130404IT

Page 36518

1 [Witness answered through interpreter]

2 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

3 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Cekic.

4 A. Good morning.

5 Q. Thank you. Please, yet again I ask you to speak slowly and, most

6 importantly, let us both pause between questions and answers. Yesterday

7 on page 89 in lines 3 through 8, you said that Batkovic was open to the

8 Red Cross and that they came regularly whenever they wished. What did

9 you mean by that?

10 A. Well, what I meant by that was that they came regularly and that

11 no one stopped them from doing so. Once a month they had regular visits;

12 however, like when the prisoners from Srebrenica came, then they would

13 come even every day. When these prisoners would be brought in then the

14 International Red Cross would be informed and they'd come there too.

15 They'd register them and together with us they took care of these people.

16 Q. Thank you. As for the level of the Main Staff, were there any

17 obstacles put in the way of the ICRC and were they stopped from coming to

18 Batkovic?

19 A. As far as I know, no. I usually had announcements from the

20 commander of the 3rd Corps regarding visits of the Red Cross.

21 Q. Thank you. How early in advance would such information arrive?

22 A. Well, for the most part, today for tomorrow.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P5125, could we have that now,

24 please. It's a Prosecution exhibit. P5125. Could this please be zoomed

25 in a bit for the witness and the participants can see the English

Page 36519

1 version.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Could you please explain what this means, the Main Staff is

4 sending this information to the corps:

5 "We hereby inform you that we approve the following travel

6 permits referring to the visits of the ICRC teams to reception centres."

7 Who gave approval? Which is the body that gave the initial

8 consent and then ultimately the Main Staff was supposed to give their

9 approval?

10 A. In our case it was the command of the Eastern Bosnia Corps.

11 Q. Thank you. What about the civilian authorities, was there some

12 structure, if you will, that approved such things?

13 A. Maybe such a body existed, but they did not contact us.

14 Q. Thank you. On that same page, from 20 to 25, there's a reference

15 to that. Could we now look at 65 ter 4001. Please, I'll read it out if

16 it's very small.

17 "The Main Staff on the 1st of December, 1995." They say the

18 following:

19 "In line with the agreement reached with the CZK," it's probably

20 the Red Cross, "on the 30th of November regarding visits to prisons in

21 territories held by the parties to the conflict and the task of the ICRC

22 to visit all the prisons run by the parties to the conflict in order to

23 register prisoners of war, we hereby inform you that prisons in

24 Republika Srpska will be visited according to the below-specified

25 schedule ..."

Page 36520

1 And that is Tunjice, Vlasenica, Batkovic, Kotorsko, Rogatica,

2 Srbinje, and Mali Logor. Further down it says:

3 "Provide access to the mentioned prisons so that the task would

4 fully be carried out, the one agreed with this commission of the CZK."

5 How does this tally with your own understanding of how this

6 service functioned from the level of the Main Staff down to the ground to

7 the units themselves?

8 A. This fully fits in. I see here this is the 4th of December,

9 yes -- no, the 14th. It fits in. For example, in Batkovic they arrived

10 on the 5th of September and then after that they came every month and, if

11 necessary, then there were these extra visits. The information I

12 received from the corps was the following: If they did not provide

13 information and if the ICRC would come and visit, I would just inform the

14 commander of the 3rd Corps, stating that they had arrived and that I

15 should freely allow them to enter and carry out their task.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3242, Your Honours.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Q. Yesterday on transcript page 91 from 13 to 16, it was suggested

21 to you that in 1995 civilians were brought to Batkovic, civilians from

22 Srebrenica, and your answer was that all of those who had been taken

23 prisoner during the breakthrough of the lines were brought in and that

24 these were combatants. Did you know what age the persons mobilised by

25 the BH Army were?

Page 36521

1 A. I did not know and I do not know how old the persons from the

2 BH Army; however, when they were taken prisoner -- well, it wasn't

3 civilians who were taken prisoner at home. It was soldiers who were

4 taken prisoner, soldiers who started the breakthrough. Now, as I said

5 yesterday, whether there were younger persons or older persons with them

6 who had joined the combatants of the BH Army, that is something I don't

7 know. That is one point.

8 Also, they all came wearing civilian clothing, and at first they

9 claimed that they had not taken part in fighting, that they were

10 civilians, and so on and so forth. However, later on in their statements

11 they did say that they were lined up in units before they started the

12 breakthrough. And, finally, we said to them that we would not take any

13 measures regardless of who did take part and who did not take part. If

14 somebody committed crimes, that would be investigated, but they can

15 freely say who had been a combatant and who had not. So on the basis of

16 that we are going to carry out an exchange, then many of them said that

17 they had been combatants and they said which units they had been members

18 of, and so on and so forth. Because they were afraid, they were afraid

19 that they would not be treated specially and they were afraid of drastic

20 measures; however, when they realised that nothing special would happen

21 then they all said -- they all said whether they were combatants or not.

22 Q. Thank you. Was an ordinary prisoner subjected to criminal

23 prosecution?

24 A. No, no. An ordinary prisoner -- actually, if there was some

25 suspicion, then police organs, investigation organs, would carry out an

Page 36522

1 investigation. So if somebody became a suspect, then this person would

2 no longer stay at the collection centre, they would be taken to

3 Vanekov Mlin and then that is where the investigation would be carried

4 out. If it would be proven that they had committed crimes, then judicial

5 proceedings would be instituted. However, if it would be proven that he

6 had not committed any crimes then such a person would be returned to the

7 collection centre and would stay on with the other prisoners.

8 Q. Thank you. You mentioned statements. What is your experience in

9 terms of these statements when exchanges would be carried out for those

10 who were in Batkovici? What was your experience? The statements they

11 gave to their organs and to their media, to what extent were they

12 correct?

13 MR. ZEC: Mr. President, I would object this question. This goes

14 to speculation.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think that the witness did

16 have an opportunity to see that because statements of other persons were

17 raised in the cross-examination.

18 JUDGE KWON: No, I agree with Mr. Zec. Please move on to another

19 topic, Mr. Karadzic.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

21 I'd like to call up 65 ter 2203. This is the 26th of July. Let

22 us see what the report said about these prisoners who were brought to

23 Batkovic. 65 ter 2203.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Can you confirm that the command of the 1st Zvornik Brigade,

Page 36523

1 infantry brigade, is reporting to the Drina Corps? And then here on

2 page 1, paragraph 1, in the middle it says:

3 "In the area of Kozjak a reconnaissance group of the

4 1st Bircanska Brigade carried out an activity and then they were sent to

5 the prison in Batkovic."

6 How does this fit into your own knowledge? What do you say to

7 that? On the 26th of July people were still being taken prisoner in the

8 woods. As for the prisoners that you received from the fighting around

9 Srebrenica, when was that?

10 A. Yes, I know about that. We received prisoners from Srebrenica

11 all the way up until the end of July, that is to say this information is

12 correct, and it is precisely at this time that I received a group of,

13 say, 30 prisoners.

14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, while Judge Lattanzi may be happy with

15 it, but why do we have only French translation?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I believe that there must be

17 an English version somewhere. The Prosecution prepared this document for

18 use. It is their services that prepared this.

19 MR. ZEC: We will check if there's English.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's continue.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3243, Your Honours.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now take a look

25 at 4023, that's the 65 ter number.

Page 36524

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Let us just establish that this is the Zvornik Brigade that is

3 reporting to the command of the Drina Corps; isn't that right? Let us

4 see now what the Drina Corps is reporting to the Main Staff, the same

5 day, the 26th of July, and the Drina Corps is reporting to the

6 Main Staff. This is a regular combat report submitted to the Main Staff

7 of the Army of Republika Srpska. Again, in paragraph 1,

8 last paragraph [as interpreted]:

9 "As for the leftover enemy forces in Srebrenica, during the day

10 34 persons surrendered and were taken to the Batkovic camp."

11 Is that the same group?

12 A. I think it is, 34.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3244, Your Honours.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Cekic, did you notice or did you learn of any planned,

20 intentional commission of evil or violation of laws in relation to

21 prisoners by official persons from the army and state?

22 A. No. During my service, I did not notice that any official

23 committed any crimes against the prisoners. In particular, there were no

24 such cases at the time when I was commander of the collection centre in

25 Batkovic.

Page 36532

1 Mr. Cekic, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the

2 Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.

3 Now you're free to go. Please have a safe journey back home.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 [The witness withdrew]

6 [The witness entered court]

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if -- could the witness make the solemn

8 declaration.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

10 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

11 WITNESS: SLAVKO KRALJ

12 [Witness answered through interpreter]

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Kralj. Please be seated and make

14 yourself comfortable.

15 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

17 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kralj.

18 A. Good morning, Mr. President.

19 Q. I hope to be able to reconcile the two facts that we have a king

20 here, because that's what your last name stands for, and a president.

21 For starters, I would kindly ask you to utter our sentences slowly and

22 pause between question and answer so as to have everything recorded.

23 Mr. Kralj, did you provide a statement to my Defence team?

24 A. Mr. President, I did talk to the Defence team and I provided a

25 statement.

Page 36533

1 Q. Are you aware that the Defence submitted your testimony in --

2 that your testimony was offered in lieu of leading you live now, your

3 testimony from another case?

4 A. Mr. President, during that conversation it was offered to me that

5 my earlier testimony in another case be tendered instead of my statement

6 and I agreed to it.

7 Q. Thank you. The answers you provided in the Popovic case during

8 your testimony, if you were put the same questions today would your

9 answers basically be the same?

10 A. My answers would be identical.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I seek to tender

13 the testimony in question and the attached documents.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We have offered 69 associated

16 exhibits with this testimony and none of them were on our 65 ter list

17 because the witness was added after that list was filed.

18 JUDGE KWON: Last night during the course of -- I'm sorry,

19 yesterday I asked my -- our Chamber staff to convey the message of the

20 Chamber to the parties that certain documents do not form part of --

21 indispensable or inseparable part of the statement. They are 1D7262, I

22 will omit 1 D, 7264, 7271, 7277, 7279, 7283, 7287, 7288, 7292, and 7293.

23 Further, among the associated exhibits additionally tendered in an

24 updated list, updated notice, the Chamber is of the view that 1D7310,

25 7313, and 7314 do not form an indispensable and inseparable -- or

Page 36534

1 inseparable part of the statement. So therefore, if Mr. Karadzic wants

2 to tender those documents, he needs to lead them live.

3 I'd like to hear from you, Ms. Edgerton, whether you have any

4 objection otherwise.

5 MS. EDGERTON: Good morning, Your Honours. No, I have no

6 objection otherwise.

7 JUDGE KWON: So except for those documents I referred to,

8 Mr. Kralj's testimony as well as other associated exhibits will be

9 admitted with the caveat as regards four intercepts; that is, 1D7260,

10 7263, 7265, and 7266. Where the witness is not one of the interlocutors,

11 they will be marked for identification.

12 So shall we give the number for the testimony.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, 65 ter number 1D7206 will be

14 Exhibit D3245.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And all the other associated exhibits

16 will be given numbers in due course by the Registrar.

17 Yes, Mr. Robinson.

18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. Dr. Karadzic will

19 lead a few of those live as well as some additional documents and just

20 for the notice of the Prosecution those three that were on our

21 supplemental list, if they want to lead them they can do that but we

22 won't be doing that. Thank you.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

24 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I

Page 36535

1 would like to read Mr. Slavko Kralj's statement, or rather, a summary

2 thereof in English and then I would lead a few documents live.

3 [In English] Slavko Kralj was a JNA officer who served in a

4 United Nations peacekeeping mission on the Iran-Iraq border in 1989.

5 When the war broke out in Bosnia in 1992, he joined the 1st Krajina Corps

6 of the VRS, where he served as a liaison officer. He remained in that

7 position until November 1994 when he was assigned to the VRS Main Staff

8 in the department for communication with international military

9 representatives. At that time, Mr. Kralj held the rank of major. He was

10 promoted to lieutenant-colonel in mid-1995.

11 His duties in the Main Staff were to acquaint himself with all

12 procedures relating to co-operation with UNPROFOR and other international

13 organisations and to assist his immediate superior, Colonel

14 Milos Djurdjic, in his work with these organisations and in his absence

15 to be able to prepare the required documents and to be able to submit

16 them for processing according to the previously established procedure.

17 Approval of the passage of UNPROFOR military convoys was placed

18 in the hands of the army, while the approval of the passage of

19 humanitarian aid convoys was in the hands of a co-ordinating body

20 attached to the Government of Republika Srpska in Pale and headed by

21 Vice-President Nikola Koljevic. Colonel Djurdjic was a member of that

22 co-ordinating body.

23 They received information that the convoys sometimes contained

24 military equipment destined for the enemy and that certain humanitarian

25 organisations were engaged in intelligence-gathering activities.

Page 36536

1 During the war, the VRS had considerable difficulties convincing

2 the civilian population that the humanitarian convoys should pass,

3 because members of the population believed they were not receiving

4 sufficient aid while the other side was receiving too much aid. There

5 were some incidents at check-points caused by civilians who held this

6 attitude.

7 All of the military organs of power from the president and the

8 president of the Assembly took the position that the convoys of

9 humanitarian aid should be allowed to pass to the other side without

10 obstruction. The procedure for UNPROFOR convoys in 1995 was that the

11 convoy would be announced at least 48 hours in advance. His office would

12 receive the request and process it for approval to the general -- of

13 General Mladic or General Milovanovic. They would signify their approval

14 by placing their initials on the document. If some items were not

15 approved, it would be noted on the document. The document would then be

16 faxed to UNPROFOR as well as to the check-points in the field.

17 The Main Staff's policy was to allow supplies for the enclaves

18 that were truly needed. There was no change of policy towards the

19 enclaves in 1995. He was not familiar with the part of directive 7 which

20 referred to reducing the supplies to the enclaves.

21 In early 1995 the VRS had intelligence that UNPROFOR was sharing

22 some of the fuel it brought in Srebrenica -- into Srebrenica with the

23 BH Army. The VRS also had information that part of humanitarian aid was

24 being delivered to the BH Army in the enclaves. That was one of the

25 reasons why they had to check the convoys. There was a Swedish project

Page 36537

1 in Srebrenica and in 1994 and 1995, the VRS allowed building materials to

2 enter Srebrenica for that project. After the NATO air strikes in

3 May 1995, there was a period of time when convoys were suspended at the

4 direction of UNPROFOR.

5 And that would be the summary of testimony that is admitted

6 instead of live testimony. Now I would like to ask Mr. Kralj several

7 questions and show several documents and Mr. Kralj is also excellent in

8 English.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. According to what you know, the information on illegal materials,

11 materiel, ammunition, and other war assets that were found in the

12 convoys, was that information correct according to what you in the

13 Main Staff learned from the ground?

14 A. Mr. President, all the information that the Main Staff received

15 was correct. The information that concerned the convoys and the abuse of

16 humanitarian aid convoys headed for the enclaves.

17 Q. I would like to call up 1D7323 in e-court.

18 Mr. Kralj, please help us and tell us whether this is a report by

19 the Rogatica Brigade pertaining to the 8th of May, 1994. The report is

20 about the convoy. Please take your time and read the first page.

21 A. This is a report --

22 Q. You don't have to read this aloud, Mr. Kralj.

23 A. Thank you.

24 Q. Towards the bottom of the page you will see that it says that the

25 convoy was stopped and you will see why it was stopped. It says here we

Page 36538

1 explained to them in a civilised way that there was a problem with the

2 cargo, that we had to inform the Main Staff, but that we hoped a swift

3 solution would be found. They reciprocated our fairness by telling us

4 that they understood the situation. Then it says there were

5 consultations with the Main Staff. Can we go to the following page now

6 in English as well.

7 You see here in the middle they looked for bread. They offered

8 us 20 marks. They got the bread but without payment. And then we see

9 that the back of the convoy moved in an authorised manner, the leader of

10 the convoy addressed the Canadians, and they said -- then he said they

11 had messed up completely, that they had made a few mistakes. Can you see

12 that? Towards the bottom.

13 A. I can see that, yes.

14 Q. Can we go to the following page.

15 Do you see here which illegal items were transported, a radio

16 set, antenna satellites, navigation devices? Can you please tell us --

17 lasers. Can you tell us, please, why did the Army of Republika Srpska

18 felt so sensitive to the transport of such assets in the direction of the

19 enemy's side? What were these assets used for?

20 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour --

21 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer.

22 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23 MS. EDGERTON: Before the witness answers, it took some time for

24 us to get to a question, actually. I think that Dr. Karadzic could have

25 asked the question without reading in the whole document or large parts

Page 36539

1 of the document and effectively leading the witness to the answer. And

2 there's not been a single foundational question with regard to this

3 document. Does the witness recognise it? Has the witness had an

4 opportunity to see it? Did he see it at the time? Is it the sort of

5 document he would, in the course of his work with the Main Staff or

6 elsewhere within the 1st Krajina Corps, have received? Did he actually

7 receive it at that time? These are the questions that Dr. Karadzic, in

8 my submission, should be asking the witness before the question that

9 we've just received, which was: Why did the Army of Republika Srpska

10 feel sensitive with respect to the transport of assets? Rather than have

11 the document read to the witness. That's leading and it's inappropriate.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to respond to

13 that?

14 JUDGE KWON: I don't think you need to respond to that. You must

15 appreciate Ms. Edgerton's submission. Why don't you reformulate your

16 question.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Your Excellency. I

18 asked the gentleman whether the information from the ground was correct,

19 the information that reached them. I'm not interested in whether he saw

20 every document. Five or six documents arrived from the same check-points

21 at different times. I'm not asking about the document. I'm asking about

22 the materiel and equipment.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Kralj, why would you say that this document is part of the

25 information that arrived from the ground? What were the reasons for the

Page 36540

1 Army of Republika Srpska to ban the transport of such loads, of such

2 cargos?

3 A. Mr. President, the Army of Republika Srpska did not allow people

4 to bring equipment and assets into the enclave if we knew that they would

5 be used by the Muslim army. This is a blatant example of such assets

6 which were exclusively intended for the Muslim army in the enclave. We

7 were informed about that by our operations organs. They forwarded such

8 documents to us if needed.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

11 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

12 MS. EDGERTON: On what basis?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to respond to

14 that?

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness was called to testify

17 to the kind of procedure that was in place for the convoys. It says in

18 the indictment that I, my services, or my army obstructed those convoys

19 for reasons which were not militarily justified, i.e., for criminal

20 reasons. I would like to use this witness to shed some light on those

21 reasons. Were there enough reasons for the Army of Republika Srpska to

22 put a halt to some of those convoys? We heard a representative of an

23 international organisation who said that --

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- they had very few problems in

Page 36541

1 view of the fact that there was over 700 such vehicles moving around

2 Republika Srpska on a daily basis --

3 JUDGE KWON: There should be no problem with you leading the

4 witness to that effect, but what did you ask the witness about this

5 document? What did the witness say about this document? That's the

6 point Ms. Edgerton raised.

7 Yes, Mr. Robinson.

8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. The witness did say that this

9 was an example of -- consistent with what he had said both in his

10 testimony, and that part of the testimony is at page 293 -- excuse me,

11 29238 and 29241 of the transcript from Popovic, in which he said that

12 they had received information that convoys sometimes contained military

13 equipment destined for the enemy and that certain humanitarian

14 organisations were engaged in intelligence-gathering activities. And so

15 this witness at page 23, line 23, basically said that this is an example

16 of -- and consistent with what he had said in his testimony.

17 JUDGE KWON: When I asked Mr. Karadzic to reformulate his

18 question after having heard Ms. Edgerton's objection, he didn't put some

19 proper questions because it was read out, it was a very much leading

20 question. So I expected some foundational question. But in this case

21 we'll admit this document.

22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3302, Your Honours.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Now, I have a few documents from the same check-points. They

Page 36542

1 were issued at different times. I don't know what the position of the

2 Chamber is with this regard. May I, for example, be allowed to call up

3 1D7262? That document was issued a year later and the Trial Chamber was

4 of the opinion that this should be led live, 1D7262.

5 And while we are waiting, Mr. Kralj, let me ask you this: How

6 often, if at all, were there cargos which were not admissible? Were

7 these exceptions? How often did you receive information to the effect

8 that those things were happening at one of the check-points?

9 A. Mr. President, the check-points had the following obligation.

10 Through the brigade reports they were supposed to say what the situation

11 was regarding the passage of convoys. As concerns regular convoy

12 passage, there weren't particular explanations provided except that such

13 and such a convoy passed through. And if something happened that had not

14 been authorised or allowed, then that would be additionally explained in

15 a document regarding that particular matter. There were such incidents,

16 but it didn't happen all the time and it didn't happen excessively.

17 Q. Thank you. It says here in paragraph 3:

18 "The UNHCR convoy from Karakaj to Zepa which arrived at the

19 check-point yesterday is still at Rogatica undergoing a detailed search

20 since yesterday ammunition for infantry weapons was found."

21 Can you tell us the following: Did you establish that anyone

22 kept a convoy that was totally regular? I'm sorry, it's the same

23 check-point but it's just a year later.

24 A. Mr. President, all check-points had orders and instructions to

25 search convoys. If there was no problem, then they should be allowed to

Page 36543

1 pass in a civilised way and they could head to the enclaves. However, if

2 there were problems, if there were goods that were not allowed there,

3 they should be seized or consultations should be carried out with the

4 superior command. And the convoys should be allowed to pass. If there

5 was a major problem, like a problem with ammunition, then such a convoy

6 would be kept there until the matter was resolved --

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, this may be a good example. You could

8 have put question before showing this passage to the witness. After

9 showing this passage, if you ask a question, that's a leading question.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll do my best,

11 Excellency, to act accordingly. Can this be admitted?

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3303, Your Honours.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Can you tell us what the position of the Main Staff was as

17 regards these obstacles that were put there by disgruntled civilians or

18 did the Main Staff do the contrary, try to persuade people to let convoys

19 pass?

20 A. Mr. President, the position of the Main Staff was that any kind

21 of misunderstandings with convoys should be avoided, or with UNPROFOR for

22 that matter. So to that end, they sent military police escorts and

23 sometimes even the civilian police would provide an escort so that

24 convoys with humanitarian aid could safely pass through the territory of

25 Republika Srpska. Personally, on several occasions, I escorted convoys

Page 36544

1 of the UNHCR with the civilian police and military police from Gradiska

2 through Banja Luka, to Turbe. At the time there were disgruntled

3 civilians and refugees and also persons on the separation line

4 complained. However, I provided explanations and also commanders of --

5 commanders also provided explanations so the convoys would invariably

6 cross over to the other side safely.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1317, could we please have that

9 now -- 7317.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. It was suggested here in the indictment issued against me and the

12 evidence presented that these were not spontaneous obstacles, rather,

13 that this had been staged. What is your knowledge? Did the army pretend

14 and did they take advantage of the population in order to stop convoys?

15 A. Mr. President, I was in the convoy business from 1992. I'm not

16 aware of a single case when the army pretended to do anything to stop the

17 passage of the convoys.

18 Q. Thank you. I'm sorry, please go on.

19 A. On the contrary, what was done was the exact opposite.

20 Everything was done to enable the passage of convoys.

21 Q. Thank you. Please focus on this information provided by

22 General Mladic end of November 1992. You see here on the first page that

23 he is describing a convoy going to Srebrenica, 16 vehicles, in Bratunac,

24 three vehicles, and he says that people were angry and that there were

25 irregularities.

Page 36545

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in

2 Serbian.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. It says here on the second page:

5 "Through the engagement of the Republika Srpska Army Main Staff

6 and the Drina Corps as well as the influence of the President of the

7 Presidency, Mr. Radovan Karadzic, and the authorities, the citizens of

8 the above places understood the situation, and after inspection the

9 convoy passed and arrived in Srebrenica unimpeded."

10 And it says:

11 "The Muslim extremists' attempt to use the rightful wrath of the

12 Serbian people against the injustice manifested through preventing the

13 passage of the convoy and the refusal of the Bratunac citizens to accept

14 humanitarian aid ...," et cetera. This attempt failed.

15 How does this tally with your own knowledge concerning the

16 position of the Main Staff and the Presidency of the republic, in terms

17 of persuading people not to hinder convoys and the UNHCR in any way?

18 A. The representatives of the Main Staff, whenever they stayed in

19 the areas that that were in charge of explained to the representatives of

20 the authorities the need for convoys to pass, that this was an obligation

21 that had been undertaken. And in a later stage there were agreements to

22 the effect that part of the aid would go to Republika Srpska as well.

23 This had a positive influence on matters in terms of convoy passage,

24 especially when expellees and refugees in Republika Srpska really needed

25 this aid and when it reached them. Then it was easier for convoys to

Page 36546

1 pass.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3304, Your Honours.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. What was the position of commands with regard to robbery and

9 other unfair or improper treatment of members of UNPROFOR or other

10 international organisations in the field? What was the position and what

11 was the attitude of the Main Staff and the second command with regard to

12 this?

13 A. Mr. President, the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska

14 issued an order stating exactly what check-points were supposed to look

15 like, emphasising the selection of personnel and equipment and also the

16 need for units in their own areas of responsibility to take all necessary

17 measures in order to prevent possible incidents or have their number

18 reduced to a minimum. The Main Staff wished at all costs to avoid any

19 kind of incidents with UNPROFOR or humanitarian organisations. Muslim

20 forces, on the contrary, carried out propaganda activities and wanted

21 incidents to happen to a large extent which would lead to NATO

22 intervention.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please take a look at

25 65 ter 19054.

Page 36547

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Please focus on 053 from the Main Staff and this is from the

3 Drina Corps. This is further elaboration. The text is basically the

4 same. And now in the introduction it says that UNPROFOR's mandate was

5 verified by the Assembly. And it says further on that there are certain

6 hindrances, and regardless of our objections, they should be allowed to

7 carry out their mission of peace. Then you see what it says further on,

8 this irregular conduct carried out by masked persons, armed persons, who

9 were seizing vehicles, and so on and so forth. Please familiarise

10 yourself with this text. This text is from 1995 and the one we saw a

11 moment ago was from 1992. Could you please tell the Trial Chamber about

12 this document and these orders -- actually, can we have the next page, or

13 rather, the bottom of this page first in Serbian and then the next page

14 both in Serbian and in English. So you did see this introduction, didn't

15 you? Robbery, attacks, crimes, you see what it says there?

16 A. I do, I do.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page now.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. And here an order is issued to commanders of units to make use of

20 all available forces, to investigate and carry out all other activities

21 and pre-trial procedure. The military police will do their job. How

22 does this tally with your own knowledge about the position of official

23 organs regarding such irregular conduct?

24 A. Mr. President, we have to bear in mind that there was a war going

25 on and that there was small groups there that had interests of their own,

Page 36548

1 to rob things, seize things and in this way major damage would be

2 inflicted on the Army of Republika Srpska. So everyone, especially in

3 the domain of command, took appropriate measures for this not to happen.

4 Such persons were searched for and eliminated from areas where convoys

5 would pass, if they would appear in these areas. Also, appropriate legal

6 measures were taken. I haven't got any concrete examples as to who these

7 persons were.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please go back to page 1

10 just to establish what the number is. And let us see whether this is

11 some kind of propaganda material or is this strictly confidential

12 material?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is an official

14 document. It is marked "strictly confidential" and by no means can this

15 be propaganda material.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Thank you.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, 65 ter 19053, 54 is

19 from the Main Staff, and 55 and from the Bircanska Brigade. And from the

20 sequence we can see how this order is further elaborated towards the

21 fields and I would like to tender all of these documents into evidence.

22 The wording is basically the same.

23 JUDGE KWON: Did we see 19053?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it please be called up? I

25 think it was on that list -- no, it wasn't on the list. Could it please

Page 36549

1 be called up?

2 MS. EDGERTON: And if there's going to be a question about these

3 documents, could Dr. Karadzic please be reminded not to lead the witness

4 to his answers. This last document again had huge paragraphs read out to

5 the witness before Dr. Karadzic asked the question which actually could

6 have proceeded any reference to the document and quite effectively.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope it wasn't so. I hope I

8 asked what in his knowledge was the position of the Main Staff vis-a-vis

9 criminal behaviour as regards UNPROFOR and the convoys and international

10 organisations.

11 JUDGE KWON: Indeed he asked about the robbery, but in a very

12 general way. Let's continue. Let's continue.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe this is not the document.

14 1D -- actually, 65 ter 19053. I don't think this is the document. In

15 the meantime, can we have 1D19055 while we're waiting for 053.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1D9055.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Could you repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic.

18 JUDGE KWON: I think it's a good time to take a break. We'll

19 break for half an hour and resume at three past 11.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I owe you an apology.

24 19053 has already been admitted as a P exhibit and I'd like to have next

25 19055, which is a further elaboration of the previous two documents.

Page 36550

1 Just before that, could we have 19054 admitted?

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3305, Your Honours.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not the document I asked

5 for. I would like to have 19055.

6 JUDGE KWON: I think this is 19055.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have something different, the

8 Ministry of the Interior -- no, no. I'll drop that.

9 1905 [as interpreted], I thought it was something else, must have been a

10 mistake. In any case, we'll drop this document.

11 For the participants, 19053 has been admitted as P2247, it's the

12 same wording, the same subject matter. It's just that it came from the

13 Main Staff to the corps command and the brigade command. The other one

14 is 19050, can we have that, please.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, please have a look and tell us if this is the

17 same document we saw a moment ago sent to the Bircani Brigade. What

18 corps did the Bircani Brigade belong to?

19 A. Mr. President, the Bircani Brigade was in the Drina Corps and

20 this is the same document.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 2 so as to see

23 who signed the document.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Do you know who was the colonel in command of the Bircani Brigade

Page 36551

1 at the time? Can we have the next page in Serbian too.

2 A. I can't remember.

3 Q. Can we go to page 2 in the Serbian version?

4 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Karadzic, this is a one-page document in

5 B/C/S.

6 JUDGE KWON: English has item 4 and 5 in its order we see on --

7 item 3 -- second page seems to be missing, Mr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps it wasn't uploaded. It

9 does exist, though, and I would kindly ask that it be uploaded. I

10 believe it says Colonel Svetozar Andric.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Does it ring a bell? Lieutenant-Colonel, is the name familiar to

13 you? Could it have been Andric?

14 A. Andric was the commander of that brigade. I recall it now.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

17 JUDGE KWON: Second page must be located and uploaded. We'll

18 admit it.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3306, Your Honours.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. During cross-examination and in your Popovic testimony, you said

22 that you knew that humanitarian aid was being used to feed the enemy

23 army. Can you tell us how you obtained such intelligence?

24 A. Mr. President, part of the information that pertained to the work

25 of our sector was occasionally received by Colonel Djurdjic from

Page 36552

1 intelligence organs. They, in turn, had received such information either

2 through interviews with those who crossed -- had crossed the lines or by

3 electronic means. In other words, that information was credible and we

4 were basically told that we were not going about our job right if such

5 things were allowed to cross to the other side. There was information in

6 circulation that the humanitarian assistance which was supposed to go for

7 civilian purposes was being used to feed the Muslim army specifically in

8 Srebrenica in this case.

9 Q. Thank you. Can we look at 1D7319. Please zoom in for

10 lieutenant-colonel. It's a document of the 25th of May, 1994. Command

11 of the 8th Operational Group Srebrenica is reporting on how much food

12 they had received per item. Can we go to the next page. Please zoom in.

13 I'll read it out.

14 "Explanation. All items of liquids are provided from

15 humanitarian aid based on the quantities available to us."

16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction:

17 "All items of food are provided."

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. "Members of the armed forces are fed only when they are engaged."

20 According to your knowledge, in May 1994 as regards the

21 demilitarisation agreement, were such forces supposed to have been

22 engaged?

23 A. Mr. President, under the demilitarisation agreement these forces

24 should first have been disarmed and in no case were they supposed to have

25 been engaged, which on the other hand happened frequently.

Page 36553

1 Q. Thank you. Can this be admitted?

2 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

3 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3307, Your Honours.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next can we have

7 1D2777 [as interpreted].

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. While we still have in document on the screen we see the date is

10 the 25th of May, 1994, and now we'll see what things were like in March

11 1995. This cannot be the document. 1D7277. It is incorrect in the

12 transcript. It was a proposed associated exhibit and then it was asked

13 to be led live if necessary. This is the document. The

14 31st of March, 1995. It reads:

15 "We forward an overview of the amount of food, materiel, and

16 technical equipment and fuel issued to the military units in our area for

17 the month of March, 18 tonnes of flour, 6 tonnes of beans, table salt,

18 sugar, cooking oil, cans, powdered milk, and 70 litres of fuel.

19 "We add that the above quantities were allotted from a

20 consignment of humanitarian aid which arrived in this area through the

21 UNHCR and this is the only source of supply of their army."

22 How does this fit into what you and the Main Staff knew with

23 regard to abusing humanitarian assistance at the time when they were

24 claiming they had insufficient quantities for the civilian population?

25 A. Mr. President, obviously they counted their soldiers within the

Page 36554

1 population since they were doing such things. We knew about that, and

2 when they were supplied with fuel and other means then, in turn, they

3 were capable of executing combat operation and excursions aimed at

4 villages where they committed crimes against Serbs.

5 Q. Do you have in mind the VRS or the civilians in those villages?

6 A. They had incursions where they targeted civilians for the most

7 part.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3308, Your Honours.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Was it known in the Main Staff what my position was with regard

14 to humanitarian assistance and were some of my orders, directives, and

15 documents received in that regard?

16 A. Mr. President, orders came from you with your signature, stating

17 that certain convoys or, as you particularly stressed, the organisation

18 Physicians Without Borders, be let through into the enclaves or out of

19 the enclaves.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we next see 18956. There is no

22 translation.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Now we'll ask you to confirm what I'm about to read out.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Mr. Karadzic needs to read

Page 36555

1 slowly as there is no translation. Thank you.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. It is dated the 14th of May, 1993. The first line:

4 "Pursuant to the directive of the president of Republika Srpska,

5 strictly confidential number 01-87-1/93 of the 14th of May, 1993," that

6 is to say the same day, "and with the aim of keeping the truce, I order

7 the following:

8 "Enable unhindered passage and protection of consignment,

9 equipment, and personnel that are assisting or providing assistance to

10 civilians on the other side.

11 "2. Forbid abuse in military -- for military purposes the

12 articles of food, harvest, and water-supply as well as water reserves and

13 dams at hydro systems.

14 "3. Abide by all regulations of the Geneva Conventions for the

15 protection of victims of wars and their Protocols I and II as well as

16 The Hague conventions on the laws and customs of war, et cetera.

17 "4. Make sure that all units and the entire personnel of the

18 army be familiarised and adhere by this order."

19 How does this tally with regard to your knowledge of my position

20 and the activities of the Main Staff concerning activities in the field?

21 A. Mr. President, your position was clear. There are written

22 documents in existence which I saw at the Main Staff which deal with

23 respecting the Geneva Conventions, their Protocols, as well as

24 The Hague Convention. And, in particular, you were adamant about

25 treating civilians in combat areas appropriately so as to avoid, or

Page 36556

1 rather, to have them extracted from the combat zone so as to avoid any

2 casualties due to such combat operations.

3 Q. I apologise. It is the same document but sent as a telegraph,

4 which is 1D7324 and that one has been translated. I wanted to tender at

5 least the translation under that number. In any case, I seek to tender

6 this document under whatever number or form.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for marked for identification

8 pending English translation.

9 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3309, Your Honours.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D7324 is the same

11 document in the form of a telegram. It does have a translation.

12 JUDGE KWON: Shall we take a look.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's it. The same number,

14 420, 14 May 1993.

15 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

16 Ms. Edgerton.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Well, since the two documents are identical in

18 terms of content, I don't see why Dr. Karadzic doesn't simply tender the

19 one that he's just shown to us. There's no point in having two identical

20 documents on the record.

21 JUDGE KWON: Probably received by different unit.

22 Are you happy with tendering this one? Yes, this will be

23 admitted as Exhibit D3309.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I'm waiting for the

25 interpretation to have finished. It doesn't really matter what the form

Page 36557

1 will be. This is a form which hasn't been translated, whether the

2 telegram has been translated.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the previous one was received -- seems to have

4 been received by the internal organ in the Main Staff. So it was not

5 Telexed. That seems to be the reason. Let's continue.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. You have also mentioned that there were other orders, my orders,

9 with this regard in addition to this directive; is that correct?

10 A. That's correct, Mr. President. When it comes to the

11 1st Krajina Corps based on those directives and orders, they organised

12 training for those members of the Army of Republika Srpska who were in

13 command of the units and were less familiar with the international law of

14 war. That training was carried out by the International Committee of the

15 Red Cross who had a lot of experience with such documents.

16 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at 18965. You mentioned that there

17 were differences when it came to the supply of the United Nations forces

18 as opposed to the aid of the civilians on the opposing side. The

19 procedure was somewhat different. I don't think that this is it.

20 Possibly it is. I don't know. Yes, it is. Yes, it is.

21 A. Yes, Mr. President.

22 Q. In April 1994, as you can see here, they are quoting my order.

23 It says here:

24 "Based on the order of the president of Republika Srpska

25 regarding the request of the UNPROFOR command to allow the passage of a

Page 36558

1 convoy carrying supplies for the Ukrainian company in Zepa ..." and the

2 order follows.

3 You testified to that effect and you said that there was a

4 difference in terms of those who were in charge of supplying the army as

5 opposed to the others who supplied the civilians on the other side.

6 Could you please summarise it for the Trial Chamber and tell the

7 Trial Chamber who was in charge of what.

8 A. Mr. President, UNHCR was a body that was in charge of supplying

9 the civilian population on an exclusive basis. The UNPROFOR command was

10 supposed to secure provisions only for its units. Those two

11 organisations were officially separated. The UNPROFOR forces in

12 protected zones had their own supply system. However, in practice they

13 co-operated closely, they were closely linked. What the UNHCR did, what

14 that organisation transported, and what it distributed and to whom in the

15 enclave was assisted by and was well-known to UNPROFOR. The

16 Army of Republika Srpska did not have an official insight into what was

17 being given to whom from any of the UNHCR convoys. The only information

18 the army had was obtained through intelligence work.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

21 JUDGE KWON: How is this document related to what Mr. Kralj just

22 said?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is linked with my question. I

24 asked the witness to tell us whether there was some individual orders of

25 mine in addition to the 1993 directives. This is another document. It's

Page 36559

1 an order that is referred to in the preamble and it concerns the supplies

2 delivered to UNPROFOR, not to the civilians.

3 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

4 Ms. Edgerton, any objections?

5 MS. EDGERTON: No.

6 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3310, Your Honours.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Could the army always implement its orders to lower-ranking

11 units? Did it sometimes occur that it was not satisfied with the

12 performance of its lower-ranking units?

13 A. Mr. President, you know very well that it is not possible to

14 implement everything with a hundred per cent success. There is always

15 room for improvement.

16 Q. Thank you. Can we then look at 1D5325. Please look at the

17 document which was issued on the 29th January 1994. The Main Staff

18 reprimands the Drina Corps and the Sarajevo Corps for not carrying out

19 orders and irresponsible conduct vis-a-vis the Main Staff, especially

20 when it comes to the passage of convoys. Am I right? It says here any

21 subsequent attempt to give reasons or justifications is basically an

22 incapacity to carry out given orders and instructions. In this regard we

23 regard you that such and similar neglect of duty must not be repeated.

24 How does this tally with what you know about the activities of the

25 Main Staff, what it wanted to do, and whether it was always doable?

Page 36560

1 A. Mr. President, the Main Staff insisted on full attention being

2 paid to the safe passage of those convoys. It insisted on the convoys

3 being escorted for their own safety in order to prevent incidents which

4 could eventually lead to grave consequences in our co-operation with

5 UNPROFOR.

6 Q. Did you know of such warnings to lower-ranking units? Did you

7 know that they were warned that they should implement fully the orders

8 issued to them by the Main Staff? Did the Main Staff make excuses for

9 neglect and non-implementation of tasks?

10 A. No, the Main Staff did not forgive anybody, especially the

11 Chief of Staff General Milovanovic who was very strict towards

12 lower-ranking units, towards the subordinated units, which did not pay

13 due attention to this order.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3311, Your Honours.

18 MS. EDGERTON: And just to note with regard to these documents,

19 I've been checking as we go along and we've looked at documents from 1992

20 right through now to January 1994, and I note the witness has already

21 provided evidence that he joined the Main Staff only in November 1994, if

22 I'm not mistaken.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I believe that the witness told

24 us that he was involved with convoys from 1992, first as a member of the

25 1st Krajina Corps and then of the Main Staff. He either sent documents

Page 36561

1 of this nature or received them. Actually, it was the Main Staff who

2 sent such documents and people in the field received them. Thank you.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. And my last question about this document. Can you remember or do

5 you know, actually, what was the position towards the United Nations

6 personnel which escorted the --

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, since you are not giving evidence

8 yourself, when you said something you need to confirm with the witness.

9 I don't think witness either sent this document or received this one.

10 Mr. Kralj, did you send or receive this document which you are

11 seeing in front of you? It was sent by the Main Staff to the Drina Corps

12 on 29th of January, 1994. It was not sent to the 1st Krajina Corps.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, maybe I may be allowed

14 to explain. I did not have in mind this particular document, but this

15 type of documents that reflect the policies of the Main Staff.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but you said in your statement at line 20 on

17 previous page "he either sent documents of this nature or received them,

18 documents of this nature."

19 Very well. Let's continue.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Can you tell us what was the position towards the escorts and the

23 personal belongings of those who escorted the convoys? Did the

24 Main Staff have a position with this regard?

25 A. Mr. President, the personnel who participated in the control of

Page 36562

1 convoys or any kind of co-operation with UNPROFOR members were extremely

2 fair towards the UNPROFOR or UNHCR personnel. The convoy personnel also

3 carried equipment that was not essential to them, such as video cameras,

4 cameras, large quantities of coffee, sugar, or equipment such as

5 binoculars. They were kindly told that such equipment or items should

6 not be transported and if that happened again, such equipment and items

7 were seized from them and then there were negotiations at a higher level

8 with representatives of UNPROFOR and UNHCR on their side and

9 Colonel Djordjevic [as interpreted] on our side. They had their

10 check-point or communications hub in Pale and that's where such incidents

11 were dealt with. However, despite all that it was a commonplace

12 occurrence that such equipment and items were transported in those

13 convoys. The personnel of the Army of Republika Srpska was hand-picked

14 for such tasks. Efforts were made to make sure that they did not tarnish

15 the reputation of the Army of Republika Srpska.

16 Q. Thank you very much.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7318.

18 1D7318. Yes, this is the document. Zoom in, can you.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. It says here - and the document was issued on the

21 9th of September, 1993 - it says:

22 "On the basis of reports from subordinate commands regarding the

23 problems which are developing in the event of inspection of UNPROFOR

24 teams and convoys and linked with new aspects of the political situation:

25 "I hereby order ..."

Page 36563

1 Under 1 it says:

2 "Until further notice, do not inspect the personal belongings of

3 personnel in UNPROFOR teams or convoys by opening back-packs or kitbags.

4 Do a visual check and gauge the approximate weight ..."

5 And there are some other bullet points as you can see. The last,

6 the seventh, says:

7 "Everything in connection with UNPROFOR and humanitarian

8 organisation has to be carried out with a lot of responsibility to avoid

9 any possible consequences for the Republika Srpska based on the decision

10 of the Security Council ...," and so on and so forth.

11 Does this sound familiar to you, the fact that they gave up on

12 controlling personal belongings of the convoy escorts? Were you familiar

13 with that?

14 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

16 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps I should apologise for my inertia, but

17 Dr. Karadzic with respect to these documents continued to do which I

18 requested he not do early on in the proceedings today, which is read a

19 paragraph to the witness and ask him if this corresponds to what he knows

20 or experiences, effectively leading the witness to the answer. And now

21 Dr. Karadzic has just read a portion of the document saying: Does this

22 sound familiar to you? In my submission, Your Honour, that's a leading

23 question which affects the weight of the witness's answer when

24 Dr. Karadzic, by reformulating his question - and perhaps now with

25 respect to this document, yet again it's too late - could have a much

Page 36564

1 more meaningful answer from the witness.

2 JUDGE KWON: Did he not ask about the personal belongings,

3 page 45 -- it's a separate matter whether that's a separate -- sufficient

4 question for a foundational purpose. I think he tried to lead some

5 foundation. Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Please answer, can you, Mr. Witness.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, you're absolutely

10 right. On line 20, or rather, lines 17 through 19 on page 45 I directed

11 my interest towards the treatment of the escorts and their personal

12 belongings.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, first of all, let me

14 tell you that I'm familiar with this document. At that time I was a

15 member of the 1st Krajina Corps. Some check-points had their own

16 interests and they organised their petty checks of the personal

17 belongings of some individuals before this document was issued. In order

18 to avoid such situations, this document was issued. If a person had

19 their personal belongings, their toiletries, and so on and so forth, that

20 bothered nobody. This decision was carried out and their personal

21 belongings were from then on not searched.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Thank you. Look at the heading and tell us who the document was

24 sent to. Was the 1st Krajina Corps among those units to which this order

25 was sent?

Page 36565

1 A. Mr. President, this is what it exactly says here, the 1st and

2 2nd Krajina Corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, the IBK, the

3 Herzegovina Corps, and this last bit is a bit illegible, so it's to all

4 the corps, the Drina Corps.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, at this point in time

7 I have no further questions and I would like to tender this document.

8 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3312, Your Honours.

10 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

11 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

12 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, thank you.

13 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kralj.

15 A. Good morning to you too.

16 Q. Just a couple of very quick background questions that I'm still

17 not clear on. Dr. Karadzic has already mentioned - and it appears in

18 your written evidence - that you were promoted to the rank of

19 lieutenant-colonel in 1995. Now, as far as I understand, it's correct,

20 isn't it, that you remained in the VRS Main Staff through 1996; is that

21 right?

22 A. Yes, that's right.

23 Q. And are you now retired from the army?

24 A. Now I am a colonel, a retired colonel, or a brigadier from 2002.

25 Q. All right. So after 1995 you were promoted again? That was what

Page 36566

1 I was interested in finding out about.

2 A. I was promoted to the rank of colonel in 2002, and then I was

3 serving in the Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska.

4 Q. Thank you. Now just another quick question. During the time you

5 were in the VRS Main Staff, and in particular from November 1994 till

6 November 1995, where were you physically located?

7 A. The question is a bit unclear. Do you mean where the bed was or

8 where I was?

9 Q. Where did you and Colonel Djurdjic work from?

10 A. The work-place was in the command of the Main Staff.

11 Q. Where precisely?

12 A. It was called Crna Rijeka, not far away from Han Pijesak.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, in your evidence today to Dr. Karadzic you said

14 at page 30 that the VRS Main Staff wanted to avoid incidents with

15 UNPROFOR and international organisations and that was with respect to

16 convoy movement. You said then Muslim forces carried out propaganda

17 activities and wanted incidents to happen, which to a large extent would

18 lead to NATO intervention. Do you remember saying that?

19 A. I remember.

20 Q. All right. When you say that, does that mean that convoys were

21 freely allowed into Srebrenica throughout 1995?

22 A. Convoys could enter freely unless there were some military

23 restrictions that would prevent them from passing safely.

24 Q. All right. Then by that remark about Muslim forces carrying out

25 propaganda activities, does that also mean that UNHCR was able to meet

Page 36567

1 its targets for feeding the civilian population in Srebrenica in 1995?

2 A. The UNHCR carried out their tasks, that is to say primarily they

3 carried out the task of feeding the civilian population. That was its

4 mandate; however, the problem was that part of this aid was being given

5 to the army, the Muslim army in the enclaves.

6 Q. Are you saying it's the Muslims' fault that UNHCR was not able to

7 meet its targets for feeding the civilian population in the enclave?

8 A. It is clear to one and all. If there is a certain quantity of

9 food for the civilian population and more than one-third is given to the

10 military, that is what the civilians would then lack.

11 Q. So that's what you're saying, isn't it, that it's their fault?

12 A. To a considerable degree their fault.

13 Q. Now, this isn't the first time you've appeared here in front of

14 this Tribunal, it's actually the third, isn't it? In 2012 you appeared

15 as a Defence witness in the Tolimir case; correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So you've discussed the humanitarian situation in the Srebrenica

18 enclave in 1995 quite a bit in front of this Tribunal, haven't you?

19 A. Yes. We discussed this in detail and I answered the questions

20 that were put to me.

21 Q. Now, today in your evidence what we've seen is that with respect

22 to convoys you were actually very well informed; correct?

23 A. I was pretty well informed in respect of the procedure of convoy

24 movement and documents that were in the office of Colonel Djurdjic.

25 Q. You knew what was going in; correct?

Page 36568

1 A. In that Main Staff I was a translator and --

2 Q. Now, now, Mr. Djurdjic [sic], that was an easy question, wasn't

3 it? It was a yes or no question. You knew what was going in and I've

4 based that question on the evidence you've given to Dr. Karadzic today.

5 You knew what was going in, yes or no?

6 A. I had insight into documentation and from time to time I knew

7 what went out and what came in, but I wasn't following that subject

8 matter.

9 Q. You knew how much was going as well, because you gave evidence

10 about that in the Popovic case which has been received by this Chamber

11 today; correct?

12 A. Information was presented to me by the Prosecutor as to what came

13 in, what was planned, and so on. I know that.

14 Q. Because that's also what you've told Dr. Karadzic today, isn't

15 it?

16 A. I don't quite understand what you're asking me.

17 Q. I'll move on. You knew where it went; correct?

18 A. I knew what was written in the document regarding the movement of

19 the convoy, and then I said that we had information about the

20 distribution, namely, that part of the aid went to soldiers too, Muslim

21 soldiers in the enclave.

22 Q. Right. You knew how it was used?

23 A. Food is being used for eating, and other things that are military

24 are used for military purposes.

25 Q. So you would agree then, wouldn't you, based on everything you

Page 36569

1 knew that restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid to Srebrenica

2 had a debilitating effect on the civilian population there?

3 A. Humanitarian aid cannot be detrimental to the civilian

4 population; it was welcomed by them.

5 Q. I'll repeat my question because you didn't seem to understand it.

6 My question was: Based on everything you knew - and you've talked about

7 what you knew in a great amount of detail today and in the Popovic

8 case - based on everything you knew, you would agree, wouldn't you, that

9 restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Srebrenica

10 enclave had a debilitating effect on the civilian population?

11 A. I don't agree with that. I just said that the army, the Muslim

12 army, they took whatever they took from the convoy and they, thereby, had

13 a debilitating effect on the civilian population.

14 Q. So concerted -- actually, I'll move on. Leaving that aside for a

15 second, let's talk about the situation for Dutch UN troops in Srebrenica.

16 You don't deny, do you, that restrictions on troop relief, troop

17 rotation, and troop supply substantially degraded the operational

18 effectiveness of the Dutch UN troops in Srebrenica?

19 A. I would not agree with you in this part. Colonel Djurdjic had

20 precise information as to what was needed and what the quantities were

21 that the Dutch -- that the Danish [as interpreted] battalion needed for

22 meeting their needs, fuel, ammunition, what they needed in order to

23 perform their function.

24 Q. So let's look at some of the evidence then that this Chamber has

25 received and you've previously seen in your testimony in the Tolimir

Page 36570

1 case. And before I call up a document I'd like to ask you this: Does

2 having food or is having food to eat essential to the operational

3 effectiveness of any armed force, yes or no?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Well, in P2478, an UNPROFOR weekly situation report for the

6 period of 26 February to 4 March 1995 -- and we can have a look at it if

7 you want but I'll tell you what the document says, at page 5 of the

8 English, paragraph 15, and page 6, B/C/S, we see that the UNPROFOR troops

9 in Srebrenica literally on the 3rd of March ran out of food. And as a

10 result, or, on that date, the Bosnian Serb army finally agreed after

11 several prior refusals to allow the troops' resupply. So contrary --

12 just a moment. I'll have a -- let's leave the document off to avoid

13 confusing the witness. Contrary to what you've just said, it doesn't

14 appear that Colonel Djurdjic was allowing enough food for the Dutch

15 troops to carry out their business. In fact, it doesn't even appear he

16 was allowing sufficient food in for them to be able to survive in the

17 enclave. Isn't that the case?

18 A. I have to tell you Colonel Djurdjic is no longer with us, but he

19 did his job responsibly and he had exact norms that made it possible for

20 the Dutch Battalion to carry out its tasks as far as food was concerned

21 over a certain amount of time, and they also gave part of their food to

22 the Muslims and that's why they didn't have enough but they didn't want

23 to admit it. Had they said honestly: We've given this much and that's

24 how much we lacked now, it would have been resolved quickly, urgently,

25 knowing Colonel Djurdjic. So according to his information, they had

Page 36571

1 enough food. They gave Muslims food and then they didn't have enough,

2 and then they clamour saying that they did not have enough food, that

3 Srebrenica did not have enough food, so that this could be looked at at a

4 higher level, if I can put it that way, not to say intervention.

5 Q. So your evidence is that DutchBat were starving themselves?

6 A. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that the Dutch Battalion

7 gave part of their food reserves to the Muslims and then it happened that

8 for some reason they did not get enough food for themselves at a given

9 point in time. That's what I'm saying.

10 Q. As a career soldier and an officer, surely you would agree with

11 me if I was to say that fuel to run your vehicles, to keep you warm, to

12 run electricity, fuel is essential to military troops to carry out their

13 mission; correct?

14 A. Fuel has its function in the army. It is true that it is of

15 crucial importance for carrying out a mission.

16 Q. This Chamber has received evidence that from January 1995 when

17 fuel stocks were very low, the Dutch Battalion wasn't able to heat, they

18 weren't able to cook, they had to do everything on foot, even resupplying

19 their observation posts. They would use occasionally local ponies to

20 bring stuff to the observation post. Does this sound to you, Mr. Kralj,

21 like the DutchBat had sufficient fuel to carry out their mission? And

22 that's the evidence of Mr. Franken, T 23067 to 23068.

23 A. Your Excellency, I'm not challenging this, but I'm challenging

24 the period concerned because they did have enough fuel for a certain

25 period of time. However, they had a shortage of fuel before that time

Page 36572

1 expired. What happened to that fuel? They don't say that they gave it

2 someone else here, and our norms that Milos Djurdjic had that this fuel

3 was sufficient for them for another few days.

4 Q. In fact, Mr. Kralj, the few days was far, far longer. By the

5 11th of July, 1995, DutchBat was unable to help the stream of refugees

6 coming into the compound at Potocari. The food situation was hopeless.

7 There was wounded, and DutchBat was unable to help the wounded because

8 their supplies had not been coming in since the end of April. And that

9 is from P00841, an UNMO report from Srebrenica dated 11 July 1995 at

10 1601. So, Mr. Kralj, in fact the length and the progression, the

11 organisation of this denial of resupply suggests that it was actually

12 systematic, doesn't it?

13 A. I did not know about that, that this was something that was being

14 done systematically.

15 Q. Are you now saying that Colonel Djurdjic didn't keep you as

16 informed as you've given evidence to?

17 A. Colonel Djurdjic informed me to the extent to which it was

18 necessary for me to deal with the documents that had to do with UNPROFOR

19 movement or UNHCR movement.

20 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.

21 Q. Now, just in regard to the information that you received from

22 Colonel Djurdjic and the extent to which it was necessary, I'd like to

23 recall your testimony in the Tolimir trial to you and that's been

24 uploaded as 65 ter number 24884. At page 18429 you discussed with my

25 colleague Mr. Vanderpuye the intelligence you had about what was going on

Page 36573

1 with the convoys on the ground in 1995. You said, as regards

2 Mr. Djurdjic, that he would always briefly tell you what was going on.

3 On the same page and over to 18430, you also explained that Djurdjic

4 occasionally acted as the duty team leader and, as such, he was privy to

5 everything that was going on when he was on duty. He received regular

6 reports from his units concerning intelligence work and it was part of

7 regular combat reporting.

8 You also said at transcript page 18283 that Djurdjic informed you

9 of the intentions of UNPROFOR. He received information and was in

10 constant contact with the units that conducted checks at check-points and

11 also the duty officer of the UNPROFOR Main Staff received reports from

12 units about UNPROFOR activities. That was supplementary information that

13 was included in such reports, but you paid special attention to it.

14 Colonel Djurdjic, you said at transcript page 18393, had the

15 necessary information about the population in the enclave and UNPROFOR

16 presence. He also had information about the quantities of goods

17 delivered to the enclaves in any given period. Based on all this,

18 Mr. Kralj, I would suggest to you that you were much better informed than

19 you've just tried to assert.

20 A. Partially you're right. I said everything that was stated there.

21 However, I only received information that had to do with my work. I had

22 an opportunity to look up a document if I needed it, but I didn't need

23 much because my foremost duty was translator. I only needed what was

24 necessary for the job. I did take part in most of the meetings, talks,

25 and negotiations, but the frequency of convoys was rather high and I was

Page 36574

1 only assigned to assist Djurdjic. I wasn't much interested in knowing

2 about it all. What I learned I learned from documents and Djurdjic only

3 briefly told me: Yes or no. And from that point on I didn't pay much

4 heed to what was going on further.

5 Q. Now, you've given detailed information today about the position

6 of the Main Staff on critical issues from 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995.

7 You've also given information today reflecting knowledge of the situation

8 as reported from different brigades, the Rogatica Brigade and the

9 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade. You've given information reflective

10 of Dr. Karadzic's position on critical issues or issues that he's

11 broached with you in your examination-in-chief. Is your evidence now

12 that you learned everything that you told us today from documents?

13 A. I state that I am familiar with what I said today either because

14 I saw a document or I was told something by Colonel Djurdjic. As for the

15 documents I saw while working in the 1st Corps, of course I saw such

16 documents which were arriving in the 1st Corps in 1993 or 1994. I was

17 the one receiving documents for implementation. The issue of convoys is

18 something I was aware of, but I did not go into any particular detail as

19 to what was going on in Srebrenica. I was busy with other tasks.

20 Colonel Milos knew far more and he didn't have much time to explain to me

21 how and what needed to be done. He only provided me with as so much

22 information as was needed when I had to stand in.

23 Q. So information about the situation for over 40.000 civilians and

24 by July 1995 150 DutchBat personnel was information that Djurdjic did not

25 provide you with in the event you had to stand in. Is that what you're

Page 36575

1 saying?

2 A. That's precisely what I'm saying. I only received information

3 that had to do with the passage of convoys and how it was supposed to

4 deal with it technically, who was supposed to sign what document. There

5 was some helicopter missions that I was completely unaware of. So in a

6 way he introduced me to that work. You must realise that I arrived in

7 late 1994. I was engaged in translation, and when Djurdjic was away then

8 I had to do that part of job too. We were simply short of men. Certain

9 documents had to be sent in the pipeline and I strove to learn as much of

10 the administrative side of things as I could.

11 Q. So your section, your sector, had no concern in assessing convoy

12 passage requests for the needs of 40.000 civilians in the Srebrenica

13 pocket; correct?

14 A. I knew how many UNPROFOR personnel there were. I had no clue how

15 many civilians there were in Srebrenica, nor did I take part in any

16 assessments or estimates of what was needed and how much.

17 Q. So if you knew how many UNPROFOR personnel there were, you would

18 have known then, Mr. Kralj, that because of refusals to allow troop

19 rotation and troop replacement, refusals that were issued from your

20 sector, the number of personnel dropped from over 300 to just over 150 in

21 July 1995, wouldn't you have? 147 actually.

22 A. I wasn't aware of such information. I only learned of it here

23 during proceedings. I knew that the total number of men in the battalion

24 was around 300. That's all I know. Now, what UNPROFOR policy was in

25 terms of how many people they wanted to retain and how many to rotate,

Page 36576

1 that's not something that was part of my job. It was Djurdjic's job.

2 Q. Well, let's have a look at something that comes out of your

3 sector, actually, if we're talking about your job, and I'll do this very

4 quickly before we break. Could we have a look at P4454, please. It's a

5 document from the VRS Main Staff to the Drina Corps command dated

6 3 July 1995. Now, if we just look at the ordinal number at the top left

7 corner of this page it has the prefix 06. That's your sector, isn't it?

8 Is that your sector, 06, yes or no?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Now -- thank you. The very first paragraph of this document says

11 that the VRS has approved convoy movement of DutchBat from Srebrenica to

12 Zagreb the next day but has not approved the return convoy. So this is

13 correspondence from your sector communicating a refusal for troop

14 rotation that's specifically geared to diminish DutchBat in the

15 Srebrenica enclave. Now, you saw the documents - you've just given that

16 evidence - are you saying that by July 1995 you were unaware of the

17 practice of the VRS Main Staff to reduce UN troop numbers in the enclave?

18 A. I was not aware of it. I know of the document and I know that

19 the document went in or went out and was whether approved -- was either

20 approved or not approved.

21 Q. Fine. Thank you.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I note the time. I wonder if you'd

23 like to take a lunch break now and I can conclude shortly after we

24 return?

25 JUDGE KWON: How much longer would you need?

Page 36577

1 MS. EDGERTON: I think probably half an hour, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break now and resume at quarter

3 past 1.00.

4 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

7 MS. EDGERTON: Well, in fact, Your Honours, I've had a look at

8 the transcript and I've been able to revise my estimate substantially.

9 Q. Mr. Kralj, you might be pleased to know that having had a look at

10 the answers you've given to my questions I have nothing further to ask of

11 you today.

12 A. Thank you.

13 THE ACCUSED: No translation, but fortunately Mr. Kralj

14 understands English, speaking English.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 Do you have any re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

17 THE ACCUSED: Yes, several. I would just like to take the

18 opportunity that we have this document and I would ask interpreters are

19 they in their own cabin?

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, they are all in their booths. What is your

21 point, Mr. Karadzic?

22 THE ACCUSED: I don't hear any Serbian translation.

23 JUDGE KWON: Oh.

24 Mr. Kralj, do you hear me in B/C/S?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I hear.

Page 36578

1 JUDGE KWON: But do you hear me in B/C/S language?

2 THE ACCUSED: Yeah, now, from that moment.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you.

4 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, I apologise I was unaware of the

6 rank you received from the ministry. Please look at this document and

7 the date when a convoy that had not been approved was supposed to come

8 back. It was on the 5th of July, 1992. It was supposed to go to

9 Srebrenica. Can you tell the Chamber what could have been the possible

10 reason for it, or rather, what was going on as of July 6th?

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

12 MS. EDGERTON: Well, the witness has already answered that he

13 wasn't aware of it and that's at page 60, line 14.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I won't ask about the

16 document then.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Do you recall when combat operations around Srebrenica began and

19 would you allow anyone through a combat zone to Srebrenica?

20 A. Mr. President, we, or rather, I would not allow -- the Main Staff

21 would not allow the passage of any convoy if there are combat activities

22 underway or if there is a risk of the convoy sustaining damage or if its

23 safe passage could not be secured.

24 Q. Thank you. Page 55 of today's transcript you were asked

25 something about fuel. Can you tell us how combat vehicles and tanks

Page 36579

1 belonging to the 28th Division, Oric's division, obtained fuel? The line

2 in question is 1 through 19, page 55.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, before you answer the question, Mr. Kralj.

4 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

5 MS. EDGERTON: I'm not disputing at all the fact that we talked

6 about fuel, but anything related to the 28th Division was not a subject

7 of the cross-examination.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness answered that the

10 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had fuel in the enclave, but I'll reformulate.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. On this page, Colonel, it was suggested to you that perhaps your

13 assertion is that the Dutch Battalion was starving themselves and making

14 themselves short of fuel, and you said at another place that

15 Colonel Djurdjic did have assessments. Can you tell us how a unit

16 assessment is made? What did Djurdjic do in that regard?

17 A. Mr. President, Colonel Djurdjic was a logistics officer. He had

18 come from the logistics organs of the Main Staff. He received from those

19 organs information in terms of how much fuel is needed per each type of

20 vehicle in order to have a full combat set and what the consumption of

21 individual vehicles was. He also knew the size of the territory and what

22 kind of tasks had to be performed. On a more senior level, he had

23 discussions about weekly supply for the UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica.

24 So it wasn't something that was reduced; it was based on the norms used

25 by both the VRS and -- well, a vehicle is a vehicle. It can only use so

Page 36580

1 much fuel per kilometre. It's not something he did off the top of his

2 head. He used norms. The same goes for food. He knew precisely what

3 the norm was per soldier in terms of water, food, or other necessities.

4 Q. Thank you. In your answer you say that Colonel Djurdjic's

5 calculations were to the effect that they had enough unless they gave it

6 to someone and you did say that you had information that they were

7 providing things for the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Just before that

8 let me ask you this: It was suggested to you that you were not aware of

9 everything perhaps. Was anything kept hidden from you in the sector?

10 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, but Dr. Karadzic has just given

11 evidence and I'm just wondering what he bases that on.

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was merely laying a foundation to

14 be able to show a document and I reiterated the witness's words. Also my

15 esteemed colleague Ms. Edgerton suggested that he may not have been aware

16 of everything Djurdjic was, and Colonel said that Djurdjic informed him

17 as to the part of work he did -- he had to do. And now I was asking him

18 whether anything was kept hidden from him and I was about to follow it up

19 with the specific items and quantities.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, there was no need to

21 hide anything from me or to inform me of anything that was unimportant to

22 my work.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D5105. The reference

Page 36581

1 in the transcript is page 55, lines 1 through 19. Franken's words were

2 quoted to you - he was the DutchBat colonel - to the effect that they did

3 not have fuel and food. Let's look at this document. Please zoom in.

4 Thank you.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. It a Muslim document of the 5th of June, 1995. They're reporting

7 to their command in Tuzla, that is to say the 2nd Corps, that they had

8 received in May almost 30 tonnes of flour, 596 kilo of sugar, 1.4 tonnes

9 of cooking oil, 5 tonnes of cold cuts, and so on and so forth --

10 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 MS. EDGERTON: This is re-direct. Dr. Karadzic can't lead and

13 he's leading by reading the document.

14 JUDGE KWON: I agree, Ms. Edgerton.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can ask the witness because he

16 was asked, he was told that Franken said that they didn't have it. The

17 witness said that it is not correct that they didn't have it. The

18 witness perhaps can tell us what this document has to tell us and how the

19 document tallies with what he knows --

20 JUDGE KWON: But by now you should know how to put your question

21 in your direct examination.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Until my next trial I'll probably

23 learn or until the next war.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Colonel, sir, what is this document about? I would especially --

Page 36582

1 JUDGE KWON: I don't see any difference.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the Colonel's answer.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Your answer is this:

5 [In English] "... I'm challenging the period concerned because

6 they did have enough fuel for a certain period of time. However, they

7 had a shortage of fuel before that time expired. What happened to that

8 fuel? They don't say that they gave it someone else here, and our norms

9 that Milos Djurdjic had that this fuel was sufficient for them for

10 another few days."

11 [Interpretation] On that same page you said this about food.

12 [In English] "That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that the

13 Dutch Battalion gave part of the food reserves to the Muslims, and then

14 it happened that for some reasons they did not get enough food for

15 themselves at a given point of time. That's what I am saying."

16 [Interpretation] Now I'm asking you: How does this document

17 tally with what you know and what you stated earlier today? Please pay

18 attention to the purchase of 171 litres of oil, engine oil, I believe

19 that there was even a bigger quantity of oil purchased.

20 A. Mr. President --

21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

22 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23 MS. EDGERTON: The witness has said in cross-examination:

24 "What I learned I learned from documents and Djurdjic only

25 briefly told me. From that point on I didn't pay much heed to what was

Page 36583

1 going on further ..."

2 So I don't think that this question related to this document is

3 anything that arises from the cross-examination.

4 JUDGE KWON: Transcript page, Ms. Edgerton?

5 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour, page 58, line 23 to

6 line 25. Actually, line 20 -- page 57, line 20 to 25, apologies,

7 Your Honour.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?

9 JUDGE KWON: And the -- and page numbers of the passage you

10 referred to, Mr. Karadzic?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 55, lines 11 through 19, and the

12 same page has this food reference and I would kindly ask Mr. Robinson to

13 reply to Ms. Edgerton's intervention because it was a procedural issue.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE KWON: In light of the answer witness gave, we will allow

16 the question.

17 Please proceed.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Have you familiarised yourself with the document that is now on

20 the screen in front of you, Colonel, sir?

21 A. Yes, I'm quite familiar with it.

22 Q. Can you tell us how this tally with what you knew about the

23 shortages in the enclave of Srebrenica? You were asked about that on the

24 pages that have just been mentioned.

25 A. Mr. President, this fully corresponds with what I stated and that

Page 36584

1 was that some of the assets of the Dutch Battalion was given to the

2 Muslim army or the 28th Division and that was the official title of the

3 division that was deployed in Srebrenica.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3226, Your Honours -- sorry, 3286.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. On page 53 you were suggested that there were over 40.000

10 civilians in Srebrenica and you said that you were not fully aware of the

11 population count. I don't know how to put the following question.

12 However, the Trial Chamber has admitted a document according to which

13 there were 37.000 people but they say that there were 45.000 people.

14 Were you aware of the fact that they tried to present an unrealistic

15 number of the population in those two enclaves and why was that done?

16 MS. EDGERTON: The witness -- if I may.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

18 MS. EDGERTON: The witness has already said at page 58 line 10:

19 "I had no clue how many civilians there were in Srebrenica nor

20 did I take part in any assessments or estimates of what was needed and

21 how much."

22 I don't think this is a question for him.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But, but, I did not ask how many.

25 I asked him whether there were accurate reports about the population

Page 36585

1 number. Did the Muslim side present the population count accurately?

2 Did the Main Staff know whether the number that was presented was correct

3 or incorrect? I did not ask about the actual population count.

4 JUDGE KWON: Please move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Did you know, or rather, you mentioned, or rather, you said that

8 the issue of fuel was distorted due to the black market dealings and so

9 on and so forth. Did you know about the illegal dealings in Srebrenica?

10 Did you know about the crime there and other such things?

11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Were there, were there, were there.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

14 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, there was no mention of black markets

15 in cross-examination.

16 JUDGE KWON: Or where did he say distortion in the distribution

17 of fuel?

18 MS. EDGERTON: I haven't found that yet, Your Honours.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He was asked, the witness was asked

20 how it was possible or whether UNPROFOR and primarily UNPROFOR, did they

21 choose to go starving, did they choose to lack fuel, was the population

22 starved by the Serbs. I'm asking the witness whether there was any crime

23 going on there. Were they aware of other forms of crime that had to do

24 with the overall supplies of the enclave?

25 JUDGE KWON: I don't think that question arose from the line of

Page 36586

1 cross-examination. It talked about assessment of Mr. Djurdjic. I will

2 consult with my colleagues.

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is unanimous. Please move on to another

5 topic, Mr. Karadzic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Let's pay attention to page 51, line 1 to line 4. Let's see how

9 to deal with that. Now we have it, yes:

10 [In English] "Q. Are you saying it is the Muslims' fault that

11 UNHCR was not able to meet its targets for feeding the civilian

12 population in the enclave?

13 "A. It is clear to one and all. If there is a certain quantity

14 of food for the civilian population and more than one-third is given to

15 the military, that is what the civilians would then lack.

16 "Q. So that's what you are saying, isn't it, that it's their

17 fault?

18 "A. To a considerable degree their fault."

19 [Interpretation] I wanted to offer a Muslim document to show you

20 what they established through their own investigations, not what the

21 Serbian MUP established but what the Muslim MUP did.

22 [Defence counsel confer]

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I put a question based on the

24 transcript?

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let us see the document.

Page 36587

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D29076 is the next document I

2 would like to call up. I'm afraid that the translation is still pending.

3 We will ask the Colonel to comment upon it.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Colonel, sir, would you please read from the top to the name

6 "Naser Oric" and thus to present the Trial Chamber the contents of the

7 document. Can you do it slowly, please? Can you do it aloud?

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

9 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

11 MS. EDGERTON: Not an appropriate way to ask the question.

12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Shall we collapse the document for the

13 moment. Without reading out or let the witness read the document, could

14 you not put the question first?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I thought I did based on what

16 was already answered. My question is this: Did you know --

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- how food shortages came about to

19 be?

20 JUDGE KWON: What witness said in his cross-examination is

21 one-third of convoys was allegedly given to the Muslim people, so how can

22 a criminal activity arise from there?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, what the witness said

24 was confirmed by the official investigations carried out by the Muslim

25 police and that was that the shortage of fuel and foodstuffs was result

Page 36588

1 of criminal activities and that there would have been enough of both

2 based on the quantities supplied.

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I rephrase the question?

5 JUDGE KWON: Given that the -- the reason for the shortage of

6 food was discussed in the cross-examination, the Chamber will allow the

7 question.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Colonel, sir, did the Serbian side -- and you were asked about

11 the responsibility and the blame for all the shortages, was the Serbian

12 side responsible for the lack of food or, in other words, the overall

13 problems with food and the shortages in Srebrenica? Was the Serbian army

14 responsible for those things?

15 A. Mr. President, the Serbian army was not responsible for shortages

16 of food in Srebrenica. It was the black market and all those groups that

17 sold the fuel and the foodstuffs in that area on the black market because

18 some of the prices of some of the products went through the roof.

19 Q. Where did they obtain the fuel and the foodstuffs from in order

20 to resell it on the black market?

21 A. Mr. President, the area was conducive to the development of the

22 black market. Whoever could find channels to bring something to that

23 black market would go rich very quickly and things came from Serbia and

24 elsewhere.

25 Q. And what about the humanitarian aid, did some of it end up on the

Page 36589

1 black market among the criminals who resold it on the black market?

2 A. Mr. President, the cheapest commodities that could sell really

3 well came from the humanitarian aid. Its entrance channels were very

4 easy and it could sell really well.

5 Q. And now can we see the document.

6 THE INTERPRETER: And could the accused please repeat the number

7 of the document.

8 JUDGE KWON: 1D29076.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Can you read slowly for the Trial Chamber and the other

11 participants, start with the institutions and end with the name of

12 Naser Oric. Let's first identify the drafter of this document. Aloud,

13 slowly, can you do it?

14 A. Yes, I can:

15 "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 "Ministry of the Interior.

17 "State Security Service.

18 "DS DB sector Tuzla" --

19 Q. Colonel, sir, you can go a little bit faster because the

20 interpreters seem to be managing.

21 A. "Line work 02.

22 "Operative JK 258.

23 "Number 7-1484.

24 "Date: 17 November 1995.

25 "Reference: An overview of criminal activities and persons from

Page 36590

1 Srebrenica during the period leading up to the occupation of this town."

2 Q. Can you start with line 4 where it says "Srebrenica, we

3 recorded ..." and so on. Let's save some time.

4 A. "... we recorded a number of acts of crime committed by the

5 members of the 28th Division and certain leaders of the municipal bodies

6 of power in Srebrenica. Those criminal acts involved persons who were

7 close to the aforementioned categories of persons who, inter alia, were

8 also one of the links in the chain of smuggling with humanitarian aid,

9 the resale of weapons, the smuggling of oil, and similar things. All the

10 recorded cases to a large extent resulted in the destabilisation of

11 relationships and a further deterioration of the security situation in

12 the protected zone of Srebrenica. Such a situation had a major impact on

13 the relationship between the military bodies and the civilian bodies ..."

14 Q. Very well. And now let's not go into any further detail. How

15 does this tally with what you knew and what the Main Staff knew about the

16 destiny of the humanitarian aid that entered the enclave?

17 A. Mr. President, this completely tallies with the information the

18 Main Staff had as to what was happening with the humanitarian assistance

19 in the Srebrenica enclave.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted for

22 identification?

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3313, Your Honours.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 36595

1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Mladjenovic. Please be seated and

2 make yourself comfortable. Before your commence your evidence,

3 Mr. Mladjenovic, I must draw your attention to a certain rule, rule of

4 procedure and evidence, that we have here at the International Tribunal;

5 that is, Rule 90(E). Under this rule you may object to answering any

6 question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if

7 you believe that your answer might incriminate you in a criminal offence.

8 In this context "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to

9 an admission of guilt for a criminal offence or saying something that

10 might provide evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence.

11 However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you and, as a

12 consequence, you refuse to answer the question, I must let you know that

13 the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the question. But in

14 that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony compelled

15 in such circumstances would not be used in any case that might be laid

16 against you for any offence save and except the offence of giving false

17 testimony.

18 Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

21 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

22 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

23 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Mladjenovic.

24 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President. I avail myself of this

25 opportunity to sincerely greet the President and the Trial Chamber, the

Page 36596

1 Prosecutor, and the Defence of Dr. Karadzic.

2 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you, as I ask myself, to speak

3 slowly and to pause between question and answer.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other

5 microphones please be switched off. Thank you.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. We do not wish to tire out the interpreters and also --

8 A. I'll do my best.

9 Q. There seem to be two microphones that are on somewhere. Perhaps

10 it is my headphones that are causing this. I think that there was a

11 complaint regarding poor sound.

12 Mr. Mladjenovic, did you give a statement to my Defence team?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D7894 in

16 e-court, and I kindly ask the interpreters to tell us whether the sound

17 is better now.

18 JUDGE KWON: Please go ahead. It was probably because of my

19 microphone.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I misspoke or perhaps I was

21 misinterpreted -- ah, yes, here it is.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Could you please take a look at this. Do you see your statement

24 before you on the screen?

25 A. Yes.

Page 36597

1 Q. Have you read and signed this statement?

2 A. I read it and I signed it. There are a few technical points. In

3 two places, in paragraphs 8 and 10, just two words by way of correction

4 and the rest, I mean -- well, this must have been a typo, obviously it

5 was a typo.

6 Q. Thank you. We'll deal with that. We'll ask you to correct

7 whatever there is to be corrected, and could the witness please be shown

8 the last page so that he could identify his signature.

9 A. This is my signature.

10 Q. Thank you. Could you please be so kind as to tell us what was

11 this in paragraph 8 --

12 A. And 10.

13 Q. Could we take a look at paragraph 8.

14 A. Just a moment, please. Paragraph 8.

15 Q. Can we have it -- aha. Yes, I see it on the screen.

16 A. The comment as to why there were more Serbs and Montenegrins than

17 Muslims employed in education and in the municipality and then the answer

18 follows.

19 Q. Sorry, could you please tell us how you'd like this sentence to

20 read. Which sentence is it anyway?

21 A. Why there were more Serbs and Montenegrins than Muslims employed

22 in health, education, and the municipality.

23 Q. So it should say "in health"?

24 A. "In health, education, and the municipality."

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 36598

1 A. And then the answer follows. And then before paragraph 11,

2 line 3, this is a comment.

3 Q. Please read out the sentence that we have now and tell us what

4 you would like it to read.

5 A. I deeply --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot find that

7 sentence.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Mladjenovic, just wait until we have the

9 para 10, probably next page for both, and please read slow.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "I was deeply mistaken and I will

11 be disappointed for the rest of my life because of the missed chances and

12 at least the minimum chances which the locals had to find, but above all

13 it was the European and the world's powerful individuals who were

14 'seirli,' as the Muslims say, when the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs were

15 bleeding." That's what I'd like to correct.

16 "I deeply believe, could have stopped it, and they had to do it

17 at the very beginning of the conflict," that's what I meant. As for the

18 rest, I believe it's correct.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. So when the Muslims and Croats Serbs were bleeding in the

21 conflict that was going on, I deeply believe they could have stopped it

22 and they had to do it at the very beginning of the conflict; is that it?

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. If these corrections are taken into account, does this statement

25 faithfully reflect what you said to the Defence team?

Page 36599

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today,

3 would your answers basically be the same?

4 A. Absolutely identical. Perhaps, perhaps I'd make briefer

5 comments, but the essence would be absolutely correct and the same.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender the 92 ter

8 package now, please.

9 JUDGE KWON: And how many associated exhibits is the Defence

10 tendering?

11 MR. ROBINSON: We're tendering two, Mr. President.

12 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Ms. McKenna. Any objections?

13 MS. McKENNA: Good afternoon, Your Honour. We have no objection

14 to 1D04210, which I believe is the first associated exhibit. In relation

15 to 1D04239, we have raised the issue of the authenticity of the document

16 with the Defence. The Defence have provided us with a revised version.

17 On the first version the signatures didn't appear, they were cut off. On

18 the second version that the Defence have provided us today there are

19 signatures but there's also some additional handwritten notes and it

20 doesn't appear to be exactly the same document. So on this basis we'd

21 ask that the document be led live with the witness.

22 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any problem with it ?

23 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.

24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll --

25 MS. McKENNA: And --

Page 36600

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 MS. McKENNA: Apologies, Your Honour, for interrupting. Just to

3 add it's our submission that 1D07990 which is referred to in paragraph 41

4 of the witness's statement should also be tendered as an associated

5 exhibit, as it seems to form an indispensable part of the witness's

6 evidence.

7 JUDGE KWON: Do we have English translation?

8 MS. McKENNA: We do -- actually, there's an English translation

9 attached to 1D04238 which is a partial duplicate of that document.

10 JUDGE KWON: Does it mean that we have only partial translation?

11 MS. McKENNA: No, I'm sorry. The -- 1D04238 appears to be two

12 documents, one document that's referred to in paragraph 24 of the

13 statement and another document which is the duplicate of 1D07990. There

14 is a full translation attached to 1D04238, which includes the translation

15 of 1D097990 [sic]. I hope that's clear. Perhaps Mr. Robinson can assist

16 me.

17 JUDGE KWON: Where is 1D7990 referred to in the witness's

18 statement?

19 MS. McKENNA: It's paragraph 41 of the witness's statement.

20 JUDGE KWON: Can I hear from you, Mr. Robinson?

21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We're happy to have these

22 admitted. The problem was we didn't have translations and actually, as

23 I'm looking in my own e-court at 1D4238, I don't see a translation there.

24 But if the Prosecution has one and they can share it with the Chamber, we

25 would be happy to have that admitted.

Page 36601

1 MS. McKENNA: We do have a translation. I thought -- I'll look

2 into where it is and we'll share it with the Chamber certainly.

3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Then we'll admit 1D4210 and 1D7990 in

4 addition to the statement. Shall we give the numbers.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour the statement will be

6 Exhibit D3314, and 1D4210 will be Exhibit D3315, and 1D7990 will be

7 Exhibit D3316.

8 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now I'm going to read

10 out the summary of the statement of Mr. Mladjenovic in the English

11 language and then I would deal with the document live and I would put in

12 another two or three questions.

13 [In English] Radojica Mladjenovic was born on

14 20th of November, 1949, in Mestrevac, Foca municipality. He was the

15 president of the Executive Committee and the chief of the Crisis Staff of

16 the municipality of Foca during 1992.

17 Negotiations between Serbs and Muslims after the multi-party

18 elections were difficult and long, although Radojica Mladjenovic

19 co-operated well in this period with his Muslim colleagues in the

20 authority.

21 Following the situation in Focatrans company which in 1990 and

22 1991 was still not resolved in court, there was great tension between the

23 Muslims and Serbs -- Muslim and Serb population. Massive rallies were

24 held by both parties. On one occasion a large crowd of Muslims gathered

25 outside the Municipal Assembly shouting, "Go to Serbia," to the Serbs.

Page 36602

1 This was perceived as an ominous message by the Serbian population.

2 During this period, the Patriotic League and the Green Berets were

3 formed, which worsened and polarised the relations between Serb and

4 Muslim population. In 1990 Senad Sahinpasic, a former deputy in the

5 joint BH Assembly brought 1.000 rifles into Foca and distributed others

6 in the Stari Grad municipality of Sarajevo.

7 Radojica Mladjenovic was elected as the chairman of the Foca

8 municipality Assembly. The Executive Committee functioned with

9 difficulty because the Muslim members maintained many unreasonable and

10 unfeasible policies, wasting energy and preventing constructive work. As

11 a result, the Serbian Municipal Assembly of Foca was formed in

12 December 1991. The Crisis Staff was formed on 3rd of April, 1991 [sic].

13 It was temporarily tasked with issuing decisions in the name of the

14 Assembly. Clashes had begun by this time, but fortunately with no

15 casualties. It was the wish of the Serbs during this time to stay living

16 together with Muslims in a common state. The Crisis Staff never ordered

17 or abetted any maltreatment, looting, murder, or intimidation. Some

18 movement of civilians was restricted for the safety of the population,

19 but the situation became increasingly chaotic. Clashes began seriously

20 on 8 of April, 1992. Mr. Radojica Mladjenovic and some colleagues of

21 him attempted to negotiate but this was unsuccessful. Around this time a

22 number of Muslims were briefly brought to the Livade house [sic]

23 including some civilians. The army suspected them of having armed the

24 Muslim people and preparing them for the battle.

25 In August 1992, attempts were made to provide materials for the

Page 36603

1 start of the school year and to repair damage done to schools, hospitals,

2 health centres, and homes. Production facilities were guarded and war

3 production started in 1992 and continued throughout the war years. Those

4 who violated military rules were brought to the KPD. Nobody from the

5 Serbian military or civilian leadership ever ordered that any crime be

6 committed; on the contrary, they ordered that members of all units behave

7 in accordance with the international conventions. These instructions

8 were passed on to military officers during army meetings. Attempts were

9 made to prevent killings as much as possible. A mixed Serbian and Muslim

10 commission was created to investigate such incidents which were isolated,

11 individual cases.

12 Certain paramilitary groups appeared during the clashes. Many

13 were involved simply to plunder rather than to protect Serbs, as they

14 claimed. These individuals could not be identified and both military and

15 civilian authorities regretted their presence. On one occasion in

16 July 1992 some drunk paramilitary members detained Radojica Mladjenovic

17 and some others. After this the civilian authorities requested

18 intervention to help bring the rebels to justice.

19 Regarding Muslim paramilitaries, the civilian and military

20 structures were aware of the Green Berets, the Black Swans, the Swallows,

21 and many other of Muslim paramilitary groups who were armed through

22 connections in Turkey and Croatia.

23 The military command attempted at all times to prevent

24 destruction and looting of property of both Muslims and Serbs. This was,

25 however, difficult to prevent given the chaos of the situation, although

Page 36604

1 the police attempted to do their job seriously and acted professionally

2 throughout the war. Regarding the KPD, it was a civilian prison that

3 became a military prison in war time. The Crisis Staff intervened in the

4 prison on humanitarian grounds and provided food, toiletries, and

5 anything else possible for the prisoners in consultations with the army

6 and the Red Cross.

7 [Interpretation] That's the summary. And now I'm going to ask

8 Mr. Mladjenovic a question.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Could you tell us what you meant by saying that you tried by way

11 of agreement to ensure peace and to preserve your community with the

12 Muslims?

13 A. Quite certainly. We tried mutually to act by doing whatever we

14 could to prevent a conflict. That can be shown from various documents.

15 Also, practically we even talked about division, a division in terms of

16 the majority part of town or villages in the belief that local communes

17 or villages, whatever you prefer, used to have Muslim majority

18 populations and before that Serb populations. In order to prevent a war

19 conflict and to have entities that would ensure that the population would

20 not have to move from their hearths that had been their home since time

21 immemorial, we negotiated and I personally took part in these

22 negotiations. However, documents show that these -- well, these

23 documents were signed by three Serbs, three Muslims, including myself and

24 the late Lojo, very legible signatures. What the prosecution

25 noticed - and that was quite justified - is that things were added in

Page 36605

1 hand. I wrote what the obligations were on both sides. I mean, maybe it

2 wasn't really written very nicely because I was writing on my hand. Now,

3 was it the Crisis Staffs or the police whose obligations were to carry

4 out these points from the agreement? Unfortunately, ultimately, although

5 I and Mr. Lojo, the late Mr. Lojo, now he's deceased, whole-heartedly

6 support this and our only objective was to prevent a war. Unfortunately,

7 the Muslims obviously gave up on this, but I have to state that even

8 after Dayton in the territory of the municipality of Foca, that is to say

9 the pre-war municipality of Foca, there are two municipalities, Foca

10 Ustikolina in the federal part and Foca in Republika Srpska.

11 Q. Thank you. Let us please clarify this. In line 13 you said

12 sometimes there would be a Muslim majority and sometimes there would be a

13 Serb majority. Did you mean that there would be a Muslim majority

14 somewhere and a Serb majority elsewhere or was it -- I mean, I'm afraid

15 that you spoke in an idiomatic way and that's why it wasn't interpreted

16 as you had meant it.

17 A. Well, let me explain. For years before the conflict and before

18 the multi-party elections in 1990, every village was a mixed village.

19 However, what was dominant was, say, there would be more Muslims in a

20 village or a local commune and there would be less Serbs and the other

21 way around. What we were counting on was -- I mean in the negotiations,

22 that they should adhere to this general request for reciprocity, namely,

23 that we both commit ourselves to guaranteed rights for the police and

24 police controls, police checks, everything else, because there was danger

25 looming. Also education and many other spheres were also under a

Page 36606

1 question mark. That's why I think this was mentioned in the statement.

2 Reciprocity would be protection of both peoples with the same rights that

3 both would enjoy in one municipality or the other. After all, that was

4 confirmed after Dayton, that both, police, education, everything else, in

5 Foca Ustikolina and Foca as a municipality that belongs to the Serb

6 entity. And Foca Ustikolina in the Federation has its own police

7 administration, an Assembly, elected Assembly, and so on and so forth.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D4239, could I call that up,

10 please. It is paragraph 23 from your statement that speaks of these

11 agreements. Can we please take a look at this now and could you please

12 explain this agreement to us and tell us what all of that is about.

13 1D4239. Yes, that's it.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. First of all, can you explain the date to us and could you tell

16 us under which circumstances this was done and what is contained?

17 A. Sorry, what did you mention now? Was it a point? Was it a

18 paragraph.

19 Q. Twenty-three.

20 A. Twenty-three. In my statement?

21 Q. Yes, there's a reference to this paragraph. Can you focus on it?

22 A. Of course I can.

23 Q. On the screen, Mr. Mladjenovic.

24 A. I apologise. This is the agreement. I can't see any signatures.

25 There should be signatures on one of the copies. On the left-hand side

Page 36607

1 and somewhere on the right-hand side margin I added something in my own

2 hand. This copy is identical in terms of the contents, but the original

3 is the one where you can see signatures. Obviously there is a

4 misunderstanding in the copying. I believe that you have both copies in

5 your possession. They are identical. This is my handwriting in the

6 margin. The handwriting is not very neat. I was writing standing up.

7 And these are the obligations of all those who were present; i.e., the

8 Crisis Staffs are mentioned as well as the police, and so on and so

9 forth. At that time we did not call our police "policija" but

10 "milicija," that was according to the system. I recognise the

11 signatures, my own, Lojo's and several other signatures including the two

12 Muslim signatures that I do not recognise.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 A. Obviously they were members of the Executive Board or the

15 leadership of the SDA, I suppose, or some other management bodies.

16 Q. This was signed on the 8th of April; right?

17 A. Yes. There were discussions before that, but that was obviously

18 what the situation was at the time and everything pointed to a possible

19 division that had to be carried out or delineation as it says here

20 because otherwise bad things could happen and they did as a matter of

21 fact.

22 Q. Thank you. There is more proof to that but we will come to that,

23 won't we?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, the agreement

25 or the document in question?

Page 36608

1 MS. McKENNA: Your Honour, while the translation is similar, it's

2 not exact. The versions of the documents are slightly different, so I

3 would suggest that the document be marked for identification pending a

4 proper translation.

5 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether it's just a translation issue.

6 Why are two versions different from each other? Is it possible to upload

7 page 1 and page 2 separately only in B/C/S? For example, item number 2,

8 3 in the page 1, we have some word about "Crisis Staff" in parenthesis

9 which we don't see on page 2. And I don't think the item number 21 is

10 identical. I'm not sure. And whether we are seeing the identical

11 signature or not. Can you explain that, Mr. Mladjenovic?

12 Or, Ms. McKenna, would you like to add anything?

13 MS. McKENNA: Perhaps it's better if Mr. Mladjenovic explains.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is absolutely

16 one and the same document. It shows various peoples' obligations. It

17 shows who would be responsible for each of the items, who would be tasked

18 with, for example, bullet point 21 where it says the police curfew is

19 being introduced, and I can see it on the other papers as well. I

20 suppose that this copy has handwritten addition and I believe that the

21 Muslim side also made some handwritten addition when we asked for the

22 co-operation of the police, the Crisis Staffs, and so on and so forth.

23 So we both made our handwritten additions. This is the essence of the

24 matter. There is nothing else. There are no other differences between

25 the two documents.

Page 36609

1 JUDGE KWON: Could you take a look at item number 2. After the

2 return of all units to their homes, on the left side it's empty but on

3 the right side, i.e., page 1, it has the "Crisis Staff" in the

4 parenthesis --

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the implementation --

6 JUDGE KWON: So why --

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Crisis Staffs.

8 JUDGE KWON: So my question is why there are two versions.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is absolutely one and the same

10 copy; however, one has comments in order to explain, or rather, to make a

11 note of who would be in charge of the implementation. The same copy, the

12 same typewriter. You have to believe me that the gist is the same. When

13 the document was copied, the one that is on the right-hand side, the

14 comments were cropped. I can even see a little part of my signature at

15 the bottom of the right-hand side copy. So this is certainly, it must be

16 the document which is relevant and which they probably also had.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we perhaps ask the witness what

18 is the link between the handwritten annotations on the left-hand side and

19 the remarks that are typed up on the right-hand side.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber?

22 A. I personally made comments in my own handwriting. That was on

23 the 8th of April immediately after, or rather, before the activities on

24 the 8th of April, 1992. I suppose it was in the early hours. And I

25 quickly jotted down while I was standing up, I jotted down what our side,

Page 36610

1 our Serbian side, should do with the Muslim side because both

2 Crisis Staffs are often mentioned as well as the police depending on the

3 nature of the bullet point under numbers from 1 to 21.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can be more specific if we may be

5 given the document back on the screen. Return the document.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Can you please tell us about bullet points 2 and 3? Can you read

8 the handwritten annotations on the left-hand side and can you draw a

9 parallel with the right-hand side version?

10 A. Crisis Staff and observers if I'm not mistaken because observers

11 were also defined as those who would supervise the implementation of the

12 agreement.

13 Q. And look at the right-hand side version, do you find the word

14 "Crisis Staff" anywhere? If you do where?

15 A. In the right-hand side version.

16 Q. Bullet points 2 and 3, for example.

17 A. The word is typed up on the right-hand side. I don't know why

18 Crisis Staffs, both the Muslims and the Serbs --

19 Q. Can you then tell us the handwritten annotations on the one

20 document, have they been typed up on the other document?

21 A. I'm not excluding that, but in any case every single letter of

22 the agreement is the same in both documents. Unfortunately I don't have

23 it here. I believe that the pencils that were used to sign the document

24 are the same, some used a ball-point pen. They've signed the final

25 document. This is a copy. So I would say that every bullet point is

Page 36611

1 credible, it's authentic, and this is the essence of the matter. On the

2 right-hand side you can see comments, Crisis Staff, that I added and here

3 somebody typed it up. I don't know.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Mladjenovic, if you touch the screen it

5 disappears.

6 Shall we show him the bottom of the page on both documents.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.

8 JUDGE KWON: Do you see your signature on both pages?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the right-hand side at the top I

10 can recognise the cropped part -- I apologise. I made the mistake again.

11 You can discern one part of my signature on the left-hand side, and I

12 know the other person, Tajvo. His signature is also there and the other

13 signatures, I don't know who the other signatures are.

14 I really don't know, believe me. And I don't know who the two

15 Muslims, there is one person called Laki Lakovic [phoen] and

16 Himro Rajic [phoen] on the first document, and I believe that

17 Podrago [phoen] also signed on the Serbian side. And Asim Rajic and the

18 other two their signatures are not legible, I can't recognise them,

19 really.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is of the view that the Chamber has a

22 basis to admit this document. We'll admit them.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3317, Your Honours.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Can you explain just one more thing. You were talking about

Page 36612

1 difficulties in communications between Foca and Pale. Is this your

2 position? What were communications like between Foca and Pale during the

3 first few months up to September 1992?

4 A. The communications for the first two or three days while

5 Mr. Ostojic was in Foca were possible. After that, they were absolutely

6 imperfect; i.e., they were non-existent. You will see from some other

7 paragraphs that people went on foot to obtain certificates for a

8 commissioner who was supposed to help civilian authorities in Foca and

9 reinforce their activities. I am sorry that in September, October, and

10 further on when we had those communications we had a fax machine on foil,

11 and those faxes, i.e., the information that we received, faded so

12 unfortunately none of that could be preserved as material that could be

13 used for those purposes. I only know that some of the orders arrived and

14 they were warnings, not so much orders. At the address of the

15 information centre they had a printer machine that could type such

16 documents. I received warnings from Dr. Karadzic that we should strictly

17 adhere, or rather, that military conscripts had to adhere to Geneva

18 Conventions and Geneva warnings so that the military structures in

19 conversation with their soldiers, high- and low-ranking officers

20 commented upon that and warned all of the soldiers in their units. I'm

21 not saying that --

22 Q. Thank you. I'm now asking you about the document. We'll move on

23 to other things later. In September did you meet with General Mladic and

24 other officials? Did you attend a meeting of some kind at that time?

25 A. In September 1992, General Mladic?

Page 36613

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. It is quite possible. Not in Pale, that's for sure. Perhaps in

3 Foca or thereabouts. Maybe he asked me to have a cup of coffee,

4 somewhere there, in Bileca, but I absolutely don't remember.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber needs to rise in two or

7 three minutes so if you have more shall we do it tomorrow?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that will be enough. If we

9 can get really quickly P1480 it will be enough. Typed-up version.

10 P1480, typed up version, page 60. The typed-up version, typewritten

11 version.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Foca, 17 September, can you see that this is General Mladic's

14 diary?

15 A. Well, it's possible that it was Foca because Kovac is mentioned.

16 He was the commander of the TG there. I suppose that the tactical group

17 was in question here.

18 Q. Can we now go to page 67 in English and in B/C/S version.

19 Sixty-seven in e-court. Sixty-seven in English and Serbian. We have it

20 in English. Vojislav Maksimovic and we are waiting for the Serbian page.

21 Here Mr. Maksimovic - he is a deputy and the member of the academia - he

22 says that there is poor co-ordination with Cajnice, Pale and Bileca. In

23 September was that co-ordination still poor?

24 A. It is correct in late September up to 10 October, the joint

25 forces of the Serbian army of Gacko and Foca suppressed from Gucevo and

Page 36614

1 Zelengora mountains the Muslim forces and the army in Foca from then on

2 controlled the entire territory of the municipality of Foca. As they

3 were withdrawing across the Suceska river towards Gacko they blew up the

4 bridge. The Muslims did that and it was repaired only sometime in 1994,

5 thereabouts.

6 Q. And now can we look at page 69 in English and Serbian. Let's see

7 what you said to all that --

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic -- just a second.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll rise for today.

11 Mr. Mladjenovic, can I advise you not to discuss with anybody

12 else about your testimony. We'll continue --

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Fine, I understand.

14 JUDGE KWON: -- tomorrow morning at 9.00.

15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.50 p.m.,

16 to be reconvened on Friday, the 5th day of

17 April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.