130311IT

Page 35088

1 Monday, 11 March 2013

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.

7 Could the witness make the solemn declaration, please.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

9 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated and make yourself

11 comfortable, Mr. Puhalac.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 WITNESS: TOMISLAV PUHALAC

14 [Witness answered through interpreter]

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,

17 Your Excellencies. Good morning to everyone.

18 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

19 Q. [Interpretation] And good morning to you, Mr. Puhalac. Did you

20 hear me, Mr. Puhalac?

21 A. Yes, yes, I did. Good morning.

22 Q. Thank you. I thought you were just making a pause, and I would

23 appreciate if you actually do that, and that we speak slowly so that

24 everything makes it into the transcript.

25 Mr. Puhalac, did you give a statement to the Defence team?

Page 35089

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see in e-court

4 1D7898. 1D7898.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Can you now see that statement before you on the screen?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did you have an opportunity to read and sign the statement?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see the last

12 page so that the witness may verify his signature.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Is this your signature?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Please do not let this paragraph 19 confuse you. The

17 Trial Chamber found that it wasn't really necessary for these

18 proceedings, but everything else remains unchanged.

19 Does this statement reflect truthfully what you've said to the

20 Defence team?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you that were

23 put to you when the statement was taken, would your answers in essence be

24 the same?

25 A. Yes.

Page 35090

1 Q. Thank you.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to

3 tender this statement, and I will have an additional document, but I do

4 not have any associated exhibits.

5 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

6 MS. EDGERTON: I just see -- I think it's a translation error in

7 paragraph 2 in the English version, third line from the bottom. The word

8 used is "Lukavac," whereas I think it should be "Lukavica," if I'm not

9 mistaken. And I'm actually not sure in the same paragraph if the witness

10 meant to say "Sokoc" or "Sokolac," but the Lukavac reference is certainly

11 a translation error.

12 JUDGE KWON: Probably you can clarify with the witness, Mr.

13 Karadzic. Otherwise, we'll admit this.

14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3104, Your Honours.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will now read the

16 summary statement of Mr. Puhalac, Tomislav, and then we'll clarify things

17 live. Now I will read it in English.

18 [In English] Tomislav Puhalac was member of the BH State Security

19 Service from 1977 to April 1992. He later worked at the National

20 Security Agency in Sokolac. In August 1992, he was appointed deputy

21 chief of the Centre of National Security in Lukavica, Sarajevo.

22 When the national parties in BH won the elections and the SDA and

23 HDZ coalition was formed, pressure began to be exerted on the Serbian

24 people in general, affecting Serb employees of the RSUP. Means Ministry

25 of Interior of Republic of BH. When Alija Izetbegovic -- Alija

Page 35091

1 Delimustafic became the head of the MUP, the appointment of the Serb

2 employees was limited and actions were taken to prevent their

3 participation in the decision-making process and other important and

4 sensitive issues. Extremists were appointed into the higher positions

5 within the police and state security department.

6 Information had been obtained that Muslim forces were

7 establishing paramilitary and parastate organisations. These

8 organisations were obtaining weapons via Croatia and Islamic countries,

9 and although confiscations were made and recorded, the undertaking of

10 further legal measures was hindered.

11 During 1991, reserve police forces were mobilised by

12 Alija Delimustafic. However, only new forces loyal to the SDA were used.

13 Serb members of the police force began to abandon their jobs or move and

14 therefore a number of police stations and reserve forces became fully

15 mono-ethnic.

16 Serbs began to fear retaliation from other colleagues. Serbs

17 began to exchange opinions on how to protect themselves, and these fears

18 were confirmed by events around Sarajevo. People convicted of serious

19 crimes were being incorporated into the reserve police forces and MUP

20 employees would be stopped, checked, searched, and intimidated by those

21 forces. Tomislav Puhalac was checked in the Bistrik settlement by men in

22 civilian clothes wearing green berets. They removed his official gun and

23 threatened to kill him in front of his family. When reported to the

24 Sarajevo SJB refused to take any action.

25 It was known that the weapons were being distributed to known

Page 35092

1 criminals. The Green Berets and the Patriotic League further received

2 weapons from various other sources. Further, extremists from other parts

3 of Yugoslavia were being employed in prominent positions in the MUP.

4 Discrimination continued in the MUP. Serbs were demoted or

5 reassigned and radio interception centre were moved to secret locations

6 including private houses. The MUP failed to take action against acts

7 committed by paramilitary organisations against civilians. It was well

8 known who killed a Serb wedding guest in Bascarsija. However, the MUP

9 failed to take any measure to arrest him. Only Serbs loyal and obedient

10 to the MUP in those illegal activities could survive. All others were

11 unprotected as there were no longer mechanisms to protect them.

12 As a result, Serbs began to move their families to safer areas.

13 Mr. Tomislav Puhalac moved his family in April 1992 following a shot

14 being fired at his children's bedroom window. It was difficult to leave

15 the town as Green Berets, the Patriotic League, and the mono-ethnic

16 reserve forces had erected barricades on all exit routes. It also became

17 very difficult for Tomislav Puhalac to return to work due to the

18 barricades. One day when he did manage to return to the MUP building, he

19 was told that the SB chief, state security chief Munir Alibabic had

20 ordered he be prohibited from entering the building.

21 In April 1992, the Green Berets began to block JNA barracks and

22 commands and take over police stations. Police officers were killed and

23 beaten of Serb ethnicity. There then followed a severe attack on the

24 Serbian majority part of Ilidza from the Muslim majority of the town. As

25 it was clear that a civil war had already begun, Tomislav Puhalac became

Page 35093

1 a member of the national security force. Serbs were expelled from

2 Sarajevo, their employment discontinued, and the apartments they owned or

3 rented were broken into, plundered and subsequently given to the Muslim

4 extremists. Many Serbs who remained in Sarajevo were tortured or killed

5 trying to leave the town.

6 And that is a short summary. I would like now to clarify what

7 learned Madam Edgerton had posed.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Puhalac, could you help us, please. In paragraph 2 we have

10 the word "Sokolac" in the third -- third grammatical case. Now is this

11 in fact -- were you trying to say here in Soko -- u Sokocu [phoen], in

12 other words, in Sokolac?

13 A. Well, yes. That's -- I just reported to the organisational units

14 that had already belonged to the Sarajevo centre, and later on it became

15 a department of the MUP of Republika Srpska.

16 Q. Thank you. Could you please give us this word "Sokocu" in the

17 first case, grammatical case. What is it, Sokolac? Correct?

18 A. Yes, it's Sokolac.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, in the third line from the bottom, this Lukavac

20 or Lukavica, what is it supposed to be?

21 A. Well, it's Lukavica. That is a settlement near Sarajevo. Today

22 it is in the eastern part of Sarajevo.

23 Q. Thank you. Could you please just slow down a bit and let's try

24 and make pauses between question and answer.

25 Now, I would also like to ask you whether you have the statement

Page 35094

1 in printed form before you.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you. Please pause. Now, please take a look at

4 paragraph 7.

5 In paragraph 7, you mention a name, and the statement that was

6 taken during an investigation involving drug -- weapons trafficking.

7 Could you tell me who the person who took the statement and who conducted

8 the investigation were?

9 A. Well, the investigation was conducted by official police forces

10 at the time, and the man in question is a man who illegally imported a

11 truckload of weapons. He -- the police stopped him, checked his ID,

12 checked the -- searched the truck, found the weapons and seized it. I

13 had occasion to see that statement. He never denied that the weapons

14 were imported for the need of the Green Berets and the Patriotic League

15 in Hrasnica. This man whose name is mentioned here is otherwise from

16 Hrasnica himself.

17 Q. Thank you. Was this statement taken by your service or, rather,

18 were you up on it, did you know what it was about?

19 A. Yes, I did. And I had occasion to see the statement. It was

20 taken by my colleagues.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Puhalac, do you hear me, Mr. Puhalac?

23 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

24 JUDGE KWON: Please wait before you start answering

25 Mr. Karadzic's question. Please put a pause for the benefit of the

Page 35095

1 interpreters.

2 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

3 THE WITNESS: Okay.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have 1D52, 1D52 in

5 e-court, please. Thank you.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. This is a telegraphic variant of this statement; correct?

8 Judging by the type of the font.

9 MS. EDGERTON: That's a leading question.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, yes, please continue.

12 THE ACCUSED: I realise that, but I just wanted to gain some

13 time.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Puhalac, could you please tell us what this statement is

16 about? What does it deal with? Could you just tell us in your own

17 words.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I'm just wondering about this. Is

19 Dr. Karadzic asking him to discuss the contents of the statement based on

20 a recollection that he's already given evidence about, or is Dr. Karadzic

21 asking him to read the contents of the statement into the record? If

22 this is a question based on recollection, what's the point of having the

23 statement in front of him?

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the witness mentioned in

Page 35096

1 paragraph 7, as a striking example, this case that was registered by the

2 police, and he was in on this investigation. Perhaps my question wasn't

3 properly put, but we have the statement in writing, the 1D55, but I just

4 wanted to ask the witness whether this was, in fact, that same statement

5 and how it was taken and whether he knew about it at the time when was

6 happening.

7 MS. EDGERTON: If I may, Your Honours.

8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

9 MS. EDGERTON: If Dr. Karadzic wants to establish a foundation

10 for the witness to deal with the statement, maybe that foundation could

11 be established properly based on the evidence that the witness gave at

12 page 7 talking about the circumstances of the investigation, the nature

13 of the individual's involvement, identifying the colleagues who took the

14 statement. The witness has said he had occasion to see the statement,

15 when that was. There are ways to go about this.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic should appreciate it, Ms. Edgerton.

17 Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I do.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Puhalac, could you assist us in this respect and tell us who

21 it was who took the statement?

22 A. I cannot remember exactly the names of the people who took the

23 statement, but I did have occasion to see it, and it was taken certainly

24 by officials of the Ministry of the Interior. This is that statement. I

25 recall it, although I hadn't seen it since. I haven't seen it since, but

Page 35097

1 I do know that it existed and that's why I mentioned it in my statement.

2 I also knew in person that man, and I know all of these people,

3 and this is how things happened. It is indisputable that he was stopped

4 and his IDs, his papers, checked and that the weapons were seized, and

5 here we can see on whose orders this was done. So it is correct. The

6 statement was taken by officials of the then MUP.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D855, please.

9 1D855. Could we now show the following pages, the pages that follow,

10 because there is a page in handwriting. I believe that's the

11 fourth page. Next page, please.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Did you see this version in handwriting at the time?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now just leaf through it

17 and see what it says here toward the end.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Maybe Dr. Karadzic can just ask the question

19 instead of leading the witness through the document.

20 JUDGE KWON: Let me see. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Puhalac, did the police where you worked at the time verify

23 this statement on the ground? Did they check it? And was this

24 statement -- did it reflect truthfully the acts of this man and his

25 group?

Page 35098

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. How did this affect the atmosphere within the police? What kind

3 of ramifications did it have?

4 A. Well, this man was not held accountable for what he had done in

5 any way, and of course among many people, professionals within the MUP,

6 especially those of Serb ethnicity, this created disbelief and distrust

7 and lack of faith in the MUP, the institution where we had worked until

8 then.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please tender this one

11 into evidence, 1D855?

12 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

13 MS. EDGERTON: I think the evidence from the witness so far

14 actually confirms what I had suspected, that this is a statement that

15 falls specifically within the lex specialis, Your Honours, and is

16 therefore, I would say, not admissible.

17 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to add anything, Mr. Karadzic or

18 Mr. Robinson?

19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think this falls into the

20 same category that you've taken under submission last week. So perhaps

21 you could take this under submission and we can, based on your ruling,

22 have the good guidance as to whether these kind of statements are useful.

23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll consider this matter together with

24 1D7846, and we'll give its ruling in due course.

25 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

Page 35100

1 questions for this witness at this point in time, Your Honours. Thank

2 you.

3 JUDGE KWON: So you tendered only 1D588 -- I'm sorry, 855.

4 THE ACCUSED: 855, yeah, you are right.

5 JUDGE KWON: Not 1D52.

6 THE ACCUSED: Not necessary.

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

8 Yes. Mr. Puhalac, as you have noted, your evidence in chief in

9 this case has been admitted in most part in writing, i.e., through your

10 witness statement, and you'll now be cross-examined by the representative

11 of the Office of the Prosecutor, Ms. Edgerton.

12 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

13 Q. Good morning, Mr. Puhalac.

14 A. Good morning.

15 Q. I'm not going to take particularly long with you, Mr. Puhalac,

16 but there's still a few questions I'd like to ask you about some of your

17 experiences during the war. Before we step back in time, though, are you

18 able to -- or can you just confirm for us that in November 2012, you won

19 the elections as a member of the SDS party for the position of president

20 of Rogatica municipality?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So even -- your evidence in your statement was that you weren't

23 an SDS member during the period leading up to the war, but you are an SDS

24 member now, obviously; correct?

25 A. Correct. I have been a member since 2008. I had never been a

Page 35101

1 member of any political party previous to that.

2 Q. Now, just to talk very briefly about your job as a member of the

3 National Security Services for Sarajevo, your first boss in that position

4 was Dragan Kijac, wasn't it?

5 A. Yes. Dragan was in charge of that service, but there were others

6 there that were superior to him as well within the hierarchy.

7 Q. And Dragan eventually left that office to go to Pale and take a

8 higher position, and he was succeeded by Predrag Ceranic or Ceranic. I

9 apologise for my pronunciation.

10 A. No, that's not correct.

11 Q. Who succeeded Dragan Kijac?

12 A. Based on my recollection, it was Dragisa Mihic.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, you said in your statement that you left

14 Sarajevo on the 1st of April, 1992, so it's correct, then, isn't it, that

15 anything that you mention in your statement about events in the city

16 after that date are things you have no personal experience of. You only

17 heard them from someone else; right?

18 A. I remained in Sarajevo until the 1st of April. After I left, we

19 continued to monitor the situation, but prior to the 4th of April, I

20 tried each and every day to make it back in to Sarajevo and go to work,

21 but after what happened on the 4th of April at Vraca, I stopped trying to

22 go back to the BH MUP. Nonetheless, throughout everything that was going

23 on, there were quite a number of people, particularly ethnic Serbs, who

24 were leaving Sarajevo over those days, and they would talk to us and tell

25 us about what was going on. On the other hand, we also followed the

Page 35102

1 media coverage on everything that was going on in the city itself.

2 Q. All right. Does that mean you're answering my question with a

3 yes? Do you remember my question?

4 A. Yes, I remember it. Did I have any first-hand experience after

5 the 1st of April? In most cases you could say it was first-hand

6 experience because I was directly in touch with people who were involved

7 in those developments, and I heard their stories directly.

8 Q. You heard them from other people; right?

9 A. Yes. From colleagues who were directly involved in those

10 developments.

11 Q. Now, something else I wonder if you can confirm for us. Can you

12 confirm, based on what I read in your statement, can you confirm that

13 from late 1991 until the war broke out in 1992, Serb policemen, including

14 yourself, would meet to discuss the situation? Is that correct?

15 A. The meetings were spontaneous. Whenever we met, we would

16 exchange our experiences and tell each other about our anxieties and

17 concerns for our own personal safety, the safety of our families, bearing

18 in mind everything that we saw happening around us in Sarajevo in those

19 days. So if your question is about whether we started meeting in an

20 organised way, then the answer is no. It was purely spontaneous and

21 happenstance because most of us were facing similar problems.

22 Q. So now during those meetings, you must have reported some of the

23 things that concerned you. My question is: Who then would you report

24 those things to?

25 A. We didn't report that to anyone. These were spontaneous

Page 35103

1 meetings, for the most part, discussions about what we could do to save

2 our families and where to head in case unrest or riots broke out. In

3 case the pressure increased on us, our lives and the risk to our families

4 and our safety. Given what was happening in Sarajevo those days, it was

5 plain for all to see that there would be problems. Many of the criminals

6 who were known to us from before were now in the city and they were given

7 official MUP ID.

8 Q. Mr. Puhalac, I appreciate that these things must have been

9 important to you, but I wonder if you could focus a little bit more on

10 the questions that I'm asking. So I'll move on and I'll ask another

11 question.

12 Are you also, based on your position at the time, able to confirm

13 that through the auspices of policemen of Serbian nationality arms were

14 distributed to Serb citizens in areas in and surrounding Sarajevo?

15 A. Could I have the interpretation again, please. Thank you.

16 Q. I'll repeat my question for the interpreters. Can you confirm

17 that through the auspices of policemen of Serbian nationality arms were

18 distributed to Serb citizens in areas in and around Sarajevo?

19 A. I can't confirm that. I received no weapons myself, and I think

20 the same applies to those of my colleagues from state security that I was

21 in touch with, and from public security too. They received no weapons

22 that I was aware of.

23 Q. That wasn't my question. My question was: Can you confirm that

24 through the auspices -- through the policemen of Serbian nationality,

25 arms were distributed to Serb citizens in areas in and around Sarajevo?

Page 35104

1 I wasn't asking about you or your colleagues.

2 A. No. I'm not aware of anything like that.

3 Q. So you claim to have some knowledge, as you've said in your

4 statement, about Bosnian Muslim arming, but you have no knowledge of Serb

5 police involvement in arming on the other side; is that correct?

6 A. No. None at all. I'm talking about Sarajevo. Until the

7 1st of April, I had never even left Sarajevo.

8 Q. Do you know who Tihomir Glavas is?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Now, he's had, like you, a long-standing career in the police,

11 and in 1993, he wrote a report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and

12 I'll show you that report.

13 MS. EDGERTON: It's P2308, and the date is September 20th. Now,

14 if you go over to page 2, paragraph 2, in both languages, please.

15 Q. In that second paragraph which begins with "At the beginning of

16 1991" and then talks about meetings organised by Tomo Kovac who was the

17 commander of the Ilidza police station, Mr. Glavas who authored this

18 document says that:

19 "Aside from the obligation that Serbs gather up and prepare for

20 war through these meetings that took place in Dobrinja, Ilidza, and

21 Blazuj, it was also agreed that intense activity should be undertaken to

22 arm citizens of Serbian nationality. Armament was transported from

23 Ravna Romanija, Pale, Sokolac, Kalinovik, the village of Nedzarici,

24 Trnovo, the village of Tosici, Hadzici, Jusuf Dzonlagic barracks,

25 Lukavica, and Nedzarici."

Page 35105

1 So, Mr. Puhalac, Mr. Glavas, who at this time was the head of the

2 police in Ilidza, has very detailed knowledge of Serb police involvement

3 in arming.

4 Now, my question is: As a member of the State Security Service

5 whose business it was to track these things, how is it that you have no

6 knowledge and Mr. Glavas does?

7 A. No interpretation, sorry. I didn't understand the question,

8 because I received no interpretation. I'm sorry.

9 Q. I'll repeat it. Mr. Glavas, who at this time was the head of the

10 police in Ilidza, has very detailed knowledge, as we see in this

11 document, of Serb police involvement in arming citizens of Serb

12 nationality. So as a member of the State Security Services, which you

13 were, whose business it was to track these things, as you've said, how is

14 it that you have no knowledge and Mr. Glavas does?

15 A. I met Mr. Glavas at some point well into the war. We first met

16 somewhere in Ilidza when he was one of the police chiefs. I never knew

17 him before the war.

18 State security on the one hand and public security on the other

19 are two different organisations, two different units. I had no knowledge

20 suggesting what you're talking about.

21 Q. You must remember who Tomo Kovac was. He was eventually your

22 minister of interior, wasn't he?

23 A. Yes. That was the -- just before the end of the war. I'm not

24 quite sure about the timing, but, yes, he was the interior minister of

25 Republika Srpska at some point.

Page 35106

1 Q. Now, Mr. Kovac gave evidence before another Chamber of this

2 Tribunal in the case against Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin, and

3 that's at T27121 and 27130 in the transcript of evidence in that case.

4 And his evidence was that on 5 March 1992 in Ilidza, his forces blocked

5 the republic staff of the Territorial Defence depot in that area, took

6 the depot and distributed the 5- to 10.000 pieces of weapons inside.

7 If you were so well informed at this time when you remained in

8 Sarajevo of events in the city, how is it that you claim to have no

9 knowledge of this significant incident?

10 A. I really had no such knowledge. I know Mr. Kovac well. We're

11 talking about Ilidza territory here. In those days, the place must have

12 been very difficult to reach. When we left our work in those days, we'd

13 normally go straight home. It was difficult to organise a meeting in

14 Ilidza in those days, and I certainly know nothing suggesting that Kovac

15 indeed ever organised anything like that.

16 Q. Well, you must know who Momcilo Mandic was.

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. And what was his position within the Ministry of the Interior up

19 until the 31st of March, 1992?

20 A. I think he was assistant minister for crime.

21 Q. And what kind of contact have you had -- or did you have with

22 Momcilo Mandic at that time and over the years?

23 A. None.

24 Q. Now, Momcilo Mandic -- pardon me. So Momcilo Mandic was not

25 involved in the spontaneous meetings you've been discussing?

Page 35107

1 A. No.

2 Q. Who was?

3 A. For the most part those of us who worked in state security. Do

4 you want the names of the people I was working with at the time?

5 Q. Well, was Mr. Vlaski involved?

6 A. We would often meet. We used to work in the same building. We'd

7 have coffee together. So that is the kind of meeting that I was talking

8 about. You could say "yes" in answer to that.

9 Q. Mr. Planojevic?

10 A. No, not really. Planojevic was a low-ranking commander at the

11 Centar police station. He's a colleague of mine from Rogatica originally

12 and a friend of mine. We used to meet privately, for private reasons.

13 Q. Have you been following this trial at all, Mr. Puhalac?

14 A. In part.

15 Q. Momcilo Mandic came to give evidence in this trial, and

16 Momcilo Mandic is mentioned in an interview in the magazine

17 "Slobodna Bosna" that we're going to have a look at. That's P1113. And

18 he gave this interview in April 1998.

19 MS. EDGERTON: And in the B/C/S document we can go over to

20 page 4, the bottom of the left-hand corner, and in the English document

21 page 2.

22 Q. Now, under the heading in "Slobodna Bosna," under the heading

23 that reads:

24 "In what ways did you help the Serb side?"

25 Mr. Mandic says:

Page 35108

1 "I gave them or put at their disposal official cars, I recruited

2 and admitted to the police force those Serbs proposed by Radovan Karadzic

3 and Rajko Dukic, but I also gave them some material means and

4 communications equipment. We would even deliver weapons to Serbian

5 police stations, for example, in Pale, Sokolac, etc. We grabbed and

6 shared out as much as was needed."

7 Now even though you said you didn't have any contact with

8 Mr. Mandic, here he is talking about widespread activity of arming, and

9 we've seen that in the previous document, and talking about the delivery

10 of weapons to Serbian police stations, Sokolac, the area where you

11 worked, and you still claim to have no knowledge of Serb police

12 involvement in the arming?

13 A. I do not belong to the Sokolac police station. As I said at the

14 outset, there was a section of the State Security Service from Sarajevo

15 there. When I left Sarajevo, I reported to that section and not to the

16 police station itself. These are two different things. I am not saying

17 that the police were being armed or were not being armed. Either way,

18 I'm not saying anything. But I certainly wasn't involved in anything

19 like that, and I never noticed anything like that going on, particularly

20 not in relation to Mr. Mandic whom I would meet in Sarajevo. I knew what

21 his official capacity was, and we go way back before the war because we

22 used to go to the same school and we used to work for the same

23 institutions.

24 I was not a member of the police, not for a single day. I left

25 the old state security. That's the way we called it. And then there was

Page 35109

1 the public security sector or department. When the Serbian national

2 security was set up, I became a member, but again that is a different

3 department which is separate from the police.

4 Q. Another thing, something I noticed you didn't mention in your

5 statement to Dr. Karadzic, was the barracks [sic] that were erected

6 throughout Sarajevo on the 1st and 2nd of March, 1992, but as an SDB

7 employee at the time, I would have thought you had information about the

8 situation. So perhaps you can confirm that both reserve and active

9 policemen were involved in the erection of the barricades. That's the

10 case, isn't it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And in fact --

13 JUDGE KWON: Line 21, "barracks" should have read "barricades."

14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. And in fact, active and reserve -- that included active and

16 reserve employees of the Ministry of the Interior of Serb nationality;

17 correct?

18 A. I -- I can't really say for certain. I can't remember a single

19 active-duty police officer, Serb or Muslim, but there were barricades all

20 over the place. There were a lot of police milling about. I didn't know

21 each and every one of them, but I believe that police were involved in

22 setting up barricades on both sides of the conflict.

23 Q. All right.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Let's have a look at 65 ter 10778. It's a

25 document dated 13 March 1992, and it's from the undersecretary of the

Page 35110

1 SDB, the security forces, forwarding a list of employees of the MUP who

2 took part in the activities relating to the setting of the barricades.

3 Now, can we go over to page 2 in -- pardon me, can we go over to

4 the last page of the document in both languages.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Ms. Edgerton, it's a one-page document.

6 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for just one second.

7 [Prosecution and Case Manager confer]

8 MS. EDGERTON: The one I've got has several pages so if you can

9 just indulge me a moment to check, and if we can't fix it quickly, I'll

10 move on.

11 Mr. Reid should be able to fix something and I'll come back to

12 that.

13 Q. The other thing that you didn't mention in your statement,

14 Mr. Puhalac, is that the day before you left Sarajevo, Mr. Mandic sent a

15 dispatch announcing the establishment of a Serbian Ministry of the

16 Interior on the 31st of March, 1992, and the reference is P1116. He

17 wrote to all forces on this -- on the day this law comes into force, the

18 security services centres and public security stations of the

19 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior,

20 are abolished and cease to function, and their authority, and he

21 continues, is taken over by the organisational units of the MUP of the

22 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23 Now, you didn't mention that in your statement, but that's

24 actually why you left Sarajevo, isn't it, Mr. Puhalac?

25 A. There were negotiations to divide the MUP at the top of the

Page 35111

1 police cadres both on the Serb and Muslim side, and among others, this

2 was confirmed by Delimustafic during his trial. I could follow this

3 during -- in the media. So there were negotiations to divide the MUP for

4 the reasons that I mention in my statement and due to the events and

5 developments. I do not know specifically of this document. I left for

6 security reasons. I wanted to make sure that my family was safe, but as

7 you can see from my statement, you can see that later on I did join the

8 public security service, Serbian, later on, and I do know that there were

9 negotiations to divide up the SUP.

10 Q. You mean to say that -- well, even though you talk about

11 negotiations, you have no knowledge of the establishment of the Serbian

12 MUP on the 31st of March, 1992?

13 A. I did not take part in the negotiations myself, but I do know

14 that there was talk about it and that there were these announcements that

15 you mentioned.

16 Q. So now you are conceding that you actually were informed that the

17 Serbian MUP was established the day before you left Sarajevo; correct?

18 A. No, I was not informed, but as soon as I left Sarajevo, I learned

19 about this dispatch.

20 MS. EDGERTON: I wonder if we can go back to 65 ter number 10778,

21 please.

22 Q. And this is the document dated 13 March 1992, and I showed this

23 to you because you said you couldn't remember a single active-duty police

24 officer, Serb or Muslim, involved in the barricades.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Now, if we can go over to the very last page of

Page 35112

1 this document.

2 Q. You see that it reads:

3 "In the Crisis Staff of the SDS, among others, the following

4 persons were engaged: Momcilo Mandic, Mico Stanisic, Dragan Kijac,

5 Dragan Devedlaka, and Cedo Kljajic."

6 And you said earlier that Dragan Kijac was actually your superior

7 for a brief period of time. So here's your superior described by the

8 vice secretary for the SDB, the vice secretary for your services, as a

9 member of the Crisis Staff of the SDS being involved in or being engaged

10 in the barricades and you didn't know anything about it?

11 A. This document was produced at the time when Dragan Kijac was not

12 my boss. Dragan Kijac became my boss only during the war.

13 Q. Five high-ranking members of the Ministry of the Interior, all

14 Serb officials, one of them eventually your boss, and you maintain that

15 you had no knowledge of Serbian police officials involved in the

16 barricades?

17 A. I know all these men, and it is true that they were high-ranking

18 members of the MUP, but I'm telling you Dragan Kijac was not my boss at

19 this time. We were even employees of two different organisational units.

20 I was with the Sarajevo centre, whereas Dragan Kijac was with the

21 Ministry of the Interior administration and the public state security

22 department.

23 Now, I'm not claiming that I didn't know what was going on in

24 Sarajevo, but I really had no -- nothing to do with the setting up of

25 barricades in Sarajevo, nor am I aware that any of these men of the five

Page 35113

1 men mentioned here participated in it, but I'm not challenging it. There

2 are -- I even attended some meetings where there was talk about this, but

3 I really don't know anything about it. I was not a high-ranking member

4 of the State Security Service at the time nor a high official to be able

5 to be privy to these conversations.

6 Q. In fact, you weren't privy, you weren't privy to any inside

7 information that you've discussed with us in your statement, were you,

8 Mr. Puhalac, not of activities of the Serb faction or the Muslim? If

9 we're to believe what you just said, that you were not high-ranking

10 member of the State Security Services nor a high official. This is all

11 second-hand information, isn't it?

12 A. If you mean the information that I provided in the statement, a

13 lot of that has to do with events that I took part in, that I saw myself

14 and experienced. As for the setting up of barricades, and that is what

15 your question is about, I did not take part in that, and I did not speak

16 either about the setting up of Muslim or Serb barricades. But I do know

17 that I did see people and that I had difficulties because of them, but I

18 really didn't know anything about how they were being set up, nor did I

19 talk about that in my statement.

20 MS. EDGERTON: I have nothing further, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE KWON: Just -- can we collapse the English and zoom in on

22 the signature part.

23 Could you help us who wrote this?

24 Let's zoom in. The stamp. Further, further.

25 Can you read it, Mr. Puhalac?

Page 35129

1 Mr. Momcilo Mandic. He told me that I had to submit a detailed report to

2 both him and the government on the situation in Prijedor, specifically in

3 relation to Trnopolje which had been dismantled already. We had been

4 informed about that, mainly that the collection centre had been

5 dismantled. That was at your intervention as the minister suggested,

6 because you and Mr. Kalinic were in Geneva at a meeting at the time. At

7 that meeting the president of the International Red Cross showed you

8 evidence about the existence of camps and also about Trnopolje resuming

9 operation. So I travelled to Prijedor. This was a delicate matter, and

10 I refused to travel with no ICRC representatives present. The ICRC HQ

11 was in Banja Luka and the representative, the person acting on behalf of

12 that office was Mr. Beat, if I'm not mistaken.

13 I got hold of Dr. Cedo Aleksic, who was assistant minister for

14 health, so I asked him to come with me to that meeting. This was, as I

15 said, a serious matter. We travelled to Prijedor and met with the local

16 leaders, Dr. Kovacevic, Dr. Stankic, Simo Drljaca, and the president of

17 the municipal conference of the Red Cross or whatever it was called,

18 Mr. Srdja Srdic. We were told that the reactivation of the Trnopolje

19 collection centre occurred because of some irresponsible individuals in

20 Prijedor who had made Muslims organise themselves and go back to

21 Trnopolje, upon which they would be transferred to countries in the West.

22 When I arrived there, Trnopolje was no longer operating, and

23 people had dispersed already. I remember that Mr. Beat, the

24 representative of the ICRC office in Banja Luka, told the political

25 leaders of Prijedor municipality in no uncertain terms that Trnopolje and

Page 35130

1 other camps had to cease to exist in Prijedor territory. This was an

2 unequivocal order from President Karadzic. I have to say that

3 Srdja Srdic, a Red Cross representative, refused to obey that. He said

4 that he was a senator in Prijedor, a deputy of the people, but his

5 opinion was not taken on board, and the conclusion was what it was.

6 The media were told about this, and I think that the media

7 actually carried the reports from the meeting in Prijedor.

8 Q. Thank you very much.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D40701, please. Thank you.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Did you have any information suggesting whether the ICRC actually

12 allowed for these evacuations?

13 A. I had nothing in writing suggesting that. Nonetheless, at the

14 meeting, the working methodology was discussed. The Red Cross took in

15 people who reported to them and said they wanted to go to other countries

16 in the West, and Srdja Srdic tried to organise this for them.

17 Q. Thank you very much. This is a Red Cross document dated the

18 2nd of October, 1992. It talks about the evacuation of 1.560 persons

19 from Trnopolje. I will read to you something that it states in

20 paragraph 2. Paragraph 2:

21 "[In English] The people concerned were civilian victims of the

22 ongoing hostilities in Northern Bosnia, and had all been visited and

23 provided with assistance by ICRC delegates since the ICRC was first able

24 to enter the camp on 10th of August. Each of them was given the

25 opportunity to confirm that he or she did in fact wish to be evacuated."

Page 35131

1 [Interpretation] How does this tally with what you found out

2 about this?

3 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me. Excuse me.

4 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Avlijas. Yes, Mr. Tieger.

5 MR. TIEGER: We go through this with every witness, so I'm going

6 to -- I rise immediately, although if there's a redirect, I have -- I'm

7 not confident it will be heeded, but this is another example of leading a

8 witness through a document rather than asking the witness for

9 information, and we -- this is persistent, and at this point

10 incorrigible.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, as Mr. Tieger indicates, you could

12 easily put the question to the witness without having to rely on this

13 document first.

14 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, excuse me. I thought that

15 Dr. Karadzic actually had done that when he asked the question at

16 line 13:

17 "Did you have any information suggesting whether the ICRC

18 actually allowed for these evacuations?"

19 And then the witness answered that people had said that they

20 wanted to go to other countries. And then having received that answer,

21 Dr. Karadzic put the document to the witness. So it seemed to me that he

22 was proceeding in accordance with the manner in which the Chamber had

23 suggested.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

25 MR. TIEGER: I will withdraw it. I think the problem has been

Page 35132

1 persistent, but in this case, I take Mr. Robinson's point and withdraw

2 the objection.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree. Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

4 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Mr. Avlijas, my question: What is the relation between the text

8 here and what you were actually told?

9 A. It's the same. It's just retold here. So information is

10 confirmed that the ICRC and the local RC made it possible for people to

11 fulfil their desired to leave for other countries in the West.

12 Q. Thank you very much.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this,

14 please.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3110, Your Honours.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Avlijas, in your statement you talk about the establishment

19 of a judicial system and state organisation at my instructions. Do you

20 remember any of these specific instructions that I issued about that at

21 the time, or do you know pursuant to which documents that was done? When

22 you say "Mr. Karadzic's instructions," what exactly do you have in mind?

23 A. When the judicial system was first being set up, I was one of the

24 team of people who were busy doing that, setting up courts and the like.

25 The principle governing the application of the relevant laws was based on

Page 35133

1 the laws of the formal Bosnia-Herzegovina which did not run counter to

2 the new laws at the time. Everybody was free to make accommodations for

3 experts to be appointed to these bodies, and this was done in

4 co-operation with the districts and then judges were appointed at each of

5 the levels - the Basic Court, the District Court, and then the Higher

6 Court.

7 At the outset there was a very good example. In Banja Luka,

8 judges who were judges before the war belonging to other ethnic groups,

9 Bosniaks and Croats, were also appointed. I don't know what became of it

10 later on. That was in Banja Luka and Bijeljina.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to apologise to the

12 Prosecutor at this point, because there's something that we failed to

13 notify them about.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. You said that my instructions were followed, and both the

16 Presidency and I were adamant that a judicial system should be set up.

17 So my question is: Did you have any particular documents in mind when

18 you talked about that? What exactly did you know about our positions on

19 those issues?

20 A. All of the positions were about obeying the law and the

21 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this was to apply throughout the

22 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia formally speaking,

23 because there were laws applying throughout the former country, such as

24 the ZKP, and all of those laws and the constitution had to be complied

25 with and obeyed.

Page 35134

1 Q. So what were the instructions and the guidelines you actually

2 received about criminal investigations and the way you treated prisoners

3 and potential criminals?

4 A. The instructions were to do nothing that wasn't in keeping with

5 the law, that there was some meetings with you and some people from the

6 Assembly. I remember a specific meeting in Bijeljina, and everybody was

7 adamant that we had to apply the law and that everything we did had to be

8 in compliance with the law. So the citizens could feel and could see for

9 themselves that a rule of law was enforced and that it was actually fully

10 operational.

11 Q. Thank you very much.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 5990. Again, my apologies

13 to the OTP. Just to make sure what the witness really knows about the

14 substance of this document. Could we also have the English version,

15 please. Thank you.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Do you remember receiving guidelines of this nature? These are

18 of the 14th of July, 1992.

19 A. Well, for the most part guidelines such as these were received by

20 the minister of justice, and he was aware of them, and then later on he

21 would actually brief us, the employees of the Ministry of Justice,

22 depending on which department we were in.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 5 in Serbian.

25 That's chapter 6. In English that will be page 4.

Page 35135

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Here we see it reads "Tasks in the field of jurisdiction and

3 administration." So please let's take a look at paragraph 13.

4 Do you recall whether this was something that was presented to

5 you and that you were -- that was set as a task?

6 A. Well, for the most part, judicial organs depending on the

7 functions that they performed had to establish contact with the army and

8 other individuals or persons who were charged with -- who were competent,

9 who had authority over the prisoners or prisoners of war. And everyone

10 in their own department would have to act, and this involved the

11 collection of evidence so that certain people who were prisoners of war

12 who were held captive were to be prosecuted.

13 Q. When you say "persons," and here it says "perpetrators and

14 persons," did that -- or, rather, what kind of -- how important was the

15 ethnic background in terms of the actions taken by the judicial organs?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please speak into the

17 microphone and repeat his answer.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Avlijas, could you come closer to the microphone

19 and speak a bit more slowly. Yes. Could you repeat your answer.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The task of the state organs,

21 judicial organs, and the organs of the interior was the same as it had

22 been before the war. In other words, crime fighting, crime prevention.

23 As you know, at the beginning of the war there was a lot of fighting.

24 There were murders. There were a lot of detained persons because of

25 murders they had committed. There were also robberies and so on.

Page 35136

1 Q. About the ethnic background of perpetrators or victims, what was

2 the position on that?

3 A. Well, the position was the same. A perpetrator of a crime,

4 whether -- so a perpetrator of a crime does not have any colour or race

5 or any ethnic background. For a really professional person, it is

6 totally irrelevant.

7 Q. Thank you. Please continue speaking slowly if you may. We would

8 appreciate that.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, can we see the next page in

10 Serbian. It should be 14, although erroneously it says 13, but in

11 English it will be on the same page. That's paragraph 14.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Would you take a look at this paragraph that relates to your

14 ministry and tell us whether -- whether the guidelines were complied

15 with.

16 A. Yes. Right after these guidelines were received, a commission

17 for the investigation of war crimes that was attached to the government

18 was established, and the way it worked -- and at the very beginning there

19 was another commission, a Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War

20 which worked together with other state organs, and there were counts --

21 they were counselled in terms of how to treat prisoners of war. They

22 were instructed. And the very fact that I was engaged on several of the

23 cases, I was involved in the organisation of the exchange of prisoners of

24 war, and that very fact shows how involved the judiciary was with these

25 problems.

Page 35137

1 There was the case of an exchange with prisoners of war, Croats,

2 and another case where Dr. Kushner was an intermediary, and in

3 April 1993, at one point I was appointed as a member of the central

4 Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War. Now, I was born in 1945

5 and not in '41. It doesn't make any sense. But what this shows is that

6 the judicial organs and the judiciary and the MUP assisted in their --

7 this commission and its work, because in Banja Luka, while I worked,

8 there was a delegated member of the Ministry of the Interior who was in

9 charge of dealing with these matters.

10 Q. Thank you. I did say 1945. The problem is in the translation.

11 Now, could you tell us about this paragraph? What did it have to

12 do with your inspections that you conducted on the ground?

13 A. Well, it related to that, because whenever I went out in the

14 field pursuant to orders of the Ministry of Justice, probably the

15 information or reports that I sent back were not at somebody's -- were

16 not viewed positively by some people because I was -- I was -- I adhered

17 strictly to legal precepts, and I felt that such a report could only

18 improve the situation because there was -- there were these stories going

19 around in the media about all these things happening, and the information

20 that I provided about the situation in the camps, one was in

21 Banja Luka -- the second was in Banja Luka and the third in Herzegovina,

22 they were very well grounded. There was a lot of evidence and proof.

23 And I also submitted some proposals because I was not authorised to issue

24 an order. I could only state what the situation was and forward this to

25 the minister who would then forward it to the government. The government

Page 35138

1 would then adopt a position and inform you on it.

2 Q. Thank you. Why did people fear you whenever you showed up in the

3 field?

4 A. Well, because I was very honest. I would always say what I

5 thought. When I saw -- when I came to some of these camps and saw what a

6 horrible situation was there and that people were held in bunkers and so

7 on, I asked these people, "What do you think? Don't you think someone

8 will be held accountable for this? Do you think this will go on for a

9 hundred years? There will be people talking and writing about you've

10 been doing here." And I sent an information to the president of the

11 court, the supreme court and the prosecutor, and we informed them of your

12 order or instructions 9 which was published in the Official Gazette

13 number 9 in 1992, where it was clearly stated how prisoners of war were

14 to be treated and who was responsible for prisoners of war and their

15 treatment.

16 Whenever I had the opportunity and the occasion to do these

17 inspections on the ground, I would advise them of the International Law

18 of War and international regulations that had to be complied with. I

19 knew of all of these conventions. I knew how much air or how much food

20 these people who were held as prisoners of war needed according to these

21 international norms, so I would always tell them whenever I visited these

22 people on site, I would advise them thereof.

23 Now, as for your guidelines, they stated that it was important to

24 determine exactly who it was who was held as prisoner of war and that

25 these people should be categorised because this was a burden to every

Page 35139

1 society. You had to care for their clothing, for their food and so on,

2 and this in itself --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat the last portion of

4 his answer.

5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The interpreters were not able to

6 hear the last portion of your answer, Mr. Avlijas.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could you repeat it.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last thing I mentioned had to

10 do with one -- had to do with one of the paragraphs in your guidelines

11 where I said that they had to take care of all the prisoners of war, that

12 triage had to be conducted so that we knew exactly who belonged to what

13 category, who -- what category of imprisoned or detained persons there

14 are. And I especially pointed out that it was very bad for our image if

15 we had a lot of prisoners of war and also that it was a very sizable

16 expense that society had to incur for taking care of these people and for

17 these detention centres and keeping them as they should be.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Thank you. Now, what was the position of the central

20 authorities, the government and the Presidency, vis-a-vis your work on

21 the ground?

22 A. I can say when I prepared these reports that I was a bit fearful,

23 because I was very objective. There were even -- there were even

24 suggestions by some of my associates that I was very brave, but I have to

25 say that I have never received any complaints about my reports from

Page 35140

1 anyone, the government, the military authorities, or the Presidency, and

2 I'm proud of it because the information that I had, the raw materials

3 that I provided, they would actually be accepted by all these three

4 levels without any comments.

5 Q. Thank you. And the last question: Although you were not

6 authorised to issue orders, did the situation improve on the ground --

7 or, rather, what was the position of these organs in the field before --

8 even before they would receive some order from the ministry?

9 A. Well, the information certainly improved, and I have to mention

10 the case of Bileca where people really took it seriously, and persons who

11 had been isolated before that, and I wouldn't want to go into a

12 discussion about terminology, what a detained person actually means, but

13 I can give an example, a good example of how local authorities took steps

14 and they make -- made a good assessment of how to do it in order to

15 protect the unprotected Muslims.

16 There were -- there was -- there were uncontrolled elements of

17 the military and paramilitary groups that all headed in that direction.

18 The president of the municipality at that point and his aides, because in

19 the meantime the mosque had been blown up, collected all the Muslim male

20 population and put them in a student hall where they provided their

21 accommodation, enough air. They were provided with food that was brought

22 from their homes, and then the Presidency did -- made a great effort to

23 ensure that those people were moved to a secure -- to a safe place

24 because there was a huge number of these uncontrolled elements that had

25 come to that area, and it was hard to guarantee their safety.

Page 35141

1 Q. Could you tell us where --

2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter could not catch the name.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Montenegro.

4 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your question, Mr. Karadzic.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Could you tell us where Zelenika is, where these people were

7 moved for safety?

8 A. Zelenika is a small harbour between Herceg Novi and Kotor in

9 Montenegro.

10 Q. Thank you. What was the effect of your inspections conducted

11 in -- of your inspections in Sarajevo municipalities?

12 A. Well, I don't want to go over what I've already said, but when I

13 was ordered to go to Vogosca on the 12th of July, 1992, the president of

14 the corps, Milenko Bjelica, the municipal prosecutor Milorad Panjevic,

15 and representatives of the Ministry of Justice talked about Vogosca.

16 Now, as I've already said, there were people who were kept detained

17 there. They were detained in Svrake and Vogosca, but they were held in

18 an open-air space near a German bunker, and --

19 Q. Could I please ask you -- what we have in the statement is not

20 really necessary to repeat, but what didn't make it into the transcript

21 is that you said that these were prisoners who had been captured during

22 fighting in Semizovac and elsewhere. But could you just tell us what the

23 repercussions were or what the effects were, and what was the situation

24 in Sonja, the Sonja restaurant?

25 A. Well, Sonja was not really a bunker. It was more a headquarters,

Page 35142

1 sort of offices, and I didn't find any detained persons there, but the

2 effect of my -- of our meeting was that a proper and appropriate

3 installation was found. It was a four-storey building. It was light,

4 there was enough light, and this was the building that was used or

5 selected to house these people, the detainees, and this covered the area

6 of three or four municipalities in that region.

7 Now, when I selected this building as an investigating prison,

8 then they asked me when we went and saw this, they asked me, "Is this the

9 kind of building that you would like to use?" And I said, "Yes." And

10 then that's what they did. But the same thing happened in Ilijas where

11 people had been held in some kind of warehouse, but after our

12 intervention and suggestion, these people were moved to and accommodated

13 in an appropriate -- to appropriate facilities which would meet certain

14 international rules and requirements.

15 Now, in Hadzici, there was also the case of individuals who had

16 been returned after an exchange of prisoners fell through. The exchange

17 of prisoners went on late into the night, so for security reasons they --

18 these people could not be taken back to where they had been, so they were

19 taken to a gym in Hadzici.

20 Now, I intervened upon this, saying that the conditions were not

21 appropriate there, but also there was a lot of fear that the local

22 population of Pazarici and Tarcin and Hadzici were held, detained, in the

23 silo.

24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter requests that the witness

25 repeat his answer. He's speaking too fast.

Page 35143

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Avlijas. Mr. Avlijas, you are speaking too

2 fast, and they were not able to catch up with you, your speed in

3 particular.

4 Could you repeat from the part when you referred to silo?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Okay. Okay. Well, I've already

6 said a group of prisoners of war of Muslim ethnicity who were held in

7 Kula and -- they were sent to Kobiljaca for an exchange. Now, this

8 exchange fell through because the Muslim side obstructed it.

9 Now, the prisoners, in terms of the locality where they were

10 supposed to be taken back, and that's about 150 kilometres away, were

11 moved to a sports hall in Hadzici where -- from where they had been taken

12 a month earlier from Kula or so. A month or two. I'm not sure.

13 Now, when I went to inspect these facilities and -- and prepare

14 the report, I found these prisoners of war who had not been exchanged,

15 although half had been, and they were housed in very poor conditions.

16 They slept on the ground, on thin mats, gym mats.

17 Now, because this municipality was divided into two parts, the

18 part under Muslim authority and the part under Serbian authority, there

19 was a camp in Tarcin where a lot of Serbs were held prisoner, and I was

20 afraid that there would be a back-lash because of these people, the

21 family members of the people who were held in that camp, the Serbs, that

22 they would retaliate against the people held at the silo. So I

23 intervened, and I effectuated, effected, these people being transferred

24 to better premises, to Kula or some place like that, where they would be

25 properly guarded and secured.

Page 35144

1 Q. In addition to Kula, you also mentioned Planina Kuca, but that

2 did not make it into the transcript.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

4 document, and I have no further questions for this witness at this time.

5 JUDGE KWON: When you put this document, you told us that this

6 document was 14th of July, 1992. How do we know that, Mr. Karadzic?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the Prosecutor marked it in

8 e-court as such, but in the preamble we see that all the dates precede

9 the 14th, or, rather, according to the Official Gazette where they were

10 published, the regulations that this document relies on. But the

11 Prosecutor marked it as a document of the 14th of July.

12 JUDGE KWON: So bear in mind that you are not giving evidence.

13 So date is not clear on its face on this document. If you think the date

14 is important, you need to put that to the witness. That was my point.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't see it here. We probably

16 need the cover page which was not in e-court. At least I couldn't find

17 it. But there probably was a cover page that bore this date.

18 JUDGE KWON: Very well. So I'll leave it at that and we'll admit

19 it.

20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3111, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Avlijas, as you have noted now, your evidence in

22 chief in this case has been admitted in its most -- in most part in

23 writing in lieu of your oral testimony, and now you'll be cross examined

24 by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Tieger.

25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 35145

1 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

2 Q. Mr. Avlijas, if I could begin, please, by just clarifying one

3 thing you noted at the beginning of your testimony when Mr. Karadzic

4 asked you about statements you had given. I believe you said you'd given

5 two statements, and a date was given in 1997, and then one to Mr. Marko.

6 So I just wanted to clarify exactly how many statements you gave to the

7 Karadzic Defence team and when you gave them.

8 A. The Defence team of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, I only gave one

9 statement to them. But I was also questioned, interviewed by the

10 representatives of The Hague Tribunal at Pale in 1997. So perhaps that's

11 where the confusion is coming from.

12 Q. Thank you, sir. I think that's right, and I think now everyone

13 understands what you're referring to of all the participants who have

14 those documents. Thank you.

15 Mr. Avlijas, I want to also confirm quickly that you have

16 testified previously in different venues. You testified in the case of

17 Stanisic and Zupljanin here in 2010. You testified in the case involving

18 Mr. Mandic before the court in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2007, and you

19 testified in the case involving Mr. Lalovic in 2009. That's correct,

20 isn't it, sir?

21 A. Yes, that's correct, and I say so in my statement.

22 Q. Right.

23 A. Witness statement.

24 Q. And I presume that your position is that you gave truthful

25 testimony in all those cases; correct?

Page 35146

1 A. Absolutely. Maybe I commented a bit more in one or the other,

2 but in essence all my statements are the same.

3 Q. Now -- and I mention that at the outset for a couple of reasons.

4 I am likely to be referring to portions of the information you provided

5 previously, and I mention that now in the same spirit that Mr. Karadzic

6 mentioned a couple of times, that it was not necessary to repeat the

7 information you already provided to this Court in the form of your

8 written statement. So references that I may make to portions of your

9 previous testimony should not be understood as an invitation to repeat

10 that testimony, but I'm simply trying to find the fastest route to

11 getting the maximum information to the Court by pointing you to certain

12 excerpts and having you confirm them. Understood?

13 A. Absolutely.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, your statement mentions that you became a member

15 of the Commission for Exchange in April of 1993, after having been

16 initially asked in 1992 and then deferring for the reasons you describe;

17 correct?

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

19 Q. And I understood from your testimony in the Stanisic and

20 Zupljanin case that during the course of your work on the Commission for

21 Exchange, you worked with Mr. Amor Masovic. And indeed you describe a

22 story to the -- or you described a story to the Stanisic and Zupljanin

23 Chamber about Mr. Masovic risking his life in the course of an attempted

24 exchange and being assisted by a counterpart on the Serbian side, and

25 then indicated that, "According to me, Mr. Masovic is a highly

Page 35147

1 professional official." Correct?

2 A. I wasn't involved in that exchange at the time. This is what I

3 referred to about the exchange that fell through at Kobiljaca, because

4 neither Masovic nor the group of Muslims who had been taken prisoner

5 could be exchanged. They were taken to Hadzici, and Masovic slept at

6 Brane Mijatovic's place, who was a commander of the police, and the rest

7 were taken to the gym. As for Masovic, the co-operation between the two

8 of us during the war was at a fairly high professional level. When I was

9 a commission member after the war, I don't think it can be described as

10 such. I don't know if it's relevant, but it was not a professional

11 relationship at the time because we were unable to get -- to get our

12 executed people because of obstruction. If the Court so wishes, I can

13 say more about this aspect.

14 Q. No. No, I think that's not necessary for my purposes. I simply

15 wanted you to confirm that you had told the Stanisic-Zupljanin Chamber,

16 and that would be at page 155 -- 15652 and at page -- well, I'll wait.

17 We need to get there for the e-court page.

18 That you volunteered during the course of that testimony when you

19 mentioned his name as the president of the commission. The question was

20 he became rather famous, and you said:

21 "And so we co-operated. I was a member of the Republika Srpska

22 Commission for Co-operation, and according to me, Mr. Masovic is a highly

23 professional official."

24 That's at 15652, e-court page 94. Do you need to see that, or

25 can you just confirm that for me that that was your testimony in the

Page 35148

1 Stanisic-Zupljanin case?

2 A. I stand by that statement when I refer to the period from 1992

3 until 1999, or actually during the war, but since his behaviour after

4 1996 is not relevant here, I won't go into that.

5 He was highly professional and co-operated with us well. We

6 exchanged information, and I really cannot say anything that is false

7 here.

8 Q. Thank you. At paragraph 18 of your statement, Mr. Avlijas, you

9 provide the following information about Mr. Skiljevic. So that's after

10 the discussion about coming to Kula in your professional capacity and

11 talking about circumstances at Kula, and you say:

12 "I remember that on one occasion a member of a tank crew," and

13 then you describe what Mr. Skiljevic did.

14 So I wanted to clarify, Mr. Avlijas, a number of things, but

15 beginning with this paragraph, that -- in fact, this is not something,

16 despite the preceding paragraphs, which indicate your presence at Kula,

17 that you saw yourself. This is you repeating an anecdote or story that

18 you had heard; correct?

19 A. No. No, that is not correct. I stated that at the trial of

20 Skiljevic and Lalovic too. I wanted to corroborate or show the

21 conditions under the -- which the penitentiary facility functioned,

22 because before the war --

23 Q. Mr. Avlijas, sorry. I'm not asking you for your motives in

24 making the statement or testifying about it at the Lalovic case. Let's

25 just take all this one step at a time. So now that you mentioned the

Page 35149

1 Lalovic case, let me take you to your testimony in that case.

2 MR. TIEGER: And that's found at 65 ter 24743. At English

3 page 28, and B/C/S page 40.

4 Q. And there you said, Mr. Avlijas:

5 "I remember an anecdote regarding Soniboj. Reportedly, a tank

6 driver directed its tank almost directly towards -- then whether somebody

7 got killed or what happened, allegedly Soniboj stood in front of the tank

8 and said, 'You'll have to kill me,'" and then go on.

9 So in the Lalovic case, Mr. Avlijas, you referred to an anecdote.

10 You described it as allegedly and reportedly. That reflects something

11 that you heard from other people, correct? And that's what you testified

12 to in the Lalovic case?

13 A. Let me correct myself. Somebody misinterpreted that. We can't

14 speak of an anecdote here. It's a tragedy, rather, because that tank

15 crew member had somebody killed on at that day. And I'll only try to

16 show what things were like in the penitentiary facility. The tank driver

17 started his tank, and then this man stood in front of the tank and said,

18 "You first have to kill me."

19 And those persons at Kula were not separated from us. Their

20 building was next to ours. Where we ate, they ate. And I think it was a

21 translation error. In my statement I wanted to show the professional

22 attitude of the warden of the penitentiary facility toward the inmates.

23 Q. Okay. We have your answer, sir. Let me turn to another part of

24 your statement, and that would be a number of paragraphs dealing with

25 access or communication with or contact with Foca. So at -- that's

Page 35150

1 paragraphs 33, 35, and 60 of your statement, where you say, for example,

2 in paragraph 35:

3 "Previously no one from the" -- referring to December 1992.

4 "Previously," that is prior to December 1992, "no one from the central

5 government could get in touch with the warden of Foca."

6 You say at paragraph 33:

7 "The first time we were able to go to Foca was in December 1992,"

8 and you say something to similar effect in paragraph 60.

9 Now, let me ask you first about things you may not be familiar

10 with. Were you aware of the extent to which the Assembly of

11 Republika Srpska was receiving information about the situation in Foca,

12 either from members of the Bosnian Serb leadership such as Dr. Karadzic

13 at the 16th Assembly session or from the representatives of Foca such as

14 Mr. Maksimovic and Mr. Cancar during the course of 1992? Did you know

15 that was happening, that they were reporting to the Assembly what was

16 happening in -- various aspects of what was happening in Foca?

17 A. I was not in such a position as to be informed about these

18 things. I was a mere coordinator, so I can't answer your question. I

19 really didn't know whether information was submitted or what kind of

20 information.

21 Q. Well, let me turn to something a little closer to home, then.

22 MR. TIEGER: Can I have 65 ter 17213.

23 Q. This is a request from the president of the government,

24 Dr. Djeric, to the Crisis Staff of Foca on the 23rd of May, 1992, asking

25 for Veljko Kostovic to came to Pale regarding the editing of the

Page 35151

1 Official Gazette. So do you claim that you were not aware of contacts

2 between the government and Foca during this period?

3 A. I reiterate, sir, that I had nothing to do with the government.

4 I know Veljko Kostovic and Branko Djeric. I know what they did. If this

5 document is in existence, then things must have had -- must have been

6 happening this way.

7 MR. TIEGER: I tender this, Mr. President.

8 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. The witness hasn't said

9 anything to this document, and it can't be something the witness could

10 be -- could have been expected to know about such that it would be

11 admitted as being contradictory.

12 MR. TIEGER: That's -- that's not --

13 JUDGE KWON: Contradictory to what, Mr. Tieger? Is it

14 communication --

15 MR. TIEGER: To the claim -- to the lack of communication claim.

16 And this is -- this is related to the government which includes the

17 Ministry of Justice for which this witness was a high-ranking official.

18 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, he said in line 24, page 61, that

19 he didn't know. He hasn't said that there was no co-operation. He said

20 he didn't know. So in order to contradict that, the Prosecution would

21 have to show some document that would make it likely that he did know.

22 MR. TIEGER: First of all, Mr. President --

23 JUDGE KWON: Just -- pause. Pause.

24 MR. TIEGER: First of all, Mr. President -- oh.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

Page 35152

1 MR. TIEGER: Yeah. The witness cannot insulate himself from

2 impeachment by hiding behind a general denial and claim therefore that

3 documents that show the contrary of what he's asserted in his statement

4 should not be admitted. This witness went to great pains and the Defence

5 took great pains to include in the statement his assertions about the

6 lack of communication and contact with Foca. This document proves the

7 contrary.

8 JUDGE KWON: Was this document communicated to Foca?

9 MR. TIEGER: I would say at a minimum, Mr. President, this

10 document certainly reflects an expectation on the part of the government

11 that they are in contact with Foca, and it's a routine -- it's a document

12 sent routinely with the expectation that it will be received and acted

13 upon.

14 JUDGE KWON: We do not know how this was delivered,

15 hand-delivered, by telex or whatever. Did the witness say that total

16 communication was cut off?

17 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, this can obviously go to weight and

18 that's going to be one of a number of pieces dealing with this subject.

19 But a routine request in May on a fairly simple matter certainly reflects

20 a state of affairs that is incompatible with what the witness suggested

21 in his statement.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may comment --

Page 35153

1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. We'll receive this.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I mean this situation.

3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P6194, Your Honours.

4 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number please.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6194.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Avlijas, would you like to add anything?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to comment on the

8 whole situation irrespective of the document. In the month of May, but I

9 don't remember so very clearly, how communication went. You could send a

10 document by courier or to cover the work obligation of Veljko Kostovic in

11 Foca, but we cannot say from this perspective that we had an organised

12 state. There wasn't even mail delivery --

13 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Mr. President.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that was organised, let alone

15 anything else.

16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Witness --

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, I let him continue.

18 That's sufficient, Mr. Avlijas.

19 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

21 Q. Mr. Avlijas, do you claim you were unaware of the fact that on

22 the 4th of July, 1992, the government adopted a decision on the founding

23 of KP Dom Foca? That's P1098.

24 A. It would be less than serious if I said I didn't know. Yes. I

25 even made a draft but the problem is --

Page 35154

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Avlijas. That's -- I asked you about -- I gave

2 you the -- I suggested to you earlier how I intended to proceed, and I

3 would also add it's not an invitation for you to argue your position.

4 You've stated the facts as you claim they were in your statement and

5 previous testimonies.

6 Do you claim you were unaware that on the 3rd of June, 1992, at a

7 government session, the government received a report on the official

8 visit to, among other places, Foca? And that's D415.

9 A. On the 3rd of July, maybe.

10 Q. That would be 3 June, I believe. D14 -- 415, rather.

11 A. I don't know who could have been there. I had only been

12 appointed on the 28th of May. It was in late May that I came from Ilidza

13 where I had lived and only started working on the 28th of May, so I

14 cannot have any knowledge about that. I really couldn't even physically

15 be there.

16 Q. Well, let me ask you about something about a little bit closer to

17 home then. In the Stanisic-Zupljanin case at page 15576, you spoke about

18 a visit to Trebinje in late June 1992 that you made as part of a justice

19 ministry working group with three other persons, and those persons

20 included Mr. Nikolic, Mr. Branka -- Ms. Branka Mandic, and

21 Igor Velasevic?

22 A. Velasevic.

23 Q. And there you testified that Mr. Nikolic and you visited

24 Herzegovina and Trebinje, "whereas the other two went down to Foca";

25 correct? And that's in June of 1992.

Page 35155

1 A. Correct. Correct.

2 Q. And they produced the following report.

3 MR. TIEGER: If I could have 65 ter 16255, please.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.

5 MR. TIEGER:

6 Q. Okay. We go to the -- all right. That report refers to the

7 activities related to organising judiciary institutions. It says the

8 working group of the Ministry of Justice visited Foca on 24 and

9 25 June 1992, talks about those with whom they held a meeting including

10 the president of the Executive Board, the president of the various courts

11 and judges, the warden of Foca correctional institution, and the

12 representatives of the Ministry of the Interior in Foca.

13 And if we turn the page so you can see the signators and

14 signatures. It indicates Branka Mandic and Igor Velasevic. That's the

15 report that was produced in late June 1992, as a result of the trip by

16 the working group by the -- by the justice ministry group to Foca;

17 correct?

18 A. That's correct. I have no objections. The report was submitted.

19 They went to Foca by way of Niksic and we went to Trebinje.

20 Q. Now, you also make some similar -- some strong claims about --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I would tender the

23 document, please.

24 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

Page 35156

1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6195, Your Honours.

2 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

3 Q. Mr. Avlijas, you also make various claims about Crisis Staffs in

4 the course of your statement. Now, reports from Crisis Staffs to

5 Mr. Karadzic or other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership were not

6 intended to go through you, were they?

7 A. I think that there's a misunderstanding. When I went out to the

8 field, I had nobody to communicate with other than the president of the

9 Crisis Staff, the chief of police, or some other --

10 Q. Sorry, Mr. Avlijas, you may misunderstand my question.

11 A. -- responsible person.

12 Q. I understand on the occasions that you went to the field which

13 you indicated in your statement that you had certain reporting

14 responsibilities and that information from Crisis Staff members could be

15 communicated to the leadership through you, but I'm asking you as a more

16 general matter. You were not part of the communication chain from all

17 the Crisis Staffs in all the municipalities to the Bosnian Serb

18 leadership; correct?

19 A. No. No.

20 Q. And with respect to those Crisis Staffs that you did not visit,

21 you were not familiar with the composition of its membership; correct?

22 You didn't know who all were on there? That's correct, isn't it?

23 A. No. I think there's been a misinterpretation of my statement. I

24 had nothing to do with Crisis Staffs. I didn't know who was on the

25 Crisis Staff. But when I arrived in the field, I would ask who the

Page 35157

1 president of the Executive Board was and who the president of

2 Crisis Staff was, and I applied for a meeting with them and said that I

3 had been sent by the Ministry of Justice to make a snapshot of the

4 situation in Brcko, for example. There was Vojan Belok [phoen] and

5 Djordjic as the president of the Crisis Staff. "Gentlemen, I have

6 horrible information. Tell me what's going on in the field." And this

7 is all the communication I had. I had no contact with the Crisis Staff,

8 because due to the position I was in, I couldn't have had. And this is

9 where the misunderstanding arose.

10 Depending on the situation, who I was able to find as a

11 counterpart to talk to in the field. For example, in Zvornik there was

12 Mr. Lokancevic who was the chief of police, a great professional, and he

13 said that he had 50 prisoners and that they had to be saved, and I sent

14 the list to the government and we were able to save them. But it was

15 different everywhere.

16 Q. Thank you. Well, let's talk about some of your contacts, then,

17 in places where Muslims and Croats were being held, and let me begin with

18 Vogosca and Ilijas, which you've -- which appear in your statement and

19 which you've referenced today as well.

20 Now, let me ask you about the genesis of that visit. First of

21 all, as you testified in the Stanisic-Zupljanin case, "There were all

22 sorts of stories in the media." That's found at 15585. Can you

23 confirm -- and you said that those were "bad stories," at 15586. Can you

24 confirm that that was your testimony, sir?

25 A. Absolutely. That was one of the conditions because of those

Page 35158

1 rumours, and in order to implement the orders received, we had to go

2 there and check what was situation was like in Vogosca in general.

3 Q. And more specifically, you testified --

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript does not contain

5 anything of the witness's statement that it should contain. The witness

6 said that the rumours about the non-implementation of the instructions of

7 the Ministry of Defence and the president were the reason to go to the

8 field to Vogosca.

9 JUDGE KWON: I don't think witness is talking about his

10 statement. He confirmed what Mr. Tieger referred to. Why don't we

11 continue.

12 MR. TIEGER: Very well, Mr. President. Thank you.

13 Q. And I'm simply focusing now on what you said before about what

14 triggered your trip. So you said in Stanisic-Zupljanin that the

15 information in the media was that "a large number of people have been

16 captured, that there were no conditions to hold them, and ... mass

17 liquidations." That's at 15586. And you said further, basically

18 everybody knew about those allegations or stories. And that's found at

19 the same page. These true. That's the testimony you had in

20 Stanisic-Zupljanin; correct?

21 A. I think we must distinguish they didn't know what was happening,

22 but everybody had heard the rumours that there were camps in Vogosca and

23 that people were being tortured there, because the media of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina insisted on that, that there were killings and so on.

25 And then a commission was appointed consisting of three members to go out

Page 35159

1 there and see what things were like, and I can confirm today that the

2 prisoners were held in unsuitable conditions.

3 Q. We'll talk about that in just a moment. And as a result there

4 was pressure, as you testified in the Mandic case, pressure "from the

5 International Red Cross and the public"; correct?

6 A. Well, the International Red Cross constantly visited camps and

7 penitentiary facilities. They informed the state organs, and the state

8 organs then passed on information to the line ministries and assigned

9 tasks.

10 Q. Mr. Avlijas, I'm asking you what you testified to in the Mandic

11 case was that there was pressure from the International Red Cross and the

12 public. That's what you testified to; right?

13 A. Yes. Yes, yes.

14 Q. Okay. All right. Now, when you went to Sonja's in Vogosca, you

15 went to meet with the leaders of the Crisis Staff; right?

16 A. Yes. If necessary, I can name all those present and the date.

17 There was Rajko Koprivica, the president of the Assembly. Then the

18 president of the Executive Board, Svetozar Stanic, also known as Sesa.

19 There was a representative of public security by the name of Blagovcanin,

20 I think, and the pre-war petty offence judge Mr. Lokota [phoen] and some

21 other people. The meeting was opened by the president of the Assembly,

22 and the introduction on behalf of the working group was given by

23 Milenko Bjelica.

24 Q. The transcript didn't catch of the name of the representative

25 from the MUP, the representative from the SJB, and that was Branko Vlaco;

Page 35160

1 right?

2 A. No, no. Branko Vlaco represented the camp. I forgot to say

3 that. And the representative of public security was Blagovcanin, because

4 Branko Vlaco was in charge of the camp that was there.

5 Q. He was also from the -- he's also a member of the MUP; correct?

6 A. Yes. I don't know who he was employed by. I can't say for sure

7 whether he was working for MUP or for somebody else. Only the relevant

8 authorities that he was being employed by can tell you that or perhaps it

9 was a so-called work obligation too.

10 MR. TIEGER: Okay. It's 12.30 now, the customary time for our

11 break, Mr. Avlijas. I'll leave it to the Court, however.

12 JUDGE KWON: You were not heard, Mr. Karadzic, because of

13 overlapping.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 25 reads as if it were a

15 question whereas actually it's part of the answer. So the Q should be

16 removed.

17 JUDGE KWON: It will be corrected in due course. Thank you.

18 We'll take a break for 45 minutes and resume at quarter past

19 1.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 1.17 p.m.

22 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

24 Q. Mr. Avlijas, we're still discussing what you observed in Vogosca.

25 I know you've alluded to the conditions at the bunker, but I want you,

Page 35161

1 for more specificity, to confirm what you've testified to in previous

2 cases, and in particular the Mandic case where you stated it was "truly

3 horrific," and said that even talking about it 15 years later, "I am

4 still horrified," and said further, "the situation was disastrous. As a

5 normal human being, when I saw the horror there, what else could I say?"

6 Those references are found at pages 7 and page 32 of the English.

7 Can you confirm that was your testimony in the Mandic case, sir?

8 A. Yes. I stand by that statement which I repeated in the Stanisic

9 case, the Zupljanin case, and whenever anyone cared to ask I said that

10 this was inhumane behaviour which left me feeling horror.

11 Q. And the location of the bunker in relation to where you and the

12 leaders of the Crisis Staff, including Koprivica and Stanic and others,

13 was, as you explained in the Stanisic-Zupljanin case, about the same

14 distance as from the witness chair to the door in the courtroom; correct?

15 That's found at page 15590.

16 A. The meeting was held in that room and that was the distance. As

17 for the Crisis Staff, it should have been in Vogosca but the meeting that

18 we had was held at the Sonja cafe which was right next to the bunker.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, you have also testified previously about who

20 ordered the detentions of these people in the bunker, and as you said

21 repeatedly in the Stanisic-Zupljanin case, and I'll ask you to confirm

22 that, you said at page 1 -- pages 15595 through 96:

23 "The Crisis Staff did," and then went on to explain, "I suppose

24 they did it most likely together with the army because they couldn't do

25 it on their own."

Page 35162

1 Asked again to clarify the question about -- the question was who

2 made the decision to take people prisoner and to put them there. You

3 said:

4 "The Crisis Staff did, and the army command most likely."

5 And then again, just a few lines later, you said:

6 "Most likely it was the Crisis Staff and the Tactical Group

7 command that were in charge of that issue."

8 And can you confirm that that was your testimony, sir?

9 A. Yes, that was my testimony. One thing I'd like to add, the

10 commander of the Tactical Group in terms of his position was also a

11 member of the Crisis Staff, but I can't be certain. It's merely an

12 assumption on my part.

13 Q. Thank you. Now you were also asked whether the people in the

14 bunker, the prisoners, were civilians or combatants, and you said in the

15 Stanisic-Zupljanin case that the leaders of the Crisis Staff told you:

16 "They told us that those were people who had been taken prisoner

17 in areas where there were armed conflicts."

18 And then you said further:

19 "They told us that those people had been taken prisoner during

20 combat." And that's at 15597.

21 And then you went on to say:

22 "That's what they told us. We didn't check whether those people

23 were really combatants or not, but it was the corps commander who was in

24 charge of making that decision." And that's at 15597.

25 Again, sir, can you confirm that was your testimony in the

Page 35163

1 Stanisic-Zupljanin case?

2 A. Yes. I stand by that. When I mentioned the corps commander, I

3 meant the instructions issued by the military minister. The corps

4 commander would be responsible for any treatment of POWs in his area, in

5 the area under his command, and then by -- by virtue of the same

6 principle also his subordinates.

7 Q. And when asked whether you considered it part of your

8 responsibility to determine whether people in the bunker were being held

9 illegally, that is, whether they were civilians or combatants, you said:

10 "No. Our task was to see whether there were any prisoners and

11 where they were kept. Now, as for the procedure, our -- the legality and

12 lawfulness of that issue, this is something that came under the

13 jurisdiction of the army."

14 That is what you testified to in the Stanisic-Zupljanin case,

15 sir; correct? You told -- you said essentially it was not your job.

16 A. No objections. No objections. That wasn't our task nor, indeed,

17 were we able to categorise. This is a purely military issue.

18 Q. Okay. And not your job as you saw it; right?

19 A. No, not our job. It wasn't for us to do. Our task was only to

20 make sure international standards were being complied with in terms of

21 POW treatment under the relevant international conventions and law.

22 Q. Now, subsequently, as you alluded to in your testimony, a remand

23 prison was established at Planina Kuca or Planjo's house, and the inmates

24 at the bunker were transferred there; right?

25 A. There is one thing that we need to clarify here, if I may. We

Page 35164

1 had three tasks to carry out in Vogosca. One was to see what the

2 situation was of the POWs and whether the instructions and orders of the

3 president and the military minister were being applied. The other thing

4 was to find a suitable facility to set up a remand unit for the regular

5 court which had nothing to do with the prisoners. So you need to

6 distinguish these two things, the prisoners on the one hand and the

7 people being prosecuted according to regular procedure.

8 All right. Once we had found a good building to set up a remand

9 prison in which had very good access, it was fully functional and so on

10 and so forth, then they asked us about our criticisms in terms of where

11 they were keeping people. What do you think?

12 Q. Mr. Avlijas, please --

13 A. Should we also transfer all of the other prisoners to that

14 building over there --

15 Q. Okay. I have limited time. That's in your statement and you

16 also explained it during your examination-in-chief, so --

17 A. All right. Thank you.

18 Q. All right. It was the Ministry of Justice that took over control

19 of Planjo's house sometime in July. You testified to that in

20 Stanisic-Zupljanin; correct?

21 Mr. Avlijas, I don't want the whole story. I am going through

22 this step-by-step through this thing so you'll see where I'm going. If

23 you can confirm that, please do; if you can't, I'll direct you to the

24 page where you address that issue.

25 A. Mm-hmm.

Page 35165

1 Q. The Ministry of Justice took control or became responsible for

2 Planjo's house sometime in July; right?

3 A. Yes, about the security of people being investigated and the

4 prisoners who received their food there. Everything else was under the

5 military, the exchanges of people being taken to work and everything

6 else.

7 Q. And Brano Vlaco, the man who is responsible for the bunker, the

8 truly horrific place that you testified about, was appointed as the

9 warden of the detention department of the penal and correctional facility

10 Butmir, Ilidza; correct? And that's what you testified to in the

11 Stanisic-Zupljanin case at 15607.

12 A. No. It wasn't Butmir. It was the remand prison covered by the

13 Ilidza Basic Court, and it was at Planjina's tower in Semizovac where the

14 other people were also being kept, the prisoners. So it was both in the

15 same place, the remand prison and the prisoners, and Vlaco was put in

16 charge of that facility and the business there.

17 Q. Okay. Thank you for the clarification. And in the

18 Stanisic-Zupljanin case you were asked to explain why, as it was put

19 there, why this appalling -- whether or not you had told Mr. Mandic

20 before the appointment that the bunker had been under the control of

21 Vlaco and your answer was:

22 "He was probably better known than myself. Everybody knew who

23 Vlaco was."

24 That's at transcript page 15608. Correct?

25 A. Yes, I stand by that statement.

Page 35166

1 Q. And then you were asked to explain or you went on to explain --

2 you just went on yourself to explain everybody knew who Vlaco was. Then

3 you started to talk about personnel policy that resulted in his

4 appointment. And you said:

5 "Personnel policy in the field was in the hands of the

6 Crisis Staff and the Serb Democratic Party."

7 And then the question was:

8 "Right."

9 And then you said again:

10 "It's a well-known fact."

11 That's what you testified to in Stanisic-Zupljanin?

12 A. No objections.

13 Q. Now, you also went to Ilijas during that same visit, in fact

14 during that same day, and you mentioned already that you found prisoners

15 there who were in a warehouse of sorts, and I'm just going to clarify

16 based on your previous testimony what conditions were like in that

17 facility. You testified that the warehouse was packed and, further, that

18 everybody was in civilian clothes. Both of those things are correct;

19 right?

20 A. Correct. What I could see through a window. The warehouse was

21 packed.

22 Q. And you also testified that a number of the people there

23 recognised you because of your pre-war position and that the meeting --

24 or that the encounter with them was "really emotional." That's what you

25 said in the Mandic trial. And you said further:

Page 35167

1 "They recognised me and they turned to me for help. They said,

2 'Slobo, how are you?'"

3 And then you testified further:

4 "It's an awful situation to have people begging you for help

5 because they felt there was no hope for them."

6 That's what you testified to in the Mandic case about your

7 encounter at the warehouse in Ilijas; correct?

8 A. It's true but my statement was not complete. I said there was an

9 assumption, an agreement, that there would be an all-for-all exchange

10 sometime soon. That was in order to give them hope. And indeed there

11 was a lot of activity going on in order to organise an all-for-all

12 exchange at the time. I told them that I'd spoken to people from the

13 Ilijas authorities to make sure that appropriate accommodation could be

14 found that would constitute an improvement over what they had at the

15 time.

16 Q. And as you testified to in the Mandic case, you went to Ilijas,

17 you met first with the president of the Crisis Staff Ratko Adzic who had

18 basically brought his entire group with him; right?

19 A. What do you mean? A group of associates, people who worked with

20 him; right? Yes. Yes, yes.

21 Q. All right. And again you referred to the hope for exchange and

22 that you mentioned to those people and the way you put it in the Mandic

23 case was that in order to comfort these people, you told them about the

24 possibility of an all-for-all exchange in which case "You could get out

25 of this hell." Right?

Page 35168

1 A. Yes. When you talked about comforting those people, I wanted to

2 relieve them of the burden of the hell they were suffering at the time,

3 but if you look up existing documents on both sides, you could tell that

4 there was a lot of activity being organised in terms of an all-for-all

5 exchange.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The interpreter did not

7 understand the last part of the witness's answer.

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. There's some portion of your answer that the interpreters did not

10 get, Mr. Avlijas, although it -- I can't figure out what might be missing

11 because the answer does look coherent.

12 A. I wanted to say that the word that I used at the time in terms of

13 comforting them, giving them hope, telling them what I knew, but talks

14 were underway, large-scale important talks about an all-for-all exchange

15 on both sides, prisoner exchange, all for all.

16 Q. The transcript did catch that. And once again, as it had been

17 the case in Vogosca, you didn't know whether these people were civilians

18 or not. In this case in Ilijas, you were told -- you learned that the

19 population -- here's what you said. Apparently that population was

20 captured during combat. That's what you said in the Stanisic-Zupljanin

21 case based on what you were told by the Crisis Staff; correct? And

22 that --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Yeah. And that you didn't know whether that was true or not?

25 A. I didn't know whether that was true or not but I knew there was

Page 35169

1 fighting going on in Ljesevo, Podlugovi and Luka, Muslim-populated

2 villages. I made that assumption and I also knew some people who were

3 from the area.

4 Q. I'm going to move on to the next visit to the field which is

5 reflected in your statement, and that was the trip to Herzegovina on the

6 18th or -- through the 20th of August which is referred to at

7 paragraph 57 of your statement, and I understand from your statement that

8 that was the first time that someone from the central government visited

9 the collection centres. It says:

10 "This is the first time that someone from the central government

11 visited the collection centres and at the intervention of the president

12 of the republic."

13 Now, I asked you before about the impetus for your visit to

14 Vogosca and Ilijas. In this case, you refer to this as being part of the

15 activity that is reflected in paragraphs 54 through 57 in the --

16 beginning in the early part of August 1992; correct?

17 So you refer in paragraphs 54 through 57 to the Presidency and

18 government meetings concerning categorising prisoners and then you go on

19 to talk about your tasking in Herzegovina. And all of that, Mr. Avlijas,

20 was the result, was it not, of the international outcry that followed the

21 media entry into Omarska and Keraterm and the publicising of stories and

22 photographs.

23 A. I can't say really whether that was due to any pressure from the

24 international community. I was not a high-ranking political leader in

25 Republika Srpska. I know that I carried out tasks given to me by my

Page 35170

1 minister who in turn was given these tasks by the government or the

2 Presidency. I had a job to do and we were also told there was pressure

3 being exerted on the leaders of Republika Srpska and all sorts of things

4 happening all over the place. Among other things, in my testimony I

5 talked about a specific example, pressure being exerted in Geneva on

6 President Karadzic and Dragan Kalinic. Pressure because there were

7 stories circulating that there were camps around that were being set up

8 again and still operating. And then after that, there was this

9 government initiative to set up groups that would be sent to the field to

10 investigate the matter.

11 Q. Your statement, Mr. Avlijas, also suggests that not only was that

12 the first time that someone from the central government went out to the

13 camps, but that until then, you said:

14 "We did not have any information about the events that took place

15 the length and breadth of Republika Srpska."

16 Now, this Court has received evidence, Mr. Avlijas, from a number

17 of sources, among other things, a letter that deputy or assistant

18 minister of the MUP Tomo Kovac wrote to the president and the

19 prime minister on August 8th noting that people were not being properly

20 categorised, including civilians, and proposing that the status of these

21 people be changed to comply with international law. Were you -- that

22 was -- were you aware of that letter by Mr. Kovac and that position?

23 And that's by the way P1100.

24 A. The first I hear of Mr. Kovac's letter, but on that same subject,

25 if I may, I could perhaps provide a comment. There was a meeting in

Page 35171

1 Banja Luka in August 1992. The vice-president of the government,

2 Milan Trbojevic, myself and Mr. Zupljanin were adamant at that meeting

3 that one should check the camps to see who was a prisoner, who was not a

4 prisoner, who was responsible, who was to be prosecuted, and who wasn't,

5 that there should be a triage. So that was one of the conclusions

6 reached at the Banja Luka meeting. As for Mr. Kovac's letter, I can't

7 say I ever heard of it.

8 Q. And your minister, Mr. Mandic, was shown this letter during the

9 course of his testimony before this Court and stated that he considered

10 it hypocritical because Mr. Kovac was well aware of this -- was well

11 aware before this of the situation he described. And Mr. Mandic went on

12 to explain that such information was received on a daily basis.

13 So were you -- do you claim that you were not privy to the

14 regular information about the problem with civilians in camps and

15 categorisation that Mr. Mandic testified about?

16 A. I was not privy to that. It wasn't the nature of my work. This

17 wasn't one of my daily dealings. It was only occasionally whenever a

18 problem cropped up because of the nature of my work, because of my

19 natural eloquence and my knowledge of the subject, the minister would

20 appoint me as a member of the commission who would be sent out into the

21 field, not because I had anything to do with the prisoners.

22 Q. In any event you did go to Herzegovina as you indicated in your

23 statement and alluded to during your examination-in-chief. Now --

24 A. Just to answer that question, I went to Herzegovina because that

25 was decided by the Government of Republika Srpska. They appointed a

Page 35172

1 commission that was sent out to investigate the matter.

2 Q. Earlier in your -- is this -- this document which was previously

3 65 ter 11044 and was -- is an associated exhibit, this is headed "To the

4 Government of Serb Republic, report," and starts:

5 "According to the decision of the Government of the Serb

6 Republic, Slobodan Avlijas and Goran Saric were appointed to visit places

7 in SAO Herzegovina," and we see your signature and Mr. Saric's signature

8 on the back.

9 But this -- this is -- this is the report; right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. And there's no other report about what was happening in

12 Herzegovina about the camps, this was it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. No.

16 Q. Before I move on from there, I just wanted to ask you one

17 question about one part of this report because you referred to it earlier

18 and that's your visit to Bileca, and you stated that you were told by

19 authorities there that all the male Muslims had been gathered up and were

20 being -- for their safety; is that right?

21 A. Yes. That's right.

22 Q. And yet, Mr. Avlijas, these -- I'm going to suggest to you, as

23 the Prosecutor in the Stanisic-Zupljanin case did, that that is not

24 compatible with two things. First of all, you recommended, as it says

25 here in the report, that the people over the age of 60 should be

Page 35173

1 released. And as the Prosecutor in Stanisic-Zupljanin asked you, if they

2 were being -- if they were there for their safety, why would you

3 recommend that the most vulnerable among them be sent out and exposed to

4 danger?

5 A. There was probably a misinterpretation of the reports, because

6 in -- when I visited these places I also introduced the conventions. I

7 told them about the conventions and the provisions of the conventions

8 that elderly and women and children are not to be detained, because

9 that's probably where this arises from, this misunderstanding, because

10 wherever I went I always said, "Gentlemen, you just must know one thing.

11 You are not allowed to detain people over 60 years of age, women or

12 children."

13 Q. Not much room for misunder --

14 A. And if I may just add one thing. Perhaps the best commentary on

15 the situation in Bileca is something that the people who were detained

16 there could provide.

17 Q. And also with respect to the safety issue, as you testified in

18 the Lalovic case, the wives of those men in the -- who were being -- it

19 says here accommodated at the SJB -- who were there at the SJB were still

20 out in -- in the communities, completely exposed to the danger that

21 these -- that all the men who had been rounded up were supposedly being

22 protected from; right?

23 A. Well, that is your assessment. Few people would target women.

24 What they -- they were looking for men. Paramilitaries when they

25 recruited they looked for men, but there was also -- it was much easier

Page 35174

1 to protect women than men, because I remained there and talked with those

2 people. I spent an hour and a half there to talk to the people, ask them

3 about their problems, to put them in touch with their families. I asked

4 them whether they had ever been mistreated, whether they had enough food,

5 and no one complained, not one of them.

6 Q. Let's move on to your next visit to the field and that was the

7 trip that you took to various places culminating in the report of the

8 22nd of October, 1992. Now, again I want to ask you about the impetus

9 for that meeting and, as you testified in Stanisic-Zupljanin, there was

10 pressure after a meeting in Geneva from the -- in this case the ICRC;

11 right? Well, you think the ICRC but you mentioned specifically

12 Madam Ogata; correct?

13 A. Yes, I did mention that because that's how it was presented to me

14 and the minister, my minister, mentioned the places that I was supposed

15 to visit because they were critical because the information about Brcko

16 was that it was horrible, about Zvornik, Vlasenica, Prijedor. So

17 according to those instructions I started with Hadzici, Ilidza,

18 Vlasenica, Brcko, and Prijedor. These were the locations that I was

19 supposed to visit.

20 Q. And this report is P1607. The report is P1607. I just wanted to

21 ask you a few questions about that report. First of all, the first

22 section refers to Vlasenica and discusses a camp in a place called Luke.

23 I just want you to confirm as you did in the Stanisic-Zupljanin case that

24 that was a reference to Susica camp; correct?

25 A. Susica.

Page 35175

1 Q. Yeah. Thank you for the improved pronunciation. The answer is

2 yes; correct? Thank you.

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. Now, there's also item 4 a discussion about Prijedor, and as I

5 understand it, the information contained there was obtained during a

6 meeting involving a number of officials from Prijedor including

7 Milomir Stakic, Dr. Kovacevic, Simo Drljaca, and Srdjo Srdic.

8 A. Yes, and Srdja Srdic, yes.

9 Q. Now, with -- you also address Sanski Most in that report. And

10 there you say the information that there is a camp in Sanski Most is not

11 correct. In that area only four people were taken prisoner and

12 transferred to the Manjaca camp during combat activities.

13 Now, Mr. Avlijas, although on its face it would suggest that you

14 were saying that only four people had ever been taken prisoner in

15 Sanski Most, you clarified in the Stanisic-Zupljanin case that you were

16 only talking about how many Muslim prisoners remained after the others,

17 well over a thousand, had been transferred to Manjaca; right?

18 A. At the time of my report they were all in Manjaca. I was

19 interested in Sanski Most, but I was unable to get there because of the

20 fighting. The information about the four men I received from the

21 security officer, so it wasn't direct knowledge of mine. It was

22 something that I learned indirectly, and I believe I said so in my

23 Zupljanin-Stanisic testimony. So this wasn't direct first-hand

24 information, but because I was supposed to go from Prijedor to

25 Sanski Most and was unable to, so I contacted the responsible persons who

Page 35176

1 were privy to the information and that's the information that I received

2 from them.

3 Q. Right. I think as you testified in Stanisic-Zupljanin, you -- at

4 15268, you spoke to a security officer from the Krajina Corps and then

5 said:

6 "There was no reason for me to disbelieve him," and "I had no

7 time ..."

8 A. Yes. Yes.

9 Q. Now, in this same report you refer to visits to Ilidza and

10 Hadzici and I wanted to ask you some questions about those. The Hadzici

11 section, which is found at the back of the report, item 10, states that

12 90 prisoners of war are accommodated in the Hadzici sports centre. Now,

13 those 90 prisoners were people who had been taken prisoner back in

14 May 1992 by the army, right? You testified to that at 15629 of the

15 Stanisic-Zupljanin case.

16 A. Well, who else could have arrested them if not the army, military

17 formations or the police? Well, some of those. Some -- I don't know who

18 arrested them, but someone from the armed forces arrested them, and they

19 were in Kula when they were arrested. Now, as for the group of 90 -- may

20 I continue? Well, the group of 90 men that I found in the sports hall in

21 Hadzici was a group that had been brought from Koviljaca in Ilidza

22 municipality. That's on the border with Herceg-Bosna and Kiseljak where

23 an exchange had fell through and they were there at night and they

24 couldn't be returned to their original place. Now you can see -- you can

25 look at the date. By that time, half of the men had already been

Page 35177

1 exchanged.

2 Q. Yeah. Let me stop you because I wanted to move through it

3 slightly more chronologically and get --

4 A. Very well.

5 Q. -- to that point. Now, after having been taken prisoner in

6 May 1992, they were first in the sports centre, then transferred to Kula

7 where they stayed until September, October when this failed exchange that

8 you just referred to took place; right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And before their transfer to Kula, these people had been

11 "viciously mistreated," those were your words, in Hadzici. As you put it

12 in another part of your testimony in Stanisic-Zupljanin:

13 "They had gone through horrific torture by paramilitaries in

14 Hadzici."

15 A. I'm a man who lived for 17 years in Hadzici. When the Hadzici

16 people were brought to Kula, to the camp, I had a moral obligation as a

17 citizen, as a person living in that town, because there were a lot of

18 friends among them, my son's best friend. So I had a moral obligation to

19 visit those people, because they saw their chance when they heard that I

20 was there. I know -- I asked the authorities, the guards who secured

21 them, and we weren't the ones who did that. The police did. I asked

22 them to let me get inside, and then I talked to those men and they told

23 me about the difficulties and the problems they had with these people but

24 not at the hands of the locals but from these members from various

25 paramilitary groups that kept coming to Hadzici. So that was why I

Page 35178

1 intervened. I intervened that those people be removed from Hadzici as

2 soon as possible and so that they could be helped.

3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not get the last portion.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may intervene in the

5 transcript. There are several comments.

6 JUDGE KWON: Probably, Mr. Avlijas, you are speaking too fast,

7 way too fast. The interpreter did not get the last portion of your

8 answer. Could you repeat it.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My apologies. I will do my best.

10 JUDGE KWON: Did you say anything after having said:

11 "I intervened that those people be removed from Hadzici as soon

12 as possible and so that they could be helped"?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said this in the context of my

14 earlier story. These were people I knew. I lived there, and I knew the

15 difficulties they had and the things they suffered at the hands of the

16 paramilitaries before they were moved to Kula. Now, this was a group of

17 prisoners who had been returned to the same place from which they had

18 been taken to Kula after two or three months because of this failed

19 exchange, so I begged these people be removed from there for their own

20 safety.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First, in his answer on page 86,

23 the word "arrested" is used repeatedly, but the witness did not say

24 "arrested." He said "taken prisoner." And also on page 87, the witness

25 said the people who suffered not at the hands of the locals and the army

Page 35179

1 but at the hands of the paramilitaries. And one more thing, he said that

2 he exchanged kisses and embraced those people who were detained there.

3 So not at the hands of the local authorities or the army but at the hands

4 of the paramilitaries. We can ask the witness to confirm this.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we continue, Mr. Tieger.

7 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.

8 Q. Now, you referred more that once to these people as friends, you

9 talked about exchanging kisses and embraces with them, and you said the

10 same thing in Stanisic-Zupljanin:

11 "I had a lot of friends there who found themselves in this

12 misfortunate situation."

13 That's at 15631.

14 Now, can -- can I assume based on the fact that you were friends

15 with them, Mr. Avlijas, that these were not a group of Islamic

16 fundamentalists or Muslim extremists?

17 A. I did not see them in that light. Either I did not -- that's not

18 how I perceived them. How could I perceive them as a fundamentalist or

19 extremist when they were friends that I had socialised with for years,

20 for 30 years or so? They were true friends. These were -- these were

21 friends that I had socialised with for many years and I helped them not

22 as --

23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the name of the

24 person that the witness is referring to.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So I could not see him in that

Page 35180

1 light. The best part of my life is when I lived there and I will never

2 forget the citizens of Hadzici. When my two parents died the entire town

3 came to see them.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The name Nermin did not make it

5 into the transcript.

6 MR. TIEGER:

7 Q. I think I remember that name Nermin, Mr. Avlijas. He was

8 somebody who --

9 A. Nermin and Alem.

10 Q. Am I correct that he was someone who was actually crying when --

11 when he met you and --

12 A. We were both crying. We both cried when we met. And the most

13 moving scene was when I found the best friend of my son's. Of course we

14 cried. He said, "Uncle Slobo, can you help me?" And I said, "Well, son,

15 this -- it's wartime and of course I will find a way to help you. You

16 cannot expect me to take you by the hand and just take you out with all

17 these extremists being present there." And I even had to help my own

18 people on several occasions because the times were such. These

19 paramilitaries, they were dangerous 24 hours a day. There wouldn't be

20 any time when they would put away their rifle.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Extremists on all three sides.

22 That's something that did not -- that was not recorded in the transcript.

23 And I would really appreciate the witness to speak a bit slower because

24 important things are omitted from the transcript.

25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue.

Page 35181

1 MR. TIEGER:

2 Q. And again you were told that these were people who had been

3 captured in areas where combat was taking place or something to that

4 effect; right?

5 A. Well, you see, if you're referring to this group of people, there

6 was fighting in the entire area of Hadzici municipality, both in the town

7 itself and outside. These were attacking, the others were defending

8 themselves, so there was shelling all the time and combat all the time.

9 Now whether these people were in fact prisoners of war, military

10 prisoners or not, I really can't answer that question.

11 Q. Right. And you didn't make any effort at the time to determine

12 whether their confinement was illegal and whether they should be

13 immediately released, notwithstanding the fact that they were crying and

14 begging for help.

15 A. Look, I was just a simple man who came to do my job on the

16 28th of May. They came in mid-June. I -- I didn't have an office or

17 anything. I did not belong to any political option. I was left without

18 any work in 1992. I was a man who was in hiding until May because I was

19 afraid, and I also had to hide my son. So I was not in any position nor

20 did I have any function so that I could intervene and tell anyone to do

21 anything. You know, at that time whoever said anything, they did not

22 fare well. You needed to be very wise to keep your skin.

23 I was just a lawyer and I was in charge of penal and correctional

24 facilities. So at that time it was bizarre, the position that I was in.

25 People tried to use my previous reputation when I was the president of

Page 35182

1 the court and when I was a municipal legal officer, so that's how people

2 saw me, what I was before the war. And knowing me and what kind of

3 person I was, they thought that I could help them too, and as a human

4 being I did my best to help them, not as a person who was in any

5 possession in the judicial system to help them.

6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the last portion

7 of the answer.

8 JUDGE KWON: Again your last part wasn't heard.

9 MR. TIEGER: I don't know there's anyway to retrieve it,

10 Mr. President. We can play the tape back but I just fear if we ask

11 again, we'll get a --

12 JUDGE KWON: I think we should --

13 MR. TIEGER: -- repetition of the entire answer.

14 JUDGE KWON: We heard sufficient answer. Let's proceed.

15 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

16 Q. I wanted to ask you a few questions, then, about Kula,

17 Mr. Avlijas. Now your statement indicates that you were there. It's

18 also correct that Mr. Mandic had an office there, right? And that's what

19 you testified to in the Lalovic case. Sorry. I know you're nodding your

20 head affirmatively, but if you can just say yes orally instead -- okay.

21 A. Yes. Yes.

22 Q. And Kula was secured by the police, by the MUP; correct? You

23 also testified to that in Lalovic?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, just a couple of questions about who was confined in Kula.

Page 35183

1 You already mentioned the presence of people from Hadzici, and you

2 clarified in the Mandic trial that it wasn't the entire population of

3 Hadzici that was imprisoned at Kula, but "the group was fairly large

4 group." And that's at Mandic, page 39; right?

5 A. I agree.

6 Q. And in addition among the people who were in Kula during the time

7 you were there were people who were "collected" from Dobrinja, from

8 Grbavica, and those residents were taken to Kula. I think your quote

9 was.

10 "You know that after the attacks then, when they collected people

11 from Dobrinja, from Grbavica, and these residents were taken to Kula."

12 And that was at -- that's what you testified to in the Lalovic

13 case, right, about some of the people who were present in Kula?

14 A. I stand by what I said.

15 Q. Now, as I understand it again from your Lalovic testimony, for

16 the most part you could not approach these people and speak to them about

17 their situation, how they got there, how they were doing, and so on?

18 A. I didn't quite understand your question. How the prisoners of

19 war got there or ...

20 Q. I understood from your Lalovic testimony at English page 24 that

21 you couldn't approach the prisoners and speak about their situation;

22 right? That's what you testified to at that page.

23 A. Correct. Correct.

24 Q. And you really didn't know about the conditions, for example, you

25 didn't know how many meals per day the prisoners got.

Page 35184

1 A. Up until the 1st of August, 1992, the detained persons were

2 guarded by the officials of the internal affairs which was proved in this

3 case. We could only access them with the approval of the chief of the

4 centre. And when I went the to visit the Hadzici people, I asked -- I

5 appealed with the minister to allow me, to enable me to get in there.

6 There was no other way I could get there.

7 Now, as soon as you detain a person, it's not a pleasant

8 condition, but the conditions were, relatively speaking, satisfactory.

9 The food, I know that we had breakfast at 8.00, and then as we were

10 leaving that cafeteria, they were coming in. So the food that we were

11 served was the food they were served. It was the same. But we ourselves

12 didn't have much food. We lived there off of a farm that was -- there

13 was a pig farm and a chicken farm and some vegetables available there and

14 that's what we used as food. Later on, the Red Cross came and they

15 assisted us with foodstuffs. So there was --

16 Q. I just want to clarify one thing and I know in your statement you

17 indicated that there was a sort of a common cauldron, but you were asked

18 about that in the Mandic case too and you clarified there at page 29 that

19 you simply were not in a position "because it wasn't my area of

20 jurisdiction" to know how many meals per day, "two or three, believe me,

21 I don't know, because it wasn't my area of" -- okay.

22 A. No. I wasn't there. It wasn't part of my job and I couldn't

23 know that.

24 Q. And as we discussed with previous situations where you

25 encountered persons being held, you assert that you could not say

Page 35185

1 precisely what their status was, civilian or combatant. And in that

2 regard, you were shown a document during the course of the

3 Stanisic-Zupljanin case reflecting that 114 persons in Kula were moved to

4 the Vrbanja Bridge area and sent into the city down Sokolovic Street,

5 persons who had been in Kula since the 12th of May. And that's P1151.

6 And in answering questions about that, first you -- about that

7 particular document, first you explained the general geography of the

8 area where the Vrbanja Bridge was, where Sokolovic Street was, and then

9 you said:

10 "There must have been an assessment to the effect that they no

11 longer needed to be kept in custody throughout the war. All exchanges

12 took place along separate lines, and the bridge on Vrbanja was a central

13 location where forces, people moved from Republika Srpska into the

14 federation and back. This is where civilians were usually released and

15 exchanged."

16 And that's at transcript 15581 through 82.

17 Can you confirm that was your testimony in the Stanisic-Zupljanin

18 case, sir?

19 A. Well, there is no reason not to confirm it. Perhaps I need to

20 explain something. During the fighting in Dobrinja I, II, III, and IV,

21 there were mass escapes. People fled to the -- to the KPD in order to

22 find shelter there, but then there was a separation. The people were

23 separated and taken, those 200 or so that you mentioned, they were taken

24 to the Vrbanja Bridge, because even if someone wanted to keep them there,

25 it would not be possible. These were just regular citizens. There were

Page 35186

1 people, men, women, elderly people.

2 Q. All right. In paragraph 37 of your statement, you discuss the

3 Koricanske Stijene event, and you talk about a meeting you attended in

4 Banja Luka where a discussion was held about what you describe as an

5 incident that took place there, and you explain that the president of the

6 Municipal Assembly Radic and the military insisted that perpetrators of

7 the crime be arrested and processed. You indicate your recollection that

8 the meeting determined that the crime was committed by a breakaway group

9 of policemen on their own volition, and "Simo Drljaca informed us that

10 these policemen were on the run." You recall an investigation was

11 ongoing. Zupljanin said he had formed a team and a criminal report was

12 filed, and that Drljaca said he tried to arrest the perpetrators but they

13 were on the run and subject to a search warrant. And the statement goes

14 on to talk about Trnopolje as part of a further discussion at that

15 meeting.

16 So I wanted to talk to you then about where this statement stops

17 and what other information you've provided to this Court or other courts

18 in other cases.

19 First of all, let me identify the persons who were present at

20 that meeting and you've previously testified that among the persons

21 present beyond Mr. Radic were Milan Trbojevic, the vice minister of the

22 government; Dragan Kalinic, the minister of health; and Bogdan Subotic,

23 the minister of defence; correct?

24 A. Yes. I think that Bogdan Subotic was there well.

25 Q. You mentioned that Stojan Zupljanin and Simo Drljaca were there,

Page 35187

1 also Mr. Radic and also some basic and district prosecutors. Right?

2 A. The presidents of the county courts were there, then the

3 municipal prosecutor, the representative of Banja Luka, and a person from

4 the Banja Luka Corps. It was a meeting attended by the most senior

5 persons from the Banja Luka region.

6 Q. Okay. The existence or the fact that this crime and the fact

7 that it had been committed by members of the SJB Prijedor commanded by

8 Simo Drljaca was no secret; right? And that's what you testified to in

9 the Stanisic-Zupljanin case. Let's -- quote:

10 "... let's not reinvent the wheel here. The entire RS knows that

11 it was done by members of the SJB in Prijedor, commanded by

12 Simo Drljaca."

13 A. Yes. Literally we say "hot water."

14 Q. Okay. And that's at T15659. And then you said further about how

15 well it was known.

16 "It is no secret at all, and it was known on that day of the

17 meeting. The entire Krajina and all of the RS knew that the police

18 station, or SJB, I'm not sure of the exact name at the time, was in

19 charge of escorting a civilian convoy, a convoy of civilian population, I

20 think predominantly of Muslim ethnicity ..."

21 A. Prijedor.

22 Q. Okay. In fact you said the only thing that wasn't known is

23 whether it was active-duty officers or reserve police officers who had

24 done it. There was no -- quote:

25 "There was no doubt about whether or not the crime had been

Page 35188

1 committed or not. Everything was known."

2 Right?

3 A. Yes. Yes. I have nothing to add.

4 Q. Then you went on to say in Stanisic-Zupljanin, if it had been --

5 this is a quote.

6 "... if it had been a well-functioning state, Simo Drljaca should

7 have been locked up. If there is command responsibility in a

8 well-functioning state, then there can be no discussion about it."

9 Right?

10 A. Yes, but I said one more thing that probably was not recorded.

11 The chance of arresting Simo Drljaca at that point in time was very poor

12 given the security situation in the RS. Simo Drljaca had built an image

13 of a warlord in the Krajina at the time. So tactics what was required.

14 But very soon after that, Simo Drljaca was no longer the chief of the

15 Prijedor police administration.

16 Q. He was actually somebody who went to the exchange commission

17 along with you and also an assistant minister of police, of the MUP;

18 right?

19 A. I don't know if he was assistant minister. He may have been for

20 a very short while until he was replaced, but he was a member of the

21 exchange commission, one who never attended a meeting. And I think, but

22 I cannot be fully sure, that he very soon left the RS and spent most of

23 his time at Zlatibor. Anyway, that -- those were the stories that I

24 heard.

25 Q. In the course of the Stanisic-Zupljanin case where you also made

Page 35189

1 the point as you have -- as you did a moment ago about Mr. Drljaca as

2 image of warlord or something to that effect in the Stanisic-Zupljanin

3 case, you were confronted with the fact that Prijedor was in the vicinity

4 of the 1st Krajina Corps and all of its troops. You were confronted with

5 the fact that the MUP had very well armed, well trained and well equipped

6 special units. And essentially you were confronted with the fact that it

7 was certainly physically possible to arrest Mr. Drljaca had there been

8 any will to do so; right?

9 And what you said at that time was: "What I'm --" I'll just tell

10 you what you said and you can expand on it if you want.

11 "What I'm saying is had the state been functioning properly, he

12 should have been arrested. Why wasn't he arrested? I don't know. I'm

13 answering you in such a way ... what I would have done had I been in

14 power, for instance."

15 Can you confirm that's what you said?

16 A. I confirm that I said that, and I've been trying all the time to

17 say that from this distance in time, we cannot look upon the RS as a

18 state who had come to high positions and who were nobodies before. They

19 had no experience with running a state. A state, a real state, which

20 executes all its remit, in such a state there is no doubt that

21 Simo Drljaca would have been arrested immediately after the crime at

22 Koricanske Stijene, because he tarnished the honour of the Serbian

23 soldier and there can be no justification for that.

24 Q. And during the course of your testimony in the Stanisic-Zupljanin

25 case, when asked about this very issue and describing something similar

Page 35190

1 to what you're saying now, you said that the problem was -- or laid the

2 problem at the doorstep of the SDS. So when you were talking about the

3 difference in a well -- what would happen in a well-functioning state but

4 what happened in this case, then you -- you added:

5 "And I can say openly ... that I told the investigators when they

6 asked me about staffing and dealing with personnel issues, it was the SDS

7 that was consulted about everything, and I asked whether -- or, rather, I

8 was asked whether a minister could appoint anyone, and I answered that he

9 could when he got approval to do so."

10 That's what you said in Stanisic-Zupljanin at page 15665; right?

11 A. I stand by that statement.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. And then you also said one page later, it had to be carefully

15 considered what to do when replacing people, and:

16 "... I believe it was the SDS's fault that they didn't allow the

17 professionals to do their work."

18 Correct? You stated that as well.

19 A. Those are my thoughts. I may have been wrong, but it is my

20 conviction that they remained fully professional, but unfortunately the

21 RS at the outset didn't have any kind of organisation, but both

22 Crisis Staffs and municipalities and everything else was built as we were

23 going along. If professionals had been in positions of responsibility,

24 such things would never have happened. Wherever there were professionals

25 in such positions, in the federation with the Bosniaks or on our side,

Page 35191

1 the likelihood of such things occurring would have been minimal.

2 Q. And perhaps last question, let me just check one thing very

3 quickly, sir.

4 And last question. Were you aware that on the 26th of November,

5 1993, Dr. Karadzic awarded the Petar Mrkonjic medal to the police station

6 in Prijedor and the Karadjordjeva medal to the former head and now

7 assistant in the Ministry of Interior, Simo Drljaca. Did you know that,

8 sir?

9 A. I didn't. No, I don't know that.

10 MR. TIEGER: And that's P4261. And I have no further questions.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have re-examination?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please proceed.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic;

16 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Avlijas, let us start with the last thing

17 the Prosecutor dealt with. You speak about it in paragraph 37 also. And

18 you mentioned that Drljaca, in your opinion, should have been held

19 responsible on the basis of command responsibility. Did you learn about

20 any information that he actively participated in that crime? Not only

21 that the perpetrators were under his command, that he actually commanded

22 the crime.

23 A. No. At the meeting he said that it was a group of breakaway

24 policemen who committed that crime. So there was no order to commit it.

25 When the centre chief, Stojan Zupljanin, informed those present that he

Page 35192

1 had filed criminal charges against unknown perpetrators -- and last time

2 I said that it was a matter to -- a matter for Mr. Puaca, the district

3 prosecutor for Banja Luka, to deal with.

4 Q. Now, the witness said "breakaway police officer." Did you say

5 "breakaway" or "regular"?

6 A. Breakaway, renegade, because this term "breakaway" or "renegade"

7 police officers was used all the time.

8 Q. Thank you. At that meeting, you stated that legal steps were

9 taken. Did you know that anything had been done to cover up that crime?

10 A. No, at no point in time. All those present were -- were

11 appalled, and they said that we won't let a group of criminals to tarnish

12 the whole Krajina. It was very emotional.

13 Q. Thank you. On page 98 of today's transcript, you said that -- it

14 was not recorded that there was no functioning system in place. This was

15 not recorded. Can you tell the Trial Chamber whether the leaders of the

16 RS favoured that situation for this -- the dysfunctionment of the system,

17 and what was the attitude of both me and the Presidency in that respect?

18 A. Based on a number of guidelines, orders, instructions, and other

19 regulations, it can clearly be seen that the president and the government

20 made efforts for the state to function in order with our rules and

21 regulations. However, how that was implemented on the ground, I cannot

22 tell.

23 Q. Thank you. When you were saying that state institutions were

24 being built from scratch, do explain to the Trial Chamber what we were

25 able to keep once Bosnia-Herzegovina had fallen apart and why we had to

Page 35193

1 start from scratch.

2 A. Well, the whole infrastructure was in Sarajevo. We didn't even

3 have desks or chairs, let alone rules and regulations and everything

4 else. So we had to start by drafting laws, and everything we were able

5 to keep was left intact. And then we went to Montenegro because they had

6 the same rules and regulations as Bosnia-Herzegovina had had. And then

7 we went law by law, regulation by regulation, and so on, and that's how

8 we worked from the very outset.

9 Q. Please make a pause between question and answer, and do enunciate

10 the way I do so that everything can be recorded.

11 On page 95, you were asked about civilians who were -- who found

12 refuge in the KPD. Were those civilians evicted to Sarajevo against

13 their will?

14 A. No. There was widespread horror at the beginning of the war. We

15 didn't -- people didn't know where the border was, where the fighting

16 was. People were fleeing in order to preserve their lives. If you cut

17 off somebody's way of retreat, for example, the Muslims to flee to town,

18 it is normal for people to escape to where some infrastructure was to

19 save themselves. Many people were left behind and they wanted to join

20 their families, and the place to meet the families was the

21 Vrbanja Bridge. Many Serbs -- Serbs were leaving Sarajevo and the others

22 were moving in the opposite direction.

23 Q. Thank you. It was said that those people were civilians from

24 Dobrinja and Grbavica. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how far the war

25 zone was from Dobrinja or Grbavica?

Page 35194

1 A. In Dobrinja there was a -- Dobrinja was in fact a war zone, and

2 Grbavica was along the Miljacka River. So we're talking about streets, a

3 distance measured in streets.

4 Q. Concerning these departures upon request, were the Presidency or

5 the government in a position to forbid that, and how would that have

6 looked with regard to the rules and regulations?

7 A. Well, everybody would interpret it the way that suited them. We

8 respected the will of the people to join their families, and I think it's

9 normal for people to go where they feel safer. Once bullets fly around

10 you, you want to be safe. Others saw that as ethnic cleansing. In such

11 situations, it is very difficult to be realistic in assessing people's

12 behaviour.

13 Q. Thank you. Did you ever establish that either the government or

14 the Presidency or I personally supported ethnic cleansing?

15 A. No. That cannot be found in any one document. And if -- nobody

16 has ever ordered me anything of that kind, nor did my ministry deal with

17 anything of the sort. I never heard in the news that somebody -- or that

18 anybody ordered for some village to be cleansed or people to be evicted.

19 Q. Thank you. On page 81, the question was asked why you were sent

20 to the field, wherever. After the first visits, the first audit, it was

21 established that you were very strict. Is that why you were removed from

22 your position or were you criticised from anybody from the government or

23 from the Presidency or myself for being so strict?

24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. No.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was not interpreted

Page 35195

1 well.

2 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. My question is: Was he criticised by me, by anyone from the

5 government, or the ministry for being strict, and was he removed from his

6 position, or was he sent to conduct further audits?

7 A. I continued to do that work, and nobody ever had any objections

8 to my reports. They were submitted to the minister, and I was -- but I

9 was never criticised by the government. I was always very frank and very

10 strict. On the contrary, my minister Jovo Rosic and Minister Kalinic

11 insisted that I be appointed as a member of the commission in April 1993.

12 In November 1993, the 3rd of November, I was appointed assistant

13 minister.

14 Q. Was that a promotion?

15 A. Well, probably somebody valued my work and thought that I was the

16 one who could engage in the work of implementing criminal sanctions

17 because I was a responsible person in my job. Although I must

18 immediately add that I did not belong to any political party.

19 Q. That's what I was going to ask you, but what was your question

20 whether that was -- what is your answer to the question whether that was

21 a promotion?

22 A. Well, yes, of course. I was a coordinator, but in November 1993,

23 I became assistant minister.

24 Q. Did you need a recommendation or the support of the SDS?

25 A. I didn't need any recommendation at the time. The only

Page 35196

1 recommendation was my work and the minister's opinion that nobody was

2 better suited for the job, and the government accepted that.

3 Q. You began to speak about the ways information was received from

4 foreigners and what happens to it later, and then there was talk of

5 pressure. Tell us first whether the information received from

6 international representatives and from the media, especially Muslim

7 media, was true, whether they depicted the situation realistically, or

8 whether they depicted it as being better or worse than in reality.

9 A. We received some information about Vogosca but we immediately

10 refused that. I think it was you, but I'm not sure, or the government

11 gave precise instructions as to which towns should be visited and I went

12 from one to the other, and there was information that there were still

13 camps in Vlasenica, Zvornik and Trnopolje. This stress was on that. In

14 Vlasenica I found nothing. I must be honest, however, and it's mentioned

15 in the statement, too, that there was a collection centre, some facility,

16 warehouse in Susica, and I was informed that everybody had been

17 exchanged. In Zvornik, I told you what I found, and in Brcko there was

18 no one prisoner. I was able to come by a list of everybody who was

19 killed in Brcko. There were about 50 people. And I made a proposal to

20 the government that an identification be carried out by an international

21 mediator.

22 Q. Thank you. Did you notice or did you learn that I reacted and

23 demanded the government and the ministry to do something only due to this

24 pressure, or did I also react to other information?

25 A. It can be seen in the archives that -- or, rather, how many

Page 35197

1 instructions you gave out.

2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't get the last sentence.

3 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your last sentence.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You can tell from the archives that

5 there is -- there were zillions of guidelines, instructions, orders, and

6 other relevant documents showing that President Karadzic took interest in

7 what was going on and that he also issued instructions as to how they --

8 how these prisoners should be treated.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Was that merely a reaction to pressure? And you were going to

11 say it but then you were interrupted.

12 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. When Karadzic is informed, what would he do afterwards with the

15 information?

16 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer. Yes, Mr. Tieger.

17 MR. TIEGER: Well, the first part of the question surely seems to

18 be inviting speculation, and the second part, I haven't seen a basis in

19 this witness's testimony to think he's in a position to answer that.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. All right. I'll rephrase. The pressure occurred in August. Did

22 you see any of my documents before this pressure in August about the need

23 to comply with the law?

24 A. It was the Official Gazette 992 reflecting your order,

25 paragraph 3, saying exactly what steps must be taken in terms of POW

Page 35198

1 treatment. And then Minister Subotic also said in one of his final

2 provisions who was responsible for the treatment of prisoners, the exact

3 list of commanders and all their subordinates.

4 Q. Thank you very much. Can you perhaps remember the exact date and

5 month?

6 A. May 1992.

7 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us about Planjina's tower? Where was it

8 located physically in relation to the bunker?

9 A. That may have been an oversight on our part but nobody asked.

10 When I looked for that facility to put people up, I tried to keep it as

11 far away as I could from the front line. That was something that needed

12 taking into account because, as a matter of fact, they were practically

13 near Zuca itself. Then I wanted something, a building, in the general

14 direction of Semizovac, something that would be further removed from the

15 front lines that would also be fit to hold a remand prison as well as the

16 prisoners there. So we moved them some 10 or 12 kilometres deep, and at

17 this point they ended up being at least 15 kilometres from the actual

18 front lines.

19 Q. Thank you very much. What about Mr. Vlaco, could he do anything

20 without your intercession? Was he in charge of Semizovac, or was it that

21 he had something available to him but it was his intention to not put

22 them up some place better, as simple as that?

23 A. He acted of his own accord and he answered to the Crisis Staff.

24 Therefore I can't say. He probably sought out and found a location for

25 that first accommodation they were given. The rest was done as per

Page 35199

1 instructions, and the Crisis Staff determined that that should be the

2 building used for that purpose. They also asked me whether that was the

3 condition imposed and to be complied with based on the UN conventions on

4 the treatment of prisoners of war.

5 Q. Thank you very much. Can you tell us if the overall Muslim

6 population was placed on remand or imprisoned, and what was the basis for

7 their detention?

8 A. You can't imprison a whole group of people like that, a whole

9 nation. The basis was some people took part in combat and some other

10 people were assisting the BH Territorial Defence in some way. Money,

11 equipment, that kind of thing. And there were some combatants who were

12 actually taken prisoner but who were not at the front line. But they

13 were members of the TO.

14 Q. Thank you very much. Page 66 --

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. -- about that visit to Herzegovina.

18 JUDGE KWON: -- shall we continue tomorrow?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I need no more than five minutes,

20 Your Honour.

21 MR. TIEGER: And I will ask for leave for just one, just very

22 discrete area with two questions.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's continue.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Thank you. Page 66 you were asked about the visit to

Page 35200

1 Herzegovina. You said that you travelled via Niksic. We know where

2 Niksic is but the Chamber doesn't. Could you please explain, why did you

3 take that route and where is Niksic?

4 A. When you travel from Sarajevo to Trebinje the distance is about

5 120 kilometres. For me to reach Trebinje, the circumstances being what

6 they were, I had to take the road from Sarajevo to Zvornik, from Zvornik

7 on to Zlatibor, from Zlatibor to Pljevlja, and then on to Podgorica, and

8 from Podgorica to Niksic. All in all about 1.000 kilometres as opposed

9 to the original 120 in order to reach Bileca, so that was the

10 differential.

11 Q. What about Niksic, Podgorica, Zlatibor, where are all these

12 places?

13 A. Niksic and Podgorica are in Montenegro, and Zlatibor is in

14 Serbia. I had to cross two republics in order to reach my eventual

15 destination, Bileca and Trebinje.

16 Q. Thank you. One more question. You said that the prisoners of

17 war were under the army's jurisdiction. Who had the authority to make

18 decisions concerning civilian prisoners, and who had the power to make

19 decisions about military prisoners? And were there any military judicial

20 bodies at the time when you were on your way to Vogosca?

21 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

23 MR. TIEGER: I just want to see how -- I don't know where -- if

24 this is a reference to the cross-examination, I can't recall a comment or

25 question that was framed in that precise manner, so I just fear that

Page 35201

1 Mr. Karadzic is carving out in his question some distinctions that he

2 hopes to lead the witness to. But I don't -- unless he directs me to it,

3 I don't take that as a fair assessment of the --

4 JUDGE KWON: I think the issue arose during your cross whether

5 certain power fell on the civilian authority including the witness or to

6 the military.

7 MR. TIEGER: I'll say my recollection is that the witness said

8 repeatedly he didn't know the status of those people and then -- but he

9 did talk about who had ordered their confinement.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If you go back to pages 73 and 74,

11 it wasn't just about taking prisoners. It's also about the fate of those

12 people and who could change or influence the position that they were in.

13 He said it wasn't him, it was the judiciary. That he said about the

14 civilian prisoners. Now, I'm asking him about the POWs.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. What section of the army was in a position to affect their

17 circumstances?

18 A. Perhaps you should explain the difference between people being on

19 remand and being prisoners. So remand is one thing and we needn't go

20 into that. That's for the civilian judiciary to deal with. It's the

21 civilian courts that should be dealing with that and deciding on the fate

22 of the persons on remand, awaiting trial. Prisoners are a totally

23 different thing. This has nothing to do with the Law on Criminal

24 Procedure. These persons were under the army's jurisdiction and nobody

25 else's but theirs. For a while at Kula our only task was to make sure