Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 37663

 1                           Wednesday, 24 April 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, good morning, Mr. Harvey.

 8             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  If I may

 9     introduce, please, Ms. Shokriya Majidi, who is originally from

10     Afghanistan and has been working with my team for the last four months.

11     She's a graduate of the University of The Hague.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.

14             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

15     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16                           WITNESS:  YASUSHI AKASHI

17             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Ambassador.

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  Good morning.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Please be seated and make yourself comfortable.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please proceed.

22             THE ACCUSED:  Good morning, Excellencies.  Good morning,

23     everyone.

24                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

25        Q.   Good morning, your Excellency.

Page 37664

 1        A.   Good morning.

 2        Q.   It's been some time since the last meeting of ours and my

 3     pleasure to see you in good health and spirit.  I'm going mostly to

 4     address you neither in Serbian nor in Japanese but in English, which is a

 5     real winner of the 20th century wars.  Nevertheless, we have to wait for

 6     the two translations in Serbian and in French.

 7             Excellency, may I ask you for the record to tell us -- to tell

 8     the Chamber in short your date and place of your birth, and full name, of

 9     course, and name of father.

10        A.   Thank you very much, Dr. Karadzic, for your kind greetings.  I

11     think we spent a very difficult time together in the former Yugoslavia.

12             My name is Yasushi Akashi.  My date of birth is

13     19th of January, 1931.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Would you be kind to shortly, which is not going to

15     be easy, review your career and tell it for the record and for the sake

16     of Chamber's knowledge.

17        A.   My career has been long, and I have to make a short capsule of

18     it.  I was brought up in Japan, was educated there, graduating from the

19     University of Tokyo in 1954.  I then went to the United States as a

20     Fulbright Scholar and started at the University of Virginia and then at

21     the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.  I then joined the UN in

22     February 1957, worked at the department of political and Security Council

23     affairs.  And from 1974 to 1979, I worked at the Japanese mission to the

24     UN as a councillor, minister, and then as ambassador.  I then rejoined

25     the UN as Under-Secretary-General for public information, subsequently as

Page 37665

 1     Under-Secretary-General for disarmament affairs, and then I was appointed

 2     the Secretary-General's Special Representative for UN peacekeeping in

 3     Cambodia.  That was 1992.  I completed my assignment there in a year and

 4     a half.  I went back to UN headquarters, then I was appointed SRSG

 5     [Realtime transcript read in error "SISG"] for the former Yugoslavia.  In

 6     January 1994 and until end of October 1995, I was back at the UN

 7     headquarters then, and I was special advisor to the Secretary-General.

 8     Afterwards, I was made Under-Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs

 9     until I retired from the UN from -- at the end of 1997.

10             I went back to my country, Japan, and have been engaged in quite

11     a number of jobs, mostly in the non-governmental area, but I have a

12     part-time responsibility with the government as the representative of the

13     Japanese government on peace building in Sri Lanka, and I'm the head of

14     the international house of Japan and some other non-governmental

15     responsibilities dealing with international affairs and trying to promote

16     peace and reconciliation between Japan and some of the neighbouring

17     countries of Japan.

18             That I think that more or less summarises.

19        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  For transcript page -- Ambassador,

21     if you could take a look at line 2 in the transcript.  Should "SISG" not

22     read "SRSG," Special Representative?

23             THE WITNESS:  Right.  That's correct, sir.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, sir.

25             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 37666

 1             MR. KARADZIC:

 2        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  It was not as easy to present this

 3     remarkable career.

 4             May I ask you, Excellency, taking into account that this mission

 5     in Yugoslavia was not the first such operation, were you -- were there

 6     any doubts of implementing the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia, and

 7     if on what basis, in the United Nations and among the big powers?

 8        A.   I myself divide the UN peacekeeping operations into several

 9     different categories.  The -- our operation in Cambodia is what I call

10     second-generation peacekeeping.  The first generation started in 1949 in

11     the Middle East with UN truce supervisional organisation which was

12     deployed on the cease-fire lines or truce lines between Israel on the one

13     hand and neighbouring Arab states on the other.  That's the

14     first-generation peacekeeping.  UN role was limited to mostly strategic

15     supervisory job of verifying cease-fire lines or truce lines or national

16     borders, but with the Cambodian peacekeeping, the second-generation

17     peacekeeping started in 1992.  This generation is a multidimensional

18     peacekeeping involving not just strategic advisory functions but more

19     dynamic complex functions extending from military to political, economic,

20     and reconstruction work.

21             So Cambodia was a very complex, very large peacekeeping.  It's a

22     military component towards itself over 20.000 people.  But the -- what I

23     call the third-generation peacekeeping is the UN operation in Somalia

24     which delved into the more forceful operation in accordance with

25     Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's doctrine enunciated in the agenda for

Page 37667

 1     peace, his own special report to the Security Council.  And in the

 2     mid-1990s, UN was confronted with three very major, unprecedented

 3     challenges:  In Somalia, in Rwanda, and in the former Yugoslavia.  And in

 4     all cases, UN experienced very serious difficulties, and we wondered

 5     whether our traditional definition of our responsibility and tasks was

 6     sufficient or not, especially in the former Yugoslavia.

 7             UN Security Council issued more resolutions and precedential

 8     statements than in any other previous peacekeeping operations, but I

 9     don't think anybody should judge it's productivity by the number of

10     resolutions or statements adopted.  The basic trouble with UNPROFOR in

11     the former Yugoslavia was lack of unity of opinions or viewpoints in the

12     Security Council.  In Cambodia, we were fortunate to have modest unity of

13     outlook in the international community effected in Security Council, but

14     in the former Yugoslavia at least three different viewpoints prevailed,

15     even among the five permanent members of the Security Council.  So our

16     work was made very difficult, very controversial, and yet under the

17     direction of the UN Secretary-General, I must say that all of us in

18     UNPROFOR did our very best to fulfil our responsibilities to the UN to

19     the best of our ability.

20        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

21             THE ACCUSED:  May we have in the e-court document 1D10513.

22             MR. KARADZIC:

23        Q.   Excellency, did you give an interview in French parliament?

24        A.   Yes.  It was not a full chamber of the French parliament but one

25     of its committees, I recall.

Page 37668

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  May we see page 5.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Could you, Dr. Karadzic, repeat the document's

 4     number.

 5        Q.   Excellency, this is a number in e-court but this is your

 6     interview in this committee of French parliament, and page in this

 7     document is 5.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Perhaps, Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Akashi could be advised

10     that the translation of that document appears on the screen in front of

11     him, and you could ask him if he's able to see it at the size it is and

12     recognise it.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we show the witness the first page of this

14     document first.

15             THE WITNESS:  Could you make the letters a bit larger.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will.

17             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  And then shall we move to the relevant page.

19             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, please.  Page number 5.

20             THE WITNESS:  Letters can be made larger?  Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC:

22        Q.   Excellency, this is chapter number 2, nature of UN peacekeeping

23     in former Yugoslavia.  What you have been telling before we called this

24     document, is it in this page concerning those doubts about implementing

25     peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia and about the premature or selective

Page 37669

 1     recognition?  Could you tell us about this statement of yours on this

 2     subject.

 3        A.   Yes.  In a sense, I think we can say that UN peacekeeping

 4     operation in the former Yugoslavia was imposed on the UN.  The

 5     Secretary-General of the UN at that time was Mr. Perez de Cuellar and he

 6     felt serious doubts about the wisdom or even the possibility of UN

 7     carrying out responsibilities in the former Yugoslavia.  His principal

 8     advisor on this question was Cyrus Vance, American Secretary -- former

 9     American Secretary of State, highly respected diplomat, and both of them

10     felt that in the volatile conflict in the former Yugoslavia, UN

11     peacekeeping operation is not suitable as a useful instrument for peace.

12             UN peacekeeping, as the name suggests, is for the purpose of

13     keeping peace, not to create peace.  So -- but in the former Yugoslavia,

14     actual fighting was ongoing, so there was no cease-fire agreement, no

15     peace agreement either.  So there was, in short, no [Realtime transcript

16     read in error "in"] peace to keep.  So UN Secretary-General and others in

17     the UN had serious doubts about UN going into former Yugoslavia, but in a

18     sense European countries exerted pressures on the UN to step in despite

19     these lingering doubts.

20        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  You underlined the lack of consensus

21     between the three parties, warring parties, in Bosnia, but also you, in

22     comparison to the Cambodia case, you underlined the lack of accord among

23     the great powers concerning the war in former Yugoslavia.

24             THE ACCUSED:  Could we see lower part of this page, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC:

Page 37670

 1        Q.   And may ask you, Excellency, just to explain your view on those

 2     differences and how those differences affected ending of the war -- the

 3     course of the war and ending of the war.

 4        A.   Here we have to take into serious account the state of public

 5     opinion in the world as reflected by media's, mass media's, viewpoints.

 6     Much of mass media in the world were horrified by the tragedy of -- and

 7     the seriousness of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and they called

 8     for some action to bring about alleviation of this conflict, especially

 9     in the humanitarian area, to alleviate the suffering of the innocent

10     people.  And also for Europeans in particular, I think they were anxious

11     to stem the tide of inflow of refugees, large number of refugees, from

12     the former Yugoslavia.  So the government were in many ways compelled to

13     do something in order to respond to the voices of public opinion and many

14     media's cries.

15             So I think the -- because of the complexity of the conflict and

16     existence of plurality of viewpoints, the Security Council puzzled over

17     actions to take, and many of their actions by the nature of the

18     Security Council were based on a compromise, and result of compromise was

19     often times the -- the ambiguousness of the resolutions and the

20     precedential statements adopted, and this made the actual task of

21     implementing these decisions and the resolutions by the peacekeepers on

22     the ground exceedingly difficult, and some generals in our peacekeeping

23     said that they read resolutions and statements in -- from the Security

24     Council many, many times and could not understand what they meant.  And

25     so they told me that they stopped reading those resolutions, which did

Page 37671

 1     not in their opinion make sense.  So this was a perplexity in which many

 2     of my colleagues in New York as well as on the ground were faced with.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document, this page?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  "This page" meaning page 5?

 6             THE ACCUSED:  Cover page and front page and page 5 for now.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  How about chapter 2 of this document?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Chapter 2 being how many pages, Ms. Edgerton?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Chapter 2 being pages 5 and 6 in part of this

11     document.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber has no difficulty with it.  We'll admit

13     the cover page and the chapter 2.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3488, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  And just for the record, transcript page 7, line 8,

16     should read "So there was, in short, no peace to keep," instead of "in

17     peace."

18             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC:

21        Q.   Excellency, did you see the reason or reasons why the peace was

22     not achieved earlier or, rather, in whose interest it was to prolong the

23     war longer than it was necessary, inevitable?

24        A.   Would you be kind enough to repeat your question?

25        Q.   Yes.  Sorry.  Did you see the reason or reasons why the peace was

Page 37672

 1     not achieved earlier, or, rather, in whose interest was -- it was to

 2     prolong the war longer than it was inevitable or necessary?  What powers

 3     and what domestic elements were for the prolonging of war?

 4        A.   I think the situation in the former Yugoslavia in different

 5     republics was very complex, and the reasons for the conflict or the

 6     prolongation of the conflict are numerous.  There were domestic as well

 7     as international reasons.  There were political, economic, social,

 8     historical, and many factors involved, and I don't think it is in my

 9     capacity to succinctly explain the causes of that most unfortunate war.

10     I think opinions are divided, some emphasise international factors,

11     others emphasise internal factors as more important for the conflict.

12     And I simply point to these difference to say that it's beyond my

13     competence to point my finger to one or a few factors.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Have you written and published a book under the title

15     "In the Valley Between War and Peace," Excellency?

16        A.   It was published in Japan, in Japanese, five years ago, I

17     believe, and then it was translated into English about two years ago

18     under my supervision.  And I would not call it a book.  I will call it a

19     booklet.  It's a modest piece of exercise on my part.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED:  May we see in the courtroom 1D29269.

22             MR. KARADZIC:

23        Q.   Is that the cover page of your book, Excellency?

24        A.   It seems to be.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 37673

 1             THE ACCUSED:  May we have page 32 in the book.  In the e-court it

 2     may be little bit higher number.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:

 4        Q.   Excellency, may I recommend your -- to your attention on third --

 5     page 33 the -- in the middle of second paragraph it's written Bosnia, and

 6     then the main issue was that neither the Bosnian government nor the

 7     United States government wanted a long-term cease-fire at that juncture

 8     based on the view that the hold of militarily superior Serb forces over a

 9     vast territory of Bosnia should not be permitted to become permanent.

10             Does it --

11             MS. EDGERTON:  So it's actually on page 32 of the book as opposed

12     to the e-court, and it's the second full paragraph from the top.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC:

15        Q.   Does it jog your memory on the different interests of foreign

16     elements and domestic elements in prolonging the war or in avoiding

17     long-term cease-fires?

18        A.   Are you reading from page 32 of the booklet?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we zoom in a bit further.  Yes, that

20     paragraph.

21             THE WITNESS:  Aha.  Fine.  Yeah.  Yes.

22             MR. KARADZIC:

23        Q.   Thank you.

24        A.   What is -- what is the question?

25        Q.   The question was whether this jog your memory on the accord of

Page 37674

 1     these foreign and domestic elements that were not interested in long-term

 2     cease-fires.

 3        A.   Yes.  That was my interpretation of events at that time.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  I would like to see number 33 just for

 5     one telephone conversation between you and President Carter.  This is the

 6     end of first paragraph on this page.

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Do you remember this cease-fire, four-month cease-fire called

 9     Carter's cease-fire, and that after you informed him that it is

10     maintained, he said that it was the best Christmas for him?

11        A.   Yes, I remember.  I remember my telephone conversation with

12     President Carter.  I called him in Atlanta where he lived, and although I

13     must say that much of the spade work was carried out by UNPROFOR headed

14     by myself for preparing for the four-month efforts to conclude this what

15     we called Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.  I think President Carter's

16     visit to Bosnia was very much welcomed by you, sir, and -- but Bosnian

17     government did not particularly appreciate Carter's visit.  And I had

18     instructions from UN headquarters to brief him fully on my negotiations,

19     which I did, and so I think President Carter made his contribution,

20     particularly to your side, but I think I must say in all modesty that it

21     was the UN which was basically behind this four-month agreement, but I

22     felt that the visit by President Carter and his wife was a gracious act

23     which facilitated acceptance of the agreement by your side.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender those two pages and cover page of the

Page 37675

 1     book of Excellency Akashi.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  In case of the previous document we admitted as

 3     Exhibit D3488, I instructed the Registry to include page 2 so that we

 4     know a bit more about the detail, about the nature of the document.  So

 5     in the case -- in this case we'll admit those two pages, and in addition

 6     we'll admit the first four pages to know what this document is about, to

 7     know the table -- to include table of contents.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Indeed, and frankly the Prosecution has no

 9     objection to the book in its entirety if it assists the parties in

10     understanding the context of these remarks.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Let us see how it evolves.  So we'll admit first

12     five pages and these two pages.  Shall we give the number.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3489, Your Honours.

14             THE WITNESS:  Mr. President, may I comment on this --

15             JUDGE KWON:  By all means, Mr. Ambassador.

16             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Mr. President.  I would also

17     much prefer that the whole booklet be available to the -- to this Chamber

18     rather than any portion thereof, because unless the whole thing is read

19     together, I think the contextual meaning may be distorted.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Rest assured, Ambassador Akashi, the Chamber will

22     have a hard copy in its entirety, but for the moment, for the purpose of

23     the exhibit, we'll leave it as it is now.  Thank you.

24             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 37676

 1             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC:

 3        Q.   Excellency, how did you see the development of balance of the

 4     power or of the armed forces in former Yugoslavia, particularly

 5     concerning Bosnia and three sides in Bosnia?  Was it the same all the

 6     time or was it shifted in one or another direction?

 7        A.   Dr. Karadzic, the balance of power, more particularly in this

 8     case balance of military power, was constantly shifting.  In the

 9     beginning of the conflict, the Bosnian Serb forces were predominant.  At

10     one stage they were in control of more than 70 per cent of the territory

11     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but towards the end of the conflict, after

12     maybe 1994 and certainly in 1995, balance of power was gradually shifting

13     for -- in favour of Bosnian government side, and also Croatian government

14     was gaining in advantages towards the end of the conflict.  That's why, I

15     think, the Bosnian Serb side wanted more permanent, longer period of

16     cease-fire and stabilisation of the situation, while Bosnian government

17     was against the -- any kind of a long-term sort of freezing of the

18     military situation.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED:  May we have page 103 in the book of

21     Ambassador Akashi.  This is 1D29269, page 103.

22             MR. KARADZIC:

23        Q.   Excellency, do you remember that there was an arms embargo for

24     former Yugoslavia, but nevertheless, there was a change of balance and

25     development in the status of armament of the sides?

Page 37677

 1        A.   That's correct.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  May I ask you to see the first paragraph of page 103

 3     on the -- you can see it on the -- on the screen in front of you and

 4     particularly the end of this paragraph which says:

 5              "But as a result of active military assistance from the

 6     United States, Germany, and the Islamic states to Croatian and Bosnian

 7     forces, the overall power balance drastically shifted in favour of

 8     Croatia and Bosnia against Serbia in the four years between 1992 and

 9     1995."

10             Is that what you said?

11        A.   Yes.  That's correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this page to be added or have new

14     number.  I suppose to be added to the previous number.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  For the moment we'll add this page to the

16     previous exhibit.

17             MR. KARADZIC:

18        Q.   Excellency, after you did assume your duties as a

19     Special Representative of Secretary-General, have you received any

20     assessment of your military commanders about the country that you have

21     taken duty in?  Have you got some briefings from your commanders?

22        A.   Could you repeat your question, please, Dr. Karadzic.

23        Q.   When -- after you assumed your duty, whether you got any

24     assessment of -- from your commanders, commanders of United Nations that

25     have been already in Bosnia?

Page 37678

 1        A.   Yes.  It is a part, a very important part of my job to ensure

 2     that the civilian and the military components of the peacekeeping

 3     operation will be -- will have the same joint assessment of the situation

 4     in our duty station and the interchange of opinions and assessment was

 5     constant endeavour on our part.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  May we have in the e-court 65 ter 06875.

 8             MR. KARADZIC:

 9        Q.   Excellency, do you remember this communication of yours toward

10     the Under-Secretary Annan and comprising the assessment of

11     General Briquemont?

12        A.   Let me see.  Please give me a second.  This is dated 15 January.

13        Q.   I --

14        A.   I do not have my immediate recollection of this cable.

15        Q.   May we have the next page, please.  This is sent to you on

16     9th of January, and could you please -- could we please see the whole

17     page and then ...

18             Excellency, do you remember this number 1 where the political

19     evolution it says if at the beginning of the war the Bosnians wanted to

20     maintain one multi national state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they now very

21     clearly want to create a Muslim state?

22             THE ACCUSED:  And if we see the end of this document.  Last page,

23     please.

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   It's signed by General Briquemont, and number 3 -- point 3,

Page 37679

 1     conclusion, says that "... my assessment is that UNPROFOR's mandate is

 2     today very ambiguous."

 3             And how does it all fit in your experience and do you remember

 4     this briefing report at the beginning of your mandate?

 5        A.   Yes.  Now I remember this assessment made by General Briquemont,

 6     and as well as my conversations with him at that time.  It was towards

 7     the end of his own term, and he was rather bitter about the position in

 8     which UN peacekeepers were placed in the situation.  He felt that the

 9     mandate given to the peacekeepers by the Security Council was extremely

10     ambiguous and almost impossible to implement.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED:  May we have the previous page.  And, please, the

13     middle of page -- third paragraph, "Nevertheless":

14              "Nevertheless, the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa took

15     place, but we could not achieve a total demilitarisation at this stage,

16     which causes difficulties with the Bosnian Serbs."

17             And three paragraphs lower, for a few months the BH units from

18     Srebrenica have been shelling the BSA position.

19             MR. KARADZIC:

20        Q.   Do you remember that you found at the beginning of your mandate

21     that those questions hadn't been resolved?

22        A.   Yes.  I remember these were the views expressed quite

23     forthrightly by General Briquemont.  Probably he was more frank at this

24     time, at the end of his [Realtime transcript read in error "this"]

25     mission.

Page 37680

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3490, Your Honours.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:

 6        Q.   Do you remember, Excellency, how many times we met approximately,

 7     and did anyone of your team make any notes during those meetings?

 8        A.   Indeed, they did.

 9        Q.   Did those notes and your impressions been reflected in your

10     reports and communications with the New York UN seat?

11        A.   Yes.  Maybe not always 100 per cent, but I think these reports

12     were quite close approximation of my own impressions, which were still

13     fresh at that time, while my memory today is somewhat fading.

14             THE ACCUSED:  May we have in e-court 65 ter 01250.

15             THE WITNESS:  By the way, Mr. President, there's a slight error

16     in the verbatim record.  I said that, "Probably he," meaning Briquemont,

17     was more frank at this time, at the end of his mission" not "at the end

18     of this mission."

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.  It will be corrected.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC:

22        Q.   Thank you.  May I ask you to see this document and do you

23     remember was it the first meeting of ours, so 9th of January, 1994?

24        A.   I believe it was our first meeting.

25             THE ACCUSED:  May we see the lower part of this page, please.

Page 37681

 1             MR. KARADZIC:

 2        Q.   "At the end of our meeting he," should be me, "strongly pointed

 3     out that if a peace agreement," next page, please, "be reached soon, the

 4     RS would have to declare the war."

 5             Have you been aware, Excellency, that the Muslim side declared

 6     the war against us and we did not declare the war on the whole

 7     Republika Srpska against them?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 9             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I would suggest that Dr. Karadzic rephrase his

11     question.

12             THE ACCUSED:  Okay.  I'll leave that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So what is your question with respect to this

14     paragraph?

15             MR. KARADZIC:

16        Q.   Do you remember this meeting, Excellency, and what was your

17     impression about fate and an attitude toward the talks, peace?  What was

18     your first impression of those meetings of ours?

19        A.   I think our first meetings, including this first one, was very

20     useful to me to get to know your concerns, as well as your assessment of

21     the situation and difficulties in which your side was faced with, and I

22     appreciated the discussions which took place, while obviously I was not

23     in full agreement with everything which was said by your Excellency and

24     as well as by your colleagues on the Bosnian Serb side.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 37682

 1             THE ACCUSED:  May I -- may we see the rest of the page, and --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  I just note, Your Honours and Dr. Karadzic,

 4     Ambassador Akashi is trying to find himself in the relevant document in a

 5     hard copy binder, and to save time and assist the Ambassador I have

 6     unmarked copies of these documents.  Perhaps with the usher's assistance

 7     I could pass them to Mr. Akashi so he could see the documents as a whole

 8     when dealing with Dr. Karadzic's questions.

 9             THE WITNESS:  That would be very helpful, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber has no difficulty with it.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  And just to make a small correction, the only

12     marking on the document is always the 65 ter number on the document,

13     otherwise they are completely clean.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  And this is 65 ter 01250.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

17             MR. KARADZIC:

18        Q.   Excellency, do you remember that at this meeting you have

19     achieved a lot and got my consent to the activities of the

20     United Nations, particularly on humanitarian and convoy issues and

21     deployment of the Dutch unit in Zepa and Srebrenica?

22        A.   Yes, particularly with regard to the rotation of UNPROFOR troops

23     in Srebrenica was a major obstacle in UNPROFOR fulfilling its mandate,

24     and so I was glad that at these meetings we were able to achieve

25     agreement of Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs to accept the rotation to

Page 37683

 1     Srebrenica.  It used to be performed by the Canadian unit, but after

 2     departure of the Canadian unit from Srebrenica we had difficulties.  I

 3     think among other countries Sweden was discussed, but in the end it was

 4     very difficult to find the replacement to the Canadians, but it was good

 5     of Denmark to finally come out and agreed to take over from Canadians,

 6     thus filling the void in Srebrenica.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Did you say "Denmark," Mr. Ambassador?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, Netherlands.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC:

11        Q.   Thank you.  I believe it is in the point 9 and 10 of this

12     document, so could we have next page.  And -- and in point 10, there is

13     your first impression about the working relationship that had been

14     established.  Do you remember that?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document, please?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We will receive it.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3491, Your Honours.

20             MR. KARADZIC:

21        Q.   Did these impressions of yours were reflected in your book?

22        A.   I hope so.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED:  May we have page 77 of the same book, that is

25     1D29269.

Page 37684

 1             MR. KARADZIC:

 2        Q.   Not to mention your impression about my size in the first

 3     sentence.  Does this say that it was more than 20 times that we have met?

 4     Do you see, Excellency, in front of you?

 5        A.   Yes, I do.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  May we have next page.  And you noticed the

 7     atmosphere of these meetings of ours.  On page 79 you remember that I

 8     cited Robert Frost, and in -- last paragraph on this page you said that I

 9     was formidable adversary in negotiations and tough debater, but you point

10     out the humourous and good atmosphere there.  But would -- was it a fact

11     that you achieved always something visiting Pale and me, that you never

12     left Pale with empty hands?

13        A.   I -- I beg to -- to make a reservation.  I'm not sure whether we

14     can make a general statement that always I was able to achieve what I had

15     wanted through our meetings and discussions.  I like to believe that I

16     had your co-operation and understanding, but subsequent to our initial

17     meetings, I think, Dr. Karadzic, you recall more difficult meetings we

18     had subsequently.  And in this booklet, I also mention that we shifted

19     from more informal discussions in a rather good working environment to a

20     larger conference room, and you shifted from speaking in English to me.

21     You shifted to Serbian language and resorted to interpreters, which made

22     our interchange more formal, more formalistic, and in my opinion somewhat

23     more confrontational.  I regretted it, but I think it was your insistence

24     maybe vis-a-vis your colleagues on the Bosnian Serb side.

25        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

Page 37685

 1             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender these three pages to be added to the

 2     previous number.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll do that for the moment.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:

 5        Q.   Excellency, do you remember meeting President Izetbegovic and me

 6     on 1st of February, 1994, in the occasion of preparations for the Geneva

 7     talks on the 10th of February?  If it would jog your memory, I could call

 8     65 ter 09088 in the courtroom.

 9        A.   I have it.

10        Q.   Thank you.  May we see the bottom of this page.  Number --

11     paragraph number 4.  Do you remember that you are -- was -- you were

12     informed by President Izetbegovic that they -- that he expressed

13     increasing distrust about Geneva talks on 10th of February?

14        A.   Yes.

15             THE ACCUSED:  May we have next page, please.  The two next pages,

16     number 3.  Point 9.

17             MR. KARADZIC:

18        Q.   Excellency, you wrote in this paragraph your -- elements from

19     your meeting with Prime Minister Silajdzic, and you wrote down that --

20     that he was even less enthusiastic about talks, and he said that it may

21     be -- it could -- it may be the last time they would go back to Geneva.

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED:  May we have lower part of this page.

25             MR. KARADZIC:

Page 37686

 1        Q.   Do you remember what was my attitude toward the talks?  And I

 2     have in mind paragraph 11.  It's about rotation of troops in Srebrenica

 3     and my -- my objections about non -- demilitarisation of -- was it very

 4     often issue of our talks, Excellency?

 5        A.   Yes.  Demilitarisation of safe areas, including Srebrenica, was

 6     one of our preoccupations, and we never stopped pointing out that the

 7     lack of demilitarisation of safe areas is an indispensable component of

 8     the safe area concept itself.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED:  May we have the next page, last page, please.

11             MR. KARADZIC:

12        Q.   And in paragraph -- at the end of paragraph 12, you noted our own

13     legitimate concerns about possible abuse of the airport, but what would I

14     like to -- what I would like to recommend to your attention is point 14

15     concerning the convoys and particularly protection of the minorities in

16     Banja Luka from the extremists.  Do you remember this --

17        A.   Yes --

18        Q.   -- subject?

19        A.   -- I do.  You remember, Dr. Karadzic, that we discussed the

20     question of my visit to Banja Luka quite a number of times, and you

21     always promised to do your best to facilitate my visit there, but I also

22     remember that I was never allowed to visit Banja Luka.  This was my

23     constant frustrations.

24        Q.   Did you have an impression, Excellency, that I was concerned

25     about your safety if you visited Banja Luka without me?  Did we mention

Page 37687

 1     that I should be with you?

 2        A.   I don't remember that particular matter, but I think on different

 3     occasions we discussed different modalities of my visit, and you said you

 4     are trying your best to facilitate it.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3492, Your Honours.

 9             MR. KARADZIC:

10        Q.   Excellency, that was the beginning of February of 1994.  Do you

11     remember two major incidents that happened on 4th and

12     5th of February, 1994; 4th of February was in Dobrinja, and 5th of

13     February, Markale marketplace?

14        A.   Yes, I do.

15        Q.   Did you order and did you get an investigation of this incident,

16     and what was the result of this investigation?

17        A.   I recall that there was much speculation in the media about the

18     perpetrators of the horrible tragedy in the open market in Sarajevo, and

19     within UNPROFOR itself there were all kinds of speculations.  Therefore,

20     I decided to establish an expert committee consisting of, I believe, five

21     ballistic experts:  Two of its members were from countries rather

22     friendly towards the Bosnia government, two others were friendly towards

23     Bosnian Serb side, and with a neutral and impartial chairman from Canada.

24     And so I felt that the composition of this body should be acceptable to

25     both sides, and they did study all aspects of the mortar incident at the

Page 37688

 1     market, but there was only one mortar which was -- which came to the

 2     marketplace, and it hit some structure before it landed on the ground,

 3     which made it very difficult for experts to judge precisely where that

 4     mortar came from.  Usually they can determine the angle from the angle

 5     and the distance where a mortar or any other weapon was shot at, but in

 6     the experts' views, the -- the shot could have come either from

 7     Bosnian Serb side or from Bosnian government side in that -- in that

 8     whole area of probably -- a probable attack.  And so the conclusion,

 9     which I accepted fully, was that the attack could have come from either

10     side.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED:  May we have 65 ter 01252.

13             MR. KARADZIC:

14        Q.   It is your communication to Annan and Stoltenberg on

15     6th of February.

16             THE ACCUSED:  And may we have second page.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  I think this is D713 as well, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED:  It may well have been, but --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It is so noted already, Exhibit D13 -- D713.

21             MR. KARADZIC:

22        Q.   Excellency, may I ask you to see number 7, and was that what you

23     just said about the conclusion over the responsibility for this?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you meet me and General Galic on the next

Page 37689

 1     morning?  Did you discuss with us, and what was or own response to these

 2     allegations?

 3        A.   I remember, Dr. Karadzic, you told me that in your opinion it was

 4     the Bosnian government side which did the shooting.  You were emphatic

 5     that it was not your side, but I didn't expect any other opinion from

 6     you.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  But you -- did you -- did you notice that we had been

 8     enthusiastic about forthcoming talks in Geneva, and on the contrary, you

 9     notify that Izetbegovic and Silajdzic were not?

10        A.   Yes.  I think our cables recorded faithfully the different

11     positions held by your side as well as the Bosnian government side.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED:  May we have page 44 of the same 1D29269, book of

14     Excellency Akashi.

15             THE WITNESS:  What page, sir?

16             MR. KARADZIC:

17        Q.   Forty-four.  It was just what you have said, that you confirm

18     that I emphatically denied the responsibility.  So maybe we don't have

19     to, but ...

20             In the middle of second paragraph.  I can tender this page.

21     Excellency Akashi has said it before seeing this page.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, did you ask any question about this?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  No.  He asked a leading question and then he

24     showed the page of the book, and perhaps he could be encouraged to

25     re-order and rephrase his question.

Page 37690

 1             THE ACCUSED:  I can read my question from line 6, 26 page:

 2             "Did you meet me and General Galic on the next morning?  Did you

 3     discuss with us, and what was our response to these allegations?"

 4             I think it was not leading.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But what's the point of tendering this page?

 6             THE ACCUSED:  Well, I lost one or two minutes, but it really

 7     corroborates what Excellency Akashi said.  It was reflected in his book.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I see here "General Gvero," not "General Galic."

 9             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, Excellency, you are right, but I think there

10     are documents that mention General Galic too.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on.  Shall we move on?

12             MR. KARADZIC:

13        Q.   Excellency, do you remember the name of the chief of this

14     investigating team from Canada?

15        A.   I don't.

16        Q.   Could it have been General Michel Gauthier?

17        A.   I'm not sure.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED:  Excellencies, I see the time.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll have a break for half an hour and resume

21     at 11.00.

22                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

25             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

Page 37691

 1             MR. KARADZIC:

 2        Q.   Excellency, do you remember following those -- this incident in

 3     Markale II, whether we have a series of meetings that led to some

 4     agreement between the two of us?

 5        A.   Yes, I do.

 6        Q.   Do you remember this agreement that according to which I accepted

 7     the grouping of our heavy weaponry, free patrolling of the UNPROFOR, and

 8     particularly do you remember that I reserved the right to take our weapon

 9     in the case of massive attack by the Muslim forces, the attack that

10     UNPROFOR couldn't prevent or stop?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Just a second.  Excuse me, Ambassador.

12             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry for the interruption.  I think that's a

14     very leading question, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it is.

16             THE ACCUSED:  Okay.  Then I would like to see D842 in the

17     courtroom.

18             MR. KARADZIC:

19        Q.   Can you tell us, Excellency, what do you remember about those

20     talks?

21        A.   I think I remember the gist of those talks.

22        Q.   Could you tell the Chamber, please, what was the substance of

23     those talks.

24        A.   Dr. Karadzic, your side was agreeable to a cease-fire, but

25     Bosnian government side said that a cease-fire is not enough.  They

Page 37692

 1     wanted it to be accompanied by some measures of disarmament, more

 2     particularly the withdrawal of heavy weapons which your side possessed in

 3     and around Sarajevo.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED:  May we have second page.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:

 7        Q.   Do you remember this communication of yours to Annan and

 8     Stoltenberg on 21st of February?  Could you please see on the screen?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Do you have a hard copy?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I do.  I could offer it up if that's of

11     assistance.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE ACCUSED:  May we see page number 2 in the e-court, and just

14     to identify what was the title of this letter.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

16             MR. KARADZIC:

17        Q.   Do you remember this letter of yours, Excellency?

18        A.   Which letter are you referring to?

19        Q.   This document, meeting with Dr. Karadzic and Krajisnik and Galic

20     on 18th of February in Lukavica.

21        A.   That's another document.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Would the usher be able to assist

24     Ambassador Akashi.  I have given him a copy of the document with the page

25     that we see now on the screen.

Page 37693

 1             JUDGE KWON:  But in the meantime, could you see -- do you see the

 2     document on the monitor?  Mr. Karadzic is referring to this document.

 3     Probably that should be the second payment of the document Ms. Edgerton

 4     handed over to you.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much.  I have it now, Mr. President.

 6             THE ACCUSED:  May we see paragraph 4 on this page.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:

 8        Q.   Do you remember, Excellency, that I proposed the type of Sarajevo

 9     agreement to be suitable for the entire Bosnia as you state -- said in

10     this paragraph 4?

11        A.   Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED:  Could we have next page, please.

13             MR. KARADZIC:

14        Q.   And for you also 3 -- page 3 of 6.

15        A.   Uh-huh.  Yes.

16        Q.   Excellency, do you remember in paragraph 6 that it was understood

17     that we had a right to withdraw our weapons in the face of a massive

18     attack?  "It was hoped that such an eventuality would not occur as it

19     would indicate a total breakdown of the peace."  But do you remember that

20     we had a right to acquire our own weaponry in the case that we attacked?

21        A.   No, but the UNPROFOR would be having a sort of intermediary

22     presence between the two forces with its own troops, and each collection

23     point will have such a presence, and for either side to attack any of

24     these collection points, it will constitute a challenge to the

25     United Nations itself.  So we were endeavouring to make our presence so

Page 37694

 1     significant as to make it unnecessary for any side to challenge UN

 2     presence.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  Could we see point 8.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:

 6        Q.   Do you remember, Excellency, that big concern of ours was the

 7     possibility that Muslim side attack the UNPROFOR on the Serb territory

 8     for the purpose of blaming the Serbs?

 9        A.   I think that was one of your apprehensions, yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember the agreement that we have signed on

11     18th of February?

12        A.   Yes.

13             THE ACCUSED:  May we see 65 ter 1D25260.  I believe we have

14     signatures too.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  This is D717.

17             THE ACCUSED:  May we see next page, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC:

19        Q.   Excellency, do you see the number 1 in this protocol that

20     regulates our right to self-defence in the case of the withdrawal of the

21     interposition -- UNPROFOR from the interposition areas and in the case

22     that UNPROFOR is not able either to prevent or stop attack, the Serbs

23     reserves -- reserves the right to implement adequate measures of

24     self-defence?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 37695

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember, Excellency, that we met on

 2     19th of February and that I proposed opening of routes to Sarajevo with

 3     the joint check-points of VRS H -- BH Army and UNPROFOR?

 4        A.   Where is the reference, Dr. Karadzic?

 5        Q.   Not in this text, Excellency, but this is D716.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Was there no question about D717?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I think there was, and the answer was yes in line 5.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Ah, confirming that he saw the document.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE ACCUSED:  I believe it was not that Excellency Akashi have

11     seen it but that he participated in concluding this.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.

13             THE ACCUSED:  May we see for a moment D716.  May we see then

14     page 2, paragraph 3.

15             MR. KARADZIC:

16        Q.   Now, do you now remember, Excellency, number 3, what I proposed

17     and what I expressed?

18        A.   Mm-hmm, yes.

19        Q.   Did the other side accept this proposal of mixed check-points

20     with the participation of UNPROFOR, BSA, and BH Army?

21        A.   I don't believe they did.  And in this connection, one of the

22     major disagreements between the two sides, Bosnian Serb side and the

23     Bosnian government side, was the number of weapons collection points.

24     While Bosnian Serb side wanted as many collection points as possible,

25     Bosnian government side wanted fewer, much fewer, number of such points,

Page 37696

 1     so that UNPROFOR better protect these points or centres with more troops,

 2     but Bosnian Serb side wanted a dispersal of these points so that they

 3     might have easier access to these sites.  So we had to search for

 4     compromise between two sides and in the end I believe we settled on seven

 5     points.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  May we have last page, paragraph 7.

 7             Do you remember, Excellency, your conclusion and observation of

 8     the tendencies of the Bosnian side to -- to feed the incident-hungry

 9     press in Sarajevo, and was it an obstacle for our doings on the bringing

10     about peace?

11        A.   I don't think I can answer such rather general questions.  I'm

12     not -- I was not very pleased with the press which had a tendency to

13     capitalise on the differences between the two sides, and they tended to

14     exaggerate the nature of incidents so that they can sort of

15     sensationalise their nature.  But we live in a world in which the press

16     is always hungry for incidents and some unusual things.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Did you write something about these moments in your

18     book?

19        A.   I remember having referred to the nature of mass media.  This is

20     one of the problems of democracies in the world.

21        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  Have you learned, Excellency, that some

22     of the generals, at least two of them, MacKenzie and -- and Briquemont,

23     have noticed that the Bosnian side was abusing the public and sensitive

24     spots and institutions and hospitals and schools, and UN facilities to

25     fire against the Serb side from the vicinity of those spots in order to

Page 37697

 1     get retaliation and to blame the Serbs?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yep, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Facts not in evidence, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm not sure that's an objection at this Tribunal,

 6     but Dr. Karadzic is putting a proposition to the witness.  He can accept

 7     or reject.  I don't see why it requires that the facts be in evidence.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson.  Yes.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Do you remember the question, Mr. Ambassador?  Shall

12     I ask Mr. Karadzic to repeat his question?

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC:

15        Q.   I'm waiting for translations, so that's why ...

16             Excellencies, have you learned that some generals, at least two

17     of them, General Briquemont and General MacKenzie, witnessed the

18     government forces carrying out artillery attacks from the vicinity of

19     very sensitive public buildings and UN facilities?

20        A.   Yes.  I think I heard observations from General Briquemont

21     directly.  As to General MacKenzie he had already left the duty station.

22     Briquemont may have referred to what General MacKenzie had said, but I

23     heard similar remarks, similar to General Briquemont from a few other

24     military senior officers who are serving with UNPROFOR in Sarajevo.

25        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

Page 37698

 1             THE ACCUSED:  And either to call in the courtroom e-court or to

 2     admit, I recommend page 110 of the Excellency Akashi's book which on this

 3     pages it is what -- exactly what Excellency Akashi confirmed now.  Or can

 4     we see the number.  Can we see the number 110 of this 1D29269.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Are you, Dr. Karadzic, referring to the first

 6     paragraph of page 110?  Yes?

 7             MR. KARADZIC:

 8        Q.   Yes.  Yes.  Exactly.  What -- you have it on the -- on the

 9     screen.

10        A.   Yes.  I'm reading actually the paragraph from the booklet.

11     That's why I feel that wars are horrible and we should do everything to

12     avoid it and resolve it if possible.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED:  May we see just the bottom of this page and also

15     111.

16             MR. KARADZIC:

17        Q.   Excellency, this is the chapter of your understanding of the

18     ethnic conflict, and did you hear that over more than 600 years there

19     were grounds for the antagonisms of those ethnic groups as you said in

20     the middle of this paragraph?

21        A.   Yes.  I find it most unfortunate that some politicians do have

22     extraordinary memory.  They like to dwell on mistakes of all kinds from

23     other parties, and instead of looking to the future, they tend to look at

24     the past and let the past decide on their action for the future.  I have

25     coped with not only -- with this state of mind in the former Yugoslavia

Page 37699

 1     but elsewhere in the world.  I think the more thoughtful people have to

 2     exert their influence, their wisdom so that politicians do not continue

 3     to indulge in -- in the past acts by other parties.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  May we see page 111, the top.  Do you

 5     remember, Excellencies, that you have concluded that the involvement and

 6     helps from outside worsened this situation in Bosnia?

 7        A.   Could you repeat your question again, please?

 8        Q.   Do you remember that you have noticed that, for instance,

 9     Croatian and German governments by -- by premature recognition of

10     Croatia, German government, then in Bosnia, worsened the situation, and

11     particularly what you said the interval of the United States provided

12     military assistance to Bosnia and Croatia and so on?

13        A.   These are my commentaries, and I agree with the observations of

14     quite a number of people that these European governments should have

15     heeded the very wise advice offered by the Badinter Commission of the

16     European Union and should have made sure that their constitution should

17     have provided for the vital interests not only of the majority group but

18     minority groups.  I think I say in this booklet that democracy consists

19     of two pillars, majority decision and respect for minorities.  I think we

20     have to have those two pillars, and democracies cannot stand on one

21     pillar alone.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED:  I tender those two pages to be added or given

24     another number.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will add two e-court pages, i.e., e-court

Page 37700

 1     page 57, 58, which covers two subsection, i.e., fog of war and the way to

 2     ethnic conflicts.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  Was it 110 or 111?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  It covers those pages.

 5             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:

 7        Q.   Excellency, do you remember did we exchange letters when we were

 8     not able to meet, and do you remember that your letter of 27th -- 26th

 9     of -- of February?

10             THE ACCUSED:  May I call, please, 1D02534.

11             MR. KARADZIC:

12        Q.   Do you remember, Excellency, that I responded to your letter from

13     24th of February, and do you remember receiving this letter of mine?

14        A.   I do not recall specifically this letter.  We have exchange -- we

15     did exchange a lot of letters at different times.

16        Q.   May I ask you -- may I recommend to your attention third and

17     fourth line in first paragraph:

18              "We have stressed several times in our recent meetings with you

19     that the Serbian side intends to fully implement the terms of ...

20     agreement ..."

21             And then first line of second paragraph that:

22             "We, too, are anxious to ensure the return of normality within

23     Sarajevo."

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And, please, last paragraph.  You are welcome to Pale, and what

Page 37701

 1     we said, that we highly appreciated your personality and your efforts.

 2     Don't you remember that?

 3        A.   Thank you.  Yes, do I.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this letter, please.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3493, Your Honours.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:

 8        Q.   Excellency, do you remember an incident that occurred between

 9     Serb forces and the UNHCR convoy near Teslic which I investigated and

10     confirmed that was -- actually happened?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12             THE ACCUSED:  May we have in the e-court 65 ter 01263.

13             MR. KARADZIC:

14        Q.   Your report to the United Nations about your letter to me.

15             THE ACCUSED:  Can we have second page.

16             MR. KARADZIC:

17        Q.   Is that your letter that concerns this incident?

18        A.   Yes.

19             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm not objecting to the tendering of the

22     document, but it's not a report of the ambassadors to the United Nations.

23     It's, if we go back to the first page, a letter to the UNMOs in Pale

24     asking that this protest be delivered to Dr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED:  I apologise, yes, but also to the information of

Page 37702

 1     General Rose and UNPROFOR, Zagreb UNPROFOR, Sarajevo.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will receive it.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3494, Your Honours.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.  May way see now 65 ter 01265.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:

 6        Q.   And this is my letter to you in response to your letter of

 7     24th of March.  May we have second page, please.  Do you remember,

 8     Excellency, that I admitted that this incident appeared and assured you

 9     that that was not the manner that the VRS generally behaved?

10        A.   I think your assertion is reflected in this letter.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this letter, this document?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3495, Your Honours.

15             MR. KARADZIC:

16        Q.   I -- I believe, Excellency, that I have to skip the subject of

17     Gorazde, and I regret for that, because it was quite a specific

18     experience for both of us.  Do you remember the crisis around Gorazde?

19        A.   I do remember, and, in fact, I -- I have not a very good memory

20     of those incidents around Gorazde, and I remember particularly with deep

21     regret that some of what you said to me was not reflected on the ground

22     situation.  And I remember our discussions in Geneva.  We were staying in

23     the same hotel, Hotel Intercontinental, and you told me a number of

24     things your side was doing or had done, but upon checking, UNPROFOR on

25     the ground, what you told me was not the real picture on the ground, and

Page 37703

 1     I found disconcerting these discrepancies between what you said, what you

 2     told me, and what was actually taking place.

 3        Q.   Excellency, could you always achieve everything that you wanted?

 4        A.   Could you repeat it?

 5        Q.   As a civilian chief of the UN army there, could you achieve

 6     everything that you wanted?

 7        A.   I think at least I could count on UNPROFOR troops to observe the

 8     directives from their superiors.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED:  May I see -- may we have 65 ter 11049 -- 48.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  That's Exhibit D705, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED:  Oh, right.  Right.  I see it.  Yes.

13             MR. KARADZIC:

14        Q.   Just to relax situation a little bit, Excellency, you see in

15     paragraph 1 when the situation was very serious, Vice-President Koljevic

16     was not between quotations.  He was real vice-president, not so called

17     vice-president.

18             THE ACCUSED:  May we see paragraph 3 and 4.

19             MR. KARADZIC:

20        Q.   Do you remember, Excellency, it said in line 2, paragraph 3, that

21     although I gave you the assurances, there was a skirmish around Gorazde;

22     and paragraph 4 that I stated that situation in Gorazde was a result of

23     Muslim attack on BSA forces from the area and natural response -- Serb

24     response was to attack?  And do you remember me saying that it was common

25     that Muslim strategy was they attack, we defend ourselves, and then they

Page 37704

 1     cry?

 2        A.   I'm not sure whether I agree with your assertion.  I think it's a

 3     general statement which is not applicable in all concrete instances.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  But do you remember that they caused by their own

 5     attacks to Gorazde, to the Serb territory, they caused this skirmish and

 6     that you have seen the same pattern of attacking from other safe areas to

 7     the Serb territory and that you have noticed it and notified the

 8     United Nations about that?

 9        A.   Now, I think each instance has to be examined on its own merit,

10     and I think there are infringes on both sides.  So I would not make a

11     sweeping statement.

12        Q.   Thank you.  May we see paragraph 10.  Do you remember,

13     Excellency, that you urged me to allow ICRC to evacuate a great number of

14     Muslims from Prijedor?  And it had been notified in this paragraph 10.

15             It was April 1994, two years after the beginning of the war.

16     There were thousands of Muslims still in Prijedor, and not only Muslims

17     but Muslim armed groups that massacres six policemen from the town.  Do

18     you remember that I was opposing -- maybe have next page.  I opposed the

19     idea of evacuation, and then I accepted to have several trucks a day,

20     several.

21        A.   Yes, I recall that in the end we agreed on sort of a pragmatic,

22     step-by-step solution to that crisis.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And do you remember - this is paragraph 20 and 22 -

24     that I accepted your proposal for the resolution of Gorazde crisis about

25     exclusion zone and withdrawal of the Serb forces?

Page 37705

 1        A.   You talk about your agreement but the most important negotiation

 2     to resolve Gorazde crisis took place, if I recollect, in Belgrade in the

 3     presidential residence of Mr. Milosevic, in which the Bosnian Serb side

 4     was represented by you, by General Mladic, and a number of others.  UN

 5     side was represented by myself, by the force commander, and against a

 6     number of others.

 7             After some strenuous negotiation, I proposed that we have a small

 8     group consisting of President Milosevic, your Excellency, and

 9     General Mladic on your side, and the force commander and myself on the UN

10     side, and in the -- in the midst of our negotiation, I came to receive

11     information that NATO council reached -- had reached a very important

12     decision on -- on the use of airpower if necessary to resolve Gorazde

13     crisis, and you might remember rather strong remarks I made that you are

14     faced with a historical decision which was very vital for the history and

15     the welfare of the Serb people, and President Milosevic immediately

16     understood the serious of the situation and it was due to his dominant

17     leadership over the Bosnian Serb side that Bosnian Serb side decided to

18     accept the proposal which UN side made.  And it was after ten hours or

19     even longer decision that at night we came to agreement, and in the next

20     morning we were able to sign a written text of our agreement.  Then I

21     looked at my wristwatch, and I had only 20 minutes or so before the

22     dead-line which I was given by UN headquarters to conclude our

23     negotiations, but having had this agreement I felt I was able to stop the

24     implementation or implication of the NATO air strike which could have

25     been a real tragedy for the entire people.  But I was blamed by some

Page 37706

 1     people, including some people in a very senior position in NATO for

 2     allowing Serb people to get away from this crisis.  I did not because --

 3     share that viewpoint of these people.  But UN was placed in a difficult

 4     position for trying to resolve the crisis through diplomatic

 5     negotiations, but I'd like to note the fact that President Milosevic was

 6     very influential in these negotiations.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  Nevertheless, there was a NATO strike

 8     authorised by you which caused some standstill in our relations.  Do you

 9     remember?

10        A.   I do remember.  And, Excellency, I must recall that repeatedly I

11     told you -- I wrote to you about the difference between an air strike

12     which is a full scale use of airpower, and close-air support, which is a

13     more limited act of self-defence when UN personnel were faced with the

14     mortal danger from weapons.  And in those cases, invocation of close-air

15     support was permitted when the smoking gun, so to speak, can be observed

16     not only from the air but from the ground by the reconnaissance people on

17     the UNPROFOR side.  So it is unfortunate if you did not understand this

18     distinction which we tried to make on every opportunity possible, in

19     writing as well as verbally in our meetings as well as in our

20     telephone -- numerous telephone conversations.

21        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  When I said that we highly appreciated

22     your attitudes, it doesn't include that you have been for the Serbs or

23     softer to the Serbs.  On the contrary.  Assuming that we were stronger

24     side, you were more tough towards us than two of the other sides.

25        A.   Thank you for recognising my impartiality, and it is not always

Page 37707

 1     easy to maintain such a moral attitude, but I think it is professional

 2     pride for international civil servants like myself to adhere to the

 3     position of impartiality whenever occasion permits us to do.  But for

 4     parties in a conflict, it is very easy to blame UN for doing something or

 5     for not doing something.

 6             THE ACCUSED:  May we have 65 ter 01271.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:

 8        Q.   Excellency, your answers are really precious for me and the, I

 9     suppose, other participants, but if we intend to finish this week, I

10     would ask you whenever it is possible to give the shortest answers,

11     the -- possible.

12        A.   I will try my best.

13        Q.   Do you remember this report of yours to Annan, Gharekhan and the

14     others concerning the events of 15th and 16th April 1994?

15             [Microphone not activated]

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we just go up so the Ambassador can see the

17     signature on this document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Probably we can show the next page to the witness.

19             MR. KARADZIC:

20        Q.   Do you remember this chronology, Excellency?

21        A.   Not all of that.

22             THE ACCUSED:  May we have this 1827 next.

23             MR. KARADZIC:

24        Q.   Yeah, "Serbs advise that they are concerned with our helicopters

25     may be engaged overflying BH territory, and they will be --" the Serbs

Page 37708

 1     will be blamed.

 2        A.   Yes, I remember.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  May we have top -- bottom of this page.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:

 5        Q.   Do you remember us being on the communication, radio

 6     communication, with the terrain?  Your commander and my commander were

 7     over there, and two of us and Stoltenberg and Churkin were at Pale.  And

 8     do you remember that there was a big conclusion about who was where?  And

 9     it is the last paragraph here.  Do you remember that it was confusion

10     that military observers were unnotifying -- unnotified and unmarked on

11     the first line and they all of a sudden appeared to be surrounded by the

12     Serbs forces who did not have any idea that they are there?

13        A.   Yes, I remember that on the basis of our animated conversation

14     you ordered General Mladic to stop firing.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection to the admission of entire document?

18             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3496, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we show the last page of this document to the

22     witness.

23             Sir, do you confirm this page as well?

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   The question of president was I believe to you, whether you

Page 37709

 1     authorised this page, and it looks like your recommendation what should

 2     be included in the Secretary-General's statement.

 3        A.   Yes.  I recognise this paragraphs with couple of points we

 4     included in the statement to be made by the UN Secretary-General.

 5             THE ACCUSED:  May we have now 65 ter 01272.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:

 7        Q.   This is your communication to Annan concerning the Gorazde

 8     crisis.  May we see the middle of the page.  That is concerning meeting

 9     with me and Krajisnik, Koljevic, and Gvero.  And in paragraph 2 you

10     notified -- noticed that the -- responded positively on withdrawal of

11     heavy weapons, and there are points that were included, what we have

12     agreed on.  Do you remember that?

13             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow the question.  Could you repeat your

14     question?

15             THE ACCUSED:  Well, maybe I was confused.

16             MR. KARADZIC:

17        Q.   Excellency, may I draw your attention to the sixth line in

18     paragraph 2 that you -- 6, 4, and 5 -- line 4, 5, and 6, that you are

19     not -- that you written down that we responded positively about the

20     withdrawal of heavy weapon, and you number several issues that we have

21     agreed to.

22        A.   Yes.  I think this was what we were able to achieve after much

23     discussion, and as I said here, this was the absolute minimum, not

24     maximum.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see second page.  As you said, Excellency,

Page 37710

 1     when we have compromises, no maximums to any side.  Do you agree?

 2        A.   I think the -- it depends on the situation, concrete situation we

 3     faced at different times.

 4        Q.   Excellency, do you -- do you remember that the Bosnian Muslim

 5     leadership was disappointed and they expected and wanted more robust

 6     involvement of NATO?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  With respect, and I could take it up in

11     cross-examination if Your Honours wish, but I think that the Ambassador

12     should have an opportunity to look at the document as a whole, and we

13     haven't seen paragraph 3 -- or he hasn't seen paragraph 3 of this

14     document.

15             JUDGE KWON:  I think he remembers what the document contains, and

16     if necessary, you may take up that issue.  We'll receive it.  In any

17     event, the whole document will be an exhibit.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3497, Your Honours.

19             THE WITNESS:  I think, Mr. President, it's important for us to

20     look at paragraphs in the context of the whole text always.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I read it.  It continues on from the previous

24     page, the last line on page 1.

25             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 37711

 1             MR. KARADZIC:

 2        Q.   Did we meet, Excellency, on 22nd of April in Belgrade with

 3     Generals Mladic and Gvero and President Milosevic, discussing who was

 4     launching attacks and discussing the ability to monitor and accurately

 5     report who was attacking?

 6        A.   Could you repeat yourself, please.

 7        Q.   Do you remember -- do you remember our meeting on

 8     22nd of April, 1994, in Belgrade where I claim that the BH Army launching

 9     attacks from the safe areas and that I seeked and requested the UN to

10     proceed immediately to Gorazde to be able to accurately report who was

11     attacking?

12        A.   I think in our meeting on the 22nd of April, 1994, we discussed

13     many things.  That meeting started at 12.00 noon and went on until 11.30

14     that night.  So it was a marathon negotiation.  We discussed many, many

15     things centering, of course, around Gorazde crisis.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I observe that Ambassador seems to

17     be consulting some document when answering the question.  So for record,

18     could I ask you if you are relying on some handwritten notes or whatever?

19     Could you clarify, Ambassador?

20             THE WITNESS:  Mr. President, yes.  I was consulting a diary which

21     I was writing major events of different days.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  The Chamber sees no difficulty with it,

23     but please let us know when you need to take a look at your diary,

24     please.

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much for your kindness.

Page 37712

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.  May we -- may we see in the courtroom

 3     65 ter 18169.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:

 5        Q.   Do you remember this communication of yours to Annan on

 6     23rd of April?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED:  Could we see the next page, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC:

10        Q.   Excellency, do you see those three bullets, normalisation of

11     relations, solution to the crisis in Gorazde, and discussions on elements

12     for the agreement on an overall cessation of hostilities?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And may we see -- may I draw your attention to paragraph 3 where

15     I complained about criteria for safe areas which did not meet the

16     requirements of the international conventions.

17        A.   Yes.  I think that you made a number of important points at our

18     meeting on that day, and the question of safe areas was also one of the

19     priority concerns of UNPROFOR.  And in the -- in many of the reports to

20     the Security Council by the Secretary-General, reference was made to

21     these problems, most of which were equally applicable to all six safe

22     areas.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And do you see, "As a result...," the sentence:

24             "As a result, the BSA would not implement any cease-fire

25     agreement in the enclave without the prior presence of the UNPROFOR to

Page 37713

 1     observe and report on the violations by either side"?

 2             Do you remember that we wished the presence of UNPROFOR in hot

 3     spots?

 4        A.   Yes.  I'm not sure whether I can give an unqualified yes to your

 5     question, but, yes, in several cases you are, of course, troubled by the

 6     alleged violations of safe areas by the Bosnian Serb side.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

 8             THE ACCUSED:  Can we see last page.

 9             MR. KARADZIC:

10        Q.   Was it -- was that agreement that you concluded with the Serb

11     civilian and military authorities concerning this crisis?

12        A.   Yes.  It was after much difficulty that we were able to hammer

13     out this agreement.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3498, Your Honours.

18             THE WITNESS:  If I may make a short comment.  I think after the

19     Sarajevo crisis of February 1994, this Gorazde crisis was another example

20     of resolving a serious crisis through our patient negotiations but under

21     the threat of NATO air strike but without having actual air strike.

22     Prior to that we were able to use diplomatic negotiations, however

23     difficult they were, to achieve our final objective of peace.  But to my

24     profound regret it was not a lasting peace but a temporary peace.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 37714

 1             MR. KARADZIC:

 2        Q.   Excellency, when you mentioned the threats, was the other side

 3     also under the threats of the NATO attacks?

 4        A.   It was our consistent position that if there are violations,

 5     infractions by either side, UN should take a decision for the use of

 6     airpower on an even, balanced, basis.  The -- some of the

 7     Security Council resolutions have clauses talking about applying airpower

 8     equally to the parties, not a party, not one single party.  But this

 9     position of UNPROFOR was not always shared by NATO or by some

10     governments, and this -- this is a matter of disagreements within the UN

11     or within the international community which may have weakened the final

12     position taken by the UN.

13        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.  Do you remember that you had protested to

14     Silajdzic about the presence of BH heavy weapons in the exclusion zone?

15        A.   Which exclusion zone are you talking about?

16        Q.   Now we are -- about Sarajevo.

17        A.   I think it was not just one time but a number of times we did

18     lodge protests to the violations by the Bosnian government as well as by

19     your side.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED:  May we see, please, 65 ter 01276.

22             [Microphone not activated]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   Do you remember your reports on meeting on 3rd of May, 1994,.

Page 37715

 1             Meetings with Prime Minister Silajdzic and me?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Excellency, with all respect, we can see, can we, from the

 4     paragraph 2 that it was for you much easier to get something for me --

 5     from me to agree than from Silajdzic?

 6        A.   You were understand me if I refrain from giving you a straight

 7     answer.  It's not an easy job for -- to maintain a position of

 8     willingness to negotiate with all parties in conflict.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I appreciate that.

10             THE ACCUSED:  Can we have the next page.

11             MR. KARADZIC:

12        Q.   Paragraph 3 is concerning your concern over the discovery of BH

13     heavy weapons and also of presence of seven BH Army weapons in

14     contravention -- contravention to the Sarajevo agreement.

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And may we -- may we -- yeah.  You do remember that, yeah?

17        A.   Yes.

18             THE ACCUSED:  And may we have page 5.

19             MR. KARADZIC:

20        Q.   At the end of paragraph 11 do you remember that 500 Bosnian

21     pilgrims departed to Mecca according to your agreement with me?

22        A.   I do not have a specific recollection.

23             THE ACCUSED:  Okay.  Can we have page 7.

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   And at the end of paragraph 2 and -- it's concerning total

Page 37716

 1     exclusion zone, and you'll note that the UNPROFOR had under the terms of

 2     Security Council Resolution 913, requested the BH to put its heavy

 3     weapons under UN control.

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And did they, Excellency?

 6        A.   I do not recall in this instance what BiH did.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3499, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED:  It's time.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  If it is convenient we'll take a break for

13     45 minutes and resume at 17 past 1.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 1.18 p.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

17             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, your Excellency.  I'll be ready in a minute.

18             MR. KARADZIC:

19        Q.   Excellency, there are too many precious documents of your

20     provenance and also all of your answers are very precious, but I wanted

21     us to finish examination-in-chief today so that tomorrow you would be

22     accomplishing your evidence, so I will try to be less confused in order

23     to enable you to give very short answers.

24             Do you remember our meeting of 5th of October, 1994, and after

25     which you gave a statement and we have been talking a lot of topics?  If

Page 37717

 1     it would jog your memory, I would like to see 65 ter 09670.

 2             This is your report from this meeting of 5th of October, and do

 3     you remember that we have been talking about peace plans and that I

 4     confirmed to you that we do not intend to divide city of Sarajevo but to

 5     form twin city?

 6             THE ACCUSED:  Could we have page 9 of 10.  And at bottom of -- of

 7     page where I complain that United States does not want the end of the war

 8     yet.  And I continued to say that there were fair solutions to be offered

 9     we would find for it in a -- in our parliament.

10             MR. KARADZIC:

11        Q.   What was your insight, your experience with the -- with internal

12     opposition that you mentioned in several documents, internal position to

13     me that I had to convince people?

14        A.   Dr. Karadzic, I think existence of divergence of opinions is to

15     be found almost everywhere, but in the case of UNPROFOR, the difference

16     of opinions was not based on the difference of their basic interest but

17     honest difference with regard to the assessment of the situation and

18     policies to be applied to cope with the situation.  So I'm not sure

19     whether this is the kind of situation in which you find yourself on the

20     Bosnian Serb side.  And within UNPROFOR there was an honest exchange of

21     views, and we usually resolved it through our internal discussions, but

22     with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and more

23     particularly with regard to how to cope with your side, the --

24     General Smith who succeeded General Rose was of the opinion that there

25     should be more straight confrontation with your side, and so we tried to

Page 37718

 1     have continuous dialogue between our colleagues in Sarajevo and those of

 2     us in Zagreb, and that continued, and even the media started to speculate

 3     about these differences, but I find that they tended to exaggerate our

 4     differences internally.  That's it.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that I mentioned to have twin city,

 6     to make two cities of Sarajevo and one to be Serbian to be -- to comprise

 7     the Serb suburbs?

 8        A.   Yes, I remember that.

 9        Q.   Do you remember, Excellency, that we have been ready to give up

10     territory for the peace that we did not claim to keep all territory that

11     we controlled?

12        A.   Yes, I do remember.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3500, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED:  May we have 09671.

18             MR. KARADZIC:

19        Q.   Do you remember the crisis around -- around Igman, Mount Igman,

20     when we withdrew in 1993 and have given this territory to the UNPROFOR

21     and Muslims abused this area?

22        A.   Yes.  UNPROFOR was in frequent negotiation with -- with the

23     Bosnian government side with regard to Mount Igman.

24        Q.   Do you remember that they abused this area handed over to the

25     United Nations, as a matter of fact, demilitarised and killed about

Page 37719

 1     20 Serbs, mainly medical workers, and several females, mutilating them

 2     and so on?  Do you remember this horrible event?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  Can we have 12 out of 19 page, please.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Sorry to interrupt, Dr. Karadzic.  My notation may

 6     be mistaken, but I thought this might be P2439, this document.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  The e-court says so.

 8             THE ACCUSED:  Then I apologise.  We don't have to spend a lot of

 9     time on that.

10             MR. KARADZIC:

11        Q.   But do you remember what was -- what is in this paragraph at the

12     top about how those people had been executed?  Lower half of the first

13     paragraph.

14             Excellency, it's not too important to study the whole document,

15     just about this -- since this document is admitted, and it is of your

16     provenance, do you remember how it was horrible and how it influenced

17     Serbian side and aggravated my position with my army and with my people?

18        A.   Yes, I understand it.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember the -- the Bihac crisis in November

20     prior to President Carter's cease-fire?  Do you remember that we

21     exchanged some letters concerning Bihac?

22        A.   Yes, I do.

23             THE ACCUSED:  May we have in the courtroom 65 ter 11608.

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   Second page is the original, but it's not legible, or it was

Page 37720

 1     rewritten on the first page.  Do you remember my letter to you at that

 2     time?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED:  May we have this letter admitted.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  So -- excuse me.  So what you said is the original

 7     letter which is on the second page is illegible, so you quoted the

 8     content of that on the first page.

 9             THE ACCUSED:  I think somebody had rewritten.  Can we see second

10     page.  I think it is the same content, and somebody had written it,

11     retyped it, so to be legible.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

13             Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D3501.

16             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you may we have now 1D02477.

17             MR. KARADZIC:

18        Q.   It was from Pale to you to BH command.

19             THE ACCUSED:  And please, could we have second page.

20             MR. KARADZIC:

21        Q.   And do you remember that I notified you that from -- from inside

22     the safe area of Bihac they have been attacking us, meanwhile claiming

23     that we are -- have been inside for 4 kilometres?  And they have launched

24     big offensive from Bihac taking almost 300 square kilometres of the Serb

25     territory and when we made a counter-offensive then they have been

Page 37721

 1     threatening many threats by NATO, by ...

 2        A.   The Bihac situation was extremely complex and confusing, and the

 3     existence of Abdic and his troops made things even more confusing, and we

 4     were faced with constant complaints by the Bosnian government side about

 5     incursions from Bosnian Serbs.  So we were trying to follow events

 6     closely, but our ability to observe closely was not of the maximum

 7     efficiency.  But, of course, we had a commitment to stabilise the

 8     situation and not to aggravate it.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED:  May we have the bottom of this page.

11             MR. KARADZIC:

12        Q.   And do you notice that I regrettably informed you that if we are

13     attacked, we have to treat forces that attacked us as our enemies?

14        A.   Yes.

15             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this letter.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3502, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED:  Could we have now 1D25264.

19             MR. KARADZIC:

20        Q.   Do you remember this draft of agreement, peace agreement, for

21     the -- the new year, which was in the presence of President Carter?

22        A.   No, I don't.

23             THE ACCUSED:  Could we have next page, please.  There is a small

24     handwriting, "We agree that we shall while the cessation of hostilities

25     in effect negotiate," and so on.  Can we have the last page.

Page 37722

 1             MR. KARADZIC:

 2        Q.   Do you remember now that was the first signature of this

 3     agreement by me, Mladic, and President Carter?

 4        A.   I don't remember this letter.

 5        Q.   But you do remember, do you, the event, the conclusion of this

 6     agreement of which President Carter told you that it was the happiest

 7     Christmas for him?

 8        A.   What he said to me on the 24th of December on the phone from me

 9     was that he was very happy to hear the news of agreement between UNPROFOR

10     on the one hand and three parties in the Bosnian conflict that they will

11     abide by the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement for four months starting

12     from January 1st, and this was what UNPROFOR had been working for months,

13     and I think President Carter gave you at least his -- his blessing to

14     being a party to that agreement.  This is not any kind of a peace

15     agreement, but it's a four-month Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.  But

16     I worked very hard for that, and even it was only for four months, it was

17     better than continuous fighting and high tensions between the parties.

18             But you remember at the end of that period in April 1995 I tried

19     my best to resuscitate that spirit of compromise and cessation of

20     hostilities by replacing this agreement with another four-month

21     agreement, and your side as well as Croatia -- Croatian Serb side --

22     Croatian side agreed to some kind of continuation, but Bosnian government

23     was against continuation.  So we could not have full agreement.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document?

Page 37723

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3503, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I should have asked you, Ms. Edgerton, whether you

 4     have any objections.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC:

 9        Q.   Do you remember that there was an additional agreement that was

10     sent -- drafted and sent by President Carter himself?  And if it would

11     jog your memory, I would like to call 1D25265.

12             Could we -- could we have -- it was -- it was sent to you from

13     Mr. Andreev.

14             THE ACCUSED:  Could we have next page, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC:

16        Q.   And it was signed by me and by -- by President Carter and me,

17     since in this phase it was a separate paper, signatures, on the both

18     sides.  Do you remember receiving this letter from Andreev?

19        A.   I don't -- I do not remember this having been sent by my

20     colleague Andreev.

21             THE ACCUSED:  May we have fifth page of sixth.  This is in same

22     wording, comprehensive peace agreement that President Carter signed with

23     the Muslim side.  Can we have last page.

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   Were you aware that it was signed that way?  President Carter

Page 37724

 1     signed it with both sides separately?

 2        A.   I was not aware of this.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  May we -- may I tender this document?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton?

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't think there's been sufficient comment in

 6     regard to this document.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, apart from the comment, it does

 8     have all the indicia of reliability, and it was sent to Mr. Akashi, so I

 9     think there's a basis to admit it.

10             JUDGE KWON:  While Ambassador Akashi does not remember this

11     letter he received, he would not challenge the authenticity of this

12     document.

13             THE WITNESS:  I have no basis to agree with or to challenge the

14     letter.  I -- my office received only a copy of it.  I was -- I was aware

15     of the fact that the Bosnian government did not appreciate the visit by

16     President Carter.  They were irritated by his visit.

17             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will receive it.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3504, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC:

21        Q.   Do you remember sending me letter in the occasion of these

22     agreement expressing your appreciation for the efforts to conclude this

23     agreement?

24        A.   Dr. Karadzic, you're referring to the

25     Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, yes.  Thank you.

Page 37725

 1        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  May we have 65 ter 06509.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  That's fine.  Just understanding the agreement

 4     we've just seen is not the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.  The

 5     Cessation of Hostilities Agreement is P1648.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  Sorry.  The letter is 1D26684.  May we have next

 8     page, please.  We don't need the memorandum up there.  Can we see the

 9     whole.  And next page.  And can we have next page and last page, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC:

11        Q.   Do you remember that you greeted, congratulated, and asked to

12     commence these cessation of hostilities comments immediately?

13        A.   Yes, I do, and I remember expressing the hope that the step has

14     been taken towards giving a new momentum to more permanent final peace

15     and that this four-month agreement will be a useful way of consolidating

16     the ground for that purpose.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED:  May we have this document admitted?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3505, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED:  And finally all signatures on the same paper, could

22     we have 06525.  It is P1648 we learned.

23             MR. KARADZIC:

24        Q.   Do you remember this final form of this agreement on complete

25     cessation of hostilities?  And if we may have last page, you will see who

Page 37726

 1     of us signed it.  Do you remember, Excellency, that you have signed it,

 2     too, and your commander signed it too?

 3        A.   Yes, commander for Bosnia and Herzegovina, not the force

 4     commander, yeah.

 5        Q.   And do you remember that it was altogether the most successful

 6     agreement on cessation of hostilities?

 7        A.   It was a landmark of some kind.  It was a great pity that it was

 8     not followed up with a more permanent step.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED:  This is already P, so ...

11             May we have 1D03123.

12             MR. KARADZIC:

13        Q.   Do you remember how often this agreement had been violated and

14     who led, who was relaying in these -- of these violations?

15        A.   In my memory, I think violations were committed by all sides,

16     particularly by your side as well as by the Bosnian government side.

17     Croats were sort of more or less on the sidelines on many occasions.

18        Q.   I got what I asked for.  I shouldn't asked a diplomat to say it,

19     to say that.

20             Do you see that General Mladic started to complain, to protest to

21     the UNPROFOR about violations and -- violations of cease-fire agreement

22     and relevant Security Council resolutions?

23        A.   Yes.  I think this matter was raised by General Mladic and by

24     yourself also.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 37727

 1             THE ACCUSED:  May we have this document admitted.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3506, Your Honours.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:

 5        Q.   Excellency, do you remember what happened in February with --

 6     with the Tuzla airport?  Was there any crisis?  Was there any -- were

 7     there any events that we complained about abuse of this airport?

 8        A.   February what year?

 9        Q.   1995.

10        A.   1995.  I do not specifically recall an incident in February 1995

11     with regard to Tuzla airport.  The incidents at or around Tuzla were very

12     frequent.

13             THE ACCUSED:  May we have in the courtroom, electronic courtroom,

14     1D03119.

15             MR. KARADZIC:

16        Q.   This is a telegram of General de Lapresle to Annan concerning

17     unidentified fixed-wing aircraft flights in Tuzla.  And it says in

18     paragraph 2 that ... [Microphone not activated]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

20             THE ACCUSED:  Sorry.

21             MR. KARADZIC:

22        Q.   And it says in first paragraph -- second paragraph that Norwegian

23     air pilot on the ground observed transport type aircraft of C-130, and

24     later, five minutes later, personnel was observed two jet aircrafts

25     circling in the area.

Page 37728

 1             THE ACCUSED:  Can we have next page.  Paragraph 4, please.

 2             MR. KARADZIC:

 3        Q.   Could you see that NordBat APCs were dispatched there and have

 4     been -- while returning to the base, APCs were fired and subsequent

 5     surrounded by BH soldiers.

 6             Have you been informed about these observations of the events,

 7     unannounced and unauthorised events, on Tuzla airport?

 8        A.   Yes, I remember that.

 9        Q.   And in the comment it said it appears that two clandestine

10     resupplies has taken place.  The equipment delivered is assessed to be

11     high value technology and so on.

12             Do you remember, Excellency, that Muslim government opposed our

13     own request to have our own observing officer at the airport Tuzla?

14        A.   The question of monitoring the use of the Tuzla airport was the

15     subject of our lengthy complex negotiations from the beginning of my

16     mission.  And I remember starting in January 1994 I negotiated with

17     Prime Minister Silajdzic, with President Izetbegovic, as well as

18     Vice-President Ganic, and I remember at one time I was embarrassed by the

19     fact that what was accepted by Prime Minister Silajdzic was not endorsed

20     but was contradicted by Vice-President Ganic.  So I think Bosnian

21     government was no exception to internal difference of views.  But I think

22     on your side also, Dr. Karadzic, the Russians proposed something

23     different from your position would cut away that Tuzla airport was to be

24     monitored.  And while Russians supported your position in general, in

25     this particular instance we felt that it was probably a lack of closer

Page 37729

 1     co-operation between Pale and Moscow.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  I tender this document.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3507, Your Honours.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:

 7        Q.   Excellency, could you tell us what was the assumption and

 8     knowledge of the United Nations?  Who delivered this equipment and

 9     armament and to what side in Bosnia?

10        A.   I think there was much speculation as to these unreported,

11     unverified flights to Tuzla, but it remains in the realm of speculation.

12     There was no way for us to ascertain where they came from and what they

13     were doing.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED:  May we have now 1D03122.  This is from

16     25th of February, protest from General Mladic, and may we have next page.

17     And there's sort of draft of the response of General Smith, but can we

18     have next page.  Lower part of the page.

19             MR. KARADZIC:

20        Q.   Had you been informed about those objections and protests by

21     General Mladic to General de Lapresle concerning Tuzla, the abuse of

22     Tuzla airport?

23        A.   I was generally aware of these complaints, but I did not have

24     specific recollection of this instance of 23 February 1995.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 37730

 1             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3508, Your Honours.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:

 5        Q.   Do you remember, Excellency, whether our own meetings in March

 6     and the rest of the 1995 were frequent?

 7        A.   Were frequent did you say?

 8        Q.   Yeah.  I mean 1995, March 1995, were they frequent?

 9        A.   I think our meetings were much more frequent in 1994 rather than

10     1995.

11             THE ACCUSED:  May I call 65 ter 09749.

12             MR. KARADZIC:

13        Q.   Do you remember this report of yours concerning your meeting with

14     Bosnian government officials, and do you remember that it -- this meeting

15     of yours have treated a killing of two girls, 9 and 11, by sniper fire

16     into Grbavica, Serb part of Sarajevo?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And do you remember that it caused us crisis about routes and

19     about communications in and around Sarajevo?

20        A.   I do not recall that, but this memorandum refers to an incident

21     of my aircraft being machine-gunned as it was taxiing and landing at the

22     Sarajevo airport, and General -- General Smith was convinced and was sure

23     that it was the Bosnian Serb side who shot at our aircraft, and he lodge

24     a strong protest to that, but I chose not to raise the matter with you,

25     Excellency, because I was negotiating on political matters.

Page 37731

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And this last sentence of -- two last sentence of the

 2     first paragraph, it says:

 3              "The purpose of the meetings was to encourage the Bosnian

 4     government to recommit themselves to the

 5     Cessation of Hostilities Agreement ..."

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   How come -- does it mean they reneged from this agreement?

 8        A.   I think the fact of the matter was that the Bosnian government

 9     was not enthusiastic in the continuation of that

10     Cessation of Hostilities Agreement beyond -- beyond that date of

11     termination of that agreement at the end of April 1995.  As you know

12     well, the military balance of power was shifting in favour of the Bosnian

13     government, so there was a lack of -- lack of enthusiasm for continuing

14     that status quo ante.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document, please?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3509, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED:  May I have 65 ter 01325.

20             MR. KARADZIC:

21        Q.   Of the same day reporting of your meeting with the Bosnian Serb

22     officials --

23             THE REGISTRAR:  That's Exhibit P2479, Your Honours.

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   [Microphone not activated] ... and I apologise.  Do you see that

Page 37732

 1     we have complained bitterly about alleged noncompliance of the Bosnian

 2     government about all aspects -- violating all aspects of the

 3     Cessation of Hostilities Agreement?

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we scroll down a bit on document.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:

 6        Q.   And you said that Serbs have resistance to participate in any

 7     further meetings of the Central Joint Commission, and as it became

 8     evident that the difficulties with the implementation of the COHA are now

 9     of an essential political nature.

10        A.   Yes.  I think what it said was very clear.  It was not a

11     technical military question, but it's a question of political decision.

12        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

13             THE ACCUSED:  May we have 1D03440.

14             MR. KARADZIC:

15        Q.   Do you remember, Excellency, that you succeeded again with me on

16     the issue of exchange of prisoners of war?  And here we have your letter

17     to me in that -- in that sectors.

18             THE ACCUSED:  May we have next page, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC:

20        Q.   Do you remember writing this --

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   -- letter to me?

23        A.   Yes, I do.

24        Q.   Do you remember what was the attitude of the Muslim side

25     concerning exchange of prisoners, and do you remember whether we

Page 37733

 1     succeeded to exchange people from Silos in Tarcin or to exchange all for

 2     all as we proposed many times?

 3        A.   I think the question of the exchange of prisoners of war and

 4     asking for support and assistance from ICRC was not a one-sided issue.  I

 5     think ICRC had a very difficult job of interceding between the two

 6     contending sides.  So I would not say that the matter of prisoner

 7     exchange was not a one-sided issue with a victor and a defeated.  It

 8     varied from case to case.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this letter, this document?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3510, Your Honours.

13             MR. KARADZIC:

14        Q.   Excellency, do you remember that we met on 20th of April, 1995,

15     on the occasion of my complaints about Bosnian Muslims' non-compliance

16     with the agreement and that I asked your Excellency and UNPROFOR to make

17     them comply otherwise we would have to start to retaliate:  Sniping and

18     other assaults, and which would mean renewal of the war in Sarajevo?

19        A.   One of the items in our bilateral negotiations was not tense --

20     I think there was a positive spirit there, but I thought that your

21     overall position was quite non-compromising, and I remember having been

22     troubled by your posture of defiance of the international community, and

23     we were also of the impression that there was some kind of tension

24     between your military and the civilian side.  We noted that

25     General Mladic was absent at that meeting.

Page 37734

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  May we have 65 ter 01332.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:

 4        Q.   Is this your telegram concerning this -- this meeting, telegram

 5     to Annan, Stoltenberg, and others, and do you remember that we -- I

 6     complained a lot of violations and -- and developments that were very

 7     unsatisfactory for the Serb side?

 8             Let me see the whole first page and the next page.

 9             And do you see that we informed you that we are pressed by

10     population and parliament to end non-beneficial relationship with

11     UNPROFOR:

12             "... UNPROFOR failed to pressurise the Bosnian side to respect

13     agreements; sniping in Sarajevo could lead to renewal of war and was a

14     form of ethnic cleansing of Serbs; Bosnian Serbs would force -- be forced

15     to retaliate appropriately to Bosnian actions in Sarajevo, and this would

16     mean a total war."

17        A.   Yes, this is an annunciation of your own position, yeah.  I hope

18     we faithfully summarised your position and your arguments.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED:  May we have the next page.

21             MR. KARADZIC:

22        Q.   And I draw your attention to the first line on the top of the

23     page about our complaints that the airport was abused, being used as a

24     taxi and ferry service for our enemies and the whole page is about my

25     complaints, and number 6, Karadzic, "In response to Karadzic's skepticism

Page 37735

 1     of the role of UNPROFOR," you said -- what did you say about the task

 2     that UNPROFOR did?

 3             And may we have next page.  Paragraph 7.  I did not lack faith in

 4     your good intentions, but we held that we are not treated well and that

 5     sanctions committees not just towards us and so on.  Do you remember

 6     that?

 7        A.   Yes, I do.

 8             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender this document?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3511, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED:  One moment, please.  I ask you for indulgence.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm encouraging Dr. Karadzic to skip through so

13     that we could finish with Mr. Akashi.  So we'll just take one minute and

14     try to shorten this.

15             THE ACCUSED:  I do hope that the genuine UN documents,

16     Excellencies, would be admitable through the bar table, so I would skip

17     several subjects and documents.

18             MR. KARADZIC:

19        Q.   Excellency, have you been of -- did you have an opinion about

20     possible advantages that Bosnian government have taken from six safe

21     areas, including Srebrenica, in terms of resting troops, re-equip,

22     retrain?

23        A.   Yes, indeed, and I already referred to some reports the UN

24     Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council discussing the state

25     of affairs with regard to six safe areas and for several defects or

Page 37736

 1     short-comings of the concept of the safe areas as well as the

 2     implementation.  The Secretary-General had serious reservations about the

 3     soundness of the concept of safe areas, and among other matters, he

 4     raised the question of shortage of the necessary number of UN troops.

 5             He had originally asked from over 30.000 troops, of which only

 6     about 7.000 were approved by the UN General Assembly.  And secondary, as

 7     Dr. Karadzic referred to, the one side in the conflict used the safe

 8     areas for rest, recuperation, and other purposes emanating from these

 9     safe areas.  And thirdly, the disarmament provisions were not

10     implemented, at different times and to different degrees.  And lastly,

11     there was no demarcation of these safe areas in most instances, and so

12     Secretary-General was of the opinion that there was a basic defect to the

13     concept as well as to the actual practice, but UN Security Council in its

14     wisdom did not heed very much to these opinions of the Secretary-General.

15     You might say that "faute de mieux" the international community as a

16     whole felt that therefore the safety and security of innocent civilians

17     in those safe areas it had to go along with it.  But, you know, we were

18     at the service of the international community and more specifically under

19     the overall command of the UN Security Council.  So the

20     Secretary-General, despite his strong views about safe areas, he accepted

21     the reality, political reality.

22        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

23             THE ACCUSED:  May we have in the e-court 1D07340, and then 6 and

24     7 page, first 6 and then 7.

25             MR. KARADZIC:

Page 37737

 1        Q.   That is part of your testimony in the -- on the board of the

 2     French parliament, and you exactly said what you said.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  May we have the bottom of page.  And may we have

 4     next page, please.  Is that 6 and 7?  Yes.  First paragraph.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:

 6        Q.   "... the Bosnian government took advantage of the six designated

 7     safe areas."

 8             So you were aware of that and you testified in the French

 9     parliament about that, and just exactly what you said the

10     Secretary-General wanted to have it different.

11        A.   Thank you.  And may I receive a copy of my own statement at the

12     French parliament committee.  I don't have a copy myself, but I don't

13     think I need to change anything contained in that statement of mine.

14     France and the United Kingdom, among other countries, were very loyal and

15     very faithful to the mission of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia.

16        Q.   Thank you, Excellency.

17             THE ACCUSED:  May I tender those two pages.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  That's chapter 3 in the translated version.  So no

20     objection.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Is this different from what we saw earlier in the

22     morning?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  That was chapter 2.

24             JUDGE KWON:  But in different 65 ter number.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  [Microphone not activated]

Page 37738

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Ms. Edgerton repeat it, because her

 2     microphone was off.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, I'm sorry.  I said that was chapter 2.  I'm

 4     sorry, I'm not familiar -- I didn't appreciate the difference in the

 5     65 ter number.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  I think it's the same, Mr. President.  7340.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  What's the exhibit number we --

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3488, Your Honours, and page 6 was

 9     already admitted.

10             JUDGE KWON:  But what I noted down was what we saw was 1D10513,

11     the title of which was "Mr. Akashi answers to French parliament," and

12     this is a bit different.

13                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

14             JUDGE KWON:  I was told that 1D10513 and 1D7340 are the same

15     documents.  Yes, we'll add these pages to Exhibit -- Defence exhibit.

16     What was the number again?  D3488.  And the -- is the Defence going to

17     deal with Mr. Ambassador's request to see the whole document?

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We can print out the entire

19     document for him and give it to him.  With your permission we can give it

20     to him before he leaves today if we like.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any difficulty with that, Ms. Edgerton?

22             MS. EDGERTON:  No.  I have a copy here immediately if it assists.

23             THE WITNESS:  If possible in English as well as in the original

24     French version.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  We have both.

Page 37739

 1             THE WITNESS:  It was given in impeccable French.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I have no doubt about it.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, Dr. Karadzic is about to get into

 5     the last area of his examination involving the events in Srebrenica, and

 6     I expect that this will take maybe about another 30 minutes, and I was

 7     wondering whether or not we should excuse General Galic for tomorrow

 8     given the fact that we've used up the whole day today with our direct

 9     examinational.

10             JUDGE KWON:  How long do you expect your cross-examination to

11     last, Ms. Edgerton?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Up to this point, Your Honours, I was thinking an

13     hour and a half or two hours, without having necessarily crafted

14     questions.  I think two hours is probably reasonable.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Together with remainder of Mr. Karadzic's in chief

16     examination, that will take up about two sessions.  And Mr. Karadzic no

17     doubt will need some time for his re-examination.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  I'm sure he will.  And I know it may give us

19     a little bit of extra time, but since it is right before the break and

20     given that Mr. Piletta-Zanin is able to return to Geneva today if we

21     won't make him wait around, perhaps on balance it might be good.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber finds the suggestion to be fair enough.

24     I thank you for that.  So we'll excuse General Galic for tomorrow.

25             Given the time, shall we adjourn for today and continue tomorrow.

Page 37740

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ambassador Akashi.  We'll adjourn for

 3     today and continue tomorrow.  Probably you will be well aware of this,

 4     but could I advise you not to discuss about your testimony with anybody

 5     else.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  The hearing is adjourned.

10                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.43 p.m.,

11                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day

12                           of April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.