Bosniaks and
16 Muslims to leave the army, and they prevented any new recruits being sent
17 to serve their military term in the JNA. The JNA did not have
18 appropriate manning levels at the time. The manning levels were raised
19 by some TO ranks which by that time one could refer to as the Serb TO,
20 but until the 8th of April, 1992, it existed as the TO of
22 It was not a paramilitary unit. Some TO units were simply
23 drafted. They were mobilised. In the conflict in Croatia, there were
24 some Serbian TO units that were mobilised and sent to the area of Srem.
25 I discussed them, for example, the Smederevo TO detachment, the
1 Palanka TO detachment, et cetera. Those were legal TO units. However,
2 your question was whether there were instances where someone from the JNA
3 armed the so-called Serb TO as you call it. There were such instances,
4 and I can cite an example where we raised a criminal report against a
5 major who issued weapons to local Serbs without any approval.
6 Q. But, General --
7 A. That is why --
8 Q. General --
9 A. May I go on?
10 Q. No. Let's -- let's go step-by-step. One of these officers who
11 provided weapons to what I call the Bosnian Serb TO, and you call it
12 differently, was General Talic; right?
13 A. No.
14 Q. I would like to refer you to a document that you basically know
15 about from your testimony in the Milosevic case.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And it's here -- Your Honour, it's here
18 Q. And, General, when you -- it should be -- yeah. And when you see
19 it coming up, you will remember it because you also discussed it in the
20 Milosevic case. It's a report of the 1st kk to the Main Staff of the VRS
21 concerning the control and issuance of weapons to the TO staffs dated
22 31st August 1992, and when we move to the next page, please, we basically
23 see a list of items being provided. It's a lengthy list of items. You
24 remember this particular document, do you?
25 A. Yes, certainly. I said then that this is a document from
1 August 1992. It was a period when I had already retired. That was the
2 period when the Army of Republika Srpska was established as a legal army,
3 and it has to do with the requests when TO units were being established
4 in accordance with the Vance Plan. And especially in Krajina the TO
5 units were manned and they went to depots that were under lock and key.
6 It says here that in the period when the army was established, because I
7 cannot see when the weapons were issued. This is from the month of
8 August. They had to sign for it and then it had to be returned
9 eventually. So I do not see anything strange about it.
10 This was the moment when the Army of Republika Srpska came into
11 being, and it is my duty to recall, though you said -- you will say that
12 you haven't asked me that, that there was an order of the chief of
13 General Staff, General Blagoje Adzic who said that no equipment or
14 weapons must be issued to any TO unit or anyone else unless this was
15 verified at the level of the General Staff. So it was not just chaotic
16 distribution of weapons any old how, but it was a lawful and organised
17 distribution of weapons to the units that were supposed to provide
18 protection of the rear in this particular area.
19 Q. But your understanding of this document, if we go back to the
20 first page, is not that those items were all provided in -- on the
21 31st of August, but, rather, it's a -- it's a document referring to what
22 had been done until the 31st of August; correct?
23 A. Yes, but you do know that from the 19th of May, there was no more
24 JNA, and in Bosnia, the Army of Republika Srpska had been constituted and
25 General Mladic was appointed commander of that army.
1 Q. Let's -- let's move on. General, during the interview that we
2 had last week, you confirmed that you were aware that certain JNA
3 officers would co-operate with the SDS; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And that on that -- through this way Serbs got weapons; is that
7 A. You are partly correct. You asked me then when we talked, just
8 as you're asking me today, whether some officers co-operated with the
9 SDS. The answer I gave was along the following lines, that we had
10 certain JNA officers who were being disciplined because they had
11 expressed some kind of nationalism, Serb, Croat, et cetera, whereas those
12 officers whose names had been mentioned had not co-operated with the SDS.
13 Before the SDS had been constituted, they had expressed extreme Serb
14 nationalist positions.
15 Again, I have to be rather extensive in order to paint a clear
16 picture for you.
17 When I was in Sarajevo on the 23rd of April, 1992, with regard to
18 reaching agreement on when Alija Izetbegovic would meet with
19 General Blagoje Adzic and Branko Kostic, then the security officers
20 briefed me about the security situation in their areas of responsibility,
21 and, inter alia, they told me that the SDS headquarters were moved to
22 Pale. There is not a single officer active-duty member of the JNA who is
23 with them in their headquarters. There is no a single officer who moved
24 there with them. We had no officers in these SDS staffs, whereas we do
25 have Muslim officers who actually constituted the Patriotic League. So
1 one officer, I can even give you the name if necessary, he was a major,
2 he established contact with people from the top echelons of the SDS, and
3 that is why criminal charges were brought against him and then he fled
4 and he became a wanted man. That's only case we had of that kind. Also,
5 in Tuzla we had officers who held these extremist positions, and this
6 colonel contacted some Chetnik formations. Not with the SDS committee in
7 Tuzla but with the Chetnik units that were there.
8 Q. General, you also confirmed during our talks last week that in
9 fact the majority of the Serb JNA officers originating from Bosnia
10 supported the SDS because they had the same objective, namely, first
11 staying in Yugoslavia and later on having their own Serb republic or
12 entity in Bosnia. That was the general position at that time; correct?
13 A. Well, you keep linking that to the SDS, and this actually has to
14 do with one's attitude towards the Serbian issue as such and towards what
15 had been happening in Yugoslavia over the preceding year. They thought
16 that when various peoples expressed their wish where they wanted to live
17 and went their own way, they thought that the Serbs also had the right to
18 decide on where they wanted to live. They did not want to live seceded
19 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they thought that their place was in
20 Yugoslavia. They wanted to remain in Yugoslavia. Whether that was SDS
21 policy, I don't know. However, it does not mean that these officers were
22 linked to the SDS.
23 I kindly ask you to accept that, because I know what the
24 situation was in the JNA. We have Serb nationalists. We have extremists
25 who believe that Serbs are exploited, that they're subjugated like all
1 other peoples who had -- held such beliefs and that were manipulated in
2 that way. However, this doesn't have to do with links between officers
3 and the SDS. That is why I presented that information of the
4 23rd of April, when the chief of security briefed me stating that there
5 was not a single officer who went with the SDS to Pale or to some
6 military staff if they had one, and I was not aware of them having one to
7 begin with.
8 Q. General, you already mentioned that you investigated and
9 disciplined certain officers for their extreme nationalist behaviour, and
10 as I remember our talks, in relation to the Sarajevo Corps, that is, the
11 JNA force corps, you had actually four officers investigated, colonels,
12 that is; right?
13 A. The interpretation is not correct that I carried out an
14 investigation. An investigation is carried out when there is evidence or
15 suspicion of the commission of a crime.
16 I was a security officer. We did not carry out investigations.
17 It was the SUP that carried out the investigation. We carried out
18 different operative measures at different levels to a different extent
19 vis-a-vis persons for whom we believed that they were expressing views
20 from the viewpoint of Serbian nationalism. It's not true that they were
21 all in the 4th Corps, the Sarajevo Corps. This corps came into being in
22 its real form only after I left the position of division commander. Some
23 of them were in the 4th Motorised Division and others were in the
24 4th Corps that existed then. However, if you're speaking about 1992,
25 March, April, it is correct that all of these officers were in the
1 4th Sarajevo Corps.
2 Q. And --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance? I wanted
4 to intervene. This misunderstanding stems from line 18, page 26. The
5 General said that they were being processed, not disciplined.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
7 Q. You -- you mentioned among those four was a Colonel Gagovic, and
8 you said he's a Montenegrin, and you couldn't remember the first name.
9 Do you now remember the first name? You wanted to think about it.
10 A. I didn't really think about it, but I seem to remember now that
11 it's Milosav Gagovic.
12 Q. And to your knowledge, did he at that time deal with logistics in
13 the Sarajevo Corps?
14 A. Yes. That's at the time when I was commander of the division in
16 Q. I would like to move on to something that you already touched
17 upon, and we need to see 65 ter 01726. And as it is coming up, General,
18 it is an order from the command of the 2nd Military District, dated
19 9 January 1992, regarding an earlier order on the procedure from the SSNO
20 dated the 31st of December, 1991.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we please have page 2 in the B/C/S
22 and page 3 in the English. Or rather, wait, wait. Can we first look --
23 let's have the first page.
24 Q. Looking at the preamble and point 1 of the order, this order
25 enforces the procedure to be applied for the equipment of TO units with
1 weapons and equipment. That's what the preamble says.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And the underlying order, the underlying
3 order is on the next, page 2 in the B/C/S and page 3 in the English.
4 Q. You -- you refer to this order in your statement already at
5 paragraph 207, and you have already touched upon it here. The reason why
6 the TO units are now requested not to contact the SSNO directly, but,
7 rather, go through the command of the JNA units in which zone they are
8 located, that's because they had so many requests suddenly to deal with
9 at the headquarters; right?
10 A. This is the end of 1991. This is a period when preparations are
11 being carried out for the demilitarisation of the Knin Krajina.
12 Territorial Defence units are being formed in the Knin Krajina, and
13 equipment and weapons are being provided -- are being sent to the
14 warehouse, and there is this joint key that is used to lock them. That
15 includes the international forces, and this does not pertain only to the
16 units of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina because this is
17 procedure related to Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to say that Kukanjac
18 had not only Bosnia-Herzegovina under his command but also part of the
19 Krajina. But this also pertained to the Territorial Defence units of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina that were supposed to be constituted, and in the
21 documentation that was shown, and I believe that you will find that now,
22 too, you will see about the constitution of the special MUP detachment in
23 Banja Luka and they're asking the military to give them two helicopters,
24 two military helicopters. This is megalomaniac requests.
25 This is not illegal. These are not paramilitaries. These are
1 legal units of the Territorial Defence that were primarily constituted on
2 the basis of the Vance Plan in the area of the Krajina and they were
3 supposed to be demilitarised, whereas the JNA was pulled out from that
4 area into Bosnia as a guarantee that the Serbs would not be attacked
5 after that. So this document pertains partly to Krajina and partly to
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to tender this
9 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6169, Your Honours.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
13 Q. And, General, you have already referred to this, as you call it,
14 megalomaniac order or request.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have a look at it. It is
16 65 ter 01713.
17 Q. And as it is coming up here, it is General Kukanjac, on
18 24th April 1992, is forwarding and endorsing a request of the Ministry of
19 Interior of the Serb Republic for a huge number of weapons, equipment
20 and, as you said, helicopters even. That is what you just referred to;
22 A. Yes. That's already the 24th of April. Not to say that two days
23 after that, there was an oral agreement between General Adzic and
24 Alija Izetbegovic concerning the fate of the JNA, the division of the
25 JNA, leaving equipment and weaponry and so on, and then these
1 megalomaniac requests come in as to what they would get from the JNA.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not catch the end
3 of the sentence.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was taken up to the highest
5 level in order to keep under control what would happen with JNA weapons
6 and equipment once the JNA withdraws.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
8 Q. Yes. General, you have to speak a bit more slowly. The
9 interpreters didn't catch part of what you said, but I think the answer
10 is translated -- is sufficient.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to tender this
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it's already in evidence as
15 Exhibit P5432.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
18 Q. General, in your statement you focus on the activities of the
19 Muslims. The arming of the Serbs and their activities was not a priority
20 for you in your work because the -- as you said, the Serbs were
21 supporting the JNA and the focus, therefore, was on the Muslims; right?
22 A. I focused on the problem that was against the JNA. Had the Serbs
23 organised themselves through paramilitaries and had they attacked the
24 JNA, then they would have been processed by JNA organs. So we did not
25 focus on the Muslims because they were Muslims and the Serbs were on the
1 other side. What we discovered was a paramilitary organisation whose
2 activity was aimed against the JNA.
3 In my explanation of the introduction of this operative action
4 that had to be approved by the Federal Secretary for National Defence, I
5 refer to the parameters why it is the military that has to deal with
6 these services. Serbs did not threaten us. I did not have
7 security-related problems with the Serbs, and we applied measures from
8 the scope of our legislative -- legal powers because Serbs were not
9 working against us. Croats weren't, and Muslims weren't either, but
10 their paramilitaries did work against the JNA and that's why I took
11 action. I assume that I've been speaking too fast again.
12 Q. During your interview that we had last week, you said that the --
13 the Serbs and the SDS considered the JNA to be their army basically.
15 A. Not in the sense that they were the owners and commanders of the
16 army but that it was their army, just as the JNA used to be the army of
17 all the peoples of Yugoslavia. So that was that in that sense, but it's
18 not that they commanded it or took it upon themselves to act as if it
19 were only their own.
20 Q. General, you have already referred to a meeting between
21 General Adzic and President Izetbegovic and other persons, including
22 members of the SFRY Presidency on the 26th of April, 1992, in Skopje, and
23 it's also referred to in your statement, and we indeed have a transcript
24 of an audio recording of this meeting that I would like to discuss with
25 you next.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 11020 on the
2 screen. And let's -- sorry. And let's just move into the text, page 3
3 in the English and page 4 in the B/C/S.
4 Q. And we have here Mr. Izetbegovic proposes that the elements of
5 the Yugoslav Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be transformed as of
6 tomorrow into the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a bit further
7 down under point 2, that the armed forces must accept the authority of
8 the civil government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a bit further down, next
9 paragraph, that the composition of the command personnel in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be changed as well as the next -- as it says in
11 the next paragraph, the troops.
12 General, you were aware of this position that Izetbegovic took;
14 A. First of all, I read this document here, the one that's been
15 displayed just now. I don't know who wrote it up and who authorised
16 it -- or, rather, who authored it, because there are certain
17 interruptions and ambiguities. When I say "interruptions," they
18 interrupt the negotiations for lunch and then they continue after that.
19 And I did not see how it continued, and usually people agree on a lot of
20 things over lunch. I know about this interpretation of General
21 Blagoje Adzic on the 27th of April, in Belgrade, when he briefed the
22 General Staff about what they had agreed upon, and that was a preliminary
23 agreement. I can say what I know from that oral briefing, because there
24 were many options there that were being looked at. One was that the JNA
25 would stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it had to be harmonised with
1 the ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And there are different
2 options that are bandied about. So I don't see from this what it was
3 that was ultimately agreed upon.
4 I know what General Adzic told us about when he returned, though.
5 The first and basic thing was with regard to the fate of the army.
6 General Blagoje Adzic advocated the following: That the JNA should stay
7 until the peace forces arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, guaranteeing a
8 peaceful resolution of the Bosnian crisis. A position was taken that was
9 allegedly agreed upon by both sides that all of those who were not
10 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and were within the JNA would leave
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina by the 19th. All of those who are citizens of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and are in the JNA in some other areas would be
13 duty-bound to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina by that dead-line. Retired
14 military personnel were guaranteed equal rights as if they had been
15 pensioned off in the JNA. However, in terms of the division of the
16 remaining equipment and weaponry from the JNA, a multi-disciplinary
17 commission was supposed to be set up as was done in Skopje when the army
18 was leaving Macedonia. That was supposed to be agreed upon during
19 May 1992. However --
20 Q. But, General, let me interrupt you here, because we do not have
21 this transcript of the section that was after the lunch. We only have
22 this one, and I would like to stick with this one for a few more minutes,
23 because what you have said what the agreement is actually in your written
25 I was wondering only about Mr. Izetbegovic's concerns about the
1 ethnic composition of the JNA at that time, and he basically states here
2 on this page that it was -- had been upset and should be restored to
3 reflect the ethnic composition of the population. And if I understand
4 you correctly, he is right here. The -- the JNA had become sort of a
5 Serb army at that time. Most of the personnel were Serb, of Serb
6 ethnicity; isn't that correct?
7 A. I have to say again that it is not so. First of all, it did not
8 become a Serb army, because not all the Muslims left the JNA by the
9 19th of May. I have specific data; namely, that by the 31st of January,
10 1992, a total of 317 Muslim officers had left the JNA, of which 65 had
11 not done it in a lawful way. So they were treated as military deserters.
12 And we had 69 Muslim officers who reported to the security organs, the
13 appearance of the Muslim paramilitary formations which tried to win them
14 over. So it is not true that the JNA was left without any Muslims by
15 that time.
16 What Mr. Izetbegovic did not mention at the meeting was that the
17 2nd Military District as the highest military command in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have any Muslim generals. There was
19 Muharem Fetahagic who hails from Kumanovo -- or, rather, was transferred
20 from Kumanovo to Bosnia precisely for the reason that he would be a
21 Muslim general in the army.
22 Another general who was a Muslim was wounded in
23 Dobrovoljacka Street. I will try to remember his last name. He used to
24 be in 51st Brigade.
25 Then for a while the commander of the 4th Corps used to be a
1 Croat, a general who later on left the JNA and went away.
2 So what you emphasise is only one segment. Blagoje Adzic
3 responded to them then in this text. I can see it. What would it be
4 like? You have caused the JNA to be composed mainly of Serbs, because by
5 your calls from August 1991, you invited Muslims not to respond to
6 call-ups. You prohibited the Muslims from serving the JNA. So you
7 caused this composition of the JNA. So he asked: How can you now
8 request that a Muslim be appointed the commander of this, conditionally
9 speaking, Serbian Army? It would be the same as if I would request from
10 you to appoint me as the commander of your Patriotic League.
11 Q. Let me -- let me --
12 A. So this is all something that can be seen from the discussion. I
13 have read it now.
14 Q. Yes.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Let us move to page 9 in the English and
16 page 13 in the B/C/S.
17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we do it after the break, if it is convenient?
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll take a break for half an hour and
20 resume at 5 past 11.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, please continue.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. General, we were just -- before the break we spoke about the
1 composition of the JNA in Bosnia at that time, and let's move to English
2 page 9 in the document and page 13 in the B/C/S, and then we can see what
3 General Adzic says about that point. And General Adzic speaks of several
4 tens of thousands troops and states that the JNA is mainly filled with
5 personnel from Bosnia-Herzegovina, with over 80 per cent of them coming
6 from that territory and over 90 per cent of them being Serbs living
8 General, what the SSNO says here, would that be correct?
9 A. I suppose that it's correct. I do not have the figures that
10 testify to the strength of the JNA. It is strange, though, that he
11 speaks precisely how many people there are in the TO, 35.000 in the
12 Serbian TO, and then about the Croats, and then he says several tens of
13 thousands in the Muslim TO. He should have said precisely how many there
14 were. Personally, I don't think that there were several tens of
15 thousands of JNA members in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But this is his
16 statement, so I cannot comment on it, and I'm not aware of this
18 Q. And just leaving aside the numbers, whether you remember them and
19 whether General Adzic is right here, but these JNA personnel that were --
20 that were at that time in Bosnia and were coming, originating, from
21 Bosnia, they were transformed into the VRS when it was created, except of
22 course those that were unwilling or, rather -- and, rather, left; is that
24 A. Yes.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move on to page 22 in the English,
1 and it is starting on page 32 -- sorry, yes, 32 in the B/C/S and goes
2 over into page 33 and even page 34.
3 Q. And Mr. Izetbegovic is again speaking, and he's referring to
4 strong paramilitary organisations of the SDS having its control -- having
5 under its control quite a number of territories, and he speaks of
6 Bijeljina, Foca, Samac, and the surroundings of Sarajevo.
7 By that time, 26th of April, General, would that be correct? Did
8 the Serbs control quite a huge territory by then?
9 A. I know that they had control in the places which are mentioned
10 here, that means Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Visegrad, but not in the entire
11 territory. He talks about the towns in which a conflict with the
12 Patriotic League broke out between the Serbian population and the
13 Patriotic League and the forces that were infiltrated from Serbia, but
14 I'm not aware of the fact that they controlled the entire territory along
15 the Drina River.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to tender this
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6170, Your Honours.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
21 Q. General, in paragraph 19 of your statement, you refer to the time
22 that parties with mostly national prefixes became legal, and giving your,
23 let's put it, multi-ethnic views on how the country should continue, that
24 was a disturbance, right, having these national parties giving speeches,
25 inflaming the populations? Correct?
1 A. Yes. Everyone was doing it from their own position.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I just please ask whether the
3 General has his statement available, and can he check it when the
4 Prosecution quotes specific paragraphs.
5 JUDGE KWON: General, do you have your statement with you now?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I haven't brought it with me.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, but I didn't quote anything
8 from a paragraph. I only mentioned that in paragraph 19, he spoke
9 about -- he referred to parties with mostly nationalist prefixes became
11 JUDGE KWON: We can continue, but I don't see any difficulty with
12 providing the witness with his statement.
13 Can you print one in the meantime in B/C/S.
14 You'll have it in due course.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I didn't bring it, unfortunately.
16 Q. General, in your testimony in the Milosevic case - and I refer
17 here to e-court page 510 - you said the following:
18 "There was a spectre of ethnic passions fanned in all
19 environments. Rather than stopping the passions and hostilities,
20 political authorities fanned them. The pattern was that the other ethnic
21 group was blamed for something that had been done, whereas one's own
22 people were, in the interpretation of the leaders, victims."
23 General, that captures your observations during the events;
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And when you say all groups, this includes the SDS as well,
3 A. It's one thing when we talk about groups and another when we talk
4 about parties. There were parties that were quite extreme.
5 And as for the previous question, if you allow me to go back, you
6 selected a specific part of my statement where I said that the parties
7 mostly had ethnic prefixes, but as for extremes, I mentioned there that
8 the HDZ brought extremists from the terrorist part of emigration who --
9 Q. General --
10 A. -- then appeared at their convention in the Lisinski hall. So
11 this is what I said previously, just to make a correction, even though I
12 don't have the statement in front of me.
13 Q. Yes. Yes. I'm sorry. General, I have to interrupt you, because
14 that is what we actually have in writing already here, and I address
15 things that are not already in evidence before this Court. So we don't
16 need to repeat this. Thank you.
17 But let's move on to the next topic and only briefly you have
18 described in your statement, and I refer here to the paragraphs 130, 149,
19 and 150, to several attempts of the security administration and the
20 Bosnian police to get a grip on the arming of troops outside the JNA and
21 how you co-operated, and we do not need to repeat it as it's all in
23 I just want to refer to a joint proposal of the security
24 administration and the BiH MUP to disarm all paramilitary formations, and
25 you refer in paragraph 157 to it, and you say the politicians did not
1 support it, not in Bosnia and not on the federal level.
2 That's how it was; right?
3 A. As I cannot describe this extensively, one could not say that it
4 was only the politicians who did not support this. Based on a meeting
5 with the military leadership on the 24th of December, which was held with
6 the Presidency of the -- of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had envisaged a plan
7 of disarming all paramilitary formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the
8 19th of January, we held a meeting. At the meeting, the representatives
9 of MUP from Croatia, Bruno Stojic and Brano Kvesic who was head of the
10 state security in Croatia obstructed this. They advocated that the
11 people would not return the weapons and, if they were pressured to do so,
12 that war would break out and that political parties should call on their
13 peoples to return the weapons. And then an argument broke out between
14 the representatives of the Serbs in the MUP and these Croats, and the
15 meeting did not -- was not completed, and there was no plan to be applied
16 as we had hoped.
17 On the 5th of February, I went for talks with Alija Izetbegovic,
18 because the previous attempt had failed. However, their interpretation
19 was that political parties would not accept this.
20 Whether they contacted between the 19th of January and the
21 5th of February when I came to Sarajevo again, whether they had contacts
22 with their ethnic leaders, this is something I don't know, but it was
23 obvious that generally speaking, no one wanted to accept it. The
24 Presidency of SFRY did not react to this either.
25 Q. Yes. And --
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I just say something about
2 the transcript so that there would not be a confusion. General talked
3 about the Croats in Bosnia rather than Croats from Croatia on T5.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
5 Q. As we do not have much time, I move on now to another meeting,
6 and we have no time to look at the document, but, General, you -- in your
7 statement you mentioned that you met Mr. Izetbegovic as well as other
8 Presidency members, and you may remember the meeting you had on the
9 15th of October, 1991, with all the members of the Presidency.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it is 65 ter 24661, but I think
11 I don't need to pull it up.
12 Q. In that meeting, non-Serb -- non-Serb members of the Presidency
13 were concerned about what they called excessive high concentration of JNA
14 units in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember that, that that was a
15 concern they had?
16 A. Yes, I remember, and I inspected the document you talk about,
17 which is entitled "Notes from the meeting." So much more was said than
18 you just mentioned. There was interpretation as to why the number of
19 troops in Bosnia increased, but what you just said is correct. But in
20 any case, it is just an extract from that.
21 If you wish to ask me about the following meeting which took
22 place on the 24th of December, I already expressed my reserve about the
23 way this meeting is interpreted. This is the key point.
24 At that meeting, neither on the 15th of October or on the 24th,
25 none of the Serbian representatives were present except for the members
1 of the Presidency, Mr. Koljevic and Ms. Plavsic. Mr. Karadzic did not
2 attend it, nor did Mr. Krajisnik. The first time I met Mr. Karadzic was
3 when I came here. They did not attend this meeting, but during the
4 discussion, even though he did not attend it, it says that he opposed the
5 peacekeeping forces entering Bosnia. This is why I believe it is said
6 that he attended the meeting, but the notes are not authentic, because
7 persons who did not attend it are listed. And I never said anything at
8 the meeting, because the principle is not for the subordinates to enter
9 the discussion when you have the federal minister who is present. So the
10 notes are untruthful, to say the least.
11 Q. Your -- but as you said, you remember the meeting. The non-Serb
12 members of the Presidency, they feared that the JNA would turn against
13 them if they continue to pursue an independent Bosnia; right?
14 A. No. It was not so. It wasn't that they were afraid that the
15 army would turn against them. This is not noted there. I have my
16 original notes from the -- from both meetings, and this was not
17 expressed. We would have -- you will have to be more precise and tell me
18 what the notes say.
19 They were not afraid of the army. Alija Izetbegovic even asked
20 the army to help to disarm the paramilitary formations, but he requested
21 that paramilitary formations in Banja Luka also be disarmed. That was at
22 the meeting of the 24th of December when they took over a relay owned by
23 the TV and turned it in another direction.
24 He was saying all the time what the Serbian side was doing and
25 never mentioned the paramilitary formations which had already grown by
1 that time and had an enormous amount of weapons. I don't know if you
2 would ask me that or not, but there is something that is usually skipped
4 As a former member of the Yugoslav People's Army, I care to say
5 that the first victims, the first casualties in Bosnia-Herzegovina were
6 military personnel, and in principle members of the military police. Let
7 me give you the dates, the 18th of September, 1991, the 5th of April --
8 Q. Let me stop you -- General, I'm sorry, but we have only very
9 limited time, and you have actually provided these details in the written
10 statement. And I would like to move on so that we can cover one more
11 topic where you can basically help us with, and that is the paramilitary
12 units, irregular troops of all kind, and I want to discuss this with you
13 as you have made observation.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 01718 on the
16 Q. And as it is coming up, it is an order of the SFRY Presidency on
17 the engagement of volunteers in the armed forces of the SFRY during
18 imminent threat of danger, dated 10 December 1991. I'm quite confident
19 that you know this decision. Do you?
20 A. I saw that decision here, because this is not the army
21 Official Gazette but the Official Gazette of Serbia, and I read these
22 provisions when I testified in the case against Mr. Milosevic.
23 Q. Yes. And as it says here in paragraph 1, that "... during the
24 imminent danger of war, the JNA and the TO are reinforced, among others,
25 with volunteers who are from the moment they joined units and
1 institutions of the armed forces of the SFRY, equal in all things with
2 soldiers and military conscripts."
3 General, there was a shortage of troops given the poor response
4 to mobilisation at that time; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And this reinforcement with volunteers, that also occurred in
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And the volunteers or paramilitaries that you observed in Croatia
10 would reappear, at least some of them would reappear in Bosnia, and I
11 would just ask you about a few. The Yellow Wasps, they caused havoc in
12 Zvornik; right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And they were associated with Seselj?
15 A. Yes, they were.
16 Q. And you have already given quite an extensive account of Arkan
17 and his men in Bijeljina, and that's in your statement on paragraph 171
18 further. They were in Bijeljina. You said that already.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And your observations of such group -- troops in Croatia, from
21 these observations you were aware that some of these volunteers and
22 paramilitaries, and I include here Arkan, would loot, would mistreat the
23 non-Serbs, and would even kill prisoners of war or innocent civilians;
25 A. That's right.
1 Q. And in relation to Arkan, you also mentioned in your testimony in
2 Milosevic that his status in the field would shift constantly. At times
3 he was part of the TO, sometimes police unit, and even on one occasion
4 part of the Novi Sad Corps; right? You -- is that correct?
5 A. No. He was never a member of the Novi Sad Corps, but the
6 then-corps commander General Bijorcevic had direct links with him, but
7 they were never a part of the Novi Sad Corps.
8 Q. Officially definitely not, as you have already mentioned also in
9 the Milosevic case, but I seem to recall that you refer to an order you
10 have seen where Arkan was basically named as a reconnaissance group of
11 the Novi Sad Corps, but that was only a fiction; is that right?
12 A. It is true that General Bijorcevic not ordered him but sent him a
13 memo claiming that in the area of Badovinci they were a reconnaissance
14 group of the Novi Sad Corps, although they were not part of the Novi Sad
15 Corps, nor did the other officers from the Novi Sad Corps know that
16 Bijorcevic had issued them such a document.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I was referring to the e-court
18 pages 62 to 63 from the Milosevic testimony.
19 Q. General, Arkan's Tigers, as they were also called, were the
20 dominant armed group taking part in Bijeljina; right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And when we spoke last week, you mentioned that after the
23 take-over of Bijeljina, Ms. Plavsic and the commander of the JNA
24 Tuzla Corps met Arkan in Bijeljina; right?
25 A. Yes. It wasn't just Ms. Plavsic who was there. There was also
1 the commander of the Tuzla Corps, Djeneral Jankovic, then Fikret Abdic
2 was there, as well as some other politicians who came as a delegation on
3 behalf of Sarajevo to calm things down in Bijeljina. It is true that
4 Ms. Plavsic was there and she greeted Arkan, kissing him on the cheeks
5 when they met.
6 Q. General, if you look back at the observations you made regarding
7 the events in Bosnia, would it be fair to say that crimes against the
8 non-Serb people by Serb troops were tolerated by the political
9 leaderships at certain times?
10 A. What political leadership?
11 Q. I would -- I was actually referring to all political leaderships.
12 But we can -- we can go and take one particular example.
13 You are aware that the Yellow Wasps were arrested and later on
14 set free; correct?
15 A. I didn't know they were set free. It was probably after I
16 retired. What I do know is this: Proceedings were instituted in
17 Loznica, I believe, and one of them was released because he was not
18 mentally fit to stand trial. He was held in the detention unit, though,
19 after he was declared unfit. I think it occurred sometime later, in 1993
20 or 1994. I think that's when the trial took place.
21 Recently, some people from that group were tried before the war
22 crimes court in Belgrade, and I don't think all of the judgements have
23 been handed down yet.
24 Q. And you also mentioned that Lukic was arrested and set free and
25 then arrested again; correct?
1 A. Yes. It all took place later, after I retired. However, it is
3 Q. And in the Milosevic case - and I'm referring here, Your Honours,
4 to page 284 in e-court - you, in fact, spoke about a modus operandi at
5 that time to avoid prosecuting such perpetrators by transferring them
6 back and forth over borders. Does that capture the prevailing attitude
7 at that time?
8 A. I don't know whether that was the prevailing attitude, but in
9 both cases you mentioned, objectively speaking, that's what had happened.
10 Q. I have one -- yes. I have one more topic, and that's now an
11 entirely different one, and it refers to paragraph 189, where you
12 describe in the statement an event, an attack on the military depot near
13 Foca on the 26th of April, 1992.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I would like to have D01683 on the
16 Q. And, General, as it is coming up, you refer in your -- in your
17 statement to a military depot near Foca, and would that be the JNA fuel
18 depot in Filipovici near Ustikolina?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And we have here a document from the 744th logistic base command,
21 17 April 1992, that refers to the situation in that area. Do you know
22 this particular document? Have you seen that before?
23 A. No, I have not.
24 Q. Before we go into details, let me just understand whether I
25 understood your comments properly. In paragraph 189, and if I understand
1 the English translation correctly, is it your evidence that some of the
2 Muslim refugees taking shelter there were armed, that they disarmed the
3 JNA officers, and when the Serbs became aware of this, they attacked the
4 depot and disarmed the Muslim attackers? Is that your evidence?
5 A. That's it more or less. Information was received through
6 security organs to the extent that some 200 Muslims, refugees, took
7 shelter in the warehouse. They were received there and fed. The
8 decision to do so was made by Major Kurtovic, who was at the warehouse.
9 Since some of the Muslims were armed, the personnel of the
10 warehouse, including Kurtovic, were disarmed, and then an SDS unit became
11 involved clearing up things. I have no further information, and what I
12 state in the statement is what I have learned from the security organ.
13 If you wish me to do so, I'll re-read it to see what happened
14 indeed, or perhaps you can put a question.
15 Q. You have already mentioned now that the SDS units were indeed
16 dealing with the situation at that time, and that's basically said here
17 in this -- in this document.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to tender this
20 JUDGE KWON: Was it not already admitted as you indicated, D1683?
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You're right. You're right. Sorry.
22 Q. General, we --
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think we need to go into
24 private session.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 [Private session]
17 [Open session]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in open session.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
20 Q. General, there's also evidence before this Tribunal that - and I
21 refer here to the adjudicated facts, Your Honour, 758 and 759 - that on
22 the day of the attack on the warehouse by these SDS troops, nine Muslim
23 men were murdered after an SDA membership card was found. General, are
24 you aware of that?
25 A. No. No.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, no -- no further questions.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. You're not tendering 65 ter 1718, are
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry, I've --
5 JUDGE KWON: Which seems to be an SFRY Presidency order.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. I would like to tender
7 it. I forgot.
8 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit it.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6171, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have re-examination?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Briefly, only perhaps one or two
14 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] General, sir, in this indictment, I'm being
16 charged with the following -- well, on page 27, you were asked about the
17 positions of officers who supported the SDS. Did the JNA change its
18 position about the SDS and supported it, or was it the SDS who suffered a
19 change of heart and then supported the JNA?
20 A. I'm not aware of any JNA position changing concerning the SDS.
21 It simply did not engage in discussions with any political party.
22 Now, whether the SDS changed their position vis-a-vis the JNA,
23 well, I seem to remember something which was in early April, perhaps,
24 when the SDS changed its position concerning the purpose of co-operating
25 between the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the TO, and they justified it
1 by having -- by the situation being changed. The MUP had split into the
2 Serb and Muslim parts, so there was no purpose in further co-operating
3 with the Muslim MUP.
4 Until the last day of my service, we never changed our position
5 on co-operating with the MUP. That is the only change I am aware of in
6 terms of SDS position at the beginning, which was praised at all of the
7 meetings. It was stated that the co-operation in question was a positive
8 move which contributed to preserving peace in Bosnia for at least a few
10 Q. Thank you. In the indictment, I am charged with supporting JNA
11 draft calls. In your knowledge, does that amount to a criminal offence?
12 A. I don't know why you would be charged with something the people
13 were supposed to do anyway as citizens. There were some volunteers which
14 were called that in the sense that they participated in the conflict in
15 Croatia. That's how they were referred to in street parlance. In
16 Croatia, there were two collection centres for volunteers at the
17 beginning of the war which were soon disbanded because those volunteers
18 would not remove their party insignia.
19 In the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, we also had two collection
20 centres for volunteers where in an organised fashion they were received.
21 We did not establish such centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because
22 people themselves, as per their war deployment, reported to JNA units,
23 and the SDS called on their -- on its membership to honour their duty as
25 I'm not saying that perhaps such volunteers did not form a
1 paramilitary unit of their own, but those people arrived in the JNA of
2 their own accord and were made part of the JNA.
3 Since the truth seems not to be able to out here in terms of
4 JNA -- the JNA in Bosnia, in addition to the volunteers who voluntarily
5 joined the JNA, eight of them were executed by firing squad in the centre
6 of Sarajevo in front of the police hall. They had been taken prisoner in
7 Dobrinja and dragged out of an APC which had broken down. These were not
8 actually volunteers but JNA soldiers who had been drafted from the
9 reserve force.
10 Q. Thank you, General. It is very good that you mention it. At
11 page 46 you were asked whether you were aware that volunteers and
12 paramilitary units which you had met in Croatia would engage in looting
13 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can one put the sign of equation between a
14 paramilitary formation and volunteers?
15 A. No. Those who reported in Croatia as volunteers were brought
16 there by political parties through their rallies, and by that time they
17 had set them up as some sort of military units which had not -- which did
18 not make part of the JNA later on, but they moved under the name of this
19 or that volunteer group. They had different names such as Dusan Silni,
20 Leva Supoderica, and so on and so forth.
21 The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was completely different.
22 There, there was general refusal to call-ups, and the 216th Mountain
23 Brigade in Han Pijesak had only 33 per cent manning levels.
24 In our army where -- where during exercises the reserves used to
25 respond to such exercises in great numbers, if the percentage was less
1 than 90 per cent, the commander was considered unsuccessful. There was a
2 call to not to respond to call-ups in Bosnia-Herzegovina starting with
3 Alija Izetbegovic and the Patriotic League, and in that case this brigade
4 had the manning level of only 33 per cent. I was unaware of the
5 Yellow Wasps during the conflict in Croatia. I heard of them for the
6 first time concerning the Zvornik incident. As for Arkan's units, they
7 were in Croatia.
8 And I cannot put the sign of equation between volunteers and
9 paramilitaries. Paramilitary units had already been established and
10 those groups moved about the theatre. Even in Kosovo they attempted to
11 insert a paramilitary group of 25 headed by some Jugoslav Petrusic. They
12 circumvented the collection centres for volunteers. Ninety per cent of
13 those who reported to the collection centres were eliminated as unfit to
14 join the army due to their previous conduct.
15 Q. Could you observe that someone could report as a volunteer and,
16 later on, to cut himself loose, creating a paramilitary unit and refusing
17 to adhere to JNA regulation -- regulations?
18 A. If someone chose to go maverick, that person was an individual.
19 It was not a group and as such would be considered a military deserter.
20 That person would have to be bring in because they had been members of
21 the regular army.
22 I don't know of such cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina out of the
23 people who responded to the call-up to wartime units. I have no such
25 Q. And the last question, General: You mentioned that you had
1 several officers in Sarajevo who were being processed or investigated,
2 and it was misinterpreted as if you had disciplined them. The processing
3 you mentioned, did it manage to prove that, for example, Colonel Gagovic
4 had committed a crime?
5 A. No. Only Gagovic was mentioned in that context. Although we are
6 not in closed session, I can tell you that there were a few dozen
7 investigations or processing procedures conducted by security organs at
8 the time on different elements of their responsibility or liability that
9 fell within the remit of security organs. There were several
10 investigations conducted on the topic of Serb nationalism. As far as I
11 know, Gagovic was not connected to any person from the SDS. As far as I
12 know, he was appointed the Chief of Staff in the command of
13 General Djurdjevac in the 4th Corps.
14 Now, as to his own criteria on how the problem in Bosnia should
15 be dealt with, well, I suppose he did, but he could not do anything
16 autonomously or use artillery without the corps command or Djurdjevac
17 knowing. He did not have any links to the paramilitaries either. As far
18 as I know, after the 19th of May, he did not remain and he joined the SDS
20 That's extent of information I have. I think he went back to
22 Q. Did you mean the VRS or the SDS?
23 A. Well, later it became the VRS.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.
25 Your Excellencies, I have no further questions of
1 General Vasiljevic.
2 JUDGE KWON: Unless my colleagues have a question for you, that
3 concludes your evidence, General Vasiljevic. On behalf of this Chamber,
4 I thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you are free to
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 [The witness withdrew]
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the two of us will now leave
9 and another -- another counsel will come.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
14 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Markovic. Please be seated and make
16 yourself comfortable.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 WITNESS: PERO MARKOVIC
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 JUDGE KWON: Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Markovic, I
21 must draw your attention to a particular Rule we have here at the
22 Tribunal. That is Rule 90(E) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
23 Under this Rule, you may object to answering a question from
24 Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you believe
25 that your answer might incriminate you in a criminal offence. In this
1 context, "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to an
2 admission of guilt or saying something that might provide evidence that
3 you have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that an
4 answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer
5 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to
6 compel you to answer the question. But in that situation, the Tribunal
7 would ensure that your testimony compelled under such circumstances would
8 not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence
9 save and except for the offence of giving false testimony.
10 Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understood.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Markovic.
13 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
14 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Markovic.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. Kindly pause and speak slowly. Actually, both of us should, so
18 as to make it easier for the interpreters and to have everything in the
20 A. Very well.
21 Q. Mr. Markovic, did you provide a statement to my Defence team?
22 A. I did.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D07822 in
25 e-court. 1D07822. Aha, very well.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Markovic, do you see that statement of yours on the screen
3 before you?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Please give your answer now. The interpretation is over.
6 A. Yes, I see that statement.
7 Q. Thank you. Have you read this statement and signed it?
8 A. Yes. I read it and signed it.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
10 the last page so that he can identify his signature.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Is this your signature?
13 A. Yes, it is my signature.
14 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said
15 to the Defence team?
16 A. For the most part, yes. There is a small mistake in number 13.
17 May I correct it?
18 Q. Certainly. We'll ask you to do that. Do you have a hard copy of
19 your statement there?
20 A. No, I don't.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I kindly ask that the witness
22 be allowed to look at his statement. Could he also be provided with a
23 copy. During the cross-examination he will probably have certain
24 paragraphs quoted to him.
25 Can we now please have paragraph 13 on page 4 on our screens.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. What was it that you wanted to correct there? Please tell us
3 what it is that should be corrected.
4 A. It says here that it's Christmas, but I actually spoke about
6 Q. Line 3, it says "over the Catholic Christmas," but it should say
7 "over the Catholic Easter"? Is that what you're saying?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you. What about the rest of the statement, does it
10 faithfully reflect what you said to the Defence team?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today in
13 this courtroom, would your answers basically be the same as those
14 provided in this statement?
15 A. Yes, they would be the same.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to
18 tender this 92 ter ...
19 JUDGE KWON: Any objection?
20 MR. ZEC: No objection.
21 JUDGE KWON: You are tendering an associated exhibit? Yes,
22 Mr. Robinson.
23 MR. ROBINSON: No associated exhibits.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you. If you would bear with me a
25 minute. Yes, we'll admit it.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3072, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now I'm going to read
4 out the summary of Mr. Pero Markovic's statement in the English language.
5 [In English] Pero Markovic was elected president of the
6 Executive Board of the Brcko Municipal Assembly.
7 He was involved in the SDS since beginning -- the beginning and
8 was present at the founding Assembly on the 26th of August, 1990.
9 Following the multi-party elections, the Brcko local government was
10 formed from members of the SDA, HDZ, and SDS as a coalition. The
11 Executive Committee of Brcko was composed of nine members, three from
12 each of the parties.
13 Pero Markovic considers that when the Executive Committee was
14 established, it was largely unfit for the purposes or interests of the
15 Serbian people in the municipality. This is because the SDA and HDZ
16 formed a joint front and were able to out-vote the Serbian members of the
17 committee. Therefore, discussions could not be implemented -- decisions
18 could not be implemented that were in the interests of all. The SDS
19 attempted in every way possible to reach a political agreement with the
20 other parties for the benefit of all citizens of the municipality,
21 regardless of religion or nationality.
22 A number of factors had a big impact on the overall inter-ethnic
23 relations in the town, including the civil wars being waged in Slovenia
24 and Croatia because of their immediate proximity to Brcko and that the
25 leaders of the HDZ openly supported the separatist activities in these
1 republics. Further, the SDA in Brcko were under pressure from the SDA
2 leadership from Sarajevo to make personnel changes to allow separatist
3 activities to take place. Mr. Pero Markovic also spoke to a number of
4 Muslim neighbours and friends who were against the demolition of the
5 federal Yugoslavia but were under pressure from the SDA and the HDZ and
6 had to work towards BH seceding.
7 Mr. Pero Markovic was aware that an order was sent from the --
8 from Jerko Doko, the minister of defence of the Socialist Republic of
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina, that no mobilisation was to be conducted for the
10 JNA and that the reserve police stations and a police force were to be
11 created. Pero Markovic believes that the reserve police forces and
12 paramilitary units were only formed in towns and neighbourhoods inhabited
13 by Muslims and Croats. This caused the Serb residents in the
14 municipality became anxious and fearful of their safety and put all their
15 hopes in the protection of the JNA.
16 Pero Markovic considers that the symbol of the first rift between
17 the ethnic groups of Brcko was in the SDA and the HDZ tying their party
18 flags together. He was aware that the bridge over the Sava River may be
19 destroyed if the unrest continued. He therefore called a meeting to
20 discuss the possibility of preventing this. However, less than month
21 later, the Croats destroyed their part of bridge. A makeshift bridge was
22 then created. However, this only allowed pedestrians to cross.
23 Further, in April 1992, the Croats stopped pedestrians from
24 crossing the bridge, meaning that between 3.000 and 5.000 people remained
25 in Brcko were unable to return to their home countries from which they
1 had travelled for the holiday. On the night of 29th of April, 1992,
2 Mr. Pero Markovic was awoken by a detonation that discovered -- and
3 discovered that the bridge over the Sava River had been torn down on the
4 right bank of the Sava River. That means on the bank on Bosnian side.
5 The town was gripped by chaos, and the work of the local authorities was
6 paralysed. Mr. Pero Markovic over the radio urged everyone to report to
7 work and remain calm.
8 Mr. Pero Markovic was aware that paramilitary units were
9 mobilising in BH because in March 1992, a large group of well-armed men
10 stopped a JNA column from the local garrison and arrested and disarmed
11 all the JNA members from the column. He called a meeting, and Muslim and
12 Croat leaders confirmed the attack and stated that they would ask their
13 compatriots to release the soldiers, which eventually happened.
14 Pero Markovic therefore concluded that there was collusion between the
15 local government and the paramilitary groups.
16 On 30th of April, 1992, Mr. Pero Markovic was informed that a
17 large group of men fit for military service from Croatia had arrived in
18 the village of Gorica. It was suspected that they were members of the
19 HOS or Green Berets. When questioned, the men stated that they were on
20 holiday. However, Pero Markovic was suspicious as the holiday period was
22 On his return to Brcko, Mr. Pero Markovic saw that a barricade
23 had been created -- erected in front of the hospital and was guarded by a
24 number of heavily armed men, the majority of which had automatic weapons.
25 He concluded that these men were members of Muslim paramilitary groups,
1 Patriotic League and the Green Berets. He was also informed that
2 check-points had been set up in the afternoon on all major roads and
3 intersections making it impossible to move around the city.
4 On the afternoon of 1st of May, 1992, members of the Muslim
5 paramilitaries mounted an attack on the town of Brcko, targeting an area
6 inhabited exclusively by Serbs. At the same time paramilitary groups and
7 the HOS were active in Brcko, the JNA withdrew to Serbia and civilian
8 authorities were dysfunctional. This led to the town effectively being
9 ruled by paramilitary groups who made arrests and physically mistreated
10 everyone. These activities made many Serbs fear for their safety. This
11 was amplified when the Serb civilians saw a television broadcast of the
12 massacre of the JNA soldiers.
13 Throughout the war, the town centre and surrounding villages came
14 under indiscriminate gunfire almost every day from Croatia and territory
15 under the control of B and H. That means from north and from south.
16 This shelling caused large-scale destruction of civilian facilities and a
17 large number of civilians who were wounded or killed, and such shelling
18 rendered normal life in the municipality impossible. Serbs, Muslims, and
19 Croats all sought to leave the municipality because of this.
20 Both during and after the war, the Muslim and Croat sides spread
21 numerous lie and told untruths about the war. They misinterpreted [sic]
22 the number of people killed in Brcko as it was publicly stated that more
23 than 8.000 Muslims were killed in Brcko. However, Mr. Pero Markovic is
24 aware that 911 Muslims have been killed in different circumstances.
25 Mr. Pero Markovic had numerous and direct contact with
1 Radovan Karadzic, and throughout he demanded full respect -- Karadzic at
2 that time demanded the full respect for other ethnic groups as well as
3 demanding they represent the interests and welfare of all. Karadzic
4 never asked Pero Markovic to plan or do anything to harm others
5 regardless of their religion or ethnic background. Karadzic asked the
6 authorities to look for solutions for the benefits of everyone.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Markovic, I wanted to ask you the following: The first time
9 your bridge was destroyed from the Croatian side and the other time it
10 was from the Bosnian side. Was this something new on the Sava or had
11 bridges been destroyed earlier on as well?
12 A. As far as I know, perhaps even a year before that, the bridge
13 between Orasje and Zupanja, near Brcko, had been destroyed. Zupanja is
14 on the Croatian side and Orasje is on the Bosnian side.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. We have a document, and
17 perhaps if we have an opportunity, we shall show all the things that had
18 been destroyed up until the 28th of February. But at this point in time,
19 Excellencies, I have no further questions.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Markovic, your evidence in this case
21 has been admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony, and now
22 you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the
24 Mr. Zec.
25 MR. ZEC: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Zec:
2 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Markovic. Mr. Markovic, you told us in your
3 statement about the composition of the local government in Brcko before
4 the war. Let me ask you quickly a few -- couple of questions about some
5 other officials in Brcko in that period.
6 Dr. Milenko Vojinovic, also known as Dr. Beli, was president of
7 the SDS in Brcko. This is correct, isn't it?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. He was also a deputy in the BiH Republican Assembly before the
10 war, later RS Assembly, member of the SDS Main Board, and member of the
11 municipal War Presidency in Brcko. This is correct, isn't it?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. In his capacity as the president of the municipal SDS and the
14 deputy in the Assembly, he co-ordinated the work of the Municipal
15 Assembly, municipal SDS, pursuant to directions of the SDS leadership in
16 Sarajevo. This is correct, isn't it?
17 A. I assume so.
18 Q. Bosko Maricic was vice-president of the SDS Municipal Board,
19 member of the municipal War Presidency, isn't it?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. He became deputy in the RS Assembly in 1995, after the death of
22 Dr. Vojinovic. This is correct, isn't it?
23 A. I think so.
24 Q. Djordje Ristanic was president of the Serbian Municipal Assembly
25 in Brcko and president of the War Presidency. This is correct, isn't it?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Before the war there was a garrison of the Yugoslav People's
3 Army, the JNA, in Brcko. Commander of the garrison was Colonel
4 Pavle Milinkovic. This is correct, isn't it?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You say in paragraph 7 and 8 of your statement that members of
7 the SDA and HDZ followed instructions from their leadership in Sarajevo
8 and Zagreb. Is it also correct that you followed instructions from the
9 SDS leadership in relation to your activities?
10 A. For the most part.
11 Q. You told us that the interest of the SDA and the HDZ was
12 independent Bosnia and Herzegovina outside Yugoslavia, which is, you say,
13 against the interest of Serbian people in the municipality of Brcko. At
14 the same time in the discussions with other two parties, the SDS asked
15 for the division of the municipality. This is correct, isn't it?
16 A. Well, I cannot claim that the SDS asked for that. This idea
17 concerning the division came from us, the parties that were in power,
18 without any instructions from the SDS. If you remember, the
19 Executive Board was three, three, three, so that was the idea of the nine
20 of us there.
21 Q. Okay. Just to be clear, according to the 1991 census, Serbs made
22 about 20 per cent of the municipal population and about the same number
23 of Brcko town. This is correct, isn't it?
24 A. Approximately.
25 Q. There were several meetings held on this topic of division of the
1 municipality, including the one around 17 April 1992 which you referred
2 to in paragraph 33 of your statement. Let me first make it clear. At
3 this time, during these discussions, everyone at these meetings was aware
4 of the situation in Brcko at the time. The war was ongoing in Croatia,
5 Arkan was in Bijeljina, Zvornik, crimes were taking place in Eastern
6 Bosnia, Brcko was packed with refugees and people forced out of their
7 homes trying to cross the bridge in Brcko in order to leave, wasn't it?
8 A. Yes.
9 MR. ZEC: Can we have P03020, page -- English page 5, and B/C/S
10 page 6.
11 Q. In front of you, Mr. Markovic, there will be a transcript of a TV
12 documentary about Brcko which was produced in Sarajevo. You will be able
13 to see it on the screen, and it's about the negotiations that -- that you
14 talk about in your statement.
15 Mato Jurisic, a Croat --
16 MR. ZEC: So English page 5; B/C/S, 6.
17 Q. So if you -- you can look at the screen. It says here MJ, that's
18 Mato Jurisic, a Croat, he refers to the committee that you also talk
19 about in paragraph 33. Munib Jusufovic says that he did not want any
20 division. Mustafa Ramic said that the SDS wanted to divide town into two
21 parts. Ibrahim Ramic said three-quarters of the town would have belonged
22 to the Serbs, the entire industrial area, the railway, and the harbour.
23 MR. ZEC: Next page in English and B/C/S.
24 He says that -- okay. Can we have in B/C/S next page?
25 Ibrahim Ramic, that the other two communities did not consider
1 this to be a serious proposal.
2 Q. Was this, Mr. Markovic, a general position of the parties during
3 these negotiations?
4 A. You've put many questions. If we are talking about the division,
5 we tried in a way to do our best to prevent a war, all three sides.
6 Unfortunately, this never came to pass. I already talked about that. We
7 had this Municipal Assembly session that was broadcast on local TV and
8 that was the reason. We just didn't want any kind of conflict to occur.
9 Q. And the only other question I want to ask about this, if you look
10 at the screen it says Vinko Marjanovic, he says -- you can see "VM." You
11 can read that. According to him -- yeah, you can read that.
12 A. Very well.
13 Q. According to him -- Vinko Marjanovic was a Croat, isn't it?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. According to him, at some point he had discussion with you and
16 you told him that peace would not prevail regardless of the outcome of
17 the negotiations. Did you say this to Mr. Vinko Marjanovic?
18 A. I don't remember that. No, I don't remember.
19 Q. In the morning hours of 30th April 1992, at 4.50, the bridges
20 across the Sava River were blown up and this was practically the
21 beginning of the war in Brcko municipality. This is correct, isn't it?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You told us in your statement, paragraph 31, that you were in
24 Stanovi in the first week of May 1992. When exactly did you go to
25 Stanovi, and when did you return to Brcko?
1 A. On the 30th of April, I left, and I'm not sure when it was that I
2 returned, possibly on the 7th.
3 Q. Djordje Ristanic testifies -- testified that the day before the
4 bridges were blown up, the garrison commander warned him to move to
5 Stanovi for safety reasons and to bring other War Presidency members with
6 him. This is in P03023, page 18.
7 Did you go, Mr. Markovic, to Stanovi with this group of people?
8 A. No. My parents lived there.
9 Q. Djordje Ristanic also testified that the War Presidency returned
10 to Brcko on 4 May 1992 and that it was initially placed in the building
11 called Sumadija in the Bijeljinska Street, which was the head the forest
12 company. This is at transcript page 16710. He said that there were
13 discussions about future executive government after 6 May 1992, and
14 according to him, you did not want to continue performing this position.
15 This is correct, isn't it?
16 A. Yes. If it matters, the building is Sumarija, not Sumadija. It
17 really does matter in our language. I don't know whether it matters in
18 English too. Sumarija means forestry building because it was a forestry
20 As for the take-over of power since that kind of chaos prevailed,
21 hardly anyone would want to play any role in government at that point in
22 time, myself included.
23 Q. The War Presidency had meetings from early May 1992, and it was
24 in charge of issuing passes for moving, public services, and other issues
25 related to the functioning of the local government. This is correct,
1 isn't it?
2 A. Well, we tried to pretend we were a government. There was no
3 water, electricity. Somebody had to try at least to take care of that.
4 MR. ZEC: Can we have 65 ter 17268.
5 Q. In front of you, Mr. Markovic, there will be a travel permit
6 issued by the Brcko War Presidency on the basis of the decision of the
7 War Presidency of 3 May 1992. The heading of the document, it has
8 information about the new Serb authorities in Brcko.
9 English version says that the heading is illegible, but you can
10 look at the stamp, Mr. Markovic, and there's a signature of
11 Djordje Ristanic.
12 Mr. Markovic, the local authorities resumed their work in Brcko
13 shortly after the take-over operations had begun. This is correct, isn't
15 A. No. There was no one to take it over from. By the
16 30th of April, we had normal government, and after that none whatsoever.
17 So there was no one to take it over from. If I properly understood the
18 interpretation of what you said. You said took over the power, but there
19 was no one to take it over from.
20 Q. What I meant is before 30th April 1992, it was, let's call it a
21 joint government in Brcko, and after 30th April 1992, as we can see in
22 this document, it's a Serb municipality of Brcko. That's what I meant.
23 A. All right, but there was no take-over as you just said.
24 MR. ZEC: Your Honours, I would tender this document.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I don't think the witness has
1 really said anything about the document that would cause it to be
2 admitted through his testimony.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zec.
4 MR. ZEC: The witness's evidence was that -- and I believe he
5 said middle May there was no government. Here this document shows that
6 there was a government before middle May, and they were functioning. So
7 this is classic impeachment document.
8 JUDGE KWON: But did he confirm that it is a governmental
9 document? All you said is "illegible." Did he confirm the signature of
11 MR. ZEC:
12 Q. Mr. Markovic, if you look at the document, can you confirm the
13 signature? Is that Djordje Ristanic?
14 A. Yes. It seems to me that it is Djordje Ristanic's signature, but
15 the date which is in the upper part of the document is the 8th rather
16 than the 4th, as I believe you said.
17 Q. I did not say 4, but, yeah, thank you. And also if you look the
18 stamp, this is the stamp that the new Serb government or authorities in
19 Brcko used after 30th April 1992.
20 A. I oppose your claim that there was a taking over of power. There
21 was no power at all, and I said that we were trying to establish some
22 sort of power. If you have a situation in which nothing is functioning,
23 then it's normal to attempt to establish some kind of authority and
24 power. So this could have been an attempt.
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6172, Your Honours.
2 MR. ZEC: Your Honours, did you want to take a break or shall I
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll take a break now for 45 minutes
5 and resume at 20 past 1.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 1.22 p.m.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Harvey.
9 MR. HARVEY: Mr. President, might I just take this moment,
10 please, to introduce Ms. Marija Grujeska, who has been working in our
11 Belgrade office for almost a year now, and she is not going to make a
12 long speech, I assure you. Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Zec, please continue.
14 MR. ZEC: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Q. Mr. Markovic, the Brcko garrison and Lieutenant-Colonel
16 Pavle Milinkovic remained in Brcko during and after the take-over of the
17 city; correct?
18 A. I don't know why you keep using this term "take-over."
19 Q. Can you confirm that Pavle Milinkovic remained in the city in
20 this period?
21 A. Yes.
22 MR. ZEC: Can we have quickly D01577.
23 Q. In front of you there will be a travel permit issued by the
24 commander of the Brcko garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel Pavle Milinkovic on
25 8th July 1992, and in paragraph 20, you say that it moved to Serbia in
1 May 1992. So that's -- I'm asking this question.
2 So it is clear, isn't it, that Pavle Milinkovic remained in Brcko
3 during this period?
4 A. There is no signature here but a facsimile on this pass. The JNA
5 left Brcko on May 19.
6 Q. Mr. Markovic, I asked you and you said yes. I asked you whether
7 Pavle Milinkovic and Brcko garrison remained in Brcko just a moment ago
8 and you said yes. And this is basically confirmation of what you said.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we --
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Up until May 19 --
11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Milinkovic and the garrison as the
13 garrison could not walk.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Do not interrupt while the witness
15 is saying something, Mr. Karadzic, please.
16 What did you say, Mr. Markovic?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that the JNA left Brcko on
18 May 19. I have no information as to when exactly Pavle Milinkovic
19 crossed the border. I believe he did that at this time.
20 JUDGE KWON: In the previous set of conversation, you confirmed
21 that Mr. Milinkovic stayed in Brcko at this time, didn't you?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Up until May 19. I didn't say
23 anything else.
24 MR. ZEC:
25 Q. Mr. Markovic --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. What was your point, Mr. Karadzic?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my objection was about
3 confusing questions that say during the take-over and during and after
4 the take-over whether the JNA and the garrison left. How can a garrison
5 leave? So just to simplify questions. The JNA left on the 19th, but the
6 garrison didn't leave. It didn't go anywhere.
7 And thirdly, do we have confirmation that this is Milinkovic's
8 signature? It is typed, but do we have a signature as well?
9 JUDGE KWON: It's not an appropriate intervention, Mr. Karadzic,
10 at all, the last point.
11 Yes, back to you, Mr. Zec.
12 MR. ZEC: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. Mr. Markovic, I don't want to spend a lot of time on this, but if
14 you look the date of this document, it's July 1992. So he was there way
15 after May 1992. This is correct, isn't it?
16 A. I cannot confirm this.
17 Q. MUP of Serb republic regulated the movement in Brcko by issuing
18 passes for movement. This is correct, isn't it?
19 A. This pass was issued by the garrison command rather than by the
20 MUP, if this is the one you have in mind.
21 Q. No, it's not. This was my question. Can you confirm? I'll show
22 you another document, but can you confirm that the MUP of Serb republic
23 was regulating movement in the city by issuing documents such as this
25 A. I think that the passes were issued by the War Presidency.
1 MR. ZEC: Can we have 65 ter 24668.
2 Q. In front of you there will be a travel permit that has the same
3 format as the one that's been seen a moment ago. And this permit has the
4 stamp of the MUP of Serb republic on it for which you say in paragraph 20
5 of your statement there was powerful [sic] to do anything. So can you
6 have a look at the stamp and confirm this is the stamp of the MUP of Serb
8 A. That's what it says here, but at the time anyone could make a
10 Q. Mr. Markovic, this is the stamp of the MUP of Serb republic.
11 That's correct, isn't it?
12 MR. ZEC: Perhaps, Mr. Registrar, we could blow-up the area
13 that -- this area where the stamp is.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
15 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I tender this document.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may just say something.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Markovic.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says down there commander
19 Lieutenant-Colonel Pavle Milinkovic. He is a soldier and the stamp is
20 from the police, as the gentleman claims. And in the heading it also
21 says "Garrison," Brcko garrison. So it's the army once again. So one of
22 them is too many. One of them is surplus; right? I don't know which.
23 MR. ZEC:
24 Q. When I introduced this document to you, I said it uses the same
25 format as the one that we saw signed by Milinkovic, but this one has
1 stamp of the MUP of Serb republic and has no Milinkovic signature on it.
2 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I tender this document.
3 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6173.
6 MR. ZEC:
7 Q. Mr. Markovic, a unit under command of Zika Ivanovic or
8 Zika Crnogorac was in Brcko during this period, wasn't he?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. He also issued passes for movement, didn't he?
11 A. I don't know that. Possibly.
12 MR. ZEC: Perhaps we can have quickly D01578. I'll move on. I
13 won't use this. This is already in evidence. Can we have P03026.
14 Q. Mr. Markovic, the War Presidency issued passes for people they
15 believed should be released from Luka camp, and those passes were
16 provided to Goran Jelisic. This is correct, isn't it?
17 A. I don't know that.
18 MR. ZEC: Can we have P03026.
19 Q. In front of you there will be a pass issued by the War Presidency
20 on 14 May 1992. It has the same format as the one we saw earlier, but
21 this was -- this one was signed by Adolf. This Chamber -- sorry, this is
22 Goran Jelisic, who called himself the Serb Adolf Hitler.
23 Djordje Ristanic testified that the War Presidency gave these passes to
24 Jelisic for people they believed should be released from Luka.
25 Transcript page 16 -- 16718.
1 Mr. Markovic, this was a way of co-ordination between
2 Goran Jelisic and the War Presidency. This is correct, isn't it?
3 A. No, I don't know. Goran Jelisic was never a member of the
4 War Presidency. Up until those days he was a completely unknown person.
5 Q. I did not suggest that he was member of the War Presidency. He
6 was in Luka camp, and I said that War Presidency, when they believed one
7 should be released from the Luka camp, they would provide these passes
8 such as this one to Goran Jelisic in the Luka camp to release people.
9 This is correct, isn't it?
10 A. You may be partly right. The passes were used by everyone,
11 whoever wanted to leave.
12 Q. That's not my question. War Presidency provided passes to
13 Goran Jelisic if they believed one should be released from Luka camp,
14 isn't it?
15 A. I cannot answer like that. It's possible that Ristanic
16 personally gave it to him, but officially no one ever gave it to him at
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 16, it's not recorded that
19 the witness said "not only those from Luka." So whoever wanted to leave,
20 not only those from Luka.
21 MR. ZEC: Can I move on, Mr. President?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MR. ZEC:
24 Q. Mr. Markovic, you told us in your statement in paragraph 9 that
25 the Serbs had put all their hopes for protection in the units of the JNA
1 garrison in Brcko. This Chamber has received evidence that Serbs in
2 Brcko believed that the forces within Brcko were not sufficient to take
3 control of the municipality. The SDS asked for assistance from
4 Bijeljina, which was part of the same region, SAO Semberija and Majevica.
5 This is correct, isn't it?
6 A. I don't know why you are saying the SDS. It wasn't just the SDS,
7 if I understood you well, or maybe it's a question of interpretation.
8 Q. My question was that the SDS asked assistance from Bijeljina.
9 That's correct, isn't it?
10 A. The War Presidency asked for that rather than the SDS.
11 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I refer to transcript page 16711 and
12 P00956, page 16.
13 Q. Mr. Markovic, as a result of this request, various Serb forces
14 came to Brcko, mainly from Bijeljina, to assist the take-over of town.
15 This is correct, isn't it?
16 A. Can you help me, because you said "various Serb forces." What
17 exactly did you mean by that?
18 Q. I will be asking you about specific units that came. So can you
19 confirm that Serb forces came?
20 A. Yes. Yes.
21 Q. The first Serbian force that arrived to Brcko about four to six
22 months before the war was the group of instructors of Captain Dragan, the
23 Red Berets or Knindzas as they called them at the time. This is correct,
24 isn't it?
25 A. I am not aware of that.
1 Q. Among this group of Captain Dragan instructors there was Rade and
2 Bozo Bozic, Simo Radovanovic, Sasa Vukojevic, Goran Petkovic, and others.
3 This is correct, isn't it?
4 A. I learned about some of those names but I don't know when they
6 Q. They arrived and formed a special unit which provided trainings
7 for Brcko residents. This was one of the first Serbian forces in Brcko;
9 A. I don't know. I'm not aware of that.
10 MR. ZEC: This is in P02888, English page 3, B/C/S e-court
11 page 9. And in D01412, English page 7, B/C/S page 5 and 6.
12 Q. The largest -- Mr. Markovic, the largest part of the Serbian
13 forces that came to Brcko was from the area of Semberija. That is from
14 Bijeljina and Ugljevik. Those were Serbian guards under the command of
15 Ljubisa Savic, also known as Mauzer, and a unit of radicals under the
16 command of Mirko Blagojevic, wasn't it?
17 A. Those units were present in Brcko.
18 Q. Branislav Filipovic, also known as Sumar, was among the
19 volunteers of the Serb Radical Party that took part in the take-over of
20 Brcko. This is correct, isn't it?
21 A. I'm not aware of that.
22 Q. Had you ever heard of name Branislav Filipovic, also known as
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. This Chamber has received evidence that the command of the Brcko
1 garrison authorised Branislav Filipovic to bring weapons from Belgrade
2 for the needs of the Brcko garrison. This is in P02877. They also gave
3 him a vehicle for his trips to Belgrade and Bijeljina in May 1992. This
4 is in P02902. There's also a receipt issued to Branislav Filipovic in
5 Belgrade for the weapons he took for the needs of the Brcko garrison.
6 This is in P02876.
7 Mr. Markovic, the Brcko War Presidency issued Sumar or
8 Branislav Filipovic a pass to travel out of the war zone and Brcko
9 municipality, isn't it?
10 A. Excuse me, but the War Presidency met very rarely. It is
11 possible that someone from the War Presidency issued this pass and gave
12 it to him, but this is not something that I'm aware of.
13 MR. ZEC: Can we have P0874 [sic].
14 Q. Mr. Markovic, in front of you there will be a pass issued by the
15 Brcko War Presidency. This pass was issued to Branislav Filipovic to be
16 able to go out of the battle zone in Brcko municipality.
17 MR. ZEC: P02874.
18 Q. Mr. Markovic, if you -- if you look at this pass, can you see
19 name of Branislav Filipovic?
20 A. I can see the last name, and I suppose that it is the
21 corresponding first name.
22 Q. It says also that there's a note that Sumar was a volunteer from
23 Bijeljina, but if you look the signature, do you recognise this
25 A. No. It's completely illegible. It's completely illegible.
1 MR. ZEC: Can we have the reverse side of this document. There
2 is second page. Mr. Registrar, can you also turn for the witness to be
3 able to see this handwriting. Can you turn it around?
4 Q. Do you recognise this handwriting, Mr. Markovic?
5 A. No, I don't, but I can read out the names.
6 Q. Can you?
7 A. Djordje Ristanic, Pero Markovic.
8 Q. This refers to you, isn't it?
9 A. I suppose so.
10 Q. Is it then possible that Sumar made a note of these two names on
11 his pass?
12 A. I don't know that.
13 Q. Among the units -- I asked you a moment ago about Ljubisa Savic,
14 also known as Mauzer, and you confirmed that he was present in Bijeljina.
15 Is it also correct that he came to Bijeljina on 2nd May of 1992? I'm
16 sorry, not Bijeljina, Brcko.
17 A. It is possible that he arrived on the 2nd of May.
18 MR. ZEC: Can we have 65 ter 45341B.
19 Q. It is correct, isn't it, Mr. Markovic, that Mauzer made agreement
20 with the command of the garrison at the time with the Presidency of the
21 municipal -- Serbian municipal -- municipality of Brcko for him to arrive
22 to Brcko? Isn't it?
23 A. It is possible that there was an agreement, but I wasn't privy to
25 Q. So if you see that --
1 MR. ZEC: Can we have also B/C/S, please.
2 Q. At the beginning it says -- this is -- Mr. Markovic, this is
3 Mauzer speaking. This is the documentary of the unit under
4 Ljubisa Savic, also known as Mauzer. And he's talking here about his
5 arrival to Brcko, and in the first line --
6 JUDGE KWON: I was told that there's no B/C/S translation.
7 MR. ZEC: Oversight, but it should be available somewhere.
8 JUDGE KWON: This is the translation for English and B/C/S exists
9 in the form of audio recording.
10 MR. ZEC: So we have tape which is transcribed in B/C/S and then
11 translated in English.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
13 MR. ZEC: We can also play, but I believe we spend a lot of time
14 if I play the video, so we will be able to find transcript very quickly.
15 I'll come back to this in a moment.
16 Q. Mr. Markovic, you said that Zika Ivanovic, also known as
17 Zika Crnogorac, was in Brcko. He led a unit of the Serbian MUP of
18 Red Berets. This is correct, isn't it?
19 A. Yes.
20 MR. ZEC: Can we have 65 ter 15117.
21 Q. Mr. Markovic, in front of you there will be a certificate issued
22 by the MUP of Serbia, unit for special purposes, dated 27 June 1992.
23 Signature, commander of the unit, Zika Ivanovic. This is Zika Ivanovic,
24 commander of the Red Berets that came to Brcko, isn't it?
25 A. I don't know the man's name, but I am aware of Zika Crnogorac if
1 this is the person in question. Otherwise, I don't know what his first
2 and last name is.
3 Q. Zika Ivanovic, nickname is Zika Crnogorac; correct?
4 A. Fine.
5 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I would tender this document.
6 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, there's no basis for this through
7 the witness.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zec, what witness confirmed is name. What would
9 you respond to Mr. Robinson's observation?
10 MR. ZEC: He confirmed that the unit commanded by Zika Ivanovic
11 or Zika Crnogorac came to Brcko and this is certificate to show that he
12 was -- that he was member of the Serbian MUP, and he's signing this
13 document as the commander of special purposes unit.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, this witness did not identify the
15 person whose name appears on this document as being the same as the one
16 that Mr. Zec is representing it to be. He just said "fine," meaning he
17 agrees with -- meaning whatever you say, whatever, but he didn't say that
18 he knew that this man whose name appears on this document is the same one
19 that they had been discussing.
20 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, when I first asked -- I'm sorry. When I
21 first asked about Zika Ivanovic and his presence in Brcko, the witness
22 said yes, I believe, earlier today.
23 JUDGE KWON: The question is what the witness confirmed about
24 this document. I will consult my colleagues.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zec, the Chamber would not receive this document
2 through this witness.
3 MR. ZEC: Can we have 65 ter 15118.
4 Q. Mr. Markovic, in front of you there will be another certificate
5 issued by Zika Ivanovic. This time he entitles his unit as a unit for
6 special purposes Brcko under SAO Semberija and Majevica. This
7 certificate was -- is dated 9 July 1992, confirming that Joco Stevanovic
8 is a member of this unit from 20 June 1992. Zika said we need every man,
9 especially a sniper. Zika ends with words "in co-operation of MUP
10 Krajina with the units of SAO Semberija and Majevica."
11 Mr. Markovic, this is the unit under Zika Ivanovic that came to
12 Brcko, isn't it?
13 A. I'm not aware of that.
14 Q. Can you confirm that units from MUP Krajina, Semberija and
15 Majevica were present in Brcko?
16 A. I don't know that.
17 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I would tender this document.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Same objection.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I may assist. In line 24,
20 page 84, the witness said, "I don't know what his real name is, but I did
21 hear of a Zika Crnogorac." Page 83.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zec, should we take a different action from the
23 one we saw before, 15117?
24 MR. ZEC: Perhaps, Mr. President, if I show another document to
25 show that Zika Ivanovic is Zika Crnogorac, maybe then it will be clear as
1 to who we're talking about.
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
3 MR. ZEC: P02855. Can we have next page in both languages. So
4 English page I'm looking is 5. In English -- in English, that's
5 second-last paragraph. Can we have B/C/S next page. I'm sorry, back.
6 Previous page. I'm trying to find the same quote basically. Sorry, the
7 last page in B/C/S.
8 Q. Mr. Markovic, if you look at third paragraph from the top, it
10 "Krajina Special Police with 45 men led by Zivojin Ivanovic, also
11 known as Crnogorac ..."
12 Mr. Markovic, this is -- this is Zivojin Ivanovic, also known as
13 Zika Crnogorac, isn't it?
14 A. Possible.
15 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I tender the previous document, which
16 was 65 ter 15118.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think this previous
19 document as well as the one before it can be admitted with this link.
20 Even though the witness didn't confirm anything about the document, it
21 might be considered sufficiently contradictory to be admissible.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: Well, given the circumstances, the Chamber will
24 admit them.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits P6174 and 6175 respectively,
1 Your Honours.
2 MR. ZEC: Now I would like to play a video-clip, which is P02852,
3 and I would like to play second clip which starts from time-code 00:09:02
4 of the tape V000-3533. This is a celebration ceremony of the Red Berets
5 unit of the Serbian state security in 1997 in Serbia.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 MR. ZEC: We can stop. Perhaps while we're waiting I can now
8 call 65 ter 25341B.
9 Mr. President, I believe we have now the video that I intended to
10 play a moment ago, which is P02852, which is a celebration ceremony of
11 the Red Berets. So we can start.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Did you hear the interpreter's
17 MR. ZEC: Yes, I have, and I believe should be in e-court.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot see e-court
19 independently in the booth.
20 MR. ZEC: Perhaps we can play without translation. I'm only
21 interested that the witness hears the name of people, that's all.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
23 [Video-clip played]
24 MR. ZEC: We can stop, Mr. President.
25 Q. Mr. Markovic, did you hear the name at the beginning of this
2 A. I did.
3 Q. That's Zika Ivanovic, isn't it?
4 A. That was the name that was pronounced.
5 Q. This was Zika Ivanovic who was assisting the take-over of Brcko.
6 Here we see him saluting the unit accompanied by Slobodan Milosevic and
7 Jovica Stanisic from the Serbian State Security. The reality is,
8 Mr. Markovic, there was no confusion as to what was the task of these
9 units in Brcko during the take-over and who was behind them. All these
10 units had one task, to make Brcko Serbian, which they accomplished very
11 fast. It was only after the take-over was accomplished and Muslims had
12 been detained or expelled, only then did these units cause difficulties
13 for the Serbian authorities in Brcko. This is correct, isn't it?
14 A. It is not.
15 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I would just go back -- would like to go
16 back to the document that I was trying to upload, and there was no B/C/S
17 translation, which was 65 ter 45341B.
18 JUDGE KWON: What's the 65 ter number of the video-clip that we
19 just saw? You said 25341B. Is there a mistake?
20 MR. ZEC: The clip that we saw is P02852, and this clip starts
21 from 00:09:02 of the video-tape V000-0533.
22 JUDGE KWON: All right.
23 MR. ZEC:
24 Q. Mr. Markovic, in front of you is a transcript of the video
25 interview of Ljubisa Savic, also known as Mauzer. And when I asked you
1 earlier about his arrival to Brcko on 2nd May 1992, he said, and you
2 confirmed that, as I believe. And you can see now at the beginning of
3 this transcript that he's saying that he came on 2nd May 1992 to Brcko.
4 This is correct, isn't it?
5 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I notice that the
6 transcript refers to an unidentified male person and doesn't make any
7 reference to Mauzer. Perhaps there's some other way of establishing
8 that, but I don't see how this witness can be asked to comment on the
9 statement of Mauzer when we don't have a foundation for that.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Zec.
11 MR. ZEC: Then we can upload the video and see.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] An intervention, please. The
13 witness did not confirm anything. He simply allowed for the possibility
14 that Mauzer arrived on the 2nd. He said it was possible.
15 JUDGE KWON: Well, let's see what witness will say about this
16 video footage, yes.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 MR. ZEC:
19 Q. Mr. Markovic, do you recognise person on this frame?
20 A. Yes. This is Mauzer.
21 MR. ZEC: Does this satisfy, Mr. President?
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE KWON: So the transcript that we saw is a transcription of
24 this video that we are seeing now.
25 MR. ZEC: That's correct. Mr. President, that's documentary
1 about Ljubisa Savic Mauzer unit, and it goes chronologically from their
2 establishment throughout the war, all their operations, and it's
3 accompanying various video-clips about their activities, and that's
4 Mauzer speaking about the unit.
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue.
6 MR. ZEC: So I believe it will be now easier if we go back to the
7 transcript and just see a few portions of it.
8 JUDGE KWON: Will that be your last question?
9 MR. ZEC: Yes, it is.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MR. ZEC:
12 Q. Also, Mr. Markovic, I asked you about agreement with Mauzer with
13 the local authorities, and you said, "I believe that's possible" or
14 something like that. So if you look at the transcript, in English it's
15 at line 11 -- from line 11, and in B/C/S line 29. Can you read,
16 Mr. Markovic?
17 "Mauzer said the agreement with the command at the time with the
18 Presidency of the Serbian municipality of Brcko was that help would
19 arrive to Brcko from Semberija the following day. When we returned from
20 Brcko, we called all Crisis Staffs in Semberija - there were 54 of them -
21 asking them to send volunteers. Some 700 of us headed out."
22 This is how Mauzer came to Brcko, isn't it?
23 A. I don't think there were 700.
24 Q. But can you confirm that this was the way how he arrived to
1 A. I don't know how he arrived in Brcko.
2 Q. When I earlier asked you the same question, you said "possible,"
3 didn't you?
4 A. It is possible. Yes, that's what I said.
5 Q. And the reason he came to Brcko was because Brcko had to be
6 Serbian. It was a hub. It was an umbilical cord, a connection between
7 the -- a connection and a link between eastern Serbian Krajinas, so to
8 say, Serbian lands. This is the reason why he came to Brcko, isn't it?
9 A. I have no idea what this has to do with it.
10 Q. If you look -- if you look the same page or in English it's from
11 line 28.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What did not find its way in the
13 transcript is the witness said, "I don't know what Luka has to do with
15 MR. ZEC: In B/C/S can we move to see the -- so it's line 11 in
17 Q. Can you see when he says at that Brcko was a connection, link
18 between eastern Serbian Krajinas and Serbian lands? So that's the reason
19 he came to Brcko, because Brcko had to become Serbian for this reason,
20 isn't it?
21 A. I don't see why it would be that way. He arrived in Brcko that,
22 if we're going to put it that way, already had been Serbian.
23 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I would tender this video.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. This is a third-party
25 statement after the fact. It hasn't been confirmed at all by the
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Zec.
3 MR. ZEC: I don't think that he did not confirm anything. The
4 witness was saying "possible," and this was happening. It's not that he
5 didn't say it is not correct.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zec, the Chamber finds that what -- the
8 testimony of this witness is a bit short of confirmation of the content
9 of this video, so we'll not admit this at this moment.
10 MR. ZEC: Thank you, Mr. President. I have nothing further.
11 Thank you, Mr. Markovic.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, just a few
15 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
16 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Markovic, on page 88 of today's transcript,
17 the following was suggested to you, the following order of events or
18 sequence of events. It seems that first that Zika Crnogorac took Brcko,
19 and then Muslims were either detained or expelled. Can you shed more
20 light on the actual sequence of events? When did Muslims leave the Serb
21 part of Brcko, and what does this have to do with Zika Crnogorac's
23 A. It has nothing to do with the arrival of Zika Crnogorac. As far
24 as I can remember, he arrived in July or in June 1992.
25 Q. Thank you. And when did the Muslims leave, as well as Serbs,
1 from the central part of Brcko?
2 A. I've already explained that. The destruction of the bridge on
3 the right bank of the Sava River was the point when practically the
4 entire population left the town of Brcko - Serb, Croats, and Muslims -
5 and that basically it was an empty town for quite a while.
6 Q. Thank you. Today it was often suggested to you that there was a
7 take-over of power in Brcko. Can you please tell us who was it was that
8 was in power in Brcko before these events and after these events?
9 A. Well, I was the representative of the authorities until the
10 destruction of the bridges. I was the president of the Executive Board,
11 and also there was a Muslim who was president of the municipality and so
12 on and so forth. So it was according to this ethnic key that the various
13 offices in the municipality were divided, and in mid-May, a government
14 was reinstated, and there was a man who was appointed whose last name was
15 also Markovic, but that wasn't me.
16 Q. Thank you. We see "Serb municipality of Brcko" in some of the
17 letterheads. Can you explain to us what it was that you held under your
18 control and what was meant by the Serb municipality of Brcko?
19 A. I've already explained that. I said today that we had
20 discussions on the territorial division of town, and in Brcko, it was
21 possible to divide most of the territory along ethnic lines because the
22 villages have a majority population belonging to one particular group.
23 Also, it was possible to divide the town itself in a similar way. For
24 example, there is a part of town that's called Serb Town, and then it
25 continues along into the, say, Serb villages, and the situation is
1 similar on the two other sides as well.
2 Q. Thank you. How old is this, this Serb Town? What's the oldest
3 part of the town of Brcko?
4 A. I think that that's the oldest part of town. I don't know how
5 old it is.
6 Q. Thank you. The Serb municipality of Brcko, did it control the
7 Muslim municipality of Brcko or the Croat municipality of Brcko, and who
8 was in power there?
9 A. Well, throughout the war there were practically three
10 municipalities of Brcko. One was under the control of the Serbs and
11 another one was under Muslim control. I think it was called "free
12 Brcko." And then there was one that was under the control of Croats, and
13 it was called the --
14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear what it was
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps 80 per cent or 90 per cent
17 of the territory of Brcko was controlled in that way if we look at the
18 inner city itself.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Ravne Brcko. Could you please speak a bit slower. We do have
22 A. Ravne Brcko. That was the part of the municipality that was
23 under the control of the Croat authorities.
24 Q. And what about the Muslim municipality of Brcko and the Croat
25 municipality of Brcko? Was there a change of government there as well?
1 Who was in power there?
2 A. I don't know who was in power there. Over the local radio that
3 was called Free Radio Brcko, I could hear that it was those people who
4 had been together with me in the local government. Some of them were
5 mentioned here today as well. They were in the local government together
6 with me before the destruction of the bridges.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P6175, could I call that up,
9 please. We had it admitted a few moments ago.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. While we're waiting, in Markovic, do you know who General Tolimir
13 A. I heard of General Tolimir. Now, I don't know who he is. I
14 mean, I think he was a high-ranking officer of the Army of
15 Republika Srpska.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation So this seems to be the other way
17 round. Give us the other one, the 74 or the 76. Oh, not, not this,
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Actually, now that we're on this one, tell us, is there a stamp
21 here, and is there a registration number?
22 A. No, neither.
23 Q. Thank you. Since you worked in the state administration, would
24 you consider this to be an official document?
25 A. No.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have Tolimir's
2 text, P6174. That's what I wrote down. Maybe it's 76 too. They were
3 admitted as a series, so I don't know which number was assigned to which
4 one of them. 74, then. No, no. Sorry, that's not it.
5 MR. ZEC: P02855.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you to Mr. Zec. The last
7 page in Serbian and in English.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. This gentleman, General Tolimir, who did he work for? He was a
10 colonel then, a general now. Was he in the Army of Republika Srpska?
11 What state was he in?
12 A. I think it was the Army of Republika Srpska.
13 Q. Thank you. Please, in the third paragraph from the top of the
14 page where he speaks about Zika Crnogorac in Brcko, what is his position
15 vis-a-vis Zika Crnogorac?
16 A. I don't know about that.
17 Q. And can you take a look at the penultimate paragraph? Actually,
18 you can read it out loud to us.
19 A. "The presence and activity of paramilitary formations negatively
20 affect the Serbian people in two ways, by diminishing trust in the
21 government and its capacity to deal with war profiteers, criminals, and
22 mass murderers, and secondly, by immensely discouraging the fighting
23 along of the members of the army of the SRBH often resulting in the
24 abandoning of positions."
25 Q. Thank you. Now that you know that this text was written by
1 Tolimir about the paramilitary formations, can you tell us now what the
2 position of this General of the Army of Republika Srpska is vis-a-vis --
3 A. Negative.
4 Q. And does it say here that the government does not have the
5 strength or that the government does not want to?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, when I asked these questions the witness
8 did not know anything and he said doesn't know anything.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'll rephrase.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Markovic, what was the position and attitude of the
12 authorities vis-a-vis Zika Crnogorac and the paramilitaries?
13 A. We tried to get rid of them in every conceivable way, and we
14 asked the leadership of Republika Srpska for assistance and also from the
15 army, whoever could help us.
16 Q. Thank you. Did you have the strength to deal with them?
17 A. No. That's why we asked for assistance.
18 Q. When did you actually deal with them and in what situation?
19 A. In mid-July, I think, something like that. A unit came under the
20 command of Mico Davidovic. I think that it was sent from the MUP of
21 Republika Srpska with that intention. It was only that unit that managed
22 to drive them out of Brcko.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now see P2888.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. On page 71, you were asked about the War Presidency and about
1 them signing something. Now, this is what I'm asking you: The
2 War Presidency at the time, could it implement any decision of its own?
3 A. It was virtually impossible.
4 Q. Thank you. This is a summary of events and situations, and we
5 can see that on the penultimate page.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the penultimate page please
7 be shown to -- actually, the participants can see for themselves the
8 penultimate page.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Whose signature is this, Mr. Markovic?
11 A. Djordje Ristanic.
12 Q. And on the back of that ID where it says "Ristanic Djordje" and
13 "Markovic Pero," are those your signatures?
14 A. No.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now, please, could we
16 have page 2 in English and page 4 in Serbian.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Did you -- did the Presidency establish or support any one of
19 those paramilitary formations?
20 A. No, none of them.
21 Q. Please focus on the penultimate paragraph.
22 "The policy of the Serb leadership of the municipal
23 War Presidency was that all conscripts had to be placed under the command
24 of the Brcko garrison immediately."
25 A. It's changed now.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please return the
2 previous page. It is 4 in e-court and it says 3 on the page itself. In
3 English it's fine.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now it's all right.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So under the command of Colonel Milinkovic and that all war
7 operations would be commanded by, et cetera, et cetera, the Serb
8 population did not for one moment form any paramilitary formations.
9 How does this fit into your own knowledge?
10 A. Precisely. I said in my statement that all our eyes were focused
11 on the JNA then.
12 Q. Thank you. Where was your military-age population, under whose
14 A. The JNA, later the Army of Republika Srpska.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we have page 8 in
16 e-court in Serbian, and page 4 and then later on page 5. Actually, first
17 page 4 in English. Eight in e-court, Serbian. Actually, it says 7 on
18 it. Page 4 in e-court. What is written is 7, but it's the eighth page.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Now, I'm going to read it out until it is here. This primarily
21 refers to Ljubisa Savic, Mauzer; Mirko Blagojevic; Sasa and Peja; Arkan's
22 volunteers; and instructors, Captain Dragan special unit. They also took
23 most of the weapons and equipment, and the units that withdrew from the
24 Brcko front line took a significant amount along with them. They kept
25 quite a lot of weapons in unnecessary locations. For example, some
1 mortars are still in the hospital compound. All of this led to a series
2 of incidents with which the command of the Brcko Brigade was unable to
3 deal efficiently.
4 How does this fit into what you yourself knew?
5 A. I said similar things.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have page 5 and
7 then 6. First 5 in English and 9 in Serbian. Fine. We have it in
8 Serbian already. This is the right page in Serbian.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. The first page of the second paragraph, "Certain formations ..."
11 A. You want me to read it out loud?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. "Certain formations have established their warehouses and looted
14 goods in Brcko as well as Bijeljina. Like, for example, the special unit
15 in the duty-free zone. This unit has even produced its own seal so that
16 it could issue appropriate documentation. The command of the unit
17 believes it should have its own till, its own current account, and, as
18 was said earlier, it should organise the public security station,
19 influence the civilian political leadership, the military police and the
20 entire command structure."
21 Should I go on?
22 Q. Yes, the next paragraph.
23 A. "It is important to mention that the unit carried out an attack
24 on the public security station (senior organs have been informed of it).
25 All these activities have been accompanied by rapes, unauthorised
1 interrogations, the issuing of dubious permits to leave town (probably
2 for a hefty fee), and there are indications that in the most drastic
3 cases, members of unknown formations have executed people."
4 Q. Thank you. What was the position of the authorities vis-a-vis
5 such groups and formations in terms of what they were doing?
6 A. I've already told you that we tried any which way to get ride of
7 them, and only when reinforcements came from the top of the Republika
8 Srpska MUP we managed to chase them away, and until that point all of us
9 living in Brcko had to put up with it.
10 Q. Thank you. What about regular passes? What were they used for
11 by those moving through the territory?
12 A. If someone needed to go, for example, to the Military Medical
13 Academy in Belgrade or to do something in Bijeljina, then they relied on
14 the passes.
15 Q. Thank you. The person who was issued with such a certificate,
16 could they discard of it, throw it away or abuse it in some other way?
17 A. Well, if they wanted to.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have D1412, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Were military conscripts free to move around without appropriate
23 A. No, they were not.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1412. Thank you. That's it.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. It is a document of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The
2 date is the 8th of August. That is a report on providing expert
3 assistance to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP. You
4 were asked about it already today.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 7 in English and
6 in Serbian page 5.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Please have a look at the last paragraph, "In the area of
9 Brcko..." Please read it out.
10 A. "In the area of Brcko there was a group of Red Berets active
11 headed by Captain Dragan. Rade and Bozo Bozic, the brothers were
12 particularly exposed, stood out, as well as the group of Zivojin ..."
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page, please. The next
14 page in Serbian.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in on the
16 bottom part. I can't read out the beginning. It probably says
17 "Crnogorac Ivanovic."
18 "Which comprised some 40 members who presented themselves as
19 Serbian MUP officials. Ivanovic and his group had IDs and the stamp of
20 the Krajina MUP as well as the official IDs of the Serbian MUP. Under
21 threat, they took 22 IDs from the public security station. Upon their
22 arrival in Brcko, the Ivanovic group undertook certain tasks upon them
23 without any authorisation which otherwise belonged -- were in the remit
24 of the MUP, such as searches of premises, commandeering vehicles,
25 et cetera. They beat regular policemen and mistreated them up to the
1 point of using force. Such conduct was also exerted in the presence of
2 military officers and concerning civilians."
3 Q. Thank you. Can we go two lines down, "The Red Berets ..."
4 A. "The Red Berets of Captain Dragan commanded by Rade Bozic,
5 inter alia, burst into the public security station in Brcko and held
6 hostage the municipal president and the Chief of Staff of the
7 1st Posavina Brigade, I believe. They threatened them and blackmailed
8 them, telling they would be liquidated unless the three arrested members
9 are released from detention in Bijeljina. On another occasion, the Bozic
10 brothers and the Red Berets burst into the police station where they
11 broke into the safe and took away money, communications equipment,
12 weapons" --
13 JUDGE KWON: Let us stop here. I don't see the point of asking
14 the witness to read out the document which has been already admitted.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. You're right,
16 Your Excellency.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Let me just say this: In line 5 it reads that the authorities
19 were afraid for their own lives, too, or those from the authorities. Can
20 you tell us who held power in Brcko before Mico Davidovic arrived?
21 A. The Red Berets and some such people. Davidovic drove all of them
22 out. He had them arrested, and they had to leave the next day.
23 Q. Thank you. It was suggested to you in one of the questions that
24 the municipal authorities in the Serb municipality of Brcko actually
25 found it appropriate to have paramilitary units driving Muslims out and
1 arresting them, and only later, the authorities became dissatisfied with
2 their conduct. Can you tell us about the sequence of events. When and
3 how did the Muslims leave Brcko at the time these units arrived?
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
5 begin again because there was an overlap.
6 JUDGE KWON: Because of overlapping, the interpreters were not
7 able to hear you, so could you start again your answer.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. I said already that on
9 the 30th of April, all of us residing in Brcko tried to go away from
10 there any which way possible, and in the course of those few days or
11 weeks, it was a deserted town. It was definitely fruitful ground for
12 such paramilitary formations to loot.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Thank you. Did any Muslims remain living in your -- or in the
15 Serbian part of Brcko municipality, such as a village or in the town
16 itself, and until when?
17 A. They reside there even today. They lived there throughout. Many
18 people of different ethnicities lived in that Serbian part of Brcko.
19 Q. What about during the war?
20 A. During the war as well. There were many killed and wounded of
21 all ethnicities during the war in Brcko.
22 Q. Thank you. Were there any Muslims in the VRS from Brcko?
23 A. There were. There were even killed VRS fighters from there and
24 their families enjoyed the same rights as those of all other fighters.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Markovic,
1 and thank you for everything you have done for all three peoples and for
2 carrying out the duties of the bodies of authority in that area.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.
4 JUDGE KWON: Well, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Markovic.
5 Thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you're free to
6 go. Have a safe journey back home.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 [The witness withdrew]
9 JUDGE KWON: Before the adjournment, the Chamber will issue an
10 oral ruling on the accused's "Motion for Modification of Segregation
11 Regime with Witness Milan Martic" filed on the 1st of March, 2013, in
12 which the accused moves for a variation of the terms of the Chamber's
13 order for the temporary transfer of a detained witness issued
14 confidentially on the 8th of January, 2013. The Chamber recalls that it
15 ordered, inter alia, that (i) Martic be kept segregated at the UNDU from
16 the accused, and (ii) no contact take place either inside or outside the
17 UNDU between Martic and the accused other than is necessary for purposes
18 of witness proofing. In the motion, the accused requests that his
19 segregation from Martic only be limited to the period in which Martic is
20 giving evidence as there is no reason why he should not have contact with
21 Martic either prior to or after his testimony. Earlier this morning, the
22 Office of the Prosecutor orally informed the Chamber that it opposes the
23 motion, noting that the motion is effectively a motion for
24 reconsideration and that the accused has failed to meet the relevant
1 As a preliminary matter, the Chamber considers that the motion is
2 in fact a motion for reconsideration of the 8th of January order. The
3 Chamber first reminds the accused that when filing motions which are
4 essentially requests for reconsideration, he must address the applicable
5 legal standard as opposed to simply avoiding the issue altogether.
6 In the present case, the Chamber recalls that in its
7 8th of January order, it explicitly provided for proofing and for the
8 witness's transfer to the UNDU a week prior to his expected testimony,
9 then scheduled for the week of 4th of March, as it deemed this time
10 period sufficient for the purpose of preparing a Rule 92 ter statement
11 and disclosing it to the Prosecution in a timely manner.
12 The Chamber did not impose any limits on the proofing that the
13 accused may deem necessary within the course of boundaries of UNDU
14 organisational constraints and outside of court hearings. However, the
15 Chamber considered that segregation other than for proofing purposes was
16 warranted in this case to preserve the integrity of Martic's forthcoming
17 testimony. This continues to be the case. The Chamber thus considers
18 that the accused does not demonstrate either a clear error in reasoning
19 or particular circumstances justifying that the 8th of January order be
20 reconsidered in order to prevent an injustice and therefore denies the
22 The hearing is now adjourned.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Does it also mean that there are no
1 restrictions after his testimony, because there's no reference to it?
2 JUDGE KWON: I don't think that our ruling did deal with that
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE KWON: Basically I think it's a matter for the
6 Detention Unit. If necessary, the Chamber will come back to the issue.
7 The hearing is adjourned.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.52 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 5th day
10 of March, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.