Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 37458

 1                           Monday, 22 April 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Do you hear me well,

 7     Mr. Galic?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hear you well, Mr. President,

 9     and I understand you well.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

13     morning to everybody.

14                           WITNESS:  STANISLAV GALIC [Resumed]

15                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

16                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

17        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General Galic.

18        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

19        Q.   Let me remind both of us that we should wait for the

20     interpretation to finish.  General, how did the 1st Corps of the BH Army

21     honour the zone of total exclusion that had been agreed in the very

22     centre of Sarajevo?

23        A.   The agreement reached on the 18th of February, 1994, is about the

24     exclusion of heavy weapons within 20 kilometres from the centre of

25     Sarajevo.  According to the information I had at the time, the 1st Corps


Page 37459

 1     of the BH Army did not honour the agreement.  I had sufficient

 2     information about their activity to draw that conclusion.  I pointed that

 3     out to all UNPROFOR representatives.  I showed them that it didn't apply

 4     in the same manner as the withdrawal of my forces from Igman and

 5     Bjelasnica, which positions they handed over to the BH Army.  But they

 6     said that they hadn't done that, but later on it was obvious that they

 7     had.  I don't know which measures they were taking to have the other side

 8     honour the agreement, but basically the 1st Corps of the BH Army

 9     according to the information I had did not honour the agreement.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01784, please.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   [No interpretation]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  We are not getting the interpretation.

14             Do you hear me?  Could you repeat, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can hear you but probably you

16     mean the interpretation into English.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General, paragraph 2 reads that the enemy did not respect the

19     truce and that they opened sniper fire from the Jewish cemetery and

20     Debelo Brdo with fragmentation ammunition, five rifle grenades, and three

21     grenades from hand-held rocket-launchers.  Are the places mentioned here

22     within that 20-kilometre exclusion zone?

23        A.   Yes.  All these places mentioned are in the territory controlled

24     by the First Corps of the BH Army.  They are near the centre of Sarajevo,

25     so certainly within the 20-kilometre exclusion zone.


Page 37460

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And in the next paragraph we can see that grenades

 2  of -- make-shift grenades, 82 mm calibre, were fired from the direction of the

 3  Agricultural Institute, then they shot at a UN plane from a browning and you

 4  also add in item 2 that your forces did not respond to enemy actions except in

 5  the zones of the Third Sarajevo Infantry Brigade in Rajlovac and Ilijas.  These

 6  two, Rajlovac and Ilijas, are they central or peripheral city municipalities?

 7        A.   We know that Sarajevo before 1991 had about 610.000 inhabitants and

 8     it had ten municipalities.  Rajlovac and Ilijas are on the outer rim like

 9     Pale.  There is something else I haven't commented upon.

10        Q.   Okay.  But be brief.

11        A.   It is important to point out the fire at the UN helicopter with

12     an anti-aircraft machine-gun of 12.7-millimetre calibre.  Up to that

13     calibre, weapons were allowed in the exclusion zone, but we're talking

14     about an anti-aircraft machine-gun which is efficient up to a distance of

15     1500 metres.  This is why that fire is very dangerous and can be provocative.

16     That's what I wanted to add, there are a lot of important matters listed here.

17        Q.   What was the position or the interest of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

18     with regard to the safety of UN planes and planes carrying humanitarian aid?

19        A.   We had a number of orders about humanitarian aid.  I expected a

20     special chapter of questions about that, so I would be able to say what

21     the obligations of the SRK were with regard to humanitarian aid.  Not

22     only the landing of planes at the Butmir airport in Sarajevo because that

23     part was very risky because you had to land between the 1st Corps and the

24     SRK, and we're talking about freight planes here, easy to hit.  And

25     whether the fire had been opened from the SRK or the 1st Corps positions


Page 37461

 1  is difficult to establish.  As far as I know and according to the information

 2  I had, we never opened fire at UN planes, not even - if I may add – when Mr.

 3  Morillon requested passage to Srebrenica I replied, "I haven’t informed the

 4  units because they don't know who's flying above them."  And we took measures

 5  for him to reach his destination safely.  A large amount of risk was involved.

 6  Those UN representatives were the one who had to implement what we had ordered,

 7  namely, the honouring of all orders with regard to the Geneva Conventions, the

 8  protection of civilians, and so on and so forth.  Because these are the

 9  implementation forces and they should warn both sides of their respective

10  obligations.  This is why we respected those forces.

11        Q.   In paragraph 3 we read that UNPROFOR accused the Serbian forces as

12     being responsible for yesterday's incident.  It -- they point out that the

13     planes were carrying 16 tonnes of fuel and that there was a risk of that

14     plane falling on Ilidza.  Was it in our interest for such a plane to fall on

15     the Serb settlement of Ilidza?

16      A.   Well, if such a plane with 16 tonnes of fuel had crashed in Ilidza,

17  I don't think that much would have remained of Ilidza, I don’t mean just the

18  settlement, but the population that lived there on either side of the frontline.

19 Q. A meeting is scheduled to take place tomorrow between General Galic and General

20  Soubirou, we read here.  General Soubirou has proposed the following agenda:

21  A global agreement on anti-sniper action, and then we see that it continues

22  with the free movement and so on and so forth.  Did that meeting take place?

23    A.  If I'm not mistaken, yes.  There's no confirmation in this report, but

24  Soubirou was the commander of the UNPROFOR sector in which Sarajevo was.

25  He's the person with whom I was supposed to co-operate officially in the zone


Page 37462

 1  of responsibility of the SRK.  I represented the SRK, and he the UNPROFOR forces

 2  and other forces in that area.  After the exclusion of heavy weapons in the

 3  20-kilometre zone, we had -- we were in a position where the 1st Corps of the

 4  BH Army had a great advantage over the SRK - I had already discussed that so I

 5  needn't repeat - and we were all for an anti-sniping agreement because even

 6  before all fire from infantry weapons had been called sniping, but this

 7  agreement was really only about snipers proper.  If you understand it that way,

 8  we thought it a good idea to have such an agreement because then the SRK would

 9  have been protected and the other day I also mentioned the obligation, or

10  rather, to withdraw heavy weapons from the 20-kilometre zone and how

11  dissatisfied the Serbs were with that.

12        Q.   Thank you.  The last item is number 10.  We can't see it in

13     English.  A Croat and a Serb crossed the lines and joined you.  This

14     person, Mate Gajo Perlind [phoen] is a Croat, right?

15   A.   Yeah, he should be.  These people who changed sides, there were many of

16  them in 1993 and 1994.  They came from the area controlled by the 1st Corps of

17  the BH Army.  They were mostly Serbs or Croats but there were also some Muslims.

18  There were -- there were such incidents with people from Sarajevo fleeing across

19  the lines, going from the area controlled by the First Corps of the BH Army to

20  the territory of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.  There was an example of a girl

21  and her boyfriend who were killed on a bridge and so on.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Just a very small thing.  At page 3 the witness

25     spoke about an anti-aircraft machine-gun being referred to in the


Page 37463

 1     document and the document doesn't say "anti-aircraft machine-gun," so I

 2     wonder what he means to describe.  There's a weapon in the document

 3     called a "Browning," maybe that's the same thing, but just before this is

 4     admitted, please, that clarification would be of assistance.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  What page?  Shall we go back to the first page.

 6             Could you assist us, Mr. Galic?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Gladly, Mr. President.  Browning is

 8     the name of the weapon.  It's a PAM or anti-aircraft machine-gun and the

 9     make is Browning.  The calibre is 12.7 millimetres.  You're right,

10     Madam Prosecutor, it is the same thing, only the word here used is

11     Browning and I called it an anti-aircraft machine-gun because I wanted to

12     explain what a Browning was and how it can be used.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be admitted as next Defence exhibit.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3435, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Before we move on to sniping and anti-sniping agreements, please

18     explain to the Chamber what a sniper is actually and what kind of sniping

19     units the SRK had and what kind of snipers or sniping rifles and what the

20     purpose was for which the SRK used snipers.  What is a sniper actually?

21    A.   In the military sense and the civilian sense too, a sniping rifle is a

22  rifle.  A gun cannot be called a sniper, although with a gun you also target

23  directly, you fire directly.  We had various M-48 rifles of 7.9 millimetre

24  calibre, which apart from a mechanical sight also had an optical sight

25  and that was an optional -- an addition to that rifle and that's what we


Page 37464

 1  called a sniping rifle.  We had a small number of semi-automatic rifles of

 2  7.62 millimetre calibre which could also be equipped with an optical sight.

 3  The optical sight enhances the precision of the rifle which can be used with

 4  precision up to 400 metres' distance and the overall range is 800 metres.

 5  The bullet of the M-48 7.9 mm rifle can fly as far as 5 kilometres but it

 6  can be used with any amount of precision only up to the distances I mentioned.

 7             If you equal all infantry weapons with sniping rifles is wrong

 8     from the military point of view.  I don't know about the legal point of

 9     view because you can approach it from various angles.  Generals from NATO

10     countries who were here actually agreed with my interpretation and that's the

11     definition widely accepted in the military profession.  Apart from

12     optical sights there are also laser sights.  You can have equipment for

13     shooting at night and so on.  Nowadays there are even more modern weapons

14     and almost any NATO rifle is equipped almost as if it were a sniping

15     rifle.  It's not the same with us.  So we must distinguish between

16     sniping and other fire from infantry weapons.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Before we move on to what SRK had, can you just tell

18     us if there are snipers which can fire bursts of fire and what is the

19     precision with regard to moving targets?

20        A.   Well, the intention of the sniper is to fire single shots because

21     bursts of fire are imprecise and bursts of fire can never be successful

22     sniper fire.  That is why we used the rifle from the Second World War

23     practically with which one could achieve what could be achieved.  So that

24     would be that briefly.

25        Q.   And moving targets?


Page 37465

 1        A.   A moving target can be better hit because in the -- with the

 2     optical sights you can count in the speed of the moving target, whether

 3     it's a man running or some other item moving, then you can calculate the

 4     time which is needed and how many metres he would cross in order to shoot

 5     in front of the target so that when the object that is targeted comes

 6     along then it collides with the bullet.

 7        Q.   Did you have any sniper units?

 8        A.   In the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps there were no sniper units, no

 9     sniper units.  There were single sharpshooters, but few.  I don't even

10     know how many we had in our corps in total, but not so many.  They were

11     assigned across various units and in lower units down to the level of

12     company.

13        Q.   Thank you.  What was their task?

14        A.   The main task of the sharpshooters or sniping activity was to

15     fight and counter the enemy sniper activities.  Next, they could also be

16     used in order to target important targets in combat; for example, if you

17     notice that there is an officer there then the sniper should target him.

18     It shouldn't be an ordinary soldier firing.  Then they could also target

19     the openings of bunkers.  If there was fire coming from bunkers and there

20     is an opening, then you would have the required level of precision with

21     the sniper to neutralise it.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell the Chamber in view of precision

23     at a distance of 400 metres what were the sections of the Sarajevo front

24     at which you could reach the targets and what were the sections where you

25     could only fire at the lines and what were the ones where you could also


Page 37466

 1     fire in-depth?

 2        A.   Well --

 3        Q.   For example, could you fire from Vidikovac and up to what

 4     distance?

 5        A.   It was possible to fire from Vidikovac but the question is what

 6     was visible from there.  It was mostly from the areas just like they did,

 7     down along Miljacka from Grbavica, and they shot at us from Marin Dvor, the

 8     faculty of mechanical engineering, and up to the government building

 9     towards our forces.  Likewise, from the high-rises, even though they were

10     somewhat lower, I mean the high-rises on our side, but our snipers were

11     deployed there and our snipers returned such fire.  Then we also returned

12     fire in Dobrinja similarly, but also in Dobrinja we had position that was

13     disadvantageous because the high-rises are almost of the same height.  We

14     held a smaller section of Dobrinja but they had the rise at Mojmilo so

15     they could use the area more.  However, it was still possible to use

16     sniper and other units, or rather, such equipment, sniping equipment

17     because we didn't have such specific units.  And then further, if you

18     need me to go on describing the situation, one could say that in part of

19     the Stup and the Stup overpass we also had that though it was not so

20     pronounced.  And in the area of Rajlovac in the direction of Brijesce

21     Brdo and Sokolj, there was no chance of using them because of the

22     significant overtowering of their forces so it wouldn't be efficient.

23     Likewise in Vogosca towards Zuc and Orlic, it wouldn't have been much

24     efficient from those sections.

25             What were the areas that could be partly or occasionally used for


Page 37467

 1     such fire?  Well, that was the area above, or rather, towards Hresa.  But

 2     only occasionally.  It depended.  For example, sometimes they would gain

 3     the upper hand in that area, sometimes we would -- that was the area

 4     towards Spicaste Stijene as they called it.  Spicaste Stijene, as far as

 5     I remember, was partly under our control at one point and then it was

 6     under their control, and the people who were on the positions there told

 7     me that they were at the bottom of Spicaste Stijene rather than up there,

 8     so it was possible to shoot from the higher parts.  As for other sections

 9    such as Hresa and Trebevic, I think that it was impossible.  Why?  Because the

10     buildings which were in the zone of the 1st Corps of the BH Army actually

11     separated this section of Trebevic and Hresa from Sarajevo so that it was

12     not rational to use any such equipment in that specific area.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.  Could you tell us something about the same

14     thing, the units, positions, and the use of sniper fire.  You already

15     told us something about that, about the 1st Corps, especially in the part

16     of the city where the lines were close to each other and so were the

17     civilian settlements such as Grbavica and Dobrinja.  But did they have

18     any sniper formations?

19        A.   In my testimony I have already mentioned quite a lot of

20     information up until now, but I would emphasize the following.  In the

21     Marin Dvor area and the other areas facing Grbavica, we know that it was

22     only the Miljacka river that separated the two fronts.  On the right bank

23     were the positions of the BH Army and on the left bank were the positions

24     of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps along the Miljacka river.  And there were

25     always various provocations and shoot-outs.  But on their side - when I


Page 37468

 1     say "their side," I always mean the 1st Corps of the BH Army - they

 2     had stronger buildings on their side so they had more possibilities to

 3     use sniper units.  According to the information that I had and that the

 4     SRK had, the 1st Corps of the BH Army had sniper units within its

 5     composition.  I said before that we had information that they had around

 6     500 snipers in Sarajevo, whether it was more or less and whether the

 7     number increased, because at the Zrak factory which was under their

 8     control they could produce optical sights so they could increase the

 9     number of such equipment that they would be using during the war, so I

10     cannot say with definite precision what the number was.

11             What is also well-known were specific groups of selected snipers,

12     that is to say the men who used snipers, who acted from the "Seve," that

13     is to say the larks; to "Laste," which are the swallows.  They had

14     specific names, all sorts of names were used.  Those sniper groups had

15     double use.  They fired against our forces, especially in Grbavica,

16     because this thing about the "Seve" was something that was mentioned

17     during the proceedings against me as well.  They said that in Grbavica

18     they would target women in mourning.  Why?  Because there were both

19     Muslim and Croatian and Serbian women living in Grbavica, but mostly the

20     women who were in mourning dressed in black were at the time were Serbian

21     women.  That is why they would target women in mourning.  This was an

22     explanation as to why they targeted them.  At least that is what I

23     understood at the time.

24             Sniper fire in Grbavica was very pronounced.  I think I told you

25     how we protected ourselves from the snipers.  We would use tents that


Page 37469

 1     would be spread across the streets, tacked on one side and the other,

 2     that would be a sort of screen protecting from their sniper fire.  It was

 3     successful only to a degree, but it was better with such a protection

 4     than without it.  I think that is sufficient about Grbavica.

 5        Q.   I would just like to ask you the following.  Can you please tell

 6     the Chamber how come that the Serbian women used to wear mourning at the

 7     time?

 8        A.   Well, many Serbs were killed in this period and elderly Serbian

 9     women very often wear black clothes; that is to say, that they are in

10     mourning.

11        Q.   And in connection with the deaths, what's the connection with

12     mourning?

13        A.   As far as I know our customs, if someone gets killed, whether

14     it's a close relative or not such a close one, then at least for half a

15     year, at least, you're supposed to be in mourning.  Women wear it,

16     sometimes men too, not so much but for women it's almost obligatory.  At

17     least six months.  And some women, especially the elderly women, if they

18     mourn for longer periods they may continue to be in mourning for the rest

19     of their lives because they mourn someone, a son or a husband or somebody

20     else.  That is why this was marked.

21        Q.   Thank you.  In the previous document we saw that there were two

22     persons who had crossed over, one Serb and one Croat.  Could you learn

23     anything from the people who crossed over about the fire directed at us

24     and the fire directed against their own people that was sometimes used in

25     the Muslim part of Sarajevo?


Page 37470

 1        A.   Well, I would like to say another thing here.  We already

 2     presented something in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, a passage that I gave

 3     to soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  It was --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Galic, just a second.  Probably it's better for

 6     you to repeat your answer kindly.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  Was I too fast or --

 8     yes, too fast.

 9             I would like to ask the question to be formulated again briefly

10     and then it will be easier for me to answer.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   The question was that we could have seen from the previous

13     document there were two men who crossed over in one single day, one Serb

14     and one Croat.  Did you receive any specific information from those who

15     crossed over, specifically with regard to the fire of Muslim snipers

16     especially against their own territory and their own civilians?

17        A.   From the persons who crossed over, sometimes they were fewer,

18     sometimes they were more numerous, but it could be up to 15 people in a

19     single day who crossed over from the territory under the control of the

20     BH Army to the territory under the control of the Sarajevo-Romanija

21     Corps.  And they were quite a significant source of information for us

22     about the situation in the territory under the control of the 1st Corps

23     of the BH Army because they had to experience everything that was going

24     on there, and they knew what were the measures taken against them in the

25     territory under the control of the 1st Corps of the BH Army, especially


Page 37471

 1     in camps and other places where they were detained, how they were

 2     treated, and so on and so forth.  And of course we would later forward

 3     this information to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska and

 4     likewise we received information about the deployment of the forces and

 5     equipment of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Starting with Marin Dvor and then downstream, could

 7     you tell us what were the buildings or facilities where snipers' nests

 8     were deployed on the Muslim side?  You can start from Momo and Uzeir the

 9     two Unis high-rises and then further on.

10        A.   Well, I would rather tell you what were the general things that I

11     could notice and then mention specific buildings because there were too

12     many.  All the buildings with reinforced concrete that were higher than

13     three floors were used for sniper fire.  From parts of their deployment

14     in Marin Dvor, the faculty of mechanical engineering, and down to

15     Dobrinja, the territory that was under the control of the BH Army.  Then

16     from Alipasino Polje, the students' halls of residence, Stupska Petlja

17     overpass, and along the entire front practically because we know what

18     were the other dominant features such as Sokolja Dol [phoen], Zuca, and

19     on the opposite side up to Grdonj and Debelo Brdo facing Grbavica.  So I

20     think I have now closed the circle, so to speak.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what sort of orders did you issue?

22     Did you issue orders to open sniper fire against targets that were not

23     legitimate, on civilians, and so on?  What sort of orders did you issue

24     with regard to this?  You and your subordinates, at least as far as you

25     knew.


Page 37472

 1        A.   Well, as for sniper fire, the fire of various snipers, I said

 2     that we did not have sniper units.  So the level of command and control

 3     which could issue such tasks directly were platoon commanders at the

 4     highest and occasionally company commanders.  The higher levels of

 5     command and control did not deal with such issues except in extraordinary

 6     circumstances.  My orders were never such that the targets could include

 7     civilians.  My orders also said that no one was entitled and did not have

 8     the right to target a civilian or select civilians as targets.  So when

 9     selecting a target, everyone would have to decide to select military

10     targets.  Now, whether there was fire that was not in accordance with

11     this and whether there was too much or disproportionate fire at some

12     points, I believe we'll talk about that soon.

13        Q.   Thank you.  How did you receive information, through reports or

14     protests?  What did you receive about sniper fire and to what extent were

15     such reports accurate?

16        A.   Well, as for protests about sniper fire, we did discuss here some

17     protests that I responded to.  Essentially, there was a general protest

18     with regard to such fire, so they would say:  Such and such a place was

19     targeted by sniper fire, but on the basis of this you could not take any

20     measures.  There were no direct protests in connection with sniper fire.

21        Q.   Are you saying that there were no specific protests?

22        A.   Yes.  For example, what I know today, what you know today, what

23     the Court knows today, I didn't know that at the time, that somebody got

24     killed from sniping fire.  How was I supposed to know that?  I did not

25     receive such information and I could not react because there was no


Page 37473

 1     information of that kind.

 2        Q.   Our soldiers, our shooters, could they distinguish between Muslim

 3     and Serbian civilians in the Muslim part of Sarajevo?

 4        A.   So far that was not said during my trial and I've not mentioned

 5     that during my testimony here.  I would like to say in Sarajevo on the

 6     territory of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army, according to what we know

 7     some 30.000 Serbs remained living in the area, 15.000 families times two

 8     family members amounted to 30.000 Serbs.  Their situation was very

 9     difficult.  They lived in 40 camps in and outside of Sarajevo from Silos

10     to the central prison.  As for distinction being made between a

11     civilian Serb and a civilian Muslim, I don't think that a soldier on the

12     front line could make that distinction at all.

13  Q. Thank you. In the indictment against me, there are allegations about an alleged

14 sniping incident whereby a 3-year-old child was wounded in the right leg on a porch

15 or balcony of its house in Zagrici street, Sirokaca area, on the 13 December 1992.

16 I believe that the location from which that fire was open was pin-pointed as

17 Stijene Baba. Did you issue that order? Did you receive report about that incident?

18        A.   That was in the area of Sirokaca.  Did you say that?

19        Q.   Yes, Sirokaca.  From Stijene Baba to Sirokaca.

20        A.   With hindsight when I tried to remember all those incidents that

21     we have discussed so far - and you have to know that during my trial we

22     discussed a total of 37 such incidents - it's very difficult to remember

23     each and every one of them, but I do remember the one that you have just

24     mentioned now.  That area, Baba Stijene, was below the road which leads

25     from Lukavica to Pale.  They may have had access, the forces of the


Page 37474

 1     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, because below the road there were positions of

 2     the BiH Army.  There's a location known as Ranjena Pita, I

 3     apologise, if I'm not mistaken, but that was 20 years ago and memory has

 4     faded, but you jogged my memory during the prepping.  That girl was

 5     injured when she returned and one needs to mention that over there there

 6     were positions and trenches of the BiH army close to their house and that

 7     troops were moving around probably in the direction of the positions at

 8     Sirokaca.  Whether any of the soldiers were there at the moment when she

 9     got hit would be mere speculation.

10        Q.   You mentioned some troops that were headed towards the positions,

11     whose troops?  What army was that?  Whose troops were moving by her house

12     in the direction of their positions?

13        A.   The 1st Corps of the BiH army, the 10th Mountain Brigade was

14     deployed there in the area and later on it was the 105th Brigade.

15        Q.   Perhaps 115th?

16        A.   Well, it could have been both, both names applied.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to call up 1D6308.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   This is your report which was issued on the 13th of December,

20     1992, when that incident happened.  Could you please tell me this:  Did

21     you issue the order for sniping fire to be opened on that girl or did any

22     of your subordinates order that?

23        A.   I have the report in front of me, but my eyes can't see it.

24     It's -- the letters are too small.

25        Q.   But can you please first answer my question about the order.  Who


Page 37475

 1     ordered it?  Whether an order was issued?  Did you receive information

 2     that somebody else had issued the order?

 3        A.   For somebody to order that fire should be opened on a child or a

 4     civilian in general, honestly I never heard that any such order was

 5     issued in my corps.  I'm sure that I never issued such an order.  Nobody

 6     who commanded me ordered any such thing.  It's absolutely inconceivable

 7     that anybody could have issued such an order.

 8        Q.   Can you please look at your report and can you see what your

 9     report at 1800 hours contained.  There is a reference to battles in the

10     Rajlovac and Vogosca Brigades.  The enemy artillery fired at Blazuj,

11     Nedzarici, Grbavica, and Mrkovici, and so on and so forth, and it also

12     says that our artillery opened fire on the enemy artillery positions.

13     There is no reference to any activities in Sirokaca.  What can you tell

14     us about that?  If there had been fire opened on Sirokaca, would you have

15     omitted that from your report?

16        A.   I have to go back to 13 December 1992, right, that's the date

17     that you're asking me about.  At that time fighting was still going on

18     for Otes.  At that time the BiH army put a lot of pressure on Zuc.

19     Fierce fighting was ongoing in that area.  Sirokaca is on the other side

20     of the front line and there should not have been any major activity in

21     that area at the time.  Major activities started taking place sometime

22     around the 20th of December when the forces should have been linked up in

23     the final stages of Jug 92 operation.

24        Q.   I asked you this:  If there had been any activities in Sirokaca,

25     would that have been reported to the Main Staff?


Page 37476

 1        A.   If there had been activities and if we had received information

 2     from our subordinated units that something of that kind had happened in

 3     that area, I'm sure that we would have reported back to the Main Staff

 4     because Sirokaca was a sensitive area.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3436, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D01486.

10     Can the document be zoomed in for the benefit of the General.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This was issued on the 26th of February, 1993.  You reported, in

13     the first item, about sniping fire and fire being open on the Rajlovac

14     barracks from Sokolje and under item i.-- on other locat...—- on Grbavica,

15     and under 7 you can see the effects of the sniping activity in Grbavica.  One

16     civilian was killed by sniper fire and a number of civilians were wounded.

17     To -- what was the ratio between civilians and soldiers who were wounded in

18     Grbavica?  Who were the most commonplace casualties?

19        A.   When I remember the information that we had at that time, there

20     were a lot of wounded and killed civilians in Grbavica.  The percentage

21     or the ratio between civilians and soldiers must have been or I assume

22     that it was 1:2, but in any case there were more wounded and dead

23     civilians.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?


Page 37477

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3437, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D01519.

 4             If the document is blown up a little, the General will be able to

 5     see it.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is your report for the 29th of March, 1993, at 1800 hours.

 8 You reported that during the cease-fire agreement which is not being observed

 9   by the enemy, there was a sniping fire open on -- from Sokolje on Dvor,

10   from Mojmilo on Lukavica, from Dobrinja 1 against the airport settlement,

11   and under item 2 you say that the SRK units generally are adhering

12     to the cease-fire agreement and do not respond to the enemy provocations.

13             Towards the end of the document under 7 you say:

14             "Casualties:  One soldier in Ilidza was killed."

15             Does that mean that in the other locations where fire was opened

16     there were no casualties?  What was the reason why you did not return

17     fire?

18        A.   If it says in the report that only one soldier was killed, that

19     was based on the information that I had at the time, so I cannot base my

20     report on the information that I may have obtained in the meantime.  A

21     cease-fire was in effect at the time and we could not respond but you see

22     that I'm -- mentioned all the places from which sniper fire was opened

23     and that's precisely where it was opened from, where they were deployed.

24        Q.   You can also see that there was a meeting dealing with the

25     freedom of movement, but why didn't you respond to the enemy fire?


Page 37478

 1        A.   The reason was the fact that the cease-fire was in effect, as

 2     I've already told you, and there were negotiations going on about blue

 3     paths or blue roads which would allow civilians to go in and out of the

 4     area of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army and the area of the Sarajevo-Romanija

 5     Corps.  That would have been two directions that civilians could have taken

 6     in order to enter and leave those areas.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3438, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   In the indictment against me there are allegations about an

14     incident which happened on the 17th of April, 1993.  Allegedly a

15     9-year-old girl was shot at and wounded in the back while she was playing

16     in her own front yard in Sedrenik in Sarajevo.  First of all, can you

17     tell us whether you ordered that fire to be opened or whether somebody

18     else ordered that.  Did you receive a report on that incident at all?

19        A.   The area of Sedrenik is very close to Spicaste Stijene, or

20     rather, it was targeted from positions on Spicaste Stijene.  That girl

21     who was wounded in the back was not made known to us.  We did not receive

22     information about that nor did we report about that.  I'm now going to

23     share with you or if you want me to I can share what I learned

24     subsequently during my trial.

25        Q.   Did you or anybody else order to open fire on civilians in


Page 37479

 1     Sedrenik?

 2        A.   Like I've already told you, such an order could not have existed.

 3     Nobody ordered to -- fire to be opened on civilians.  If anybody opened

 4     fire that was done unbeknownst to us against any orders.

 5        Q.   Can you then tell the Trial Chamber, starting from Mrkovici above

 6     Spicaste Stijene, whose positions were there and how far were the Serb

 7     positions away from the settlement known as Sedrenik?

 8        A.   Let me try and think of all these positions up there.  There was

 9     Pavlovic, Pavlovic Kosa, there's Grdonj of course, and there is also the

10     part known as seven forests or seven woods.  The part where

11     Spicaste Stijene is located was approximately a kilometre away from

12     Sedrenik or perhaps even a kilometre and a half.  I apologise if I'm

13     mistaken.  I am talking off the top of my head, but it's very difficult

14     to remember all of the details, but I would very much like to answer all

15     of your questions.

16        Q.   Between our positions and Sedrenik --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  You were cut off, Mr. Galic, while

18     you were saying that you wanted to share what you learned subsequently to

19     during your trial.  Could you tell us briefly what it was?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand your question,

21     Your Honour.  At the time when I was in command of the Sarajevo-Romanija

22     Corps, I did not receive any information about any sniping incidents in

23     Sedrenik.  At that time I did not have any information, I did not receive

24     any data so I could not react because I was unaware of any such thing.

25     During my trial that incident was discussed and based on that I can tell


Page 37480

 1     you that it had been established that one could not see the area where

 2     that girl was from the positions where our troops was.  And if you look

 3     at the entry/exit wound on that girl you could see that she was lying

 4     down when she was shot at or something of that kind.  In any case, her

 5     location could not be seen from the positions where our troops were

 6     deployed at that time.  I'm sorry if I don't remember all the details.

 7     It was also said during that -- my trial that there were some other

 8     troops or trenches in the vicinity of that house.  It was only normal

 9     when you look at the map of the deployment of the 1st Corps of the BiH

10     Army and if you copied those positions on the map depicting all the

11     incidents that are mentioned, you will see immediately what happened,

12     whether there were any troops in the area.  I'm sure that there were, but

13     I can't tell you how many and where they were deployed.  I was not in a

14     position to know that.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Thank you.

16             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let us see 1D54365,

18     please.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Could you please repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D54365 -- oh, there is no 3 in

21     there, so ...

22             It's 1D5465 without the number 3.  This is it.  Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, the date is the 17th of April.

25     General Manojlo Milovanovic, the deputy commander of the Main Staff, is


Page 37481

 1     issuing this warning to be alert and raise combat-readiness.  There is --

 2     there are the preparations for Easter mentioned here and the recipient is

 3     reminded that on Orthodox holidays the enemy mostly attacks Serbian

 4     villages.  There is a reminder of Kravica and other massacres of

 5     civilians.  It says ensure maximum alertness, increase the number of

 6     patrols, and so on.

 7             Here is my question:  Did we step-up or step-down our combat

 8     activities during our holidays?

 9        A.   During major holidays of ours combat activity was moderate.  It

10     wasn't stepped down.  We wanted to maintain the status quo, but it

11     certainly was not stepped up at the time.  That is why we see here that

12     General Milovanovic in his order demands that about 50 per cent of the

13     manpower be at the positions.  The usual case is that two-thirds are at

14     the positions and one-third is resting.

15        Q.   Thank you.  The general here says "calmed down" rather than

16     moderate.  Does it follow from this order of the Main Staff that combat

17     activity is to be boosted on the occasion of Easter?

18        A.   On the occasion of Easter, combat activity is not boosted but

19     reconnaissance and observation is.  Various provocations by the BH Army

20     followed and the general reminded of situations around Srebrenica.  There

21     was a massacre in that area at Christmas time, and we also referred to

22     such events.  There had been such events in the area of the SRK, but

23     those are mostly about the infiltration of sabotage units that were able

24     to penetrate the lines and return to their territory because the

25     soldiers -- our soldiers were a bit relaxed.


Page 37482

 1        Q.   I'm afraid although I speak at a moderate pace my questions are

 2     simplified.  In line 9 I said the general said that combat activity is

 3     calmed down and not moderate, as it was interpreted.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   I see here that you also received this document, it says "SRK."

 7        A.   Yes, and we certainly issued an own order as a follow-up.  And

 8     sometimes when there was no time to rephrase it, then we also passed on

 9     the original order.  But we did always draft an own order.

10        Q.   Can you confirm that this was on the 17th of April, that is the

11     day of the alleged incident with that girl at Sedrenik, it was also not

12     entered as part of my question.

13        A.   Yes, the date stated here is the 17th of April, 1993.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3439, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   You've already mentioned that the Muslims had their positions at

20     Spicaste Stijene.  Generally speaking, General, did we have positions

21     anywhere without the Muslims having their own positions facing ours?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Before -- yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't know where the General said what

24     Dr. Karadzic is attributing to him.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On two pages before this one we'll


Page 37483

 1     find it.  While we are looking, could the General please answer this

 2     question I just put.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Could one side have its positions without enemy positions facing

 5     them?

 6        A.   In the Sarajevo area there were no such instances, but elsewhere

 7     there were large stretches of no man's land that were as wide as a few

 8     kilometres sometimes.  But in Sarajevo areas without forces were very

 9     small, and when there were a need, then there would be a rapid

10     intervention to take that area.

11        Q.   Page 10, line 3, is an instance of the General saying that the

12     Muslims had their forces up there.  And on page 9, lines 24 and 25.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see 1D1582.  Page 10,

14     line 1 as well.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, were there any forces of theirs between our positions at

17     Trebevic and the Sedrenik development?

18        A.   Yes, there were forces of theirs, and I believe that I gave a

19     similar answers to the Presiding Judge.

20        Q.   Thank you.  This is a regular combat report for the 28th of

21     August, 1993, the hour is 1700.  Under item 1 you immediately say that

22     they violated the cease-fire agreement, and among the places from which

23     they did so we see bullet 2 saying from Spicaste Stijene with rifle

24     grenades on the Mrkovic sector and with an anti-aircraft gun on

25     Donji Biosk.  Can you tell us, General, what these places are, Mrkovici


Page 37484

 1     and Donji Biosk?

 2        A.   Mrkovici is a housing development and Donji Biosk is another

 3     inhabited neighbourhood.  Mrkovici is beyond the Sedrenik area and Spicasta

 4     Stijena -- actually, it's a village.  When I was saying that they had

 5     positions at Spicaste Stijene, it's actually confirmed here in this report.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3440, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  1D0158 -- no 524,

10     please.  1D01524.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, this is a report of the 4th of May, 1993, the hour is

13     1700.  You report to the Main Staff about activity directed against

14     Vojkovici with 30-millimetre gun from Igman, four 82 mm shells on the

15    Serbian part of Dobrinja, successfully repelled attack against Perivoje

16    village, it’s the Rajlovac Brigade.  Look at item 7 and the losses.  Three

17    soldiers killed, four wounded, and one civilian, and the conclusion reads:

18      "In spite of all measures taken, the intensive enemy sniper fire inflicting

19     heavy casualties on us as a result of the relaxed behaviour of soldiers and

20     civilians.  Two soldiers were killed and one wounded by sniper fire today."

21             And further down in the decision it says activities towards

22     Ormanje and Igman.  Are these two on the outer rim of the area or at the

23     front line?

24        A.   This report covers the major part of the zone of responsibility

25     of the corps.  It really summarises what happened in Sarajevo and in the


Page 37485

 1     close surroundings.  We listed the municipalities belonging to Sarajevo

 2     and one of them is Hadzici.  About Hadzici and the direction of Pazarici

 3     there is mount Ormanje.  That part of territory is above Hadzici in the

 4     direction of Pazarici.  At that time speaking about our activities

 5     directed at Ormanje, there was a huge pressure off the population at

 6     Hadzici in connection with the events at the silos camp at Tarcin, which

 7     is behind Ormanje.  According to the information we had at the time, we

 8     were able to reach that Silos to see what was going on there.  I even

 9     issued some equipment and gave some forces to the Igman Brigade commander,

10     but these were not used efficiently and I proposed that that commander

11     be replaced later.

12        Q.   General, talking about sniping, how do you assess these losses in

13     one day, especially the fact that two soldiers were killed and one was

14     wounded -- or four were wounded plus one civilian due to sniping?

15        A.   Taking into consideration all the enemy activities and our own

16     activities to prevent these and launch some attacks outside of Sarajevo,

17     then the losses are slightly higher than average, which is justified in

18     such situations.  Of course it's always better to have smaller losses,

19     but this is average more or less under such conditions of active defence.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3441, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01532, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 37486

 1        Q.   This is your report to the Main Staff for the 17th of May, 1993.

 2     Under item 1 you speak about opening fire from infantry weapons and you

 3     single out sniping.  So in your reports you distinguish between infantry

 4     fire and sniping.

 5        A.   I was always in favour of sending out such reports.  It was

 6     popular to say -- no, it wasn't infantry fire.  It was sniping.  Then it

 7     makes a greater impression on the higher command and the media and

 8     everybody if you say that -- if you speak about sniping, but we

 9     distinguished between these two things because they're different.

10        Q.   Thank you.  One woman was wounded here and then under item 2 you

11     speak about stepped-up surveillance and reconnaissance and respect of the

12     agreed cease-fire.  Or did you not respond to the wounding of this

13     civilian woman?

14        A.   It's the 17th of May and we want to honour the order about, or

15     rather, follow the order on the honouring of the cease-fire agreement.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get the next page.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know if you're interested,

18     but maybe I should say so now so that we don't go back to the question of

19     the airport.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   We'll get to that yet.  It says here under forecast:

22             "It is to be expected that enemy provocations will continue with

23     the aim of provoking our fire."

24             Why did they want to provoke our fire?

25        A.   The 1st Corps of the BH Army had both a political and military


Page 37487

 1     interest to provoke us.  They had already reached their political goals

 2     because the NATO forces and other forces had already sided with them.  So

 3     it only remained to -- for them to provoke NATO to openly side with the

 4     BH Army.  I'm not sure if I'll interpret this correctly, but General Rose

 5     said to me once that he had asked General Delic:  How long are we

 6     supposed to wage war for you?  When they had asked him to do something

 7     against the VRS.  They were always on the side of the 1st Corps of the

 8     BH Army.  I'm always limiting myself to that corps - which was very rare

 9     when it comes to us.  I never asked anybody to side with us; I just

10     wanted them to be fair.  They were supposed to point out to both sides

11     how they should wage war, but I don't think they really carried out their

12     assignment completely.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3442, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D01544.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   This is a report from you to the Main Staff for the 3rd of June,

20     1993, and in item 1, line 1, we can see that a truce is in force but that

21     it is violated.  We can see the various places where they fired from

22     mortars on Rajlovac, from Lemezi cemetery, mortars on civilian buildings

23     in Ilidza from Hrasnica.  And under item 2 you say:

24             "Our units have stepped up reconnaissance and surveillance and

25     they are additionally surveying the positions."


Page 37488

 1             That's under item 2 [as interpreted].  And under item 7 you say

 2     that two soldiers were wounded by sniper fire, whereas two soldiers were

 3     wounded in Ilidza, so a total of four wounded and two women were killed

 4     by sniper fire in the Aerodrom settlement, the airport settlement.  And

 5     further on --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we just have a correction to the transcript,

 8     I suppose, please.  And this sort of thing happens when Dr. Karadzic

 9     reads out what's actually what we can read in the document, but the

10     transcript on page 30, line 16, says "... from Lemezi cemetery from

11     civilians targets in Hrasnica," and that's not what the document says.

12     The document says enemy mortar fire from the direction of Hrasnica hit

13     civilian targets in Ilidza.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.  That's quite

16     correct.  Perhaps I tried to sum up what everyone can read, but let me

17     move on to my point immediately.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Why didn't you respond to this fire where you had four wounded

20     soldiers and two women killed by sniper fire in airport settlement and

21     also there was mortar fire against civilian targets in your area?

22        A.   If we look at where the losses were sustained or from what

23     direction the fire arrived, if that was the area where they targeted the

24     airport settlement, that's from Dobrinja on the airport settlement, and

25     other fire - let me not repeat what's written in the document - any sort


Page 37489

 1     of response in those areas would represent a violation of the truce that

 2     was in force and would likewise have probably caused other losses,

 3     unnecessary losses of civilians and others.  That was why we decided to

 4     avoid responding in this specific period and that is the 5th of June,

 5     1993.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, please?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3443, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  1D01554 is the document

11     we would need now, please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is your report for the 23rd of June, 1993, and under item 1

14     you say that the enemy is not observing the truce and in line 2 you say

15     that there was firing from infantry weapons and sniper rifles.  So here

16     you also make a distinction between infantry fire and sniper fire.

17        A.   Yes.  You can see that it's the section of Grbavica that was

18     under our control where one woman was shot dead.  I would turn your

19     attention to that part of the report under item 1, because we

20     distinguished [as interpreted], we always wanted to distinguish, sniper

21     fire from infantry weapons fire even though this is difficult to do, I

22     can tell you that.

23        Q.   Thank you.  We can also see that by burning wood on

24     Mount Trebevic they are threatening your positions.  And under item 2

25     observation and reconnaissance is continuing.  Then under item 7 this


Page 37490

 1     woman is mentioned, one soldier wounded in the barracks.  Why didn't you

 2     respond to these losses and to these enemy activities, enemy fire from

 3     various weapons, in particular the snipers at this point?

 4        A.   There is a new element here, a new activity on their part and

 5     that was burning the bush and burning the wooded areas, bush-like trees

 6     in particular because fire would then spread quickly, though that depended

 7     on the direction of the wind.  We know that the wind may blow down a mountain

 8     slope or up the mountain slope.  They usually used the moments when the wind

 9     was blowing upwards towards Trebevic because it would then spread the fire

10     towards Trebevic, towards our positions and in that way they would achieve to

11     chase away our forces even without any combat.  However, the fire did not

12     spread much up the slope as far as I remember, but there was fire.  As

13     for the other fire and activities, that was on average like previously.

14        Q.   Was that the reason why you did not respond?

15        A.   Well, I -- I always focus on the main section of the document

16     which says that there is a cease-fire or some sort of truce in force and

17     that the wish was to observe the truce.  I think that this was the end of

18     a truce that had already been at stake because of the activities of the

19     1st Corps of the BH Army.  In such a situation there was still a wish to

20     try and preserve peace as much as possible.  We did not respond because

21     we wanted to observe the truce and in order to avoid unnecessary losses,

22     even though we had quite a few losses as you can see from here.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that you will now order

25     us to take a break.


Page 37491

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 2        Q.   But just before that let me ask you one thing:  Before a truce

 3     were there legitimate goals and what is a legitimate goal during a truce?

 4     Is one allowed to shoot during a truce at all?

 5        A.   Well, if a cease-fire was ordered, most often it was just a

 6     cease-fire or a cessation of any firing which meant any fire from any

 7     combat hardware or equipment or weapons.  And then no firing at any

 8     target with any weapon was allowed.  That was what it meant.  In such

 9     situations we stuck to the rule that we would inform the UNPROFOR about

10     the locations from which the truce was being violated and with which

11     weapons, and we would say that we would have to respond if that was

12     repeated for our personal safety or our duty to keep our positions in the

13     defence zone.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, please?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be Exhibit D3444.

17             And before we break, Mr. Robinson, the witness who is going to

18     testify on Wednesday will be testifying viva voce and in public?

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE KWON:  And I am aware that there's an issue with regard to

21     preparation for that witness that may affect tomorrow's scheduling.

22             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  That's correct, as Mr. Tieger indicated during our

24     last session last week.

25             JUDGE KWON:  So tomorrow we'll have the first break for an hour


Page 37492

 1     and the lunch break will be half an hour, in conclusion ending up at

 2     3.00.  Would it suit the parties?

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  That would be fine, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  And also the -- given the estimate of the length of

 5     the examination-in-chief and Mr. -- it's evident that Mr. Galic should

 6     stay over until next week?

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  It appears that we haven't had an estimate for

 8     cross-examination of General Galic, but it appears unlikely we will be

 9     able to complete his testimony this week.  I remind the Chamber that next

10     week we have a break, so we would be resuming the week of the 6th of May.

11             JUDGE KWON:  And is the planning that the parties are going to

12     conclude Mr. Akashi's -- Ambassador Akashi's evidence on Wednesday?  Then

13     could that continue on Thursday?

14             MR. ROBINSON:  I think the plan is that Mr. Akashi's evidence

15     would spill over until Thursday and that sometime on Thursday

16     General Galic would resume his testimony completing the rest of that day,

17     and then if we don't finish with him he would have to resume testimony

18     around the 7th of May.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at three past

21     11.00.  Just -- before we break, yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin?  No.

22             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I would just like to tell the

23     Chamber that I'm based in Geneva and not in The Hague, and I don't know

24     when I will be able to come back after the 6th of May.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll come back to that.


Page 37493

 1                           --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Before you continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             Mr. Galic, the Chamber has been informed of your back problem.

 5     The Chamber has no difficulty with you standing at any time to ease

 6     yourself.  And further, please let us know if you need a rest at any

 7     time.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I hope that my lawyer

 9     will say something more with regard to my health and other issues.  I

10     asked him to speak, but if necessary I can say that myself,

11     Mr. President.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             Do you like to add anything, Mr. Piletta-Zanin?

14             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, thank you, Your Honour.

15     I think it might be a good idea if General Galic would talk about his

16     problems now for this may affect his testimony and his concentration.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to stand up, if I may,

19     because when I address the Chamber I prefer to stand.  Thank you.

20             Well, Your Honours, you know that I was injured during my arrest

21     in 1999 and that my spine was damaged as well as my shoulder and my teeth

22     and I had major problems because I could not walk for six months here.

23     The objection to the manner of arrest was rejected.  I was operated on in

24     Germany two years ago, they operated my spine, but it was not successful.

25     So I still have my old problems and now new ones as well.


Page 37494

 1             During my trip from Germany to the Netherlands, the trip lasted

 2     three days.  I requested to fly precisely because of my spine problems.

 3     Others are something that I can tolerate, but they did not agree to that.

 4     I'm not sure who decided on that.  I had to be transported in a vehicle.

 5     I was isolated the first night, the next night I travelled to Arnhem for

 6     the whole night up until 11.00 a.m., then I slept with others, but I

 7     couldn't sleep because there were four other men who were smoking and

 8     talking, and then it was only on the third day on Friday that I arrived

 9     here.  I was quite tired and exhausted considering that at the time I had

10     also problems with my denture being made.  I had injuries while I was in

11     Germany and maybe you noticed that I had difficulty speaking on the first

12     day here because it was only here that they made the dentures smaller.  I

13     had lesions in my mouth and these problems date back to December.

14             So I would ask you if it would be possible for me to fly back

15     or -- as when I returned in 2009 in the direction of Freiburg.  In the

16     Detention Unit they have a decent and correct attitude toward me, nothing

17     special.  But please, there is no need at all to check on me in my cell

18     every 60 minutes in the night because it affects me.  I wake up, I'm a

19     soldier, I still have good reflexes.  Even though I am 70-years-old, my

20     reflexes are still quite good, so sometimes they wake me up even though I

21     must admit that the guards are really very sensitive and careful.  They

22     cannot be more careful than that, but I would kindly ask you to stop

23     monitoring me.  There is no need to monitor me at all because then I

24     could peacefully focus on the trial.  That was all, your President.  It

25     was a bit long-winded.  But that's how things stand.


Page 37495

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Galic.  The Chamber will take a look

 3     into the matter.  Shall we continue?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thanks a lot.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, my indictment includes an incident dated 11th of July,

 9     1993.  According to the indictment, Munira Zametica lost her life while

10     she was getting water from Dobrinja, in the Dobrinja area.  Can you

11     please tell us, first of all, whether you or one of your subordinates

12     ordered such fire and did you receive a report about this incident?

13        A.   I previously said that such incidents, sniping incidents as they

14     are called here, were something that I did not receive reports about.  I

15     don't remember any of the ones which were mentioned during the trials,

16     even during my own trial.  This incident when people were fetching water

17     from the Dobrinja river, that was an incident that I learned about during

18     my trial and during the war I was not familiar with it.  I was not aware

19     of this incident nor did anyone report me about that.

20             But during my trial we arrived at some conclusions which might

21     throw more light on this incident.  At the place where she was taking

22     water from the Dobrinja river, there was a bridge above that location and

23     there were some sacks there, and it was said that the soldiers responded

24     when fire was opened from the territory of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

25     They said that we fired from the church, the new church behind Dobrinja,


Page 37496

 1     the new one that was newly constructed, it was new as far as I know.  But

 2     it was damaged by recoilless gun-fire from Mojmilo, from the BH Army

 3     positions.  So in that area up there I never saw any of my soldiers going

 4     out there, but they said that that was the area from which the fire came.

 5     That is what I remember this incident by if I have described it well and

 6     if I describe the circumstances under which it may have occurred.

 7        Q.   So to return to my question, did you order, did you receive a

 8     report that one of your subordinates ordered this, or did you receive an

 9     official report about this incident?

10        A.   It could all be answered by one negative, no.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you knew enough about the

12     presence of the BH Army in Dobrinja and also about their deployment,

13     where were they deployed?

14        A.   Well, you see, there is one basic rule in the army and it is

15     this:  A commanding officer at one level should be aware of the

16     deployment of forces at two levels down.  And as for the remainder of the

17     deployment is up to others.  I'm the sixth level or thereabouts, the

18     sixth level of command and control.  I was quite well aware of the

19     deployment in Dobrinja and also on the main front line of the

20     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Which brigade was deployed in Dobrinja, how many

22     troops did it have?  What was the density of the troops deployed in that

23     area?

24        A.   I apologise.  If we look at the area of Dobrinja which is above

25     Mojmilo, Goranovo neighbourhood, in Alipasino Polje and goes towards the


Page 37497

 1     Serbian territory, towards Nedzarici and the airport, we will see that

 2     the area is not very big.  It was held by the 5th Mountain Brigade.

 3     According to some estimates, there were about 3.000 troops there.

 4     The figure is not accurate.  This is just an estimate.

 5        Q.   When it comes to the 5th Brigade of the BiH Army, did they have

 6     snipers among them?

 7        A.   Previously during my testimony we said that all of their units

 8     had sniper units, not only sniper rifles, but also entire units which

 9     were used and they were under the direct command of superior commands.

10     They were not used on the orders of a lower-ranking officer.  They were

11     used at the brigade level.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D01546.

14             JUDGE KWON:  While we are waiting for the document to be

15     uploaded, for the record I'd like to state that the Chamber wants to

16     receive a Rule 33 submission from the Registry with respect to

17     General Galic's statement -- submission as soon as practicable.  I wonder

18     whether the Prosecution wants to respond to what Mr. Galic stated?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   This is your report to the Main Staff.  It was issued on the 7th

25     of June.  Please pay attention to bullet point (b) where it says in the


Page 37498

 1     area of responsibility of the Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade where sniper

 2     fire was opened on Grbavica as well as on the Lukavica-Bijelo Polje road

 3     from Dobrinja 1, 2, and 3.  Who held Dobrinja 1, 2, and 3 settlements?

 4        A.   Since I did not live in Sarajevo, I cannot be very precise when

 5     it comes to roads or particular neighbourhoods.  I apologise to the

 6     Trial Chamber and all of those who are listening to my evidence.

 7     However, as far as I know from documents, that area, area 1, 2, and 3

 8     were held by the 1st Corps; right?

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?  Can the English

11     page be scrolled up, please.  Well, no, we need the second page or the next

12     page.  Let's also look at the second page in Serbian.  Let's see sniper fire

13     from Dobrinja.  I'm interested in C5.  It says here in the third paragraph

14     from the top:  Today in the afternoon, sniper fire intensified from the

15     direction of Dobrinja, quadrant C5.  This is enemy fire; right?

16        A.   Yes, this is enemy fire and fire was opened on one part of

17     Dobrinja which was under the control of the 5th Mountain Brigade of the

18     1st Corps.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Admission, please.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3445, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up a

23     document that has already been admitted, it's D3418 dated the 11th July,

24     on the same day when the incident involving the late Munira Zametica

25     happened.


Page 37499

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Let's look at what was reported at 1700 hours on the 11th of

 3     July.  It says here that the enemy opened fire along most of the corps

 4     defence line.  And under 2 it says our forces are reinforcing their

 5     position.  And then it says there were no other incidents.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Serbian page be scrolled up

 7     in order to display bullet point 4.  That's the last line.  There were no

 8     other incidents.  Can we go to the following page in Serbian.  Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   You can see here that Savo Kuljanin was killed and that

11     Milenko Urta was seriously injured.  Could you tell us why this incident

12     involving Munira Zametica was omitted from this daily report?

13        A.   Look at the date when all of that was going on and if you look at

14     the rest of the text you will see that that was while Lukavac 93

15     operation was ongoing.  That means that that part of the Sarajevo front

16     line, that was the south-western part of the front line, was under fire

17     on both sides.  All the troops there were engaged.  At that time we did

18     not report on Mrs. Zametica because we were not aware of that incident.

19     Therefore, my people at the command post could not report about that.

20     This was signed by Milosevic.  In that time I was in a different

21     position, I was observing and commanding Lukavac 93 operation.

22        Q.   It says here that provocative fire was being opened on all

23     separation lines.  How far is Lukavac 93 front line from the place of the

24     incident in Dobrinja?

25        A.   If you want to be aware of the situation you have to know that


Page 37500

 1     the airport is an obstacle.  On the one side there is Dobrinja where the

 2     incident involving sniper fire happened and on the other side of the

 3     airport towards Hadzici and Mount Igman is the area where that operation

 4     was taking place and it spilled over towards Trnovo and Bjelasnica.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up

 7     1D01572.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   This is a report sent by your command to the Main Staff on the

10     2nd of August on St. Ilija's [phoen] day in 1993.  Again it says here

11     that the cease-fire was not observed and that sniper fire was opened from

12     Dobrinja 5 from Stupska Petlja.  It is also said that from the Hasici houses

13     sector three shells were fired towards UNPROFOR in Skenderija and another shell

14     was repeated.  What is the purpose of that fire being opened by the Muslim

15     forces on UNPROFOR?  Judging by the name, when you see this location, Hasici

16     houses, who did those houses belong to, by ethnicity?

17        A.   Well, you have to understand one thing, it's very difficult to look at

18     any of the front lines in the zone of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in isolation,

19     is it only in the urban or in the suburban area.  You have to bear in mind a

20     whole; however, at that time we were already very deep behind the lines.  They

21     needed to provoke NATO hoping that NATO would prevent further advancement of

22     the VRS.  That's why they were provoking UNPROFOR.  They wanted to blame the

23     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, i.e., the Army of Republika Srpska.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you explain the Trial Chamber when it comes to

25     this cease-fire what part of the front line did that apply to in view of


Page 37501

 1     the operation on Mount Igman and Lukavac 93 and violations of the

 2     cease-fire in the city?  Was that a regional cease-fire or was it applied

 3     across the board in all of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Two things.  Perhaps Dr. Karadzic can take another

 6     try at phrasing that question.  And at page 42, line 19, it's not Hadzici

 7     sector, it's Hasica Kuca, and that could probably have been avoided if

 8     Dr. Karadzic slowed down a bit.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I apologise.  Indeed I

10     did mention Hasica Kuca and not Hadzici.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   You never answered that question.  In terms of ethnicity, whose

13     houses were those?

14        A.   Judging by the name of the location, ethnic groups can be

15     distinguished by family names but not all.  Sometimes different ethnic

16     groups share the same family name.  However, Hasici should be a Muslim

17     name.  I believe that I know approximately where those houses are, but I

18     can't be sure so I don't want to speculate.

19        Q.   Thank you.  What types of cease-fires existed in terms of the

20     regional outlay of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Did that cease-fire apply to the

21     city of Sarajevo?

22        A.   Well, thank you very much for putting this question to me.  I'm

23     very happy that you did.  What happened here was a very controversial

24     account of the situation that had been arrived at.  You can see very

25     clear that in the urban area of Sarajevo, in the centre of Sarajevo,


Page 37502

 1     there should have been a cease-fire in place.  That was an order.  As far

 2     as I can remember -- or rather, I can't remember that order because I was

 3     at a forward command post, and at that time the forward command post in

 4     question was somewhere at the foot of Mount Bjelasnica.  I'm sure that

 5     the order applied only to the urban area of Sarajevo.  That's where a

 6     cease-fire should have been in place.  I myself did not receive such an

 7     order.  I was ordered to proceed, to carry on until the 11th of August.

 8     I believe that was the situation, that I'm not mistaken.

 9        Q.   On line 10 it should read:

10             "I did not receive such a cease-fire order to be implemented so

11     far from the urban area of Sarajevo."

12             Is that correct, General?  Just the contrary what -- was the

13     case, you received an order to carry on your combat activities?

14        A.   I can't be very precise and I can't tell you where I was on the

15     2nd of August, but as far as I can remember it was at the foot of

16     Mount Bjelasnica in one of the villages there.  That was very far from

17     Sarajevo, some 27 kilometres away from Sarajevo.  In that area I did not

18     receive an order to cease fire.  Just the contrary was the case.  I was

19     ordered to carry on.  I'm sure that that was the case.  I was in charge

20     of that axis and I know for a fact that that was the case.

21        Q.   Under 2 it says that you should not respond.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Conclusions and forecasts.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I need that in English as well.


Page 37503

 1     Perhaps it's on the last page in English.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 3        Q.   You say here that enemy provocations can be expected to continue

 4     along with firing on our positions and at UNPROFOR forces so as to blame

 5     our forces and bring about foreign military intervention.  SRK units are

 6     to keep strictly to the ordered cease-fire measures and they shall fire

 7     only with the permission of the higher command when directly threatened.

 8             Can you tell us briefly what this means?

 9        A.   Those forces which were in Sarajevo itself had to observe the

10     cease-fire and they will respond only if necessary.  I can repeat what

11     that means.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Admission, please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3446, Your Honours.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  And just one thing for the record, Dr. Karadzic

16     has been good about clarifying this, but he forgot to mention this is not

17     the General's document, it's General Milosevic's document.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that the General was able to

19     explain who was authorised to sign.  This is from the corps command so he

20     said who was authorised in the commander's stead.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can you repeat, General, who was authorised to sign such

23     documents?

24        A.   The advisors and the deputies of the commanders.

25        Q.   Thank you.


Page 37504

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us see 1D01575.  1D01575.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3   Q.  This is dated the 8th of August.  It says a cease-fire agreement is still not

 4  honoured.  Kula was fired at from PAMs from Dobrinja 1 and Mujezinovica houses.

 5  Our units did not return fire.  And then you were exposed to 82-millimetre mortar

 6  fire at Gornji Kotorac.  And then at Lukavica road rifle grenades and two

 7  82-millimetre shells at Traparine houses, infantry fire and sniping and so on from

 8 Sokolovic Kolonija, Dobrinja 3 and 5.  The corps units are engaged in reconnaissance

 9 and observation but did not respond to the provocations and activity of the enemy.

10             What was the reason for that restraint?

11        A.   We said earlier that there was a cease-fire of that -- in that part

12     of town in force for both sides.  However, we see that the enemy side, that

13     is, the 1st Corps of the BH Army, does not honour the agreement and the

14     forces of the SRK along that part of the front line are honouring it.

15        Q.   Please explain.  It says here infantry fire and sniper fire from

16     these localities.  Where are they?  Stupsko Brdo, Butmir, Vojnicko field,

17     Sokolovic Kolonija, and Dobrinja 3 and 5.

18        A.   Well, let's proceed in this order then.

19        Q.   Is it in town or outside town and where are they with respect to

20     the airport?

21        A.   Dobrinja and the others are in town, whereas Sokolovic Kolonija

22     are beyond the airport toward the Igman mountain.  And Dobrinja and the

23     other town part are in the city.

24        Q.   Vojnicko field and Butmir --

25        A.   Butmir is toward Igman further away from the airport, whereas


Page 37505

 1     Vojnicko field is near Alipasino Polje, so between Dobrinja and Alipasino

 2     Polje there is this one.

 3        Q.   I believe the Trial Chamber knows the area.  Perhaps they have

 4     also visited the locations.

 5      A. I don't know that, but I hope that I was able to explain well enough.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3447, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   In the indictment against me there is another incident dated the

12     3rd of September, 1993, Nafa Taric and her 8-year-old daughter Elma were

13     wounded with one bullet at the Ivana Krndelj Street in the centre of

14     Sarajevo.  The bullet hit the left thigh of the mother and the right hand

15     and belly of the girl, but I don't want to ask you about these ballistic

16     things which are very complicated, but let me know whether you know of

17     this incident or whether you ordered fire or one of your subordinates,

18     and did you have the information that this happened on the 3rd of

19     September, 1993?

20        A.   This incident as well as nearly all incidents of sniper fire, as

21     stated in the indictment, the question is always whether it was really

22     sniper fire.  But I didn't order this or any other activity direct

23     against this area.  Perhaps there was activity launched in reaction to

24     enemy activity, but I don't know.

25        Q.   Let us see now how you informed the Main Staff -- let us see


Page 37506

 1     65 ter 12386.  65 ter 12386.

 2        A.   While we are waiting let me say that in this area there were

 3     shelters in protection against infantry fire.  It's surprising that

 4     anyone may have been hit there.

 5        Q.   I'm not sure that this should be translated as "shelter."

 6     Possibly a different translation would be better.  You mean obstacles?

 7        A.   Yes, they can be mobile or stationary.  I think it was UNPROFOR

 8     that did something and it was in this sector.

 9        Q.   How are you reporting to the Main Staff on that day at 1700

10     hours:

11             "The enemy did not observe the cease-fire agreement and opened

12     fire ..." and so on.

13             The third paragraph:

14             "In the Sanac, Grbavica sector, the enemy opened intensive small

15     arms fire and during the day they opened sniper fire on the barracks..."

16     and so on.

17             On the 3rd of September there is no mention of this alleged fire

18     directed at Ivana Krndelj Street.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us go to the following page in

20     both languages.  We're interested in item 4.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   It says here that there were no unusual incidents.  Subsequently

23     we see that Captain first class commander -- company commander

24     Radomir Stojanovic was killed on Grbavica by sniper fire from the

25     direction of Hrasno P Kosorica square.  Would the wounding of two


Page 37507

 1     civilians be an unusual incident and would it be mentioned in this

 2     report?

 3        A.   If we had such information, it would certainly have been included

 4     in the report because civilians were victims.  If we had any such

 5     information, we would inform the Main Staff so that measures could be

 6     taken and for them to be able to help us do that.  But at the time, as I

 7     said, we had no such information and consequently couldn't inform them.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And item 8 says you expect frequent injuries and

 9     losses on our side, and you say that it is very difficult for our

10     soldiers and officers to remain patient and restrain themselves from

11     responding with effective fire.  Does the Main Staff approve of such more

12     vigorous return of fire or do you stand by your restraint?

13        A.   As far as the activities of the corps are concerned, unless

14     explicit orders are received then the tasks are carried out in line with

15     earlier orders.  And these are in line with the principles of warfare in

16     the city.  Whether and how there will be responses, whether there will be

17     extensive reactions or proportionate, that's left to the commanders who

18     decide about the kind of fire and the weapons they will use at any given

19     moment.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Why did not return with effective fire and what is

21     effective fire?

22        A.   What is effective fire depends on the target.  When an order was

23     issued to neutralise a target, then the fire was effective, then the --

24     when the target was neutralised or if the order was destroy the target,

25     then it is effective if the target was indeed destroyed; if it wasn't, it


Page 37508

 1     was not effective.  The quantity of ammunition for the destruction of a

 2     target can be six times higher than the quantity needed to neutralise a

 3     target.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3448, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We don't need to call

 9     up a document.  It was admitted with General Galic, D24 -- 3429.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   It says enemy provocations are continuing, the consequence of

12     which is the exhaustion of soldiers because they respond only

13     exceptionally so that the question as to how long they would be able to

14     restrain themselves is moving into the foreground.  I read this from item

15     8, forecasts and conclusions.  You saw the document.  The document of the

16     4th doesn't mention the incident on Ivana Krndelj Street either.  Why?

17        A.   I have already said that we had no information about that

18     incident nor did anyone inform us nor did anyone protest.  All our

19     information was received much later after the war speaking about this

20     specific incident.

21        Q.   If you say in the report of the 4th that you refrained from

22     returning fire, does that mean that you did so on the following day as

23     well?

24        A.   If it says we continued to exercise restraint, then it applies to

25     the following day as well unless there is a report to show the opposite.


Page 37509

 1     I've already said what that restraint means and for what reasons it can

 2     be given up.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 4             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  The answer's already been given, but just

 6     another caution to Dr. Karadzic in the phrasing of his questions.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Line 23 should read the

 8     previous day rather than the following day.  Because I was asking about

 9     the previous day, the 3rd of September.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Galic?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That applies to the 3rd of

12     September as well.  Yes, I confirm.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D06305, please.  It's

15     dated the 5th of September.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   This is a report of the 5th of September and it is again stated

18     that the enemy violated the truce agreement.  And paragraph 4 says sniper

19     fire throughout the day on Grbavica and Lukavica from the point of town

20     where the Muslims are and from Mojmilo.  And item 7, could we scroll down

21     to find it.

22        A.   Please scroll down the Serbian version too.

23        Q.   No, no, not the second page.  In the Serbian version it is at the

24     bottom and we need item 7 in English too.  You say here under "losses,"

25     that two soldiers were seriously wounded by enemy snipers in the zone of


Page 37510

 1     responsibility of the Vogosca TG and the names are Dobro Kojic and

 2     Boro Gavric.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's go to the following page in

 4     both languages.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   In the conclusions you say that the enemy is still violating the

 7     cease-fire and intensifying sniper fire.  You expect them to continue

 8     with provocations in the coming period.  In this report for the 5th of

 9     September, there is nothing about Ivana Krndelj Street, but it is said

10     that the Muslim side is intensifying its sniper fire; correct?

11        A.   There is nothing about the events in Dobrinja and in

12     Ivana Krndelj Street and it's surroundings.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3449, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  1D01618, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   While we are waiting for it to appear on the screen, General, did

20     the international factor paid you attention to the Serbian casualties in

21     Grbavica and Ilidza, did they voice a protest about that as they voiced

22     protests when something happened to the other side?

23        A.   I have to say that everyone is more sensitive about his or her

24     own casualties.  If the casualties are greater in number, then the

25     sensitivity of either side is greater.  So to assess whether a third


Page 37511

 1     party understood us or them and understood the incidents properly, it can

 2     be said that the attitude internationally, in the international media and

 3     the international politics, was such that they leaned to the BH Army and

 4     its 1st Corps.  And therefore, all the commands and institutions of the

 5     mass media were sent to the BH Army territory in Sarajevo, whereas on the

 6     side of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps we had military observers and one

 7     part of the units depending on the stage of the war that we're talking

 8     about.

 9        Q.   And the attitude to our casualties in the media and in UN

10     reports, what was it like?

11        A.   Well, it's difficult from this point in time to provide an

12     overall assessment, but from how I understood it then it's different when

13     you assess it from this point in time than if you assessed it then.  I

14     then believed that our losses were not considered sufficiently and that

15     the casualties on the Serbian side, not just Serbs but in our territory,

16     were not valued as much as casualties and incidents that occurred in the

17     territory under the control of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

18        Q.   All right.  Let us look at your report dated the 24th of October,

19     1993, 1700 hours, where in paragraph 4 you say that Browning fired and

20     sniper fire on Dobrinja, Grbavica, and Lukavica and that one woman was

21     killed by sniper fire in Grbavica today.  We see that Nafa Taric was

22     wounded and that is included in the indictment as an incident, and in

23     Grbavica a woman was killed, and God knows which incident this was in

24     which Serb civilians lost their lives, and once again you did not

25     respond.  There's only observation and reconnaissance as we can see under


Page 37512

 1     item 2 --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 3             Yes.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Again, if Dr. Karadzic is going to persist in

 5     reading out the document when we can all see it, maybe he should get it

 6     right because at page 53, line 20, he said:  We see that Nafa Taric was

 7     wounded.  The document doesn't say that.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we have dealt with the

10     incident dated the 3rd of September in which Nafa Taric and her daughter

11     were wounded, and in this instance a woman was killed.  And that was the

12     basis for my question what sort of attention was paid to Serbian

13     casualties.  It's not in this document, that's true, but it is mentioned

14     in the previous document, or rather, in the indictment.  Here let me

15     avoid that.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Please tell me how many civilian casualties were needed for you

18     to decide to respond?

19        A.   It's a very difficult question.  It depended on many factors

20     whether we would decide, take the decision, to violate the truce if it

21     was in force.  We have said what the circumstances were under which one

22     could violate the truce and order fire only if there was great necessity.

23     So I would not repeat.  I have already said that once.

24             But what is important here in my view is what was going on in

25     Grbavica.  We said previously that there were many civilian losses there


Page 37513

 1     and what was the ratio -- well, every now and then there would be some

 2     civilian casualty in Grbavica which confirms what I observed previously.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3450, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 21 I would rather say

 8     "ultimate necessity" than "great necessity."

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   So "ultimate necessity" or "great necessity," what did you say?

11        A.   Ultimate necessity, ultimate necessity, I repeat.

12        Q.   Thank you.  The indictment also includes an incident dated the

13     2nd of November, 1993, in which Ramiza Kundo according to the indictment

14     was wounded while she was carrying a pail of water and crossing

15     Brijesko Brdo Street which is now called Bulbulistan.  Did you order fire

16     to be opened then and there or was it somebody else who ordered it and

17     then reported to you that such an incident occurred?

18        A.   We are talking about the area above the railway station in

19     Rajlovac as far as I can remember, and there were some railway cars

20     parked there.  I did not receive any report about it then.  We discussed

21     that incident just like all other sniping incidents, so I did receive

22     several pieces of information about it.  But this area, if we look at our

23     map again, which was a colour map, it's better than the one which is

24     enclosed, I mean the one from the 1st Corps of the BH Army.  And if we

25     then see the deployment of the brigade in Brijesce Brdo we will see that


Page 37514

 1     they did have forces deployed in that area.  Now, what was there, what

 2     forces were there?  At the time when the incident occurred, there is

 3     nothing specific that I can say about that apart from the general

 4     disposition of forces.  One piece of information during the discussion

 5     about the incident was that the position was not sufficiently visible

 6     from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps positions.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell the Chamber who was at a

 8     dominant position and who was at a lower position, which forces?  Who is

 9     at Brijesce Brdo and who or where were the Serbian forces with regard to

10     Brijesce Brdo or in relation to Brijesce Brdo?

11        A.   Well, the date was October --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the date.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were in the area of Azici and

14     down towards the Dobrinja river, and on Brijesce Brdo there was the 2nd

15     Mountain Brigade I -- no, motorised brigade or whatever.  So the

16     1st Corps of the BH Army was at Brijesce Brdo and its forces were in the

17     area.  It was one brigade.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness kindly repeat the date.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a minute, Mr. Galic.  Did you refer to a date

20     when answering the question?  If so, please repeat the date.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I repeated the date.  That was

22     during the month of October 1993.  Just to have some bearing in time

23     because this was a continuing process.  This is why I mentioned the date

24     from this daily report, October, but let us say the day as well, the 24th

25     of October, 1993, so if we were to say where our forces were, they were


Page 37515

 1     in Azici holding that area and Brijesce Brdo and the surrounding area

 2     where the incident occurred was in the zone of the BH Army 1st Corps.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is dated the 2nd of November -- oh, excuse me.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Please speak a bit more slowly.  Yes, please

 9     continue.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   You told us about Brijesce Brdo.  Just tell us briefly who was on

12     top of the slope and who was in the valley and where did the incident

13     occur, was it up or down?

14        A.   I wanted to explain but I was interrupted.  That is why I will

15     now repeat.  Brijesce Brdo and that area of Sokol which continues on to

16     Zuc, an elevation which dominates in this area, and above the area of

17     Azici in the direction of Rajlovac and Ilidza as well.  So our forces

18     were at the foot of this hill.  And the incident happened on the hill.

19     It's a part of the hill or the foot of the hill, how should I put it?

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 1D1622.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   This document dates from the previous day, General.  We can see

24     what the enemy was doing, and under item 2 the document says that our

25     forces responded and returned fire in the sectors where the enemy grouped


Page 37516

 1     and the points from which there was strong fire.  This order dated the

 2     1st of November to return only fire at the sectors where they are

 3     grouping their forces and the points from which there was fire, was it

 4     changed on another day, on the next day, the 2nd of November?  So was it

 5     still in force, this order, was it in force for the following day?

 6        A.   I couldn't tell anymore whether it was valid for the following

 7     day because so many years have passed.  I really cannot remember.  I

 8     really cannot answer this question.  I can't remember.

 9        Q.   Well, was it usual to change the manner of conduct and the way

10     activities were carried out without any orders?

11        A.   For any change of order, approval had to be sought, unless it was

12     already covered by what was ordered previously and unless the possibility

13     was allowed for someone to independently decide to fire.

14        Q.   And if this Ramiza Kundo on Brijesce Brdo were really wounded by

15     the Serbian forces, is that something that would be in accordance with

16     the permission or order of the corps or was there any military target on

17     Brijesce Brdo that could have been targeted possibly?

18        A.   On Brijesce Brdo one battalion of that brigade was deployed.

19     That was more or less the strength, and its disposition was in this zone.

20     Now, where this civilian was at that particular moment, certainly in the

21     disposition zone or deployment zone of the 1st Corps.  Now, whether there

22     were any troops in the immediate vicinity, that's something that I

23     couldn't tell you from this point in time.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?


Page 37517

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3451, Your Honours.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   There is another incident dated the 6th of January, 1994, in

 5     which a lady - let me not mention her name - was shot, that's incident 6,

 6     the last part.  She was shot in her bottom while she was crossing the

 7     bridge in Nikola Demonja Street in Dobrinja on a bicycle.  The same

 8     question:  Did you order, did anyone -- any one of your subordinates

 9     order such fire?  And did you receive a report about this wounding?  The

10     bicycle was moving across the bridge.

11        A.   In Dobrinja?

12        Q.   Yes, in Dobrinja.  The person was wounded just above the seat of

13     the bicycle.

14        A.   Well, the answer is the same as with previous.  We have seen

15     incidents with sniping or shelling, whatever you call them.  I did not

16     receive any report nor did I issue orders to fire on that area because if

17     there was fire then it was infantry fire.  The corps commander rarely or

18     only under exceptional circumstances orders that specific fire be opened

19     in specific areas.  Now whether some of the subordinate units did it, I

20     did not receive a report that someone ordered such fire.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at ...

23             [In English] I see Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

25             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you, Your Honour.


Page 37518

 1     Just a piece of information.  Page 59, lines 13 and 14, I don't think

 2     that General Galic exactly said that.  For the second sentence:  "We have

 3     seen incidents with shelling or sniping, whatever you call them."  I just

 4     wanted to draw your attention on this in case of future problems with

 5     that part.  Thank you.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be instructed to slow

 7     down when answering questions.  Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General, sir --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue but please bear in mind

11     speaking very slowly, General.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, sir, I'm sure that I remember what you said but we can

14     always listen to the tape.  You said about that incident as well as about

15     other previous incidents, you didn't say we saw incidents involving

16     sniping and shelling, you didn't say that you saw any such thing?

17        A.   Mr. President, I would like to repeat what I said for the

18     clarity's sake.

19             JUDGE KWON:  By all means.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  When we're talking

21     about this particular incident, the same applies as to any other sniping

22     incidents in the indictment or indictments.  I never received any reports

23     about any of those incidents.  I never received information that anybody

24     had ordered fire to be opened in the area.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 37519

 1        Q.   Please pay attention to the report issued one day before, on the

 2     1st --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, we have never received

 4     this document.  I would like to call up 65 ter 2393.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  If I may, just before we get to another document,

 7     I'd just like to put on the record that D3451 was actually a daily combat

 8     report and not an order, as Dr. Karadzic said at the last line of page

 9     57, the beginning of page 58, that's D3451 is a daily combat report.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let's clarify that as well.

12     This is not the document that I called up.  I asked for 65 ter 23903.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, sir, if you or your command reported on the

15     conduct on the 1st of November, did it comport itself in

16     keeping with the orders?

17        A.   As we can see here, the command acted in accordance with the

18     previous orders.

19        Q.   On this particular day when that alleged incident involving the

20     lady on the bicycle took place at the end of that day, it's at 1800

21     hours, it was already dark and everything had calmed down apparently.

22     Let's see if we can find that incident anywhere here.  I don't see it.

23     It says that the enemy carried out several successive infantry attacks

24     against our positions in Grbavica and Ilidza and that over 120 shells

25     fell on Ilidza.  They were 120-millimetre shells.  And then under 2 it


Page 37520

 1     says that the Serb forces were involved in defence activities.  And

 2     whenever targets were discovered fire was opened.  There were no major

 3     successes due to very strong defence.  And now under 5 it says that there

 4     is a desire among a number of soldiers to spend their -- spend

 5     Christmas Eve and Christmas with their families.  So security of our

 6     positions may be threatened in that case.

 7             We saw earlier today one of the sniping incidents happened on

 8     Serbian Easter.  For the participants, I would like to say that the 6th

 9     of January is Christmas Eve and the 7th of January is Christmas according

10     to the Julian calendar --

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Dr. Karadzic isn't here giving a speech nor is he

14     having a conversation with the General, and so perhaps he could be

15     encouraged to start this question again and actually ask the question

16     rather than repeat the contents of the document for whatever purpose I

17     don't understand actually.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I shall establish a link.

19             JUDGE KWON:  But while the Prosecution will not challenge that

20     the specific date was Christmas Eve or Christmas Day on Orthodox

21     religion, but do not -- refrain from making comments.  It is a rather

22     lengthy comment.  Put your question to the witness.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could have asked the witness but

24     that would have taken up some time.  I could have asked him about those

25     holidays and those dates.


Page 37521

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   You remember from one of the previous documents that one sniping

 3     incident took place on the Serbian Easter and now we are talking about

 4     the Serbian Christmas Eve.  There was sniping activities on that day.

 5     Let me ask you, did the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps have more activities

 6     during Muslim holidays or did it refrain itself from activities on those

 7     days?

 8        A.   In the territory of Sarajevo, people knew each other although

 9     they waged a war against each other.  They didn't know me.  I was not a

10     resident of Sarajevo, but they knew each other.  They called to -- up to

11     each other.  I was in Rajlovac when I heard them calling each other.  So

12     they knew and they were familiar with the customs of the area.  They

13     could even joke with each other during the war and of course they

14     respected each other's holidays, and then a thing like that happened.

15     But that was not a rule.  However, incidents did happen on both sides.

16     We wanted to celebrate holidays peacefully, not only Sarajevo but

17     everywhere else.  We wanted peaceful Muslims as well as for ourselves.

18             I remember a request by the commander of the Egyptian Battalion.

19     He addressed me in writing, although I had invited him to come to my

20     office.  He was headquartered in the Marsal Tito barracks in the

21     territory of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.  He asked us not to display

22     any activities during that time.  I wanted to talk to him and tell him

23     that as much as possible I would prevent any such activities during the

24     Ramadan and similar religious holidays.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In this document nothing is reported about fire that


Page 37522

 1     was opened on the bridge where the lady was wounded?

 2        A.   Let's remind ourselves that that was the bridge across the

 3     Dobrinja and I don't see a reference to any activities across that

 4     bridge.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Admission?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3452, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   In the indictment there is another incident which allegedly

12     happened on the 25th of May, 1994.  One 53-year-old woman and another

13     62-year-old woman were wounded in the legs while riding on a bus full of

14     passengers at the crossroads of Nikola Demonja Street and the JNA

15     boulevard.  Currently, it is the crossroads of the Nikola Demonja Street

16     and the defenders of Dobrinja avenue in Dobrinja.  Two women -- two

17     passengers on the bus were wounded in the legs.  In other words, on the

18     25th of May, 1994, was an order issued?  Was it approved to open fire on

19     a civilian bus or a bus full of civilians?

20        A.   From this distance when I look back and when I remember that

21     buses were running, that people could stroll, that they could work in

22     their gardens, that they could go shopping, I asked myself:  What else

23     could we do?  What else could we make possible in that area?  If public

24     transport was working in the area of Dobrinja which was under constant

25     fire as it were and if people were wounded, the question is:  Who wounded


Page 37523

 1     them and whether we could open fire on that bus from our side.  A bus in

 2     that area -- I remember some of the footages that were shown from a

 3     subsequent period of time, where one could see that some people were not

 4     that serious when they opened fire on either buses or trams.  There was a

 5     ban on opening fire on public transport means because it was well-known

 6     that passengers were mostly civilians; however, if it was discovered that

 7     troops were being transported, then that would have been a legitimate

 8     military target.

 9        Q.   Did you learn that some of your subordinates had approved fire

10     opening on the bus on the 25th of May?

11        A.   At that time I didn't receive reports to that effect.  I don't

12     remember that I ever received a report on a bus having been a target in

13     Dobrinja.  If you have a document that speaks to the contrary, I would

14     like to see it; but as far as I can remember, that was not the case.

15        Q.   General, sir, just a while ago you addressed a topic that I would

16     like to follow-up on.  During the 1200 or 1300 days of war in Sarajevo,

17     what is your view of the fact that the indictment includes the wounding

18     of people that happened in such large intervals?  What can you tell us

19     about the freedom of movement, the activities of the civilians and

20     civilian transport means?  And can you put all that in the perspective of

21     possible incidents that happened?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, I don't think I follow the question.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Nor do I at all.


Page 37524

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we take a break?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to show another document.

 3     I wanted to show you what I received by way of a report on that date.  It

 4     will take me only a couple of minutes and while the topic is still fresh

 5     on our minds.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue but I couldn't understand your

 7     last question.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe I'll come back to that report

 9     later.  I would like to call up 65 ter 7042.  7042, 65 ter, yes, that's

10     the document.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, sir, this is a report which was sent to me, to the

13     president of Republika Srpska, by the Main Staff.  Look at the zone of

14     responsibility of the SRK in the fourth paragraph where I was informed

15     about the activities of the enemy, sniping fire on Vrbanja bridge,

16     Zlatiste, and so on and so forth.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.

18     Can we go to the following page in English?  Bullet point 2(c).

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

20        Q.   I was informed that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps observed the

21     cease-fire.  It was engaged in reconnaissance of the enemy activity.  The

22     point is that had you been informed about that incident, would you have

23     reported back to the Main Staff and would the Main Staff have reported

24     back to me?

25        A.   If I had received a report about that incident that had happened,


Page 37525

 1     I'm sure that I would have conveyed that to the Main Staff.  I don't know

 2     and can't say for a fact that the Main Staff would have conveyed that

 3     message to you as well, but I am almost sure that it would have.

 4        Q.   With regard to you and your knowledge from the field, what would

 5     you say about the president's knowledge about the situation on the

 6     ground?  What did the president know and where did he receive his

 7     information from?

 8        A.   What president?  I knew a lot of presidents.  I knew a lot of

 9     presidents of the Main Boards or municipalities.  Which president?

10        Q.   The president of the republic.

11        A.   Thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Calls for speculation.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He may be in a position to be aware

15     of the sources of my knowledge.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Could I have known more than the information that I received from

18     the Main Staff?

19        A.   Yes, I can answer that question, but I wanted you to be precise

20     in terms of what president you had in mind because some other presidents

21     also received reports along their own chains of information.  The

22     Ministry of the Interior sent its reports and I suppose that reports were

23     also sent by the intelligence services and all the other segments that

24     were at the very top of and close to the command of the armed forces of

25     the Republika Srpska and you were its supreme commander of course.


Page 37526

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Admission?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive this.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3453, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at

 6     18 past 1.00.

 7                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.20 p.m.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   To be clearer and put things simpler with regard to the question

13     that I seem to have phrased in a too complicated fashion, during the war

14     in Sarajevo which lasted 1200 or 1300 days but you were only there during

15     1.000 days or so, did civilians walk about freely, go to shops, have

16     cultural events, go to mosques or churches, and have public

17     transportation?

18        A.   It all depended on the development of the situation in the

19  respective part of town or the period of time.  There were times when there were

20  soccer matches between UNPROFOR and the BH Army, but on the whole –- well, of

21  the measures we took we made an effort to spare civilians and not let them

22  become war victims.  No matter how far the law reaches in the humanitarian sense,

23  war did progress in a negative way.  With the development of various techniques,

24  tactics and operations, civilian losses grew even greater.  Let me mention what

25  I read, that during the First World War civilian losses accounted for 5 per cent;


Page 37527

 1   in the Second World War, 45 per cent; Korean War, 85 per cent; Vietnam War,

 2   90 per cent, and it's as high as 96 per cent in Iraq.  I don't know how accurate

 3   this data is, but they do tell us something.  The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 4   according to some sources, had 56 per cent of civilian losses.  The latest

 5   estimates say that the overall losses were 100.000, and that's the estimate of

 6   that institute in Sarajevo, and 40 per cent of that number are civilian victims.

 7   And the share of civilian losses in Sarajevo was 36 per cent, according to the

 8   data while I was in command, according to OTP data.

 9        Q.   In the indictment against me there is a sniping incident and

10     allegedly happened on the 19th of June, 1994, when on a tram which was

11     moving from Carsija westward, Jasmina Kucinar and her son, aged 4, were

12     slightly wounded in the legs.  Mensur Jusic, likewise, Belma Sukic, and

13     so on.  The tram was near the Holiday Inn at that time.  Did you issue an

14     order on or around the 19th of June to launch such activities or did you

15     have information about any subordinates to have ordered anything like it?

16    A.  I only remembered that at that time there was discussion about restarting

17  tram traffic in Sarajevo, and that was done in contacts between the UNPROFOR

18  representatives for BH and the Main Staff.  It was decided that trams should

19  start again, and public transportation in general, and we received an order to

20  that effect.  All speculation about the impossibility to have public transportation

21  on both sides depended on the current situation at any given moment.

22        Q.   Based on orders of higher commands, could you and did you give

23     permission and orders to shoot at public transportation?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Before the witness answers, Your Honour --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.


Page 37528

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  -- I see we're going into another topic quite

 2     squarely and I apologise for not rising sooner, but at the beginning of

 3     this session Dr. Karadzic put a question to the witness claiming on his

 4     part that the war in Sarajevo lasted 1200 or 1300 days and telling the

 5     witness he was only there for 1.000 of that, which is not evidence, only

 6     comment, inappropriate and, I would submit, misleading.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

 8      THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that's an approximation.  It may not

 9   have been 1.000 days exactly, but on the whole the war in Sarajevo lasted

10   over 1200 days.  From the 6th of April till the peace, that's more 1200 days.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was commander for 23 months, so

12     that may be around that number.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.  Probably it's better for you,

14     Mr. Karadzic, to repeat your question.

15             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Did you have approval from the higher command to order or

20     tolerate shooting at buses, trams, and other public transportation?

21        A.   All civilian facilities or persons or protected facilities could

22     not be fired at.  Nobody had the right to issue such an order.  The

23     conclusion that somebody ordered fire on buses and trams is false.  If

24     there was such instances, then I should have been informed or the brigade

25     command because there were military observers there, and then I'm certain


Page 37529

 1     that measures could be taken.

 2        Q.   You already said that the UNPROFOR never informed you about

 3     individual sniping incidents but only -- you only got general

 4     information.  Were you ever invited to delegate somebody to the

 5     commission to investigate such incidents?

 6        A.   I've been waiting for this question because little has been said

 7     about it.  The truth is like this:  We were for the establishment of

 8     Joint Commissions at the level of the Main Staff and the UNPROFOR staff

 9     for Bosnia-Herzegovina.  There was a commission called the lower joint

10     military commission formed at the corps level.  The commission included a

11     representative of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, one of the 1st Corps of

12     the BH Army, and one of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo sector.  And they were

13     supposed to investigate all these incidents, but following orders of the

14     Joint Commission at the level of General Staffs.  So they didn't have the

15     right to do anything without an order and without their safety being

16     guaranteed.  I only remember that we sent a representative of our corps,

17     I'm speaking about Lieutenant-Colonel Ugresic, to take part in the work

18     of that commission, and it happened at the airport, to report to General

19     Razek, and the -- it was as usual:  The Serbs are to blame.  This was

20     about an attack on the forces and equipment of UNPROFOR at Butmir

21     airport, but the commission established that the forces of the 1st Corps

22     of the BH Army were responsible for that.  It is interesting that the

23     commission never met after that incident, although we requested that

24     whenever there's a problem of any kind the commissions should meet and

25     find out what it's all about.  That's how it wanted to investigate the


Page 37530

 1     Markale incident too and General Gvero insisted on that.

 2             The situation at the airport and the investigation of that

 3     incident are something that Lieutenant-Colonel Ugresic also testified

 4     about.  He died unfortunately.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1754, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Let us see a report dated 18 June 1994.  That's one day before

 8     the 19th of June and incident number 8 on the F list.  Here it is.

 9     Please take a look.  Item 2 reads:

10             "Our forces.

11             "Units of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps honour the cease-fire.  At

12     the lines reached the units are engaged in additional monitoring."

13             Let us take a look at item 8.  Here we have item 8:  Conclusions,

14     forecasts, and decision.

15             "It is expected that the enemy will continue to carry out

16     provocations and combat activities with which he wishes to provoke our

17     forces to reply to provocations and jeopardise the signed truce."

18             And the following sentence:

19             "Continue to fully and consistently implement the agreement on

20     the cessation of combat activities."

21             Is this an order, sir?

22        A.   This can be interpreted as an order, but judging by the heading I

23     would say it's a report.

24        Q.   And this item, conclusions, forecast, and decision?

25        A.   The decision is stated for the superior command to see whether


Page 37531

 1     the decision is all right or not.  How could the Main Staff react to the

 2     corps command's decisions?  Because it cannot have their people present

 3     in every corps command.  We mostly had the representatives around when

 4     something important was happening or when we're launching significant

 5     military operations along certain axes.  Here the conclusion, or rather,

 6     this demand is very interesting.  I don't know if you want me to comment.

 7        Q.   If you can be brief, go ahead, especially from the point of view

 8     of the incident that happened on the following day.

 9        A.   We're talking about the Bobovac Brigade here which had its

10     positions in the direction of Varos, and we must create conditions to cut

11     the line towards that area where that HVO Brigade was located, but I

12     cannot link this to the incident in Sarajevo.

13        Q.   But in connection with Sarajevo, this report dated the 18th of

14     June, does it allow for the possibility of somebody shooting from

15     infantry weapons or snipers at a tram?

16        A.   Based on these conclusions and forecasts and the decision itself,

17     which is partly reproduced here, no shooting at the city can be expected,

18     especially not at public transportation.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3454, Your Honours.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let us take a short

24     look at D2668, page 2.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]


Page 37532

 1        Q.   It's a report dated 19 June.  Oh, that's probably the one -- yes,

 2     this is it.  Now page 2 in Serbian.  Conclusions, expectations, and

 3     decision.  It says:

 4             "Continue to implement the agreement on the cessation of combat

 5     activities.  Expect that the enemy will continue with provocations in

 6     order to endanger the agreed cease-fire."

 7             General, had there be firing at public transportation would that

 8     have been mentioned in this report?  Is the Main Staff informed of all

 9     combat activities?

10        A.   Whatever was sent by the subordinate units to the corps command

11     or what the corps command found out personally in the zone under the

12     command of the corps or if we received any information from other

13     sources, we then wanted to and did present it to the Main Staff command.

14     So if we had information that public transportation vehicles were fired

15     at, if someone fired and did fire, we would certainly report this to the

16     Main Staff.

17        Q.   Thank you.  There is another incident under number 9 on the F

18     list in the indictment.  The date is the 26th of June, 1994.  Supposedly

19     Sanela Muratovic was wounded in her right shoulder while walking along

20     Djure Jaksic Street with a female friend of hers.  Now it's

21     Adija Mulabegovic Street in the western part of Sarajevo.

22             General, did you or anyone from the corps order or allow fire at

23     that street, or rather, at a 16-year-old girl in that street on the 26th

24     of June?

25        A.   I'm trying to find my bearings and remember where the street is.


Page 37533

 1     I told you earlier that I did not live in Sarajevo so it's very difficult

 2     for me to find my bearings around the various neighbourhoods and streets.

 3     When you mention them it's a great problem for me, but not such a great

 4     problem that I could not answer your question.  I can tell you that

 5     certainly, like with anything else that had to do with the protection of

 6     the civilians and the order which I issued, if we have that in mind no

 7     one ordered or should have ordered any sort of disturbing the civilians

 8     or attack against civilians.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at D2554 for a

11     moment, please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is a report sent to the Main Staff at 1700 hours, a regular

14     combat report for the 26th of June, 1994.  Could we please see page 2.

15     We need item 8.  Could you please read item 8, the first two paragraphs.

16     I'm not sure what was translated.  This is an admitted document; however,

17     item 8 --

18        A.   It says --

19        Q.   -- conclusions --

20        A.   -- conclusions, expectations, and decisions about further

21     activities.  Considering the enemy activities --

22        Q.   Please slow down.

23        A.   Considering the enemy activities, it is still to be expected that

24     there would be significant fire in provocation at our defence lines.

25        Q.   And the next two lines as well, please.


Page 37534

 1        A.   Continue to implement the agreement on the truce consistently and

 2     refrain from combat activities.

 3        Q.   What sort of conclusion would you then draw on the basis of the

 4     order and decision on further activities in view of the incident which

 5     supposedly occurred on the 26th of June, 1994?  Could that have happened

 6     with the knowledge or with the approval not to say at the -- on the order

 7     of the commands?

 8        A.   As we can see that restraint from further combat activities is

 9     ordered here, that means both active combat operations and manoeuvres of

10     the forces and also any firing, that they should refrain from that.  So

11     no incident should happen and it was not allowed to happen in that

12     period.  If such an incident did occur and if we had been aware of it, we

13     would have had to mention it in this report, process it in some sort way.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 1D01 --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I'm wondering why we do not have a

17     matching English translation.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  I was asking Mr. Reid the same question.  The

19     English translation that's here was done by, our records read, the

20     Defence in General Galic's trial.  This was an associated exhibit with

21     Mr. Guzina.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  And for some reason the fact that the English

24     translation was incomplete wasn't noticed and not raised in court and

25     the Prosecution made no objection to it.  Regardless, the English


Page 37535

 1     translation is still incomplete.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But I'm not sure whether this English translation is

 3     part of the original document.  Can we see the first page in B/C/S.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  The reference number reads the same.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  It appears to be a translation of paragraph 1

 7     alone.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes.  So shall we mark it for identification

 9     pending the English translation is complete?

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  It's been admitted as an exhibit already,

11     but if you want to reclassify it in any event we'll go ahead and request

12     a complete translation.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, in order not to forget.  Just a second.

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15             JUDGE KWON:  We will reclassify it as marked for identification

16     pending English translation.

17             Yes, please continue.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now please

19     have 1D01760.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Two days before the last incident your regular combat report, or

22     rather, the report from your command, Cedo Sladoje was probably the

23     person who signed it, please look at the third paragraph which reads:

24             "Today at 1415 hours, Koviljka Krajisnik from Zabrdje was killed

25     by a sniper bullet to the heart.  The bullet came from the direction of


Page 37536

 1     Sokolj."

 2             And with all due piety, do you know what was the relation of the

 3     woman who was killed with our parliament speaker, Mr. Krajisnik?

 4        A.   We can see here, first of all, that the one month cessation of

 5     hostilities was still in force in the beginning under enemy, so any

 6     firing or activities in the Sarajevo zone was prohibited.  As for the

 7     incident, Zabrdje is a village between Rajlovac and Vogosca in the

 8     direction of Zuc.  And this family used to live there.  I'm saying they

 9     used to live there because as far as I know they no longer live there

10     today.  She is probably related in one way or another to our parliament

11     speaker I suppose, but I cannot say that with certainty.  Judging by the

12     surname she should be.  And very often we are related by the common

13     surname.

14        Q.   Thank you.  May I be allowed to say that she was his

15     daughter-in-law.  Under item 2, let us see what our forces are doing.

16     They are observing the agreement on the truce.  The commanders of certain

17     units are making a tour of certain positions and lines in order to review

18     the troops and to remove any shortcomings.  And then there's a warning

19     that unnecessary firing should stop.  There are courses for units which

20     are about to begin and so on and so forth.  How often did commanding

21     officers visit or tour the first front line?  Was that done with your

22     knowledge or at your orders?

23        A.   The officers from the corps command toured the front line in

24     accordance with a plan and also on my order, which is normal.  I

25     personally also made tours of units and commands in the entire zone of


Page 37537

 1     the defence of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  All those activities were

 2     organised in a planned manner as much as that was possible, but there

 3     were always many extraordinary circumstances and unusual incidents so

 4     that these plans had to be changed very often.  Because if we plan for

 5     today to visit, for example, the Vogosca Brigade, and then there are

 6     problems on the Nisici plateau, or if we have a breakthrough, an enemy

 7     breakthrough in that area, then it's certain that that part of the

 8     command would go to the area where the positions of our side are

 9     jeopardised or if there are major losses.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see item 8 on the

11     following page in both languages.  In the English language it's possibly

12     the last page.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, here also the last sentence under item 8 says:

15             "Consistently implement the agreement on the cessation of

16     hostilities and put up decisive resistance to defend the lines reached."

17             Two days before the incident, was it then prohibited to open fire?

18        A.   Well, we follow the order and it says that it's a one-month

19     cessation of hostilities rather than a cease-fire.  I think it was called

20     cessation of hostilities.  So it was normal that we had to stick to the

21     order and carry out the tasks as set out in the order.  So that would be

22     everything that I could say about it.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.


Page 37538

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3455, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Incident number 10 on the F list in my indictment has to do with

 5     an incident that occurred on the 22nd of July, 1994, and according to the

 6     indictment, supposedly Sead Solak, a 13-year-old who was shot and wounded

 7     in his belly while together with his mother and sister.  He was

 8     window-shopping in Miljenka Cvitkovica Street, currently Ferde Hauptmana

 9     Street in Cengic villa section of Sarajevo.  What was your knowledge of

10     the situation as regards the orders issued on that day with regard to

11     firing at civilians, and did you receive any report about such an

12     incident?

13        A.   This is one of the incidents, individual incidents, about which

14     we have stated our conclusions previously.  I did not receive any reports

15     about this incident during the war nor was I aware of it.  I learned

16     about it during my trial later on.  The area in question is Cengic villa

17     and we can see if we look at the disposition which forces were deployed

18     there, but there is some information available that there was some unit

19     or troops that were deployed or were moving in that particular area.

20     Now, whether there was any firing, what sort of fire or activities, that

21     is something that I could not claim at this point in time and in this

22     situation.

23        Q.   Whose troops would be moving around Cengic villa at the time?

24        A.   In Cengic villa, that's the Sarajevo down-town, the very centre

25     of the city, so that was -- that would have been the troops of the


Page 37539

 1     1st Corps of the BH Army or the troops belonging to the Supreme Command

 2     because they had their special units, the MUP was there, and so on.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2994 is the document we would

 5     need to look at now, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Could you tell us where the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade was

 8     deployed?

 9        A.   The 3rd, in this period the 3rd Sarajevo Brigade -- it was set up

10     a bit later than the Rajlovac Brigade, the Vogosca Brigade, and the

11     Kosevo or Centar Brigade, depending on how we called it at which point.

12     The 3rd Sarajevo Brigade was in charge of that area, Rajlovac, Vogosca,

13     and a part stretching in the direction of Hresa.

14        Q.   Was it in the zone of Cengic villa?

15        A.   The 3rd Sarajevo?  The 3rd Sarajevo was in the opposite part of

16     town.  There was no chance to -- for activities by the 3rd Sarajevo

17     Brigade in the area of Cengic villa.  I can't see from which positions

18     they could have fired at Cengic villa.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Please focus on item 2 now so that we wouldn't deal

20     with everything else.  Item 2 says:

21             "Our forces did not respond to occasional enemy fire except for

22     the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade, the units of which responded with fire

23     from infantry" --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Bear in mind that we do not seem to have English

25     translation other than the paragraph 1.


Page 37540

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, can you please read out item 2 and the first paragraph

 3     of item 2?

 4        A.   Gladly.  Item 2:

 5             "Our forces did not respond to occasional enemy fire, except for

 6     the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade whose units returned fire from infantry

 7     weapons at observed enemy points."

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can this be linked with Cengic villa, this firing by

 9     the 3rd Sarajevo Brigade?

10        A.   I think that the disposition of such forces was such that they

11     could not have done anything in the direction of Cengic villa.  It was

12     possible to fire with mortars - but I don't know what else - in the

13     direction of Cengic villa.  But with a rifle or any other infantry weapon

14     it was not possible, because the distance was too great nor was there any

15     suitable location from which to fire.

16        Q.   And down under item 3, situation in the territory, it says:

17             "Due to sniper fire at Trebevicka and Ohridska Street, the 1st

18     Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade, UNPROFOR has been informed, then their

19     representatives came out to the spot immediately and conducted an on-site

20     investigation.  Where are the Trebevicka and Ohridska streets located?

21     Who had that under their control?

22        A.   Trebevicka and Ohridska Street, as far as I can remember, are

23     close to the Jewish cemetery.  I may be mistaken in which case I

24     apologise because you know the situation better than I do. I believe that

25     Trebevicka Street is there and it continues or rather it extends into the


Page 37541

 1     Jewish cemetery and onwards to Debelo Brdo.  In other words, that part of

 2     Trebevicka Street -- I believe I've answered your question, right?

 3        Q.   Yes, you did.  Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit MFI D3456.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to add

 8     something.  Maybe I have not said everything or maybe my words have not

 9     been recorded properly.  That area was under the control of the Army of

10     Republika Srpska.  That's what I wanted to add to my previous answer.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  And now let's look at another document dated 27 July

13     1994, 1D01788.  General, sir, could you please help us.  Look at the

14     first paragraph where it says that during the preceding 24 hours the

15     enemy did not respect the cease-fire and the document goes on to say that

16     it attacked Beogradska Street with rifle grenades and that sniper fire

17     was opened on Sedrenik.  Who controlled Sedrenik at the time?

18        A.   Sedrenik, as far as I can understand, this may be confusing, but

19     Sedrenik was under the control of the 1st Corps of the BiH army.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In other words, your men reported to you that they

21     had opened fire on Sedrenik; right?

22        A.   Yes, that's what I can read here and I can only confirm that

23     Sedrenik was within the zone of responsibility of the 1st Corps of the

24     BiH army; it was not under the control of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

25        Q.   Thank you.


Page 37542

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page

 2     bullet point 10.  I'm looking for the same in English.  It says that in

 3     Sucuri Dobrinja settlement, one woman was wounded.  Who controlled that

 4     settlement, Sucuri?

 5        A.   Sucuri settlement is close to Mojmilo, but Sucuri was within the

 6     zone of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  We controlled that area.  Dobrinja

 7     is also in that area and the so-called Sucura houses are in that area, a

 8     bit below Mojmilo.

 9        Q.   According to the report, was that woman a civilian?  If she was

10     not a civilian, would that be clear from the report?

11        A.   It always says in the report when a soldier was wounded.  If it

12     says just a woman, it is self-explanatory.  At one point, though, we had

13     a battalion of women in Ilidza but it was disbanded; however, whenever it

14     says a woman, that implies that the person was also a civilian.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3457, Your Honours.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, sir, I would like to move on to a different topic.  I

20     would like to discuss the issue of UNPROFOR and military observers of the

21     United Nations and relationship between the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and

22     those structures.  What was your position with regard to the co-operation

23     and relationship with UNPROFOR and UNMOs, UNMO standing for the military

24     observers of the United Nations?

25        A.   I already shared with you my general position, or rather, the way


Page 37543

 1     I understood their role and what my attitude was towards UNPROFOR and

 2     UNMOs.  I considered them an integral part of the implementation of all

 3     those things that were part of the customs of war of everything that was

 4     envisaged by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Protocols.  So if they

 5     didn't do their job properly, we were not in a position to comply with

 6     our obligations.  If we did not co-operate with them, we also could not

 7     comply with our obligations.  In the territory of the 1st Corps of the

 8     BiH army in Sarajevo, the front line didn't move much.  How could I be

 9     informed what was going on there?  We had our reconnaissance missions.

10     We relied on people who crossed over, and one of our major sources whom I

11     trusted were them.  I trusted them.

12             When the information was wrong, I did not think that it was

13     intentional, that it was intended to deceive the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

14     Whatever information they received, they conveyed it to me and this is

15     visible from the report that we saw the other day.  That relationship was

16     also based on the fact that we issued orders to our subordinated units,

17     telling them how to treat those forces and their representatives.

18     Whoever represented them and whoever visited us, even not on an official

19     visit, they could all address me directly or any other body in the

20     command.  In our corps command which operated next to the ten UNMOs whose

21     office was next to mine, I had a battalion of the legion of foreigners

22     from France sitting next to me, and I had 90-millimetre self-propelled

23     guns in front of the corps command, three of them that belonged to the

24     French Battalion.  I am speeding, I apologise.  I'll wait a little.

25             I wanted to build our relationship on mutual trust and


Page 37544

 1     understanding, on mutual respect as well.  I respected all the commanders

 2     whose mission in Sarajevo was not easy.  They did not have an easy task,

 3     but my task was also not easy.  Nobody had an easy time in Sarajevo at

 4     that time.  That's why I sympathised with them more than they could ever

 5     understand.

 6        Q.   General, sir, you just said that you believed that if they

 7     misinformed you they didn't do it on purpose, but they just conveyed the

 8     information that they had received.  Who did they receive their

 9     information from?  Who may have provided them with misinformation?

10        A.   Let's remind ourselves, we had a map before us giving an overview

11     of UNMOs on the side of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  They covered 11

12     different points.  And we also saw that on the side of the 1st Corps of

13     the BiH army there were eight - that's what I said - but I only saw four

14     positions.  I didn't count them.  So I accept that the schematic that we

15     saw was more accurate than my information because I didn't really know

16     how many of them there were on the Muslim side.

17             They received information and reports from the military observers

18     who were deployed in the territory of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army.

19     They also received reports from the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

20     which was in Sarajevo.  They were in constant communication with them and

21     they did not communicate constantly with you in Pale.  Whatever problem

22     had to be shared, whatever information had to be shared, they would go to

23     see Ganic or Alija or the corps commander or the chief of the Main Staff,

24     and they would receive information about whatever issue was at stake and

25     they received that information.


Page 37545

 1             Since that information came from important high places and

 2     from important people, I suppose that they did not double-check that

 3     information but rather sent that information directly to us, and

 4     sometimes that information was not exactly accurate that -- and that we

 5     already saw in the reports that were before us already.

 6        Q.   Were they always properly marked?  What kind of orders and

 7     instructions did you give to your subordinate commands with regard to the

 8     international forces, the United Nations forces, in Sarajevo?  When I say

 9     "properly marked," I mean their vehicles, their staffs, their observation

10     posts.  Were they properly and well marked?  What kind of instructions

11     did you give to your subordinate units with regard to their safety?

12        A.   Wherever they were deployed in our zone of responsibility, in the

13     zone of responsibility of the Romanija -- Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, my

14     order was to provide them with the best possible conditions of life and

15     work.  My instructions were to fully co-operate with those people, with

16     the representatives of the military observers.  Likewise, they were

17     marked.  Their vehicles were marked by UN markings.  Their uniforms were

18     UN uniforms.  And you could also tell which national army they were

19     affiliated to.  For example, the French Foreign Legion soldiers wore

20     their own uniforms but they also bore UN markings by which they could be

21     distinguished from some other troops, for example, Egyptian, Russian or

22     others that joined them subsequently in Grbavica.

23             That part of our position or attitude towards them, I believe

24     that should have been or should have led to more help from them.  When we

25     were withdrawing from Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica in the territory


Page 37546

 1     of Tresnja Brdo towards Golo Brdo and when they were supposed to take

 2     over positions from us, they were attacked by the 1st Corps of the BiH

 3     Army, so we had to protect them and we had to fight with them against the

 4     forces of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army.  They gave us a certain degree

 5     of recognition, but you can't find it in any of their reports.  Nowhere

 6     will you find an account of that help that we gave them in performing

 7     their mission.

 8             Our units of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps helped them whenever and

 9     wherever they could.  For example, various convoys passed through our

10     territory in winter-time and in summertime.  The roads were not conducive

11     to their passage.  Very often they would skid from the road and we helped

12     them.  Some of those things will be seen in the documents that you are

13     going to show.  There are a lot of those things.  I want to be economical

14     with time.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Galic, let me go back to the issue of

16     misinformation.  I note that word is used by Mr. Karadzic, not by you,

17     but you said -- what you said is this.  It's page 85, line 2:

18             "When the information was wrong, I did not think that it was

19     intentional, that it was intended to deceive the Sarajevo-Romanija

20     Corps."

21             While you -- let me confine it to the sniping incidents.  While

22     you did not know whether it happened or not, how do you know that

23     information -- certain information was wrong?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I spoke about the information that

25     was presented to the corps command by UNPROFOR.  I'm sure you will


Page 37547

 1     remember a document that we analysed here in this courtroom.  In that

 2     document they say - if I'm not mistaken - that fire had been opened at

 3     Colina Kapa and we replied that in that area there were no Muslim forces

 4     at that time and that there was no need to open fire on that area.  Now,

 5     who provided them with that information?  I don't know.  It's not up to

 6     me.  But that information at that moment was inaccurate or any other such

 7     inaccurate information for that matter.  I would answer them along the

 8     same lines.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's go back to the sniping issues

10     again, and Mr. Karadzic presented you - I think it's ten, ten incidents

11     referred to in the indictment, schedule F (1) to schedule F(10) - and

12     Mr. Karadzic repeatedly asked you every time with respect to those

13     sniping incidents whether you or somebody else ordered such firing and

14     whether you received any report about those incidents.  And your answers

15     were all no to every question.  But at certain point of time, it's page

16     58, line 10 to 12, you alluded to the possibility of independent firing

17     by someone and also you said this, it's at page 15 from lines 15 to 19,

18     when you were answering a question to a specific protest.  This is what

19     you said:

20             "For example, what I know today, what you know today, what the

21     Courts know today, I didn't know that at that time, that somebody got

22     killed from sniping fire.  How was I supposed to know that?  I did not

23     receive such information and I could not react because there was no

24     information of that kind."

25             Do you remember having said that, Mr. Galic?


Page 37548

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's no dilemma whether I said

 2     it or not.  This is what I did say.  But the context is important.  The

 3     question is important, to which I answered that -- I'm sure that I did

 4     say that, but give me the context or give me the question to what I

 5     answered that.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  In light of that context this is a question for you,

 7     Mr. Galic.  From what you know today in light of what you know or you

 8     have heard today, do you exclude the possibilities that the victims

 9     referred to in the indictment were killed by Serb forces?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Based on what I know today and we

11     also investigated after that, I mean during my trial and after the trial,

12     I can say that the victims mentioned here, I cannot deny.  I can't say

13     that these incidents didn't happen.  The evidence available now shows

14     that some incidents happened, no doubt.  But at the time, I repeat, I did

15     not have such evidence because things were not put to me with the same

16     arguments from UNPROFOR, the enemy forces, and the various commissions

17     who went to the site to check whether it was possible that fire came from

18     here or from there, if I had had all that information I would have viewed

19     things differently.

20             I can say something else to show my honesty, besides I'm under

21     oath so I must speak the truth and nothing but the truth.  If the

22     prosecutor started the trial against me with 37 sniping incidents, and if

23     they had given up ten, or rather, they gave up ten and confined himself

24     to 23, that is, 40 per cent were given up immediately, now based on new

25     evidence we are contesting 12 of these incidents out of 23.  But one of


Page 37549

 1     the Judges also accepted the evidence that we led during the trial but

 2     the other members of the Chamber did not accept it.  Now I would have to

 3     give it another thought whether an individual incident happened or not.

 4     This would be my reply.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I will leave it at that.

 6             Back to you, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 9        Q.   General, His Excellency, Judge Kwon, asked you if it was possible

10     that this was committed by Serbian forces.  What would -- how would you

11     interpret "Serbian forces" in this context with regard to your command

12     and your ability of acting as a commander?

13        A.   I interpret it in this context as meaning the forces of the

14     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  But if we remind ourselves of what we mentioned

15     before and namely the existence of various paramilitaries and the area of

16     responsibility of the 1st Corps of the BH Army who even were in combat

17     with their own forces, then it could be also interpreted in this way.

18        Q.   Is any Serb with a rifle in the zone of responsibility of the SRK

19     part of Serbian forces for which you are responsible?

20        A.   If that person is under my command, then I'm responsible.  But in

21     the zone of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps after my

22     arrival I had quite some problems with some paramilitaries that were not

23     under the command of the corps.  Let me immediately clarify what we call

24     paramilitaries.  It's not the same thing as the English term.  A

25     paramilitary, to our understanding, is anybody who is not under the


Page 37550

 1     command of the commander of that territory, be it an individual or a

 2     unit.  And I always used to say that a paramilitary can only be created

 3     by para authorities.

 4       Q.   Let's go back to the topic of co-operation or relations with UNPROFOR.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the number of

 6     the document.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   While we're waiting for the document, General, let me ask you if

 9     it was difficult to procure weapons with optical sights just before the

10     war or in the early days of the war?

11        A.   At the beginning of the war, or rather, in the early stage of the

12     war -- well, it may have been less difficult for some people to procure

13     some weapons than for others.  But the forces of the 1st Corps of the

14     BH Army were better-placed to procure such weapons because of the factory

15     that was located on their side.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document number is 1D01147.  If

17     we can have that, please.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me follow-up on my previous

19     reply.  The forces of the BH Army were in a position to come by more

20     modern sniping rifles importing them from abroad, whereas we didn't have

21     so much opportunity to do so.  And while they were co-operating with the

22     HVO, they had -- it was even easier for them to come by such weapons.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Let us now look at your report to the Main Staff dated the 14th

25     of September, 1992.  I'm interested in item 6 on page 2 of the original,


Page 37551

 1     whereas in English it's on the first page.  It says here that you as a

 2     corps commander met with the commander of the UN observer forces sector.

 3     You spoke about flights, humanitarian aid, demilitarisation, and then you

 4     say:

 5             "Mutual understanding and trust in resolving these issues was

 6     expressed."

 7             You spoke about it a short while ago.  Was this what you meant,

 8     this sentence in this report?

 9        A.   What's the date again?  I don't remember it.  It's 1992, right?

10        Q.   14 September, 1992.

11        A.   I must inquire about the date to know who this commander of the

12     Sarajevo sector was at the time, and it was General Razek.  We wanted to

13     have extensive co-operation with him and we would do what we could to

14     assist him.  The issue of the Sarajevo airport included the question why

15     the Resolution of the Security Council to surrender the airport was not

16     implemented.  In May or June 1992 there was this Resolution banning all

17     activities in the zone of the airport and along the access roads to

18     Sarajevo.  The BH Army at the time launched its Jug operation, which

19     means south, and we know what the consequences were.  That's why we

20     insisted that this be implemented around the airport, namely, that the

21     Resolution of the Security Council be implemented on the ground.

22             About the -- about flights, both transport, or rather, freight

23     planes are meant that brought any assets for UNPROFOR are meant as well

24     as NATO aviation in the SRK zone of responsibility.

25             In early 1992 there were already instances when the aviation


Page 37552

 1     flying over our positions, breaking the sound barrier causing dismay.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It wasn't recorded that the General

 3     said flights bringing humanitarian aid.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 5        Q.   Did you mention humanitarian aid, General?

 6        A.   Yes.  That was the main purpose of the airport and the reason why

 7     we handed over to UNPROFOR; namely, for humanitarian aid to be delivered

 8     to Sarajevo and materiel and technical equipment for UNPROFOR as well,

 9     including provisions and so on.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3458, Your Honours.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Did you and how recommend to your subordinate commands what kind

15     of relations they should have with UNPROFOR?

16        A.   Subordinate commands even before me received orders from

17     commanders of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that they need to co-operate

18     with UNPROFOR and what that co-operation included.  When I arrived I

19     issued orders of my own and I believe that they were clear and precise

20     enough about that co-operation.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D06310.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, please take a look at this.  It is one of a number of

25     warnings of yours.  Let us look at paragraph 3 and paragraph 4.  What are


Page 37553

 1     you here warning the commands?

 2        A.   You mean paragraphs 3 and 4?

 3        Q.   Yes.  I hereby warn all commands.  You needn't read it out, just

 4     summarise it and tell us how often you sent out such warnings.

 5        A.   Well, not really.  This must have been about some problems with

 6     the relations with some UNPROFOR components in the area of the SRK.  I

 7     especially singled out the Egyptian Battalion.  It says here:

 8             "Egyptians and other Muslims must not be singled out in advance

 9     on any grounds."

10             When I say "other Muslims," I meant such units that belonged to

11     the UN contingent.  In a civil conflict, a religious conflict, an ethnic

12     conflict, clearly there is resistance toward anything that doesn't fit in

13     the context.  One reason for waging the war was religious strife or

14     intolerance.  There must have been some actions that were not in line

15     with our orders about relations with UNPROFOR.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You go on to add:

17             "They are very" -- the translation reads "very insulted by our

18     mistrust of them."  I believe it should have been translated different.

19        A.   They are very susceptible to our distrust of them or sensitive,

20     because it's very difficult to co-operate with someone you don't trust.

21        Q.   Just on religious grounds; right?

22        A.   Well, yes, you shouldn't be distrustful based on religion because

23     people are always people and religion is merely an addition.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.


Page 37554

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3459, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 1D06326, please.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, can you shed some light on this.  This is a month or a

 5     month and a half later on 23 November.  You were giving instructions to

 6     your subordinate units about relations with UNPROFOR.  In paragraph 4 we

 7     read instances of negative, unprofessional, uncivilised behaviour of

 8     individuals and so on, and even the Serbian population in certain areas.

 9     Were such instances the consequence of any orders given by authorities or

10     what may have been the reason for civilian population behaving toward

11     UNPROFOR in this manner?

12        A.   Can we scroll down because I want to see who sent -- actually, I

13     want to see the top of the page.

14        Q.   This is a telegram.

15        A.   Yes, a telegram because this is a different style, that's why

16     it's phrased differently from a report or an order.  Now that I'm

17     thinking back to that time, I'm trying to remember why I wrote this.

18     There must have been an order from the Main Staff, given the fact that it

19     was sent out to so many recipients, and there must have been some

20     problems in our zone.  In the area of Hadzici, the transportation of

21     humanitarian aid went along three axes through our corps' zone.  From

22     Pazarici through Hadzici towards Sarajevo was one axis, and they carried

23     humanitarian aid for civilians in the zone of the 1st Corps of the

24     BH Army.  We know what the problems were at Tarcin with the Silos camp

25     and the other 40 or so camps for Serbs in the zone of the 1st Corps of


Page 37555

 1     the BH Army.  And now some women gathered there and wanted to take care

 2     of these problems in their own way.

 3  We took some measures which were not always adequate.  They wanted the Silos cases

 4  to be investigated, so they laid down on the road and wouldn’t let the convoy for

 5  Sarajevo pass.  And now what do you do about that?  It's always a dilemma.

 6  Commanders of the Sarajevo sector went there, commanders from other levels tried

 7  to solve the problem.  In a word, people who were able to make promises.  Because

 8  if someone knows that their son is being mistreated or killed in a camp, they

 9  of course don't want to let a humanitarian convoy pass to bring food for the

10  Muslim army and civilians, i.e. the 1st Corps of the BH Army.  This is about the

11  reaction of civilians and how they can create problems.  I pointed this out

12  because this happened repeatedly, not so very often but it was repeated.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3460, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D06327.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, sir, this was issued three or four days after the

20     previous one.  This is your order.  In the preamble it says there have

21     been serious oversights in the behaviour of members of the VRS towards

22     members of the UNPROFOR.  What follows is your order.  Under 3 it says:

23             "Make sure that members of your unit are polite towards UNPROFOR

24     members ..." and so on and so forth.

25             Under 4 it says:


Page 37556

 1             "Immediately implement disciplinary measures including criminal

 2     liability for any transgressions against UNPROFOR ..."

 3             So something prompted you three days later after the warning to

 4     issue an order and to threaten punishment; is that correct?

 5        A.   I'm sure that it is.  There were cases.  For example, convoys

 6     from Pancevo that went down Mount Trebevic and proceeded across Pale,

 7     they were stopped in Sokolac and other places.  Everybody wanted to

 8     control those convoys.  Everybody wanted to flex their muscle, and that's

 9     why I had to warn everybody that humanitarian convoys could not and

10     should not be stopped because it was well-known who had the authority to

11     stop them and how to co-operate with their escorts.  Most of the escorts

12     came from the Ukrainian Battalion contingent.  They were very tolerant.

13     However, I'm sure that there must have been problems that prompted me to

14     issue an order to follow that warning or instruction that we saw

15     previously.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit D3461.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   What was your personal relationship with UNPROFOR commanders?

20     What kind of personal relationships did you forge with them?

21        A.   In terms of our personal relationship, I tried to establish good,

22     friendly relationships.  I know that General Razek used to say that the

23     other members of his staff did not really understand him, that he felt

24     isolated.  Whether intentionally or by chance, he said that he was a

25     Christian.  That's what he told me, but then when he testified against me


Page 37557

 1     I realised that he was of Muslim faith.  But it doesn't really matter.  I

 2     knew how to establish good relationships with everybody.  I believe that

 3     I respected them as much as they wanted me to.  I invited them to

 4     unofficial meetings.  They invited me in turn.  I know Soubirou invited

 5     me the most, but I never attended any unofficial meetings with them.  It

 6     would always be somebody else from my command.  I myself never found the

 7     time.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9        A.   Before he left, he asked me to see him off but I had already been

10     pensioned off.  I was no longer in the Sarajevo region.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 65 ter 17007,

12     the last document today.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter is not sure that she heard the

14     document number correctly.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give the number again.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 17007.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you remember Lieutenant-Colonel Mole, General?

19        A.   Mole was the head of the UNMOs as far as I can remember.  It was

20     very difficult to distinguish between UNMOs and UNPROFOR.  For a while we

21     thought that they were both the same.  At that time I really did not know

22     who they belonged to because they were all United Nations members.

23        Q.   Thank you.  The next page, please.

24             Do you remember that you received this letter from

25     Lieutenant-Colonel Mole.  In this letter he congratulates you on your


Page 37558

 1     promotion, he wishes you all the best, and he praises the co-operation

 2     that he had with you?

 3        A.   Yes, I remember that letter, of course.  Whoever left, and let me

 4     remind you that mandate was a short-term mandate, whenever they left they

 5     would send me a thank you letter.  Most of them came to see me personally

 6     before they left.  Most of them were UNMOs.  I don't want to comment upon

 7     the personal part of this letter.  In any case, it was about our personal

 8     relationship between myself and Mole.  But in any case what you see in

 9     the letter I believe is self-explanatory.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page in

11     Serbian.  We don't need the following page in English because I don't

12     think it exists.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Here he thanks you for your courtesy to himself and your

15     continued kindness to the UNMOs.  And he says that he trusts that you

16     will persevere in your endeavours to keep them safe, especially if

17     circumstances deteriorated.  Irrespective of the fact that this letter is

18     personal, how does this letter tally with your experience with regard to

19     the relationship that you had forged with the representatives of the

20     United Nations?

21        A.   That experience, as I've already told you, was positive.  I tried

22     to maintain very honest co-operation with them and that's what I was

23     hoping for.  I wanted that co-operation to be mutually beneficial as

24     well.  If such co-operation is based on honesty and sincerity, I believe

25     that it can also be full.  Of course there were influences of various


Page 37559

 1     politics and at various trials those people behaved quite differently.  I

 2     don't know why.  In my view, my relationship with them was always

 3     friendly.  It seems that they are embarrassed to admit that.  I don't

 4     know why.  Why should they be ashamed of such relationship?  If anything

 5     was happening at the time, why didn't they tell me that I was a bad man,

 6     that I was a bad commander, that I didn't know how to do my job properly?

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3462, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll adjourn today here.

12             Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

13             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, with your

14     leave, a couple of comments for the transcript and I have a question for

15     the Chamber.  I'll start with my comments.  I'll be very quick so that

16     the English version is the same as the French version.  Page 13.11,

17     there's a typo.  It's more numerous rather than less numerous.  Page 32,

18     line 11, we distinguished.  Page 71, line 2, General Galic talked about

19     commissions in plural and not in singular.  And finally, page 97, line

20     16, shouldn't be:  "I'm not sure," but it should be:  "I am sure."

21             And then my question, Your Honour, has your -- the Chamber

22     decided about the questions raised by General Galic?  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  We are taking a look into the matter.  I will leave

24     it at that.

25             And as to the return date I think we can have -- you can hear


Page 37560

 1     Mr. Galic's evidence on Thursday.  I don't think Mr. Akashi's evidence

 2     continued until the end of Thursdays so that we can hear him.  And at

 3     that time, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, did you ask whether -- when you should

 4     return?

 5             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Asking who, Your Honour?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Are you aware of the scheduling -- trial scheduling?

 7             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] If we're talking about next

 8     week, I don't think that there would be anything until the 7th, if you're

 9     talking about that week, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll resume on 7th of May.

11             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Noted down, thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  In Courtroom I.

13             The hearing is adjourned.

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.54 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 23rd day of

16                           April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.

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